Report on

Activities and Programs for

Countering Proliferation and 

NBC Terrorism

Executive 

Summary

May 2004

Volume I
Report on Activities and Programs 

for Countering Proliferation and 

NBC Terrorism 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 VOLUME I 

May 2004 

Counterproliferation 

Program 

Review 

Committee 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

ii 

CONTENTS 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................1 

Establishment of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee..................................1 

Composition of the CPRC and Standing Committee.................................................................1 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction ....................................................1 

Interagency Efforts to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction .................................................2 

CPRC Areas for Capability Enhancement.................................................................................3 

CPRC Assessment of Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Requirements...........................4 

CPRC Detailed ACE Assessments ...........................................................................................6 

DoD Combating WMD Policy and Planning Activities............................................................6 

Key DOE Activities ................................................................................................................11 

Key IC Activities .....................................................................................................................13 

Funding of CPRC-Monitored Programs ..................................................................................14 

CPRC Findings and Recommendations...................................................................................14 

Conclusion and Outlook ..........................................................................................................17 

Abbreviations and Acronyms ...........................................................................................................19 

FIGURES 

1 DoD’s Multitiered Approach to Combating WMD.......................................................7 

TABLES 

1 2004 ACEs and ACE Priorities of CPRC-Represented Organizations .........................3 

2 Assessed Performance Area Challenges........................................................................5 

3 Highlights of DoD Response to the Combating WMD ACEs.......................................9 

4 Highlights of DOE Response to Combating WMD ACEs ..........................................12 

5 Highlights of IC Response to Combating WMD ACEs ..............................................13
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAM 

REVIEW COMMITTEE 

In the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (as amended), Congress directed that the 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) be established to review activities and 

programs related to countering proliferation, including paramilitary and terrorist nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threats. The CPRC is chaired by the Secretary of Defense; the other 

members are the Secretary of Energy (as vice chair), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Together they represent the four organizations that make up the committee. 

The CPRC is chartered to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental (specifically, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

intelligence community (IC)) activities and programs to address shortfalls in capabilities to 

counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)––nuclear, biological, and chemical––and their means of delivery. The findings and recommendations of the CPRC’s annual review for 2004 are presented in this, its eleventh annual report to Congress. 

COMPOSITION OF THE CPRC AND STANDING COMMITTEE 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to perform the duties of CPRC Chairman. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 

Chemical, Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) has been designated by Congress as 

CPRC Executive Secretary. The Standing Committee is composed of the ATSD(NCB) (as chair); 

the Director, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, DOE (as vice chair); the Special 

Assistant to the DCI for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC); 

the Deputy Director for the War on Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5); and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION 

The 2002 National Strategy To Combat WMD has three pillars: Strengthened Nonproliferation To Combat WMD Proliferation; Counterproliferation To Combat WMD Use; and Consequence Management To Respond to WMD Use. These pillars are seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. Serving to integrate the pillars are four cross-cutting enabling functions: intelligence collection and analysis on WMD, their delivery systems, and related technologies; research 

and development to improve the U.S. ability to respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile states and terrorists. 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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The first pillar of the National Strategy, strengthened nonproliferation, entails: 

Active nonproliferation diplomacy 

Multilateral regimes (arms control and other agreements) 

Nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation 

Controls on nuclear materials 

U.S. export controls 

Nonproliferation sanctions (i.e., proliferation prevention). 

The second pillar, counterproliferation, entails: 

Interdiction (including counterforce) 

Deterrence 

Defense and mitigation (i.e., active defense, passive defense, and mitigation of crises). 

And the third pillar, consequence management, entails actions to respond to the 

consequences of WMD use on U.S. territory, or U.S. forces abroad, as well as to assist friends and 

allies. These include: 

Minimize the consequences of WMD use against our population 

Respond to effects of WMD use against our forces 

Respond to effects of WMD use against our friends and allies. 

INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION 

Integration of security efforts to combat WMD/M proliferation and WMD terrorist threats 

is the responsibility of U.S. national-level interagency organizations that address critical policy, 

strategy, and research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) objectives. Since 1994, the CPRC 

has ensured that interdepartmental RD&A activities and programs of three departments––DoD, 

DOE, and the IC––respond to U.S. policy and strategy objectives for countering WMD/M proliferation and WMD terrorism. Other interagency organizations—including the Nonproliferation and 

Arms Control Technology Working Group, the Technical Support Working Group, the National 

Security Council-led Counterterrorism and National Preparedness Policy Coordinating Committee, the Community Nonproliferation Committee, and the Measurement and Signatures Intelligence Biological Warfare Technology Steering Group—address complementary aspects of national policy and strategy objectives associated with countering WMD/M proliferation and WMD 

terrorist threats. Commonly, the departments themselves also have their own internal committees 

to meet their requirements for counterproliferation (CP)- and combating terrorism (CT)-related 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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demands. The CPRC focus is on maximizing synergies to combat WMD and WMD terrorism by 

coordinating activities among DoD, DOE, the Joint Staff, and the IC. The CPRC leverages the investments already made in military forces and defense infrastructure necessary to defend the 

United States while ensuring that requirements for countering proliferation are also met. 

The CPRC mission areas correspond to the three principal pillars of the 2002 National 

Strategy: 

National Strategy Pillars CPRC Mission Areas 

Nonproliferation Proliferation prevention 

Counterproliferation 

Deterrence 

Counterforce 

Active defense 

Passive defense 

Consequence management Consequence management 

CPRC AREAS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT 

 The CPRC established Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs) to describe combating 

WMD mission area requirements and to characterize areas where progress is needed to enhance 

warfighting capabilities of the combatant commanders (COCOMs) and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U.S. combating WMD policy. The ACEs are derived from the COCOM combating WMD (CbtWMD) requirements but are not a one-for-one restatement of them. Instead, 

they reflect a more general statement of requirements, appropriate for a multidepartmental approach. The ACEs define priority areas where additional capabilities are needed to meet CP requirements. Each CPRC-represented organization individually prioritizes the ACEs in accordance 

with its own departmental mission needs. The 16 combating WMD ACEs for 2004 are listed in 

Table 1. 

Table 1: 2004 ACEs and ACE Priorities of CPRC-Represented Organizations

ACE Priorities 

DoD DOE IC Areas for Capability Enhancements 

1 1 Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of strategic, operational, and tactical level actionable 

intelligence to support CP and CT 

2 2 Detection, identification, characterization, location, prediction, and warning of traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents (including medical surveillance) 

3 3 Defense against, and detection, characterization and defeat of paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD capabilities (including protection of critical CONUS and OCONUS installations) 

4 2 5 Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M and related materials, components, and key personnel 

5 7 Support for maritime, air, ground WMD/M interdiction, including special operations 

6 Enable sustained operations in a WMD environment through decontamination, and individual and collective protection 

7 

Medical protection, training, diagnosis, treatment, and countermeasures against NBC agents, to include surge manufacturing capability and stockpile availability of vaccines, pretreatments, therapeutics 

and other medical products 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Table 1: 2004 ACEs and ACE Priorities of CPRC-Represented Organizations (Continued)

ACE Priorities 

DoD DOE IC Areas for Capability Enhancements 

8 9 Ballistic and cruise missile active defense 

9 Consequence management in response to use of WMD (including civil support in response to domestic WMD contingencies) 

10 6 Target planning for WMD/M targets 

11 3 4 Detection, location, characterization, defeat, and elimination of WMD/M weapons and related facilities 

while minimizing collateral effects 

12 8 Detection, location, characterization, and defeat of HDBTs while minimizing collateral effects 

13 10 Prompt mobile target detection and defeat 

14 1 Protection of WMD/M and WMD/M-related materials and components 

15 5 11 Support to export control activities of the U.S. Government 

16 4 12 Support to inspection and monitoring activities of arms control agreements and regimes and other nonproliferation initiatives 

CPRC ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD 

REQUIREMENTS 

Each year the CPRC focuses on identifying key RD&A program accomplishments and 

milestones; highlighting planned near-, mid-, and long-term capability improvements; assessing 

where shortfalls exist in CbtWMD capability; and making recommendations to improve capabilities. Progress strengthens U.S. capabilities for combating WMD and WMD terrorism and includes 

(1) the rapid fielding of essential capabilities, (2) coordinating and focusing interorganizational 

RD&A activities, (3) expanding international cooperative activities, and (4) improving the integration, management, and oversight of activities and programs related to countering proliferation and 

WMD terrorism. The CPRC is able to report that progress continues to be made in all ACE priority areas, but some ACEs face greater challenges than others. 

CPRC Major Assessment Findings. Many useful efforts are underway, and several ACEs 

are experiencing considerable enhancement of capabilities with programs now in development. 

However, there are concerns in various ACEs. The CPRC believes these are the areas on which 

additional attention should be focused. Briefly, these areas include the need for (1) more capable 

sensors and detectors for chemical and biological agents and radiological material, (2) better intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities to identify adversaries’ intentions and planned operations, including their activities in the United States, (3) continued development of missile defense 

technologies, and (4) continued development of technologies to bring foreign chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material under control and to protect it from theft and smuggling. Table 2 highlights selected issues that could constrain the ability to meet requirements in 

specific performance areas. 

As Table 2 indicates, better sensors or detectors are a technical challenge in ACEs 2, 4, 11, 

and 12. Current sensors do not yet meet the needs of current conditions. Generally, technological 

difficulties also continue to stand in the way of missile defense, ACE 8. In ACE 3, while efforts to 

anticipate the actions of adversaries are being addressed by the IC through technological and other 

means, this goal is one of the hardest to address adequately. 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Table 2: Assessed Performance Area Challenges 

2004 ACEs 

(in DoD Priority Order) 

Performance Areas* 

Cost Schedule Technology 

2. Detection, identification, characterization, 

location, prediction, and warning of traditional 

and nontraditional CW and BW agents (including medical surveillance) 

Program timelines for 

detection of nontraditional/4th-generation 

agents are lengthy 

Program timelines for 

detection of nontraditional/4th-generation 

agents are lengthy 

Detect, identify, and characterize (standoff ranges insufficient) 

Prediction and battle management (insufficient information 

management “backbone”) 

3. Defense against, and detection, characterization and defeat of paramilitary, covert delivery, 

and terrorist WMD capabilities 

 Counterterrorist intelligence 

(global target set difficult) 

Force protection (standoff 

explosive detection) 

4. Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M 

and related materials, components, and key 

personnel 

 Sensors (BW threats difficult to 

detect—dual use facilities) 

6. Enable sustained operations in a WMD environment through decontamination, and individual and collective protection 

 Size, power, and weight limitations 

7. Medical protection, training, diagnosis, treatment, and countermeasures against NBC 

agents, to include surge manufacturing capability and stockpile availability of vaccines, 

pretreatments, therapeutics, and other medical products 

Medical chemical, 

biological, and radiological defense 

Medical chemical, 

biological, and radiological defense 

8. Ballistic and cruise missile active defense Missile defense 

(critical technological 

challenges in boost 

phase)

Missile defense 

(critical technological challenges in boost phase) 

11. Detection, location, characterization, defeat, 

and elimination of WMD/M weapons and related facilities while minimizing collateral effects

 Evolving WMD elimination mission Sensors (BW threats difficult to 

detect—dual-use facilities) 

Agent dispersion complexities 

difficult to model 

12. Detection, location, characterization, and defeat of HDBT while minimizing collateral effects  Sensors 

(Standoff detection sensor 

capability) 

Characterization models 

(physical layout difficult to 

characterize) 

13. Prompt mobile target detection and defeat Technology to detect and 

defeat mobile targets remains 

challenging 

*Could be impacted by a cost, schedule, or technology shortfall. 

From the standpoint of cost or schedule, several issues are problematic. Vaccines against 

BW agents have been available only in limited amounts. The problem is being addressed, in part 

through the Department of Health and Human Service’s work in vaccines (e.g., through the 

BioShield Program), but U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensing requirements could 

lead to scheduling delays. Another significant challenge is to bring under control and to protect 

from theft or smuggling CBRN materials by proliferant states or nonstate actors. Finding 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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cost-effective methods of controlling and securing them from further distribution or use is equally 

challenging. 

DoD BW CP Impediments. The National Defense Act for FY03 legislated that the CPRC 

report include a discussion of the limitations and impediments to the BW CP efforts of DoD and 

recommendations to mitigate the impediments. Appendix M of Volume III of the 2003 CPRC Report to Congress provided the detailed discussion that focused on technological constraints that 

limit DoD’s efforts. The detailed discussion is not repeated in this year’s CPRC Report to Congress. However, the constraints identified in last year’s report are still applicable to current BW 

CP efforts within DoD. In summary, the technical challenges remain in the areas of biological collection, detection and identification, quantification, sample processing, interferent (i.e., false positive and negative alarms) and ambient biological background rejection, and genetic probe development. Other challenging areas that still remain today are size, weight, and power reduction of 

detectors; power generation and consumption; development of integrated biological and chemical 

detection systems; and the fusion of sensor data with mapping, imagery, and other data for nearreal-time display of events. 

CPRC DETAILED ACE ASSESSMENTS 

Volume II of this report contains more detailed assessments of all ACEs. 

DOD COMBATING WMD POLICY AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES 

Figure 1 depicts the proliferation threat environment and the CbtWMD mission areas to 

prevail against it––proliferation prevention, deterrence, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, restoration of operations, and consequence management. 

DoD Combating WMD Guidance. The key elements of CbtWMD include supporting U.S. 

diplomacy, arms control, and export controls; maintaining a strong deterrent capability; developing capabilities to identify, characterize, destroy, and interdict the production, storage, and 

weaponization of NBC; developing active defenses to interdict delivery means; developing passive defenses to provide detection, medical countermeasures, and individual and collective protection; training and equipping U.S. forces to operate effectively in an NBC-contaminated environment; developing the ability to restore operations and manage the consequences of NBC use; and 

encouraging U.S. allies and coalition partners to make CP a part of their military planning. The 

U.S. CbtWMD strategy is articulated to COCOMs through the Joint Strategic Planning System 

and through joint doctrine. Key documents include Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, Joint Doctrine for 

Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments; and JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Final Coordination Draft, November 2003). 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Joint Combating WMD Doctrine. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, provides combatant commanders, subunified commanders, joint task force commanders, and components of these commands with strategic and operational-level concepts and guidelines for how to effectively plan and execute joint and multinational NBC military operations throughout the entire battlespace. It provides joint operational doctrinal concepts to better integrate the effective use of passive defense capabilities, including medical capabilities, to enable U.S. military forces to survive, fight, and win in an NBC-contaminated 

environment. This operational doctrine is centered on the principles of avoidance, protection, and 

restoration of combat operations. JP 3-11 also provides the same strategic and operational-level 

guidance for peacetime, crisis, conflict, post-conflict, and military operations other than war. Joint 

Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations (2000), established the conceptual linkages necessary to support COCOMs’ planning and execution of CP tasks and missions. JP 3-40 is currently under revision to reflect the CbtWMD National Strategy, and is to be 

titled Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

CJCS Guidance and Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 0500. CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, provides operational and policy 

guidance and instructions for U.S. military forces supporting a lead federal agency’s domestic 

consequence management (CM) operations. Developed from this instruction, CJCS CONPLAN 

0500-98, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, provides guidance and taskings for domestic CM operations. 

Nonproliferation Counterproliferation Consequence

Management

Adversary’s WMD/M Capability Adversary’s WMD/M Capability

Stopped by DoD

Support to

Nonproliferation

and Deterrence

Stopped by

Deterrence

Stopped by

Counterforce/

Interdiction

Stopped by

Active

Defense

Stopped by

Passive

Defense

Consequence

Management

Restoration

Operations

National Strategy

CWC

BWC

Figure 1: DoD’s Multitiered Approach to Combating WMD 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Combating WMD Support to Combatant Commands. DoD agencies have focused their 

expertise in chemical and biological defense, nuclear science, information management, intelligence collection, battlefield surveillance, strategic weapons dismantlement, arms control technologies, and numerous other fields, to provide new core capabilities to support the warfighter. 

Multiple capabilities mentioned in the CPRC report provide support to warfighters before, during, 

and after the conflict to identify, destroy, and dismantle or otherwise eliminate WMD weapons 

and associated material in the area of operations. 

CPRC Chemical/Biological Defense Focus Group. The CPRC Chemical and Biological 

Defense (CBD) Research, Development, and Acquisition Focus Group is developing integrated 

CBD RD&A plans for CBD technology areas; such plans have already been developed for biological point detection technologies. The integration process and roadmap model developed in 

conjunction with the biological point detection integrated plan is being used as a template to facilitate development of integration plans for other technology areas such as chemical point detection, 

CB standoff detection, decontamination, and modeling and simulation. 

Ongoing ACTDs. Several noteworthy Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 

(ACTDs) are underway to accelerate the fielding of advanced technologies and capabilities to 

counter WMD/M threats: the Agent Defeat Warhead ACTD, which will demonstrate new capabilities to destroy chemical and biological agents at high rates while minimizing collateral damage 

through unique low-pressure dispersal characteristics; the Tunnel Target Defeat ACTD, which will 

provide interoperable characterization, planning, and weaponeering tools to defeat strategic hard 

and deeply buries targets; the Counter Bomb/Counter Bomber ACTD, which will evaluate standoff and portal explosive detection technologies to protect U.S. forces from the evolving threat 

from terrorist improvised explosive devices; the Thermobaric Weapons ACTD; the Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation ACTD; and the Restoration of Operations (RestOps) 

ACTD (residual support phase). 

DoD Programs. Well over 150 DoD programs (see Appendix G, Volume III) are strongly 

supporting national efforts to combat WMD/M and NBC terrorist threats. Over the past several 

years, substantial progress has been made in these programs and other activities to (1) improve 

fielded counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and NBC counterterrorism capabilities to respond to 

newly identified shortfalls; and (2) establish the necessary groundwork for continued advances. 

Selected accomplishments of these activities and programs are highlighted in Table 3. 

DoD Medical NBC Training and R&D Programs. Advanced clinical medical NBC training programs are provided by the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School, U.S. Army 

Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, and Armed 

Forces Radiobiology Research Institute. Courses are offered at these facilities, at the requesting 

unit’s site, via distance education courses, or through the training method selected by the unit to 

best meet its requirements. 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Table 3: Highlights of DoD Response to CbtWMD ACEs 

DoD ACE Priority Selected Accomplishments in DoD Combating WMD Programs

1. Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of strategic, operational, 

and tactical level actionable intelligence to support CP and CT 

Developed standoff ID capability through the use of inherent signatures for Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

Developed improved remote sensor controller mission life 

2. Detection, identification, characterization, location, prediction; and warning 

of traditional and nontraditional CW 

and BW agents (including medical surveillance) 

Deployed 237 Joint Portal Shield Systems to 22 overseas sites 

DARPA is developing a BW agent sensor system (TIGER) capable of significant bacterial discrimination 

3. Defense against, and detection, characterization and defeat of paramilitary, 

covert delivery, and terrorist WMD capabilities (including protection of critical 

CONUS and OCONUS installations) 

Conducted over 100 Balanced Survivability Assessments to date. 

Conducted 595 Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments of key government sites 

Identified, recovered, and exploited 663 ordnance items during Operation Enduring 

Freedom in 2003 

4. Detection, location, and tracking of 

WMD/M and related materials, components, and key personnel 

Conducted radiological detection and response courses with Estonia, Latvia, and Romania 

5. Support for maritime, air, ground, 

WMD/M interdiction, including special 

operations 

Continued development and deployment of specialized technologies and equipment 

prototypes to assist SOF and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in countering 

WMD/M threats 

Delivered 5 shipments of improvised explosive device defeat equipment to EOD forces 

in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (14 technologies and over 200 items) 

6. Enable sustained operations in a WMD 

environment through decontamination, 

and individual and collective protection 

Continued deployment of critical NBC detection and warning, individual and collective 

protection, and decontamination systems for use throughout battlespace 

Conducted RestOps final demonstration, which demonstrated CW/BW defense procedures to restore fixed-site operations 

Conducted a Large Frame Aircraft Decontamination Demonstration to determine procedures for effective decontamination 

Fielded 26,000 pocket radiation detection, indication, and computation devices to active 

duty forces and WMD Civil Support Teams 

7. Medical protection, training, diagnosis, 

treatment, and countermeasures 

against NBC agents, to include surge 

manufacturing capability and stockpile 

availability of vaccines, pretreatments, 

therapeutics, and other medical products 

Produced 4.2 million doses of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) 

Developed new class of antibiotics (DNA methylation) that kills broad spectrum of bacteria (DARPA) 

8. Ballistic and cruise missile active defense 

Tested Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) components in various field exercises 

Tested Airborne Laser models and simulations in test facilities 

Proceeded with development of Forward-based X-Band radar under development 

OSD approved Army Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) acceleration— will field initial CMD 

capability by FY10 

Achieved great success with PATRIOT in OIF—intercepted 9 of 9 ballistic missiles 

Commenced joint (OSD-Army) effort to merge PATRIOT and Medium Extended Air 

Defense System programs into a single, more efficient international effort 

9. Consequence management in response to use of WMD (including civil 

support in response to domestic WMD 

contingencies) 

Continued to leverage improvements and doctrine from DoD to emergency responders 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) established 24/7 WMD technical reachback 

capability to provide analytical modeling support to combatant commanders, civil support 

teams, and other governmental entities including first responders 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Table 3: Highlights of DoD Response to CbtWMD ACEs (Continued) 

DoD ACE Priority Selected Accomplishments in DoD Combating WMD Programs

10. Target planning for WMD/M targets DTRA deployed targeting teams in support of OIF operations and other combatant command exercises and planning activities to provide WMD expertise and consequence of 

target execution modeling analysis 

DTRA’s 24/7 technical reachback capability conducted targeting analysis and plume 

modeling in support of the IC and combatant command deliberate and contingency 

planning 

11. Detection, location, characterization, 

and defeat, and elimination of 

WMD/M weapons and related facilities while minimizing collateral effects 

DTRA/TD operationally demonstrated unmanned aerial vehicle-based standoff CW 

detection and collection/identification capability in the Chemical Combat Assessment 

System (CCAS) 

DTRA/TD developed and delivered quick-reaction BLU-119/B (CrashPAD) weapons in 

support of OIF 

DTRA/TD operationally demonstrated the Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant (TTPV) 

cruise missile 

DTRA/TD developed and demonstrated prototype architecture for the Integrated Weapons of Mass Destruction Toolset in 1st quarter FY04 

12. Detection, location, characterization, 

and defeat of HDBT while minimizing 

collateral effects 

Operationally demonstrated the TTPV and CCAS against a chemical target 

Completed CCAS operational demonstration 

13. Prompt mobile target detection and 

defeat 

Demonstrated operational utility of command, control, communications, computers, and 

intelligence systems for rapid dissemination of intelligence to users 

14. Protection of WMD/M and WMD/Mrelated materials and components 

Continued development of technologies with Russian Federation under the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (CTR) treaty Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security and Biological 

Weapons Proliferation Prevention programs 

Completed the Fissile Materials Storage Facility 

Secured nerve agents at 2 Russian storage sites 

15. Support to export control activities of 

the U.S. government 

Reviewed 25,000 export license applications for military and dual-use technologies 

IC conducted significant number of risk analyses on foreign end users of U.S. goods in 

support of U.S. licensing and export 

16. Support to inspection and monitoring 

activities of arms control agreements 

and regimes and other nonproliferation initiatives 

As of December 31, 2003, under the CTR treaty in the former Soviet Union, destroyed 

527 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), eliminated 455 ICBM silos, eliminated 408 

submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and eliminated 124 heavy bombers 

Began construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility 

Assisted Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to become nonnuclear states 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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KEY DOE ACTIVITIES 

Based on its highly specialized scientific, technical, analytical, and operational capabilities, 

DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its national laboratories are 

uniquely qualified to provide leadership in national and international efforts to reduce the danger 

to U.S. national security posed by the proliferation of WMD. NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation plays the key role to accomplish this mission by (1) preventing the spread of 

WMD materials, technology, and expertise; (2) detecting the proliferation of WMD worldwide; 

(3) reversing the proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities; (4) eliminating, securing, or storing 

surplus fissile materials in a safe manner pending disposition; and (5) disposing of surplus materials in accordance with terms set forth in agreements between the United States and Russia. 

Activities that address DOE’s nonproliferation mission include: 

Developing technologies and systems to detect the proliferation of WMD and to 

monitor and verify existing treaties. 

Providing unique and in-depth policy and technical expertise as part of the U.S. 

Government's integrated efforts to monitor for nuclear detonations. 

Facilitating the shutdown of the remaining plutonium production reactors in the 

Russian Federation. 

Downblending surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) for peaceful use as commercial reactor fuel. 

Providing technical support for nuclear safeguards programs of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

DOE strongly supports the CbtWMD missions of DoD and the IC primarily through its 

nuclear proliferation prevention and counterterrorism activities. DOE plays a critical role, through 

its core nuclear work, in addressing ACE priorities supporting inspection and monitoring activities 

of arms control agreements and regimes (DOE ACE priority 4); and protection of WMD/M and 

WMD/M-related materials and components, detection and tracking of these materials and components, and export control activities (DOE ACE priority 1, 2, and 5). DOE is working closely with 

DoD and the IC to detect, characterize, and defeat WMD/M facilities (DOE ACE priority 3). 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Selected accomplishments of DOE CbtWMD programs are shown in Table 4. 

Table 4: Highlights of DOE Response to CbtWMD ACEs 

DOE ACE Priority Selected Accomplishments in DOE Programs 

1. Protection of WMD/M and WMD/M-related materials and components Secured 77% of the 39 Russian Navy warhead sites 

Initiated materiel, protection, control, and accounting upgrades at 16% of the 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites 

Secured 22% of the 600 metric tons (MT) of weapon-useable nuclear material 

Converted 16% of the 27 MT of HEU to low-enriched uranium 

Secured 8 radiological dispersion device program sites 

Installed radiation detection equipment at 39 (Second Line of Defense) sites 

2. Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M and 

related materials, components, and key personnel 

Engaged 7,600 former Soviet weapon scientists, engineers, and technicians; 20 technologies have been commercialized or businesses created, which attracted $23M of 

venture capital; met 49% of nuclear complex reduction targets at 6 weapon facilities 

3. Detection, location, characterization, elimination, 

and defeat of WMD/M facilities with minimal collateral effects 

Tested 4 advanced radiation and remote sensing technologies to detect early stages 

of nuclear weapon programs 

Delivered 4 advanced technologies and operational systems (e.g., satellite payloads 

and seismic station calibration data sets) to U.S. national security users to improve 

accuracy and sensitivity of nuclear weapon test monitoring 

4. Support to inspection and monitoring activities of 

arms control agreements and regimes and other 

nonproliferation initiatives 

Completed 39% of work to convert 98 targeted research and test reactors; completed 

design of suitable pin-type fuel for Russian-supplied research reactors 

Expanded bilateral physical protection visits, physical protection training, and IAEA’s 

International Physical Protection Advisory Service to help protect WMD facilities 

around the world against terrorist attack and sabotage; conducted 5 physical protection training courses 

Operated 2 Blend-Down Monitoring Systems in Russia and conducted 22 monitoring 

visits to 4 HEU-to-LEU processing facilities 

Administered 11 cooperative agreements, including sister-lab agreements, with foreign countries and organizations and completed 5 tasks 

Developed agreements for HEU research reactor fuel purchase and transportation 

arrangements 

Made progress toward shutdown of 3 remaining plutonium production reactors in 

Russia 

Expedited retrieval of spent fuel from central Asia 

Finalized decisions on technical path forward for disposing of surplus Russian 

weapon-grade plutonium 

5. Support to export control activities of the U.S. 

Government 

Worked with U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel to familiarize them with 

nuclear equipment, material, and technology, and to improve real-time analysis of 

suspected shipments 

Reviewed 100% of U.S. nuclear-related transfers and 50% of missile technology and 

chemical and biological-related exports 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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KEY IC ACTIVITIES 

Selected IC accomplishments of IC CbtWMD programs are highlighted in Table 5. 

Table 5: Highlights of IC Response to CbtWMD ACEs 

IC ACE Priority Selected Accomplishments in IC Programs 

1. Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of 

strategic, operational, and tactical level actionable intelligence to support CP and CT 

IC continued to work closely with Joint Staff in response to CONPLAN 0400 

IC produced a wide range of estimates and analytical products in support of OIF 

DIA ‘s Strategic Multilayered Analysis program supported operational efforts during 

OIF 

IC personnel deployed forward to provide real-time support to the warfighter during 

and after OIF 

IC is supporting Iraq Survey Group in its efforts to determine status of Iraq’s WMD 

programs. 

IC assisted Department of State in providing actionable information to international 

inspection and monitoring regimes, nonproliferation regimes, and foreign governments 

2. Detection, identification, characterization, location, prediction, and warning of traditional and 

nontraditional CW and BW agents (including 

medical surveillance) 

IC characterized traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents 

IC produced wide range of estimates and analytical products 

3. Defense against, and detection, characterization, 

and defeat of paramilitary, covert delivery, and 

terrorist WMD capabilities (including protection of 

critical CONUS and OCONUS installations) 

IC provided assistance in the deterrence of possible illicit WMD proliferation 

IC produced wide range of estimates and analytical products to include terrorists’ 

potential NBC capabilities 

4. Detection, location, characterization, defeat, and 

elimination of WMD/M weapons and related facilities while minimizing collateral effects 

IC produced wide range of estimates and analytical products 

DIA improved Athena information space and facility analysis database 

5. Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M and 

related materials, components, and key personnel 

IC characterized CW and BW agents 

IC produced wide range of estimates and analytical products 

IC continued to work on databases to track and link key WMD personalities 

Office of Naval Intelligence identified and tracked WMD-related shipments 

6. Target planning for WMD/M targets IC provided analysis and support to various COCOMs in support of WMD/M target 

planning 

7. Support for maritime, air, and ground WMD/M 

interdiction, including special operations 

IC produced wide range of estimates and analytical projects 

DIA improved Athena information space and facility analysis database 

U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative expanded cooperation in international community to impede and stop flow of WMD/M 

8. Detection, location, characterization, and defeat 

of HDBT while minimizing collateral effects 

IC produced wide range of estimates and analytical projects to include physical vulnerability analysis 

DIA improved Athena information space and facility analysis database 

9. Ballistic and cruise missile active defense IC provided early warning of imminent missile tests 

IC produced estimates and technical analysis of various missile systems 

10. Prompt mobile target detection and defeat IC provided early warning of imminent missile tests 

11. Support to export control activities of the U.S. 

Government 

WINPAC coordinated with Department of Commerce to provide export control support 

DIA conducted 20,000 end-user checks for DOC export licenses on dual-use items 

12. Support to inspection and monitoring activities of 

arms control agreements and regimes and other 

nonproliferation initiatives 

Improved global monitoring of nuclear detonations in atmosphere through advances in 

modeling and simulation of Global Positioning System/Nuclear Detonation Detection 

System constellation 

IC provided early warning of imminent missile tests 

WINPAC coordinated IC input to diplomatic and other nonproliferation efforts 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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FUNDING OF CPRC-MONITORED PROGRAMS 

CbtWMD efforts build on the substantial investments made in the military forces and defense infrastructure necessary for the security of the United States. The combined DoD-DOE investment in CP programs for FY05 is over $15.2 billion compared with over $14 billion in FY04. 

All FY05 budget figures in this report are from the President’s Budget. 

DoD’s investment for FY05 is $13.78 billion. DoD budgets the bulk of its CbtWMD investment in the areas of missile defense (DoD ACE priority 8); detecting, identifying, characterizing, locating, predicting, and warning of traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents (DoD 

ACE priority 2); and supporting the inspection, monitoring, and verification of arms control 

agreements (DoD ACE priority 16). 

 DOE continues its heavy investment in nonproliferation activities with $1.43 billion requested for FY05 compared with the FY04 level of $1.41 billion. As part of its core national nonproliferation program, DOE focuses on protection, tracking, and control of nuclear-weapon-related 

materials and components and export control activities (DOE ACE priorities 1, 2, and 5); and supporting the inspection and monitoring of arms control agreements and other nonproliferation initiatives (DOE ACE priority 4). 

CPRC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 As evidenced by the numerous program and activity accomplishments cited in this report, 

the CPRC continues to find that the seriousness of WMD/M proliferation and WMD terrorist 

threats, and the need to enhance capabilities to combat them, are recognized throughout DoD (including OSD, the Joint Staff, the services, and the COCOMs), DOE, the intelligence community, 

and the U.S. interagency community. Indeed, combating WMD remains an established and institutionalized priority within each of the CPRC-represented organizations. The development of capabilities to counter WMD terrorist threats is receiving attention throughout DoD, DOE, and the IC. 

These efforts reflect the President’s firm commitment to stem WMD/M proliferation and negate 

terrorist WMD threats. Moreover, as decisionmakers, policymakers, and warfighters continue to 

reprioritize their nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and WMD counterterrorism policy and 

strategy objectives, the CPRC will continue to review related DoD, DOE, and IC activities and 

interagency programs to ensure that they meet evolving needs and requirements. 

The CPRC’s recommendations for 2004 are summarized below: 

Support the President’s FY05 budget for CPRC organizations. 

Continue to address CbtWMD and WMD terrorism requirements as high-priority 

items in annual budget processes, including in support of homeland defense. 

Continue to integrate the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) into 

the CPRC process and continue dialog with the IC to address support requirements. 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Continue previous coordination of chemical and biological defense in the CBD 

RD&A Focus Group by establishing comparable relationships with the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) Chemical and Biological National Security Program. 

Continue to integrate the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

into the CPRC process and expand communications and coordination with DHS 

and the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). 

Continue to expand dialog and information sharing between CPRC organizations 

and other U.S. Government agencies—for example, DHS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), state and local governments. Establish and promote mechanisms to leverage CbtWMD and CT R&D. 

Promote DoD, DHS, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the 

IC expanded dialog and information sharing on medical countermeasures for WMD 

to ensure a plan that includes development of an FDA-approved countermeasure 

for each high-priority threat agent. 

Continue to expand pursuit of international cooperation and partners in combating 

global proliferation of WMD/M and NBC terrorist threats. 

Continue to monitor, contribute to, and incorporate activities of the JCS CbtWMD 

architecture process and the CbtWMD Enhanced Planning Process (EPP). 

Assist DoD, DOE, and the IC to identify appropriate requirements to support the 

implementation of the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative. 

Restructure and reprioritize ACEs based on a more analytic process tied to the development of COCOM CbtWMD required capabilities and the National Strategy 

for Combating WMD. 

The FY05 President’s Budget addresses priority activities and programs for combating 

WMD/M proliferation and WMD terrorism. Therefore, the CPRC recommends that the FY05 

President’s Budget for each of the CPRC-represented organizations be authorized and appropriated by the Congress, and that the needs and requirements for CbtWMD and countering the WMD 

terrorist threat continue to receive high-priority status in the annual budget development process, 

including in support of the expanding homeland defense mission. 

Recognizing the critical need for intelligence in establishing an effective response to the 

proliferation of WMD/M, the CPRC recommends the continued integration of the new USD(I) 

into the CPRC process. This position was established in 2003. Actionable intelligence remains the 

highest priority DoD ACE, which indicates the need for this integration and the need to continue 

dialog with the IC to address CbtWMD intelligence support requirements. 

One of the CPRC’s primary responsibilities is to ensure coordination of CbtWMD activities among its representatives. To that end, the CPRC recommends continued close coordination 

of DoD, DOE, and IC CbtWMD RD&A activities and programs, including the continued use of 

subgroups or focus groups. The CPRC Chemical and Biological Defense RDA Focus Group has 

defined the process for integrating the CBD technology base programs and developing preliminary 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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integrated technology base roadmaps. This process will be used to coordinate RD&A in numerous 

future CBD programs. DOE’s Chemical and Biological National Security Program (CBNP) was 

the primary DOE liaison with DoD in this focus group concerning chemical and biological defense. However, the CBNP has been transferred to DHS. The CPRC recommends that the working 

relationship with the CBNP––now in DHS––should continue. 

The CPRC recognizes the growing threat of WMD terrorism in the United States and the 

potential contributions of the CPRC-represented organizations to the mission of supporting civil 

authorities. To facilitate awareness and the possible transfer of appropriate technologies to the 

first-response/domestic-response community, the CPRC recommends that it continue to integrate 

communications and coordination with DoD’s new Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, the 

new DHS, and USNORTHCOM.

One of the CPRC’s additional responsibilities is to expand dialog and information sharing 

between CPRC organizations and other governmental agencies such as the FBI, DHS, USDA, and

state and local governments. During the annual CPRC Program Review of DoD, DOE, and the IC 

CbtWMD programs, nontraditional CPRC organizations attended and benefited from the review. 

This expanded dialog includes DoD, DHS, DHHS, and the IC on medical countermeasures for 

WMD to ensure a plan that includes development of an FDA-approved countermeasure for each 

threat agent. The CPRC can further expand this type of dialog and communication by establishing 

and promoting mechanisms to leverage CbtWMD and counterterrorism RD&A. 

 Recognizing the global nature of WMD/M proliferation and WMD terrorist threats, the 

CPRC recommends expanding the pursuit of international cooperative efforts to counter these 

threats by supporting expansion of existing cooperative activities in R&D, proliferation prevention, and WMD counterterrorism being conducted by DoD, DOE, DHS, and the IC; and by working with the policy community to engage international partners to participate in cooperative 

RD&A efforts in the future. The CPRC’s immediate goal is to support CPRC-represented organizations in encouraging the establishment of additional international cooperative R&D efforts (beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and expanding existing cooperative efforts; and, 

eventually, to explore possibilities for establishing joint acquisition programs. The CPRC continues to encourage and endorse cooperation with our international partners through joint activities 

and programs, including international information-sharing conferences and outreach programs addressing the threats of WMD/M proliferation and NBC terrorism. 

 The Joint Staff is developing an operational architecture that will result in a CbtWMD 

roadmap, capstone requirement documents for the CbtWMD mission areas (as required), and a 

CbtWMD investment strategy. The CbtWMD EPP, co-chaired by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Joint Staff, serves as the framework to identify funding options needed for known and evolving WMD threats. Integrating the activities and 

results of this assessment will be a critical step in integrating interagency activities. Therefore, the 

CPRC recommends that the activities of the CbtWMD EPP and JCS Integrated CbtWMD roadmap continue to be closely monitored, supported, and incorporated in CPRC member organization processes.
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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 In 2003, the President announced a new multilateral, international counterproliferation effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). To execute this initiative, the CPRC will support 

DoD, DOE, and the IC in identifying appropriate requirements to support the implementation of 

the PSI.

 The Joint Staff, in developing CbtWMD-required capabilities, uses an objective process 

based on the National Strategy To Combat WMD. In the ACE development process of 2005, the 

CPRC will examine a similar methodology to restructure and reprioritize ACEs. 

In addition to these recommendations, the CPRC, through its Standing Committee, will 

continue to review and update the CbtWMD ACEs, reprioritizing them as required. This process is 

central to ensure that the ACEs continue to reflect the integration of COCOM warfighting priorities and the overarching national security policy and strategy objectives they support. Updated and 

relevant ACEs assist the CPRC in meeting its program review responsibilities while improving the 

focus of future programmatic and managerial efforts among the CPRC-represented organizations 

to counter WMD/M proliferation and WMD terrorist threats. 

In the 2003 report, the CPRC began a process to bring greater fidelity and utility to the 

ACEs through the introduction of additional granularity by delineating associated capability shortfalls with linked areas for progress for each of the ACEs. The CPRC will continue to implement 

this process to pursue the continued improvement of the fidelity, utility, and prioritization of the 

ACEs. This process will include a systematic review, revision, and refinement, where necessary, 

to incorporate provisions of current national-level guidance and rigorous prioritization methodologies to maximize objectivity. 

The CPRC has historically used existing intra- and interdepartmental collection and prioritization mechanisms due to the interagency nature of the CPRC constituency. The mechanisms 

provide a data set that, although extensive, is not exhaustive and can benefit from the incorporation of improved methodologies. These improvements will refine and standardize the collection of 

programmatic data along with identification of alternative data sources to assist in the assessment 

of the comprehensiveness of the data submitted. The prioritization process will also continue to be 

refined to maximize the objectivity of the results. 

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 

From a policy perspective, there is no single, simple solution to counter WMD weapons. 

Rather, an integrated CbtWMD strategy is required, with each component building on the strength 

of the others. The strategy must include nonproliferation efforts to prevent countries from acquiring WMD weapons, counterproliferation programs to deter or interdict the use of WMD weapons, 

and finally, consequence management efforts to respond to the use of WMD on U.S. territory, 

against U.S. forces abroad, and against U.S. friends and allies. 

In the past several years, the CPRC member organizations have devoted much attention, 

and shifted significant resources, to deal with the threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons. The CPRC has made considerable progress in a short time. But NBC weapon attacks 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

18 

against U.S. troops overseas and citizens at home remains a threat to the security of the United 

States; hence U.S. and allied forces must be prepared to defend against the use of WMD weapons.
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

ACE Area for Capability Enhancement 

ACTD Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration 

ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs 

 

BW biological warfare 

 

CB chemical and biological 

CBD Chemical and Biological Defense (program) 

CBNP Chemical and Biological National Security Program (formerly DOE, now DHS) 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CbtWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

CCAS Chemical Combat Assessment System 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CM consequence management 

COCOM combatant commander 

CONPLAN contingency plan 

CONUS continental United States 

CP counterproliferation 

CPRC Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 

CT counterterrorism 

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction (treaty) 

CW chemical warfare 

 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DCI Director of Central Intelligence 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOC Department of Commerce 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EPP Enhanced Planning Process 

 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

FY fiscal year 

 

HDBT hard and deeply buried target 

HEU highly enriched uranium 

 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IC intelligence community 

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 

 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

 
2004 CPRC Report to Congress 

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LEU low-enriched uranium 

 

MT metric ton 

 

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

 

OCONUS outside the continental United States 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 

 

R&D research and development 

RD&A research, development, and acquisition 

RestOps Restoration of Operations (ACTD) 

 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

 

TTPV Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant 

 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

 

WINPAC Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD/M WMD and their means of delivery