Docket No . 108947.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E O F ILL IN OI S, Appe llant , v
.

CARM ECITA WILLIAMS, Appel le e.
Opinion filed November 18, 2010.

CHIEF JUS TI CE KILB RID E d elivered t he judg ment of th e c our t, wit h op inion. Justice s Fr ee man , T ho mas , Ga rman , Ka rmeie r , Bu rke , an d T he is
co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Defe n dant Carm

eci ta Will ia ms was convi

cted of off

ic ia l mi sconduct(720 ILC S 5 /3 3–3 (b) (Wes t 199 8) ), and sentence d to 24 months’ pr ob ati

on . Th e a pp el l ate cou rt r e versed de fendant’s
con vi cti on and en tered a judgm

ent of acqui

t t al, co ncluding t hat t he evi dence was insu ff

ic ie nt to sustain

her convi

ction. 393 Ill . App. 3d 77. We all owed t he Stat e’s petition for leav e to appeal (210 Ill . 2d R. 315(a )). Fo rt he fo llo win g r ea so ns, we affir m t he j udg ment o f the appe l l ate cou rt.-2- I. BACKG

ROUND Defend ant was char ged by indictment in t he cir cu it cou rt of Cook Cou n ty wi th c ri m i na l dru g c ons pi rac y an d of f i ci al m i sc on duc t . T he
o ffi ci al m isc o nd uc t co un t alle ge d t ha t de fen da nt wa s a pu blic employee of t he Village o f Glenwo od and “i n he r offi ci al capaci ty as police di spatcher knowi

ngl y pe rformed an ac t which she knew she is forbi dden by law t o pe r fo rm, to wit: sh e notif ie d Greg Stro ud

about police ac t ivit y nea rhis resi dence i n South Holland, Il

l i n oi s, i n ord er to f aci l i tate il l egal

drug-d eal i ng b y Greg S troud.” At def endan t’s b ench tria l , Al ex Di Mare test if

ied that he is a retired dep ut y chief of t he Glenw oo d po lice dep ar t ment. Defend ant
was hi red as a rad i o di spa

tche r i n O ctober 1 997. As a d

i spa tche r, defend ant was re qui

re d to re lay to po lice officer s inte rna l depa rt ment in form ation an d in form ation reported by the pub li c. Di Mare ident ifi ed a n exhibit as t he “Glenw oo d P olice D epa rt ment rules and re gulat ions” co ver ing disclo sur e o f co nfident ial inf or matio n. Di Mare not ed t hat t he exhibi t also co nta i ne d “ a s mal

l se cti on on dis ci pli nary action.” Hetestifi

ed that when def

endan t was hi red, she
was info rmed o r ally a nd in writi ng ab out the confi

dentia li ty rules and
r eg ula t io ns. DiM ar e fur t her t est ifi ed t hat t he r ules a nd r egu latio ns were “a dopted i n 19 85” a

nd “ were in effect ” whe n he left t he department on Jun

e 28, 2000. Di Mare ide ntif ie d a t ime ca rd i nd i ca ti ng de f en da nt wasat w ork on Ju ly 12 , 19 98 . Th

e S tate t he n p laye d t ap es o f t hr ee t ele ph o ne ca lls defend ant made to Greg Stro ud on that date. The f

irst cal l was placed f rom a Gl en wood pol i cedepa rtm en t l i ne wh i l e def en da nt wason du ty
as a di spatcher. The transcri pt o f that cal

l ref le cts the followi

n g co nver sat ion:

“D EFENDANT: Ke ep y

our s c an [ n] er o n t he r e is so me stuff going on i

n y our area[.] * * * MR. STROUD: Wh

at up? DEFEN DA NT: OK I’m at work[.] MR. ST ROU D: Wha t do you he ar [?] DEFEN DA NT: I’ m at work[.] MR. S TROU

D: OK [.]” The second cal

l was placed f

rom the sam

e Gl enwood police-3- dep ar t ment l i

n e 2 0 m i n ute s l ater. T he t r an sc r ipt o f t he se co nd ca ll sta tes i n perti n en t pa rt: “D EFENDANT: Yo u have so me eyes st age d at t he coll ege[.] * * * MR. STROUD: Wh

at!–A burgl

ary or somethi

ng? DEFEN DA NT: Hu h! –N o–Som

e eyes [.] Youknow what I’m say in g? MR. S TROU

D: Ye ah [.] * * * DEFEN DA NT: Don’ t worry

about that o ther

stuf f y ou’re hear ingabout the barri ca ded subject that ’s not what I ’m tal ki ng a bout[.] MR. S TROU

D: Ye ah –Yea h w hen y ou get of f cal l me[.] DEFEN DA NT: I sure wi

l l [.]” Ap pr o ximat ely

1 hour and 20 mi

nut es later, t he thi

rd call was pla ced from de f enda n t’ s ho me t ele ph o ne

. T he t r an sc r ipt o f t ha t ca ll sta tes i n perti n en t pa rt: “D EFENDANT: Uh–I don’t know exactly what– what’s go ingo n– I t ain ’t like I r ea lly hea r d n o t hing [

. ] I t ’s like OKt his guy ove r t her e o n 160 s omet hing and S ou t h Par k he d one barri cade hi s house–Barricade his s elf in the house and we had to send a SERT team

over there so we– * * * And uh– We send a SERT team in the area we have to let any agents know i

n the a r ea t hat we’r e co ming thr ou gh and ther e’ ll be a l ot of radio t raff

ic so either they

can chang e frequen ci es or what eve r a nd I kn o w I ha d t o se nd it via
com puter[.] MR. S TROU

D: A l ri ght[.] DEFEN DA NT: I had to send i

t o ver to they use posts li

ke post one– post two for l

ocati ons[ .] MR. S TROU

D: A l ri ght[.] DEFENDANT : I jus

t so happen to know where post 20 i s an d tha t’s South Suburb an

Coll ege[.]-4- MR. S TROU

D: Uh huh [.] DEFEN DA NT: So I’ m

not sure what agenc

y yo u k no w if th ere’s FBI –DE A–o r AT F o r w hat ever but we jus t kno w ther e’s agents i

n the area–Eh y

ou k now an d th ey at S outh Sub urb an caus e tha t’s w here I had to sen

d the mess age to[.] * * * MR. STR

OU D: Hu h ?–W oul d i t h av e to b e on

e of th e m ATF or FBI? DEFEN DA NT: Yea h–I t ’s o ne o f the m it’s it ’s eit he r ATF[,] FBI orDEA cause those are the onl y one s that let us know wh ere they

at[.] * * * MR. ST RO UD : O K– ( Un in tell igi ble) See what that’s about l et me kn ow[.] DEFEN DA NT: Ye ah ba sic ally t he y pr oba b l y won ’t I proba bl y won’ t hea

r nothi ng b ut i f I do I’l l l et y ou know [.]” Di Mare identifi ed defendant ’s voic e on the tapes. He testifi ed that
on the date the call

s were m ade, the Sout h Suburb an Em ergency Response Te am (S ER T) was assist ing wit h a bar ricad ed p er so n and th e di sp at ch er wa s r eq ui r ed t o no t ify lo ca l ag en cie s o f t ha t ac t ivit y. Di Mare tes ti f i ed tha t the i nf orm ati on d ef en da nt g ave to Str

ou d wa s confidential

under the po li

ce depart men

t’s rules and regulations. Af ter the Stat e rested, the trial court granted

de f en da nt’ s m oti on f or a di rected f i nd i ng on th e c ri m i na l dru g c ons pi rac y cou nt

. Defend ant the

n te sti f i ed tha t Gre g Stroud i

s th e f ather of her 14-yearol d so n. She a dmitt ed mak ing t he t hr ee ca lls, bu t t es t ified t ha t she did not kno w S t ro ud w as d ealing na rcot ic s. She told Stroud t hat police off i cers were at S outh Su b ur b an Col l eg e b ec au se

i t wa s c l ose

to his house and s

he wan ted to get his rea ct ion. She ho pe d S t r o ud “w o uld le t [her] know i f there was

an y thi ng su sp i ci ousgoi ng on i n h i s house.” On cross-ex am

in ation, def endan t acknowledged that she was i nf ormed ab out the ru

l esan d re gul ati ons proh i bi ti ng di sc l osu re of confi dentia l informat ion. She c l aimed, how ever , t hat she d id no t disclo se a ny confi dentia l informat ion, but fabrica t ed t he i nf orm ati on to provoke a response f

rom Stro ud. The t rial co ur t fou nd

de f en da n t gui l ty of of f i ci al m i sc on duct. She-5- was l ater s en

ten ce d to 24 m onth s’ prob ati on wit h co ndit ions including the perform

ance of 250 hours of comm

uni ty serv ic e. On ap pea l, de fendant contended the Stat e fai

le d to establ

is h that her dis cl osure of in

form ation vi olated a “l aw” as re qui re d to pr ove t he offense of o ffi

cial miscond uct . T he St at e r esp ond ed t hat defend ant
was proven gui

lty of off ic ia l m is condu ct becau se she violat ed t he Gl en wood pol i ce de

partm ent ru les and re gulat ions p ro hibiting disclo sur e o f co nfident ial inf or matio n. Fo llowing oral

argu men t, the a pp el l ate court ordered t he parties to pr o vid e a ut ho r it y o n w he t he r t he Gle nwood po lice dep ar t ment rules and regul

ations are “la

ws” wi t hin the me ani

ng of the of

fi ci al mi sconductstatut e. The State at tached to its supple me nt al br ief a copyo f t he Gle nw o o d V illag e o r din an ce s c o ve r ing t he po lic e de pa rtm en t. The Stat e also attached a copy of the m in utes of a Vill

age board of trustee s m

eeti ng he l d N ove

m be r 19 , 19 85, pur

por tin g to sh owthat t he Board “approve[d] the ne w Gl enwood Polic e depar tment’s Policy

and Procedures package, as presen ted by Trustee Pass agl i a.” The appella

te court determi

ned that the Gl enwood p o lice departmen

t rul es and regul

ations do not rise to the lev el of a “l aw” under th e of f i ci al m i sc on duct statu

t e. Fur t her , e ven if the ru les and
re gulat ions had been codif ied b y the Vi ll age as ord in

ances, they

ar e not “la ws ” b ec au se o nly t he legislat ur e ca n pr omu lgat e a law . T he evi dence t ha t de fen da nt vio lated th ose rules was, therefore, in suf fi ci ent to est abl

is h a v iolation of the of

fi ci al mi sconduct statut e. The app ellate co ur t also fou nd t hat t he de par t ment’ s ru les and
re gulat ions di d n o t ap pl y t o de fe n da n t b ec au se sh e w as n ot a “m em ber” of the departmen

t as defined by t he Gle

nwood Munici

pal Code. A cc or d ingl

y, the app ell

ate cou rt reverse d defendant’s convi ction an d entered a j udgme

nt of acqui

tt al because the evi dence
was insu fficie nt t o pr o ve he rgu ilt y o f o fficia l misc o nd uc t

. 39 3 I ll. App. 3d 77. Justice Murphy dis sented, assertin

g that t he rules and r egu latio ns were “approved an

d codif ie d as an ordi

nan ce” by the V ill ag e of Gle nwood, and they

should be consi

dered la ws wi thi n th e m ea ni ng of t he off ic ia l m is conduct stat ute. The e vidence sho wed t hat t he
con f i den ti al i ty rules appli

ed to defendan

t as a di sp atc he

r f orthe poli ce de pa rtm en t. Justice M ur phy concl uded that “[w]hen a

police-6- dis patcher ale r t s a dr ug de ale ro f p o t en t ial p o lice ac t ivit y a ime d at him, it ha s t o be o fficia l misc o nd uc t

. Pu t qu it e s imply, if t his c as e is not an exam ple of off i cial m i scon duct, the n I d o not know w

ha t is .” 393 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 94 (Mur phy , J., disse nti ng)

.
II. AN AL YSIS On appeal to this cour t, t he

State con ten dstha t the Gl en wood police depart men

t ru les an d regulations are “laws” wit hin the meaning of t he o ffi cial miscond uct st at ut e bec aus e t hey wer e ena ct ed byth e m un i ci pal i ty as ordi na nc es. Th e rul es h av e the f orc e o f l aw as administr at iverul es an d r eg ul at io ns

. By v i ol ati n g th e c on f i den ti al i ty rules o f t he Gle nw o o d p o lice de pa r t men t , de fen da nt kn o win gly performe d

an ac t t hat she kn ew wa s p r o hib it ed by la w. Ad di t io na lly, t he appe l l ate court

erred in concl udin g that t he conf

ide ntial ity rules do not appl y to defen dant. The State, t her efo re , maint ains t hat defend ant
wa s prop erl

y con v i cte d of of f i ci al m i sc on duct. Defend ant resp o nds t hat t he St at e failed t o p re sent co mpet ent evi dence est ablishing tha t t he Gle

nwood polic e departmen

t rules were e nac ted as m

unici pal ordinan ces. The conf

ide ntial ity rules are, therefore, onl

y pa rt o f t he po lice de pa r t men t ’s emp lo yment man ua l. The vi olation of em ploy me nt rules canno t be co nsider ed p er for ming
an act “ f orb i dden b y l aw ” a s req

ui re d to pro ve the offense of off ic ia l
m i sc on du ct. The St ate ’s argumen t would all

ow anoff ic ia l m is conduct
con vi cti on to be base d on a publ i c em

pl oyee ’s vi ol ati on of a m i nor or trivi al employment rule. Def

endan t further argues that the term “l

aw” sho uld be co nst ru ed na rr ow ly to include o nly stat e st at ut es a nd t he I llino is Constitution. Thus, ev en if the conf

ide ntial ity rules had b een enacted b y th e m un i ci pal i ty , the ordi

n an ce wou l d n ot f i t wit hin t he
me ani ng of a “ la w” under the off

ic ia l m is conduct stat ute. Defend ant f

urthe r m ai ntai ns that the appe l l ate court prope

rl y foun d the confi

dentia li ty rules do not apply

to her as a ci

vi li an em ploy ee. Fi nal ly , if her vi olation of the confi

dentia li ty rules m

ay ser ve a s a ba sis for a convi ction, def endan t contends the offi

ci al misconduct stat ute violates her constitut ional right to due pro cess. Wh en assess in g whe t her t he evide nce is su ffi cient t o s ust ain a
co nvictio n, t he reviewi

ng court’s in

quiry is “ ‘wh ether, after

viewing t he evi den

ce i n the l i ght m ost fa vorabl e to the pros ecuti on, any-7- rational trier of f act cou l d h av e f oun d th e e ss en ti al el em en ts of th e cr ime be yo nd a r ea so na ble do ub t

. ’ ” ( E mph as is i n ori gi na l .) People v. Bush , 214 Ill . 2d 318, 326 (2005), quo ting Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 31 8-19, 6 1 L. Ed . 2d 560 , 573, 99S. Ct. 2781 , 2 78 8-89 (1979 ). Before considerin g the suffi

cien cy of the evi

dence, we must fi rst det er mine whet her t he conf i den tia l i ty ru l es a re “laws” w ithin t he
me aning of

th e of f i ci al m i sc on duct statu

te. The p ar

ti es dispute whether th e c on f

i den ti al i ty ru l es are “l aw s”

an d, c on se qu en

tl y , wh eth er d efenda nt ’s violat ions o f tho se r ules a re act s “for bidden by la w” under the statute. The construction of the term “la w” presents an

is sue of statutory i nte rpreta ti on su bj ec t to denovo revi ew. People v. Howard , 22 8 I ll. 2d 428, 432 (2008)

. The f und am en tal obj ecti ve of statutory
co nst ru ct ion is t o a sce rt ain and g iveeffect to the legislature’s i n ten t, pr esu ming

i t di d n ot i n ten d to caus e absurd, inconven ien t, or u nj ust results. People v. Christopher son , 231 Ill . 2d 449 , 454 ( 200 8) . T he la nguage of a statute, giv

en its plai n and ordinary

mean in g, is the best i nd i ca ti on of l egi slati ve i nten t. People v. Lew

is , 234 Ill . 2d 32, 44 (2009 ). Crim

in al statut es are construed strictly in fav or o f the ac cused. People v. Grever

, 222 Il l . 2d 321 , 338 (2 006). Sec ti on 33 –3 (b ) o f t he Cr

i m i n al Cod e of 19 61 prov i de s th

at a pu blic em ploy ee co mmit s mis co nd uc t wh en , in t he pu blic employee’s off ic ia l ca pa cit y, h e k no win gly

performs an act he kn

ows is forbi dden by l aw. 720 ILC S 5/3 3–3(b ) (West 1998). The off ic ia l m is conduct sta tute was i ntended to prev en

t publ i c of

f i cers an d e m pl oyee s f rom using a n official po sitio n in the comm is si on of an of

fen se. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva , 1 42 I ll. 2d 4 95, 506 (1 991 ). The statut e “requi res that t he cha rg inginst ru ment ‘sp ec ify t he “law” alleged ly vi

olat ed by t he off ic er.” Grever, 22 2 I ll. 2d at 335, quo ting Fellhauer , 142 Ill . 2d at 506. In Fellhauer , this court assertedt ha t t he t er m “law ” in the off ic ia l
m i sc on du ct statu

te i nc l udes a ci vi l or penal statute, a supr em e court rule, ad m i n i strati v e r ul es or re gul ati

ons, or a tenet of a professi onal code. Fellhauer , 142 Ill . 2d at 506 (citin g People v. Basse tt , 16 9 I ll. App. 3d 2 32, 235 (1 988 ), and People v. Weber, 133 Ill . App. 3d 686, 690 -9 1 ( 198 5) ). We have si nce repeated

that conclusi

on, holdi ng an indict ment chargi

ng off ic ia l m is conduct “m

ust, at a min

im um, al le ge f acts tha t woul d s how defen dant vi olated an i

dentif ia ble statut e, rule,-8- re gulat ion, or t enet of a profes si onal code.” Grever, 222 Ill . 2d at 337. Those st at ement s o n t he so ur ces of law ar e no t intend ed t o be exh austiv e, howe ver, as s hown by our subs eq

uen t h ol di n g th at a vi ol ati on of the Ill i noi s C ons ti tution ma y s erve as a predi

cate unlawful act f or off i cial m i scon duct. Howard

, 22 8 I l l . 2d

at 4 39. Thus , a prov i si on may be a “law” w ithin t he me a ni ng of the of

fi ci al mi sco nduct

st at ut e eve n if i

t do es no t fit sq uar ely within o ne o f the categories we ha

ve previ ously ide ntif ie d. Indeter mi

ni ng whether the co nf

iden tiali ty rules at iss

ue ar e “l aws ,” we f

i rst con sider the State’ s arg um en t that they were enacted
as a Vi l l ag e ordi

n an ce . A t tri al, reti re d deputy

po lic e chi

ef A le x Di Mare testifi ed that the rules were “adopted in 1985” an d w er e s t ill in effect when he left t he de par t ment in 2 000 . T he Stat e di d not o ff er any evidenc e o n t he drafting of the rules, t he pr oc ess u sed in enact ing t he m, or t he g ove rnm ent body that adopt ed them . The evi dence presented at tr ia l o n t his issue w as limi

t ed t o D iMare ’s mer e st at ement that the rules

were adopted in 1985. Based on this evi dence, we
c an not conclude that t he rules were enacted by the Vil lage as a n ordinan ce. The ap pe llat e c o ur t o r de r ed su pp leme n ta l briefing, a llowing t he Sta te an op po rt unit y to submit a ut hor ity est ablishing tha t t he
con f i den ti al i ty rules are “l aws.” The State att ached to its bri ef copies of t he Glenw oo d o rd inances g ove rning t he po lice dep ar t ment a nd mi nutes f rom a board of trustees me eting h el d in 1985. The parties

dis pute whether this

court should take judi

ci al notice of the mi nutes f rom the board of trustees mee ting

. We find it
unne c ess ary

to deci de whether the m in utes are subj ect to judi

ci al
no t ic e beca

use, even if we consi der them, they

do not establ

is h that t he con f i den ti al i ty ru l es wereen acte d as an ordin

ance. The m

in utes
o nly sta te that t he b oard appro ved a n ew “Polic y a nd Procedures package”pre sente d by

one of the trustee s. The

re i s n o i nd i ca ti on of t he con t ent s o f the “Po licy and Pr oc edu re s pa cka ge” or t hat t he
con f i de nti al i ty rul esat i ss uewere p art of

t hat pac kag e. We note that t he con f i de nti al i ty rul esha ve be en ref erred to as“ Gl en wood Pol ic e Dep ar t ment ru les a nd r eg ula t io ns, ” no t as pa rt o f a “ Po licy and Procedures package.” Further, the m in utes sim pl y st at e t hat t he packag e w as

“ appr ov e[ d] .”They

do n ot i n di ca te t ha t it was ena

cted
as a V ill age or dinance . T hus, even if t he minut es sho wed t hat t he-9- con f i den ti al i ty rul es were

i ncl uded i n the “Pol i cy and Pr ocedure s package,” those mi

nutes do not establi sh that the rules were enacted as an ordi nan ce. The o r din ances s

ubm itted by the Stat e i

ncl ude a section e

ntitled “Promulga

ti on of rul es and regul

ations b y c hief of police.” That section stat es:

“The chi ef of police m ay ma ke or prescribe

such rul es and reg ul ati on s as he s

hal l de em advi sabl e. Such rul es, when app ro ved by t he village pr eside nt and board o f trustees, sha ll be bi ndi ng on the m

em bers of the pol

ic e departmen

t. Such rules and r egu latio ns may co ver t he conduct of the mem bers,
un ifo rms and equi

pme nt to be wo rn or ca

rri ed , hours of
s ervi ce, vacations, and all

ot her sim

il ar matter s necess ar y o r des i rab l e f or the b etter ef

f i ciency of the pol

i ce de partm en t.” The o r di na nc e s ug ge st s t ha t t he po lice ch ief may h av e pr omu lgat ed t he conf

i den tia l i ty ru l es a s pa rt of the departmen

t rules and r eg ula t io ns, an d t ha t t he Villa ge co uld po t en t ially a pp r o ve t he m. The re is no p ro of, how ever , t hat t he r ules w er e ac t ually appr ove d by t he Vil la ge. As n ot ed, the mi

nutes submitt ed by t he Stat e i ndicate that
a “Po licy and

Pr ocedures package” was approved b y the board, but there is no evid enc e t hat t he c o nfi dential ity rules were part o f that package. Even i

f we c ould concl

ude that the confi

dentia li ty rules at is sue wer e pa rt of t hat pac kag e, t he boa rd ’s ap pr ova l of t he package
wo uld still n

ot establi sh that t he rules wer e form ally enacted as an ordinan ce. Ad di t io na lly, Al

ex Di Mare onl y testi f i ed that the ru

l es w ere “adoptedin

1985,” without any

expl anati on of the process used or t he person o r entity adopt in

g the rules. We f urthernote that t he Il

li nois Muni ci pal Code pr ovid es, “[t ]he
m uni ci pal cl erk shal

l record, in

a book used excl

usi vel y f or t hat purpose, all ordi

nan ces pas sed

by the c orporate auth

oriti es.” 65 ILCS 5/1–2–5 (W es t 20 08 ). Th e M unic ipa l Co de sp ec ifi es meth odsf or pr oving the cont ents and pass ag e o f ordinan ces. 65 ILCS 5/1–2–5, 1–2–6 (Wes t 200 8). A cc ordi ngl y , i f the con f i de n ti al i ty ru l es w ere passed as a n or dinance , t he St at e co uld have eas ily pr ove n t he
con ten ts and p assage o f t ha t o r din an ce

. T he St at e d id n o t su bmit proof o f t he c o nt ent s o r p as sa ge o f any or dinance pr ohibit ing disclo sur e o f co nfident ial inf or matio n.-10- We co nc lud e t ha t t he r ec o r d d o es no t sho w t he co nfid en t ialit y rules were form ally passed or enacted by

the Vi ll age as an ordin

ance. The re co rd her e o nly shows t hat defend ant violat ed r ules a do pt ed by t he Gle nw o o d p o lice de pa r t men t o n t he dis clo su r e o f co nfid en t ia l informat ion. We

m ust, the ref ore , det ermi

ne wh ether those rules qu alify as “l aws” withi

n the m eani ng of the of

fi ci al mi sconduct statut e. In reviewi ng the confidential

ity rul es, we fi nd our appellate co urt ’s
re aso ningin People v. Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d 677 (1991), persuasiv

e. In th at c as e, th e de fen da nt wa s e mplo yed as a ja nit o rby an I llino is vet er ans ho me a nd b ec ame frie nds wit h a r es ide nt o f t he home

. E ve nt ua lly, t he r eside nt app ro ache d t h e def en da n t an d of f ered to in vest$60,000 in

hi s restaurant. After consi derin g the off er for a f ew days, the defe

ndan t accep t ed. In e xchang e fo r t he $6 0, 000 , t he defend ant as sig ne d h is int er es t in t he r es t au r an t bu ild i n g to t he
re sident in a

documen t draftedby

the re siden

t. Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d at 679-80. The parties h

ad a fa ll in g out shortly

after the restaurant was opened and the resi

dent fi le d sui t, seekin g the retur n o f hi s $60,000 i n v estmen t. The State subsequentl

y c harged the def

endan t with off ic ia l mi sconductalle gi ng t ha t , wh ile a ct ing in h is o ffic ial c ap ac it y a s a pu blic em ploy ee, he kn owingl y pe rformed an act that he knew was forbi dden by la w, “tha t law being t he De par t ment o f Vet er ans Af f ai rs I llino is Veterans Home P er son al Con duct R ul es f or Em pl oy ee s, to wi t: having any

financial tr ansa ct ions w ith client s o r member s.” The defend ant ackn

owl edge d tha

t he w as a

ware of t he personal

conduct rules and u nder st oo d he had v

iolated a rule a

gai nst fi nan ci al dealin gs wi th res i den ts. Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d at 680-81. T he def endan t was convi cted of of

f i cial m i scon duct (Il l . Rev . Stat. 1989, c

h. 3 8, par

. 33–3( b)) and sen

tenced to a term of probati

on. Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d at 678. On appe al, the S tate

ar gu ed t ha t t he rule of the hom e was a “ la

w” under t he o fficia l m isc o nd uc t st at ut e b ec au se it wa s “a pr o pe r ly pr o mu lga ted adm i nistrati ve rule or regu

l ati on.” Th

e app el l ate court rejected t he St at e’ s a r gu men t , ho ldin g t ha t t he r ec o r d o nly dem onstrated “so meo ne in a ut ho r it y at t he Ho me t ho ug ht t his rule to be de si rabl e, i nc l ude d i t i n th e l i st of em pl oy m ent rules

to be pass ed out t o a ll employees, and defen dant was giv

en a copy .” Gray , 22 1 I ll. App. 3d a t 683 -8 4. The evi dence sh owed that t he rule was “ generated-11- by t he Ho me’s ad mini

st ra t ive st aff and a pplied t o no othe r f ac i l i ty of the Departmen

t o f Veterans

Af fai rs.” Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d at 684. The appe l l ate court

listed several ot her pro hibitions in the home’s personal conduct rules, i

ncl udin g delib erately

ref using t o o be y a super visor’s or der s, u sing o bsce ne o r a busive langua ge, “[d ]iso beying instruct ions, pro ce du

re s a n d p oli ci es , w h eth er th rough n eg l ect, procras ti na ti on or del i berate disobe di ence,”

and “ [d]e libe r at ely inter fering wi

th or delaying t he work o f other em ploy ees.” Gray , 221 I ll

. App. 3d at 684. The appella te court recognized that the r ule s prohib ited

“ a l ot of ba d th i ng s a n e m pl oyeem i gh t do or sa y” and a vi ol ati on of those rules

ma y j us ti f y su sp ensi on w i thou t pa y or i m med i ate dis ch arge. Gr ay , 221 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 685. The legi slature
co uld not have i ntended, though, to deem

that behav

ior a f el ony w hen it enacted t he o ffi cial

m i scon duct sta tute. Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d at 685-86. The ap pella

te court , therefore, held that t he off ic ia l mi sconductsta

tute wasnot

applic abl e to t hese f

acts and revers ed

t he def endan t’s c onv i cti on. Gray , 221 Ill . App. 3d at 686. S imila r ly, the

re i s n o evi dence in

this case that any

form al legislat ivepr o ce ss wa s u se d in ado pt ing t he co nfident iality rules. The
ev id ence does not even establ

is h that the rules

were sanctioned

o r approved by the V ill

age of G lenw oo d. The rules were, therefore, prescrib ed

wi th out any fo rmal e na ct men t o rinfo rmal a pp r o va l by a go ver ning body. W e share the Gray cou rt ’s co ncer n abo ut co nst ru ing t he t er m “law ” in t he o fficia lm i sc on du ct st at ut e s o br o ad ly t ha t it in cl udes rules p rom

ulgate d s o lely by a p er so n in au t ho rit y of a go ver nment al d ep ar t ment o r t he a dminist ra t ive s t aff. The confi dentia li ty rules here were appa

rently promulgated under t he ord in ance allowin

g the po li

ce chi ef to pr escribe rules an d
re gulat ions co ver ing, amo ng o t her t hing s, co ndu ct o f t he m emb ers, un ifo rms and equ ipment , ho ur s o f service , a nd vac at ions. The St ate ’s
ar gument wo uld allo w a felo ny of f i ci al m i sc on duct pros ecuti

on to be based o n a vio lat io n o f rule s p r es cr ibe d s o lely by the pol

i cech i ef on those ma tt ers. We f urther note t hat

the confi dentia li ty rules i ntroduced by t he St at e p r o vid e, in p ar t , t ha t “[ a] lleg at io ns , go ss ip , he ar sa y, rum orand an onym ous uncorroborat ed

in form ation sh all b e treated as conf i den tia l .” A l th oug h th e S tate di d n ot contend def

endan t viol ated that particul

ar pa rt o f the rule, acce

pting the c onfi

dentia li ty rules as “l aw” would al

low a f el ony prosecuti on to be b ased o n the poli ce-12- chief ’s rul esproh i bi ti ng di sc l osu re of gossi p, he arsa y , or rum or. We do not be l i ev e the

l egi slatureintend ed t he t er m “law” t o be giv en such a br oa d co nst ru ct ion. In sum , we concl

ude that the confi

dentia li ty rules here do not

rise to the l evel of a “l aw ” w i

thi n th e m ea ni ng of the off ic ia l m is conduct statut e. The Stat e’s ev

ide nce tha t de f en da nt v i ol ate d those

rul esi s n ot sufficient to sh

owthat defenda

nt performe d an act “f

orbidden by la w”
as required to sustain

a co nv i cti

on of of f i ci al m i sc on duct. W e m

us t, therefore, affirm the a ppe llate c ou rt ’s judg ment that the evi dence was insufficient t o s ust ain defend ant ’s co nvictio n. Wh en a c o nvic t io n is rev

ers ed base d on ev id en t iar y ins uf

fic ien cy, t he do uble jeo par dy claus e pr eclud es t he St at e fro m ret rying t he defen dan t, and t he o nly p r o pe rr eme dy is a ju dg men t o f ac qu it t al. People v. Olivera , 164 Ill . 2d 382, 393 (1995). Giv en our de ci si on on t his issue, i

t is unnecessary

to address th e p ar

ti es ’ o th er argu men ts on t he applic abi

li ty of the conf

ide ntial ity rules to defen dant an d th e constitutional

ity of the off ic ia l m is conduct stat ute. As a final matt er , w e empha size t hat ou r ho lding sho uld no t be in terpret ed asan approv al of defend ant ’s co nduc t . T he cond uct h ere is cer t ainly tro ubleso me and unj ustif ia ble. We h old thatde fen da nt did not co mmit t he o ff

e nse o f official mi

sco nduc t only beca use t he
con f i den ti al i ty rules at issue he re canno t be construed as “l aws” unde

r t he statut e. At oral argum

ent, defense counsel

asserted defe

ndan t may have been properly charged with other cri

mi nal off enses . We do not express an

y opi n i on on th at poi

n t. We o nly hold t hat t he ci rcumstances presented

by this ca se do n ot es tab l i sh

the of f ense of of f i ci al m i sc on du ct.

III. CONCLUSION For the f oregoi ng r eas ons, we af

f i rm t he appellate co urt ’s judg ment re ver sing defen

dant’s conv

iction and e

nterin g a j udg men t of
ac qu it t al. Appellate court judgment affirmed.