64-370CC

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/csce

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2000

BELARUS: STALLED AT

THE CROSSROADS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

MARCH 9, 2000

[CSCE 106-2-4]

 
(ii)

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

Co-Chairman

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, Department of State

DR. EDWARD L. WARNER III, Department of Defense

PATRICK A. MULLOY, Department of Commerce

COMMISSION STAFF

DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Chief of Staff

RONALD J. MCNAMARA, Deputy Chief of Staff

(VACANT), Senior Advisor

ELIZABETH M. CAMPBELL, Office Manager

OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor

JOHN F. FINERTY, Staff Advisor

CHADWICK R. GORE, Communications Director, Digest Editor

ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor

JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor

MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel for International Trade

KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion

MICHELE MADASZ, Staff Assistant/Systems Administrator

MICHAEL J. OCHS, Staff Advisor

ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law

MAUREEN T. WALSH, General Counsel
(iii)

BELARUS: STALLED AT THE CROSSROADS

MARCH 9, 2000

OPENING STATEMENTS

PAGE

Chairman Christopher H. Smith .................................................................... 1

Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Ranking Member ......................................................... 5

WITNESSES

PAGE

Harold Hongju Koh, Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.... 4

Ross Wilson, Principal Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large and Special

Advisor to the Secretary of State for New Independent States................ 8

Semyon Sharetsky, Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of

Belarus ...................................................................................................... 15

Stanislav Shushkevich, Member of the Supreme Soviet and corresponding

member of Belarus National Academy of Sciences ................................ 18

Anatoly Lebedka, Chair of the Commission for International Affairs of the

13th Supreme Soviet and Deputy Chair of the United Civil Party........ 20

Testimony of Adrian Severin, OSCE Parliamentary Assemblys Working

Group on Belarus ...................................................................................... 30

Testimony of Spencer Oliver, Secretary General, OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly ................................................................................................... 32

APPENDICES

Prepared Statement of Hon. Steny H. Hoyer ............................................... 41

Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Brownback ............................................. 42

Written Submission of Harold Hongju Koh ................................................. 43

Written Submission of Adrian Severin ........................................................ 48

Written Submission of Stanislav Shushkevich ........................................... 56

Report on the Activities in 1999 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on

Belarus of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ...................................... 59

Written Submission of Semyon Sharetsky .................................................. 71

Written Submission of Anatoly Lebedka ..................................................... 76

Written Submission of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of

Belarus ...................................................................................................... 80
BELARUS: STALLED AT A CROSSROAD

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 2000

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

WASHINGTON, DC.

The Commission met at 10:00 a.m. in Room 334, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., the Honorable Christopher H. Smith,

Chairman, presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman; Hon.

Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Co-Chairman; and Hon. Joseph R. Pitts

Witnesses present: Amb. Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of

State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Ambassador Ross Wilson, Principal Deputy to the Ambassador- at-Large and Special Advisor

to the Secretary of State for New Independent States; Anatoly Lebedka,

Chair of the Commission for International Affairs of the 13th Supreme

Soviet and Deputy Chair of the United Civil Party; Semyon Sharetsky,

Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus; Stanislav

Shushkevich, Member of the Supreme Soviet and corresponding member of Belarus National Academy of Sciences; Adrian Severin, M.P.,

Head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assemblys Working Group on Belarus; Spencer Oliver, Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN

Mr. SMITH. Good morning. Last April, the Commission held a hearing on Belarus, when we examined Belarus track record with respect

to human rights and democracy. Most of the testimony was not encouraging, although, at the time, there appeared to be some basis for thinking that there might be possible solutions to the constitutional impasse

that has so damaged the democratic development of Belarus.

Unfortunately, today there appear to be even fewer grounds for optimism and Belarus appears to be stalled at the crossroads. Alyaksandr

Lukashenka remains in power, beyond the expiration of his legal term

on July 20, 1999. Not surprisingly, he did not acknowledge last Mays

alternative opposition-organized presidential elections. Instead, several

individuals associated with that election have paid the price for organizing elections according to the 1994 constitution.

Former Prime Minister Mikhail Chygir, the leading candidate in the

alternative elections, was detained for eight months ending November

30, and is now in the midst of a questionable trial that strongly smacks

of being politically motivated.
2

Viktor Gonchar, who chaired the Central Election Commission for

those elections, along with his friend Anatoly Krasovsky, and former

Minister of Internal Affairs Yuri Zakharenka, a close associate of Chygirs,

has mysteriously disappeared. There is understandable anguish and

fear on the part of the family, friends, and the democratic opposition in

Belarus, and grave concern from the international community. Other

individuals who have opposed the regime, such as Andrei Klimov and

Vladimir Koudinov, continue to suffer in detention.

Lukashenkas regime continues to clench the reins of power, stifling

fundamental freedoms and violating the human rights of Belarusian

citizens. Despite several false starts, it has refused to engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition. Instead, he has played lip service to

dialogue, or has used the tactics of delay and obfuscation, so reminiscent of the communist past.

To cite an example, disregarding the OSCE mediated dialogue process, the flawed electoral code recently approved by Lukashenka ignores key OSCE recommendations. Bypassing the dialogue process contradicts both the July 15, 1999, agreement with the opposition and the

OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group, as well as paragraph 22 of the

Istanbul Summit Declaration which calls for progress in that dialogue.

More important, the flawed electoral code dramatically reduces the

chances of a free and fair parliamentary election this Fall. I would like

to think that real dialogue will begin, based on last weeks round-table

conference in Minsk between the Belarusian Government and the opposition and NGOs, with the participation of a joint delegation of the OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly

and European Parliament.

I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Severin and Mr. Lebedka, who

participated in this meeting. However, given the record of Mr.

Lukashenkas broken promises, and the continued climate of repression, I am somewhat skeptical, although I would be very pleased if turns

out that my skepticism was unwarranted.

Meanwhile, frustration and discontent with Lukashenka and his regime continue to grow, both domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, the regimes reaction to criticism has been to downplay, ignore

or rationalize its own violations of freely undertaken OSCE and other

international commitments.

Meanwhile, the situation for the long-suffering people of Belarus gets

worse. Living standards are dropping. Inflation is spiraling. The legacy

of Chernobyl still hangs like a dark cloud. According to a March 1 Reuters

article, Belarus is experiencing soaring levels of infertility and genetic

changes.

Belarusian citizens, led by the democratic opposition, will be holding

large rallies in the next few weeks. We expect that there will not be a

repeat of the events of last Octobers Freedom March in which some

demonstrators were brutally beaten, and we would hope that the rights

to freedom of expression, assembly and association will be unequivocally respected.

Another issue of growing concern is the Russia-Belarus Union. How

can one talk about a Union when mockery is made of democratic processes? When freedom of expression is severely limited; when a legitimate parliament reflecting the electorate is cast aside; when the judi-
3

ciary is controlled by the executive; when freedoms of association and

assembly are constrained, how can we talk of a Union? Can a genuine

debate exist under these circumstances?

For that matter, can we speak of a Union when the decks are stacked

against those who deeply care about Belarus independence, and when

the head of the country actively works against open debate on the subject? A momentous decision such as whether or not to unify with another country, with all the implications for Belarus sovereignty should,

as perhaps no other decision, reflect the genuine will of the people.

I am very pleased to welcome our distinguished witnesses here today,

and to hear their views on the situation in Belarus and its prospects for

the future. We are joined by Assistant Secretary Harold Hongju Koh,

but before yielding to our first witness, Id like to yield to my friend

from Pennsylvania.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I dont have an opening statement. I would like to thank the Chairman for polling his support during this important hearing on this situation.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Commissioner Pitts.

Let me introduce our first witnesses. It is Assistant Secretary Harold

Koh, the Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and an

executive branch member of our Helsinki Commission.

Assistant Secretary Koh formerly served as a Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. He has served as a U.S. Supreme Court

and Court of Appeals clerk, worked as an attorney at the Justice Department, and in private practice. Assistant Secretary Koh has authored

more than 70 articles on international law, human rights, constitutional law and books on international relations, law, and human rights

and yesterday, I wanted to point out to members of our Commission,

went through a grueling three hours before the subcommittee on International Operations of Human Rights and, as expected, came through

with flying colors. He is a man that we deeply respect on the Commission and on our committee as a stalwart in the fight for human rights

around the globe.

We also want to introduce and welcome Ross Wilson, who has been

Principal Deputy to the Ambassador at Large and Special Advisor to

the Secretary of State for the New Independent States since 1997. Since

entering the foreign Service in 1979, he has served twice as economic

officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and also in Prague and

Melbourne, and he has served as U.S. Consul General.

Mr. Wilson was Deputy Executive Secretary of the State Department

form 1992 to 1994, and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of

State from 1990 to 1992. He has testified to this Commission, most

recently in April 1999, on our hearing on Belarus. We welcome him

back and applaud him for the fine work he is doing as well.

Secretary Koh, if you could begin.

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD HONGJU KOH,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS

AND LABOR

Sec. KOH. Mr. Chairman, fellow members of the Commission, I am

delighted to be with you this morning both as Assistant secretary of

State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and as the State
4

Departments Commissioner on the Helsinki Commission. I have a

written statement which I will submit for the record, and which Id like

to summarize.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in Belarus has markedly deteriorated

since the spring of 1999 when you held your last hearing on this beleaguered country. Belarus is being left behind at a time when the rest of

Europe is seeking to build a common foundation of democratic governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Because the United

States is deeply concerned about the situation in Belarus, I traveled to

Minsk last November, and Mr. Wilson will be traveling there in the

next few days. Before describing my own trip, let me briefly sketch the

broad outlines of the democracy and human rights situation in Belarus.

There are many critical elements of democracy, but the key four are

first, respect for the will of the people; second, a vibrant civil society;

third, the rule of law; and fourth, and informed citizenry. In all four of

these areas, Belarus now faces serious challenges.

First, in Belarus, the regime continues to try to suppress the will of

the people. Besides using unconstitutional methods in 1996 to rewrite

the countrys constitution, and replacing the legitimate 13th Supreme

Soviet with a rubber stamp parliament, Alexander Lukashenka unilaterally extended his own term of office by 2 years, until 2001. His legal

term of office expired last July 20, and as a result of these actions, as

well as pattern of abuse of fundamental human rights by his regime,

Lukashenka has lost his democratic legitimacy and is shunned by leaders throughout most of Europe. Lukashenka also recently approved the

seriously flawed electoral law for upcoming parliamentary elections.

As you pointed out in your statement, Mr. Chairman, the OSCEs

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights examined the

new law in detail and concluded that it does not meet OSCE standards.

Major problems include strict limitations on political activity which

effectively prevent real campaigning from taking place, and the lack of

a provision for multiparty representation on election commissions which

is so vital for impartiality and public confidence in the electoral process.

The Lukashenka regimes recent announcement of plans to resume

the OSCE-sponsored dialogue with the opposition must not impose preconditions that will make it impossible for the opposition to participate.

Instead, it must produce real results including agreement on an electoral code that meets OSCE standards and provides an internationally

acceptable framework for legitimate, free and fair parliamentary elections. Otherwise, the U.S. Government and other democracies will find

it very difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the parliamentary election planned for later this year as legitimate, and Belarus will not resolve its political and constitutional crises or end its self-imposed isolation.

The second core element of democracy is a vibrant civil society. We

learned long ago that democracy means far more than just holding elections or referendums, but in Belarus those who have chosen to participate in civil society by speaking truth to power, have done so at great

risk to their own freedom and even their lives.

Last year marked a new low in Belarus, not only because of the expiration of Lukashenkas legitimate term of office, but also because several prominent opposition figures whom you have mentioned, former

Interior Minister Yuri Zakharenka and Victor Gonchar, along with his

associate Anatoly Krasovsky disappeared. A third prominent figure,
5

former National Bank Chair Tamara Vinikova, felt so threatened that

she escaped the country by temporarily disappearing. Others, such as

Simyon Sharetsky and Zianon Pazniak also fled abroad out of fear for

their safety.

Former Prime Minister and candidate in the opposition sponsored

1999 presidential elections, Mikhail Chygir, and the 13th Supreme Soviet Deputies Anatoly Lebedka, Valerii Shchukin, and Andrei Klimov

are only a few of the many opposition figures who have been targeted,

beaten, or imprisoned for their peaceful expression of their beliefs.

Taken together, this series of disappearances, arrests and exiles has

greatly exacerbated the climate of fear that exists in Belarus, and has

made clear that citizens expressing opposition to the government are in

great peril.

The Lukashenka regime has also sought to repress civil society by

restricting freedom of assembly and association, first by its violent oppression of the October 17, 1999 Freedom March, and also of other peaceful protests. The regime has inhibited freedom of association through

its restrictive law requiring NGOs, political parties and trade unions to

reregister, and last week, the Ministry of Justice announced that it

intends to disband 200 NGOs that the regime refused to reregister.

Registration requirements also restrict the practice of religion, despite constitutional and international guarantees of freedom of religion.

This is especially true for non-Orthodox or non-traditional religions which

include some Protestant faiths. In the United States, NGOs and religions may register if they wish to receive a specific tax status, but let

me make it clear. Unlike in Belarus, no organization or NGO or religion is required to register to function or to hold a bank account. It is

this requirement of registration that imposes the difference.

The Lukashenka regime also has restricted freedom of expression

and association through harassment of free and independent trade union

activities. Trade union organizations are refused registration and trade

unionists are arrested for legitimate trade union activities such as distributing leaflets. Unionists and members of their families are arrested

on trumped-up charges and are given unusually severe punishments

for minor offenses.

The failure to protect internationally recognized worker rights has

led the United States to advise the Belarusian authorities that the general system of preferences benefits [GSP] are now on the verge of being

withdrawn.

A third element of any true democracy is the rule of law. Once the

rule of law crumbles, accountability withers and along with it, democracy. In Belarus, those in power have sought to undermine democracy

and accountability by stifling the independence of the judiciary. The

legal system has become little more than a tool to advance Lukashenkas

agenda. Laws have been passed not to protect, but to restrict human

rights and democratic governance.

The judiciary has been used to reward loyal followers, to rubber stamp

decisions, and to silence peaceful democratic opposition. Over the past

few months for example, the Lukashenka regime has been conducting

show trials against Mikhail Chygir and Andrei Klimov because they

oppose Lukashenkas authoritarian rule.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a genuine democracys executive overreach

is checked by a fourth key element of democratic society, namely, an

informed electorate. But in Belarus, the regime continues to combat its
6

critics by placing extensive restrictions on independent media. In September, at the request of a libel suit by the Ministry of the Interior, the

independent Newspaper Navini was forced out of business. That same

month, the regime attempted to pull the registration for ten other papers. In January, the regime closed the daily Kutsenya in Orsha. The

successor to Navini, Nasha Svaboda had its press run stopped last

week, only on its second day of publication.

State-controlled Belarusian TV maintains a monopoly as the only

nationwide television station. Even Internet access is limited to government controlled service providers. However, such measures have not

stopped the courageous efforts of independent reporters and journalists

such as Pavel Zhuk, the fearless editor of Navini and Nasha Svaboda. Last November, I visited Minsk along with two members of your

Commission staff, Ron McNamara and Orest Deychakiwsky, to give

moral support to democracy and human rights advocates and to convey

the U.S. Governments concerns to the government of Belarus.

While in Minsk, I participated in an NGO sponsored rule of law conference, the focus of which was human rights protection and the protection of human rights lawyers. I also met with members of the 13th

Supreme Soviet, wives of the disappeared and detained democratic opposition leaders, human rights activists, and Ambassador Wieck, the

head of Mission of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group.

I also met with independent journalists and Foreign Minister Latypov

and Deputy Foreign Minister Martynov, who we pressed for concrete

actions including the release of Chygir, which later came about, and

opposition media access.

Shortly after my trip to Belarus, I returned to Istanbul for the OSCE

summit where I met first with Belarusian opposition and then with

official delegations including then-presidential advisor and OSCE liaison Sazanov, who subsequently left his position and was replaced by

Igor Uelichansky and Deputy Foreign Minister Jarasumavich.

Since then, I have given special focus to the Belarus issue here in

Washington, participating with Deputy Secretary Talbott in a recent

meeting he had with Semyon Sharetsky, Mr. Shushkevich, and Ligmila

Gryazanova, and I have met with numerous NGOs, lawyers, and dissidents from Belarus.

My trip was only one of the ways in which the U.S. Government has

sought to buttress our support for democracy and human rights in

Belarus. Weve also put in place an assistance program designed to

support democracy and human rights advocates and independent media in Belarus. In fiscal year 1999, we provided more than $8 million in

democracy related assistance out of a total country budget of $12.4 million in Freedom Support Act funds.

In other words, over two-thirds of our assistance consisted of democracy building programs, while the remaining 1/3 consisted of programs

designed to promote civic empowerment through the private sector, as

well as U.S.-Belarusian hospital partnerships and humanitarian assistance for victims of the Chernobyl accident.

A central component of our democracy building strategy has been the

U.S. Embassys Democracy Commission, which in the fiscal year 1999

awarded more than $1 million in small grants to support print and

electronic media, independent trade unions, youth and womens groups,

human rights groups, and other democratically organized organizations.
7

An additional $1 million in small grants was awarded by the Eurasia

Foundation in fiscal year 1999 with funding from the U.S. Government

as well as from private foundations.

Other types of ongoing U.S. Government-funded democracy programs

include NGO development programs, legal assistance and education

programs, political party training programs focusing especially on women

and youth activists, and academic and professional exchange. I will do

my utmost to ensure that U.S. core democracy programs are preserved

to the fullest extent possible in Belarus in fiscal year 2000, and I will

seek to identify some funding from my own bureau as well.

Let me close by saying I have been deeply moved by the courage of the

members of Belarusian civil society I have met, and I am deeply committed to giving them sustained and meaningful support. The United

States is well represented in Minsk by Ambassador Dan Speckhard,

who is doing an outstanding job promoting democracy and human rights,

and its a pleasure to have a strong collegial relationship with my friends

at the State Department, Steve Sestanovich and Ross Wilson, from whom

you will hear next. We welcome your partnership in this and all we do

in democracy and human rights, and look forward to your thoughts on

what more we can do to promote democracy, human rights, and the

rule of law in Belarus.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Koh, thank you very much for your excellent

statement and for the administrations giving this such a high priority.

Its a high priority shared by the Congress, Democrats and Republicans

alike.

I think at a time when some things, particularly in an election year,

break down over partisan differences, I think the message that we want

to send, which is the true and real message of todays hearing, is that

we are united in trying to promote democracy and human rights in

Belarus, and that we stand with those who are being oppressed, and not

with the oppressor. I want to congratulate you for the fine job that you

have been doing.

We have been joined by Congressman Alcee Hastings from Florida,

who is a rapporteur on the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly for the Security and Political Affairs Committee, and we are very happy to have

him here today.

If you have any comments youd like to make, Mr. Hastings?

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you so very much for letting me come and sit

in on this critically important hearing. I wish that I were going to be

able to be here for all the seminars but I am not.

I know you have read, by reflecting on your statement, about the

meeting that took place last week where, particularly, the OSCE Assembly was represented. I wanted to pay my respects to those that participated in that activity and be prepared from the standpoint of the

committee that I serve on.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Wilson.

TESTIMONY OF AMB. ROSS WILSON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY TO

THE AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE AND SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

Amb. WILSON Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear

again before this Commission. You and Assistant Secretary Koh have

spoken eloquently about the deterioration of democracy and respect for
8

human rights in Belarus. My comments will highlight our policy approach toward that country and steps that were taking to try to promote democratic change there.

Our policy toward Belarus, in principle, is the same as that toward

all the states of the former Soviet Union. We support Belarus sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as its market

democratic transformation and integration among the broader transAtlantic community of nations. Market democracy is the basis for Belarus integration and guarantor of its independence. As long as Belarus remains under authoritarian rule of dubious legitimacy, this

country will have difficulty modernizing its political and economic institutions, our ability to help it will be limited, and trans-Atlantic security on NATOs eastern flank will suffer.

Mr. Chairman, when I appeared before you last April, our ambassador had been recalled to protest his outrageous treatment at the hands

of the Lukashenka regime in violation of its Vienna Convention obligations. Encouraged by the kinds of things that you said then and that

others said in those proceedings, we redoubled our efforts to resolve the

Drozdy affair in a way that respected the taxpayers interest in recovering property taken from us and got our ambassador back to post.

Ambassador Speckhard and our embassy have put effective support

of democratic change at the top of their agenda. They and we keep close

tabs on domestic developments, meet regularly with the opposition,

strongly support the work of the OSCE in Belarus, and coordinate closely

with our European allies.

With the government, our approach continues to be one of selective

engagement. We engage with it intensively on democracy and human

rights and selectively at an appropriate level on other issues when our

interests dictate. We provide no direct assistance to the government.

We speak out when particular problems arise. Assistant Secretary

Koh referred to the difficulties that Viktor Gonchar had, the difficulties

that Mikhail Chygir had, the Freedom March that took place last year,

the expiration of President Lukashenkas term of office. On each of these

occasions, we have issued strong statements and we have discussed our

concerns directly with the Belarusian authorities.

Our assistance programs support and promote change through academic and professional exchanges for young reform-minded Belarusians,

small grants for non-governmental organizations and independent media, and by providing access to information through the Internet and

cross-border radio broadcasting, that I know is an interest of yours.

As we look to Belarus future, we see one new concern looming that

youve referred to, Mr. Chairman, and that is the prospect that the

Lukashenka regime could mortgage his countrys independence to Russia. This Administrations policy on integration among the former Soviet states is that it must be voluntary, mutually beneficial and erect

no new barriers. The breakdown of democracy has made a voluntary

decision by the Belarusian people impossible.

The Lukashenka regime long ago lost its democratic legitimacy and,

in our view, lacks the authority to commit Belarus to something that

could diminish the countrys sovereignty and independence. Many Russians believe that Lukashenkas Belarus is no fit partner for a Russia

that intends to stay on the path of democracy and market reform. We

share those concerns.
9

It remains to be seen whether the 1999 union treaty will have any

more meaning than its predecessors, but we will continue to monitor

this closely and make our views about it clear both in Moscow and in

Minsk.

Next week, as Assistant Secretary Koh indicated, I will be visiting

Minsk. Ill be there on the eve of the first of a series of demonstrations

that opposition leaders have planned for the spring. I see four key objectives:

First, to reiterate our call on the authorities to allow peaceful opposition demonstrations to proceed unimpeded. These demonstrations are

an opportunity for real dialogue that should be used, not suppressed.

Second, to reinforce the message that genuine dialogue with the opposition and legitimate, free and fair elections are in the interest not only

of the Belarusian people but of the Belarusian government. Only in this

way can Belarus end its self-imposed international isolation and build a

promising future for its people.

Third, to show support for democratic leaders and the OSCE mission

in Belarus, and discuss with them upcoming plans and ways that we in

the West can be supportive. We are now in the process in the State

Department of finalizing decisions about our democracy and overall assistance budget for fiscal year 2000 in Belarus. I want to hear first

hand what more we can do and how we can be more effective. Ill also be

visiting several European capitals later in the week to coordinate with

them on Belarus policy as well.

Fourth, to restate this countrys readiness for closer, more cooperative relations with a Belarus that elects its leaders and legislators, that

shows respect for the fundamental human rights of its people, and that

pursues responsible, cooperative policies toward its neighbors and the

world.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. I appreciate the fact

that you are going to be there, and that I think it is a very important

and timely deployment and use of your time, to be delivering that message. I think the message should be clear that you go with a very united

Congress as well, the Executive Branch, obviously, but that the Congress is behind you as well.

Let us know how we can be helpful as you dialogue with people there,

including our allies in other foreign capitals in Europe, so that we can

all speak from the same sheet and hopefully usher in democracy sooner

rather than later.

I wanted to ask you specifically, either Assistant Secretary Koh or

Mr. Wilson, what efforts do you contemplate should be taken in the

next few weeks and months on behalf of the disappeared Viktor Gonchar,

Zakharenka, and Anatoly Krasovsky? Are there any more plans?

I know that you have already made representations and its an ongoing process, and we all speak again with one voice on that. Is there

anything new that you are contemplating trying to end this terrible

disappearance legacy?

Sec. KOH. Ill speak first and then Ill ask Mr. Wilson to make his

contribution.

I think weve made it clear that we will continue to raise the disappearance issue with the government of Belarus and we wont let the

issue die. Weve issued statements whenever disappearances have oc-
10

curred, and Ambassador Speckhard and other officials have called on

the Belarusian government both here in Washington and repeatedly in

Minsk to account for the disappeared.

We have also made a special effort to reach out to all the families of

the disappeared, who remain in tremendous distress about the situation of their relatives.

I met with the spouses of all three of the people you mentioned, Viktor

Gonchar, Yuri Zakharenka, and Anatoly Krasovsky when I was there

in November and I know that Ross intends to raise this when he is in

Minsk later this week.

I think the basic point that we have made is that the government

either needs to account for the disappeared or make it clear that it is

conducting its own aggressive investigation to find out what has happened to them.

Ross?

Amb. WILSON The only thing I would say is to repeat what Assistant

Secretary Koh said. I will raise this issue when Im there. I will refer

specifically to your interest and the Congressional interest here. The

point Ive made to Belarusian authorities that Ive talked to is that no

one believes the story that they peddle in trying to explain what has

happened to these people. Its a tragedy.

I look forward to meeting with Mrs. Gonchar, with a number of other

spouses of political prisoners in Belarus.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you about the talks that were held last week,

the round-table talks between the authorities, opposition, and the Parliamentary Troika. What do you think, realistically, is going to come

out of those talks?

How much emphasis should be placed on ensuring opposition access,

for example, to the state media, and do you see anything meaningful

coming out of this?

Ross?

Amb. WILSON Well, first Id sayI understand youll be hearing a

little bit later this morning from people directly involved in the talks. I

was given a lengthy report on these proceedings as I came up here,

which I have not had time to look at.

Since we have repeatedly called for dialogue, we felt it was inappropriate immediately to condemn this effort or to write it off as something

that will not be useful. The State Department put out a statement a

number of days ago, and that statement focused on what we would like

to see as key issues that the government needs to address to make this

be a fruitful and useful exercise. It must include all elements of the

opposition. It needs to include a strong and effective role for the OSCE.

It must deal with the real issues that Belarus faces with respect to

elections, with respect to the proper role of the parliament and so forth.

We also made the point in that statement, and I have made this

privately to the Belarusian ambassador here, that in order for this dialogue to succeed, the government has to create a climate in which it can

succeed. That means accounting for those who have disappeared. It

means ceasing harassment of opposition figures. It means ending the

campaign against independent media. It means ending the campaign

and shutdowns of non-governmental organizations over their alleged

failure to register or comply with this or that government rule or regu-
11

lation. It means broadly endingmoving away from a pattern of gross

abuse of human rights. Those kinds of things will make this a fruitful

dialogue.

Sec. KOH I would add only that weve made clear that we dont believe

in dialogue for its own sake or for sham dialogue, but dialogue against

the background and incorporating OSCE principals, and taking into

account the factors that Mr. Wilson has mentioned.

Mr. SMITH. Ill ask one more question and yield to my friends on the

Commission.

On December 8, as you know, Lukashenka signed a union treaty

with Russia that calls for the establishment of a federal government

consisting of a supranational Supreme State Council and having a common currency, tax, and customs and border procedures.

Could you tell us what your viewyou mentioned, Mr. Wilson, the

idea that anything like that would have to be voluntary, and that at

this particular time that is simply impossible given the hijacking of the

democracy, but how does Putins view, differ perhaps from Yeltsins,

and is this something we need to be concerned about from a security

point of view?

Amb. WILSON Let me try to make three points.

First, this is a tough, analytical problem or issue to deal with. This is

the fourth union treaty in 5 years. The previous three treaties failed

really to accomplish anything or be meaningful. It is not clear or obvious that the result of this treaty will be any different from its predecessors.

Second, many Russians and many Belarusians have questions, serious questions about this treaty. Russians question the suitability of

Belarus as a partner, given the authoritarian government there, given

the fact that it is economically bankrupt and has enormous economic

and social problems. Many Belarusians question what this means for

Belarusian independence, and probably with some good reason.

It is clear, as I said, that this process cannot be judged as a voluntary

one. The government cannot speak for the people here, and I think one

of the focuses that I have tried to take in discussing this has been the

Belarusian side of the equation. The Belarusian government does not

have the authority to do this.

Third, in respect to Mr. Putin, as on many other issues, I think frankly

Mr. Chairman, we dont entirely know what Mr. Putins attitude is.

There has been some movement, quite a bit of movement actually, since

the first of the year, to implement this treaty or to start to set up the

institutions that it would establish. But it frankly remains to be seen,

really, how far this is going to go. Its a subject were watching very

closely.

Mr. SMITH. Commissioner Pitts?

Thank you.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to follow up on that, what are some of the security implications

for the United States?

Amb. WILSON Well, again Id make the observation that we dont

entirely know what that is, so thats a big, big caveat that I think

limits what I can say. There is talk that one aspect of this treaty is

creating a joint military zone throughout the Belarus-Russia Union,

which in theory, I suppose, could move Russian forces significantly farther to the West. That could lead, I suppose, to some reconsideration
12

about deployments with respect to the CFE treaty and implications for

the CFE treaty. A concern that I think many of us would have is if

there were any revisiting by the Russians and the Belarusians of the

decision to withdrawal nuclear weapons from Belarus. That would clearly

have significant security implications for us.

A broader set of concerns is, I think, the implications that this development has elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. I traveled extensively last year in most of these countries and each of them asked what

do we think about this treaty. They are clearlyor at that point it was

not the treaty, what do we think about this movementand they are

clearly worried about what might be threats to them.

Mr. PITTS. This question is for either of you to answer. The authorities in Belarus have appeared to be keen on having delegations of U.S.

officials, including members of Congress, visit Minsk. Should such delegations undertake such visits, given the poor state of democracy and

human rights? Would such visits be used by Lukashenka for propaganda?

Sec. KOH I think weve made it clear that our policy is one of selective

engagement. We think that going, visiting, talking straight about the

situation, saying the same things in public and private are beneficial.

Its a good way to keep delivering the same message, both through inside negotiations and through external pressure.

I think its important that these not be used as occasions for

Lukashenka to claim a kind of endorsement, but I think that the delegations themselves can control the message by the way in which they

conduct themselves, meeting with the independent media, meeting with

opposition figures, meeting with the NGOs lawyers who are being harassed, meeting with the families of the disappeared to express their

concern. So there are many ways in which the message could be gotten

out.

Mr. PITTS. I am particularly interested in your perception of the human rights picture in Belarus. Have you detected any changes? Is it

getting worse? Is it getting better? What is your perspective?

Sec. KOH. We just issued our human rights report on Belarus and I

think this is the only country yesterday that we didnt talk about with

Chairman Smith at our three-hour hearing.

Mr. SMITH. I did that knowing that we would be here today.

Sec. KOH. The key paragraph says, in a nutshell, the governments

human rights record worsened significantly last year, and then recounted a number of the points which Ive made in my own testimony.

In the last few months since the reporting period ended, namely December 1999, we havent seen significant changes, which suggests that there

is no new indication of political will to solve the problem.

There are at least five particular events since the start of the new

year that are worth noting that shows continuing difficulties.

First, the preconditions that the government placed for resumption of

the dialogue.

Second, the show trial, the continuing show trial of Mr. Chygir, who

was released after a lot of public outcry and pressure. But as soon as he

was released, he was put on trial and under quite outrageous conditions.

Third, in January, former Agriculture Minister Leonov, who had been

languishing in detention, was sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment on

fabricated charges.
13

Fourth, Mr. Lebedka, from whom you will be hearing later, sought a

passport to visit the United States, and the government was initially

unwilling to grant him that passport even to engage in peaceful exit.

And finally, the closing of newspapers, Kutsenya and Orsa, as I said,

and then last week the stopping of the publication of a new paper right

at the start of its first run. So all of these are negative developments,

and quite recent ones.

Mr. PITTS. How would you compare the human rights situation in

Belarus with that of other post-Soviet countries?

Sec. KOH. Well, as I said yesterday in our general Statement of Country report, we try to avoid a rank ordering. However, I would say that

with regard to other countries in the Soviet Union, the former Soviet

Union, the problems here have been in the four areas that Ive described,

rule of law, respect for the will of the people, the treatment of independent media, and then also our concerns about the state of civil society.

There have also been significant concerns with regard to religious freedom.

I would say that in all of these areas there has been progress backwards, and that distinguishes it from nearly all of the other countries of

the former Soviet Union.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you very much, Commissioner.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I want to thank our very distinguished panel, and say that we look forward to working with you.

Regrettably, we do have to run for a vote. Well be back in about 10 or

15 minutes, and then well welcome our second panel.

The hearing is suspended for about 15 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will resume its hearing.

I want to say for the record, and I think this is very significant because it again underscores the strong support that the leadership of

both the Executive Branch and the Congress have in our solidarity with

Speaker Sharetsky, Congressman Dick Armey just came over and

wanted to express his solidarity with the parliamentarians and with

the democracy efforts.

As you know, he is the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives. He serves from a district in Texas.

The Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, also called over and conveyedhe is tied up with some legislative business, but also wanted to

convey his warm regards to our visiting parliamentarians and to the

Speaker and to let him know that we all stand in solidarity with the

opposition who is trying its level best to bring back democracy to Belarus.

So I want to make that point for the record and Congressman Armey,

the Majority Leader who left a moment ago. As he told you, Mr. Speaker,

he wanted you to know that he is watching these proceedings very carefully and cares deeply about what is happening in Belarus.

Let me introduce our second panel.

Semyon Sharetsky was elected Speaker of Belarus 13th Supreme

Soviet in January of 1996. The Supreme Soviet was disbanded, as we

know, by President Lukashenka in November of 1996. Speaker Sharetsky

lives in exile in neighboring Lithuania under the protection of the Lithuanian parliament.

He helped establish and was Chairman of the Agrarian Party of Belarus. Speaker Sharetsky has held various positions in government and

academia in the areas of agricultural organization and economics and

has written textbooks on these subjects.
14

Our second witness will be Stanislav Shushkevich who is the deputy

of the 13th Supreme Soviet, and was Chairman of the Supreme Soviet

of Belarus in 1991-1994 and, as such, independent Belarus first head of

state.

In December of 1991, with Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, he

signed the agreement which brought an end to the existence of the Soviet Union.

Professor Shushkevich, who has a background in physics, has held

numerous positions in government and academia and currently is a

Professor of Political Science at the European Humanities University

in Minsk and a Corresponding Member of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences.

Finally, we have Anatoly Lebedka, who is a Deputy of the 13th Supreme Soviet, and serves as the Chair of the Commission on International Affairs. He is also Deputy Chair of the United Civic Party and

has played a leading role in the OSCE-led discussions between the opposition and government, participating in these as recently as those talks

that we had mentioned earlier in this hearing.

He has been the victim of detentions, fines and beatings as a result of

his opposition to the Lukashenka regime. Mr. Lebedka is president of

the Belarusian Association of Young Politicians, and the author of more

than 80 publications.

Mr. Speaker, if you could begin.

TESTIMONY OF SEMYON SHARETSKY,

SPEAKER OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF

THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

Mr. SHARETSKY. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission.

On March 9, 1918, a second constituent charter was adopted by the

Council of the Belarusian Democratic Republic. The Council of the

Belarusian Democratic Republic proclaimed Belarus to be an independent state. The coincidence of these two dates, we, Belarusians consider

it as a lucky omen. We hope that the cause that was launched at that

time in 1918 will conclude with a victory.

First of all, I wish to express my deep gratitude to your country, the

most powerful in the world and a paragon of democracy for others, for

its concern with the cause of human rights in other regions of the globe

and in particular, in our country. We view the present hearing in precisely this way.

We very much need and appreciate all of this because Belarus has

become, since November 1996, a kind of testing ground for experimentation aimed at the restoration of the former totalitarian Bolshevik order on post-Soviet territory.

A previous session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus,

well aware that the defense of human rights in each country must be

valued not only from the national viewpoint but also on an international level, brought its laws into conformity with international standards and norms and devised mechanisms for their execution. These

developments were in no way acceptable, first of all to the Communist

elite.
15

Secondly, independence and democracy-building in Belarus were unacceptable to Russias chauvinist circles, which continue dreaming about

the renewal of the Russian empire. In this respect, the programs and

actions of all Russian politicians, no matter of what hue or color, coincide.

Russian politicians are guided only by their own imperial interests.

Vladimir Putin now uses Russias strategic interests in Belarus as an

argument for the necessity to unite Belarus and Russia. A while ago, on

Russian television screens, Belarus was described as the Russian corridor into Europe.

Russia remains an empire, as demonstrated by the events in Chechnya,

on whose territory an imperial policy is being conducted. I have in mind

the satisfaction with which the Russian military and journalists report, for example, about the opening in Chechnya of Russian schools, in

which the Chechen language is taught only as a subject.

I would especially like to stress this point, because on the territory of

Belarus, there are no terrorists who would threaten Russia or its citizens. Nevertheless, and unfortunately, Russians who occupy the most

important positions in the Lukashenka governmentnow including

prime ministerconduct the same spiritual genocide or, to use a phrase

from Russian soldiers, there is an open, ongoing cleansing of Chechnya

from Chechens and Belarus from Belarusians.

Presently, in Belarus, there is not a single higher educational institution functioning in the Belarusian language, and not a single

Belarusian school remains in the capital of Minsk. The Belarusian language has been eliminated from all government offices, despite the fact

that in the territory of the Republic, as the 1999 census has shown,

more than 80 percent of the population is of Belarusian nationality.

This means that the policy I mentioned constitutes a violation of the

main nationalitys basic constitutional right to use its native language,

let alone that it fails to satisfy the needs of Poles, Ukrainians, Jews and

other national minorities.

The first step toward the renewal in Belarus of the old totalitarian

system, with its crude socialism and annexation of the Republic to Russia, was the removal of Stanislav Shushkevich from the position of Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus. At the time,

this was presumed to have been done to facilitate the presidential candidacy of Vyachaslau Kebich, who headed the government. However,

the fact that the podium of Russias State Duma, which at the time was

dominated by communists, was given only to Lukashenka, one of six

presidential candidates in Belarus, clearly showed who enjoyed the support of Russia in that presidential contest.

Lukashenka was also supported by the Russian leadership as its

henchman during the coup detat that he carried out in November 1996,

under the guise of a national referendum.

Russian chauvinist circles need the dictator Lukashenka, who would

not be a Belarusian in his mentality, and thus would contribute to further the Russification of the Belarusian people which had started under

the tsars and continued during Soviet times.

Since the so-called referendum of November 1996, all division of power

in Belarus has been eliminated. All branches of government are in the

hands of Lukashenka. Instead of the Supreme Council elected by the
16

people, he created an entirely illegitimate National Assembly which by

its nature and competency, is similar to the former fascist council which

existed under the dictatorship of Mussolini.

All categories of prosecutors and judges are appointed and dismissed

by Lukashenka only. Relationships in society, including in the sphere

of human rights, have been regulated by decrees and directives or simply by oral orders of Lukashenka.

A powerful police force has been set up. There are 135,000 policemen

to be supported by a population of 10 million. Moreover, he created, by

decree, an anti-constitutional paramilitary force and empowered it to

disregard essentially any right or law.

According to that decree, this organization has the right to break into

any domicile and search it without any warrant from a judge or a Ministry of Justice official, and to arrest any individual on its own decision.

Mr. Koh, in his statement, named the names of those in prison and

those who disappeared without any trace.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, the presidential term of Alaksandar

Lukashenka expired on July 20, 1999. On December 1, 1999, the Attorney General of the Republic of Belarus launched a criminal inquiry into

the seizure and holding of power by unconstitutional means. Presently,

the investigation continues.

All this gives us grounds to state that the signatures of Lukashenka

on official documents after the above-mentioned date have no juridical

validity. Indeed, I made such a statement on the eve of the signing by

Lukashenka and Yeltsin of the so-called treaty on unification of Belarus

and Russia into one state.

We should note that less than 5 percent of the Republics population

supports annexation of Belarus to Russia. By the way, more than 500,000

people have said that if, God forbid, this should happen, they will be

ready to leave the country and seek settlement in the West. This is why

we consider any attempt by the Russian leadership to annex Belarus as

an aggression against our country, with all the consequences that it

entails.

Here we count on the support of international organizations and the

worlds democratic countries, more so because when Belarus decided to

give up her nuclear arms in 1994, the United States, Great Britain,

and Russia guaranteed the security and integrity of the Republic of

Belarus as an independent state. Today, one of these countries is infringing upon that guarantee.

In connection with this I wrote a letter to the President of the United

States, Bill Clinton, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair, and

the former President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. Regretfully, none of them

responded. In the case of Mr. Yeltsin, everything is understandable.

But how should we understand the other two?

As to the issue of Moscows conspiracy against Belarus, a particular

concern has been caused by the Theses of the Council on Foreign and

Security Policy of Russia, published in Russian newspapers in connection with the Russian-Belarusian integration. In those Theses, inter

alia, the following has been stated: As a result of the integration with

Belarus, Russia gains a series of undeniable geopolitical advantages

including an increase in military possibilities in the sphere of conventional arms as a result of the integration with the Belarusian army,
17

which possesses a high degree of military capabilities, and the emergence of the Kaliningrad special defense region from strategic isolation.

If, God forbid, Belarus should be annexed to Russia, then a 700-kilometer-deep wedge will be driven into Europe, and this wedge will become as follows from the above-mentioned document. Russias military

forefront.

Then, another question becomes paramount: How will the Kaliningrad

special defense region be able to emerge from isolation? Belarus, to be

sure, does not border on the Kaliningrad region. Or are there some

further steps planned, at which we now can only guess?

It follows from what I have said here, that the independence of Belarus

and the preservation of its sovereignty, its return to a democratic way

of development, and its joining of European structures, is not only necessary for the creation of normal living conditions for the 10 million

Belarusian people who are European in their mindset, but it is also

necessary, to guarantee the security of our neighbors and of all of Europe. Understanding that the problems of Belarus should be solved by

the Belarusians themselves, I nevertheless hope that todays hearing

will serve as a reminder of this.

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Speaker, we thank you very much for that very eloquent statement.

Id like to, before we go to questions, ask the remainder of our panel if

they would make their presentations at this time.

Mr. Shushkevich?

TESTIMONY OF STANISLAV SHUSHKEVICH, MEMBER OF THE

SUPREME SOVIET AND CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF

BELARUS NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Mr. SHUSHKEVICH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, excellencies, ladies and gentleman, I can considerably shorten my case and we have an agreement with a translator because in your statement, and those of Mr. Koh and Wilson, very correctly facts were stated and opinions expressed.

I would like to raise only one question. What are the reasons that in

Belarus there is this regime that violates human rights? The reason is

the imperial forces of Russia. I would like to say that supporters of

democracy in Belarus are no enemy of Russia and have never been

such. Russia does not conceal that it wants to annex Belarus to Russia.

The independence of Belarus restored de jure in December 1991.

Belarus has removed the nuclear weapons from its territory, declared

its desire for neutrality, and attempted to follow a path toward democracy, a market economy and an open society.

Supporters of Belarusian independence are no enemies of Russia.

Russia on the other hand, does not conceal its intentions that it wants

to swallow Belarus under the guise of unification. The Russian Federation Council on Foreign and Defense Policy declared openly that there

should not be any delay in this matter and that one should even pay a

certain economic price for such a profitable geopolitical union, and that

time is working in favor of the opponents of integration. So, the unification process should be speeded up.
18

In short, it is necessary to expand the Russian empire by suppressing

the national self-awareness of the Belarusian people, which is on the

rise. Russias grandeur today is based solely on nuclear weapons, not

on its economic power. The maintenance and modernization of these

weapons at the mutually assured destruction level rob the Russian taxpayer and it is detrimental to Russias economy.

Vladimir Putin admitted unequivocally that the standard of living of

the average Russian is ten times less than that of the average American; that the Russian Gross Domestic Product is five times less than

that of China; and that under the most favorable conditions, the average Russian will reach todays standard of living of the average Portuguese in 15-20 years. However, at the same time, on January 10, 2000,

Putin approved the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, according to which Russia will oppose both the domination of the

international community by Western countries, led by the United States,

and attempts to ignore Russias interests could undermine the international security and stability.

To put this statement into clearer language, Russians are lagging

behind economically, but they are great in spirit, and therefore they

can teach others. Yet, whoever does not understand this undermines

international security.

A government which relies on such controversial postulates while

maintaining the political stability in the country can only be a dictatorship.

Unfortunately, there is very little hope that, after securing his power

by going through the election process, Mr. Putin will follow the path of

developing a peacetime economy for the benefit of the ordinary Russian.

The Belarusian experience demonstrates quite the opposite. A fairly

sensible people installed a dictator in Belarus, thinking that they will

serve as a brain center for him and that because of his poor personal

knowledge, he will, with a strong hand, carry out their sensible policy.

It turned out to be the opposite.

The political opposition and the independent mass media are allowed

to exist nominally in Belarus, but they cannot affect the situation because the regime suppresses the democratic opposition by force, intimidation and open political terror. Belarus has become a police state.

It has the largest number of members of the police per capita in Europe. Popular political leaders are disappearing without a trace; members of the parliament with the parliamentary immunity are being arrested; independent lawyers lose their right to defend their clients in

courts; and the courts have become nothing but a farce.

The economy of Belarus is in crisis. In 1999, inflation was higher

than 220 percent. The Belarusian ruble, with respect to the Russian

ruble, dropped in value by 225 times.

Opinion polls confirm that there is a drop in confidence for the government. The government bureaucracy itself also understands that the

current economic policy leads to nowhere. Under these conditions, it

would be very important for Belarus to receive help from the international community for democratic transformation.

The OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group has been operating in

Minsk since January 1998. OSCE countries have agreed that the elections in Belarus should follow the development of the climate of confidence and the approval of the election code based on the dialogue between the government and the opposition.
19

The OSCE rules of engagement do not permit this organization to

effectively influence this regime, which does not want to carry out any

democratization. The Advisory and Monitoring Groups efforts have resulted in development of a singular approach by the opposition to negotiations. These efforts, however, have diverted the attention of the opposition parties from other types of resistance, and in that sense, have

thus become counterproductive.

Belarus will become a law-abiding democratic nation. It will achieve

the status of a civilized society. However, the process of democratization and liberalization will be rather long without help from the countries abroad.

In summary, first, the present Russian leadership supports the existing regime in Belarus for geopolitical reasons, even though the regime

in Belarus has revived communist values such as harsh government

control of the economy and distribution of goods, and human rights

violations.

Second, European governments are under the illusion that this type

of regime is susceptible to gradual liberalization, as if the dictator could

evolve into someone more humane through exposure to Western institutions. This viewpoint was held for some time by the Advisory and

Monitoring group of the OSCE.

Third, the U.S. Department of State and the majority of European

countries consider the present regime in Belarus anti-democratic, and

support the democratic opposition in Belarus. It is hard, however, for

the opposition to resist the Russian imperial onslaught because of the

ceaseless disinformation of Belarus population through the state owned

mass media.

Russia spends for brainwashing of the Belarusian population, $80 per

Belarus resident, at the minimum. On the other hand, the National

Endowment for Democracy is spending 14 cents a year per resident of

Belarus. The support is unequal, and it is hard for the opposition to

withstand such pressure.

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Shushkevich, thank you very much for your testimony, which is provocative and critical. I think there are questions we

will get to ask you to elaborate on some of those points.

I would like to ask our final witness in this panel, Mr. Lebedka, if he

would proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ANATOLY LEBEDKA, CHAIR OF THE COMMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE 13TH SUPREME

SOVIET AND DEPUTY CHAIR OF THE UNITED CIVIL PARTY

Mr. LEBEDKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, dear colleagues.

Toward the end of the century, Belarus was twice exposed to global

catastrophes. In 1986, it was the Chernobyl tragedy, which entered the

homes of two million of the countrys citizens. Exactly 10 years later, a

legal Chernobyl took place, and the population of the whole country fell

victim to it. As a result of the non-democratic referendum of November

24, 1996, political processes lost all semblance of constitutionality and

legality. In other words, it was a coup detat.
20

We are grateful to the persistence of the world community, which has

attempted to influence the Belarusian regime in a positive way. Nevertheless, in its goodwill, it has even gone so far as shutting one eye and

one ear. The regime has taken it to be an indulgence for its old sins and

as a carte blanche for new actions.

An obvious fact has to be acknowledged. Different, diametrically opposed approaches to solving the Belarusian problem have collided. The

OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the opposition, they all propose to

play chess using the well-established and generally recognized rules.

The regime, sweeping the figures off the board, prefers to use it for

smacking its opponent on the head. In fact, it has unilaterally stopped

consultations on starting a negotiating process.

Prior to beginning the discussion, it is important to define the concept and the subject of discussion. Obviously, we cannot fail to take into

account the following factors.

First, there is existence of a constitutional and political crisis in

Belarus. That fact was admitted by Mr. Lukashenka himself, who signed

the final document of the Istanbul summit.

Second, the international community does not recognize the outcome

of the 1996 referendum and, consequently, does not accept an appointed

national assembly that the people did not elect.

Third, President Lukashenkas authority expired on July 21of last

year. This is not subject to discussion. This approach was established

in dozens of international political and legal documents from practically all influential international organizations.

But we cant fail to note that what is going on now is a juggling of the

basic concepts that we are dealing with, and a narrowing of the problems of Belarus down to discussing only the conditions for holding elections. Free and democratic elections are, undoubtedly, an urgent task.

But that is only part of the problem.

Second, there is great doubt concerning the sincerity of statements

made by official Minsk. Lukashenka is drowning the world community

in a sea of broken promises.

It will be useful just to pass quickly through some of the major problems this made in the last few years in written documents.

1996, Lukashenkas address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the

Council of Europe, Constitutional reforms are not aimed at curtailing

parliamentary democracy, but on the contrary, at improving it.

1997, Foreign Minister of Belarus addressing the President of the

European Union Council, On behalf of President Lukashenka, I would

like to announce that the President and the Government want to discuss with all the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, the question of updating the 1994 Constitution in order to establish a better balance between

the functions and duties of the three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial.

1998, Lukashenkas letter to the European Council, On our road to

building up our statehood and sovereignty, we are firmly and steadfastly committed to development of a new Europe in close collaboration

and friendship with all nations. This is a promise. But meanwhile, a

diplomatic war was running parallel to these claims. Ambassadors of

many of Western countries were suddenly turned into political refugees. This is an unprecedented case in the history of modern diplomacy.
21

1999, at the session of the UN Sub-commission in Geneva, the regime assumed a number of obligations including to hold honest and

fair elections, which presupposes giving equal access to the state-controlled mass media, as well as ensuring the freedom of assembly and

the right to peaceful demonstrations. Nevertheless, as you can see, not

one of these promises has been fulfilled.

The conclusion is obvious. The declarations and promises of the

Belarusian authorities are not worth the paper they were written on.

This greatly worsens the actual prospects for any negotiations. It means

none of them could be implemented. This was confirmed again by the

regimes refusal to implement the agreement signed last November on

the oppositions minimal access to the state-owned mass media.

Those who build castles in the air and create virtual democracies

have no problem with finding building materials. They consist of lies,

misinformation, fear, and the floating of ones obligations. Neither the

St. Petersburg Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, nor

the final document of the Istanbul summit has materialized into guidelines for the regimes actual deeds.

In contrast to the castle in the air, the language of facts is harsh and

impartial: disappearances, arrests, non-registration, exile.

A free democratic parliamentary election is, no doubt, an important

step. But an election, considered by itself out of the general context of

the constitutional and political crisis held according to Lukashenkas

script, will not solve the problem. Seeds thrown into permafrost will

never sprout. Irresponsible actions could create conditions for the weakening of Belarus immune system and its sovereignty.

Under these conditions, when a legitimate head of state is absent and

the world community does not recognize the legitimacy of the National

Assembly, not a single agreement, not a single treaty can have legal

consequences. Legitimizing Lukashenkas parliament through an undemocratic election builds a legal foundation for the annexation of

Belarus. The inevitable result will be the emergence of another hot spot

in the middle of Europe. Half a million people are saying theyre ready

to emigrate if Belarus loses its sovereignty.

The problem of Belarus is not so much an absence of law as a lack of

legality. Law is something you have on paper; legality is something you

have in practice. It has been a long time since Belarus lived under the

law. We see a rule by decree and edicts. For example, decree No. 40

makes it possible to convict a person and to seize property or belongings

without a trial. The function of the law has been replaced in Belarus

with propaganda and ideology, and it is being shown off to foreign visitors.

For 6 years now we have been in an acute crisis in our relations with

the outer world and foreign policy. Lukashenka declares, I will not

lead my people by trailing right behind the civilized world. Thats one

rare promise he has kept scrupulously. A belligerent negation of the

values and standards of European democracy, as well as the norms of

international law, has led to political self-isolation.

It must be recognized that one of the causes of the events in Belarus

is the absence of due attention to Belarus earlier in the 90s. Investment in the development of democracy was clearly inadequate to ensure

transformation. Belarus remained somewhere on the back burner of

foreign policy consciousness.
22

Interest was focused exclusively on the removal of nuclear weapons.

That was a necessary step. But after 7 years, we can state categorically

that the problem was not solved. There is a real threat of nuclear weapons returning to Belarus. All the prerequisites are in place for it, so the

regimes political will and the well-preserved military infrastructure

are there as well.

Negotiations in the OSCE format constitute a strategic possibility,

but the national public dialog a la Lukashenka is a tactical device. It

creates a semblance of compliance with obligations. Its the same thing

as accepting plastic flowers instead of the real thing.

Dialog is a natural state of society. In Belarus it was interrupted in

November 1996 by the governments will. The current initiative of public dialog only underscores the degree of degradation and the depth of

the fall. The regime acknowledges, thereby, that a struggle has been

going on in the country all the time. It has been waging an informational, psychological, and other type of war instead of having a dialog.

What should be done? The intelligence of the powers that be in Belarus will be determined by the way that they solve this problem, either

through talks or by force. The Belarusian regime is betting on the second option, force.

The political opposition has proceeded responsibly, with dignity. We

have given no reason to doubt the sincerity and honesty of our intentions and actions. Our position contrasts favorably with Lukashenkas

empty rhetoric.

We propose a real plan for resolving the Belarusian crises. It consists

of three stages.

First, a negotiation process should be initiated immediately. Concurrently, the agreement on our access to mass media, already once signed

by both sides, should be implemented.

The second stage is the process whereby negotiations will get started,

where the following issues must be resolved, building a climate of trust.

Again, equal access to radio and TV, and the functions, and competence

and powers of the parliament, and thereby the holding of a democratic

free election.

The third stage is the legitimization of the agreement already reached.

Simultaneous ratification of the negotiations final documents by the

Supreme Soviet and the House of Representatives can become a real

mechanism for implementing these agreements.

If the regime persists in playing the role of a deaf mute, the reaction

of the world community must be appropriate. In this situation, an election that is not a consequence of negotiating and compromise, but that

is held under deliberately unequal and discriminatory conditions cannot be recognized as democratic and legitimate.

The U.S., in coalition with the European Union, is capable of effectively influencing the situation in Belarus, using the possibilities offered by Russia for this purpose. The allocation of financial assistance

to Russia should be considered in conjunction with the human rights

situation in Belarus. The protection of human rights must remain one

of the priorities of Western foreign policy. It must be an important factor in international stability, and consequently, in European security.

Were against the countrys isolation, but we support actions directed

at making Lukashenka and his henchmen feel isolated.
23

Before answering the tactical question of what to do about Belarus,

the international community must make up its mind about its strategic objective. What kind of Belarus would you like to see? A Belarus

with a velvet dictator or an unenlightened oligarchy and a helpless puppet quasi-parliament? Or an independent, democratic Belarus?

This is not only a political choice, but a moral one. Our slogan for the

forthcoming march is, in English, TALKS, CHANGES, VICTORY.

Please support us in this and dont step back from your principles.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Lebedka, thank you very much for that testimony.

I would like to announce that weve been joined by Congressman Sam

Gejdenson, who is the ranking Democrat on the International Relations

Committee, who has come by. We welcome him to the panel and I would

like to yield to him for any comments he would like to make.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you.

Ill make a short comment. Im presently at another hearing and

have a meeting at the state that I have to go to. But both for personal

respect for my father, having grown up in Belarus and survived the

war there because of the courage of particularly two families in

Karfyanito; and because really, of all the Eastern former Soviet countries in some ways, the situation in Belarus is so tragic, I want to commend the Chairman for holding this hearing.

But I say to my friends in the panel that the most important thing is

that the opposition cooperates and coordinate its activities. That we

continue the effort. I agree, the Belarusian, Mr. Lukashenka, talks a

lot and then attempts to consolidate power. Nevertheless, our goal has

to be not to give into that. We want to help, but it really takes the

opposition coming together, putting compromise within the opposition

first to present a unified field opposing Mr. Lukashenka and his attempt to impose Stalinism on Belarus.

I applaud your courage and I tell you, on my part and I know on

many of my colleagues part here, well do what we can. The struggle, of

course, will be up to the people of Belarus. A difficult struggle because,

in particular of their history, but one that is worth fighting and one

that is worth coming together in the opposition to join forces in opposition to Lukashenka and I apologize for not being able to stay.

Thank you again.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank Mr. Gejdenson for coming by.

We do have a mark up and it may still be going on, in the International Relations Committee. I serve as Chairman of the International

Operations and Human Rights Committee. As usual, many of our members have five different places to be at once.

But the importance of this hearing, and I say this to you Mr. Speaker

because you know havingbecause of your leadership as head of a parliament, members will know about this, Sam Gejdenson and I, Im a

Republican, hes a Democrat, we are absolutely united in standing with

the opposition to convey to Mr. Lukashenka our outrage at his ongoing

human rights abuses, his mistreatment of a freely elected parliament.

We will do everything we can with the Executive Branch.

Sam, we are very appreciative that he came by to join us.

Professor Zaprudnik? I think you had your hand up. You wanted to

mention something.

Professor ZAVRADNIK. Mr. Sharetsky called my attention to the fact

that I unfortunately omitted his very concluding paragraph after saying that Russia spends $80.00 per Belarus resident to brainwash the
24

Belarusian population and the entities felt incensed to correct it. Mr.

Shushkevich says, and I read now his concluding paragraph.

What about us? The democratic opposition of Belarus. We are there.

We know what to do. We are sufficiently well organized. We are ready

to cooperate with the other democratic forces everywhere. We are ready

to borrow from the experience of others. We have plenty to offer. What

we lack are the material resources to buy, for example, the latest communication technology, technology which would make us invulnerable

to the encroachments of an authoritarian state.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.

Thank you, Professor.

Let me ask the first question. Mr. Speaker, you might want to take

this, or perhaps the other members of the panel. Did you give us the

specific circumstancesyou know one of the things when you and I and

Speaker Hastert met, the Speaker afterwards was very concerned and

his staff, aboutyoure our colleagues. Theres a collegiality. Theres a

friendship that extends to fellow members of other parliaments. To see

arrests, to see detentions, harassment, beatings, families impoverished,

is an outrage in a civilized society. What we want to do is get the most

accurate accounting as to the whereabouts and the status, and this is

something you might want to provide in more detail for the record, of

your parliamentarians.

You conveyed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives here in

the United States your concern as the head of this parliament, a heartfelt concern for those under your leadership, that their families are

being hurt and harassed, not to mention the parliamentarians themselves.

If you could give us some additional insight, either now or for the

record, on what is actually happening with each of those parliamentarians. Any of the other members that might want to touch on this issue.

Mr. SHARETSKY. First, all the 50 deputies who take the position to

defend the independence of Belarus who did not join the parliament of

Lukashenkas have no possibility to work. Moreover, there are cases

where children of those deputies would be excluded from institutes. Their

wives cannot work. Concerning myself and Mr. Shushkevich, he is

present to mention it. There is an order that our pensions would not be

increased. We receive 3.7 dollars a month for our pension. Thats academicians and I dont mention the fact that their entire lives were devoted

to Belarus.

Part of the pressure is concerning other members of opposition. Its a

daily occurrence. Not only beatings or arrests and imprisonment, but

also offenses and personal abuse.

Mr. SMITH. Commissioner Pitts.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This question is for anyone on the panel who would like to answer.

The courts were very helpful in stating that the parliamentary scheduled for in the fall will be free, fair, democratic, transparent. What can

be done to ensure that the parliamentary elections are legitimate?

Mr. SHUSHKEVICH. If you permit, Ill answer your question, sir.

When the election takes place according to the codes that exist now

the one that was recently adopted, and according to the false Constitution that was unlawfully adoptedso there will be no elections, but there

will be legitimization of the unlawful regime.

According to the so-called Constitution of 1996, the President has in

his hands all legislative, executive, and judicial power. Although these
25

high principles are declared, there are no mechanisms for their realization. This is confirmed by the Venetian Expert Commission and a number of other juridical commissions of Europe.

Mr. PITTS. One other question.

What can the United States do to best help the development of democracy in Belarus? Please give some practical examples.

Mr. SHUSHKEVICH. We need help to communicate among ourselves.

We lack the means of communication. In reality, there are no mass

media, free mass media in Belarus. There are no newspapers considered to be independent. If they publish, for example, a decision of the

legal Supreme Council, the next day they will be closed. What we call

independent press is under high pressure by the regime.

We are grateful for the free radio in Poland and Prague. These radio

stations cover only part of Belarus and not everyone can listen to them.

We would like to spread these possibilities and I would say the following.

Poland came to establish democracy in itself after one million young

Poles spent some time outside the country, which took place between

1980 and 1989. Two and a half percent of young Poles received their

education abroad. When Belarusians will be able to obtain four times

less, Im sure the democracy would progress.

We expect education programs to play a function, to play a role in it.

We lack means to do it on our own.

Mr. LEBEDKA. Id also like to add something to what Mr. Shushkevich

is saying. First you have to obtain from the regime the implementation

of the promises it has already made. The promises made at the Istanbul

summit and so on. Also, the St. Petersburg Declaration of the OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly.

Secondly, you also have to affect what is happening in Belarus through

Russia. Human rights are not just the internal affairs of Belarus. Russia today is getting a large amount of financing from various international institutions. You have a real lever to affect the situation in Belarus

and that is through your loans to Russia. You must be setting conditions to these loans to Russia and tie them to the human rights situation in Belarus.

The third point. As long as your investment in democracy in Belarus

is only equal to your investment in Turkmenistanthey have the same

budget this yearyoure going to see the results that youll see.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you for your statements.

Thank you for your leadership, for your courage. We look forward to

working with you to establish democracy once again in Belarus.

Mr. SHARETSKY. With your permission, I would like to say a few

words.

I would like to see fulfillment of what was promised Belarus in 1994,

the guarantee by the three great powers including the United States,

which is to preserve the security and integrity of Belarus as an independent state.

One of the three powers infringes upon that guarantee, which is Russia. That is why I wrote my letter to President Clinton, Prime Minister

Blair, and why I would like to receive an answer, which shows an example in democracy. We are grateful to you for these hearings. We have

to solve the main problem. The Belarusian people hope that they were

not misled in 1994. We have not received a response. We are still waiting for the answer.
26

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Speaker, we will contact the White House as well,

and the Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and ask them to respond

to you as you are most deserving of a response. We do have a copy of

your letter and we will do our best to try to procure you that response.

Regrettably, there is another vote on the floor. I will return and other

Commissioners will return momentarily. We only have about five minutes to get over to the Capitol, so we will be in recess for approximately

ten minutes, and I apologize for the delay.

(Whereupon at 12:05 p.m., off the record until 12:31 p.m.)

Mr. SMITH. Again I want to apologize to our witnesses for the delays.

Weve had one vote after another on the House floor and, as I think you

know, you need to be physically present. We have no voting in absentia, so one has to go to the House floor to make that vote. So I do apologize

for that.

Let me ask a question regarding the upcoming March 15 demonstrations. As we all know, the last time there was an outpouring of support

for democracy and demonstrations. There were beatings. There were

harassments. What is being done now with the government to try to

prevent that kind of debacle from happening again? For instance, are

parade routes being discussed, demonstration plans, or is it pretty much

being kept close to vest, as we would say?

Are you seeking a maximum international presence to mitigate the

possibility of violence by the government? I would say to the Belarusian

government from this podium that all the world will be watching and

will be watching with very high scrutiny and intense scrutiny as to

what happens.

But what are you as the opposition party members doing to try to talk

with the government on this issue?

Mr. LEBEDKA. The freedom march that took place on October 17 of

last year was one of the most significant political events in Belarus.

More than 30,000 people took part. Now we have irrefutable evidence

that there was deliberate provocation by the authorities against these

marchers.

We now have witnesses from the law enforcement agencies, including police officer Oleg Baturin. Baturin publicly spoke out about the

provocations that the police performed against the marchers. Different

provocateurs were infiltrated among the ranks of the marchers and

they are the ones who were behind that clash. Now were all collectively

very concerned about the fate of Oleg Baturin after making his speech.

We were forced to help him leave the country but his fate continues to

alarm us.

Now Freedom March Two, Im also one of the organizers. In compliance with the law, we submitted an application, but we dont have any

reaction or answer yet for our application. The OSCE Mission to Minsk

proposed an initiative to hold a round table with the march organizers

and the city authorities to discuss the march. The opposition had no

problem in supporting this initiative from OSCE but the authorities, to

this day, have been silent on the question.

Weve been getting some negative feedback. We cant rule out that

another provocation isnt again being prepared. So your statement that

officials of Washington will closely watch the events in Belarus, thats a

very good sign for us.

Let me show you one example here about Freedom March One, and

its an answer to your question really. It also answers the question of

how independent the judicial system is in Belarus. After the march,
27

they sentenced me to spend some time in jail. My trial took place October 20. Nevertheless, here is a document. This is my sentence, but its

dated October 18. Here is the court decision dated October 18, although

my trial was October 20. This is the instructions to send me to jail. The

trial hadnt taken place yet but the decision of the court is already prepared.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Lebedka, if we could have a copy of that, wed like to

make that part of the record, the official record.

Mr. LEBEDKA. I cited that example to emphasize and reinforce the

notion that we fear there will be a new provocation of this type. But we

underscore the fact that were for a peaceful march. And the slogan for

the march is: We are for sovereignty of Belarus, independence of Belarus,

and for real negotiations with the government.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to yield to Jonathan Moore who is a Congressional Fellow, but also a Special Assistant to the Speaker of the House

of Representatives, who has been following and is very intimately involved with the issues relevant to Belarus and cares deeply and speaks

on behalf of Speaker Hastert.

I yield to Mr. Moore.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to join you today in this important hearing.

Chairman Sharetsky, as you know from your meeting with the

Speaker, Speaker Hastert is deeply committed to seeing the restoration

of democracy and sovereignty to Belarus. He is very grateful for the

opportunity to have met with you and was very pleased that the Chairman was in that meeting and that has led to this hearing today on this

important subject.

I dont have specific questions. I would like to echo Chairman Smiths

comment from earlier also. There is no question that the conditions

under which all the persons who live in Belarus are difficult. It is particularly significant to any number of people here in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, to know more of what has happened to you and

your colleagues at the 13th Supreme Soviet and your families. Recognizing that you have many tasks ahead of you and, of course, based as

always on the access to information also to be considered the Lukashenka

regime, if at some point it is possible for you or your colleagues to put

together more comprehensive information about simply the names, the

dispositions, the conditions under which the members of the 13th Supreme Soviet that have chosen not to cooperate with Lukashenka, thats

very significant.

Again, not to diminish what all the people of Belarus are suffering,

but to emphasize that in his disregard for democratic institutions, parliamentarians, people like you, elected democratic leaders, are suffering in the ways that you begin to see. If more details of that are possible

in the future, that would be very helpful to us.

Then beyond that, Id also like to echo Mr. Gejdensons comments

from our perspective. There is no question in the presence of all of you

here today, Mr. Lebedka, Mr. Shushkevich, and Chairman Sharetsky,

indicates the importance of providing a unified opposition.

We sadly see cases elsewhere in Europe where lack of unification

opposition makes it very difficult for both the opposition and those people

outside the country to provide them with assistance. Its important that

you can work together, that you have the joint events planned and youre

able to conduct them in Belarus. We wish you the best of luck to continue with those endeavors.
28

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.

If our panel has no further comments, or if you do, perhaps a final

comment, we will go on to the third panel. But I would like to yield to

you.

Yes, Mr. Lebedka?

Mr. LEBEDKA. I do want to underscore the fact that there is a high

degree of consolidation among the opposition forces now. Nine opposition parties have joined in the Consultative Council of the Congress of

Democratic Forces. We also share the fear that if the opposition doesnt

stay unified and if it is torn apart and atomized, that this will interfere

in our success.

All the actions planned now for Spring 2000 are the fruit of cooperation that has come out of all the opposition parties working together. If

we can feel the political and moral support of the international community, that will be an additional factor in unifying our opposition.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Lebedka.

Again I want to say to all three of our distinguished witnesses how

grateful we are for your courage. That the Congress, in a bi-partisan

way, not just this Commission but the House and the leadership of the

House will be following the developments especially with the upcoming

demonstrations that are planned.

We care deeply for your personal safety and for the safety of your

loved ones and well do all that is humanly possible to make this the

highest priority that it could possibly be.

From our point of view, this is why the OSCE exists. Human rights,

I believe, are at the core of democracy and if they are not respected we

see the kind of outrages that Lukashenka has perpetrated upon the

people of Belarus. So, we will continue the effort. Your presence here

today I think moves the ball forward immensely. Again, you are very

courageous and were grateful for your presence and your leadership.

Id like to thank you.

Let me ask our third panel if they would now proceed to the witness

table.

Beginning first with Adrian Severin who is the head of the OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly Working Group on Belarus, who just returned

from government opposition talks in Belarus. He is a member of the

Romanian Chamber of Deputies who serves on its Foreign Affairs Committee, and head of Romanias delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly.

Mr. Severin has served in various positions in the Romanian government, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

from 1996 to 1997, and Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Reform and

Relations with the Parliament back in 1990 to 1991. He teaches law

and is the author of books and articles on international and comparative trade law and trade arbitration.

We are also joined by an old friend of this Commission, Spencer Oliver,

who currently serves as Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly. He was General Counsel to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Hes also served as Chief of Staff to this Commission, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, from 1976 to 1985 and

has been a walking institutional memory of OSCE proceedings and work.

Its so good to have you back, Spencer, on that side of the table, to

provide your insights as well.
29

So Id like to ask Mr. Severin if you would proceed, and then Spencer

Oliver.

TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN SEVERIN, HEAD OF

 THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLYS WORKING GROUP

ON BELARUS

Mr. SEVERIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my gratitude to you for inviting me to give my testimony today in

front of this Commission, during this very important hearing on a very

sensitive topic.

You have the map of Belarus over there and everybody can see that

Belarus is an important country. It is a country in the center of Europe,

a country without which we cannot foresee a real united and coherent

Euro-Atlantic space with secure room for all of us.

Mr. Chairman, I have already prepared and distributed a written

statement, and certainly I am not going to read it to you. I have also

forwarded to your committee the report we have prepared for the Standing Committee of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and it is also at

your disposal.

I simply want to sum up a few ideas about Belarus today and tomorrow, if we can foresee tomorrow in a clear way. Certainly afterwards

Im ready to answer your questions.

Well, to sum up the actual situation, the existing situation, I would

say that one point needs to be stated clearly: Belarus, at this time, has

not achieved international standards, the OSCEs standards, and consequently it didnt fulfill the commitments it undertook as a member or

a participating state of OSCE. This is clear, and I dont think anybody

could doubt it.

As far as the existing situation in the country, I think that it is obvious we have there a very involved controversy and a very basic crisis of

a political and constitutional nature.

Number two, the country is divided over a very crucial subject which

is the union between Belarus and Russia, the future, the character, the

nature of this union.

Number three, there is a widespread decline in the countrys economic situation. Nevertheless, as a result of my last consultation and

exchange of views with the IMF, World Bank, and some other international institutions, we might assess that the country is not in a virtual

state of economic collapse, in spite of the economic difficulties they are

facing.

We can also say that in Belarus the attitude of the people in power is

not homogenous. We can find various groups and orientations within

the state structures. Some are more concerned with real democratization of the country, while others consider that Belarus should not become more democratic at this stage.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me say that to assess is extremely important, but it is not everything. I think that it is much more important to

change. From this point of view I would like to remind you of the words

of Mr. Lebedka. He told us a few minutes ago that the slogan of the

forthcoming demonstration in Minsk is, talks, change, and dialogue.

These are very important three words.

Talks means the political way. I think that, to change a region which

is not democratic into becoming a democratic region, we have two paths

a revolutionary one and a political one. I dont think at this stage that
30

we can follow the revolutionary one. There are not enough elements or

conditions for a revolution in this respect, but talks are the political

way.

Talks, yes, but not only talks. Talks for what? Talks for change. This

is extremely important. Not just mere talks, but talks which will lead

us to a meaningful change, a meaningful progress toward democratization of the country.

Dialogue, the last word of this slogan, means exactly that. Changes

and progress which could be reached through real political dialogue.

This is, Mr. Chairman, the strategy we have followed. We have asked

all political sides in the country to embark in a genuine, sincere, meaningful, and structured dialogue which should lead not only to free and

fair elections, but which would give us an answer to overcome the political and constitutional crisis. But these elections must be the result of a

political consensus, a political consensus which is the result of a political dialogue.

I would add that our strategy included, and we are going to continue

along this line, a preoccupation for strengthening and unifying the opposition. The future of the country cannot be positive, if the opposition

is divided and not credible in its approach to the problems of the country.

I think that this, if we have to assess important progress, and success, is the most important to my mind. Today the opposition in Belarus

is much more united than a year ago. Today the opposition in Belarus

is much more oriented toward the problems of the population and thats

why it is more credible.

The second point of this strategy is to create a meaningful dialogue

between the international community and the government of Belarus.

We might like this government or not. We might criticize it every day.

As for those who are exercising power, we have to try to exercise a

certain influence on them. That is why we put in place ways and means

to communicate with the representatives of the government and to establish certain arrangements which can compromise on everything but

human rights or the basic rules of democracy, of a pluralistic and structural democracy.

From this point of view I might say, Mr. Chairman, that our slogan,

if we have adopted a slogan would be, Strategic Firmity and Tactical

Flexibility. We want to be flexible from the tactical point of view, in

order to move the process ahead, but we cannot compromise, as I said,

on the strategic goals, which are a democratic Belarus.

My final point, Mr. Chairman, is about the need for coordination. We

need to achieve a high level of coordination cooperation between the

parliamentary dimension and governmental dimension represented on

the spot by the AMG.

We have achieved an important step toward cooperation among European organizations. Im thinking about the Parliamentary Assembly of

OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the

European Parliament. Recently, we have formed a parliamentary Troika

which is supposed to act jointly in order to give a one-voice message, a

strong message in Belarus.

Certainly, we think it is important to coordinate with the neighboring countries, namely Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine and with some of

the regional and global actors. I am thinking of the United States and

countries like Germany, but I am also thinking certainly to Russia.

Thats why we think that we have to talk to Russia and to try to estab-
31

lish together a strategy vis-a-vis the progress of democracy in Belarus.

Mr. Chairman, I would end my introductory remarks here by saying

that indeed we have at this moment some undertakings and some promises that Mr. Lukashenka and his government have made. We, in turn,

always asked Mr. Lukashenka not only for promises but for deeds. But

we also have to look, Mr. Chairman, and see if we are ready for deeds,

and not just for protests and statements.

I think we have to prepare for ourselves a plan of deeds which should

accompany the deeds on the side of the government of Belarus, in order

to accompany step-by-step progress. The current process, which for the

time being cannot be supported very much, we must continue to pursue

since no other way currently is available to us.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Oliver, would you like to

TESTIMONY OF SPENCER OLIVER,

SECRETARY GENERAL, OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

Mr. OLIVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for

your kind words of welcome.

I think that the work that Mr. Severin and his Working Group are

undertaking in Belarus is a continuation of the kind of parliamentary

and congressional involvement that began with the creation of this Commission more than 20 years ago with the first step in congressional and

parliamentary involvement and human rights in the OSCE and the

CSCE.

The creation last week ofthe visit last week of this parliamentary

Troika from the three international parliaments, I think sends a very

effective message that the parliamentarians, or the so-called parliamentarians of a puppet parliament are not going to be legitimatized or recognized by real parliamentarians around the world until they have free

and fair elections.

This hearing here by this Commission and this Congress I think,

coming as it does right on the heels of the tri-parliamentary troika visit

to Minsk, puts an exclamation point on that message and I think it is

most welcome and I congratulate you on that.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Oliver. Thank you for your work on these

issues.

Let me ask a couple of questions. This hearing, for the record, is the

second in a series of hearings that will be held on Belarus. The idea is

that this will not go away. Its a process, as you pointed out, Mr. Severin. Talk and dialogue is important but we want to see deeds.

When Mr. Lebedka went through his list before and his testimony,

almost you could summarize it as promises made, promises broken over

the last several years. It underscores that the frustration level is very

high and the hope is that Mr. Lukashenka will realize that democracy

has its up side even for his regime in terms of the economy, perhaps the

World Bank, the IMF and others areengaging in a very real way if we

could see some substantial progress on the human rights front. So there

are some carrots out there that should not go unnoticed by the current

regime in Belarus.

The upcoming demonstrations planned for mid-March, I know that I

have great concerns and I think all of us on the Commission have great

concerns about the potential of violence being initiated by, as Mr. Lebedka
32

called it, provocateurs who probably will seek to look and play the part

of people who are demonstrating and then turn into people who actually

precipitate violence.

I hope that Lukashenka is aware that nobody is fooled by those kinds

of games. People do get hurt, obviously, but nobody is fooled in the Western world or anywhere else by that kind of activity. Hopefully they are

unnoticed. Everyone will be watching very carefully. Our Commission

will be scrutinizing this very carefully and I know the other countries

in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and everyone else will be doing

so as well. The hope is that it will be a free and unfettered demonstration without violence.

In your talks last week, were these issues raised? Do you suspect,

Mr. Severin, that these issuesMr. Lebedka mentioned that they have

applied for the proper clearances and permits and have yet to hear from

the government. Theyre trying to follow the procedure to the letter of a

flawed law, and yet they still are getting a non-answer. What can we do

to try to facilitate that, and did it come up last week?

Mr. SEVERIN. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, we raised this question during our meeting last week with Mr. Lukashenka. At the same time, we

explained to him or we tried to pass him a clear message that he should

be the person first interested in making sure that no violence or provocations will be linked with these possible demonstrations that were announced.

At the same time, as usual, we are going to scrutinize attentively the

process in Belarus. We do believe that, within the kind of dialogue which

has already been announced by Mr. Lukashenka, one point must be

madethat the political harassment and intimidation should cease. Certainly this is all about hopes at this stage. Many times the Belarusian

government has abused the benefit of doubt. But certainly we hope that

a positive change could be seen in the near future.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you, what steps need to be taken by the

Belarusians to ensure that the fall elections are legitimate, are free and

fair? What are you suggesting to Lukashenka to make sure that is the

case?

Mr. SEVERIN. Well, the short answer is that the electoral code should

be amended in many respects. I have to say in all fairness that the law

which has already been adopted is much better than the previous one,

but it is also far from being at the level of our standards. So I made

clear to the President that our standards are not a menu, but a package. All these standards should be respected in order to let us assess

whether or not that the law is a guarantee for free and fair elections.

But, Mr. Chairman, the longer answer is that this election law is not

enough. We need a political environment able to give the possibility to

all candidates to run freely and with equal chances in these elections.

We need also, as I said already, a law which is a result of a political

consensus, of a political dialogue. We need a law which is not the American

law or the French law or the German law, but a law which respects our

standards and which is appropriate for that specific situation in Belarus.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you with regard to changes in the Kremlin,

specifically Alexander Putin and the horrific and bloody war that is

now under way in Chechnya, what impact have those two changes in

Russian policy had on the Belarusian situation? Have you seen any

change whatsoever, heads of state change and the war?

Mr. SEVERIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, we rely very much on a positive

contribution from Russia to improve the democratic process which we
33

are trying to promote in Belarus. Certainly during the current election

period in Russia, the campaign does not exercise a positive influence on

our work because Russia has some other interests at this moment, but

certainly they can involve themselves in discussions about Belarus in

the future.

On the other hand, I think that democracy and human rights are

indivisible. If human rights are breached in a certain part of the world,

this could exert a bad influence in another part of the world. So, if you

want me to link what is going on in Chechnya with human rights in

Belarus, I would say that this is not going to encourage a better attitude

vis-a-vis the human rights situation in the latter country.

So, I think we have to be in touch immediately after the elections in

Russia with the Russian president and with the Russian government in

such a way as to let them be involved in a positive process under the

aegis of the OSCE. After all, Russia is a member of our organization.

Mr. SMITH. In his testimony, Stanislav Shushkevich made this statement, and I would appreciate your response to it. He said that the OSCE

rules do not permit the organization to effectively influence the regime

which does not want to carry out any democratization. AMG efforts

have resulted in the development of a single acceptable approach by the

opposition to negotiations. These efforts, however, have diverted the

attention of the opposition parties from other types of resistance, and in

that sense, have become counterproductive.

How do you assess that analysis?

Mr. SEVERIN. Well, I fully understand the bitterness of Mr.

Shushkevich, and he expressed to me the bitterness of some other representatives of the opposition. To a certain extent it is our bitterness.

Nevertheless, on the other hand, we have to see in an unemotional

way the situation in Belarus, because we are interested in results. This

is extremely important. Protests are important, if they lead us to results. Resolutions are important, if this resolution can pave the way to

some practical progress.

In this respect, we didnt identify any other practical way to make

the process move along. If somebody could give us an idea about an

alternative way, certainly we are going to consider it. But for the time

being, to my mind, its obvious there is no other way.

Mr. SMITH. To what extent can you cooperate with Ambassador Wieck

and the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group? How does that work

out?

Mr. SEVERIN. I would say that we have achieved an unprecedented

level of cooperation between the governmental and parliamentary dimensions of the OSCE. If we were able to change something in Belarus,

we must wait some time to assess whether or not the changes are far

better.

But, in any case, the mere fact that we were able to change something in that country is also the result of this cooperation between the

AMG representative, the governments of the OSCE, and my working

group representing the Parliamentary Assembly.

Well, we have to work in this way, diplomacy and technical abilities

with political involvement, with political creativity and imagination,

and political vision. I think that this is a very good combination.

Certainly we cannot always reach the results we might like to achieve.

Thats why, if you look to the various public statements, you can see

that sometimes Mr. Wieck and his group were criticized by the opposi-
34

tion and other times by the government. I think that this is a very

difficult exercise and we have to support the presence and activity of the

AMG in Belarus.

Mr. SMITH. One of Mr. Lebedkas statements, part of his testimony

was the importance to negotiate access to the mass media and as a

lawmaker and politician myself Ive run in 11 elections and my first

election I lost and lost it resoundedly. I was never in the media. Now we

have a free media. They didnt think I was a viable candidate. But in a

country where it is controlled by the government and by a regime that

does not allow the opposition to have free access and there is no journalistic judgment being made about the newsworthiness of any given statement or event, that is press censorship.

My question is what do you think can be done, what is being done,

especially with the upcoming elections, to have the ability for people to

vote fairly on the day of the election, if it is fair. Its certainly not fair if

everything preceding that theres been a blackout of the opposition message and the individual candidates.

What is your sense as to any progress being made in the area of

access to mass media?

Mr. SEVERIN. I cannot agree with you more, Mr. Chairman, and Im

happy that you raised this question.

I think that free access to media, as long before the starting date of

the election campaign as possible, is of paramount importance. This is

a strategic goal. Its not just one step which should be done to have a

more democratic Belarus.

I think that in this respect we can also identify steps forwards and

steps backwards. A very important step forward is the fact that the

opposition and the government were able to agree and to sign a protocol

on free access to the media. The step backward is that this document

hasnt been implemented. But at least we have now a document which

we could make reference to, and we can ask for its implementation.

It was a positive signal that some leaders of the opposition were able to

express themselves through the state-owned media during the last few

months. This is a step forward. But the step backward is that this

presence was sometimes subject to censorship, or the topics were limited in advance.

For the future, Mr. Chairman, I would say that media means, among

other things, money. I was disturbed to hear and surprised to hear

that, for instance, the funds given to Radio Free Europe were limited

and the presence of this radio station has become, consequently, less

visible in Belarus. I think that we have to increase these funds, in order

to support real news coverage and a real, independent, mass media in

the country.

From the administrative point of view, I think that there have been

fewer pressures during the last few months, but the remaining economic constraints are substantial. This undermines the hopes for a

real meaningful, free, independent media.

Mr. SMITH. Id like to yield to Mr. Moore.

Mr. MOORE. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

I ask this question of you, Mr. Severin, and thank you again for your

distinguished work, which is a credit both to Romania and to the OSCE.

More as an OSCE frontline veteran having served in the OSCE mission

in Bosnia after the date in agreement, recognizing that this might be a

difficult forum in which to ask you this question, what perspective could

you offer on possible improvements to the structure, the staffing, or
35

perhaps even the status of the AMG in Minsk?

You mentioned of course the AMG, as is inevitable in these cases, is

criticized by both the government and by the opposition. But its not a

particularly large operation. Its status is of course subject to all the

OSCE membership agreeing on that status.

But what might be done, perhaps through this Commission or through

other means, to expand its reach or its staffing, or what other improvements might be made recognizing that Ambassador Wieck is also a

very distinguished diplomat? What would you suggest?

Mr. SEVERIN. Well, to be very frank, I didnt think very much about

such a project to change a structure which does not belong to the Parliamentary Assembly. I think that the numbers of staff at the AMG is

quite enough for the time being, but maybe we can supplement the staff

with experts on very particular subjects which might become more

important in the coming months.

I hope that we approach free and fair elections in Belarus. But I also

hope that, if conditions are not met, we will act accordingly. If positive

steps are made, I think we will need to strengthen the AMGs expertise

in some fields. I think they have good enough experts, for instance, as

far as the election law is concerned.

But, at the same time, I think that time is very short. Maybe the

problems could be divided, and so more experts could take a limited

number of topics. Then they could be more efficient.

For the rest, you ask me to give my ideas on the general management, and this is something which I am not very ready to comment on

at this point.

Mr. MOORE. I understand. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.

Id like to thank our very distinguished witnesses for again appearing

and say that again, this is one more hearing, but we will have additional hearings on Belarus. Were going to stay very close to this. I am

looking forward to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Bucharest, in

your home country, in early July. I can assure you we will be very

much attentive as will all the other parliamentarians.

Mr. Lebedka, I remember sitting right across from the American

delegation with his folks and thats as it should be. As a freely elected

member of the parliament, he should be making law and policy in Belarus

and not being in exile, even internal exile.

I do have one final question if I could, Mr. Severin. Secretary Harold

Koh earlier spoke of selective engagement with regards to Belarus as

perhaps the way he wanted to describe U.S. policy vis-a-vis Belarus.

How would you describe U.S. policy?

We heard earlier that Speaker Sharetsky was very upset that his

letter had gone unanswered to the President of the United States. And

certainly even if its an answer thats not fulfilling, there at least should

be an answer. We ourselves have a copy of that letter, so we know its

certainly gotten to the right quarters.

But selective engagement and your take on U.S. policy toward Belarus?

Mr. SEVERIN. Mr. Chairman, I think that my first duty as a representative of an organization where the United States are full-fledged

members is to try to give expression to the policy of United States in the

daily activity of our organization. What I am trying to do is to be as

faithful as possible to each member state, and to bring them together

into a coherent and articulate expression. So this is maybe the right

angle from which I can look to this issue.
36

At the same time, I would say that policy, as selective as it was formulated by Assistant Secretary, I think this is a step by step policy, a

stick and carrot policy. This is the understanding I give to this expression. I think this is a very appropriate approach.

The process is difficult, as I said, with ups and downs, steps backwards, steps forwards, and it is very difficult to say each day if we are

moving or not. Thats why I think a selective approach is to be encouraged. To me a selective approach means a step-by-step approach.

We have to establish benchmarks for the Belarusian government.

But we have also to establish benchmarks for ourselves. We should ask

for timetables to be respected by the Belarusian authorities, but we

should have our own benchmarks. We have to work with real carrots

and real sticks, not to describe the carrots as sticks or vice-versa.

We have to define a very specific policy and I do hope that we will be

able to define such a policy in practical terms and not just in very vague

words and terms.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Severin, thank you very much for your testimony

and for your work.

Thank you, Mr. Oliver as well.

We will be following this very closely and we will very soon be convening another hearing on Belarus and all eyes, like I said before, will be

looking on the March 15 and thereabouts demonstrations to ensure that

there is hopefully, God willing, no violence and that democracy will

flourish someday, sooner rather than later, in Belarus.

Thank you again for being here. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 1:25 p.m.]
37

APPENDICES

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER

 Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important that the Commission, the

Congress and our government continue to shine the light on what is

going on in Belarus. I thank you for holding this timely hearing to do

just that, and I welcome our many distinguished witnesses who will

share their experiences in fighting for democratic reform in Belarus.

Several weeks ago, the State Department released its annual human

rights country report on Belarus which highlights numerous violations

of human rights and underscores the Belarusian government's lack of

compliance with its OSCE commitments. Among other developments

in the deteriorating political and human rights situation in Belarus are

the continuing show trial of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chygir, the

continued detention and brutal beating by prison guards in December

of political detainee Andrei Klymov, a deputy of the 13th Supreme Soviet, and the still-unresolved disappearances of opposition leaders Viktor

Gonchar and Yuri Zakharenka.

Since the beginning of this year, I have had the opportunity to meet

with all of our belarusian opposition leaders present here todayMr.

Sharetskiy, Mr. Shushkevych and Mr. Lebedka. All of them are at the

forefront of the struggle to restore democracy to Belarus. The 13th Supreme Soviet, which they represent, was illegally disbanded by

Belarusian strongman Lukashenko. In the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, we have worked to keep faith with the Supreme Soviet, the

legitimate legislature of the country, and have insisted on supporting

them and not Lukashenko's pocket parliament, the National Assembly. Giving the opposition credibility is a critical thing for us to be doing

in the West.

I met yesterday with Adrian Severin, my colleague from the OSCE

parliamentary assembly, who was involved in talks among the belarusian

government and opposition, with the involvement of the so-called troika

consisting of the osce parliamentary assembly, the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe and european parliament. Seven months

of on-again off-again talks between the regime and the opposition have

failed to bear fruit, thanks to the intransigence of the authorities. Genuine dialogue with democratic forces is essential if Belarus is to move

beyond the current period of stagnation. Access to state media by the

opposition will be crucial here. And very importantly, in order to get

beyond the constitutional impasse, free and democratic parliamentary

elections should be held this year consistent with relevant OSCE standards and norms.

Mr. Chairman, it is important that we send a messageloud and

clearto the dictator in minsk that his government's continued abuse

of human rights and violation of OSCE commitments devastates the

people of Belarus and prohibits his country from taking its rightful

place in a free, prosperous and democratic Europe. Ultimately, he will

not prevail.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman
38

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK

 First, I would like to acknowledge the distinguished witnesses who

have come to share their expertise, including Assistant Secretary Harold

Koh, who recently testified for me regarding sex trafficking. The purpose of this hearing is to encourage democracy development and human

rights in Belarus. Your efforts to brief us today on these subjects are

greatly appreciated.

After the Wall collapsed, the nations of the former Soviet Union experienced extraordinary upheaval. Since that time, civil societies have

been shaken to their core. This fragmentation among the former Soviet

satellites has produced a wide spectrum of results, ranging from radically transformed societies such the Czech Republic to the other extreme found in Eastern Europenamely, nostalgia for the Soviet Era.

Unfortunately, Belarus is known for being in the latter category.

In the initial period of independence (from 1991 to 1994), Belarus

embraced a budding respect for human rights and democracy. But all

this dramatically when President Lukashenka assumed power in 1995.

I am sorry to say that Belarus is continuing to resurrect the destructive policies of the Soviet Era.

Once again, Lukashenka has implemented central control and state

ownership. Once again, he has curtailed privatization and restricted

the formation of small and medium-sized businesses. As a result, the

situation in Belarus is deteriorating rapidly, with inflation rapidly spiraling downward.

Their human rights record is flawed, in light of the basic standards

expressed in the Helsinki Accords, which Belarus has signed. There are

olitically motivated trials, among other failures of fundamental civil

rights. And now, Lukashenka continues in his position as president of

the country even though his legal term expired in July, 1999 last year.

Thus the president of Belarus presently lacks democratic legitimacy.

It would be relatively simple for Belarus to begin to reform its poor

reputation. This can be accomplished by beginning to implement some

of the reforms which will be discussed here today. In particular, we are

hopeful that the parliamentary elections scheduled for the Fall will be

free, fair, democratic and transparent. Also, real effort should be made

by the government to enter into a dialogue with the opposition parties,

with the help of the OSCE, if needed.

I hope that the exposure of these trends will open a door of freedom for

those who seek to usher their country into a better era marked by freedom, economic reform, and democracy. So many of the countries in

Central and Eastern Europe are beginning to achieve these goals. Towards this end, we hope that the democracy forces in Belarus will be

strengthened and encouraged by this hearing today.
39

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF HAROLD HONGJU KOH,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN

RIGHTS & LABOR

 Mr. Chairman, fellow members of the commission, I am delighted

to be with you this morning, both as Assistant Secretary of State for

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, as well as the Department of

State's commissioner on the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Chairman, the

situation in Belarus has markedly deteriorated since the spring of 1999,

when you held your last hearing on this beleaguered country. Belarus

is being left behind at a time when the rest of Europe is seeking to build

a common foundation of democratic governance, respect for human

rights, and the rule of law. The United States is deeply concerned about

the situation in Belarus, and that is why I traveled to Minsk last November. Before describing that trip, let me outline how we see the democracy and human rights situation in Belarus.

 There are many critical elements of democracy, but the key four are

respect for the will of the people, civil society, the rule of law, and an

informed citizenry. First, the will of the people: As we in the United

States know from our own country's hard experience, democratization

is a long and complex struggle, which does not come easily. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has noted, [D]emocracy must emerge

from the desire of individuals to participate in the decisions that shape

their lives. nlike dictatorship, democracy is never an imposition; it is

always a choice. In Belarus, the regime continues to try to suppress

the will of the people. In addition to using unconstitutional methods in

1996 to rewrite the country's constitution, and replacing the legitimate

13th Supreme Soviet with a rubberstamp parliament, Aleksandr

Lukashenko unilaterally extended his term of office by two years, until

2001. His legal term of office expired last July 20. As a result of these

actions, as well as a pattern of abuse of fundamental human rights by

his regime, Lukashenko has lost his democratic legitimacy and is

shunned by leaders throughout most of Europe.

 Lukashenko also recently approved a seriously flawed electoral law

for upcoming parliamentary elections. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights examined the new law in detail,

and concluded that it does not meet OSCE standards. Major problems

include strict limitations on political activity which effectively prevent

real campaigning from taking place and the lack of a provision for multiparty representation on election commissions, which is so vital for impartiality and public confidence in the electoral process.

Democratic legitimacy only can be restored through free and fair elections in which all citizens and candidates can participate on an equal

basis and by restoring the necessary checks and balances among the

branches of government. The Lukashenko regime's recent announcement of plans to resume the OSCEsponsored dialogue with the opposition must not impose preconditions that will make it impossible for

the opposition to participate. It instead must produce real results, including agreement on an electoral code that meets OSCE standards and

provides an internationally acceptable framework for legitimate, free

and fair parliamentary elections. Otherwise, the U.S. and other democracies will find it very difficult if not impossible to recognize the parliamentary elections planned for later this year as legitimate, and Belarus

will not resolve its political and constitutional crisis or end its selfimposed isolation.
40

 The second core element is civil society. Democracy means far more

than just holding elections or referenda. The slow development of democracy in some states has demonstrated that elections must be regarded not as an end in themselves, but as the means to establish a

political system that fosters the growth and satisfaction of its citizens

by promoting and protecting their political and civil rights.

 Democracy also requires the full flowering of civil societythe broad

array of political parties, independent labor unions, independent media,

non-governmental organizations, womens' groups, and societies and

clubs that encourage political and social participation. Such groups serve

as an important conduit by which individuals may freely express their

dissatisfaction with politics as usual. It is precisely because of the

potential power of civil society that so many governmentsincluding

the Lukashenko regimeseek to limit or quash its influence.

 In Belarus, those who have chosen to participate in civil society by

speaking truth to power have done so at great risk to their freedom, and

even their lives. Last year marked a new low in Belarus not only because of the expiration of Lukashenko's legitimate term of office, but

also because two prominent opposition figuresGeneral Yuri Zakharenko

and Viktor Gonchar, along with his associate Anatoliy Krasovsky

disappeared. A thirdformer Central Bank Chair Tamara Vinnikova

felt so threatened that she escaped the country by temporarily disappearing. Others, such as Semyon Sharetsky and Zenon Poznyak, also

have fled abroad out of fear for their safety.

 Former Prime Minister and candidate in the oppositionsponsored

1999 presidential elections Mikhail Chigir and 13th Supreme Soviet

deputies Anatoly Lebedko, Valery Shchukin, and Andrei Klimov, are

only a few of the many opposition figures who have been targeted, beaten,

or imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their beliefs. Taken together,

this series of disappearances, arrests, and exiles has greatly exacerbated the climate of fear that exists in Belarus and made clear that

citizens expressing opposition to the government are in great peril.

 The Lukashenko regime also has sought to repress civil society by

restricting other fundamental freedoms such as freedom of assembly

and of association. The regime's restrictions on freedom of assembly

were manifested by its violent repression of the October 17 Freedom

March, as well as of other peaceful protests. It has inhibited freedom of

association through its restrictive law requiring NGOs, political parties and trade unions to re-register. Just last week the Ministry of Justice announced that it intends to disband 200 NGOs, that the regime

refused to reregister.

 Registration requirements also restrict the practice of religion, despite Constitutional and international guarantees of freedom of religion.

This is especially true for non-Orthodox or non-traditional  religions,

which include some Protestant faiths. Mr. Chairman, sometimes we

are asked by representatives of other governments whether the U.S.

requires NGOs or religions to register. The bottom line is this: NGOs

and religions may register in the U.S. if they wish to receive a specific

tax status. Butunlike in Belarusthey are not required to register in

order to function or hold a bank account.

 The Lukashenko regime also has restricted freedom of association

through harassment of free and independent trade union activity. Trade

union organizations are refused registration and trade unionists are

arrested for legitimate trade union activities such as distributing leaf-
41

lets. Unionists and members of their families are arrested on trumped

up charges or given unusually severe punishments for minor offenses.

The failure to protect internationally recognized worker rights has led

the United States to advise the Belarusian authorities that Generalized

System of Preferences (GSP) benefits are on the verge of being withdrawn.

 A third element of any true democracy is the rule of law. Genuine

democracy requires that democratic institutions and officials be guided

by and constrained by the lawthat is, a government accountable to

the law, not above it. Governments committed to the rule of law respect

individual rights, rule through a body of laws that are transparent,

predictable, based on popular will, and fairly and equitable applied.

Mature democracies have a fair and efficient legal system led by an

independent and professionally competent judiciary that acts as a final

arbiter of the law and is not subject to pressure by the Executive Branch.

They respect international human rights standards.

 Absent an independent judiciary and the rule of law, democracies

seldom remain democratic for long. History shows that a strong rule of

law helps to assure sustainable economic development, to combat corruption, to support social stability and peace, and to carve out necessary space for individual political and economic activity. It also provides

the average citizen with the capacity to hold leaders and institutions

in both the public and private sectoraccountable.

 But once the rule of law begins to crumble, accountability withers

and along with it democracy. In Belarus, those in power have sought to

undermine democracy and end accountability by attacking the rule of

law and stifling the independence of the judiciary. The legal system has

become little more than a tool to advance Lukashenko's agenda. Laws

have been passed not to protect, but to restrict human rights and democratic governance. The judiciary has been used to reward loyal followers, to rubber stamp decisions, and to silence peaceful, democratic opposition. Over the past few months, for example, the Lukashenko regime

has been conducting show trials against Mikhail Chigir and Andrei

Klimov because they oppose Lukashenko's authoritarian rule. Such

actions represent the rule of might, not the rule of law.

 In genuine democracies, executive overreach is checked by a fourth

key element of democratic society: an informed electorate. Only free

mediawhether print, broadcast, or electroniccan guarantee that

citizens have access to the information they need to make political decisions. If a government can control information or limit press freedom,

it can usually preordain elections, stunt civil society and manipulate

the judiciary. In Belarus, the regime continues to combat its critics by

placing extensive restrictions on the media.

 The regime has increased harassment of the independent press. In

September, through a questionable libel suit by the Minister of Interior, the independent newspaper Naviny was forced out of business.

That same month, the regime attempted to pull the registration for 10

other papers. In January, it closed the daily Kutseyna in Orsha. The

successor to Naviny, Nasha Svaboda, only on its second day of publication had its press run stopped just last week. State-controlled Belarusian

television and radio maintains a monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Even internet access is limited to government-controlled
42

service providers. However, such measures have not stopped the courageous efforts of independent reporters and journalists such as Pavel

Zhuk, the fearless editor of Naviny and Nasha Svaboda. In light of the seriousness of the situation in Belarus, I visited Minsk

on members of the Helsinki Commission staff, Ron McNamara and

Orest Deychakiwsky, following the OSCE review conference in Istanbul.

My purpose was to give moral support to democracy and human rights

advocates, and to convey the U.S. government's. While in Belarus, I

participated in an NGOsponsored rule of law conference, the focus of

which was human rights protection and the protection of human rights

lawyers. I was very impressed by the participants at the conference,

especially the enthusiastic young lawyers. I also met with Members of

the 13th Supreme Soviet, wives of the disappeared and detained, democratic opposition leaders, human rights activists, the

OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group head of mission Ambassador

Wieck, independent journalists, and Foreign Minister Latypov and

Deputy Foreign Minister Martynov, whom we pressed for concrete actions including the release of Mikhail Chigir and opposition media access.

 Shortly after my trip to Belarus, I returned to Istanbul for the OSCE

Summit. I met first with the Belarus opposition, and then with the

official delegation, including thenPresidential Advisor and OSCE liason

Sazanov, who subsequently left this position and was replaced by Igor

Velichansky, and Deputy Foreign Minster Gerasimovich. Since then, I

have given special focus to the Belarus issue: I participated in Deputy

Secretary Strobe Talbott's meeting with Semyon Sharetsky, Stanislav

Shushkevitch, Ludmila Grazyanova, and continued the meeting with

them in my office; I have met with lawyers, NGO reps, and dissidents,

and continue to follow the situation in Belarus closely.

 My trip was but one of the ways in the U.S. Government has sought

to buttress our support for democracy and human rights in Belarus.

We also have put in place an assistance program designed to support

democracy and human rights advocates and the independent media in

Belarus. In FY 1999, we provided over $8 million in democracy-related

assistance to Belarus, out of a total country budget of $12.4 million in

FREEDOM Support Act funds. In other words, over two-thirds of our

assistance consisted of democracy-building programs, while the remaining one-third consisted of programs designed to promote civic empowerment through the private sector, as well as U.S.-Belarusian hospital

partnerships and humanitarian assistance for the victims of the

Chernobyl accident.

 A central component of our democracy-building efforts has been the

U.S. Embassy's Democracy Commission, which in FY 1999 awarded

over $1 million in small grants in support of print and electronic media,

independent trade unions, youth and women's groups, human rights

groups and other democratically oriented organizations. An additional

$1 million in small grants was awarded by the Eurasia Foundation in

FY 1999, with funding from the U.S. Government as well as from private foundations. Other types of ongoing U.S. Governmentfunded

democracy programs include NGO development programs, legal assistance and education programs, political party training programs (focusing especially on women and youth activists), and academic and

professional exchange programs. I will do my utmost to ensure that
43

United States core democracy programs are preserved to the fullest

extent possible in Belarus in FY 2000, and I will seek to identify some

funding from my own Bureau as well.

 Let me close by thanking you for the opportunity to participate in

your hearing. I have been deeply moved by the courage of the Belarusian

civil society members whom I have met, and I am deeply committed to

giving them sustained and meaningful support. The U.S. is well-represented by Ambassador Dan Speckhard in Minsk who is doing an outstanding job promoting democracy and human rights, and it is a pleasure to have a strong collegial relationship with Steve Sestanovich and

Ross Wilson on Belarus. We welcome your thoughts on what more the

U.S. Government can do to promote democracy, human rights, and

rule of law in Belarus
44

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF ADRIAN SEVERIN,

 HEAD OF THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLYS

WORKING GROUP ON BELARUS

Just over one year ago, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc

Working Group on Belarus undertook its first visit to Minsk to assess

the political situation and to explore avenues for resolving the parliamentary crisis. Now, many missions later, we stand at a crossroads in

Belarus where some issues have been resolved, but serious questions

remain. Across the past year, the OSCE Parliamentary Working Group

has created a strategy and pursued a policy designed to promote dialogue between the opposition and Government of Belarus. This strategy

has also been adopted and promoted by the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk, in a unique combination of international parliamentary and governmental cooperation. It was hoped that, with international guidance, all sides of the Belarusian political process could be

involved in resolving the political issues which have stalemated the

democratic development of the country. I have just returned from Minsk

representing one side of a parliamentary Troika of international organizations which has been recently formed as an extension and further

internationalization of this dialogue process. I would like to begin by

summarizing the current state of affairs.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

A Constitutional and political crisis still exists and divides the country between those who support the 1994 and 1996 Constitutions. Although it is difficult to ascertain how much the average citizen identifies with this issue, the possibility of a union with Russia does have a

deeper resonance with some people in the countryside but also divides

the country politically. Whereas the political debate on constitutionality and legitimacy may not have a serious impact on day-to-day life, a

political and/or economic merger with Russia is seen as a positive move

by some citizens (mostly for economic reasons) and a loss of sovereignty

and individuality by many others.

In addition, declining economic standards are pervasive throughout

Belarus and are a major factor in the political dynamics of the country.

Though international experts point out that the country is not in a

state of complete economic collapse, inflation, unemployment and declining living standards are all aspects of every day life in Belarus that

must be accounted for by the Government. Often the blame for this is

officially placed on Western countries which have isolated  and applied double standards  to Belarus. Alexandr Lukashenko is portrayed

in the State press as someone defiant and willing to stand up to this

international pressure.  Nonetheless, at some point, it would seem

logical that increasing numbers of the population would begin to question the country's leadership.

Within the internal circle of power in the administration, it has become apparent to our Working Group that some leaders disagree on

what course of action to follow, either economically or politically. Many

within Government are opposed to a political merger with Russia. Many

also see the only hope for the country's economic development coming

through access to Western capital and technology. Others favor a closer

alliance with Moscow for political and strategic reasons. This schism in

the inner circles of Belarusian power has led to a number of resigna-
45

tions and reappointments in the recent past. Those in favor of closer

relations with Russia appear now to have gained the upper hand in this

ideological and tactical struggle.

The OSCE's parliamentary and governmental strategy to promote

dialogue between the opposition and Government has met with acceptance by virtually all camps in the Government and in the opposition.

All sides of the political equation have spoken in favor of dialogue. However, because of the past history of mistrust, or due to fundamental

differences of interest, some have sought to avoid engaging in dialogue.

The question of trust weighs heavily over the political spectrum in

Belarus as the human rights situation in the country has deteriorated

seriously in the last two years. Opposition leaders and members have

been subject to arrests, detentions, and various highly questionable

practices. Some have even disappeared. Whereas many opposition leaders have continued their activities unabated, there is nonetheless a chilling

effect over the opposition's ability to promote its ideas and programs.

The result of all these factors is a democratization and Western integration process that is characterized by ups and downs. We have seen

across the past year a number of steps forwards and steps backwards.

However, we are by no means at the same point of departure as we were

last year. A number of events and changes in the political system have

changed the course of politics. The OSCE's strategy of promoting dialogue has been a key influence on this process of change. I would now

like to summarize the major aspects of our strategy.

STRATEGY

The ad hoc Working Group of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

has from the very beginning sought to overcome the constitutional and

political crises in Belarus through a political dialogue that would include the Government, the opposition and NGO's. The dialogue concept

has centered around the question of holding free and fair parliamentary

elections in Belarus in the year 2000. As the mandates of both the 13th

Supreme Soviet, recognized by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as

the legitimate Parliament of Belarus, and the operational legislature

are set to expire with this next round of elections, this political event

was believed by Working Group members and the OSCE Advisory and

Monitoring Group (AMG) to provide a solid foundation for a possible

discussion and compromise. However, one aspect of the dialogue that

has been of crucial importance to the opposition has been related to the

kind of Parliament that was to be elected. Would it have real power and

perform a democratic role as a check and balance to the executive?

One preliminary factor in the parliamentary effort was to try and

unite the opposition into a more cohesive, coherent and credible negotiating partner. Against a unified, official representation, the stratified

and divisive opposition political parties were unable to enunciate or argue for any clear demands. To augment this process, the OSCE AMG

also worked on a regular basis to promote the creation of a positive,

political program and platform. A major reason for the creation of this

platform was to direct the opposition's attention towards the real problems of the country and to appeal directly to voters. One of the major,

official criticisms of the opposition in Belarus has been that the country's

political parties are not organized and do not represent any real con-
46

stituency. Although important, the continual and strict reliance on the

question of constitutional legitimacy, appeared to the Working Group

members as too limited for rallying the opposition's support.

Another aspect of the Working Group's strategy has been to enhance

communication channels between the OSCE and the Belarusian authorities. Through steadfast support of the AMG, and through a series

of high-level contacts of its own, the OSCE parliamentary dimension

sought also to broaden and strengthen avenues for dialogue and discussion at the governmental and inter-parliamentary levels. To maintain

this channel of communication, the Working Group decided it was necessary to have Parliamentary Assembly representatives present at times

of crisis in Belarus and when windows of opportunity presented themselves. Numerous visits of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Working Group have been conducted in the past year to defuse situations and

to facilitate further communication.

While trying to be politically pragmatic, the Working Group consistently promoted the notion that democracy is not just elections, but also

tolerance, equal opportunities for all to participate, respect for the rule

of law and accountability. On these points, the Working Group sought

to maintain tactical flexibility, but strategic rigidity.

Through the development of these forms of enhanced communication, the strategy then sought to involve the opposition and Government in activities which promoted common interests and goals (thereby

learning how to work together). The Working Group and AMG also felt

at this point that NGO's should also be involved as third parties in the

dialogue process, as many NGO's were better structured and more developed than their party counterparts.

In pursuing a strategy working with political parties and NGO's, the

Assembly Working Group and the AMG focussed not just on Minskbased organizations, but also with local and regional NGO and party

structures. As these groups often enjoyed better credibility with the

population at large, this aspect of the strategy also concentrated on the

creation of an emerging political class unburdened by the political events

of the recent past which focussed instead on traditional bread and butter voter issues.

In order for this kind of strategy to succeed, it was necessary for the

Parliamentary and Governmental sides of the OSCE to agree and to

coordinate their own activities. The linkage between the OSCE Governmental approach (diplomatic/technical) and the Parliamentary approach

(political flexibility) proved a useful and powerful combination. The

Parliamentary Assembly also sought to coordinate activities with other

international actors and governments and sponsored a meeting in Copenhagen for this purpose which was then followed by a series of other,

smaller international coordination meetings. Early this year, a parliamentary troika was formed between the groups with responsibilities

relating to Belarus from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, in order to reinforce the international community's support for

efforts to promote free and fair parliamentary elections in Belarus.

Another of the key aspects of the Working Group's efforts has been in

seeking to coordinate its own policy with those of neighboring states

(Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania), as well as regional and global actors

(Germany, Russia, and United States). In this regard, a number of
47

high-level meetings were held and OSCE Working Group representatives travelled to national capitals to discuss the situation and developments in Belarus.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

 STRATEGY

Perhaps the most visible achievement of the Assembly's strategy has

been a much more unified opposition. Although some parties and organizations continue to prefer confrontation with the administration and

condemnation of any efforts at negotiation, most political parties have

agreed to work together to promote a dialogue with the Government on

free and fair elections. An intrinsic part of this dialogue process includes access for the opposition to the State-controlled media and a number of other basic issues. The unification and strengthening of the opposition, as well as its credibility, has also resulted in a unified message

oriented to the needs of voters and the nation. The unification process

was initiated during a Working Group meeting for political party members and NGO's held outside of Bucharest. Governmental representatives, though invited to attend, declined to go.

The Bucharest process as it became known promoted a format for the

mediation dialogue of 2+1+1  (Parties and NGO's, the Government

and OSCE). The overall process promoted consensus on confidence-building measures (the release of some political prisoners, as well as opposition access to State-controlled media), but later was to include a

roundtable dialogue on the preparation for the elections (from both the

legal and political point of view) and the functions of the future Parliament.

Another significant achievement was the media agreement guaranteeing opposition access to State press that was signed by both opposition and State representatives, though it has yet to be implemented.

Whereas there appeared some resistance in the Governmental administration to implementation of the media agreement per se, the Parliamentary Assembly Working Group made an interim proposal to allow a

controlled and phased access of the opposition to the media which appears to have been accepted. Since this proposal was made, there have

been appearances of opposition representatives on State TV and Radio,

as well as the publication of opposition viewpoints in the State print

media on a limited basis.

Some prominent political prisoners (Chigir, Statkevich, Lebed'ko, etc.)

were released, after repeated efforts by the OSCE and high-level visits

by the Chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary Working Group. In a

similar vein, the registration and re-registration of some independent

newspapers, as well as some political parties and NGO's was also

achieved after repeated visits and mediation efforts. Most of these accomplishments can be attributed to the establishment of relatively permanent and stable communication between the Parliamentary Assembly representatives and the authorities of Belarus, as well as the Working

Group's efforts to reinforce the OSCE AMG, its work and its reputation.

The open recognition of the opposition's existence by Mr. Lukashenko

and the Belarusian authorities, as well as the tacit recognition of the

need for dialogue with the opposition and society in general, is a very

significant accomplishment of this strategy. Prior to these efforts, the

Government generally refused to even recognize the existence of an op-
48

position in the country. The adoption of the dialogue concept by the

Government also pays tribute even at the most minimal level to the

importance of public participation in the governing process.

A related accomplishment of the Working Group strategy has been

the creation and organization of permanent structures within the

Government's inner circle of power for a national dialogue. Originally

these structures were related to the OSCE-moderated dialogue, but are

now associated with the dialogue taking place under Mr. Lukashenko's

aegis. Relatedly, there appears to be a greater appreciation in the inner

circles of power in the Belarusian administration that blanket arrests

and detention of the opposition is counter-productive to the process and

to the country's already-tarnished human rights record.

Although an election code was passed by the operational legislature

and signed by Mr. Lukashenko, he and his administration have stated

clearly that amendments can be made to the election code based upon

the national dialogue. It should be noted that the new election code is an

improvement over its predecessor, though still features a number of

deficiencies. The OSCE has raised a number of technical issues and

cited areas in need of improvement, some of which have been made. The

elimination of administrative sanctions as a means of prohibiting candidates from competing in the elections was a primary concern raised

by the Parliamentary Working Group representatives and has been

removed from the current code. Though still insufficient to meet OSCE

commitments, the apparent willingness to amend the code leaves some

room for optimism.

One other key achievement of the Parliamentary Assembly's strategy was the creation and the recent visit of the Parliamentary Troika

to Minsk, which included representatives of the three international parliamentary organizations. This international body represents a coordinated parliamentary-international policy vis-a-vis Belarus and also signifies the commitment of the international community towards Belarus.

During this visit, the Troika group expressed its dismay at the interruption of the process leading up to the dialogue, but also was encouraged by the expressed intentions of all sides to find solutions through

dialogue.

STRATEGIC GOALS STILL TO BE ACHIEVED

Though the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Working Group on

Belarus strategy has been very successful, the political environment in

Belarus is very dynamic and fluid. There remain some goals which

have yet to be reached so far. Foremost among these is the establishment of a permanent, meaningful dialogue on the election system and a

consensual election code. It is hoped that the current official proposal

for dialogue, sponsored by Mr. Lukashenko, will serve this purpose, but

this has yet to be proven. A major expectation for such an inclusive

dialogue would be a consensual election code that would then be adopted

simultaneously by the legitimate and operational parliaments, thereby

avoiding certain legitimacy questions for some electoral participants.

As the current election code was adopted unilaterally by the National

Assembly and signed by Mr. Lukashenko, it was not a product of dialogue and does not address some of the opposition's concerns. Any national dialogue in Belarus needs to try and address the concerns of the

opposition. One of their greatest concerns is that the electoral code is

not currently in full compliance with international commitments. A
49

number of issues, including media access for the opposition, the composition of election commissions, campaign finance provisions, domestic

observation, etc., still need to be addressed. In this regard, the implementation of the signed media agreement would be a positive step in

addressing some of the concerns of both the opposition and the international community.

Working Group members and the OSCE AMG also still hope to achieve

an agreement on the functions of the future parliament. In terms of

democratic development and international support, it is believed that

the newly elected legislature must have real powers and perform a meaningful role. One avenue towards achieving this goal could be the repeal

of all presidential decrees which limit the authority of the legislature.

Another goal of the Working Group has been to secure the release of

all political prisoners, and for harassment and intimidation of individuals and organizations to cease. In order to create a positive electoral

environment, it is important for all aspects of Belarusian society to

have an unimpeded ability to compete in the electoral process, without

fear of repercussion.

Finally, the Parliamentary Assembly Working Group hopes to influence a change in the official Governmental rhetoric which has been

consistently anti-opposition and sometimes anti-Western. Again, in order to build a constructive relationship, more positive rhetoric, stressing areas for mutual cooperation, would seem beneficial.

FUTURE

Given the limited time remaining before elections will be held in

Belarus (although a date has not officially been set, expectations are

that the elections will be held in the Fall), a number of issues remain as

priorities:

 First is to encourage the opposition and NGO's to enter Mr.

Lukashenko's proposed national dialogue. The short-term benefit

of this would be to transform an amorphous dialogue into a structured, meaningful and inclusive exchange of ideas. The longerterm goal would be to reach consensus between the Government

and the opposition on the election legislation. Ideally this agreement would reflect international standards, include access of the

opposition to the State-controlled media and would also include

an agreement on the functions of the new parliament.

 On the other side of the equation, the Working Group also believes a major priority is to continue to encourage the Government to include the opposition in the national dialogue, and to

make the dialogue an inclusive, meaningful process.

 Continued emphasis on the need for the respect of human rights

and increased tolerance in Belarus is also necessary at this point.

Freedom of expression and respect for rule of law is controlled by

the Government. If the dialogue process is to be successful, it

must reflect a real consensus. Even a good election law that does

not respect this fundamental aspect of democracy would be insufficient.
50

 The Working Group also believes it necessary to define a step-bystep process for international organizations regarding the provision of technical and other assistance, as well as tangible incentives and rewards for a gradual implementation of reform in

Belarus. Though a carrot and stick  policy has been advocated

for Belarus by some governments and international organizations,

Working Group members believe there need to be carrots as well

as sticks.

 Similarly, the international community needs to be better organized in order to provide assistance for the forthcoming elections.

This particularly relates to the creation of an agreed-upon, coordinated approach for the provision of technical assistance and

observation. An international conference seems an ideal venue to

agree upon minimal standards and improvements necessary for

international observation to take place, as well as standards of

compliance necessary for the eventual recognition of the election

results. During such a conference the specific competencies of

different assistance organizations should also be identified and

coordinated, so as to avoid duplication of function and to streamline efficiency.

 The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Working Group also firmly

believes that international contacts with Belarus should be maintained, even during difficult periods in its political development

process. The democratization process in Belarus has been characterized by steps forward and backward. Isolation and a continued eastward drift of the country will not serve any long-term

interests.

 Finally, an international plan between Russia, the United States

and European powers should be created to assist, encourage and

promote the democratization process in Belarus. Through the concerted efforts and interests of major governments, the rewards of

democratization can be emphasized and highlighted.

CONCLUSIONS

The political situation in Belarus is currently a virtual stalemate.

The opposition by itself has little ability to influence or have an impact

upon the current political situation. However, by boycotting the current dialogue process, the opposition can condemn the process itself and

the results to be one-sided and exclusive. The Government, on the other

hand, has the ability to involve the opposition and to make the political

development process in Belarus inclusive and democratic. This would

send a strong signal to a number of governments and international

organizations. Both sides stand at a crossroads and must decide whether

it is more beneficial to create and participate in a truly democratic process, or to maintain their separate positions and thereby guarantee that

the electoral process will not be inclusive, democratic or internationally

acceptable.

In the long term, the democratization process in Belarus and its evaluation will be complicated and will require time to evaluate the actual

results. With the current political situation as fluid and subject to change

as it is, it is difficult to assess and interpret events in terms of their

ultimate impact on the overall development process. Is an isolated event

an indication of a positive or negative shift by the Government or the

opposition? Time is needed to evaluate each development, and knee-jerk
51

responses by governments or international organizations can and have

been counterproductive to the conflict-resolution process currently being undertaken by the OSCE.

To those who have been involved in seeking to find a way out of the

political stalemate, there is no other way to achieve democratization

goals except through an internal, political dialogue and with non-violent political action. Sensitivities are high on all sides of the political

spectrum, and trust is difficult to achieve. Past human rights violations have clouded and jaded many as to the possibilities for any positive democratic development in the country. However, only through a

stable and gradual process of dialogue can the necessary trust be secured, and individual issues be addressed.

The current situation in Belarus does not give much reason for enthusiasm. There have been a number of setbacks to the democratization process and to the efforts of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Working Group and the OSCE AMG to create an inclusive political

dialogue on elections. The date for these elections is drawing near with

many necessary issues yet to be resolved. However, some hope still remains. The Government has recognized the need for a national dialogue

and has instituted its own process. The opposition has expressed a willingness to participate in any meaningful dialogue which will work towards the resolution of their differences with the Government. Whereas

confidence and trust are still lacking in this new process, it is imperative that all sides try to make the effort a successful one.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Working Group encourages the

OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group to observe the development of

this dialogue and to provide such assistance as it is able to on a daily

basis, in order to facilitate a meaningful exchange of ideas and a consensual outcome. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working

Group on Belarus will maintain its commitment to the process and

provide support and assistance as needed. The Parliamentary Troika of

representatives from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament has expressed its commitment to the process as well, and will also

add its political support to a positive outcome. The key issue is that

time is short and much needs to be done in order for free, fair and

recognizable elections to take place in Belarus this year.
52

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF STANISLAV SHUSHKEVICH

BELARUS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION AND SECURITY

Geopolitical interests of Russia are the main obstacles on the path of

making Belarus a democratic, law-abiding, neutral nation, an important element for stability and security in Europe.

The independence of Belarus was restoredde jure in December 1991.

Belarus has removed nuclear weapons from its territory, declared its

desire for neutrality, and attempted to follow a path toward democracy,

a market economy and open society.

Supporters of the Belarusian independence in Belarus are no enemies

of Russia. They understand that Russia is more democratic than Belarus

is today and that Russia's economy is more liberal. But they also realize

that to follow the path of reforms together with an unpredictable Russia

is similar to that of following a herd of horses, speeding along without

knowing where they might turn next.

Russia does not conceal its intentions that it wants to swallow Belarus

under the guise of unification . The Russian Federation Council on

Foreign and Defense Policy declared openly that the unification must

be used to oppose the expansion of NATO to the East;  remove the

potential threat of creating the so-called Black-and-Baltic Sea Belt which

would isolate Russia ; improve our military potential by integrating

with the Belarusian army ; remove the Kaliningrad special defense

region from military and strategic isolation ; ensure the integration of

the two armies into a single system with a single command and control

structure ; and develop a unified, powerful military industrial complex . Even more cynically, the Council also declared that there should

not be any delay in this matter and that one should even pay a certain

economic price for such a profitable geopolitical union. And since the

processes of restoring national self-consciousness are being accelerated

in Belarus, time is working in favor of the opponents of integration.

So, the unification process should be sped up. It has also been suggested to ultilize the main sources of anxiety among the Belarusian

people, such as the low economic security, increase in crime, and the

consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, because they divert the attention of the people from the essence of the integration process.

In short, it is necessary to expand the Russian empire by suppressing

the national self-awareness of the Belarusian people, and utilizing the

state of poverty in Belarus. There is no mention of the fact that one of

the causes of poverty in Belarus is Russia itself, because it supports the

illegitimate regime, a regime that ruins the economy by employing its

communist methods of management.

Russian politicians are convinced that they represent an empire, or

superpower, and that they have the right to dictate the direction that

other countries should follow. They forget that Russia's grandeur

today is based solely on nuclear weapons, not on its economic power and

that the maintenance and modernization of these weapons at the mutually assured destruction level robs the Russian taxpayer at the expense

of the economy.

In his New Year's article, Vladimir Putin admitted unconditionally

that the standard of living of the average Russian is ten times less than

that of the average American, that the Russian GDP is five times less
53

than that of China, and that under the most favorable conditions the

average Russian will reach today's standard of living of the average

Portuguese in 15-20 years. But, at the same time, on January 10, 2000,

Putin approved the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, according to which Russia will oppose both the domination of the

international community by Western countries, led by the United States,

and the attempt of ignoring Russia's interests which can undermine

the international security and stability. To put this statement into

clearer language: Russians are lagging behind economically, but they

are great in spirit and, therefore, they can teach others. And those who

do not understand this, undermine international security.

A government, which relies on such controversial postulates while

maintaining the political stability in the country can only be a dictatorship.

Unfortunately, there is very little hope that, after securing his power

by going through the election process, Mr. Putin will follow the path of

developing a peace-time economy for the benefit of the ordinary Russian. The Belarusian experience demonstrates quite the opposite. A fairly

sensible people installed a dictator in Belarus, thinking that they will

serve as a brain center for him and that, because of his personal narrow-mindedness, he will, with a strong hand, carry out their sensible

policy. It turned out to be the opposite.

The regime established in Belarus is a dictatorship in spite of the fact

that the so-called 1996 Constitution speaks about the parliament,

legal opposition, freedom of speech and even the principle of the

existence of different branches of government.

The political opposition and the independent mass media are allowed

to exist nominally in Belarus, but they cannot affect the situation because the regime suppresses the democratic opposition by force, intimidation and open political terror. Belarus has become a police state. It

has the largest number of members of the police per capita in Europe

125,000 militiamen in a country of 10 million people. Popular political

leaders are disappearing without a trace; members of the parliament

with the parliamentary immunity are being arrested; independent lawyers lose their right to defend their clients in courts, and the courts

have become nothing but a farce.

The Russian leadership, in spite of its own economic difficulties, supports all this. The activity around the absorption of Belarus became

only one factor that united the opposing Russian political forces. A set of

six treaties which, in effect, were statements of intent and were signed

between April 1996 and December 1999, on the unification as well as on

the creation of a confederation, and, finally, on the union between Belarus

and Russia, demonstrates that Russia supports the illegitimate regime.

The treaties also blunt the suffering of the Russian population caused

by the war in Chechnya and economic hardships.

The economy of Belarus is in crisis. In 1999, inflation was higher

than 220 percent. The Belarusian ruble, with respect to the Russian

ruble, dropped in value by 225 times. The statements issued by the

regime about the rise of its GDP and the reduction in the number of

people with the required minimum living income are nothing but a

bluff. The minimum monthly income per capita was $2.00 in 1998,

while the average income was $37.00; in comparison, in neighboring

Lithuania, these figures were $105.00 and $256.00 respectively.
54

Opinion polls confirm that there is a drop in confidence for the government. The government bureaucracy also understands that the vain

economic attempts made by the regime have no future. The bureaucracy does not feel that it is being protected. At the whim of the dictator

any bureaucrat can be handcuffed or lose his job and all means for his

survival. The regime promotes its international isolation and without

any outside aid, Belarus will not be able to get out of the crisis. The

majority of the government bureaucracy is, therefore, interested in the

collapse of the dictatorship. This is also true for members in the power

authorities. If the opposition would stir up the active part of society

while the bureaucrats realize that the regime is unstable and begin to

think about their own future, then, with their help, the situation may

change drastically. Under these conditions, it would be very important

for Belarus to receive help from the international community in its

democratic transformation.

The OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) has been operating in Minsk since January 1998. OSCE countries have agreed that the

elections in Belarus should follow the development of the climate of confidence and the approval of the election code based on the dialogue between the government and the opposition. The international community does not recognize the elections if there are no independent election

commissions, which can also be created as a result of negotiations.

But the authorities, supported by Russia, have become even more

impudent. As a result, on February 22, 2000, 12 opposition parties refused to participate in the so-called elections. They considered the election law, created by the puppet parliament, antidemocratic

However, the OSCE rules do not permit the organization to effectively influence the regime, which does not want to carry out any democratization. The AMG efforts have resulted in the development of a

single, acceptable approach by the opposition to negotiations. These efforts, however, have diverted the attention of the opposition parties from

other types of resistance and, in that sense, have thus become counterproductive.

The formation of a nation, which has its own language, its own culture, literature, traditions, including the tradition of statehood, cannot

be stopped. Belarus will become a law-abiding democratic nation. It will

achieve the status of a civilized society. However, the process of democratization and liberalization will be rather long without the help from

the countries abroad, in particular, without the support of the enlightening and educational programs by the outside world.

Belarusians are aware of the length of time required for them to get

out of this dead end. They understand that the rapid development of the

country can only be accomplished with the aid of foreign investments.

From the excellent geographic location to its inexpensive, highly qualified and disciplined labor force, Belarus has plenty of factors favorable

for making profitable investments. The political forces inside the country supported by the enlightening and educational aid from the West

and, most of all, from the United States, should ensure the transition to

democracy and political stability in Belarus. We may then try to convince the United States and Europe to initiate a new Marshall Plan.
55

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES IN 1999

OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON BELARUS

OF THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

14 JANUARY 2000

CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT

Mandate of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Working Group on Belarus

Summary of Activities

Overview of Work

Next Steps Analysis

Annex 1: St. Petersburg Resolution

Annex 2: Istanbul Summit Declaration

MANDATE OF THE WORKING GROUP

The President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Mrs. Helle Degn

(MP, Denmark), appointed to the Group:

Mr. Adrian Severin (MP, Romania), Chairman of the Working Group

Mr. Ihor Ostash (MP, Ukraine), Vice President of the OSCE PA

Mr. Gert Weisskirchen (MP, Germany), Chair of the Third Committee

Mr. Kimmo Kiljunen (MP, Finland), Chair of the First Committee

Mrs. Nino Burjanadze (MP, Georgia), Rapporteur of the Third Committee

on the occasion of the Assembly's Annual Session in Copenhagen on 7

July 1998. The Group is assisted by OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Director of Programs Dr. Eric Rudenshiold.

Through its repeated visits to Belarus and other activities, the OSCE

Parliamentary Working Group seeks to engage the different political

factions in Belarus and to develop a dialogue on a number of crucial

constitutional, parliamentary and electoral questions. Working Group

members have made a special point of meeting with parliamentarians

of the 13th Supreme Soviet, leaders from political parties, as well as

representatives from the Republic of Belarus and other political forces

in the country. During all of its meetings, the Group has stressed the

importance of participation in the OSCE process and of the need for

finding peaceful, inclusive solutions to the country's various political

problems.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

1720 January 1999: First Assessment Visit of Working Group to

Minsk

The ad hoc Working Group on Belarus of the OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly visited Minsk from 17-20 January 1999, at the invitation of

the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus (AMG). The Parliamentary Group met with officials and representatives from the Presidential administration, Government and parliamentary officials, opposition representatives, members of the diplomatic corps, as well as with

members of non-governmental organizations and the media.
56

The purpose of the visit was to study the political situation and to

investigate the outlook for democratic transformation in Belarus. The

OSCE Parliamentary Working Group focused its efforts on a number of

pending constitutional and parliamentary questions in the country and

sought to directly engage and deepen dialogue between parliamentarians of the 13th Supreme Soviet, political parties, the Government of

Belarus and other political forces in the region. During its meetings

with the various political factions in Belarus, the Group also stressed

the importance of participation in the OSCE process.

1922 March 1999: Finnish Election Observation Program

The OSCE Parliamentary Working Group organized, in cooperation

with the Finnish Parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the OSCE

AMG, and the United Nations Development Program, to have six individuals from Belarus observe the Finnish elections on 21 March, as

part of the Group's efforts to build a dialogue on elections between the

Belarusian Government and opposition groups. Those individuals from

Belarus who participated in the election program were chosen from various institutions and organizations and represented a broad diversity of

official and unofficial political opinions. During their program in Finland, the Belarusian electoral observers witnessed political campaigning, met with press officials and representatives from different parties,

observed voting and polling procedures, as well as the final vote tabulation.

The Finnish program participants later expressed to the Working

Group representatives their appreciation for having been afforded the

opportunity to observe the Finnish elections, and they commented on

having had a number of opportunities to discuss their own electoral

problems during the Finnish program. These same Belarusian participants later made a presentation on what they observed to the Bucharest

meeting of political representatives from Belarus in the Spring.

March 1999: Working Group Consultations

Also in March, the Chairman of the Working Group, Mr. Adrian Severin, met with representatives of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and

the Department of State in Washington, D.C., and also with the Speaker

of the Russian Duma, Mr. Gennady Seleznev, and representatives of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, to discuss the current situation in Belarus. During his meetings in Washington, the Working

Group Chairman discussed possible ways for re-integrating U.S. activities in Belarus, as well as the means to identify and support the development of democratization in the republic. While in Moscow, Mr. Severin

expressed his gratitude to Mr. Seleznev for the Duma's interest in the

Working Group's activities in Belarus, and asked for their continued

support. The Working Group Chairman also met with a number of

Russian Federation officials while in Moscow to solicit their opinions on

the developing crisis in Belarus.

2-6 April 1999: Second Assessment

Visit Coinciding with Belarusian Local Elections Representatives of

the ad hoc Working Group on Belarus of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly visited Minsk from 2-6 April 1999, coincidentally with the AMG's

assessment of the Local Elections in Belarus. Although it was not a

formal election observation exercise, since the election law had been
57

determined by the OSCE not to be in compliance with international

commitments, the Working Group delegation participated in the election evaluation exercise in order to gain a closer insight on the various

kinds of electoral issues that Belarus must overcome in practice. The

Parliamentary Group also met with officials and representatives from

the Presidential administration, Government and parliamentary officials, opposition representatives, members of the diplomatic corps, as

well as with members of non-governmental organizations and the media.

The primary purpose of the visit was to assist the AMG in its electoral assessment, to follow up contacts made during the first visit of the

Working Group to Belarus, to gauge the level of political tension in the

republic, and to make preparations for future Working Group activities. Another major aim of this visit was to augment support for the

work of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group, headed by Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck.

2223 April 1999: Working Group Meeting in Copenhagen at

Expanded Bureau Meeting

The members of the ad hoc Working Group on Belarus held a meeting of its membership to discuss their findings from previous visits to

Belarus and to analyze the current political situation in the Republic.

The Group members also discussed various possible areas for concentration and possible strategies. An agenda of forthcoming activities was

also discussed and agreed upon by all Group members. The Group Chairman, Mr. Severin, made a progress report to the Expanded Bureau

Meeting.

1418 May 1999: Working Group Visit Coinciding with

Opposition Presidential Elections

Representatives of the ad hoc Working Group on Belarus of the OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly visited Minsk from 14-18 May 1999, timed to

coincide with the presidential elections being organized by opposition

forces on 16 May. The Working Group delegation unofficially observed

voting in the elections that were supported by the 13th Supreme Soviet

and opposition political parties, and held in accordance with the expiration of the presidential mandate as called for in the 1994 Constitution.

The Working Group stated that the elections constituted an important

step towards the needed political dialogue between government and opposition.

The Parliamentary Group also again met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, a number of Government and parliamentary

officials, opposition and political party representatives, members of the

diplomatic corps, as well as with members of non-governmental organizations and the media. Another purpose of the visit was to continue

preparations for a meeting to be held in Bucharest for representatives

from the government, the opposition and the non-governmental sector

to explore ways and means that could bring about democratic elections

in Belarus which would be acceptable to all sides.

1014 June 1999: Bucharest Meeting of Belarusian Opposition

and NGO's
58

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working Group on Belarus held a meeting regarding forthcoming elections for members of

Belarusian political parties, non-governmental organizations and trade

unions on 11-13 June outside of Bucharest, in conjunction with the

OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk. The meeting initiated

a dialogue between participants in order to investigate common grounds

for free and fair elections that could be participated in and recognized

by all political forces in Belarus. The purpose of the meeting was to

start a discussion on common denominators that could bring together a

consensus for political participation in democratic elections.

The Bucharest Meeting was a three-day series of closed-door talks

which also sought to further the coordinated effort of the OSCE parliamentary and governmental sides to engage the various Belarusian political factions in discussions related to free and fair elections in the

transitional republic. Although participants were divided on some subjects that were discussed, a number of areas of agreement were noted.

Foremost among the concerns of all participants was to gain access to

the state-run media, particularly television. Another concern was the

creation of an election law which was in line with OSCE commitments.

After this meeting, the Working Group and AMG sought to broaden the

Bucharest Process by engaging official Belarusian institutions on the

issues which were discussed in Romania.

610 July 1999: St. Petersburg Annual Session

The Working Group held a meeting and discussed its recent activities and future plans and Mr. Severin reported these to the Standing

Committee. A Resolution calling for free and fair parliamentary elections in Belarus to be held in the year 2000 in accordance with OSCE

commitments was unanimously adopted during the St. Petersburg

Annual Session of the OSCE PA in July. The Resolution also called for

political parties and opposition groups to have access to state-owned

media. (See Annex 1)

14-18 July 1999: Working Group Visit and Meeting with

President Lukashenko

From 14-18 July 1999, Mr. Severin had substantive talks on a number of political issues with then President Alexsandr Lukashenko and

other key political figures in Belarus. Mr. Severin and President

Lukashenko met for more than two hours in Minsk on 15 July, and

discussed the St. Petersburg Resolution, the progress of the Working

Group and the situation with regard to political prisoners. The Belarusian

President stated his commitment to the holding of free, fair and recognizable parliamentary elections in 2000, as well as his support for a

political dialogue (National Round Table) on elections to be held between the Government and the opposition, with broad media coverage

of the talks. The President further declared the participation of OSCE

in this process indispensable. He also stated to the Working Group Chairman that Mr. Lukashenko considers himself personally involved in this

national political project. In their talks with Mr. Severin, representatives from the political opposition also expressed their readiness to engage in dialogue with the Belarusian authorities, but underlined the

need for deeds to confirm good intentions. They also emphasized the

need for firm commitments by all sides entering such negotiations, access particularly to electronic media for all participants in the negotiations, and a political climate free of fear and politically motivated prosecution.
59

This was the fourth visit of Mr. Severin as Chairman of the OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) ad hoc Working Group on Belarus

to have political consultations with the Belarusian leadership and opposition. During his talks with the President, Mr. Severin discussed the

recently adopted OSCE PA Resolution on the Situation in Belarus, which

calls for free and fair parliamentary elections to be held next year in the

Republic in accordance with OSCE commitments. The Resolution, unanimously adopted during the St. Petersburg Annual Session of the OSCE

PA, also calls for political parties and opposition groups to have access

to state-owned media.

The Working Group talks concentrated on the implementation of free

and fair parliamentary elections in Belarus in the year 2000, which

need to be recognizable both domestically and internationally. In order

to bring about nationwide political support for such elections, as well as

international observation, the Parliamentary Working Group and the

Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus promoted the concept that

meaningful dialogue and substantive negotiations with all political forces

of the country must be undertaken. Mr. Severin stressed that free and

fair elections involveaccording to the conviction of OSCE Governments

and Parliamentsunimpeded access of the opposition to the media, in

particular the electronic media, and an understanding about the role of

a meaningful parliament in a democratic state. The Working Group

Chair also stated that such understandings in Belarus have to be reached

by dialogue between the government and the opposition, and with the

support of and consultations with non-governmental organizations. Given

the protracted nature of the political conflict over the past few years in

Belarus, the joint OSCE parliamentary and governmental effort stated

that trust must be re-established between political actors in the country.

The OSCE PA Working Group and the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (OSCE AMG) stated this trust could only be achieved if dialogue replaced the current situation of administrative restrictions, political intimidation and inflammatory rhetoric. The pre-trial detention

of opposition personalities on questionable legal grounds was one example raised by the Working Group Chairman as further exacerbating

political tensions. The OSCE was deeply concerned at this time as there

was no apparent legal need, under Belarusian law, for particular investigations to continue while the individuals were incarcerated and stated

that their release would be an important and positive signal.

Mr. Severin also discussed the results of the Bucharest Meeting between the various political, non-governmental and civic forces of Belarus,

which took place on 11-13 June upon invitation by the OSCE Parliamentary Working Group. The meeting helped to improve communication between the various participating civic forces of Belarus and initiated a dialogue, which has since come to be known as the Bucharest

process.

13 September 1999: Working Group Meeting for International

Organizations

On 13 September, the Working Group hosted a Co-ordination and

Strategy Meeting on Belarus for International Organizations and Governments at the Assembly's International Secretariat in Copenhagen.The

purpose of the Meeting was for the participants to exchange ideas and

to develop and co-ordinate strategies. The main policy goals were considered to be holding internationally-recognizable parliamentary elec-
60

tions and pursuing the opportunities presented by the National Round

Table, of which, under the aegis of the AMG, five preliminary and organizational meetings had already been held. A show of public and unified

support for the OSCE process regarding the National Round Table, the

correlation of timetables between international organizations and cross

participation for various initiatives and programmes were deemed important. Furthermore, it was agreed that the International Secretariat

would act as a clearing house and information unit for activities and

occurrences regarding Belarus, and that human rights should remain

at the top of the negotiations agenda.

The meeting was chaired by the Head of the Working Group, Mr.

Adrian Severin (MP, Romania), and representatives from a number of

organizations were present, including the Parliamentary Assembly of

the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the NATO Assembly. Also in attendance was Ambassador

Hans-Georg Wieck, Head of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group

in Minsk (AMG), who described recent developments which have taken

place in Belarus as a result of the combined effort of the Assembly's

Working Group and the AMG.

October 1999: Chairman's Meeting with Belarusian Leader

From 27-31 October, Mr. Severin visited Minsk and had a constructive three-and-a-half-hour meeting with Aleksandr Lukashenko concerning developments in Belarus and the arrests of certain key, opposition leaders. The two also discussed the issues needing to be resolved

prior to the beginning of the round table discussions on elections. Mr.

Severin stressed the primary importance of releasing political prisoners and providing the opposition access to the state-controlled media as

confidence-building measures, prior to the start of negotiations. Since

the meeting those arrested at the 17 October opposition-organized freedom march were released. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir was

also released and a media access agreement was signed (but not implemented).

4 November 1999: Working Group Chair Address OSCE Permanent Council

Mr. Adrian Severin (MP, Romania), Chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working GroupDemocracy Teamon

Belarus, addressed the OSCE Permanent Council on 4 November 1999,

on developments related to the establishment of round-table talks between the opposition and Government of Belarus. Mr. Severin informed

the Permanent Council about the Assembly's involvement in seeking to

find a resolution to the political impasse that exists in Belarus. He also

described the strong, working partnership that has been forged between

the governmental and parliamentary sides of OSCE in this regard.

17 November 1999: Working Group Meeting at Istanbul Expanded

Bureau Meeting

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working Group on Belarus held a working meeting in conjunction with the Assembly's Expanded Bureau Meeting and the subsequent Istanbul Summit to discuss developments in Belarus. The Group members discussed their

forthcoming plans and activities and met with Belarusian participants

in the forthcoming round table talks. Mr. Severin reported to the Expanded Bureau on the work of the Group.
61

1819 November 1999: Istanbul Summit Meeting of Participants in

Roundtable Talks

The Assembly's Working Group invited the government and opposition teams for the planned round table talks to come to the Istanbul

Summit for preparatory talks designed to reduce problems for beginning negotiations. During their meetings with Working Group members, opposition political party representatives were unanimous in their

concerns and tactics regarding the up-coming talks. The governmental

representatives agreed that certain confidence-building measures needed

to be implemented by the Government before the talks could successfully begin. All participants were also encouraged to meet with other

interested OSCE Delegations attending the Summit.

1115 December 1999: Working Group Consultations in Minsk

On 11-15 December, Mr. Adrian Severin visited Minsk for the sixth

time in 1999 as Chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc

Working Group on Belarus. Mr. Severin sought to continue consultations with the Belarusian government and opposition in order to facilitate the opening of the roundtable meetings designed to bring about free

and fair elections in Belarus which are acceptable both internationally

and domestically. Mr. Severin focused his attention on the issues preventing the implementation of the already-signed agreement on access

for the opposition to the state-controlled mass media. He also sought to

emphasize the need for implementation of human rights confidencebuilding measures by the government and for the need to begin election

negotiations in the near future.

During this visit to Minsk, Mr. Severin met with the Deputy Prime

Minister and Foreign Minister, as well as with a number of governmental specialists and officials. He also met with the Presidium of the 13th

Supreme Soviet, the advisory council of opposition political parties, NGOs

and several research institutes. Mr. Severin additionally met with former

Prime Minister Michael Chigir and with the families of political prisoners.

OVERVIEW OF WORK

The OSCE PA Working Group on Belarus has made a number of

visits to Minsk since the last Vienna Standing Committee Meeting, and

organized a number of meetings and consultations, in order to meet

with various Belarusian individuals and organizations. The Parliamentary Group has sought to investigate the elements of the political stalemate which has existed in Belarus already for several years, and to

suggest possible avenues for discussion and cooperation between governmental and opposition political forces. Early on in the past year,

political tensions increased in Belarus, and the OSCE Parliamentary

representatives were continually aware that, while relations between

the opposition and authorities were deteriorating, the potential for heated

conflict was also rising. One indicator of the escalation was that a complete set of parallel legal and political structures exists in Belarus, including legislative bodies, Constitutions, and executive structures.

In order to approach and discuss with these parallel bodies, it should

be noted that, during this past year, the Working Group has enjoyed a

unique relationship with the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in
62

Belarus (OSCE AMG), which has provided an important example of

cooperation and solidarity between the parliamentary and governmental sides of OSCE in the face of this political stalemate.

Though several other international efforts have failed to achieve results in the Belarusian conflict, from its first meeting in Minsk, the

OSCE PA Working Group has sought to engage all sides of the

Belarusian political spectrum in the hopes of finding common ground

for dialogue and the eventual development of a strategy to resolve at

least some aspects of the internal political conflict. During numerous

meetings with Belarusian politicians and representatives, many concerns and obstacles to cooperation were raised by all sides. However,

some possible areas for dialogue and even compromise seemed possible

to the Working Group representatives. It has been in these areas that

Group activities and discussions have been focused, and where some

dialogue between Belarusian political actors has been initiated. However, there has been and remains a deep mistrust between the various

political forces in Belarus which makes any level of discussion extremely

difficult.

The meeting in Bucharest, organized by the Working Group with the

assistance of the OSCE AMG, was a prime example of the fragility of

confidence in the existing situation. Although the closed-door meetings,

held from 11-13 June, were originally agreed to be between governmental, opposition and NGO representatives, the majority of Belarusian

participants from official structures canceled their plans to attend at

the last minute. Many opposition and NGO representatives also questioned the need for dialogue with the other sides that were invited to

Bucharest. However, opposition and NGO representatives, along with a

representative from the official trade unions, did travel to Bucharest,

and did engage in discussions on grounds for participation in common

elections that could be mutually recognized. During the intensive discussions, all Bucharest participants agreed that an election law which

is in keeping with OSCE Commitments needs to be adopted and implemented. All participants also agreed that opposition groups need access

to state-owned and -controlled media, particularly television. Whereas

a number of Constitutional, legal and procedural issues divided the

Bucharest participants, the Working Group members sought to challenge participants to explore new ideas and options. As the three-day

series of meetings progressed, a number of proposals and suggestions

were made by all participants. The lively and collegial discussions which

took place were regarded by organizers and participants as a success in

initiating a constructive dialogue on elections and possible next steps.

The Working Group and AMG has since sought to broaden the

Bucharest Process by engaging official Belarusian institutions. Working Group members visited Minsk again and met with the President of

Belarus in mid-July to discuss possibilities for implementing possible

agreements and areas of compromise. Since that time there has been a

commitment to dialogue voiced by the Government and some confidencebuilding measures implemented to build trust where little exists. Unfortunately, human rights violations and imprisonment of opposition

leaders increased, as well as a series of disappearances of some key

political figures.

Nevertheless, the Working Group continued to push for the process of

dialogue and to work with the AMG to prepare all sides for impending

negotiations, once the Government had instituted the confidence-build-
63

ing measures. The Working Group also sought to increase coordination

between international organizations and governments from the EuroAtlantic region regarding sharing information and the provision of future technical assistance in Belarus.

As members of the Parliamentary Working Group have learned, the

process which should lead toward the democratization and development

of a free and open society in Belarus is long and complicated. There are

no spectacular or immediate solutions to the issues which make up the

political stalemate. However, the Working Group representatives believe that some progress has been made to date, and that the groundwork for further progress towards democratic elections and further democratization in Belarus have been made. The need for a steady and

coordinated approach from the international community, which emphasizes the importance and wisdom of adhering to OSCE and other

international principles, must be continued, if there is to be a successful outcome.

NEXT STEPS ANALYSIS

Major Political Issues to be Resolved Regarding Elections in

Belarus in 2000 (After Confidence-Building Measures in Place)

A political decision by the Belarusian authorities to accept the following five points is urgently needed to resolve potential conflict areas, to

build transparency and efficiency into the elections process, and to speed

the ability of Belarus to meet its electoral commitments.

1. Central Election Commission (CEC), and regional and local commissions--All political parties should be represented at all levels

of election commissions. The CEC should act independently and

have full authority to run the elections process, with domestic

and international observation.

2. There should be no exclusion of candidates under administrative

investigation or with records of administrative sanction.

3. The electoral threshold should be reduced to 25 percent for the

first round (and no threshold for a second round).

4. The election law should promote a mixed electoral system ( percent proportional and percent majoritarian).

5. Regarding the issue of registration of parties at local addresses,

the law should be suspended or enforced only after 1 January

2001. There is currently not enough commercial property available in some regions of Belarus to make this feasible at this point

in time.

The rest of the issues (the authorities of the Parliament, equal budgetary subsidies for all candidates, equal and open campaign conditions,

simplification and transparency of the registration procedure, etc.) related to the election are more technical in nature and should be discussed in the direct negotiations of the National Round Table, based

upon the agreements above.

The forthcoming election law must be achieved by negotiations between the opposition and the government, in order for the resulting

elections to be recognizable, either domestically or internationally. Pressures by some political institutions in Belarus to adopt a non-negotiated

election law will only result in further alienating opposition groups from
64

the political process thereby making the resulting electoral procedure

unacceptable to important constituents in the Belarusian political spectrum. This is an unacceptable situation, particularly so when the Government of Belarus has shown a willngness to negotiate with the opposition.

However, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working Group

has a number of other concerns at this point:

 Little progress has been made recently towards the activization

of the Round Table process.

 Time delays exacerbate tensions and reduce trust in the political

system.

 Time delays favor a non-negotiated situation, or a solution which

allows little to no time for alternatives to be discussed between

the government and opposition.

 Confidence-building measures have only been partially implemented: former Prime Minister Chygir has been released from

prison, but still faces a trial that has already had sessions conducted behind closed doors; a signed media agreement, giving

access to the opposition, has yet to be employed.

Despite assurances to the contrary, the Working Group has become

increasingly alarmed at the lack of overall progress on the Government's

part in creating a situation conducive for negotiations. Delays reduce

the ability of achieving a mutually acceptable agreement on holding

free, fair and recognizable elections in the year 2000. Delays in implementing the media agreement also indicate a measure of bad faith on

the Government's part, though its leaders have indicated a commitment to the process of dialogue.

Opposition parties have organized and unified their efforts to negotiate with the Government and shown a strong willingness to compromise and work towards a mutually acceptable solution. The 13th Supreme Soviet has also shown a desire to negotiate and flexibility over its

positions in January of 1999. The Government, on the other hand, has

recently sent mixed signals and appears unable to act on or implement

the words of its leaders.

Given this apparent impasse, particularly regarding the underlying

concerns over implementation of the media agreement, the Working

Group suggests an interim solution of partial implementation. Some

air time for opposition people on television and radio could be provided,

via a single, regular program that would be taped (in order to give all

sides the chance for editorial security) and broadcast later. Fixed subjects of discussion could be agreed to in advance, again as a measure for

all sides to gain experience and confidence in working together. Partial

steps, such as this, could serve to break the ice on further implementation and to build confidence that both the governmental and opposition

sides will act responsibly.

It is a concern to the OSCE PA Working Group on Belarus that agreements, such as the Russia-Belarus Union Treaty have been ratified by

an unrecognized institution, and thereby cannot be recognized by the

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Pressing these issues to the fore, prior

to legitimate elections, only further serve to exacerbate the existing

political tensions in Belarus and to raise legitimacy questions that could

be solved by a new, democratically elected legislature.
65

At the same time, the Working Group believes that there should be a

strengthening of coordination vis-a-vis Belarus between international

organizations and Governments. The Working Group will continue in

its efforts to try and increase this form of coordination, so as to avoid

contradictory and overlapping approaches. In a related vein, the Working Group also believes there currently needs to be a mobilization of

available tools to assist in developing democracy in Belarus. In particular, the Group calls upon Russia to provide such assistance as to raise

the level of democratic development in Belarus at least to the level that

Russia itself has achieved. The European Union has both the economic

and political means to influence and encourage positive processes, calling upon the deep democratic roots and traditions of its members.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working Group on Belarus

believes there is still time to enter into negotiations between the opposition and government, and to achieve a meaningful dialogue and negotiation on acceptable elections. However, should this dialogue not take

place, the Working Group questions whether the outcome of the resulting elections could be recognized in the future.

ANNEX 1:

ST. PETERSBURG RESOLUTION

CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN BELARUS

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

1. Recalling its concerns regarding the situation in Belarus, as stated

in the Sixth Annual Session Warsaw Declaration;

2. Noting the continued existence of serious differences between political forces in Belarus;

3. Considering the forthcoming parliamentary elections scheduled

for the year 2000;

4. Remembering the expiration of mandates of the 13th Supreme

Soviet and the operational legislature in the year 2000;

5. Recognizing past deficiencies in the Belarusian electoral system;

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,

6. Urges all political forces in Belarus to co-operate in constructive

talks and to look for solutions to the political impasse;

7. Continues to support the work of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus (AMG), particularly with respect to its

monitoring of human rights issues and the political situation in

Belarus;

8. Directs the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly ad hoc Working Group

on Belarus to:

a. continue its efforts to engage all sides in a meaningful dialogue on

elections, as begun during the recent Bucharest Meeting;

b. broaden the political dialogue within Belarus, in order to hold

elections under conditions agreeable to all political sides and which

will produce mutually acceptable results; and
66

c. work towards the co-ordination and reintegration of other international organizations in Belarus, particularly with respect to

the provision of technical assistance in preparation for the forthcoming elections (election law drafting assistance, media observation and development, election commission training, domestic

observer training, etc.);

9. Calls upon the Government of Belarus to:

a. agree to elections procedures and the conduct of the elections in

accordance with OSCE Commitments, and to

b. provide political parties and opposition groups with access to time

on State-owned Television and Radio;

10. Requests that OSCE Governments and international organiza

tions express their support for the development of a democratic

election process in Belarus and to provide such assistance as appropriate and necessary.

ANNEX 2:

ISTANBUL SUMMIT DECLARATION

CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN BELARUS

22. We strongly support the work of the Advisory and Monitoring

Group in Belarus, which has worked closely with the Belarusian authorities as well as with opposition parties and leaders and NGOs in

promoting democratic institutions and compliance with OSCE commitments, thus facilitating a resolution of the constitutional controversy

in Belarus. We emphasize that only a real political dialogue in Belarus

can pave the way for free and democratic elections through which the

foundations for real democracy can be developed. We would welcome

early progress in this political dialogue with the OSCE participation, in

close co-operation with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We stress

the necessity of removing all remaining obstacles to this dialogue by

respecting the principles of the rule of law and the freedom of the media.
67

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF SEMION SHARETSKI

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commisssion:

First of all, I wish to express my deep gratitude to your country, the

most powerful in the world and a paragon of democracy for others, for

its concern with the cause of human rights in other regions of the globe

and, in particular, in our country. We view the present hearing in

preciselythis way. We very much need and appreciate all of this, because Belarus has become, since November 1996, a kind of testing ground

for experimentation aimed at the restoration of the former totalitarian

Bolshevik order on post-Soviet territory.

A previous session of the Supreme Council (Soviet) of the Republic of

Belarus, well aware that the defense of human rights in each country

must be valued not only from the national viewpoint, but also on an

international level, brought its laws into conformity with international

standards and norms and devised mechanisms for their execution. First

of all, these requirements were taken into account during the preparation of the Constitution and its adoption on March 15, 1994. Moreover,

from the beginning of the Republic of Belarus to November 1996, much

was done to democratize the system of government in practical terms.

Increasingly, Belarus was striving not only to be become independent

and sovereign, but also to be an equal member among the European

structures.

These developments were in no way acceptable, first of all, to the

communist elite. The programs of the communist parties, at least those

of the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine, envision as one of

their mains tasks the renewal of the Soviet Union, with its militaristic

ways. Secondly, independence and democracy-building in Belarus were

unacceptable to Russia's chauvinist circles, who continue dreaming

about the renewal of the Russian empire, whose successor was the Soviet Union. And, in this respect, the programs and actions of all Russian politicians, no matter of what heu or color, coincide. Generally

speaking, where international matters are at play, there end the democratic tendencies of all Russian politicians. This was demonstrated by

the events in Yugoslavia; this is evident from their attitude toward the

settlement of the Chechen problem; and this is exemplified by their

views on the independence and sovereignty of the Belarusan state. In

all such cases, Russian politicians are guided only by their own imperial interests.

Unfortunately, another example of the same type is exhibited by the

presidential nominee of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, who

uses Russia's strategic interests in Belarus as an argument for the

necessity to unite Belarus and Russia. At the same time, he does not

even intend to ask Belarusans: what are their own strategic interests.

A while ago, on Russian television screens Belarus was described as the

Russian corridor into Europe. Incidentally, Russia does not pay a single

kopeck to Belarus, either for the oil and gas pipes which cross our territory, or for the railroads and air space, or for the maintenance of its

military installations. Namely, here lies one of the main reasons why

the attempt to restore the former Russian empire starts with Belarus.

Russia remains an empire, as demonstrated by the events in Chechnya,

on whose territory an imperial policy is being conducted. I do not refer

here to the fight against terrorism. Such a battle, indeed the most aggressive, must be waged. I have in mind the satisfaction with which

the Russian military and journalists report, for example, about the open-
68

ing in Chechnya of Russian schools in which the Chechen language is

taught only as a subject. I would especially like to stress this point,

because on the territory of Belarus, there are no terrorists who would

threaten Russia or its citizens. Nevertheless and unfortunately, Russians, who occupy the most important positions in the Lukashenka

government (now including prime minister), conduct the same spiritual genocide, or, to use a phrase from Russian soldiers, there is an

ongoing cleansing of Chechnya from Chechens and Belarus from

Belarusans.

Presently, in Belarus, there is not a single higher educational institution functioning in the Belarusan language, and not a single Belarusan

school remains in the capital of Minsk (there are only a few Belarusanlanguage classes). The Belarusan language has been eliminated from

all government offices, despite the fact that, in the territory of the Republic, as the 1999 census has shown, over 80 percent of the population

are of Belarusan nationality. This means that the policy I mentioned

constitutes a violation of the main nationality's basic constitutional right

to use its native language, let alone that it fails to satisfy the needs of

Poles, Ukrainians, Jews and other national minorities. Everyone is being forcibly converted into a Russian.

The first step toward the renewal in Belarus of the old totalitarian

system, with its crude socialism and annexation of the Republic to Russia, was the removal of Stanislau Shushkevich from the position of

Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus. At the

time, this was presumed to have been done to facilitate the presidential

candidacy of Vyachaslau Kebich, who headed the government. However, the fact that the podium of Russia's State Duma, which at the

time was dominated by communists, was given only to Lukashenka,

one of six presidential candidates in Belarus, clearly showed who enjoyed the support of Russia in that presidential contest. Lukashenka

was also supported by the Russian leadership as its henchman during

the coup d'etat that he carried out in November 1996, under the guise

of a national referendum.

However, one cannot correctly label as a referendum, an undertaking

which was carried out by bringing to Minsk more troops than the city

had seen since the end of the Second World War. Armored cars were put

on the streets of the city and the building of the Central Electoral Commission was occupied by armed presidential guardsmen who refused

entry to anyone, thus creating every opportunity to blatantly falsify the

results of the referendum. Voting bulletins were printed and distributed to localities by presidential teams, without any control. Incidentally, the bulletins contained a note stating that the submitted proposals regarding the amendments to the constitution were of a consultative

nature, to be considered by the Supreme Council. After the referendum,

Lukashenka decreed its results to be mandatory as to all proposals.

Also, thousands of violations of law were committed during the voting

process in the various localities, and this was documented. I myself

forwarded to the Republic's Attorney General, documents on more than

one thousand such infringements, but no reply was ever received.

The fact that a number of KGB officials were awarded personalized

arms and other rewards for asuccessful organization of the so-called

referendum (1996) testifies that coertion was committed.
69

All these facts were well known to the leadership of the Russian Federation, including Messrs. Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Stroyev and Seleznev.

As to Yeltsin personally, he agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union not

because he became such a democrat, ready to assist other peoples in

establishing their own national states on the basis of the former Soviet

republics, but because only through such a maneuver did he see a real

chance to gain supreme power, at least in Russia itself. At that time,

there was no way whatsoever for him to become president of the Soviet

Union. However, after he was elected president of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin was no longer reluctant to start restoring the former Russian empire. And in this respect his strivings coincided with those of

the communists. This is exactly why he supported Lukashenka.

Russian chauvinist circles need the dictator Lukashenka, who by

anti-constitutional means paralyzed the functioning of Belarus's democratic organsthe Supreme Council and the Constitutional Court

which stood firmly for preservation of independence and national sovereignty for the Republic of Belarus and for furtherance of market economy

reforms. They needed a dictator in Belarus who would not be a Belarusan

in his mentality and thus, would contribute to further the russification

of the Belarusan people which had started under the tsars and continued during Soviet times. They also must have a dictatorial regime in

Belarus which can establish a monopoly over the mass media and suppress dissent in order to remove obstacles along the road of their chauvinist policy. To create conditions for carrying out such a policy, Russian chauvinist circles are ready not only to close their eyes to the

flagrant violations of human rights and liberties in Belarus by the

Lukashenka regime, but also to forgive the dictator for the offenses he

has been allowing himself toward Yeltsin and other Russian politicians,

as well as Russia as a whole.

Since the so-called referendum of Novemer 1996, all division of power

in Belarus has been eliminated. All branches of governmentlegislative, executive, and judicialare in the hands of Lukashenka. Instead

of the Supreme Council, elected by the people, he created the entirely

illegitimate National Assembly, which by its nature and competency is

similar to the former fascist council which existed under the dictatorship of Mussolini. All categories of prosecutors and judges are appointed

and dismissed by Lukashenka only. Relationships in society, including

in the sphere of human rights, have been regulated by decrees and

directives, or simply by oral orders of Lukashenka. His decrees revoked

many laws that had previously been adopted. A powerful police force

has been set upthere are 135,000 policemen to be supported by a population of ten million. Moreover, he created by decree an anti-constitutional paramilitary force and empowered it to disregard essentially any

right or law. According to that decree, this organization has the right to

break into any domicile and search it without any warrant from a judge

or a ministry of justice ministry official, as well as to arrest any individual on its own decision. The lawlessness has reached such a point

that, under arrest and now in prison, in violation of their constitutional

rights, are Supreme Council deputies Uladzimir Kudzinau (Vladimir

Kudinov) and Andrei Klimau (Klimov), the latter of whom was up recently beaten. A show trial is currently being conducted against former

prime minister Mikhail Chyhir (Chigir), who refused support to

Lukashenka before the November 1996 referendum. No one among the

authorities will provide an answer as to where the following have disap-
70

peared: former minister of the interior Yury Zakharenka, First Deputy

of the Supreme Council Viktar Hanchar (Gonchar), and businessman

Anatol Krasouski.

Along with the state budget, which, by the way, the above-mentioned

National Assembly literally approves within few hours, Lukashenka

has his own budget which is beyond oversight, and which is replenished

in part by criminal means, including uncontrolled selling of arms. The

government has not only monopolized the electronic mass media and

over 90 percent of the print media, but practically prohibits mass meetings and assemblies, as well as strictly controlling the activities of all

political and social organizations.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen!

The presidential term of Alaksandar Lukashenka expired on July 20,

1999. On December 1, 1999, the Attorney General of the Republic of

Belarus launched a criminal inquiry into the seizure and holding of

power by unconstitutional means. Presently, the investigation continues. All this gives us grounds to state that the signatures of Lukashenka

on official documents after the above-mentioned date have no juridical

validity. Indeed, I made such a statement on the eve of the signing by

Lukashenka and Yeltsin of the so-called treaty on unification of Belarus

and Russia into one state.

The majority of the population in Belarus as of now does not support

Lukashenka. It is only the all-around support by Russia of the

Lukashenka regime which enables the dictator to disrespect the constitution of the Republic of Belarus and flagrantly violate the laws and

liberties of people, in disregard of appeals by international organizations and parliaments of democratic countries for the Belarusan government to return to a lawful sphere and start real negotiations with

the representatives of the democratic opposition.

Instead of creating conditions for real negotiations with the opposition, with participation by OSCE representatives, whose present position and work we fully support and highly appreciate (although we occasionally polemicize with them), Lukashenka attempts to introduce

new phony proposals that only complicate and aggravate the situation

in the Republic. But then, this is understandable, inasmuch as he nowadays has support only from groups created and financed by him, who

are designed to substitute the genuine opposition.

As to the aforementioned treaty, it should be noted that less than five

percent of the Republic's population supports annexation of Belarus to

Russia. By the way, over 500,000 people have said that if, God forbid,

this should happen, they will be ready to leave the country and seek

settlement in the West. This is why we consider any attempt by the

Russian leadership to annex Belarus as an aggression against our country, with all the consequences that it entails. And here we count on the

support of international organizations and the world's democratic countries, the more so because, when Belarus decided to give up her nuclear

arms in 1994, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia guaranteed

the security and integrity of the Republic of Belarus as an independent

state. Today, one of these countries is infringing upon that guarantee.

In connection with this I wrote a letter to the President of the United

StatesBill Clinton, Prime Minister of Great BritainTony Blair and

the former President of RussiaBoris Yeltsin. Regretfully, none of them

responded. In the case of Mr. Yeltsin, everything is understandable.

But how should we understand the other two? Incidentally, following
71

their silence, my appeal to them was published in some Belarusan newspapers. So now, a reply from high places is being awaited by the entire

Belarusan population, who hope that they were not misled in 1994.

As to the issue of Moscow's conspiracy against Belarus, a particular

concern has been caused by the Theses of the Council on Foreign and

Security Policy of Russia, published in Russian newspapers in connection with the Russian-Belarusan integration. In those Theses, inter alia,

the following has been stated: As a result of the integration with Belarus,

Russia gains a series of undeniable geopolitical advantages..., including an increase in military possibilities in the sphere of conventional

arms as a result of the integration with the Belarusan army, which

possesses a high degree of military capabilities, and the emergence of

the Kaliningrad special defense region from strategic isolation. Further, it was stated even more clearly that, the unification of Armed

Forces of the two countries significantly strengthens the grouping, especially ground forces, in the region and does not require restructuring

of the system of leadership of the united armies.

In light of the statements quoted above, the only question remaining

is: what advantages from this integration are there for Belarus, which

has many times been victimized by Russia's chauvinist policy?

If, God forbid, Belarus should be annexed to Russia, then a sevenhundred-kilometer-deep wedge will be driven into Europe and this wedge

will become, as follows from the above-mentioned document, Russia's

military forefront. And then, one more question becomes paramount:

how will the Kaliningrad special defense region be able to emerge from

isolation? Belarus, to be sure, does not border on the Kaliningrad region. Or are there some further steps planned, at which we now can

only guess?

It follows from what I have said here, that the independence of Belarus

and the preservation of its sovereignty, its return to a democratic way

of development, and its joining of European structures, is not only necessary for the creation of normal living conditions for the ten-million

Belarusan people who are European in their mindset, but it is also necessary in order to guarantee the security of our neighbors and all of

Europe. Understanding that the problems of Belarus should be solved

by the Belarusans themselves, I nevertheless hope hope that today's

hearing will serve as one more reminder of this.

Thank you for your attention.

Excerpt from Ambassador Daniel Speckhard's speech given at the

presentation of the Annual Country Reports at the U.S. Embassy in

Miensk on February 28.
72

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF ANATOLY LEBEDKA

Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues,

It is a great honor for me to be at the U.S. Congress, one of the cradles

of world democracy, and to take part in hearings on the situation in

Belarus. At the same time, I feel an enormous responsibility. Our task

is simple and, at the same time, exceedingly complicated. We must

create a pro-Belarusian lobby in the U.S. Congress. We have the obligation to find the words and proof that Belarus is not a black hole in the

center of Europe, but a place for profitable investments in democracy.

Believe me, the people of Belarus deserves living in their own home;

they deserve being always remembered on Capitol Hill and in the White

House. We paid a heavy price for the right to live in an independent

country, a free society, and rich and respected state. Hundreds of thousands of our compatriots went through the guillotine of Stalins repression. One third of the population of Belarus perished in World War II.

Toward the end of the century, Belarus was twice exposed to global

catastrophes. In 1986, it was the Chernobyl tragedy, which entered the

homes of 2 million of the countrys citizens. Exactly 10 years later, a

legal Chernobyl took place, and the population of the whole country fell

victim to it. It was as a result of the non-democratic referendum of

November 24, 1996, that political processes lost all semblance of constitutionality and legality. In other words, a coup detat occurred in the

country.

We give credit to the tolerance of the world community, which has

been making numerous attempts to influence the Belarusian regime in

a positive way. In its goodwill, it even went as far as shutting one eye

and one ear. The regime took it to be an indulgence for its old sins and

as a carte blanche for new actions.

An obvious fact has to be acknowledged. Different, diametrically opposed approaches to solving the Belarusian problem have collided. The

OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the opposition suggest playing chess

using the well-established and generally recognized rules. The regime,

sweeping the figures off the board, prefers to use it for smacking its

opponent on the head. In fact, it has unilaterally stopped consultations

on starting a negotiating process.

Prior to beginning the discussion, it is important to define the concepts, terminology, and the subject of discussion. Obviously, we cannot

fail to take into account the following factors. First, there is the existence of a constitutional and political crisis in Belarus. The fact was

admitted by Mr. Lukashenko himself, who signed the final document of

the Istanbul summit. Second, the international community does not

recognize the outcome of the 1996 referendum and, consequently, does

not accept an appointed national assembly that the people did not elect.

Third, President Lukashenkos authority expired on July 20, 1999. This

is not subject to discussion. This approach was laid down in dozens of

international political and legal documents from practically all influential international organizations.

But we cannot fail to note that an attempt is underway to substitute

the concepts and to narrow the problem down to discussing only the

conditions for holding elections. Free and democratic elections are, undoubtedly, an urgent task. But that is only a part of the problem. Second, there is great doubt concerning the sincerity of statements made

by official Minsk. Lukashenko has drowned the world community in a

sea of verbal promises. It will be useful and timely to refresh our memory.
73

Lets turn to documents and facts. It is 1996. This is Lukashenkos

address sent to the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of

the Council of Europe, Leni Fischer. Constitutional reforms are not

aimed at curtailing parliamentary democracy, but on the contrary, at

improving it Thats what he promised. And what did take place, in

fact? In November of the same year, Lukashenko forcibly dismisses the

legally elected Supreme Soviet; he abolishes the principle of

parliamentarism; then he appoints by decree 110 persons whom he calls

parliamentarians, and constitutes a national assembly, which does not

have even a payroll division of its own.

It is 1997. Antonovich, Foreign Minister of Belarus, addresses Mr.

Mierlo, President of the European Union Council, on April 10. I would

like to announce that the President and the Government want to discuss with all the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the 13th session the

question of updating the 1994 Constitution in order to establish a better

balance between the functions and duties of the three branches of governmentlegislative, executive, and judicial.was put down in the final

document of the mission of the European Union and the Council of Europe, which had responded to Lukashenkos appeal for help to update

the Constitution. The group declared the dialog a failure, and blamed

the Government.

The following year. This comes from A. Lukashenkos letter sent July

12, 1998 to the President of the European Union Council, W. Schussel.

On our road to building up our statehood and sovereignty, we are firmly

and steadfastly committed to development of a new Europe in close collaboration and friendship with all nations. This is a promise. But a

diplomatic war is running a parallel course full swing, and as a result,

the ambassadors of a whole number of countries were turned into political refugees. This is an unprecedented case in the history of modern

diplomacy.

It is 1999. At the session of the UN Subcommission for the Promotion

and Protection of Human Rights, which took place in Geneva on August 20, the regime assumed a number of obligations, including the one

to hold honest and fair elections, which presupposes giving equal access to the state-controlled mass media, as well as ensuring the freedom of assembly and the right to peaceful demonstrations. As you can

guess, not a single one of the Geneva promises has been fulfilled.

The conclusion is obvious. The declarations and promises of the

Belarusian authorities are not worth the paper they were written on.

This greatly worsens the prospects for any negotiations, and does not

guarantee the implementation of any agreements. This was confirmed

by the regimes refusal to carry out the agreement that it signed last

November on the oppositions minimum access to state-owned mass

media.

Those who build castles in the air and create virtual democracies

have no problem with building materials. They are lies, misinformation, fear, and ignoring ones obligations. Neither the Saint-Petersburg

Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, nor the final document of the Istanbul summit has materialized into guidelines for the

regimes activities.

The language of facts is harsh and impartial. At the 55th session of

the UN, Belarus was officially included in the list of the 13 worst violators of human rights. This is a list of national disgrace. Victor Gonchar
74

and Yuriy Zakharenko disappeared without a trace. Paradoxically, in

Belarus today a public politician feels safer in prison than when he is

free.

In the near future, the role of a political hitman with regard to former

prime minister Mikhail Chygir will be devolved to a court, which, in

fact, is taking over the functions of the former Presidents administrative office. Political trials masquerading as criminal cases are very popular in Belarus today.

A policy of erecting artificial barriers for the registration of the regional bodies of political parties and trade unions is being pursued.

The current President of the Supreme Soviet, Sharetsky, has to reside in neighboring Lithuania because there are no guarantees for his

personal safety.

Supreme Soviet deputies V. Kudinov and A. Klimov are still in prison.

Within the framework of the present political system, the majority of

citizens have no possibility of expressing their will. The relevant institutions and mechanisms have been eliminated. Not only the rights of

individuals, but those of a whole nation are violated.

A free democratic parliamentary election is, no doubt, an important

step forward. Nevertheless, an election, if considered by itself, out of the

general context of the constitutional and political crisis, and held according to Lukashenkos script, will not solve the problem of Belarus.

Seeds thrown into permafrost will never sprout. Irresponsible, ill-conceived actions could create conditions for the weakening of the immune

system of Belarusian sovereignty. In todays conditions, when a legitimate head of state is absent and the world community does not recognize the legitimacy of the National assembly, not a single agreement,

not a single treaty can have legal consequences. A legitimization of

Lukashenkos parliament through an undemocratic election builds up

a legal foundation for the annexation of Belarus. The inevitable result

will be the emergence of another hot spot on the map of Europe. And

then, half a million people are declaring their readiness to emigrate if

Belarus loses its sovereignty.

The problem of Belarus is not so much an absence of law as a deficit

of legality. Law is something you have on paper; legality is something

you have in practice. It has been a long time since Belarus lived according to laws; now it lives according to decrees and edicts, which are

vested with the highest legal authority. For example, decree No. 40

makes it possible to convict a person and to seize property or belongings

without a trial. The function of the laws in Belarus is propaganda and

ideology, more than anything else. They are being shown off to foreign

visitors.

For nearly six years the country has been going through an acute

crisis in its relations with the outer world, and in its foreign policy.

eople in the wake of the civilized world,enko. And this is one of those

rare promises he has been carrying out very scrupulously. A belligerent negation of the values and standards of European democracy, as

well as the norms of international law, has led to political self-isolation

of the country, which could not have but affected the peoples standard

of living.

It must be recognized that one of the causes of the things going on in

Belarus today is the absence of due attention to Belarus on the part of

the international community in the early 1990s. Investment in the development of democracy was clearly inadequate to ensure transforma-
75

tion and change. Belarus remained somewhere in the back of foreign

policy consciousness. Interest was focused exclusively on the problem of

withdrawing nuclear weapons from Belarus: 81 SS-25 missiles and 1141

tactical missiles. This was surely a necessary step. But after 7 years

can we state categorically that the problem was solved? No. Today,

there is a real threat of nuclear weapons returning to Belarus. All the

prerequisites are in place for it, and so are the regimes political will

and the well-preserved military infrastructure.

Negotiations taking a format agreed upon with the OSCE constitute

a strategic prospect. Social dialog a la Lukashenko is a tactical device

directed at creating a semblance of compliance with obligations. This is

about the same thing as coming to a florists and being offered a plastic

imitation of flowers instead of the real thing.

Dialog is a natural and constant state of society. In Belarus it was

interrupted and definitely stopped in November 1996 by the governments

will. The current initiative of social dialog only underscores the degree

of degradation and the depth of the fall. The regime thereby acknowledges a struggle has been going on in the country all this time; it was

an informational, psychological, and other similar type of war instead

of a dialog.

What should be done? The intellect of powers that be is determined by

the way they solve a problem, either by talks or by force. The Belarusian

regime is betting on the second way. The political opposition has proceeded responsibly and in dignity. We have given no reason to doubt the

sincerity and honesty of our intentions and actions.

Our position contrasts favorably with Lukashenkos empty rhetoric.

We propose a real and specific plan for resolving the Belarusian issue.

It consists of three stages. First, a negotiation process should be initiated immediately. Concurrently, the agreement on the oppositions access to mass media that both sides signed should be implemented.

The second stage is the process of negotiations proper, where the following issues will be resolved: building a climate of trust, equal access

to radio and TV, the functions and competence of the Parliament, and

holding a democratic free election.

The third stage is the legitimization of the agreements reached. Concurrent ratification of the negotiations final document by the Supreme

Soviet and the Chamber of Representatives can become its real mechanism.

If the regime persists in playing the role of a deaf mute, the reaction

of the world community must be appropriate. In this situation, an election that is not a consequence of negotiation and compromise, but that

is held under deliberately unequal and discriminatory conditions, cannot be recognized as democratic and legitimate.

The US, in coalition with the European Union, is capable of effectively influencing the situation in Belarus, using the possibilities offered by Russia for this purpose. The allocation of financial assistance

to Russia should be considered in conjunction with the human rights

situation in Belarus. The protection of human rights must remain one

of the priorities of Western foreign policy. It must be an important factor in international stability, and consequently, in European security.

We are against the countrys isolation, but support actions directed

at making Lukashenko and his henchmen feel isolated.
76

Prior to answering the tactical question of what to do, the international community has to determine its strategy of choice. How would it

like to see Belarus? Sporting a regime of velvet dictatorship? Headed by

an unenlightened oligarch and a puppet quasi-parliament without any

rights? Or being an independent democratic state? This is not only a

political, but also a moral choice.

Our priorities are firm: statehood, democracy, human rights and freedoms. We intend to protect the sovereignty of Belarus; we are ready to

fight for freedom and democracy. The philosophy of Freedom March 2,

which will be taking place on March 15, 2000, is: Negotiations, Changes,

and Victory. Our cause is just, and our success is inevitable.

Rumors that Slobodan Milosevic is the last European dictator are

exaggerated. As long as totalitarianism and neototalitarian ideologies

like Lukashism remain, as long as there is impunity for crimes against

humanity, as long as unscrupulousness and conformism exist, favorable soil for the emergence of new fuhrers and authoritarian rulers will

remain.
77

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF

THE M INISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

The Government of the Republic of Belarus sees as its major task the

creation of favorable conditions for transition to the market economy in

Belarus, improvement of the system of governance in accordance with

the internationally recognized principles of democracy and supremacy

of law, comprehensive realization of human rights. The essential prerequisite of this task is the consolidation of the independent Belarusian

statehood. Democratic, independent and prosperous Belarus has become

the basic value for the majority of the Belarusian people and the foundation for a broad consensus in the society, Ways and means needed to

achieve this objective continue to be under discussion in the Government and in the society at large and will be a major subject in the

upcoming parliamentary elections in Belarus in the year 2000.

Although enjoying wideand sufficient for effective and good governancesupport of the people the Belarusian authorities believe that

any effort bringing a broadest public consensus on the topical issues of

the day is important for the success of the Belarusian reform. Hence

the renewed support of the Government for a broad dialogue of all political forces of the society.

Should some disagreements persist, they can be brought to the public

to make its judgment at the elections. Nothing else but concerted efforts of Belarusians themselveswith all respect to the concerned assistance of our foreign partnerscould determine the most effective political and economic strategy of reform in Belarus and rally the necessary

public support.

It is in this spirit and in a hope for an unbiased and accurate consideration of the hearings agenda that the Ministry has the honor to offer

the following comments on some of the more prominent issues related

to Belarus and attracting particular public attention and concern.

 INTERNAL PUBLIC DIALOGUE

The discussions and consultations of the last few days in the Government and political quarters mark an important new stage in a broad

public pre-electoral dialogue. A working formula of such a dialogue has

been developing since last year. Recently the Head of State expressly

pronounced the Governments active participation in such a dialogue.

The President himself is willing to participate in public discussions. No

political or social organization is barred from taking part in the dialogue. There are no forbidden subjects for the discussion now or in the

future. In the process of the dialogue the Government is ready for constructive cooperation with all interested international organizations

the OSCE continues to be a part of the process of the dialogue. Legislative initiatives may result from the process of the dialogue. This formula

of the dialogue advanced by the Government is in full conformity with

the obligations undertaken by Belarus in the OSCE Istanbul Declaration (paragraph 22).

The long-awaited appointment of the head of the Governments working group for the dialogue and the high level of the appointee (UI.

Rusakevich, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration) are

important clear signs that the authorities are seriously interested to

ensure d successful dialogue.
78

The tactics of biased and unconditional criticism of the Governments

efforts to arrange for the fruitful public discussion cannot be regarded

as productive. Initiatives, proposals and concrete steps on the part of all

participants in the dialogue are much welcome. In particular, a joint

initiative group to advance the dialogue has been formed by a number

of public associations of various political affiliations.

ELECTORAL CODE

The first draft of the Electoral Code was sent by the Belarusian Government for a legal analysis to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In

October 1999 the experts of the Venice Commission of the Council of

Europe concluded that the draft code can certainty be used for reasonably fair elections. Sharp negative comments received much later on

the same early draft from the OSCE Human Rights and Democracy

Bureau demonstrated how easily the problem could be politicized. Yet

most of the remarks conveyed to the legislators by the Advisory and

Monitoring Group of the OSCE were taken into account. A new, much

improved text or the code was adopted in February 2000.

The fact that the Electoral Code was adopted does not precludes the

possibility of introducing amendments and changes into the document

at any stage Adoption of the Code at this time was necessitated by the

need to provide for the preparations to hold parliamentary elections not

later than the fall of 2000, in accordance with the Constitution.

The text of the adopted Electoral Code is being circulated by the Government among the leading European institutions for additional expert

study. The Government hopes that these conclusions will be made on

the merits of the law, free from politicized and partisan bias.

 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

The Government or the Republic of Belarus affirms its readiness to

ensure strict fulfillment of its international obligations with respect to

holding free and fair elections to the national Parliament in the year

2000 according to the highest international standards. The constitution of Belarus provides for general, equal, fair, secret, free, open elections. The President of Belays invited international observers to monitor the process of preparation for the elections and the electoral procedure

itself.

PROMINENT CRIMINAL CASES

In Belarus there are cases of criminal prosecution of formerly notable

public figures (M. Chygir, A. Klimau, UI. Kudzinau). They are prosecuted through the courts of law not for their political activity but for

their concrete illegal wrongdoings. Corruption, its scale and corroding

impact on the society is only too well known in post-Soviet and other

states. Political stature of any person does not and should not ensure

immunity from the law. It is appropriate to recall that in Belarus there

were also a number of cases of high-level government officials prosecuted and convicted on corruption charges. Whoever transgresses the

law has to be held responsible before the law.

 DISAPPEARANCES

The competent government agencies are undertaking all possible

measures to investigate the disappearances of Yu. Zakharenka and V.

Ganchar. They did the same in the case of T. Vinnikava. The Govern-
79

ment welcomes any assistance, including the United States, in tracing

the location of the missing persons. It also has every right to regard

politicized accounts of these disappearances as irresponsible.

A cause for concern is the attitude of some foreign authorities which

blameopenly or implicitly the Government of Belarus for the disappearances yet do not display required cooperation, transparency and

responsibility as far as assistance in establishing location of the missing persons is concerned, The fake disappearance of T. Vinnikava who

recently surfaced in the Westapparently not without knowledge of

some European national and international law enforcement authoritiesis a very eloquent example of employment of the double standards

tactics.

MASS MEDIA

In Belarus there are more than 1 thousand printed periodicals. Less

than 20 percent of these are state-owned. The state distribution network carries independent publications. There are non-government owned

electronic media in the country (on TV and radio).

The last few weeks saw a significant increase in the number of appearances of prominent political opposition figures on state-owned TV,

which testifies to the effort of the dialogue. With the formal start of the

election campaign access of the candidates to the electronic and printed

media will be regulated by the Electoral Code, which ensures equal

access for all registered candidates.

Recently much publicized case of refused registration of the Kuceyna

newspaper has a clear legal explanation. The Kuceyna editors had to

reregister their publication like hundreds of other printed media successfully did in 1999 in the framework of a general procedure. The set of

documents submitted by the paper for consideration to the State Press

Committee was incomplete. As soon as the editors submit the missing

document required by the law the newspaper will be reregistered without delay.

Many problems of media will find their solution in the new amendments to the law on the media in Belarus, which are now being drafted

in a tripartite consultation effort (governmentindependent journalistsOSCE).

RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Treaty on the Creation of the Union State signed in December

1999 directly and unequivocally provides that both Belarus and Russia

preserve their state sovereignty and independence within the new integration format. The relations the Republic of Belarus is currently developing with the Russian Federation follow in all essential aspects the

established pattern of integration of sovereign European states within

the European Union and do not threaten sovereignty or territorial integrity of Belarus.
80

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