COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MICHAEL ANTHONY STARR, A/K/A MICHAEL SAUCERE, 

 A/K/A MICHAEL SAUCIER, A/K/A KEITH SHEPPARDSON, 

 A/K/A JUNO IRVING 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2294-93-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 AUGUST 15, 1995 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

James E. Kulp, Judge 

 Betty Layne DesPortes (Steven D. Benjamin; 

 Steven D. Benjamin and Associates, on briefs), 

 for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

 brief), for appellee. 

 Michael Anthony Starr (appellant) appeals his convictions 

for attempted robbery in violation of Code §§ 18.2-26 and 18.2-58 

and two counts of use of a firearm in commission of a felony in 

violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. Appellant contends that the trial 

court improperly limited the scope of cross-examination of a 

prosecution witness. Because the trial court committed no 

reversible error, we affirm appellant's convictions. 

 As the parties are well-acquainted with the relevant facts, 

we repeat only those facts necessary to our discussion. On 

August 10, 1992, a manager of a McDonald's in Henrico County was 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

shot once in the head. Minutes later, Patricia Justice was 

accosted in front of her house, which was approximately onequarter-mile from McDonald's. 

 On October 20 and 22, 1993, appellant was tried before a 

jury and was convicted of attempted robbery and two firearms 

charges stemming from these incidents. George Bond and Alfred 

Robinson testified for the prosecution and implicated appellant 

in the incidents. Bond provided many of the details supporting 

appellant's convictions, including the whereabouts on the night 

in question of himself, appellant, and Robinson; the clothing 

they wore; the weapons they carried; and the crimes they 

committed. 

 Appellant wished to cross-examine Robinson on aspects 

relating to his flight from the jurisdiction after he had been 

released on bond in an unrelated grand larceny to which he pled 

guilty. Appellant theorized that Robinson agreed to testify in 

appellant's trial to gain release from jail and flee; that 

Robinson was aware that his version of the McDonald's events were 

untrue; and that Robinson's flight constituted a consciousness of 

guilt. The trial court prevented appellant from establishing 

specific facts relating to Robinson's non-compliance with his 

release. 

 Appellant also asked the court for permission to crossexamine Robinson on certain issues tending to show bias. 

Appellant theorized that Robinson hoped to gain leniency in his 
 3 

sentencing on the grand larceny charge and a separate show-cause 

hearing on a ten-year suspended sentence, after he testified 

favorably for the prosecution in appellant's case. Appellant 

tried to introduce Robinson's presentence report, which contained 

details of the grand larceny crime and the evidence of possible 

flight. However, the trial court prevented appellant from asking 

Robinson details concerning the grand larceny conviction and did 

not allow the presentence report to be introduced into evidence, 

ruling that any details contained within the plea agreement were 

irrelevant and collateral. 

 Robinson admitted on cross-examination that the Commonwealth 

offered him concessions in exchange for his testimony in 

appellant's case. Robinson, whose testimony at trial generally 

corroborated Bond's testimony, also acknowledged five felony 

convictions. 

 We hold that the trial court did not err in limiting 

appellant's cross-examination of Robinson. We are guided by 

certain well-accepted principles. 

 Cross-examination of prosecution witnesses is 

fundamental to the truth-finding process and is an 

absolute right guaranteed to an accused by the 

confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. . . . 

Subject to such reasonable limitations as the trial 

court may impose, a party has an absolute right to 

cross-examine his opponent's witness on a matter 

relevant to the case . . . . 

Maynard v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 437, 444, 399 S.E.2d 635, 

639-40 (1990)(en banc)(citations omitted); see Whittaker v. 
 4 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 967, 234 S.E.2d 79, 79 (1977)(trial 

court erred in ruling that defendant could not cross-examine 

prosecution witness about lenient sentences witness received in 

exchange for his testimony at defendant's trial, where witness 

was the only one who directly implicated defendant). 

 While an inquiry into bias is always relevant, a "trial 

court has discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination 

which is for the purpose of establishing bias." Norfolk & W. Ry. 

v. Sonney, 236 Va. 482, 488, 374 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1988). As the 

United States Supreme Court has stated: 

It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation 

Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge 

from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry 

into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On 

the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar 

as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose 

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on 

concerns about, among other things, harassment, 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' 

safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only 

marginally relevant. And as we observed . . . "the 

Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for 

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 

is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, 

the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 

U.S. 15, 120 (1985)(per curiam). 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986); see Scott v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 692, 694, 446 S.E.2d 619, 620 

(1994)(stating that the liberties of a cross-examiner to show a 

witness' bias are not unlimited); Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 

App. 53, 77-78, 354 S.E.2d 79, 93 (1987)(stating that a trial 

court "'may exercise discretion to see that the right of cross-
 5 

examination is not abused once the right to cross-examine has 

been fairly and substantially exercised.'")(citation omitted). 

 Appellant was permitted to cross-examine Robinson concerning 

his past felony convictions for crimes involving lying, cheating, 

and stealing. Appellant was also allowed to cross-examine 

Robinson regarding the outstanding grand larceny conviction for 

which he had not yet been sentenced. During extensive 

questioning, Robinson specifically admitted that he had been 

granted bond and released from jail while awaiting sentencing on 

that charge, and that he was testifying in exchange for the 

Commonwealth recommending a twelve-month sentence on that charge. 

 Furthermore, Robinson conceded that he was charged in the 

attempted robbery of McDonald's and that his trial on that charge 

had been continued. Finally, appellant elicited from Robinson 

the fact that a show-cause hearing had not yet been held to 

determine whether Robinson's ten-year suspended sentence would be 

revoked. 

 In light of these facts, this case can be distinguished from 

other cases, such as Whittaker, where the defendant's right to 

show a witness' bias was abused. In Whittaker there was only one 

prosecution witness whose testimony directly implicated 

defendant, whereas in this case, at least two prosecution 

witnesses provided credible evidence that implicated appellant in 

the crimes with which he was charged. Furthermore, in Whittaker, 

the defense was prohibited from cross-examining the prosecution 
 6 

witness on any aspect of the lenient sentences he received in 

exchange for his testimony in defendant's trial. In this case, 

appellant cross-examined Robinson at length about various "deals" 

that had been struck between Robinson and the Commonwealth in 

exchange for Robinson's testimony. 

 As we have explained, the trial court's decision to exclude 

cumulative evidence is entitled on review to a presumption of 

correctness. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 585, 423 

S.E.2d 160, 165 (1992). Adhering to this standard of review, we 

believe that the trial court set reasonable limitations on 

appellant's right to question Robinson, while still protecting 

appellant's right to confront Robinson and explore his 

credibility and bias. Given the extent to which Robinson's 

credibility was impeached, "it is doubtful that additional 

evidence in this regard would have made a difference in the 

jury's opinion of his credibility." Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. 

App. 38, 55, 366 S.E.2d 615, 625 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 

945 (1989). Allowing the introduction of further evidence 

detailing specific aspects of Robinson's presentence report would 

have been repetitive and marginally relevant at best. 

 Furthermore, the trial court did not err in refusing to 

admit evidence that allegedly showed Robinson's flight, from 

which appellant hoped the jury would conclude that Robinson knew 

his version of the crimes lacked credibility and knew that he was 

"more guilty" than appellant. Appellant's theories as to 
 7 

Robinson's alleged flight and its impact on his testimony were 

irrelevant and speculative, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding certain evidence to support these 

theories. Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 

838, 842 (1988)("The admissibility of evidence is within the 

broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion."). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's 

convictions. 

Affirmed.
 8 

BENTON, J., dissenting. 

 "[A] primary interest secured by [the Sixth Amendment to the 

Constitution] is the right of cross-examination." Douglas v. 

Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). Emphasizing the primacy of 

that interest, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated 

that the denial of the right to conduct a proper crossexamination to develop a witness' bias "'would be constitutional 

error of the first magnitude.'" Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 

131 (1968) (citation omitted). "The very integrity of the 

judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on 

full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the 

rules of evidence." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 

(1974). 

 Invoking the Constitution of Virginia and statutory law, the 

Supreme Court of Virginia has also recognized that "[o]ne of the 

most zealously guarded rights in the administration of justice is 

that of cross-examining an adversary's witnesses." Moore v. 

Commonwealth, 202 Va. 667, 669, 119 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1961). The 

Court so zealously guards that right because "[o]ne purpose of 

cross-examination is to show that a witness is biased and his 

testimony is unreliable because it is induced by considerations 

of self-interest." Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 376, 337 

S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985). 

 The witness whom the trial judge refused to allow the 

defendant to fully cross-examine at the trial of this case had 
 9 

admitted his own guilt in the offenses for which the defendant 

had been charged and was assisting the Commonwealth in its 

prosecution. The trial judge refused to allow the defendant to 

cross-examine the confessed accomplice regarding the accomplice's 

flight from prosecution and a pending criminal charge that had 

been held in abeyance while the accomplice cooperated in the 

defendant's prosecution. That ruling was error. 

 The principle is well established that in exploring the 

depths of a witness' self-interest, "the cross-examiner is not 

only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the 

witness' perception and memory, but the cross-examiner has 

traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the 

witness." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). Moreover, 

because a testifying accomplice is exposed to great temptation to 

curry favor, the examination of that witness' testimony is 

generally of critical importance in a criminal trial. 

Recognizing the danger of such testimony, the Supreme Court has 

stated that "[a]ny evidence is admissible which tends to affect 

the credibility of accomplices or the weight of their testimony 

by showing what influences, if any, were brought to bear upon 

them." Woody v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 296, 297-98, 199 S.E.2d 

529, 531 (1973). 

 In order to give effect to the principle that "the exposure 

of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important 

function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
 10 

examination," Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17, a trial judge may not 

limit the right of defense counsel to cross-examine an accomplice 

unless the record clearly establishes that counsel has fully 

exercised the right to cross-examine and has begun to abuse the 

right. 

 It is only after the right of crossexamination has been substantially and fairly 

exercised that the allowance of further 

cross-examination becomes discretionary with 

the court. The right, when not abused, is an 

absolute right and not a mere privilege of a 

party against whom a witness testifies. 

Moore, 202 Va. at 669, 119 S.E.2d at 327. Moreover, the rule is 

well established that "[d]efense counsel should be afforded great 

latitude in cross-examining accomplices testifying against a 

defendant." Woody, 214 Va. at 98, 199 S.E.2d at 531. 

 The trial judge's ruling that these issues were collateral 

and irrelevant was plainly wrong. An accomplice's conduct for 

which the prosecution has shown leniency is always relevant. 

Hewitt v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 621, 623, 311 S.E.2d 112, 114 

(1984). Bias may always be shown by facts that prove that an 

accomplice had "a motive for favoring the prosecution in his 

testimony." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 

"The bias of a witness . . . is not a collateral matter . . . 

[and] is always a relevant subject of inquiry." Henson v. 

Commonwealth, 165 Va. 821, 825-26, 183 S.E. 435, 437 (1936). 

Indeed, "a defendant is entitled to show that testimony of a 

prosecution witness was motivated by an expectation of leniency 
 11 

in a future trial." Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 968, 

234 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1977). 

 The defendant was entitled to establish the details of the 

inducements in order "to reveal to the jury the full weight of 

any pressures brought to bear on [the accomplice], at the time he 

testified, which might motivate him to depart from the truth." 

Hewitt, 226 Va. at 623, 311 S.E.2d at 114. Defense counsel's 

attempt to do so was not cumulative but rather was an effort to 

cause the accomplice "to admit the complete details of the 

inducement." Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 374, 379, 429 

S.E.2d 881, 884 (1993). The refusal to permit that line of 

inquiry on cross-examination was error. Id. 

 We have a long line of established precedent to emphasize 

the principle that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility 

of the witnesses. E.g., Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 

558, 127 S.E. 368, 374 (1925); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. 

App. 407, 414, 424 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1992); Estes v. Commonwealth, 

8 Va. App. 520, 524, 382 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1989). When the trial 

judge refused to allow defense counsel to fully cross-examine the 

witness to test his bias and self interest, the jury was deprived 

of the ability to fully and fairly discharge its function as the 

finder of fact. See Andrews v. C. & O. Ry., 184 Va. 951, 957, 37 

S.E.2d 29, 31-32 (1946). That ruling was not based upon any 

showing of abusive cross-examination. Because the limitation on 

cross-examination was improperly invoked, the trial judge 
 12 

undermined the defendant's constitutional right to crossexamination and subverted the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process. 

 For these reasons, I would reverse the conviction and remand 

for a new trial. I dissent.