Filed 1/25/21 Lewine v. BSI Financial Services CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT LEWINE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

BSI FINANCIAL SERVICES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B293975

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC657255)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Barbara Marie Scheper, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Offices of Steven Rein and Steven Rein for Plaintiffs

and Appellants.

Blank Rome, Cheryl S. Chang and Jessica A. McElroy for 

Defendants and Respondents Wilmington Savings Fund Society 

FSB, as trustee and Servis One, Inc. d/b/a BSI Financial Services.

ZBS Law and Bradford E. Klein for Defendant and 

Respondent Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP.

____________________________
2

Before us is an appeal by appellants Robert Lewine and 

Phyllis Katz-Lewine (the Lewines)1 of the granting of a summary 

judgment motion after a property they held as joint tenants was 

sold at a foreclosure sale on April 4, 2017. The property was sold 

to pay off a loan that was secured by a deed of trust on the 

property. The Lewines sued Servis One, Inc., d/b/a BSI Financial 

Services (BSI), the servicer of the underlying loan; Wilmington 

Savings Fund Society, FSB, the beneficiary of the deed of trust 

(WSFS); and Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP, the trustee on the 

deed of trust (ZBS) (collectively, respondents) on April 11, 2017,

claiming that they violated Civil Code section 2923.62 by 

foreclosing on the property while a complete loan modification 

application was pending, and without complying with the notice 

and appeal provisions of section 2923.6. 

Respondents countered that the Lewines’ claim had abated 

because those appeal and notice provisions were repealed in 2018 

and the Lewines’ loan modification application was not complete. 

In 2018, the trial court agreed that the Lewines’ claim had 

abated, granted summary judgment for respondents, and entered

judgment terminating the action.

As set forth in our Discussion, we need not address the 

Lewines’ appellate claim that a recent legislative amendment to

section 2923.6 establishes that the abatement doctrine does not 

apply to their cause of action against respondents. This is 

because we agree with respondents’ alternative argument that, 

1 For the sake of clarity, and meaning no disrespect, when 

we refer to Robert Lewine or Phyllis Katz-Lewine individually, 

we use their first names. 

2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Civil Code.
3

even if the Lewines’ claim under section 2923.6 had not abated, it

fails as a matter of law because the Lewines’ 2017 loan 

modification application was incomplete. We thus affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

We summarize only those facts relevant to this appeal.

In 1976, Robert purchased the subject property in 

Los Angeles for approximately $78,500. The Lewines held title to 

the subject property as joint tenants prior to the foreclosure. In 

January 2007, Phyllis executed a promissory note for $1 million, 

which was secured by a deed of trust on the property. In 

September or October 2012, Phyllis defaulted on the monthly 

payment obligations in breach of the note and deed of trust. 

On February 10, 2015, the deed of trust was assigned to 

WSFS. At an unspecified point in time, ZBS became the

nonjudicial foreclosure trustee on the deed of trust.

On January 26, 2016, a notice of default and election to sell 

under deed of trust was recorded with the Los Angeles County 

Recorder’s Office. Between August 29, 2016 and 

September 11, 2016, “ ‘Phyllis[,] by and through her counsel of 

record[,] . . . submitted a loss modification application to the . . . 

Statebridge Company, LLC[,]’ ” which, at that time, was the 

servicer of the subject loan. On August 30, 2016, a notice of 

trustee’s sale was recorded with the Los Angeles County 

Recorder’s Office. On September 8, 2016, Statebridge informed 

3 Part of this summary is based on the undisputed portions

of the trial court’s order granting respondents’ summary 

judgment motion. (See Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement 

System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 349, fn. 2 [utilizing the 

summary of facts provided in the trial court’s ruling].) 
4

Phyllis that her application was incomplete. On 

September 16, 2016, Statebridge informed Phyllis that it had 

received a facially complete application from her. On October 20, 

2016, “Statebridge ‘addressed a letter to Phyllis . . . substantively 

denying her . . . application due to insufficient income and 

excessive liens on the Subject Property.’ ” 

On October 25, 2016, BSI took over servicing of the loan. 

On November 16, 2016, Phyllis appealed Statebridge’s denial of 

her application to BSI. On December 22, 2016, BSI determined 

that the appeal was incomplete and requested additional 

documents. The Lewines thereafter submitted additional 

documents but, on February 15, 2017, BSI advised the Lewines 

that it “ ‘require[d] a new completed loan modification application 

and supporting documents by or before March 2, 2017[,]’ ” and 

BSI stated that it “would postpone the sale date by 45 days to 

allow for this review.” 

On March 1, 2017, BSI received a loan modification 

application from the Lewines. On March 2, 2017, BSI wrote 

Phyllis a letter notifying her that the loan modification 

application was denied because it was incomplete. The Lewines 

deny having received this letter until after the foreclosure sale, 

which occurred on April 4, 2017. Although the Lewines claim

they belatedly received this letter “because it was addressed to 

Phyllis but mailed to [the Lewines’ counsel’s] address,” their 

appellate briefing does not explain how or precisely when they

actually received the letter. 

On April 11, 2017, the Lewines filed a verified complaint

against respondents. The verified complaint stated that “[the 

Lewines] are informed and believe and thereon allege that in 

foreclosing on the property, [respondents] violated §2923.6(c) . . . 
5

in that, at the time of the sale, [the Lewines] had submitted a 

complete loan modification application which was under 

consideration and had not been denied, nor had [respondents] 

complied with any of the denial and appeal provisions of that 

section.” The Lewines sought “all available relief under C.C.

§2924.12, including injunctive relief to stop the recordation of the 

Trust Deed on Sale if it has not been recorded, an order 

rescinding the sale, and/or damages.” 

On May 25, 2017, BSI and WSFS filed a verified answer. 

ZBS filed a verified answer on August 29, 2017. 

On February 7, 2018, respondents moved for summary 

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Respondents contended, inter alia, that the Lewines could not 

establish that they violated section 2923.6 because the Lewines’

March 1, 2017 submission was not a complete application for a 

loan modification. 

On April 10, 2018, the Lewines opposed the motion. 

On April 19, 2018, respondents filed a reply in support of 

their motion, wherein they argued that the Lewines’ claim under 

section 2923.6 abated because the statutory provisions affording 

borrowers the right to appeal denials of loan modification 

applications were repealed effective January 1, 2018 without a 

savings clause. On May 4, 2018, the Lewines filed a surreply 

brief addressing that issue.

On May 9, 2018, the trial court heard respondents’ 

summary judgment motion and agreed with respondents that the 

Lewines’ cause of action had abated: “The Legislature chose not 

to include a savings clause and this indicates a willingness to 

terminate any pending claims.” The trial court thus issued an 

order granting the motion. On July 18, 2018, the trial court 
6

entered judgment in favor of respondents, and respondents 

served notice of entry of judgment on the Lewines on 

August 17, 2018. On October 11, 2018, the Lewines appealed the 

judgment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘We review the ruling on a motion for summary judgment 

de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.’ 

[Citation.] ‘Summary judgment is appropriate only “where 

no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ’ [Citation.]” 

(Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 

33 Cal.App.5th 70, 76.) “Under summary judgment law, ‘ “[t]here 

is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence 

would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact 

in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the 

applicable standard of proof.” [Citation.]’ ” (Lares v. Los Angeles 

County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2020) 

56 Cal.App.5th 318, 331–332.)

“ ‘ “[D]e novo review [of an order granting summary 

judgment] does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of 

the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable 

issues. As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the 

appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, 

therefore, to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are 

present by citation to the record and any supporting authority. 

In other words, review is limited to issues which have been 

adequately raised and briefed.” ’ [Citation.]” (See Los Angeles 

Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 

57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 (Los Angeles Unified School Dist.).)
7

“We affirm the trial court’s decision [granting a summary 

judgment motion] if it is correct on any ground the parties had an 

adequate opportunity to address in the trial court, regardless of 

the reasons the trial court gave.” (See Jameson v. Pacific Gas & 

Electric Co. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 901, 909 (Jameson).) 

DISCUSSION

As far as we can discern, the Lewines contend on appeal 

that: (1) Because the Legislature reenacted in 2019 the very 

provisions of section 2923.6 it had repealed in 2018, “the claims 

abatement logic” upon which the lower court relied was 

erroneous; (2) BSI is estopped to deny that it is “bound by the 

mandates of §2923.6 as it existed at the time of the operative 

facts in this case, particularly the appeal rights provisions”; and 

(3) the authorities upon which respondents relied during the 

proceedings below did not establish that the abatement doctrine

applies to the instant case. 

Respondents disagree with each of these contentions, and 

assert, as they did before the trial court, that the Lewines’ loan 

modification application was not complete. Under the 

respondents’ theory, the Lewines were not entitled to 

section 2923.6’s protections even if the Lewines’ claim had not 

abated.4

For the reasons discussed below, we agree that the 

Lewines’ failure to submit a complete loan modification

application is fatal to their sole cause of action under 

section 2923.6. (See Jameson, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 909

4 We observe that because the Lewines failed to file a reply 

brief, they did not respond to the potential alternative bases for 

affirmance raised in the respondents’ brief. 
8

[noting that a reviewing court may affirm an order granting 

summary judgment “on any ground the parties had an adequate 

opportunity to address in the trial court”].) 

A. The Reenactment in 2019 of the Appeal and Notice 

Provisions that Existed in 2017 and the Legislature’s

Expression of Intent 

Before turning to the merits of the appeal, we observe the 

Lewines are correct that in 2019, the Legislature did indeed 

reenact appeal and notice provisions that are virtually identical 

to those in the version of section 2923.6 that existed in 2017, and 

that were repealed in 2018, albeit briefly as it turned out.

More specifically, Senate Bill No. 818 reenacted the 

substance of the pre-January 1, 2018 version of section 2923.6, 

and those reenacted provisions went into effect on 

January 1, 2019. (Compare Stats. 2012, ch. 87, § 7 [Senate Bill 

No. 900, which added the version of section 2923.6 that was 

effective until January 1, 2018], with Stats. 2018, ch. 404, § 7 

[Senate Bill No. 818, which reenacted the substance of the preJanuary 1, 2018 version of section 2923.6].) After the passage of 

Senate Bill No. 818, subdivisions (c) through (g) of section 2923.6

now read as follows:

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a 

first lien[5]loan modification offered by, or through, 

the borrower’s mortgage servicer at least five 

business days before a scheduled foreclosure sale, a 

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 

5 “ ‘First lien’ means the most senior mortgage or deed of 

trust on the property that is the subject of the notice of default or 

notice of sale.” (§ 2920.5, subd. (d).)
9

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default 

or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale, while the 

complete first lien loan modification application is 

pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, 

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a 

notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a 

trustee’s sale until any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written 

determination that the borrower is not eligible 

for a first lien loan modification, and any 

appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has 

expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered 

first lien loan modification within 14 days of 

the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien 

loan modification, but defaults on, or otherwise 

breaches the borrower’s obligations under, the 

first lien loan modification.

(d) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan 

modification is denied, the borrower shall have at 

least 30 days from the date of the written denial to 

appeal the denial and to provide evidence that the 

mortgage servicer’s determination was in error.

(e) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan 

modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, 

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent 

shall not record a notice of default or, if a notice of 

default has already been recorded, record a notice of 

sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until the later of:
10

(1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is 

notified in writing of the denial.

(2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant 

to subdivision (d), the later of 15 days after the 

denial of the appeal or 14 days after a first lien 

loan modification is offered after appeal but 

declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan 

modification is offered and accepted after 

appeal, the date on which the borrower fails to 

timely submit the first payment or otherwise 

breaches the terms of the offer.

(f) Following the denial of a first lien loan 

modification application, the mortgage servicer shall 

send a written notice to the borrower identifying the 

reasons for denial, including the following:

(1) The amount of time from the date of the 

denial letter in which the borrower may request 

an appeal of the denial of the first lien loan 

modification and instructions regarding how to 

appeal the denial.

(2) If the denial was based on investor 

disallowance, the specific reasons for the 

investor disallowance.

(3) If the denial is the result of a net present 

value calculation, the monthly gross income 

and property value used to calculate the net 

present value and a statement that the 

borrower may obtain all of the inputs used in 

the net present value calculation upon written 

request to the mortgage servicer.
11

(4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower 

was previously offered a first lien loan 

modification and failed to successfully make 

payments under the terms of the modified loan.

(5) If applicable, a description of other 

foreclosure prevention alternatives for which 

the borrower may be eligible, and a list of the 

steps the borrower must take in order to be 

considered for those options. If the mortgage 

servicer has already approved the borrower for 

another foreclosure prevention alternative, 

information necessary to complete the 

foreclosure prevention alternative.

(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers 

submitting multiple applications for first lien loan 

modifications for the purpose of delay, the mortgage 

servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate 

applications from borrowers who have been evaluated 

or afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated 

consistent with the requirements of this section, 

unless there has been a material change in the 

borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of 

the borrower’s previous application and that change 

is documented by the borrower and submitted to the 

mortgage servicer.[6]

6 This statutory text is identical to the version of 

subdivisions (c) through (g) that was in effect prior to 

January 1, 2018, except the pre-January 1, 2018 version of 

subdivision (c) did not specify that the application must be 

submitted at least five business days before a scheduled 
12

(Stats. 2018, ch. 404, § 7.)

The Legislature stated the following in section 26 of 

Senate Bill No. 818: “It is the intent of the Legislature that any 

amendment, addition, or repeal of a section or part of a section 

enacted by Senate Bill 900 [(which added the pre-January 1, 2018 

version of section 2923.6)] . . . that took effect as of 

January 1, 2018, shall not have the effect to release, extinguish, or 

change, in whole or in part, any liability that shall have been 

incurred under that section, or part of a section, prior to January 

1, 2018, unless the amendment, addition, or repeal expressly so 

provides. The section, or part of a section, that was amended, 

added, or repealed shall be treated as still remaining in force for 

the purpose of sustaining any proper action, suit, or proceeding 

for the enforcement of such a liability, as well as for the purpose 

of sustaining any judgment, decree, or order.” (See Stats. 2018, 

ch. 404, § 26, italics added.) 

Even though this provision arguably expresses the 

Legislature’s intent to revive a claim like the Lewines’ cause of 

action under section 2923.6, the parties fail to discuss section 26 

at all in their briefing. We do not discuss it further because the 

Lewines’ cause of action would fail even if the abatement doctrine 

did not apply to their claim.

foreclosure sale, and certain minor modifications have been made 

to the current version of subdivision (g) that are not relevant 

here. (See Stats. 2012, ch. 87, § 7.)
13

B. The Lewines’ Loan Modification Application Was 

Incomplete and the Notice and Appeal Provisions of

the Current and Pre-January 1, 2018 Versions of

Section 2923.6 Do Not Apply to Incomplete Loan 

Modification Applications

As set forth in the Factual and Procedural Background, on 

February 15, 2017, BSI advised the Lewines that it needed them 

to submit a new loan modification application and supporting 

documents by March 2, 2017. The Lewines do not contend that 

this request was improper. Rather, they complain that BSI 

thereafter foreclosed on their property without informing them 

“in what respect [their loan modification application] was 

incomplete; without advising them of their appeal rights as 

required by C.C. §2923.6(e); and without giving them 30 days to 

appeal, plus 15 additional days, as required by C.C. §2923(e).”7

7 To the extent that the Lewines intended to proceed on 

any other theory (e.g., respondents foreclosed on the property

when an appeal of a loan modification application—and not a

loan modification application itself—was pending), they have 

failed to articulate clearly any such theory on appeal. (See Los 

Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 492 

[“ ‘ “As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s 

responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, 

to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by 

citation to the record and any supporting authority.” ’ ”]; Cahill v. 

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 

(Cahill) [“ ‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal 

authority for the positions taken. . . . The absence of cogent legal 

argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the 

contention as waived.’ ”].)
14

Under the version of section 2923.6 that was in effect prior 

to January 1, 2018 and the version that is currently operative, a 

borrower is entitled to written notice of a denial of a loan 

modification application and an appeal therefrom only if the 

borrower has submitted a complete application. Subdivision (c) of 

the statute prescribes the legal consequences that follow “[i]f a 

borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan 

modification” (e.g., a trustee’s sale shall not be conducted during 

the pendency of the application), and subdivisions (d), (e), and (f) 

of the statute afford notice and appellate rights to “the 

borrower.” (See § 2923.6, subds. (c)–(f).) Given the text (i.e., 

subdivisions (d)’s, (e)’s, and (f)’s placement of the definite article 

“the” before “borrower”) and the structure of these four provisions

(i.e., subdivisions (d), (e), and (f) follow subdivision (c)), it is 

apparent that subdivisions (c), (d), (e), and (f) all confer rights to 

the same borrower—to wit, the borrower who has submitted a

complete loan modification application.

8

8 (See People v. Chevron Chemical Co. (1983) 

143 Cal.App.3d 50, 54 [“ ‘[A] statute should be construed with 

reference to the entire statutory system of which it forms a 

part in such a way that harmony may be achieved among its 

parts. . . .’ ”]; cf. Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 

50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396–1397 [“Use of the indefinite articles ‘a’ or 

‘an’ signals a general reference, while use of the definite article 

‘the’ (or ‘these’ in the instance of plural nouns) refers to a specific 

person, place, or thing. [Citation.] . . . [H]ad the Legislature 

used the definite article ‘the’ before ‘action for the wages,’ as in 

‘suit may be filed for these penalties at any time before the 

expiration of the statute of limitations on the action for the wages 

from which the penalties arise,’ it would suggest the Legislature 

was referring to a specific suit for unpaid final wages filed by an 

employee who seeks section 203 penalties as well.”].) 
15

Furthermore, several federal district courts have arrived at 

the same conclusion, that is, a borrower is entitled to these notice 

and appeal rights only if he or she has submitted a complete 

application.

9 In fact, the Lewines conceded during the 

proceedings below and before our court that Rocha stands for this 

proposition, yet they do not contend that Rocha was wrongly 

decided. 

“For purposes of [section 2923.6], an application shall be 

deemed ‘complete’ when a borrower has supplied the mortgage 

servicer with all documents required by the mortgage servicer 

within the reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage 

servicer.” (See § 2923.6, subd. (h); Stats. 2012, ch. 87, § 7 [preJanuary 1, 2018 version of § 2923.6, subd. (h), which is identical 

to the current version of that provision].) In a February 15, 2017 

9 (See Penermon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 

47 F.Supp.3d 982, 998–999 [granting a motion to dismiss the 

plaintiff’s claim that the defendant failed to provide her with a 

written denial or allow her to appeal the denial of her application 

because she “fail[ed] to clearly plead that [her] application as 

submitted was complete as required by” section 2923.6]; Rocha v. 

CIT Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal., Apr. 3, 2018) [2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 

57671, at p. *25] [nonpub. opn.] (Rocha) [“Without a complete 

application, [the defendant-bank] had no obligation to review 

Plaintiffs’ loan modification application, and it was neither 

obligated to provide a written denial as required by the statute 

nor impeded from proceeding with a foreclosure sale.”].) We may 

consider Rocha because, “ ‘[a]lthough we may not rely on 

unpublished California cases, the California Rules of Court 

do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may 

properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority.’

[Citation.]” (Herpel v. County of Riverside (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 

96, 122, fn. 25.)
16

letter, BSI asked the Lewines to submit several documents in 

support of their new loan modification application within 15 days, 

including a “pension benefit statement.” Included in the Lewines’ 

March 1, 2017 submission of documents to BSI is a letter from 

Phyllis in which she stated that “[she] can’t find [her] SAG 

pension benefit statement,” and claimed that “[t]he monthly 

payment received is highlighted on [her] U.S. Bank statements.”

Absent from the Lewines’ briefing is any argument that 15 days 

was not a reasonable timeframe in which they could obtain the 

missing pension benefit statement, nor is it apparent that this 

deadline was unreasonable. Absent also from the Lewines’ 

briefing is any explanation why a line item on a bank statement 

is equivalent to a representation from the union (SAG) about the 

amount of Phyllis’s pension income, especially where it is 

common sense that this information would be necessary to 

evaluate Phyllis’s ability to pay a modified loan. 

It follows that no reasonable trier of fact could find that the

Lewines’ March 1, 2017 loan modification application was 

complete for the purposes of section 2923.6. Because the 

Lewines’ sole cause of action under section 2923.6 fails as a 

matter of law, the trial court did not err in granting respondents’ 

motion for summary judgment.10 (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 

10 When the Lewines submitted their loan modification 

application on March 1, 2017, section 2924.10, subdivision (a) 

obligated BSI to provide “written acknowledgment of the receipt” 

of “any document in connection with a first lien modification 

application” within five business days of receiving it; that written 

acknowledgment needed to identify “[a]ny deficiency in the 

borrower’s first lien loan modification application.” (See Stats. 

2012, ch. 87, § 13.) Much like the provisions of section 2923.6 

discussed in this opinion, section 2924.10 was repealed as of 
17

subd. (c) [“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if 

all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.”].) 

January 1, 2018, and reenacted effective January 1, 2019. (See 

Stats. 2012, ch. 87, § 13; Stats. 2018, ch. 404, § 13.)

The Lewines did not allege in their complaint that 

respondents violated section 2924.10, nor do they argue on appeal 

that BSI failed to comply with this statute after the Lewines

submitted their loan modification application on March 1, 2017. 

Thus, we need not decide whether the Lewines could have 

obtained relief for a violation of section 2924.10. (See Laabs v. 

City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 [“ ‘To create 

a triable issue of material fact, the opposition evidence must be 

directed to issues raised by the pleadings. [Citation.] If the 

opposing party’s evidence would show some factual assertion, 

legal theory, defense or claim not yet pleaded, that party should 

seek leave to amend the pleadings before the hearing on the 

summary judgment motion. [Citations.]’ ”]; Cahill, supra, 

194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956 [“ ‘We are not bound to develop

appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.]’ ”].)
18

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Servis One, Inc. 

d/b/a BSI Financial Services; Wilmington Savings Fund Society, 

FSB; and Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP are awarded their costs 

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

FEDERMAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.