Electrical General Corp. et al. v. Michael L. LaBonte, No. 69, September Term, 2016

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT – MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. (1991, 

2016 REPL. VOL.) § 9-656 – ACCIDENTAL PERSONAL INJURY –

SUBSEQUENT INTERVENING EVENT – WORSENING OF MEDICAL 

CONDITION – Court of Appeals held that, where Workers’ Compensation Commission 

has awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease and has also determined that employee incurred subsequent 

intervening event—e.g., an injury sustained outside course of employment—upon request 

to reopen alleging worsening of employee’s medical condition, employee is entitled to 

compensation for permanent partial disability for any portion of such disability that is 

caused by and reasonably attributable solely to employee’s accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease. Stated otherwise, where employee has incurred both accidental 

personal injury or occupational disease, and subsequent intervening event, and Workers’ 

Compensation Commission has apportioned permanent partial disability benefits for 

accidental personal injury or occupational disease, existence of subsequent intervening 

event finding does not preclude Commission from awarding additional permanent partial 

disability benefits for worsening of employee’s condition caused by and reasonably 

attributable solely to accidental personal injury or occupational disease.

Court of Appeals held that existence of subsequent intervening event does not, per se, 

preclude employer’s liability for workers’ compensation benefits. Employer may be liable 

for workers’ compensation benefits where employee demonstrates that worsening of 

medical condition was caused by accidental personal injury or occupational disease.

Court of Appeals held that issues of whether accidental personal injury or occupational 

disease, or subsequent intervening event, caused worsening of employee’s medical 

condition, and whether, for purposes of permanent partial disability benefits, worsening of 

employee’s medical condition was reasonably attributable solely to accidental personal 

injury or occupational disease, are factual matters for Workers’ Compensation 

Commission to determine in each individual case.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 69

September Term, 2016

______________________________________

ELECTRICAL GENERAL CORP. et al.

v.

MICHAEL L. LABONTE

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J.

______________________________________

Filed: July 10, 2017

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. 02-C-13-180640

Argued: June 1, 2017 
The purpose of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & 

Empl. (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.) (“LE”) §§ 9-101 to 9-1201, “is to protect workers and their 

families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with 

compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of 

and in the course of employment.” Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 448 

Md. 648, 655, 141 A.3d 90, 94 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For 

purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, “an accidental injury that arises out of and in 

the course of employment” is known as an “accidental personal injury[.]” LE § 9-

101(b)(1). The Workers’ Compensation Act divides disabilities that are caused by 

accidental personal injuries into four categories:

temporary partial disability (disability which is temporary in duration and 

partial in extent) . . . ; temporary total disability (disability which is temporary 

in duration but total in extent) . . . ; permanent partial disability (disability 

which is permanent in duration and partial in extent) . . . ; and permanent 

total disability (disability which is permanent in duration and total in 

extent)[.]

Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346, 353 n.2, 7 A.3d 13, 17 n.2 (2010).

In this matter of first impression—where an employee suffered an accidental 

personal injury and incurred a subsequent injury outside the course of employment, the 

Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) awarded permanent partial 

disability benefits, and, later, the employee alleged a worsening of the employee’s medical 

condition—we must decide whether the existence of a subsequent intervening event

finding by the Commission precluded the Commission from awarding additional 

permanent partial disability benefits and other workers’ compensations benefits for 
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worsening of the employee’s condition.

Michael L. LaBonte (“LaBonte”), Respondent, was an electrician who worked for 

Electrical General Corporation, Petitioner, which had workers’ compensation insurance 

through Selective Insurance Company of America, Petitioner (together, “Electrical

General”). LaBonte suffered an accidental personal injury to his back at work when he 

caught and pushed a large ladder that had been falling down. LaBonte filed a claim for 

workers’ compensation and multiple Issues1 with the Commission, seeking temporary total 

disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits, both of which the Commission 

awarded. 

Later, LaBonte was injured outside of the workplace in an unrelated matter. 

Specifically, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that LaBonte had 

been driving outside the course of his employment. According to LaBonte, during the 

traffic stop, the law enforcement officer grabbed him and pushed him down onto the 

vehicle, causing his existing back pain to be aggravated. 

LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission again, seeking additional temporary total 

disability benefits. The Commission issued an Order denying LaBonte’s request, 

observing that he had been “involved in a subsequent event on” the date of the incident 

with the law enforcement officer. LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission again, this 

 

1

“After [a] claim [for workers’ compensation] has commenced, any party may raise 

an issue by filing [] Issues[.]” Md. Code Regs. (“COMAR”) 14.09.03.02B. The issues

that a party may raise by filing Issues include “[w]hether the employee is entitled to 

temporary partial and temporary total disability benefits” and “[t]he nature and extent of a 

permanent disability to specified body parts[.]” COMAR 14.09.03.02C(13), (14).
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time seeking permanent partial disability benefits. In an Award of Compensation, the 

Commission awarded LaBonte permanent partial disability benefits, finding that his 

disability was partly due to his accidental personal injury—i.e., his work-related injury—

and partly due to “pre-existing and subsequent conditions[.]”

Years later, LaBonte filed a Petition to Reopen2 with the Commission, alleging that 

his back condition had worsened, and requesting additional permanent partial disability 

benefits. The Commission granted the Petition to Reopen, but found that there had not 

been a worsening of LaBonte’s back condition that was causally related to his accidental 

personal injury because the Commission’s previous Order and Award of Compensation 

established a “subsequent intervening event” that broke the “causal nexus” between 

LaBonte’s accidental personal injury and his existing back condition. 

LaBonte filed a Petition for Judicial Review. In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 

County, a jury found that LaBonte’s accidental personal injury was the cause of the recent 

worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. Electrical General noted an appeal, and the Court 

of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the incident with the law enforcement officer did 

not preclude Electrical General’s liability for the worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. 

Before us, Electrical General argues that, where an employee suffers both an 

 

2

“[T]he general practice before the Commission, when a claimant seeks a 

modification of an award, is to file a petition to reopen or for modification[.]” Buskirk v. 

C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 136 Md. App. 261, 268, 764 A.2d 857, 861 (2001). “[W]hen 

a petition to reopen to modify an award is based on a change in disability status, the petition 

must be filed within the five year period [after the last compensation payment] and allege 

a change in disability status, with a basis in fact, as opposed to merely alleging continuing 

medical treatment.” Id. at 263-64, 764 A.2d at 858-59. In this case, it is undisputed that 

LaBonte filed the Petition to Reopen timely.
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accidental personal injury that causes a permanent partial disability and a subsequent 

intervening event—e.g., an injury sustained outside the course of employment—a finding 

that the employee has incurred a subsequent intervening event precludes the accidental 

personal injury from being the proximate cause of worsening of the disability. In other 

words, Electrical General asserts that a finding that an employee sustained a subsequent 

intervening injury forecloses an employer’s further liability for permanent partial disability 

benefits and other workers’ compensation benefits due to an alleged worsening of the 

employee’s condition.

As explained below, in our view, Electrical General conflates the law that applies 

to a temporary disability with the law that applies to a permanent disability. Liability for 

a temporary disability depends on the injury that occurred last. See Martin v. Allegany 

Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 73 Md. App. 695, 700, 536 A.2d 132, 134 (1988). By contrast, 

liability for a permanent disability is to be apportioned among all of the injuries that caused 

the permanent disability, not just the injury that occurred last. See LE § 9-656. Applying 

these principles, we hold that, where the Commission has awarded permanent partial 

disability benefits based on an accidental personal injury or occupational disease and has 

also determined that the employee incurred a subsequent intervening event—e.g., an injury 

sustained outside the course of employment—upon a request to reopen alleging worsening 

of the employee’s medical condition, the employee is entitled to compensation for 

permanent partial disability for any portion of such disability that is caused by and 

reasonably attributable solely to the employee’s accidental personal injury or occupational 

disease. Stated otherwise, where an employee has incurred both accidental personal injury
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or occupational disease, and a subsequent intervening injury, and the Workers’ 

Compensation Commission has apportioned permanent partial disability benefits for an 

accidental personal injury or occupational disease, the existence of a subsequent 

intervening event finding does not preclude the Commission from awarding additional 

permanent partial disability benefits for worsening of the employee’s condition caused by 

and reasonably attributable solely to the accidental personal injury or occupational disease.

Further, the existence of a subsequent intervening event does not, per se, preclude 

an employer’s liability for workers’ compensation benefits. An employer may be liable 

for workers’ compensation benefits where an employee demonstrates that a worsening of 

the employee’s medical condition was caused by an accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease. And, the issues of whether an accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease, or a subsequent intervening event, caused a worsening of an 

employee’s medical condition, and whether, for purposes of permanent partial disability 

benefits, a worsening of an employee’s medical condition was reasonably attributable 

solely to an accidental personal injury or occupational disease, are factual matters for the 

Commission to determine in each individual case.

BACKGROUND

Accidental Personal Injury, Claim, and Initial Issues

On September 2, 2004, while on the job, LaBonte and a helper maneuvered a 40-

foot ladder that weighed more than 300 pounds. The ladder started to fall, and LaBonte 

caught it and pushed it back up. LaBonte felt something shift in his back. Later, LaBonte 

began experiencing constant back pain, and it was determined that LaBonte had suffered a 
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herniated disc. 

LaBonte was either not working, or working in “a light duty position,” throughout 

nearly all of the period from September 13, 2004 to December 19, 2006. During that 

period, on May 24, 2006, LaBonte underwent back surgery. 

On September 27, 2004, LaBonte filed a claim for workers’ compensation with the 

Commission, requesting temporary total disability benefits, medical treatment, and medical 

expenses. On June 15, 2005, the Commission conducted a hearing. In an Award of 

Compensation dated June 22, 2005, the Commission found that, on September 2, 2014, 

LaBonte had suffered an accidental personal injury that caused a disability. The 

Commission did not specify the type of disability that LaBonte’s accidental personal injury 

had caused. The Commission reserved on the issue of temporary total disability benefits 

because no medical documentation had been submitted. The Commission granted 

LaBonte’s requests for medical treatment and medical expenses. 

LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission, requesting additional medical treatment

in the form of a neurological consult; temporary partial disability benefits from March 18, 

2005 to October 21, 2005; and temporary total disability benefits from September 13, 2004 

to October 24, 2004, from November 23, 2004 to December 30, 2004, from February 24, 

2005 to March 17, 2005, and from October 21, 2005 onward. On October 21, 2005, the 

Commission conducted a hearing. In an Order dated November 10, 2005, the Commission 

granted LaBonte’s request for additional medical treatment, and awarded LaBonte all of 

the temporary partial disability benefits that he had requested. The Commission reserved 

on LaBonte’s request for temporary total disability benefits from October 21, 2005 onward; 
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denied LaBonte’s request for temporary total disability benefits from March 8, 2005 to 

March 17, 2005; and awarded LaBonte all of the other temporary total disability benefits 

that he had requested. 

LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission a second time, requesting additional 

medical treatment that his physician had recommended, and temporary total disability 

benefits from January 5, 2006 onward. On March 10, 2006, the Commission conducted a 

hearing. In an Order dated March 15, 2006, the Commission granted LaBonte’s request 

for additional medical treatment, and awarded LaBonte temporary total disability benefits

starting on January 5, 2006, and continuing as long as he remained temporarily totally 

disabled as a result of his accidental personal injury. 

LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission a third time, requesting temporary total 

disability benefits from March 18, 2005 to October 21, 2005, and temporary partial 

disability benefits from March 18, 2005 onward. On June 29, 2006, the Commission 

conducted a hearing. In an Order dated July 20, 2006, the Commission awarded LaBonte 

all of the temporary total disability benefits that he had requested, and denied LaBonte’s 

request for temporary partial disability benefits. 

Incident with the Law Enforcement Officer and Subsequent Issues

On December 31, 2006, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle 

that LaBonte had been driving outside the course of employment. LaBonte was unable to 

perform sobriety tests to the officer’s satisfaction, and the officer arrested and handcuffed 

LaBonte. According to LaBonte, the handcuffs came loose, and the officer grabbed 

LaBonte and pushed him down onto the vehicle. According to LaBonte, after the incident
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with the law enforcement officer, his back pain was aggravated. 

On January 15, 2007, a doctor recommended that LaBonte be placed on off-work 

status, and scheduled another appointment for February 5, 2007. Sometime after the 

February 5, 2007 appointment, LaBonte returned to work. LaBonte was prescribed 

medication and exercise, but no additional surgery was performed on his back. 

LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission a fourth time, requesting temporary total 

disability benefits from January 4, 2007 to March 9, 2007 and additional medical treatment

in the form of lumbar epidural injections. On March 9, 2007, the Commission conducted 

a hearing. In an Order dated March 30, 2007, the Commission found that LaBonte’s need 

for lumbar epidural injections was not causally related to his accidental personal injury. 

The Commission further stated that LaBonte had been “involved in a subsequent event on 

December 31, 2006”—i.e., the date of the incident with the law enforcement officer—and 

denied LaBonte’s requests for temporary total disability benefits and additional medical 

treatment. 

LaBonte filed Issues with the Commission a fifth time, requesting temporary total 

disability benefits from February 11, 2006 to March 20, 2006; temporary partial disability 

benefits from October 6, 2006 to December 19, 2006; permanent partial disability benefits 

from December 20, 2006 onward; and expenses for medical treatment that he had received 

between January 15, 2007 and March 5, 2007. On October 4, 2007, the Commission 

conducted a hearing. In an Award of Compensation dated October 15, 2007, the 

Commission found that LaBonte had “overall 30% industrial [permanent partial] disability 

to the body due to an injury to the back; 20% is due to [his] accidental [personal] injury, 
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and 10% is causally connected to pre-existing and subsequent conditions[.]” The 

Commission awarded LaBonte all of the temporary total disability benefits and temporary 

partial disability benefits that he had requested. The Commission awarded LaBonte 

permanent partial disability benefits in the form of $247 weekly, starting on December 20, 

2006, and continuing for 100 weeks, and denied LaBonte’s request for medical expenses

that had been incurred between January 15, 2007 and March 5, 2007. 

Petition to Reopen

Approximately five years later, on October 10, 2012, LaBonte filed a Petition to 

Reopen with the Commission, alleging that his back condition had worsened, and 

requesting additional medical treatment, payment of medical expenses that he had incurred 

on February 16, 2012, and additional permanent partial disability benefits. The 

Commission granted the Petition to Reopen. On January 16, 2013, the Commission 

conducted a hearing. In an Order dated January 24, 2013, the Commission found that there 

had not been a worsening of LaBonte’s back condition that was causally related to his 

accidental personal injury because the Commission’s Order dated March 30, 2007 and its 

Award of Compensation dated October 15, 2007 “establish[ed] a subsequent intervening 

event [that] breaks the causal nexus between the accidental [personal] injury and the 

[existing back] condition.” The Commission denied LaBonte’s requests for additional 

medical treatment, medical expenses, and additional permanent partial disability benefits. 

Proceedings in the Circuit Court

LaBonte filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 

County. The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (“the 
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circuit court”). 

Electrical General filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that, as a 

matter of law, the Commission’s orders precluded a finding that LaBonte’s accidental 

personal injury caused his back condition’s worsening. The circuit court denied the Motion 

for Summary Judgment. 

At a jury trial, in a video deposition, Michael Franchetti, M.D., testified as an expert 

witness for LaBonte in the fields of orthopedic surgery and medicine. Dr. Franchetti 

testified that he examined LaBonte at his counsel’s request on two occasions—first on May 

22, 2007, and second on September 18, 2012.3 During the first examination, Dr. Franchetti

determined that LaBonte had 43% “whole person impairment due to” his accidental 

personal injury. During the second examination, Dr. Franchetti determined that LaBonte’s 

whole person impairment had increased to 53%. Dr. Franchetti testified that the incident 

with the law enforcement officer did not result in any permanent worsening of LaBonte’s 

back condition, and that LaBonte’s back condition was causally related to his accidental 

personal injury.

4

 

In another video deposition, Edward R. Cohen, M.D., testified as an expert witness 

for Electrical General in the fields of orthopedic surgery and medicine. Dr. Cohen testified 

 

3During the video deposition, the date on which Dr. Franchetti conducted the second 

examination of LaBonte is identified as both September 8, 2012 and September 18, 2012; 

however, the date on which the second examination occurred is of no consequence to the 

outcome of this case. 

4After LaBonte rested, Electrical General moved for judgment, contending that the 

incident with the law enforcement officer severed the causal relationship between 

LaBonte’s accidental personal injury and his disability. The circuit court denied the 

motion. 
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that he examined LaBonte at Electrical General’s request on two occasions—first in 2004, 

and second in 2014. Dr. Cohen opined that, in light of the incident with the law 

enforcement officer, LaBonte’s existing back condition was not causally related to his 

accidental personal injury. 

Using a special verdict sheet, the jury found that LaBonte’s existing back condition 

was causally related to his accidental personal injury; that 100% of the worsening of 

LaBonte’s permanent partial disability since October 15, 2007 was due to his accidental 

personal injury; that LaBonte’s request for medical treatment was reasonable, necessary, 

and causally related to his accidental personal injury; and that LaBonte’s request for 

medical expenses that he had incurred on February 16, 2012 was reasonable, necessary, 

and causally related to his accidental personal injury. 

The circuit court reversed the Commission’s January 24, 2013 order and remanded 

with instructions to issue an order consistent with the jury’s verdict. Electrical General 

filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court denied.

Electrical General noted an appeal. 

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the 

incident with the law enforcement officer “did not, per se, preclude further liability on the 

part of [Electrical General] for the permanent partial injury [that LaBonte] sustained on the 

job.” Elec. Gen. Corp. v. LaBonte, 229 Md. App. 187, 208, 196, 144 A.3d 856, 868, 861, 

reconsideration denied (Sept. 28, 2016). The Court of Special Appeals concluded that 

“there was sufficient proof that [LaBonte]’s back condition was caused by his [accidental 
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personal injury] and not by the [] incident with the [law enforcement] officer.” Id. at 197, 

144 A.3d at 862 (citation omitted). The Court of Special Appeals explained that 

“permanent disability benefits, unlike temporary disability benefits, can be caused by both 

an initial [accidental personal injury] and a subsequent accident so as to preserve the 

liability of the employer for that portion of the disability that is attributable to the initial 

accident.” Id. at 201, 144 A.3d at 864.

5

Electrical General filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that the opinion of 

the Court of Special Appeals was internally inconsistent and conflicted with precedent. 

The Court denied the motion. 

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Electrical General petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following four 

issues:

1. Whether the previously determined finding that [LaBonte]

sustained a subsequent intervening accident barred any further liability of 

[Electrical General] for workers’ compensation benefits due to a prior 

[accidental personal] injury?

2. Whether the Circuit Court erred by allowing the jury to consider 

whether [LaBonte] sustained a subsequent intervening accident to his back 

 

5The Court of Special Appeals also concluded that the Commission’s finding of a 

subsequent intervening event, i.e., the incident with the law enforcement officer, “did not, 

under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, preclude the jury from considering whether 

[LaBonte]’s current back condition is causally connected to his [accidental personal 

injury]”; that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in submitting to the jury the issue 

of whether LaBonte’s back condition’s worsening was causally related to his accidental 

personal injury; and that the circuit court did not err in allowing the jury to decide issues 

related to apportionment and the reasonableness and necessity of LaBonte’s requests for 

medical treatment and payment of medical expenses. See LaBonte, 229 Md. App. at 204, 

206-07, 144 A.3d at 866, 867-68. As discussed below in Footnote 6, Electrical General

has not briefed these issues in this Court.
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because litigation of that issue was precluded under the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel?

3. Whether the Circuit Court erred in submitting the jury question of 

whether [LaBonte]’s back condition was causally related to the [accidental 

personal] injury because the question was insufficient to resolve the factual 

disputes between the parties and improperly shifted the burden of proof to 

[Electrical General]?

4. Whether the Circuit Court erred by allowing the jury to decide 

issues that were not previously decided by the [] Commission?

This Court granted the petition. See Elec. Gen. Corp. v. LaBonte, 450 Md. 662, 150 A.3d 

818 (2016).6

DISCUSSION

The Parties’ Contentions

Electrical General contends that it is not liable for permanent partial disability 

benefits or any other workers’ compensation benefits due to the worsening of LaBonte’s 

back condition because the Commission previously found the existence of a subsequent 

intervening act. Electrical General argues that it is undisputed that LaBonte sustained a 

subsequent intervening accident on December 31, 2006, and that the Commission found as 

much in its Order dated March 30, 2007 and its Award of Compensation dated October 15, 

 

6This Court granted the petition as to all of the questions presented. Nonetheless, 

in its brief, Electrical General addresses only the first question presented—i.e., the issue 

regarding whether the incident with the law enforcement officer barred liability—and did 

not brief the questions presented regarding collateral estoppel, the burden of proof, or 

issues being submitted to the jury that were not previously decided by the Commission. 

Because Electrical General has not briefed the second, third, and fourth questions 

presented, we do not address them. Cf. Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 746 n.9, 12 A.3d 

153, 156 n.9 (2011) (“Because the issue relating to the limitations period for submitting a 

claim to the Treasurer was not briefed by either party, it is not, at present, before this 

Court.” (Citation omitted)).
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2007. Electrical General asserts that, because LaBonte suffered an accidental personal 

injury, and the Commission found that he incurred a subsequent injury outside the course 

of employment, the subsequent intervening accident severed the causal nexus between 

LaBonte’s disability and the accidental personal injury. 

As such, Electrical General maintains that, although it was liable for the portion of 

LaBonte’s back condition that was caused by his accidental personal injury, the subsequent 

intervening event—namely, the incident with the law enforcement officer—precluded its

liability for any worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. Electrical General contends that 

the Commission’s Order dated March 30, 2007 and its Award of Compensation dated 

October 15, 2007 constituted the law of the case because no party petitioned for judicial 

review of either decision. According to Electrical General, once the incident with the law 

enforcement officer was found to be a subsequent intervening event, as a matter of law, 

that event became the cause of any alleged additional disability. 

LaBonte requests that the Court affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals 

because his back condition’s worsening was independent of the subsequent event. LaBonte 

contends that, where an accidental personal injury causes a permanent disability, the 

finding of a subsequent intervening event does not discharge the employer from any further 

responsibility under the Workers’ Compensation Act. LaBonte argues that the 

determination of a subsequent intervening event does not sever the causal relationship 

between the accidental personal injury and any worsening of the employee’s medical 

condition. LaBonte notes that, unlike liability for temporary disability benefits, liability 

for permanent disability benefits may be apportioned among multiple injuries. 
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Specifically, LaBonte observes that, under LE § 9-656(a), where it appears that an 

employee’s permanent disability is partly due to an accidental personal injury and partly 

due to a preexisting condition, the Commission must determine the proportion of the 

permanent disability that is reasonably attributable to the accidental personal injury, and 

the proportion of the permanent disability that is reasonably attributable to the preexisting 

condition. LaBonte asserts that, irrespective of the Commission’s Order dated March 30, 

2007 and its Award of Compensation dated October 15, 2007, the jury had the authority to 

determine how much, if any, of the worsening of his back condition was caused by his 

accidental personal injury. LaBonte maintains that the evidence adduced at trial supported 

the jury’s finding that his accidental personal injury was the only cause of his back 

condition’s worsening. 

LaBonte contends that adopting Electrical General’s position would create a new 

legal rule and allow employers and insurers to escape liability for accidental personal 

injuries in situations in which a subsequent intervening event is not the cause of an 

employee’s ongoing or worsening injury. LaBonte argues that such a result would be 

contrary to the Workers’ Compensation Act’s language and remedial purpose, which is to 

provide compensation for lost earning capacity that results from accidental personal 

injuries.

Standard of Review

In an action for judicial review, this Court reviews the administrative agency’s 

decision, not the decision of the circuit court or the Court of Special Appeals. See

Hollingsworth, 448 Md. at 654, 141 A.3d at 93. Although “the decision of the Commission 
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is presumed to be prima facie correct[,]” LE § 9-745(b)(1), “this presumption does not 

extend to questions of law, which [this Court] review[s] independently.” Hollingsworth, 

448 Md. at 655, 141 A.3d at 94 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

LE § 9-745(c)(3) (“The court shall determine whether the Commission . . . misconstrued 

the law and facts applicable in the case decided.”). This Court gives some deference to the 

Commission’s interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act “unless its conclusions 

are based upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Holmes, 416 Md. at 359, 7 A.3d at 21.

The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent. 

See Hollingsworth, 448 Md. at 655, 141 A.3d at 94 (citation omitted). If the ordinary and 

natural meaning of a statute’s language makes the General Assembly’s intent clear, the 

Court applies the statute’s language. See id. at 655, 141 A.3d at 94. Because the Workers’ 

Compensation Act is a remedial statute, if its language is ambiguous, the Court construes 

the Act “as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to 

effectuate its benevolent purposes.” Id. at 655, 141 A.3d at 94 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Where the Workers’ Compensation Act’s language is 

unambiguous, however, the Court may not create an ambiguity to interpret the Act more 

favorably to injured employees. See id. at 655-56, 141 A.3d at 94.

Workers’ Compensation Act

LE § 9-656, part of the Workers’ Compensation Act, provides for apportionment of 

liability for permanent disability benefits as follows:

(a) Determination by Commission.—If it appears that a permanent disability 

of a covered employee following an accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease is due partly to the accidental personal injury or 
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occupational disease and partly to a preexisting disease or infirmity, the 

Commission shall determine:

(1) the proportion of the disability that is reasonably attributable to the 

accidental personal injury or occupational disease; and

(2) the proportion of the disability that is reasonably attributable to the 

preexisting disease or infirmity.

(b) Payment of compensation.—The covered employee:

(1) is entitled to compensation for the portion of the disability of the 

covered employee that is reasonably attributable solely to the accidental 

personal injury or occupational disease; and

(2) is not entitled to compensation for the portion of the disability that 

is reasonably attributable to the preexisting disease or infirmity.

LE § 9-655(1) and (2) state: “This Part VIII of this subtitle[, which includes LE § 

9-656,] does not apply to: (1) a temporary partial disability; [or] (2) a temporary total 

disability[.]” (Paragraph break omitted).

LE § 9-736(b) provides for continuing jurisdiction and authorizes the Commission 

to modify its findings as follows:

(1) The Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction over each claim 

under this title.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, the Commission may modify 

any finding or order as the Commission considers justified.

(3) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission may 

not modify an award unless the modification is applied for within 5 years 

after the latter of:

(i) the date of the accident;

(ii) the date of disablement; or

(iii) the last compensation payment.
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Causation

In Reeves Motor Co. v. Reeves, 204 Md. 576, 582-83, 105 A.2d 236, 239-40 (1954), 

a case involving an initial determination of permanent partial disability, this Court reversed 

a jury’s award of permanent partial disability benefits for an accidental personal injury, 

concluding that a subsequent surgery that resulted in the employee’s further injury broke 

the causal connection between the accidental personal injury and the permanent partial 

disability. This Court observed that an accidental personal injury is the proximate cause 

of an employee’s disability where the accidental personal injury could have caused the 

employee’s disability and “no other efficient cause has intervened[.]” Id. at 581, 105 A.2d 

at 239. This Court concluded that an accidental personal injury is not the proximate cause 

of an employee’s disability where the employee’s disability “ensues from some hazard to 

which [the employee] would have been equally exposed apart from his [or her]

employment.” Id. at 582, 105 A.2d at 239 (citation omitted). In Reeves, id. at 579, 105 

A.2d at 238, an employee incurred an accidental personal injury when he dislocated his 

shoulder while working in a garage, and was compensated for a week that he missed from 

work. Afterward, the employee dislocated his shoulder several more times, both in and 

outside the course of employment, with the most recent shoulder dislocation occurring at 

the workplace. See id. at 579-80, 105 A.2d at 238. The employee’s physician treated him 

for his most recent work-related shoulder dislocation. See id. at 580, 105 A.2d at 238. 

After the treatment, there was no limitation of movement in the employee’s shoulder, 

which was in approximately the same condition that it had been before his most recent 

work-related shoulder dislocation. See id. at 580, 105 A.2d at 238. Subsequently, the 
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employee underwent surgery on his shoulder, which became partially immobilized as a 

result. See id. at 580-81, 105 A.2d at 239. The employee filed a claim for workers’ 

compensation as to his most recent work-related shoulder dislocation, seeking both 

temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. See id. at 582-

83, 105 A.2d at 239-40. The Commission denied the employee’s claim. See id. at 578, 

105 A.2d at 237. The employee appealed. See id. at 578, 105 A.2d at 237. A jury found 

that the employee’s most recent work-related shoulder dislocation had caused his

temporary total disability and his permanent partial disability. See id. at 578, 105 A.2d at 

237.

This Court reversed,7concluding that, in light of the evidence concerning the 

intervening surgery, the trial court had erred in not withdrawing from the jury the issue of

whether the employee’s most recent work-related shoulder dislocation had caused his 

permanent partial disability. See Reeves, 204 Md. at 583, 105 A.2d at 240. This Court 

observed that there was no evidence that the employee’s most recent work-related shoulder 

dislocation had caused his permanent partial disability, as the employee’s expert witness, 

his physician, testified that his most recent work-related shoulder dislocation did not cause 

his condition after the surgery. See id. at 582-83, 105 A.2d at 239-40. Additionally, the 

expert did not testify that the employee’s most recent work-related shoulder dislocation 

necessitated the surgery. See id. at 582, 105 A.2d at 239. We noted: “This is not the case 

of reopening an old claim for injury wherein the claimant’s condition has become worse or 

 

7At the time, the Court of Special Appeals did not exist.
- 20 -

new disability has developed.” Id. at 582, 105 A.2d at 239. In sum, in Reeves, id. at 582-

83, 105 A.2d at 239-40, this Court found that there was no evidence of a causal connection 

between the accidental personal injury on which the employee relied and the surgery and 

subsequent disability, and concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the issue of 

permanent partial disability to go to the jury.

In Martin, 73 Md. App. at 700, 536 A.2d at 134, the Court of Special Appeals held 

that the principle “[t]hat benefits are to be awarded for a temporary disability without 

regard to pre-existing disease or infirmity makes clear that it is the final accident 

contributing to the disability which is to serve as the basis for liability.” In Martin, id. at 

73 Md. App. at 696, 536 A.2d at 132-33, an employee suffered an accidental personal 

injury involving his back and filed a claim for workers’ compensation, and the Commission 

awarded him temporary total disability benefits. The employee started a new job with a 

different employer, suffered two more accidental personal injuries involving his back, and 

filed a second claim for workers’ compensation. See id. at 696, 536 A.2d at 132-33. The 

Court of Special Appeals observed that the record on appeal in Martin did not include a 

copy of the Commission’s order as to the employee’s second claim. See id. at 696, 536 

A.2d at 133. Accordingly, it was unknown whether the Commission awarded the employee

any temporary total disability benefits as to his second claim. See id. at 696, 536 A.2d at 

133. In any event, the Commission’s order as to the employee’s second claim was appealed 

to a trial court, in which a jury found that the employee’s temporary total disability was 

causally related to all three of his accidental personal injuries. See id. at 696-97, 536 A.2d 

at 133. The trial court remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to determine
- 21 -

the amount of compensation, if any, to which the employee was entitled. See id. at 697, 

536 A.2d at 133. No party appealed from the proceedings in the trial court. See id. at 697, 

536 A.2d at 133. On remand, based on the employee’s first accidental personal injury, the 

Commission awarded the employee temporary total disability benefits, to be paid entirely 

by the employee’s first employer. See id. at 697, 536 A.2d at 133. The employee’s first 

employer sought judicial review. See id. at 697, 536 A.2d at 133. The trial court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the employee’s first employer, and the Court of Special 

Appeals affirmed. See id. at 698, 701, 536 A.2d at 133, 135.

The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the jury’s findings of a causal 

relationship between each of the employee’s three accidental personal injuries and his 

temporary total disability became the law of the case because no party appealed from the 

jury’s verdict. See id. at 698-99, 536 A.2d at 133. Next, the Court of Special Appeals held 

that the Commission’s award of temporary total disability benefits was inconsistent with 

the jury’s finding that the employee’s temporary total disability was causally related to his 

third accidental personal injury, i.e., an injury that occurred while the employee was 

working for his second employer. See id. at 700, 536 A.2d at 134. The Court of Special 

Appeals noted that, because the case involved a temporary disability rather than a 

permanent disability, the award of disability benefits was not to be apportioned to account 

for all three accidental personal injuries. See id. at 699, 536 A.2d at 134. The Court of 

Special Appeals stated that, given that an award of temporary disability benefits is not to 

be apportioned to assess for a preexisting disease or infirmity, it follows that the last 

accident that contributes to a temporary disability determines which employer is liable. 
- 22 -

See id. at 700, 536 A.2d at 134. As such, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the 

employee’s second employer was liable for his disability because he was working for his 

second employer when he suffered his third and final accidental personal injury. See id. at

700, 536 A.2d at 134. The Court of Special Appeals explained that, although the jury found 

that the employee’s temporary total disability was causally related to his first accidental 

personal injury, the same was not the proximate cause of his temporary total disability

because the employee’s later two accidental personal injuries were intervening efficient 

causes. See id. at 700-01, 536 A.2d at 135.

As to causation, Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 30:12, which applies to 

workers’ compensation cases and was given at trial in this case, states:

In order to be compensable there must be proof that the injury could 

have been caused by the accident and nothing else after the accident occurred 

to cause the injury.

When an Employee has an injury that arises out of and in the course 

of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury 

likewise arises out of the employment.

Analysis

Here, we conclude that, where the Commission has awarded permanent partial 

disability benefits based on an accidental personal injury, and the Commission has also 

determined that the employee has incurred a subsequent intervening event—e.g., an injury 

sustained outside the course of employment—the employer may be liable for a worsening 

of the employee’s condition that is caused by and reasonably attributable solely to the 

accidental personal injury. Where it appears that an employee’s permanent disability was 

caused in part by an accidental personal injury and in part by a preexisting disease, LE § 
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9-656(a) directs the Commission to determine the proportion of the disability that is 

reasonably attributable to the accidental personal injury, and the proportion of the disability 

that is reasonably attributable to the preexisting disease. Under LE § 9-656(b)(1), the

employee is entitled to benefits for the portion of the permanent disability that is reasonably 

attributable solely to the accidental personal injury. It is entirely logical that an employer 

and its insurer are liable for the portion of a worsening of an employee’s medical condition

that was caused by, and is reasonably attributable solely to, an accidental personal injury. 

The issues of whether an accidental personal injury or a subsequent intervening event

caused a worsening of an employee’s medical condition, and whether, for purposes of 

permanent partial disability benefits, the worsening of the employee’s medical condition 

was reasonably attributable solely to the accidental personal injury, are factual matters for 

the Commission to determine in each individual case.

It is evident that, in this case, the Commission interpreted its Order dated March 30, 

2007—in which it stated that LaBonte had been “involved in a subsequent event”—and its 

Award of Compensation dated October 15, 2007—in which it apportioned LaBonte’s 

permanent partial disability, with 10% of the disability as being “causally connected to preexisting and subsequent conditions”—to be findings of a circumstance that, as a matter of 

law, precluded further liability on the part of Electrical General for worsening of LaBonte’s 

medical condition.

8

 Indeed, in its Order dated January 24, 2013, the Commission stated 

 

8The parties have at various times have referred to the Commission’s finding in 

denying workers’ compensation benefits due to the worsening of LaBonte’s medical 

condition as the finding of a subsequent injury, subsequent intervening accident, 
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that the previous Order and Award “establish[ed] a subsequent intervening event which 

breaks the causal nexus between the accidental [personal] injury and the current condition.” 

Despite the Commission’s determination, we unequivocally hold that, if an employee 

incurs a subsequent intervening event—e.g., an injury sustained outside the course of 

employment—further liability of an employer for permanent partial disability and other 

workers’ compensation benefits is not precluded as a matter of law. An employer may be 

liable for permanent partial disability benefits for a worsening of the employee’s condition 

that is caused by and reasonably attributable solely to the accidental personal injury, and 

liable for other workers’ compensation benefits such as medical treatment and medical 

expenses subject to a case-by-case determination. 

The analysis that applies to the determination of permanent disability benefits 

significantly differs from the one that applies to a determination of temporary disability

benefits. As LE § 9-655(1) and (2) provide, LE § 9-656 is inapplicable to temporary 

disability benefits. Instead of being apportioned among multiple injuries under LE § 9-

656, liability for a temporary disability depends entirely on the injury that occurred last. In 

other words, as the Court of Special Appeals stated in Martin, 73 Md. App. at 700, 536 

A.2d at 134, “it is the final accident contributing to [a temporary] disability which is to 

serve as the basis for liability.” The exclusive focus on the injury that occurred last, 

however, has no application in a determination of liability for a permanent disability, as to 

 

subsequent intervening event, and subsequent intervening injury. The Commission 

labelled the circumstance a subsequent intervening event. For purposes of this opinion, we 

use the terms subsequent intervening event and subsequent intervening injury.
- 25 -

which LE § 9-656 provides for apportionment of liability among multiple injuries. Simply 

put, the “final accident” rule that the Court of Special Appeals articulated in Martin, 73 

Md. App. at 700, 536 A.2d at 134, applies only to the determination of temporary disability

benefits, not to the assessment of permanent partial disability benefits. We are unpersuaded 

by Electrical General’s reliance on Martin for the proposition that the final accident that 

contributes to a worsening of an employee’s medical condition serves as the basis for 

liability for permanent partial disability benefits. 

In the Petition to Reopen, LaBonte requested not only a finding of apportionment 

of permanent partial disability benefits for worsening of his medical condition, but also 

medical treatment. On brief, Electrical General contends that medical treatment is not 

apportionable, and that its liability for medical treatment is precluded by the Commission’s 

finding of a subsequent intervening event. The only case upon which Electrical General 

relies in support of its argument is J & M Const. Co. v. Braun, 44 Md. App. 602, 609, 410 

A.2d 607, 611 (1980), in which the Court of Special Appeals stated that LE § 9-656’s 

predecessor “provide[d] for apportionment of only [p]ermanent disability.” In J & M 

Const., id. at 603, 605, 410 A.2d at 608, 609, an employee suffered two separate accidental 

personal injuries while working for two different employers, and the second employer and 

its insurer contended that the first employer’s insurer should have contributed to the 

employee’s vocational rehabilitation expenses. The Court of Special Appeals rejected this 

contention on the ground that it had not been found that the employee had a permanent 

disability as a result of the second accidental personal injury; instead, the Commission had 

found that the employee had a temporary disability. See id. at 609, 603-04, 410 A.2d at 
- 26 -

611, 608. J & M Const. stands for the principle that, under LE § 9-656, liability for 

permanent disability benefits is apportionable, while liability for temporary disability 

benefits is not. As such, J & M Const. does not support Electrical General’s proposition 

that medical treatment cannot be awarded where an employee demonstrates that a 

worsening of his or her medical condition was caused by an accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease.

In the Order dated January 24, 2013, the Commission found a subsequent 

intervening event and denied authorization for medical treatment and the payment of 

medical expenses. According to the Commission, the prior Order and Award of 

Compensation “establish[ed] a subsequent intervening event which breaks the causal nexus 

between the accidental injury and the current condition.” In light of our holding that the 

subsequent intervening event does not, per se, preclude an employer’s liability due to the 

worsening of an employee’s medical condition, the summary denial of medical treatment 

and medical expenses is not warranted. The question is not whether medical treatment can 

be apportioned; the question is whether a worsening of an employee’s medical condition 

was caused by the accidental personal injury, and, thus, necessitated additional medical 

treatment and expenses. 

Electrical General is also incorrect in contending that, here, the Commission’s Order 

dated March 30, 2007 and its Award of Compensation dated October 15, 2007 became the 

law of the case because there was no petition for judicial review of either decision.

Generally, “[t]he law of the case doctrine is one of appellate procedure. Once an appellate 

court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound 
- 27 -

by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case.” Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. 

Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 216, 94 A.3d 791, 800 (2014) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The doctrine of the law of the case typically does not apply to a decision 

of a trial court because, “‘as a general principle, one judge of a trial court ruling on a matter 

is not bound by the prior ruling in the same case by another judge of the court.’” Scott v. 

State, 379 Md. 170, 184, 840 A.2d 715, 723 (2004) (quoting Gertz v. Anne Arundel Cty., 

339 Md. 261, 273, 661 A.2d 1157, 1163 (1995)).9 Similarly, in Gertz, 339 Md. at 272, 661 

A.2d at 1163, this Court held that a trial judge’s order did not become the law of the case, 

and thus did not preclude another trial judge from consideration of a legal issue. 

Electrical General provides no authority, and we know of none, in which the 

doctrine of the law of the case has been applied to an award or order of the Commission. 

Indeed, at oral argument, when asked by the Court to explain Electrical General’s

contention regarding the doctrine of the law of the case, tellingly, without addressing the 

doctrine of the law of the case, Electrical General’s counsel responded that the doctrine of 

 

9 The general principle that a trial judge’s ruling does not bind another trial judge in 

the same case is fully consistent with the Court of Special Appeals’s holding in Martin, 73 

Md. App. at 698, 536 A.2d at 133-34, in which the Court concluded that the doctrine of the 

law of the case applied to a jury’s findings of a causal relationship between an employee’s

accidental personal injuries and his disability. In Martin, id. at 697, 536 A.2d at 133, after 

the jury made its finding, the trial court remanded the case to the Commission so that the 

employee could prove the amount of benefits to which he was entitled. The Court of 

Special Appeals explained that, on remand, “[t]he Commission could not ignore or amend 

the jury’s finding. There was no need for the Commission to take evidence on a matter 

[that] had already been decided for it by the circuit court, a higher tribunal.” Id. at 698, 

536 A.2d at 134. In other words, the Commission was bound by the jury’s finding of a 

causal relationship between the employee’s accidental personal injuries and his disability

because the jury’s finding essentially constituted a decision of a higher tribunal.
- 28 -

collateral estoppel applied to the issue of whether the incident with the law enforcement 

officer was a subsequent intervening event because neither party sought judicial review of 

the Commission’s March 30, 2007 Order and its October 15, 2007 Award of 

Compensation. When asked whether a Maryland appellate court had ever applied the 

doctrine of the law of the case in a workers’ compensation case to enforce orders or awards 

of the Commission, Electrical General’s counsel identified the case of Criminal Injuries 

Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 331 A.2d 55 (1975). In Gould, id. at 513, 331 A.2d at

72, this Court observed that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board conceded that it 

was estopped from contending that its decision was not subject to judicial review because 

the Board’s counsel had informed the opposing party’s counsel that the Board’s decision 

was subject to judicial review.

For obvious reasons, this Court’s holding in Gould does not support Electrical 

General’s contention regarding the doctrine of law of the case. Gould did not involve an 

issue as to the doctrine of the law of the case, and this Court did not mention the doctrine 

anywhere in Gould. Nor does the holding in Gould support the proposition that an award 

or order of the Commission can have preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel. Put simply, nowhere in Gould did this Court indicate that the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel applied to an award or order of the Commission.

In any event, the doctrine of the law of the case and the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel are distinct. The doctrine of the law of the case precludes a party from re-litigating 

an issue of which an appellate court in the same case has already disposed. See Doe, 439 

Md. at 216, 94 A.3d at 800. By contrast, “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a 
- 29 -

party from re-litigating a factual issue that was essential to a valid and final judgment 

against the same party in a prior action.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. 

The Fund for Animals, Inc., 451 Md. 431, 463-64, 153 A.3d 123, 142 (2017) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where: (1) 

the issue that was decided in a prior adjudication is identical to the issue that the party seeks 

to re-litigate; (2) the court issued a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party that seeks to 

re-litigate the issue was either a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior adjudication; 

and (4) the party that seeks to re-litigate the issue was given a fair opportunity to be heard 

on the issue. See id. at 464, 153 A.3d at 142.

10

The Workers’ Compensation Act negates both Electrical General’s contention 

regarding the doctrine of the law of the case in its brief, and its contention regarding the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel at oral argument. LE § 9-736(b)(1) provides that “[t]he 

Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction” in workers’ compensation cases. LE 

§ 9-736(b)(2) allows the Commission, within a certain time period, to “modify any finding 

or order as the Commission considers justified.” Under LE § 9-736(b), the Commission is 

not bound to follow its previous awards and orders; to the contrary, the Commission has 

the express authority to modify the same.

 

10As explained earlier, Electrical General has not briefed the issue of the 

applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case. Normally, this Court does 

not address issues that were not briefed. See, e.g., HNS Dev., LLC v. People’s Counsel 

for Baltimore Cty., 425 Md. 436, 459, 42 A.3d 12, 26 (2012) (“The brief provides only 

sweeping accusations and conclusory statements. After reviewing [the] brief, we are 

disinclined to search for and supply [the party] with authority to support its bald and 

undeveloped allegation[.]”).
- 30 -

LE § 9-736(b) unequivocally supports our holding that, where the Commission has 

determined an employee’s permanent partial disability and apportioned between an 

accidental personal injury and a subsequent intervening injury, if the employee’s condition 

worsens, the Commission is not precluded from awarding workers’ compensation benefits

due to the accidental personal injury. In its March 30, 2007 Order, the Commission 

properly denied LaBonte’s request for additional temporary total disability benefits 

because the injury that occurred last—i.e., the injury that resulted from the incident with 

the law enforcement officer—precluded liability for temporary disability benefits, as 

opposed to permanent disability benefits. In its October 15, 2007 Award of Compensation, 

because LaBonte had sought permanent disability benefits instead of temporary disability 

benefits, the Commission properly determined the portion of his back condition that was 

due to his accidental personal injury. Nothing in either of these two orders precluded the 

Commission from determining at a later date how much, if any, a worsening of LaBonte’s 

back condition was due to his accidental personal injury. Indeed, LE § 9-656(a) 

empowered the Commission to make such a determination, and LE § 9-736(b)(2) 

authorized the Commission to modify its previous finding of the proportion of LaBonte’s 

back condition that was due to his accidental personal injury.

Electrical General is mistaken in arguing that Reeves, 204 Md. at 582, 105 A.2d at

239, bars an employer’s further liability for any worsening of an employee’s medical 

condition after a finding of a subsequent intervening event. In Reeves, id. at 583, 580-81, 

105 A.2d at 240, 239, this Court held that an employer was not liable for permanent partial 

disability benefits where an employee suffered a shoulder dislocation in the course of 
- 31 -

employment, and a surgeon operated on the employee’s shoulder, which became partially 

immobilized as a result; i.e., the surgery constituted a subsequent intervening event. 

Critical to this Court’s conclusion were the circumstances that the employee’s physician 

testified that the employee’s work-related shoulder dislocation did not cause his shoulder’s 

partial immobility, and did not testify that the employee’s shoulder dislocation necessitated 

the surgery. See id. at 582, 105 A.2d at 239. In short, there was no evidence to support 

the jury’s finding that the employee’s work-related shoulder dislocation had caused his 

shoulder’s partial immobility; to the contrary, the evidence indicated that the subsequent 

surgery was the sole cause of permanent partial disability. See id. at 582-83, 105 A.2d at

239-40. And, as this Court observed, Reeves was not a case involving the reopening of a 

prior claim for injury upon the claimant’s condition’s worsening. See id. at 582, 105 A.2d 

at 239. In sum, Reeves did not involve a petition to reopen based on worsening of a medical 

condition, and this Court’s holding in Reeves merely establishes the proposition that a 

causal connection between an accidental personal injury and a disability is required for an 

initial award of permanent partial disability benefits.

In contrast to Reeves, in this case, ample evidence supports the jury’s finding that 

LaBonte’s accidental personal injury, not the incident with the law enforcement officer,

caused the worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. As a result of his accidental personal

injury, LaBonte was mostly either not working, or working in a light duty position, for 

more than two years; by contrast, as a result of the incident with the law enforcement 

officer, LaBonte missed less than a month from work. Whereas LaBonte underwent back 

surgery as a result of his accidental personal injury, medication and exercise were 
- 32 -

prescribed as a result of the incident with a law enforcement officer. Dr. Franchetti, 

LaBonte’s medical expert, examined him on two occasions; the first examination occurred

approximately five months after the incident with the law enforcement officer, and the 

second examination occurred more than five years after the incident. As a result of the first 

examination, Dr. Franchetti determined that LaBonte had 43% “whole person impairment 

due to” his accidental personal injury. After the second examination, Dr. Franchetti 

determined that LaBonte’s whole person impairment had increased to 53%. At deposition, 

Dr. Franchetti testified that the incident with the law enforcement officer did not result in 

any permanent worsening of LaBonte’s back condition, and that LaBonte’s back condition 

was causally related to his accidental personal injury. These circumstances more than 

support the jury’s finding that LaBonte’s accidental personal injury was the cause of his 

back condition’s worsening—i.e., that the incident with the law enforcement officer was 

not a cause of LaBonte’s back condition’s worsening. 

In sum, the Commission erred in concluding that its March 30, 2007 Order and its 

October 15, 2007 Award of Compensation were dispositive as to the issue of whether 

LaBonte’s accidental personal injury had caused a worsening of his back condition. Where 

an employee seeks reopening of a workers’ compensation claim based on the worsening of 

a medical condition, the employer may be liable for permanent partial disability benefits 

for the portion of any subsequent worsening of the employee’s medical condition that is 

caused by and reasonably attributable solely to the accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease. In other words, in the event that the Commission has apportioned 

liability for an employee’s permanent partial disability between an accidental personal 
- 33 -

injury or occupational disease, and a subsequent intervening event, and the employee’s 

condition has worsened, the Commission may determine the extent to which the worsening 

was caused by and was reasonably attributable solely to the accidental personal injury or 

occupational disease, and further award permanent partial disability benefits. And, where 

an employee moves to reopen a workers’ compensation claim, the existence of a 

subsequent intervening event finding does not, per se, preclude an employer’s liability for 

workers’ compensation benefits. Rather, an employer may be liable for workers’ 

compensation benefits where the employee demonstrates a worsening of his or her medical 

condition was caused by an accidental personal injury or occupational disease. As such, 

the circuit court did not err in submitting to the jury the question of how much, if any, of 

LaBonte’s back condition’s worsening was caused by his accidental personal injury. The 

jury’s determination that LaBonte’s accidental personal injury was the cause of his back 

condition’s worsening is amply supported by the evidence adduced at trial. 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 

APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONERS TO PAY 

COSTS.