2020 IL App (1st) 172107-U

No. 1-17-2107 

November 9, 2020 

First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DIONELL PAYNE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 12 CR 20806 

Honorable 

Carol M. Howard, 

Judge, presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Pierce and Coghlan concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s convictions for robbery and burglary are affirmed over his challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Dionell Payne was found guilty of one count of robbery 

and one count of burglary and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends 

the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where eyewitness identifications 

were unreliable, and the evidence established his alibi. He also argues the trial court erroneously 
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denied his posttrial motion alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial 

counsel did not investigate or present additional evidence supporting his alibi. We affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with one count each of robbery, burglary, and unlawful restraint.1

The robbery count alleged he knowingly took a wallet, credit cards, identification cards, and a 

checkbook from the presence of Jelena Pavlovic by the use of force or threatening the imminent 

use of force.2 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2012). The burglary count alleged he, knowingly and 

without authority, entered Pavlovic’s BMW with intent to commit theft therein. 720 ILCS 5/19-

1(a) (West 2012). The unlawful restraint count alleged defendant knowingly and without legal 

authority detained Pavlovic. 720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 2012). As defendant only raises issues of 

identification, alibi, and ineffective assistance of counsel, we recite only those facts necessary to 

decide this appeal. 

¶ 5 Jelena Pavlovic testified her car broke down on the I-94 expressway at 59th Street at 

approximately 8:00 a.m. on October 17, 2012. She pulled over to the shoulder and called for a tow 

truck. As she sat in her car, a silver car pulled over and parked a few feet in front of her car. 

Defendant, whom Pavlovic identified in court, was the only person in the silver car. He wore blue 

jeans and a brown jacket, and nothing covered his face. 

¶ 6 Defendant walked toward Pavlovic’s car; he did not use a cane. Defendant stood “[l]iterally 

right in front of [her] car right next to [her] door” and asked if she needed help. Pavlovic said she 

1 Defendant was also charged with three counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), 

(c) (West 2012)), which were nol-prossed before trial.

2 The indictment spells the victim’s last name “Pavlovik,” but she spelled it “Pavlovic” at trial. 

We use the spelling she provided. 
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did not, but finally agreed to let defendant help her and opened the hood of her car. Defendant said 

her car needed antifreeze, and Pavlovic noticed he was “limping a little” as he walked back to his 

car to get antifreeze. Defendant put antifreeze in Pavlovic’s car, but she was still unable to start it. 

She let defendant sit in the driver’s seat of her car in an attempt to start the engine. 

¶ 7 Pavlovic was standing “right next to the driver’s doors” when she noticed something

missing from her purse in the front passenger seat. She told defendant to get out of her car, which 

he did, and he walked quickly toward his car. Pavlovic saw her wallet was missing from her purse, 

so she chased after defendant and grabbed his jacket. She asked where her wallet was, and 

defendant said he did not have it. Pavlovic saw her wallet underneath defendant’s right arm. 

Defendant pushed her away and got in the driver’s seat of his car. Pavlovic chased defendant to 

his car and saw a wallet between his legs, and then saw him toss the wallet on the passenger seat. 

Pavlovic reached through the open driver’s side door and over defendant to grab her wallet, and 

he pushed her back. Defendant started his car and began driving. He pushed Pavlovic again, and 

she fell to the roadway. Approximately 30 minutes elapsed between the time defendant first 

approached Pavlovic’s car and the time he drove away. 

¶ 8 Pavlovic called police, who arrived shortly thereafter. Around noon that day, she identified 

defendant in a photo array. That evening, she identified defendant in a lineup. Defendant was not 

wearing a brown jacket when Pavlovic viewed the lineup, and she asked detectives where it was. 

Pavlovic identified the brown jacket defendant was wearing at the time of the incident in a 

photograph. 
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¶ 9 On cross-examination, Pavlovic testified “this incident all happened between 8:00 and 9:00 

a.m.” Her car breaking down made her “upset.” After she pulled over, she sat in her car for “maybe 

15 minutes” before defendant arrived. 

¶ 10 Dennis Altgilbers testified he was driving northbound on I-94 at approximately 8:30 a.m. 

on October 17, 2012, when he saw a gray BMW parked behind a gray Ford Focus on the shoulder, 

and a woman next to the driver’s door of the Ford. The Ford “accelerated to take off,” and the 

woman fell to the ground. Altgilbers pulled in front of the Ford to stop it. Altgilbers “was looking 

right at” the man driving the Ford, whom he identified in court as defendant, and was “right next 

to” defendant as he “tried to pin [defendant] from taking off.” Nothing blocked Altgilbers’s view 

of defendant. He followed defendant’s car northbound on I-94, called 911, and provided a 

description of defendant’s car and its rear license plate number. Later that day, Altgilbers “ma[d]e 

an identification” in a photo array and a lineup. At trial, Altgilbers identified defendant in the photo 

array, a photograph of the lineup, and an individual photograph. 

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Altgilbers testified he saw defendant’s face through the closed 

passenger-side window of his own car. The windows of defendant’s car were not tinted. 

¶ 12 Illinois State Police special agent Jonathan Parker testified he was assigned to investigate 

a robbery on October 17, 2012. Parker obtained the license plate number Altgilbers provided to 

911, which he matched to a silver Ford Focus registered to defendant. Parker created a photo array 

that included a photograph of defendant, whom he identified in court. Prior to viewing this photo 

array, Pavlovic and Altgilbers signed forms advising them the suspect might not be in the photo 

array, they were not obligated to make identifications, and they should not assume the person 

administering the photo array knew which person was the suspect. Pavlovic’s advisory form is 
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dated October 17, 2012, at 12:13 p.m.; Altgilbers’s is dated October 17, 2012, at 12:41 p.m. Parker 

testified Pavlovic identified defendant in the photo array “instantaneous[ly],” and Altgilbers 

identified defendant “instant[ly].” These advisory forms and photo arrays were entered into 

evidence.

¶ 13 Defendant was arrested during the afternoon of October 17, 2012. He was pulled over in a 

silver Ford Focus with a front license plate number that matched the number Altgilbers provided, 

but no rear license plate. In the evening, Pavlovic and Altgilbers came to the police station where 

defendant was in custody to view a lineup. Prior to viewing the lineup, Pavlovic and Altgilbers 

signed forms advising them the suspect might not be in the lineup, they were not obligated to make 

identifications, and they should not assume the person administering the lineup knew which person 

was the suspect. Pavlovic’s advisory form is dated October 17, 2012, at 7:37 p.m.; Altgilbers’s is 

dated October 17, 2012, at 7:34 p.m. Parker testified Pavlovic identified defendant “almost 

instantaneous[ly],” and Altgilbers identified defendant as well. At trial, Parker identified a 

photograph of the lineup and an individual photograph of defendant in custody. These photographs 

and the lineup advisory forms were admitted into evidence. 

¶ 14 Illinois State Police forensic scientists testified defendant was excluded from fingerprints 

and DNA samples taken from Pavlovic’s car. 

¶ 15 The trial court granted defendant’s motion for a directed finding with respect to the 

unlawful restraint count, but denied with respect to the robbery and burglary counts. 

¶ 16 The parties stipulated Teayre Ferba would testify, in relevant part: 

“[S]he was employed as a receptionist at Longwood Charter School on October 17, 2012. 

She first saw the Defendant on October 17, 2012 in the hallway of the school as she was 
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walking to the teacher’s lounge to get some tea. She believed that it was approximately 

between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. It could have also been between 9 and 9:30 a.m. When 

the investigating agents asked how certain she was about the time line in which she first 

saw the Defendant, she said it was about 50 percent.” 

¶ 17 In rebuttal, Veronica Avila-Lopez testified she worked as a receptionist at Chicago 

International Charter School Longwood campus (Longwood) on the morning of October 17, 2012. 

She arrived at work after 8:00 a.m., and “at least an hour” later, she saw defendant in the doorway 

of the main office. She knew defendant, as he had children in the school. Defendant “screamed” 

her name and said he had “been waiting all morning” to see the principal. Defendant left the office, 

and Avila-Lopez did not see him again that day. A few minutes after defendant left the office, 

Avila-Lopez sent the principal an email about defendant wanting to see him. A copy of this email 

had a time stamp of 9:55 a.m. 

¶ 18 A security desk at Longwood kept a log of visitors. Avila-Lopez identified the visitor’s log 

for October 17, 2012. The visitor’s log consists of two pages dated “Wednesday 10/17/12.” On the

first page, entries are in chronological order from 7:00 a.m. to 9:32 a.m. On the second page, the 

first entry has no time. The second entry appears to have a time of 8:3X; the last digit is illegible.3

This entry is labeled “Parent” and what appears to be the name “D. Payne.” The next entry has a 

time of 9:58 a.m., and the following entries continue in chronological order until 11:50 a.m. 

¶ 19 On cross-examination, Avila-Lopez acknowledged she told police she arrived at work at 

6:00 a.m. on October 17, 2012. She was “generally” at her desk between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. 

¶ 20 The jury found defendant guilty of both robbery and burglary. 

3 Avila-Lopez testified the time of this entry was 8:30 a.m., and it was signed by “D. Payne.” 
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¶ 21 Defendant filed a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The trial court appointed new counsel, who filed a motion for a new trial, also alleging ineffective 

assistance for, inter alia, trial counsel’s failure to present additional evidence in support of 

defendant’s alibi he was at Longwood at the time of the incident. 

¶ 22 At a hearing on these motions, the parties stipulated to the testimony of several teachers at 

Longwood and an Illinois State Police officer who interviewed them on October 18, 2012.4

Teacher Dan Such stated defendant’s son came to his first period class at approximately 8:00 a.m. 

on October 17, 2012, but defendant was not with him. First period lasted from 7:45 a.m. to 8:54 

a.m. Lutha Maura stated neither defendant nor his son attended the second period class, which 

lasted from 8:57 a.m. to 9:51 a.m. Several other teachers stated both defendant and his son attended

the third, fourth, and fifth period classes, which lasted from 10:00 a.m. to 2:18 p.m. During fifth 

period, which lasted from 12:30 p.m. to 1:20 p.m., defendant told a Ms. Wilson he had been at 

Longwood all day. 

¶ 23 Private investigator Alice Washington testified she obtained surveillance video recordings 

from October 17, 2012, from Longwood. A recording with a time stamp of 8:26 a.m. showed, as 

the court described, “a person walking away from the camera so you can see the person’s back, 

[but] you don’t actually see the person’s face.” This video recording was admitted into evidence.5

 

4 Defendant’s motion for a new trial included as exhibits two affidavits that were not introduced 

at the hearing on his posttrial motions. Defendant’s daughter, Venidra Payne, stated defendant drove her 

to Longwood on the morning of October 17, 2012. She did “not know the exact time [they] arrived at the 

school, but it would have been around 8:00 a.m.” because she went to her first period class. An affidavit 

from Ferba stated she saw defendant at Longwood “between 8:00 a.m. and 8:45 a.m.” The court did not 

consider the substance of Ferba’s affidavit, and only considered it to “note that that person exists and 

might be called as a witness in the future, if a new trial was ordered.” 

5 This video recording is not included in the record on appeal.
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¶ 24 On cross-examination, Washington testified she did not verify whether the time stamp on 

the video recording was accurate. She acknowledged she could not determine the height, weight, 

race, or facial features of the person depicted in the video, butshe could see the person was wearing 

a “light colored jacket.” 

¶ 25 On redirect examination, Washington testified the height and weight of the person depicted

in the video were consistent with defendant’s height and weight as documented in police reports. 

The person in the video walked with a cane in his right hand, which was consistent with what 

Washington “knew of” defendant. 

¶ 26 Defendant’s son, Dionell Payne, Jr. (Junior), testified defendant drove him to Longwood 

on October 17, 2012. He was “not quite sure what time” they arrived. Junior entered Longwood 

with defendant, who talked to a security guard while Junior went to his locker. Junior went to the 

main office for a disciplinary issue and saw defendant there. Junior did not know what time he was 

“done” in the main office, but he and defendant attended classes together for the rest of the day

thereafter. Junior identified defendant in the surveillance video recording from Longwood. 

¶ 27 On crosss-examination, Junior testified he was “not sure” what time he saw defendant in 

the main office, but he went to the main office right after he arrived at his first period class. He 

acknowledged that, in an affidavit, he stated he did “not know the exact time [he and defendant] 

arrived to the school, but it would have been somewhere around 8:00 a.m.” In the affidavit, he also 

stated he saw defendant in the main office at the beginning of second period. 

¶ 28 The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, finding he failed to establish a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel because the additional alibi evidence would not have changed 

the outcome of the trial. 
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¶ 29 The court sentenced defendant to 12 years on each count, to run concurrently. 

¶ 30 Defendant timely appealed. 

¶ 31 ANALSIS

¶ 32 On appeal, defendant first contends the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of 

robbery and burglary where Pavlovic and Altgilbers’s identifications of him were unreliable and 

the evidence established he was at Longwood at the time of the robbery.6 

¶ 33 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the 

issue is “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ‘any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” People 

v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67 (quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)). The 

trier of fact resolves conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable 

inferences from the evidence. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. We do not retry the 

defendant or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of 

the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Id. We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence 

is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of a defendant’s 

guilt. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). 

¶ 34 To prove defendant guilty of robbery, the State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 

he knowingly took property from the presence of Pavlovic by the use of force or by threatening 

the imminent use of force. See 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2012). To prove defendant guilty of 

6 Defendant was found guilty of both robbery and burglary. On appeal, he does not dispute such 

crimes occurred; he only disputes whether he was the person who committed them. For brevity, we refer 

to the incident at 59th and I-94 on the morning of October 17, 2012, as “the robbery.”
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burglary, the State had to establish beyond a reasonable he, without authority, knowingly entered 

Pavlovic’s motor vehicle with the intent to commit a theft. See 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2012). 

¶ 35 We find a rational trier of fact could conclude defendant committed the robbery and 

burglary of Pavlovic. Pavlovic and Altgilbers identified defendant as the offender in photo arrays

and lineups, and at trial. “In assessing identification testimony, Illinois courts rely on the factors 

set out by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 * * * (1972).” Id. “Those 

factors are: (1) the opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the crime; (2) 

the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the offender; 

(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification confrontation; and (5) 

the length of time between the crime and the identification confrontation.” Id. “In * * * undertaking 

a review of the [Biggers] factors * * * it is the function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility 

of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence.” People v. Romero, 384 Ill. App. 3d 125, 132 (2008). 

¶ 36 Here, the Biggers factors support a conclusion Pavlovic and Altgilbers’s identifications of 

defendant were reliable. Pavlovic had the opportunity to view defendant over the course of 

approximately 30 minutes, between the time he first approached her car and the time he drove off. 

She saw defendant three times in close proximity: (1) when he first approached her car and asked 

if she needed help; (2) when he sat in the driver’s seat of her car and tried to start it; and (3) when 

she tried to retrieve her wallet from his car. Altgilbers had a briefer opportunity to observe 

defendant, but was “right next to” defendant, viewing him through untinted windows, when he did 

so. Both witnesses identified defendant immediately in photo arrays, and Pavlovic identified 

defendant almost immediately in a lineup. The jury could have rationally interpreted this evidence
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as suggesting a high level of certainty in their identifications. Both witnesses identified defendant 

in photo arrays approximately 4 hours after the robbery, and in lineups approximately 11 hours 

after the robbery. Thus, under the Biggers factors, a rational factfinder could conclude these 

identifications were reliable and sufficient to support findings of guilt. 

¶ 37 Nevertheless, defendant contends Pavlovic and Altgilbers’s identifications were unreliable. 

Defendant cites the “stress of the event,” the witnesses’ limited opportunities to see his face, and 

their lack of detailed descriptions to police as supporting a finding those identifications were 

unreliable. However, the jury already heard all of these arguments and, given the guilty verdicts,

appears to have rejected them. Thus, we find defendant’s arguments unpersuasive. See People v. 

Baugh, 358 Ill. App. 3d 718, 737 (2005). 

¶ 38 Defendant’s argument that “no physical evidence corroborated Pavlovic or Altgilbers’s 

identification[s]” is similarly unpersuasive, as physical evidence is not necessary to corroborate 

eyewitness accounts. People v. Corral, 2019 IL App (1st) 171501, ¶ 91. Defendant also contends 

the identifications were unreliable because they were cross-racial. However, nothing in the record 

on appeal addresses what, if any, effect the cross-racial nature of these identifications had on their 

reliability, and defendant presents no authority holding that cross-racial identifications are 

automatically unreliable. Thus, we do not find Pavlovic and Alitgilbers’s identifications were so 

unreliable as to warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions. 

¶ 39 Defendant also argues the evidence established he was at his children’s school, Longwood, 

at the time of the incident. We disagree. Altgilbers testified defendant drove away from 59th and 

I-94 at approximately 8:30 a.m., and Pavlovic’s testimony suggested he drove away closer to 8:45 

a.m. Ferba’s stipulated testimony stated she saw defendant at Longwood at some point between 
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8:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., with only “50%” certainty about the earliest time she saw him. Ferba’s

testimony suggested defendant may have been at Longwood at the time of the robbery. However, 

her testimony also supported a rational conclusion defendant left the scene of the robbery and 

arrived at Longwood 45 to 60 minutes later, at 9:30 a.m. Similarly, Avila-Lopez’s testimony and 

email supported a reasonable inference defendant was in Longwood’s main office shortly before 

9:55 a.m., well after the time of the robbery. 

¶ 40 The jury could have considered the visitor log, which indicated defendant signed in at 

Longwood at approximately 8:30 a.m. But the jury was also free to reject the visitor’s log given 

that defendant’s entry is out of chronological order and difficult to read. 

¶ 41 Altogether, the evidence supported conflicting inferences as to defendant’s whereabouts at 

the time of the robbery. Thus, “it is best left to the trier of fact for proper resolution.” People v. 

Moore, 365 Ill. App. 3d 53, 58 (2006). “[T]he weight to be given alibi evidence is a question of 

credibility for the trier of fact, and there is no obligation on the trier of fact to accept alibi testimony 

over positive identification of an accused.” Corral, 2019 IL App (1st) 171501, ¶ 90. We defer to 

the jury’s judgment with respect to defendant’s alibi (see People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 

(2009)), which the jury must have rejected given its findings of guilt. Accordingly, we find the 

evidence sufficient to support the jury’s findings of guilt, and we affirm defendant’s convictions. 

¶ 42 Defendant next contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial 

counsel failed to present the testimony of his son, the stipulated testimony of teachers at 

Longwood, the surveillance video recording that purportedly shows defendant at Longwood at 

8:26 a.m., and Ferba’s affidavit stating she saw defendant at Longwood between 8:00 a.m. and 
No. 1-17-2107 

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8:45 a.m.7 Defendant maintains this additional evidence would have provided a “far more 

substantial alibi,” creating a “reasonable probability” the outcome of trial would have been 

different.

¶ 43 Defendant presented this evidence and essentially the same arguments at the the hearing 

on his posttrial motions. Defendant’s notice of appeal indicates he is appealing from the judgment 

of July 14, 2017, which was the date the trial court denied his posttrial motions at the conclusion 

of the hearing. Thus, we construe defendant’s argument as a claim the trial court erroneously 

denied his posttrial motions premised on his allegation trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present the additional alibi evidence. 

¶ 44 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 24. Defendant must show his trial counsel’s 

performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the 

deficient performance so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair trial. Id. Prejudice is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different or that the result of 

the proceeding was unreliable or fundamentally unfair. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; People v. 

Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 334 (2005). 

¶ 45 A defendant’s failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 455 U.S. at 697; People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 

144-45 (2007). If it is easier to decide a claim of ineffective assistance on the prejudice prong 

rather than the deficient performance prong, a court should do so. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

7 As noted previously, the surveillance video recording is not included in the record on appeal, 

and the trial court did not admit Ferba’s affidavit for its substance at the hearing. Defendant submitted 

Ferba’s affidavit to the trial court as an attachment to his posttrial motions. 
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“Determining whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance involves a bifurcated 

standard of review, wherein we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, but make a de novo assessment of the ultimate legal issue of 

whether counsel’s actions support an ineffective assistance claim.” People v. Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 

3d 598, 612 (2009).

¶ 46 Counsel’s performance is presumed to be reasonable, and “ ‘strategic choices, made after 

investigating the law and the facts, are virtually unchallengeable.’ ” People v. Velez, 388 Ill. App. 

3d 493, 502-503 (2009) (quoting People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 86 (1997)). A defendant who 

claims ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to “overcome the strong presumption that 

counsel’s action or inaction was the result of sound trial strategy.” People v. Anderson, 2013 IL 

App (2d) 111183, ¶ 54. “ ‘Defense counsel has a professional obligation, both legal and ethical, to 

explore and investigate a client’s alibi defense.’ ” People v. English, 403 Ill. App. 3d 121, 137 

(2010) (quoting People v. Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d 70, 79 (2002)). However, “ ‘[w]hether defense 

counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate is determined by the value of the evidence that 

was not presented at trial and the closeness of the evidence that was presented.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 79). 

¶ 47 We find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s posttrial motions. We agree 

with the trial court that defendant has not shown a reasonable probability the result of the trial 

would have been different with the additional alibi evidence; thus, he has not established the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland test. None of the teachers saw defendant at Longwood until 10:00 

a.m., more than an hour after the robbery. Defendant’s son and daughter did not know what time 

they and defendant arrived at Longwood, except that it was at some point during first period, which 
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ran from 7:45 a.m. to 8:54 a.m. The children’s testimony suggested defendant may have been at 

Longwood at the time of the robbery. However, it did not negate the possibility he was at 59th and 

I-94 between approximately 8:15 a.m. and 8:45 a.m., and was at Longwood before or after the 

robbery. The surveillance video recording did not establish defendant was at Longwood at the time 

of the robbery, because no witness testified to the accuracy of the time stamp on the video. 

¶ 48 Here, two witnesses positively identified defendant. Their testimony was sufficient to 

sustain his convictions even if the additional alibi evidence had been presented at trial. 

Accordingly, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by any alleged ineffectiveness of his trial 

counsel, so the trial court did not err in denying his posttrial motions based on ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Thus, we affirm defendant’s convictions. 

¶ 49 CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 51 Affirmed.