-1- Docket No . 107146.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

J ER RYSLOV

INSK I, Ap pel l an t, v. JA MES ELLIOT et al., Appell ees.
Opinion filed April 15, 2010.

JUSTICE BU RKE de l i

v ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fit zg er ald and J ust ices Fr eeman, Tho mas, G ar man, and Ka rmeier co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ice Kilbride diss ent ed, wit h op inion.

OPINI ON

Fo llowing the

en try of a de fault judg ment i

n a def am ati on l aw su i t, a j ury awa

rdedt he pla int iff, Je rry Slo vins ki, $81 ,60 0 i n d am ag esf or em ot iona l dist re ss and $2 milli

on in pun i ti ve da mag es

. T he cir cu it courtof Co ok Co unt y remitt ed t he pu nitive dam ag e a wa rd to $1 mi ll ion. On appeal , the appell

at e c o ur t affir med t he de fau lt jud gme nt and the award f or emotional

dam age but remi

tt ed t h e punit ivedam

age award f

urther, t o $81,600 . No. 1–05–0423 (unpubl is hed o r de run de rSu pr eme CourtRule 23). Plai ntif f appeal s, challenging only t he ap pellat e co ur t ’s judg ment r emitt ing t he punit ive-2- da mag e a wa rd . We af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.

Bac kgr ou nd In July 199 7, plaint iff

fil ed a one -c ou nt co mplaint alleging de f am ati on per se aga inst C her ry Co mmunicatio ns, I nc. (Che rr y), a nd i ts ch i ef executi ve of f i cer, d ef en da nt J am esEll i ot

. Cherry

wa s a t eleco mmunica

ti ons co mpany which bo ught long -d ista nce p hone mi nutes in bul k at a discounted rate and then res ol d them

f ora p rof i t. Plai ntiff ’s c ause of action was stay ed i n Novem ber of 1997 af

ter Cherry fil ed fo r ba nkr upt cy. Che rr y ha s si nce d isso lved and is no long er a pa rt y to t his act ion. T he ban kruptcy stay

was eve ntuall y l if ted and, in

April of 2003, pla int iff fi le d a second am

ended co mpla int

. I n his co mplain t , p laint iff alle ged that he was

the chi ef f in anci al off ic er of Cherry

from Jul y 1995 to May 19 96. Plaint iff

furt her alleged t hat one of hi s responsi bi li ties
as chi ef f in anci al off ic er was to prepare monthl

y a nd an nual fi nan ci al stat emen ts, which wo uld allo w Che rr y’s sup pliers t o a sses s t he fina nc ial s t r en gt h a nd cr ed it wo r t hin es s o f t he co mp an y. In May 1996, plai

ntif f’ s em ploy me nt was t er minated . Ac co rd ing to pla in tif f’ s compl ai nt, prior to hi s departure from Ch erry h e h a d compl eted Cher ry’s 1 995 annua l fi nancial st at ement and t he mo nt hly sta tem en ts fo r J anu ar y, F ebr ua ry, and Ma rc h 19 96 . P laint iff
ma in taine dthat t he f

in anci al statements dem

onstrated t ha t t he o ve r all fi nan ci al si tuation of Che

rry was worseni

ng. Several months af ter h is emp lo yment wa s t er minat ed , p laint iff le arned of a meet ing t hat oc cur re d in July 199 6 bet wee n defend ant and r ep r es en t at iv es f

rom WorldCom, one of Cherry’s suppl iers. Dur ingthis

me eting, def

endan t and the WorldC om represen tatives dis cussed Ch er ry’s de bt t o Wo r ldC o m, an d W o r ld Co m requested Cherry’s 19 95 an nu al fin an cia l st at eme nt an d u pd at ed mo nt hly stat emen ts. Pla int iff

alleged t hat , d ur ing t he me eting, def endan t made false sta te men ts about plai

ntif f to t he WorldCom representatives. S pe cif ica lly, acc or ding t o p laintiff, de fendant st at ed t hat Che rry ’s fi nan ci al st at eme nt s w er e no t ava ilable b ec au se pla int iff had no t c ompleted them, pl

ai ntif f “ was not doing h

is job,” pl ai ntif f “cam e i n l ate and left early

,” plai ntif f was “sn eaki ng off to do wo rk ou t s,” and pla in tif f “ spent his tim

e chasi ng pussy all da y.”1 Alth ough plainti ff’s com

plaint co ntaine d fu rthe r al legations regar ding de fen dant’s defamat ory s ta tem en ts, and th ese we re d ee me d adm itte d by vi rtueof defendant’s default , t he al lega tio ns wer e not p res ented to the ju ry dur ing the damages heari ng. S ee gen era lly Moone

y v . U nderw riters at
-3- Af ter def endan t fa i l ed re p eat edly to answ er disco ver y req ues t s, t he cir cu it courten t er ed a d efa ult j udgm en t ag ai n st d ef en da n t pu rsua n t to Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 2 19 ( c) ( v) ( 21 0 I ll. 2d R . 2 19( c) (v) ). A hear ing
was su bs eq uentl y he l d b ef ore a j ury on th e q ue sti on of dam ages. See 735 IL CS 5/2

–1206 (a) (W

est 200 0). At the h eari ng, p lain t iff

and his w ife, Bo nita S lovinski, wer e t he
o nly wi tn es se s to testify

. The bul k of plai ntif f’ s testim ony c onsi stedof ext ensive de sc r ip t io ns o f his wo rk a nd sa lar y h ist or y after leaving Ch er ry. Through this

testim ony, pl ai ntif f at tempt ed to show t hat defendant’s defam

ator y s tatements had dam

aged his r ep ut at io n in

t he t eleco mmunicatio ns in

dustry an d resul ted i n a red uc ti on in hi s i ncom e. Pla int iff also t esti f

i ed th at def en da n t’s de f am ator y sta tem en ts caused him emo t io nal d ist re ss . P laint iff st at ed t hat he h ad a “v er y diffi cu lt
co nver sat ion” with h

is wif e about the defam

ator y s tatements and h

ad to ex pl ai n to h er th at they were n ot t ru e. Pl

ai n ti f f also t esti f

i ed th at, because hi s professi

onal reputat ion h

ad suf fered, h e had b een f

orced to t ake jobs out of

t o wn an d h ad lo st t ime w it h hi s fa mily. Fin ally, pla int iff sta ted th at h e h ad n ot y et tol d h i s ch i l dr en

ab out th

e s tat emen ts, t hat t his was s omet hing else he had t o d o, and t hat t hi s was so methi ng that caused himemotional stress. On crossex amina t io n, p la

in tif f ackn owledged that his f

iri ng, whi ch occurred
so me t wo mont hs pr ior t o d efenda nt ’s meet ing wit h t he W or l dC om representat iv

es, was unrelat ed t o de fendant’s defam ato ry statements. Bon i ta t est ifi ed t hat she was “shocked ” to learn of defendant’s
ac cu sa ti on t ha t pla int iff ha d c ha se d “ wo men all da y lo ng

. ” S he init ially considered

whether the ac cu sa ti on was true but “af

ter t hi nki ng ab out it ” reali zed i t “was def in itel y a fal se accusation.” Accordin

g to Boni ta, pla int iff app ear ed les s “ener get ic abo ut go ing t o w or k” a fte r he le arned about the de f

am ato ry st at eme nt s. He als o sp en t les s t ime socializi ng with f riends. The evidenc e pr esented at t he hearing regar ding defendant’s conduct was minimal. 1 Pla int iff t es t ified t ha t he r ec eiv ed a p ho ne ca llLloyd’s, London , 33 Ill. 2 d 566 , 57 0 (19 65) (admiss ions in pl eadi ng s m ay be ar gued to the jur y); 4 J. W igmore, Evidence §1 064 (Cha dbour n rev. ed. 1972).
-4- f rom the trea su rer of W orldC om

i n Nove m be r of 199 6. Acco rd ingto pla int iff, t he t re asu re r t old him that dur ing a m eeti ng wi th W orldC om representatives in

Jul y 1996, def

endan t madea number of d ispar aging
com men ts about pl

ai nti f f . Sp ec i f i cal l y , de f en da nt tol d the W orldC om representatives that plai

ntif f h ad not compl eted Cherry ’s f in anci al stat emen ts, t ha t pla int iff “w as no t do ing his jo b, ” t ha t pla int iff “c ame in l ate and l eft earl y,” that plai

ntif f was “sn eaki ng off to do workouts,” and t ha t pla in

tif f “ spe nt his t ime ch as ing p us sy all d ay. ” P laint iff testifi ed that none of these statem ents were true. No further evi dence
was in tro duced regardin

g defen dant’s conduct and n

o evi dence was in tro duced regar din

g defendant’s f

in ances. Dur ingcl osin

g argumen

t, plai ntif f’ s atto rney

contended th at a

n awar d of $2 m il li on in puni tive da ma ges was n

ecessar y to pun ish defend ant , lar gely beca use defend ant ha d e ng ag ed in a preme ditated
sc he me to harm

pla in tif f. Def endan t’s counsel , in

turn, de cl ined to address t he issue o f punit ivedam ages. Instead, def

ense couns el

argued to t he ju r y t ha t sinc e p un it ive da mag es co uld o nly be aw ar de d if
c omp en satory

da mag es we r e fo un d, an d s inc e, in d efe nse co un se l’ s view, there was no bas is

for a compen

satory award, there was no need to even di scuss the issue of puni tive dam ages. The jury subse quently

returned an

item iz ed ver dict for m awar ding pla int iff $0 f or l ost w ag es , $0f

or da mag e to r epu t at ion, $8 1, 60 0 in dam ages fo remo t io na l dis t r es s a nd $2 million i n puni tive dam ages. The circui

t co urt deni ed defendant’s p os t t rial mot ion se eking judg ment notwithstandi

ng the verdict, a di

rected verdict ora n ew t r ial. The court al so denied

defen da nt ’s mot ion se eking r emitt itu r o f the
com pensatory dam age award. However, the circui t cour t granted de f en da nt’ s m oti on see king r emitt itu r o f the punit ivedam age a ward and red uc ed t he a wa rd t o $1 million. De fend ant ap pe ale d. Pla int iff cross-appeale d, ch all enging t he circ uit co ur t ’s r edu ct ion o f the pun i tiv e dam age a ward. The a pp el l ate co ur t affirmed t he t r ial c o ur t ’s en t ry o f t he de fau lt judg ment and uphel d the award o f $81,600 for emot ional distress.-5- Howev er, the a ppel l ate court en

tered a re mit ti tur of $1, 918 ,40 0 on t he pun i tiv e dam age a ward, r educ i ng i t to $81,600, co nd it io ne d on pla int iff ’ s co nse nt

. No

. 1– 05 –0 42 3 ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme CourtRu le 2 3) . W e g ra nt ed pla int iff’s p et it io n fo r le av e t o ap pe al. 210 I ll. 2 d R

. 31 5. We als o all ow ed th e Il l i noi s Tri al Law yers Asso ciat ion t o file an amicus curiae br ief in su pp o rt o f pla int iff.

Ana lysis Pu nitive damag es “ar e no t awa rd ed a s co mpens a t ion, but ser ve in steadt o p unish t he o ffender and to deter tha t pa rty an d others f rom co mmi t t ing si mi la r acts of wrongdoing i

n the f ut ure.” Loitz v. Remington Arms Co. , 138 Ill . 2d 404, 414 (1990). Puni tive da ma ges ma y be awarded when the defendan t’s t ort ious conduct evi

nces a hi gh degree of m

oral cul pabi li ty, that is, whe n t he tort is “com m i tted wi th fraud, ac t ua l malic e, de liber at e v io len ce o ro pp r es sio n, or when t he defend ant acts wil

lf ull y, or wi th such gross n

eglige nceas to i n di ca te
a wan ton di sreg ard of

the ri ghts of othe rs.” Kelsay

v. Motorola, Inc. , 74 Il l . 2d 17 2, 1 86 (1 97 8) . To d

ete rm i n e w h eth er pu n i ti ve dam ages areapp ro pr iate , “t he tri er of fact can properly consider the character of t he de fendant ’s ac t , t he nat ur e and ext ent of t he har m to t he pla int iff t hat t he defen

dant caused or in

tended to ca us e a n d th e w ea l th of t he def endan t.” Restatem

en t (Second) of

Torts §908( 2) (197 9). Because puni

tive da ma ges are penal

in nature, they “are not favored in t he law, and t he cour ts must t ake cau t ion t o s ee t hat punit ive dam ages are not i m prop erl y orunwi sel

y a warded.” Kelsay , 74 Ill . 2d at 188. Sec ti on 2–1207 of

the Code of

Ci vi l Pr ocedu re (735 I LCS 5/2–1207 (West 20 00 )) prov i de s th at th e “ trial cou rt m ay , i n i ts discr et ion, wit h re spe ct t o p unit ivedamag es, det er mine wh ethe r a j ury awa rd for punit ive damag es is exc essive, and if so, enter a remi

tt itur and a condi

tional new trial .” Acc or di

ngl y , wh en , as i

n th i s ca se, a cir cu it cour t red uces ajury’s p unit ive damag e aw ar d by remi tt itur, we
revi ew the court’ s de ci sion f or an a bus e of di scre tion

. I nit iall y, pla int iff

co nt end s th

at the a ppe l l atecou

rt er red i n n ot re insta t ing

the jury ’s origi

nal award bec aus e t he j ury ’s aw ard of $2 mi ll ion s hould h ave b een l

eft undisturbed b y thec i

rcui t court. In plain tiff ’s vi ew , th e c i rcu i t cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on in remitt ingt he-6- j ur y ’s pu n i ti v e dam ag e a wa rd b y an y am oun t. In gra nti ng de f en da nt’ s m oti on f orre mitt itu r, t he circui

t co urt fi rst recited the general

pr inciples und er lyi

ng pu nitive d amage s, s t at ing that such damages are m

eant to punis

h the wrongdo er and deter ot hers, and t ha t pu nit ive da mag es mus t “fit t he cr im e” and not be im

posed
un wis ely. The c i

rc ui t cou rt th en wen t on to no t e t ha t wh ile it did not con don e def en da n t’s con duct, “an aw ar d w hic h is dis

propo rtionate to the wrong serves none of t he pu r po se s o f pu nit ive da ma ges and is exces sive. T he Cou rt bel ie ves that i n l igh t o f the f act that t he j ury awa

rded Pla int iff $81,600.00 compensatory, an award o f pu

nitive dam ages in the a mou nt of o ne million dol l ar s is s uf f i ci en t to punis h the Defe nda nts a nd deter ot hers f

rom comm

ittin g a si mi la roff en se. A ccordi ngl y , a remi tt itur will be en tered in the
am ount of one m i l l i on dol l ars.” Pla int iff maintains th at th

i s rea son i n g is i n adeq ua te. A cc ordi

n g to pla int iff, the c i

rcui t court err ed in entering a rem ittitur withou t first making specifi

c fi ndi ngs that the evi

dence failed t o s upp or t t he jury’s award, or t hat t he ju r y’ s aw ar d wa s impro per ly based o n pas sion, prejudi ce or co rr upt ion. Ci

ti ng to NC Illinois Trust Co. v. First Illini Bancorp, Inc. , 323 Ill. App . 3 d 25 4 ( 200 1) , p laintiff mai nt ains t hat t he cir cu it court’s

f ai l ure to m ake th ese spe ci f i c f i ndi ngs i s, by i tsel f,
reason t o ho ld t ha t t he co ur t ab us ed it s d isc r et io n a nd is re as on to rei nstate the jury ’sawar

d. W e di sag

ree. In NC Ill inois Trust Co. , t he ap pe llat e c o ur t r ev er se d a cir cu it
cou rt ’s remi

tt itur of a j ury’ s puni

tive da ma ge award. In so hold ing, t he appella te court stated t he f

oll owing: “In re m i tti n g th e j ur y ’s pu n i ti v e dam ag es aw ard to $450,000, the tri

al cour t he re m ade n o sp ec i f i c f i nd i ng s n or did i t de term i ne tha t the j ury ve rdi ct w asthe

prod uc t of pa ss i on or prej udic e. I nst ea d, t he co ur t st at ed o nly t ha t it found the dam

ages award to be exces si

ve. T his cou rt h asal rea dy set f or thwit h par t icular ity t he evi dence in the reco rd sup por ting the jury’s finding t hat Bank
r ep ea t ed ly

breach ed i ts fi duc ia r y duty to t he estate. Because t he t r ial c o ur t in dic at ed o nly that it d id no t believe t he evi dence sup po rt ed t he ve rdi ct, th i s c our t h as n o wa y to-7- reviewt he pr op riet y of t hat d eci si on. Case law di ctates t hat when the record suppor

ts the jury verdict

, the trial cour t must s et f ort h i ts reasons for rem

ittin g that award. See Batterton , 105 Ill . App. 3d at 805, 434 N.E .2dat 1178 . As the c ourt here fai le d t o do s o, we reverse.”

(Em phasi s ad ded.) NC Illinoi

s Trust Co. , 323 Ill . App. 3d at 267. Though it was perh

aps i nartful ly phrased, wedo not read NC Illinois Trust Co. as holdin

g that a circ uit co ur t ’s failu r e t o pr o vid e s pe cific
re aso ns for ent er inga r emitt itu r is, st anding a lone, and w itho ut giving any cons i derati

on to the re cord, a

basis f ora r ev iew ing co ur t t o ho ld that the ci rcuit court abused

its di scretion. Rather, weread NC Illinoi s Trust Co. as st an din g fo rt he simp le prin ci ple that when a re viewing courtdeterm

i ne s tha t the rec ordsup po rt s t he jury’s ve rd ict, and t he cir cu it court off

ers no expl

anati on as to wh y a r emit t it ur is n ec es sa ry, the jury verdict must be rei

nstated. T his re ad ing o f NC Illinois Trust Co. is co nsist ent wit h t he stan dard of revi ewtha t weha ve rec ogn ize d f ora circ uit co ur t ’s r uling
on a m oti on f or new tri al , a m oti on closel y related to rem

i ttitur. See, e.g. , Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, B osselman & Weaver, 222 Ill . 2d218, 254 (2006 ). As we h

ave h el d, when r ev iew ing a c irc uit cou

rt’ s r ul i ng on a motion f or new trial , “a n abu se of di scre tion wil l be f ound w here there i s n o rec ogn iza bl e b as i s i n th e re cord to s upp or t” the or der entered by the c i rcui t court. Snelson v. Kamm , 204 Ill . 2d 1, 41 (2003 ). Ap

pl y i ng th at stan dard h ere , t he r elevant que st ion fo r t he appe l l ate cou rt was not whet her t he circ uit co ur t set for t h any particular fi ndi ngs. Inst ead , t he question f ace d by the a ppel l ate court was whether or

not th ere wa s a basis i n th e re cord to su pp ort t he ci rcui t court’s orde

r. Pla int iff fur ther co ntends, however, t hat the appellate cour t also erredwhen

it failed t o o ffer mor e sp ecific re aso ns for its ho ldingthat t he cir cui t court shoul d ha

ve reduc ed th e pun

i tiv e dam age a ward f urthe r. The appe llate co ur t below , a fte r a ckno wledg ing t hat t he cir cu it cou

rt’ s entr y of a re m i tti tur wasrev

i ew ed f or an ab us e of dis cretion, stated t he f

oll owing: “Here, after caref

ul ly reviewi

ng the ev ide nce, we concl

ude that defend ant ’s co nduc t was re pr ehens ible and ce rt ainl y wa rra n ts an awar d of p unit ive damag es. Neve rt heless, we find that both the j ury ’s $2 m i l l i on puni tive da ma ges awa rd and t he-8- cir cu it co ur t ’s o rd er of r emitt ance t o $ 1 mill ion r epr ese nt exce ssive awards. *** Ult imately, w e co nclude t hat a pu nitive dam ages aw ard

of $81 ,60 0, w

hi ch i s e qua l to p l ai n ti ff ’s
com pensatory da mag es aw ar d, wo uld su fficie nt ly punis h defend ant and deter othersf rom commi tt in g a sim il ar offense under the

pa rticul ar c i

rcu m sta nc esof thi s c as e.” No. 1–05–0423 ( unp ub lishe d o r de run de rSu pr eme Co ur t Ru le 23). Pla in ti f f co nt en ds t ha t t he ap pe llat e c o ur t ’s st at eme nt t ha t it reviewed th e ev i den ce

i s i n suf f i ci en t an d th at th e a pp el l ate courtwas required to state wi

th m ore specifi

ci ty how the ci

rcuit court err ed. The appe l l ate court ’s f ai lure to do so, accordin

g to pla in tif f, m eans that we must rev ers e the j udg

men t of th e a pp el l ate court . Agai

n, we di sagree. “It i s a f un da men tal pri nc i ple of appe l l ate la w that when an

appeal is taken f rom a j udgme nt of a lower court , ‘[t]he question be fore [the]
re viewing co ur t is the co rr ec t ne ss o f t he r es ult reached b y the lower courtan d n ot t he co rr ect ness o f the re aso ningup o n w hic h t ha t r es ult
was reached.’ ” People v. Johnson , 208 Il l

. 2d 118, 128 (2 003), quo t ing People v. Novak

, 16 3 Il l . 2d 93, 101 (19 94) . F or pu

rpos esof
our review, it i s i

rrelev ant whether the appel

la te court articulated wi

th sufficient cl

ari ty the reasons i

t had for reachi ng i ts decis ion. The

is sue f orthis cour t i s simply whet her t he ap pellat e co ur t er re d in ho lding that the ci rcui t court shoul d ha

ve reduc ed th e j ury ’sawar

d f urthe r. In ord er to determi

ne wh ether the appella

te court erred, we must of cou rs e re sol ve the un derl y i ng i ss ueof whether the ci rcuit court was correct to enter a remi

tt itur i n the f irst place. Accordi

ngl y, we co nclude t hat t he sco pe o f ou r r eview in t his case may beexpresse d in a single q ues t ion: Is t her e a ba sis in the r eco rd t o s upp or t t he remi tt itur entered b y th e c i rc ui t cou rt? W e tu rn n ow to t hat que st ion. The pr imar y ar gu men t ad va nc ed by p laint iff in t he cir cu it co ur t in f av orof a la rge puni tive da ma ge award was that defe

ndan t engaged in a p re med it at ed sc heme t o har m plain t iff. Du ri n g c l osi n g a rgum en t, fo rex amp le, pl ain t iff’ s c o un se l st at ed t o t he jury:

“And I sai d be f ore how [the d ef am atory statem en ts] were designed. I ke ep thi

nk i ng be f ore [ de f en da nt] went i nto t hat meet ing when he was dri

vi ng hi s lim o over t o Wo r ldC o m, he had to h av e s at i n th e b ack s ea

t an d th oug h t wh at c an I te l l th em? W h at c an I te l l th em th at m ay b e b el i ev ab l e, th at wil l-9- appeal t o t he m about why

these f in anci al s aren’ t availa

ble? Wh at can I t ell them abo ut [p laintiff] t hat will appea l to t he
men in t he r o o m? [Defen dant’s counsel

]: Obj ection, Judge. THE COURT: Overrule d. [Plaintif f’scounse l ]: I wo nd er wh et he rhe wa s fr an kly
r ea lly ple as ed wit h hims elf w he n he ca me up w ith t he cha sing pussy story, because I’m

sure that he knew that would appe al to t he men in t he r o o m, an d th at th at woul d p l ay we l l wi th t hem. We k now he had t o t hink about it. We know he

had to plan i t out, unless

may be al l thi s com es n atural to hi m .” Late r, p lai

ntiff ’s counsel continue d

wit h t he t heme o f pre medit at ion: “And t he de fend an t is not ent itled t o t he bene fit o f any do ubt b eca use he didn’ t give [ plaint iff ] a ny benefit o f the do ubt on that day i

n Jul y of 1996 when

he m ali ci ou sl y wi th
ma li ce aforethought went in

to that meeti

ng a nd di d w hat he did to [pl ai

ntif f ] and hi s f am i l y .” Pla int iff also repe ats

this argumen t before thi s court. Plai

ntif f contends that the jury ’s origi

nal $2 mi ll ion pun iti ve dam age award i s ju stif

ie d because de f

en da n t’s “ con duct w as pr em ed i tate d, c al cul ate d, and
cons i dered

i n a ‘risk-re ward’ typ e of

f ram ework.” The pr oblem wit h t his arg ument i s tha t the j ury he ar d a bso lut ely
no ev i den ce to supp ort it. Therewas no evi dence that def

endan t ro de in a limousine wh ile p lo t t ing t o de fame pl ai n ti f f pri or to m

eeti n g w i th t he Worl dCom re prese ntative s. In f

act, t here was n

o evi dence presented of any thin g taking p la ce p r io rt o Ju ly 19 96 t ha t wo uld i n di ca te defen dant had a prem

edi tated sc he me t o de fame plaint iff . T he
o nly evi dence off ered of ev en ts prior to Jul

y 1996 th at would app ear, at lea st init iall y, to bear

on the question of

defen dant’s m ot iv ation was pla i ntiff ’s firing in May of 19 96. But plaint iff t est ifi ed t hat his firing had nothing to do with defen dant’s defam

ato ry statements: “[Defendant’s counsel]: But it i s y our testi mon y , i s i t n ot, Mr. Slovi nski , that any com

me nts m ade that are

pra yed f orin your co mplaint had not hing t o d o w ith yo ur firing in May of 1996? [Plai ntif f ]: That i s corre ct.”-10- As par t of his ar gument t hat defend ant had a p r eme dit at ed sc he me to defame plai

ntiff , plaintif f’scounsel

also main tained t hat de fendant’s def am atory st at eme n t s su cce ssfully “boug ht t ime” for Cher ry and hel ped stave off ban kruptcy until Nove

m ber o f 19 97 . B ut pla int iff testifi ed that af ter May 1996, he “wa s gone so I rea ll y wasn’t in volv ed” with C

herry and thus h

ad no k now ledge of Cherr y’s busi nesstransact ions. On t his record, it is possi ble that the bankruptcy
wo uld have occurred at the same ti me it did, even

i f de f en da nt h ad not
ma de th e state

men ts ab ou t plaint iff

. Ac co rd ingly, the re was no evi dence that defenda

nt’s statemen

ts delay ed Ch err y ’s cre di tors or waspart of

a succe ssf

ul , prem edi tated scheme to “b

uy tim e.” Plain tiff ’s coun sel

al so argued to the j ury

that the def am atory sta tem en ts we re pa rt o f pr eme dit at ed s cheme e nact ed by de fendant because ot herwi se d efend an t wo uld ha ve ha d t o inve st mo r e o f his
ownmo ne y in

to Ch erry. A

gai n, however, n

o evi dence was

off ered about Cherry ’s f

in anci al status orwhether def

endan t would have been
r eq uir ed t o pu t his o wn mo ne y int o t he firm. In short, there w as n

o evi den ce pre sent ed to t he j ury that defend ant had

an i n ten ti on al, pr em ed i tate d s ch em e to har m plain t iff. The most th

at m ay be sa i d on thi s rec ord– an d de f en da nt d oesnot contest t his po int– is tha t d ef endan t’s de f am atory statem en ts were
ma de wi th a re ckl

ess di sreg ard f

or pl ai ntif f ’sri ghts . Th is

pla ces defendant’s co nduc t on t he l ow end of the sc al e f orpuniti ve damages, fa rb el ow th ose ca se s i n v ol v i n g a de f en da n t’s de l i b erate atte m pt t o har m anot her per so n. Other facts of rec ord also i

ndicate that a smal

l p uni tive da ma ge awar d is a pp r o pr iat e in t his ca se . F orexample, t he evide nce be for e t he j ury was tha t de f en da nt d i d n ot repeat the defam

ator y s tatements, but
ma de t he m o n l

y onc e, i n th e J ul y 199 6 m eeti ng . The s cop e of publ i ca ti on was al so li

mi ted, t o t hose i

ndi vi dua ls pr ese nt in the
meeti ng. Furth er, the jury ’s verdict wi

th respectto compensatory dam ages shows lim ited har m to plaint iff

. T he jur y found no dam

ages f or loss of
re put at ion, or l

ost wage s. A l

th ou gh t here wa s a dam age a ward returnedf orem ot iona l di stress, there was no evi

dence of any phy si cal ha rm to pla i ntif f . The re wa s, f or e xam ple , no e vi denc e of vi si ts to a doc toror t herapist, no evidence that plai ntif f m iss ed work, and no evidence of any

alteration in pl

ain tiff ’s normal dail y activ ities

.-11- An awa rd of p unit iveda

mag es m us t b e rem

i tted to the extent that t he r e is n o m

ate rial ev i den ce to supp ort it. Loitz v. Remington Arms Co. , 138 Ill . 2d

404 , 42 6 (1 990 ); se e g en era l l y C. McC or mick , Dam ages §79 , a t 281 -8 2 ( 193 5) (o bs ervi ng tha t even i n c as esof de f am ati on per se , the m

al i ci ous con duct n ec es sa ry to su pport an awar d of puni tive da ma ges may not be presum

ed, but must be proved by competent evi

dence ) . For t he reasons

stated above, we concl

ude that the ci

rcu i t court abused its discret ion in remitting the jury’s pu nit ive da mag e a wa r d t o $1 million

. T he r e is no ba sis in the record to suppo rt such

an awar d. W e con

cl ude, a s di d the appe l l ate court be l ow, that the

hi ghe st awa rd the evi dence of record may

su pp o r t is $81,600. A cc ordi

n gl y , w e af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt. In lightof o ur dispo sitio n t hat t he j udgm en t of the appe l l ate court must be af fi rmed un der pr i nc i plesof sta te c om mon l aw , we ne ed not address defen

dant’s al ternative c ontention that the ci rcui t cour t’s judgm ent vi olated the due pr o ce ss pr inc iple s s et fo r t h in State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance

Co. v. Camp bell , 538 U.S . 408 , 155 L. Ed

. 2d 58 5, 1 23 S. Ct. 1 51 3 ( 20 03 ), a n d th at th e j udgm en t of th e appe l l ate co ur t sho uld t he re for e be aff irm ed as a m atter of f ederal constitutional

la w.

Con

cl us i on Fo r t he fo re go ing

reasons, t he jud gme nt o f t he ap pe llat e c o ur t is aff irm ed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, di ssen ting: I di sa gre e w i th th e m aj ori ty ’s con cl us i on t hat t he trial

court abused it s dis cr et io n in r emit t ing th e j ur y ’s pu n i ti v e dam ag e a wa rd to $1 mi ll ion a nd that the hi

ghest awa

rd t he evi dence of

record may supp ort is $81,600. In my

view, t he major ity gives lip se rvice t o t he correct stan

dard of revi ew–w

hether the tri al

courtabuse d i

ts dis cret io ninr emit t ing t he da mag es aw ar d– an d t he n ig no r es t his stan dard b y sub sti tutin g i ts j udgm en t for th e tri al

court’s

.-12- T his court ha s re co gn iz ed tha t “ [a] rev

i ew i ng cou rt wi l l not dis turb an aw ard of pu nit ive da mag es o n g r o un ds t ha t t he amo un t is
ex ce ss ive un les s it is ap pa r en t t ha t t he aw ar d is t he r esu lt o f pass ion, pa r t iali t y, or co rruption.” Deal v. Byf ord , 127 Ill . 2d 192, 204 (1 989). Here, b y re duci n g th e pun i ti v e dam ag es aw ard, t

h e tr i al court implic it ly f ound th at the puni

tiv e dam age a ward of $2 m i l l i on was t he
res ul t of j ury pa ss i on, pa

rti al i ty , or co rr upt ion. The t rial co ur t fou nd t he awa rd dispr op or t ionat e t o t he wron g a nd con cl ude d a n a wa rd of punit iveda

mag esi n th e a moun t of $1 m i l l i on was sufficient to punis

h defen dant and deter others from com mi tt in g a si mi la r offe nse. We ma y only fi nd the tr ial

cour t’s remittitur t o be an abuseo f di screti on when “no reason

ab l e p ers on

woul d agre e w i

th th e p osi ti on adopted by t he t r ial c ourt .” Sch w artz v. Cortelloni , 177 Ill . 2d 166, 17 6 ( 19 97 )

. I n r ev iew ing an aw ar d o f pu nit ive da mag es , t he co ur t is to co nsider t he r elevant circu msta nces , includ ing “the nat ur e and
eno rmity o f the wr ong , t he financial st at us o f the defend ant , a nd t he pot entia l liabil ity o f the defend ant .” Deal , 12 7 I ll. 2 d a t 20 4. I n t his case, the na ture an d enor m i ty of the wro ng

an d the l i ab i l i ty of def endan t are bey ond question. In addi

tion, the abse

nce of e vi dence
re gar ding defen

dant’s f in anci al status is the di

rect result o f defendant’s de fau lt and may no t pr o pe rly be us ed ag ains t t he p laint iff. The only real iss ue is the am

ount o f the pun

iti ve dam ages award. I mp o r t an t ly, propo rtional ity between pun

iti ve an d co mp en satory da mag es is no t r eq uir ed un de rt his cou rt ’s prece den ts. Deal , 12 7 I ll. 2d at 204. “Becaus e puni

tive da ma ges serv e a pe na l purpos e an

d are awardednot as c omp ensa t ion, but for re aso ns o f ret ribut ion and det er re nce, t he amo unt of such an award is determi

ned b y m ore t han just a consideration of the n

ature and ex

ten t of the

clai man t’s l oss.” Loitz v. Remin gton Arms Co

. , 13 8 I ll. 2d 40 4, 4 16 (1 99 0) . Th

e f acts of each cas e m

ust be exam

in ed caref ull y, an d the court mus

t consider t he un derl y i ng pur pos esof a puni tive da ma ge award. Deal , 127 Ill . 2d at 204. Her e, t he r eco rd indicat es t hat plaint iff fil ed a co mplaint alleging de f am ati on per se . I n his co mplaint, plaint iff alleged t hat defend ant kn o win gly

mad e fa lse st at eme nt s t ha t pla in t iff ha d not comple

ted
c omp any financial sta t ement s, t hat plaint iff “was no t do ing his job, ” that pl ai n ti f f “ ca me i n l ate and left ea rly, ” t hat pla int iff “was s neak ing
o ff to do wor ko uts, ” and t hat plaint iff “spe nt his time cha sing2 The re co rd e stab li she s th

at d e fe nd an t’s act ual stat ement w as f ar m ore derogat ory. -13- [women

2 ] al l day .” Defend ant fai

led to answer plaintiff

’s compl ai nt, fai le d si x tim es to pr ese nt hi ms el f f or depo si tion, and f

ai le d to c omply

with plain

tiff ’s di scovery re qu ests, de sp i

te bei ng orderedto co m

pl y b y th e tr i al cou rt. Ult imat ely, t he t rial co ur t ent er ed a defaul t judgment again

st de f en da n t, an d th e c as e w as

set f or j ur y trial on th e dam age s i ssue al one. Du e to d

ef en da n t’s de f aul t, w e m us t ac ce pt th e tr uth of th e allegat ions in the p laintiff’s co mplaintand concl ude that de f

en da n t per sede famed pla int iff. See Buck v. Citizens’ Coal Mining Co

. , 25 4 I ll. 198, 20 0 (191 2). Accordi ng t o t he allega t ions in t he co mplaint, defend ant mali cio us ly, in

tentional ly , an d kn owi n gl y made f alse sta tem en ts to thi rd parties that were desi gned to injure plai

ntif f. The c omplain t alle ged th at “de f

en da n t kn ew th i s state ment t o be false and t he st at ement was made with t he in tent to injure p lai

ntiff .” T he maj or ity’s anal ysi s, ho we ve r , fails to ack now ledge t he t ru t h of t hese allegat ions and, i n ste ad , c on cl

udes th at de fendant ’s co nduc t merely sho wed “a recklessdisre gar d fo r p laintiff’s right s,” placing “def endan t’s conduct
on t he low end of the s cale f or p uni tive dam ages, far below t hose
casesin volv in g a defe ndan t’s delib erate a t tempt to harm another pers on.”Slip o p. at 11. The ma jori ty does not dispute, however, that t he jury wa s pr ese nt ed w ith su ffi cient evidenc e t o w ar ra nt pu nit ive damages. Rather, t he major ity simply choo ses t o o ver loo k t he t ru t h of t he allegat ions in t he co mplaint and , a cco rd ingly, disag re es w ith t he trial
cou rt ’s asse ssment of t he exc essivene ss o f the punit ivedam age award. The ma jori ty appar en

tl y wou ld a wa r d a sig nific an t ly lo we rsu m if it
were init ially d ec idin g t he r emit t it ur iss ue

. T ha t , ho we ve r , is not t he
r o le of a re viewing c ou rt unde r t he limi t ed “a buse of d iscre t ion” stan dard of r eview a pplicable in t his case . B eca use I d o no t believe t he
maj ori ty pr o pe r ly applie d this

hi ghl y de feren tial sta n da rd of re v i ew to th e fac t s w e mu st ac ce pt as t rue un de rt he un dis pu t ed alle ga t io ns in th e p l ai n ti f f ’s com pl ai n t, I m us t re sp ectf

ul l y di ss en t.