24108 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 91, 121, 125, and 129

[Docket No. 29104; Amendment Nos. 91–

264, 121–275, 125–33 & 129–28]

RIN 2120–AF81

Repair Assessment for Pressurized

Fuselages

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This action requires operators

of certain transport category airplanes to

incorporate repair assessment

guidelines for the fuselage pressure

boundary into their FAA-approved

maintenance or inspection program.

This action is the result of concern for

the continued operational safety of

airplanes that are approaching or have

exceeded their design service goal. The

purpose of the repair assessment

guidelines is to establish a damagetolerance based supplement inspection

program for repairs to detect damage,

which may develop in a repaired area,

before that damage degrades the load

carrying capability of the structure

below the levels required by the

applicable airworthiness standards.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 25, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Brent Bandley, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, Airframe Branch,

ANM–120L, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Federal Aviation

Administration, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California

90712–4137, telephone (562) 627–5237,

fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Final Rules

An electronic copy of this document

may be downloaded using a modem and

suitable communications software from

the FAA regulations section of the

FedWorld electronic bulletin board

service (telephone: 703–321–3339), or

the Government Printing Office’s

(GPO’s) electronic bulletin board service

(telephone: (202) 512–1661).

Internet users may reach the FAA’s

web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/

arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the (GPO)

Federal Register web page at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to

recently published rulemaking

documents.

Any person may obtain a copy of this

document by submitting a request to the

Federal Aviation Administration, Office

of Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800

Independence Avenue SW.,

Washington, DC 20591, or by calling

(202) 267–9680. Communications must

identify the amendment or docket

number of this final rule.

Persons interested in being placed on

a mailing list for future rulemaking

documents should request from the

above office a copy of Advisory Circular

No. 11–2A, ‘‘Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking Distribution System,’’

which describes the application

procedure.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of

1996, requires the FAA to comply with

small entity requests for information or

advice about compliance with statutes

and regulations within our jurisdiction.

Therefore, any small entity that has a

question regarding this document may

contact their local FAA official Internet

users can find additional information on

SBREFA on the FAA’s web page at

http://faa.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa/htm and

may send electronic inquires to the

following Internet address: 9–AWA–

SBREFA@faa.gov.

Background

On December 22, 1998, the FAA

issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(NPRM) 97–16, which was published in

the Federal Register on January 2, 1998

(98 FR 126). That NPRM proposed to

prohibit the operation of certain

transport category airplanes (operated

under 14 CFR parts 91, 121, 125, and

129) beyond a specified time, unless the

operator of the airplane incorporated

FAA-approved ‘‘repair assessment

guidelines’’ into its approved

maintenance inspection program. The

FAA provided a period of 90 days for

the public to submit input on the

proposed rule. On April 3, 1998 (63 FR

16452), the FAA reopened the period for

public comment for an additional 90

days. (A discussion of the comments

received in response to the NPRM

appears below.)

The repair assessment guidelines,

which are to be approved by the FAA

for each airplane model affected by this

rule, contain:

• A methodology for assessing the types of

repairs expected to be found in the fuselage

pressure boundary (fuselage skins, bulkhead

webs, and door skin), and

• Methods to determine the damagetolerance characteristics of the surveyed

repairs.

Each of the guidelines contains

repetitive repair inspection intervals

that are based on residual strength,

crack growth, and inspectability

evaluations, and are closely compatible

with typical operator maintenance

practices (i.e., C-checks, D-Checks, etc.).

In addition to this final rule, the FAA

has developed an associated advisory

circular (AC), ‘‘Repair Assessment of

pressurized Fuselages.’’ The AC

provides guidance for operators of the

affected transport category airplanes on

how to incorporate FAA-approved

repair assessment guidelines into their

FAA-approved maintenanced or

inspection program as a means to

comply with this final rule. Availability

of the AC will be announced in Federal

Register in the near future.

Issues Prompting This Rulemaking

Activity

In April 1988, a high-cycle transport

airplane enroute from Hilo to Honolulu,

Hawaii, suffered major structural

damage to its pressurized fuselage

during flight. This accident was

attributed in part to the age of the

airplane involved. The economic benefit

of operating certain older technology

airplanes has resulted in the operation

of many such airplanes beyond their

previously projected retirement age.

Because of the problems revealed by the

accident in Hawaii and the continued

operation of older airplanes, both the

FAA and industry generally agreed that

increased attention needed to be

focused on the aging fleet and on

maintaining its continued operational

safety.

In June 1988, the FAA sponsored a

conference on aging airplanes. As a

result of that conference, the FAA

established a task force in August 1988

as a sub-group of the FAA’s Research,

Engineering, the Development Advisory

Committee, representing the interests of

the aircraft operators, aircraft

manufacturers, regulatory authorities,

and other aviation representatives. The

task force, then known as the

Airworthiness Assurance Task Force

(AATF), set forth five major elements of

a program for each airplane model in

the aging transport fleet that would

serve to keep the aging fleet safe:

• Select service bulletins describing

modificaitons and inspections necessary to

maintain structural integrity;

• Develop inspection and prevention

programs to address corrosion;

• Develop generic structural maintenance

program guidelines for aging airplanes;

• Review and update the Supplemental

Structural Inspection Documents (SSID)

which describe inspection programs to detect

fatigue cracking, and

• Assess damage-tolerance of structural

repairs.

By Federal Register notice, dated

November 30, 1992 (57 FR 56627), the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24109

AATF was placed under the auspices of

the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory

Committee (ARAC) and renamed as the

Airworthiness Assurance Working

Group (AAWG). Structures Task

Groups, sponsored by the AAWG, were

assigned the task of developing the five

elements into workable programs. The

AAWG completed work on the first four

of the elements lists above at the time

Notice 97–16 was issued. Issuance of

this final rule completes the fifth

element.

This final rule addresses the specific

task assigned to the AAWG relevant to

the fifth element, which was to develop

recommendations concerning whether

new or revised requirements and

compliance methods for structural

repair assessments of existing repairs

should be initiated and mandated for

the following airplanes.

• Airbus Model A300 (excluding the -600

series);

• British Aerospace Model BAC 1–11;

• Boeing Models 707/720, 727, 737, and

747;

• McDonnell Douglas Models DC–8, DC–9/

MD–80, and DC–10;

• Fokker Model F–28;and

• Lockheed Model L–1011.

Related Regulatory Activity

In addition to these initiatives, there

are other on-going activities associated

with FAA’s Aging Aircraft Program.

The Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1991

(Public Law 49 U.S.C. 44717) instructed

the FAA Administrator to prescribe

regulations that will ensure the

continuing airworthiness of aging

aircraft through inspections and reviews

of the maintenance record of each

aircraft an air carrier uses in air

transportation. In response, the FAA

published Notice 93–14 (58 FR 51944,

October 5, 1993)). Among other things,

that notice proposed to require

operators to.

• Certify aging airplane maintenance

actions;

• Establish a framework for imposing

operational limits on certain airplanes; and

• Perform additional maintenance actions,

such as inspections or parts replacements, in

order to continue operating the airplane.

The FAA subsequently withdraw

Notice 94–14, and issued a new Notice

99–02 (64 FR 16298, April 2, 1999). The

new notice proposes to require that all

airplanes operating under parts 121,

129, and 135 undergo records reviews

and inspection after their 14th year in

service to ensure that the maintenance

of these airplanes’ age-sensitive parts

and components has been adequate and

timely. The proposed new rule also

would prohibit operation of these

airplanes after specified deadlines,

unless damage-tolerance-based

inspections and procedures are

included in their maintenance or

inspection program. The period or

public comment on the proposal ended

on August 2, 1999, and the FAA

anticipates regulatory action in the near

future.

In addition, the FAA has found that

some operators do not have a

programmatic approach to corrosion

prevention and control programs

(CPCP). In its accident investigation

report (NTSB/AAR–89/03) on the

Hawaii accident, the NTSB

recommended that the FAA mandate a

comprehensive and systematic CPCP.

Therefore, the FAA is considering

rulemaking to mandate CPCP’s for all

airplanes used in air transportation. As

part of that deliberation, the FAA is

considering the CPCP’s recommended

by the AATF and previously mandated

by the FAA through airworthiness

directives (AD); all of the airplanes

affected by this proposal currently are

subject to those AD’s.

The Concern Posed by Older Repairs

The basic structure of the large jet

transports that are affected by this final

rule was required at the time of original

certification to meet the applicable

regulatory standards for fatigue or failsafe strength. Repairs and modifications

to this structure also were required to

meet these same standards. The early

fatigue or fail-safe requirements,

however, did not provide for timely

inspection of critical structure so that

damaged or failed components could be

dependably identified and repaired or

replaced before a hazardous condition

developed.

By amendment 25–45 (43 FR 46242,

October 5, 1978), the FAA amended

§ 25.571 (‘‘Damage-tolerance and fatigue

evaluation of structure’’) by introducing

a new certification requirement called

‘‘damaged-tolerance’’ to assure the

continued structural integrity of

transport category airplanes certificated

after that time. Additionally, for existing

designs, guidance material based on that

amendment was published in 1981 as

Advisory Circular (AC 91–56),

‘‘Supplemental Structural Inspection

Program for Large Transport Category

Airplanes.’’

Damage-tolerance is a structural

design and inspection methodology

used to maintain safety, considering the

possibility of metal fatigue or other

structural damage (i.e., safety is

maintained by adequate structural

inspection until the damage is repaired).

The underlying principle for damagetolerance is that the initiation and

growth of structural fatigue damage can

be anticipated with sufficient precision

to allow inspection programs to safely

detect damage before it reaches a critical

size. A damage-tolerance evaluation

entails.

• The prediction of sites where fatigue

cracks are most likely to initiate in the

airplane structure;

• The prediction of the crack growth under

repeated airplane structural loading;

• The prediction of the size of the damage

at which strength limits are exceeded; and

• An analysis of the potential

opportunities for inspection of the damage as

it progress.

Information from the evaluation is

used to establish an inspection program

for structure, which, if rigorously

followed, will be able to detect cracking

that may develop before it precipitates

a major structural failure. The evidence

to date is that, when all critical structure

is included, the damage-tolerance

concept and the supplemental

inspection programs that are based on it

provide the best assurance of continued

structural integrity that currently is

available.

In order to apply the damage

tolerance concept to existing transport

airplanes, the FAA issued a series of

AD’s, beginning in 1984, that require

operators to comply with supplemental

structure inspection programs resulting

from the concept’s application to

existing airplanes. Nearly all of the

airplane models affected by this final

rule currently are subject to such AD’s.

Generally, those AD’s require that

operators incorporate Supplemental

Structural Inspection Documents (SSID)

into their maintenance programs for the

affected airplanes. These documents

were derived from damage-tolerance

assessments of the originally-certificate

type designs for these airplanes. For this

reason, the majority of AD’s written for

the SSID program did not attempt to

address issues relating to the damagetolerance of repairs that had been made

to the airplanes. The objective of this

final rule is to provide that same level

of assurance for areas of the structure

that have been repaired.

Repairs are a concern on older

airplanes because of the possibility that

they may develop, cause, or obscure

metal fatigue, corrosion, or other

damage during service. This damage

might occur within the repair itself or in

the adjacent structure, and might

ultimately lead to structural failure. The

damage-tolerance evaluation of a repair

would be used in an assessment

program to establish an appropriate

inspection program, or a replacement

schedule if the necessary inspection

program is too demanding or not

possible. The objective of the repair

24110 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

assessment is to assure the continued

structural integrity of the repaired and

adjacent structure based on damagetolerance principles.

In general, repairs present a more

challenging problem to solve than the

original structure because each repair is

unique and tailored in design to correct

particular damage to the original

structure. Whereas the performance of

the original structure may be predicted

from tests and from experience on other

airplanes in service, the behavior of a

repair and its effect on the fatigue

characteristics of the original structure

are generally not known to the same

extent as for the basic unrepaired

structure.

The available service record and

surveys of out-of-service and in-service

airplanes have indicated that existing

repairs generally perform well.

Although the cause of an airplane

accident has never been attributed to

properly applied repairs using the

original repair data, repairs may be of

concern as time-in-service increases for

the following reasons:

1. As airplane age, both the number

and age of the existing repairs increase.

Along with this increase is the

possibility of unforeseen repair

interaction, autogenous failure, or other

damage occurring in the repaired area.

The continued operational safety of

these airplanes depends primarily on a

satisfactory maintenance program

(inspections conducted at the right time,

in the right place, using the most

appropriate technique). To develop this

program, a damage-tolerance evaluation

of repairs to flight critical structure is

essential. The longer an airplane is in

service, the more important this

evaluation and a subsequent inspection

program become.

2. The practice of damage-tolerance

methodology has evolved gradually over

the last 20 or more years. Some repair

described in the airplane manufacturers’

Structural Repair Manuals (SRM) were

not designed to current standards.

Repairs accomplished in accordance

with the information contained in the

early versions of the SRM’s may require

additional inspections if evaluated

using the current methodology.

3. Because a regulatory requirement

for damage-tolerance was not applied to

airplane designs type certificated before

1978, the damage-tolerance

characteristics of repairs may vary

widely and are largely unknown.

Development of ‘‘Repair Assessment

Guidelines’’

To address the ARAC assignment

relative to repairs, the AAWG tasked the

manufacturers to develop ‘‘repair

assessment guidelines (RAG)’’ requiring

specific maintenance programs to

maintain the damage-tolerance integrity

of the basic airframe. The following

criteria were developed to assist the

manufacturers in the development of

the guidance material:

• Repairs that do not conform to SRM

standards must be reviewed and may require

further action.

• Repairs must be reviewed where the

repair has been installed in accordance with

SRM data that have been superseded or

rendered inactive by new damage-tolerant

designs.

• Repairs that are in close proximity to

other repairs or modifications require review

to determine their impact on the continued

airworthiness of the airplane.

• Repairs that exhibit structural distress

should be replaced before flight.

To identify the scope of the overall

program, fleet data were required. This

resulted in the development of a fivestep program to develop factual data for

the development of the rule. The fivestep AAWG program consisted of:

Step 1. Development of model

specific RAG’s using AAWG repair

criteria.

Step 2. Completion of a survey of a

number of operators’ airplanes to assess

fuselage skin repairs and to validate the

approach of the manufacturer’s RAG.

Step 3. Determination of the need for

and the development of a worldwide

survey.

Step 4. Collection and assessment of

results to determine further necessary

actions.

Step 5. Development of specific

manufacturer/operator/FAA actions.

Early in the development of this task,

each manufacturer began to prepare

model-specific RAG’s. When

sufficiently developed, these draft

guidelines were shared with the

operators to get feedback on

acceptability and suggestions for

improvement. The operators stressed

the need for commonality in approach

and ease of use of the guidelines. They

also expressed the need for guidelines

that could be used on the shop floor

without engineering assistance and

without extensive training.

Meanwhile, the AAWG conducted

two separate surveys of existing repairs

on airplanes to collect necessary data.

The first survey was conducted in

March 1992 on certain large transport

category airplanes being held in storage.

Teams comprised of engineering

representatives from various

organizations, including FAA’s Aircraft

Certification and Flight Standards

offices, operators, and manufacturers,

surveyed 356 external fuselage skin

repairs on 30 airplanes of 6 types. Using

repair classification criteria developed

by the individual airplane

manufacturers, the teams concluded

that the general quality of the repairs

appeared good. Forty percent of the

repairs were adequate, requiring no

supplemental inspections, and sixty

percent needed a more comprehensive

damage-tolerance based assessment,

with the possibility that supplemental

inspections might be needed. Some

determining factors on the need for

further assessment were the size of the

repair and its proximity to other repairs.

While the survey sample size was very

small compared to the total population

of transport airplanes type certificated

prior to 1978, it provided objective

information on the quality and damagetolerance characteristics of existing

airplane repairs.

In 1994, the AAWG requested that the

manufacturers conduct a second survey

on airplane repairs to validate the 1992

results and to provide additional

information relative to the estimated

cost of the assessment program. The

manufacturers were requested to visit

airplanes that were operating their

products and to conduct surveys on

airplanes that were currently

undergoing heavy maintenance. An

additional 35 airplanes were surveyed

in which 695 repairs were evaluated.

This survey was expanded to include all

areas of the airframe. The evaluation

revealed substantially similar results to

the 1992 results: forty percent of the

repairs were classified as adequate, and

sixty percent of the repairs required

consideration for additional

supplemental inspection during service.

In addition, only a small number of

repairs (less than 10 percent) were

found on portions of the airframe other

than the external fuselage skin.

The AAWG proposed that the repair

assessment be initially limited to the

fuselage pressure boundary; if

necessary, future rulemaking would

address the remaining primary

structure. This limitation was based on

two considerations:

First, the fuselage is more sensitive to

structural fatigue than other airplane

structure because its normal operating

loads are closer to its limit design loads.

Stresses in a fuselage are primarily

governed by the pressure relief valve

settings of the environmental control

system, and these are less variable from

flight to flight than the gust or maneuver

loads that typically determine the

design stresses in other structure.

Second, the fuselage is more prone to

damage from ground service equipment

than other structure and requires repair

more often. The result of the second

survey described above supports the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24111

conclusion that repairs to the fuselage

are far more frequent than to any other

structure.

Determining Which Airplanes Should

Be Affected

This final rule and the repair

assessment guidelines apply to 11 large

transport category airplane models. (In

the original ARAC task, the Boeing

Models 707 and 720 were counted as

one model. This final rule addresses the

707 and 720 models separately due to

their different flight cycle

implementation times.) The reason for

this limitation is that the original

tasking to the ARAC limited the scope

of the work to the 11 oldest models of

large transport category airplanes then

in regular service. This tasking

identified those airplanes for which the

great concern exists as to the status of

primary structure repairs. Derivatives of

the original airplane models are covered

to the extent that the structure has not

been upgraded to meet damagetolerance requirements.

Those transport category airplanes

that have been certificated to regulatory

standards that include the requirements

for damage-tolerance structure under

§ 25.571 are not included in this

rulemaking action. These later

requirements make it incumbent on the

operating certificate holder to return the

structure to the original certification

basis by installing only those repair that

meet the airplane’s damage-tolerance

certification basis. The AAWG, in its

final report on this subject, did

recommend continued monitoring of

repairs on the newer airplanes, with the

possibility of additional rulemaking if

conditions warrant. (A copy of the

AAWG’s final report is included in the

public docket for this rulemaking).

It was from this activity that the

AAWG and manufacturers recognized

not only the need for a RAG document

for each affected model, but a SRM

updated to include the results of a

damage-tolerance assessment.

Considerations in Developing and

Mandating Repair Assessment

Guidelines

In considering the establishment of

RAG’s, the AAWG recognized that the

guidelines would add to existing repair

approval data and, in some cases, may

even appear to be in conflict with that

data. All repairs assessed under the

requirements of this final rule should

have been previously approved by the

FAA using an FAA using an FAAapproved SRM, an FAA-approved

Service Bulletin, or a repair scheme

approved by either an FAA Designated

Engineering Representative or an SFAR

36 authorization holder. To avoid the

appearance of conflicts between FAA

approved data sources, the

manufacturers have agreed to update the

affected SRM’s, as well as repairs

identified in Service Bulletins, to

determine requirements for

supplemental inspections, if not already

addressed.

Another consideration was that

structural modifications and repairs

mandated by AD’s do not always

contain instructions for future

supplemental inspection requirements.

The manufacturers have agreed to

evaluate the need for post modification

inspections for these mandated

modifications and repairs. A list of

Service Bulletins that are the subject of

AD’s will be contained in the modelspecific RAG documents, with required

post-modification/repair inspection

programs, as appropriate. A list of other

structural Service Bulletins will be

provided in the model-specific RAG

document, with associated inspection

thresholds and repeat intervals. The

manufacturers have agreed to complete

their review of Service Bulletins related

to skin repairs in conjunction with the

initial SRM updates.

These agreements notwithstanding,

there is still a possibility that the

requirements in the RAG document will

not agree with those in an AD,

especially if the AD was written to

address a modification to the airplane

made by someone other than the

original manufacturer. Federal Aviation

Regulations require that compliance be

shown with both the AD and this final

rule. Such dual compliance can be

avoided in the longer term by working

with the manufacturer, if that is the

source of difficulty, or by securing an

Alternative Method of Compliance

(AMOC) to the AD. In the short term,

compliance with the earlier threshold,

shorter repeat inspection interval or

more stringent rework/replace schedule

would always constitute compliance

with the less stringent requirement.

Thus, the operator would not be faced

with an unresolvable conflict.

Another consideration, and one that

the AATF originally recommended, was

that the use of RAG’s be mandated by

an AD. The FAA concluded that an

unsafe condition necessitating AD

action had not been established for

repairs, and this position is supported

by both repair surveys. However, the

FAA also considered, and the AAWG

agreed, that the long term concern with

repairs on older airplanes, as described

earlier, does warrant regulatory action,

and this final rule addresses that

concern.

The AAWG also recognized that the

concerns discussed above for the safety

of existing repairs also would apply to

the long-term safety of future repairs to

these airplanes. Therefore, the AAWG

considered that new repairs also should

be subject to damage-tolerance

assessments. It is expected that most

new repairs will be installed in

accordance with an FAA-approved SRM

that has been updated to include this

damage-tolerance assessment. However,

in the event that a new repair is

installed for which no such assessment

has been made or is available, the repair

assessment guidelines prepared to meet

the requirements of this final rule

should be used. The intent of this final

rule is that all repairs to the fuselage

pressure boundary will be evaluated for

damage-tolerance, and that any resulting

inspection schedule will be specified

and the work accomplished, regardless

of when, where, or by whom the repair

was installed.

Development of Repair Assessment

Methodology

The next step in the AAGW’s program

for this task was to develop a repair

assessment methodology that is effective

in evaluating the continued

airworthiness of existing repairs for the

fuselage pressure boundary on affected

transport category airplane models.

Older airplane models may have many

structural repairs, so the efficiency of

the assessment procedure is an

important consideration. In the past,

evaluation of repairs for damagetolerance would require direct

assistance from the manufacturer. The

size of an assessment task conducted in

that way would be unmanageable

considering that:

• Each repair design is different,

• Each airplane model is different,

• Each area of the airplane is subjected to

a different loading environemnt, and

• The number of engineers qualified to

perform a damage-tolerance assessment is

small.

Therefore, a new approach was

developed.

Since repair assessment results will

depend on the model-specific structure

and loading environment, the

manufacturers were tasked to create an

assessment methodology for the types of

repairs expected to be found on each

affected airplane model. Since the

records on most of these repairs are not

readily available, locating the repairs

necessitates surveying the structure of

each airplane. A survey form was

created that may be used to record key

repair design features needed to

accomplish a repair assessment. Airline

24112 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

personnel not trained as damagetolerance specialists can use the form to

document the configuration of each

observed repair.

Using the information gathered during

the survey as input data, the

manufacturers have developed

simplified methods to determine the

damage-tolerance characteristics of the

surveyed repairs. Although the repair

assessments should be performed by

well-trained personnel familiar with the

model specific repair assessment

guidelines, these methods enable an

engineer or technician, not trained as a

damage-tolerance specialist, to perform

the repair assessment without the

assistance of the manufacturer.

From the information gathered during

the survey, it is also possible to classify

repairs into one of three categories:

Category A: A permanent repair for

which the baseline zonal inspection

(BZI), (typical maintenance inspection

intervals assumed to be performed by

most operators), is adequate to ensure

continued airworthiness (inspectability)

equal to the unrepaired surrounding

structure.

Category B: A permanent repair that

requires supplemental inspections to

ensure continued airworthiness.

Category C: A temporary repair that

will need to be reworked or replaced

prior to an established time limit.

Supplemental inspections may be

necessary to ensure continued

airworthiness prior to this limit.

The airplane manufacturers generated

this methodology and are preparing

model-specific repair assessment

guidelines for the 11 aging airplane

models affected by this final rule. The

manufacturers chose to produce the

model-specific repair assessment

guidelines for the older models first,

and to produce those for the newer

models as those airplanes get closer in

age to the implementation time.

(Operators should be in contact with the

manufacturers to obtain a schedule of

when the repair assessment guidelines

will be prepared for their specific

airplane models.) Uniformity and

similarity of these repair assessment

procedures between models has been an

important factor to consider in

simplifying operator workload. The

manufacturers have spent considerable

time over the last several years to

achieve commonality of the repair

assessment process.

The inspection intervals contained in

the FAA-approved model specific RAG

documents are based on residual

strength, crack growth, and

inspectability evaluations. The

manufacturers have endeavored to make

the inspection methods and intervals

compatible with typical operator

maintenance practice. Thus, internal

inspections would be acceptable at

flight cycle limits that are equivalent to

D-check intervals, while simpler

external inspections could be

accommodated at flight cycle limits that

are generally equivalent to C-check

intervals. If the inspection method and

intervals for a given repair are not

compatible with the operator’s

maintenance schedule, the repair could

be replaced with a more damagetolerant repair.

These guidelines can also be used for

evaluating the damage-tolerance

characteristics of new repair for

continued airworthiness.

Related Activity Affecting Structural

Repair Manuals

In order to further facilitate the

assessment process, the manufacturers

have agreed to update model-specific

SRM’s to reflect damage-tolerance repair

considerations. Their goal is to complete

these updates by the first revision cycle

of the model-specific SRM after the

release of the associated RAG document.

Consistent with the results of the

surveys, only fuselage pressure

boundary repairs are under

consideration.

The general section of each SRM,

Chapter 51, will contain brief

descriptions of damage-tolerance

considerations, categories of repairs,

description of baseline zonal

inspections, and the repair assessment

logic diagram. Chapter 53 of the SRM

for pressurized fuselage skin will be

updated to identify repair categories and

related information.

In updating each SRM, existing

location-specific repairs should be

labeled with appropriate repair category

identification (A, B, or C), and specific

inspection requirements for B and C

repairs also should be provided, as

applicable.

Structural Repair Manual descriptions

of generic repairs also will contain

repair category considerations regarding

size, zone, and proximity. Detailed

information for determination of

inspection requirements will be

provided in separate RAG documents

for each model. Repairs that were

installed in accordance with a oncecurrent SRM, but that have now been

superseded by a new damage-tolerant

design, will require review. Such

superseded repairs may be reclassified

to Category A, B, or C. Category B or C

repairs would require additional

inspections and/or rework.

Repair Assessment Process

There are two principal techniques

that can be used to accomplish the

repair assessment. The first technique

involves a three-stage procedure. This

technique could be well-suited for

operators of small fleets. The second

technique involves the incorporation of

the RAG as part of an operator’s routine

maintenance program. This approach

could be well-suited for operators of

large fleets and would evaluate repairs

at predetermined planned maintenance

visits as part of the maintenance

program.

Manufacturers and operators also may

develop other techniques, which would

be acceptable as long as they fulfill the

objectives of this rule and are FAA

approved.

The first technique generally involves

the execution of the following three

stages:

• Stage 1. Data Collection. This stage

specifies what structure should be

assessed for repairs and collects data for

further analysis. If a repair is on a

structure in an area of concern, the

analysis continues; otherwise, the repair

does not require classification per this

program. Repair assessment guidelines

for each model will provide a list of

structure for which repair assessments

are required. Some manufacturers have

reduced this list by determining the

inspection requirements for critical

details. If the requirements are equal to

normal maintenance checks (e.g., BZI

checks), those details were excluded

from this list. Repair details are

collected for further analysis in State 2.

Repairs that do not meet the static

strength requirements or are in a bad

condition are immediately identified,

and corrective actions must be taken

before further flight.

• Stage 2. Repair Categorization. The

repair categorization is accomplished by

using the data gathered in Stage 1 to

answer simple questions regarding

structural characteristics. If the

maintenance program is at least as

rigorous as the BZI identified in the

manufacturer’s model specific RAG,

well-designed repairs in good condition

meeting size and proximity

requirements are designed as Category

A. Simple condition and design criteria

questions are provided in Stage 2 to

define the lower bounds of Category B

and Category C repairs. The process

continues for Category B and C repairs.

• Stage 3. Determination of Structural

Maintenance Requirements. The

supplemental inspection and/or

replacement requirements for Category

B and C repairs are determined in this

stage. Inspection requirements for the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24113

repair are determined by calculation or

by using predetermined values provided

by the manufacturer, or other values

obtained using an FAA-approved

method. In evaluating the first

supplemental inspection, Stage 3

defines the inspection threshold in

flight cycles measured from the time of

repair installation. If the time of

installation of the repair is unknown

and the airplane has exceeded the

assessment implementation times or has

exceeded the time for first inspection,

the first inspection should occur by the

next C-check interval, or equivalent

cycle limit after the repair data is

gathered (Stage 1).

An operator may choose to

accomplish all three stages at once, or

just Stage 1. In the latter case, the

operator would be required to adhere to

the schedule specified in the FAAapproved model-specific RAG for

completion of Stages 2 and 3.

Incorporating the maintenance

requirements for Category B and C

repairs into an operator’s individual

airplane maintenance or inspection

program completes the repair

assessment process for the first

Technique.

The second technique involves setting

up a repair maintenance program to

evaluate all fuselage pressure boundary

repairs at each predetermined

maintenance visit to confirm that they

are permanent. This technique requires

the operator to choose an inspection

method and interval in accordance with

the FAA-approved RAG. The repairs

whose inspection requirements are

fulfilled by the chosen inspection

method and interval would be inspected

in accordance with the regular FAAapproved maintenance program. Any

repair that is not permanent, or whose

inspection requirements are not fulfilled

by the chosen inspection method and

interval, would either be: (1) Upgraded

to allow utilization of the chosen

inspection method and interval, or (2)

individually tracked to account for the

repair’s unique inspection method and

interval requirements. This process is

then repeated at the chosen inspection

interval.

Repairs added between the

predetermined maintenance visits,

including interim repairs installed at

remote locations, would be required

either to have a threshold greater than

the length of the predetermined

maintenance visit or to be tracked

individually to account for the repair’s

unique inspection method and interval

requirements. This would ensure the

airworthiness of the structure until the

next predetermined maintenance visit,

at which time the repair would be

evaluated as part of the repair

maintenance program.

Whichever technique is used, there

may be some repairs that cannot easily

be upgraded to Category A due to cost,

downtime, or technical reasons. Such

repairs will require supplemental

inspections, and each operator should

make provisions for this when

incorporating the RAG into its

maintenance program.

Repair Assessment Implementation

Time

The implementation time for the

assessment of existing repairs is based

on the findings of the repair surveys and

fatigue damage considerations,

described previously. As discussed, the

repair survey findings indicated that all

of repairs reviewed appeared to be in

generally good structural condition.

This tended to validate the

manufacturer’s assumptions in

designing both the repair and the basic

structure. Since the manufacturer had

based the design stress levels on a

chosen Design Service Goal (DSG), it

was concluded that the repair

assessment needed to be implemented

sometime before a specific model

reached its DSG. Based on this logic, the

manufacturers and operators established

an upper boundary for an assessment to

be completed, and then reduced it to

establish an ‘‘implementation time,’’

defined as 75% of DSG in terms of flight

cycles.

Therefore, under this approach,

incorporation of the RAG into an

airplane’s maintenance or inspection

program ideally should be

accomplished before an airplane

accumulates 75% of its DSG. After the

guidelines are incorporated into the

maintenance or inspection program,

operators should begin the assessment

process for existing fuselage repairs

within the flight cycle limit specified in

the FAA-approved model-specific RAG.

There are three ‘‘deadlines’’ for

beginning the repair assessment process,

depending on the cycle age of the

airplane on the effective date of the rule.

1. Airplane cycle age equal to or less

than implementation time on the rule

effective date: The operator is required

to incorporate the guidelines into its

maintenance or inspection program by

the flight cycle implementation time, or

one year after the effective date of the

rule, whichever occurs later. The

assessment process begins (e.g.,

accomplishment of Stage 1) on or before

the flight cycle limit specified in the

RAG after incorporation of the

guidelines. (The flight cycle limits are

expressed in flight cycle numbers, but

are generally, equivalent to a D-check.)

2. Airplane cycle age greater than the

implementation time but less than the

DSG on the rule effective date: The

operator is required to incorporate the

guidelines into its maintenance or

inspection program within one year of

the rule effective date. The assessment

process then begins (e.g.,

accomplishment of Stage 1) on or before

the flight cycle limit specified in the

RAG (this flight cycle limit is generally

equivalent to a D-check), not to exceed

another specified flight cycle limit

(computed by adding the DSG to the

flight cycle limit equivalent of a Ccheck) after incorporation of the

guidelines.

3. Airplane cycle age greater than the

DSG on the rule effective date: The

operator is required to incorporate the

guidelines in its maintenance or

inspection program within one year

after the effective date of the rule. The

assessment process would begin (e.g.

accomplishment of Stage 1) on or before

the flight cycle limit specified in the

RAG (generally equivalent to a C-check)

after incorporation of the guidelines.

In each of these three cases, the

assessment process will have to be

completed, the inspections conducted,

and any necessary corrective action

taken, all in accordance with the

schedule specified in the FAA-approved

RAG document.

Discussion of the Final Rule

This final rule is intended to ensure

that a comprehensive assessment for

damage-tolerance be completed for

fuselage pressure boundary repairs, and

that the resulting inspections,

modifications, and corrective actions (if

any) be accomplished in accordance

with the model-specific RAG. To

comply with this, the operator will need

to consider the following:

Consideration 1

The means by which the FAAapproved RAG’s are incorporated into a

certificate holder’s FAA-approved

maintenance or inspection program is

subject to approval by the certificate

holder’s Principal Maintenance

Inspector (PMI) or other cognizant

airworthiness inspector.

Consideration 2

The FAA Aircraft Certification Office

(ACO) having cognizance over the type

certificate of the airplane must approve

the RAG.

Consideration 3

This final rule will not impose any

new reporting requirements; however,

normal reporting required under 14 CFR

121.703 will still apply.

24114 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Consideration 4

This final rule will not impose any

new FAA recordkeeping requirements.

However, as with all maintenance, the

current operating regulations (e.g., 14

CFR 121.380) already impose

recordkeeping requirements that will

apply to the actions required by this

final rule. When incorporating the RAG

into its approved maintenance program,

each operator should address the means

by which it will comply with these

recordkeeping requirements. That

means of compliance, along with the

remainder of the program, will be

subject to approval by the PMI or other

cognizant airworthiness inspector.

Consideration 5

The scope of the assessment is limited

to repairs on the fuselage pressure

boundary (which includes fuselage skin,

door skin, and pressure webs). A list of

Service Bulletins that are the subject of

AD’s will be contained in the modelspecific RAG with required post

modification/repair inspection

programs, as required. A list of other

structural Service Bulletins will be

provided in the model-specific RAG

with associated inspection threshold

and repeat intervals.

Consideration 6

The RAG’s provided by the

manufacturer do not generally apply to

structure modified by a Supplemental

Type Certificate (STC). However, the

operator will still be responsible to

provide RAG’s applicable to the entire

fuselage external pressure boundary that

meets the program objectives specified

in the advisory circular (AC) associated

with this final rule (which will be

available in the near future). This means

that the operator should develop,

submit, and gain FAA approval of

guidelines to evaluate repairs to such

structure.

The FAA recognizes that operators

usually do not have the resources to

determine a DSG or to develop RAG’s,

even for a very simple piece of

structure. The FAA expects the STC

holder to assist the operators in

preparing the required documents. If the

STC holder is out of business, or is

otherwise unable to provide assistance,

the operator will have to acquire the

FAA-approved guidelines

independently. To keep the airplanes in

service, it is always possible for

operators, individually or as a group, to

hire the necessary expertise to develop

and gain approval of RAG’s and the

associated DSG. Ultimately, the operator

remains responsible for the continued

safe operation of the airplane.

The cost and difficulty of developing

guidelines for modified structure may

be less than that for the basic airplane

structure for three reasons:

First, the only modifications made by

persons other than the manufacturer

that are of concern in complying with

this final rule are those that affect the

fuselage pressure boundary. Of those

that do affect this structure, many are

small enough to qualify as Category A

repairs under the RAG, based solely on

their size.

Second, if the modified structure is

identical or very similar to the

manufacturer’s original structure, then

only a cursory investigation may be

necessary. In such cases, the

manufacturer’s RAG may be shown to

be applicable with few, if any, changes.

If the operator determines that a repair

to modified structure can be evaluated

using the manufacturer’s model-specific

RAG, that determined should be

documented and submitted to the

operator’s PMI or other cognizant

airworthiness inspector for approval.

For all other repairs, a separate program

will need to be developed.

Third, the modification may have

been made so recently that no RAG will

be needed for many years. Compliance

with this final rule could be shown by:

• Establishing the DSG for the new

modified structure,

• Calculating an implementation time that

is equal to three quarters of that DSG, and

• Then adding a statement to the

operations specifications for part 121, 125

and 129 operators that the RAG will be

incorporated into the maintenance or

inspection program by that time. For part 91

operators, the inspection program will be

revised to include the RAG.

If the modified structure is very

similar to the original, then the DSG for

the modified structure may also be very

similar. No RAG would be needed until

75% of that goal is reached. For

example, in the case of a large cargo

door, such installations are often made

after the airplane has reached the end of

its useful life as a passenger-carrying

airplane. For new structure, the clock

would start on repair assessment at the

time of installation. Further, since the

DSG is measured in cycles, and cargo

operation usually entails fewer

operational cycles than passenger

operations, the due date for

incorporation of the RAG for that

structure could be many years away.

Compliance with this final rule

requires that conditions such as those

described above be properly

documented in each operator’s FAAapproved maintenance program;

however, the FAA considers that the

cost of doing so should not be

significant. There should be very few

examples where the STC holder is

unavailable, and the operators would

have to bear the cost of developing a

complete RAG document. Guidance on

how to comply with this aspect of the

rule is discussed in the soon-to-bereleased AC associated with this rule.

Consideration 7

An operator’s repair assessment

program will have to include damagetolerance assessments for new repairs.

Repairs made in accordance with the

revised version of the SRM would

already have a damage-tolerance

assessment performed; otherwise, the

manufacturer’s RAG could be used for

this purpose, or operators may develop

other methods as long as they achieve

the same objectives.

Consideration 8

Once the airworthiness inspector

having oversight responsibilities is

satisfied that the operator’s continued

airworthiness maintenance or

inspection program contains all of the

elements of the FAA-approved RAG, the

airworthiness inspector will approve a

maintenance program or inspection

program revision. This will have the

effect of requiring use of the approved

RAG.

In summary, based on discussions

with representatives of the affected

industry, recommendations from ARAC,

and a review of current rules and

regulations affecting repair of primary

structure, the FAA recognizes the need

for a repairs assessment program to be

incorporated into the maintenance

program for certain transport category

airplanes. This final rule accomplishes

that.

Discussion of Comments

The FAA received 16 comments in

response to Notice 97–16. Comments

included airplane manufacturers,

airplane operators, non-U.S. aviation

authorities, and aviation industry

representatives and groups. The

disposition of all comments, grouped by

subject, follows.

Support for the Proposal

Several commenters support the

proposed rule.

No Need for the Rule

One commenter contends that the

proposed rule is largely redundant and

may not even be needed. The

commenter points out that, in 1978,

with amendment 25–45, the FAA

amendment § 25.571 to impose damagetolerance criteria for design of aircraft

structure. Airplanes certified after that

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24115

date have damage-tolerance criteria

built in to the manufacturers’ repair

philosophies. Airplanes older than that

are regulated by FAA-approved

Supplemental Inspection Documents.

The commenter also points out that,

in 1989 (ref. memorandum from

Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, ‘‘Policy Regarding Impact of

Modification and Repairs on the

Damage-tolerance Characteristics of

Transport Category Airplanes,’’ dated

November 27, 1989), the FAA clarified

that ‘‘* * * All transport category

airplanes having the damage-tolerance

requirements of § 25.571, amendment

25–45, as their certification basis and

those with mandated Supplemental

Inspection Documents [SID]

* * * must continue to maintain their

damage-tolerance characteristics when

repaired or modified in any way.’’

Industry has adhered to this rendering

since that time.

Thus, through the certification rule

for new airplanes and through the SID

programs for older airplanes, the

damage-tolerance assessment of repairs

is already being done. For this reason,

commenter does not see a need for the

proposed rule and implies that it should

be withdrawn.

The FAA acknowledges the

commenters’ observations, but does not

occur that the rule is unnecessary. As

discussed in the preamble to the notice

(and this final rule), the airplanes

certified after amendment 25–45 must

be maintained in accordance with their

certification basis and, therefore, a

damage-tolerance analysis of all repairs

is required. The 1989 memorandum was

issued by the FAA to clarify that

operators with airplanes subject to the

mandated SID programs should

continue to maintain the damagetolerance capabilities of the airplanes

when repaired or modified in any way.

However, all operators of the airplanes

covered by SSID’s have not routinely

followed this policy. This fact was made

clear by the adoption of Airworthiness

Directive (AD) 98–11–03 (Amdt. 39–

10530; 63 FR 27455, May 19, 1998) and

AD 98–11–04 (Amdt. 39–10531; 63 FR

27456, May 19, 1988) which revised the

SSID programs for the Model 727 and

737, respectively. In response to the

NPRM’s for those AD’s, numerous

commenters (including the ATA)

objected to proposed requirements that

repairs be assessed. In part, these

objections were based on the argument

that operators did not have the records

to identify, or the methods to assess

existing repairs. The FAA, as well as the

AAWG, in developing the repair

assessment program, concluded that it is

necessary to assess the repairs on all of

the affected 11 models of (aging) aircraft

to ensure that the original intent of the

SID programs (and related AD’s

mandating them) is being followed.

Manufacturers’ Commitments to

Providing Documents

Two commenters suggest that

adoption of the rule and

implementation of the repair assessment

program be delayed until the RAG

documents, revised SRM’s, and service

bulletins are available from the

manufacturers to affected operators.

One of these commenters states that

the FAA should not rely on verbal

commitments from the manufacturers to

issue these documents sometime in the

future. The commenter further states

that commitments cannot be depended

on, especially where manufacturers are

operating with greatly reduced staffs

and resources (i.e., due to takeovers).

The commenter suggests that, if

manufacturers are unable to supply

these documents in a timely manner,

operators may find themselves in

situations where they are not in

compliance with this rule.

The other commenter points out that

the manufacturer has not provided any

information regarding the SRM update

schedule for the affected airplanes in

this commenter’s fleet. The commenter

states that, being unable to review the

SRM beforehand, raises concerns about

possible conflicts between the modelspecific RAG document and the

corresponding SRM. If the FAA does not

delay implementation of the rule, this

commenter requests that an appropriate

‘‘grace period’’ be provided after the

SRM’s are completely updated so that

operators will have time to incorporate

the new changes.

The FAA acknowledges these

commenters’ concerns, but does not

agree that a delay is necessary. This

final rule is written such that it neither

requires the type certificate (TC) holder

to develop the guidelines, nor depends

on this issuance of any documents from

the TC holder to be enforceable. As

stated in the preamble to the notice and

this final rule, the operator is

responsible for providing the RAG

applicable to the fuselage external

pressure boundary of the airplanes in its

fleet. If the TC holder does not or cannot

provide relevant service information,

the operator may develop, submit, and

gain approval of its own guidelines to

evaluate repairs to such structure.The

information contained in the soon-to-bereleased accompanying AC describes

one method that may be used by any

entity—operator, TC holder, or

otherwise—to develop such guidelines.

Additionally, it is always possible for

operators, individually or as a group, to

hire the necessary expertise to develop

and gain approval of RAG’s. Ultimately,

however, the operator remains

responsible for the continued safe

operation of its airplanes.

Further, the FAA also does not concur

with the commenter’s request that

implementation of the repair assessment

program be postponed, or a grace period

provided, until SRM’s are updated to

correspond with the RAG documents.

The purpose of the two documents is

different: the purpose of the RAG

document is to assist in evaluating

existing repairs; the purpose of the

updated SRM is, as is usual, to assist in

the installation of new repairs.

Operators affected by this new rule will

be required to show how new repairs

installed after the effective date of the

final rule will be handled. The methods

described in the soon-to-be-released AC

associated with this rule also may be

used for this purpose.

The FAA has been advised, however,

that as of the date of publication of this

rule, the manufacturers have finalized

the RAG’s applicable to the older

airplane models affected by this rule.

The guidelines for the newer models are

nearly complete and certainly will be

finalized by the time the newer models

will require the initial inspections.

Further, the FAA also has been

advised that the manufacturers (1) have

completed updating the pertinent parts

of their Structural Repair Manuals and

(2) are ready to provide necessary

training programs.

Airplanes Subject to the Final Rule

Airbus Models Subject to Rule. One

commenter requests that the listing of

affected models of Airbus airplanes in

the proposed rule be revised as follows:

• Change references to the Airbus A300 to:

‘‘Airbus A300 (excluding the –600 series);

and

• Clarify paragraph (a)(3) of the proposed

§ 91.410, § 121.370, § 125.248; and § 129.32

to include references to the Airbus Model

C4–200 and F4–200 models.

The FAA concurs with the

commenter’s first request to exclude the

Airbus A300–600 series from the

applicability of the rule, and has revised

the text of the final rule accordingly.

The FAA finds it is appropriate to

exclude the Airbus A300–600 series

from the applicability of this rule

because this model been certified to

regulatory standards that include the

requirements for damage-tolerant

structure under § 25.571, as amended by

amendment 25–45. As explained earlier,

such airplanes are not included in this

rulemaking action. An Airworthiness

Limitations Section has been approved

24116 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

for the Airbus A300–600 series

airplanes, and it is considered a

damage-tolerant airplane. Based on the

Airbus airplanes currently certificated

in the U.S., the following airplanes in

the Model A300–600 series would be

excluded from compliance with this

rule:

• A300 Model B4–600 series,

• A300 Model B4–600R series, and

• A300 Model F4–600R series.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s second request to add

references to Airbus A300 Model C4–

200 and A300 Model F4–200 model

airplanes to the applicability of the rule.

The C4–200 and F4–200 model

airplanes currently are not certified in

the U.S. and, therefore, cannot be made

part of the rule’s applicability.

In light of this commenter’s requests,

the FAA finds that additional

clarification is appropriate as to specify

exactly which Airbus A300 airplanes

are subject to the requirements of this

rule.

In § 91.410, § 121.270, § 125.248, and

§ 129.32, the FAA delineates the Airbus

A300 ‘‘Model B2’’ as a separate model,

whose implementation threshold is

36,000 flights, Based on the airplanes

currently certified in the U.S. specified

in Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS)

A35EU, the ‘‘A300 Model B2’’

designation referred to in the rule

includes:

• Model B2–1A,

• Model B2–1C,

• Model B2K–3C, and

• Model B2–203.

If any new ‘‘Model B2’’ airplanes are

certified in the U.S. in the future, those

airplanes would be required to follow

he implementation time of 36,000

flights above the window line and

36,000 flights below the window line, as

outlined in the rule.

Readers also note that, in § 91.410,

§ 121.370, § 125.248, and § 129.32, the

FAA delineates the Airbus A300

‘‘Model B4–100 (including Model B4–

2C)’’ as a separate model whose

implementation threshold is 30,000

flights above the window line and

36,000 flights below the window line.

Based on the airplanes currently

certificated in the U.S. specified in

TCDS A35EU, this model designation

referred to in the rule includes:

• Model B4–103 and

• Model B4–2C.

If any new ‘‘Model B4–100’’ airplanes

are certificated in the U.S. in the future,

those airplanes would be required to

follow the implementation time of

30,000 flights above the window line

and 36,000 flights below the window

line, as outlined in the rule.

Further, in § 91.410, § 121.370,

§ 125.248, and § 129.32 and FAA,

delineates the Airbus A300 ‘‘Model B4–

200.’’ as a separate model whose

implementation threshold is 25,000

flights above the window line and

34,000 flights below the window line.

Based on the airplanes currently

cerfificated in the U.S. specified in

TCDS A35EU, this model designation

referred to in the rule is the Model B4–

203.

If any new ‘‘Model B–200’’ airplanes

are certificated in the U.S. in the future,

those airplanes would be required to

follow the implementation time of

25,500 flights above the window line

and 34,000 flights below the window

line, as outlined in the rule.

Fokker Models Subject to Rule. One

commenter states that the AAWG

recommended that only the Fokker F28

Mark 1000 through 4000 airplanes were

to be affected by this action. The

commenter requests that proposed

paragraph (1) of the affected regulations

be revised to specify this. The proposal

includes reference to the Mark 1000C

and 3000C models, which is incorrect.

The FAA concurs. The Mark 1000C

and 3000C were inadvertently added to

the applicability of the proposed rule.

References to those models have been

deleted from the final rule.

Boeing Models Subject to Rule.

Another commenter requests

clarification as to whether the Boeing

Model 737–300 is affected by the

proposed rule. The commenter notes

that the Boeing 737 Repair Assessment

Guidelines appear to address only the

–100 and –200 models, whereas the

proposed rule appears to include the

–300.

The FAA points out that the Boeing

737–300 is included in the applicability

of the rule, as are all models of the

Boeing 737. The manufacturers usually

produce documents for the older

airplanes first before they produce

documents for the newer model

airplanes Boeing has advised the FAA

that it will produce RAG’s for all the

models of the Boeing 737. Boeing is

expected to produce the documents

based on how soon the fleet leaders for

a specific model will reach the

mandated implementation time. The

operators should maintain close contact

with the manufacturers to obtain a

schedule of when the model-specific

RAG’s will be produced.

General Applicability of the Rule.

Another commenter notes that the

proposed rule did not mention the

‘‘later design’’ airplanes, that is,

airplanes that are certified to § 25.571,

amendment 25–45, or later. The

commenter requests clarification as to

whether these airplanes would be

affected by the proposed rule.

The FAA concurs with the

commenter’s observation that the

proposal did not mention the term

‘‘later design [airplanes].’’ The FAA

infers that the commenter uses this term

to refer to airplanes certificated after the

time that amendment 25–45 became

effective. As explained previously,

damage-tolerance requirements were

introduced into the airplane design in

post-amendment 25–45 airplanes, and

the certificate holder is required by the

amendment to return repaired airplane

structure to the original certification

basis by installing only those repairs

that meet the airplane’s damagetolerance certification basis. In light of

the fact that damage-tolerance is

‘‘designed into’’ the post-amendment

25–45 airplanes, the FAA considers it

unnecessary to include those airplanes

in this rule. This final rule, therefore,

applies to those airplanes whose

certification basis was approved before

amendment 25–45 became effective, and

were not designed with requirements for

damage-tolerant structure. [The FAA

points out, however, that the AAWG did

recommend continued monitoring of

repairs on the newer (‘‘later design’’)

airplanes, and additional rulemaking if

conditions warrant.]

Areas of Inspection

One commenter requests that the FAA

clarify the proposed rule to indicate that

the area of inspection termed the

‘‘fuselage pressure boundary’’ includes

not only the fuselage skin and bulkhead

web, but the door skin as well.

The FAA concurs. The intent of the

repair assessment is to include the

entire fuselage pressure boundary,

which does include, among other

things, the fuselage, bulkhead webs, and

the door skin. (The preamble to the

proposal, in fact, did refer to assessment

of modified structure relevant to large

cargo doors.) The rule has been revised

for clarity as suggested by the

commenter.

Effective Date of the Rule

One commenter requests that the

effective date of the final rule be

changed to at least one year after each

of the model-specific RAG documents is

officially approved and published. The

commenter further requests that an

additional grace period be added to

allow operators the time for preparation

work before starting a new complicated

program like the repair assessment

program and time to train their

personnel. The commenter states that

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24117

none of the model-specific RAG’s

developed by manufacturers have been

officially approved yet by the FAA, and

it is difficult for the operators to review

and prepare for implementing the

program without the actual guideline

materials in hand. To justify this

request, the commenter points out that

the FAA previously provided similar

extended compliance times for

incorporating other complex programs

such as the CPCP and the SSID

programs.

The FAA does not concur that a

revision to the effective date of the final

rule is appropriate. As it is written, the

rule does allow a ‘‘grace period’’ of one

year after the effective date for operators

to implement the program. (This is

similar to the provisions of the CPCP

and SSID programs.) The FAA also

points out that operators and airlines

have had the opportunity to work with

the manufacturers in the development

of the guidelines over the past 6 years.

The FAA already has reviewed the RAG

documents for 9 of the 11 models

affected by the rule and has found that

they would satisfy the intent of the rule,

the FAA will approve these RAG

documents when the rule becomes

effective. However, even if these

documents are not approved, the rule

places the onus on the operators to have

guidelines and a program in place. The

airframe manufacturers are providing

the RAG documents as a ‘‘service’’ to

their customers. However, if the

manufacturer does not have a RAG

document available, the operator would

still be required to develop repair

assessment guidelines. Therefore, trying

the compliance time of the rule in any

way with the date of publication of the

manufacturers’ documents is

immaterial.

Another commenter requests that the

proposed implementation time be

increased from 1 year to 18 months to

allow manufacturers adequate time ‘‘to

respond to the new rule.’’ The

commenter is concerned that the

proposed rule will be implemented

sooner than the manufacturers can

support the operators with inspection

thresholds and repeat inspection

intervals for multiple repair

configurations, Service Bulletin repairs,

and SRM repairs.

The FAA does not concur that

additional calendar time for

implementation is appropriate. The

FAA has reached this conclusion for

several reasons:

First, the original notice of this

rulemaking provided a 3-month period

for public comments. The FAA later

reopened the comment period for an

additional 3 months to allow the

manufacturers time to distribute copies

of the RAG’s and allow the operators

time to review those documents and

provide comments.

Second, industry has been aware of

the need to assess the damage-tolerance

of repairs since at least 1978, when

amendment 25–45 was issued to impose

damage-tolerance criteria for design of

aircraft structure. Airplanes certificated

after 1978 have damage-tolerance

criteria built in to the manufacturers’

repair philosophies. Airplanes

certificated before that date are

regulated by FAA-approved

Supplemental Inspection Documents.

The FAA then clarified for the industry

in 1989 that all transport category

airplanes having the damage-tolerance

requirements of § 25.571, amendment

25–45, as their certification basis (i.e.,

post-1978 certificated airplanes) and

those with mandated Supplemental

Inspection Document programs ( i.e.,

pre-1978 certificated airplanes) must

continue to maintain their damagetolerance characteristics when repaired

or modified in any way. Industry has

been aware of this policy since that

time. Thus, the damage-tolerance

assessment of repairs is already being

done; it is not a new concept. The

RAG’s have been under development for

many years and, during that

development, the manufacturers of the

affected airplanes have consulted with

operators.

Similarly, another commenter

requests that additional time be

provided before implementation of the

assessment program so that regulated

aviation community can review,

understand, comment on, and assimilate

the RAG documents. The commenter

claims that ‘‘FAA’s aggressive schedule

on the instant rulemaking has resulted

in placing a lot of pressure on the

airframe manufacturers to publish the

RAG documents as soon as possible.’’

The commenter asserts that, because of

this, the documents are of poor quality,

with obvious gaps and numerous

inconsistencies between them. The

commenter maintains that there is a

‘‘compelling need’’ to have these

documents reviewed for completion and

for inconsistencies within and among

them prior to starting the clock for

compliance.

The FAA does not concur. Numerous

operators have participated in the

development of this rule, and have

worked closely with the manufacturers

in the development of the RAG’s.

During various working group meetings,

the FAA raised the issue of

inconsistencies between documents;

however, the operators represented at

the meetings did not raise any concerns

about this. The FAA does not agree that

granting more time before implementing

this rule will result in the timely

resolution of inconsistencies; as long as

the repair assessment guidelines meet

the intent of the rule, the guidelines are

not required to be identical.

Implementation Times

One commenter requests clarification

concerning the implementation times of

the repair assessment for new repairs.

The commenter questions what

implementation period would apply for

new repairs, assuming that an airplane

already has surpassed the flight cycle

implementation time specified for that

model, and assuming that the operator

has already assessed every applicable

repair under the proposed rule.

The FAA clarifies this issue by noting

that the operator is required to

incorporate an FAA-approved repair

assessment program into its

maintenance or inspection program, and

that this program must include a

provision for addressing new repairs. As

stated in the final rule, for airplanes that

have already exceeded the specified

implementation time, the maintenance

program must be revised to incorporate

the repair assessment program within a

year after the effective date of this final

rule. Once the program is revised,

operators are required to comply with it

thereafter, under normal maintenance

rules. Therefore, there is no separate

‘‘implementation time’’ for new repairs.

Another commenter requests

clarification on the definitions of

various phases of the repair assessment

program described in the Boeing Model

727 RAG document, D6–56167. Since

this commenter’s questions are not

specifically relevant to this final

rulemaking action, they are not

included in this preamble. However, the

FAA has responded directly to the

commenter and a copy of the detailed

response is contained in the docket.

Determination of Inspection Intervals

One commenter questions why the

proposed rule holds airplanes with

mechanical fuselage joints to the same

inspection intervals as those whose

fuselage joints are assembled with

adhesives. The commenter implies that

the inspection intervals should be

different for each type of these

airplanes.

The FAA does not concur. The final

rule does not specify any explicit

interval for repetitive inspections. Those

intervals will be developed based on

what is determined to be appropriate for

the particular design features of the

airplane. These intervals will be

specified in the model-specific RAG

24118 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

documents and will be subject to

approval by the cognizant FAA Aircraft

Certification Office. The only aspect that

all airplanes will be held to is that the

inspection intervals must ensure that

damage is detected and corrected before

failure of a structural repair could occur.

Another commenter requests that the

FAA issue a determination in advance

stating that the results of SID

inspections could serve as an alternative

means of compliance with the proposed

rule. The commenter asserts that it is

unclear how to address an apparent

conflict where damage-tolerance

analysis done under a SID program,

which is mandated by an AD, might

render a different inspection schedule

from the guidelines in the RAG

document.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s request. The FAA

understands that the commenter’s

concern arises from a scenario such as

the following:

• A repair to a principal structural element

(PSE) has been accomplished previously.

• The operator has an inspection schedule,

as part of its SID program, for the repaired

PSE based on damage-tolerance analyses.

• While assessing the repair of a PSE in

accordance with the new RAG document, the

operator finds that the inspection schedule

under the RAG is more conservative than the

SID (i.e., shorter inspection intervals, more

frequent inspections).

The FAA does not consider it either

necessary or appropriate to issue ‘‘an

advance determination’’ that SID

inspection results could serve as an

alternative method of compliance to the

rule for, in fact, they may not. As stated

in the preamble to the notice and this

final rule, there is the potential that

there will be some situations where

requirements of the RAG do not agree

with those of an AD (especially if the

AD were written to address a

modification to the airplane made by

someone other that the original

manufacturer). In those cases, the

Federal Aviation Regulations would

require that compliance be shown with

both the AD and this rule. Such a ‘‘dual

compliance’’ situation can be avoided in

the long term by working with the

manufacturer, if that is the source of

difficulty, or by securing approval of an

alternative method of compliance with

the AD. In the short term, however,

accomplishment of the earlier threshold,

the shorter repeat inspection interval, or

the more stringent rework/replacement

schedule would always constitute

compliance with the less stringent

requirement. Thus, the operator would

not be faced with an unresolvable

conflict.

Escalation of Inspection Intervals

One commenter, an airframe

manufacturer, requests that the

proposed rule be revised to allow a ‘‘less

restrictive policy’’ with regard to

escalating the repetitive inspection

intervals required by the program. This

commenter notes that, in approving the

RAG documents developed for affected

airplanes, the FAA stated that it would

approve provisions allowing for

escalation of repeat inspection intervals

for an individual airplane, but on the

condition that each escalation is first

approved by the FAA airworthiness

inspector on a case-by-case basis. In

approving these documents, the FAA

indicated that it would not allow (1) any

escalation of the inspection threshold or

(2) a generally applicable escalation of

repetitive inspection intervals.

The commenter maintains that the

requirement of gaining prior approval

by the FAA airworthiness inspector on

a case-by-case basis is more restrictive

than similar requirements currently

required by other FAA-approved

programs, such as the SSID and the

CPCP. The SSID program, for example,

allows the repeat inspection interval for

individual airplanes to be increased by

up to 10% of the normal interval.

Additionally, the CPCP program allows

the repeat inspection interval to be

increased by up to 10% (but not to

exceed 6 months) in order to

accommodate unanticipated scheduling

requirements; the operator needs only to

notify the cognizant FAA Principal

Inspector (PI) in writing of any

extension made. This commenter

suggests that the approach taken by

these programs appears to be a more

reasonable method of addressing the

escalation of inspection intervals, and

asserts that the inspection intervals

found in the RAG’s all could be

increased by 10% and still provide

adequate inspections to maintain safety.

The commenter requests that the

proposed rule be revised to allow the

same escalation policy provided in for

the SSID and CPCP programs be applied

to the repair assessment program.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s request. This position is

based on experience that the FAA has

gained over the years in trying to

administer the SSID and CPCP

programs. In trying to allow for some

flexibility in those programs to

accommodate scheduling and other

situations, the FAA has found that some

affected operators are very confused

about the process for escalating the

repeat inspection intervals; the FAA

also has found that some affected

operators abuse the process. The

operators themselves pointed this out in

the numerous meetings that were held

during the development of the repair

assessment program. In September 1997,

the Manager of the Transport Airplane

Directorate issued a memorandum to all

cognizant ACO’s providing guidance for

development of the RAG’s. That

memorandum addressed areas of

concern regarding inspection intervals

and established two policies:

• Inspection thresholds shall be fixed and

there should be no provisions for escalation

of them; and

• Repeat intervals can be escalated up to

either 10% or a specific time interval

specified by the manufacturer, whichever is

less. Escalation must be approved by the

airworthiness inspector on a case-by-case

basis to accommodate one-time scheduling

conflicts.

One of the purposes of the

memorandum was to ensure

standardization of the application of the

program across FAA offices. Further,

because many operators have various

airplane models and multiple TC

holders are involved, there was a great

desire on the part of the operators to

have the repair assessment program

standardized as much as possible and be

less confusing. As stated previously,

operators have been involved in many

meetings with the FAA and TC holders

as the RAG’s were being developed;

therefore, they are aware of the policy

regarding escalation and have indicated

their agreement with that policy.

New Repairs

One commenter’s understanding of

the proposed rule is that it would allow

the use of the RAG document as a tool

to evaluate new repairs. The commenter

does not believe, however, that this is in

line with the intent of the repair

assessment program, which is to serve

as a ‘‘catch-up’’ process to ‘‘remedy’’ old

repairs and not as a design tool for new

repairs. If it is possible to use the RAG

to assess new repairs, the commenter

foresees a situation where it could be

possible to install repairs with a bad

damage-tolerance capability and,

through the RAG document, to

demonstrate that the repair is still

‘‘safe’’ during a certain period. The

commenter maintains that, if the

proposed rule were to be revised to

require that the general guidelines for

designing repairs—as defined in the

SRM—are followed for the new repair

installed, then the situation described

will certainly not occur. The commenter

requests that the proposed rule state that

the damage-tolerance assessment of a

‘‘new repair’’ will have to be done

through the current recommendations

found in the relevant part of the SRM,

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24119

or the repair assessment will have to be

done by a design office (TC holder or

other) and approved by the FAA

following current procedures.

This commenter justifies this request

by stating that all the repairs installed

on the pressurized shell boundary will

have to be assessed for their damagetolerance characteristics. The

commenter states that, in order to avoid

design and installation of ‘‘Category C’’

repairs (temporary repairs that will need

to be reworked or replaced prior to an

established time limit), operators will

need to use the repair instructions and

methods described in the updated SRM

guidelines. The commenter maintains

that this will compel the manufacturer

to update its SRM and not to rely only

on the RAG document to fulfill its

obligations to the operators under this

final rule. If the SRM is used in lieu of

the RAG, the approach will be

preventive instead of curative and this

will, in a certain manner, increase the

level of safety.

The FAA recognizes the commenter’s

point, but does not concur that a

revision to the rule is necessary.

Existing regulations [e.g., 14 CFR

43.13(b)] already require that all repairs

restore the airplane to at least its

original or properly altered condition,

and those requirements are not affected

by this final rule. As discussed

previously, this rule simply ensures that

the durability of repairs is assessed, and

that necessary inspections and rework

are accomplished in a timely manner.

The TC holders have been devoting

resources to update their SRM’s, but this

process has not proceeded as quickly as

hoped; therefore, as an interim measure,

the operators can use the RAG

document to evaluate their repairs. The

FAA considers that use of the RAG

document to evaluate temporary repairs

will not compromise the repair

assessment program required by this

final rule.

Classification of Major/Minor Repairs

One commenter questions whether

any levels of rework or repairs resulting

from the inspections that would be

required under the proposed rule would

be classified as ‘‘major repairs.’’ The

commenter suggests that this item be

clarified.

The FAA responds by noting that

there should be no change regarding the

classification of either ‘‘major’’ or

‘‘minor’’ repairs based on the

requirements of the new rule. Generally,

repairs to PSE’s meet the definition of

‘‘major’’ repairs.

Supplemental Type Certificate Holders

One commenter raises a concern

about Supplemental Type Certificate

(STC) holders and any commitment that

they would owe to operators in

developing the repair assessment

program. Under the proposed rule, an

STC holder could quite easily withhold

assistance and the operator would have

to acquire an FAA-approved RAG

independently. The commenter requests

that the rule be revised to require the TC

holder to assist the operator in assessing

whether a repair to an STC modification

can be evaluated through the use of the

manufacturer’s RAG, based on

similarity. The TC holder’s assistance

should be required to gain approval

from the operator’s Principal

Maintenance Inspector (PMI) or other

cognizant airworthiness inspector. If the

rule is not changed and the support of

the STC holder is not required,

significant additional costs could be

incurred by the operators.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s request that the TC holders

be required to assist the operators in

assessing repairs to STC modifications.

Under this rule—and operating rules in

general—the operator is ultimately

responsible for maintenance of its fleet.

As discussed in the NPRM, the operator

is required to establish a program to

assess repairs to modified structure, and

may be compelled to contract for the

necessary expertise to develop that

program.

Relationship of Rule to Operation

Specifications

One commenter states that, in a

number of places in the preamble to the

notice, the phrase, ‘‘an operator’s

operation specification or maintenance

program’’ is used correctly, while in

other places only the term ‘‘operation

specification’’ is used, which is

incorrect. Small operators can be

expected to have their maintenance

programs incorporated into Section D of

the airplane’s operation specifications.

However, large operators, especially

those permitted reliability-based

maintenance programs, have only a

chapter of their Maintenance Manual

listed in Section D of the operation

specifications. The commenter requests

that the proposed rule be revised to

clarify this.

The FAA concurs. The FAA has

removed the term ‘‘operation

specification’’ and replaced it with

‘‘maintenance program’’ in the

appropriate areas of the text of the final

rule.

Adjustment for Pressure Factor

One commenter expresses concern

that the 1.2 adjustment factor for the

Boeing 747SR touch and go allowance,

and the allowance for flights with less

than 2.0 PSI, were removed from the

Boeing 747 RAG document. The

commenter requests that the rule

specifically permit the use of these

pressure factor allowances in the RAG

document.

The FAA does not concur. The FAA

is concerned about tracking individual

airplanes and their usage in order to

comply with such an allowance. If the

operator submitted a plan on how the

airplanes would be tracked and how

this information would be transferred in

the event the transfer of such an aircraft,

the FAA would consider a proposal that

could be approved on a case-by-case

basis.

Recordkeeping

Several commenters raised concerns

about recordkeeping that could

necessarily accompany the

implementation of the requirements of

the proposed rule. In the preamble to

the notice, the FAA indicated that the

rule would not impose any new FAA

recordkeeping requirements, and that

the current operating regulations (e.g.,

14 CFR 121.380, ‘‘Maintenance

recording requirements’’) already

impose adequate recordkeeping

requirements that would apply to the

actions required by the rule. As

discussed below, certain commenters

contest that statement:

Transfer of Repair Data. One

commenter states that § 121.380 is not

an adequate regulation either to

mandate the transfer of repair data from

one owner to another, or to ensure the

transfer of inspection data resulting

from the new regulation. The

commenter points out that § 121.380

requires that data be retained for only

certain periods of time (usually one

year), not the lifetime of the airplane.

This poses a problem if operators are

required to be knowledgeable of all the

repairs previously performed on every

airplane in its fleet. The commenter

asserts that the proposed rule fails to

take into consideration that ‘‘over half of

the commercial airplanes in the U.S. are

leased and, therefore, subject to transfer

between two U.S. operators.’’ Those

involved in such transfers today are

well aware that the ability to obtain

repair data is dependent on the

individual recordkeeping standards of

the operators—how long or how well

the operator has kept the data.

Moreover, the current regulations do not

assist in the acquisition of such data.

24120 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

The commenter suggests that § 121.380

should be revised to require the

retention of records for the lifetime of

the aircraft or to exempt repair data

from the current ‘‘one-year destruction’’

rule.

The FAA acknowledges the

commenter’s observations, but does not

agree that there is a need either to

impose new recordkeeping

requirements in conjunction with this

rulemaking, or to revise § 121.380. In

every case, when an operator purchases

an aircraft, it is the operator’s

responsibility to ensure that the aircraft

complies with the operational

requirements prior to adding it to its

certificate. If pertinent data are not

available at the time of the purchase, it

normally is the operator’s responsibility

to go about obtaining the necessary

information. In the case of this final

rule, if the repair data are not available,

an operator may be required to perform

an assessment of the aircraft to establish

the damage-tolerance of the repairs to

the fuselage pressure boundary. The

operator could then retain records of

this assessment. Generally, the FAA

anticipates that availability of necessary

repair records will significantly enhance

the value of affected airplanes because

of the degree to which such records will

simplify airplane transfers. Therefore, it

is likely that, as a matter of commercial

practice, operators will retain those

records indefinitely.

Information Actually Retained. One

commenter states that, while most U.S.

operators agree that records covering

‘‘unsuperseded’’ routine maintenance

functions must be maintained, they do

not all agree that ‘‘non-routine functions

resulting from these inspections are

equally important.’’ In short, a record

that documents the performance of a

repair assessment inspection may be

kept, but any rework, repairs, etc.,

resulting from that inspection may not.

This is especially true in cases where

operators have totally automated their

record systems. The commenter suggests

that the proposed rule, in actuality, will

impose new recordkeeping

requirements since operators will have

to maintain repair data resulting from

inspections.

The FAA acknowledges the

commenter’s comments. However, the

FAA reiterates that, as stated previously,

there are no new recordkeeping

requirements mandated by this rule. As

in any case, operators are required to

maintain satisfactory evidence that they

are in compliance with the regulations;

this new rule requires nothing in

addition to this.

New Methods To Retain/Maintain

Repair Data

One commenter states that it has

developed an inexpensive software

program and has a ‘‘U.S. Patented

Process’’ to track new and old repairs

completed on aircraft by using digital

cameras. The commenter suggests that

this product would be an excellent way

of tracking aircraft repairs for the

proposed repair assessment program.

The FAA infers from this comment

that the commenter is suggesting the

rule be revised to require the use of such

software to maintain repair data. The

FAA understands that this software and

others like it currently are available on

the market. Operators could certainly

use these types of products to simplify

the retention of the necessary

information needed to demonstrate

compliance with this rule. However, no

change to the rule is necessary to

indicate this.

Enforceability of § 129.32

One commenter questions the

enforceability of the proposed § 129.32

on operators that are not subject to FAA

regulations, specifically non-U.S.

operators. The commenter states that,

for example, although maintenance

program provisions specified in part 129

may be issued by the FAA and provided

by the airplane lessor (in the U.S.) to an

international lessee, there is ‘‘no way to

enforce [the lessee’s] adherence’’ to the

requirements of that regulation. The

commenter asserts that ‘‘there are no

recordkeeping enforcement provisions

for part 129 operators’’ and, since ‘‘they

do not operate to 14 CFR, the proposed

rule would be meaningless to them.’’

The commenter fears that this could

result in the invalidation of the leased

airplane’s Standard Airworthiness

Certificate when it is returned to the

U.S.

The FAA does not concur. The rule

will be enforceable with regard to part

129 foreign air carriers operating U.S.-

registered aircraft into the U.S. As

discussed in the preamble to the notice,

the new repair assessment program

required by § 129.32 will be approved as

part of the foreign air carrier’s

operations specifications (the

maintenance programs will be

incorporated into or listed in Section D

of the operation specifications). In

accordance with § 129.11, part 129

foreign air carriers must conduct their

operations in accordance with the

operations specifications.

If foreign persons operating U.S.-

registered aircraft in common carriage or

foreign air carriers operating outside the

U.S. do not maintain the aircraft in

accordance with U.S. airworthiness

standards, or cannot present adequate

documentation of such maintenance,

then the airworthiness certificate will be

invalidated. A prudent aircraft owner

will insist, as a matter of contract, that

the repairs and maintenance are

adequately documented so that, when

the lease is terminated or the airplane

sold, the airplane can retain its

airworthiness certificate.

Impact on International Trade

One commenter raises three issues

concerning the International Trade

Impact Assessment that appeared in the

preamble to the notice, and the intended

effect of the proposed rule on the import

and export of airplanes:

First, the commenter questions

whether the International Trade Impact

Assessment took into account the fact

that other nations could emulate this

rulemaking action and establish their

own similar repair assessment

programs. Usually foreign operators

maintain considerably better records for

such things as repairs than do U.S.

operators and if the proposed rule does

not require ‘‘any new recordkeeping

requirements,’’ U.S. operators may be

hard-pressed to provide adequate data

to support the other country’s repair

assessment program. The commenter

implies that this may be a hindrance to

the export of airplanes to those

countries.

Second, the commenter asks that, if

an imported airplane has never been

inspected under a repair assessment

program, (1) would its baseline

inspection suffice, or (2) does the FAA/

AAWG assume that the airplane’s next

U.S. part 121 operator would be

responsible for bringing it up to the

standards of the proposed rule prior to

operation? The commenter notes that

there is no FAA checklist of items that

require action prior to issuance of a

Standard Airworthiness Certificate, but

an airplane being imported must meet

the requirements of parts 21, 43, and 91

to obtain a Standard Airworthiness

Certificate. The commenter states that

the proposed change to § 91.410 would

establish deadlines that would preclude

the issuance of the certificate prior to an

airplane being added to a part 121

operator’s fleet.

Third, the commenter considers that

the AAWG did not possess the

necessary expertise that would come

from experience in the transfer of

airplanes, to reach the conclusion that

the proposed rule would not affect the

import or export of airplanes to or from

the U.S. The commenter implies that the

International Trade Impact Assessment

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24121

statement that appeared in the preamble

to the notice is incorrect.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter. The information provided

in the International Trade Impact

Assessment states only that the

proposed rule would not constitute a

‘‘barrier to international trade, including

the export of American airplanes to

foreign countries and the import of

foreign airplanes into the United

States.’’ Despite the condition that an

airplane is in when imported to the

U.S., a part 121 operator will still be

responsible for ensuring compliance

with the repair assessment

requirements—as well as with every

other applicable regulation—prior to

putting the airplane into operation.

While this may entail additional work

on the part of the operator, it does not

constitute a ‘‘barrier to international

trade.’’ In fact, it is general practice for

the importing operator to ensure the

airplane is compliance with all

applicable regulations of the importing

country.

Regarding the effect on exports, as

indicated previously, the FAA

anticipates that, as a commercial

practice, operators will retain repair

assessment records to facilitate future

transfers. Assuming that foreign civil

aviation authorities adopt requirements

similar to this final rule, these records

would also be sufficient to meet those

requirements.

As for the qualifications of the

AAWG, the FAA points out that the

AAWG is comprised of representatives

from the aviation industry both in the

U.S. and foreign countries; this includes

manfuacturers, airlines, leasing

companies, industry associations,

unions, and non-U.S. civil aviation

authorities. These representatives are

some of the most experienced

individuals in aviation worldwide who

possess far-reaching expertise in

numerous relevant areas. Their

qualifications are incomparable and, as

demonstrated in their work at part of

AAWG, their knowledge and

capabilities are considerable.

Proposed Regulatory Evaluation

One commenter states that the

proposal grossly underestimates the cost

impact it will have on operators. The

commenter states that one operator, who

manages a fleet of about 10 percent of

the affected U.S. fleet, has assessed the

potential impact of the proposed

program on its staffing requirements as

follows:

• If only 12 repairs per airplane require

assessment under the program, the total

number of repairs for a fleet of 356 airplanes

will be 4,272.

• Approximately 4 engineering hours (at

$55 per hour) would be required for each

initial assessment. Based on this figure, the

total number of work hours could be as many

as 17,088, costing over $900,000.

• If half the number of repairs would

require evaluation beyond the scope of

existing manufacturers’ documents,

engineering support would be twice the level

of the ordinary initial assessment and, thus,

an additional cost of $900,000 could be

expected.

• Repetitive inspections resulting from the

program will add another $2.3 million in

costs and over 10,000 hours of out-of-service

time.

The total estimated cost for this single

operator is at least $4.1 million, and the

loss of service of three airplanes out of

the fleet for the remainder of their

operational lives. If the airlines elects to

replace the lost capacity, additional

costs on the order of $300 million will

be incurred. While one carrier may elect

not to replace lost capacity and allow

the lost traffic to go to competitors, the

industry as a whole cannot take this

strategy. If all operators opted not to add

capacity, load factors would have to

grow. At over 70%, load factors are

already at an all-time high, and

production is at its limits. As a result,

there would be a severe degradation in

service to the public, as more travelers

would be forced into second and third

choices involving indirect routing and

higher fares. The implied total U.S. cost

would then be at least $40 million, and

potentially as much as $3 billion more

to replace lost capacity.

The commenter avers that cost

analysis indicated by FAA fails to

recognize that the extensive repair

analyses and additional repetitive

inspections on airplanes will force

many airplanes to be pulled out of

normal rotations to complete the

required work; the resulting out-ofservice time will wreak havoc on airline

schedules. The commenter points out

that the potential impact on system

capacity has not been addressed by the

FAA and should be adequately treated

prior to adopting the proposed rule.

Moreover, the commenter states that the

FAA does not address the potential

redundancy of the requirements with

regard to existing Supplemental

Structural Inspection Program and

airworthiness directives that also result

in damage-tolerance evaluation of

structural repairs. The commenter

requests that the FAA initiate and

complete a more formal cost-benefit

evaluation of the proposed action, and

make it available to the public for

review and comment, prior to taking

final action.

The FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s conclusions concerning

the economic impact of this rule, or the

need to provide additional time for

public comment on the cost-benefit

evaluation. A summary of the final

economic evaluation appears in the

Regulatory Evaluation Summary section

of this document. The summary

provides details of the FAA’s final

determination as to the economic

impact and cost-benefit of this final

rule. The full final economic evaluation

can be found in the public docket. The

FAA’s response to specific points

brought up by the commenter in its

arguments is as follows.

The commenter used the figure of 4

engineering hours as the number of

hours necessary to carry out each initial

assessment. According to the

commenter, this figure was based on

one operator’s estimate. The FAA used

a figure of 1 engineering hour for an

initial assessment; this figure was based

on estimates provided by members of

the AAWG group associated with this

rule, who had arrived at the figure from

the input from several operators and

others in pertinent aviation fields. The

FAA considers the 1 hour figure more

feasible due to the fact it represents data

obtained from a wider range of entities

affected by this rule.

The commenter estimated that

repetitive inspections would add

another $2.3 million in costs and over

10,000 hours of out-of-service time. The

FAA does not consider those figures to

be appropriate. With regard to the $2.3

million, the commenter made no

mention of using discounted values;

therefore, the FAA assumes that the $2.3

million figure is represented in current

values/prices. However, the inspections

are to take place in the future—and they

would need to be discounted to present

values. This would substantially reduce

their magnitude in present value.

With regard to the 10,000 hours of

out-of-service time, the commenter

made no mention of accomplishing the

inspections required by the rule during

a regularly-scheduled C- or D-check.

The use of the C- and D-check. The use

of the C- and D-checks to carry out

inspections would significantly reduce

or effectively eliminate the out-ofservice time.

In its proposed economic evaluation,

the FAA carried out cost estimates for

operators by using 1 hour for the

accomplishment of the initial

assessments, and 2 hours for carrying

out supplemental inspections. The

assessments and inspections also were

assumed to take place during C- or Dchecks. The cost estimates thus derived

were subsequently discounted to

present day values—since the

assessments and inspections would not

24122 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

take place today but at some years in the

future.

The commenter considers the rule to

be largely redundant and not needed

because the current certification

regulations for new airplanes, and the

Supplemental Structural Inspection

Programs (SSIP) for older airplanes,

already accomplish the intent of a

damage-tolerance assessment of repairs

that would be required by the rule. The

FAA does not concur with the

commenter’s assumption and has

explained, in both the preamble to the

notice as well as this preamble, the

reasons why this rule is essential. To

reiterate: The Supplemental Structural

Inspection Programs for existing

airplanes, including nearly all of the

airplane models affected by this new

rule, were mandated by Airworthiness

Directives (AD) beginning in 1984. The

majority of those AD’s did not attempt

to address issues relating to the damage

tolerance of repairs that had been made

to the airplanes; therefore, one of the

objectives of this new rule is to provide

that same level of assurance for areas of

the structure that have been repaired.

The practice of damage-tolerance

methodology has evolved gradually over

the last 20-plus years. Because a

regulatory requirement for damagetolerance was not applied to airplane

designs type certificated before 1978,

the damage-tolerance characteristics of

repairs that currently exist on airplanes

may vary widely and are largely

unknown. Further, some repair designs

contained in the airplane

manufacturers’ Structural Repair

Manuals (SRM) were not designed to

current standards, and repairs

accomplished in accordance with those

SRM’s may require additional

inspections if evaluated using current

methodologies. This new rule will

ensure that those inspections are

accomplishments and that repairs are

brought up to standards, if necessary.

Terminology Changes in Final Rule

The FAA has revised certain

terminology that appeared in the

proposed introductory text of § 91.410

and § 125.248.The provisions of those

sections, as they appeared in the

proposal, included the phrase ‘‘No

certificate holder may operate * * *’’

However, in this final rule, that phrase

has been replaced with ‘‘No person may

operate * * *’’ in order to conform with

the terminology used throughout parts

91 and 125.

Additionally, the FAA has replaced

this same terminology in the next of

§ 129.32 with ‘‘No foreign air carrier or

foreign persons a U.S.-registered

airplane may operate * * *’’ This

change has been made in order to

correctly reflect the operators who are

affected by this section of the

regulations.

The FAA also has revised certain

other wording in the introductory text of

§§ 121.370, 125.248, and 129.32. The

proposed text in each of those sections

stated that none of the affected airplanes

could be operated beyond the specified

time(s) ‘‘* * * unless its operation

specifications have been revised to

reference repair assessment guidelines

* * *’’ This text in the final rule has

been revised to state ‘‘* * * unless

operations specifications have been

issued to reference repair assessment

guidelines * * *’’ This change is

necessary to corrently reflect the

interface of this rule with the operations

specifications process.

Additionally, in the proposal, the

introductory text for each of the

proposed regulations indicated that

approval of the repair assessment

guidelines could be granted only by the

FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)

having cognizance over the type

certificate for the affected airplane. The

FAA has revised this text in the final

rule to indicate that there are FAA

offices other than ACO’s that have

cognizance over type certificates and,

therefore, those office may approve the

repair assessment guidelines.

Paperwork Reduction Act

In accordance with the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995 [44 U.S.C.

3507(d)], the FAA has determined that

there are no requirements for

information collection associated with

this final rule.

International Compatibility

In keeping with U.S. obligations

under the Convention on International

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to

comply with International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards

and Recommended Practices to the

maximum extent practicable. The FAA

determined that there are no ICAO

Standards and Recommended Practices

that correspond to these regulations.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

Changes to Federal regulations must

undergo several economic analyses.

First, Executive Order 12866 directs that

each Federal agency shall propose or

adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned

determination that the benefits of the

intended regulation justify its costs.

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act

of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the

economic impact of regulatory changes

on small entities. Third, the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) directs

agencies to assess the effect of

regulatory changes on international

trade. And fourth, the Unfunded

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a

written assessment of the costs, benefits,

and other effects of proposed or final

rules that include a Federal mandate

likely to result in the expenditure by

State, local, or tribal governments, in the

aggregate, or by private sector, or $100

million or more annually (adjusted for

inflation).

In conducting these analyzes, the

FAA has determined that this rule is not

‘‘a significant regulatory action’’ as

defined under section 3(f) of Executive

Order 12866 and, therefore is not

subject to review by the Office of

Management and Budget. The rule is not

considered significant under the

regulatory policies and procedures of

the Department of Transportation (44 FR

11034, February 26, 1979). This rule

will not have a significant impact on a

substantial number of small entities and

will not constitute a barrier to

international trade.

These analyses, available in the

docket, are summarized below.

Costs to Manufacturers

This section presents the FAA’s

estimate of costs to the four

manufacturers of the airplane models

affected by the rule. The FAA has

conservatively included estimates of

costs to non-U.S. manufacturers (i.e.,

Airbus Industrie, British Aerospace, and

Fokker Aircraft B.V.), although only

those costs to U.S. manufacturers are

required to be estimated. Manufacturers

will incur one-time, ‘‘set-up’’ costs to:

1. Revise their SRM and to develop

RAG’s to reflect damage-tolerant repair

considerations:

2. Publish the revised SRM and the

RAG’s; and

3. Train their engineers, personnel of

the operator, and the FAA to conduct

repair assessments.

Manufacturers also will incur

continuing program maintenance costs

of:

• Maintenance of records for the program,

• Additional training and subsequent

revisions to the SRM, and

• Assessments of unusual repairs that are

not described in the published guidelines.

The total one-time, set-up costs are

estimated to be $10.8 million in the year

2000. Total annual, recurring costs for

the years 2001 through 2022 are

estimated to be $28.7 million, or about

$1.3 million per year. The total nondiscounted costs of the rule to affected

manufacturers are estimated to be $39.5

million over the years 2000 through

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24123

2022, or $25.2 million discounted to

present value at 7 percent.

The estimates are based on an

effective date of 2000. The FAA assumes

that the manufacturers’ costs of setting

up their repair assessment programs

would be incurred in the year 2000, and

that annual costs would be incurred

each year beginning in 2001 through

2022. The setting-up costs include the

cost of revising Structural Repair

Manuals and developing repair

assessment guidelines for some models,

the cost of publishing these documents,

and the cost of training. Costs are

expressed in constant dollars.

Costs to Operators

Operators will incur costs to

• Train inspectors,

• Integrate the repair assessment program

into the maintenance program for each

affected model,

• Conduct repair assessments and

supplemental inspections, and

• Maintain records of assessments and

inspections.

Because repair assessments and

supplemental inspections are assumed

to be conducted during regularly

scheduled C- and D-checks, the FAA

has not attributed any downtime costs.

The FAA estimates that it takes between

25 and 30 people, working three shifts

per day, 10 to 14 days to conduct a Ccheck. The FAA also estimates that it

takes between 30 and 40 people,

working three shifts per day, three to

seven weeks to conduct a D-check. The

relatively brief time to conduct a repair

assessment or a supplemental

inspection check could be incorporated

into a C- or D-check without additional

loss of service.

• Fleet Data and Noise Restrictions:

The FAA used Airclaims fleet data to

estimate operators’ costs to conduct

repair assessments and inspections.

Airplane-specific cumulative and

current annual flight cycles and flight

hours for all U.S.-registered airplanes

affected by the program were used to

predict each airplane’s ‘‘threshold’’ date

(i.e., the date on which the proposed

flight cycle implementation time is

reached). The analysis includes affected

U.S.-registered airplanes that are

operated by foreign entities. The

threshold, or flight implementation

time, is 75 percent of the original

equipment manufacturer’s design

service goal. Information received from

several of the affected manufacturers

confirmed the accuracy of the database.

Noise restrictions on airplanes also

have an impact on the estimate of the

number or airplanes affected by the rule.

Because of noise restrictions, as of

January 1, 2000, Stage 1 and Stage 2

airplanes will not longer be allowed to

operate in the continental United States;

and the FAA assumes that U.S.

operators will either retire or sell to

foreign entities those models that are

exclusively State 1 or Stage 2 airplanes.

This relates to airplanes such as the

BAC 1–11 and Fokker F–28.

The database of airplanes used for this

analysis includes data that are effective

as of January 1, 1999. To carry out

calculations, the FAA assumed that

airplanes in that database that still had

Stage 2 hush kits would not be

equipped with Stage 3 hush kits by the

end of 1999. These airplanes were, thus,

not included in the calculations. The

FAA recognizes that an underestimate

of the number of airplanes with Stage 2

hush kits may thus occur; however, the

FAA believes that number to be small

and indeterminate. This estimate

includes both N-registered airplanes

operated by airlines as well as by nonairline entities, but does not include any

additional airplanes that might be

imported. It also does not include future

production (i.e. ‘‘new’’) airplanes that

may reach the threshold before 2022,

the estimate of which would be highly

tenuous and whose present value costs

will be low or zero.

• Repair Assessment and

Supplemental Inspection Costs: The

activities involved in the entire repair

assessment program can be classified

into three basic stages. The first stage

requires that a certificate holder (i.e., an

operator) incorporate a repair

assessment program into this

maintenance or inspection program by

the time that an airplane, for that

particular model, reaches its flight cycle

implementation time (e.g., the

threshold) or within one year from the

effective date of the rule—whichever

occurs later. The actual outcome

between these two possibilities is

affected by the actual number of flight

cycles in relationship to the design

service goal of the airplane at the

effective date of the rule.

The second stage involves repair

assessments. This work is to be

conducted, for individual airplanes,

within the D-check or C-check flight

cycle interval after the first stage. The Dcheck interval is used for airplanes

whose flight cycles will not have

exceeded their design service goal by

the effective date of the rule. The Ccheck interval is used for those

airplanes that will have exceeded their

design service goal by the effective date

of the rule. In this second stage, the

previous repairs to the fuselages of the

affected airplanes are assessed, by

operators’ maintenance personnel, to

check whether they meet the damagetolerance criteria. If they do, additional

work is not required. If they do not,

these repairs are to be repaired again

and brought up to the expected quality.

During the third stage, these repairs

are to be inspected at the C-check

interval of that particular airplane

model.

With regard to specific chronology,

given an expected effective date of the

rule of 2000 and the requirements in the

rule, the repair assessment will be

conducted at the next heavy

maintenance D-check after January 1,

2001, or after the threshold, whichever

occurs later. For those airplanes that

have exceeded the design service goal,

by the effective date of the rule. The

repair assessment will be conducted at

the next C-check after January 2001.

The AAWG estimated the number of

repairs for airplanes, in each affected

airplane model, that would require

assessment at the appropriate date, and

the number of those repairs that would

require supplemental inspections. The

AAWG also estimated that it would take

1 hour to assess a repair and 2 hours to

inspect a repair. For supplemental

inspections, the AAWG estimated that

1⁄2 of the repairs would require

inspections during every C-check, while

the other half would require inspections

during every fourth children-check.

Manufacturers and operators provided

information on the average number of

flight hours between C-checks and Dchecks, by affected model. The AAWG

estimated that affected airplanes would

continue to be operated for 10 years

beyond the dates of their repair

assessments.

The FAA has estimated operator

compliance costs for repair assessment

and supplemental inspections through

the year 2022 to the $17.4 million, or

$6.0 million discounted to present

value.

• Training Costs: Operators of

affected U.S.-registered airplanes will

incur costs in order to train their

maintenance personnel to assess and

inspect repairs. Moreover, it is expected

that, rather than train their own

maintenance personnel, operators with

only a few affected airplanes will likely

contract out assessments and

inspections with other operators whose

maintenance personnel have been

trained to conduct these activities.

The FAA assumes that training costs

for operators’ maintenance personnel

would be incurred in 2000. Moreover, in

order to account for turnover among

maintenance personnel trained for

repair assessment, the FAA estimates

that operators would incur annual

training costs, equal to 5 percent of the

2000 training costs, for each year from

24124 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

2001 through 2022. Operators’ costs for

training are described in more detail in

the full regulatory evaluation.

The FAA estimates that total training

costs over the years 2000 through 2022

will be $869,842, or $643,279

discounted to present value.

• Administrative Costs of the Repair

Assessment Program: The rule will

require each affected operator to

integrate a repair assessment program

into either its maintenance program (for

affected airplanes operated under part

121 or 129) or its inspection program

(for affected airplanes operated under

part 91 or 125) by the time the threshold

is reached or within one year from the

effective date of the proposed rule,

whichever is later. The repair

assessment program can include such

information as:

• The scope of the assessment;

• Relevant Airworthiness Directives (AD)

and Service Bulletins (SB);

• The means to identify, assess, and

inspect repairs; and

• Procedures to maintain records for each

airplane’s repair survey, assessments, and

supplemental inspections.

Costs to operators for program

administration are estimated to total

$0.7 million, or $0.3 million discounted

to present value.

Based on estimates of manufacturers,

operators, the AAWG, and the FAA,

over the years 2000 through 2022,

operators of airplanes affected by the

proposed rule are expected to incur total

costs of $19.0 million, or $6.9 million

discounted to present value. Repair

assessments and supplemental

inspection costs account for about 92

percent of total costs and 86 percent of

present value costs.

Costs to the FAA

The rule requires FAA approval of

repair assessment programs. Aircraft

Certification Offices (ACO) will review

repair assessment guidelines for airline

and non-airline operators. The FAA

Principal Maintenance Inspectors (PMI)

will review the maintenance programs

for their assigned airlines to ensure

implementation and compliance with

the repair assessment program. In

addition, PMI’s and other FAA

inspectors also will be trained to

conduct repair assessments and

supplemental inspections. It is

estimated that the total cost to the FAA

will be $548,353, or $344,695

discounted to present value.

Total Costs of the Rule

Total costs of the rule to

manufacturers, operators, and the FAA

are estimated to be $59.1 million over

the years 2000 through 2022, or $32.5

million in present value.

Benefits

Based on available data, no accidents

have been caused by the failure of

structural repairs to airplanes of the

models affected by the rule.

Nevertheless, these airplanes being

operated beyond their design service

objective and the FAA has determined

that the repair assessment program is

needed to maintain the continued

airworthiness of these aging airplanes.

The FAA is unable to determine the

number of accidents that would be

prevented by this rule. However, only

one serious accident needs to be

avoided in order to offset the total cost

of the rule. Based on International

Aircraft Price Guide [Summer 1994:

Airclaims Limited: London, England],

the FAA estimated that the weighted

average value of an affected airplane is

$10.8 million, in constant dollars. Using

a conservative load factor of 63 percent

for passenger airplanes and accounting

for those airplanes that are operated in

cargo service, the weighted average

number of occupants is 103. Using $2.7

million as the statistical value of a

fatality avoided, the average cost of an

accident to an affected airplane

resulting in the loss of the airplane and

half of its occupants, would be $150.9

million, including $1 million for

accident investigation. If this accident

occurred halfway between the first and

last year of repair assessments in this

analysis (i.e., between 2001 and 2022),

the present value of benefits is

estimated to be $46.8 million.

Benefits Compared to Costs

The benefits of the rule are estimated

at $46.8 million, at present value, while

the costs of the rule are estimated at

$32.5 million at present value. The

FAA, therefore, has determined that if

the rule prevents one ‘‘average’’

accident, the repair assessment program

will be cost-beneficial.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601–612, directs the

FAA to fit regulatory requirements to

the scale of the business, organizations,

and governmental jurisdictions subject

to the regulation. We are required to

determine whether a proposed or final

action will have a ‘‘significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities’’ as defined in the Act. If we

find that the action will have a

significant impact, we must do a

‘‘regulatory flexibility analysis.’’

This final rule will affect

manufacturers and operators of

airplanes, in the specified parts of the

CFR. For both manufacturers and

operators, a small entity is currently

defined as one with 1,500 or fewer

employees. None of the airplane

manufacturers that are affected by this

final rule have employee levels that fall

below this employment threshold.

Consequently, the FAA certifies that the

final rule will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of manufacturers of airplanes.

Some operators, however, do have

employee levels that fall below the

employment threshold. Consequently,

calculations were carried out to assess

whether the rule will have a significant

impact on a substantial number of these

operators. These calculations showed

that the annualized cost of the rule is

very small in comparison to annual

revenues of the affected entities—

considerably smaller than 1 percent of

their revenues. Consequently, the rule

will not have a significant impact on

small operators.

International Trade Impact Assessment

The provisions of this rule will have

little or no impact on trade for U.S.

firms doing business in foreign

countries and foreign firms doing

business in the United States.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA has analyzed this final rule

under the principles and criteria of

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We

determined that this action will not

have a substantial direct effect on the

States, on the relationship between the

national Government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, the

FAA has determined that this rule does

not have federalism implications.

Unfunded Mandates Analysis

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), codified

as 2 U.S.C. 1501–1571, requires each

Federal agency, to the extent permitted

by law, to prepare a written assessment

of the effects of any Federal mandate in

a proposed or final agency rule that may

result in the expenditure by State, local,

and tribal governments, in the aggregate,

or by the private sector, of $100 million

or more (adjusted annually for inflation)

in any one year. Section 204(a) of the

Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the

Federal agency to develop an effective

process to permit timely input by

elected officers (or their designees) of

State, local, and tribal governments on

a proposed ‘‘significant

intergovernmental mandate.’’ A

‘‘significant intergovernmental

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24125

mandate’’ under the Act is any

provision in a Federal agency regulation

that would impose an enforceable duty

upon State, local, and tribal

governments, in the aggregate, of $100

million (adjusted annually for inflation)

in any one year. Section 203 of the Act,

2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements

section 204(a), provides that before

establishing any regulatory

requirements that might significantly or

uniquely affect small governments, the

agency shall have developed a plan that,

among other things, provides for notice

to potentially affected small

governments, if any, and for a

meaningful and timely opportunity to

provide input in the development of

regulatory proposals.

This rule does not contain a Federal

intergovernmental or private sector

mandate that exceeds $100 million in

any one year.

Environmental Analysis

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA

actions that may be categorically

excluded from preparation of a National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

environmental assessment or

environmental impact statement. In

accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D,

appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this

rulemaking action qualifies for a

categorical exclusion.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate

Aviation in Alaska

Section 1205 of the FAA

Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.

3213) requires the Administrator, when

modifying regulations in Title 14 of the

CFR in a manner affecting intrastate

aviation in Alaska, to consider the

extent to which Alaska is not served by

transportation modes other than

aviation, and to establish such

regulatory distinctions as he or she

considers appropriate. Because this

amendment applies to the operation of

certain transport category airplanes

under parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 of

Title 14, it could affect intrastate

aviation in Alaska. Because no

comments were received regarding this

regulation affecting intrastate aviation in

Alaska, the FAA will apply the rule in

the same way that it is being applied

nationally.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the rule has

been assessed in accordance with the

Energy Policy and Conservation Act

(EPCA) Pub. L. 94–163, as amended (43

U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It

has been determined that the final rule

is not a major regulatory action under

the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 91

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Federal

Aviation Administration, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements.

14 CFR Part 121

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation Safety,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Safety, Transportation.

14 CFR Part 125

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Federal

Aviation Administration, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements.

14 CFR Part 129

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation Safety,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

The Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the

Federal Aviation Administration

amends parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 of

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations as

follows:

PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND

FLIGHT RULES

1. The authority citation for part 91

continues to read:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113,

40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44709, 44711,

44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306,

46315, 46316, 46502, 46504, 46506–46507,

47122, 47508, 47528–47531.

2. Add a new § 91.410 to read as

follows:

§ 91.410 Repair assessment for

pressurized fuselages.

No person may operate an Airbus

Model A300 (excluding the –600 series),

British Aerospace Model BAC 1–11,

Boeing Model, 707, 720, 727, 737 or

747, McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8,

DC–9/MD–80 or DC–10, Fokker Model

F28, or Lockheed Model L–1011

airplane beyond applicable flight cycle

implementation time specified below, or

May 25, 2001, whichever occurs later,

unless repair assessment guidelines

applicable to the fuselage pressure

boundary (fuselage skin, door skin, and

bulkhead webs) that have been

approved by the FAA Aircraft

Certification Office (ACO), or office of

the Transport Airplane Directorate,

having cognizance over the type

certificate for the affected airplane are

incorporated within its inspection

program:

(a) For the Airbus Model A300

(excluding the –600 series), the flight

cycle implementation time is:

(1) Model B2: 36,000 flights.

(2) Model B4–100 (including Model

B4–2C): 30,000 flights above the

window line, and 36,000 flights below

the window line.

(3) Model B4–200: 25,000 flights

above the window line, and 34,000

flights below the window line.

(b) For all models of the British

Aerospace BAC 1–11, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(c) For all models of the Boeing 707,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(d) For all models of the Boeing 720,

the flight cycle implementation time is

23,000 flights.

(e) For all models of the Boeing 727,

the flight cycle implementation time is

45,000 flights.

(f) For all models of the Boeing 737,

the flight cycle implementation time is

60,000 flights.

(g) For all models of the Boeing 747,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(h) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–8, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(i) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–9/MD–80, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(j) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–10, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(k) For all models of the Lockheed L–

1011, the flight cycle implementation

time is 27,000 flights.

(l) For the Fokker F–28 Mark 1000,

2000, 3000, and 4000, the flight cycle

implementation time is 27,000 flights.

PART 121—CERTIFICATION AND

OPERATIONS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND

SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIERS AND

COMMERCIAL OPERATORS OF

LARGE AIRCRAFT

1. The authority citation for part 121

continues to read:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119,

44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711,

44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901, 44903–

44904, 44912, 46105.

2. Add a new § 121.370 to read as

follows:

§ 121.370 Repair assessment for

pressurized fuselages.

No certificate holder may operate an

Airbus Model A300 (excluding the –600

series), British Aerospace Model BAC 1–

11, Boeing Model 707, 720, 727, 737, or

747, McDonnel Douglas Model DC–8,

DC–9/MD–80 or DC–10, Fokker Model

F28, or Lockheed Model L–1011

airplane beyond the applicable flight

cycle implementation time specified

below, or May 25, 2001, whichever

24126 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

occurs later, unless operations

specifications have been issued to

reference repair assessment guidelines

applicable to the fuselage pressure

boundary (fuselage skin, door skin, and

bulkhead webs), and those guidelines

are incorporated in its maintenance

program. The repair assessment

guidelines must be approved by the

FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),

or office of the Transport Airplane

Directorate, having cognizance over the

type certificate for the affected airplane.

(a) For the Airbus Model A300

(excluding the –600 series), the flight

cycle implementation time is:

(1) Model B2: 36,000 flights.

(2) Model B4–100 (including Model

B4–2C): 30,000 flights above the

window line, and 36,000 flights below

the window line.

(3) Model B4–200: 25,000 flights

above the window line, and 34,000

flights below the window line.

(b) For all models of the British

Aerospace BAC 1–11, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(c) For all models of the Boeing 707,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(d) For all models of the Boeing 720,

the flight cycle implementation time is

23,000 flights.

(e) For all models of the Boeing 727,

the flight cycle implementation time is

45,000 flights.

(f) For all models of the Boeing 737,

the flight cycle implementation time is

60,000 flights.

(g) For all models of the Boeing 747,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(h) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–8, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(i) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–9/MD–80, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(j) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–10, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(k) For all models of the Lockheed L–

1011, the flight cycle implementation

time is 27,000 flights.

(l) For the Fokker F–28 Mark 1000,

2000, 3000, and 4000, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

PART 125—CERTIFICATION AND

OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A

SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE

PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM

PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000

POUNDS OR MORE

1. The authority citation for part 125

continues to read:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–

44702, 44705, 44710–44711, 44713, 44716–

44717, 44722.

2. Add a new § 125.248 to read as

follows:

§ 125.248 Repair assessment for

pressurized fuselages.

No person may operate an Airbus

Model A300 (exlcuding the –600 series),

British Aerospace Model BAC 1–11,

Boeing Model 707, 720, 727, 737 or 747,

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8, DC–9/

MD–80 or DC–10, Fokker Model F28, or

Lockheed Model L–1011 beyond the

applicable flight cycle implementation

time specified below, or May 25, 2001,

whichever occurs later, unless

operations specifications have been

issued to reference repair assessment

guidelines applicable to the fuselage

pressure boundary (fuselage skin, door

skin, and bulkhead webs), and those

guidelines are incorporated in its

maintenance program. The repair

assessment guidelines must be approved

by the FAA Aircraft Certification Office

(ACO), or office of the Transport

Airplane Directorate, having cognizance

over the type certificate for the affected

airplane.

(a) For the Airbus Model A300

(excluding the –600 series), the flight

cycle implementation time is:

(1) Model B2: 36,000 flights.

(2) Model B4–100 (including Model

B4–2C): 30,000 flights above the

window line, and 36,000 flights below

the window line.

(3) Model B4–200: 25,000 flights

above the window line, and 34,000

flights below the window line.

(b) For all models of the British

Aerospace BAC 1–11, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(c) For all models of the Boeing 707,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(d) For all models of the Boeing 720,

the flight cycle implementation time is

23,000 flights.

(e) For all models of the Boeing 727,

the flight cycle implementation time is

45,000 flights.

(f) For all models of the Boeing 737,

the flight cycle implementation time is

60,000 flights.

(g) For all models of the Boeing 747,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(h) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–8, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(i) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–9/MD–80, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(j) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–10, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(k) For all models of the Lockheed L–

1011, the flight cycle implementation

time is 27,000 flights.

(l) For the Fokker F–28 Mark, 1000,

2000, 3000, and 4000, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

PART 129—OPERATIONS: FOREIGN

AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN

OPERATORS OF U.S.—REGISTERED

AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON

CARRIAGE

1. The authority citation for part 129

continues to read:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40104–40105,

40113, 40119, 44701–44702, 44712, 44716–

44717, 44722, 44901–44904, 44906.

2. Add a new § 129.32 to read as

follows:

§ 129.32 Repair assessment for

pressurized fuselages.

No foreign air carrier or foreign

persons operating a U.S. registered

airplane may operate an Airbus Model

A300 (excluding ¥600 series), British

Aerospace Model BAC 1–11, Boeing

Model 707, 720, 727, 737, or 747,

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8, DC–9/

MD–80 or DC–10, Fokker Model F28, or

Lockheed Model L–1011 beyond the

applicable flight cycle implementation

time specified below, or May 25, 2001,

whichever occurs later, unless

operations specifications have been

issued to reference repair assessment

guidelines applicable to the fuselage

pressure boundary (fuselage skin, door

skin, and bulkhead webs), and those

guidelines are incorporated in its

maintenance program. The repair

assessment guidelines must be approved

by the FAA Aircraft Certification Office

(ACO), or office of the Transport

Airplane Directorate, having cognizance

over the type certificate for the affected

airplane.

(a) For the Airbus Model A300

(excluding the –600 series), the flight

cycle implementation time is:

(1) Model B2: 36,000 flights.

(2) Model B4–100 (including Model

B4–2C): 30,000 flights above the

window line, and 36,000 flights below

the window line.

(3) Model B4–200: 25,500 flights

above the window line, and 34,000

flights below the window line.

(b) For all models of the British

Aerospace BAC 1–11, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(c) For all models of the Boeing 707,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(d) For all models of the Boeing 720,

the flight cycle implementation time is

23,000 flights.

(e) For all models of the Boeing 727,

the flight cycle implementation time is

45,000 flights.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 25, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 24127

1 29 U.S.C. 1002(33) (1994).

2 65 FR 10939, corrected at 65 FR 12318 (March

8, 2000).

3See 65 FR 10939 at 10940–41.

4 29 U.S.C. 1001 (1994 and Supp. III 1997) and

1301 (1994), respectively.

5See 65 FR 10939 at 10941–42.

6Pub. L. No. 104–290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).

7See 65 FR 10939 at 10942. This exemption has

been codified at 15 U.S.C. 80a–3(c)(14) (Supp II

1996).

8 In its footnote to this statement, the Commission

explained that:

If a collective investment vehicle (such as a

Church Plan) is not a commodity pool, the operator

of the vehicle would not be a CPO. The operator

would nonetheless be a person for all other

purposes of the [Commodity Exchange Act (‘‘Act’’)]

and CFTC rules—e.g., it would be subject to the

general antifraud provisions of section 4b of the

Act, 7 U.S.C. 6b(1994), and to the large trader

reporting requirements of Part 18 of the regulations.

If a collective investment vehicle is a pool, in

addition to being a person for the purposes of the

Act and the rules, its operator would be a CPO

subject to all provisions of the Act and Commission

rules applicable to CPOs regardless of registration

status—e.g., to the special antifraud provisions for

CPOs (and [commodity trading advisors (‘‘CTAs’’)]

in section 4o of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 6o (1994), the

operational requirements for CPOs in Rule 4.20 and

the advertising requirements for CPOs (and CTAs)

in Rule 4.41.

In this regard, the Commission wishes to

emphasize that the status of a collective investment

vehicle as a pool or a ‘‘non-pool’’ does not affect

the registration or Part 4 requirements of any CTA

to the vehicle. But see Rule 4.14(a)(8), which makes

available an exemption from CTA registration to

certain registered investment advisers who, among

other things, provide commodity interest trading

advice to Rule 4.5 trading vehicles in a manner

solely incidental to their business of providing

securities advice to those vehicles. 65 FR 10939 at

10942, n.26.

9 65 FR 10939 at 10942.

(f) For all models of the Boeing 737,

the flight cycle implementation time is

60,00 flights.

(g) For all models of the Boeing 747,

the flight cycle implementation time is

15,000 flights.

(h) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–8, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(i) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–9/MD–80, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,000 flights.

(j) For all models of the McDonnell

Douglas DC–10, the flight cycle

implementation time is 30,000 flights.

(k) For all models of the Lockheed L–

1011, the flight cycle implementation

time is 27,000 flights.

(l) For the Fokker F–28 Mark 1000,

2000, 3000, and 4000, the flight cycle

implementation time is 60,00 flights.

Issued in Washington, DC, on April 19,

2000.

Jane F. Garvey,

Administrator of Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA).

[FR Doc. 00–10220 Filed 4–24–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING

COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 4

RIN 3038–AB34

Commodity Pool Operators; Exclusion

for Certain Otherwise Regulated

Persons From the Definition of the

Term ‘‘Commodity Pool Operator’’

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading

Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures

Trading Commission (‘‘Commission’’or

‘‘CFTC’’) is adopting Rule 4.5(a)(4)(v),

which adds a plan defined as a church

plan in Section 3(33) of Title I of the

Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974 (‘‘ERISA’’) 1 (‘‘Church

Plan’’) to the types of employee benefit

plans that Rule 4.5(a)(4) currently

provides shall not be construed to be

commodity pools. The CFTC also is

adopting conforming amendments to

Rule 4.5(a)(4).

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 25, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Barbara S. Gold, Assistant Chief

Counsel, or Christopher W. Cummings,

Special Counsel, Division of Trading

and Markets, Commodity Futures

Trading Commission, Three Lafayette

Center, 1155 21st Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20581. Telephone:

(202) 418–5450.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March

1, 2000 the Commission published for

comment proposed amendments to Rule

4.5(a)(4)(the ‘‘Proposal’’.2 The sole

substantive amendment the Commission

proposed was to add a plan defined as

a church plan in section 3(33) of the

Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974 (‘‘ERISA’’) to the types of

employee benefit plans that the rule

provided shall not be construed to be

commodity pools. This was proposed to

be accomplished by adding a new

paragraph (a)(4)(v) to the rule. In

proposing this action, the Commission

discussed generally the history of Rule

4.5,3 it noted that Congress had

exempted Church Plans from coverage

under Titles I and IV of ERISA 4 ‘‘to

avoid excessive Government

entanglement with religion in violation

of the First Amendment to the

Constitution’’ 5 and it further noted that

more recently, in connection with the

adoption of the National Securities

Markets Improvement Act of 1996

(‘‘NSMIA’’),6 Congress provided that

Church Plans are not investment

companies under the Investment

Company Act of 1940 and therefore that

they are not subject to registration as

such.7

The various technical amendments

the Commission proposed to Rule

4.5(a)(4) were to conform the

punctuation of the rule and to

accommodate grammatically proposed

paragraph 4.5(a)(4)(v). The Commission

did not propose to change the text of

any of the paragraphs Rule 4.5(a)(4)(i)–

(iv).

The Commission specifically

requested comment on two aspects of

the proposal. As the Commission stated:

The proposal would be broader than the

[commodity pool operator (‘‘CPO’’)]

registration no-action positions that its staff

previously has issued to the operators of

Church Plans.8 Also, under this proposal the

operators of Church Plans would not need to

file a Notice of Eligibility to claim relief and

they would not need to restrict their Plans’

activities to the operating criteria of Rule

4.5(c). The Commission believes the breadth

of its proposal is appropriate in light of

Congress’ rationale in excluding Church

Plans from coverage under Titles I and IV of

ERISA. The Commission nonetheless

requests comment on whether rather than

adding Church Plans to the list of plans that

should not be construed to be a pool as

proposed, the Commission should include

the operator of a Church Plan as an eligible

person who may claim an exclusion from the

CPO definition. The Commission also

requests comment on whether relief under

Rule 4.5 should be available solely to those

Church Plans that have not made an election

under Section 410(d) of the Internal Revenue

Code [‘‘IRC’’] to be subject to certain

provision of ERISA.9

The Commission received two

comment letters on the Proposal.

Neither of the letters the Commission

received on the proposed amendments

to Rule 4.5(a)(4) addressed specifically

the two issues on which the

Commission had requested comment.

One letter, from counsel to a Church

Plan, expressed strong approval of the

Proposal. The letter also stated that an

additional support for the Proposal’s

adoption is that the rights of Church

Plan participants are fully protected by

the exclusive benefits requirements

imposed on Church Plans by the IRC.

The other letter, from a member of the

commodities bar, asked the Commission

to adopt a policy and implementing

regulations to the effect that ‘‘a

collective investment vehicle using

commodity interests solely for

recognized risk management purposes is

not ‘commodity pool’ within the intent

of the [commodity pool operator]

definition in section 1a(4) of the

Commodity Exchange Act.’’ While this

comment is outside the scope of this