U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

F a l s e B u r g l a r A l a r m s

2nd Edition

by Rana Sampson

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

No. 5
www.PopCenter.org

Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site 

at www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help 

you deal more effectively with crime and disorder in your 

community, including:

• Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides

• Interactive training exercises

• Online access to research and police practices

• Online problem analysis module.

Designed for police and those who work with them to 

address community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great 

resource in problem-oriented policing.

Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
False Burglar Alarms

2nd Edition

Rana Sampson

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#1999CKWXK004 and 2005CKWXK001 by the Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. 

The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not 

necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of 

Justice. References to specific companies, products, or services should 

not be considered an endorsement thereof by the author(s) or the 

U.S. Justice Department. Rather, the references are illustrations to 

supplement discussion of the issues.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

March 2007

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

Guide No. 5

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series i

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about 

how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime 

and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention 

and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to 

investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. Neither 

do they cover all of the technical details about how to 

implement specific responses. The guides are written for 

police—of whatever rank or assignment—who must address 

the specific problem the guides cover. The guides will be 

most useful to officers who:

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles 

and methods. The guides are not primers in problemoriented policing. They deal only briefly with the initial 

decision to focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze 

the problem, and means to assess the results of a problemoriented policing project. They are designed to help police 

decide how best to analyze and address a problem they have 

already identified. (A companion series of Problem-Solving Tools

guides has been produced to aid in various aspects of problem 

analysis and assessment.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the 

complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to spend 

perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and responding to 

it. Carefully studying a problem before responding helps you 

design the right strategy, one that is most likely to work in your 

community. You should not blindly adopt the responses others 

have used; you must decide whether they are appropriate to 

your local situation. What is true in one place may not be true 

elsewhere; what works in one place may not work everywhere.

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing police 

business. The guides describe responses that other police 

departments have used or that researchers have tested. While 
ii False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

not all of these responses will be appropriate to your 

particular problem, they should help give a broader view 

of the kinds of things you could do. You may think 

you cannot implement some of these responses in your 

jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when 

police have discovered a more effective response, they have 

succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving 

the response to the problem. (A companion series of 

Response Guides has been produced to help you understand 

how commonly-used police responses work on a variety of 

problems.) 

• Understand the value and the limits of research 

knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful 

research is available to the police; for other problems, 

little is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series 

summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate 

the need for more research on that particular problem. 

Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to 

all the questions you might have about the problem. The 

research may help get you started in designing your own 

responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This 

will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local 

problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, 

not every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has 

every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so 

would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The 

references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 

on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of 

research on the subject. 

• Are willing to work with others to find effective 

solutions to the problem. The police alone cannot 

implement many of the responses discussed in the guides. 

They must frequently implement them in partnership with 

other responsible private and public bodies including other 
About the Problem-Specific Guides Series iii

government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 

private businesses, public utilities, community groups, 

and individual citizens. An effective problem-solver must 

know how to forge genuine partnerships with others 

and be prepared to invest considerable effort in making 

these partnerships work. Each guide identifies particular 

individuals or groups in the community with whom 

police might work to improve the overall response to that 

problem. Thorough analysis of problems often reveals 

that individuals and groups other than the police are in 

a stronger position to address problems and that police 

ought to shift some greater responsibility to them to do 

so. Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility 

for Public Safety Problems, provides further discussion of this 

topic.

The COPS Office defines community policing as 

“a policing philosophy that promotes and supports 

organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce 

the fear of crime and social disorder through problemsolving tactics and police-community partnerships.” These 

guides emphasize problem-solving and police-community 

partnerships in the context of addressing specific public 

safety problems. For the most part, the organizational 

strategies that can facilitate problem-solving and policecommunity partnerships vary considerably and discussion of 

them is beyond the scope of these guides.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police 

practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, 

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and 

Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police 

practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that 

the police everywhere experience common problems. In 
iv False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is 

important that police be aware of research and successful 

practices beyond the borders of their own countries.

Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the 

research literature and reported police practice and is 

anonymously peer-reviewed by line police officers, police 

executives and researchers prior to publication. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to 

provide feedback on this guide and to report on your 

own agency’s experiences dealing with a similar problem. 

Your agency may have effectively addressed a problem 

using responses not considered in these guides and your 

experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This 

information will be used to update the guides. If you wish 

to provide feedback and share your experiences it should 

be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.

For more information about problem-oriented policing, 

visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 

www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access 

to:

• the Problem-Specific Guides series

• the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools series

• instructional information about problem-oriented policing 

and related topics

• an interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise

• an interactive Problem Analysis Module

• a manual for crime analysts

• online access to important police research and practices

• information about problem-oriented policing conferences 

and award programs. 
Acknowledgments v

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are produced by the 

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, whose officers are 

Michael S. Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate 

Director) and Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). 

While each guide has a primary author, other project 

team members, COPS Office staff and anonymous peer 

reviewers contributed to each guide by proposing text, 

recommending research and offering suggestions on 

matters of format and style. 

The project team that developed the guide series 

comprised Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin 

Law School), Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), 

John E. Eck (University of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott 

(University of Wisconsin Law School), Rana Sampson 

(Police Consultant), and Deborah Lamm Weisel (North 

Carolina State University.) 

Members of the San Diego; National City, California; 

and Savannah, Georgia police departments provided 

feedback on the guides’ format and style in the early 

stages of the project.

Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS 

Office. Research for the guide was conducted at the 

Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 

direction of Phyllis Schultze. Suzanne Fregly edited this 

guide.

Contents

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

What this Guide Does and Does Not Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

General Description of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Causes of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Effectiveness of Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Costs of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Specific Responses to Reduce False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Responses with Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Response Not Recommended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Contents vii

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 1

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

What This Guide Does and Does Not Cover

This guide deals with the problem of false burglar alarms. 

It begins by reviewing factors that increase the risks of 

false burglar alarms. It then identifies a series of questions 

that might help you analyze your local problem. Finally, it 

reviews responses to the problem and what is known about 

them from evaluative research and police practice.

False burglar alarms is but one aspect of the larger set of 

problems related to alarms and misuse of police resources. 

This guide is limited to addressing the particular harms 

created by false burglar alarms. Related problems not 

directly addressed in this guide, each of which require 

separate analysis, include:

misuse and abuse of 911

false fire alarms

false vehicle alarms

false robbery alarms

noise complaints about audible alarms. 

Some of these related problems are covered in other 

guides in this series, all of which are listed at the end of 

this guide. For the most up-to-date listing of current and 

future guides, see www.popcenter.org.

•

•

•

•

•
2 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

General Description of the Problem

In the United States in 2002, police responded to 

approximately 36 million alarm activations, at an estimated 

annual cost of $1.8 billion.1 Most of these activations 

were burglar alarms.§ This guide examines current police 

responses and presents alternative strategies to address 

the false alarm dilemma. Purchasers of an alarm system 

are told to expect a police response to an alarm activation, 

even though they bought the system from a private alarm 

company with no link to a police department. The vast 

majority of alarm calls—between 94 and 98 percent 

(higher in some jurisdictions)—are false.§§ In other words, 

alarms’ reliability, which can be measured by these rates 

of false activations, is generally between 2 and 6 percent. 

Nationwide, false alarms account for somewhere between 

10 and 25 percent of all calls to police.2 For many U.S. 

police agencies, false burglar alarms constitute the highestvolume type of call for service. In the United States 

alone, “solving the problem of false alarms would, by 

itself, relieve 35,000 officers from providing an essentially 

private service.”3 

During the 1990s, consolidation within the alarm industry 

changed the way alarm companies delivered services. 

Larger companies purchased smaller ones, and a number 

of alarm monitoring companies moved, sometimes out 

of state, to achieve economies of scale. For example, a 

company in Texas might monitor the alarms of tens of 

thousands of customers in Utah or other distant states.§§§ 

When an alarm goes off, the monitoring company calls the 

owner. If no one answers or the person who answers gives 

the wrong prearranged code, the monitoring company 

calls the police, expecting them to respond.§§§§ 

§ In some cities, police also respond 

to fire alarms. It is typical for 

burglar alarm calls to substantially 

outnumber fire alarm calls to police 

departments. 

§§ For example, in Dallas, Texas, 

of the 62,000 alarm calls in 2004, 

only 2.8 percent were valid (Security 

Sales and Integration 2005). In Salt 

Lake City, Utah, of the thousands 

of alarm calls responded to in 1999, 

only 0.3 percent resulted from crime 

(Salt Lake Tribune 2000). In Eugene, 

Oregon, from the 5,944 alarm calls 

in 2001, police made only 10 arrests 

(Salem Police Department, Burglar 

Alarm Task Force 2004). 

§§§ The mergers also mean that 

alarm systems originally installed 

and serviced by one company may 

now be serviced by another. Many 

politicians, fearful of alienating their 

local security industry, often initially 

support police response to all alarms. 

However, the monitoring companies 

they are supporting may not be local 

at all. 

§§§§ A few alarm companies still 

respond as part of their contract 

with customers, but this is rare.
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 3

An estimated 32 million security alarm systems have 

been installed in the United States,4 and most of these 

are monitored. The industry adds roughly 3 million 

new systems each year.§ Sixty percent of those are in 

residences, the rest in commercial and institutional 

properties.5 Alarm industry statistics indicate that the 

average security system costs between $100 and $1,200, 

depending on its complexity, and monitoring fees average 

about $35 per month. Some security companies offer 

free alarm systems because the monthly monitoring fee 

alone produces strong profits for the industry. At least 

one of every seven U.S. businesses and one of every five 

U.S. residences have alarms.6 The recent trend of wiring 

new residential construction with alarm capacity has the 

potential to significantly increase the number of alarm 

calls in the coming decade. Consequently, even those 

police agencies with recently enacted false alarm policies 

and ordinances should revisit their approach; otherwise, 

their workload may be further consumed with false alarm 

calls.§§ 

Alarm associations suggest that false burglar alarms are 

not evenly distributed: some alarm systems experience 

no false alarms, and others, many. In some jurisdictions, 

the pattern of false alarms is much more widely 

distributed.§§§ Whether concentrated across locations or 

not, the aggregate number of false alarm calls among all 

alarmed premises places a high demand on limited police 

resources. 

§ Estimates of the number of new 

alarms installed differ (see Hakim 

and Blackstone 1997; Spivey and 

Cobb 1997; Blackstone, Hakim, and 

Spiegel 2000; and National Burglar & 

Fire Alarm Association 2005). 

§§ In Arlington, Texas, between 

1985 and 2001, the number of 

police responses to residential alarm 

calls increased 494 percent, and 

commercial alarm calls increased 

186 percent, with 99 percent proving 

false. In 2001, alarm calls accounted 

for 19 percent of all dispatched calls 

for service (White 2002).

§§§ While false alarm calls may 

be clustered among a relatively 

small number of premises in some 

jurisdictions, other jurisdictions 

have found a much broader 

distribution. For example, one 

study of a Midwestern capital city 

showed that 70 percent of all alarm 

permit holders had one or two false 

alarm calls (Gilbertson 2005).The 

Salem (Oregon) Police Department 

also found that a large number of 

locations accounted for the volume 

of alarm calls: 2,643 separate 

locations accounted for 5,688 alarm 

calls (Salem Police Department, 

Burglar Alarm Task Force 2004).
4 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

The Causes of False Burglar Alarms

Research suggests that false burglar alarms result from 

three main causes: 

user errors, such as using incorrect keypad codes, 

leaving a door or window open when activating 

the alarm, roaming pets or helium balloons, and 

errors arising from inadequate employee training, 

such as entering and exiting alarmed premises 

incorrectly7,§ 

faulty or inappropriately selected equipment

poor installation, including failing to install motion 

detectors in sensible areas or at appropriate 

heights.§§

These are not the sole causes. Bad weather, alarm 

monitoring-center mistakes, and alarm line errors also 

falsely signal a burglar’s presence.8

Commercial properties tend to have even higher false 

alarm rates than residential properties because more 

people tend to share responsibility for activating and 

deactivating the alarm systems, and the systems tend to be 

more complex. The rate of false alarms for commercial 

alarm users may be as much as three times higher than 

the rate of false alarms among residential alarm users.9

Chronic false alarm activations are often due to inadequate 

employee training or inferior systems that have not been 

upgraded. 

•

•

•

§ One U.K. study found that user 

error caused about 50 percent of 

alarm activations (Gill and Hemming 

2003).

§§ The alarm industry suggests user 

error accounts for the largest portion 

of false calls, poor installation is on 

the decline, and faulty equipment 

is less of a problem given recent 

technological advances [International 

Association of Chiefs of Police 

n.d.(a)]. 
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 5

The Effectiveness of Burglar Alarms

Burglar alarms are intended to prevent burglary and to 

help police apprehend burglars, which, if done reliably and 

efficiently, benefits the public at large. If, however, burglar 

alarms are unreliable or inefficient, the drain on police 

resources from responding to them may outweigh their 

benefits. Here we review the evidence of burglar alarms’ 

contribution to these two worthwhile objectives.

Studies from both the United States and the United 

Kingdom have shown burglar alarms to be among the 

most effective burglary-deterrence measures.10 However, 

a number of other measures that do not impose a 

substantial burden on police are also effective at 

preventing burglary. Occupancy, or signs of occupancy, is 

the biggest deterrent. In addition, closed-circuit television, 

window bars, barking dogs, nosy neighbors, and motionactivated lights have also been shown to be effective.§

 For 

the most part, burglars avoid alarmed premises because 

easier choices are usually available.11 Given the availability 

of non-alarmed premises and similarly unprotected targets 

(such as houses with open garage doors or windows), 

burglars may be deterred by the mere presence of an 

alarm company’s window sticker or yard sign.12 

Do burglar alarms account for burglary declines in the 

United States? The U.S. burglary rate has declined steadily 

and substantially since the early 1980s.13 During the same 

time, the number of premises with alarms rose, but there 

is no evidence of a link between the two. During the 

1990s through 2004, when alarm ownership experienced a 

steep rise, other types of crime declined just as sharply as 

burglary, suggesting that factors other than an increase in 

the number of alarm systems fueled the burglary decline. 

§ See the POP guides titled Burglary 

of Single-Family Houses and Burglary of 

Retail Establishments for more complete 

coverage of burglary prevention 

measures.
6 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Are alarms an efficient and effective way to catch 

burglars? Although burglary remains one of the most 

frequently reported crimes, the clearance rate for U.S. 

burglaries has remained below 15 percent for many 

years.

14 Clearly, whatever contribution burglar alarms are 

making to solving burglary cases is modest, at best. 

The available research does not provide much support for 

alarms’ value in catching burglars. One study found that 

police were more likely to catch burglars in the act on 

premises without alarms than those with alarm systems.15 

Police responses to burglary calls at locations without 

alarms are typically the result of an eyewitness, such as a 

neighbor, which is more reliable than an alarm. 

Proper installation of alarm systems is essential to 

prevent false alarms.

Bob Morris
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 7

§ Lost-opportunity costs might 

include time that police could have 

spent conducting problem-solving 

efforts to reduce documented crime 

and disorder, reducing repeat calls 

at crime hot spots, and engaging 

the community in public safety 

initiatives. These all compete with 

time spent on chronic false-alarm 

response.

The Costs of False Burglar Alarms 

Each false alarm requires approximately 20 minutes of 

police time, usually for two officers. This costs the public 

hundreds of millions of dollars. In the vast majority 

of jurisdictions, the cost of responding to false alarms 

is not recouped through fines. Jurisdictions trying to 

recoup costs generally omit the lost-opportunity costs, a 

potentially significant part of the equation.§ Typical costs 

include 

personnel costs of police call-takers and 

dispatchers

personnel, equipment, and costs related to backup 

personnel

personnel costs associated with analyzing false 

alarms

software, hardware, office space, and equipment 

costs for false alarm management

administrative and staff costs of notifications, 

permitting, billing, and education programs

costs of developing, printing, and distributing 

publications to educate the public and alarm 

companies about false alarms

lost-opportunity costs, when police are unavailable 

to work on actual crime problems

costs associated with call displacement, because 

the response to other 911 calls takes longer. 

In addition, in some jurisdictions, officers have sustained 

injuries or their vehicles have been damaged as the result 

of traffic accidents while responding to false alarm calls.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
As an inducement to buy an alarm system, a number of 

companies offer “free monitoring services” for the first 

few months. Many insurance companies offer discounts 

on insurance premiums to customers with operable alarm 

systems. These discounts may be as much as 20 percent 

for commercial customers, and slightly less for residential 

owners.

16 In addition, many police departments offer 

several “free” false alarms before imposing any fine, even 

though the cost to respond is significant right from the 

start. The offers of free monitoring services by alarm 

companies and discounts from insurers call into question 

the appropriateness of the current trend in U.S. policing 

of allowing three or four free false alarms per calendar 

year, because they provide no up-front incentives to 

encourage owners to prevent false alarms.

Certain burglary prevention measures have costs only to 

the owner. Lights, locks, and bars installed by a property 

owner (if within the fire code) are cost-free to the rest of 

the community. The individual purchaser bears these costs. 

On the other hand, alarm systems are not cost-free to the 

community, especially if up to 98 percent of alarms are 

false but still require the time and resources of a police 

response.§ 

Another social cost of burglar alarms is the noise 

neighbors endure when audible alarms sound, fueling 

noise complaint calls to the police. Some callers seek 

to alert the police that a neighboring alarm has been 

activated. Others merely want the police to stop the 

noise. In many jurisdictions, legislators have passed time 

restrictions for audible alarms, limiting them to 15 or 20 

minutes and prohibiting extra sounding cycles.§§ 

8 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

§ In 2004, 86 percent of Dallas, 

Texas, households and businesses 

(representing the percent of 

unalarmed premises in the City ) 

subsidized the police alarm response 

to the 14 percent of households and 

businesses that have alarms (Dallas 

City Council 2005).

§§ In New South Wales, Australia, 

the Environmental Protection 

Authority prohibits the sale of 

building-intruder alarms produced 

after September 1997 that sound for 

more than five minutes or that can 

automatically reset and sound again, 

since police and insurance groups 

have reported that most burglaries 

are over within five minutes. See 

www.environment.nsw.gov.au/noise/

alarms.htm.
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 9

§ In 2004, the burglary rate for 

urban areas was higher than rural 

or suburban areas: 41.9 burglaries 

per 1,000 urban households; 27.8 

per 1,000 rural households; and 23.2 

per suburban households (Catalano 

2005).

One of the hidden costs of false burglar alarms is that 

they can distort the proper geographic distribution of 

police. False burglar alarms do not necessarily concentrate 

in the same places where crime in general, or burglary in 

particular, concentrates. Burglary rates are typically much 

higher in urban areas than in either suburban or rural 

areas,§ and residential burglaries tend to concentrate in 

and around low-income areas. Yet more affluent areas 

tend to have burglar alarms.17 In 2004, those at highest 

risk for burglary had household incomes below $25,000. 

Those with incomes below $7,500 were at the greatest 

risk, having twice the risk of households with incomes of 

$75,000 or more.18 In the United Kingdom, the risk of 

burglary among those with household income less than 

£5,000 was twice the national average.19 To the extent 

that calls-for-service data (which can be heavily skewed 

by alarm calls) are used to allocate police personnel to 

different areas, more officers might be assigned where 

there are a lot of false burglar alarms rather than where 

there is a lot of crime. No matter where they are assigned, 

officers spending time responding to false burglar alarms 

have less time available to attend to other crime problems. 
So, while alarm systems may have some benefit for 

alarm owners as part of an overall security package, 

the question remains whether non-alarm owners in the 

community should shoulder a share of the cost. If alarm 

use resulted in enhanced public safety—that is, alarms 

led to much higher burglar apprehension rates or, ideally, 

fewer burglaries across an entire jurisdiction—its public 

value would be more evident. However, the fact that 

alarm calls are overwhelmingly false and do not contribute 

substantially to police ability to apprehend burglars makes 

the underwriting of alarm response by police and entire 

communities (all taxpayers subsidize police response to 

alarmed properties) an expensive and inefficient approach 

to burglary reduction across an entire jurisdiction.

10 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

User errors account for a high percentage of false 

burglar alarms.

Bob Morris
Understanding Your Local Problem 11

Understanding Your Local Problem

Stakeholders

The following groups have an interest in the false burglar 

alarms problem and ought to be considered for the 

contribution they might make to gathering information 

about the problem and responding to it:

community members who do not own alarms

alarm owners

private security companies

local government finance officials

public building managers

private alarm companies.

Asking the Right Questions

The information provided above is only a generalized 

description of false alarms. The first step to address 

your community’s false alarm problem is to analyze it. 

You must combine the basic facts with a more specific 

understanding of your community’s problem. Careful 

analysis will help you design a more effective response 

strategy.§ This analysis should, at a minimum, answer the 

following questions: 

What proportion of your department’s call-forservice workload involves responding to alarms?

What proportion of the department’s alarm calls 

is false?

What proportion of the department’s alarm calls 

are burglar alarms, and what proportion of those 

are false?

What proportion of the department’s noise calls 

relate to alarms,§§ and what are the call-taking 

costs for these?

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

§ For an example of how one city 

analyzed and responded to its false 

burglar-alarm problem, see Salt 

Lake City Police Department (2001), 

at www.popcenter.org/Library/

Goldstein/2001/01-55(F).pdf.

§§ Do not include vehicle alarms, as 

they are a different alarm problem 

requiring separate analysis.
12 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

What is the department’s true cost of responding 

to alarms (police departments should locally 

determine the average time spent responding 

to alarm calls; see “The Costs of False Burglar 

Alarms,” above)?

How many residential and commercial alarm 

systems are operable in your jurisdiction, and 

what is the anticipated growth rate for alarm 

installation?

At what rate do police catch burglars at alarm 

calls? 

What are the numbers of false alarm calls from 

businesses, residences, and governmental, public, 

or semipublic premises (such as schools, city labs, 

museums, and city storage yards)?

Are there any identifiable patterns for commercial 

alarm calls, such as at opening and closing times 

or during the holidays? (This indicates that alarm 

companies must educate specific groups of alarm 

owners.) 

Are there any identifiable patterns for residential 

alarm calls, such as the frequency of alarm 

calls that are cancelled by the owner (or alarm 

company) within 15 minutes of the initial 

activation? (This indicates the alarm company’s 

responsibility for educating owners about proper 

alarm operation.) 

Do some alarm companies have higher false alarm 

rates than others?

What does a review of websites for alarm 

companies in your area suggest about the 

accuracy of their claims when trying to gain new 

customers?

What does a review of alarm company policies 

and contracts suggest about alarm companies’ 

obligations to alarm owners?

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
Has your department identified jurisdictions that 

have successfully reduced their total number of 

false alarms, not just their rates per system (see 

“Responses to the Problem of False Burglar 

Alarms,” below, for examples)?

Has the department interviewed alarm company 

personnel to determine their perspectives on 

the false alarm problem, and their openness to 

new solutions? Has the alarm industry done an 

analysis to determine the most failure-prone parts 

of the systems installed in the area, or why so 

many alarm users make mistakes in activating and 

deactivating their alarms? 

Has the department interviewed groups of 

property owners (with and without alarms) to 

determine their perspectives on the false alarm 

problem, and their openness to new solutions?

Has the department met with police union or 

police association leaders to determine their 

perspectives on the false alarm problem, their 

openness to new solutions, and their willingness to 

support a new approach?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

You should take measures of the false alarm problem 

before implementing responses, to determine how serious 

the problem is, and after implementing them, to determine 

whether the responses have been effective. Measurement 

allows you to determine to what degree your efforts have 

succeeded, and suggests how you might modify your 

responses if they are not producing the desired results. 

For more detailed guidance on measuring effectiveness, 

•

•

•

•

Understanding Your Local Problem 13
see the companion guide to this series, Assessing Responses 

to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. 

The following are potentially useful measures of the 

effectiveness of responses to false alarms:

reduced number of alarm calls

reduced false alarm numbers for various types 

of premises—commercial, residential, and 

governmental (such as schools, city labs, museums, 

and city storage yards)

reduced number of false alarm calls at high-risk 

times, such as at business opening and closing 

times, during stormy weather, or during the 

holiday seasons

reduced number of personnel hours devoted to 

handling false alarm calls

reduced percentage of the police department’s call 

load devoted to false alarms

increased percentage of uncommitted time for 

officers to engage in problem-solving concerning 

actual crime and disorder problems

reduced costs of handling false alarm calls

reduced false alarm rates of individual alarm 

companies

increased rate at which police catch burglars 

at alarm calls (if false calls are minimized and 

response times are improved, burglar apprehension 

rates should rise). 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

14 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 15

Responses to the Problem of False 

Burglar Alarms

Your analysis of your local problem should give you 

a better understanding of the factors contributing to 

it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and 

established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, 

you should consider possible responses to address the 

problem. 

The following response strategies provide a foundation 

of ideas for addressing your particular problem. These 

strategies are drawn from a variety of research studies, 

police reports, and news articles. Several of these 

strategies may apply to your community’s problem. It is 

critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, 

and that you can justify each response based on reliable 

analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will 

involve implementing several different responses. Law 

enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in 

reducing or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself 

to considering what police can do: carefully consider 

who else in your community shares responsibility for the 

problem and can help police better respond to it. The 

responsibility of responding, in some cases, may need 

to be shifted toward those who have the capacity to 

implement more effective responses. (For more detailed 

information on shifting and sharing responsibility, see 

Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for 

Public Safety Problems).
This guide assumes that the alarm industry has the 

responsibility to improve the quality of its equipment, 

install devices more accurately, improve its advice to 

consumers about the suitability of different types of 

systems for different types of homes and businesses, and 

increase user knowledge of its products. The responses 

described below have some potential to reduce false alarm 

calls. Police policies that stimulate the alarm industry 

to improve its products’ overall reliability are strongly 

preferred so as to minimize the burden on police in the 

effort to reduce the incidence of false burglar alarms. 

Specific Responses to Reduce False Burglar 

Alarms

1. Requiring alarm companies to verify alarm 

legitimacy before calling the police (commonly 

called “verified response”). Under this approach, alarm 

monitoring companies must verify the legitimacy of 

alarms (except holdup, duress, and panic alarms) before 

calling the police. Verified response typically involves visual

on-scene verification of a break-in. Verification may also 

be established by remote video surveillance. Audio intrusion 

detection technology is also available.§ However, it is not 

nearly as effective as visual on-scene or video verification 

at this point.§§ As for in-person verification, it is usually 

conducted by private security personnel who travel to the 

location, assess the situation, and if necessary, contact 

police.§§§ By requiring alarm monitoring companies to 

screen alarm activations, police response is reserved for 

true break-ins, actual attempts and holdup, duress, and 

panic alarms. Under this approach, only holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms require permits, whereas burglar alarms 

do not, reducing the administrative costs associated with a 

police-staffed false alarm program.20 

§ Audio intrusion detection technology 

relies on sensors that, when activated, 

transmit a signal to the alarm company 

whereby an operator listens to live 

audio from the location and decides 

whether to notify the police.

§§ London’s Metropolitan Police 

Service (2006) found that audio 

verification false alarm rates were 

80 percent. Several cities in the 

United States, including Fremont 

(California), Salt Lake City, and Burien 

(Washington), have also examined 

audio verification versus visual/video 

verification and found significant false 

alarm rates for audio monitoring. The 

Fremont Police Department (2006) 

found a 96 percent false rate with 

audio monitoring in an analysis of one 

year’s worth of audio alarms. The Salt 

Lake City Police Department (2006) 

found an 82 percent false rate on audio 

monitoring over several years, although 

the number of audio alarms calls was 

modest. The Burien Police Department 

(2006) found a 92 percent false rate 

on audio alarms in its review of nearly 

seven years of audio calls that were 

made from the unincorporated areas 

of King County ,Washington, and 13 

contract cities in King County.

§§§ Private security forces in the 

United States outnumber sworn police 

officers by about four to one (Betten 

and Mervosh 2005). The Private Sector 

Liaison Committee of the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, 

collaborating with alarm industry 

organizations, published guidelines for 

private security response but noted, 

“the alarm industry does not support 

response by other than sworn police 

officers, except as a final step in an 

escalating series of sanctions for alarm 

system abusers or as a supplement 

to response service provided by local 

police.” [International Association of 

Chiefs of Police n.d.(c)].

16 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Cities adopting verified response have found enormous 

decreases in the number of alarm calls, typically around 

90 percent, which improves police response times to other 

types of calls. In 2000, Salt Lake City, Utah, adopted 

verified response using visual verification. By significantly 

reducing the number of calls to which officers needed 

to respond, the Salt Lake City Police Department gained 

an equivalent of five full-time officers, decreased the 

workload of call-takers and dispatchers, and decreased 

the response time to other calls for service. Area alarm 

industry representatives cited increased revenues (as a 

result of the service charge applied for verification) and 

similar sales levels to those before the verified response 

policy.21

This approach may be most feasible in more populous 

areas: jurisdictions with few alarm customers scattered 

over a large area may have difficulty securing a private 

resource that can deliver satisfactory and cost-effective 

response times.22 However, in all likelihood, police in 

those jurisdictions have long response times to these 

alarm calls. In cities adopting verified response, insurance 

companies continue to provide discounts to alarm owners, 

as it is the monitoring itself, not whether it is done by 

police or private security, that appears to matter.23 Over 

the past few years, between 20 and 25 U.S. cities have 

adopted this approach, and several police agencies in 

Canada have done so as well. 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police 

(supported by the National Burglar & Fire Alarm 

Association and the Central Station Alarm Association) 

recommends an approach to reducing false alarms 

that includes, among other things, telephone (or 

other electronic) verification by alarm companies and 

notification to alarm owners every time their alarm 

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 17
activates.24 The difference between this approach and 

verified response is that the latter requires the alarm 

company to make visual or video verification, eliminating 

the police response to almost all false alarms. Common 

arguments against using alarm company personnel 

to verify alarms are that the public expects a police 

response and police are better trained than private 

security to respond to such situations.25 In addition, some 

mass media reports of verified response policies are 

characterized in a light unfavorable to police, creating the 

impression that police are providing less effective service. 

The majority of police agencies that adopted verified 

response had to withstand significant resistance from 

the alarm industry. The alarm industry has defeated 

verified response proposals in many other cities. Adopting 

a verified response policy requires an investment in 

educating political leaders, the public, and interested 

parties (alarm companies, police unions, and the media) 

about the costs and benefits of a modified response. 

It also requires alarm companies’ availability for initial 

response to alarms. 

2. Charging a fee for service for all false holdup, 

duress, and panic alarms. When an alarm is personally 

activated (as in a holdup, duress, or panic alarm), gaining 

additional verification before dispatching a police officer is 

unrealistic. Even though these calls would seem the most 

likely to be true, many will also be false. As a result, a fee 

for service is charged for false holdup, duress, and panic 

alarm calls both so that police do not have to absorb the 

costs of false calls and to encourage responsible handling 

of these alarms. Salt Lake City, Utah, has adopted a fining 

approach to reduce the number of false holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms. In the United Kingdom, a combined 

approach of fines, eventual loss of police service, and 

18 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
§ Those panic devices police provide 

to victims of ongoing crimes, such 

as stalking, may be exempted.

§§ False duress calls from cell 

phones are similar to the problem 

of false mobile personal-alarm calls. 

With the advent of E911 Phase 

2, which reveals the location of 

cell phone users calling 911, police 

agencies will face the dilemma of 

whether to respond to cell phone 

hang-up calls to 911. Most of 

these hang-ups are the result of 

unintentionally dialing 911. The 

911 operator hears no caller and 

has to decide whether to dispatch 

an officer. In essence, these are the 

equivalent of false burglar alarms. 

For more information about this 

particular problem, see the POP 

guide titled Misuse and Abuse of 911.

§§§ The National Burglar & Fire 

Alarm Association and the False 

Alarm Reduction Association offer 

guidance for jurisdictions wishing to 

draft an ordinance providing sample 

language, including definitions; 

registration requirements; duties 

of users, installers, and monitors; 

fines; notifications; suspensions; 

appeals; and reinstatement. Further, 

the guidance includes checklists for 

installers and users, and guidelines 

for setting fines and fees (National 

Burglar & Fire Alarm Association 

and the False Alarm Reduction 

Association 2001). 

device reengineering is used to reduce technology-related 

false alarms.26 Each department should conduct a separate 

analysis of holdup, duress, and panic alarms to identify 

the size and scope of the local problem.

3. Responding to holdup, duress, and panic alarms 

only if they come from a building. This approach is 

intended to stem the burgeoning use of mobile personal 

alarms and should be used in addition to the strategies 

discussed above.§ New technology has prompted 

entrepreneurs to market mobile alarms: some handheld, 

some worn on clothing, others in automobiles. If police 

response is promised as part of these advances, the 

volume of false alarm calls could increase dramatically. To 

combat this potential problem, police agencies can adopt 

policies providing for police response only when an alarm 

originates from a building. Salt Lake City’s ordinance 

includes a section to address this problem, but again, a 

separate analysis of this problem is recommended.§§

Responses With Limited Effectiveness 

4. Establishing an ordinance requiring owners to 

obtain alarm permits and to pay escalating fines 

for false alarms. Many police agencies rely on a local 

alarm ordinance to guide policy and establish false 

alarm fines.§§§ Some ordinances provide for fixed fines, 

others include escalating fines against repeat abusers, 

and a few apply a cost-recovery system. Typically, 

fines are allocated to the general fund and not to the 

police budget. Invariably, alarm owners are not fined 

until they have several false alarms (usually three or 

four). Many ordinances also require alarm owners to 

obtain a permit. In theory, alarm permits help police 

departments to track and fine alarm abusers and to 

notify the most chronic abusers of the suspension 

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 19
of police response. However, some jurisdictions have 

found that some alarm companies do not make their 

customers aware of the permit requirement, and many 

alarm owners do not apply for required permits, which 

severely compromises this response’s effectiveness.27 This 

approach is administratively costly and requires continued 

officer dispatch (except in the most chronic cases).§

Some residents resent police fines for services, as they 

mistakenly believe their taxes cover them. As a result, it 

may be difficult to collect fines; collection rates can be as 

low as 60 percent without significant follow-up.28 Finally, 

some jurisdictions have experienced initial reductions in 

the number of false alarms after an ordinance has been 

passed, but in general, these initial decreases do not 

endure over the long term.29

5. Setting a cost recovery-based fee for all false 

alarm calls. A fee for service would cover all costs 

associated with responding to false alarms. These include 

lost-opportunity costs for officers responding to false 

alarms rather than proactively working on reducing crime 

and disorder problems.§§ A fee for service differs from a 

fine in that it is not punitive; it is meant only to recover 

costs. It is unclear whether a fee for service reduces false 

alarms, though it does reimburse the city for providing a 

police response to calls that are almost always false. Any 

cost-recovery policy would need to incorporate follow-up 

action against nonpayers.

6. Charging permit fees and fines directly to alarm 

companies. To lessen the administrative burden inherent 

in strategies requiring alarm users to obtain permits and to 

pay fines in the event of a false alarm, some jurisdictions 

charge these fees directly to the alarm installation or 

monitoring company. Not only does this practice ensure 

20 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

§ In 2004, the city of Dallas, 

Texas, spent upwards of $650,000 

administering its false alarmreduction program involving fines 

and collections (Dallas City Council 

2005).

§§ Calculating lost-opportunity 

costs might be less difficult for 

departments engaged in problemoriented policing. Line officers 

in these departments proactively 

address specific crime and disorder 

problems.
that all new alarms are registered with police, but it 

also greatly reduces the number of contacts that police 

alarm administrators must make. Rather than contacting 

thousands of alarm owners, alarm administrators make 

contact with a much smaller number of installers and 

monitoring companies. 

7. Outsourcing the administration of permits, fines, 

and fees. Administering permits, fines, and fees can 

be cumbersome and, if not implemented properly, the 

deterrent value of an ordinance is lost. Automation is 

essential to reduce the alarm administrator’s workload.§

These administrative duties can be outsourced to a private 

firm in exchange for a portion of the fees.§§ Even with 

outsourcing, collection rates may be only about 60 or 70 

percent.30 However, it is important to recognize that this 

response only manages, but will not solve, the problem.

8. Requiring alarm monitoring companies to 

make two calls to owners of activated systems 

before calling police. Most jurisdictions require alarm 

monitoring companies to make a single contact with the 

owner of an activated alarm system to learn whether 

the alarm was inadvertently set off during routine 

operations (e.g., arming or disarming the system). A 

practice labeled “enhanced call verification” requires 

monitoring companies to attempt contact using two or 

more phone numbers (for example, an owner’s home 

phone and cell phone) before calling police. Jurisdictions 

adopting this strategy have noted modest reductions 

(around 25 to 40 percent) in the number of false alarm 

calls to police.31 Customer satisfaction may increase 

because fines for police response to false alarms are 

avoided. However, because alarm monitoring companies 

generally handle customers from many jurisdictions, they 

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 21

§ The Central Station Alarm 

Association developed a software 

package, False Alarm Analysis 

Program, to assist jurisdictions 

with the cumbersome task of 

administration. The software creates 

invoices and bills, tracks payment 

delinquency, and provides reports 

that analyze individual alarm users’ 

false alarm rates and those of 

customers of individual monitoring 

companies. The software package 

also has online training. See www.

csaaul.org/faap.htm. However, “off 

the shelf ” software packages may 

not suit every jurisdiction’s needs 

(Kanable 2001). 

§§ The Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

(North Carolina) Police Department 

outsourced the administration and 

tracking of ordinance enforcement 

to a private company (Mowrey n.d.). 

The company launched a media 

campaign to encourage users to 

register alarms and also set up a tollfree telephone number to answer 

questions about the local ordinance 

(Kanable 2001).
may have difficulty applying multiple policies correctly. 

Furthermore, not all alarm companies comply with these 

directives, fearing liability if police are not called to the 

scene when a crime is in fact occurring. It is important 

to note that these efforts to contact the alarm owner are 

not the equivalent of verification. The person called may 

be out of town or away from the location and would have 

no idea if their premise was being burgled. Finally, police 

cannot verify or enforce the “enhanced call verification” 

approach. 

9. Accepting dispatch cancellations. Some police 

agencies will cancel a dispatch upon request by an alarm 

company. The alarm company cancellation is usually based 

on telephone, not visual, verification. This approach can 

lead to decreases in the number of alarm calls, but it also 

inadvertently increases the number of incoming calls to 

dispatchers, because cancellation calls must be fielded and 

dispatched.§

10. Alerting alarm companies about false-alarm 

abusers. Some police agencies contact alarm companies 

with the names of customers who are false-alarm abusers. 

This practice can reduce false alarms if alarm companies 

work with alarm owners to remedy the abuse.32 This 

approach depends on the alarm company’s willingness 

to follow up with its customers, and its capacity to 

bring abusers into line. It works best if both the alarm 

companies and the abusers are charged for costs. 

Alerting alarm companies requires police administrative 

staffing and police response to all alarm calls, and it may 

necessitate additional police resources as the number of 

alarm systems rises. In addition, some alarm companies 

may not be willing to share customer lists with police. 

22 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

§ An evaluation of Memphis, 

Tennessee’s, Alarm Office found 

that, while some alarm companies 

did indeed cancel alarm calls 

before dispatch, the practice did 

not have a measurable impact on 

the overall number of false alarms 

to which police were required 

to respond (Forde and Hellman 

2004). Similarly, since Montgomery 

County, Maryland, enacted its alarm 

ordinance in 1995, alarm monitoring 

companies cancelled 24 percent of 

all requests for dispatch. While this 

reduced the number of false alarms 

to which police responded, it also 

increased dispatchers’ workload 

(Montgomery County Police 

Department 2004). 
11. Setting criteria for temporarily suspending police 

response. After a predetermined number of false alarms, 

some jurisdictions withhold police response to subsequent 

alarm activations.§ Other jurisdictions will not dispatch police 

to locations that do not have a valid alarm permit on file. 

Proper implementation requires quick access to the number 

of prior false alarms and the permit status of the location, 

adding responsibilities to police call dispatchers. This 

response can be combined with a modified verified response 

policy so that either the police or a private security company 

respond to all alarms. Alarm owners should be warned of 

the intent to suspend police response and should receive 

official notification of the suspension of services. Many 

jurisdictions allow owners to appeal the suspension decision 

and to “earn back” police response after some time. This 

approach can involve significant financial costs for the police 

in accommodating the administrative and appeal work this 

approach requires.

12. Publishing alarm companies’ false alarm rates on 

websites or elsewhere. Police can calculate and publish 

the false alarm rates of individual alarm companies to help 

potential buyers make informed decisions. This could prompt 

companies with higher false alarm rates to improve their 

practices, but requires significant police administrative work. 

13. Conducting alarm users’ education classes. Some 

police agencies hold false-alarm classes for abusers, 

usually with some success. These classes typically offer 

information on the scope of the false alarm problem in the 

local area and the basic functions of alarm systems, along 

with maintenance procedures and other practices that can 

help to reduce false alarm activations.§§ Many jurisdictions 

waive the fine incurred for a false alarm if the alarm owner 

attends the class. While some jurisdictions such as Phoenix, 

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 23

§ In 2004, the Los Angeles 

(California) Police Department 

restructured its response to burglar 

alarms by 1) increasing fines, 2) 

suspending service after two false 

alarms in a rolling 12-month period, 

and 3) requiring alarm verification 

for all calls after suspension. In 2005, 

these changes reduced the number 

of alarm calls by about half, led to 

approximately the same cancellation 

rate, and required approximately half 

the number of alarm dispatches (Los 

Angeles Police Department 2005). 

The approach requires a significant 

amount of administrative work, 

including alarm permitting, false 

alarm classes, appeals processes, and 

use of a collection agency for pastdue accounts [Los Angeles Police 

Commission, Alarms Section, Board 

of Police Commissioners (n.d.)].

§§ The False Alarm Reduction 

Association and National Burglar 

& Fire Alarm Association created 

guidelines for establishing an alarm 

users’ awareness school (False Alarm 

Reduction Association and National 

Burglar & Fire Alarm Association 

2000). 
Arizona, and Bellevue, Washington, claim that as few as 

10 percent of attendees have a subsequent false alarm, 

other jurisdictions such as Memphis, Tennessee, and Fort 

Lauderdale, Florida, have not experienced the same success 

level of success.33 The most effective alarm education 

efforts are done by alarm monitoring and installation 

companies providing on-premises instruction so that users 

receive hand-on training with their own equipment.34 Most 

often, however, police teach the alarm reduction classes 

offered. Representatives from alarm companies, arguably 

the group most knowledgeable about reducing false alarm 

calls, sometimes choose not to even attend. In general, 

alarm users’ classes must lead to a dramatic reduction in the 

total number of false alarms in a given jurisdiction to pay 

for the personnel and administrative costs of operating the 

program.

35 Further, it is debatable whether police should 

bear the responsibility for alarm education efforts required 

for using a private consumer product.36

14. Lowering the call priority of alarms. Avoiding 

the political issues involved in disagreeing with the alarm 

industry or in battling with city or county legislators, some 

police agencies have simply lowered the call priority for 

alarms (other than holdup, duress, and panic alarms). Other 

jurisdictions simply issue a general alert, allowing officers 

on patrol to respond at their discretion. This does not 

reduce the number of false alarms, nor does it reduce the 

number of alarm calls coming into a police dispatch center. 

24 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 25

Response Not Recommended

15. Providing an emergency police response to 

unverified burglar alarm calls. A number of police 

agencies still respond to alarm calls with their highest 

priority, often referred to as “priority one,” authorizing 

the swiftest response to the call. The research does not 

support this level of response due to the high rate of false 

alarms. In addition, this approach does nothing to address 

the underlying causes of false alarms. 

Appendix: Summary of Responses to 

False Burglar Alarms

The table below summarizes the responses to false burglar 

alarms, the mechanism by which they are intended to 

work, the conditions under which they ought to work 

best, and some factors you should consider before 

implementing a particular response. It is critical that you 

tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can 

justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most 

cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing 

several different responses. Law enforcement responses 

alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the 

problem.

1.

2.

16

18

Requiring alarm 

companies to 

verify alarm 

legitimacy before 

calling the police 

(commonly 

called “verified 

response”)

Charging a fee 

for service for 

all false holdup, 

duress, and panic 

alarms

The alarm 

company 

responds to 

the scene of 

an alarm and 

calls the police 

only if a crime 

has occurred or 

been attempted. 

If the alarm 

company is in 

visual contact 

with the alarm 

site, such as 

through CCTV, 

and can verify 

a crime or an 

attempt, police 

will respond

Used in 

combination 

with response 1, 

keeps these types 

of alarm calls 

from becoming 

unmanageable

...holdup, panic, 

and duress alarms 

are exempted; 

alarm companies 

are prohibited 

from classifying 

an alarm call 

as duress when 

it isn’t; and 

combined with 

responses 2 and 3 

below

...the alarm 

industry is 

prohibited 

from classifying 

ordinary burglar 

alarms as “duress” 

alarms, and 

combined with 

responses 1 and 3

Requires educating 

the public, police 

union, and media 

to enable police 

leaders to establish 

departmental policy, 

or to encourage 

local (and sometimes 

state) legislators to 

enact ordinances 

Requires permits 

for holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms, 

as well as false 

alarm-reduction 

management to 

monitor trends in 

such calls 

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Effective Responses

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False Burglar Alarms 27
3.

4.

5.

6.

19

19

20

20

Responding to 

holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms 

only if they 

come from a 

building 

Establishing 

an ordinance 

requiring owners 

to obtain alarm 

permits and to 

pay escalating 

fines for false 

alarms

Setting a cost 

recovery-based 

fee for all falsealarm calls

Charging permit 

fees and fines 

directly to alarm 

companies

For an example, 

see the Salt Lake 

City ordinance 

at www.slcgov.

com/police. 

Police may make 

exceptions for 

panic alarms 

given to highrisk domestic 

violence and 

stalking victims

Requires permits 

for alarm owners 

and escalating 

fines for false 

alarms 

The city 

calculates the 

true cost of 

false-alarm 

response, 

including the 

lost-opportunity 

costs for police 

Reduces the 

number of 

contacts police 

must make to 

recover costs, 

and ensures 

all new alarm 

system owners 

obtain permits

Requires outreach 

to mobile-alarm 

manufacturers

Involves 

significant 

administrative 

resources; 

collection rates 

may be low; may 

involve taking 

legal action 

against nonpayers

Involves billing 

and follow-up 

with customers 

who fail to pay; 

may involve 

taking legal action 

against nonpayers

Requires 

cooperation from 

alarm companies

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

...publicized so 

that mobile-alarm 

manufacturers 

know the police 

will not respond

...all alarmed 

premises obtain 

required permits, 

the community 

has an extremely 

low number of 

false alarms, and 

officers have 

sufficient free 

time so that 

responding to 

false alarm calls 

does not impede 

their ability to 

work on actual 

crime problems

...the political 

climate is more 

supportive of 

fees for service 

than “verified 

response”

...alarm 

companies 

recognize the 

value of reduced 

administrative 

workload for 

police

28 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Responses With Limited Effectiveness
7.

8.

9.

10.

21

21

22

22

Outsourcing the 

administration 

of permits, 

fines, and fees

Requiring alarm 

monitoring 

companies 

to make two 

calls to owners 

of activated 

systems before 

calling police

Accepting 

dispatch 

cancellations

Alerting alarm 

companies 

about falsealarm abusers

Private 

companies are 

contracted to 

manage the 

administrative 

burden of 

permitting, 

tracking down, 

and collecting 

fines and fees 

from nonpayers

Provides an 

additional 

opportunity to 

verify the validity 

of an alarm 

by contacting 

owners who 

are not on 

the alarmed 

premises when 

alarm activates

The alarm 

company verifies 

(usually by 

telephone) that 

the alarm was 

false, and then 

calls police, 

who cancel their 

response

Police sort 

records of falsealarm abusers 

by company, 

and notify the 

companies

Manages, but does 

not solve, the false 

alarm problem

Monitoring 

companies 

serving multiple 

jurisdictions may 

have difficulty 

applying multiple 

policies correctly; 

some alarm 

companies fear 

liability if police 

are not called 

immediately

Increases the 

number of 

incoming calls 

dispatchers must 

handle

Requires police 

staff time to 

sort records, and 

alarm company 

cooperation in 

dealing with alarm 

owners

...permitting, 

fine, and fee 

transactions are 

automated

...alarm 

monitoring 

companies 

are diligent in 

applying policy, 

and alarm 

owners have 

multiple contact 

numbers

...established by 

ordinance, and 

alarm companies 

follow through

...accompanied 

by sanctions for 

noncompliance; 

or alarm 

companies, along 

with individual 

alarm owners, 

are charged for 

costs

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False Burglar Alarms 29
11. 

12.

13.

23

23

23

Setting criteria 

for temporarily 

suspending 

police response

Publishing 

alarm 

companies’ 

false alarm rates 

on websites or 

elsewhere

Conducting 

alarm users’ 

education 

classes

Police response 

is withheld for 

properties with 

chronic false 

alarms or for 

those premises 

without a valid 

alarm permit, and 

can be combined 

with a modified 

“verified 

response” policy

Police post alarm 

companies’ false 

alarm rates on 

department 

websites or 

elsewhere

Police hold 

classes for alarm 

abusers to reduce 

the number of 

errors made 

activating and 

deactivating the 

system

Requires 

significant 

administrative 

effort to maintain 

current records of 

prior false alarms 

and permit status

Requires accurate 

and regular 

updating, perhaps 

quarterly. In the 

United Kingdom, 

an inspectorate 

monitors 

companies’ false 

alarm rates. For 

those companies 

unwilling to 

reduce high rates, 

the police do not 

respond to alarms 

without evidence 

of a crime in 

progress37 

If police lead 

classes, they must 

develop expertise 

in typical alarm 

systems and 

their false-trigger 

patterns; must 

lead to a dramatic 

reduction in the 

number of false 

alarms to be costeffective; unclear 

what responsibility 

police should 

have for educating 

users of a private 

consumer product

...police have 

quick access 

to database 

containing the 

number of prior 

false alarms and 

permit status, 

and alarm 

owners are 

notified of the 

intent to suspend 

police response

...police alert 

alarm companies 

that they are 

going to do so, 

and give them 

time to reduce 

their false alarm 

rates before 

publication

...classes are 

taught by the 

alarm installation 

and monitoring 

companies, 

and provide 

on-premises 

instruction so 

users receive 

hands-on 

training

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

30 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
14. 

15.

24

25

Lowering the 

call priority of 

alarms 

Providing a 

high priority 

emergency 

police response 

to unverified 

burglar alarm 

calls

Police code 

alarm calls as 

“low priority” 

for dispatch 

purposes 

Police treat 

alarm calls 

as actual 

emergencies, 

despite extensive 

research findings 

to the contrary

Does not address 

the underlying 

causes of false 

alarms; does not 

reduce the number 

of incoming 

calls to police 

dispatchers

Assumes police 

desire full 

responsibility for 

false alarms, or 

the community 

and legislature are 

unwilling to accept 

extensive research 

concerning the 

percentage of false 

alarms

...police have 

sufficient 

resources to 

respond to 

alarm calls, and 

local legislators 

are unwilling 

to address the 

problem in any 

other way

...the community 

has few crime 

problems, and 

police have 

sufficient 

resources to 

do so 

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False Burglar Alarms 31

Response Not Recommended

Endnotes 1

 Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005). 

2

 Blackstone, Buck and Hakim (2005); International 

Association of Chiefs of Police (n.d.)(a). 

3

 Blackstone, Hakim, and Spiegel (2000); Blackstone, 

Buck, and Hakim (2005).

4

 National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association (2005). 

5

 Blackstone, Hakim, and Spiegel (2000). 

6

 Light (2001); Hakim and Blackstone (1997).

7

 Seattle Police Department (n.d.).

8

 Seattle Police Department (n.d.).

9

 Blackstone, Hakim, and Spiegel (2001); Gilbertson 

(2005).

10 Budd (2001); Palmer, Holmes, and Hollin (2002); 

Hakim, Rengert, and Shachmurove (2001).

11 Cromwell and Olson (2004).

12 Cromwell and Olson (2004). 

13 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004).

14 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004).

15 LeBeau and Vincent (1998).

16 Buck, Hakim, and Gaffney (1993).

17 Budd (2001).

18 Catalano (2005).

19 Budd (2001). 

20 Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005). 

21 Salt Lake City Police Department (2001).

22 Baranzini (2002); Cahalane (2001).

23 Salem Police Department, Burglar Alarm Task Force 

(2004); Steckler (2005); Werner (2005).

24 International Association of Chiefs of Police (2002).

25 International Association of Chiefs of Police (2002).

26 British Security Industry Association (2005).

27 Butterfield (2003); Forde and Hellman (2004); 

Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005); Steckler (2005). 

Endnotes 33
28 Forde and Hellman (2004).

29 Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

30 Stephens (2005). 

31 Mowrey and Rice (2004); Fernandez (2005).

32 Phoenix Police Department (2000).

33 False Alarm Reduction Association and the National 

Burglar & Fire Alarm Association (2000); Security 

Industry Association (2005); Gill and Hemming 

(2003); Forde and Hellman (2004).

34 Gill and Hemming (2003).

35 Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

36 Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

37 Association of Chief Police Officers (2000). 

34 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
References

Association of Chief Police Officers, (2000). “ACPO 

Revises Security Systems Policy: Press Release.” 

October 25. London: Association of Chief Police 

Officers. 

Baranzini, R. (2002). Reducing False Alarms: A Systemic 

Approach. IQ Report 34(6). Washington, D.C.: 

International City/County Management Association.

Betten, M., and M. Mervosh (2005). “Should Police 

Respond to Alarms?” Security Management 49(6):166, 

168.

Blackstone, E., A. Buck, and S. Hakim (2005). “Evaluation 

of Alternative Policies To Combat False Emergency 

Calls.” Evaluation and Program Planning 28(2):233–242.

Blackstone, E., S. Hakim, and U. Spiegel (2001). 

“Congestion in Delivery of Emergency Services in 

Urban Areas: The Case of Police Response to Burglar 

Alarms.” Working paper. Philadelphia: Center for 

Competitive Government, Temple University.

——— (2000). “The Schizophrenian Good: The Case 

of Police Response to Alarms.” Unpublished paper, 

October 24.

British Security Industry Association (2005). Guidelines 

for the Implementation of the ACPO Requirements for 

the Reduction of False Holdup Alarms: The 10-Point 

Plan. Worcester, England: British Security Industry 

Association. www.bsia.co.uk/pdfs/Form_176.pdf. 

References 35
Buck, A., S. Hakim, and M. Gaffney (1993). ”The 

Residential Security System/Homeowner’s Insurance 

Discount Connection.” Security Dealer (April): 28-33.

Budd, T. (2001). Burglary: Practice Messages From the British 

Crime Survey. Briefing Note 5/01. London: Home 

Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit.

Burien Police Department (2006). Personal 

communication, December 5, 2006.

Butterfield, F. (2003). “Alarms Without the Burglars Put 

Strain on Police Budgets.” New York Times, January 17, 

p. A1.

Cahalane, M. (2001). “Reducing False Alarms Has a 

Price—So Does Response: Is the Real Price Worth 

Paying?” Security Journal 14(1):31–53.

Catalano, S. (2005). Criminal Victimization, 2004. 

Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 

City of Milwaukee (2005). “Police Chief Hegerty To 

Update Council Members on Alarm Response 

Policy.” Milwaukee (Wisconsin): City of 

Milwaukee. www.ci.mil.wi.us/display/displayFile.

asp?docid=7312&filename=/User/cklose/

08alarmpolicy.briefing.pdf. 

Cromwell, P., and J. Olson (2004). Breaking and Entering: 

Burglars on Burglary. Belmont (California): Thomson/

Wadsworth.

Dallas City Council (2005). Verified Alarm Response 

Options. www.dallascityhall.com/dallas/eng/council_

briefings/briefings/20051205_alarm.pdf. 

36 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
False Alarm Reduction Association and the National 

Burglar & Fire Alarm Association (2000). How 

To Create an Alarm User Awareness School for Your 

Municipality. Rockville (Maryland): False Alarm 

Reduction Association; Silver Spring (Maryland): 

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004). Crime in the United 

States, 2003. Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. 

Fernandez, L. (2005). “Fremont, Calif., Police To End 

Automatic Response to Home Alarms.” San Jose 

Mercury News, February 5, p. 1B.

Forde, D., and R. Hellman (2004). Update to Best Practice 

Number Three: False Burglar Alarms Since the Formation of 

the Metro Alarm Office. Memphis (Tennessee): Memphis 

Shelby Crime Commission.

Fremont Police Department (2006). Personal 

communication, November 21, 2006.

Gilbertson, T. (2005). “Reducing False Security Alarm Calls 

for Police Service: A Policy Research Note.” Criminal 

Justice Policy Review 16(4):499–506.

Gill, M., and M. Hemming (2003). The Causes of False 

Alarms. Leicester (England): Perpetuity Press.

Hakim, S., and E. Blackstone (1997). Securing Home and 

Business: A Guide to the Electronic Security Industry. 

Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

References 37
Hakim, S., G. Rengert, and Y. Shachmurove (2001). 

“Target Search of Burglars: A Revised Economic 

Model.” Papers in Regional Science 80(2):121–137.

International Association of Chiefs of Police (n.d.)(a). 

“False Alarm Perspectives.” www.theiacp.org/

documents/pdfs/Publications/FalseAlarmPerspective

s%2Epdf. 

——— (n.d.)(b). “Response to Mobile Security Alarm 

Devices.” www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/pubs/pslc/pslc8.

introduction.htm. 

——— (n.d)(c). “Nonsworn Alarm Responder 

Guidelines.” www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/

Publications/nonswornalarmresponderguidelines.pdf. 

——— (2002). “IACP/PSLC Position Paper: Verified 

Response.” Alexandria (Virginia): International 

Association of Chiefs of Police. www.siacinc.org/

documents/IACP-PSLC%20Documents/IACP-verifie

d%20response%20position%20letter.pdf.

Kanable, R. (2001). “False Alarms: A Call for Law 

Enforcement, the Alarm Industry, and Citizens.” Law 

Enforcement Technology 28(6):54–56, 58, 60, 62.

LeBeau, J., and K. Vincent (1998). “Mapping It Out: 

Repeat-Address Burglar Alarms and Burglaries.” In 

D. Weisburd and T. McEwen (eds.), Crime Mapping and 

Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 8. New 

York: Criminal Justice Press.

38 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Light, J. (2001). “The Effects of Privatization on Public 

Services: A Historical Evaluation Approach.” New 

Directions for Evaluation 90:25–39.

London Metropolitan Police Service (2006). Personal 

communication, December 7, 2006.

Los Angeles Police Commission, Alarm Section, Board of 

Police Commissioners (n.d.). Frequently Asked Questions. 

Los Angeles: Los Angeles Police Commission. www.

lapdonline.org/organization/bpc/commission_

investigation/alarm/alarm_faqs.htm.

Los Angeles Police Department (2005). Two-Alarm Dispatch 

Status Report, January 2005 to October 2005. Los Angeles: 

Los Angeles Police Department. 

Montgomery County Police Department (2004). False 

Alarm Reduction. Rockville (Maryland): Montgomery 

County Police Department.

Mowrey, G. (n.d.). Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department 

False Alarm Reduction, Billing, and Tracking Program. 

Charlotte (North Carolina): Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department. 

Mowrey, G., and D. Rice (2004). “Alarm Industry Steps Up 

To Reduce False Alarms Calls Through Enhanced Call 

Verification.” Police Chief 71(9):14–15.

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association (2005). Industry 

Statistics—Electronic Security Industry. www.alarm.org/

stats-industry.html. 

References 39
National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association and the False 

Alarm Reduction Association (2001). NBFAA/FARA 

Model Burglar Alarm Ordinance. Silver Spring (Maryland): 

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association; Rockville 

(Maryland): False Alarm Reduction Association.

Palmer, E., A. Holmes, and C. Hollin (2002). 

“Investigating Burglars’ Decisions: Factors Influencing 

Target Choice, Method of Entry, Reasons for 

Offending, Repeat Victimization of a Property, and 

Victim Awareness.” Security Journal 15(1):7–18.

Phoenix Police Department (2000). False Alarm Reduction 

Plan. Phoenix (Arizona): Phoenix Police Department.

Salem Police Department, Burglar Alarm Task Force 

(2004). Final Report and Recommendations to the Mayor 

and City Council. Salem (Oregon): Salem Police 

Department. www.cityofsalem.net/~citygov/staff_

reports/2004/011204/5.b.pdf. 

Salt Lake City Police Department (2006). Personal 

communication, November 30, 2006.

———— (2001). “The False Alarm Solution: Verified 

Response.” Submission for the Herman Goldstein 

Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. 

www.popcenter.org/Library/Goldstein/2001/01-

55(F).pdf. 

Salt Lake Tribune (2000). “Crying Wolf.” March 15, p. A12. 

Seattle Police Department (n.d.). False Alarms. Seattle: 

Seattle Police Department. www.seattle.gov/police/

prevention/Alarms/default.htm. 

40 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Security Industry Association (2005). SIA White Paper: 

Solution to False Alarm Problem. Alexandria (Virginia): 

Security Industry Association.

Security Sales and Integration (2005). Dallas Approves 

Verified Response for Businesses. Torrance (California): 

Security Sales and Integration. www.securitysales.com/

t_ci_newsView.cfm?nid=2630.

Spivey, K., and R. Cobb (1997). “Public Safety/Private 

Sector Working To Solve the Problem.” The Police Chief

64(6):44–52. 

Steckler, C. (Fremont Police Department) (2005). Personal 

communication, December 13. 

Stephens, D. (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department) 

(2005). Personal communication, December 17. 

Werner, S. (Salt Lake City Police Department) (2005). 

Personal communication, December 15. 

White, J. (2002). The False Alarm Problem. Arlington 

(Texas): Arlington Police Department. 

References 41

About the Author

Rana Sampson

Rana Sampson is a national problem-oriented policing consultant 

and the former director of public safety for the University of 

San Diego. She was previously a White House Fellow; National 

Institute of Justice Fellow; senior researcher and trainer at the 

Police Executive Research Forum; attorney; and patrol officer, 

undercover narcotics officer and patrol sergeant with the New 

York City Police Department, where she was awarded several 

commendations of merit and won the National Improvement of 

Justice Award. She is the coauthor (with Michael Scott) of Tackling 

Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case Studies in Problem-Solving, 

which documents high-quality crime control efforts from around 

the United States, Canada and Europe. She is a judge for the 

Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented 

Policing, a former judge for the police Fulbright awards, and a 

commissioner with California's Commission on Peace Officer 

Standards and Training. Sampson holds a law degree from 

Harvard and a bachelor's degree from Barnard College, Columbia 

University.

About the Author 43

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An 

Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers,

by John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide 

is a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. 

It provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 

problem-oriented policing efforts.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.

Recommended Readings 45
• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 

1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This 

document produced by the National Institute of Justice 

in collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A 

similar publication is available for the award winners from 

subsequent years. The documents are also available at 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective 

or ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory 

for Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 

Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 

1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 

theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory 

have practical implications for the police in their efforts to 

prevent crime.

• Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 

Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 

analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 

can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 

policing practices.

46 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 

how a police agency can implement the concept.

• Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 

by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). 

Provides a thorough review of significant policing research 

about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat 

victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings 

to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police 

departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by 

improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and 

securing productive partnerships.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 

First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 

Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 

Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 

(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 

rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 

problem-solving process, and provides examples of 

effective problem-solving in one agency.

Recommended Readings 47
• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 

Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 

Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 

Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 1998) (also available at www.cops.usdoj.

gov). Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, 

basic information on the SARA model and detailed 

suggestions about the problem-solving process.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 

Studies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 

methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 

20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 

Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson 

and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 

for Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 

police to analyzing problems within the context of 

problem-oriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 

many of the basics of research as it applies to police 

management and problem-solving.

48 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 

2001. ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

2. Street Prostitution, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-02-9

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 

Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7

5. False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition. Rana Sampson. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-05-3

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-07-X

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 

Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-14-2

16. Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs, 2nd Edition. Michael S. 

Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-15-0

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-16-9

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 

2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-18-5

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 49
20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly.

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-30-4

23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 

Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

24. Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-33-9

25. Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-35-3

26. Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and Kenneth J. Peak. 

2004. ISBN: 1-932582-36-3

27. Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-39-8

28. Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-42-8

29. Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-43-6

30. Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

31. Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos and Mike 

Hough. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-45-2

32. Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-46-0

33. Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-47-9

34. Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-50-9

35. School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-9325802-51-7

36. Drunk Driving. Michael S. Scott, Nina J. Emerson, Louis B. 

Antonacci, and Joel B. Plant. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-57-6

37. Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1932582-56-8

38. The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. Newman. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-59-2

39. Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. Eck. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-60-6

50 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
40. People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-63-0

41. Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley 

and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-65-7

42. Witness Intimidation. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-67-3

43. Burglary at Single-Family House Construction 

Sites. Rachel Boba and Roberto Santos. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

44. Disorder at Day Laborer Sites. Rob Guerette. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-72-X

45. Domestic Violence. Rana Sampson. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-74-6

46. Thefts of and from Cars on Residential Streets 

and Driveways. Todd Keister. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-

76-2

47. Drive-By Shootings. Kelly Dedel. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

Response Guides series:

• The Benefits and Consequences of Police 

Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

• Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should 

You Go Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

• Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns.

Emmanuel Barthe. 2006 ISBN: 1-932582-66-5

• Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 

Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 

2005. ISBN: 1-932582-55-X

• Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 

2006 ISBN: 1-932582-58-4

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 51
Problem-Solving Tools series: 

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory 

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

• Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. 

Schultz. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7

• Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem 

Solving. Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5

• Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm 

Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1

Understanding Risky Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke 

and John E. Eck. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Abandoned Vehicles

Bank Robbery

Bicycle Theft

Crowd Control at Stadiums and Other Entertainment Venues

Child Abuse

Crime and Disorder in Parks

Pedestrian Injuries and Fatalities

Robbery of Convenience Stores

Traffic Congestion Around Schools

Transient Encampments

•

52 False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition
Problem-Solving Tools

Designing a Problem Analysis System

Displacement

Implementing Responses to Problems

Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in 

Problem Solving

Partnering with Community Developers to Address Public 

Safety Problems

Response Guides

Enhancing Lighting

Sting Operations

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 

Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit 

COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 53


For More Information:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below.

e0307265 March 2007

ISBN: 1-932582-04-5 

www.cops.usdoj.gov