[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-13731

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00284-JB-N-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OSCAR ORLANDO GUILLEN-ORELLANA, 

a.k.a. Oscar Guillen-Orellana, 

a.k.a. Oscar Orlando Guillen, 

a.k.a. Oscar Guillen, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

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(April 12, 2021)

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Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Oscar Guillen-Orellana appeals his 41-month sentence imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry into the United States after having 

been deported or removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He 

argues that the within-guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable because 

the district court ignored his mitigating personal circumstances and motives for 

unlawfully reentering the United States—namely, the fact that he was fleeing 

Honduras because his life was threatened and because he needed to support his 

common-law wife and three minor children who were left destitute following his 

prior deportation.

1

 After review, we affirm. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The district 

court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to 

comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a 

sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, 

provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from future 

criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court must also consider the nature 

1 The record reflects that Guillen-Orellana was deported previously from the United 

States to Honduras in 2006 and again in 2010. 

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and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant. Id. § 3553(a)(1). We examine whether a sentence is substantively 

reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant 

factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor 

significant weight, or (3) “commits a clear error of judgment in considering the 

proper factors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 

2015) (quotation omitted). Because such an abuse of discretion infrequently 

occurs, “it is only the rare sentence that will be substantively unreasonable.” Id.

(quotation omitted). The burden rests on the party challenging the sentence to 

show “that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) 

factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” Id. We will 

“vacate the sentence if, but only if, we ‘are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of 

reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 

F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 41-month 

sentence, which was at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range of 41 to 51 

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months’ imprisonment. The record reflects that the district court considered 

Guillen-Orellana’s request for a sentence of time-served given (1) his non-criminal 

motives for returning to the United States after being deported to Honduras for a 

second time because he was “threatened by criminals and felt compelled to leave 

the country in order to avoid being killed”; and (2) his need to support financially 

his wife and children who remained in the United States and were left homeless 

after his prior deportation.2

 The district court stated that it understood and 

“sympathize[d]” with Guillen-Orellana’s motives and his family’s circumstances, 

but that Guillen-Orellana’s conduct was still illegal and a sentence at the low-end 

of the guidelines range was appropriate in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 

Guillen-Orellana has not established that the district court erred in its consideration 

of the relevant factors. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256; United States v. 

Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight to be accorded any given 

§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” 

(quotation omitted)).

2 Guillen-Orellana explained at sentencing that since his arrest in the instant case, his 

family was again in similar circumstances because his wife was unable to work due to having to 

home school the children during the pandemic and the family had received notices of eviction 

and their car had been repossessed. He urged the district court to have “mercy” and impose a 

time-served sentence so that he could go to another country and work in order to support his 

family. 

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Further, Guillen-Orellana’s 41-month sentence is within the guidelines range 

and well-below the statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment,3 which are both 

indicators of reasonableness. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (“Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the 

guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect [such a sentence] . . . to be 

reasonable.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 

(11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that is below the statutory maximum is 

another indicator of reasonableness). Accordingly, we conclude the sentence is 

substantively reasonable and affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

3 Guillen-Orellana faced a statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment because he was 

removed previously following a conviction for an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) 

(providing that any alien reenters the United States illegally “whose removal was subsequent to a 

conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, . . . shall be fined under such title, 

imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both”). 

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