UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 95-5918

ANTHONY COREY ALEXANDER, a/k/a

Troy Williams, a/k/a Troy Smith,

a/k/a Troy B. Jackson,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CR-94-589)

Submitted: October 17, 1996

Decided: October 25, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Douglas H. Westbrook, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Margaret B. Seymour, United States Attorney, Robert H. Bickerton,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Corey Alexander appeals his conviction entered pursuant

to a plea made in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.

25 (1990). The district court convicted Alexander of one count of

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute

cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 846 (1994), five

substantive drug counts in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1) (1994),

one count of conspiracy to engage in money laundering in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (1994), and two substantive counts of money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), 1957(a) (1994).

Alexander alleges that the district court erred in refusing to decrease

his offense level based upon acceptance of responsibility under USSG

§ 3E1.1 (Nov. 1994). We affirm.

We review the district court's determination regarding acceptance

of responsibility for clear error. United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553,

557 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 905

(4th Cir. 1989)). The district court judge has great discretion in applying this adjustment. See United States v. White , 875 F.2d 427, 431

(4th Cir. 1989). In determining whether the defendant is qualified for

the reduction, the district court should consider whether the defendant

truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction.

USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)); see United States v. Martinez, 901

F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1990).

Alexander was charged with transporting quantities of cocaine

from Florida to South Carolina, involvement with others in the distribution of crack and cocaine powder in the Charleston area, and the

pick-up and delivery of approximately $70,000 of funds that were the

proceeds of drug transactions which he transported to a co-defendant.

While Alexander admitted to selling five to six kilograms of cocaine

powder, knowing that it would be sold in South Carolina, and that he

 2
picked up and delivered $70,000 in cash to a co-defendant, he did not

admit to most of the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction.

Alexander alleges that the district court erred to the extent that its

denial of acceptance of responsibility was based upon a finding that

an Alford plea precludes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

At sentencing, the district court did not hold that the Alford plea precluded Alexander from receiving the reduction, and properly considered other evidence regarding the reduction. Other circuits have

addressed this issue and held that a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility is not automatically barred by the Alford nature of the

plea, but that the plea is a relevant factor to consider. See United

States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Burns, 925 F.2d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Tucker,

925 F.2d 990, 991 (6th Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction because the district court did

not clearly err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility

under USSG § 3E1.1. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3