U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

B a n k R o b b e r y

by Deborah Lamm Weisel

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

No. 48
www.PopCenter.org

Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site 

at www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help 

you deal more effectively with crime and disorder in your 

community, including:

• Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides

• Interactive training exercises

• Online access to research and police practices

• Online problem analysis module.

Designed for police and those who work with them to 

address community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great 

resource in problem-oriented policing.

Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
Bank Robbery

Deborah Lamm Weisel

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#2004CKWXK002 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein 

are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official 

position of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific 

companies, products, or services should not be considered an 

endorsement of the product by the author or the U.S. Department 

of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement 

discussion of the issues.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-78-9

March 2007

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

Guide No. 48

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series i

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about 

how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime 

and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention 

and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to 

investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. Neither 

do they cover all of the technical details about how to 

implement specific responses. The guides are written for 

police—of whatever rank or assignment—who must address 

the specific problem the guides cover. The guides will be 

most useful to officers who:

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles 

and methods. The guides are not primers in problemoriented policing. They deal only briefly with the initial 

decision to focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze 

the problem, and means to assess the results of a problemoriented policing project. They are designed to help police 

decide how best to analyze and address a problem they have 

already identified. (A companion series of Problem-Solving Tools

guides has been produced to aid in various aspects of problem 

analysis and assessment.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the 

complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to spend 

perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and responding to 

it. Carefully studying a problem before responding helps you 

design the right strategy, one that is most likely to work in your 

community. You should not blindly adopt the responses others 

have used; you must decide whether they are appropriate to 

your local situation. What is true in one place may not be true 

elsewhere; what works in one place may not work everywhere.

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing police 

business. The guides describe responses that other police 

departments have used or that researchers have tested. While 
ii Bank Robbery

not all of these responses will be appropriate to your 

particular problem, they should help give a broader view 

of the kinds of things you could do. You may think 

you cannot implement some of these responses in your 

jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when 

police have discovered a more effective response, they have 

succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving 

the response to the problem. (A companion series of 

Response Guides has been produced to help you understand 

how commonly-used police responses work on a variety of 

problems.) 

• Understand the value and the limits of research 

knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful 

research is available to the police; for other problems, 

little is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series 

summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate 

the need for more research on that particular problem. 

Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to 

all the questions you might have about the problem. The 

research may help get you started in designing your own 

responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This 

will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local 

problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, 

not every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has 

every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so 

would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The 

references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 

on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of 

research on the subject. 

• Are willing to work with others to find effective 

solutions to the problem. The police alone cannot 

implement many of the responses discussed in the guides. 

They must frequently implement them in partnership with 

other responsible private and public bodies including other 
About the Problem-Specific Guides Series iii

government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 

private businesses, public utilities, community groups, 

and individual citizens. An effective problem-solver must 

know how to forge genuine partnerships with others 

and be prepared to invest considerable effort in making 

these partnerships work. Each guide identifies particular 

individuals or groups in the community with whom 

police might work to improve the overall response to that 

problem. Thorough analysis of problems often reveals 

that individuals and groups other than the police are in 

a stronger position to address problems and that police 

ought to shift some greater responsibility to them to do 

so. Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility 

for Public Safety Problems, provides further discussion of this 

topic.

The COPS Office defines community policing as 

“a policing philosophy that promotes and supports 

organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce 

the fear of crime and social disorder through problemsolving tactics and police-community partnerships.” These 

guides emphasize problem-solving and police-community 

partnerships in the context of addressing specific public 

safety problems. For the most part, the organizational 

strategies that can facilitate problem-solving and policecommunity partnerships vary considerably and discussion of 

them is beyond the scope of these guides.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police 

practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, 

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and 

Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police 

practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that 

the police everywhere experience common problems. In 
iv Bank Robbery

a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is 

important that police be aware of research and successful 

practices beyond the borders of their own countries.

Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the 

research literature and reported police practice and is 

anonymously peer-reviewed by line police officers, police 

executives and researchers prior to publication. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to 

provide feedback on this guide and to report on your 

own agency’s experiences dealing with a similar problem. 

Your agency may have effectively addressed a problem 

using responses not considered in these guides and your 

experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This 

information will be used to update the guides. If you wish 

to provide feedback and share your experiences it should 

be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.

For more information about problem-oriented policing, 

visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 

www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access 

to:

• the Problem-Specific Guides series

• the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools series

• instructional information about problem-oriented policing 

and related topics

• an interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise

• an interactive Problem Analysis Module

• a manual for crime analysts

• online access to important police research and practices

• information about problem-oriented policing conferences 

and award programs. 
Acknowledgments v

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are produced by the 

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, whose officers are 

Michael S. Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate 

Director) and Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). 

While each guide has a primary author, other project 

team members, COPS Office staff and anonymous peer 

reviewers contributed to each guide by proposing text, 

recommending research and offering suggestions on 

matters of format and style. 

The project team that developed the guide series 

comprised Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin 

Law School), Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), 

John E. Eck (University of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott 

(University of Wisconsin Law School), Rana Sampson 

(Police Consultant), and Deborah Lamm Weisel (North 

Carolina State University.) 

Members of the San Diego; National City, California; 

and Savannah, Georgia police departments provided 

feedback on the guides’ format and style in the early 

stages of the project.

Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS 

Office. Research for the guide was conducted at the 

Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 

direction of Phyllis Schultze. Stephen Lynch edited this 

guide.

Contents

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of Bank Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

What this Guide Covers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Trends in Bank Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Factors Contributing to Bank Robbery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Increased Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Lucrative Rewards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Low Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Bank Security Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Types of Bank Robbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Escape Routes in Target Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Robbery Risk and Prior Victimization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Temporal Patterns of Bank Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Potential Bank Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Bank Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Individual Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Contents vii
viii Bank Robbery

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

General Requirements for an Effective Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Specific Responses to Bank Robberies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Reducing Rewards to Robbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Increasing Perceptions of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Increasing Risk of Apprehension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Increasing Difficulty of Offending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Responses with Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Bank Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
The Problem of Bank Robbery 1

The Problem of Bank Robbery

What This Guide Covers

This guide begins by describing the problem of bank 

robbery and reviewing the factors that increase its risks. 

It then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze 

your local bank robbery problem. Finally, it reviews 

responses to the problem of bank robbery as identified 

through research and police practice.

Bank robbery is but one aspect of a larger set of problems 

related to robbery and to financial crimes involving banks. 

This guide is limited to addressing the particular harms 

created by bank robbery. Related problems not directly 

addressed in this guide include:

robberies of financial couriers, including armored 

carriers

burglary, larceny, and extortion of banks

bank fraud, including check and credit card fraud§

insider crimes, such as embezzlement

robberies at automated teller machines§§ 

other types of commercial robbery.§§§

Each of these problems requires separate analysis. Several 

are covered in other guides in this series, all of which are 

listed at the end of this article. For the most up-to-date 

listing, see www.popcenter.org. 

•

•

•

•

•

•

§ See Problem-Specific Guide No. 

21, Check and Card Fraud.

§§ See Problem-Specific Guide No. 

8, Robbery of Automated Teller Machines.

§§§ See Problem-Specific Guide No. 

34, Robbery of Taxi Drivers.
2 Bank Robbery

A bank is a specific type of financial institution but the 

term is widely used to refer to all financial institutions, 

including banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. In 

the United States, the term primarily refers to financial 

institutions with deposits that are federally insured and 

that fall under the federal Bank Protection Act. This guide 

is focused on individual retail bank branches at different 

locations while the term bank refers to the financial 

corporation that operates the branches. Most bank 

robberies are robberies of bank branches. 

This guide is not about investigating bank robberies. 

Neither does it cover serial bank robberies—that is, bank 

robberies that are committed by the same offender or 

offenders over a period of time—because patterns related 

to a single offender are not generally consistent with the 

problems and solutions described in this guide. 

Trends in Bank Robbery

Bank robberies are relatively uncommon: only about 2 of 

every 100 robberies are of a bank.1 Although violence is 

rare, employees and customers are at some risk of injury.§ 

If nothing else, being victimized can be terrifying. In 

addition, bank robberies can invoke fear in the community 

at large, as most are well-covered by the media. And in 

fact, a distinctive bank robbery such as the fatal 1998 

shoot-out between police and two bank robbers armed 

with assault weapons in Los Angeles can influence public 

images of crime for many years. 

Because of the potential for violence, police always 

respond quickly to a bank robbery in progress. As one 

police commander said, “When a bank robbery goes 

down, all hell breaks loose in a police department.”2

§ Injuries occur in about 2 percent 

of bank robberies in the United 

States and in 6 percent of robberies 

in Australia (Maguire and Pastore, 

1997; Pastore and Maguire, 2005; 

Borzycki, 2003). A death occurs 

in about 30 percent of U.S. bank 

robberies (Pastore and Maguire, 

2005). 
The Problem of Bank Robbery 3

The likelihood of catching a bank robber on or near the 

scene is higher than for other crimes. This is because 

most bank robberies are reported very quickly, most occur 

during daylight hours, many have multiple witnesses, and 

some produce photographic images that can be used to 

canvass the surrounding area for suspects. Consequently, 

many robbers are caught the same day. In fact, the 

clearance rate for bank robbery is among the highest 

of all crimes—nearly 60 percent. Although the FBI has 

jurisdiction over most U.S. bank robberies, local police 

typically respond first.§

§ Although the FBI has jurisdiction 

over most bank robberies in 

the United States, offenses are 

investigated concurrently with local 

police; in fact, local agencies may 

handle the entire investigation. 

The FBI maintains the Bank 

Crime Statistics database (BCS), an 

important investigative tool that 

documents offender and offense 

characteristics across jurisdictions. 

Despite the federal role, the primary 

impact of bank robbery is inherently 

local, as citizens and political 

leaders look to local police for 

solutions. Local police are often best 

positioned to advise banks about 

preventive strategies because of their 

established relationships with local 

bank employees. 

Figure 1: Bank Robberies in the United States,

1985-2004 (Uniform Crime Reports: 1986-2005)
4 Bank Robbery

The United States experienced a dramatic increase in 

bank robberies between 1965 and 1975, when the number 

of crimes quadrupled from 847 to 3,517. Despite the 

enactment of the federal Bank Protection Act in 1968, 

robberies continued to rise through the early 1990s and 

now average around 8,800 per year (see Figure 1).§ Other 

countries have faced similar fluctuations in the number of 

bank robberies. 

For the most part, the incidence of bank robbery is 

closely related to other crime trends, especially commercial 

robbery.3 In the United States, banks have comprised an 

increasing proportion of the nation’s commercial robberies: 

in 1989, 6 percent of commercial robberies were of banks; 

this proportion increased steadily to 9 percent in 2004.4

(See Figure 2.)§§ 

Although bank robberies track crime trends, they vary by 

the size of the jurisdiction. In recent years, bank robberies 

in smaller U.S. cities have comprised an increasing share 

of commercial robberies: nearly 12 percent of commercial 

robberies in smaller cities are of banks, compared to 8 

percent in larger cities.§§§ (See Figure 2.) 

§ The number of bank robberies in 

Figure 1 are those reported by local 

police to the FBI’s Uniform Crime 

Report, not those recorded in BCS.

§§ The contribution of banks to the 

total number of commercial robberies 

can change over time. For example, 

although bank robberies in Australia 

increased 52 percent during one seven 

year period, they also dropped from 9 

to 6 of commercial robberies during 

that same period (Taylor, 2004). In 

the Netherlands, banks comprised an 

average of 26 percent of commercial 

robberies over seven years, but the 

proportion varied from as little as 

15 percent to as much as 33 percent 

in any given year (Van Koppen and 

Janssen, 1999). 

§§§ Computed from data in the FBI’s 

Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the 

United States (1989-2004).

Figure 2: Banks as percent of Commercial 

Robbery in the U.S.

1995-2004

14%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

U.S.

Largest cities (250,000+)

Smallest cities (10,000-25,000)
The Problem of Bank Robbery 5

Evidence suggests that urban bank robberies have been 

somewhat displaced in recent years; the share of bank 

robberies in small towns increased from 20 percent in 

1996 to about 33 percent in 2002.5 Still, the majority of 

bank robberies are concentrated in urban areas. Although 

this concentration is often attributed to the fact that 

there are more branches in urban areas, the number of 

robberies is disproportionately higher than the number 

of branches. In Canada, for example, seven cities have 

30 percent of all bank branches but 66 percent of all 

bank robberies;6 in the United Kingdom, London has 10 

percent of the nation’s branches but 39 percent of its 

robberies.§ 

Just as bank robberies are more common in urban areas, 

bank robberies within a jurisdiction tend to cluster where 

there are more banks. Branches are often located in 

groups near retail shopping areas, in commercial districts, 

and along major transportation corridors. Although 

individual branches in poorer areas seem to suffer more 

robberies,7 this primarily reflects the fact that there are 

fewer branches in such areas. Bank robberies are actually 

more numerous in more affluent neighborhoods. In 

one city, for example, only 3 percent of bank robberies 

occurred in areas considered as poor.8 

Julie Trinks

In commercial or retail shopping areas, bank 

branches often cluster. On this busy street across 

from a shopping center, six banks are located 

adjacent to one another.

§ The concentration is most visible 

at the city level. For example, 

California has 15 percent of all U.S. 

bank branches and a proportional 

18 percent of all U.S. bank robberies 

(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

2003); most of the state’s bank 

robberies, however, are concentrated 

in the Los Angeles area.
6 Bank Robbery

Factors Contributing to Bank Robbery

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem 

will help frame local analysis, determine good effectiveness 

measures, recognize key intervention points, and select 

appropriate responses.

Increases in bank robberies can largely be explained by 

three factors.

1. More bank outlets and extended hours increase 

opportunities for robberies. 

2. Banks remain the most lucrative of all robbery 

targets; moreover, 80 percent of stolen money is never 

recovered.

3. Bank robberies are usually fast, low risk crimes, 

because employees are trained to comply with a robber’s 

demands. Moreover, although the risk of arrest is high, 

much of this risk is short term, and risk — as reflected 

by clearances — has declined over time.

Increased Opportunity 

Banks are plentiful and, in many places, increasingly so. 

Retail banking is highly competitive, and consolidation in 

recent decades through mergers and acquisitions has led 

to an expansion into new markets. In 1970, there were 

approximately 22,000 bank outlets in the United States; by 

2000 that number had more than tripled to 70,000.9

Much of the growth in the number of bank outlets is 

attributable to the explosion of mini-branches—also known 

as in-store branches—in retail grocery stores and big-box 
The Problem of Bank Robbery 7

retailers such as Wal-Mart.10 The increase in in-store 

branches is predominately an urban phenomenon.§ Instore branches less expensive to open and to operate than 

traditional branches, and banks can capitalize on exclusive 

agreements with particular retailers to rapidly increase 

the number of outlets. Because profit underlies bank 

expansion efforts, the number of branches within any 

jurisdiction can substantially expand or contract over time. 

Once well-known for “banker’s hours”—referring to a 

short working day—many branches now have extended 

operating hours. To attract customers, virtually all instore branches remain open into the evening hours during 

the week, operate a full day on Saturday, and may offer 

Sunday hours as well. The increase in operating hours 

effectively increases bank exposure to robbery by at least 

25 percent. As banks have become more convenient for 

their customers, they have also become more convenient 

for robbers.

§ The rise of in-store branches has 

been paralleled by the loss of others. 

In Australia, the number of branches 

dropped from 5,003 to 1,300 in 10 

years; bank robberies also dropped 

precipitously (Borzycki, 2003). 

Julie Trinks

Although bank branches in supermarkets 

might seem especially vulnerable to robbery, 

the escape route is difficult to navigate 

because of shopping carts, displays, strollers, 

and numerous customers.
8 Bank Robbery

Lucrative Rewards

Although many banks limit the amount of cash on 

hand and control access to it within the branch, banks 

nevertheless remain a source of easy cash for robbers.11 

In fact, banks are the most lucrative commercial robbery 

targets. In the United Kingdom, banks suffer the highest 

average losses from armed robberies. In the United 

States, bank robbers net just over $4,000 per robbery;§ 

this represents about 60 percent of financial losses from 

commercial robberies, despite the fact that bank robberies 

comprise less than 10 percent of the total for this crime 

type.12

Although the average take§§ hardly seems worth the 

punishment, interviews indicate that most robbers would 

be satisfied with much less.13 In addition, although many 

bank robbers are eventually apprehended, the stolen 

money usually is not: only 20 percent of money taken in 

bank robberies is ever recovered.14 

Low Risk

For a robber, there are three main reasons why bank 

branches may be considered predictable and relatively lowrisk targets.

1. Branches have standardized designs and 

predictable layouts and operations.

2. Bank employees are unarmed and consistently 

compliant.§§§ Even robbery transactions are 

handled quickly and efficiently.

3. Most robbers avoid apprehension, at least 

initially. 

§ This loss is the amount reported 

by local police in the Uniform Crime 

Reports. The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (2003) reports that the 

average loss is $8,000. 

§§ Calculations of average losses 

are somewhat misleading as they 

include robberies in which no money 

is taken; including losses from these 

failed robberies dilutes average 

bank losses. If such attempts are 

excluded in calculating averages, the 

average loss increases by nearly 25 

percent (Matthews, 1996). Reporting 

averages also masks big takes. In 

Dade County, Florida for example, 

only 10 percent of robbers stole 

over $10,000; however, the most 

successful robbery netted $60,000. In 

Chicago, a solitary robbery in 2004 

netted more than $225,000 (Vardalis 

and Cox, 1998; McCormick, 2005).

§§§ Employee characteristics likely 

affect a robber’s perception of 

compliance; tellers are often young 

and predominately female, whereas 

robbers are predominately male. 
The Problem of Bank Robbery 9

Predictable Design

Banks have highly uniform business practices and interior 

designs.15 Branches have a predictable physical footprint 

that features a centralized entry and a group of chest-high 

teller windows arrayed in close proximity to the entrance. 

Although such uniformity may help customers feel 

comfortable banking in any branch, it also provides great 

predictability for robbers. 

Compliant Victims 

During a robbery, bank practices are highly standardized; 

consequently, robbers know that they can count on 

compliant victims. Most banks—consistent with police 

advice—direct employees to comply quickly with robbers’ 

demands.16 Tellers willingly empty their cash drawers when 

presented with a simple robbery demand note, whether 

or not violence is threatened or a weapon is displayed. 

The bank’s primary objective is to protect the safety and 

security of its employees and customers by reducing 

the likelihood of violence. Consequently, the risk that a 

robber will encounter resistance is extremely low. 

Bank employees are so compliant that the robbery itself 

is a quick and efficient transaction; more than two-thirds 

of bank robberies are completed in three minutes or 

less.17 Robbers often wait in the teller’s line with legitimate 

customers and pass a demand note to the teller. In many 

robberies, the event is handled so discreetly that other 

customers and even other employees are not even aware 

that a crime has occurred until after the robber has left 

the premises. 
10 Bank Robbery

Risk of Apprehension 

Although arrest is the primary risk to a bank robber,§ 

most do not believe they will be caught.18 Indeed, most 

bank robberies are successful, at least initially§§—about 10 

percent of all bank robberies fail19—that is, the robberies 

are not completed. The failures no doubt contribute 

to the 15 percent of bank robbers who are arrested at 

the scene20 and the one-third of bank robberies that 

are solved the same day.21 Overall, 60 percent of bank 

robberies are solved§§§ and about half are solved within 

30 days.22 However, it takes up to 18 months to catch 75 

percent of the suspects who will eventually be arrested.23

As with other crimes, bank robberies that are not solved 

quickly are less likely to be solved at all.24 

Although the clearance rate for bank robbery is among 

the highest for all crimes, the rate has declined. In the 

United States, bank robbery clearances have dropped from 

80 percent in 1976 to 58 percent in 2001;25 clearances 

vary by region, from as low as 34 percent to as high as 80 

percent.26 In Canada and Germany, 60 to 70 percent of 

bank robberies are cleared.27 

Bank robbers are predictable, as they continue to 

rob, often on the same day, and employing the same 

modus operandi in successive robberies. It is often this 

repetition—the use of particular signature or trademark, 

such as a distinctively worded note or a similar disguise—

that leads to their apprehension.28 As a result, a single 

arrest may clear numerous bank robberies. In London, for 

example, the arrest of each bank robber clears an average 

of 2.8 bank robberies.29 

§ Bank robbers face risks of injury 

or death during the commission of 

the crime; in fact, the robber is the 

person most often killed (Pastore 

and Maguire, 2005; Erickson and 

Balzer, 2003).

§§ Failure rates vary over time. In 

the U.S., the percentage of failed 

robberies within a year has climbed 

higher than 25 percent (Cook, 

1983; Hauge, 1969). In Australia, 

11 percent of bank robberies 

failed in 1991; the rate more than 

doubled by 2002 (Borzycki, 2003). 

Failure rates reflect the impact 

of crime prevention efforts. For 

example, higher failure rates have 

been observed at banks with 

bandit barriers and at banks where 

employees resist the robbery 

attempt.

§§§ In the United States, the FBI 

reports solution rates for bank 

robberies; these are similar to the 

clearance rates that are defined for 

local police by the Uniform Crime 

Reports. Solution and clearance 

rates do not take into account how 

an offense was solved. For example, 

where a bank robber has committed 

numerous robberies before being 

apprehended, a single arrest will 

clear multiple robberies, including 

offenses in different jurisdictions. 

Many of the latter will likely be 

cleared exceptionally by agencies 

in those jurisdictions, as reasons 

outside their control prevent the 

individual from being prosecuted for 

each offense.
The Problem of Bank Robbery 11

When robbers are arrested, multiple witnesses, 

surveillance images, and physical evidence contribute 

to high prosecution and conviction rates. In the United 

States, where most bank robberies are federal offenses, 

93 percent of bank robbers tried in U.S. district court in 

1990 were convicted and sentenced.30 Federal sentencing 

guidelines result in a 20-year sentence; sentences can be 

increased by five years if a weapon is present during a 

robbery. 

Bank Security Practices

Banks have many security practices and are usually 

considered the most secure of all commercial businesses. 

Banking security practices are highly standardized,31 and 

electronic security is commonplace—even among branches 

that are robbed. By 2000, 98 percent of robbed branches 

had both cameras and alarm systems. 

The widespread adoption of bank security practices has 

reduced average losses from robbery, contributed to 

high clearance rates, and may have reduced violence in 

robberies. Other than among robbed banks, the prevalence 

of different security practices is unknown; thus, there is 

no clear evidence that any single security practice prevents 

robbery. In fact, most studies show that robbed branches 

have as many or more security features than do branches 

that have never been robbed.32 

Traditional bank security practices—alarms, surveillance 

systems, bait money—have focused on increasing the 

likelihood that an offender will be apprehended. Some 

banks have adopted more proactive security strategies 

that are designed to thwart robberies before they occur. 
12 Bank Robbery

For example, some have implemented cash management 

practices that make robberies less lucrative by restricting 

the amount of cash on hand; others restrict physical 

access through the use of bullet-resistant bandit barriers 

between customers and bank employees; and still others 

employ access control vestibules (also known as mancatchers) to stop weapons from being brought into the 

branch.

Bank decisions about security practices reflect a variety of 

goals: protecting the safety of customers and employees, 

attracting customers, generating profits, protecting 

bank assets, recovering stolen money, and apprehending 

offenders. 

Some banks are concerned that security measures 

such as bandit barriers or employee resistance 

that might thwart robbers will lead to violence or 

hostage taking. There is mixed evidence, however, 

about the contribution of such practices to 

escalating violence,33 likely because of differences 

in robbery in different places. 

Some banks feel that visible security measures—

such as limiting bank access or bandit barriers—

put off customers who value an environment that 

appears not to need such obvious security devices.

The expense of security devices is a factor for 

some banks. In fact, some smaller banks have been 

forced to close or to limit banking and security 

services because of the cost.34

There is no evidence that every bank or branches needs to 

adopt the same rigorous and expensive crime prevention 

practices—practices that can sometimes make a branch 

look like a fortification. Instead, different branches face 

different robbery risks, even those that are quite near to 

one another.

•

•

•
Types of Bank Robbers 

Ever since the era of Bonnie and Clyde in the 1930s, 

violence—or the potential lethality suggested by the 

use of weapons in bank robbery—has shaped crime 

prevention efforts. Many security strategies, such as 

bandit barriers and weapon detection devices, have been 

developed to thwart armed robbers; employee compliance 

has been widely advocated to prevent a robber from using 

violence. 

These strategies focus on the risk of bank robberies 

committed by professional armed robbers. However, 

most bank robberies do not appear to be well-planned 

offenses committed by professional criminals; instead, 

increasing evidence suggests that many bank robberies are 

spontaneous and opportunistic crimes that are often acts 

of desperation.35 Consider that:

Solitary offenders commit the vast majority—

nearly 80 percent—of bank robberies.36

Weapons are uncommon in bank robbery and 

their use is declining.§ Up to 72 percent of bank 

robbers are unarmed offenders who do not use or 

even threaten violence.37 

Overall, about 60 percent of bank robbers do not 

bother with disguises; only 7 percent of robbers in 

Florida did.38 

More than 80 percent of arrested bank robbers 

have no prior convictions for bank crime.39

Because most bank robberies are committed by 

solitary, unarmed and undisguised offenders, they 

can be considered the work of amateurs rather than 

professionals. In contrast, it is the less common armed 

bank robberies that more often involve multiple offenders 

•

•

•

•

The Problem of Bank Robbery 13

§ In 1987, 71 percent of bank 

robbers in Australia were armed; 

by 2002, only 48 percent were. In 

1980, half of all bank robberies in 

the United States featured a visible 

weapon; this dropped to 30 percent 

in 2000. The use of weapons varies 

between places: 44 percent of bank 

robberies in Florida involved a 

weapon, whereas only 20 percent in 

New York City and Massachusetts 

did (Borzycki, 2003; Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, 2003; Vardalis and 

Cox, 1998; Pacelle, 2003; Weir and 

Santos, 2003).
and the use of disguises.40 Distinguishing bank robberies 

as the work of amateur or professional robbers provides 

important insight about the risks of robbery at a branch, 

and thus guidance in selecting crime prevention strategies 

most likely to be effective. Targets that attract amateur 

robbers may discourage professional robbers while targets 

that are attractive to amateurs will often hold little appeal 

for professionals.41 Further, although discouraging an 

amateur robber is much easier and the approach different 

than thwarting a committed team of professionals, the 

measures that might deter an amateur may well increase 

the likelihood of violence by professional robbers.

To a great extent, robbers can be classified as amateur 

or professional based on known characteristics of the 

robbery—the number of offenders, use of weapons and 

disguises, efforts to defeat security, timing of the robbery, 

target selection, and means of getaway (see Figure 3). 

Bank robberies by amateurs are less successful: nearly onethird of all bank robberies by unarmed solitary offenders 

fail.42 Takeover robberies—those involving multiple armed 

offenders—are less common§ but more lucrative: losses in 

takeover robberies are 10 times greater than average.43 

Amateur bank robbers seek different targets from 

professionals and commit their offenses at different times. 

Solitary offenders tend to rob banks around midday, when 

branches are full of customers; professionals, on the other 

hand, prefer to operate when there are fewer customers, 

such as at opening time, which increases their control of 

the crime scene.44 

14 Bank Robbery

§ Takeover robberies have spiked in 

some locations; this has largely been 

tied to gangs. Rehder and Dillow 

(2003) attribute a huge spike in bank 

robberies in California in 1991 and 

1992 to gangs. Moreover, the FBI 

reported that gangs were involved 

in most of the takeover robberies in 

Los Angeles in 2003. 

§§ Figure 3, page 15

This table is not prescriptive as it 

generalizes about bank robberies. 

Some factors will not fit your local 

pattern and there will be exceptions 

that fit no category. The reader 

is encouraged to use the table as 

a starting point to separate and 

categorize local robberies. 
The Problem of Bank Robbery 15

Figure 3:

Distinguishing Professional and Amateur Bank Robbers§§

 Professional Amateur 

Offenders • Multiple offenders with division of labor

• Shows evidence of planning 

• May be older

• Prior bank robbery convictions

• Travels further to rob banks

• Solitary offender

• Drug or alcohol use likely

• No prior bank crime

• Lives near bank target

Violence • Aggressive takeover, with loud verbal 

demands

• Visible weapons, especially guns

• Intimidation, physical or verbal threats

• Note passed to teller or simple verbal 

demand

• Waits in line

• No weapon

Defeat 

Security

• Uses a disguise

• Disables or obscures surveillance cameras

• Demands that dye packs be left out, 

alarms not be activated, or police not be 

called

Robbery 

Success 

• Hits multiple teller windows

• Larger amounts stolen

• Lower percentage of money recovered

• More successful robberies

• Fewer cases directly cleared

• Longer time from offense to case 

clearance 

• Single teller window victimized

• Lower amounts stolen

• Higher percentage of money recovered 

• More failed robberies

• Shorter time from offense to case 

clearance, including more same-day 

arrests

• Direct case clearance more likely 

Robbery 

Timing

• Targets banks when few customers are 

present, such as at opening time

• Targets banks early in the week

• Targets banks when numerous 

customers are present, such as around 

midday

• Targets banks near closing or on Friday

Target 

Selection 

• Previous robbery

• Busy road near intersection

• Multidirectional traffic

• Corner locations, multiple vehicle exits 

• Previous robbery

• Heavy pedestrian traffic or adjacent to 

dense multifamily residences 

• Parcels without barriers

• Parcels with egress obscured 

Getaway • Via car • On foot or bicycle 
The method of escape further distinguishes amateur from 

professional robbers. Cars are not the sole means of 

escape; many offenders escape on foot or even by bicycle, 

at least initially. In 1978, for example, 80 percent of 

bank robbers used getaway cars,45 whereas vehicles were 

observed in only one-third of robberies in the 1990s.46 

Get-away vehicles are more prevalent when there are 

two or more offenders: 72 percent of robbery teams use 

vehicles, which reflects some degree of planning.47 In 

contrast, 58 percent of solitary robbers escape on foot.§

Two factors discourage solitary robbers from using 

vehicles: without an accomplice to drive the vehicle, it 

must be parked and quickly accessible to the robber; 

further, solitary robbers typically select targets that are 

convenient, such as close to their residence making a 

car unnecessary. In contrast, professional bank robbers 

appear willing to travel farther than other robbers, 

perhaps because there are fewer banks than other types of 

commercial targets or because banks tend to be clustered 

geographically and are open fewer hours.48 

Escape Routes in Target Selection

Because many bank robberies are the work of amateurs, it 

may appear that robbers randomly select targets. They do 

not. Instead, robbers select targets primarily based upon 

their concern with getting away from the robbery quickly.

Although much effort to reduce bank robbery has focused 

on bank interiors and security measures,§§ most bank 

robbers do not feel that they are at risk of apprehension 

during the commission of the crime.49 Instead, robbers 

assume that there will be easy access to cash and that 

the robbery will be completed quickly. Thus, robbers are 

relatively unconcerned about alarms and cameras, neither 

of which will slow their escape. 

§ The mode of escape cannot always 

be established, as bank employees 

may fail to observe the escape. 

Robbery escapes, of course, may 

initiate on foot, and resume with 

another mode of transportation.

§§ Some bank features such as bank 

size, number of entrances, lobby 

size, and number of tellers may 

affect ease of escape; larger banks 

may have more exits and the greater 

hustle and bustle may mask both the 

robbery and the escape. 

16 Bank Robbery
A robber’s choice of target is shaped by two escape 

features: the type of transportation available§ and the ease 

and number of escape routes.50 Because offenders prefer 

choices during flight, they tend to select targets that have 

more than one escape path. 

Solitary offenders typically cannot escape in a vehicle 

because of the logistics of parking and retrieving a 

vehicle.§§ Thus, solitary offenders typically escape on foot 

and select targets with the following features. 

Parcels that are open and accessible to foot 

traffic, without barriers such as fencing or dense 

impermeable shrubbery; these may be parcels with 

pedestrian pathways or alleys, or parcels that are 

accessible from other commercial premises. 

Escape routes that prevent a robber from being 

easily followed. These include banks that abut 

wooded areas, numerous small streets, railroads, 

ditches, or creeks.

Obstructions that block the view of the proposed 

escape route, such as architectural features, 

adjacent buildings, hills, foliage, fences, or walls 

and even cars in parking lots.51

Parcels that open directly onto pedestrian traffic52 

or that are adjacent to dense residential areas, 

where offenders can easily disappear or stash an 

escape vehicle. Many offenders take care to walk 

away from a robbery, as running will distinguish 

their behavior from that of other pedestrians.

Offenders escaping on foot avoid targets that are 

too isolated; targets that require them to cross 

large parking lots, open areas, or major streets 

with heavy traffic; and targets that force them to 

navigate areas filled with shopping carts, cars, or 

too many pedestrians.53 

•

•

•

•

•

§ Some targets are equally attractive 

to robbers on foot or in cars.

§§ An escape can include distinct 

phases; for example, an initial 

escape may be on foot and a robber 

may then retrieve a vehicle stashed 

nearby.

The Problem of Bank Robbery 17
In contrast, multiple offenders typically escape in a 

vehicle—often stolen54—and thus select quite different 

targets.

Targets with easy vehicular access, such as banks 

on corner parcels, near intersections, or spanning 

parallel streets, that provide multiple points of 

egress and several choices of direction.55 

Branches on multiple lane roadways with two-way 

traffic: for example, 61 percent of bank robberies 

in Dade County, Florida occurred on such 

roadways.56 

Streets with traffic volume that is busy but not 

standstill. Although it is widely believed that 

bank robberies occur in close proximity to major 

highways, many do not. One study found that 

70 percent of robbed banks were more than two 

miles away from a major highway.57

In unfamiliar areas, robbers in vehicles select 

targets near major roadways so that they can avoid 

getting lost if a chase ensues.58 Robbers in cars 

do not select targets located in cul de sacs, or on 

narrow one-way streets, and avoid routes with 

traffic signals that may hinder their escape.59 

Despite these distinctions, some branches may be equally 

attractive to robbers on foot or in cars. Other targets may 

be vulnerable because of their proximity to alternative 

methods of escape, such as taxis or subways. 

Distinguishing the type of escape associated with 

individual branches can guide the selection of effective 

crime prevention strategies. For example, controlling 

vehicular access may thwart professional robbers but 

will have little impact on amateurs; on the other hand, 

blocking pedestrian access will likely have little impact on 

professional robbers.

•

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18 Bank Robbery
§ See the Problem-Oriented 

Response Guide Analyzing Repeat 

Victimization.

Robbery Risk and Prior Victimization 

Because bank robbery is not a common crime, it may 

appear random, which suggests that all banks are at a 

high risk of robbery. In the short-term, however, the vast 

majority of branches do not get robbed. For example, 

during one year only 2 percent of branches in West 

Germany were robbed,60 only 8 percent of branches in 

Indiana were robbed,61 and only 14 percent of branches in 

Canada and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania were robbed.62 

As the time period increases, however, more branches 

are victimized: in two years, 31 percent of branches in 

Washington, D.C. were robbed;63 in five years, 41 percent 

of branches in California were robbed;64 and in 10 

years, 52 percent of branches in Washington, D.C. were 

robbed.65 

The increasing percentage of robbed branches levels off 

over time: after 10 years, nearly half of all bank branches 

will not have been robbed, while branches that have been 

robbed once are often robbed again—a phenomenon 

known as repeat victimization.§ Figure 4 depicts this trend 

by using a multi-year map that compares robbed and 

unrobbed branches in one jurisdiction.

Because robbed branches are often robbed again, these 

contribute disproportionately to the number of bank 

robberies. 

In the United Kingdom, 15 percent of all bank 

robberies in two years were repeat robberies.66

In three years, 37 percent of robbed branches 

were robbed two or more times and comprised 58 

percent of all bank robberies.67 

•

The Problem of Bank Robbery 19
In Seattle, Washington, 63 percent of robbed 

branches were victimized two or more times; these 

generated 82 percent of all robberies during a four 

and one-half year period.68

In Washington, D.C., 12 percent of branches 

were robbed five or more times in 10 years; these 

branches generated more than one-third of all 

bank robberies during this period.69 

•

•

20 Bank Robbery

6 robberies: 3 at each of the 

robbed branches; 0 at the 4 

unrobbed branches

3 robberies at one bank and 

0 at the others

5 robberies at this 

bank outlet

These banks have not 

been robbed at all

Figure 4:

Sample Map: Bank Robberies over Multiple Years

(Symbols are scaled in size to the number of robberies)
Robbed branches are distinctly different from unrobbed 

branches in their future victimization risk. A branch 

that has never been robbed faces a low risk of robbery, 

whereas a robbed branch has a substantially higher risk. In 

Indiana, for example, robbed branches were three times 

more likely to be robbed in the succeeding three years 

than unrobbed branches.70 A branch that has been robbed 

multiple times faces the highest risk of all.

Repeat robberies may be committed by a robber who 

returns to reprise a successful crime or to complete an 

attempted crime. A repeat robbery is particularly likely 

if the robber felt the crime was easy; many offenders 

describe bank robberies this way.71

The pattern of repeat victimization is so strong that not 

all repeat robberies can be attributed to repeat offenders. 

Repeat robberies also occur because the features that 

attracted an initial robber—such as an easy escape route 

that remains unchanged—are likely to attract other 

like-minded robbers. Some believe that publicity about 

successful bank robberies attracts copycats, but there is no 

evidence that this is so.72 

Studies show that the risk of repeat victimization is 

most acute in the short-term: at least one-third of repeat 

bank robberies occur within two months of a previous 

offense.73 Because bank robberies are a low volume crime, 

multi-year data is often necessary to identify such patterns. 

Repeat victimization continues over longer periods of 

time; these patterns can best be identified when robbed 

and unrobbed banks are compared. The risk of repeat 

victimization is so strong that robbed banks are often 

surrounded by unrobbed banks (see Figure 4). 

The Problem of Bank Robbery 21
Temporal Patterns of Bank Robbery 

Virtually all studies of bank robbery examine the day of 

the week and time of the day of the robbery. In many 

ways, this is possible because banks—in contrast to other 

businesses—typically have limited operating hours. Bank 

robbery data is particularly reliable for crime analysis, 

because all offenses are reported and the time reliably 

established. 

Fridays are generally the most popular day for bank 

robberies, accounting for about 25 percent of all such 

crimes.74 In the United States, an increasing number of 

bank robberies occur on weekends—about 7 percent of 

all bank robberies occur on Saturday—consistent with the 

extended operating hours of banks at in-market and some 

traditional banks.75 

The most popular time for bank robberies is morning 

through midday. Bank robberies concentrate at opening 

time in West Germany and the Netherlands,§ whereas 

about one-third in the United States occur between 9 

AM and 11 AM.§§ In Dade County, Florida, half of bank 

robberies occur between 10 AM and 12 PM.76 

Knowing the day and time of bank robberies is useful 

in distinguishing between types of bank robbers. 

Professionals target opening hours because there are 

fewer customers or because of expectations about the 

amount of cash that is on hand from morning deliveries 

and the emptying of night safes and deposit boxes.77

Opportunistic robbers, on the other hand, opt for times 

of day when customers are more numerous. 

22 Bank Robbery

§ In the Netherlands, 23 percent of 

bank robberies between 1988 and 

1994 occurred between 9 AM and 

9:59 AM.

§§ In the 1980s, 32 percent of 

bank robberies in the United States 

occurred between 1 PM and 3 PM. 
Banks are at a higher risk on Friday because many have 

extended operating hours. The risk is even greater during 

winter, when early darkness provides cover for escape.78 Cold 

weather further facilitates robberies by allowing perpetrators 

to use coat collars, scarves, and hats for disguises. In the 

Netherlands, bank robberies in winter near closing time 

increase by nearly 700 percent.79 Fridays may also be more 

popular because the increased payday traffic attracts solitary 

offenders who prefer busy banks; in addition, robbers 

motivated by drug and alcohol addiction may want money for 

partying over the weekend.80 

Information about common robbery days and times may 

lead police to focus on surveillance and apprehension, which 

may be appropriate for investigations relating to specific 

offenders. It may also be useful in developing short term 

prevention strategies.

The Problem of Bank Robbery 23

Understanding Your Local Problem 25

Understanding Your Local Problem

The information above provides only a generalized 

description of bank robbery. You must combine the basic 

facts with a more specific understanding of your local 

problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully will help 

you design a more effective response strategy. 

Stakeholders

In addition to criminal justice agencies, including the FBI, 

the following groups have an interest in the bank robbery 

problem and should be considered for the contribution 

they might make to gathering information about the 

problem and responding to it:

banks, especially risk management personnel and 

local branch managers

state and federal banking regulatory agencies

state and national banking associations

banking security companies or consultants. 

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should ask 

in analyzing your particular problem of bank robbery, 

even if the answers are not always readily available. Your 

answers to these and other questions will help you choose 

the most appropriate set of responses later on.

You may have a variety of hunches about which factors 

contribute to your bank robbery problem—for example, 

branch locations, parking lot and building layout, or 

management practices. You should test these hunches 

against available data before developing a response. 

Because bank robberies are rare, it is important to 

•

•

•

•
examine the differences between robbed and unrobbed 

branches. While police often know much about branches 

that get robbed, it is important to compare this 

information with data concerning unrobbed branches, as 

most bank branches are very similar.

Your analysis will be improved if you examine several 

years’ worth of data. Examining multijurisdictional data 

can also be useful. This is especially important if your 

jurisdiction has few robberies each year. 

Incidents

How many bank robberies have there been? Is the 

number of bank robberies increasing? How does the 

number of bank robberies compare to the number 

of other commercial robberies? In jurisdictions 

with more robberies it may make sense to examine 

monthly or quarterly figures. In jurisdiction with fewer 

robberies, consider combining your data with that of 

neighboring jurisdictions. 

How successful are bank robberies?

o How many robberies are attempted? How many are 

completed? These figures can be used to calculate 

the bank robbery failure rate.

o How much money is taken? Be sure to calculate 

both the average amount and the range from high 

to low, paying particular attention to robberies with 

zero losses. 

o How much money is recovered? Be sure to include 

the total, average, and range from high to low.

How many robberies are cleared?

o How many result in arrests on or near the scene of 

the robbery?

•

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26 Bank Robbery
o How many are cleared the same day?

o How much time elapses between offense and 

clearance? You can standardize these figures by 

grouping clearances within one day, two days, one 

week, one month, and so forth.

o How many robberies are cleared through a direct 

arrest? How many are cleared as exceptional 

according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting 

rules?

Potential Bank Victims

Every bank robbery has two victims: the branch that was 

robbed and the bank or corporation that owns the robbed 

branch. That is, Wells Fargo is a banking corporation 

that operates many branches. When a Wells Fargo branch 

is robbed, both the branch and the parent corporation 

are victimized. The risk of victimization will vary both 

by branch and by bank. Determining how victimization 

is distributed among banks and branches will help you 

identify the factors that increase the risk of robbery.

How many bank corporations are in your jurisdiction? 

What types are they? Credit unions? Savings and 

loans? Retail or commercial banks? Remember that 

ownership can change over time as a result of merger 

or acquisition. 

How many branches are operated by banks in your 

jurisdiction? You can use both addresses and bank 

names as unique identifiers, but remember to note any 

changes in branch ownership. 

For each branch, determine:

o What type of branch is it? In-store? Traditional? 

Main office?

o What are the days and times of operations? Are 

there extended hours? 

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•

Understanding Your Local Problem 27
o How many teller windows are there? How many 

employees? Does this vary by time or day? Does 

the branch have hours when staffing is low?

o How busy is the bank? How many customer 

transactions are there per day? Does the volume 

of business vary during the day or week? Does 

the branch have vulnerable periods, such as during 

money transfers? Does the bank have cash-rich 

periods, such as specific paydays? 

o Does the branch focus on specific types of 

customers, such as seniors or students? Does it 

offer particular types of services, such as check 

cashing?

What are the security practices of the branches? 

o What types of physical security are used? Mantraps? Bandit barriers? Metal detectors? 

o What types of access control are used? Weapon 

detection systems? Key cards?

o What type of electronic surveillance is used? What 

is the reliability and quality of the imaging?

o What cash management practices are used? Cash 

limits? Cash dispensing machines? Timed safes? 

o What is the bank’s policy on activating alarms?

o What other security practices are employed? 

Armed or unarmed guards? Greeters? Mandatory 

removal of hats and scarves? 

Bank Victims

How many banks have been robbed? How many 

branches of each have been robbed? Be sure to 

differentiate between banks and branch locations. 

What types of banks are they? Credit unions? Savings 

and loans? Retail banks? 

How many robberies are there by branch type?

•

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•

28 Bank Robbery
o How many times has each branch been robbed? 

Are there branches that have never been robbed? 

o Are certain branches victimized repeatedly? 

Record the time between robberies at the same 

branch. This is generally reported as the number 

of days or weeks between robberies.

o What is the sequence of successful robberies? Are 

successful robberies more likely to recur? Are high 

loss robberies more likely to recur? Do successive 

robberies involve fewer offenders?

Where do robberies occur? 

o What are the traffic patterns of the streets where 

the robbed branches are located? Are they located 

on busy streets? Close to major highways? On 

major thoroughfares? In business districts? In 

shopping centers? 

o Are the land parcels of robbed branches easily 

accessible by foot? Are they easily accessible by 

motor vehicle?

o How is the visibility at robbed branches? Are 

entrances clearly visible from nearby roadways or 

businesses? Are branch interiors visible from the 

outside? Are branch interiors visible from drivethrough windows?

When are branches robbed?

o Are branches robbed at particular times of day? 

Opening time? Lunchtime? Near closing? 

o Are branches more likely to be victimized on 

certain days or during specific weeks or months?

o Are there seasonal variations? Do more robberies 

occur during winter months when it gets dark 

earlier? 

o How many customers are present during robberies? 

Are the lobbies empty or filled with customers?

What areas of the branch are robbed? Single or 

multiple teller windows? Vaults?

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Understanding Your Local Problem 29
Individual Victims 

Although it may be tempting to focus only on the 

corporate victims, individuals can also be victimized 

during a bank robbery: bank employees—especially 

tellers—and customers may be threatened, injured, taken 

hostage, or even killed.

What type of employee was confronted by the robber? 

Teller? Guard? 

Where was the employee physically located? Near a 

door? At her work station?

What were the employee’s physical characteristics? 

Age? Gender? Physique? How long had the staff 

member been employed? Had she received training 

regarding bank robbery?

How did employees respond to the robbery? Were 

bank policies followed? Were alarms activated? Were 

dye packs or bait money used? 

Was anyone injured in the robbery? What types of 

injuries were suffered? (Many employees may feel 

debilitating fear following a robbery; robbery training 

can address this reaction.) 

What were the characteristics of customers involved 

in the robbery? Physical location? Age? Physique? 

Gender? 

Offenders

Many bank robberies can be sorted into the work of 

professionals or amateurs (consistent with Figure 3) 

based upon the answers to the following questions. 

o How many offenders were there? Multiple 

offenders? A lone robber?

o Was a weapon used? Did the offender present a 

simple note demand?

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

30 Bank Robbery
o Did violence occur? Were hostages taken? 

o Were disguises used?

o Did the robbers attempt to disable cameras or 

other surveillance equipment?

o Did the robbers give detailed instructions to the 

employees, such as demanding money without dye 

packs or instructing them not to set off the alarm? 

How did the robbers escape? On foot? By bicycle? In 

cars? Do these characteristics vary by branch? 

What are the demographic characteristics of the 

robbers? Age? Gender? Race and ethnicity? Is there 

gang involvement? Are drugs or alcohol involved?

How committed are robbers? How far do they travel 

to rob branches? Do they have criminal histories that 

including bank robbery? Have they committed prior 

bank robberies?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree 

your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you 

might modify your responses if they are not producing 

the intended results. You should take measures of your 

problem before you implement responses, to determine 

how serious the problem is, and after you implement 

them, to determine whether they have been effective. 

In many cases, measures should be developed to detect 

displacement of robberies into surrounding areas or onto 

other branches. (For more detailed guidance on measuring 

effectiveness, see the companion guide to this series, 

Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police 

Problem-Solvers.) 

•

•

•

Understanding Your Local Problem 31
You should use measures that specifically relate to the 

response implemented; for example, police might give 

target-hardening advice to bank robbery victims following 

a robbery. If branch managers fail to change their cash 

management practices, other security measures may have 

little impact. In addition, you must determine how many 

banks and branches are in your area before measuring 

response effectiveness. You can obtain such information 

from your state’s banking regulator, the state or local 

banking association, or other sources. Finally, because 

bank robbery is a relatively rare crime, you should 

compare robbery trends in your jurisdiction with those of 

other jurisdictions, especially those that are similar to your 

own. 

The following are potentially useful measures of the 

effectiveness of responses to bank robbery.

Reduction in the number of bank robberies.

o Reduction in the number of robbed banks or 

branches relative to all banks and branches.

o Reduction in the number of repeat robberies.

o Reduction in bank robberies as a percentage of 

commercial robberies.

Reduction of violence in bank robberies.

o Reduction in the percentage of bank robberies 

where weapons are used.

o Reduction in the percentage of robberies with 

injuries, violence, threats, or hostage taking.

Reduction in the success of bank robberies.

o Reduction in the percentage of completed bank 

robberies.

•

•

•

32 Bank Robbery
o Reduction in the financial loss from robberies. 

(This can be computed as both a total and an 

average, including and excluding failed robberies. 

Be sure to include the range of money taken, from 

high to low, as a single high-dollar robbery will 

otherwise distort the results.) 

o Increase in the amount of money recovered.

o Increase in the proportion of robberies where the 

money is recovered.

Increase in the proportion of robberies cleared by 

arrest.§ (Note that this measure does not directly 

reflect changes in the number of robberies, but may 

be an indirect measure of the effectiveness of the 

response. Even a single arrest can reduce the number 

of incidents.)

o Reduction in the number of bank robberies related 

to each arrest.

o Reduction in clearance time.

•

Understanding Your Local Problem 33

§ Cases cleared by direct arrest 

suggest that arrests are made by 

the reporting jurisdiction and often 

relatively soon after the robbery. 

Many exceptional clearances occur 

when an offender is arrested in 

another jurisdiction, sometimes long 

after the robbery. Of course, there 

are other reasons for exceptional 

clearances, such as the death of 

a suspect, but the most accurate 

evaluations will distinguish robberies 

by the type of clearance.

Responses to the Problem of Bank 

Robbery 

Analyzing your local problem will give you a better 

understanding of the factors that contribute to it. Once 

you have analyzed your local problem and established a 

baseline for measuring effectiveness, you can consider 

possible responses to the problem. 

The following strategies will provide a foundation for 

addressing your particular bank robbery problem. These 

strategies are drawn from a variety of studies and police 

reports. Several may apply to your local problem. 

It is critical that you tailor responses to local 

circumstances and that you can justify each response 

based upon reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective 

strategy will involve several different responses. Because 

law enforcement alone is seldom effective in reducing or 

solving the problem, do not limit yourself to considering 

only what police can do; rather, carefully consider 

whether others in your community share responsibility 

for the problem and whether they can help respond to 

it. Remember that you are more likely to succeed if you 

can enlist the support of the actors and organizations 

that have the capacity to implement the most effective 

responses. For more detailed information on shifting and 

sharing responsibility, see Response Guide No. 3, Shifting 

and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems.

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 35
General Requirements for an Effective Strategy

1. Enlisting the support of banks. Reducing bank 

robbery often requires that branches alter their properties 

or management practices. To justify this shift, police 

should analyze bank robbery data to distinguish between 

high risk and low risk properties, providing individual 

branches with explicit guidance on preventive measures. 

Because most branches are guided by corporate policies 

and practices, police need solid information to justify 

the recommended changes, particularly those that may 

be costly. It is also important to secure the cooperation 

and involvement of as many banks as possible, to ensure 

that neither banks nor branches feel unfairly targeted. 

For more detailed guidance on shifting responsibility, see 

the companion guide to this series, Shifting and Sharing 

Responsibility for Public Safety Problems.

2. Adopting a multijurisdictional approach. Because 

bank robberies are infrequent in smaller jurisdictions, 

multijurisdictional efforts may be needed to provide 

sufficient data and to guide the development of effective 

responses. 

Multijurisdictional data about bank robberies—preferably 

several years worth—will provide a better basis for 

statistical analysis. Because they are not common, the 

bank robberies within a single jurisdiction can spike where 

the robberies are the result of a crime spree involving 

one or more repeat offenders. In the short term, a serial 

robber can cause substantial fluctuations in the number of 

bank robberies within a city or even a state; using longer 

term data adjusts for this phenomenon.

36 Bank Robbery
Because bank robbers travel farther than other criminals, 

often taking advantage of major transportation corridors, 

regional or even statewide approaches have the potential 

to be particularly effective. In addition, collating 

multijurisdictional data can provide a basis for increased 

cooperation between banks, the FBI, and local police 

agencies. 

3. Focusing on high risk branches. While basic 

preventive measures should be applied to all branches, 

some special preventive measures should be focused on 

high-risk branches. It is critical that you acknowledge the 

legitimacy of a bank’s profit motive.

It is unlikely that all branches will need to adopt a 

standardized set of preventive measures; some branches 

will need different measures while others may need none. 

Insisting that all branches adopt security practices that 

may be expensive is likely to create conflict between police 

and the financial industry. 

Branches that have already been successfully robbed face 

the highest risk of robbery in the future, and this risk is 

most acute in the short term. Thus, prevention efforts 

should be implemented quickly to increase the difficulty 

of future robberies. While such tactics may be short-term, 

immediacy is key; the amount of preventive efforts should 

be increased proportionally based on the number and 

success of previous robberies.

4. Focusing on specific types of bank robbery.

Although it is tempting for police to focus predominately 

on violent takeover robberies—and this reflects much 

of the federal interest in bank robberies—robberies 

committed by unarmed, solitary offenders occur more 

often and may be easier to deter. 

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 37
Specific Responses to Bank Robberies

Because bank robbery prevention efforts can involve 

a variety of responses, it may be difficult to assess the 

effectiveness of each individual strategy. The following 

section describes specific responses that can be combined 

to form an effective bank robbery prevention strategy. 

Despite the importance of multiple interventions, you 

should avoid trying a little bit of everything; instead, try 

to employ complementary tactics.

Reducing Rewards to Robbers

5. Limiting cash access. Cash in banks is available at 

teller windows—the most frequent target of robbers—and 

safes. Most banks have cash management policies, such 

as removing cash from teller drawers when it reaches a 

predetermined amount. Some banks use vacuum systems 

to quickly and efficiently remove cash from teller drawers. 

Although such cash management procedures can be 

troublesome for tellers, they can help limit robbery losses.

Access to cash can be further limited through the use 

of an automatic cash dispensing unit (CDU), which is 

positioned so that tellers must leave their stations to 

withdraw currency. The CDU limits the amount a teller 

can withdraw, thus capping the amount that can be stolen. 

More importantly, the CDU requires the teller to leave the 

window, thus reducing the exposure to violence and also 

delaying the commission of the robbery. A longer robbery 

increases the risk of apprehension.81 One Canadian bank 

reduced robberies 65 percent in two years by using such 

machines.82 

38 Bank Robbery
Although most bank robberies target teller windows, 

takeover robberies may involve the vault; losses in these 

robberies are usually much higher. Some banks have 

responded by limiting the amount of cash they keep 

in their in their vaults or by using time delay safes that 

cannot be quickly accessed by employees, even those 

under duress. 

6. Using dye packs. Dye packs are widely used by 

banks to prevent stolen money from being used. Dye 

packs stain both the robber and the cash, preventing use 

of the money and aiding in the detection of the robber. 

Many dye packs are supplemented by tear gas which is 

triggered by an electromagnetic field near the bank exit 

door; when tear gas explodes, the robber is effectively 

immobilized. Dye packs and tear gas systems cost about 

$4,000 to install and about $500 per pack.83 Dye packs are 

used by many banks, including 29 percent of banks that 

were robbed in 2000.84

3SI Security Systems, www.3sisecurity.com

Dye packs that stain both the robber 

and the cash are widely used by banks.

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 39
Increasing Perceptions of Risk 

7. Slowing the robbery. Because bank robbers want 

the crime to proceed quickly, some banks have adopted 

strategies that are intended to slow the pace of the 

robbery. A slow robbery may increase the suspect’s 

perception of risk and will sometimes cause him to 

abandon the crime.85

Resistance by bank employees can both thwart attempted 

robberies and limit the amount of cash taken86 Resistance 

can be active—refusing the robber’s demands, walking 

away from the teller window, calling out for assistance, 

activating an alarm—or passive, as when employees act 

hesitantly or otherwise slow down the robbery.87 Because 

there is some concern that employee resistance can 

increase violence, the type and level of recommended 

resistance should relate to specific conditions, such as the 

presence of bandit barriers88 or the absence of customers.

Interior obstacles such as revolving doors or customer 

service counters can slow the robber’s escape; timed safes 

and withdrawal limits on cash dispensing machines can 

further increase the duration of the robbery.

8. Banning disguises. Some banks require that 

customers remove hats, sunglasses, or other apparel 

that can be used as a disguise. Such a policy reduced 

the robbery rate 3 percent at bank branches in 

Massachusetts.89 However, this policy may be impractical 

if customers are likely to be wearing coats, scarves, or hats 

due to inclement weather.

40 Bank Robbery
9. Employing greeters. Bank employees known as 

greeters welcome customers and reduce the anonymity 

of a would-be robber; this face-to-face interaction may 

discourage a robbery before it occurs. Greeters should be 

trained to be alert to suspicious behavior. Greeters were 

part of a package of measures that reduced robberies 

substantially at a Canadian bank.90 The response is more 

likely to discourage amateur robbers than professionals.

10. Hiring security guards. There is disagreement 

regarding the effectiveness of bank security guards.91 

Guards are expensive, generating recurring costs for 

banks of about $50,000 per year. They also may create an 

environment that makes customers fearful. Some research 

suggests that guards reduce the risk of bank robbery,92 

although 7 percent of banks robbed in 2001 had guards.93 

On the other hand, some studies suggest that armed 

guards increase the risk of violence during a robbery.94 

For this reason, some banks only use armed guards in 

branches with high robbery rates.95 

11. Warning likely offenders. Bank robbers tend to 

overestimate the amount of money they will get from a 

robbery, to underestimate the likelihood of arrest, and 

to be unaware of the sentences they face if convicted.96 

Thus, some banks and trade associations have developed 

publicity campaigns designed to educate would-be 

offenders about the low take, high capture rate, and other 

perils of a career in bank robbery.97 This may be effective, 

depending upon the expectation of the robbers. However, 

would-be robbers who know of offenders who have made 

big scores and have gone undetected are unlikely to be 

deterred by publicity. 

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 41
Increasing Risk of Apprehension 

12. Using tracking devices. Some banks hide electronic 

tracking devices in the robbery money, thus aiding police 

in locating offenders. Tracking devices use low voltage 

transmitting microchips with transponders. So slim 

that they can be hidden in special packets of currency, 

these devices emit an electronic signal that can be 

tracked by police. There have been no evaluations of the 

effectiveness of these devices, but one FBI official stated 

that the system reduced bank robberies in his region by 55 

percent.98 Since tracking devices are intended to increase 

the chance of apprehending offenders, they are not likely 

to prevent robberies from occurring.

13. Using bait money. Bait money is cash with 

sequential serial numbers that are recorded by the bank. 

When the money reenters circulation, police track its use 

in hopes of locating the suspect. Bait money is already 

widely used by banks, even those that are robbed; 90 

percent of banks robbed in 2001 used bait money.99 

14. Offering rewards. Some banks actively publicize 

“most wanted” bank robbers, displaying their surveillance 

photos and offering rewards for information leading to 

their capture. An initiative in Massachusetts included 

the use of a website to post photos of most wanted 

offenders.100 Since 1991, one bank has paid out 166 

rewards that resulted in the capture of 228 offenders at 

an average cost of just over $3,000.101 Banks use websites, 

local silent witness programs, and tip lines to publicize 

crimes and to seek out offenders. There are also national 

tip organizations that coordinate information about highly 

mobile robbers.

42 Bank Robbery
15. Upgrading electronic surveillance. Bank 

surveillance cameras are in widespread use: 98 percent 

of robbed banks have interior surveillance cameras.102 

However, cameras do not appear to reduce robberies. 

Many bank robbers are not deterred because they simply 

do not believe they will be caught. Others believe that 

cameras can be thwarted with a disguise or by covert 

behavior or that cameras can be disabled such as with 

spray paint; or they simply do not think about cameras at 

all.103 

Surveillance images are valuable for police in identifying 

and apprehending suspects and can aid in prosecution as 

well. The use of good quality photographs during news 

broadcasts and on reward programs has contributed to the 

apprehension of a number of offenders.

There are a variety of different types of surveillance, 

including constant imaging surveillance, surveillance 

cameras that must be activated by employees, two-way 

surveillance cameras—visibly located in lobbies to remind 

would-be offenders that they are under surveillance—and 

broad-band internet video feeds directly to police.104 

Although cameras have been credited as the key factor 

in about 25 percent of bank robbery arrests,105 police 

are often critical of the quality of surveillance images, 

attributing poor images to inferior or outdated equipment, 

failure of employees to activate cameras, or poor camera 

performance in recording images, sometimes because of 

poor camera placement.106 

Exterior surveillance cameras have not been widely 

used but have the potential to record license tags or to 

document other details of an offender’s escape. Similarly, 

automatic license plate readers have the potential to record 

the license plate of the offender’s getaway car.

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 43
16. Rapidly activating alarms. Alarms are in 

widespread use by banks but do not appear to reduce 

robbery: 98 percent of banks robbed in 2001 had alarm 

systems.107 As early as 1986, research found that robbers 

were not deterred by alarms, as they expected that the 

crime would proceed quickly and that they would escape 

before the alarm was activated or before the police 

arrived.108 

While alarms lead to the arrest of bank robbers in only 

about 6 percent of crimes,109 there is evidence that 

prompt activation increases apprehension rates.110 Some 

bank employees do not activate alarms until after the 

robber has left the premises, reflecting concerns about 

the safety of employees and customers, lest police trap 

the robber inside the bank and provoke violence. In other 

cases, the delay might be due to panic or to comply with 

instructions made by the robber. 

Increasing Difficulty of Offending

17. Installing bandit barriers. The FBI recommends 

that banks install bullet-resistant glass barriers between 

tellers and customers.111 While most of these are 

permanent installation, some bandit barriers “pop-up” 

when activated by tellers or when an object crosses the 

counter. The prevalence of bandit barriers and the extent 

of their effectiveness is not known. In the late 1970s, 44 

percent of banks in the Washington, D.C. area had bandit 

barriers; these, however, did not prevent robbery.112

Among robbed banks, 10 percent in the United States 

and 85 percent in Germany had bandit barriers.113 In 

one bank, the installation of barriers reduced the risk of 

robbery by 25 percent.114 Even if bandit barriers do not 

prevent robberies, some research suggests that they reduce 

the success of bank robberies. In the United Kingdom, 

44 Bank Robbery
Germany, and Switzerland robberies at banks with bandit 

barriers were less successful. Some banks believe that 

bandit barriers increase robbery violence. Indeed, robbers 

took hostages in 17 percent of German banks with bandit 

barriers.115 Other banks are concerned that such barriers 

adversely alter the banking environment. 

Bandit barriers are relatively expensive—about $1,000 per 

linear foot116—and may put customers and unprotected 

employees at a higher risk of violence. However, bandit 

barriers do prevent some types of robbery (such as jumpover robberies) and may also reduce losses in individual 

robberies as well.

18. Limiting bank access. Access to bank lobbies 

can be limited by keys, entry cards, or other special 

identification systems, such as personally encoded cards 

or identification numbers. Such systems can be overridden 

by bank employees to permit access. Another method of 

limiting access is the use of a revolving door that is timed 

to restrict the number of customers who can enter the 

bank.

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 45

Bandit barriers may discourage some bank 

robbers and also increase the safety of bank 

employees.

Clear Security Systems, www.clearsecuritysystems.com
19. Installing access control vestibules. Access control 

vestibules—also known as man-catcher vestibules or mantraps—are a specialized form of access control device. 

These devices can be used to scan potential customers for 

weapons before they access the bank interior; others are 

designed to be manually activated by tellers. All contain 

bullet-resistant glass and range in price from $10,000 to 

$20,000.117 Although these devices may prevent armed 

robbers from gaining entrance, they do not guarantee that 

a robbery will not occur. 

20. Hardening targets. Studies show that physical 

and perceptual objects that seem as if they might slow 

a robber’s escape tend to reduce a bank’s attractiveness 

as a target.118 Thus, banks have employed a wide variety 

of target-hardening strategies that are designed to 

make the bank interior appear inhospitable to wouldbe robbers. These include revolving doors, increased 

distances between entrances and teller stations, higher 

teller counters, queuing and other physical barriers, 

and single door entrances and exits.119 Other strategies 

include increasing the visibility within and into the bank 

by avoiding physical features such as columns that block 

sight lines. Although such environmental strategies seem 

promising, they have not been carefully evaluated. 

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

21. Increasing criminal sanctions. Convicted 

robbers, especially habitual offenders, already face stiff 

penalties. Once convicted, about 80 percent of robbers 

are incarcerated; the average prison sentence is 137 

months.120 Use of a firearm during the commission of a 

robbery further increases the punishment. Although some 

46 Bank Robbery
robbers assess the severity of punishment in committing 

a crime, research suggests that criminals give more weight 

to potential rewards than to increases in punishment. 

Consequently, further penalty increases are unlikely to 

have an added deterrent effect.

22. Limiting media coverage. Some jurisdictions 

limit media coverage of bank robberies to reduce the 

likelihood of copycat crimes. Although such measures are 

inexpensive and have little downside, there is no evidence 

that copycat bank robberies actually occur.121 

23. Training employees to spot suspicious behavior.

To deter robbers, police often advise bank employees to 

watch for suspicious behavior. Branches, however, have 

such predictable designs and consistent operations that 

less than 20 percent of robbers even case their targets. 

In fact, many robbers do not even go inside the bank 

prior to robbing it,122,§ making it unlikely that suspicious 

behavior will be detected. This is true regardless of 

the type of offender: amateur robbers can be difficult 

to detect because they strive to blend in with other 

customers, whereas takeover robbers act too quickly for 

their behavior to become noticeable. Although a bank 

employee in hindsight may describe a robber’s behavior 

as suspicious, robbery is such a rare event that most 

employees will be unable to do so prospectively. 

Federal law requires that all U.S. bank employees receive 

training about bank security, including what to do in the 

event of a robbery; how to deal with hostage situations; 

how to activate alarms and cameras; how to use dye 

packs and other tracking devices; and how to be a good 

witness and preserve evidence. Employee training can help 

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 47

§ Casing is more common in armed 

robberies with multiple offenders.
assuage the emotional effects of victimization, may help 

reduce robbery violence, and can assist in investigations. 

Such training can include videos or simulated scenarios 

that are intended to provide employees with something 

of a realistic robbery experience. In settings with high 

employee turnover, frequent training may be needed. 

Employees do not always closely follow policies or comply 

with training and some police have developed additional 

training to reinforce the importance of employee 

behaviors during and after a robbery. For example, police 

in New York developed special training after noting that 

many bank employees failed to notify police or to activate 

surveillance systems in a timely fashion, failed to safeguard 

crime scenes, and were unable to provide useful suspect 

descriptions.123 

24. Increasing police efforts to deter and apprehend 

bank robbers. There is little evidence that extra police 

presence is an effective or efficient use of resources, 

although arresting a prolific robber can halt a shortterm robbery pattern. Although some robbers assess the 

environment and are deterred by frequent patrols or by 

the close proximity of banks to police stations,124 this 

deterrent effect is likely slight. Police stakeouts and other 

undercover operations are very expensive and have not 

been found effective in reducing bank robberies. The 

primary purpose of stakeouts is to observe a robbery 

in progress, but the specific timing of a bank robbery is 

hard to predict; there were no robberies or attempts in 

20 high risk banks during a seven week police undercover 

operation that required the effort of 40 officers.125 

48 Bank Robbery
Historically, much police effort to reduce bank robbery 

has focused on improving security practices that result in 

investigative evidence. These practices include improving 

the quality of surveillance images and employing tracking 

devices. Although these techniques can aid police after 

a robbery has occurred, they are unlikely to reduce the 

incidence of bank robberies. 

Bank robbery arrests appear to arise from a variety 

of factors: surveillance photographs, rapid response 

to alarms,126 tips from citizens or informants, or a 

patrol officer spotting a license tag.127 Police blockades 

are sometimes employed to catch robbers; these 

involve securing the geographic area around a robbed 

branch to prevent the robber from fleeing the scene. 

Because police may have descriptions of offenders or 

escape vehicles, such practices can be effective when 

transportation corridors are limited. In dense urban areas 

with many avenues for escape, however, blockades are 

not effective.128 Physical evidence can also play a role in 

the arrest and conviction of robbery suspects. Not only 

can physical evidence obtained from demand notes and 

other robbery tools be used to convict individual robbery 

suspects, but separate robberies may be linked through 

forensic evidence, handwriting analysis, the repetition 

of specific wording in notes or verbal commands, or 

similarities in modus operandi.

Responses to the Problem of Bank Robbery 49
Appendix: Summary of Responses to 

Bank Robbery

The table below summarizes the responses to bank 

robbery, the mechanisms by which they are intended to 

work, the conditions under which they ought to work 

best, and some factors that should be considered before 

a particular response is implemented. It is critical that 

you tailor responses to local circumstances and that 

you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. 

Remember, in most cases an effective strategy will involve 

implementing several different responses because law 

enforcement alone is seldom effective in reducing or 

solving the problem.

1.

2.

3.

4.

36

36

37

37

Enlisting support 

of banks

Adopting a 

multijurisdictional 

approach

Focusing on high 

risk branches

Focusing on 

specific types of 

bank robbery

Establishes joint 

ownership of 

the problem

Provides 

sufficient data to 

focus resources 

where most 

needed

Identifies high 

risk locations

Employs specific 

preventive 

strategies

... changes in 

management are 

needed

... there are too 

few robberies 

within a single 

jurisdiction to 

suggest changes 

... branches are 

cooperative in 

addressing risks 

... specific types 

of robbery can 

be identified

Recommendations 

lack the force of law 

Encourages 

cooperation between 

banks, police, and 

the FBI 

Combines 

prevention and 

detection; costeffective; targets 

high risk locations; 

may be expensive

Most likely to 

produce tangible 

results

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

General Requirements for an Effective Strategy

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Bank Robbery 51
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

38

39

40

40

41

41

41

Limiting access 

to cash 

Using tear gas or 

dye packs 

Slowing the pace 

of the robbery

Banning 

disguises

Employing 

greeters

Hiring guards

Warning likely 

offenders

Reduces rewards 

Robbers often 

drop cash upon 

activation; 

dyed money is 

difficult to use

Increases 

perceptions of 

use

Deters 

opportunistic 

offenders

Deters 

opportunistic 

offenders

Increases risk of 

apprehension

Increases 

perception of 

risk 

Inconvenient 

for employees; 

compliance must 

be monitored; 

unlikely to 

discourage 

robbers with low 

expectations

Gas and dye packs 

are already widely 

used

May reduce 

successful 

robberies, or 

reduce amount 

of loss, but may 

increase violence; 

inexpensive; can 

be tailored to the 

situation

Difficult to 

enforce in cold 

weather

May be useful 

as a short-term 

solution at 

specific times and 

locations

Expensive; may 

increase violence; 

alters bank 

environment

Low cost strategy

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

... bank policies 

are routinely 

followed

... employees 

include packs in 

stolen money

... robbers are 

unarmed

... robbers are 

solitary offenders; 

robberies are not 

planned

... robbers are 

solitary note 

passers

... guards are 

highly visible 

... robbers are 

local

52 Bank Robbery

Reducing Rewards

Increasing Perceptions of Risk
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

42

42

42

43

44

Using tracking 

devices

Using bait 

money

Offering 

rewards

Upgrading 

electronic 

surveillance 

Rapidly 

activating 

alarms

Increases risk of 

apprehension

Increases risk of 

apprehension 

Increases risk of 

apprehension

Increases risk 

of apprehension 

and perception 

of risk

Increases risk of 

apprehension

Can be used in 

high risk locations; 

conserves police 

resources; 

employees must 

include devices

Bait money is 

already widely used

Publicity may have 

a deterrent effect 

on other would-be 

robbers

Video surveillance 

is already widely 

used, but the 

quality could be 

improved; provides 

good investigative 

evidence but can 

be defeated with 

disguises; 

exterior surveillance 

can provide 

information about 

escape routes

Alarms are widely 

used but must be 

activated quickly; 

quick response by 

police may trap 

robber inside bank, 

thus increasing the 

risk of violence

... offenders are 

aware of devices 

but cannot easily 

defeat them 

... tellers include 

bait in money

... offenders are 

local

... cameras are 

well positioned, 

visible, reliably 

activated, 

produce good 

quality images, 

and not easily 

disabled

... alarms are 

activated quickly

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Bank Robbery 53

Increasing Risk of Apprehension
17. 

18.

19.

20.

21

44

45

46

46

46

Installing bandit 

barriers

Limiting bank 

access

Installing 

access control 

vestibules

Hardening 

targets

Increasing 

criminal 

sanctions

Stops robbers 

from using 

weapons

Blocks robbers

Blocks armed 

robbers

Increases 

difficulty

Protects employees 

but may increase 

risk to customers; 

can be installed 

in high risk 

locations; although 

unpleasant for 

customers, popup screens do 

not alter the 

environment

Varied controls 

can be tailored to 

particular locales; 

can be installed in 

high risk locations; 

may affect bank 

environment and 

customers

Can be installed in 

high risk locations; 

expensive to install

May be expensive 

or difficult to 

install; may 

inconvenience 

customers; often 

unnoticeable; 

can be tailored 

to individual 

properties

Offenders already 

face stiff penalties; 

stiffer penalties for 

gun use may have 

decreased armed 

robberies; general 

deterrent effect is 

weak

... robbers are 

armed

... customers 

become 

accustomed to 

the practice 

... robbers are 

armed

... target 

vulnerabilities 

can be identified 

and altered

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

54 Bank Robbery

Increasing Difficulty of Offending

Responses with Limited Effectiveness
22. 

23.

24.

47

47

48

Limiting media 

coverage of 

bank robberies

Training 

employees to 

spot suspicious 

behavior

Increasing 

police effort 

to deter and 

apprehend bank 

robbers

No evidence that 

media coverage 

contributes to 

copycat robberies 

Difficult for 

employees to 

detect; few robbers 

case branches

Little evidence 

that extra police 

presence is 

effective or 

efficient; does 

not affect future 

robbery risks; 

expensive 

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Bank Robbery 55
Endnotes 1

 Computed from data in the FBI’s annual Uniform 

Crime Reports, Crime in the United States, 1989-

2004.

2

 Braiden (1986). 

3

 Gould, Camp, and Peck (1986); Clarke (1989); Clarke, 

Field, and McGrath (1991); Leineweber and Buchler 

(1991). 

4

 Calculated from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, 

1989 – 2004. 

5

 Wilgoren (2002); computed from Uniform Crime 

Reports.

6

 Desroches (1995).

7

 Hannan (1982); Gould, Camp, and Peck (1986); 

Baumer and Carrington (1986).

8

 Vardalis and Cox (1998).

9

 Wipprecht (2002a); Wilgoren (2002); Hechinger 

(2002). 

10 Radecki, Wenninger, and Orlow (1996); Sanders 

(2004); Robson (1999).

11 Matthews (1996).

12 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003).

13 Erickson (1996).

14 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003).

15 Desroches (1995); Letkemann (1973); Leineweber and 

Buchler (1991).

16 Barancik (1998).

17 Buchler and Leineweber (1991); Gill and Matthews 

(1994); Hurst (1996).

18 Gill and Matthews (1994); Erickson (1996).

19 Cook (1983); Hauge (1969); Vardalis and Cox (1998); 

Leineweber and Buchler (1991); Austin (1988).

20 Matthews, Pease, and Pease (2001).

21 Leineweber and Buchler (1991); Haran (1982); 

Baumer and Carrington (1986).

Endnotes 57
22 Calculated from solution statistics reported by the 

FBI Field Offices for 2003 for robbery, burglary and 

larceny. Solution rates for robbery are not separated 

from bank burglary and larceny, but most of the bank 

crimes are robbery. 

23 McCormick (2005).

24 Blankenburg and Feest (1977).

25 Haran (1982); Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003). 

26 Calculated from solution statistics reported by the 

FBI Field Offices for 2003.

27 Buchler and Leineweber (1991); Desroches (1995).

28 Rehder and Dillow (2003).

29 Morrison and O’Donnell (1994).

30 Administrative Office of the Courts (1991).

31 Kube (1988); Barancik (1998); Gould, Camp, and 

Peck (1986); Trudel and LeBlanc (1986); Gabor and 

Normandau (1989). 

32 Hannan (1982); Barancik (1998); Erickson and Balzer 

(2003). 

33 Grandjean (1990); Leineweber and Buchler (1991); 

Wise and Wise (1985). 

34 Bankersonline (2002); Wilgoren (2002); Weir and 

Santos (2003).

35 Gill and Matthews (1994); Gill and Pease (1998); 

Gabor and Normandeau (1989); Leineweber and 

Buchler (1991); Haran (1982); Gabor et al. (1987); 

Camp (1968); Johnston (1978).

36 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003); Baumer 

and Carrington (1986); Vardalis and Cox (1998); 

Desroches (1995). 

37 Borzycki (2003); Cook (1983); Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (2003). 

38 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003); Borzycki 

(2003); Matthews (1996);Vardalis and Cox (1998).

39 Federal Bureau of Investigation (2003).

40 Borzycki (2003); Matthews (1996);Vardalis and Cox 

(1998).

58 Bank Robbery
41 Nugent et al. (1989).

42 Borzycki (2003).

43 Arend (1994).

44 Morrison and O’Donnell (1994).

45 Johnston (1978).

46 Saylor and Janus (1981); Vardalis and Cox (1998); 

Buchler and Leineweber (1991).

47 Leineweber and Buchler (1991).

48 Van Koppen and Jansen (1999); Van Koppen and 

Jansen (1998).

49 Gill and Matthews (1994); Erickson (1996).

50 Erickson (1996); Desroches (1995); Johnston (1978); 

Gabor et al. (1987); Erickson and Stenseth (1996); 

Leineweber and Buchler (1991); Kube (1988); Nugent 

et al. (1989); Tiffany and Ketchel (1978).

51 Nugent et al. (1989); Gill and Pease (1998).

52 Gould, Camp, and Peck (1986); Nugent et al. (1989).

53 Robson (1999).

54 Blankenburg and Feest (1977).

55 Gould, Camp, and Peck (1986); Nugent et al. (1989); 

Gill and Pease (1998); Gill and Matthews (1994); 

Vardalis and Cox (1998).

56 Vardalis and Cox (1998).

57 Vardalis and Cox (1998).

58 Van Koppen and Jansen (1998).

59 Desroches (1995).

60 Buchler and Leineweber (1991). 

61 Baumer and Carrington (1986).

62 Hannan (1982); Desroches (1995).

63 Saylor and Janus (1981).

64 Tiffany and Ketchel (1978). 

65 Saylor and Janus (1981).

66 Matthews (1996).

67 Matthews, Pease, and Pease (2001).

68 Wise and Wise (1985).

69 Saylor and Janus (1981).

Endnotes 59
70 Baumer and Carrington (1986).

71 Gill and Pease (1998); Gill and Matthews (1994); 

Matthews (1996).

72 Clarke (1990); Clarke and McGrath (1992).

73 Matthews, Pease, and Pease (2001).

74 Van Koppen and Jansen (1999); Buchler and 

Leineweber (1991); Bruce (2002).

75 Bruce (2002).

76 Buchler and Leineweber (1991); Van Koppen and 

Jansen (1999); Bruce (2002); Vardalis and Cox (1998).

77 Gill and Matthews (1994); Van Koppen and Jansen 

(1999).

78 Gabor and Normandeau (1989).

79 Van Koppen and Jansen (1999).

80 Van Koppen and Jansen (1999).

81 Abraham and Baldassaro (2001).

82 Abraham and Baldassaro (2001).

83 Rehder and Dillow (2003).

84 Hurst (1996); Erickson and Balzer (2003).

85 Tiffany and Ketchel (1978); Morrison and O’Donnell 

(1994).

86 Hechinger (2002); Austin (1988).

87 Morrison and O’Donnell (1994); Hechinger (2002); 

Buchler and Leineweber (1991); Kube (1988); Austin 

(1988).

88 Leineweber and Buchler (1991).

89 Economist (2003).

90 Abraham and Baldassaro (2001).

91 Barancik (1998); Tiffany and Ketchel (1978); Hannan 

(1982).

92 Nugent et al. (1989); Hannan (1982); Saylor and Janus 

(1981).

93 Erickson and Balzer (2003).

94 Baumer and Carrington (1986); Hannan (1982); 

Nugent et al. (1989).

60 Bank Robbery
95 Hechinger (2002).

96 Nugent et al. (1989); Kube (1988); Buchler and 

Leineweber (1991).

97 Kube (1988).

98 Federal Communications Commission (1996).

99 Erickson and Balzer (2003).

100 Massachusetts Bankers Association (2003).

101 Bankersonline (2002). 

102 Erickson and Balzer (2003).

103 Gill and Matthews (1994); Vardalis and Cox (1998); 

Wise and Wise (1985).

104 Kenney (2003).

105 Baumer and Carrington (1986).

106 Weir and Santos (2003); Kenney (2003); Carroll and 

Loch (1997); Lissenden (1996).

107 Erickson and Balzer (2003).

108 Desroches (1995); Gould, Camp, and Peck (1986); 

Hannan (1982).

109 Baumer and Carrington (1986).

110 Buchler and Leineweber (1991); Kube (1988); 

Matthews (1996).

111 Barancik (1998).

112 Saylor and Janus (1981).

113 Erickson and Balzer (2003); Leineweber and Buchler 

(1991).

114 Wipprecht (2002b).

115 Austin (1988); Grandjean (1990); Leineweber and 

Buchler (1991).

116 Wipprecht (2002b).

117 Hechinger (2002).

118 Gill and Matthews (1994); Wise and Wise (1985); 

Nugent et al. (1989).

119 Nugent et al. (1989); Gill and Matthews (1994); 

Archea (1985).

120 Gould, Camp, and Peck (1986).

121 Clarke (1990); Clarke and McGrath (1992).

Endnotes 61
62 Bank Robbery

122 Camp (1968); Johnston (1978).

123 Lissenden (1996).

124 Gabor et al. (1987); Nugent et al. (1989); Gabor and 

Normandeau (1989). 

125 Desroches (1995).

126 Buchler and Leineweber (1991); Kube (1988); 

Matthews (1996).

127 Rehder and Dillow (2003). 

128 Buchler and Leineweber (1991).
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About the Author

Deborah Lamm Weisel

Deborah Lamm Weisel is an assistant research professor and the 

director of police research in the Department of Political Science 

and Public Administration at North Carolina State University. Her 

portfolio includes research on police responses to crime problems 

such as gangs, street drugs and graffiti, as well as community policing, 

safety and security in public housing, and repeat victimization 

from burglary and robbery. Her work has been published in Justice 

Quarterly, Public Management, the NIJ Journal, and the American 

Journal of Police. She holds a doctorate in political science/public 

policy analysis from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

About the Author 73
Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An 

Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers,

by John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide 

is a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. 

It provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 

problem-oriented policing efforts.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.

Recommended Readings 75
• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 

1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This 

document produced by the National Institute of Justice 

in collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A 

similar publication is available for the award winners from 

subsequent years. The documents are also available at 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective 

or ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory 

for Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 

Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 

1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 

theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory 

have practical implications for the police in their efforts to 

prevent crime.

• Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 

Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 

analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 

can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 

policing practices.

76 Bank Robbery
• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 

how a police agency can implement the concept.

• Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 

by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). 

Provides a thorough review of significant policing research 

about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat 

victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings 

to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police 

departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by 

improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and 

securing productive partnerships.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 

First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 

Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 

Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 

(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 

rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 

problem-solving process, and provides examples of 

effective problem-solving in one agency.

Recommended Readings 77
• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 

Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 

Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 

Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 1998) (also available at www.cops.usdoj.

gov). Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, 

basic information on the SARA model and detailed 

suggestions about the problem-solving process.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 

Studies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 

methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 

20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 

Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson 

and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 

for Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 

police to analyzing problems within the context of 

problem-oriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 

many of the basics of research as it applies to police 

management and problem-solving.

78 Bank Robbery
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 

2001. ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

2. Street Prostitution, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-02-9

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 

Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7

5. False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition. Rana Sampson. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-05-3

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-07-X

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 

Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-14-2

16. Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs, 2nd Edition. Michael S. 

Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-15-0

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-16-9

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 

2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-18-5

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 79
20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly.

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-30-4

23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 

Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

24. Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-33-9

25. Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-35-3

26. Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and Kenneth J. Peak. 

2004. ISBN: 1-932582-36-3

27. Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-39-8

28. Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-42-8

29. Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-43-6

30. Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

31. Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos and Mike 

Hough. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-45-2

32. Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-46-0

33. Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-47-9

34. Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-50-9

35. School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-9325802-51-7

36. Drunk Driving. Michael S. Scott, Nina J. Emerson, Louis B. 

Antonacci, and Joel B. Plant. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-57-6

37. Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1932582-56-8

38. The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. Newman. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-59-2

39. Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. Eck. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-60-6

80 Bank Robbery
40. People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-63-0

41. Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley 

and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-65-7

42. Witness Intimidation. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-67-3

43. Burglary at Single-Family House Construction 

Sites. Rachel Boba and Roberto Santos. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

44. Disorder at Day Laborer Sites. Rob Guerette. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-72-X

45. Domestic Violence. Rana Sampson. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-74-6

46. Thefts of and from Cars on Residential 

Streets and Driveways. Todd Keister. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-76-2

47. Drive-By Shootings. Kelly Dedel. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

48. Bank Robbery. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-78-9

Response Guides series:

• The Benefits and Consequences of Police 

Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

• Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should 

You Go Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

• Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns.

Emmanuel Barthe. 2006 ISBN: 1-932582-66-5

• Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 

Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 

2005. ISBN: 1-932582-55-X

• Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 

2006 ISBN: 1-932582-58-4

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 81
Problem-Solving Tools series: 

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory 

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

• Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. 

Schultz. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7

• Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem 

Solving. Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5

• Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm 

Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1

Understanding Risky Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke 

and John E. Eck. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Abandoned Vehicles

Bicycle Theft

Crowd Control at Stadiums and Other Entertainment Venues

Child Abuse

Crime and Disorder in Parks

Pedestrian Injuries and Fatalities

Robbery of Convenience Stores

Traffic Congestion Around Schools

Transient Encampments

•

82 Bank Robbery
Problem-Solving Tools

Designing a Problem Analysis System

Displacement

Implementing Responses to Problems

Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in 

Problem Solving

Partnering with Community Developers to Address Public 

Safety Problems

Response Guides

Enhancing Lighting

Sting Operations

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 

Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit 

COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 83
For More Information:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below.

e03071267 March 2007

ISBN: 1-932582-78-9 

www.cops.usdoj.gov