14-2194 

Fair v. Verizon Communications Inc., et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 26th 4 day of October, two thousand fifteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 RALPH K. WINTER, 

8 DENNIS JACOBS,

9 PIERRE N. LEVAL,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 Avon E. Fair, 

14 

15 Plaintiff-Appellant,

16 

17 v. 

18 14-2194 

19 

20 Verizon Communications Inc., 

21 Verizon Inc., Verizon, et al, 

22 

23 Defendants-Appellees. 

24 _____________________________________ 

25 

26 

27 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Avon E. Fair, pro se, New 

28 York, NY. 

29 

30 
1 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Joseph A. D’Avanzo, 

2 Esq., Ledy-Gurren, Bass, 

3 D’Avanzo & Siff LLP, 

4 White Plains, NY.

5 

6 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 

7 for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.). 

8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

9 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

10 Appellant Avon E. Fair, pro se, appeals the district court=s 

11 dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of her 

12 disability discrimination claims under Section 255 of the 

13 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 255, and of her 

14 state law fraud and breach of contract claims. We assume the 

15 parties= familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

16 history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

17 When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for lack of 

18 subject matter jurisdiction, we review the district court’s 

19 factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de 

20 novo. Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). 

21 Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled 

22 that it lacked diversity jurisdiction because the parties were 

23 both citizens of New York State. However, the district court 

24 erred by dismissing the Telecommunication Act claim for lack 
3 

1 of federal question jurisdiction rather than for failure to 

2 state a claim. 

3 The Telecommunications Act expressly provides that 

4 “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to authorize any 

5 private right of action to enforce any requirement of this 

6 section or any regulation thereunder.” 47 U.S.C. § 255(f). 

7 Furthermore, it grants “exclusive jurisdiction with respect to 

8 any complaint under this section” to the FCC. Id. 

9 Determinations that a federal statute does not provide a 

10 private right of action are typically subject to dismissal under 

11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Rules”) for 

12 failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. ABB 

13 AG, 768 F.3d 145, 171 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s 

14 dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) that Foreign Corrupt Practices 

15 Act does not provide a private right of action); Lopez v. Jet 

16 Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming 

17 district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) that the Air 

18 Carrier Access Act does not provide a private right of action); 

19 George v. NYC Dep't of City Planning, 436 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 

20 2006) (affirming district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 

21 that the Coastal Zone Management Act does not provide a private 
4 

1 right of action). Here, the conclusion that § 255 provides no 

2 private right of action is categorically supported by the 

3 explicit text of § 255(f); but that does not compel a different 

4 result here. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) 

5 (“A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 

6 U.S.C. § 1331 may be dismissed for want of subject-matter 

7 jurisdiction if it is not colorable . . . .”). Since plaintiff 

8 has asserted a cause of action under § 255, which § 255 provides 

9 no private right of action, her § 255 claims must be dismissed 

10 for failure to state a claim. 

11 Accordingly, rather than vacate and remand the case to the 

12 district court, we affirm the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for 

13 lack of diversity, and we affirm the dismissal of the 

14 Telecommunications Act claims, albeit on different grounds, 

15 under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Norex 

16 Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 

17 2010) (affirming under 12(b)(6) without remand a district 

18 court’s 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of federal question subject 

19 matter jurisdiction in a case concerning the extraterritorial 

20 application of civil RICO). 
5 

1 We have considered all of Fair’s remaining arguments and 

2 find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the 

3 judgment of the district court. 

4 

5 FOR THE COURT: 

6 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk