U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

29–513 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–966

IRAN’S NUCLEAR IMPASSE: NEXT STEPS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, AND INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 20, 2006

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Minority Staff Director 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

THOMAS CARPER, Delaware 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

KATY FRENCH, Staff Director 

SHEILA MURPHY, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

LIZ SCRANTON, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 3

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 26

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2006

Amir Abbas Fakhravar, Chairman, Independent Student Movement (through 

a translater) .......................................................................................................... 4

Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council ........ 7

Michael A. Ledeen, Freedom Scholar, American Enterprise Institute ............... 9

Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ....................................................................................................................... 12

Jim Walsh, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 14

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Berman, Ilan: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40

Fakhravar, Amir Abbas: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

Ledeen, Michael A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46

Takeyh, Ray: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54

Walsh, Jim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59

(1)

IRAN’S NUCLEAR IMPASSE: NEXT STEPS 

THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2006

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:39 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Coburn, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Coburn, Carper and Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. The Federal Financial Management and International Security Subcommittee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs will come to order. I want to welcome all of our 

guests. I have thoroughly read your testimony, even those that 

have come somewhat late. I appreciate the efforts that you have 

made to inform this Subcommittee of your thoughts and views. 

We live in a dangerous time, a dangerous world. The events that 

are unfolding in the Middle East today are not always what they 

seem to be, and, in fact, proxies appear to be performing for others. 

There is no question that the largest sponsor of terrorism in the 

world is the government of Iran. Without question, that not only 

impacts the Middle East but the rest of the world. There is no 

question that the sponsor and promoter and payer for the improvised explosive devices that are multidirectional and unidirectional 

in Iraq are prepared and paid for by the government of Iran. 

The purpose of this hearing, however, is to discuss Iran’s nuclear 

impasse and what is to be done about it and the evidentiary nature 

of the statements that have been made by their own negotiators 

and that they do not intend to negotiate straightforward, they intend to buy time, as published widely and worldwide by the fact 

that their negotiator said they stalled the EU so that they could 

continue developing. 

I think it is very important for us—and I want to thank my coChairman Senator Carper for having initiated this second of our 

hearings on Iran. But it is important for us to understand the seriousness of the threat to the entire world, not just the Middle East. 

I also think it is very important for us to recognize the threat 

that the government of Iran is to the people of Iran, to the very 

people that they supposedly represent because ultimately what 

they do, it does them tremendous damage. 

2

I have a complete written statement I will make a part of the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Coburn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Within the past few weeks, the regime in Iran illustrated yet again why it is a 

threat that the world cannot afford to ignore any longer. There is no doubt that Iran 

is behind the two-front war being waged against our closest ally in the Middle East, 

Israel, by Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists. Just like there is no doubt that Iran is 

behind the road-side bombs and other terrorist acts killing Allied soldiers and innocent civilians in Iraq. For decades, the regime in Iran has been exporting terror all 

around the world and killing untold numbers including Americans, Israelis, Iraqis, 

and even fellow Iranians. Iran is already a threat to the world without a nuclear 

capability—nuclear weapons will only exacerbate that threat. 

When the Iran’s nuclear weapons program was first revealed by Iranian dissidents in 2002, the international community could no longer deny the problem. In 

2003, Germany, France, and Britain—the ‘‘E.U.–3’’—responded by offering Iran a 

generous economic package and a promise of help developing so called ‘‘peaceful’’ 

sharing of nuclear technology. The condition was that Iran would have to stop enriching uranium. After lengthy negotiations, Iran responded by breaking the 

I.A.E.A. seals on its centrifuges and rejecting the deal. The following year, the Europeans tried another round of negotiations, resulting in even more E.U.–3 concessions. But again, after lengthy negotiations, Iran responded by breaking I.A.E.A. 

seals on its uranium conversion facility and continued to develop nuclear technology. 

We now know that Hassan Rowhani, the Iranian representative at the negotiations, admitted that while he was negotiating with the Europeans, the regime 

rushed to complete a major nuclear site. The Telegraph article, aptly entitled ‘‘How 

we duped the West, by Iran’s nuclear negotiator,’’ quotes Rowhani as saying he created a ‘‘tame situation’’ to buy time for the regime to finish the job. 

President Bush has decided to give Iran one more opportunity at negotiations. 

The United States has expanded the already generous economic incentive package 

and has made Iran one final offer. It is uncertain whether this new round of negotiations represents an exercise in truly checking every last box or the Administration is indulging to the prevailing in truly checking every last box or the Administration is indulging to the prevailing appeasement ideology in Europe and in some 

quarters at the State Department. Let’s hope that nobody is actually counting on 

good faith from a regime which has shown no sign of it, and that these many efforts 

are simply an instrument of pressure for the international community to demonstrate that everything has truly been tried. 

Amazingly, even after all we know regarding the regime’s central role in terrorism 

both inside and outside of Iran, some analysts here in the United States jump at 

the chance to defend Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Since the beginning, the Iranian regime has referred to the United States as ‘‘the Great Satan’’ and, even when 

a so-called reformer was president, the regime rules Iran with an iron fist—crushing 

all who would dare call for democracy and freedom—and continues to be a state 

sponsor of terror. Against all rationality, the apologists believe the regime will 

somehow have a change of heart if only the United States offers trade relations, university scholarships, and relaxed travel visas to the regime. 

The regime’s stall tactics are well documented, and recent Iranian calls for more 

time and talking appear to be more of the same. Assuming that these will eventually fail to deter an Iranian nuclear program, the United States has three options 

left: Sanctions, military action and aggressive democracy promotion. 

Unfortunately, sanctions are not a promising option. First, they must be agreed 

upon by everyone. Second, even when they are, they haven’t worked. Third, they 

won’t pass in the U.N. Given the track record with the U.N. on Burma, Sudan, Iraq, 

North Korea and any other dangerous regime, it is highly unlikely we will see the 

Security Council enforce an effective sanctions package against Iran. It would be 

equally difficult for the United States to form a coalition of willing nations since 

many European countries depend on Iran’s energy exports and several Western nations have significant trade relations with the regime. 

So, what about military options? While a full-scale invasion is not necessarily ‘‘off 

the table,’’ it doesn’t appear to have any serious weight in the current policy track 

of the Administration. Surgical strikes, on the other hand, appear to be within the 

realm of possibility. Advocates say there are only a limited number of nuclear sites, 

and striking them would cripple Iran’s program. Opponents say our intelligence on 

Iran is limited and unreliable. Regardless, it is doubtful that President Bush wants 

3

to pass on to his successor the same unresolved problems he inherited—North 

Korea, Iran, and al-Qaeda. Surgical air strikes might be a fast and effective way 

to ensure he doesn’t leave office with Iran having a nuclear arsenal with which to 

blackmail and threaten free nations. 

Perhaps the greatest hope the world has is the spirit of liberty among the Iranian 

people. Seventy percent of the Iranian people are below the age of 30. These young 

people want a country of opportunity, freedom, a chance to live out their dreams—

not an oppressive dictatorship under constant isolation from the free world. As was 

the case in the former Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, and many 

of the other Soviet satellites, the role of democracy revolutionaries was essential to 

these countries’ transformation. 

Iran poses a grave threat to the world but an even graver threat to Iranians; and 

therein lays our greatest hope for peace. By aggressively and intelligently supporting the millions of young Iranians who long for freedom and opportunity, the 

free world can loosen the iron grip of the ayatollahs. That’s why I’ve co-sponsored 

the Iran Freedom and Support Act. But just throwing money at so-called democracy 

promotion programs isn’t enough. If not done right, programs can do more harm 

than good. We have a responsibility to Iran’s young people to oversee these programs. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to discuss these policy options and the next 

steps for dealing with Iran. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, and 

I look forward to your testimonies.

Senator COBURN. I would like to recognize my Co-Chairman, 

Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses today, welcome. We appreciate your willingness to stop 

what you are doing in your lives to be here with us today and to 

share your thoughts and to respond to some of our questions. I 

want to thank the Chairman for scheduling this hearing and our 

staffs for working to prepare us for this day. 

Every now and then we have hearings, and I am sure we both 

participate in them, and you say, Why is this relevant to what is 

going on in the world? Today we do not ask that question. We 

know for sure why this is relevant to what is going on in the world, 

in our lives and certainly in the lives of a lot of people in the Middle East. 

For nearly 2 weeks, violence in the Middle East has led to more 

than 300 deaths, with many of those dying being civilians. Iran, 

through its sponsorship of Hezbollah and its willingness to back 

Syria, has been publicly linked to these events. 

Our country has been placed in a difficult situation, a situation 

where we must lead our allies on the one hand to strategically contain the conflict between Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israeli forces, and 

at the same time try to help stop the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons. 

The Administration has entered a decision to engage in talks 

with Iran, multilateral talks with Iran regarding its nuclear program. But, unfortunately, the success of this path remains today at 

least in question, especially given the current situation. 

Additionally, the Administration has said that it will send Secretary Rice to both the U.N. and to the Middle East to discuss a 

solution to ending the conflict involving the Israelis and some of 

their neighbors. 

I cannot more urgently stress the need for these visits to happen 

as soon as possible or the need for the United States to utilize our 

4

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fakhravar appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

diplomatic leverage to urge a cease-fire to the fighting that continues to claim innocent lives. 

I am looking forward to hearing the testimony from all of you, 

and we look forward to the opportunity to see if that testimony 

may shed a little more light on both the situations that we face and 

a possible better path forward. Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Again, welcome to our panelists. I will introduce each of you, and then we will recognize you. Your full statements will be made part of the record. Because Mr. Fakhravar will 

have an interpreter, we will give him an additional amount of time 

with which to make his statement. 

Amir Abbas Fakhravar is Chairman of the Independent Student 

Movement, is an Iranian student leader that recently left Iran and 

came to the United States in April of this year. While in Iran, Mr. 

Fakhravar was imprisoned by the regime for his writings and activities that promote a free and democratic Iran. 

Next is Dr. Michael Ledeen, who is the Freedom Scholar at the 

American Enterprise Institute. His research areas include state 

sponsors of terrorism, Iran, and the Middle East. 

Ilan Berman is Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign 

Policy Council. Mr. Berman’s research includes Iran and the Middle East. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the 

Council on Foreign Relations. He has testified before this Committee before. Welcome back. He works on issues related to Iran 

and political reform in the Middle East. 

Finally, Dr. Jim Walsh is from the Security Studies Program at 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He researches international security policy. 

Each of you will be allotted 5 minutes, and we will be somewhat 

free with that time, if we can. If you do not have time to make your 

point, we will be lenient in that regard. And I want to welcome 

you. And to our leader of the Iranian Student Movement, there is 

a movie that is well known in America, and a classic line from it 

is, ‘‘People don’t follow titles. They follow courage.’’ I want to commend your courage and offer you my admiration for your leadership for what you are doing. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF AMIR ABBAS FAKHRAVAR,1 CHAIRMAN, 

INDEPENDENT STUDENT MOVEMENT 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. Thank you very much for giving me the honor 

and opportunity to speak at the U.S. Senate, one of the world’s oldest and most distinguished democratic institutions. I assure you 

that the very thought of being able to be with you fills me with joy 

and awe. You are, as your ancestors promised, a beacon of light to 

all nations around the world. 

[Through translator.] My name is Amir Abbas Fakhravar. I am 

basically leader of a portion of student movement in Iran. I have 

been through jails and tortured. As a result of torture, you can see 

the scars on my face. My left wrist was broken. My knee was broken. 

5

I am here to voice the Iranian operation, bring it to your attention, and the basic regime change model and the message is what 

we are here to pass on to you all. 

I have four points to make here. 

First is the negotiation part. Is there any real truth and meaningful reason to have the negotiations with the Islamic regime? 

I have lived all my life under the system, the current system in 

Iran, and I know the system very well. There is no way that there 

is any place of negotiation with these people. 

You can negotiate with people who have logical minds and humanistic beliefs. The people in charge in Iran do not have either 

one. They are brutal and oppressive. The crimes that they pull on 

the people of Iran, you can see it based on examples like stoning, 

cutting off their hands, eye gouging, and torture. 

I am not saying that the negotiation is not going to be fruitful—

sorry, that the negotiations are going to be futile. However, it is not 

just futile. It is dangerous, outright dangerous, because you will 

provide them legitimacy. The Islamic regime has no legitimacy 

both inside and outside of Iran. 

Through this negotiation, you are giving them the legitimacy, at 

least inside of Iran, towards the Iranian people inside. 

Heads of Islamic regime are moving toward this movement to 

bring bloody ordeal in the country, in the world. This is one of the 

fundamental religious beliefs. 

Ahmadinejad, Khamenei, and Mesbaheh Yazdi are all of the belief that for bringing back the 12th Imam, Shi’ite Imam, the whole 

world has to be in a chaotic and bloody way before they arrive. 

They will do anything to disrupt the order of the world and make 

a mockery of the world so they can reach to their goal of bringing 

the 12th Imam back to life. 

I am here standing in front of you to tell you that the youth of 

Iran, the Iranian students, do have the power to stand in front of 

this regime. We did show the might and the power of the Iranian 

student movement on the July 9, 1999, protest. At that time we did 

not have a full organized group, and we did not have the full education to combat this regime and uprise. 

Through the means of communication, we would like to broadcast 

and promote democracy amongst the Iranian young and other 

groups such as labor movements, women movements, and other 

participants in other movements. We need communication devices, 

such as mobile cell phones, printers to print our magazines and our 

fliers. We need websites. Most importantly, we need radio and TV 

broadcasts. Both Radio Farda and Voice of America, the Persian 

version, can help us greatly. 

The path that they have taken so far does not seem to be helping. I do not think that the U.S. taxpayers are happy to see their 

monies being used for propaganda against the United States. The 

most optimistic ones of the analysts and all do not even trust the 

reform within the regime. People of Iran have not received accurate 

news for years. They do need to hear accurate news and accurate 

analysis. With a so-called balanced view of these two media, the 

Voice of America and Radio Farda, they have really caused nothing 

but confusion among Iranians. 

6

Every program should be geared toward regime change, and that 

is what Iranians inside of Iran wish for. We are planning through 

an organization called ‘‘Confederation of Iranian Students’’ to organize all students once again. We can accomplish this organization, 

we can organize it. However, the Iranians inside of Iran do need 

to know that people of the world are standing by them. 

Through a hard sanction, multilateral sanction, I do believe that 

the Iranian people will come to the realization that the world is not 

supporting the regime, should not be worried about this sanction. 

My younger brothers and sisters and mother are living inside of 

Iran. They are going through very hard economic conditions. This 

is throughout Iran for everybody. They are willing to handle a 

short period of hard times so they would get rid of this regime once 

and for all. Iran is not a poor country. But the income of the country goes basically into the mullahs’ pockets and their children, 

their sons. 

All Iranians do know that after removal of the regime, there 

would be foreign investments. We can use this sanction to organize 

and gather up people, bring them together. 

And about the military, nobody is after military action, neither 

us nor you. All we are doing is to show that we do have the power 

and let you know that we can do it from inside. We would like to 

replace Islamic regime with a secular democratic system. And we 

do our best. The mistakes by Islamic regime is that they are trying 

to prolong the time, and if they feel that there is any danger in the 

world, nobody is going to ask us how to deal with them. But I am 

sure that Iranians’ interests will be considered in this. 

There are two points. I know I have taken so much of your time. 

Twenty-six years ago, a few, a handful of Iranian students 

climbed the walls of the U.S. Embassy. For 444 days, they held 

hostage the American sons and daughters and brought shame to 

Iranian students. I promised myself once the opportunity is available on behalf of the Iranian students, as the leader of the Iranian 

student movement, to apologize for this insane crime to the people 

of the United States and the world. 

The second point is we realize that the nuclear issue of Islamic 

regime has really tired the whole world. This is a problem for the 

world population as well as the Iranian population. But the main 

point in Iran is different. This shall be a big problem for the entire 

world as well. The sick mind of the regime’s man in charge, they 

teach the children in school how to make bombs and how to kill 

people. Our prisons are overflowing with political prisoners and 

breaking human rights widely. We hope that while you are paying 

attention to the nuclear dossier, we want these issues are not forgotten. For security even here in the United States, you need stability in the Middle East. 

Senator COBURN. You need to summarize for us, if you would, 

and complete your testimony. 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. Thirty seconds, sir. A change of regime to a secular democrat will help stability in the region and the world. We 

see what the Islamic regime has done with its support of Hezbollah 

in Lebanon and what crime has taken place. Please help us to remove the Islamic regime, and you can count on it that Iran will be 

one of the best friends and ally of the United States and the world. 

7

1The prepared statement of Mr. Berman appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Fakhravar. 

[Applause.] 

Senator COBURN. Mr. Berman. 

TESTIMONY OF ILAN BERMAN,1 VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY, 

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Senator Coburn. That is a very hard 

act to follow, but I will try. 

Let me talk a little bit from the American perspective. The one 

thing that I think we should emphasize here is that right now the 

United States is at a crossroads. We have a situation where the 

State Department’s negotiating offer over the Iranian nuclear program, the one that was proffered in late May, has effectively 

ground to a halt. Certainly the Iranian regime is trying to extend 

the timeline that they have been given, but for all intents and purposes, this effort has failed. 

What we have now is a moment of reckoning when we need to 

look again at all of the policy options that are available to the 

United States for dealing with the Iranian nuclear program and 

the Iranian regime itself. 

A little bit of historical perspective is useful here. The State Department’s offer is actually the third such effort over the last decade. Between 1994 and 1997, there was a process called ‘‘critical 

dialogue,’’ under which we tried to alter Iranian behavior through 

economic and political inducements. That failed spectacularly. Between 2003 and 2005, you had what you could charitably term 

‘‘critical dialogue redux,’’ when the EU Three—France, Great Britain, and Germany—tried to do the same, specifically on the nuclear 

issue. And now you have this latest abortive offer coming out of the 

State Department. 

All of these offers failed because they fundamentally misread the 

political will of the Iranian regime to become a nuclear power. And 

future offers that neglect to understand this are going to meet the 

same fate. Also, I think it is useful to note that they also did not 

account for Iranian perceptions. 

I recently had the opportunity to travel to the Persian Gulf and 

have meetings with Iranian officials. I was astounded by what they 

told me. They told me that under no circumstances will the Iranian 

regime ‘‘do a deal’’—their words, not mine—with the U.S. Government because they do not believe that American worries over the 

Iranian nuclear program are legitimate. Instead, they think that 

the nuclear issue is a foil that the Bush Administration is using 

to promote regime change within Iran. 

As such, they have little to no incentive to actually come up with 

some sort of negotiated settlement because, after all, if the nuclear 

issue is gone, there are just going to be others. 

The third thing that is useful to note with regard to the negotiating track is that there is a lot of opportunity costs that are associated with it. What we have really done by offering for the first 

time in 27 years direct negotiations with the Iranian Government 

is to send two messages. 

8

The first is to the Iranian leadership, and the message is as follows: We are so concerned over your nuclear effort, we are so concerned over your atomic program, that the other elements of your 

rogue behavior—your interference in Iraq, your support of terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian, now Israeli-Hezbollah, conflict—

all fall by the wayside. This is not an encouraging or a moderating 

sort of message to send. 

The second message that we have sent is to the Iranian people 

themselves, which is that our concern over one aspect of the Iranian regime’s rogue behavior is so great that it has chilled our support for their desire for change. 

On the opposite end of the political spectrum, we have the idea 

of military action, and I certainly would second Mr. Fakhravar in 

saying that this is something that neither the Iranians nor the 

American people truly desire, for no other reason than the fact that 

it is likely to be profoundly self-defeating. First of all, we have to 

account for the fact that there is likely to be a very grave asymmetric response from the regime because of how it is positioned in 

the region and because of the tools of their terrorist proxies and the 

tools that they can marshal to retaliate. But more than anything 

else, what you have is a situation where military action will likely 

create a ‘‘rally around the flag’’ effect that is likely to be profoundly 

self-defeating because it will strengthen, not weaken, the Iranian 

regime. 

So that leaves us with what I would like to call a triple-track approach, and I think all of these should be pursued simultaneously. 

The first is economic pressure, and there are really three pressure points that we can bring to bear upon the regime. The first 

is foreign direct investment. The Iranian regime is dependent on 

foreign direct investment for continued oil production. They require 

about $1 billion annually to continue output at current levels, 2.5 

million barrels a day export, and $1.5 million to increase that capacity. That is not a lot of money, and I think that should be understood. Iran has signed contracts worth dozens of billions of dollars with foreign powers over the last several years. With China 

alone, they signed two massive exploration and development deals 

worth $100 billion over 25 years. A billion dollars is a drop in the 

bucket. 

But we can, through measures like multilateral sanctions, complicate their access to foreign direct investment and force them to 

dip into their hard currency reserves to continue their program. So 

we can slow it somewhat. But we cannot change the political will 

of the leadership itself to continue pursuing this program. 

The second is the economic hierarchy. Right now in Iran you 

have a situation where the vast majority of government funds and 

of government resources rests in the hands of very few people. And 

through measures like targeted sanctions, like travel bans, like 

asset freezes, we have the ability to take a large chunk of this 

money out of commission and really capture the conscience of the 

behind-the-scenes decisionmakers. Again, we cannot change their 

political will, but we can certainly telegraph to them that we are 

serious. 

The third and most promising economic point of vulnerability is 

commodities. Iran right now requires close to 40 percent of its anVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 10, 2007 Jkt 029513 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29513.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
9

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ledeen appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

nual consumption of gasoline to come from abroad. This is at a cost 

of about $3 million a year. Moreover, Iran does not have a strategic 

gas reserve. Iran only has, according to authoritative estimates, 

about 45 days’ worth of gasoline in-country, after which it becomes 

vulnerable. And that means that freezes on foreign exports of gasoline to Iran have the ability very quickly, much quicker than normal sanctions would, to affect both the ability of the regime to 

maintain the vast state subsidies on gasoline which currently exist, 

and also potentially these sort of commodity restrictions could create a situation where you have substantial social unrest in Iran. 

For the sake of brevity, I will not touch upon democracy promotion because my colleague, Dr. Ledeen, can certainly touch upon 

that for me. But what I would like to talk about as a concluding 

point is public diplomacy. 

Neither the nuclear effort, which right now retains a large 

amount of domestic popularity, nor the idea that the United States 

stands with the Iranian people in their desire for change can be 

telegraphed without an effective public diplomacy mechanism. And 

right now we have a situation where the tools of U.S. public diplomacy towards Iran, the Voice of America’s Persian Service and 

Radio Farda, are simply not doing the job. You have a situation 

where $56.1 million at last count is heading towards the Broadcasting Board of Governors with no effective oversight. And the corporate culture that exists in those mechanisms today, ineffective 

programming, lack of strategic clarity, and sometimes even ineffective, mixed, or downright dangerous messages about American intentions, are likely to be amplified as a result of those funds if 

there is no governmental oversight. 

Certainly I will be less diplomatic than my colleague, but I do 

not think it is unfair to say that regime change in U.S. public diplomacy towards Iran needs to happen. And it needs to happen because the stakes are so high. All of these efforts are interdependent. The nuclear issue is the most pressing one. But over 

the long term, the only thing that can ensure that an Iran armed 

with nuclear weapons is not a threat is by changing the finger on 

the trigger, by changing the character of the regime itself. 

Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Dr. Ledeen. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL A. LEDEEN,1 FREEDOM SCHOLAR, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. LEDEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Carper, and 

Senator Dayton if he returns. 

Sadly, recent events, most notably the Iranian-sponsored war 

against Israel, have made this discussion more urgent than ever. 

But that is what happens when successive administrations for 

nearly three decades avoid dealing with a serious problem. It gets 

worse. The cost of dealing with it becomes more and more burdensome. The theocratic tyranny in Tehran is a very serious problem, 

and it is becoming graver. It has already cost a great number of 

American lives and an even greater number of innocent Iranians, 

10

Iraqis, Israelis, Lebanese, Argentineans, and others around the 

world. Now they are literally hell-bent to become a nuclear power. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with us for 27 

years, and we have yet to respond. Fanatical Iranians overran the 

American Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and subjected diplomats to 

444 days of confinement and humiliation. In the mid-1980s, Iranian-supported terrorists from Hezbollah killed hundreds of Americans in our Beirut Embassy and 6 months later killed 241 Marines 

in their barracks there. A couple of years after that, Hezbollah took 

other Americans hostage in Lebanon from the CIA station chief in 

Beirut to Christian priests to a distinguished military man who 

had served as General Colin Powell’s military assistant in the Pentagon. The priests were eventually ransomed; Mr. Higgins and Mr. 

Buckley were tortured and murdered. 

They have waged an unholy proxy war against us every since the 

revolution. They created Hezbollah and Islamic Hijad. They support most all the others, from Hamas and al Qaeda to the Popular 

Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Iran’s 

proxies include Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Marxists, all cannon fodder for 

the overriding objective to dominate or destroy us. 

It is no accident that the weekend before the two-front attack on 

Israel, there was a security summit in Tehran, involving all of 

Iraq’s neighbors, at which Iran’s infamous President Ahmadinejad 

issued one of his trademark warnings to Israel. Perhaps he had a 

hint of what would soon explode. 

There are still those in Foggy Bottom, Langley, and academics 

who believe that somehow we can sort out our differences with the 

Islamic Republic. I wish they were right. But it seems to me that 

the Iranians’ behavior proves otherwise. Religious fanatics of the 

sort that rule Iran do not want a deal with the devil. They want 

us dominated or dead. There is no escape from their hatred or from 

the war they have waged against us. We can either win or lose, but 

no combination of diplomatic demarches, economic sanctions, and 

earnest negotiations can change that fatal equation. It is not our 

fault. It is their choice. 

A few months ago, the CIA concluded that Iran could not produce 

nuclear weapons in much less than a decade, but given the history 

of such predictions, we should be very skeptical of that timeline. 

Some Russian experts reportedly think it could be a matter of 

months, and they probably have better information than we do. 

Numerous Iranian leaders have said that they intend to use nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, and contemporary history suggests 

that one should take such statements at face value. A nuclear Iran 

would be a more influential regional force, and since its missiles 

now reach deep into Europe, it would directly menace the West. 

I am the last person to suggest that we should not do everything 

possible to prevent the emergence of a nuclear Iran. But the nuclear question simply adds urgency to the Iranian threat, which is 

already enormous, and which should have been addressed long ago. 

The mullahs do not need atomic bombs to kill large numbers of 

Americans. They have done it with conventional explosive. They 

have long worked on other weapons of mass destruction, and they 

have an imposing network of terrorists all over the Western world. 

I am afraid that the obsession with the nuclear question often obVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 10, 2007 Jkt 029513 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29513.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11

scures the central policy issue: That the Islamic Republic has 

waged war against us for many years and is killing Americans 

every week. They would do that even if they had no chance of developing atomic bombs, and they will do it even if by some miracle 

the feckless and endlessly self-deluding governments of the West 

manage to dismantle the secret atomic facilities and impose an effective inspection program. The mullahs will do that because that 

is what they are and it is what they do. 

The nuclear threat is, therefore, inseparable from the nature of 

the regime. If there were a freely elected, democratic government 

in Tehran, instead of the self-selecting tyranny of the mullahs, we 

would in all likelihood be dealing with a pro-Western country that 

would be more interested in good trade and cultural relations than 

in nuclear warheads. 

In other words, it is all about the regime. Change the regime, 

and the nuclear question becomes manageable. Leave the mullahs 

in place, and the nuclear weapons directly threaten us and our 

friends and allies, raising the ante of the terror war they started 

27 years ago. 

What should we do? 

The first step is to abandon the self-deception that we will be 

able to arrive at a negotiated settlement. It cannot be done. The 

Iranians view negotiations as merely tactical enterprises in support 

of their strategic objectives. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, a 

few months ago, Hassan Rowhani, the mullah in charge of nuclear 

negotiations with the Europeans, bragged in a public speech that 

Iran had duped European Union negotiators into thinking it had 

halted efforts to make nuclear fuel while in reality it continued to 

install equipment to process yellowcake—a key stage in the nuclear 

fuel process. 

It could hardly be clearer, or so one would think. The ‘‘negotiations’’ were merely a tactic. 

Nor is there any reason to believe we can count on the United 

Nations to impose the rules of civilized behavior on the mullahs, 

either on nuclear issues or terrorism. The supreme leader, Ali 

Khamanei, has told his associates that Iran now has a ‘‘strategic 

relationship’’ with Putin’s Russia, and that China is so dependent 

on Iranian oil that it is highly unlikely Beijing would vote against 

Tehran in the Security Council. 

That leaves us with three courses of action, none of which is 

automatically exclusive of the others: Sanctions, military strikes, 

and support for democratic revolution. 

I do not know of a single case in which sanctions have produced 

a change in behavior by a hostile regime. Moreover, sanctions 

aimed against the national economy seem to me misconceived because they harm the people, who are highly likely to be our best 

weapon against the tyrants, while leaving the oppressive elite 

largely untouched. 

We should want to punish hostile regimes and help the people. 

Big-time economic sanctions or embargoes cannot do that, but very 

limited sanctions and other economic and financial actions can, although nothing is as effective in this case as the Iranian leaders 

themselves. Iranian debt has just been downgraded two levels to Bminus, putting Iranian paper now at the level of junk bonds. But 

12

1The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh appears in the Appendix on page 54. 

I am very much in favor of seizing the assets of the Iranian leaders 

who have stolen billions from their oppressed and impoverished 

subjects. That money properly belongs to the Iranian people, whose 

misery grows from day to day. We should hold it for them and return it to a freely elected government after we have helped them 

overthrow their oppressors. 

I also support a travel ban on the leaders because it shows the 

Iranian people that we consider the mullahs unworthy of acceptance in the civilized world. Iranians know it better than we do, but 

they need to see that we have taken sides, their side, and the travel ban is one good way to do that. 

Military action. Nobody this side of the yellow press is talking 

about an invasion of Iran, but there is considerable speculation 

about limited strikes against nuclear facilities. I do not know 

enough to be able to offer an informed opinion on this matter. I 

would only point out that our intelligence about Iran has been bad 

since before the revolution of 1979, and you would have to be very 

optimistic to base a military plan on our current intelligence product. 

That leaves us with revolution. Iran has had three revolutions in 

the 20th Century and boasts a long tradition of self-government. 

The demographics certainly favor radical change: Roughly 70 percent of Iranians are 29 years old or less. Young Iranians want an 

end to the Islamic Republic. We know from the regime’s own public 

opinion surveys that upwards of 73 percent of the people would like 

a freer society and a more democratic government, and they constantly demonstrate their hatred of the regime in public protests. 

Oddly, just as it was generally believed that there was no hope 

of a peaceful overthrow of the Soviet Empire, today the conventional wisdom intones that there is no hope for democratic revolution in Iran, and even if there were, we would no longer have 

enough time for it, as if one could fine-tune a revolution. 

This pessimism strikes me as bizarre as it is discouraging. We 

empowered a successful revolution in the Soviet Empire with the 

active support of a very small percentage of the population. In Iran, 

revolution is the dream of at least 70 percent of the people. The 

regime is famously vicious, but the KGB was no less vicious, and 

tyranny is the most unstable form of government. 

Nobody knows with certainty whether revolution can succeed in 

Iran or, if it can, how long it will take. But we do know one very 

important thing. In recent years, a surprising number of revolutions have toppled tyrants all over the world. Most of them got help 

from us, which should not surprise Americans. We got plenty of 

help against the British. The Iranian people now await concrete 

signs of our support. Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Dr. Takeyh. 

TESTIMONY OF RAY TAKEYH,1 SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST 

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me back to 

the Subcommittee. I will try to confine my remarks to the allotted 

5 minutes so as to not tax your patience. 

13

Senator COBURN. I will be very lenient. We have been thus far, 

and we will continue to be. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you. What I will try to do in the time that 

is allowed to me is discuss the internal factional opinions within 

the regime on the nuclear issue, whether there are debates, disagreements, and what that implies for the future, of course, of the 

nuclear diplomacy that is at hand, and, finally, what is to be done 

at this late date. And I would like to begin with two cautionary 

notes. 

First of all, there is a considerable degree of opacity over Iran’s 

national security decisionmaking, particularly on issues as sensitive as nuclear issues, so there is much that we do not know. And 

much of what we say is speculative, but hopefully it is informed 

speculation. 

Second of all is, as we proceed down that track, we have to be 

cautious that perhaps Iran’s nuclear ambitions may not be subject 

to diplomatic mediation. There might not be a deal out there that 

is satisfactory to the sort of international community and the 

standards that we have set, namely, no enrichment capability. 

But having said that, let me just outline the opinions as I understand them, given the limits that we have at our disposal. 

Today in the Iranian regime, I would suggest that the debate is 

between two factions, and you can call them the hard-liners and 

real-hard-liners, in the sense that this is a debate that takes place 

on the margins of the extreme right. For the real-hard-liners that 

are represented by the President of Iran and individuals in the security services, the Revolutionary Guards and so forth, I suspect 

that their approach to the nuclear issue is conditioned by a mixture 

of wariness and nationalism. Their bitter experience of the IranIraq war, at which many of them were participants at that age, has 

led to cries of ‘‘Never again,’’ uniting their veterans turned politicians behind the desire to achieve not just a credible posture of deterrence, but potentially a convincing retaliatory capability. 

After decades of tension with America, Iran’s reactionaries perceive conflict with the United States as inevitable, and that the 

only manner by which America can potentially be deterred is 

through the possession of strategic weapons—the nuclear weapon. 

Given their suspicion and their paranoia, the hard-liners insist 

that America’s objection to Iran’s nuclear program does not stem 

from the proliferation, and I think some of that was mentioned by 

the previous speakers, but it is opposition to the character of the 

regime. They argue that should Iran acquiesce on the nuclear 

issue, then there will be another issue with which America try to 

coerce and punish Iran. Therefore, given such views, there appears 

limited incentive to compromise on such a critical national issue 

since acquiescence will not measurably relieve American pressure. 

So there is a core suspicion by which they approach the United 

States and issues of the nuclear diplomacy. 

The second faction, which, for lack of a better term, one can call 

less ideological and more realist, but certainly is hard-line, is curiously enough led by one of the more curious individuals within this 

regime, the head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali 

Larijani. For Larijani and many other sort of the hard-line realists, 

the Islamic Republic has offered a rare and perhaps a unique opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 10, 2007 Jkt 029513 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29513.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14

portunity to establish its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. 

For centuries, Iran’s monarchs and mullahs perceived that given 

their country’s demography, civilizational achievements, historical 

position, they had a right to become the preeminent power in the 

Gulf. But due to machinations of the global empires and certainly 

other hegemonic powers, those ambitions were unjustly thwarted. 

Today, as Iran’s hard-liners or politicians look at the Middle East, 

they perceive an America, a crestfallen America eager for an exit 

strategy out of its Arab predicament, an Iraq preoccupied with its 

own simmering sectarian conflicts, and a Gulf princely class more 

eager to accommodate rather than confront Iranian power. Therefore, they suggest a judicious Iran, a less provocative can achieve 

its long cherished aspiration of dominating the critical waterways 

of the Persian Gulf. 

A careful examination of Ali Larijani’s speeches reveals, strangely enough, his suggestion of India as a potential model for an aspiring regional power. India’s reasonable relationship with America 

has allowed it to maintain both its nuclear arsenal and also dominate its immediate neighborhood. In contrast, a Russian Federation 

that is at times at odds with the United States finds that its aspirations to control its ‘‘near abroad’’ are often checked by a skeptical 

America. So if you are aspiring for which regional power you want 

to be like, maybe India offers a better model. Although the United 

States presence in the Middle East is bound to diminish, for Iran’s 

hard-line realists American power can still present a barrier to 

Tehran’s resurgence. Although this faction does not seek normalization of relations with the United States—and I do not think any 

faction does—it does sense that a less contentious relationship with 

America may ease Washington’s distrust, paving the way for the 

projection of Iranian influence in the Gulf. 

As such, for the realists, the nuclear program has to be viewed 

in the larger context of Iran’s international relations and regional 

aspirations. Once more, India being the model of a country that 

should improve its relations with the United States, it may obtain 

American approbation of its nuclear ambitions. Although they are 

disinclined to dismantle the nuclear edifice—and I do not think we 

can get to ‘‘no enrichment capability’’—they do sense the need for 

restraint and the necessity, at least for now, of adhering to Iran’s 

long-standing NPT obligations. And NPT is a treaty that allows 

you to do much within its restrictions. 

What is to be done? It is a question that is often asked. It is almost impossible to answer satisfactorily, and it is not going to be 

answered with any degree of satisfaction for me. 

In May 2006, Secretary Rice took a step in revising America’s approach to Iran. In a unique step, she proposed direct talks with 

Iran over its nuclear program. The Administration, in my view, judiciously insisted on suspension of nuclear enrichment activities as 

a precondition for those talks. Despite the fact that this is a bold 

reconceptualization of American policy, it tends to miscast the disagreement between Iran and the United States as a disarmament 

dispute. The only manner of resolving this issue is through comprehensive discussions that deal with the totality of American and 

Iranian concerns. 

15

1The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

The United States and Iran both need to move one step further 

and discuss negotiations that encompass not just Iran’s nuclear 

ambitions, but Iraq as well as terrorism. To me, it is impossible at 

this point to have any degree of negotiations with the Iranian regime that are segregated and limited to the nuclear issue, given 

what has transpired on the Lebanese-Israeli border. 

Iranians have their own concerns—sanctions, suspension, frozen 

assets—and those should also be on the table. As both parties become satisfied with the content of the negotiations, satisfied that 

they encompass all their concerns, then perhaps an agreement can 

be reached. The diplomatic framework that I outlined views the nuclear issue as a symptom of a larger U.S.-Iranian malady and tries 

to address the root cause of those animosities. Only through a fundamental transformation of U.S.-Iran relations can we arrive at a 

satisfactory solution to Iran’s nuclear imbroglio. 

But this is a dynamic issue. As it moves forward, then Iran’s program crosses successive thresholds, and it may be impossible to reverse. Therefore, we should proceed with caution, if not alacrity. 

And I will stop right there. Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Dr. Walsh. 

TESTIMONY OF JIM WALSH,1 SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, 

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Carper, it is an honor to appear before you today. My comments will focus on the nuclear 

issue, and let me offer to you, if you have following this hearing 

additional questions that you would like me to respond to in writing, I would be happy to do so. 

Let me begin by way of background. I was invited, I think, to 

speak here today in part because over the past 2 years I have been 

engaged in a series of Track II discussions—discussions between 

Americans and Iranians, mostly being held in Europe and mostly 

focused on the nuclear issue. I returned just this past Saturday 

from Stockholm, where a group of Americans, mostly former officials, and Iranians were meeting to discuss the events that confront us. 

Between those meetings and my own travel to Iran, I have spoken to or met with over 100 Iranians. Most of those are from the 

conservative and technocratic class, and let me just briefly summarize that point of view, because it is important, as the previous 

speakers have pointed out, to realize that there are many factions 

in Iranian politics, and factions with different agendas and different points of view. 

The conservative technocrats that I mostly speak to dislike U.S. 

policy and they dislike the policy of President Ahmadinejad. They 

hope to avoid what they perceive is a lose-lose conflict between the 

United States or the West more generally and Iran. They see that 

there will be costs to a confrontation, but they think costs will be 

borne by all parties, and they hope to avoid that. 

They believe that escalation of this crisis actually increases the 

risk of nuclear weapons development; that as feelings harden and 

as the domestic politics of this issue play to the pro-nuclear side, 

16

that it gives more leeway for those who are advocates of nuclear 

weapons to be able to pursue that policy in a more overt manner. 

And they have deep mistrust and suspicion of U.S. Government 

motives. They think that the United States is about regime change, 

but they have affection for the American people, and most of them 

studied here or have relatives here. 

With that as background, let me speak more specifically to the 

nuclear ambitions and nuclear decisionmaking, and I endorse all 

the comments of the previous witness. 

One of those comments he made is important, and that is that 

there are multiple players here with multiple ambitions. There is 

the supreme leader, who I think by consensus most would agree is 

the most important policy actor. It is not the president, but the supreme leader who is the final arbiter of nuclear weapons policy. 

The most active person on nuclear weapons—or nuclear policy, I 

should say, rather than nuclear weapons policy, is Ali Larijani from 

the Supreme National Security Council. He is the person who is 

working on it day to day. The president has weighed in and at 

times appropriates that issue and speaks publicly on it, I think for 

his own domestic political purposes. He is for the most part a domestic president elected on populism and economic issues, not foreign policy issues, but he will play to these and the Israel issue as 

he sees that it benefits him politically. 

He is tied to the Iranian Republican Guard, which is broadly 

seen as being more pro-nuclear weapons, but there is very little 

data on this. And then, finally, there is the nuclear bureaucracy 

itself, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and if nuclear history tells us anything, the history of nuclear weapons decisionmaking is that these bureaucracies often have an important role to 

play, and I am sure that is the case here, although the data is limited. 

The common policy denominator for all these players with all 

these agendas is they want a complete fuel cycle. Now, I think that 

they are willing to see restraints on the 164 cascade or some research level of centrifuges. But they want to have something, and 

that is their new—well, it is not new, but that is their bottom line. 

But I think they are willing to compromise on the parameters of 

that and the environment in which that small cascade functions. 

This program, as I see it, is driven primarily by national pride 

and bureaucratic and domestic politics, not security. It is, therefore, closer, historically speaking, to nuclear programs in France 

and India, which, again, were driven by national pride and bureaucratic, less like the programs of Pakistan or the DPRK, where there 

is a security component. 

Nuclear technology is, unfortunately, a priority for the regime 

and for the population now, but it is not their most important priority. They really seek recognition on the world stage and economic 

development, and there are multiple sources of power in play, from 

the Grand Ayatollahs to the Majliis, to Rafsanjani and his residual 

influence, to public opinion. And as my written remarks indicate, 

public opinion is often the least understood of those power centers. 

As to the nuclear negotiations themselves, I think Secretary 

Rice’s initiative has improved the U.S. position, and the President 

deserves credit for it, and polling data suggest that the American 

17

people are happy with this policy, perhaps happier with this policy 

than any other foreign policy of the President. Unfortunately, Iran 

appears to have missed the significance of the Rice proposal—that 

based on discussions that I have had. They have focused more on 

suspension as a precondition and missed the larger statement 

about the United States willing to join the talks and some of the 

other elements of the proposal. My hope is that those are being 

communicated to policy circles in Iran now. 

The Iranians want to keep some face-saving level of enrichment. 

In their ideal world, they would have a full, complete fuel cycle, but 

I think they recognize that they cannot have their cake and eat it, 

too. They cannot achieve their economic and prestige objectives and 

at the same time have a provocative nuclear program. 

Will the talks succeed? I think it is too early to say. I do expect 

an announcement on August 22. The announcement by Larijani 

today, as you probably saw in the newspaper, does not forebode a 

negative response. The Iranians that I have been speaking with recently suggest that Iran will respond by either accepting the proposal, offering a conditional yes, a yes-but, or a condition no, a nobut. But in any case, the answer is likely to set the stage for future 

negotiations. 

As for policy options, we all know what they are. We can try to 

coerce them or isolate and contain them. That is basically what we 

have done through the Clinton and Bush years, and to, I think, little effect. We can use military force, but I think that will be extremely costly, for reasons described in my testimony, and will put 

in jeopardy the number one U.S. policy goal today, which is success 

in Iraq. If we strike Iran, we will have to put more U.S. soldiers 

in Iraq for a longer period of time. 

And so that leaves very little in the way of alternatives other 

than negotiation. But my hope is that we will improve the negotiation track by focusing more on the issue of national pride, by seeking to identify and win over particular bureaucratic and internal 

constituencies, and that if we are going to say that all options are 

on the table, then all options need to be on the table, and that includes direct talks with some distant possibility for normalized relations. 

Finally, I think we need to approach this problem, as all the witnesses agree, not as issue-by-issue but in a broader strategic context. That is, I think, the only way out of here. 

Let me conclude with comments about the role of Congress. I believe that one of the reasons why I am so happy to be here with 

you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Carper, is I think that the role of 

Congress will be critical. It will be needed. If there is a negotiated 

settlement, Congress will have to act on issues of sanctions and 

legislation and funding. If there is not, Congress will be needed 

just as much. 

As we go forward, I think Congress can, in addition to its normal 

duties in terms of information collection and oversight, which are 

critical, I would suggest that it can be a policy innovator as well. 

And, in particular, two things briefly. One, smart engagement. 

Many of the Iranians I spoke with in Iran want to come to the 

United States. They tend to be the youngest and the most conservative who come up to me and complain to me after I give a speech 

18

in Iran, they come up and hector me about the United States and 

then sort of classically say, ‘‘Oh, and by the way, is it possible to 

come and study in the United States?’’ But people who want to 

come to the United States, who want to take advantage of opportunities to come and to study, and whatever, feel they cannot take 

advantage of current programs that are labeled under a category 

of regime change. That puts them at personal risk if they do that. 

So we need smart engagement that gives people the opportunity to 

come to the United States and us to go there in ways that do not 

taint them for having taken up that opportunity. 

And, finally, I would like to propose to you that you consider legislative-to-legislative contacts, contacts between the U.S. Senate 

and the Majliis. I think now that the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee has explored this in the past, and Iran has refused to 

respond to that initiative. I am told that views are changing on 

that and that in the near term it may be possible for members of 

the Majliis and the Senate to meet together to talk about what divides us, and also areas for potential cooperation. And I would encourage you to take that opportunity if it does develop. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. 

Mr. Fakhravar, Dr. Takeyh’s testimony claims that the regime of 

Iran entertains debates across the political spectrum, from his written testimony, regarding Iran’s nuclear program. What has been 

your experience with trying to freely dialogue and debate the Iranian regime’s quest for nuclear weapons or any other political 

topic? 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. There is nobody to negotiate with in the regime 

in Iran. That is their tactics, has been, so you don’t know whom 

you are talking to. You have experienced the negotiations and nuclear dossier of Iran, and there are several of them, and none of 

them have the final say. That is exactly their tactic. 

Senator COBURN. More specifically, when you discuss as a student activist these issues and you raise the questions, what is the 

response from the regime when the students raise the questions, 

whether it be about this or any other political subject? Whether it 

be about nuclear issues or any other subject, what is the response 

of the regime to the students who raise questions or question the 

policies? 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. When the students and the people of Iran learn 

that there is a possible negotiation between the United States and 

the regime, the entire people will consider you as betraying them. 

Let me put it bluntly. If you can play chess with monkeys, then 

you can negotiate with the man in charge of Islamic regime. Thank 

you. 

Senator COBURN. One of our policies—and this is addressed to 

anybody on the panel that wants to answer it. In the 1990s, we followed a negotiation stance with North Korea, and all during that 

period of time when we were negotiating and had agreements, the 

fact is that those agreements were not being honored. Progression 

on nuclear weapons development continued regardless of what we 

did. 

Can anybody think of a time where negotiations have proved successful, in terms of hostile regimes, in terms of bringing about the 

19

desired result on nuclear weapons or other results? Go ahead, Dr. 

Walsh. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me offer first a direct 

answer and then maybe a slightly different view of the DPRK 

issue, something I have spent some time on. I was in Pyongyang 

last summer. 

Certainly the Soviets were a hostile empire, and certainly we can 

point to any number of arms control agreements with the Soviets, 

most notably the treaty preventing ABM, the ABM Treaty, that the 

Soviets followed and that enhanced the security of the United 

States, in part because it allowed countries—it allowed the United 

States and the Soviet Union to avoid the more dangerous aspects 

of the arms race and to provide some predictability and stability to 

it. 

I would argue the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been one 

of the most successful treaties in human history. The rate of proliferation has declined since the 1960s—not increase but declined—

and the number of states that are interested or seeking nuclear 

weapons is smaller since any decade since the 1940s. 

Let me conclude by saying on the DPRK my view is that the 

Agreed Framework was a success. That Agreed Framework is 

about three and a half pages long, and when you read it, you see 

that neither side followed through on their original commitments, 

but that program was frozen. There were no new nuclear weapons 

built under the Agreed Framework. That ended and that has no 

longer been true. North Korea did go behind the back of the agreement to engage in procurement activity related to an HEU plant, 

but neither the CIA nor any other U.S. intelligence agency, none 

of them have concluded that the DPRK built an enrichment plant. 

And during the period of the agreement, that plutonium reactor 

was frozen and there were no new nuclear weapons being built 

during that period. 

Senator COBURN. If I recall my history correctly, it was Reagan 

walking away from the negotiations that broke the back of the Russians’ nuclear development. It wasn’t negotiating. It was walking 

away from the negotiation if you will recall the history and the criticism that he received. 

Dr. Takeyh, you wanted to comment on that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. First of all, I want to clarify the portion of my testimony that you alluded to. What I was trying to suggest in that is, 

in terms of the nuclear deliberation, all political tendencies, the reformers and others, are brought to the table, the leadership of the 

different factions, even those which are not necessarily in power 

today. I was not suggesting that the Islamic Republic puts its nuclear decisionmaking out for a referendum or having sort of 

brought in activism. So there is more of an elite debate. But, nevertheless, it is elites from across the political landscape. 

In terms of negotiations that are successful, as Mr. Walsh was 

suggesting, in the 1970s the United States negotiated several arms 

control agreements with the Soviet Union, SALT I in particular, 

and also the Reagan Administration negotiated the INF agreement 

in 1986, which was the first agreement that actually did not regulate the size of nuclear arsenals, but suggested elimination of a certain class of weapons. 

20

But when you are dealing with nuclear negotiations, it is important to suggest that they cannot be segregated from the overall relationship between the two adversaries. When U.S.-Soviet relations 

were reasonable during the period of detente in the 1970s, then nuclear negotiations actually expedited and there was agreement on 

a variety of issues. When the relationship was not necessarily, as 

it was in the early 1980s, then actually the arms control negotiations always break down. 

So you have to situate nuclear negotiations in the larger context 

of relations between the two countries. That is why I do not believe 

the United States and Iran at this particular point can easily reach 

a nuclear accord barring dealing with other areas of concern that 

they have—that we have and they have. So the canvas has to be 

broadened in order for negotiations to be successful. 

Senator COBURN. Would you comment on the fact in your testimony related to India, India is not a theocracy. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Sure. 

Senator COBURN. And the fact is India’s leaders do not threaten 

death to anybody who does not believe the way they believe, or the 

so-called U.S. infidels, that we should die. So the context of nuclear 

weapons in the hand of somebody whose axiom is that if you are 

not with us in terms of your religious beliefs and your behavior 

along those religious beliefs, you obviously should perish according 

to a theocratic viewpoint. 

It is hard—and I guess the further point to my question is: Can 

that not be understood in terms of the decisionmakers among the 

Iranian elite or the hard-lines and very-hard-liners, as you described them, can that not be understood as we would have trouble 

having a rational basis for—understanding that there might be a 

motivational difference between those that were running the Soviet 

Union and those that are presently leading Iran? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes, I think that analogy that the regime uses, or 

some of the regime uses, that Iran can potentially follow the model 

of India is wrong, for all the reasons that you suggested. But, nevertheless, it is their rationale that they embrace. Iran is not India, 

and I was not suggesting that they are analogous. India is a democratic regime. It is largely peaceful in terms of its intentions. And 

Iran is neither of the above. 

However, when certain members of the regime look at India and 

they see the way an aspiring regional power can have influence in 

terms of its region, it is to negotiate a different type of relationship 

with the United States. 

Now, there is a contradiction in that. I do not believe—there is 

a huge contradiction in that, in the sense that the India model applied to Iran fails not only because of the domestic complexion of 

the Iranian theocracy, but also because it is unlikely that any 

American administration would be sanguine about the possibility of 

Iran having that sort of a nuclear technology at its disposal and 

edging closer to the weapons program. So I don’t think the India 

analogy works, but it is the one that I was suggesting certain members of the Iranian elite hierarchy tend to embrace. 

Senator COBURN. But who are not in ultimate control. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, they can be in control. They are part of the 

landscape. But I do not believe Iran is going to follow the model 

21

of India in terms of its domestic politics, in terms of its democratic 

processes, no. 

Senator COBURN. It is my understanding that Amir Fakhravar 

will have to be leaving here shortly. Do you have any questions for 

him, Senator Carper? 

Senator CARPER. I do. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Why don’t we let you have an opportunity 

to do that before he leaves, and I will defer my further questions. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fakhravar, thank you for your testimony today. The U.S. 

Congress has provided almost $100 million for democracy promotion in Iran over the course of the last 3 years, I believe with 

the largest installment of funding coming in the current year. 

There have been calls in Congress for this funding to be provided 

to democratic organizations within Iran. However, in the past, 

some of those groups have actually ended up on a State Department terrorist list. 

There is also the concern that giving the United States money to 

authentic groups would lead them perhaps to be targeted by the 

current regime in Iran. 

Last, it is also being said that Iran is not ripe yet for change, 

and so giving this money to groups could simply be a waste of 

money. 

You have previously stated that you are only one of many individuals to fight for a more open society in Iran. Based on this assertion, I have several questions relating to prospects for change in 

Iran. And let me just ask these questions, and I will ask you to respond very briefly, because apparently your time is limited and because we would like to ask questions of other witnesses. 

The first question is: How do you visualize an ideal Iran? What 

would be the structure of its religious, its economic, its social, and 

governmental institutions? Is there anyone else in Iran with economic and political power that holds the same vision for Iran as 

you see it? And, again, I would ask that you just respond briefly. 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. First of all, thank you, and I would like to close 

the discussion down here about the negotiations. North Korea is 

way off the area of the strategic, both India and North Korea. Iran 

is not. And I highly suggest those who consider negotiations to do 

consider these facts. 

None of these two nations are after wiping Israel off the face of 

the map. Allocating funds is something and using it is another 

thing. The system that we wish for Iran, future Iran, is secular 

democratic. It is not important that it is going to be a republic system or a constitutional system. It is important for Iranian population that it would be secular. Majority of Iranians are Muslim. 

I, too, am a Muslim. But I am not a terrorist. People of Iran are 

not terrorists. But the Islamic regime, people in charge of the Islamic regime are. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you. 

Can you tell us who or what organizations or people are currently leading the fight against the current regime in Iran? And 

can you provide us with an estimate of how many people or what 

percentage of the population that might be? 

22

Senator COBURN. I would like to interrupt here. You should be 

very cautious—you are in a public hearing—in how you answer 

that question because you may put some of your compatriots at 

risk. 

Senator CARPER. I will say the question again. Can you tell us 

who or what organizations are currently leading the fight against 

the current regime in Iran? And can you provide us with an estimate of how many people or what percentage of the population that 

might be? 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. The first front line is comprised of Iranian students. That is mostly youth, and we have 70 percent under the age 

of 29, 30; 64 percent in the movement, the next group is women’s 

movement, which is 64 percent. Their rights are violated and they 

are abused. We would like to take these two movements and bring 

them together, unify them. There are many groups right now, but 

what we are planning to do, to bring all the groups together. For 

that purpose, we are organizing Confederation of Iranian Students 

so they would bring this together, this unification. 

Senator CARPER. All right. One last question for this witness. 

And, again, we thank you for your testimony and your response to 

our questions. You stated that you would like to see the United 

States provide a variety of things. I believe you mentioned laptops, 

cell phones, workshops for training resistance support, both outside 

and within Iran. What would be the expected outcome of such assistance? And how soon might we expect to see some change as a 

result of that assistance? 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. Iranian population are very bright, but they do 

not receive accurate news. We need to talk to our people. Certainly 

we can make them aware of the news in the world. Eight to ten 

a year is what the time limit, I would say, 8 months to a year 

Eight months to a year. I apologize. 

Senator CARPER. Do Iranians have access to the Internet? 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. Very limited, in big cities. We need to expand 

on that. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you very much. 

Senator COBURN. Amir, I want to wish you Godspeed. I know you 

are going from here to meet with President Bush. He has great esteem for you and your courage, and we wish you Godspeed and 

good luck. 

Mr. FAKHRAVAR. I thank you and the great Nation of the United 

States. 

Senator COBURN. Would you like to continue on with your questions, Senator Carper, of the other witnesses? 

Senator CARPER. If I could, thanks. 

Senator COBURN. We will come back, and then you will be next. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

I would just ask very briefly of each of our witnesses, could you 

just take a moment and describe your visits to Iran in the last, say, 

decade, their frequency, the duration, how long were you there, the 

nature of the exchanges, who you met with, that sort of thing? And, 

Dr. Walsh, we will start with you, if you would, please. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, Senator, most of the Track II discussions I 

have with Iranian officials, academics, and think-tank personnel 

occur outside of Iran, usually in Europe—in Italy or in Sweden. 

23

And I participated over the past several years in four to five of 

those Track II’s. 

In February, I was in Iran for 12 days where I met a variety of 

people, mostly, as I said in my testimony, people who fall into the 

conservative, technocratic class, people who probably voted for 

Rafsanjani rather than Ahmadinejad. And I will be returning to 

Iran in the fall. 

All told, as I indicated in my testimony, I have probably met or 

spoken to about 100 Iranian officials, former officials, academics 

and think-tank types. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would suggest mine was similar to Mr. Walsh’s in 

the sense that they have been a lot of former officials in Track II 

settings. In my case, there are some family members that I have, 

of course, being of Iranian descent. And I was supposed to go working on a trip to Iran this August, so we will see if it comes through 

or not. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Ledeen. 

Mr. LEDEEN. I have never been to Iran. I have met with senior 

Ayatollahs from this regime, in the mid-1980s, and with no end of 

Iranians since then from all walks of life, some pro-regime, some 

anti-regime, most recently in Rome in 2001. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Like Dr. Ledeen, I have never been to Iran, but I 

have traveled many times to the Middle East. Most recently I have 

traveled to Persian Gulf 3 weeks ago to Oman to attend an international conference at which I had the opportunity to meet with 

Iranian officials. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Coburn and I were privileged to be in 

a discussion earlier today with some of our colleagues and others, 

and I had an opportunity to talk about the Administration’s proposal for multilateral talks with the Iranians. And to the extent 

that they are willing to give up on their desire to enrich uranium, 

we would be willing to enter into those multilateral discussions. 

And I understand that when that offer was presented to the Iranians, it was presented with a number of incentives and with the 

understanding that there would be disincentives or sanctions if the 

Iranians chose not to accept it. 

Let me just ask you, again, your views. Was that an appropriate 

thing for the Administration to do? Was it the right thing? Or was 

it a mistake? Dr. Walsh. 

Mr. WALSH. I think it was very wise, very prudent, for two reasons. If you think that negotiations have a shot, the only way they 

are going to be successful is if the United States sits at the bargaining table one way or another. We cannot outsource our foreign 

policy to others. Iran is not going to take as credible promises of 

incentives unless the United States is directly part of that process. 

One of the problems with critical dialogue that the Europeans 

carried on in the past is the United States was not at the table, 

and it was clear they were skeptical of the process. So you need to 

be able to make credible threats and credible promises. If you do 

not make a credible promise, the other side is not going to play because they figure you are just playing them for a fool, and a lot of 

Iranians are deeply suspicious. 

24

But if you do not think negotiations are going to work, Secretary 

Rice’s announcement was still a wise move because diplomatically 

it put her in a stronger position to get the Russians, the Chinese, 

and others on board. So all around, I think it was an excellent 

move, and as I said in my comments, it is a move that has the support of the American people. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Takeyh. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would agree with that. Actually, however, if I was 

to critique the negotiating track, as I mentioned in my comments, 

I would suggest that the issues under consideration should be 

broader in the sense that the totality of American-Iranian disagreements exceed the nuclear issue. There are issues of terrorism; there 

are issues that they have with us that are not exclusive to the nuclear issue. 

Beyond that, I think where the Administration was in the spring 

of 2006 was that they were in a situation which was untenable in 

the sense that the negotiations at the U.N. had stalled and it was 

unlikely to go further without some sort of an American measure, 

and that measure was quite a momentous measure in the sense 

that it revised not just Bush Administration policy but 27 years of 

American policy. So I think that aspect of Secretary Rice’s rather 

remarkable reconceptualization of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran 

has often been neglected. 

Now, where it goes from here is hard to read because I think ultimately we are settling into a number of red lines. Iranians have 

a red line that calls for them to have some sort of an enrichment 

capability. Americans at this point, we have a red line that they 

should not have that. Whether that difference can be bridged in the 

next several months will reflect the ultimate success of these negotiations, but it remains to be seen. 

The other criticism I would make is that the offer of negotiations 

may have come a little late in the sense that, in 2002, if these negotiations had taken place, there was no enrichment capability, 

and perhaps we could have gotten a no-enrichment deal. But the 

nuclear program, as Mr. Walsh knows very well, is a dynamic 

issue, and as countries develop those technologies, they in essence 

become in some cases irreversible. So earlier would have been better. It is late, but it may not be too late. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Senator Dayton. 

Mr. LEDEEN. May I? 

Senator COBURN. Yes, I am sorry. Dr. Ledeen. 

Mr. LEDEEN. Yes, I would like to make two comments on the 

question of negotiations. The first is you should not believe that 

there have not been negotiations. There have been talks endlessly. 

Most of them have been secret, let’s call them. State Department 

people have talked to counterparts in Iran. CIA people have talked 

to counterparts in Iran. At least to my knowledge, all through the 

first term of the Bush Administration talks were going on all over 

the place because there were people in the State Department, primarily Richard Haas, who believed that we were on the verge—we 

had a historic opportunity, we could reach a grand bargain with 

Iran and this was the moment to do it. And so talks were going 

on. They have been going on. 

25

If you read Pollack’s book, ‘‘The Persian Puzzle,’’ which was written by a person who spent a long career in diplomacy and at the 

CIA, he says there categorically we have tried everything. We have 

tried intimidating them. We have tried threatening them. We have 

tried cajoling them. We have tried offering them. And they have rejected it all. And the conclusion he came to—and this is a person 

who labored all his professional life to accomplish some kind of 

agreement with Iran—and believe me, broad issues, they talked 

about everything. He said, ‘‘They don’t want it.’’

It is really baffling to me that after 27 years it is impossible for 

serious persons to say they have declared war on us. They declared 

war on us 27 years ago. They have been waging war against us for 

27 years. They are killing us today, as often and wherever they 

can. Those IEDs that blow up our soldiers in Iraq, they come from 

Iran. Those intelligence officers and revolutionary guards, they are 

Iranians. They are doing everything in their capacity to do that. So 

we have had talks all along, and I do not see where it is going to 

go. 

The real question, if you will permit me, is where is American 

policy on it. We yet have no Iran policy. We have a nuclear issue 

policy. All the talk is about nuclear this and that. All the talk is 

about will we permit the Iranians—are they going to stop enrichment and so forth. And along those lines, I believe, the Iranians 

will never give up their nuclear program because it is not an enrichment program and it is not for national prestige. It is a weapons program, and they want it to be able to defend themselves and 

to launch aggression against other countries. They concluded—and 

we know this—in 1991 that if Saddam had had nuclear weapons, 

we would never have dared do to him what we did in the first Gulf 

War. And they said, ‘‘We do not want that to happen to us; therefore, we must have nuclear weapons.’’ And the program that started then was a weapons program. And I believe it is still a weapons 

program. And I think even by now El-Baradei knows that it is a 

weapons program, and one of his assistants just quit in a rage and 

went to the press and said, ‘‘They won’t let us into any of the military facilities that we want to see.’’ And it is obvious that it is a 

military program. 

What we have got is a negotiation on an issue that distracts our 

attention from the central issue between the United States and 

Iran, which is they are waging war against us. 

Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Chairman Coburn. Just a couple of 

points. 

I would say the following: Whether or not negotiations are a good 

idea or a bad idea depend entirely on who you are talking to. And 

what is useful to remember here is that, as Dr. Ledeen pointed out, 

there is a demographic bulge. The vast majority of Iranians are 

very young. They have lived most or all of their lives under the Islamic Republic and very well know that the Islamic Republic is not 

doing the job, the economic job, the political job, the civil society 

job that they need. 

Our negotiations with the Iranian people are a good idea, but 

any negotiations which demonstrate to the vast majority of IraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 10, 2007 Jkt 029513 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29513.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
26

nians that want change, that the United States is so preoccupied 

with a tangential issue that we have articulated limits to our support for their desire for freedom are dangerous. And I would say 

this, and I specifically say this to you, Chairman Coburn, because 

you are a medical doctor: I think diplomacy should be pursued from 

a ‘‘do no harm’’ standpoint. And in this context, the negotiations 

that were proffered by the State Department may have had tactical 

benefits, but over the long term they were very damaging. 

Senator COBURN. Senator Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Ranking 

Member for holding this very important hearing. I regret, analogous to your other profession, I hold afternoon office hours with a 

stream of Minnesotans who want to see me, and I try my best to 

honor that. But really it is one of those where I scheduled all that 

well in advance of knowing about this hearing, and I regret not 

being able to be here. I thank you for convening it. 

I am not going to risk redundancy, either of testimony or previous questions, but I will review the transcript of the hearing. I 

thank all of you for your participation, for your patience. We do not 

have many witnesses who speak even longer than Senators, but 

that is something we practice here, and it was very informative. I 

do not mean it in any way disrespectfully. But I noticed you all 

have been very respectful and patient, so I want to acknowledge 

that. And thank you for bringing your expertise to us. I am sorry 

more of us—I am supposed to be in three different places simultaneously right now in addition to here, and I think my colleagues 

share that difficulty. And so I apologize on their behalf and regret 

that, but thank you again for your expertise. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COBURN. I have several more questions. In Dr. Walsh’s 

testimony, he testified that it would not be the end of the world if 

Iran obtains nuclear weapons despite the fact that the Iranian regime is saying that it intends to use those weapons against Israel, 

and the quote is, ‘‘to wipe Israel off the map.’’ We have good knowledge that Iran is behind the recent attacks against Israel, and the 

roadside bombings for sure, they are killing our soldiers. Should 

the United States take Iran’s statements seriously or not in regards to their long-term goals of nuclear weapons or nuclear proliferation, nuclear development? I have heard what Dr. Ledeen 

said. I am interested in your response to that. 

Mr. WALSH. Yes, Senator, thank you, and thanks for quoting my 

testimony, and I appreciate the care with which——

Senator COBURN. I started reading it at 5 o’clock this morning 

because I did not get it until late last night. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I appreciate it nonetheless. And as you know, 

in the rest of the testimony it goes on to say that I have spent all 

my adult professional career working to try to prevent the spread 

of nuclear weapons, and I do not welcome——

Senator COBURN. Well, let me make it clear, we are very happy 

with the quality of the people that are testifying, and we doubt 

none of your motivations. But these are legitimate questions that 

the American people are going to ask. When, in fact, the President 

27

of Iran says that he intends to wipe Israel off the face of the map 

and is involved in a nuclear development program that will ultimately end up in nuclear weapons, it is not a long step at all to 

conclude that those weapons are intended for Israel. So those are 

the facts of what is being presented. Whether that is the behindthe-scenes truth, we do not know. I suspect you do not know. 

Mr. WALSH. I think that is right, but let me speak to that. 

First of all, obviously, as everyone has said so far, it is not the 

president that calls the shots on nuclear policy. It is the supreme 

leader, and under him, Larijani, that makes nuclear policy, not the 

president. The president I assume will be a one-term wonder and 

is here as primarily a president elected on economic populism, not 

foreign policy. 

Moreover, I think the Iranians——

Senator DAYTON. Be careful what you say about one-term wonders. [Laughter.] 

Mr. WALSH. Let me also point out that Iran is more than aware 

of the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons, that the United States 

would not allow Israel to be threatened with nuclear weapons, but 

Israel has its own nuclear deterrent. 

The other thing to keep in mind is, as John Negroponte has 

pointed out, the time frame here is not tomorrow, it is not next 

month. It is sometime between the middle of the next decade or the 

end of the next decade. So this is not an imminent threat to U.S. 

national security and it is not an imminent threat to Israeli national security. 

Senator COBURN. Well, could you give me some of your history? 

North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons proceeded at a 

slower pace than what is expected to be from Iran. Is that correct? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, the North Korean program started in the mid1980s, and most intelligence estimates that they completed their 

first device sometime between 1990 and 1994. That is when the 

CIA said they had somewhere between zero and two nuclear weapons. 

Senator COBURN. And the Pakistanis did that in a shorter period 

of time. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, the Pakistani program began in roughly 1972, 

and they did not test until 1998. And most of my colleagues think 

they had nuclear weapons in the late 1980s. But let me speak directly to the point of Iran. The puzzle about Iran, given the neighborhood that it lives in, given the fact that there is nuclear Pakistan on its border, nuclear Russia, all these states, Israel, the surprise is that they have not done more in the nuclear area. They 

started their program, whatever that program may be, by most accounts sometime in the mid-1980s. It is now 2005, and they have 

164 centrifuge cascade. 

Senator COBURN. That we know about. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, that the IAEA believes is the case. 

Senator COBURN. But the IAEA talks about them violating the 

no-reporting obligations for 18 years, and the testimony we have 

just had is we do not know. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I agree with you. My view is that we should 

follow what the IAEA says, and on this I think they are pretty 

clear that their centrifuge capacity is perhaps—they have parts for 

28

a thousand. Whether they have all the parts for a thousand more 

centrifuges is unclear. But no one thinks that they are going to 

have a bomb tomorrow or anytime soon, even if they made a command decision to do so, and that, of course, is the judgment of the 

top-ranking intelligence officer in the United States. 

Mr. TAKEYH. If I can say a few things about this, Senator? 

Senator COBURN. Sure. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I do not think we can be sanguine or complacent 

about Iran’s nuclear motivations or ambitions. I think Iran’s nuclear danger is acute and growing. I think should Iran cross the 

nuclear threshold in violation of its NPT obligation, that essentially 

ends the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which in my opinion has 

been a very beneficial treaty in terms of preventing the spread of 

nuclear weapons and dangerous nuclear technologies. I think it will 

have a destabilizing impact on the region, namely, it could spark 

an arms race. And a region that should devote its economic resources to its people, to benefits of the health care and public 

schooling, is likely to divert it to further build-up of conventional 

arms, at least, and quite possibly divert scarce resources to building up nuclear programs. 

So this is not something that we can look for with any degree of 

ease. This is why I do believe that diplomacy has to be energetic, 

comprehensive, and imaginative. I think sitting around wishing the 

Iranian nuclear program away, talking about how more radio 

broadcasts is going to make it go away is not the way to go. Radio 

broadcast is not a judicious counter-proliferation strategy. I cannot 

think of any time that radio broadcasts have worked in terms of 

effectively disarming a country. We have to have a very effective 

diplomacy. I think Secretary Rice took a first step in that direction, 

and it has to go many more steps. Otherwise, we cannot potentially 

get to a position where we have not only a hegemonic Iran in the 

Persian Gulf, where there is nothing particularly stopping them. 

Iraq is a broken country. The Gulf States are not going to do anything about it, and we are leaving the Gulf. We are leaving Iraq. 

That is just the reality of the situation. I think we all know that. 

And they know that. So we can have a hegemonic Iran with a mature nuclear capability. That is not something that is desirable, 

and that is why I do believe that the diplomatic solution to this 

issue is urgent and quite imminent. 

Senator COBURN. Would you agree with Dr. Ledeen that we need 

a total Iran policy instead of focus at the issues that come up? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes. Oh, yes, as I mentioned, I think we have to 

have a comprehensive discussion with Iranians that tends to deal 

with issues of the nature of their support for terrorist organizations. 

Senator COBURN. I would tell you, I am somewhat encouraged in 

terms of students because I look at Poland and I look at Ukraine 

and nobody in the State Department saw Ukraine coming. Nobody 

saw it coming, the fact that brave leaders stood up and challenged 

authoritarianism and made a difference. And so, my caution is that 

we certainly nurture in any way possible the voice of a secular government in Iran, and if that is through student organizations and 

women’s organizations and union organizations, that certainly 

should be part of a total policy. Would you disagree with that? 

29

Mr. TAKEYH. No. I do think we have to have a broad policy to 

deal with issues of proliferation, terrorism, human rights, and Iranians will have their own grievances to bring to the table, whether 

it is our sanction policy, whether it is frozen assets. I mean, everything has to be on the table, but not necessarily—the progress of 

any one issue should not be linked to the other, namely, I would 

not prevent negotiations or a deal on the nuclear issue if we have 

not reached an accord on the issue of the nature of the Iranian relationship with various Palestinian rejectionist groups. But I do 

think the negotiations have to be broad and comprehensive, although not necessarily the progress of any one issue linked to the 

other one. 

Senator COBURN. Dr. Ledeen or Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you. Let me just say a couple words, because Dr. Takeyh said something very controversial. He said that 

public broadcasting has never forced a regime to give up its arms, 

which technically is true. But it is useful to remember, as I said 

in my testimony and Dr. Ledeen said in his testimony, the issue 

is not nuclear weapons. The issue is the character of the regime 

that will ultimately wield them. And public broadcasting and public diplomacy were responsible, at least in part, for the single largest totalitarian collapse in modern history. So let’s not underestimate the effectiveness of these tools. 

On the issue of the question that you asked Dr. Walsh, let me 

just chime in here for a second, because I think what we are really 

talking about is: At the end of the day, if Iran does go nuclear, can 

we have some sort of modus vivendi with them? I would argue very 

differently than Dr. Takeyh and Dr. Walsh, because it seems to me 

that it may have been true a year ago to say that the Iranian presidency is an empty office and the supreme leader calls the shots. It 

is far less clear that is the case today. 

What we have seen over the last year is the rise of what Dr. 

Takeyh has called in other publications a ‘‘war generation,’’ embodied by Mr. Ahmadinejad, and also his systematic consolidation 

of power, to the extent that the president has now emerged, at 

least in part, as an independent foreign policy in his own right. 

And that is very important because a year ago, 5 years ago, we 

could have said the supreme leader holds all the cards. The supreme leader can escalate or de-escalate the nuclear issue at his 

will. 

I am not sure we can say that anymore. I think it is true that 

the supreme leader can escalate the nuclear issue, but I am not at 

all sure that the new power centers that are emerging in the Islamic Republic will allow him to de-escalate if in this game of nuclear chicken he all of a sudden decides to blink. 

Senator COBURN. And I would also note that the supreme leader, 

in his belief in the 12th Imam, might benefit from the utilization 

of nuclear weapons as well. 

Dr. Ledeen. 

Mr. LEDEEN. Well, the question of who is Ahmadinejad and what 

does he represent reminds me a lot about the good old days of the 

Soviet Union when people used to say, Molotov is such a good fellow to work with, it is a pity that Stalin is always in the way. 

30

I think that the only person who matters on any serious question 

facing Iran is the supreme leader. That is why he has that name. 

That is what it means. He is the supreme leader. He determines 

policy. And I do not think—to mildly disagree with Ilan, I do not 

think that Ahmadinejad is any more an independent actor or any 

more representative of a new class and a new force or independent 

political movement inside Iran than was the opposite of 

Ahmadinejad, who was Khatami for 9 years before Ahmadinejad. 

Then people ran around and said Iran is in the grips of a reform 

movement and is moving toward reform. Well, in 9 years there 

were no reforms. 

Now everybody is saying Iran is in the grips of a super-fanatic 

religious nut case named Ahmadinejad. But his statements are canonical. In regimes of this sort, I do not believe that the president 

would be permitted to go around saying things that are not approved by the supreme leader. And I think that we can take what 

he says as an expression of what the supreme leader and his 

henchmen want us to hear and want us to believe. And as for what 

they—that does not necessarily mean it is what they really believe. 

I mean, it is a whole culture based on deception, after all, and illusion. We should not forget this. 

The one thing that is a reliable basis for analysis in terms of 

what Iran might do when and if it gets nuclear weapons is their 

religious convictions and is the doctrine of the 12th Imam and the 

End of Days and where the world is seen heading, and the world 

as they see it—and from time to time, I have been fortunate 

enough to get what I think are very accurate minutes from highlevel meetings in Iran, and I have published them. And their view 

of the world is that what they are doing is working, that we are 

bending to their will, that we are ready to be driven out of the Middle East and elsewhere, and that in relatively short order they are 

going to dominate and they will then use their nuclear weapons. 

On the question of what they have and what they do not have, 

I will only say again what I said at greater length in my prepared 

testimony, and that is that we have always been wrong on estimating how long it takes country A or B or C to develop nuclear 

weapons. We have always been surprised. We were surprised when 

the Soviets did it. We were surprised when the Chinese did it. We 

were surprised when the French did it. We are always surprised. 

We were surprised when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons during——

Senator COBURN. We were surprised when they told us they were 

not, and then the students revealed they were. 

Mr. LEDEEN. Yes. Well, I mean intelligence is imperfect, and CIA 

excels at imperfection. What can we say. 

Senator COBURN. I would also put forward that Natan Sharansky 

said that the linkage of human rights to military and economic 

issues is the very thing that did break the USSR, and that is somebody that was on the inside the whole period of time that was 

going on. 

Dr. Takeyh, in your testimony you started out by saying the current generation of pro-regime Iranians are not preoccupied with the 

United States but are looking eastward. But it seems you contradict this by saying that the same people are paranoid about the 

31

United States, that the drive for nuclear weapons is deterring for 

what you call ‘‘superpower bullying.’’ Which is it? Are they looking 

to the East, or are they looking to the West? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think in terms of economic opportunities, increasingly there are many within the Iranian regime that suggest they 

should look eastward to China, Japan, India, Russia, and essentially reorient Iran’s trade toward those countries, which are not as 

concerned about Iran’s proliferation tendencies or for that matter 

human rights abuses. So essentially trade packages that do not 

come with conditions about internal practices. 

Senator COBURN. No strings. 

Mr. TAKEYH. That is right. And this has to do not just with energy deals but also technology transfers. In terms of the second 

portion of my testimony that you alluded to, I am not quite sure. 

If you can give me the context, maybe I can give you a more informed assessment. 

Senator COBURN. Well, the reference was to ‘‘superpower bullying.’’

Mr. TAKEYH. Oh, yes. I think I know. There are those within the 

Iranian regime that suggest that the United States is not particularly concerned about Iran’s proliferation tendencies, but is concerned about the character of the regime. They do not have to 

make concessions on this because they are being picked on, not because of their treaty violations or treaty provocations, but because 

of superpower bullying. So essentially there is a suggestion that 

U.N. processes and U.N. resolutions and IAEA resolutions that 

have come about are politically contorted as a result of——

Senator COBURN. How do we change that? That is obviously a 

misperception, You would agree with that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. And we all in this room understand it is a 

misperception. So how do we change that perception? Or is that a 

convenient misperception on their part? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, it is a misperception that we have already 

changed in the sense that much of the international community 

agrees with the United States——

Senator COBURN. I am not talking about the international community. I am talking about the leaders of Iran. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I understand that. Much of the international community agrees that Iran stands in violation of NPT obligations and, 

therefore, there should be multilateral pressures on it if it does not 

cease its objections and its objectionable activities. 

However, it is the same international community that suggests 

the United States should go the extra mile in terms of the negotiations before they sign off to any level of multilateral pressures enacted through the United Nations, and I think ultimately that is 

the type of pressure that can work, multilateral measures through 

the United Nations adhered to by the international community 

over a persistent period of time. That may temper the regime’s ambitions in that particular realm. But I do not think this is something the United States can achieve unilaterally, whether it is unilateral economic concessions, unilateral economic coercion, or any 

sort of military program. 

32

Senator COBURN. All right. One other thing. We had some comments in terms of regime change and support for the students, in 

terms of the Voice of America and—is it Radio Farsi? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Farda. 

Senator COBURN. Farda. Any comments about the effectiveness 

of the tools that the United States is using today in terms of trying 

to accomplish that goal? I am not talking about whether you believe that is an effective tool, but given the fact that we are using 

the tool, are we doing it effectively? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, there is in my view an analytical challenge 

here, because the notion that has been presented is that Iran is an 

information-starved society. I do not know how that is possible in 

the global village that we live in, in an era of globalization. There 

are 24-hour Persian broadcasts into Iran every day. It is called 

BBC Persian Service. It is 24 hours a day. It is on radio. There is 

talk of a BBC television station. And if you want to reach the Iranian people, radio, transistor radio, particularly in provinces and so 

forth. So there is 24-hour radio broadcasts from the British Broadcasting Company every day. 

As a consumer of VOA——

Senator CARPER. Excuse me. Are those broadcasts intercepted? 

Mr. TAKEYH. You can listen to it every day in Iran. They are not 

intercepted, blocked, or anything. As a matter of fact, one of the 

ironies is many who advocate greater radio broadcasts by the 

United States, they say we need politically neutral broadcasts like 

BBC Persian Service, except they neglect to say there is something 

called the BBC Persian Service. I think there is Internet use in 

Iran which is significant. All Iranian papers are on the Internet. 

As a consumer of those, someone who listens to Iranian radio 

broadcasts every day—I listen to it at 3:30 in the afternoon, which 

is a midnight broadcast over there. They recapitulate the news. It 

is politically constrained, but certainly broadcast happens. 

Why is the Iranian public not more politicized? Why is it not 

more passive? The fallout question is——

Senator CARPER. Excuse me. Why is it not more passive? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Why is the Iranian population passive in light 

of——

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, they do not lack information. The analytical 

challenge is why are they passive despite the level of information 

that is available to them. Why are they depoliticized despite the 

level of information that is available to them? There is information 

available. 

Senator COBURN. What is the obvious conclusion you would have 

when you have such a theocratic rule there? What is the obvious 

conclusion you would draw to that? Are there consequences to 

being active? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes, there certainly are. 

Senator COBURN. We had somebody that has been imprisoned, 

their arm broken, their knee broken. We have pictures of the union 

truck drivers where they have, in fact, been beaten and tortured. 

There is a cost to being active in Iran. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I do not see how a regime’s coercive practices are 

going to be relieved by radio broadcasts. So if you are concerned 

33

about the fact that the security services are effective, radio broadcasts are not going to do much about that. Certainly it is a regime 

that is capable of, therefore, controlling its public space. It is a regime that is capable of controlling its population. That does not 

mean it can control its population forever. But if what you are saying is correct, then there is a certain degree of coercive stability. 

Now, I do not know necessarily that this situation is going to be 

tenable if the country gets into serious economic difficulties where 

it is no longer capable of patronage politics. At this particular 

point, I would say the Iranian regime has roughly between 10 to 

15 percent support. But it is a support that they can mobilize. It 

is arms support. And it has very elaborate intelligence purposes. 

And one thing we have to appreciate is that the Iranian regime has 

been very effective at separating state from society in the sense 

that they have effectively, at least for now, managed to depoliticize 

the population. 

Iran exists on two separate planes. There is the state, with all 

its deliberations, with all its considerations. And there is the population that does what it wants. And at this particular point, one of 

the clever things that the Iranian regime has done is not to have 

a cultural clampdown. Iranian youth—many of my cousins and so 

forth—have sort of a vast subterranean activity. They go to parties. 

They do things. And the regime has not disturbed that because it 

recognizes that is a politically explosive thing to do. It is a regime 

that is very adept at survival. That does not mean it will survive 

forever. You can never look at an unrepresentative government and 

say this government will survive forever. 

Senator COBURN. Would you care to comment on the broadcasts? 

Mr. BERMAN. I would, actually. I think there are two issues at 

play here. In my testimony, I talked about the policy options that 

are available to the United States. The key commonality in all of 

those, whether it is military action, if it ever comes to that as a 

last resort, or economic sanctions or what have you, is for us to accurately telegraph what we are going to do and what we are not 

going to do to the Iranian people. They are the key allies in all of 

this. But so far we have not been able to do that. 

I will give you a concrete example. Before February of this year, when Secretary Rice announced the request for $75 million for democracy promotion, the annual allocation for 2005 for public diplomacy, public broadcasting into Iran was $16.4 million. Iran is a 

country of 70 million people, so that is roughly 21.5 cents per Iranian per year. You can argue about whether or not we should do 

more, but that is clearly insufficient. It is doubly insufficient when 

we think about the last time we really needed a robust public diplomacy effort, which was the Cold War. During the Cold War, we 

did more than a third of that per Soviet per year as early as 1983. 

My argument here is that we are simply not being serious in 

terms of public broadcasting. We do not have the scope that we 

want, and we also have a corporate culture that discourages articulating the message that the Administration has at least implicitly 

said, which is that the U.S. Government stands with the Iranian 

people in their desire for change. Not too long ago, the director of 

Voice of America said publicly at a conference that the U.S. Government is not in the business of helping the Iranian people overVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 10, 2007 Jkt 029513 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29513.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
34

throw their government. That seems slightly at odds with what the 

President had said in several pronouncements. 

So it seems to me that while the President has a message and 

has articulated a message, that message could be more forcefully 

applied to the bureaucracy. 

Senator COBURN. Somebody please address my question, which 

was: Whatever the level, is the level at what we are doing, the content effective in accomplishing the purpose? Dr. Ledeen. 

Mr. LEDEEN. The short answer is it cannot be effective because 

there is no content to communicate because we do not have an Iran 

policy. Until and unless we have an Iran policy, the greatest broadcasters in the world would not accomplish something we do not 

know what it is in the first place. 

I would like to comment, if I may, on the question of why are 

they so passive, and the question of information. As someone who 

has been systematically slandered by the BBC for most of his professional life, I rise to defend the view that the BBC, whatever 

service it may be, is not communicating information at all. I do not 

speak Farsi, so I have not listened to it. But if it is anything like 

the BBC English language service, I would have no trouble understanding why the Iranian regime would have no problem with it 

and would not jam it and so forth. 

But the serious question is: Why are they so passive? And that 

is a serious question. It almost never happens in history that a revolution was foreseen. Before the revolution broke out, everyone always said, Boy, these people are really passive. 

When I went to the Reagan Administration in 1981 and we started saying, well, we are going to try to bring down the Soviet empire, everybody thought we were mad. They said, well, look at the 

way the people behave. Nobody will take a chance. No one will 

challenge them. You have these obscure dissidents, one or two of 

them, and they get locked up and are never heard from again. And 

then there was this tiny trade union movement in Poland in the 

Gdansk shipyards. 

Well, 9 years later it came down, vast popular support for the 

overthrow of that regime. It turned out it was there. We did not 

see it. 

If you compare the level of protest and the level of political complaint against the regime in the Soviet Union circa 1981, 1982, 

with the level of ongoing political demonstration against the Iranian regime, week after week and month after month and year 

after year, big numbers of people, tens of thousands, hundreds of 

thousands, up to a million people 3, 4 years ago in the streets of 

Tehran, there is no question that the people have a very sharp political awareness of the evils of the regime, and they do not like it. 

And when Dr. Takeyh says, quite rightly, that the regime probably has 10, 15 percent support, I think that is probably just about 

right. And the other 85 or 90 percent are not mobilized to do it, 

and no one is smart enough to know why exactly. But we do know 

one thing, that is, Iranian culture, the Iranian people believe that 

nothing can happen, nothing of this magnitude can happen without 

the support of the United States. And they do not have that. They 

have not seen it. They have heard various statements from various 

people. I believe that a few years ago, somewhere—what was it, 3 

35

years ago, in 2003? I could be wrong. I have reached an age where 

active memory is failing rapidly. But they were gearing up for bigscale demonstrations all over the country when the Secretary of 

State, then Secretary Powell, was asked were we going to support 

this imminent nationwide uprising, and he said, ‘‘We do not wish 

to get involved in an Iranian family squabble.’’ And you could hear 

the great sucking sound as the air came out of the balloon, and 

nothing happened. Demonstrations were canceled, the movement 

was canceled, and so forth. 

When the United States moves, the world changes, and this kind 

of static analysis, as the economists would call it, of a country in 

which you do not see revolutionary activity in the Washington Post,

but then the Washington Post has never reported on the huge demonstrations that take place all the time all over Iran. So we will 

not read about that anyway. We do not hear about tens of thousands of people demonstrating in Baluchistan. We do not hear 

about the general strike in the oil fields in Khuzestan, but it is 

there. So to say why are they so passive, for me the real question 

is, compared to other modern and contemporary examples of successful democratic revolutions, the Iranians are super-active, they 

are super-politicized. They are the opposite of passive. Look at all 

those people—and the amazing thing is that they have lost their 

fear of the terrible tortures to which they are subjected when they 

get rounded up. There is a video of this poor man’s tongue being 

cut out. It is not just a matter of burns on his back. And they have, 

for the most part, overcome that as well. 

So, we need a policy. We do not have one. And I think it should 

be a policy of support for democratic revolution. Just a final point. 

And I would advocate that. Even if Iran were not the world’s biggest supporter of terrorism, and even if Iran did not have a nuclear 

weapons policy at all, because it is the right thing to do, it is what 

we should stand for. It is what America is supposed to be all about. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Dr. Ledeen. 

Senator Carper is going to have to go, so I am going to turn to 

him. 

Senator CARPER. We are having a debate over on the Senate floor 

about whether or not to extend, reauthorize the Voting Rights Act 

of 1965, and my time slot is in about 7 minutes so I have to run. 

Before I do that, I just want to say to Dr. Walsh, Dr. Takeyh, 

Dr. Ledeen, and Dr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. I am a lawyer so I am not technically a doctor, so 

‘‘Mister’’ is fine. 

Senator CARPER. I just want to say this has been an interesting, 

it has been an enjoyable, it has been a provocative discussion, and 

we thank each of you for helping to make it that. Some of you have 

been before us previously, and we are delighted that you would 

come back. Some of you have come from afar, and we are delighted 

that you could be with us today. 

Thomas Jefferson used to say, I believe, and I will paraphrase 

him: When people know the truth, they will not make a mistake. 

And I think in Iran, to the extent that the people there actually 

understand what is at stake for them—we have had—Dr. Coburn 

and I have heard even today that the Achilles heel in the regime 

in Iran is their economy. And to the extent that the people there 

36

actually know what is at stake, to the extent that we are able to 

find a combination of common ground on the issues that we want 

to discuss at these multilateral talks, then there is a great economic benefit for the people of Iran. And to the extent that those 

talks are not productive or—do not begin or are not productive, 

that is something that is quite different. And I think part of the 

challenge for us and those who would like to see a better outcome 

is to figure out how best to make sure that people know the truth 

and are in a better position to put pressure on their regime and 

their leaders to not make a mistake. 

Again, our thanks to each of you, and with that having been 

said, Mr. Chairman, I am going to head out. Thanks again for letting us have this hearing. I think it has been great. 

Senator COBURN. I want to thank each of you. Dr. Takeyh, I can 

tell—you can see it in your face—the pain you feel on your mother 

country. And it is important that your voice is heard, and I appreciate you coming and testifying before us. 

I want to make a statement. I am going to be a Senator for at 

least 4 more years, and I am going to do everything I can to see 

that the people of Iran—not the government of Iran—have every 

opportunity to express themselves through a secular government 

rather than through a theocracy. And that is at every angle, at 

every appropriation bill, at every chance I get, to support their 

right for freedom. 

Thank you all for being here. 

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(37)

A P P E N D I X 


29513.001
38


29513.002
39


29513.003
40


29513.004
41


29513.005
42


29513.006
43


29513.007
44


29513.008
45


29513.009
46


29513.010
47


29513.011
48


29513.012
49


29513.013
50


29513.014
51


29513.015
52


29513.016
53


29513.017
54


29513.018
55


29513.019
56


29513.020
57


29513.021
58


29513.022
59


29513.023
60


29513.024
61


29513.025
62


29513.026
63


29513.027
64


29513.028
65


29513.029
66


29513.030
67


29513.031
68


29513.032
69


29513.033
70


29513.034
71


29513.035
72


29513.036
73


29513.037
74


29513.038
75


29513.039
76

Æ


29513.040