alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 200 (Monday, October 19, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 53523]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-25058]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>11906 and <greek-i>11907]


Kentucky Disaster <greek-i>KY-00030

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Administrative declaration of a 
disaster for the Commonwealth of Kentucky dated 10/09/2009.
    Incident: Severe storms and flooding.
    Incident Period: 09/25/2009 through 09/26/2009
    Effective Date: 10/09/2009
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 12/08/2009.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 07/07/2010.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of 
the Administrator's disaster declaration, applications for disaster 
loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally 
announced locations.
    The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected 
by the disaster:

Primary Counties: Jessamine.
Contiguous Counties:
    Kentucky: Fayette, Garrard, Madison, Mercer, Woodford.

    The Interest Rates are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeowners with Credit Available Elsewhere...................      5.500
Homeowners without Credit Available Elsewhere................      2.750
Businesses with Credit Available Elsewhere...................      6.000
Businesses & Small Agricultural Cooperatives without Credit        4.000
 Available Elsewhere.........................................
Other (Including Non-Profit Organizations) with Credit             4.500
 Available Elsewhere.........................................
Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations without Credit             4.000
 Available Elsewhere.........................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 119066 
and for economic injury is 119070.
    The State which received an EIDL Declaration <greek-i> is Kentucky.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

    Dated: October 9, 2009.
Karen G. Mills,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. E9-25058 Filed 10-16-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### BECHTELL v. SHATLER.

Slander in a foreign language — publication.

^Slanderous words, spoken in Welsh, in a Welsh county, will sustain an action, without an averment that the words were understood.

The same rule applies to German words spoken in a German county in Ohio.

Whether the words were understood, is a question of publication, and after verdict finding a malicious speaking, it will be intended they were uttered in a language understood by those he addressed.

Error to the Common Pleas. The action below was slander. In the declaration, the words are charged to have been spoken in Dutch, and there is no averment that they were understood by the hearers.

*Jarvis*and *Starkweather,*for the plaintiff in error,

cite 1 *Saund. R.*242,«.l; 1 *Saund. R.*228, *n.*1; *Cro.*JEJiiz.865; 2 *CTi.Pl.*259, *n.p.; Stark, on Slander,*85; *Bac. Ab. verdict,*1 *T. R.*141.

*Avery*and *Van Rensselaer,*contra,

cite 2 *Ch. PI.*260, *n.f.p.; ib.*263, *n.;*1 *Saund. R.*242, *n.*1; 1 *Ch. PI.*401, 2.

Wright, J.

The words are charged to have been spoken in a discourse with divers people, and in their hearing. The question is one of publication; if published, it is sufficient. In England, it has been held, that if the words are spoken in Welsh in a Welsh county, no averment is required that they are understood. The court will intend they were understood in such case; *Stark, on Slander,*85. If that is good law, the rule seems equally applicable to German words, spoken in a German county, like this. We hold the question one of publication. After verdict, it will be intended that words spoken in a *discourse*with divers people, concerning another, with a malicious intent, were uttered in a language understood by those he addressed.

The judgment is affirmed with costs.
#### Hill v. The State.

*Murder.*

(Decided December 18, 1913.

64 South. 163.)

*Homicide; Degree; Drunkenness.*— Although voluntary, drunkenness rendering one incapable of forming an intent or purpose to do a thing may reduce a homicide then committed below manslaughter in the first degree.

Appeal from Walker Law and Equity’Court.

Heard before Hon. T. L. Sowell.

Tom Hill was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

The evidence tended to show that all the parties were drinking, or had been drinking, when they met where the difficulty occurred, and that there Avas considerable whisky among them. Evidence for defendant tends to show that he was very drunk when he .fired the shot.

The following are the charges refused:

*8(1) “If the jury find that defendant was so drunk that he was incapable of volition, incapable of voluntarily doing anything, and incapable of forming malice or entertaining malice, then defendant could not be convicted of anything more than manslaughter in the second degree.”

(8) “If the jury believe that defendant, at the time he is said to have shot Dave Todd, was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the purpose to do a voluntary act, then he cannot be convicted of any offense higher than manslaughter in the second degree.”

Guxx & Powell, for appellant.

The court erred in refusing written charges 6 and *8.*— Hemnhurg *v. State,*151 Ala. 26. On this same authority the court was in error in its oral charge as to the effect of drunkenness.

R. C. Brickell, Attorney General, and TT. L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for the ¡átate.

WALKER, P. -I.

Charges 1 and 8, refused to the defendant, were not. abstract, and each of them was such a charge as should have been given, Avhen duly requested by the *defendant.*— Heninburg *v. State,*151 Ala. 26, 48 South. 959. The, action of the court on these and on other charges given and refused, as well as instructions given in the oral charge, make it plain that it entertained the view that, the voluntary drunkenness of the defendant, though it rendered him incapable of forming an intent or purpose to do anything, could not have the effect, of reducing a homicide committed by him below the grade of manslaughter in the first degree. That, this view is an erroneous one is shown by the ruling above cited.

Reversed and remanded.
#### GODELL *v.*TAYLOR, ET AL.

Fraudulent conveyance — advancement—insolvency.

A father may convey land to a child by way of advancement, but if he do so insolvent, or in debt contemplating insolvency, the advancement will be postponed to his creditors.

A conveyance, with intent that the property should be held in trust for the party making it, is void as to creditors.

It is a strong badge of fraud, that a son to whom property has conveyed, who pretends he has paid for it, in paying debts for his father, is not able to show when, and to whom he paid, and how much.

Chancery. This bill was filed by a judgment creditor of William Taylor, an insolvent debtor, to set aside a conveyance of a house and lot, in Cleaveland, alleged to have been conveyed by him to his *83son, the other defendant, in order to defraud creditors. The-answer of the son is equivocal. It sets out no particular consideration, merely asserting that the son paid debts for his father, without showing what debts or sums were paid, except a mortgage for a part of the original purchase money of the lot, which was due from the father. Proof was taken.

*Allen*and Willey, for the complainant.

*S. J. Andrews,*contra.

By the Court.

A father may honestly advance his son, and convey to him a good title to land for that purpose; but if he does it when insolvent, or with a view to insolvency, or while deeply in debt, the conveyance will be postponed to creditors. If he conveys with intent that the property shall be held in trust for himself, the conveyance is void. We agree with the counsel for the defendant, that it is not of itself a wrong act for a child to provide for his parent, for it is his duty so to do, if able, and such act is highly commendable. In this case, the consideration named in the deed is admitted not to have been paid, and the lot was not conveyed in the usual course of business; but the son says, he was to pay, and has paid debts for his father, though he shows no particular debts, and avows his inability to show how or what he has paid. He admits that his father’s family have occupied the premises since the conveyance, the same as they did before. It is proved, that the father finished the house and paid the bills, and that he said *he intended to fix the property*so *that his creditors should not get at it.*We have no doubt the sale is fraudulent. It is incredible that the son, as he pretends, should have bought the property, and paid for it in the way pretended, and not be able to show to whom he paid, when and how much. He stands in a situation where he should repel the suspicion which attached to the sale, by a statement of all the circumstances; and the omission so to do, is a strong, if not a conclusive, circumstance of fraud.

A decree may be drawn, subjecting the property to the complainant’s demand, and if not paid, ordering a master to sell the house and lot, and of the proceeds to pay the balance of the original purchase money, if any is due, then the complainant, and to bring the residue of the proceeds into court.
1

EXHIBIT B

SUMMARY OF TIMEKEEPERS INCLUDED IN THIS APPLICATION FOR FEE PERIOD

Name Title or 

Position Department

Date of 

First 

Admission

Fees Billed 

in this 

Application

Hours 

Billed in 

this 

Application

Hourly Rate 

Billed

Number 

of Rate 

Increases 

Since 

Case 

Inception

Juan J. Casillas Partner Labor and Litigation 1997 $98,577.00 365.10 $270.00 0

Juan J. Casillas Partner Labor and Litigation 1997 $67.50 0.50 $135.00 0

Luis F. Llach Partner Labor and Litigation 2004 $8,937.00 33.10 $270.00 0

Total Partner: $107,581.50 398.70

Luis Ramos Member Labor and Litigation 2002 $1,593.00 5.90 $270.00 1

Total Member: $1,593.00 5.90

Edna Tejeda Counsel Labor and Litigation 2001 $19,812.00 76.20 $260.00 0

Total Counsel: $19,812.00 76.20

Cristina Fernández Junior Partner Labor and Litigation 2015 $35,184.00 146.60 $240.00 2

Juan Nieves Junior Partner Labor and Litigation 2012 $24,912.00 103.80 $240.00 1

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:22873-4 Filed:11/15/22 Entered:11/15/22 18:14:56 Desc:

Exhibit B Page 1 of 2
2

Total Junior Partner: $60,096.00 250.40

Paralegal Services Paralegal Labor and Litigation $1,330.00 14.00 $95.00 0

Total Paraprofessional: $1,330.00 14.00

Total: $190,412.50 745.20

Blended Rate: $255.52 

Blended Rate Excluding Paraprofessionals: $258.59 

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:22873-4 Filed:11/15/22 Entered:11/15/22 18:14:56 Desc:

Exhibit B Page 2 of 2
###### Editorial Note on Part 741

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 741 appear at 84 FR 1608, Feb. 5, 2019.

#### § 741.208 Mergers of federally insured credit unions: voluntary termination or conversion of insured status.

Any credit union which is insured pursuant to title II of the Act and which merges with another credit union or non-credit union institution, and any state-chartered credit union which voluntarily terminates its status as a federally insured credit union, or converts from federal insurance to other insurance from a government or private source authorized to insure member accounts, shall adhere to the applicable requirements stated in section 206 of the Act and parts 708a and 708b of this chapter concerning mergers and voluntary termination or conversion of insured status.
#### §§ 701.27-701.29 [Reserved]
EXHIBIT 32.2


                CERTIFICATION BY THE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
          REQUIRED BY RULE 13A-14(B) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
                       OF 1934 AND 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350

         I, Eric Bello, Treasurer (principal financial officer) of Quipp, Inc.,
a Florida corporation (the "Company"), hereby certify that, based on my
knowledge:


         (1)      The Company's quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period
                  ended September 30, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with
                  the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
                  Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

                                      * * *




/s/ ERIC BELLO
--------------
Eric Bello
Treasurer (principal financial officer)

Date:    November 15, 2004
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Company

Appellate case number: 01-21-00141-CV

Trial court case number: 2017-52441

Trial court: 234th District Court of Harris County

Real party in interest, Martina M. Valyan, has filed an unopposed second motion for 

extension of time in which to file her response to relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. Real 

party in interest’s motion is granted. Real party in interest’s response is due June 18, 2021.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ____/s/ Julie Countiss_____

 Acting individually 

Date: June 15, 2021
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000797324
<NAME>                        LASERGATE SYSTEMS, INC.  
                              
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                   SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                            239,672
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                     690,194
<ALLOWANCES>                      161,980
<INVENTORY>                       148,572
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  974,297
<PP&E>                            309,344
<DEPRECIATION>                    568,803
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  4,176,859
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           3,102,164
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                           238
<COMMON>                          223,862
<OTHER-SE>                        710,595
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    4,176,859
<SALES>                         3,346,578
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                3,346,578
<CGS>                           2,536,414
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   3,021,056
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   29,034
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                (2,181,858)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            (2,181,858)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                   (2,181,858)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                        (.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           0
                               


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF EDISON CONTROL CORPORATION AS OF AND
FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED OCTOBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   OCT-31-1999
<CASH>                                         455,236
<SECURITIES>                                   1,109,525
<RECEIVABLES>                                  4,405,110
<ALLOWANCES>                                   370,896
<INVENTORY>                                    6,862,474
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               12,917,338
<PP&E>                                         10,309,459
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2,285,236
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 30,314,487
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          4,195,786
<BONDS>                                        8,531,845
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       23,469
<OTHER-SE>                                     17,563,387
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   30,314,487
<SALES>                                        19,759,315
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               19,759,315
<CGS>                                          12,668,699
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  3,643,353
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1,115,085
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               102,896
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             635,215
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                2,332,178
<INCOME-TAX>                                   936,075
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,396,103
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,396,103
<EPS-BASIC>                                  .59
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .48


</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2

                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

The Board of Directors
MTI Technology Corporation:

     We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(Nos. 333-95915, 333-92623, 333-85579, 333-61957, 333-46363, 333-50377,
333-18501 and 33-80438) on Form S-8 of MTI Technology Corporation of our report
dated May 23, 2000, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of MTI
Technology Corporation and subsidiaries as of April 1, 2000 and April 3, 1999
and the related consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity and cash
flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended April 1, 2000, and
related schedule, which report appears in the April 1, 2000 annual report on
Form 10-K of MTI Technology Corporation.

                                          KPMG LLP

Orange County, California
June 30, 2000
EXHIBIT L

ACTIONS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO AVOIDANCE ACTIONS TRUST

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:23097-12 Filed:12/16/22 Entered:12/16/22 20:34:58 Desc:

Exhibit L Page 1 of 2
2

Actions to be Transferred to the Avoidance Actions Trust1

VENDOR NAME ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NO.

Core Laboratories N.V. d/b/a Saybolt 19-381

Puerto Nuevo Security Guards, Inc. 19-384

 1 The actions to be transferred to the Avoidance Actions Trust include, but are not limited to, the actions listed on 

this Exhibit.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:23097-12 Filed:12/16/22 Entered:12/16/22 20:34:58 Desc:

Exhibit L Page 2 of 2
#### § 619.9250 Participation certificates.

Evidence of investment in a bank or association to which all the rights and obligations of stock attach with the exception of the right to vote in the affairs of the institution.
#### BROCKWAY *v.*CLARK.

Interest — usury—demurrer.

'The agreed rate of interest after the debt is due, will riot be calculated if higher than six per cent.

After a demurrer to a bill in chancery setting forth a particular state of fa'ct, the defendant will not be permitted afterwards to set up a new state of fact as the basis for counting higher g interest. . '

Chancery: (see 6 *O. R.*50.) The master reported several calculations under the order of reference.

1. Of the rnohey loaned at the rate of six per cent, per annum, compoundingevery ninety days, and malunga balance due of *$*3L 0-1

2. According to. the agreement in March, 1830, for ten : ■ ■ per cent, every ninety days — since October,' 1827 — -balance ■ due, - - - - - - -. ' • . 219 66

3. According to the original agreement for ten per cent. compounding every ninety days — balance, - - , 816 19

The complainant excepted to the *two last*calculations, 'and

THe defendant to the *first.*

By the Court.

The exceptions are allowed on both sides, The bill alleges the giving a note for $>130,'in October, 1.827, at ninety days for *$*100 borrowed. The giving a second note in January or February, 1826, for *$150,*or *$160*in. ninety days.- The giving a third note in May or June for *$216.*These are all the notes alleged to have been given for the loan, and they were given on. an agreement for ten per cent, for each ninety days. Thjs is admitted true by the defendant’s demurrer to the bill, — and he will not now be permitted to set up a new contract.. For two hundred and seventy days, then, from October, 1827, the defendant is entitled to the agreed rate of interest, in the aggregate thirty per cent, for the *728residue of the time since the loan was made, he is entitled to interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum. A calculation on this principle, applying the first payments to the interest due, leaves due to the defendant $46 40. A decree may be drawn enjoining the judgments at law on the complainant’s paying that sum and the costs on the judgment.
42395.

#### ALEXANDER v. O’KELLEY et al.

*Felton, C. J., and Pannell, J., concur.*

Argued November 8, 1966

Decided January 20, 1967

Rehearing denied February 8, 1967

*E. E. Moore, Jr., J. C. Daugherty,*for appellant/

*Stephens Mitchell, Lee Evans,*for appellees.

Frankum, Judge.

The appeal in this case is from a judgment sustaining the general demurrers of two of the co-defendants in the same action as was involved in *Alexander v. Daniel,*ante. The ruling made in that case is determinative of all issues here and requires that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*