[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Dent , Slip Opinion No. 2 020-Ohio-6670.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6670
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . D ENT , A PPELLEE . T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . W ALKER , A PPELLEE [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Dent , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6670.] Criminal law—R.C. 2923.32—Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity—The existence of an enterprise is establishe d by showing that the organization is fully operational and engaging in a pa ttern of illicit ac tivity—The time frame for the commission of a pattern of criminal conduct is sufficient when the evidence shows that the corrupt activity is neither isolated nor so closely connected to be considered a singl e offense—Court of appeals’ judgment
reversed in case No. 2019-0651—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed in
case No. 2019-0654 and cause remanded. (Nos. 2019-0651 and 2019-0654—Submitted February 26, 2020—Decid ed December 16, 2020.)
A PPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 No. 17AP-592, 2019-Ohio-1510, and N o. 17AP-588, 2019-Ohio-1458.

__________________ O’C ONNOR , C.J. {¶ 1} In these consolidated discretionary appeals, we consider whethe r appellant, the state of Ohio, pr esented evidence sufficient to support the convictions of Alvin C. Dent Jr. and William L. Walker Jr. (collectively, “ appellees”), for the felony offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity und er R.C. 2923.32. Because we conclude that it did, we reverse the judgments of th e Tenth District Court of Appeals. Factual and Procedural Background {¶ 2} After a joint jury trial, Dent and Walker were both found guilt y of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, possessing cocaine, illegally manufacturing drugs, and traffick ing in cocaine. The convictio ns for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity are the focus of this consolidate d appeal. A third individual, Drakkar Groce, was a lso convicted in the same trial . Groce’s conviction is the subject of a separate but related appeal pending before this court in case No.
2019-0594. {¶ 3} At the joint trial, Detective La wrence Gauthney of the Columbus Police Department testified t hat he began observing a house on Greenway Avenue in response to citizen complaints that he had received around F ebruary 2016. As a result, he conducted two to three “spot checks” during which he observed foot traffic at the house consistent with “an up-and-running drug ho use.” More specifically, he observed a hi gh volume of individuals who knoc ked and entered the house like visitors, but stayed only five to ten minutes be fore leaving. He testified that in his experience, this was activity consistent with the sale of drugs
from the house. {¶ 4} Gauthney testified that on Ma rch 11 and 15, he conducted visual surveillance of the property for over an hour each time. Gauth ney’s surveillanceJanuary Term, 2020

3 reports were admitted into evidence, and he testified again tha t the activity at the house—specifically, a high volume of foot traffic in and out wi thin a short period of time—was what he had consistently observed during each spot check. Additionally, during the March 15 surveillance, Gauthney observ ed Walker enter through the back door of the house but did not see him leave du ring the approximately one and o ne-half hours that Gauthney had observed the house. {¶ 5} On March 28, Gauthney arranged for a confidential informant to purchase what Gauthney believed to be crack cocaine from someon e in the house. Following this buy, Gauthney obtained a no-knock warrant to sea rch the house. {¶ 6} When the warrant was executed on March 29, neither appellees no r Groce were apprehended in the house, but three other individual s were. The police recovered items from the house, including small plastic bags co ntaining cocaine, electronic scales containing cocaine residue, a glass measuring cup containing cocaine residue, as well as multiple firearms and ammunition lo cated throughout the house. During the search of the house, the police also rec overed video recordings from a camera that was located in the house’s kitche n containing footage of appellees, Groce, and other indi viduals. Gauthney determine d that the recorded footage covered a single date—Ma rch 29—and lasted for a period of over four
hours. {¶ 7} From the videos, Gauthney drafted an investigative report in wh ich he described what he observed at various portions of the videos . This report and portions of the actual videos were admitted into evidence. In addition, Gauthney
testified as to what he believed the videos showed while the vi deos played for the jury. In summary, Gauthney testified that the camera recorded appellees and Groce conducting various activities with what Gauthney believed to be cocaine, including “cooking” it to make crack cocaine (by heating a mixture of coc aine, baking soda, and water), weighing and bagging the drug, selling it, and exch anging large amounts of money.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 8} More specifically, the videos show Dent handling and weighing multiple small plastic bags of a white substance believed to be crack cocaine. Dent is present while Groce “cooks” cr ack cocaine using a microwave. Dent also exchanges large stacks or ro lls of money with others in the hou se, including Groce and Walker. At one point, Dent —with Groce’s help—adjusts the c amera in the
kitchen for several minutes. {¶ 9} The videos show Walker handling small plastic bags of crack coc aine and exchanging large amounts of money with Dent. He also prepa res crack cocaine using a measuring cup, baking soda, and the microwave. He exch anges a small bag containing what appears to be c rack cocaine for money with unkn own individuals. And then he goes back to bagging up crack cocaine at the kitche n table. {¶ 10} The videos also show Groce selling what appears to be crack coc aine to several individuals who appear to stay only a short time aft er he lets them into
the house. He accesses kitchen cabinets in which portions of c rack cocaine appear to be stored, weighs the substance and places it in smaller pla stic bags. In addition to “cooking” crack cocaine, he h andles large “cookie” size port ions of crack cocaine and splits those larger portions into smaller-sized por tions and places the smaller portions in bags. He handles money in the kitchen from others and places
it in his wallet. {¶ 11} In addition to these activities that relate to the underlying o ffenses of possessing, illegally manufacturing, and trafficking cocaine, t he videos also demonstrate appellees and Groce engaging in more ordinary activ ities in the house
distinct from those other indivi duals in the videos. For examp le, appellees and Groce are in the house without j ackets, in contrast to others w ho come into view of the camera for a short duration. Although the videos do not in clude audio, appellees casually chat with each other, Groce, and others. At one point , Groce appears shirtless and rolls a cigar. While appellees and Groce are in view, another individual makes what appears to be french fries using a counte rtop appliance. AtJanuary Term, 2020

5 another point, Walker makes hims elf a sandwich and appears to s hare a video on his phone with Dent and another i ndividual. Dent makes a sandw ich while handling a large roll of cash. At one point, Groce enters the kitchen w ith what appears to be a bag of food and a two-liter beve rage. Walker and Dent share the beverage with
Groce and others while Groce eats . While Walker works at the m icrowave doing what appears to be manufacturing crack cocaine, another individ ual attempts to hand him cash but Walker allows the individual to casually leav e the money on the top of the microwave. {¶ 12} The jury returned guilty verdicts for both appellees for engagi ng in a pattern of corrupt activity in addition to the other drug-rel ated underlying
offenses. 1 The trial court sentenced Walke r to an aggregate prison term of 20 years and Dent to an aggregate prison term of 22 years. {¶ 13} Dent and Walker separately appe aled to the Tenth District and argued that their convictions w ere not supported by sufficient evidence. In each case, the court of appeals agreed and reversed each of their co nvictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity on the basis that there was in sufficient evidence to support those convictions. 2 State v. Dent , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-592, 2019- Ohio-1510; State v. Walker , 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444 (10th Dist.).

1. The jury also found Walker guilty of one count of possessin g cocaine, one count of illegally manufacturing drugs, and three counts of trafficking in cocaine , but not guilty of the accompanying firearm specifications. Dent was also found guilty of one coun t of possessing cocaine, one count of illegally manufacturing drugs, and one count of trafficking in cocaine, along with the attendant firearm specifications. He also pleaded guilty to having a wea pon while under a disability.
2. Walker and Groce raised nearly identical assignments of err or in their respective appeals to the Tenth District. And the court of appeals’ decision in each cas e is substantially similar. Compare State v. Groce , 2019-Ohio-1007, 133 N.E.3d 930 (10th Dist.), with State v. Walker , 2019-Ohio1458, 135 N.E.3d 444 (10th Dist.) (conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was not supported by sufficient evidence). In contrast, Dent argued in his appeal that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to survive a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The court of appeals’ decision, however, relied on its reasoning in Groce to conclude that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for engaging in a p attern of corrupt activity. State v. Dent , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-592, 2019-Ohio-1510, ¶ 12-13. T his court’s analysis in thisS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 14} The state sought this court’s discretionary review in each case on the following proposition of law:

The existence of an enterprise under R.C. 2923.31(C) is established by showing the orga nization is fully operational an d engaging in a pattern of illicit activity. The time frame for the commission of a pattern of criminal conduct is sufficient where the evidence shows the corrupt activity is neither isolated or so c losely
connected to be considered a single offense. R.C. 2923.31(E).

We accepted the state’s discreti onary appeals, 156 Ohio St.3d 1 463, 2019-Ohio2892, 126 N.E.3d 1167, and consolidated the cases for oral argu ment, 157 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2019-Ohio-4202, 132 N.E.3d 697. Analysis {¶ 15} On its face, the state’s proposition of law presents a sufficie ncy-ofthe-evidence question. “Whether the evidence is legally suffic ient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.” State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Therefore, our review is de novo. In re J.V. , 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 3. In a sufficiency-of-t he-evidence inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when v iewed in a light most favorable to the prosecuti on, would allow any rational tri er of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus , superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith , 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following Jackson v. Virginia , 443

opinion refers to the court of appeals’ decision in Walker since that decision gives a more complete analysis of the relevant issues.January Term, 2020

7 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “In essence, s ufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386. {¶ 16} At the core of the parties’ argum ents is a debate regarding how broadly to read the court of appe als’ holding. The court of ap peals correctly stated that R.C. 2923.32, which describes the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, “does not contain a dur ational requirement,” 2019-Ohi o-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 21. And it stated that its conclusion should not be read “to suggest that the predicate offenses underlying a charge of engaging in a pat tern of corrupt activity can never occur on the same day.” (Emphasis sic.) Id . at ¶ 27. But, the court of appeals ultimately concluded that the state’s evidence was insufficient because “the state put forth no evidence that these men worked beyond the single day of the surveillance video.” Id . In making this conclu sion, the court of appeals elevated a time-duration requirement as an element of the offen se. And by suggesting what additional evidence might have compelled it to reach a different conclusion, see id. , the court of appeals focused on whether the state presented the
best evidence. But the proper questi on is whether the evidence pre sented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution , would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a re asonable doubt. Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. Applying the proper standard , we conclude that
it does. {¶ 17} The statute setting forth the felony offense of engaging in a p attern of corrupt activity states that “[n]o person employed by, or as sociated with, any enterprise shall conduct or partic ipate in, directly or indirec tly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity * * *.” R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). R.C.
2923.32 is sometimes referred to as Ohio’s “RICO statute,” give n its similarity to the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et

seq.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 18} Like the federal law, Ohio’s RICO statute requires the existenc e of an “enterprise” and a “pattern of corrupt activity.” An “enter prise” is defined as including “any individual * * * or any organization, associatio n, or group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.” R.C. 2923.31(C). A “pattern of corrupt activity” is defined as “two or more incidents of co rrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to t he affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, a nd are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event .” R.C. 2923.31(E).
At least one of the incidents in t he pattern must be a felony. Id

. {¶ 19} The court of appeals started its sufficiency-of-the-evidence an alysis with a focus on the word “longevity,” 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3 d 444, at ¶ 20,
because it is one of the structural features of an association- in-fact enterprise identified by the United States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United States , 556 U.S. 938, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009), see 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 22. In Boyle , the court interpreted the defi nition of “enterprise” in the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C . 1961(4), which is materially si milar to Ohio’s statutory definition in R.C. 2923.31(C). See Boyle at 944-945. The court concluded that an association-in-fact enterprise need not have a formal s tructure, but must have at least the following fea tures: “a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to per mit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id

. at 946. {¶ 20} Here, the court of appeals recognized that “the pertinent statu tes and case law do not define ‘longevit y’ in terms of finite, quantifi able amounts of time” but that “[s]ufficient longevit y is required to determine wheth er there is a common purpose and whether the associat es have relationships in furthe rance of that purpose.” 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 24. Nonetheles s, the court of appeals noted that other Ohio a ppellate districts have found “a t least a month or predicate offenses occurring on d ifferent dates at different lo cations” to show theJanuary Term, 2020

9 longevity contemplated by Boyle . 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 24. With that focus, the court of appeals concluded that there was insuf ficient evidence to prove an enterprise here because “all of the predicate offenses occurred on the same day in the same location” and “the state presented no evidence that the relationships
of these men extende d beyond a single day.” Id . at ¶ 25. {¶ 21} In Boyle , the longevity required for an a ssociation-in-fact enterprise was stated to be only that “sufficient to permit the[] associat es to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id . at 946. And the court of appeals is correct that nothing in the statutes or caselaw pertaining to the definition of “ent erprise” in R.C. 2923.31(C) specifies a time durati on. Thus, our task is to det ermine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosec ution, is sufficient to allow a rational juror to conclude that the enterprise here had longevity sufficient to permit appellees to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. {¶ 22} Here, the purpose of the enterpr ise was to manufacture and sell cocaine out of the house on Greenway Avenue. The video evidenc e shows a relationship between appellees. Appellees, along with Groce, a ppear together in the videos, cooperating with each other in the manufacture, pre paration, and sale of crack cocaine at a known drug house. The video evidence also d emonstrates appellees and Groce casually and familiarly interacting with ea ch other and their surroundings. For example, Dent and Groce work together to adj ust the camera on which the video evidence was captured. All three eat and drink together and appear familiar with each other. They casually chat with each other a nd do not appear guarded or tense, even while exchanging money or preparing the cocaine for sale. Based on the video evidence, and viewing the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the prosecution as we must, a rational juror could reasonabl y conclude that appellees and Groce were not str angers to each other or to the drug activities at the house; and all understood the purpos e of their joint activities . Thus, we concludeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 that sufficient evidence demonstrates a purpose and relationshi p relating to their illegal activities. {¶ 23} Evidence of longevity sufficient to further the purpose of the enterprise is demonstrated by Detective Gauthney’s spot checks and his surveillance reports from March 11 and 15, the confidential inf ormant’s purchase of drugs, and the videos obtaine d at the time of the search on March 29. Together, this evidence demonstrates that activity consistent with an “up -and running drug house” had been occurring since at least late February when Gau thney received the complaints that prompted furth er investigation. Additionally, Gauthney observed Walker at the house on March 15 using the back door without kno cking and staying longer than a few minutes, which is activity that stands in con trast to the more frequent visitors Gauthney observed knocking and entering the f ront door of the house and staying only five to ten minutes. Even if we focused solely on March 29, the day the video evidence wa s recorded, appellees performe d the tasks necessary to further the enterprise’s purpose of selling crack cocaine out of the house. And, based on appellees’ conduct and interaction in the house on March 29 that is distinguishable from the frequent yet short-term visito rs observed at the house, it is reasonable to infer that their activities with the enterprise extended beyond a single day. {¶ 24} Viewing the evidence described above in a light most favorable to the prosecution as we must, we c onclude that a rational juror c ould have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellees participated in an ass ociation-in-fact enterprise with sufficient long evity to further its purpose. {¶ 25} The court of appeals also noted t hat the statutory definition o f a pattern of corrupt activity in R.C. 2923.31(E) requires that th e incidents of corrupt activity not be isolated. It l ooked to this court’s decision i n State v. Miranda , 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, in which this cour t noted that the pattern of corrupt activity “ ‘m ust include both a relationship and continuousJanuary Term, 2020

11 activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise,’ ” id. at ¶ 13, quoting
State v. Dudas , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-109, 2009-Ohio-1001, ¶ 46. Focusi ng on the word “continuous,” the court of appeals observed that it “seems to contemplate that the activity oc curs over some not insignifican t period of time.” 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 23. The court of appeals concluded that the surveillance-video evidence covering just one day of activity w as not sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the predicate offenses were not is olated. {¶ 26} As we noted above, a rational juror could reasonably infer from the activity and interactions observe d in the surveillance-video ev idence that the predicate offenses were not isolated, that appellees did not se rendipitously find themselves in an up-and-running drug house and decide independe ntly to cook crack cocaine and then weigh, bag, and sell it to customers who happened to enter the house. The productivity, the coordinated activity of each appellee and Groce— along with the ease and comfort with which they went about thei r business— evidenced a high degree of familiarity with the house, the work at hand, the clientele, and the volume and price of each bag. Importantly, appellees and Groce
knew about the camera in the kitc hen overlooking the drug-prepa ration and sales area and took pains to adjust it to capture the kitchen activit y, presumably as a precaution against employee theft. It would be irrational and contrary to the evidence to determine that appellees’ illegal activities that a re observed were ‘isolated’ events. Viewing the e vidence in a light most favora ble to the prosecution as we must, we conclude that a reasonable juror could have foun d beyond a reasonable doubt that appellees participated in incidents of il legal activity that were
not isolated and estab lished a pattern of co rrupt activity.
Conclusion {¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Tenth District’s judg ments in relevant part. In Dent’s case (case No. 2019-0651), there a re no remaining issues for the court of appeals to resolve; therefore, his conviction for engaging in a patternS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 of corrupt activity is reinsta ted. In Walker’s case (case No. 2019-0654), the Tenth District determined that its conclusion regarding insufficient evidence supporting
the conviction mooted certain issu es raised in some assignments of error. Therefore, we must remand Walker’s case to the court of appeals for further proceedings to address those remaining issues. Judgment reversed in case No. 2019-0651. Judgment reversed in case No. 2019-0654
and cause remanded.
K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , and D E W INE , JJ., concur.
Z MUDA , J., concurs, with an opinion.
D ONNELLY , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by S TEWART , J.
G ENE A. Z MUDA , J., of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting for
F RENCH , J.

_________________ Z MUDA , J., concurring. {¶ 28} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant the state of Ohio’s evidence in these cases, involving appellees Alvin C. De nt Jr. and William L. Walker Jr., when viewed in a light most favorable to the pro secution, is sufficient to establish the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise under R.C. 2923.31(C) and a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32. I write separately because I reach this conclusion based on different reasoning than the maj ority, namely regarding how the state’s evidence supports a reasonable juror’ s conclusion that the enterprise engaged in corrupt activity over a period of time ex tending beyond a single day. {¶ 29} In State v. Beverly , 143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 116, this court noted that R.C. 2923.31(C)’s definition of “ent erprise” is “remarkably open-ended.” Id. at ¶ 8. Indeed, an “enterprise” under R.C. 2923.31(C) includes “any individual, sole proprietorship, partn ership, limitedJanuary Term, 2020

13 partnership, corporation, trust, union, government agency, or o ther legal entity, or any organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity .” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 30} In Beverly , this court went on to adopt the definition of an association-in-fact enterprise articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United States , 556 U.S. 938, 944, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009). Indeed, the Supreme Court explained in Boyle that an association-in-fact enterprise is “ ‘a group of persons associated together for a c ommon purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’ ” Id. , quoting United States v. Turkette , 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The Supreme C ourt further explained that an association-in-fact enterprise must have “lon gevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id . at 946. It is this longevity requirement that is at issue in these cases. 3 {¶ 31} The issue in these cases is whether the evidence “is sufficient to allow a rational juror to conclude that the enterprise here had longevity sufficient to permit appellees to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Major ity opinion at ¶ 21. The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not sufficient in either defendant’s case, because the predicate offenses all occ urred on the same day and the state failed to present e vidence that the relationships among Walker and his codefendants extended beyond a single day. See State v. Walker , 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.). Having examined the record, I conclude that the court of appeals’ characterizati on of the state’s evidence is i nconsistent with the testimony provided by Detective Lawrence Gauthney of the Columb us police

3. That the group of men charged in these case—Dent, Walker, a nd a third individual, Drakkar Groce—were associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct aimed at producing and selling crack cocaine out of the house located on Greenway Avenue is not in dispute here. The video surveillance depicting the group of me n cooking crack cocaine and exchanging the product for large sums of cash with one another and with transients, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish the coordinated activity of Walker, Dent, and Groce.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 department at their joint trial as to the duration of Walker’s and Dent’s involvement in the enterprise. {¶ 32} During its case-in-chief, the state presented extensive testimo ny from Detective Gauthney, who indi cated that he performed spot c hecks on the Greenway Avenue home. Gauthney testified that during those che cks, which took place two weeks prior to the controlled buy and subsequent sear ch of the house, he observed what appeared to be an “up-and-running drug house.” N otably, during his spot checks, Gauthney took notes, which included descriptio ns of the
individuals who entered and exite d the home as well as notation s of the time of entry and exit. At trial, Gauthney testified that he observed Walker enter the house during one of his spot checks. Unlike the other entrants, Walk er remained in the home for longer than a few minutes , and he entered the home wit hout knocking. Furthermore, the video-surveillance camera was adjusted by Dent several times during the approximately four-hour recording. And the video fo otage reveals that Walker and Dent conducted drug activity inside the home. {¶ 33} When viewing Gauthney’s testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the state, I find that a rational juror could conclude that the enterprise here was operational f or a period of at least two weeks, from March 15, 2016, when Gauthney observed Walker e ntering and remaining at the home longer tha n some of the other visitors, a nd continuing through March 29, when the video surveillance confirmed Walker’ s and Dent’s involvement in the enterprise. Gauthney’s testimony establishe d that Walker was a participant in the drug activity that occurred inside the res idence on at least two dates spaced weeks apart, and the video surveillance confirmed Gauthney’s observation that the residence was being used by the enterprise as an up-andrunning drug house. Therefore, I conclude that the Tenth Distr ict erred in finding that all the predicate offenses occurred on the same day and th at the state presentedJanuary Term, 2020

15 no evidence to demonstrate that the relationships among Walker, Dent, and Groce extended beyond a single day. {¶ 34} The state’s evidence of coordinated drug activity by Walker, De nt, and Groce over a two-week period satisfies the applicable longe vity requirement in these cases. This same evidence, in my view, also suggests a p attern of corrupt activity, contrary to the position espoused by the dissenting o pinion. See Beverly , 143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 116, at ¶ 7 (holdi ng that the evidence used to prove an enterprise may also be used to prove the associated pattern of corrupt activity). Therefore, I agree with the majo rity’s determination
that the state’s evidence was sufficient to support Walker’s an d Dent’s convictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R .C. 2923.32. Given the two-week period of coordinated ac tivity that is suggested by th e evidence introduced by the state, we n eed not, and the majority does not , delve into whether it is possible to obtain a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity based on conduct that occurs entirely within a one-day period. That issue simply is not presented here. {¶ 35} With this explanation in mind, I concur.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J., dissenting. {¶ 36} To prove that a defendant has committed the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32, the state must have sufficient evidence that the defendant engaged in two or more s eparate incidents of corrupt activity

. Appellant, the state of Ohio, presented evidence that appellees , Alvin C. Dent Jr. and William L. Walker Jr., were involved in a single incident of corrupt activity that was undivided in both time and place

. Because I would conclude that the state did not p resent sufficient evidence to support appellees’ convictions for engaging in a pa ttern of corrupt activity, I di ssent.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 {¶ 37} The facts in this case are simple

. After the Columbus Police Department conducted su rveillance of a house on Greenway Avenue , police subsequently executed a warran t for the house and obtained vide o footage showing Walker, Dent, and other individuals preparing and selling crack cocaine

. The video footage lasted a little over four hours and covered a single da te—March 29, 2016

. Walker and Dent (1) were not in the Greenway Avenue house when the police executed the search warrant, (2) were not identified as being p resent in the Greenway Avenue house when the police conducted a controlled dr ug buy, which occurred the day before the police executed the search warrant, and (3) were not heard discussing past instances of drug sales or future plans f or drug sales in the video, as it did not include audio

. In short, there was no evidence of Walker or Dent engaging in any criminal activity together other than the criminal activity seen
on the video itself

. But because Walker and Dent di d not seem to “serendipitously find themselves,” majority opinion at ¶ 26, committing crimes f or the very first time in a random location with complet e strangers, and instead seeme d to know each other and how to prepare crack cocaine, the majority concludes that there is
sufficient evidence that Walke r and Dent engaged in a pattern o f corrupt activity. {¶ 38} I would conclude that the evidence proves nothing more than Wal ker and Dent engaging in a single, isolated instance of corrupt act ivity involving multiple drug offenses

. The fact that Walker and Dent seemed to know each other and ate sandwiches together does not transform their actions th at occurred over a four-hour period into an ongoing participation in the kind of o rganized-crime syndicate targeted by R.C. 2923.32

. There are statutes that punish the actions shown in the video recording—possessing cocaine (R.C. 2925.11), illegally manufacturing drugs (R.C. 2925.04), and trafficking cocaine (R. C. 2925.03)—and Walker and Dent were convicted pur suant to those statutes and r eceived prison terms for those drug offenses

. To add an additional, consecutive 11-year prisonJanuary Term, 2020

17 term to each of their sentences for engaging in a pattern of co rrupt activity is just
absurd. {¶ 39} Ohio’s statutory prohibition aga inst engaging in a pattern of c orrupt activity, R.C. 2923.32, is modeled af ter the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq

. State v. Schlosser , 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997)

. The federal RICO statute is intended to target the kind of organized-c rime syndicates that have the power to “ ‘infiltrate and corrupt legitimate busine ss and labor unions and * * * demo cratic processes,’ ” resulting in harm to the nati on’s economy and domestic security

. Id ., quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News at 1073

. Organized-crime syndicates obtained such power in large part “ ‘through money o btained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the th eft and fencing of property, the importation and di stribution of narcotics and oth er dangerous drugs,
and other forms of soc ial exploitation.’ ” Id ., quoting Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970

. Accordingly, the federal RICO statute provides the federal government with the tools to link together various incidents of illegal activity, including drug trafficking, in or der to eradicate organized-cri me syndicates

. While drug trafficking may be relevant to proving that someone engage d in a pattern of corrupt activity, it is a mer e piece to the larger puzzle

. {¶ 40} Nothing about the purpose behind the federal RICO statute strik es me as intending to inflict sign ificant additional punishment on participants in a single series of drug sales just because the participants seem to know each other

. But federal congressional intent aside, an application of the p lain language of
Ohio’s statutes—R.C. 2923.31 a nd 2923.32—demonstrates that the state did not put forth sufficient evidence that Walker and Dent engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity

.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 {¶ 41} R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) prohibits a per son from participating in “th e affairs of [an] enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activit y.” Although the majority focuses mostly on the meaning of the word “enterprise, ” the crux of this case is whether Walker and Dent engaged in a “pattern of corrup t activity,” which is defined as “two or more incidents of corrupt activity * * * that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not s o closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a si ngle event.” R.C. 2923.31(E)

. {¶ 42} The specific type of “corrupt activity” applicable here is defi ned as “[a]ny violation” or “any combi nation of violations” of certain criminal statutes, including R.C. 2925.11 (possessing drugs when the offense is a felony of the first, second, third, or fourth degree), R.C. 2925.04 (illegally manuf acturing drugs), and R.C. 2925.03 (trafficking drugs), “when the proceeds of the vi olation [or combination of violations], * * * or the value of the contraban d * * * exceeds one thousand dollars.” R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c)

. The $1,000 minimum “applies to each individual, and not to the enterprise as a whole.” State v. Stevens , 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 2014-Ohio-1932, 11 N.E.3d 252, ¶ 18 (lead opinion). 4 {¶ 43} To constitute a “pattern” as it is defined in R.C. 2923.31(E), the state must prove (1) two or more separ ate incidents of corrupt activi ty, (2) that each
incident has a connection with the enterprise, and (3) that the incidents are not
isolated

. All three of the foregoing requi rements apply conjunctively, me aning that proof of two incidents alone is not enough to establish that a person engaged in a

4. The Tenth District Court of Appeals did not reach the issue in Walker’s case whether his drug offenses involved proceeds or contraband over $1,000 because it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support Walker’s conviction for engagi ng in a pattern of corrupt activity on other grounds. (Dent did not raise the monetary-threshold issu e in his appeal to the Tenth District.) Because it is generally inappropriate to address legal issues “ before the lower courts have the opportunity to address them in the first instance,” Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow , 137 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 22, I am assuming for the sake of the rest of the analysis that the $1,000 thresh old was met.January Term, 2020

19 pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32: the i ncidents must be evaluated to determine whether their details and context truly establish a pattern

. Further, and most importantly to this case, R.C. 2923.31(E) sta tes that if the incidents of corrupt activity are “so closely related to each o ther and connected in time and place,” then “they constitu te a single event,” not two or more

. {¶ 44} The federal RICO statute similarly requires a “ ‘pattern of racketeering activity,’ ” which requires “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. 1961(5)

. Although 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) does not include the specific kind of temporal and locational limitations found in R.C. 2923.31(E) , federal courts have concluded that the requirement o f “two acts” requires two separ ate criminal incidents and that multiple crimes committed within one episode do not constitute separate “acts” for purpo ses of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5)

. Apparel Art Internatl., Inc. v.
Jacobson , 967 F.2d 720, 722-723 (1st Cir.1992), citing Roeder v. Alpha Industries,
Inc. , 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir.1987); J.D. Marshall Internatl., Inc. v. Redstart,
Inc. , 935 F.2d 815, 820-821 (7th Cir.1991); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor,
Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1417-1419 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied , 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007

. The First Circuit reasoned that holding otherwise “would mean that many individual bank robberies, frauds, drug s ales, embezzlements, and other crimes as well would automatically fal l within the scope of the RICO statute, a result contrary to RICO’s basic purpose. ” Apparel Art Internatl., Inc. at 722. {¶ 45} Thus, neither the federal nor Ohio’s statutes intended for isol ated clusters of multiple criminal acts to constitute RICO violation s

. Even the arguably
narrower standard under the federa l statute inherently requires some manner of temporal or conceptual division between racketeering acts in or der to establish the minimum “two acts of racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C. 1961(5)

. The standards and requirements in Ohio are explicit: R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) st ates that an incidentS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 of corrupt activity may involve “any combination of violations” of specific criminal statutes, and R.C. 2923.31(E) sta tes that multiple incidents of corrupt activity constitute a single event if they are closely related to each o ther and connected in time and place

. Accordingly, multiple related crimes committed during the same time period and in the same place qualify as only one incident of corrupt activity
under Ohio law

. {¶ 46} Walker and Dent committed multiple related crimes during the sa me time period and in the same place

. The plain language of R.C. 2923.31(E) and 2923.31(I)(2)(c) requires the conclusion that Walker and Dent e ngaged in only one incident of corrupt activity

. {¶ 47} The majority opinion focuses on the details and context surroun ding the drug offenses that Walk er and Dent committed on March 29, 2 016, such as the month-long suspicion that the house on Greenway Avenue was a so urce of drug activity, Walker’s and Dent’s mutual efforts to cook, divide, p ackage, and sell crack cocaine, and their ordinary activities together, like eating sn acks and showing each other cell-phone videos

. As discussed by the majority, these details assist with proving that an “enterprise” exists as defined by R.C. 2923.31( C)

. But these details do not transform a single, isola ted incident of corrupt activit y that occurred on March 29, 2016, into two or more separate incidents of corrupt activity

. Without the foundational requirement of tw o or more incidents, the rema inder of the analysis
fails no matter how compelling it is

. {¶ 48} Instead of acknowledging that a modicum of additional police wo rk could have potentially uncovered evidence to establish that Wal ker and Dent were involved in additional, separate incidents of corrupt activity sufficient to establish a violation of R.C. 2923.32, the state has asked this court to stretch the limits of R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32 to their absolute breaking point

. And the majority has obliged, rewarding incomplete police work and providing the sta te with yet anotherJanuary Term, 2020

21 opportunity to gain an unjust amount of leverage to extract gui lty pleas from smalltime criminals by adding big-time criminal charges to their alr eady stacked
indictments

. It is an unjust result, unsupported by the plain language and s pirit of
R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32

. I dissent, and would affirm the judgments of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.
S TEWART , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kimberly M. Bond, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. Brian J. Rigg, for appellee Alvin D. Dent Jr. in case No. 2019 -0651. Blake Law Firm Co., L.L.C., and Dustin M. Blake, for appellee W illiam L.
Walker Jr. in case No. 2019-0654.

_________________