SUMMARY REPORT OF 2005 ENERGY AND 

WATER DISTRIBUTION EXERCISE 

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EPA 600/R-07/042
Acknowledgements

The 2005 Energy and Water Distribution Exercise was developed and managed by Kathy Clayton of the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center, Alice Lippert of the U.S. 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and Ronda Mosley of Public 

Technology Institute (PTI). 

EPA, DOE, and PTI wish to thank the workshop participants, the case study contributors (San Diego, CA; Miami 

Dade County, FL, and San Francisco, CA), and John Whitler of EPA’s Water Security Division for their expertise 

and significant contributions toward reducing vulnerabilities resulting from sector interdependencies. 

Logistical support for the workshop was provided by the Science Applications International Corporation under EPA 

contract 68-C-02-067 and by McMunn and Associates under DOE contract DE-AP26-05NT50444. This report was 

prepared by PTI and The Cadmus Group, Inc. under EPA contract number 68-C-02-069.
Contents

I. Statement of the Problem ....................................................................................................... 1

II. Objectives and Summary of Exercise ..................................................................................... 3

III. Key Discussion from Exercise Participants............................................................................. 4

IV. Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 6

V. Additional Resources and References.................................................................................... 8

VI. Attachments ..........................................................................................................................12

A. Participating Organizations in the 2005 Energy and Water Distribution Workshop..................... 12

B. Summary of Exercise Evaluations ...............................................................................................13

C. Exercise Sponsors.......................................................................................................................16



1.0

Statement of the Problem

Understanding the interdependencies among our 

nation’s 17 critical infrastructures (defined in 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD -7) 

is critical to sustaining the continuity and resilience of 

each infrastructure component as well as the collective 

system. This report discusses the relationship of two 

critical infrastructures, water and energy, and provides 

recommendations for minimizing the effects of energy 

emergencies on drinking water distribution.

The reliance on a constant supply of energy is widely 

recognized and receives regular coverage in the media. 

Repercussions from energy emergencies, such as the 

impacts of the 2003 blackout in the northeastern United 

States, are commonly understood and well documented 

(https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.

pdf). Less understood is the criticality of water and 

wastewater systems. According to HSPD - 7, an attack 

or breakdown of the United States critical infrastructure 

and key resources (e.g., water sector) could cause 

“catastrophic health effects or mass casualties... 

affect our national prestige and morale... [or] have 

a debilitating effect on security and economic wellbeing.” 

The following examples demonstrate some of the ways 

our society and economy depend upon functioning 

water systems and the interdependency between the 

water and energy sectors:

Hospitals, nursing homes, schools, office buildings, 

restaurants, and other such facilities all require 

drinking water and wastewater service in order to 

operate. Water is used for drinking, sanitation, and 

heating and cooling systems.

Many manufacturing operations either use water 

as an ingredient in their processes or rely on 

wastewater systems to remove and process their 

manufacturing waste. 

Water is critical to emergency response in many 

ways. The most obvious is fire fighting. Having 

ready access to safe water is important in order 

•

•

•

to provide mass care services and public health 

services, such as supplying potable water for 

drinking and ice for preserving food and medicine, 

during the emergency.

 

Clean water and functioning wastewater treatment 

systems are also necessary for sanitation, preventing 

the spread of disease among evacuated populations 

and emergency responders, and the provision of 

temporary housing.

Power generation and water infrastructures are 

significantly interdependent. Drinking water and 

wastewater cannot typically be processed without 

energy to run pumps and treatment equipment. 

Likewise, water is used in many aspects of the 

energy infrastructure including electricity generation 

(steam generation to turn turbines) and cooling of 

generators or other equipment used to provide fuel 

and power during emergencies. 

Essential work has been done in both the private and 

public sectors to enhance the security and protection 

of the drinking water/wastewater infrastructure. A key 

component of such efforts is assessing and hardening 

vulnerabilities. Some vulnerabilities are completely 

within the scope and control of the sector, such as 

site security. However, others are related to sector 

interdependencies. Questions for planners and decision 

makers to consider regarding the energy and water 

relationship in their community include:

Are the infrastructures (or specific important 

facilities within each infrastructure) so tightly 

linked that close coordination and cooperation 

will be needed to restore both infrastructures? As 

described earlier, water and energy infrastructures 

are co-dependent. As a result, it may be necessary to 

restore these services simultaneously depending on 

how close this relationship is in a community.

What facilities/operations within the community 

require the drinking water/wastewater infrastructure 

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•

•


be brought on-line first before they themselves can 

be restored? For example, health regulations prevent 

most facilities, such as schools, hospitals, and 

nursing homes, from opening if there is no drinking 

water or wastewater service. 

Who are the critical water customers? Critical 

customers include those facilities that provide 

essential services during an emergency or are critical 

to the function of a community (e.g., hospitals, 

kidney dialysis centers, industrial users, etc.). These 

facilities would be given first priority for restoring 

service.

What if multiple segments of the drinking water/

wastewater infrastructure are affected? It is 

important to prioritize the internal restoration of the 

drinking water/wastewater infrastructure if multiple 

segments are affected at once during an incident. 

For example, water and wastewater themselves are 

•

•

closely linked; the need for sewer services is less 

important following a disaster until the water system 

comes back on-line and water is again flowing into 

the wastewater system.

To comply with the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, drinking 

water utilities serving populations of 3,300 or greater 

had to complete vulnerability assessments (VA) and 

emergency response plans (ERP) to address those 

vulnerabilities. These VA’s and ERP’s should have 

taken interdependencies into account. To assist water 

and energy sectors with this effort, U.S. EPA’s National 

Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) in 

partnership with U.S. DOE’s Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability and Public Technology 

Institute (PTI) held a workshop in 2005 designed 

to identify best practices and lessons learned from 

previous crisis incidents that impacted both the energy 

and water infrastructures. 


2.0

Objectives and Summary of the Exercise

On August 17, 2005 local, state, and federal officials 

and representatives from private industry gathered in 

Washington D.C. for a half-day scenario-based tabletop 

exercise and lessons learned workshop regarding a case 

study of a major energy system disruption, caused by 

Hurricane Isabel, in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan 

Area and the resulting effects on the water distribution 

and supply infrastructure in the area. The exercise was 

sponsored by U.S. EPA’s NHSRC, U.S. DOE’s Office 

of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and PTI.

Exercise presentations and discussions focused on 

pre-emergency planning, emergency operation plan 

implementation, alternative water supply options, and 

energy and water-related best practices and policybased options. Exercise participants reviewed actual 

occurrences from pre-landfall of Hurricane Isabel to 

several days into recovery and restoration, and actively 

discussed energy and water issues throughout this 

defined timeframe. On September 18, 2003, Hurricane 

Isabel made landfall near Cape Hatteras, North 

Carolina, as a Category 2 storm with winds near 100 

mph. Despite this fairly modest storm classification, 

over the next 24 hours Isabel caused unprecedented 

power outages (6.5 million customers) throughout the 

Mid-Atlantic region. 

Participants were briefed on the issues and challenges 

faced by local, state, and federal agencies and private 

organizations during response and coordination 

efforts. Bringing these agencies and organizations 

together periodically to review the special demands of 

emergency response and recovery efforts is a unique 

way to build understanding, trust, and relationships that 

are essential in the fast-paced operating environment of 

major disasters. This exercise afforded the participants 

the opportunity to conceptualize synchronized 

operations related to priorities, capabilities, and 

the needs of all partners and customers. A list of 

participating organizations is provided in Attachment A.

The exercise and facilitated discussions were intended 

to:

Provide lessons learned from the 2005 hurricane 

season related to the energy and water infrastructure.

Highlight the importance of communications and 

establishing working relationships across various 

state, federal, and private organizations in advance 

of energy and water emergencies as a part of the 

planning process.

Provide opportunities to discuss process and 

coordination efforts with various state and local 

energy and water authorities in infrastructure 

assurance to engage them in reliability issues.

Assess the technical assistance needs of local 

officials with regard to planning for and responding 

to an energy and subsequent water supply disruption.

Provide opportunity for participants to exchange 

ideas and best practices for dealing with future 

energy emergencies that affect water supply.

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3

 

Hurricanes highlight the unique interdependencies 

within the water and energy sectors. A better 

understanding of these interdependencies is needed 

across all sectors and within the government for the 

purposes of planning and mitigation, prioritizing 

restoration, and recovery. This exercise helped advance 

the degree of mutual understanding of the impacts of a 

multi-region/state response to a hurricane. Hurricane 

Isabel challenged the water and energy sector, and this 

exercise paved the way for improving the effectiveness 

of response and restoration operations for water 

and wastewater, power, and natural gas networks. 

Using the tabletop exercise to guide discussion, 

workshop facilitators posed the following questions to 

participants: 

• What lessons were learned from Hurricane Isabel?

• What are the water sector’s priorities in times of 

crisis?

• What assistance do local officials and utilities need 

from state and federal agencies during this type of a 

crisis?

• How do water utilities currently plan to obtain power 

during energy emergencies?

• How can the electric utilities do more to help the 

water utilities?

With respect to lessons learned, participants impacted 

by Hurricane Isabel indicated that it served as a “wakeup” call for more detailed planning. Although the water 

and energy sectors were able to recover from Hurricane 

Isabel relatively quickly because it was a comparatively 

short-term event, the following were identified as 

priorities for plan augmentation:

• Staffing:

• Prepare contingency staffing plans (key personnel 

were on vacation when Hurricane Isabel struck in 

August);

• Cross-train employees and minimize multiple 

responsibilities for individuals;

• Prepare for long-term events (staff sustainability);

• Consider and plan for the needs of employees’ 

families;

• Utilize Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and 

resources from other agencies and organizations 

(i.e., Parks and Recreation Department, trade 

associations, neighboring jurisdictions, larger 

utilities) earlier.

• Communications:

• Redundant communication technologies are 

necessary (800 MHz radios, amateur radio, cell 

phones);

• Develop protocols for regular interagency 

and interdisciplinary communication during 

emergencies (to improve communication 

and coordination among agencies and other 

responding entities);

• Enhance timeliness and effectiveness of 

communication to the public, including 

alternative methods to communicate emergency 

measures when standard modes, such as 

television and radio, are not available due to 

power loss.

Another key lesson learned from Hurricane Isabel was 

the need for urban forestry planning and regular tree 

trimming. One of the main after effects of the hurricane 

was the number of downed trees and limbs which 

in turn downed power lines. There was significant 

discussion about the cost to keep tree limbs trimmed 

away from power lines. This is a continuing concern 

for jurisdictions with a large number of older trees 

throughout the community.

Regarding the water sector’s priorities during times 

of crisis, staffing and communications were again 

the primary themes of the discussion. Specifically, 

mobilizing staff resources quickly (who needs to report; 

where to report; where to respond) and sustaining staff 


resources are priorities. For communications, quickly 

and effectively notifying the public of “do not use” or 

“boil water” advisories and establishing information 

outlets, such as call centers, were priorities. 

Regarding assistance from state and federal agencies 

during these types of emergencies, participants 

indicated that they primarily need quick financial aid. 

Coordination support, staffing, equipment resources 

(generators) and supplies (fuel, ice, water), and risk 

communication assistance were also identified as areas 

where assistance would be most helpful.

With respect to obtaining power during energy 

emergencies, there was extensive discussion about 

back-up generators, including cost, availability, 

reliability, maintenance, and associated regulatory 

requirements, such as air quality permitting. Obviously, 

being able to obtain fuel for emergency generators is 

critical. Participants shared strategies for ensuring 

that adequate fuel is available, such as establishing 

relationships with local as well as out-of-town 

suppliers, maintaining fuel stockpiles, and utilizing 

underground storage tanks rather than above ground 

tanks. 

In response to the question of how electric utilities 

can help water utilities, participants asked that electric 

utilities (recognizing budget limitations) invest in 

newer technology (i.e., better transformers, switches, 

and fuses, bury power lines), increase staff during 

emergencies for quicker recovery (mutual aid and 

assistance agreements and MOUs), and participate 

in local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) when 

they are activated. During this part of the workshop, 

there was discussion regarding the unanticipated 

consequences of deregulation and DOE’s performance 

standards for utilities, specifically as they related to 

response and restoration time. It was also noted that 

electric utilities could prioritize water utilities as critical 

customers so that they would receive assistance in 

restoring power supply as soon as possible.

Lastly, each of the questions evoked discussion 

regarding water storage capacity as well as the 

importance of mutual aid and assistance agreements 

and MOUs not only within the sectors, but also among 

the sectors. After the workshop, the water sector has 

engaged in a large effort to increase the number of 

intrastate mutual aid and assistance agreements in 

the water sector, commonly referred to as Water and 

Wastewater Response Networks (WARNs). The main 

resource for this effort has been the “Utilities Helping 

Utilities” Action Plan that was published by the 

American Water Works Association (http://www.awwa.

org/Advocacy/govtaff/issues/Issue07_Water_Response_

Networks.cfm). This document describes the process 

for establishing WARNs based on the CALWARN and 

FLWARN models which were the first two WARN 

programs developed by the water sector.


4

Although there are a number of areas for improvement, 

the overall response and recovery of the water and 

energy sectors to Hurricane Isabel was successful. 

Local governments and industry deserve considerable 

credit for effective planning and preparation as 

well as tireless efforts of restoration under difficult 

circumstances. Industry and government worked well 

together at all levels.

Hurricane Isabel highlighted the unique 

interdependencies within the water and energy sectors. 

The storm also underscored the criticality of the 

energy infrastructure. A better understanding of these 

interdependencies is needed across all sectors and 

within the government for the purposes of planning, 

mitigation, prioritizing, restoration, and recovery. 

Many participants noted the need to build greater 

resiliency in the water and energy sectors, which will 

require diversifying energy resources and investing in 

new infrastructure.

Analysis of the issues and discussion resulted in the 

development of the following recommendations from 

the exercise. Local, state, and federal agencies and 

industry should evaluate each recommendation to 

determine which actions are appropriate to implement 

independently or collaboratively. In considering 

these recommendations, public and private sector 

organizations need to gauge the point at which the cost 

of preparation (planning, stockpiling of supplies, etc.) 

exceeds the public’s willingness to pay for preparation. 

Similarly, the public needs to be educated on the level 

of service to expect following an emergency that 

impacts both energy and water.

Best Practice Case Study –

Miami-Dade, FL

The Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department 

(MDWASD), being in a hurricane zone, has extensive 

backup power systems and a sophisticated resource 

management plan. Standby power systems (dual fuel 

to the extent possible) are installed at major wellfields, 

water and wastewater treatment plants, and major 

wastewater pumping stations. Rules now require that 

new wastewater pumping stations at or above 100 

gallons/day average flow be furnished with in-place 

standby power systems. Additionally, at the largest 

MDWASD water treatment plant, “spinning reserve” 

is utilized to ensure the maintenance of adequate 

system pressure in the event of a power failure. 

Under this approach, at least one standby power 

generator and one direct diesel-driven high service 

pump are operated continuously in preparation for 

power failures. On the approach of significant rain 

events, additional units are preemptively started in 

anticipation of a power failure. At the other treatment 

plant complex, five remote storage tank/pumping 

stations facilities are located in the system. These 

help maintain pressure in the event of a power failure 

at the main treatment plant high service pump station. 

Also, as an alternative to the “spinning reserve,” 

MDWASD is planning on a system of elevated water 

storage tanks to maintain pressure during power 

failures (http://www.miamidade.gov/wasd/home.asp).

Best Practice Case Study – 

San Francisco, CA

An independent power generation system is a 

system that can supply power independent of the 

electrical grid. This supplied power will assist with 

the distribution of water when electricity services are 

disabled. Independent systems can utilize any number 

of alternative power sources, such as solar, wind, and 

hydroelectric. 

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission 

(SFPUC) Wastewater Enterprise (WWE) installed a 

1.95 MW cogeneration plant in 2003 at its Southeast 

Plant. This unit uses waste gases to produce electricity 

and heat, which is used onsite. When running, the 

cogeneration plant can provide approximately 40% of 

the electricity needs of the facility (http://sfwater.org/).


Recommended areas for action:

Pre-plan personnel and other resource management 

and allocation during emergency response and 

recovery phases. The ability to obtain resources 

proved difficult on many fronts (ice, food, housing, 

generators, etc.). Industry, state, and local 

organizations should identify resource requirements 

and pre-negotiate contracts for emergency 

supplies. Consider pooling resources and preparing 

contingency staffing plans.

Better understand what state and federal 

governments can deliver and when. Local, state, 

and industry personnel were not fully aware of 

the resources that the federal sector had to offer to 

support preparation and response. Develop and 

distribute a catalogue of federal resources available 

to responders and key points of contact.

Communication is key. Develop and preestablish protocols for regular interagency and 

interdisciplinary communication during emergencies 

and ensure redundant communication systems. 

Improve fuel supply for response and recovery. 

Fuel supply solutions must be identified to ensure 

that adequate supplies are strategically positioned 

for use. Pre-negotiated fuel supply contracts or 

adequate stockpiles should be considered.

Establish or improve upon mutual aid and assistance 

agreements. Initial results have proven successful 

between cities and counties, as well as between 

energy and water sectors. 

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Best Practice Case Study – 

San Diego, CA

The City of San Diego’s Alvarado Water Treatment 

Plant utilizes solar panels to produce approximately 

20 percent of the plant’s power. The Alvarado 

photovoltaic installation was built under a power 

purchase agreement (PPA) with SunEdison, North 

America’s largest solar services company. Under 

the agreement, SunEdison installed the photovoltaic 

system at no cost to the city allowing residents 

to gain the benefits from clean, solar energy 

while avoiding an estimated $6.5 million worth of 

installation costs (http://www.sandiego.gov/water/

gen-info/history.shtml).


5

In response to HSPD-7 and the National Response Plan, 

the federal government has developed several tools that 

states, municipalities, and stakeholders may find useful 

when developing their emergency operation plans or 

responding to an incident.

EPA Resources

The following EPA Web page, http://cfpub.epa.gov/

safewater/watersecurity/home.cfm?program_id=8, 

provides a comprehensive list of emergency response 

tools that can be used to help with emergency incident 

planning. A table on this Web page identifies the 

intended users for each tool provided on the page. This 

list includes drinking water and wastewater utilities as 

well as “other government and private sector entities, 

such as public health and law enforcement officials, 

emergency responders, laboratories, and technical 

assistance providers.”

Tools and technical assistance focused more on water 

security and antiterrorism measures can be found on 

the following EPA Web page: http://cfpub.epa.gov/

safewater/watersecurity/tools.cfm. 

Information regarding EPA grant opportunities for 

certain organizations to provide training, technical 

assistance, and tool development for water security 

can be found at this EPA Web page: http://cfpub.epa.

gov/safewater/watersecurity/financeassist.cfm. 

EPA also provides a search engine on its Web site 

that allows a user to find training courses, meetings, 

workshops, and webcasts that are sponsored by EPA 

and other organizations involved in water security. 

The search engine is found at: http://cfpub.epa.gov/

safewater/watersecurity/outreach.cfm.

DOE Resources

The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability offers the following 

information, lessons learned, and tools to assist all 

levels of government and industry with emergency 

planning and preparedness.

Florida State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 

2004 Hurricanes: http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/

fl2004energy.pdf.

The Office staff worked with DOE’s Emergency 

Operations Center, Department of Homeland Security, 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and other 

groups to respond to the massive power outages caused 

by Hurricane Isabel: http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/

hurricanes_emer/isabel.aspx.

The State Energy Program (SEP) is the only federally 

funded, state-based program administered by the U.S. 

Department of Energy that provides resources directly 

to the states for allocation by them. More information 

about this program, administered by the National 

Association of State Energy Officials, can be found at: 

http://www.naseo.org/sep/default.htm.

The Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration 

(ISER) Division of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

leads the federal government’s effort to ensure a 

robust, secure, and reliable energy infrastructure. 

Information can be found at: http://www.oe.energy.

gov/infrastructure.htm.

EPA Partner Organizations

EPA works closely with many partners on guidance 

and best practices for water security and other 

interdependency issues, however two were key 

participants in this exercise: the American Water 

Works Association (AWWA) and the Association of 

Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA). 

AWWA is an international nonprofit scientific and 

educational society dedicated to the improvement of 

water quality and supply. Founded in 1881, AWWA is 

the largest organization of water supply professionals in 

the world. Its more than 60,000 members represent the 

full spectrum of the water community: treatment plant 

operators and managers, scientists, environmentalists, 

manufacturers, academicians, regulators, and others 


who hold genuine interest in water supply and public 

health (www.awwa.org). 

AMWA is an organization of the largest publicly 

owned drinking water systems in the United States. The 

association was formed in 1981 by a group of general 

managers of metropolitan water systems who wanted 

to ensure that the issues of large publicly owned water 

suppliers would be represented in Washington, D.C. 

Among other services, AMWA serves as the U.S. EPAdesignated liaison between the water sector and the 

federal government on critical infrastructure protection 

and operates the Water Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center (WaterISAC) and the Water Security 

Channel (WaterSC) (www.amwa.net). 

DOE Partner Organizations

In addition to PTI, the following partner organizations 

of the Department of Energy offer topical briefs, 

technical papers, and other tools regarding energy 

assurance and energy security.

The National Association of State Energy Officials 

(NASEO) is the only nonprofit organization that 

represents the Governor-designated energy officials 

from each state and territory. The organization was 

created to improve the effectiveness and quality of state 

energy programs and policies, provide policy input and 

analysis, share successes among the states, and be a 

repository of information on energy issues of concern to 

the states and their citizens (http://www.naseo.org).

The National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners (NARUC) is a non-profit organization 

founded in 1889. Its members include the governmental 

agencies that are engaged in the regulation of utilities 

and carriers in the fifty States, the District of Columbia, 

Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. NARUC’s member 

agencies regulate the activities of telecommunications, 

energy, and water utilities (http://www.naruc.org/

displaycommon.cfm?an=1).

The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 

is a bipartisan organization that serves the legislators 

and staffs of the nation’s 50 states, its commonwealths, 

and territories. NCSL provides research, technical 

assistance, and opportunities for policymakers to 

exchange ideas on the most pressing state issues. NCSL 

is an effective and respected advocate for the interests 

of state governments before Congress and federal 

agencies (http://www.ncsl.org/public/govern.htm).

Founded in 1908, the National Governors Association 

(NGA) is the collective voice of the nation’s governors 

and one of Washington, D.C.’s most respected public 

policy organizations. NGA provides governors and 

their senior staff members with services that range 

from representing states on Capitol Hill and before the 

Administration on key federal issues to developing 

policy reports on innovative state programs and 

hosting networking seminars for state government 

executive branch officials. The NGA Center for Best 

Practices focuses on state innovations and best practices 

on issues that range from education and health to 

technology, welfare reform, and the environment. 

NGA also provides management and technical 

assistance to both new and incumbent governors 

(http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.

cdd492add7dd9cf9e8ebb856a11010a0/)

Additional References

ABC7Chicago.com, Water main break causes problems 

in Kankakee area, [http://abclocal.go.com/wls/news/

print_071204_ap_ns_kankakee.html]. July 12, 2004.

Adams, Paul, Tunnel blame drama begins, 

Baltimoresun.com, [http://www.baltimoresun.com/

news/local/bal-bz.legal27jul27,1,7798825.story], July 

27, 2001.

American Water Works Association, Water fully 

restored after US/Canada blackout, WaterWeek, Vol. 

12, No. 34, [http://www.awwa.org/communications/

waterweek/index.cfm?ArticleID=217], August 20, 

2003.

American Water Works Association, Blackout highlights 

water security issues, Water Security Series, Vol. 

47, No. 4, [http://www.awwa.org/Communications/

mainstream/2003/Oct/Lead05_SecuritySeries01.cfm], 

October 2003.

American Water Works Association, Chat Room, 

Emergency Backup Power Supply, e-Journal 

AWWA, Vol. 96, No. 1, [http://www.awwa.org/

communications/journal/2004/January/News/

0104chatroom.pdf], January 2004.
10

Argonne National Laboratory, Infrastructure 

Interdependencies Associated with the August 14, 

2003, Electric Power Blackout, report prepared by 

Infrastructure Assurance Center, Argonne, IL 60439, 

August 29, 2003.

Association of State Drinking Water Administrators 

and the National Rural Water Association, Security 

Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small 

Drinking Water Systems, (May 30, 2002).

Belleville.com, Kankakee water main break affects 

business, residents, [http://www.belleville.com/mld/

belleville/9139109.htm?template=contentModules/

printstory.jsp], July 12, 2004.

Calvert, Scott and Michael Scarcella, Rail accident 

linked to water main break, Baltimoresun.com, 

[http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/bal-te.md.

water20jul20,1,4792291.story], July 20, 2001.

Capital Reports Environmental News Link, EPA 

Awards $2 million grant to enhance water security, 

available at [http://www.caprep.com/0404006.htm].

City of New York Environmental Protection press 

release, EPA Proposes To Continue Grant of 

Filtration Avoidance For New York City’s Catskill/

Delaware Water Supply, [http://www.nyc.gov/html/

dep/html/press/02-19pr.html], May 23, 2002.

Environmental Protection Agency Alert on Chemical 

Accident Prevention and Site Security: [http://www.

epa.gov/ceppo/pubs/secale.pdf].

Environmental Protection Agency Counterterrorism: 

[http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/ecounterterrorism.

html].

Environmental Protection Agency, 2000 National 

Public Water Systems Compliance Report – National 

Summary, [http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/annual/

sdwcom2002.pdf].

Environmental Protection Agency, 1999 Drinking Water 

Infrastructure Needs Survey, (February 2001), [http://

www.epa.gov/safewater/needs.html].

Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water 

Treatment, EPA publication 810-F-99-013, [http://

www.epa.gov/safewater/faq/treatment.pdf].

Environmental Protection Agency News Release, 

Association of Metropolitan Water Agency (sic) 

Awarded Two million Dollars to Enhance Water 

Security, March 29, 2004.

Environmental Protection Agency; Office of Water, 

Instructions to Assist Community Water Systems 

in Complying with the Public Health Security and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,

(January 2003), [www.epa.gov/safewater/security].

Ezell, Barry C., Risks of Cyber Attack to Supervisory 

Control and Data Acquisition for Water Supply,

Masters of Science thesis, University of Virginia, 

(May 1998), [http://www.riskinfo.com/cyberisk/

Watersupply/SCADA-thesis.html].

Ezell, Barry C., John V. Farr, and Ian Wiese, 

Infrastructure Risk Analysis of Municipal Water 

Distribution System, Journal of Infrastructure 

Systems, (September 2000).

Gillette, Jerry, James Peerenboom, Ronald Whitfield, 

and Ron Fisher, Analyzing Water/Wastewater 

Infrastructure Interdependencies, presented at 6th

Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 

Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 25, 2002.

Grigg, Neil S., Water Utility Security: Multiple Hazards 

and Multiple Barriers, Journal of Infrastructure 

Systems, (June 2003).

Hickman, Major Donald C., USAF, BSC, A Chemical 

and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water Systems 

at Risk, The Counterproliferation Papers, Future 

Warfare Series No. 3, USAF Counterproliferation 

Center, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, September 1999, [http://www.

au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/hickman.htm].

The JournalNews.com, Catskill calamity, [http://www.

thejournalnews.com/print_newsroom/051304/

13edresort.html], May 13, 2004.

MITRE Corporation, Potential Bioterrorism Threats to 

U.S. Public Water Supplies, report to the Scientific 

& Technical Intelligence Committee of the National 

Intelligence Council, (12 September 2002).
11

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, 

Water Infrastructure Simulation Environment, http://

www.lanl.gov/source/orgs/d/nisac/pdfFiles/WISE.pdf, 

January 2005.

National Transportation Safety Board, Office of 

Research and Engineering, Factual Report on 

Howard Street Tunnel Construction and Condition, 

January 7, 2003.

National Transportation Safety Board, Railroad 

Accident Brief: CSX Freight Train Derailment and 

Subsequent Fire in the Howard Street Tunnel in 

Baltimore, Maryland, on July 18, 2001, NTSB Report 

Number: RAB-04-08, adopted on 12/16/2004, [http://

www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/RAB0408.pdf].

NAWC Privatization Study: A Survey of the Use of 

Public-Private Partnerships in the Drinking Water 

Utility Sector, Hudson Institute for the National 

Association of Water Companies, presented to the 

United States Conference of Mayors, New Orleans, 

LA, June 11, 1999, [http://www.nawc.org/study_

main.html].

NBC5.com, Boil Order Remains in Effect in Kankakee 

Area, [http://www.nbc5.com/print/3521129/detail.

html?use=print], July 13, 2004.

New York Times, City May Have to Build Water 

Filtration Plant, The New York Times on the Web, 

[www.nytimes.com/00/06/01/news/national/regional/

ny-water.html], June 1, 2000.

Peerenboom. James, “Infrastructure Interdependencies: 

Overview of Concepts and Terminology,” National 

Science Foundation Workshop, June 2001.

Peerenboom, James, Ronald Fisher, and Ronald 

Whitfield, “Recovering from Disruptions of 

Interdependent Critical Infrastructures,” presented 

at CRIS/DRM/IIIT/NSF Workshop, Alexandria, VA, 

September 10-11, 2001.

Power Magazine, Been there, used that, P 19 March 

2004.

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting 

America’s Infrastructures, October 1997.

Rinaldi, Steven M., James P. Peerenboom, and Terrence 

K. Kelly, Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,

invited paper for special issue of IEEE Control 

Systems Magazine on “Complex Interactive 

Networks” December 2001.

Styron, Hilary C., CSX Tunnel Fire Baltimore, MD, July 

2001, U.S. Fire Administration, Technical Report 

Series, USFA-TR-140 (no date).

United States Office of the Press Secretary, Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, Subject: 

Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 

and Protection, December 17, 2003.

WaterTech.com, Water main break leaves 70,000 dry,

[http://www.watertechonline.com], July 13, 2004.
12

6

Attachment A: Participating Organizations in the 2005 Energy and Water Distribution 

Workshop

American Water

American Water Works Association

Arlington County Energy Office

Arlington County Water

Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies

Cincinnati Fire Department

Computer Sciences Corporation

DC Energy Office

Fairfax County

Fairfax Water

Federal Technical Support Working Group

Greater Cincinnati Water Works

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Maryland Department of the Environment

McMunn and Associates

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority

Public Technology Institute

University of Louisville

U.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington Aqueduct

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
13

Attachment B: Summary of Exercise Evaluations

DOE WORKSHOP

Workshop Evaluation

Customer Satisfaction Survey: OMB #2090-0019 Expires 3/31/06

1. With what type of organization are you affiliated (check

a. Regulated facility or business = 2 e.

b. Industry sector = 2 f.

c. Consulting company = 2 g.

d. Government = 18 h.

as may as apply)?

Trade association = 1

Nonprofit organization = 5

School or university = 1

Other ________________________________

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION/CLARITY OF INFORMATION

On a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 is very dissatisfied and 6 is very satisfied please indicate your level of satisfaction

with the following:

Readability

2. a. Readability (i.e., flow, writing style, and presentation of concepts) of the workshop materials?

6 Very satisfied = 8 3 Somewhat dissatisfied

5 Satisfied = 14 2 Dissatisfied

4 Somewhat satisfied = 2 1 Very dissatisfied

Don’t know = 5

b. COMMENT:

-Not really any handouts- PPT was excellent

-Good Visuals

-Supplemental handouts of comparison documents would have been helpful.

-Nothing Handed out

-No materials

-No handout materials

3. a. Understandability of the workshop materials (i.e., the ability of the product to convey the

information in a way that is easy to grasp and comprehend)?

6 Very satisfied = 5 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1

5 Satisfied = 18 2 Dissatisfied

4 Somewhat satisfied = 4 1 Very dissatisfied

Don’t know = 1

b. COMMENT:

-I thought more emphasis would be on energy.

-Concise format -well focused

-Our objectives were not very clear, lack of attendance from electric utilities degraded meeting

severely.

-Objectives not clear

-Could have used Electric Utilities; if certain water utilities were prepared to present their

lessons learned rather than asked to chime it, there may have been more discussion.

-Consider providing an agenda & reviewing the plan for the meeting prior to starting the actual

workshop.
4. a. Accuracy of the technical information (knowledge regarding the subject matter) included in

workshop materials?

6 Very satisfied = 8 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1

5 Satisfied = 11 2 Dissatisfied = 1

the

4 Somewhat satisfied = 7 1 Very dissatisfied

Don’t know = 1

b. COMMENT:

-Some info was excellent, other info a bit dated or not accurate.

-This did not present other than high level material - already understood

-Facilitators could have had more water knowledge; consider including more industry reps.

Organization and Clarity

5. a. How satisfied are you with the organization (presented in a logical order) of the Meeting?

6 Very satisfied = 13 3 Somewhat dissatisfied =

5 Satisfied = 11 2 Dissatisfied = 1

4 Somewhat satisfied = 4 1 Very dissatisfied

Don’t know =

b. COMMENT:

-No agenda or clear objective- table top did not cause new info to be discovered.

-Could have gone Fed- State- Local

6. a. How clearly (plain and evident) is information communicated in this Meeting?

6 Very satisfied = 10 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1

5 Satisfied = 14 2 Dissatisfied = 1

4 Somewhat satisfied = 4 1 Very dissatisfied

Don’t know 

b. COMMENT:

-Good interplay and support by presenters.

-Main presenters were excellent.

Other Recommendations:

7. We welcome any other comments you have about this workshop.

-Coverage of the energy side was superficial and lack of utility participation was disappointing.

-Presentation used altered/fake phot of hurricane Isabell on the “Hot Wash” slide.

-Made some good contacts. What other deliverable could have been developed? Identify and

define R & D requirements.

-Consider incorporating an actual exercise into the workshop. I think it would allow the sectors

to develop an even better understanding of each other.

-Is there any research ongoing on types of trees to recommend for home owners to plant? i.e.

Some trees fall/break greater then others. Some trees grow a little shorter.

-More data about other power problems at other utilities could be useful.

-Excellent-Brought it down to local area.

AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING

8. a. How satisfied are you that this workshop meets your need for information about the issue/subject

matter?

6 Very satisfied = 6 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1

5 Satisfied = 12 2 Dissatisfied = 1

4 Somewhat satisfied = 9 1 Very dissatisfied


15

b. COMMENT:

-Good to get later dependant entities together. Next time need to have electric utilities in the

works next time.

-Need to link info from “natural disasters” to “ un-natural disasters” (i.e. terrorist incidents)

-could have benefitted with more lead-time

-The information presented was very helpful- need more information on planning for an

“unplanned” emergency.

-Not sure what the end result is- develop a report that goes where???

9. a. How satisfied are you that the information presented in this workshop increased your awareness

of the issue/subject matter?

6 Very satisfied = 8 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 2

5 Satisfied = 11 2 Dissatisfied = 1

4 Somewhat satisfied = 5 1 Very dissatisfied

Don’t know = 1

b. COMMENT:

- Good level representation — helps in reintroducing essentials in energies.

-Already knew a fair amount on this issue

10. a. Do you expect to refer to the information from this workshop again?

Yes = 24 No = 5

b. Why or why not?

-Took some lessons learned back to modify our energy planning.

-I’d like a copy of the PPT for future use.

-EPA emergency Response Exercise CD

-Report back to supervisor

-I often work with all utilities, this info will be helpful

-Internal planning for technology development

-Practical first-hand info from actual situations was featured

-Concern for little new information learned

-Met a networking contact on an issue I may need to confront

-Member of our Emergency Mgt coordinating committee can use these.

-It doesn’t fall under my scope of work, but it helps me understand what my co-workers do.

-re emphasis on vulnerabilities (critical) that have been discussed but not addressed.

10. a. Would you recommend this workshop to others?

Yes = 25 No = 4

b. Why or why not?

-Useful to take a few minutes and focus

-For those outside the DC area useful / for those here sufficient representation there. No need to

repeat.

-Yes on two levels Policy makers at one; Operational level

-Very informative

-IT was very important information and a networking opportunity

–Practical first hand info from actual situations was featured.

-Some will benefit, others won’t

-Networking Opportunity

-Would recommend including a balance of representatives from both sectors

-Down to earth and useful

-It makes you understand all that is involved in a disaster, natural or man made

-Very well presented. Is elevated critical information to public safely and critical information.
16

Attachment C: Exercise Sponsors

EPA’s National Homeland Security Research 

Center

The National Homeland Security Research Center 

(NHSRC) develops and delivers reliable, responsive, 

expertise and products based on scientific research 

and evaluations of technology. NHSRC’s expertise 

and products are widely used to prevent, prepare for, 

and recover from public health and environmental 

emergencies arising from terrorist threats and incidents. 

Research and development efforts focus on five primary 

areas:

Threat and Consequence Assessment investigates 

human exposure to chemical, biological, and 

radiological contaminants to define dangerous 

levels of these contaminants and establish protective 

cleanup goals. 

Decontamination and Consequence Management

focuses on decontamination of buildings and 

outdoor environments, as well as the safe disposal of 

contaminated materials. 

Water Infrastructure Protection is charged with 

protecting the nation’s drinking water sources 

and distribution systems and ensuring the safety 

of wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal 

procedures. 

Response Capability Enhancement works directly 

with emergency responders and local governments 

to provide tools and information needed to make 

informed decisions in the event of an attack. 

Technology Testing and Evaluation evaluates 

technologies that show potential for use in homeland 

security applications. These evaluations are used by 

water utility operators, building owners, emergency 

responders, and others to make informed decisions 

when purchasing security technology. 

For additional information, visit NHSRC’s website at 

www.epa.gov/nhsrc.

•

•

•

•

•

DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 

Reliability 

The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity (OE) 

Delivery and Energy Reliability’s mission is to lead 

national efforts to modernize the electric grid, enhance 

security and reliability of the energy infrastructure, and 

facilitate recovery from disruptions of energy supply. 

Program efforts focus on three primary areas:

Research and Development

Plan, implement, and evaluate a portfolio of 

electric delivery and infrastructure security 

technology projects, visions, R&D roadmaps, 

public-private partnerships, technology transfer 

and commercialization plans, and education and 

outreach strategies. Manage research, development, 

field-testing, and demonstration projects for “next 

generation” electric delivery and infrastructure 

security technologies. Develop, implement, and 

maintain a cyber security program to assist the 

Nation’s energy sector.

Permitting, Siting, and Analysis

Conduct analysis of the physical, regulatory, and 

institutional barriers that interfere with the efficient 

and secure operation of electric transmission 

and distribution systems. Conduct analyses 

to identify major electric delivery constraints 

(“bottlenecks”). Coordinate with national, regional, 

state, and local organizations and utilities to 

develop effective solutions and assess alternatives 

increasing the reliability and efficiency of electric 

market operations. Coordinate with the Power 

Marketing Administrations (PMAs). Evaluate 

and, if appropriate, approve applications for 

Presidential permits for new electric transmission 

lines across U.S. international borders. Evaluate 

and, if appropriate, approve applications to export 

electricity from the U.S. Collect, analyze, and 

disseminate annual data on U.S. international 

electricity trade. Participate in bilateral and trilateral 

discussions with Canada and Mexico related to 

electricity trade and regulation.

•

•
17

Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration

Manage DOE’s activities related to the national 

critical infrastructure protection program in 

coordination with DHS, FERC, and others. Conduct 

analysis of energy infrastructure vulnerabilities to 

physical disruptions and recommend preventative 

measures in coordination with DHS and others. 

Provide technical and operational support to other 

federal, state, and local agencies in planning 

for and responding to energy emergencies. In 

accordance with the National Response Plan, 

conduct Emergency Support Function Twelve 

(energy) operations in support of the Department of 

Homeland Security during a declared National or 

State Emergency or National Security Special Event.

For additional information, visit OE’s website at http://

www.oe.energy.gov/about/384.htm.

• Public Technology Institute 

The Public Technology Institute (PTI) is a national 

member supported organization based in Washington, 

DC. As the only technology organization created by 

and for cities and counties, PTI works with a core 

network of leading local government officials– the PTI 

membership – to identify opportunities for technology 

research, share best practices, offer consultancies and 

pilot demonstrations, promote technology development 

initiatives, and develop enhanced educational 

programming. Officials from PTI member governments 

participate in councils and forums that address specific 

technology areas. Through a corporate partner program 

with leading technology companies, and partnerships 

with federal agencies and other governmental 

organizations, PTI shares the results of these activities 

and the expertise of its members with the broader 

audience of the thousands of cities and counties across 

the U.S. 

For additional information, visit the PTI web site at 

www.pti.org.


EPA 600/R-07/042 | April 2007 | www.epa.gov/ord