[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Dent, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6670.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6670

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DENT, APPELLEE. 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WALKER, APPELLEE

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Dent, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6670.] 

Criminal law—R.C. 2923.32—Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity—The 

existence of an enterprise is established by showing that the organization is 

fully operational and engaging in a pattern of illicit activity—The time 

frame for the commission of a pattern of criminal conduct is sufficient when 

the evidence shows that the corrupt activity is neither isolated nor so closely 

connected to be considered a single offense—Court of appeals’ judgment 

reversed in case No. 2019-0651—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed in 

case No. 2019-0654 and cause remanded. 

(Nos. 2019-0651 and 2019-0654—Submitted February 26, 2020—Decided 

December 16, 2020.) 

APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

No. 17AP-592, 2019-Ohio-1510, and No. 17AP-588, 2019-Ohio-1458.

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J.

{¶ 1} In these consolidated discretionary appeals, we consider whether 

appellant, the state of Ohio, presented evidence sufficient to support the convictions 

of Alvin C. Dent Jr. and William L. Walker Jr. (collectively, “appellees”), for the 

felony offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32. 

Because we conclude that it did, we reverse the judgments of the Tenth District 

Court of Appeals. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} After a joint jury trial, Dent and Walker were both found guilty of 

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, possessing cocaine, illegally 

manufacturing drugs, and trafficking in cocaine. The convictions for engaging in 

a pattern of corrupt activity are the focus of this consolidated appeal. A third 

individual, Drakkar Groce, was also convicted in the same trial. Groce’s conviction 

is the subject of a separate but related appeal pending before this court in case No. 

2019-0594. 

{¶ 3} At the joint trial, Detective Lawrence Gauthney of the Columbus

Police Department testified that he began observing a house on Greenway Avenue 

in response to citizen complaints that he had received around February 2016. As a 

result, he conducted two to three “spot checks” during which he observed foot 

traffic at the house consistent with “an up-and-running drug house.” More 

specifically, he observed a high volume of individuals who knocked and entered 

the house like visitors, but stayed only five to ten minutes before leaving. He 

testified that in his experience, this was activity consistent with the sale of drugs 

from the house. 

{¶ 4} Gauthney testified that on March 11 and 15, he conducted visual

surveillance of the property for over an hour each time. Gauthney’s surveillance 
January Term, 2020 

3

reports were admitted into evidence, and he testified again that the activity at the 

house—specifically, a high volume of foot traffic in and out within a short period 

of time—was what he had consistently observed during each spot check. 

Additionally, during the March 15 surveillance, Gauthney observed Walker enter 

through the back door of the house but did not see him leave during the 

approximately one and one-half hours that Gauthney had observed the house. 

{¶ 5} On March 28, Gauthney arranged for a confidential informant to 

purchase what Gauthney believed to be crack cocaine from someone in the house. 

Following this buy, Gauthney obtained a no-knock warrant to search the house. 

{¶ 6} When the warrant was executed on March 29, neither appellees nor 

Groce were apprehended in the house, but three other individuals were. The police 

recovered items from the house, including small plastic bags containing cocaine, 

electronic scales containing cocaine residue, a glass measuring cup containing 

cocaine residue, as well as multiple firearms and ammunition located throughout 

the house. During the search of the house, the police also recovered video 

recordings from a camera that was located in the house’s kitchen containing footage 

of appellees, Groce, and other individuals. Gauthney determined that the recorded 

footage covered a single date—March 29—and lasted for a period of over four 

hours. 

{¶ 7} From the videos, Gauthney drafted an investigative report in which 

he described what he observed at various portions of the videos. This report and 

portions of the actual videos were admitted into evidence. In addition, Gauthney 

testified as to what he believed the videos showed while the videos played for the 

jury. In summary, Gauthney testified that the camera recorded appellees and Groce 

conducting various activities with what Gauthney believed to be cocaine, including 

“cooking” it to make crack cocaine (by heating a mixture of cocaine, baking soda, 

and water), weighing and bagging the drug, selling it, and exchanging large 

amounts of money. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

{¶ 8} More specifically, the videos show Dent handling and weighing 

multiple small plastic bags of a white substance believed to be crack cocaine. Dent 

is present while Groce “cooks” crack cocaine using a microwave. Dent also 

exchanges large stacks or rolls of money with others in the house, including Groce 

and Walker. At one point, Dent—with Groce’s help—adjusts the camera in the 

kitchen for several minutes. 

{¶ 9} The videos show Walker handling small plastic bags of crack cocaine 

and exchanging large amounts of money with Dent. He also prepares crack cocaine 

using a measuring cup, baking soda, and the microwave. He exchanges a small bag 

containing what appears to be crack cocaine for money with unknown individuals. 

And then he goes back to bagging up crack cocaine at the kitchen table. 

{¶ 10} The videos also show Groce selling what appears to be crack cocaine 

to several individuals who appear to stay only a short time after he lets them into 

the house. He accesses kitchen cabinets in which portions of crack cocaine appear 

to be stored, weighs the substance and places it in smaller plastic bags. In addition 

to “cooking” crack cocaine, he handles large “cookie” size portions of crack 

cocaine and splits those larger portions into smaller-sized portions and places the 

smaller portions in bags. He handles money in the kitchen from others and places 

it in his wallet. 

{¶ 11} In addition to these activities that relate to the underlying offenses of 

possessing, illegally manufacturing, and trafficking cocaine, the videos also 

demonstrate appellees and Groce engaging in more ordinary activities in the house 

distinct from those other individuals in the videos. For example, appellees and 

Groce are in the house without jackets, in contrast to others who come into view of 

the camera for a short duration. Although the videos do not include audio, appellees 

casually chat with each other, Groce, and others. At one point, Groce appears 

shirtless and rolls a cigar. While appellees and Groce are in view, another 

individual makes what appears to be french fries using a countertop appliance. At 
January Term, 2020 

5

another point, Walker makes himself a sandwich and appears to share a video on 

his phone with Dent and another individual. Dent makes a sandwich while handling 

a large roll of cash. At one point, Groce enters the kitchen with what appears to be 

a bag of food and a two-liter beverage. Walker and Dent share the beverage with 

Groce and others while Groce eats. While Walker works at the microwave doing 

what appears to be manufacturing crack cocaine, another individual attempts to 

hand him cash but Walker allows the individual to casually leave the money on the 

top of the microwave. 

{¶ 12} The jury returned guilty verdicts for both appellees for engaging in 

a pattern of corrupt activity in addition to the other drug-related underlying 

offenses.1

 The trial court sentenced Walker to an aggregate prison term of 20 years 

and Dent to an aggregate prison term of 22 years. 

{¶ 13} Dent and Walker separately appealed to the Tenth District and 

argued that their convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. In each 

case, the court of appeals agreed and reversed each of their convictions for engaging 

in a pattern of corrupt activity on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to 

support those convictions.2

 State v. Dent, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-592, 2019-

Ohio-1510; State v. Walker, 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444 (10th Dist.). 

 

1. The jury also found Walker guilty of one count of possessing cocaine, one count of illegally 

manufacturing drugs, and three counts of trafficking in cocaine, but not guilty of the accompanying 

firearm specifications. Dent was also found guilty of one count of possessing cocaine, one count of 

illegally manufacturing drugs, and one count of trafficking in cocaine, along with the attendant 

firearm specifications. He also pleaded guilty to having a weapon while under a disability. 

2. Walker and Groce raised nearly identical assignments of error in their respective appeals to the 

Tenth District. And the court of appeals’ decision in each case is substantially similar. Compare 

State v. Groce, 2019-Ohio-1007, 133 N.E.3d 930 (10th Dist.), with State v. Walker, 2019-Ohio1458, 135 N.E.3d 444 (10th Dist.) (conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was not 

supported by sufficient evidence). In contrast, Dent argued in his appeal that the state failed to 

present sufficient evidence to survive a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The court of appeals’ 

decision, however, relied on its reasoning in Groce to conclude that the state did not present 

sufficient evidence to support a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. State v. 

Dent, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-592, 2019-Ohio-1510, ¶ 12-13. This court’s analysis in this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

{¶ 14} The state sought this court’s discretionary review in each case on the 

following proposition of law: 

The existence of an enterprise under R.C. 2923.31(C) is 

established by showing the organization is fully operational and 

engaging in a pattern of illicit activity. The time frame for the 

commission of a pattern of criminal conduct is sufficient where the 

evidence shows the corrupt activity is neither isolated or so closely 

connected to be considered a single offense. R.C. 2923.31(E). 

We accepted the state’s discretionary appeals, 156 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2019-Ohio2892, 126 N.E.3d 1167, and consolidated the cases for oral argument, 157 Ohio 

St.3d 1438, 2019-Ohio-4202, 132 N.E.3d 697. 

Analysis 

{¶ 15} On its face, the state’s proposition of law presents a sufficiency-ofthe-evidence question. “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a 

verdict is a question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997). Therefore, our review is de novo. In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 

1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 3. In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light 

most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by 

constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio 

St.3d 89, 102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

 

opinion refers to the court of appeals’ decision in Walker since that decision gives a more complete 

analysis of the relevant issues.
January Term, 2020 

7

U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “In essence, sufficiency is a test 

of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386.

{¶ 16} At the core of the parties’ arguments is a debate regarding how

broadly to read the court of appeals’ holding. The court of appeals correctly stated 

that R.C. 2923.32, which describes the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity, “does not contain a durational requirement,” 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 

444, at ¶ 21. And it stated that its conclusion should not be read “to suggest that 

the predicate offenses underlying a charge of engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity can never occur on the same day.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 27. But, the 

court of appeals ultimately concluded that the state’s evidence was insufficient 

because “the state put forth no evidence that these men worked beyond the single 

day of the surveillance video.” Id. In making this conclusion, the court of appeals 

elevated a time-duration requirement as an element of the offense. And by 

suggesting what additional evidence might have compelled it to reach a different 

conclusion, see id., the court of appeals focused on whether the state presented the

best evidence. But the proper question is whether the evidence presented, when 

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier 

of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jenks

at paragraph two of the syllabus. Applying the proper standard, we conclude that 

it does. 

{¶ 17} The statute setting forth the felony offense of engaging in a pattern 

of corrupt activity states that “[n]o person employed by, or associated with, any 

enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the 

enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity * * *.” R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). R.C. 

2923.32 is sometimes referred to as Ohio’s “RICO statute,” given its similarity to 

the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et 

seq. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

{¶ 18} Like the federal law, Ohio’s RICO statute requires the existence of 

an “enterprise” and a “pattern of corrupt activity.” An “enterprise” is defined as 

including “any individual * * * or any organization, association, or group of 

persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.” R.C. 2923.31(C). A “pattern 

of corrupt activity” is defined as “two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether 

or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same 

enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and 

connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.” R.C. 2923.31(E). 

At least one of the incidents in the pattern must be a felony. Id. 

{¶ 19} The court of appeals started its sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis 

with a focus on the word “longevity,” 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 20, 

because it is one of the structural features of an association-in-fact enterprise 

identified by the United States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 

938, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009), see 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 

444, at ¶ 22. In Boyle, the court interpreted the definition of “enterprise” in the 

federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961(4), which is materially similar to Ohio’s 

statutory definition in R.C. 2923.31(C). See Boyle at 944-945. The court concluded 

that an association-in-fact enterprise need not have a formal structure, but must 

have at least the following features: “a purpose, relationships among those 

associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to 

pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. 

{¶ 20} Here, the court of appeals recognized that “the pertinent statutes and 

case law do not define ‘longevity’ in terms of finite, quantifiable amounts of time” 

but that “[s]ufficient longevity is required to determine whether there is a common 

purpose and whether the associates have relationships in furtherance of that 

purpose.” 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 24. Nonetheless, the court of 

appeals noted that other Ohio appellate districts have found “at least a month or 

predicate offenses occurring on different dates at different locations” to show the 
January Term, 2020 

9

longevity contemplated by Boyle. 2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 24. With 

that focus, the court of appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 

prove an enterprise here because “all of the predicate offenses occurred on the same 

day in the same location” and “the state presented no evidence that the relationships 

of these men extended beyond a single day.” Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 21} In Boyle, the longevity required for an association-in-fact enterprise 

was stated to be only that “sufficient to permit the[] associates to pursue the 

enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. And the court of appeals is correct that nothing 

in the statutes or caselaw pertaining to the definition of “enterprise” in R.C. 

2923.31(C) specifies a time duration. Thus, our task is to determine whether the 

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient 

to allow a rational juror to conclude that the enterprise here had longevity sufficient 

to permit appellees to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. 

{¶ 22} Here, the purpose of the enterprise was to manufacture and sell

cocaine out of the house on Greenway Avenue. The video evidence shows a 

relationship between appellees. Appellees, along with Groce, appear together in 

the videos, cooperating with each other in the manufacture, preparation, and sale of 

crack cocaine at a known drug house. The video evidence also demonstrates 

appellees and Groce casually and familiarly interacting with each other and their 

surroundings. For example, Dent and Groce work together to adjust the camera on 

which the video evidence was captured. All three eat and drink together and appear 

familiar with each other. They casually chat with each other and do not appear 

guarded or tense, even while exchanging money or preparing the cocaine for sale. 

Based on the video evidence, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution as we must, a rational juror could reasonably conclude that 

appellees and Groce were not strangers to each other or to the drug activities at the 

house; and all understood the purpose of their joint activities. Thus, we conclude 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

that sufficient evidence demonstrates a purpose and relationship relating to their 

illegal activities. 

{¶ 23} Evidence of longevity sufficient to further the purpose of the 

enterprise is demonstrated by Detective Gauthney’s spot checks and his 

surveillance reports from March 11 and 15, the confidential informant’s purchase 

of drugs, and the videos obtained at the time of the search on March 29. Together, 

this evidence demonstrates that activity consistent with an “up-and running drug 

house” had been occurring since at least late February when Gauthney received the 

complaints that prompted further investigation. Additionally, Gauthney observed 

Walker at the house on March 15 using the back door without knocking and staying 

longer than a few minutes, which is activity that stands in contrast to the more 

frequent visitors Gauthney observed knocking and entering the front door of the 

house and staying only five to ten minutes. Even if we focused solely on March 

29, the day the video evidence was recorded, appellees performed the tasks 

necessary to further the enterprise’s purpose of selling crack cocaine out of the 

house. And, based on appellees’ conduct and interaction in the house on March 29 

that is distinguishable from the frequent yet short-term visitors observed at the 

house, it is reasonable to infer that their activities with the enterprise extended 

beyond a single day. 

{¶ 24} Viewing the evidence described above in a light most favorable to 

the prosecution as we must, we conclude that a rational juror could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellees participated in an association-in-fact 

enterprise with sufficient longevity to further its purpose. 

{¶ 25} The court of appeals also noted that the statutory definition of a 

pattern of corrupt activity in R.C. 2923.31(E) requires that the incidents of corrupt 

activity not be isolated. It looked to this court’s decision in State v. Miranda, 138 

Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, in which this court noted that the 

pattern of corrupt activity “ ‘must include both a relationship and continuous 
January Term, 2020 

11 

activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise,’ ” id. at ¶ 13, quoting 

State v. Dudas, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-109, 2009-Ohio-1001, ¶ 46. Focusing 

on the word “continuous,” the court of appeals observed that it “seems to 

contemplate that the activity occurs over some not insignificant period of time.” 

2019-Ohio-1458, 135 N.E.3d 444, at ¶ 23. The court of appeals concluded that the 

surveillance-video evidence covering just one day of activity was not sufficient 

evidence to demonstrate that the predicate offenses were not isolated. 

{¶ 26} As we noted above, a rational juror could reasonably infer from the 

activity and interactions observed in the surveillance-video evidence that the 

predicate offenses were not isolated, that appellees did not serendipitously find 

themselves in an up-and-running drug house and decide independently to cook 

crack cocaine and then weigh, bag, and sell it to customers who happened to enter 

the house. The productivity, the coordinated activity of each appellee and Groce—

along with the ease and comfort with which they went about their business—

evidenced a high degree of familiarity with the house, the work at hand, the 

clientele, and the volume and price of each bag. Importantly, appellees and Groce 

knew about the camera in the kitchen overlooking the drug-preparation and sales 

area and took pains to adjust it to capture the kitchen activity, presumably as a 

precaution against employee theft. It would be irrational and contrary to the 

evidence to determine that appellees’ illegal activities that are observed were 

‘isolated’ events. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution 

as we must, we conclude that a reasonable juror could have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellees participated in incidents of illegal activity that were 

not isolated and established a pattern of corrupt activity. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Tenth District’s judgments 

in relevant part. In Dent’s case (case No. 2019-0651), there are no remaining issues 

for the court of appeals to resolve; therefore, his conviction for engaging in a pattern 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

of corrupt activity is reinstated. In Walker’s case (case No. 2019-0654), the Tenth 

District determined that its conclusion regarding insufficient evidence supporting 

the conviction mooted certain issues raised in some assignments of error. 

Therefore, we must remand Walker’s case to the court of appeals for further 

proceedings to address those remaining issues. 

Judgment reversed in case No. 2019-0651. 

Judgment reversed in case No. 2019-0654 

and cause remanded. 

KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

ZMUDA, J., concurs, with an opinion. 

DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J. 

GENE A. ZMUDA, J., of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

FRENCH, J. 

_________________ 

ZMUDA, J., concurring. 

{¶ 28} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant the state of 

Ohio’s evidence in these cases, involving appellees Alvin C. Dent Jr. and William 

L. Walker Jr., when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient 

to establish the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise under R.C. 2923.31(C) 

and a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32. I write separately because I 

reach this conclusion based on different reasoning than the majority, namely 

regarding how the state’s evidence supports a reasonable juror’s conclusion that the 

enterprise engaged in corrupt activity over a period of time extending beyond a 

single day. 

{¶ 29} In State v. Beverly, 143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 

116, this court noted that R.C. 2923.31(C)’s definition of “enterprise” is 

“remarkably open-ended.” Id. at ¶ 8. Indeed, an “enterprise” under R.C. 

2923.31(C) includes “any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited 
January Term, 2020 

13 

partnership, corporation, trust, union, government agency, or other legal entity, or 

any organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact although not 

a legal entity.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 30} In Beverly, this court went on to adopt the definition of an 

association-in-fact enterprise articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 

(2009). Indeed, the Supreme Court explained in Boyle that an association-in-fact 

enterprise is “ ‘a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of 

engaging in a course of conduct.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 

576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The Supreme Court further 

explained that an association-in-fact enterprise must have “longevity sufficient to 

permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. It is this 

longevity requirement that is at issue in these cases.3 

{¶ 31} The issue in these cases is whether the evidence “is sufficient to 

allow a rational juror to conclude that the enterprise here had longevity sufficient 

to permit appellees to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Majority opinion at ¶ 21. 

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not sufficient in 

either defendant’s case, because the predicate offenses all occurred on the same day 

and the state failed to present evidence that the relationships among Walker and his 

codefendants extended beyond a single day. See State v. Walker, 2019-Ohio-1458, 

135 N.E.3d 444, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.). Having examined the record, I conclude that the 

court of appeals’ characterization of the state’s evidence is inconsistent with the 

testimony provided by Detective Lawrence Gauthney of the Columbus police 

 

3. That the group of men charged in these case—Dent, Walker, and a third individual, Drakkar 

Groce—were associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct aimed 

at producing and selling crack cocaine out of the house located on Greenway Avenue is not in 

dispute here. The video surveillance depicting the group of men cooking crack cocaine and 

exchanging the product for large sums of cash with one another and with transients, when viewed 

in a light most favorable to the state, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish the coordinated 

activity of Walker, Dent, and Groce. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

department at their joint trial as to the duration of Walker’s and Dent’s involvement 

in the enterprise. 

{¶ 32} During its case-in-chief, the state presented extensive testimony 

from Detective Gauthney, who indicated that he performed spot checks on the 

Greenway Avenue home. Gauthney testified that during those checks, which took 

place two weeks prior to the controlled buy and subsequent search of the house, he 

observed what appeared to be an “up-and-running drug house.” Notably, during 

his spot checks, Gauthney took notes, which included descriptions of the 

individuals who entered and exited the home as well as notations of the time of 

entry and exit. At trial, Gauthney testified that he observed Walker enter the house 

during one of his spot checks. Unlike the other entrants, Walker remained in the 

home for longer than a few minutes, and he entered the home without knocking. 

Furthermore, the video-surveillance camera was adjusted by Dent several times 

during the approximately four-hour recording. And the video footage reveals that 

Walker and Dent conducted drug activity inside the home. 

{¶ 33} When viewing Gauthney’s testimony and the reasonable inferences

to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the state, I find that a rational 

juror could conclude that the enterprise here was operational for a period of at least 

two weeks, from March 15, 2016, when Gauthney observed Walker entering and 

remaining at the home longer than some of the other visitors, and continuing 

through March 29, when the video surveillance confirmed Walker’s and Dent’s 

involvement in the enterprise. Gauthney’s testimony established that Walker was 

a participant in the drug activity that occurred inside the residence on at least two 

dates spaced weeks apart, and the video surveillance confirmed Gauthney’s 

observation that the residence was being used by the enterprise as an up-andrunning drug house. Therefore, I conclude that the Tenth District erred in finding 

that all the predicate offenses occurred on the same day and that the state presented 
January Term, 2020 

15 

no evidence to demonstrate that the relationships among Walker, Dent, and Groce 

extended beyond a single day. 

{¶ 34} The state’s evidence of coordinated drug activity by Walker, Dent, 

and Groce over a two-week period satisfies the applicable longevity requirement in 

these cases. This same evidence, in my view, also suggests a pattern of corrupt 

activity, contrary to the position espoused by the dissenting opinion. See Beverly, 

143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 116, at ¶ 7 (holding that the 

evidence used to prove an enterprise may also be used to prove the associated 

pattern of corrupt activity). Therefore, I agree with the majority’s determination 

that the state’s evidence was sufficient to support Walker’s and Dent’s convictions 

for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32. Given the 

two-week period of coordinated activity that is suggested by the evidence 

introduced by the state, we need not, and the majority does not, delve into whether 

it is possible to obtain a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity 

based on conduct that occurs entirely within a one-day period. That issue simply 

is not presented here. 

{¶ 35} With this explanation in mind, I concur. 

_________________ 

DONNELLY, J., dissenting.

{¶ 36} To prove that a defendant has committed the offense of engaging in 

a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32, the state must have 

sufficient evidence that the defendant engaged in two or more separate incidents of 

corrupt activity. Appellant, the state of Ohio, presented evidence that appellees, 

Alvin C. Dent Jr. and William L. Walker Jr., were involved in a single incident of 

corrupt activity that was undivided in both time and place. Because I would 

conclude that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support appellees’ 

convictions for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, I dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

{¶ 37} The facts in this case are simple. After the Columbus Police 

Department conducted surveillance of a house on Greenway Avenue, police 

subsequently executed a warrant for the house and obtained video footage showing 

Walker, Dent, and other individuals preparing and selling crack cocaine. The video 

footage lasted a little over four hours and covered a single date—March 29, 2016. 

Walker and Dent (1) were not in the Greenway Avenue house when the police 

executed the search warrant, (2) were not identified as being present in the 

Greenway Avenue house when the police conducted a controlled drug buy, which 

occurred the day before the police executed the search warrant, and (3) were not 

heard discussing past instances of drug sales or future plans for drug sales in the 

video, as it did not include audio. In short, there was no evidence of Walker or 

Dent engaging in any criminal activity together other than the criminal activity seen 

on the video itself. But because Walker and Dent did not seem to “serendipitously 

find themselves,” majority opinion at ¶ 26, committing crimes for the very first time 

in a random location with complete strangers, and instead seemed to know each 

other and how to prepare crack cocaine, the majority concludes that there is 

sufficient evidence that Walker and Dent engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity. 

{¶ 38} I would conclude that the evidence proves nothing more than Walker 

and Dent engaging in a single, isolated instance of corrupt activity involving 

multiple drug offenses. The fact that Walker and Dent seemed to know each other 

and ate sandwiches together does not transform their actions that occurred over a 

four-hour period into an ongoing participation in the kind of organized-crime 

syndicate targeted by R.C. 2923.32. There are statutes that punish the actions 

shown in the video recording—possessing cocaine (R.C. 2925.11), illegally 

manufacturing drugs (R.C. 2925.04), and trafficking cocaine (R.C. 2925.03)—and 

Walker and Dent were convicted pursuant to those statutes and received prison 

terms for those drug offenses. To add an additional, consecutive 11-year prison 
January Term, 2020 

17 

term to each of their sentences for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity is just 

absurd. 

{¶ 39} Ohio’s statutory prohibition against engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity, R.C. 2923.32, is modeled after the federal Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. State v. Schlosser, 79 

Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997). The federal RICO statute is intended 

to target the kind of organized-crime syndicates that have the power to “ ‘infiltrate 

and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and * * * democratic processes,’ ” 

resulting in harm to the nation’s economy and domestic security. Id., quoting 

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 

922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News at 1073. Organized-crime 

syndicates obtained such power in large part “ ‘through money obtained from such 

illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of 

property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, 

and other forms of social exploitation.’ ” Id., quoting Organized Crime Control 

Act of 1970. Accordingly, the federal RICO statute provides the federal 

government with the tools to link together various incidents of illegal activity, 

including drug trafficking, in order to eradicate organized-crime syndicates. While 

drug trafficking may be relevant to proving that someone engaged in a pattern of 

corrupt activity, it is a mere piece to the larger puzzle.

{¶ 40} Nothing about the purpose behind the federal RICO statute strikes 

me as intending to inflict significant additional punishment on participants in a 

single series of drug sales just because the participants seem to know each other. 

But federal congressional intent aside, an application of the plain language of 

Ohio’s statutes—R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32—demonstrates that the state did not 

put forth sufficient evidence that Walker and Dent engaged in a pattern of corrupt 

activity.
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18 

{¶ 41} R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) prohibits a person from participating in “the 

affairs of [an] enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity.” Although the 

majority focuses mostly on the meaning of the word “enterprise,” the crux of this 

case is whether Walker and Dent engaged in a “pattern of corrupt activity,” which 

is defined as “two or more incidents of corrupt activity * * * that are related to the 

affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each 

other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.” R.C. 

2923.31(E).

{¶ 42} The specific type of “corrupt activity” applicable here is defined as 

“[a]ny violation” or “any combination of violations” of certain criminal statutes, 

including R.C. 2925.11 (possessing drugs when the offense is a felony of the first, 

second, third, or fourth degree), R.C. 2925.04 (illegally manufacturing drugs), and 

R.C. 2925.03 (trafficking drugs), “when the proceeds of the violation [or 

combination of violations], * * * or the value of the contraband * * * exceeds one 

thousand dollars.” R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). The $1,000 minimum “applies to each 

individual, and not to the enterprise as a whole.” State v. Stevens, 139 Ohio St.3d 

247, 2014-Ohio-1932, 11 N.E.3d 252, ¶ 18 (lead opinion).4

{¶ 43} To constitute a “pattern” as it is defined in R.C. 2923.31(E), the state 

must prove (1) two or more separate incidents of corrupt activity, (2) that each 

incident has a connection with the enterprise, and (3) that the incidents are not 

isolated. All three of the foregoing requirements apply conjunctively, meaning that 

proof of two incidents alone is not enough to establish that a person engaged in a 

 

4. The Tenth District Court of Appeals did not reach the issue in Walker’s case whether his drug 

offenses involved proceeds or contraband over $1,000 because it concluded that there was 

insufficient evidence to support Walker’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity on 

other grounds. (Dent did not raise the monetary-threshold issue in his appeal to the Tenth District.) 

Because it is generally inappropriate to address legal issues “before the lower courts have the 

opportunity to address them in the first instance,” Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic 

Classroom of Tomorrow, 137 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 22, I am assuming 

for the sake of the rest of the analysis that the $1,000 threshold was met. 
January Term, 2020 

19 

pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32: the incidents must be 

evaluated to determine whether their details and context truly establish a pattern. 

Further, and most importantly to this case, R.C. 2923.31(E) states that if the 

incidents of corrupt activity are “so closely related to each other and connected in 

time and place,” then “they constitute a single event,” not two or more.

{¶ 44} The federal RICO statute similarly requires a “ ‘pattern of 

racketeering activity,’ ” which requires “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 

18 U.S.C. 1961(5). Although 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) does not include the specific kind 

of temporal and locational limitations found in R.C. 2923.31(E), federal courts have 

concluded that the requirement of “two acts” requires two separate criminal 

incidents and that multiple crimes committed within one episode do not constitute 

separate “acts” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). Apparel Art Internatl., Inc. v. 

Jacobson, 967 F.2d 720, 722-723 (1st Cir.1992), citing Roeder v. Alpha Industries, 

Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir.1987); J.D. Marshall Internatl., Inc. v. Redstart, 

Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 820-821 (7th Cir.1991); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, 

Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1417-1419 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 

S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. The First Circuit reasoned that holding otherwise 

“would mean that many individual bank robberies, frauds, drug sales, 

embezzlements, and other crimes as well would automatically fall within the scope 

of the RICO statute, a result contrary to RICO’s basic purpose.” Apparel Art 

Internatl., Inc. at 722. 

{¶ 45} Thus, neither the federal nor Ohio’s statutes intended for isolated 

clusters of multiple criminal acts to constitute RICO violations. Even the arguably 

narrower standard under the federal statute inherently requires some manner of 

temporal or conceptual division between racketeering acts in order to establish the 

minimum “two acts of racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). The standards 

and requirements in Ohio are explicit: R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) states that an incident 
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20 

of corrupt activity may involve “any combination of violations” of specific criminal 

statutes, and R.C. 2923.31(E) states that multiple incidents of corrupt activity 

constitute a single event if they are closely related to each other and connected in 

time and place. Accordingly, multiple related crimes committed during the same 

time period and in the same place qualify as only one incident of corrupt activity 

under Ohio law.

{¶ 46} Walker and Dent committed multiple related crimes during the same 

time period and in the same place. The plain language of R.C. 2923.31(E) and 

2923.31(I)(2)(c) requires the conclusion that Walker and Dent engaged in only one 

incident of corrupt activity.

{¶ 47} The majority opinion focuses on the details and context surrounding 

the drug offenses that Walker and Dent committed on March 29, 2016, such as the 

month-long suspicion that the house on Greenway Avenue was a source of drug 

activity, Walker’s and Dent’s mutual efforts to cook, divide, package, and sell crack 

cocaine, and their ordinary activities together, like eating snacks and showing each 

other cell-phone videos. As discussed by the majority, these details assist with 

proving that an “enterprise” exists as defined by R.C. 2923.31(C). But these details 

do not transform a single, isolated incident of corrupt activity that occurred on 

March 29, 2016, into two or more separate incidents of corrupt activity. Without 

the foundational requirement of two or more incidents, the remainder of the analysis 

fails no matter how compelling it is.

{¶ 48} Instead of acknowledging that a modicum of additional police work 

could have potentially uncovered evidence to establish that Walker and Dent were 

involved in additional, separate incidents of corrupt activity sufficient to establish 

a violation of R.C. 2923.32, the state has asked this court to stretch the limits of 

R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32 to their absolute breaking point. And the majority has 

obliged, rewarding incomplete police work and providing the state with yet another 
January Term, 2020 

21 

opportunity to gain an unjust amount of leverage to extract guilty pleas from smalltime criminals by adding big-time criminal charges to their already stacked 

indictments. It is an unjust result, unsupported by the plain language and spirit of 

R.C. 2923.31 and 2923.32. I dissent, and would affirm the judgments of the Tenth 

District Court of Appeals. 

STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kimberly M. 

Bond, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

 Brian J. Rigg, for appellee Alvin D. Dent Jr. in case No. 2019-0651. 

Blake Law Firm Co., L.L.C., and Dustin M. Blake, for appellee William L. 

Walker Jr. in case No. 2019-0654. 

_________________