United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on National Security and 

Foreign Affairs, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

Actions Needed to 

Improve DOD’s 

Stability Operations 

Approach and 

Enhance Interagency 

Planning 

May 2007 

 

GAO-07-549 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2007

MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s 

Stability Operations Approach and 

Enhance Interagency Planning 

Highlights of GAO-07-549, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 

National Security and Foreign Affairs, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

Since the end of the Cold War, the 

United States has frequently been 

involved in stability and/or 

reconstruction operations that 

typically last 5 to 8 years and 

surpass combat operations in the 

cost of human lives and dollars. A 

2005 presidential directive requires

DOD and State to integrate stability

activities with military contingency 

plans. GAO was asked to address 

(1) DOD's approach to enhance 

stability operations capabilities, 

and challenges that have emerged 

in implementing its approach; 

(2) DOD planning for stability

operations and the extent of

interagency involvement; and 

(3) the extent to which DOD is 

applying lessons learned in future 

plans. To address these issues, 

GAO assessed DOD policy and 

planning documents, reviewed

planning efforts at three combatant

commands, and evaluated DOD’s 

use of lessons learned. GAO is also 

conducting a related study of the

Department of State’s efforts to

lead and coordinate stability

operations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DOD take

several actions to improve its 

approach to stability operations 

and interagency planning. DOD

partially agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations, but did not 

specify actions it would take to 

address them. Therefore, GAO 

recommends Congress require 

DOD to develop an action plan and 

report annually on its efforts to

address GAO recommendations. 

DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, 

but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of 

effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into 

military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future 

plans. These challenges may hinder DOD’s ability to develop sound plans. 

Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its 

military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help 

guide DOD planning for the next 15–20 years. These steps reflect a 

fundamental shift in DOD’s policy because they elevate stability operations 

as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that 

military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to 

identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability 

operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when 

to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to 

address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of 

capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively 

accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made 

limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of 

weaknesses in DOD’s guidance. 

DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to 

stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to 

facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At 

the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with 

representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other 

outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors 

cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD’s 

planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to

commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, 

(2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and 

non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning 

processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to 

participate in DOD's full range of planning activities. 

Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are 

not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency 

plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information from 

current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into 

various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this 

information because (1) DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons into its 

plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step,

(2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the review 

process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are 

www.gao.gov/cgi incorporated into specific plans. -bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations 

Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps 

and Measures of Effectiveness 13 

DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency 

Planning for Stability Operations 24 

Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes 

Contribute to Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability 

Operations Planning 33 

Conclusions 37

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 39 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 46 

Appendix II Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions 49 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 51 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54 

Related GAO Reports 55 

Tables 

Table 1: Selected U.S. Government Responsibilities Related to

Stability Operations 9 

Table 2: JIACG Membership at the Central, European, and Pacific 

Commands 28

Page i GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Figures 

Figure 1: Major Mission Elements of Stability, Security, Transition, 

 and Reconstruction Operations 8 

Figure 2: Geographic Combatant Commands’ Areas of 

 Responsibility 12 

Figure 3: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations 15 

Figure 4: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of Military 

 Planning 26 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

State Department of State 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-549 Military Operations
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 31, 2007

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security 

 and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Shays: 

In the ongoing war on terrorism, the United States government is 

confronting a host of challenges requiring a capability to conduct what has 

been termed stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations in various countries around the world. The Department of 

Defense (DOD) has defined “stability operations” as an overarching term

encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted 

outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of 

national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 

provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure 

reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.1

 Since the end of the Cold War, 

DOD’s involvement in stability operations activities has been significant, 

as evidenced by reconstruction and transition operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan, and security operations in

Bosnia and Kosovo. DOD’s increased role in these types of activities has 

also required it to employ an increasing number of personnel with specific 

skills and capabilities, such as those in civil affairs and psychological 

operations units. This shift in DOD’s role was captured in The Defense 

Science Board’s 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, 

which highlighted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 

been involved in either a stability or reconstruction operation every 18 to 

24 months, that these operations typically last 5 to 8 years, and that these 

activities surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and 

dollars. 

 1

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Sep 2006). This term and 

definition was also added to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, as amended through September 17, 2006. 

Page 1 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
In December 2005, President George Bush issued National Security 

Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) which directed U.S. government 

agencies to increase efforts to better coordinate stability operations. NSPD 

44 also states that, when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction and 

stabilization contingency plans and missions will be coordinated with U.S. 

military contingency plans to ensure harmonization with any planned or 

ongoing U.S. military operations. The Department of State (State) and DoD 

have highlighted that success in stabilization and reconstruction efforts 

will depend heavily upon the ability to develop an integrated, interagency 

approach, and have initiated steps to facilitate this shift in focus. But this 

shift will require cultural changes throughout government that will take 

years or perhaps decades to achieve, according to DOD and State officials. 

In the near term, DOD’s combatant commanders routinely develop a wide 

range of military contingency plans, many of which involve consideration 

of stability operations capabilities. As discussed in this report, DOD’s 

military planning efforts are being expanded to include actions intended to

stabilize regions before conflict develops, deliver humanitarian assistance, 

or provide postconflict reconstruction support. In many cases, these 

actions will require coordination with non-DOD organizations, such as 

State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the 

Department of Justice. 

You asked us to examine DOD’s capabilities related to stability operations, 

and the extent to which DOD integrates its military planning efforts with 

other government agencies. In response to your request, this report 

addresses (1) DOD’s approach to enhance stability operations capabilities 

and challenges that have emerged in implementing this approach, (2) DOD 

military planning for stability operations and the extent to which the 

department’s planning mechanisms facilitate an interagency approach; and 

(3) the extent to which DOD is applying stability operations-related 

lessons learned from past operations as future plans are developed. As 

agreed with your office, we have additional work underway to address 

your request to examine the Department of State’s efforts to lead and

coordinate stabilization operations in conjunction with DOD, U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. agencies, and plan

to report on those issues separately. 

To evaluate DOD’s approach to enhance stability operations capabilities,

and the challenges that have emerged in implementing this approach, we 

obtained and analyzed relevant departmentwide polices and implementing 

guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and 

selected combatant commands, and we discussed with each organization 

Page 2 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
the challenges that exist in implementing DOD’s approach. We also 

discussed DOD’s approach with Department of State and USAID officials 

to obtain their perspectives on these issues. Within DOD, we analyzed 

documentation and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, the services, three 

combatant commands (Central Command, European Command, and 

Pacific Command) and fourteen of their related component commands. To 

evaluate DOD’s stability operations planning and the extent to which the 

department’s planning mechanisms encourage and facilitate an 

interagency approach, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and portions 

of selected planning documents that pertain to interagency coordination.

Our review did not include the planning for ongoing operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan. We also discussed the planning process and impediments to 

interagency coordination with representatives from non-DOD agencies 

assigned to the combatant commands to gain their perspectives, 

understand the extent to which these agencies are represented, identify 

their roles and responsibilities, and determine the extent to which they 

participate in the DOD planning process. We did not, however, assess the 

extent to which these roles and responsibilities, including those of DOD, 

are appropriate. To determine the extent to which DOD planners are 

applying lessons learned from past operations and exercises in planning,

we reviewed relevant DOD guidance, discussed with DOD officials the 

consideration of lessons during planning, and analyzed information in 

lessons-learned databases maintained by each service and Joint Forces 

Command, and two non-DOD organizations. With the information from 

both DOD and non-DOD sources, we developed a database with over 3,500 

individual lessons and observations from 38 reports or studies, identified 

strategic-level lessons learned related to stability operations using a 

process of independent coding and review, and then grouped the selected

lessons into 14 major themes. 

We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in 

appendix I. 

DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its 

stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in 

identifying and addressing capability gaps and developing measures of 

effectiveness, which are critical to successfully executing this approach. 

Among the many improvement efforts underway, the department has 

taken three key steps that frame this new approach. Specifically, the 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
department (1) formalized a new stability operations policy, DOD 

Directive 3000.05, that elevated stability operations to a core mission on 

par with combat operations, (2) expanded DOD’s planning construct to 

more fully address pre- and postconflict operations, and (3) defined a new 

joint operating concept that will serve as a basis for how the military will 

support stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in 

the next 15 to 20 years. Notwithstanding these positive and important 

steps, however, DOD has encountered challenges in identifying stability 

operations capabilities and developing measures of effectiveness—both of 

which are key tasks required by DOD Directive 3000.05 and important 

steps in performance-based management. Specifically, the services are 

each pursuing efforts to improve current capabilities, such as those 

associated with civil affairs and language skills. However, DOD has yet to 

systematically identify and prioritize the full range of needed capabilities 

because DOD has not provided clear guidance, including timeframes for 

completion, on how and when to accomplish these tasks. As a result, the 

services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may 

not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed to 

effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD 

has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness 

required by DOD Directive 3000.05 because the current guidance does not

clearly articulate a systematic approach for developing measures of 

effectiveness. Without agreed-upon measures of effectiveness, DOD will 

not be able to assess the extent to which its efforts are enhancing stability 

operations capabilities. We are recommending DOD provide more 

comprehensive guidance, including a clear methodology and time frames 

for completion, to combatant commanders and the services on how to 

identify and prioritize needed capabilities and develop measures of 

effectiveness. 

DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans to 

address stability operations, but it has not established adequate 

mechanisms to obtain input from other federal agencies to incorporate 

into its planning efforts. Recent changes in national security strategy and 

policies and DOD guidance require State and DOD to integrate 

stabilization and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans 

where relevant and appropriate, and to coordinate those plans with 

relevant government and nongovernment organizations.2

 DOD has begun 

 2

Recent changes are included in the National Security Strategy, NSPD-44, DOD Directive

3000.05, and DOD Joint Publications. 

Page 4 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
taking steps to better coordinate with other U.S. government agencies by 

establishing working groups with representatives from several key 

organizations, such as the Department of State and USAID, but these 

working groups are comprised of liaison officers with limited planning 

experience and training, the representatives are few in number, and the

representatives do not consistently participate in DOD’s planning process. 

In addition, some DOD organizations are reaching out to country teams in 

embassies within their areas of responsibility on an ad hoc basis, but this 

approach can be cumbersome because of the large number of countries 

that may be affected by a regional plan. Combatant Commanders have 

achieved limited interagency participation in the development of military 

plans because: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to

commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, 

(2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information 

with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations 

lack an understanding of each other’s planning processes and capabilities, 

and have different planning cultures and capacities. As a result, the overall 

foundation for unity of effort—common understanding of the purpose and 

concept of the operations, coordinated policies and plans, and trust and 

confidence in key participants—in military operations that involve 

stabilization and reconstruction activities is not being established. To 

increase unity of effort in these operations, we are recommending the 

Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide

implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and 

encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans, 

develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD agencies

early in the planning process as appropriate, and orient DOD and nonDOD personnel in each agency’s planning processes and capabilities. 

Although DOD has spent considerable time and resources to collect 

lessons learned from past and ongoing operations, DOD planners are not 

consistently using these lessons learned as they develop future

contingency plans. Department policies and guidance encourage the 

consideration of lessons learned during the planning process, and 

information from current and past operations is being incorporated into 

various databases.3

 For example, our analysis of DOD’s databases 

 3

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.0l, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures) (Sept. 29, 2006);

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Nov. 28, 2005); and Department of 

Defense, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Washington, D.C., December 2006). 

Page 5 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
identified lessons learned related to the need for (1) the military to work 

more closely with other agencies during stability operations, (2) DOD to 

develop knowledge of other agencies and the capabilities they can 

contribute, and (3) commanders to ensure that military sectors during 

operations correspond with civil geopolitical boundaries. However, we 

found that DOD planners are not using lessons-learned information on a 

consistent basis as plans are developed or revised because (1) Joint Staff 

guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not 

specifically state that planners are required to include lessons learned in 

the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned 

databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not 

evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific 

plans. DOD has recently initiated an effort to develop an information 

system to improve access to lessons learned within the department and 

between non-DOD agencies, and although this is a positive step, this effort

is in its early stages. Moreover, it is not clear how the system will 

accommodate interagency needs, and when it will be fully operational. In 

addition, without a comprehensive and timely approach to improve 

guidance, information systems, and the planning review process, DOD’s 

efforts to improve information systems alone may not enable the 

department to fully leverage lessons learned from past operations into its 

future plans, and past mistakes could be repeated. We are recommending 

that DOD update its planning guidance to: (1) direct planners to include 

lessons learned as plans are developed, and (2) require that the plan 

review process include a step to verify lessons learned have been 

considered and adopted as appropriate. We are also recommending that 

DOD include the interagency stakeholders in the development of its new 

lessons-learned information system earlier than currently planned. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 

our eight recommendations but did not discuss what specific steps, if any,

it plans to take to implement our recommendations. (DOD’s comments 

appear in their entirety in app. III.) State was also afforded an opportunity 

to comment on this report, but declined to do so. In its written comments, 

DOD highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and approaches to 

developing capabilities, measures of effectiveness, coordinating with other 

agencies, and incorporating lessons learned that it believes are adequate to

address our recommendations. Although DOD is making progress in 

achieving a greater focus on stability operations through its new directive, 

our report notes it has made limited progress in certain areas, such as 

establishing measures of effectiveness, due to the limited guidance 

provided to DOD components. As a result, we continue to believe our 

recommendations are warranted and that DOD should take specific steps 

Page 6 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
to address them. Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD 

plans to take to implement our recommendations we have added a matter 

for congressional consideration suggesting that the Congress require the 

Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually on the 

specific steps being taken to address our recommendations and the 

current status of its efforts. The report should also identify challenges to 

achieving an integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and 

potential solutions for mitigating those challenges. 

According to DOD’s guidance, the immediate goal of stability operations 

often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential 

services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help 

develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable 

market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil 

society.4

 Stability operations include a continuum of activities that can 

occur throughout the spectrum of conflict ranging from preconflict 

stabilization to postconflict reconstruction and transition to effective 

governance. DOD has identified six major activities, or major mission 

elements, that U.S. military forces, civilian government agencies, and in

many cases multinational partners may need to engage in to stabilize an 

environment and build sustainable host-nation capabilities. Figure 1 

depicts these major mission elements. 

Background 

 4

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. 

Page 7 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Figure 1: Major Mission Elements of Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction Operations

End result

Full host nation 

responsibility 

across the 

mission 

elements in 

the context 

of a new 

domestic 

order resolving 

earlier sources

of instability to 

ensure a viable, 

sustainable 

peace

Source: GAO presentation of DOD information.

Establish representative, 

effective governance

Support economic development

Reconstitute critical infrastructure/

essential services

Deliver humanitarian assistance

Establish and maintain a

safe, secure environment

Conduct Strategic Communications

As Figure 1 illustrates, the mission elements, or dimensions, of stability 

operations range from establishing and maintaining a secure environment 

to delivering humanitarian assistance, economic support, and establishing 

effective forms of governance. As shown in the figure, DOD envisions one 

key element—strategic communications—as encompassing all of the other 

five mission elements. DOD guidance recognizes that many stability 

operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian 

professionals and that DOD’s participation may be in a supporting role. 

However, this guidance also states U.S. military forces shall be prepared to

perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians 

cannot do so. 

NSPD-44 outlines the major roles and responsibilities throughout the 

government for stability operations, including the responsibilities of the 

National Security Council, State, non-DOD agencies, and DOD. In 

November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, which established the 

department’s overall policy and assigned responsibilities within DOD for 

Page 8 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability 

operations.5 Table 1 highlights several key responsibilities established by 

NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05. 

Table 1: Selected U.S. Government Responsibilities Related to Stability Operations 

Organization Key Responsibilities

National Security Councila • Co-Chair to Policy Coordination Committee established for Reconstruction and 

Stabilizationb

• Designate lead and supporting responsibilities as outlined in National Security 

Presidential Directive-1c

 for stability operations. 

Department of State • Coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments

and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization 

and reconstruction activities. 

• Develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and economic 

cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed toward foreign states 

and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. 

• Coordinate interagency process to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency 

planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for 

integrated U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and 

regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military 

contingency plans, where appropriate. 

• Provide U.S. government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated 

response in connection with specific reconstruction and stabilization operations. 

• Coordinate U.S. government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the 

Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. 

military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and

implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for 

reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with 

military contingency plans and doctrine. 

• Lead U.S. government development of a strong civilian response capability including 

necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, 

mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian 

reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction 

activities to respond quickly and effectively. 

• Resolve relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among U.S. government 

departments and agencies with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign 

economic cooperation related to reconstruction and stabilization, consistent with Office 

of Management and Budget’s budget and policy coordinating functions. 

 5

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. 

Page 9 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Organization Key Responsibilities

Other Executive Departments and 

Agencies 

• Support stability operations activities and requirements with agency resources. 

• Coordinate with the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization during budget formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization 

activities prior to submission to the Office of Management and Budget and Congress, or 

as required to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities. 

• Identify, develop, and provide Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization with relevant information on capabilities and assets. 

• Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program 

management that can be mobilized in response to crises. 

• Identify within each agency current and former agency personnel skilled in crisis 

response, including contract employees, and establish under each agency’s authorities 

mechanisms to reassign or reemploy these personnel and mobilize associated 

resources rapidly in response to crises. 

• Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, 

responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other 

efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international 

reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 

Department of Defense • Institutionalize stability operations within DOD and prioritize them comparable with 

combat operations. 

• Integrate stability operations across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, 

training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. 

• With the Secretary of State, integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans 

with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. 

• Develop general framework with the Secretary of State to fully coordinate stabilization 

and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate. 

• Provide and seek assistance and advice from the Department of State and other U.S. 

departments and agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations 

capabilities. 

• Develop greater means to help build other countries’ security capacity quickly to ensure 

security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere. 

• Be prepared to perform all necessary tasks to establish or maintain order when civilians 

or other agencies cannot do so. 

• Lead and support the development of military civilian teams to support stability 

operations activities. 

• Share information with U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and 

forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and members of 

the private sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal requirements. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and non-DOD data.

Note: Data are from NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05. 

a

In those instances when we refer to the National Security Council as it relates to NSPD-44, the 

directive generally refers to the National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), Organization of 

the National Security Council System (Washington, D.C., Feb. 13, 2001). 

b

National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committees manage the development and 

implementation of national security policies and serve as the mechanism for interagency coordination 

of national security policy. They provide policy analysis and ensure timely responses to decisions

made by the President. 

Page 10 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
c

National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council System 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2001). This directive is issued by the President and establishes policy for 

the organization and membership in the National Security Council to advise and assist the President 

in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States—domestic, foreign, 

military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council [NEC]). The 

National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in 

the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. 

Within DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is 

responsible for developing stability operations policy options for the 

Secretary of Defense and, according to DOD officials, provides oversight 

for the implementation of DOD’s stability operations policy. Under DOD 

Directive 3000.05, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the 

Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, shall each develop stability operations capabilities. 

Commanders of the geographic combatant commands through the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall identify stability operations 

requirements within their areas of responsibility, shown in figure 2. 

Combatant commands are also directed to engage other organizations in 

stability operations planning, training, and exercises, in coordination with 

the Joint Staff and the Office of Policy. 

Page 11 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Figure 2: Geographic Combatant Commands’ Areas of Responsibility 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data. 

U.S.

PACIFIC

COMMAND

U.S.

SOUTHERN

COMMAND

U.S.

NORTHERN

COMMAND

U.S.

CENTRAL

COMMAND

U.S.

PACIFIC

COMMAND

U.S.

EUROPEAN

COMMAND

Alaskaa

U.S. 

PACIFIC 

COMMAND

U.S. 

SOUTHERN 

COMMAND

U.S. 

EUROPEAN

COMMAND

Note: As of October 1, 2006. 

a

The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility. Forces

based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to multiple commands. 

The department has recently announced that it plans to realign these areas 

of responsibility to establish a new geographic combatant command for 

the continent of Africa. As of February 2007, the details of this realignment 

had not been finalized. 

Page 12 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its 

stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in 

identifying capability gaps and developing measures of effectiveness, 

which are critical to successfully executing this approach. Among the 

many improvement efforts underway, the department has taken three key 

steps that frame this new approach. Specifically, the department has: 

(1) formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability 

operations to a core mission and gave them priority comparable to combat 

operations, and assigned numerous responsibilities to DOD organizations, 

(2) expanded DOD’s planning construct to more fully address stability 

operations, and (3) defined a new joint operating concept that will serve as 

a basis for how the military will support stabilization, security, transition, 

and reconstruction operations in the next 15 to 20 years. However, DOD 

has made limited progress in identifying and prioritizing needed 

capabilities, and in developing measures of effectiveness, which are 

critical steps required by DOD’s new directive and important tenets of 

performance-based management. Capability gaps are not being assessed 

because the department has yet to issue adequate guidance on how to 

conduct these assessments or set specific time frames to complete them. 

Similarly, the department has made limited progress in developing 

measures of effectiveness because current guidance does not clearly 

articulate a systematic approach on how to develop measures of 

effectiveness. Without a comprehensive assessment of stability operations 

capability gaps and clear measures of effectiveness, the department may 

not be appropriately prioritizing and developing the needed capabilities, or

measuring its progress toward achieving these goals. 

In the past 18 months, DOD has taken positive steps to improve stability 

operations capabilities by establishing a new and comprehensive policy, 

planning guidance, and joint operating concept. First, in November 2005,

DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which established DOD’s stability 

operations policy and assigned responsibilities within the department for 

planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability 

operations. This directive reflects a fundamental shift in DOD’s policy 

because it designates stability operations as a core mission that shall be 

given priority comparable to combat operations and emphasizes that 

integrated military and civilian efforts are key to successful stability 

operations efforts. According to DOD officials, this publication is intended 

to serve as a catalyst, pushing DOD to develop methods to enhance its 

own capabilities and integrate the capabilities and capacities of the 

defense, diplomatic, and development communities for achieving unity of 

effort in stability operations. The policy emphasizes that integrating 

DOD Has Developed 

an Approach to 

Improve Stability 

Operations 

Capabilities, but 

Faces Challenges in 

Identifying Capability 

Gaps and Measures of 

Effectiveness 

DOD’s Approach to 

Stability Operations 

Includes a New Policy,

Planning Guidance, and a 

Joint Operating Concept 

Page 13 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
civilian and military efforts is key to successful stability operations and 

recognizes that stability operations will not always be led by the military, 

and that DOD needs to be prepared to provide support to both government 

and nongovernment organizations when necessary. 

The directive assigns responsibility for approximately 115 tasks to 18 

organizations in the department, such as the Under Secretaries for Policy 

and Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant 

Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The 

directive states that stability operations skills, such as language 

capabilities and regional area expertise, be developed and incorporated 

into professional military education at all levels, and that information shall 

be shared with U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and 

forces, international organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and 

the members of the private sector supporting stability operations, 

consistent with legal requirements. The policy also states that military 

plans shall address stability operations throughout all phases of an 

operation or plan as appropriate, and that stability operations dimensions

of military plans be exercised and tested, when appropriate, with other 

U.S. departments and agencies. In addition, the directive states that the 

Under Secretary for Policy shall submit a semiannual report developed in

coordination with responsible DOD components to the Secretary of 

Defense evaluating the department’s progress in implementing the 

directive. 

A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to 

broaden its military planning guidance for joint operations to include 

noncombat activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent 

hostilities; and postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization, 

reconstruction, and transition governance to civil authorities. Figure 3 

illustrates the change in DOD planning guidance. 

Page 14 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Figure 3: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations

PHASE I

Deter/engage

Crisis defined

PHASE II

Seize

initiative

Assure friendly 

freedom of 

action 

Access theater 

infrastructure

PHASE III

Decisive

operations

Establish 

dominant force 

capabilities

Achieve 

full-spectrum 

dominance

PHASE IV

Transition

Establish civil 

control and 

rule of law

Redeploy

Prior

primary

activities

Prior

phases

of joint 

campaign

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

PHASE 0

Shape

Prevent 

prepare

PHASE I

Deter

Crisis defined

PHASE II

Seize

initiative

Assure friendly 

freedom of 

action 

Access theater 

infrastructure

PHASE III

Dominate

Establish 

dominant 

force 

capabilities

Achieve 

full-spectrum 

superiority

Current

primary

activities

PHASE V

Enable civil

authority

Transfer to 

civil authority

Redeploy

PHASE IV

Stabilize

Establish 

security

Restore 

services

Current 

phases

of joint 

campaign

As shown in Figure 3, previous Joint Staff planning guidance considered 

four operational phases, including deter and engage the enemy, seize the 

initiative, conduct decisive operations, and transition to peaceful 

activities. The revised planning guidance now directs consideration of six 

phases of an operation, which include shaping efforts to stabilize regions 

so that conflicts do not develop, and expanding the dimensions of stability 

operations that are needed in more hostile environments after conflicts 

Page 15 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
occur.6

 This new planning guidance requires planners to consider the types 

of activities that can be conducted to help a nation establish a safe and

secure environment, eliminating the need for armed conflict, and activities 

to assist a nation in establishing security forces and governing 

mechanisms to transition to self-rule. These are also the phases of an 

operation that will require significant unity of effort and close 

coordination between DOD and other federal agencies. 

In December 2006, DOD took a third step in outlining its approach to 

stability operations when the Joint Forces Command published the 

Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

Operations Joint Operating Concept.7

 This operating concept describes 

how the future Joint Force Commander will provide military support to 

stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within a 

military campaign in pursuit of national strategic objectives in the 2014–

2026 time frame. The operating concept focuses on the full range of 

military support that the future Joint Force might provide in foreign 

countries across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order 

to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due 

to either a natural or man-made disaster. This publication provides a 

conceptual framework for how future commanders can provide military 

support in foreign countries to a full range of stabilization, security, 

transition, and reconstruction operations, such as 

• assist an existing or new host nation government in providing security, 

essential public services, economic development, and governance 

following the significant degradation or collapse of the government’s 

capabilities due to internal failure or as a consequence of the destruction 

and dislocation of a war;

• provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory and care for 

refugees in major combat operations fought for limited objectives that fall 

short of forcibly changing the adversary regime; 

• support a fragile national government that is faltering due to serious 

internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism and 

factional conflict; 

 6

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations. 

7

DOD defined stability, security, transition, and reconstruction missions as activities that 

support U.S. government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition 

operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. In many cases

stability operations and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction terminology is 

used interchangeably. 

Page 16 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
• assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating natural 

disaster; 

• provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that is facing 

modest internal challenges; and 

• provide military assistance and training to partner nations that increase 

their capability and capacity to conduct stabilization, security, transition, 

and reconstruction operations at home or abroad.

This publication is intended to complement both policy and planning 

guidance by expanding the understanding of stability operations and by 

providing leaders with a conceptual explanation of the strategic 

considerations, solutions, risks and mitigations, and implications to 

consider when planning a stability operation. 

In addition to establishing a new policy, revising planning guidance, and 

developing a new joint operating concept, DOD has taken other 

complementary actions to address stability operations capabilities within 

the department. For example, in order to follow up on initiatives identified 

in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the department has published a 

series of roadmaps on specific topics such as Building Partnership 

Capacity. The Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap provides an action

plan to meet objectives focused on strengthening interagency planning and 

enhancing both DOD and non-DOD capabilities in this area. Another step 

taken by DOD was to work with the Department of State to develop a draft 

planning guide for other federal agencies that is intended to assist these 

organizations in the planning for reconstruction and stabilization 

operations.8

DOD Directive 3000.05 tasked several organizations within the department 

to take specific actions to identify and prioritize stability operations 

capabilities, but the department has made limited progress in meeting this 

goal. Specifically, the directive states that the Under Secretary of Defense

for Policy shall identify DOD-wide stability operations capabilities and 

recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff is tasked to identify stability operations capabilities 

and assess their development. The Geographic Combatant Commanders, 

responsible for contingency planning and commanding U.S. forces in their 

DOD Has Encountered 

Challenges in Identifying 

and Prioritizing Stability 

Operations Capabilities 

 8

United States Joint Forces Command, J7 Pamphlet, U.S. Government Draft Planning

Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December

2005). 

Page 17 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
regions, shall identify stability operations requirements. Finally, the 

Secretaries of the Military Departments and Commander of U.S. Special 

Operations Command are required to develop the required stability 

operations capabilities and capacity in coordination with the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s office stated 

they intended to meet the requirement to identify capabilities and 

recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense through an iterative 

process known as capability gap assessments. Policy officials envisioned 

that the geographic combatant commands would conduct theater-specific, 

scenario-driven assessments of forces and capabilities required for 

contingencies through DOD’s planning process. They also expected that 

the geographic commands would compare the planned requirements for 

stability operations with the current available forces and military 

capabilities, and propose remedies for eliminating the gaps. DOD officials 

described the Joint Staff’s role as to review each of the combatant 

command assessments and provide guidance, including common 

standards and criteria, to the combatant commands to assist them in 

identifying their requirements. The combatant command requirements 

were then expected to drive each service’s development of stability 

operations capabilities and capacity. 

As discussed below, as of March 2007, DOD has made limited progress in 

identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities following this iterative 

capability gap assessment process. At the three combatant commands that

we visited, we found that the identification of stability operations 

requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner. At Central 

Command, officials from the command’s assessment branch explained 

that there has been increased emphasis on stability operations across the 

command, especially for nonlethal activities, such as civil military 

operations. Officials explained that organizations at the command level 

routinely conduct capability assessments and turn in a list of shortfalls for 

incorporation into the command’s consolidated integrated priority list that 

the Combatant Command Commander submits annually to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff.9

 They envision that in the future these lists will include 

stability operations requirement shortfalls. Similarly, in the European 

Command, various organizations are independently conducting

 9

The Integrated Priority List is a succinct statement, prepared annually, of key capability 

gaps that could hinder the performance of a combatant commander’s assigned missions. 

Page 18 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
assessments within their respective areas. For example, within the 

combatant command headquarters, training officials explained that they

were working on a consolidated and prioritized list of stability operations

training requirements, while at the Naval component command they are

evaluating each country within its region to identify the specific stability 

operations requirements for that country. At the Pacific Command, 

officials stated that they had not tasked any of their component commands 

to identify stability operations requirements. However, component 

command officials indicated that capability requirements would be 

identified through routine processes, such as DOD’s required Joint 

Quarterly Readiness Review.10

Notwithstanding the lack of identification of specific requirements from

combatant commanders, each service is taking some steps to improve 

stability operations capabilities, but each service is using a different 

approach. For example, Marine Corps officials highlighted the 

establishment of a program to improve cultural awareness training, 

increased civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and the 

establishment of a Security Cooperation Training Center as key efforts to 

improve stability operations capabilities.11 Navy officials highlighted the 

service efforts to align its strategic plan and operations concept to support 

stability operations, the establishment of the Navy Expeditionary Combat 

Command, and the dedication of Foreign Area Officers to specific 

countries as their key efforts.12 Army officials highlighted the

establishment of an office dedicated to stability operations policy and 

strategy, the development of Army doctrine related to stability operations, 

and an ongoing process to address gaps in Army stability operations 

 10The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for conducting a Joint Quarterly Readiness 

Review, which is a scenario-based readiness assessment that identifies capabilities and 

risks associated with missions that support strategic-level planning guidance. Participants 

in this review include the Combatant Commanders, senior representatives from DOD, the

Military Services, and other DOD components. 

11The Marine Corps’s Security Cooperation Training Center coordinates Marine Corps

education and training programs in support of Department of Defense Security 

Cooperation efforts to enhance interoperability with allied and coalition partners in the

conduct of traditional and irregular warfare and in support of the global struggle against

violent extremism. 

12Foreign Area Officers are a group of military officers with a broad range of military skills 

and experiences; knowledge of political-military affairs; familiarity with the political, 

cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of the countries and regions in 

which they are stationed; and professional proficiency in one or more of the dominant 

languages in their regions of expertise. 

Page 19 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
capabilities and capacities. Army officials expect to approve an action plan 

by the end of fiscal year 2007 that is intended to provide solutions for 

improving its capabilities to conduct stability operations. Air Force 

officials emphasized the service’s use of an analytical capabilities-based 

planning model that has identified and begun to address specific shortfalls 

related to stability operations. 

Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to 

identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the services 

to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the department may not be

identifying and prioritizing the most critical capabilities needed by the 

combatant commanders, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

has not been able to recommend capability priorities to the Secretary of 

Defense. The department recognizes the importance of successfully 

completing these capability assessments, and in the first semiannual 

report on stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under 

Secretary stated that the department has not yet defined the magnitude of

DOD’s stability operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the 

scope of these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the 

department.13

We identified two factors that are limiting DOD’s ability to carry out the 

capability gap assessment process envisioned by the Office of Policy. First, 

at the time of our review, DOD had not issued guidance or set specific 

timeframes for the combatant commands to identify stability operations 

capability requirements. Joint Staff officials explained that the combatant

commanders were expected to identify capability requirements based on 

operational plans, and DOD has not issued its 2007 planning guidance to

the combatant commanders that reflect the new six-phase approach to 

planning previously discussed in this report.14 Joint Staff officials 

expressed concerns that if the combatant commands based their 

 13Interim Progress Report on DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington, D.C., August

2006).

14To focus the guidance provided in the national strategy, and to meet statutory 

requirements of Title 10 of the United States Code, the Secretary of Defense provides 

written policy guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation and 

review of contingency plans every 2 years, or more frequently as needed. This written 

guidance, called the Contingency Planning Guidance includes the relative priority of plans 

and drives DOD’s contingency planning efforts. To meet the requirements of the

Contingency Planning Guidance, combatant commanders develop plans focused on their 

specific areas of responsibility. 

Page 20 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
requirements on existing plans that have not been updated to reflect new 

planning guidance, the requirements would not reflect the more 

comprehensive stability operations capabilities needed. 

A second factor contributing to the limited progress in completing 

capability gap assessments is confusion over how to define stability 

operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in their May 22, 2006, 

Stability Operations Self Assessment that the absence of a common 

lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions results in 

unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability 

operations. In March 2007 they reiterated that they still consider this lack 

of a common lexicon an issue in identifying stability operations 

capabilities. Central Command and Pacific Command officials equated 

stability operations with activities conducted under the auspices of 

Theater Security Cooperation, while European Command officials stated 

that stability operations are what they do in every country they have a 

presence. This lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability 

operations has caused confusion across the department about how to 

identify activities that are considered stability operations, and 

commanders have difficulty identifying what the end state is for which 

they need to plan. Officials with DOD’s Office of Policy have recognized 

that confusion exists surrounding the definition of stability operations, 

and stated they are taking actions to clarify it. For example, Office of 

Policy officials cited a revised definition of stability operations that has 

been incorporated into DOD’s September 2006 planning guidance 

discussed previously in this report, and the office is considering a more 

aggressive outreach program that will help DOD officials at all levels 

better understand the definition and application of stability operations 

concepts in identifying and addressing capability gaps.15 However, without 

clear guidance on how and when combatant commanders are to develop 

stability operations capability requirements, the combatant commanders 

and the military services may not be able to effectively identify and 

prioritize needed capabilities. 

 15Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations. 

Page 21 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Past GAO work on DOD transformation reported the advantages of using 

management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge performance 

in helping organizations successfully manage major transformation 

efforts.16 Good performance measures are an important results-oriented 

management tool that allows DOD to determine the extent to which 

individual goals contribute to progress in achieving the overall goal of 

increasing stability operations capability. GAO’s previous work highlighted 

that the elements of a performance measure should include a baseline and 

target; be objective, measurable, quantifiable; and include a time frame. 

Clear, well-developed and coordinated performance measures help ensure 

that stakeholders are held responsible and accountable for completing 

their tasks in a timely manner and to an agreed-upon standard. Resultsoriented measures further ensure that it is not the task itself being 

evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended outcome. 

DOD has recognized the need for performance measures to evaluate its 

progress in enhancing stability operations goals and objectives. 

Specifically, DOD Directive 3000.05 requires each organization tasked 

under the directive to develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate 

progress in meeting its goals. According to Office of Policy officials the 

intent for developing measures of effectiveness was to let stakeholders 

take ownership in identifying the metrics and procedures for evaluating 

their assigned tasks. These officials also explained that as each

organization develops a measure of effectiveness, the Office of Policy will

review the proposed measure, provide feedback, and assist the 

stakeholders in refining the metrics to ensure that the measure is 

adequate. Policy officials expect that some measures will be quantitative, 

while others will be qualitative. This approach is based on the premise that 

the directive did not intend to place a fixed methodology on the 

stakeholders, would allow development of a process that was flexible 

enough to evolve with future stability operations activities and 

requirements, and would motivate change at the lowest level.

Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as 

of March 2007 we found that limited progress has been made in developing 

measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion over how this 

task should be accomplished, and because of minimal guidance provided 

DOD Has Made Limited 

Progress in Developing 

Measures of Effectiveness 

 16GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management

Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, 

GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2004).

Page 22 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
by the Office of Policy. Specifically, in initial discussions with us, the Army 

had indicated that it was working on an Action Plan for Stability 

Operations, but had placed the process on hold pending guidance from 

DOD. More recently, despite the lack of guidance, the Director of the 

Army’s Stability Operations Division told us that it is taking steps to 

finalize the Action Plan for Stability Operations and once it is approved 

will track all of the responsibilities outlined in DOD 3000.05 through its 

Strategic Management System. Army officials have also established May 

2007 as an objective for developing and refining its performance-based 

metrics. Air Force officials explained that they already conduct a biennial 

review of Air Force Concepts of Operations that produces a stability 

operations assessment and that the results of its 2005 review were 

summarized and provided to DOD. Air Force officials indicated that in 

their opinion, this satisfied the requirement to develop performance 

measures for stability operations. As of March 2007, officials from the 

Navy’s Office of Strategy and Concepts explained that the Navy has begun 

efforts to implement a stability operations action plan that includes 

developing metrics and measures of effectiveness, but have put the 

process on hold pending metrics guidance from DOD. Similarly, the 

Marine Corps’s Action Plan for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction dated February 2007 shows that the Marine Corps is also 

still waiting for additional guidance from DOD on developing measures of 

effectiveness. Within the combatant commands, Pacific Command officials 

explained that they were still waiting for guidance on implementing the 

directive from the Office of Policy and had not tasked the component 

commands with any implementing tasks, including developing metrics. At 

Central Command a policy official told us that there had been no 

development of measures of effectiveness relative to the directive. In DOD 

headquarters, officials in the Office of Personnel and Readiness stated that 

they expected the development of measures of effectiveness to be 

problematic, for both themselves and the Office of Policy, and that they

were unsure how the measures would be developed for their office. 

Officials from DOD’s office for stability operations stated they are aware 

of the confusion surrounding the development of measures of 

effectiveness and that in the next few months they plan to sponsor a 

workshop to help train individuals on developing measures of 

effectiveness. While these workshops can be a positive step, they will only 

benefit those who participate. Without clear departmentwide guidance on

how to develop measures of effectiveness and milestones for completing 

them, confusion may continue to exist within the department and progress 

on this important management tool may be significantly hindered. 

Moreover, without central oversight of the process to develop measures of 

Page 23 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
effectiveness, including those that address identifying and developing

stability operations capabilities, the department will be limited on its 

overall ability to gauge progress in achieving stability operations goals and

objectives. 

DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive plans related to 

stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to 

facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of 

military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Recent military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the overall war on 

terrorism, have led to changes in national security and defense strategies 

and an increased governmentwide emphasis on stability operations. 

NSPD-44 states that lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and 

departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. 

In some cases, per NSPD-44, the National Security Council may direct the 

Department of State to lead the development of stabilization, security, 

transition, and reconstruction plans for specific countries.17 However, the 

combatant commanders also routinely develop a wide range of military 

plans for potential contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input 

from other agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands 

where contingency plans are developed, the department is either 

beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S. embassies 

on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives. But this approach 

can be cumbersome, does not facilitate interagency participation in the 

actual planning process, and does not include all organizations that may 

be able to contribute to the operation being planned for. Combatant 

Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation in the 

development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided specific 

guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD 

organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of 

planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and nonDOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning 

processes and capabilities, and have different planning cultures and 

capacities. As a result, the overall foundation for unity of effort in stability 

DOD Lacks Adequate 

Mechanisms to 

Facilitate Interagency 

Planning for Stability 

Operations 

 17NSPD-44 directs this through NSPD-1. Specifically, NSPD-44 states “Within the scope of

this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given 

contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting 

responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism 

outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be redesignated as 

transitions are required.” 

Page 24 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
operations—common understanding of the purpose and concept of the 

operation, coordinated policies and plans, and trust and confidence 

between key participants—is not being achieved. 

As previously discussed, NSPD-44 states that the Secretary of Defense and

the Secretary of State will integrate stabilization and reconstruction 

contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and

appropriate and will develop a general framework for fully coordinating 

stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all 

levels where appropriate. DOD Directive 3000.05 has placed significant 

emphasis on the interagency nature of stability operations and the need 

for a coordinated approach to integrate the efforts of government and 

nongovernment organizations. Specifically, the Directive requires the 

geographic combatant commanders to engage relevant U.S. departments 

and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international 

organizations, nongovernment organizations, and members of the private 

sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as 

appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.18 Beyond this directive, 

combatant commanders also have the overall responsibility to plan for a 

wide range of military operations, such as potential military conflicts, 

other operations to stabilize fragile governments or regions, or to respond 

to unexpected events such as the Tsunami relief effort in 2005. As a result, 

combatant commanders now have an expanding responsibility to 

coordinate these planning efforts with representatives from various U.S. 

agencies, organizations, other governments, and the private sector. 

Combatant commanders develop military plans focused at three distinct, 

yet overlapping, levels that help commanders at each level visualize a 

logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. 

Figure 4 illustrates these levels, and the type of planning that occurs in 

each. 

Interagency Coordination 

is Necessary at Strategic, 

Operational and Tactical 

Levels of Planning 

 18Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. 

Page 25 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Figure 4: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of Military Planning 

As illustrated in figure 4, at the strategic level, planners prepare what is 

known as the supported plan, which describes how a combatant 

commander intends to meet the national or high-level goals for his 

geographical area of responsibility. These plans assign responsibilities for 

specific strategic goals to other organizations and subordinate commands, 

but do not provide the details for how these goals will be accomplished. 

Generally, component commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force forces assigned to the combatant commander) prepare operational 

and tactical level plans, which are intended to provide an increasing level

of detail and fidelity to the plans and are referred to as supporting plans. It

is at this level of planning that planners develop specific details about 

actions that will be taken and how resources will be applied to achieve the 

objectives outlined in the strategic level plan. At the operational and 

tactical levels, military planners need knowledge of the resources they can 

rely on from other agencies for conducting operations and who will be on 

the ground that they can coordinate with for information and integration 

of activities. 

To achieve a fully integrated strategic, operational, or tactical plan, DOD 

planners require increased knowledge of the roles, responsibilities, and 

capabilities that all agencies and organizations can contribute to 

stabilization efforts. DOD policy officials responsible for developing 

Source: GAO analysis.

Tactical level

-----

(Supporting plan)

 Level at which combatant commanders employ the Secretary 

 of Defense’s Contingency Planning Guidance to develop 

 the military strategy to guide the development of plans for 

 conducting operations specific to their area of responsibility

 Level where Joint Force and service component commanders 

 design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and 

 organize and employ military forces.

 Level at which tactical employment of forces are linked to 

 national and military strategic objectives.

 Level where planning is focused on executing battles, engagement, 

and activities to achieve military objectives.

Operational level

-----

(Supporting plan)

Strategic level

-----

(Supported plan)

Page 26 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
planning guidance have stated that interagency planning in military 

operations can no longer be an afterthought, but is critical to realizing U.S.

interests in future conflicts. We found almost universal agreement 

between all organizations included in our review that there needs to be 

more interagency coordination in planning, and that these coordination 

requirements differ at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

planning. For example, officials agreed that at the strategic level, the many 

organizations that can play a key role in stability operations should be 

present to represent their respective organizations, and that those 

representatives can help facilitate a mutual understanding of the overall

contributions, capabilities, and capacity of each organization. These 

representatives can also develop a better understanding of DOD and the 

process used to develop military plans. At the operational and tactical 

level, DOD officials agreed that, ideally, they need consistent access to 

interagency personnel from other government agencies that have been 

authorized by their organizations to establish coordinating relationships 

with the military. Specifically, European Command officials commented 

that they would benefit from subject matter experts from non-DOD 

organizations at the operational level who can (1) participate in the 

planning process and (2) increase the probability that planned 

contributions from non-DOD organizations in stability operations can 

actually be provided. Similarly, Pacific Command officials stated that to 

facilitate interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels, 

several issues such as liaison authority, willingness on the part of other 

agencies to work with DOD, and coordinating mechanisms must be 

addressed. The department has also recognized that nongovernmental 

organizations should participate in DOD’s planning process, where 

appropriate.19

DOD has taken steps to establish interagency coordination mechanisms 

and to improve interagency participation in its planning efforts, but it has 

not achieved consistent interagency representation or participation at the

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning. At the strategic level,

DOD’s primary mechanism for interagency coordination within each

combatant command is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

(JIACG). As shown in Table 2, the size and composition of these groups 

varied within each combatant command we visited, but in general, they

have been comprised of a limited number of representatives from State, 

DOD Has Not Achieved 

Consistent Interagency 

Participation in the 

Military Planning Process 

 19Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. 

Page 27 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
USAID, the Department of Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Table 2: JIACG Membership at the Central, European, and Pacific Commands

JIACG membership (proposed staffing)

Department of 

Defense (DOD) 

Department

of State 

Federal 

Bureau of

Investigations

Drug 

Enforcement 

Agency

Department

of Homeland 

Security

Department

of the

Treasury USAID

Department of 

Transportation

Military Civilian

U.S. 

Central 

Command 41 8 1 2 1 1 1 1 0

U.S. 

European 

Command 13 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 0

U.S. 

Pacific 

Command 8 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

The organization and functions of the JIACGs are evolving. At the time of 

our review, each JIACG we examined had an overall function to improve 

general coordination between DOD and the agencies represented in the 

group and were not intended to be actively involved in DOD’s planning 

efforts. At each command we visited, we found JIACG participants served 

primarily as advisors and liaisons between DOD and their parent 

organizations, had limited planning experience and training, and were not 

consistently engaged in DOD’s planning process. However, officials 

commented that the role of the JIACG was changing. Specifically, Central 

Command officials expected that the JIACG within their command would 

begin to assume a more active role in the planning process, but they did 

not have specific details on how or when this would occur. At the Pacific 

Command, the JIACG was being refocused by the commander from 

coordinating counterterrorism activities to more of a “full spectrum” 

approach that would include stability operations activities. At the 

European Command, officials also expected the focus of the JIACG would 

expand from a counterterrorism focus to a fuller spectrum of operations, 

which, in their opinion, could include participating in the planning 

process. 

Below the strategic level, at the operational and tactical levels, some 

service component commands are reaching out to country teams in 

embassies within their areas of responsibility on an ad hoc basis to obtain 

Page 28 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
interagency perspectives during their planning efforts. But this approach 

can be cumbersome because of the large number of countries that may be 

affected by a regional plan. Generally, component command officials we 

contacted agreed that the primary mechanism available to them for 

interagency coordination was establishing personal relationships and 

direct dealings with country teams and other embassy personnel. For 

example, according to Naval Forces Europe, it is developing new 

contingency plans, and one of its first steps in this effort is to identify the 

key participants and resources available within its area of operations and

to develop individual relationships that will help it accomplish more. In 

Central Command, both the Army and Navy component commands 

commented that they work directly with the embassies in the area of 

operations in order to interface with other agencies. 

Limited Guidance, 

Information Sharing and 

Training Hinder 

Interagency Participation 

in the Development of 

Military Plans 

Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation 

in the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided 

specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with nonDOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of 

planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and nonDOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning 

processes and capabilities, and non-DOD organizations have limited 

capacity to fully engage in DOD’s planning efforts. At each combatant 

command we visited, planners acknowledged the requirement to include 

interagency considerations in planning, as required by recent DOD policy. 

But command officials stated they did not have any guidance on how to 

meet the requirement, or on the specific mechanisms that would facilitate 

interagency planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For 

example, numerous DOD publications and documents discuss the JIACG 

organizations at each combatant command, but there is no published DOD 

guidance that establishes policy governing the JIACGs or that outlines the 

responsibilities for establishing and managing them. Officials from the 

DOD and State also commented that the JIACG organizations were not 

intended to be a coordinating body for military planning, and questioned if

this was an appropriate mechanism for integrating the planning efforts 

between DOD and other agencies. 

The second factor inhibiting interagency participation is that DOD does 

not have a process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning 

information with non-DOD agencies, when appropriate, early in the 

planning process without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense. 

Specifically, DOD policy officials, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that it is the department’s policy 

Page 29 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
not to share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside of 

DOD unless directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines 

if they have a need to know. In addition, DOD’s planning policies and 

procedures state that a combatant commander, with Secretary of Defense

approval, may present interagency aspects of his plan to the Joint Staff 

during the plan approval process for transmittal to the National Security 

Council for interagency staffing and plan development. This hierarchical 

approach limits interagency participation as plans are developed by the 

combatant commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

State officials also told us that DOD’s current process for sharing planning 

information limits non-DOD participation in the development of military 

plans, and inviting interagency participation only after the plans have been

formulated is a significant obstacle to achieving a unified government 

approach in those plans. In their opinion, it is critical to include 

interagency participation in the early stages of plan development at the 

combatant commands. 

Additionally, according to combatant command officials, non-DOD 

personnel do not always have the necessary security clearances required 

by DOD for access to the department’s planning documents or 

participation in planning sessions. In its recent interim report to the 

Secretary of Defense on DOD Directive 3000.05, DOD acknowledged the 

current challenges in information sharing and predicts that DOD will 

continue to face serious problems concerning the release and sharing of 

information among DOD, other U.S. government agencies, international 

partners, and other nongovernmental organizations. In the report DOD 

attributed information-sharing issues to restrictions based on current 

information-sharing policies and emphasized that to improve informationsharing capabilities senior leadership direction is required. 

The third factor limiting the effectiveness of interagency coordination 

efforts is that DOD and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of 

each other’s planning processes and capabilities, and have different 

planning cultures and capacities. DOD and non-DOD officials repeatedly

emphasized in their discussions with us the cultural and capacity 

challenges that the two communities face. Within DOD, officials discussed 

a lack of formally trained DOD planners within the combatant commands. 

For example, only two of the six planners at U.S. Army Europe were 

formally trained, and another official noted that it takes a planner about a 

year on the job to become proficient in what is generally a 2-year 

assignment. Even if combatant command planners are experienced, they

may lack knowledge of interagency processes and capabilities. For 

example, a Pacific Command planner stated that they had to guess about

Page 30 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
interagency capabilities during planning. Senior Pacific Command officials

cited a need to educate DOD planners on U.S. government agencies 

strengths and weaknesses and where expectations may exceed an 

agency’s capabilities. Similarly, European command JIACG officials 

commented that DOD needs to institutionalize the interagency education 

piece at its schools for professional planners, and a European Command 

planner stated that it is essential to understand what the various non-DOD 

agencies do and what they need to know about DOD capabilities. 

Our analysis of DOD’s lessons-learned databases from current and past 

military operations provided details that specifically addressed the 

training differences between DOD and non-DOD agencies and the limited

knowledge of each other’s capabilities. For example, the databases can 

contain lessons learned such as: (1) DOD needs to develop knowledge of

other agencies and the capabilities they bring to operations, (2) significant 

improvements could be made in military education by the development of 

interagency programs of instruction, and (3) DOD should work to 

aggressively include State in the process of project development.20

Furthermore, DOD officials described what they believe is a significant 

difference in the planning cultures of DOD and non-DOD organizations. 

They stated that DOD has a robust planning culture that includes 

extensive training programs, significant resources, dedicated personnel, 

and career positions. Conversely, officials from the Joint Staff, the Office 

of Policy, Joint Forces Command, and the combatant commands 

explained that many agencies outside of DOD do not appear to have a 

similar planning culture and do not appear to embrace the detailed 

planning approach taken by DOD. In addition, these officials repeatedly 

stated that their efforts to include non-DOD organizations in planning and 

exercise efforts has been stymied by the limited number of personnel 

those agencies have available to participate. DOD has attempted to 

mitigate some of these challenges by sharing its planning resources to 

projects such as the development of a draft joint planning concept with 

State, offering DOD personnel to provide training to non-DOD 

organizations, and encouraging non-DOD agencies to participate in 

exercise planning. We did not examine the planning capability and 

capacity of non-DOD organizations in this review, but we do have ongoing 

work that is examining this issue in more detail. 

 20Our analysis of DOD’s lessons learned data is discussed in more detail in the next section 

of this report. 

Page 31 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
The difference in planning between DOD and other U.S. departments and 

agencies was also highlighted in the first semiannual report to the 

Secretary of Defense on stability operations. In that report, the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy states, “The difference between DOD 

and other U.S. Departments and Agencies is that DOD plans and prepares 

for current and future operations and other U.S. Departments and 

Agencies plan and prepare for current operations. This is reflected in the 

different planning processes across the U.S. Government and the relative 

spending on training, education, and exercises.”21

Officials from State offered similar perspectives on the planning 

capabilities and capacities of non-DOD organizations. They stated that 

State planning is different from military planning, with State more focused 

on current operations, and less focused on the wide range of potential 

contingency operations that DOD is required to plan for. As a result, State 

does not allocate planning resources in the same way as DOD, and 

therefore does not have a large pool of planners that can be deployed to

the combatant commands to engage in DOD’s planning process. These 

officials agreed, however, that participating in DOD’s planning efforts as 

plans are being formulated is necessary to achieve a unified government 

approach in the military plans, and suggested alternative methods to 

accomplish this goal. For example, State officials discussed a current 

initiative to test methods to “virtually” include State planners in a DOD 

contingency planning effort in the European Command using electronic 

communication tools, and stated that State personnel could potentially 

participate in a large number of planning efforts if this approach were 

expanded. State officials also suggested that DOD policies may need to be 

revised to authorize combatant commanders to reach back directly to 

State and other government agencies as plans are being developed, instead 

of through the hierarchical approach through the Joint Staff and the 

National Security Council as previously discussed. 

Without clear guidance to the combatant commanders on how to establish 

adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency 

participation in planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

planning, a process to share planning information as plans are being 

developed, and methods to orient and include professional planners from 

key organizations in DOD’s planning process, the contributions and 

 21Department of Defense, Interim Progress Report on DOD Directive 3000.05. 

Page 32 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
capabilities of these organizations may not be fully integrated into DOD’s 

plans, and a unified government approach may not be achieved. 

DOD planners are not consistently using lessons learned from past 

operations as they develop future contingency plans. NSPD-44 and DOD 

policies highlight the importance of incorporating lessons learned into 

operational planning. Lessons learned from current and past operations 

are being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our 

analysis indicates that DOD planners are not using this information on a 

consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors 

contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: 

(1) DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is 

outdated and does not specifically require planners to include lessons 

learned in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessonslearned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process 

does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated 

into specific plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of the 

lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes. 

Inadequate Guidance, 

Information Systems, 

and Processes 

Contribute to 

Inconsistent Use of 

Lessons Learned in 

Stability Operations 

Planning 

NSPD-44 and DOD guidance stress the importance of incorporating 

lessons learned into operations and planning. Furthermore, the recently 

released Joint Operating Concept for stability operations envisions that 

the Joint Force will implement a continuous learning process that 

incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations through 

constant observation, assessment, application, and adaptation of tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System manual, which provides planners with the step by step process for 

planning joint operations, states that a regular review of lessons 

information can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful and 

innovative ideas. Prior GAO work on DOD’s lessons learned noted that 

effective guidance and sharing of lessons-learned are key tools to 

institutionalize and facilitate efficient operations, and failure to utilize 

lessons heightens the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to 

build on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations.22

 22GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard

Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington,

D.C.: Nov 10, 2004); Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but 

Could Be Improved and Expanded, GAO 02-890 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2002). 

Page 33 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
DOD has established comprehensive joint lessons learned programs at all 

levels within the department, and lessons learned from exercises and 

operations are being captured. The department’s Joint Lessons Learned 

Program is a federation of separate lessons-learned organizations 

embedded within the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the Services and 

Combat Support Agencies that focus upon capturing information, data,

and lessons based upon each command’s priorities. Each lessons-learned 

organization within this program has developed its own processes, 

systems, and information products for capturing, storing, and retrieving 

lessons and observations based upon each organization’s requirements 

and resources. 

Lessons Learned are Being 

Captured but Not 

Incorporated into Plans 

The various organizations in the Joint Lessons Learned Program focus on 

capturing lessons learned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

These lessons tend to be oriented toward a specific customer and are 

disseminated through a variety of different products. For example, the 

services tend to collect tactical- and operational-level lessons that they use 

to address command and service-specific issues for resolution. Similarly, 

the combatant commands have each developed their own theater-specific

command-level lessons programs related to joint, interagency, and 

multinational matters and other matters involving interoperability. In 

addition, each organization tailors its lessons-learned programs to meet 

the individual command’s requirements and available resources. For 

example, the U.S. Pacific Command’s program is: managed by one civilian 

contractor; focuses it efforts on issues at the senior command leadership 

level; and hosts a web-based repository that contains approximately 145

lessons documents. In contrast, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has 

179 people on staff; focuses on all levels within the Army from the 

individual soldier to the most senior leaders; uses a combination of active 

collection techniques, such as sending out teams to interview soldiers and 

observe operations; and has an electronic repository consisting of 

approximately 157,000 documents. 

Our lessons-learned analysis provides insights into the types of lessons 

available to DOD planners and the volume of information that could be 

useful to improve future stability operations planning. We grouped 1,074 

lessons into 14 themes that reflect the full spectrum of strategic-level

issues surrounding stability operations, such as cultural sensitivity, 

language skills, intelligence, communications systems, and reconstruction 

activities. For example, the information in one theme we developed 

related to DOD coordination and planning with other U.S. agencies and 

non-U.S. government organizations highlights issues such as the need for 

(1) the military to work more closely with other agencies during stability 

Page 34 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
operations, (2) DOD to develop knowledge of other agencies and the 

capabilities they can contribute, and (3) commanders to ensure that 

military sectors during operations correspond with civil geopolitical 

boundaries. The information in another of our themes discussing civil

military operations highlights issues such as steps needed to improve 

information operations, and how to address cultural differences during 

information operations to reach specific audiences. A comprehensive 

listing of our themes and an explanation for each can be found in appendix

II. 

Despite the robust lessons-learned gathering process in place, we found 

that DOD planners at the combatant and component commands in our 

review did not consistently incorporate lessons as plans were developed 

or revised. For example, two of the combatant commands that we visited 

stated that they did not routinely use lessons as plans were developed.

Similarly, we found a range of how lessons learned were used in the 

planning process at the component commands we visited. For example, 

one Central Command component stated that lessons learned were part of 

the component command’s planning process, but a Pacific Command 

component commented that it generally did not utilize lessons learned as 

it developed plans. 

When we discussed the limited use of lessons learned with officials from 

the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, they stated that 

planners are generally aware of the need to check lessons learned as they

develop plans. However, the officials acknowledged that there are barriers 

to the use of lessons learned, that the existing lessons learned systems 

need updating, and questions do exist on whether the information 

provided by the current systems is adequate. One official noted that Office

of Policy is developing a new Center for Complex Operations, which is 

envisioned to facilitate the use of lessons by acting as a clearinghouse for 

stability operations information. The Center is still in the planning phase, 

and we were told that funding has been requested in the fiscal year 2007 

supplemental budget request and in the fiscal year 2008 budget to 

implement the plan. 

Three Factors Contribute 

to the Inconsistent Use of 

Lessons Learned in 

Planning 

We identified three factors that contribute to this inconsistent use of 

lessons learned in the planning process. First, the guidance regarding 

lessons learned in the Joint Staff’s manual for planning is outdated–the 

relevant section of the manual has not been updated since July 2000 and 

does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the 

planning process. Specifically, this guidance states that the Joint Universal 

Page 35 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Lessons Learned System should be contacted early in the planning process 

and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas

of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise 

occurrences.

23 However, this system does not exist and has not been 

supported since 1997, nor does the update reference an existing system 

that planners can access for joint lessons learned. 

The second factor contributing to limited use of lessons learned in the 

planning process is that accessing and searching lessons-learned 

databases is cumbersome. For example, to conduct our analysis of DOD 

lessons learned, we used five databases—four managed by each of the 

services, and one managed by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis. 

To obtain lessons-learned information from these sources, we had to: 

separately access each database, become familiar with each system’s 

functionality and search engines; repeat the same searches in each site for

stability operations–related terms; and review the results to find relevant

lessons. However, knowing how to navigate and search each of the 

lessons-learned systems is not enough. We also had to familiarize 

ourselves with and sort through the multitude of products generated to 

find lessons that were applicable to our analysis. Planners we contacted 

also told us they considered the databases difficult and time-consuming to 

use. One combatant command official described the magnitude of the 

challenge by noting that there is so much information within the program 

that the biggest difficulty is turning the information into usable knowledge. 

Additionally, the Joint Staff has acknowledged that the current system is 

inefficient and of limited effectiveness in sharing lessons-learned data. 

In an effort to address these issues, DOD has recently initiated an effort to 

develop a Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is intended to

standardize the collection, management, dissemination and tracking of 

observations and lessons. The department is in the early stages of 

developing this system, and plans that the system will establish 

interoperable lessons databases that can be searched with an easy-to-use 

search engine. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System

development strategy includes non-DOD agencies, and eventually non-U.S. 

partners. However, while Joint Staff officials recognize the need for 

stakeholder input to avoid continued inefficiency and limited effectiveness 

in sharing lessons learned, they do not plan to include non-DOD 

organizations until the later stages of the program’s development. 

 23Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, CJCSM 3122.01. 

Page 36 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
The third factor affecting the use of lessons learned is that the planning

review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are 

incorporated into specific plans. During discussions with planners at the 

various commands, we found no evidence of a formal mechanism to verify 

that lessons were considered in plan development. Furthermore we found 

conflicting views as to the need for a formal requirement. For example, 

one combatant command planner believed that, despite the lack of a

formal mechanism, the command’s vetting process for plans ensured that

lessons would be incorporated, while at another combatant command a 

planner stated that mechanisms for ensuring that lessons are used in 

planning is broken because there is no formal requirement to utilize 

lessons in plan development. 

DOD has invested substantial resources to develop systems that capture 

lessons from exercises, experiments, and operations, with the intent of 

using these lessons to improve efficiency. However, in the case of 

planning, the department has not developed mechanisms to ensure that 

they are taking advantage of this resource. As a result, DOD heightens its 

risk of either repeating past mistakes or being unable to build on the 

efficiencies developed during past operations as it plans for future 

operations. 

The DOD has a critical role in supporting a new national policy to improve 

stability operations capabilities and to achieve a more unified 

governmentwide approach to this demanding and important mission. 

Recent operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, along with current operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq provide daily reminders of how complex and difficult

these missions are. The department has developed an approach to improve 

its ability to execute stability operations, but it has achieved limited 

progress in two key areas—identifying needed capabilities, and developing 

measures of effectiveness—that are critical to successfully executing this 

approach. Without clear guidance on how and when combatant 

commanders are to develop stability operations capability requirements, 

the capabilities needed to conduct stability operations may not be fully 

developed or current service efforts to enhance capabilities may not be 

addressing the most critical needs of the commanders. Similarly, without 

clear departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of 

effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may continue 

to exist within the department, and progress on this important 

management tool may be significantly hindered.

Conclusions 

Page 37 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
DOD has recognized the need to achieve greater interagency participation 

in the development of military plans, but it has not established an effective 

mechanism to accomplish this goal. A governmentwide approach to 

stability operations is dependent upon an integrated planning effort of all 

organizations involved in them. Integrated planning can help fully leverage

the capabilities, contributions, and capacity of each organization, and 

increase the potential for successful operations. The challenge now facing

the department is how to modify its planning approach to better integrate 

non-DOD organizations into all levels—strategic, operational, and 

tactical—of planning and to support State as the lead agency in stability 

operations planning. Without improved guidance to military commanders 

on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate interagency planning, an

approach to appropriately share planning information with non-DOD 

organizations as plans are developed, and steps for overcoming 

differences in planning culture and training and capacities among the 

affected agencies, integrated interagency planning for stability operations 

may continue to be stymied. 

The consideration of lessons learned from past operations as new plans 

are developed is not only a requirement stipulated by new stability 

operations guidance, it is a requisite step to reducing the potential that 

past mistakes will be repeated in future operations. Without clear and 

complete guidance for planners, steps to increase the potential that 

information system improvements will facilitate sharing of lessons learned 

both within DOD and between all organizations that will participate in 

planning for stability operations, and a focus on lessons learned as plans 

are reviewed, the potential gains that can be achieved through systematic 

consideration of lessons learned as future plans are developed may not be 

realized. 

To meet the goals of identifying and developing stability operations 

capabilities and for developing tools to evaluate progress in achieving 

these goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy to take the following two actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Provide comprehensive guidance, including a clear methodology and time 

frames for completion, to the combatant commanders and the services on

how to identify and address stability operations capability gaps. 

• Provide comprehensive guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop

measures of effectiveness as directed by DOD Directive 3000.05, including 

those measures related to identifying and developing stability operations 

capabilities. 

Page 38 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
To achieve greater interagency participation in the development of 

military plans that include stability operations, and increase the potential

for unity of effort as those operations are executed, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State take

the following three actions: 

• Provide specific implementation guidance to combatant and component 

commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate and 

encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans 

that include stability operations–related activities. 

• Develop a process to share planning information with the interagency

representatives early in the planning process. 

• Develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture, 

training, and capacities among the affected agencies. 

To more fully incorporate lessons learned in the planning process, we 

recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint 

Chief’s of Staff working with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to take

the following actions: 

• Update the current planning guidance to 

• direct military planners to include lessons learned as they develop 

plans, and 

• require that the plan review process include a step to verify that 

lessons learned have been considered and adopted as appropriate. 

• Include non-DOD stakeholders in the development of the Joint Lessons 

Learned Information System at an earlier point than currently planned. 

Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans to take to 

implement our recommendations, the Congress should consider requiring 

the Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually to

the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on 

Armed Services on the specific steps being taken and current status of its 

efforts to (1) identify and prioritize needed stability operations

capabilities, (2) develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate progress in 

achieving these capabilities, (3) achieve greater interagency participation 

in the development of military plans, and (4) fully incorporate lessons 

learned in the planning process. The Secretary’s report should also identify

challenges to achieving an integrated, interagency approach to stability 

operations, and potential solutions for mitigating those challenges. 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Page 39 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 

our eight recommendations but did not discuss what specific steps, if any,

it plans to take to implement our recommendations. (DOD’s comments 

appear in their entirety in app. III.) State was also afforded an opportunity 

to comment on this report, but declined to do so. In its written comments, 

DOD highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and approaches to 

developing capabilities, measures of effectiveness, coordinating with other 

agencies and incorporating lessons learned that it believes are adequate to

address our recommendations. Although DOD is making progress in 

achieving a greater focus on stability operations through its new directive, 

our report notes it has made limited progress in certain areas, such as 

establishing measures of effectiveness, due to the limited guidance 

provided to DOD components. As a result, we continue to believe our 

recommendations are warranted and that DOD should take specific steps 

to address them. Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD 

plans to take to implement our recommendations, we have added a matter 

for congressional consideration suggesting that the Congress require the 

Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually on the 

specific steps being taken to address our recommendations and the 

current status of its efforts. The report should also identify challenges to 

achieving an integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and 

potential solutions for mitigating those challenges. 

DOD provided three overall comments to the report. First, DOD 

commented that GAO began the field work for this report in October 2005,

one month prior to the issuance of DOD Directive 3000.05, and observed 

that much of our field work was therefore conducted prior to activities 

DOD undertook to implement the directive. The department is mistaken in 

this observation. In October, 2005, we held our entrance conference with 

DOD officials, but conducted the majority of our field work from January 

2006 through March 2007. We believe the timing of our field work enabled 

us to focus on the approach DOD was taking to implement the directive, 

observe how key organizations began implementing this approach over a 

1-year period, and highlight impediments that may impair DOD’s ability to

achieve the results intended by the directive—improved stability 

operations capabilities. Therefore, we believe our work and related 

recommendations are particularly relevant and important because they

address systemic issues associated with DOD’s approach and could assist 

DOD organizations tasked with implementing the new directive. 

Second, DOD commented that our report is directed exclusively at DOD; 

that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction activities are 

inherently interagency in nature; and that DOD can only implement 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 40 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
recommendations under its purview. While we agree that stability 

operations are inherently interagency in nature, we disagree that our work 

is focused exclusively on DOD. Specifically, our audit work included 

discussions with State and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and at 

each of the combatant commands included in our review to gain their 

views and perspectives. We have also included recommendations to 

improve interagency participation in the development of military plans 

that are directed to the Secretary of Defense because the military planning 

process is conducted under the purview of the Secretary of Defense. 

However, acknowledging that interagency participation in DOD planning 

cannot be forced, we are recommending the Secretary of Defense 

coordinate with the Secretary of State to implement these 

recommendations. Furthermore, as we discussed with DOD officials 

during the course of our review and stated in this report, we have other 

work underway to evaluate State’s efforts to lead and coordinate 

stabilization operations in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, and plan

to report on those issues separately. 

Third, DOD commented that the identification and development of 

stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations capabilities 

are not so different from other DOD capabilities that they require a new or 

separate methodology to identify and develop military capabilities and 

plans. We disagree. As we discuss in this report, DOD has made limited 

progress in identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities, the 

identification of stability operations requirements was occurring in a 

fragmented manner, and each service is using a different approach to 

improve stability operations capabilities. To date, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy has not identified and prioritized needed stability 

operations capabilities and military plans do not fully reflect an integrated, 

interagency approach to stability operations. Therefore, we continue to 

believe that our recommendations in these areas are still warranted, as 

discussed below. 

Regarding our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive 

guidance, including a clear methodology and time frames for completion, 

to combatant commanders and the services on how to identify and 

address stability operations capability gaps, DOD stated that existing, 

mandated capability assessment methodologies already effectively address 

stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations capability 

needs at the combatant commands and the services. It also stated that 

under this process, the combatant commands assess and communicate to 

DOD the capabilities required to conduct these missions just as they do for 

other assigned missions. However, as discussed in this report, we found 

Page 41 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
that the combatant commands included in our review had made limited 

progress in identifying stability operations requirements because DOD had 

not issued guidance or set specific time frames to complete this task, and

there was confusion over how to define stability operations. During the 

course of our work, DOD refined the definition of stability operations, 

which was a positive step, but has not clarified the guidance or set specific 

time frames for identifying stability operations requirements. Because 

combatant command officials indicated to us that the absence of guidance

and timeframes was a significant contributor to the lack of progress in 

developing requirements, we believe our recommendation would assist the 

department in accomplishing this task. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive 

guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop measures of 

effectiveness, the department stated that it already develops measures of 

effectiveness in general, and a special process is not needed for stability 

operations. We believe this response is not consistent with DOD Directive 

3000.05, which requires each organization tasked under the directive to 

develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in meeting their 

respective goals listed in the directive. In addition, as discussed in this 

report, and as acknowledged by officials from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Policy) in a progress report to the Secretary of 

Defense, the department has made limited progress in developing 

measures of effectiveness related to stability operations. We found this 

limited progress was caused by significant confusion over how this task 

should be accomplished, and because minimal guidance was provided by 

the office of Policy. The department recognizes this confusion exits, and 

as discussed in this report plans to establish workshops to assist 

organizations in these efforts. We believe this is a positive step that should 

be complemented with improved guidance that would be available to all

organizations tasked with this responsibility, and therefore continue to 

believe our recommendation is appropriate and necessary. 

In response to our recommendations that DOD coordinate with State and 

provide specific implementation guidance to the combatant and 

component commanders on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and 

encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans, 

and that the two departments develop a process to share planning 

information, DOD provided the same response to both recommendations. 

The department believes that National Security Presidential Directive 44

should, by itself, provide sufficient direction on the structures needed and 

a process to share planning information. The department also stated it 

would continue to include other agencies in planning and exercising for 

Page 42 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
stability operations. We believe the department’s response is inadequate 

because NSPD-44 is a high-level directive that sets forth goals for 

improved interagency participation in stability operations, but does not 

contain details on mechanisms to achieve those goals. During the course 

of our review we received consistent comments from DOD and State 

officials that it is clear interagency participation in DOD planning is 

needed, but it is very unclear to as to how to accomplish this goal. 

Therefore, as detailed in this report, we found that interagency 

participation in the development of military plans at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels was very limited in every command 

included in our review in part because DOD’s guidance did not provide 

details on how to engage relevant agencies in planning or on the specific 

mechanisms that would facilitate interagency planning, and because DOD 

practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information. 

Combatant command officials cited significant limitations in current 

coordinating groups, and various ad hoc methods were in place to gain 

interagency perspectives on DOD planning efforts. State officials were 

concerned that DOD practices limit the appropriate sharing of DOD 

planning information as plans are developed, and it therefore had minimal 

impact as plans are being constructed. These fundamental and systemic 

issues will not be resolved with the guidance provided by NSPD-44. We 

continue to believe that systemic solutions are needed and can be 

achieved with improved guidance and more effective processes to 

appropriately share planning information with interagency

representatives. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD, in coordination with State, 

develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture, training, 

and capacities among the affected agencies, DOD stated that it will 

continue to work to understand and accommodate differences in these 

areas, offer non-DOD organizations opportunities to participate in DOD 

training courses, and detail DOD personnel to other agencies. We believe 

these are positive steps and agree DOD should continue to pursue them. 

However, our work indicates that these measures are not adequate to fully

address the magnitude of differences in the planning culture and capacity 

between DOD and other agencies. As discussed in this report, State 

officials believe that new and innovative practices need to be identified 

and pursued, such as “virtual” collaborative planning between DOD and 

State. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation for 

DOD and State to work together to develop more comprehensive and 

innovative solutions to overcome these differences is an important and 

necessary step to take. 

Page 43 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
In response to our recommendations that DOD update its current planning 

guidance to direct military planners to include lessons learned as they 

develop plans, and to update current planning guidance to require that the 

plan review process include a step to verify that lessons learned have been 

considered and adopted as appropriate, DOD stated that the current 

planning methodology takes into account lessons learned when 

constructing or modifying a plan. As discussed in our report, this is not 

always the case. In the course of our field work, we found sporadic use of

lessons learned in the planning process and a lack of formal guidance 

directing consideration of lessons learned in both constructing and in

reviewing plans. According to DOD, taking lessons learned into account

during planning is at the heart of all effective military (or nonmilitary) 

planning. However, the Joint Staff's manual on the Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System encourages, but does not direct planners 

to review lessons learned as they develop plans. We agree that lessons 

learned are being used by planners, but inconsistently. As a result we 

believe that our recommendations should be implemented in order to 

increase the potential that lessons are actually incorporated into plans as 

appropriate.

In response to our recommendation that DOD include non-DOD 

stakeholders in the development of the Joint Lessons Learned Information 

System at an earlier point than currently planned, DOD agreed to invite 

stakeholders to participate in the system at an earlier stage, but expressed 

concerns that these stakeholders face shortfalls in capacity and resources 

and therefore cannot ensure their interactive participation. We believe this

is a positive step and responsive to our recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Minority Members, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign 

Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. We are also 

sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low Intensity Conflict, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and officials

in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific 

Command. We will also make copies available to other interested parties 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at

(202) 512-4402 or by e-mail at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

Page 44 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 45 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To evaluate the Department of Defense’s approach to improving stability 

operations and DOD’s identification of stability operations capabilities and 

development of performance measures we obtained and analyzed DOD 

Directive 3000.05, National Security Presidential Directive 44, the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, 

the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction Operation Joint Operating Concept, and the Defense 

Science Board studies on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within 

DOD. We interviewed current and former officials at the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff and Services, three

Regional Combatant Commands (European Command, Pacific Command, 

and Central Command), and U.S. Joint Forces Command. In these 

interviews we reviewed relevant information and discussed implementing 

guidance for completing responsibilities outlined in the Directive, the 

interviewees’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities in 

completing assigned tasks, progress in implementing the Directive, 

challenges that have been encountered, and input provided for the first 

report to the Secretary of Defense on implementing the Directive. Finally, 

we reviewed the first report to the Secretary of Defense and discussed the 

report’s findings with officials within the Office of the Under Secretary for 

Policy. 

To identify the extent to which DOD is planning for stability operations 

and whether the department’s planning mechanisms encourage and 

facilitate consideration of non-DOD capabilities, we reviewed and 

analyzed NSPD-44, DOD Directive 3000.05, joint planning guidance and 

manuals, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Building Partnership 

Capacity Roadmap, and combatant command processes. We interviewed 

officials at the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, 

and the United States Agency for International Development to obtain 

other agencies’ perspectives regarding DOD’s planning process and the 

inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in contingency plans. To understand 

DOD’s planning process, mechanisms for interagency involvement in 

planning, and impediments to interagency coordination, we met with 

representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy as well as planners from three regional combatant commands, 

which included the Pacific, European, and Central commands, members of 

each combatant command’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group, and 

fourteen combatant command component commands responsible for 

contingency operation planning. We also reviewed examples of 

interagency coordination contingency planning documents to gain an 

understanding of the level of detail to which the commands planned 

Page 46 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

coordination efforts. We did not, however, assess the extent to which 

these roles and responsibilities, including those of DOD, are appropriate.

Our review did not include the planning for ongoing operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan. DOD’s contingency plans are classified documents and a 

complete review of the contingency plans was beyond the scope of this 

audit, and as a result we did not develop a comprehensive list of 

documents to draw a representative sample of contingency planning 

documents related to interagency coordination. However, we worked with 

combatant command officials to identify examples of planning documents

related to interagency coordination and the level of detail to which the 

commands planned coordination with other agencies. We did not include 

in our review any current or planned coordination between DOD and nonU.S.-government organizations, foreign governments, or international 

organizations. 

To determine the extent to which DOD planners are applying lessons 

learned from past operations and exercises we reviewed relevant DOD 

guidance, and discussed with DOD officials their consideration of lessons 

learned during planning. In order to understand the requirements for 

utilizing lessons learned in the planning process and the purpose and 

scope of the Joint Lessons Learned Program, we analyzed DOD’s planning 

guidance and manuals, lessons learned instructions for the Joint Lessons 

Learned Program, and the services’ lessons learned guidance.

To assess the type and extent of strategic stability operations lessons 

learned available, we identified organizations that produced studies or 

reports that included lessons learned relevant to stability operations, both 

within and outside DOD. To identify strategic level lessons within DOD’s 

Joint Lessons Learned Program, we obtained access to the four armed 

services lessons learned databases (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force), the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and obtained stability 

operations studies from the Defense Science Board. In order to identify 

relevant non-DOD organizations conducting lessons-learned research, we 

contacted individuals identified as subject matter experts in stability 

operations and asked them to identify non-DOD agencies that published 

reports and studies regarding stability operations that they recognized as 

being leaders in the field. In this manner, several non-DOD organizations 

were identified, including the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies and the United States Institute of Peace. After obtaining search 

results from the DOD lessons-learned databases and non-DOD 

organizations, we reviewed the materials and selected analytical products

for further examination based upon whether the report or study included 

original data collection and analysis related to the conduct of stability and 

Page 47 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

reconstruction in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or the 

operations of the Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. We also excluded 

reports and analysis focused primarily on combat operations, including 

tactics, techniques, and procedures, after action-reports, and handbooks. 

We reviewed over 200 reports or studies, and found 38 documents that met 

these criteria. We entered all of the individual lessons and observations 

from the 38 reports into a database resulting in over 3,500 individual 

lessons and observations. Two GAO analysts independently reviewed the

individual lessons and observations using the following criteria for 

inclusion. 

We included lessons related to: U.S. forces performing or supporting local

governance functions in areas such as health care, utilities, infrastructure, 

and law enforcement; and U.S. forces interacting with local civil 

authorities to enhance the viability of these authorities and strengthen 

their capacity to provide basic services to the local population. 

We excluded lessons related to: tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

combat operations (e.g., marksmanship and weapons maintenance; house 

takedown; cordon and search); general purpose logistical support and 

systems sustainment; combat operations that are primarily offensive in 

nature. (Note: This does not include operations or use of force in direct 

support of the noncombat activities described above. For example, we 

would select lessons regarding the depth and composition of forces 

required to provide security for Provincial Reconstruction Teams.) 

Following the independent review, the team compared their individual 

results and, when agreement between the independent reviewers could 

not be reached, a third independent reviewer decided upon the inclusion 

or exclusion of the lesson. This analysis resulted in 1,074 individual 

lessons that met GAO’s criteria, which we reviewed for commonalities 

from which we developed our 14 major themes. After developing the 

themes, we categorized each lesson or observation, by consensus, into one 

or more categories based upon the content of the lesson. We used these 

themes and our knowledge of the lessons-learned systems and guidance as 

a basis for discussions with combatant command and component 

command planners regarding the use of lessons learned in the planning 

process. We recognize that this analysis is not based upon an exhaustive 

review of all reports and studies on the subject of stability operations. 

We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Inclusive Criteria 

Exclusive/Restrictive Criteria 

Page 48 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes 

and Descriptions 

Listed below are the 14 major themes that we developed after reviewing 

and categorizing 1,074 lessons learned. We used our analysis to provide 

insight into the types of stability operations lessons available to planners 

and to facilitate our discussions with Department of Defense. Our coding 

methodology often resulted in a lesson falling into one or more categories 

based upon the content of the lesson. Furthermore, several categories, 

such as Civil Military Operations and Provisional Reconstruction Teams, 

were considered to be functional categories, or topical areas, and the 

lessons were often included in another theme. The first column lists the 

theme GAO developed. The second column provides a general description 

of the types of lessons included within the theme. The third column lists 

the total number of lessons coded into each theme. Our analytical 

methodology was developed to support an insight as to the types of 

lessons available and does not does imply a ranking of themes in terms of 

importance or critical needs. A detailed discussion of our methodology is 

included in appendix I. 

GAO Themes Theme Definitions

Total Number 

of Lessons

Cultural Sensitivity, Awareness, 

and Engagement 

Cultural sensitivity, awareness as it pertains to U.S.-to-host nation and host 

nation-to-U.S. engagement before and during deployments. 177

Language Training of U.S. forces and the use of interpreters. 55

Civil Military Operations Functional category related to lessons concerning psychological operations,

civil affairs, public affairs, and information operations, which were viewed as

included within civil military operations. (Lessons in this category are often 

included with one of the other themes that talk to a more specific issue.) 301

Intelligence Processes and products, including: intelligence preparation of the battlespace; 

operational security; counterintelligence; human intelligence. 133

DOD Coordination with non-DOD 

Organizations 

Planning and coordination related to nonmilitary activities with other U.S. 

agencies, non-U.S.-government organizations, and host nation governments. 212

Force Composition and 

Restructuring of Forces 

While deployed, temporary changes in the primary role of U.S. forces to meet 

immediate or unanticipated operational needs. For example, transition and

reconstruction activities. 12

Welfare and Force Protection. Includes providing for the care, feeding, and security of military and U.S. 

government or coalition civilian forces. 39

Unity and/or Exercise of 

Command. 

Addresses the question of who is in charge and how is the authority of 

command being used. 21

Transition and Reconstruction Examples include Corps of Engineers and contracted construction. Transfers 

of authority/responsibility of activities to host nation; election support. 138

Automation, Communication, and 

Systems 

Capability, capacity, and compatibility of U.S. military communication and 

information systems in the theater of operation. 64

Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes 

and Descriptions 

Page 49 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes 

and Descriptions 

GAO Themes Theme Definitions

Total Number 

of Lessons

Military to Military Coordination U.S., coalition, and host nation military coordination, planning, and capacity. 

Instances showing how units are working together. This category addresses 

military-to-military. 167

Human Capital—Skills, 

Capabilities, and Capacity 

Military personnel authorization issues. Are units staffed with enough 

personnel in the right grade with the right skills and military specialties all the 

time, temporarily, or not at all? 236

Preparation for Operations What is being done to prepare before a unit needs to deploy. Includes: issues 

of doctrine, training, and logistics; and lessons learned that will result in 

changes to training and logistics to prepare for future operations. 149

Provisional Reconstruction Teams Functional category related to lessons concerning Provisional Reconstruction 

Teams. (Lessons in this category are often included with one of the other 

themes that talk to a more specific issue.) 31

Source: GAO.

Page 50 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-07-549 Military Operations
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 54 GAO-07-549

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky, Assistant 

Director; T. Burke; Stephen Faherty; Susan Ditto; Ron La Due Lake; Kate 

Lenane; Jonathan Carver; Maria-Alaina Rambus; and Christopher Banks 

made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Military Operations
Related GAO Reports

Page 55 GAO-07-549

Related GAO Reports 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 

Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 

Sites to Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-639T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 22, 2007. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 

Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage 

Sites to Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-444. Washington, D.C.: 

March 22, 2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, 

Security, and Capacity Challenges. GAO-07-426T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 15, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-07-308SP. Washington,

D.C.: January 9, 2007. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and

Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and 

Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing

Challenges. GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing 

Challenges. GAO-06-428T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2006. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating 

Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. 

Goals. GAO-05-742. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and 

Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform 

Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2004. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 

and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited 

Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy 

Needed. GAO-04-403. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004. 

Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003. 

(350743) Military Operations
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