Pure Magnesium From China

Investigation No. 731-TA-895 (Review)

Publication 3908 March 2007
U.S. International Trade Commission

Robert A. Rogowsky

Director of Operations

COMMISSIONERS

Address all communications to

Secretary to the Commission

United States International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436

Jennifer A. Hillman

Shara L. Aranoff, Vice Chairman

Daniel R. Pearson, Chairman

Staff assigned

Debra Baker, Investigator

Vincent DeSapio, Industry Analyst

Cathy DeFilippo, Economist

John Ascienzo, Accountant/Auditor

Mary Jane Alves, Attorney

George L. Deyman, Supervisory Investigator

Deanna Tanner Okun

Charlotte R. Lane

Irving A. Williamson
U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436

March 2007

www.usitc.gov

Publication 3908

Pure Magnesium From China

Investigation No. 731-TA-895 (Review)
 
i

CONTENTS

Page

Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Views of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Information obtained in the review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-3

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-3

The original investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-4

Other investigations concerning magnesium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-5

Commerce’s reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-7

Administrative reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-7

Results of expedited five-year review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-7

Distribution of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-7

The product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-8

Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-8

U.S. tariff treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-9

Description and uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-10

Manufacturing process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12

Channels of distribution, marketing, and pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-14

Domestic like product and domestic industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-14

The industry in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-18

U.S. producers’ domestic operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-18

U.S. producers’ imports and purchases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-23

U.S. production, capacity, shipments, and financial data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-23

U.S. imports and consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-30

U.S. importers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-30

U.S. imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-30

Apparent U.S. consumption and market shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-34

Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-39

The industry in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-40

Global supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-42

Appendix

A. Federal Register notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. Statement on adequacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

Note.--Information that would reveal confidential operations of individual concerns may not be

published and therefore has been deleted from this report. Such deletions are indicated by

asterisks. 

 1

 The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR §

207.2(f)).

 2

 Commissioners Jennifer A. Hillman and Irving A. Williamson not participating. Commissioner Dean A.

Pinkert was not a member of the Commission at the time of the vote.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

Investigation No. 731-TA-895 (Review)

PURE MAGNESIUM FROM CHINA

DETERMINATION

On the basis of the record1

 developed in the subject five-year review, the United States

International Trade Commission (Commission) determines, pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of

1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)) (the Act), that revocation of the antidumping duty order on certain pure

magnesium from China would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an

industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.2

BACKGROUND

The Commission instituted this review on October 2, 2006 (71 F.R. 58001) and determined on

January 5, 2007 that it would conduct an expedited review (72 F.R. 3876, January 26, 2007).

 1

 Commissioner Jennifer A. Hillman and Commissioner Irving A. Williamson did not participate in this

determination. Commissioner Dean A. Pinkert was not a member of the Commission at the time of the vote.

 2 On October 26, 2000, Magcorp amended the petition to include the United Steel Workers of America, Local

8319, as a co-petitioner, and on April 20, 2001, they amended the petition to add “concerned employees of

Northwest Alloys, Inc.” as co-petitioners. See, e.g., Confidential Staff Report, Mem. INV-EE-009 (Feb. 1, 2007)

(“CR”) at I-5 n.11; Public Report (“PR”) at I-4 n.11.

 3 See, e.g., CR at I-5; PR at I-4 to I-5.

 4 See 66 Fed. Reg. 49347 (Sept. 27, 2001).

 5 See 66 Fed. Reg. 50680 (Oct. 4, 2001).

 6 See Pure Magnesium from China and Israel, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-403 and 731-TA-895 to 896 (Final), USITC

Pub. 3467 at 14-15, 22-27 (Nov. 2001). Where antidumping or countervailing duty investigations involve both

Israel and another country, the Commission must first determine whether there is material injury, or the threat

thereof, to a domestic industry by reason of subject imports from Israel. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(ii)(IV).

 7 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(ii)(IV). Subject imports from Russia also were not eligible for cumulation because

of Commerce’s negative final antidumping duty determination concerning those imports. See 19

U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(ii)(II).

 8 See USITC Pub. 3467 at 14-15, 22-27.

 9 See USITC Pub. 3467 at 15-22. Commissioner Hillman and Commissioner Marcia E. Miller defined two

domestic like products and corresponding industries, and their views were amplified in a separate dissenting opinion. 

See USITC Pub. 3467 at 31-54.

3

VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION

Based on the record in this five-year review, we determine under section 751(c) of the Tariff Act

of 1930, as amended (“the Act”), that revocation of the antidumping duty order on pure magnesium in

granular form from the People’s Republic of China (“China”) would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.1

I. BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2000, Magnesium Corp. of America (“Magcorp”) filed an antidumping duty

petition with the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the U.S. International Trade

Commission (“Commission”),2

 alleging that an industry in the United States was materially injured and

threatened with material injury by reason of imports of pure magnesium from Israel and Russia, and

imports of pure magnesium in granular form from China that were alleged to be sold in the United States

at less than fair value, and by reason of imports of pure magnesium from Israel that were alleged to be

subsidized by the Government of Israel.3

 Commerce subsequently made a final negative determination

regarding subject imports from Russia,4

 and the Commission accordingly terminated its corresponding

investigation of that subject merchandise.5

Because the Commission determined that a domestic industry was neither materially injured nor

threatened with material injury by reason of subject imports from Israel that Commerce had found 

were subsidized and sold in the United States at less than fair value,6

 subject imports from Israel were not

eligible for cumulation with subject imports from China.7

 In contrast to its negative final determination

concerning subject imports from Israel,8

 the Commission determined that an industry in the United States

was materially injured by reason of imports of pure magnesium in granular form from China that

Commerce found had been sold in the United States at less than fair value.9

 On November 19, 2001,
 10 See 66 Fed. Reg. 57936 (Nov. 19, 2001).

 11 See 71 Fed. Reg. 58001 (Oct. 2, 2006).

 12 See, e.g., CR at I-3 n.4; PR at I-3 n.4.

 13 See, e.g., CR at I-3 to I-4; PR at I-3 to I-4.

 14 See, e.g., CR at I-3 to I-4; PR at I-3 to I-4. Commissioner Hillman found both the domestic interested party

group response and the respondent interested party group response to be inadequate and voted for an expedited

review. See, e.g., CR at I-4 n.6; PR at I-4 n.6. In the original investigation, she and Commissioner Miller had

defined two domestic like products: pure granular magnesium and pure magnesium ingot. They defined

corresponding domestic industries of (1) producers of pure granular magnesium that also included companies that

grind pure magnesium in ingot form into granular magnesium; and (2) producers of pure magnesium ingot. See

USITC Pub. 3467 at 31-40. Only one producer of pure granular magnesium (US Magnesium) responded to the

Commission’s notice of institution, and no respondent interested party responded. See, e.g., CR at I-3 to I-4; PR 

at I-3 to I-4.

 15 Chairman Daniel R. Pearson and Commissioner Deanna Tanner Okun dissented. They voted to conduct a full

review in order to reconsider the definition of the domestic like product.

 16 See 72 Fed. Reg. 3876 (Jan. 26, 2007).

 17 Section 751(c)(3)(B) of the Act indicates that the Commission in an expedited five-year review may issue a

final determination based on the facts available. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(3)(B). Accordingly, we have relied upon

the facts otherwise available in these reviews, including information from the earlier reviews and original

investigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a).

4

Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on pure magnesium in granular form from China.10 The

Commission’s original determination was not litigated.

On October 2, 2006, the Commission gave notice of its institution of this review to determine

whether revocation of the antidumping duty order on pure granular magnesium from China would be

likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.11

The Commission received only one substantive response to the notice of institution. The sole domestic

interested party response was filed by US Magnesium, a domestic producer of pure and alloy magnesium

and the successor firm to Magcorp.12 The Commission did not receive a response from any other firm 

producing magnesium in the United States, and it did not receive any responses from producers or

exporters of pure granular magnesium from China or any U.S. importers of the subject merchandise.13

On January 5, 2007, the Commission determined that the domestic interested party response to its

notice of institution was adequate and the respondent interested party response was inadequate.14 The

Commission did not find any circumstances that would warrant conducting a full review.15 The

Commission determined that it would conduct an expedited review pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §

1675(c)(3)(B).16 Because the Commission’s review of the antidumping duty order has been expedited,

much of the information relied upon in this review was collected during the original investigation, from

US Magnesium’s submissions in this proceeding, as well as from publicly available information from

recent Commission proceedings involving other magnesium products.17
 18 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A).

 19 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10); see also Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 19 CIT 450, 455 (1995); Timken Co. v.

United States, 913 F. Supp. 580, 584 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996); Torrington Co. v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 744, 748-

49 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1990), aff’d, 938 F.2d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1991); S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1979).

 20 See Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and the

United Kingdom, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-380 to 382 and 731-TA-797 to 804 (Review), USITC Pub. 3788 at 6 (Jul.

2005); Crawfish Tail Meat from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-752 (Review), USITC Pub. 3614 at 4 (July 2003); Steel

Concrete Reinforcing Bar from Turkey, Inv. No. 731-TA-745 (Review), USITC Pub. 3577 at 4 (Feb. 2003).

 21 See, e.g., CR at I-11; PR at I-10.

 22 See, e.g., CR at I-11; PR at I-10.

 23 See, e.g., CR at I-11; PR at I-10.

 24 See, e.g., CR at I-11; PR at I-10.

 25 See, e.g., CR at I-11 to I-12; PR at I-10.

 26 See, e.g., CR at I-12; PR at I-10.

 27 See, e.g., CR at I-12; PR at I-10.

5

II. DOMESTIC LIKE PRODUCT AND INDUSTRY

A. Domestic Like Product

In making its determination under section 751(c), the Commission defines the “domestic like

product” and the “industry.”18 The Act defines the “domestic like product” as “a product which is like, or

in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an investigation

under this subtitle.”19 The Commission’s practice in five-year reviews is to look to the like product

definition from the original determination and any previous reviews and consider whether the record

indicates any reason to revisit that definition.20

1. Background

Magnesium, the eighth most abundant element in the earth’s crust and the third most plentiful

element dissolved in seawater, is a silver-white metallic element.21 It is the lightest of all structural metals

with a density approximately 63 percent of that of aluminum, the principal metal with which it competes

in the U.S. market.22 Magnesium’s light weight and high vibrational-dampening properties have

encouraged research to develop magnesium-based alloys with improved physical and mechanical

properties for use as a structural metal in applications where minimizing weight is an important design

consideration.23 There are two principal forms of magnesium: pure magnesium and alloy magnesium.24

Magnesium may also be classified as primary magnesium (which is magnesium produced by directly

decomposing raw materials into magnesium metal) or as secondary magnesium.25 Secondary magnesium

is magnesium produced by recycling magnesium-based scrap, containing less than 50 percent of primary

magnesium.26 Pure magnesium in unwrought form contains at least 99.8 percent magnesium by weight

whereas alloy magnesium (or magnesium alloy) consists of magnesium and other metals, typically

aluminum and zinc, containing less than 99.8 percent magnesium by weight but more than 50 percent

magnesium by weight, with magnesium the largest metallic element in the alloy by weight.27 “Off-
 28 See, e.g., CR at I-12; PR at I-10.

 29 See, e.g., CR at I-12 to CR at I-13; PR at I-11.

 30 See, e.g., CR at I-13; PR at I-11.

 31 See, e.g., CR at I-13; PR at I-11. Although alloy magnesium can be in granular form, most granular

magnesium is classified as pure or “off-specification pure” magnesium (alloy magnesium not meeting ASTM

specifications for alloy magnesium). “Off-specification pure” magnesium falls within the scope of the antidumping

duty order on magnesium from China in granular form that is subject to this review. See, e.g., CR at I-13 n.38; PR at

I-11 n.38. No U.S. producers reported producing “off-specification pure” magnesium during the Commission’s full

review in 2006 on pure and alloy magnesium. See, e.g., CR at I-16; PR at I-13.

 32 See, e.g., CR at I-13 to I-14; PR at I-11 to I-12.

 33 See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 25691 (May 12, 1995); USITC Pub. 2885 (May 1995).

 34 See 72 Fed. Reg. 5417, 5418 (Feb. 6, 2007).

 35 See 72 Fed. Reg. 5417, 5418 (Feb. 6, 2007). Commerce explained that pure magnesium includes:

(1) Products that contain at least 99.95 percent primary magnesium, by weight (generally referred

to as “ultra-pure” magnesium); (2) products that contain less than 99.95 percent but not less than

99.8 percent primary magnesium, by weight (generally referred to as “pure” magnesium);

(3) chemical combinations of pure magnesium and other material(s) in which the pure magnesium

content is 50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 percent, by weight, that do not conform to an

“ASTM Specification for Magnesium Alloy” (generally referred to as “off-specification pure”

magnesium); and (4) physical mixtures of pure magnesium and other material(s) in which the pure

magnesium content is 50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 percent, by weight. 

72 Fed. Reg. at 5418. Commerce excluded from the order

mixtures containing 90 percent or less pure magnesium by weight and one or more of certain non-

(continued...)

6

specification pure” magnesium is magnesium that contains 50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8

percent magnesium by weight, that does not conform to an ASTM specification for alloy magnesium.28

Pure magnesium is typically used in the production of aluminum alloys for use in beverage cans

and some automotive parts, in iron and steel desulfurization, and as a reducing agent for various

nonferrous metals (e.g., titanium, zirconium, hafnium, uranium, beryllium).29 Alloy magnesium is

principally used in structural applications, primarily in castings (die, permanent mold, and sand) and

extrusions for the automotive industry.30 Magnesium may come in different forms, including a cast or

ingot form or in a granular or powder form.31 Granular magnesium is typically used in the production of

magnesium-based desulfurizing reagent mixtures that are used in steelmaking to reduce the sulfur content

of steel. Lesser amounts of granular magnesium are used in defense applications, such as military

ordnance and flares.32

2. The Scope of This Review, The Definition of the Domestic Like Product in

the Original Investigation, and The History of Different Scopes and

Different Like Products in Other Magnesium Investigations and Reviews

In its expedited five-year review determination, Commerce pointed out that there has been an

antidumping duty order on pure magnesium in ingot form from China since 1995,33 and it explained that

the scope of this review excludes pure magnesium that is already covered by that order.34 The scope of

this review includes “imports of pure magnesium products, regardless of chemistry, including, without

limitation, raspings, granules, turnings, chips, powder, and briquettes, except as noted above.”35 This
 35 (...continued)

magnesium granular materials to make magnesium-based reagent mixtures. The non-magnesium

granular materials of which the Department is aware used to make such excluded reagents are:

Lime, calcium metal, calcium silicon, calcium carbide, calcium carbonate, carbon, slag coagulants,

fluorspar, nephaline syenite, feldspar, aluminum, alumina (Al2O3), calcium aluminate, soda ash,

hydrocarbons, graphite, coke, silicon, rare earth metals/mischmetal, cryolite, silica/fly ash,

magnesium oxide, periclase, ferroalloys, dolomitic lime, and colemanite. A party importing a

magnesium-based reagent which includes one or more materials not on this list is required to seek

a scope clarification from the Department before such a mixture may be imported free of

antidumping duties.

According to Commerce, the subject merchandise is currently classifiable under item 8104.30.00 of the HTSUS. It

cautions, however, that “the HTSUS subheading is provided for convenience and customs purposes, {but} the

written description of the scope of this order is dispositive.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 5418.

 36 See, e.g., 66 Fed. Reg. 57936 (Nov. 19, 2001).

 37 See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 19928 (Apr. 15, 2005); Magnesium from China and Russia, Invs. Nos. 731-TA-1071

and 1072 (Final), USITC Pub. 3763 (Apr. 2005).

 38 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 3-9. The Commission’s opinion reflected the views of Commissioner Lynn M.

Bragg, Commissioner Dennis M. Devaney, Commissioner Stephen Koplan, and Commissioner Okun. In a separate

and dissenting opinion, Commissioner Hillman and Commissioner Miller found two domestic like products

corresponding to granular pure magnesium and pure magnesium ingot. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 3 n.1.

 39 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 347 at 8 n.34 (“We find that the lack of a clear dividing line between granular

magnesium and magnesium ingot warrants broadening the domestic like product beyond the scope of the Chinese

investigation, which is limited to granular magnesium, to include magnesium ingot. In light of the scope language of

the existing antidumping duty order on magnesium ingot from China and Commerce’s explicit exclusion of Chinese

magnesium ingot from the scope of the Chinese investigation, our broadening of the definition of the domestic like

product does not affect our treatment of magnesium ingot from China to the United States during the period of

investigation as non-subject imports.”)

7

scope definition is unchanged from Commerce’s original scope definition.36 Subsequent to the imposition

of the antidumping duty order on Chinese pure magnesium in granular form, after Commerce and the

Commission made affirmative final determinations in a separate investigation, in April 2005, Commerce

issued a third antidumping duty order on magnesium from China, this time regarding alloy magnesium

from China.37

Although the scope of subject merchandise from China in the original investigation is identical to

the scope of the Chinese order under review here (pure granular magnesium), at the time of the

Commission’s original investigation, subject imports of pure magnesium in both ingot and granular form

from Israel were also part of the scope of that companion investigation. In the original investigation, the

Commission defined a single domestic like product: pure magnesium that included both granular pure

magnesium and pure magnesium ingot.38 In other words, as the Commission explicitly recognized, the

domestic like product in the original investigation was defined more broadly than the scope of the

Chinese investigation.39

Both before and since the time of the original investigation, there have been several other

investigations and reviews involving various types of magnesium products. The scopes of the

investigations and reviews and the domestic like products defined by the Commission (or Commission

majority) have varied over the years. The scope of the first magnesium investigation covered “primary

magnesium” (i.e., both pure and alloy magnesium) from Canada, and in its final determination, the

Commission majority defined a single domestic like product and domestic industry corresponding to that
 40 See, e.g., Magnesium from Canada, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-309 and 731-TA-528 (Final), USITC Pub. 2550 at 5-

11 (Aug. 1992).

 41 See, e.g., Magnesium from Canada, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-309 and 731-TA-528 (Final) (Remand), USITC Pub.

2696 at 1-4 (Nov. 1993).

 42 See, e.g., Magnesium from China, Russia, and Ukraine, Invs. Nos. 731-TA-696 to 698 (Final), USITC Pub.

2885 at 5-10 (May 1995).

 43 See, e.g., Magnesium from Canada, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-309A, 701-TA-309B, and 731-TA-528 (Review),

USITC Pub. 3324 at 5-6 (July 2000) (first review of Canadian orders) (finding two domestic like products, pure

magnesium and alloy magnesium); Pure Magnesium from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-696 (Review), USITC Pub. 3346

at 4-5 (Aug. 2000) (first review of Chinese order on pure magnesium ingot) (defining one domestic like product

consisting of pure including off-spec magnesium in a review of an order on pure ingot from China). The

Commission’s domestic like product findings in the first review of the Canadian orders were not the reason why a

binational panel issued two remands. See, e.g., Magnesium from Canada, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-309A, 701-TA-309B,

and 731-TA-528 (Review) (first remand determination), USITC Pub. 3542 (Oct. 2002); Magnesium from Canada,

Invs. Nos. 701-TA-309A, 701-TA-309B, and 731-TA-528 (Review) (second remand determination) USITC Pub.

3882 (Apr. 2006).

 44 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3763 at 3-11. Commissioner Hillman and Commissioner Miller defined two domestic

like products: (1) pure and alloy primary and secondary magnesium except for magnesium in granular form, and

(2) granular magnesium. See USITC Pub. 3763 at 3 n.1.

 45 See, e.g., Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium from China, Invs. Nos. 701-TA309A, 701-TA-309B and 731-TA-696 (Second Reviews), USITC Pub. 3859 at 6-13 (July 2006). Vice Chairman

Shara L. Aranoff and Commissioner Hillman found two domestic like products: (1) pure magnesium ingot and

(2) alloy magnesium ingot (including secondary products). See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 34-43. Commissioner

Koplan agreed with their domestic like product finding although he also included pure magnesium in granular form

in his definition of the relevant domestic like product. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 36 n.236.

8

scope.40 The Commission majority’s finding was rejected by a binational panel, so on remand, the

Commission defined two domestic like products and two corresponding domestic industries, one for pure

magnesium and the other for alloy magnesium.41 The next investigations involved pure and alloy

magnesium from China, Russia, and the Ukraine, and the Commission defined two corresponding

domestic like products: (1) pure including “off-spec” magnesium and (2) alloy magnesium.42 The

Commission continued its practice of defining separate domestic like products for pure and alloy

magnesium in the first reviews of both sets of those orders.43

In two of the most recent reviews and investigations, the Commission defined a single domestic

like product that was broader than in previous reviews and investigations. In an original investigation of

primary and secondary alloy magnesium from China as well as primary and secondary and pure and alloy

magnesium in both granular and ingot form from Russia, the Commission defined a single domestic like

product that included pure and alloy, primary and secondary, and ingot and granular magnesium

(notwithstanding that the scope of the Chinese investigation did not include pure magnesium).44 In the

second reviews of certain magnesium imports from Canada and China that were conducted

simultaneously for convenience, the scope of the Canadian review included pure and alloy magnesium

whereas the scope of the Chinese order included pure magnesium in ingot form. The Commission

defined a single domestic like product for each order that included pure and alloy, primary and secondary

magnesium whether in ingot or granular form; this domestic like product was broader than the scope of

each of the reviews.45
 46 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Feb. 6, 2007, Final Comments at 7-11; US Magnesium’s Dec. 11, 2006,

Comments on Adequacy at 4-5, 7-8; US Magnesium’s Nov. 21, 2006, Response to the Notice of Institution at 17-18,

21.

 47 See, e.g., CR/PR at Table I-9 n.1 and Table I-10.

 48 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 3-9. The Commission majority noted Congress’ admonition that the domestic

like product standard should not be interpreted in “such a narrow fashion as to permit minor differences in physical

characteristics or uses to lead to the conclusion that the product and article are not ‘like’ each other, nor should the

definition of ‘like product’ be interpreted in such a fashion as to prevent consideration of an industry adversely

affected by the imports under consideration.” See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 8 n.33 (citing S. Rep. No. 96-249, at

90-91 (1979)).

 49 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 3-8. The Commission majority found it significant that grinders essentially

replaced magnesium ingot purchases with granular magnesium imports during the time period at issue in the original

investigation, consisting of full-year data for 1998, 1999, and 2000 as well as half-year data for 2000 and 2001

(“POI”). See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 9 n.35. While there was almost complete interchangeability in the

desulfurization segment, it acknowledged that there was no evidence at the time of interchangeability in the ***

segment, which was a large consumer of pure magnesium. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 9 n.35.

 50 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 8. In addition, the Commission noted that the record in the original

investigation showed that Magcorp and Dow produced limited quantities of granular magnesium during the POI in

magnesium ingot facilities. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 9 n.36.

9

3. Issues in This Review

In this review, US Magnesium urges the Commission to define the domestic like product to

include “all types, shapes, and sizes of magnesium.” In other words, it seeks to define the domestic like

product as all pure and alloy magnesium, including magnesium in ingot and granular form as well as

primary and secondary magnesium. In light of the failure of any respondent interested parties to

participate in this review, US Magnesium insists that the Commission should rely on undisputed facts

available from its recent reviews and investigations to conclude that alloy magnesium is also part of the

same domestic like product as well as primary and secondary magnesium.46

The scope of this review, as noted above, consists of pure magnesium in granular form from

China. Pure magnesium in granular form is also produced in the United States, as it was during the time

of the original investigation.47

a. Whether to Expand the Definition of the Domestic Like

Product to Include Pure Magnesium in Ingot Form

The first question is whether to expand the domestic like product beyond the scope to include

pure magnesium in ingot form. In the original investigation, although there was some support for finding

two domestic like products, on balance, the Commission majority found a single domestic like product

that included pure magnesium in ingot and granular form.48 It explained that pure magnesium in granular

form and pure magnesium ingot were produced in a continuum of forms and sizes, without any clear

dividing line; they shared the same chemical properties; and they were sold through similar channels of

distribution. They were interchangeable at least for significant end uses, particularly in the

desulfurization segment.49 Although the grinding operations generally took place in separate facilities

using separate workers, the same production facilities, processes, and workers were used to produce pure

magnesium ingot and pure granular magnesium up to the grinding stage.50 On that basis, the Commission
 51 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 3-9 (Commissioner Hillman and Commissioner Miller dissenting).

 52 Vice Chairman Aranoff does not join the remainder of this domestic like product discussion except for

footnote 56. She finds that pure magnesium and alloy magnesium (including secondary magnesium) are separate

like products. Because the record in this review does not include current information sufficient to make a full

analysis of like product issues addressed by her colleagues in recent investigations and reviews, she does not find a

like product different from that defined in the original investigation. Accordingly, for purposes of this expedited

review, she does not expand the domestic like product to include alloy magnesium (including secondary magnesium)

and instead adopts the domestic like product from the original investigation.

 53 See, e.g., Pure Magnesium from China, Israel, and Russia, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-403, 731-TA-895 to 897

(Prelim.), USITC Pub. 3376 at 7 (Dec. 2000). The Commission noted that in recent cases, it had found that alloy

magnesium and pure magnesium were separate like products. It further reasoned that the principal arguments by the

Israeli respondents for finding them to be one like product – that pure magnesium and magnesium alloy have similar

physical characteristics, chemistries, production processes, and channels of distribution, and that companies that

produce both products often use the same machinery, equipment, and employees – were considered by the

Commission in its prior findings that pure magnesium and magnesium alloy constitute separate like products and

these arguments were not viewed as sufficient to warrant a single like product definition. Given that alloy

magnesium was not included in the scope, and the absence of new information in the record on this issue, the

Commission decided not to broaden the like product beyond the scope to include alloy magnesium in the same like

product as pure magnesium. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3376 at 7.

 54 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 9 n.37. The Commission noted that Israeli producer DSM abandoned its

argument that the domestic like product should include alloy and pure magnesium, and found no additional data or

arguments in the final phase of the investigations that warranted reconsideration of the Commission’s finding in the

preliminary determination that the domestic like product did not include alloy magnesium. See, e.g., USITC Pub.

3467 at 9 n.37.

 55 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3763 at 3-11. Commissioner Hillman and Commissioner Miller found two domestic

like products: (1) pure and alloy primary and secondary magnesium and (2) magnesium in granular form. See, e.g.,

USITC Pub. 3763 at 3 n.1.

10

majority defined one domestic like product in the original investigation – pure magnesium that included

both granular magnesium and magnesium ingot.51

US Magnesium has asked the Commission to expand the domestic like product to include pure

magnesium in ingot form, and there is no information on this record that would call into question our

decision to do so in the original investigation. Based on the record in this expedited review, and absent

any party arguments or other information to the contrary, we expand the domestic like product to include

pure magnesium in ingot form.

b. Whether to Expand the Definition of the Domestic Like

Product to Include Alloy Magnesium52

The next question is whether to expand the definition of the domestic like product to include

alloy magnesium. In the preliminary phase of the original investigation, the Commission rejected a

request to expand the domestic like product to include alloy magnesium.53 In its final determination in the

original investigation, the Commission reiterated this finding.54 In the Commission’s April 2005 final

determinations concerning magnesium from China and Russia, however, a majority of Commissioners

defined a single domestic like product that included both pure and alloy magnesium.55 These

investigations involved a different record and a different, broader scope that included both pure and alloy

magnesium. In the recent (July 2006) second reviews of magnesium from Canada and China, three

Commissioners (Chairman Pearson, Commissioner Charlotte R. Lane, and Commissioner Okun) found a

single domestic like product that included pure and alloy magnesium even though the scopes of the
 56 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 6-11. Vice Chairman Aranoff and Commissioner Hillman found two domestic

like products: (1) pure magnesium ingot and (2) alloy magnesium ingot (including secondary products). 

Commissioner Koplan agreed with their domestic like product finding although he also included pure magnesium in

granular form in his definition of the relevant domestic like product. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 36 n.226. They

reasoned that although pure and alloy magnesium share essential physical characteristics as a light-weight, lowdensity metal with a high strength-to-weight ratio, this commonality of physical characteristics was limited in that

the alloying additives give the alloy product certain additional properties that improve its strength, ductility,

workability, corrosion resistance, density, and castability. As a result of these different properties, they found that

pure and alloy magnesium generally have different principal uses. Pure magnesium was typically sold to end users

(mostly aluminum alloyers) who combined it with other elements (typically aluminum) for use in a final product. 

Alloy magnesium, on the other hand was used principally in structural applications (mostly in castings and

extrusions for the automotive industry). They recognized that at least some types of alloy magnesium could be used

in aluminum production, and that alloy magnesium was occasionally used by granule and reagent producers, but

pure magnesium could not be used for diecasting. They found that the limited one-way substitutability of alloy

magnesium for pure magnesium was anomalous and waning and appeared to have been heavily driven by the

presence of very low-priced alloy magnesium from China in the U.S. market before imposition of antidumping

duties on such imports in 2005. They found the evidence as to manufacturing facilities and employees was mixed. 

They found that the average unit value and pricing data showed significant price differences and showed some

differences in changes in price levels. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 34-40.

 57 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 36-37.

 58 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 9-10. We found that pure and alloy magnesium shared the basic physical

characteristics of being lightweight and strong and having low density. Both products consisted mostly of

magnesium: pure magnesium contains at least 99.8 percent magnesium by weight, and alloy magnesium usually

contains at least 90 percent. The two products differed from each other in that alloy magnesium had certain

properties that improved its strength, ductility, workability, corrosion resistance, density, and castability, as

compared with pure magnesium. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 9-10.

 59 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 9-10. Although we acknowledged that aluminum producers might have a

preference for using pure magnesium in aluminum production, we found record evidence that aluminum producers

were using significant quantities of alloy magnesium when it was available at relatively attractive prices. See, e.g.,

USITC Pub. 3859 at 9-10.

 60 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 10-11. We found that conventional users of pure magnesium, particularly

aluminum manufacturers, who had developed new technology that permitted the use of alloy magnesium in

aluminum production, were turning to the alloy market. We acknowledged that the increase in the use of alloy

magnesium by aluminum manufacturers may have been at least in part fueled by the existence of lower-priced

imported alloy magnesium from China in the market, but we noted that the presence or absence of low-priced

imports did not detract from the fact that the two types of magnesium were indeed interchangeable. See, e.g.,

USITC Pub. 3859 at 10-11.

11

underlying orders were narrower.56 The Chinese order at issue in the 2006 reviews included pure

magnesium in ingot form but not alloy magnesium.57 Thus the domestic like product was defined more

broadly than the Chinese scope.

In the 2006 second reviews concerning magnesium from Canada and China, we concluded that

circumstances had changed sufficiently so as to blur the dividing line between pure and alloy magnesium,

and to warrant treating pure and alloy magnesium as a single domestic like product. We relied on the

shared essential physical characteristics;58 the overlap in the uses of pure and alloy magnesium in

aluminum production (the single largest use for magnesium);59 the recognition by some industry

participants of increased competition between pure and alloy magnesium;60 the general similarities in

channels of distribution for pure and alloy magnesium (to end users, including to several common end
 61 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 11.

 62 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 11.

 63 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 9.

 64 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 9.

 65 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at 9.

 66 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 7-11; US Magnesium’s Comments on Adequacy at 4-5, 7-8;

US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at 17-18, 21.

 67 Magnesium from China and Russia, Invs. Nos. 731-TA-1071 and 1072 (Prelim.), USITC Pub. 3685 at 10

(Apr. 2004).

12

users);61 and the convergence in prices for the two types of magnesium.62 We also found that primary

production of pure and alloy magnesium generally occurred in the same facilities and by the same

employees, except that additional equipment and labor was involved for the additional step of adding

alloying elements.63 The amount of value added to the magnesium in the alloying phase was not

substantial.64 Where alloy magnesium was made in secondary production (i.e., by recyclers), we found

that the manufacturing facilities and employees involved were different from those involved in the

production of pure magnesium (which was made only in primary production).65

US Magnesium has asked the Commission to expand the domestic like product to include alloy

magnesium,66 and there is no information on this record that would call into question our decision to do so

in two recent proceedings. Based on the record in this expedited review, and absent any party arguments

or other information to the contrary, we expand the domestic like product to include alloy magnesium for

the same reasons we did so in the recent proceedings.

c. Whether to Expand the Definition of the Domestic 

Like Product to Include Secondary Magnesium

The final issue is whether to expand the definition of the domestic like product beyond the scope

to include secondary magnesium. This issue did not arise and was not addressed in the original

investigation. The 2005 China/Russia investigations were the first Title VII cases to include secondary

magnesium in their scope. The Commission included secondary magnesium in the domestic like product

in those investigations. As it explained in the preliminary determinations:

If secondary magnesium is compared with primary alloy magnesium, it is clear that the

products are similar in terms of physical characteristics and uses, interchangeability,

customer and producer perceptions, channels of distribution, and price, for the reasons

that petitioners give. The products are not like each other in terms of manufacturing

facilities and employees, because primary magnesium is made by US Magnesium

through the primary production process (i.e., by decomposing raw materials into

magnesium metal) whereas secondary magnesium is made, largely by firms other than

US Magnesium, through a recycling process. If secondary magnesium is compared with

all primary magnesium (i.e., pure and alloy primary magnesium) the similarities between

the primary and secondary products become more attenuated because of the differences

between pure and alloy magnesium, which are described above. Based on the limited

data in the record, we find that primary and secondary magnesium are part of the same 

domestic like product. For purposes of these preliminary investigations, we note that the

secondary magnesium is part of the domestic like product consisting of alloy

magnesium.67
 68 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3763 at 6.

 69 See USITC Pub. 3859 at 11-12, 13. Vice Chairman Aranoff, Commissioner Hillman, and Commissioner

Koplan expanded the alloy magnesium like product to include secondary magnesium. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3859 at

40-41, 43.

 70 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 7-11; US Magnesium’s Comments on Adequacy at 4-5, 7-8;

US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at 17-18, 21.

 71 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A). In defining the domestic industry, the Commission’s general practice has been to

include in the industry producers of all domestic production of the like product, whether toll-produced, captively

consumed, or sold in the domestic merchant market, provided that adequate production-related activity is conducted

in the United States. See United States Steel Group v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 673, 682-83 (Ct. Int’l Trade

1994), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

 72 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 4-5, 6-7; US Magnesium’s Comments on Adequacy at 2-3, 5;

US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at 17-18, 21.

13

The Commission did not explore this issue any further in its final determinations, in which it found pure

and alloy magnesium to constitute a single like product.68 In the 2006 second five-year reviews, the

Commission adopted the same logic absent any indication that the underlying rationale or facts had

changed.69

US Magnesium has asked the Commission to expand the domestic like product to include

secondary magnesium,70 and there is no information on this record that would call into question our

decision to do so in two recent proceedings. Based on the record in this expedited review, and absent any

party arguments or other information to the contrary, we expand the domestic like product to include

secondary magnesium for reasons stated in those recent proceedings.

4. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we define the domestic like product as primary and secondary pure

and alloy magnesium whether in ingot or granular form.

B. Domestic Industry

Section 771(4)(A) of the Act defines the relevant domestic industry as the “producers as a whole

of a domestic like product, or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like product

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of the product.”71

US Magnesium argues that the Commission should define the domestic industry as all producers

of magnesium, whether pure or alloy, primary or secondary, and in any form, including ingot and

granular form; US Magnesium agrees with the Commission’s previous decisions to include grinders in the

domestic industry. To its knowledge, US Magnesium is the only producer of primary pure and alloy

magnesium, and the existing grinders are ESM Group Inc., Hart Metals Inc., Reade Manufacturing

Company, and Rossborough Manufacturing Company.72

1. Original Investigation

At the time of the original investigation, there were two producers of pure magnesium ingot that

represented 100 percent of U.S. production of that product in 2000: Magcorp (US Magnesium’s
 73 See, e.g., CR/PR at Table I-5. The record in the original investigation also indicated that ***. See, e.g.,

CR/PR at Table I-5 n.1.

 74 See, e.g., CR/PR at Table I-5. The Commission determined that ***. See, e.g., CR at I-23 n.74; PR at I-19

n.74.

 75 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 9-11.

 76 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 9-11; Confidential Version of Commission’s Views at 12-15.

 77 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 11 & n.49; Confidential Version of Commission’s Views at 14-15 & n.49.

 78 USITC Pub. 3467 at 11. Commissioner Okun did not include grinders in the domestic industry based on her

finding that such firms did not engage in sufficient production-related activities. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 29-

30. Commissioner Hillman and Commissioner Miller found that grinders did engage in sufficient production-related

activities and included them in their definition of the domestic industry producing granular pure magnesium. See,

e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 37-39.

 79 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 12-13. The Commission considered whether other domestic producers that

purchased imported subject merchandise were related parties, but concluded that none of them were. See, e.g.,

USITC Pub. 3467 at 12.

 80 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 12-13; Confidential Version of Commission’s Views at 16-18. Commissioner

Hillman and Commissioner Miller also excluded ESM from the domestic grinding industry defined by those

Commissioners. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 40.

 81 In deciding whether a firm qualifies as a domestic producer, the Commission generally analyzes the overall

nature of a firm’s production-related activities in the United States, although production-related activity at minimum

levels could be insufficient to constitute domestic production. The Commission generally considers six factors:

(continued...)

14

predecessor) and Northwest Alloys.73 The Commission also identified four producers of pure granular

magnesium that represented nearly all U.S. production in 2000: Magcorp (which ***) as well as grinders

ESM Manufacturing; Reade Manufacturing Co; and Rossborough Manufacturing Co.74 Based on its

definition of a single domestic like product that included pure magnesium in ingot and granular form, the

Commission defined a corresponding domestic industry that included all producers of pure magnesium. 

It noted that the evidence was mixed but, on balance, it found that grinding operations constituted

sufficient production-related activity to qualify firms that ground pure magnesium in ingot form into pure

granular magnesium (“grinders”) as domestic producers.75 The capital investment for grinding operations

was not insignificant, nor were the capital expenditures during the original investigation POI. Grinding

was not a particularly complex process, but ***, and there was some degree of technical expertise

involved in handling granular magnesium.76 Moreover, the Commission noted its findings in previous

investigations involving other products that grinding could be sufficient production-related activity.77 It

acknowledged that the value-added data were of limited use, since they also included reagent activities

and that, while low, employment levels were not insignificant.78

In its original determination, the Commission also decided that appropriate circumstances existed

to exclude grinder ESM from the domestic industry as a related party.79 Based on ***, the Commission

found that appropriate circumstances existed to exclude ESM from the domestic industry.80

2. The Current Review

In accordance with our domestic like product determination, we determine that there is one 

domestic industry composed of the domestic producers of pure and alloy magnesium, including primary

and secondary magnesium, and magnesium in ingot and granular form.

As in the original investigation, we also include grinders in the domestic industry producing

magnesium.81 82 The limited information in this expedited review relating to the production-related
 81 (...continued)

(1) source and extent of the firm’s capital investment;

(2) technical expertise involved in U.S. production activities;

(3) value added to the product in the United States;

(4) employment levels;

(5) quantity and type of parts sourced in the United States; and

(6) any other costs and activities in the United States directly leading to production of the domestic like

product.

No single factor is determinative, and the Commission may consider any other factors it deems relevant in light of

the specific facts of any investigation. See, e.g., Citric Acid and Sodium Citrate from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-863

(Prelim.), USITC Pub. 3277 at 8 (Feb. 2000); Certain Cut-to-Length Steel Plate from France, India, Indonesia, Italy,

Japan, and Korea, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-387 to 391, 731-TA-816 to 821 (Final), USITC Pub. 3273 at 9 (Jan. 2000); see

also Large Newspaper Printing Presses from Germany and Japan, Invs. Nos. 731-TA-736 to 737 (Final), USITC

Pub. 2988 at 8-9 (Aug. 1996).

 82 Consistent with her views in the original investigation and the fact that there is no new information on this

record concerning grinders, Commissioner Okun does not include grinders in the domestic industry. See Dissenting

Views of Commissioner Okun, Pure Magnesium from China and Israel, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-403 and 731-TA-895 to

896 (Final), USITC Pub. 3467 at 29-39 (Nov. 2001); Confidential Version of Commissioner Okun’s Views at 41-44. 

She does not join the remainder of the domestic industry discussion.

 83 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 5, 9; US Magnesium’s Comments on Adequacy at 2-3, 5; US

Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at 18, 21.

 84 None of the grinders provided data in response to the Commission’s notice of institution in the current

expedited proceeding. In addition to the limitations in the record data concerning grinders, there is also limited

information about recent domestic industry shipments of alloy magnesium, see, e.g., CR at I-36; PR at I-28, and

limited information on this record regarding production by the secondary magnesium producers that the Commission

included in the domestic industry in the 2005 and 2006 investigations and reviews. See, e.g., CR at I-37; PR at I-29. 

There are no data from the original investigation corresponding to the broader domestic like product and related

industry that would include pure and alloy, and primary and secondary magnesium. See, e.g., CR at I-36; PR at I-28.

 85 At the time of the original investigation, US Magnesium reported shipping ***. See, e.g., CR at I-25; PR at I20.

 86 See, e.g., CR/PR at Table I-6 n.2.

 87 The current record indicates that ESM continues to operate within the SKW Americas, Inc. corporate family

and is a subsidiary of Degussa (Germany). It manufactures magnesium-based steel desulfurization reagents (along

with injection equipment and slag conditioners) at three U.S. plants (two in Pennsylvania and one in Indiana) and at

a plant in Canada and one in Tianjin, China. See, e.g., CR at I-26; PR at I-21.

 88 According to the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”), Rossborough imports a mixture of magnesium and

limestone from China for subsequent blending at its Walkerton, IN plant. See, e.g., CR at I-27; PR at I-21.

15

activities of grinders does not indicate that the industry has changed since the original investigation. 

US Magnesium asks us to include grinders in the domestic industry,83 and no other parties participated in

this expedited proceeding.84 Domestic production of granular pure magnesium in 2005 was estimated by

adding the quantity of pure magnesium ingot produced by US Magnesium85 and shipped to U.S. grinders

plus the estimated tonnage of imported pure ingot magnesium ***.86

With respect to related party issues, there is only limited additional information about ESM

beyond that discussed in the Commission’s original determination and no data concerning whether it

***.87 There is also only limited information available regarding other possible related parties.88 Since
 89 Vice Chairman Aranoff determines that there is one domestic industry composed of the domestic producers of

pure magnesium whether in ingot or granular form, including grinders.

 90 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a).

 91 SAA, H.R. Rep. No. 103-316, vol. I, at 883-84 (1994). The SAA states that “{t}he likelihood of injury

standard applies regardless of the nature of the Commission’s original determination (material injury, threat of

material injury, or material retardation of an industry). Likewise, the standard applies to suspended investigations

that were never completed.” SAA at 883.

 92 While the SAA states that “a separate determination regarding current material injury is not necessary,” it

indicates that “the Commission may consider relevant factors such as current and likely continued depressed

shipment levels and current and likely continued {sic} prices for the domestic like product in the U.S. market in

making its determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of material injury if the order is revoked.” 

SAA at 884.

16

we lack current data with respect to these firms, we are unable to resolve whether any domestic producers

are related parties, let alone whether appropriate circumstances exist to exclude any from the domestic

industry.

For these reasons, we define the domestic industry as domestic producers of pure and alloy

magnesium, including primary and secondary magnesium, and magnesium in ingot and granular form.89

III. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF MATERIAL INJURY IF

THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ORDERS ARE REVOKED

A. Legal Standard in a Five-Year Review

In a five-year review conducted under section 751(c) of the Act, Commerce will revoke an

antidumping duty order unless: (1) it makes a determination that dumping is likely to continue or recur,

and (2) the Commission makes a determination that revocation of the antidumping duty order “would be

likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.”90

The SAA states that “under the likelihood standard, the Commission will engage in a counter-factual

analysis; it must decide the likely impact in the reasonably foreseeable future of an important change in

the status quo – the revocation or termination of a proceeding and the elimination of its restraining effects

on volumes and prices of imports.”91 Thus, the likelihood standard is prospective in nature.92 The U.S.
 93 See, e.g., NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1352 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003) (“‘likely’

means probable within the context of 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) and 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)”), aff’d mem., 05-1019 (Fed.

Cir. August 3, 2005); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, Slip Op. 02-153 at 7-8 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 24, 2002)

(same); Usinor Industeel, S.A. v. United States, Slip Op. 02-152 at 4 n.3 & 5-6 n.6 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 20, 2002)

(“more likely than not” standard is “consistent with the court’s opinion”; “the court has not interpreted ‘likely’ to

imply any particular degree of ‘certainty’”); Indorama Chemicals (Thailand) Ltd. v. United States, Slip Op. 02-105

at 20 (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 4, 2002) (“standard is based on a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury, not a

certainty”); Usinor v. United States, Slip Op. 02-70 at 43-44 (Ct. Int’l Trade July 19, 2002) (“‘likely’ is tantamount

to ‘probable,’ not merely ‘possible’”).

 94 For a complete statement of Commissioner Okun’s interpretation of the likely standard, see Additional Views

of Vice Chairman Deanna Tanner Okun Concerning the “Likely” Standard in Certain Seamless Carbon and Alloy

Steel Standard, Line and Pressure Pipe from Argentina, Brazil, Germany, and Italy, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-362 and 731-

TA-707 to 710 (Review) (Remand), USITC Pub. 3754 (Feb. 2005).

 95 Commissioner Lane notes that, consistent with her views in Pressure Sensitive Plastic Tape from Italy, Inv.

No. AA1921-167 (Second Review), USITC Pub. 3698 (June 2004) at 15-17, she does not concur with the U.S. Court

of International Trade’s interpretation of “likely” but she will apply the Court’s standard in this review and all

subsequent reviews until either Congress clarifies the meaning or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

addresses the issue.

 96 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(5).

 97 SAA at 887. Among the factors that the Commission should consider in this regard are “the fungibility or

differentiation within the product in question, the level of substitutability between the imported and domestic

products, the channels of distribution used, the methods of contracting (such as spot sales or long-term contracts),

and lead times for delivery of goods, as well as other factors that may only manifest themselves in the longer term,

such as planned investment and the shifting of production facilities.” Id.

 98 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1).

 99 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1). The statute further provides that the presence or absence of any factor that the

Commission is required to consider shall not necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the Commission’s

determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(5). While the Commission must consider all factors, no one factor is

necessarily dispositive. See SAA at 886.

17

Court of International Trade has found that “likely,” as used in the five-year review provisions of the Act,

means “probable,” and the Commission applies that standard in five-year reviews.93 94 95

The statute states that “the Commission shall consider that the effects of revocation or termination

may not be imminent, but may manifest themselves only over a longer period of time.”96 According to

the SAA, a “‘reasonably foreseeable time’ will vary from case-to-case, but normally will exceed the

‘imminent’ timeframe applicable in a threat of injury analysis in original investigations.”97

Although the standard in a five-year review is not the same as the standard applied in an original

antidumping duty investigation, it contains some of the same fundamental elements. The statute provides

that the Commission is to “consider the likely volume, price effect, and impact of imports of the subject

merchandise on the industry if the orders are revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated.”98 It

directs the Commission to take into account its prior injury determination, whether any improvement in

the state of the industry is related to the order or the suspension agreement under review, whether the

industry is vulnerable to material injury if the orders are revoked or the suspension agreement is

terminated, and any findings by Commerce regarding duty absorption pursuant to 19 U.S.C.

§ 1675(a)(4).99
 100 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(4).

 101 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 15. For example, in its analysis of whether the statutory captive production

provision applied, the Commission separately examined captive production of magnesium ingot and magnesium in

granular form. The Commission did not find that the statutory captive production provision applied with respect to

internal transfers of magnesium ingot, and with respect to granular pure magnesium, the Commission found that the

third statutory criterion was not satisfied because the granular magnesium production sold in the merchant market

was generally used in the production of the downstream article, reagents for the desulfurization segment. Although

it found that the statutory captive production provision did not apply, the Commission nevertheless considered

captive production as a relevant condition of competition. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 16-17.

 102 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 16. Magcorp produced magnesium ingot using an electrolytic process in

which brine from the surface waters of the Great Salt Lake in Utah was evaporated and treated to produce a

concentrated solution of magnesium chloride, which was further concentrated and dried to yield magnesium chloride

powder. The powder was then melted, further purified, and fed into electrolytic cells operating at 700° Celsius. 

Direct electrical current was sent through the cells to break down the magnesium chloride into chlorine gas and

molten magnesium metal. The metal rose to the surface where it was guided into storage wells and cast into ingots. 

Some Chinese producers used the electrolytic process. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 16 n.84.

 103 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 16. Northwest produced magnesium ingot using a silicothermic process in

which magnesium-bearing dolomite mined from an open pit was the primary feed material. Calcined dolomite,

ferrosilicon, and alumina were ground, heated, and briquetted. The briquets were subsequently reduced in a heated

vacuum, producing magnesium vapor. The vapor was crystallized in a condensing chamber, melted, and ladled into

casting forms. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 16 n.85. The silicothermic process (also known as the Pidgeon

process) is used by a majority of the largest producers in China. See, e.g., CR at I-14 to I-15; PR at I-12 to I-13.

 104 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 16-17. Dow ceased magnesium ingot production in November 1998, and

Northwest ceased production in September 2001. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at n.86.

 105 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17.

 106 See, e.g., CR at I-23 to I-27; PR at I-20 to I-22.

 107 See, e.g., CR at I-27 to I-28; PR at I-22.

18

B. Conditions of Competition and the Business Cycle

In evaluating the likely impact of the subject imports on the domestic industry, the statute directs

the Commission to consider all relevant economic factors “within the context of the business cycle and

conditions of competition that are distinctive to the affected industry.”100

Data issues: In the original investigation, even though the Commission defined a single domestic

like product that included pure magnesium in granular and ingot form, it concluded that it was not

possible to calculate internal shipments as a percentage of total domestic production of granular

magnesium and magnesium ingot combined. Because of the potential for double-counting magnesium

ingot, production data for the two were not combined.101

Supply: During the original investigation POI, two production methods were used to produce

magnesium ingots: the electrolytic process102 and the silicothermic process.103 During this time, there

were three firms that produced magnesium ingot in the United States, Magcorp, Northwest, and Dow.104

In the United States, most granular magnesium was produced from smaller ingots or magnesium chips,

and was ground into powder using a particle reduction process, although one grinder atomized molten

pure magnesium to produce granular magnesium.105 Today, the U.S. market continues to be supplied by

domestic producers as well as subject and non-subject imports. In addition to US Magnesium, which

produces pure and alloy magnesium, the record suggests that ESM, Hart, Read, and Rossborough engage

in grinding operations in the United States.106 There are at least three known producers of secondary

magnesium in the United States: Amacor, MagPro LLC, and MagReTech.107 In addition to the subject

imports from China, non-subject imports also supply the U.S. market. The primary sources of non-
 108 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17-18.

 109 See, e.g., CR at I-43; PR at I-30.

 110 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17.

 111 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17.

 112 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17; Confidential Version of the Commission’s Views at 24.

 113 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17.

 114 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17. *** reported that global demand for pure magnesium increased slightly or

remained unchanged after January 1, 1998. It reported that overall North American demand declined as a result of

falling demand in aluminum alloying, steel desulfurization, and other areas. *** reported that U.S. demand was

either flat or growing several percent per year. Three domestic producers reported demand was cyclical or

unchanged, and one reported demand was decreasing. Four of seven responding importers stated that demand was

unchanged, while the remaining three importers reported demand increasing. Twelve of twenty-five purchasers

reported that demand for the product they produced using magnesium had not changed, eight reported declining

demand, three reported increasing demand, one reported demand fluctuating with ***, and one did not report how

demand had changed. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17; Confidential Version of the Commission’s Views at 24-25

n.92.

 115 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17.

 116 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 17.

 117 See, e.g., CR at I-43; PR at I-34.

 118 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 18-19; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 6, 21.

 119 See, e.g., CR at I-43 to I-44; PR at I-34; CR/PR at Table I-9.

19

subject magnesium ingot during the original investigation were Russia, Canada, and non-subject imports

from China, whereas the primary source of non-subject granular magnesium during the original

investigation was Canada.108 Canada was the primary source of non-subject granular magnesium in

2005.109

Demand: In its original determination, the Commission found that demand for magnesium ingot

largely depended on the demand for aluminum, particularly aluminum sheet used in the production of

beverage cans and other packaging.110 Magnesium ingot also was used in other applications, including

grinding into granular magnesium.111 Twenty purchasers reported that cost shares for pure magnesium

ranged from less than one percent (for various aluminum products and for ***) to more than 90 percent

(for production of desulfurization and alloying products).112 Only alloy magnesium or scrap magnesium

and calcium carbide were cited as potential substitutes for pure magnesium but mainly only for

desulfurization applications, and the Commission found that, even in this context, factors limited their

substitutability for pure magnesium.113 The record in the original investigation contained conflicting

views on whether overall demand was increasing, decreasing, or stable.114 The data gathered in the

original investigation indicated that demand as measured by total apparent domestic consumption for

magnesium ingot and granular magnesium declined during the POI.115 Whereas open-market granular

magnesium consumption increased, open-market magnesium ingot consumption decreased.116 The record

in this review continues to indicate that demand for pure magnesium is largely derived from the demand

for its end uses: aluminum alloying, steel desulfurization, and chemical and pharmaceutical

manufacturing.117 Because it is tied to the business cycles of the magnesium-consuming industries, US

Magnesium asserts that the magnesium industry is unlikely to increase demand for its products with 

lower prices.118 There is only limited information on this record concerning current demand conditions in

the United States.119
 120 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 19; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 7.

 121 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(2).

 122 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(2)(A) to 1675a(a)(2)(D).

 123 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18-19. Due to concerns about double-counting, the Commission compared the

volume of Chinese subject imports with apparent domestic consumption of granular magnesium. The parties to that

proceeding estimated that a metric ton of magnesium ingot was roughly equivalent to a metric ton of granular

magnesium. Using this estimate, the Commission also found the volume of Chinese subject imports was significant. 

See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18 n.97.

 124 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18.

 125 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18.

 126 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18; Confidential Version of Commission’s Views at 26.

 127 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18.

 128 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18.

20

Substitutability: US Magnesium argues that Chinese subject imports are still highly substitutable

for the domestic like product,120 and the record in this expedited review does not indicate otherwise.

C. Likely Volume of Subject Imports

In evaluating the likely volume of imports of subject merchandise if the antidumping duty order

were revoked, the Commission is directed to consider whether the likely volume of imports would be

significant either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States.121 In

doing so, the Commission must consider “all relevant economic factors,” including four enumerated

factors: (1) any likely increase in production capacity or existing unused production capacity in the

exporting country; (2) existing inventories of the subject merchandise, or likely increases in inventories;

(3) the existence of barriers to the importation of the subject merchandise into countries other than the

United States; and (4) the potential for product shifting if production facilities in the foreign country,

which can be used to produce the subject merchandise, are currently being used to produce other

products.122

In its determination in the original investigation, the Commission found the volume of subject

imports of granular magnesium from China and the increase in that volume were significant in all

respects.123 The volume of Chinese subject imports increased from 9,972 metric tons in 1998 to 13,185

metric tons in 1999 and to 15,262 metric tons in 2000.124 The Commission attributed the lower volume of

Chinese subject imports in interim 2001 (2,281 metric tons) as compared to interim 2000 (6,277 metric

tons) to the pendency of the investigation.125 As a share of total apparent domestic granular magnesium

consumption by quantity, Chinese subject imports increased from *** percent in 1998 to *** percent in

1999, to *** percent in 2000, and were lower in interim 2001 (*** percent) compared to interim 2000

(*** percent).126 Apparent domestic consumption of pure granular magnesium decreased between 1998

and 1999 but increased between 1999 and 2000, and was lower in interim 2001 than in interim 2000.127

During this time, the domestic producers’ share of total apparent domestic granular magnesium

consumption declined between 1998 and 1999, increased between 1999 and 2000, and was higher in

interim 2001 than in interim 2000.128 Non-subject imports accounted for *** percent of total apparent
 129 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18; Confidential Version of Commission’s Views at 26-27. As a share of

apparent open-market granular magnesium consumption by quantity, Chinese subject imports were *** percent in

1998, *** percent in 1999, *** percent in 2000, and were *** percent in interim 2001 compared to *** percent in

interim 2000. During this time, the domestic producers’ share of apparent open-market granular magnesium

consumption by quantity was *** percent in 1998, *** percent in 1999, *** percent in 2000, *** percent in interim

2000, and *** percent in interim 2001. Non-subject imports accounted for *** percent of apparent open-market

consumption of granular magnesium by quantity in 1998, *** percent in 1999, *** percent in 2000, *** percent in

interim 2000, and *** percent in interim 2001. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 18-19 n.101; Confidential Version of

Commission’s Views at 27 n.101.

 130 Likewise, there is no information on this record concerning existing inventories of the subject merchandise,

or likely increases in inventories of subject merchandise from China.

 131 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

 132 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

 133 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

 134 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

 135 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

 136 See, e.g., CR at I-52; PR at I-41.

 137 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 25; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at

12.

 138 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 25; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at

12-13.

 139 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 26-27; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 13.

21

domestic consumption of granular magnesium by quantity in 1998, *** percent in 1999, *** percent in

2000, *** percent in interim 2000, and *** percent in interim 2001.129

Due to the lack of response from subject foreign producers, there is limited information in this

record concerning current levels of production capacity in China.130 The Chinese magnesium metalproducing industry at the time of the original investigation was characterized by a large number of

production facilities manufacturing magnesium ingot.131 The total number of magnesium metalproducing plants in China was estimated at eighty-four, with production dominated by nearly sixty

export-oriented plants.132 According to the China Magnesium Association, only twenty-two Chinese

manufacturers had plants with an annual capacity of over 3,000 metric tons.133 The number of Chinese

facilities producing magnesium was also reported during the original investigation to depend largely on

the price level of magnesium ingot.134 In 1997, when magnesium ingot prices were relatively higher,

there were an estimated 400 magnesium plants in China.135 The USGS estimated China’s capacity for

primary magnesium at 528,000 metric tons in 2005.136

US Magnesium argues that the Chinese industry has grown from one producer in 1987 to 84 in

2001 (of which nearly sixty were export-oriented), and the industry is now the largest in the world with

“vast unused capacity” and further expansion plans underway.137 According to US Magnesium, Chinese

capacity has grown from 188,000 metric tons in 2000 to between 469,000 and 527,600 metric tons in

2005.138 US Magnesium argues that the Chinese industry’s production capacity far exceeds consumption

in China and is likely to be sent to the world’s largest consumer of magnesium – the United States.139 US

Magnesium also refers to reports that some 105,000 metric tons of production capacity would be added in
 140 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 26; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 13.

 141 See, e.g., CR at I-51; PR at I-40 to I-41.

 142 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 28-29; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 15, Exh. 1.

 143 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 26-28; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 13-15.

 144 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 30; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 16.

 145 See, e.g., CR at I-52; PR at I-41.

 146 See, e.g., CR at I-52; PR at I-41. Similar trends are reflected in data concerning imports of subject

merchandise from China. See, e.g., CR at I-39; PR at I-30; CR/PR at Figure I-1, Table I-8.

 147 See, e.g., CR at I-53; PR at I-42.

 148 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 27; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 15.

22

China in 2005 and 2006.140 No evidence is in the record to contradict that provided by US Magnesium. 

Available evidence from USGS is consistent with that submitted by US Magnesium. According to USGS

data, estimated Chinese production has also grown significantly over the years, from 70,500 metric tons

in 1998 to 470,000 metric tons in 2005.141

Although only granular pure magnesium is subject to the antidumping duty order currently under

review, US Magnesium argues that product shifting is likely in the magnesium industry, stating that

“virtually all magnesium can be converted into granular form.”142 The history of orders on magnesium

from China provides some evidence of product shifting to the extent that the original order pertained to

pure magnesium in ingot form from China, this order applied to pure magnesium in granular form from

China, and a few years later, another order was put in place regarding alloy magnesium from China, as

discussed above.

US Magnesium argues that the Chinese magnesium industry continues to be export-oriented.143 It

also points out that Chinese magnesium benefits from an export tax rebate (albeit reduced from 13 percent

in 2005 to 5 percent in 2006).144 The record supports these assertions. Export data from the

Chinese Customs Service indicate that total exports of magnesium in granular form from China have

grown significantly from 11,228 metric tons in 1998 to 45,245 metric tons in 2005.145 Exports to the

United States dropped off significantly after the filing of the petition and imposition of the antidumping

duty order, although there was an unexplained but temporary increase in exports of granular pure

magnesium to the United States in 2004 according to that source.146 In addition to the U.S. orders on

other magnesium products from China, antidumping duty orders are also currently in place in Brazil for

imports of pure magnesium (in both pure and ingot form) and alloy magnesium from China.147 According

to US Magnesium, Chinese producers also faced tariff barriers in India and the European Union, at least

until producers in those markets ceased production in the face of low-priced magnesium imports from

China.148

In conclusion, the numerous subject producers in China collectively have substantial production

capacity that has continued to increase in recent years, they produce large quantities of granular pure

magnesium at volumes that have continued to increase, they have shown their ability to shift production

from one form of magnesium to another, and they export substantial and growing quantities of subject

merchandise and continue to rely on the U.S. market even under the discipline of the order. The record
 149 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 30; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 16.

 150 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(3). The SAA states that “{c}onsistent with its practice in investigations, in

considering the likely price effects of imports in the event of revocation and termination, the Commission may rely

on circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence of the adverse effects of unfairly traded imports on domestic prices.” 

SAA at 886.

 151 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 19. Nine of twenty-six purchasers reported quality as the most important

factor for choosing a pure magnesium supplier, and eight reported price. Two purchasers reported availability,

qualified supplier, or purity as the most important factor. Sixteen of twenty-six purchasers listed quality or price as

the second most important factor for choosing a pure magnesium supplier. Twenty-three of twenty-four responding

purchasers of pure magnesium products reported that availability, product consistency, and reliability of supply were

very important purchasing factors, whereas twenty-two reported that product quality was very important and

nineteen reported that delivery time was very important. Twelve reported that lowest price was very important, and

twelve responded that lowest price was somewhat important. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 19 n.104.

 152 See, e.g., CR at I-17; PR at I-14.

 153 See, e.g., CR at I-17; PR at I-14.

 154 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 19.

 155 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 19.

23

also provides some evidence that Chinese producers benefit from export tax rebates and face tariff

barriers in third-country markets.149 In light of these facts as well as our findings in the original

investigation that the volume of subject imports from China was significant in all respects, we conclude

that the likely volume of the subject merchandise from China, both in absolute terms and relative to

consumption and production in the United States, would be significant, absent the restraining effect of the

order.

D. Likely Price Effects of Subject Imports

In evaluating the likely price effects of subject imports if the order under review were revoked,

the Commission is directed to consider whether there is likely to be significant underselling by the subject

imports as compared to the domestic like product and whether the subject imports are likely to enter the

United States at prices that otherwise would have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on the

price of the domestic like product.150

In its original determination, the Commission found subject imports from China were highly

substitutable for domestically-produced pure magnesium, particularly in the production of reagent

mixtures for the desulfurization segment of the U.S. market, and that price was an important consideration

in choosing a pure magnesium supplier and pure magnesium products.151 Pricing was generally

determined in transaction-by-transaction negotiations and in contracts and depended on such factors as

the prevailing competitive environment and potential purchase volumes.152 Magnesium prices

were usually quoted on a delivered basis, and typical sales terms were net 30 days; price lists were not

generally used.153 Average unit values as well as the direct pricing data collected in the original

investigation showed declining prices of Chinese subject imports, declining domestic prices, as well as

considerable underselling by Chinese subject imports at significant margins over the original

investigation POI.154 Chinese subject imports undersold the domestic like product in all possible price

comparisons at average margins that increased from 49.1 percent in 1998 to 72.7 percent in 1999, and to

79.5 percent in 2000.155 Although most of the shipments of Chinese subject imports were to the
 156 As a share of total shipments of Chinese subject imports to the U.S. market, those shipped to the

desulfurization segment were *** percent in 1988, *** percent in 1999, *** percent in 2000, *** percent in interim

2000, and *** percent in interim 2001. Although the Commission’s report in the original investigation suggested

that *** percent in 1999, *** percent in 2000, and *** percent in interim 2000 of Chinese subject imports were

shipped to the *** segment, the Commission explained that further inquiries revealed that those shipments were

destined for use in ***. See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 20 n.107; Confidential Version of the Commission’s Views

at 28 n.107.

 157 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 19-20; Confidential Version of the Commission’s Views at 28.

 158 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 20.

 159 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 20.

 160 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 20.

 161 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 29; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at

16.

 162 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 29-30; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 16, 19-21.

 163 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 30; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at

16-17.

 164 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 30; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution at

17.

 165 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

 166 See, e.g., CR at I-50; PR at I-40.

24

desulfurization segment of the U.S. market ***,156 the Commission found that Chinese subject imports

had adverse effects throughout the market.157 For example, it found the low-priced Chinese subject

imports drove domestic producers and Israeli producer DSM largely out of the desulfurization segment of

the U.S. market, leading to intensified price competition in the aluminum alloying segment of the market

between the domestic like product, magnesium ingot imports from Israel, and non-subject magnesium

ingot imports, such as imports from Russia.158 Moreover, it found that the prices of Chinese subject

imports in the desulfurization segment of the market were so low that they were even lower than

magnesium ingot prices to that and other segments of the market.159 For these reasons, the Commission

found significant price underselling by subject imports from China as compared with the price of

domestic like product, and that imports of such merchandise otherwise depressed prices to a significant

degree.160

There were no current pricing data in these expedited reviews. According to US Magnesium,

China remains the low-price supplier to the world market.161 Even though Chinese producers have

allegedly pushed other world producers into closure, US Magnesium insists that prices are still weak as

world demand has not caught up with supply.162 It asserts that recent price increases in Chinese

magnesium products still leave prices of those products at levels that are much lower than U.S. market

prices.163 US Magnesium anticipates that revocation of the order would lead to large volumes of very

low-priced imports from China that would cause renewed price suppression and depression.164

USGS data support these allegations. With the exception of a slight increase at the beginning of

the year, U.S. magnesium prices fell throughout 2005 and by the end of the year were 30 to 40 cents per

pound lower than at the end of 2004.165 USGS also reported that contract prices among the magnesium

producers and large consuming companies for 2006 were reported to be between $1.25 and $1.32 per

pound, which was less than the 2005 contract level of about $1.40 to $1.50 per pound.166

Based on this record, we find it likely that, absent the antidumping duty order, competitive

conditions would return to those prevailing prior to the imposition of the order. In conjunction with our
 167 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(4).

 168 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(4). Section 752(a)(6) of the Act states that “the Commission may consider the

magnitude of the margin of dumping or the magnitude of the net countervailable subsidy” in making its

determination in a five-year review. 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(6). The statute defines the “magnitude of the margin of

dumping” to be used by the Commission in five-year reviews as “the dumping margin or margins determined by the

administering authority under section 1675a(c)(3) of this title.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(C)(iv); see also SAA at 887. 

Commerce expedited its five-year review of granular pure magnesium from China and found that revocation of the

antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the following margins: 

24.67 percent for Minmetals and 305.56 percent for the PRC-wide rate. See 72 Fed. Reg. 5417 (Feb. 6, 2007). 

These were the same margins that Commerce found in the original determination. See, e.g., CR/PR at Table I-2. 

There have been no duty absorption findings by Commerce with respect to the order under review because there

have been no administrative reviews of the antidumping duty order. See, e.g., CR at I-8; PR at I-7.

 169 The SAA states that in assessing whether the domestic industry is vulnerable to injury if the order is revoked,

the Commission “considers, in addition to imports, other factors that may be contributing to overall injury. While

these factors, in some cases, may account for the injury to the domestic industry, they may also demonstrate that an

industry is facing difficulties from a variety of sources and is vulnerable to dumped or subsidized imports.” SAA at

885.

 170 The domestic industry at issue in the original investigation was narrower than that at issue here, due to

differences in the Commission’s definition of the domestic like product and corresponding domestic industry.

25

finding of a likely significant volume of imports from China in the event of revocation as well as the

importance of price in the market, the substitutability of domestic and subject product, the significant

underselling and other significant price effects by subject imports during the original investigation, and

subject imports’ continuing presence in the U.S. market notwithstanding the existence of the order, we

find that subject imports will likely have adverse effects on domestic prices in a market that already

appears to face low and declining prices. We determine that, if the order were revoked, a significant

volume of subject imports from China would be likely to significantly undersell the domestic like product

and would be likely to have significant depressing or suppressing effects on the prices of the domestic

like product within a reasonably foreseeable time.

E. Likely Impact of Subject Imports

In evaluating the likely impact of imports of subject merchandise if the antidumping duty orders

were revoked, the Commission is directed to consider all relevant economic factors that are likely to have

a bearing on the state of the industry in the United States, including but not limited to: (1) likely declines

in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity;

(2) likely negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital,

and investment; and (3) likely negative effects on the existing development and production efforts of the

industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like

product.167 All relevant economic factors are to be considered within the context of the business cycle

and the conditions of competition that are distinctive to the industry.168 As instructed by the statute, we

have considered the extent to which any improvement in the state of the domestic industry is related to

the orders at issue and whether the industry is vulnerable to material injury if the orders are revoked.169

Consistent with its findings in the original investigation that the volume of Chinese subject

imports during the POI and the increase in that volume compared to apparent domestic consumption was

significant, and that there was significant price underselling and significant price depression over that

same period by reason of subject imports from China,170 the Commission found that Chinese subject
 171 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 20-22.

 172 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 21.

 173 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 21. The Commission found that domestic magnesium ingot production

capacity was ***. Several magnesium ingot domestic industry performance indicators declined over the POI,

including production, capacity utilization, commercial shipments, internal consumption, total domestic shipments,

and the unit value of shipments. Transfers to related firms improved somewhat over the POI, but end-of-period

inventories increased. Although there was some fluctuation during the POI, most magnesium ingot employment

indicators worsened. The domestic magnesium ingot producers lost market share throughout the POI, as measured

by their open-market shipments as a share of total apparent domestic magnesium ingot consumption and openmarket shipments as a share of total open-market apparent domestic magnesium ingot consumption, although the

domestic magnesium ingot producers’ captive shipments as a share of total apparent domestic magnesium ingot

consumption increased during the POI. The domestic magnesium ingot producers had an ***; their cash flow and

their capital expenditures and research and development expenses declined throughout the POI; and petitioners

argued that domestic magnesium ingot producers had difficulty raising capital and reduced returns on investment. 

See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 21 n.117; Confidential Version of the Commission’s Views at 30 n.117.

 174 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 21.

 175 See, e.g., USITC Pub. 3467 at 21; Confidential Version of the Commission’s Views at 30.

 176 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 16-17; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 10-11.

 177 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 16-17; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of Institution

at 10-11.

 178 See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments at 18, 23-24; US Magnesium’s Response to the Notice of

Institution at 11.

26

imports were having a significant adverse impact on the domestic industry.171 Specifically, the

Commission found that significant volumes of Chinese subject imports at low prices displaced the

domestic like product in the desulfurization segment of the market and intensified competition throughout

the U.S. market, including in the aluminum alloying segment where the domestic like product also

competed with subject imports from Israel and non-subject imports from countries like Russia.172

Domestic producer Magcorp declared bankruptcy at the end of the POI, Northwest announced the closure

of its production facilities in June 2001, and the condition of the magnesium ingot producers declined

during the POI.173 Although the Commission considered that the data concerning grinders were less

meaningful to the extent they included some reagent production, it found that the grinders also

experienced declining performance throughout the POI.174 *** Rossborough testified about the injurious

effects of Chinese subject imports on its operations, and the data showed the deteriorating condition of the

grinders.175

US Magnesium argues that the antidumping duty order on granular pure magnesium has enabled

the domestic industry to improve, *** that it had previously lost to imports of granular magnesium from

China.176 US Magnesium *** after a 2002 scope ruling by Commerce establishing that Chinese pure

magnesium ingot imported into Canada, ground into powder, and exported to the United States was

covered under the scope of the order.177 Nevertheless, US Magnesium insists that the domestic industry is

still vulnerable, due in part to the conditions of competition distinctive to this industry that generally

increase the ease with which low-priced imported material from China can take customers away from

domestic producers and suppress and depress prices.178

There is little information on the record of this expedited review pertaining to many of the

financial and trade indicators, such as output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on

investment, capacity utilization, cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise

capital, investment, and development and production efforts of the industry, that we generally consider in
 179 US Magnesium asserts that the electrolytic cells used in the production of magnesium will deteriorate and

need to be rebuilt at high costs if they are not kept running constantly. See, e.g., US Magnesium’s Final Comments

at 19.

27

assessing whether the domestic industry is in a weakened condition as contemplated by the statute. 

Therefore, given the absence of industry performance data, we are unable to determine whether the

industry is currently vulnerable.

We find that if the order were revoked, the likely volume of subject imports would be significant,

at the expense of the domestic industry. As discussed above, revocation of the antidumping duty order

likely would lead to significant increases in the volume of subject imports at prices that would likely

undersell the domestic like product and significantly depress U.S. prices. In addition, the likely volume

and price effects of the subject imports likely would cause the domestic industry to lose market share,

with a significant adverse impact on the domestic industry’s production, capacity utilization,179 shipments,

sales, and revenue levels. This reduction in the industry’s production, shipments, sales, and 

revenue levels would have a direct adverse impact on the industry’s profitability as well as its ability to

raise capital and make and maintain necessary capital investments.

Accordingly, based on the limited record in this expedited review, we conclude that, if the

antidumping duty order were revoked, subject imports from China would be likely to have a significant

adverse impact on the domestic industry within a reasonably foreseeable time.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we determine that revocation of the antidumping duty order on pure

magnesium in granular form from China would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material

injury to the domestic industry within a reasonably foreseeable time.
 
I-1

INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE REVIEW

 1

 19 U.S.C. 1675(c).

 2

 There are three antidumping orders in place covering imports from China of the following magnesium products: 

pure ingot, pure granular, and alloy. The Commission’s determinations related to those orders are: Magnesium

From China, Russia, and Ukraine, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-696-698 (Final), USITC Publication 2885, May 1995 (pure

magnesium in cast or ingot form); Pure Magnesium From China and Israel, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-403 and

731-TA-895-896 (Final), USITC Publication 3467, November 2001 (pure magnesium in granular form); and

Magnesium From China and Russia, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1071-1072 (Final), USITC Publication 3763, April 2005

(alloy magnesium). See the sections of this report entitled “Other Investigations Concerning Magnesium” and

“Domestic Like Product and Domestic Industry” for further information.

Also see the domestic interested party’s Response, dated November 21, 2006 (“Response”) for a

comparison of import trends for the three magnesium products and the timing of the filing of petitions for import

relief and issuance of the various antidumping duty orders. The domestic interested party argues that “the history of

these cases demonstrates that revocation of any one of the orders would be tantamount to revoking all three orders,

because the Chinese would simply shift their efforts in the U.S. market to selling the product that is no longer

covered by an order.” The domestic interested party requests, therefore, that the Commission “consider the order on

pure magnesium in granular form in the context of the other two antidumping orders on Chinese magnesium.” 

Response, pp. 4-5 and attachment 1.

 3

 70 FR 31537, June 1, 2005. All interested parties were requested to respond to this notice by submitting the

information requested by the Commission. The Commission’s notice of institution is presented in app. A.

 4

 The Commission received one submission in response to its notice of institution for the subject review

(hereinafter “Response”). It was filed on behalf of US Magnesium LLC (“US Magnesium” or “the domestic

interested party”), a domestic producer of pure and alloy magnesium and the successor firm to Magcorp (a petitioner

in the original investigation on pure magnesium in granular form from China). US Magnesium indicated in its

response that it accounted for 100 percent of domestic production of primary (pure and alloy) magnesium during

2005. Based on a definition of a single domestic like product consisting of pure magnesium in both ingot and

granular forms and based on the treatment of granular magnesium shipments as production by US Magnesium, US

Magnesium estimated that it accounted for *** percent of U.S. production in 2005; if the volume shipped by US

Magnesium to U.S. grinders is treated as production by the U.S. grinders rather than production by US Magnesium,

US Magnesium accounted for *** percent of production of the domestic like product. Based on a definition of the

domestic like product that encompasses both primary pure and alloy magnesium (in both ingot and granular forms)

and secondary alloy magnesium and based on the treatment of magnesium shipments as production by US

Magnesium, US Magnesium accounted for *** percent of U.S. production in 2005; if the volume shipped by US

Magnesium to U.S. grinders is treated as production by the U.S. grinders, rather than production by US Magnesium,

US Magnesium accounted for *** percent of U.S. production of the domestic like product. Letter from US

Magnesium, December 5, 2006, pp. 3-4. 

I-3

INTRODUCTION

Background

On October 2, 2006, in accordance with section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,1

the U.S. International Trade Commission (“Commission”) gave notice that it had instituted a review to

determine whether revocation of the antidumping duty order on pure magnesium (in granular form) from

China2

 would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably

foreseeable time.3

 On January 5, 2007, the Commission determined that the domestic interested party

response to its notice of institution was adequate;4

 the Commission also determined that the respondent
 5

 The Commission did not receive any responses to its notice of institution from Chinese producers or importers

of the subject merchandise.

 6

 Commissioner Jennifer A. Hillman found both the domestic interested party group response and the respondent

interested party group response to be inadequate. In the original determination, the Commissioner defined the

relevant domestic like product as pure granular magnesium. No domestic producer of granular pure magnesium

(other than US Magnesium) responded to the Commission’s notice of institution, nor was there any response from

any respondent interested party. Commissioner Hillman found an inadequate domestic interested party group

response as well as an inadequate respondent interested party group response and voted for an expedited review.

 7

 The Commission’s statement on adequacy is presented in app. B.

 8

 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(3).

 9

 Chairman Daniel R. Pearson and Commissioner Deanna Tanner Okun dissented. Chairman Pearson and

Commissioner Okun voted to conduct a full review in order to reconsider the like product definition.

 10 Cited Federal Register notices beginning with the Commission’s institution of a five-year sunset review are

presented in app. A. 

 11 On October 26, 2000, the petitioners amended the petition to include the USWA International as a copetitioner, and on April 20, 2001 amended the petition to add “concerned employees of Northwest Alloys, Inc.” as

co-petitioners.

I-4

interested party response was inadequate.5 6 The Commission found no other circumstances that would

warrant conducting a full review.7

 Accordingly, the Commission determined that it would conduct an

expedited review pursuant to section 751(c)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930.8 9

 The Commission voted on

this review on February 20, 2007, and notified the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) of its

determination on March 1, 2007. Information relating to the background of the review is presented

below:10

Effective date Action Federal Register citation

November 19, 2001 Commerce’s antidumping duty order 66 FR 57936

October 2, 2006 Commission’s institution of five-year review 71 FR 58001

January 5, 2007 Commission’s determination to conduct

expedited five-year review

72 FR 3876, January 26, 2007

February 6, 2007 Commerce’s notice of final results of

expedited five-year review

72 FR 5417

February 20, 2007 Commission’s vote Not applicable

March 1, 2007 Commission’s determination transmitted to

Commerce 

Not applicable

The Original Investigations

The original investigations resulted from a petition filed on October 17, 2000, by Magnesium

Corp. of America (“Magcorp”) and the United Steel Workers of America, Local 8319,11 alleging that an

industry in the United States was materially injured and threatened with material injury by reason of
 12 On September 27, 2001, Commerce published notice of a negative final determination of sales at less than fair

value (“LTFV”) in connection with the investigation on Russia (66 FR 49347). Accordingly, the Commission

terminated its antidumping investigation concerning pure magnesium from Russia (Inv. No. 731-TA-897 (Final)).

 13 The Commission determined that an industry in the United States was not materially injured or threatened with

material injury, and the establishment of an industry in the United States was not materially retarded, by reason of

imports of pure magnesium from Israel that Commerce found to be subsidized and sold in the United States at

LTFV. Pure Magnesium From China and Israel (hereinafter “Original Views”), p. 3.

 14 66 FR 49345, September 27, 2001.

 15 Original Views, p. 3. Commissioners Marcia E. Miller and Jennifer A. Hillman dissented. Pure Magnesium

from China and Israel, Dissenting Views of Commissioners Marcia E. Miller and Jennifer A. Hillman (hereinafter

“Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views”), p. 31. The Commission made a negative final determination with

respect to pure magnesium from Israel. Original Views, p. 3.

 16 66 FR 57936.

 17 The countervailing duty orders on pure ingot magnesium and alloy magnesium and the antidumping duty order

on pure ingot magnesium from Canada were issued in 1992 (57 FR 39392, August 31, 1992) following an

affirmative determination in Inv. Nos. 701-TA-309 and 731-TA-528 (Final), and were continued in 2000 (65 FR

49964, August 16, 2000) following sunset reviews. The antidumping duty order on pure magnesium from Canada

was retroactively revoked effective August 1, 2000 (69 FR 70649, December 7, 2004), and the countervailing duty

orders on pure ingot magnesium and alloy magnesium from Canada were retroactively revoked effective August 16,

2005 (71 FR 38382, July 6, 2006).

 18 An antidumping duty order on pure ingot magnesium from Russia was issued in 1995 (60 FR 25691, May 12,

1995) following an affirmative determination in Inv. No. 731-TA-697 (Final). The order was revoked effective

May 12, 2000 (65 FR 41944, July 7, 2000; as amended by 65 FR 53700, September 5, 2000). Another antidumping

duty order for pure and alloy magnesium from Russia was issued in 2005 (70 FR 19930, April 15, 2005) following

an affirmative determination in Inv. No. 731-TA-1072 (Final).

 19 An antidumping duty order on pure ingot magnesium from the Ukraine was issued in 1995 (60 FR 25691, May

12, 1995) following an affirmative determination in Inv. No. 731-TA-698 (Final)). The order was revoked in 1999

(64 FR 46182, August 24, 1999) following a remand determination by the Commission.

I-5

imports of pure magnesium from Israel and Russia,12 and pure granular magnesium from China, that were

alleged to be sold in the United States at less than fair value (“LTFV”), and by reason of imports of pure

magnesium from Israel that were alleged to be subsidized by the Government of Israel.13

Commerce made its final affirmative dumping determination with respect to pure magnesium in

granular form from China on September 27, 2001. Commerce determined that the following percentage

weighted-average margins existed for the period April 1, 2000 through September 30, 2000: Minmetals

Precious & Rare Minerals Import and Export/China National Nonferrous Metals Industry Trading Group

Corp. (“Minmetals”) (24.67 percent) and all others (305.56 percent).14 The Commission subsequently

determined that an industry in the United States was materially injured by reason of imports of pure

magnesium (in granular form) from China that were sold at LTFV.15 Commerce issued an antidumping

duty order on November 19, 2001.16

Other Investigations Concerning Magnesium

Beginning in 1992, the Commission has conducted a series of Title VII investigations and fiveyear reviews of existing orders on magnesium from five countries: Canada, China, Israel, Russia, and

Ukraine. Table I-1 presents actions taken by the Commission and Commerce with respect to the

magnesium investigations concerning China. With respect to the other sources, during portions of the

period from 1998 to date, countervailing duty and antidumping duty orders were in place for pure and

alloy ingot magnesium from Canada17 and Russia18 and for pure ingot from Ukraine.19 See table I-3 in 
 20 64 FR 73574, December 30, 1999.

I-6

Table I-1

Magnesium: Actions taken by the Commission and Commerce in Title VII investigations with

respect to China

Action

Date

of action

Federal

Register

citation

Commission’s affirmative determination in Inv. No. 731-TA-696 (Final)

(pure ingot)1 05/17/1995 60 FR 26456

Antidumping duty order issued2

 (A-570-832) (pure ingot) 05/12/1995 60 FR 25691

Institution of first five-year review (expedited) 04/03/2000 65 FR 17531

Commission’s affirmative determination in first five-year review 09/12/2000 65 FR 55047

Continuation of antidumping duty order3

(pure ingot) 10/27/2000 65 FR 64422

Institution of second five-year review (full) 07/01/2005 70 FR 38101

Commission’s affirmative determination in second five-year review 06/26/2006 71 FR 36359

Continuation of antidumping duty order4

 (pure ingot) 07/10/2006 71 FR 38860

Commission’s affirmative determination in Inv. No. 731-TA-895 (Final)

(pure granular) 11/20/2001 66 FR 58162

Antidumping duty order issued5

 (A-570-864) (pure granular) 11/19/2001 66 FR 57936

Commission’s affirmative determination in Inv. No. 731-TA-1071 (Final)

(alloy) 04/15/2005 70 FR 19969

Antidumping duty order issued (A-570-896)6 (alloy) 04/15/2005 70 FR 19928 1

 The Commission made a negative determination with respect to alloy magnesium.

2

 Commerce found the weighted-average antidumping duty margin to be 108.26 percent ad valorem (65 FR

47713, August 3, 2000). 3

 In its first five-year review, Commerce found the weighted-average antidumping duty margin to be 108.26

percent ad valorem (65 FR 47713, August 3, 2000). 4

 In its second five-year review, Commerce found the weighted-average antidumping duty margin to be 108.26

percent ad valorem (71 FR 580, January 5, 2006). 5

 Commerce found a weighted-average antidumping duty margin of 24.67 percent ad valorem for Minmetals and

a country-wide rate of 305.56 percent ad valorem. 6

 Commerce found a weighted-average antidumping duty margin of 24.67 percent ad valorem for Minmetals and

305.56 percent ad valorem for all other manufacturers and exporters in China (66 FR 49345, September 27, 2001).

Source: Cited Federal Register notices.

Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, Investigation Nos. 701-TA309-A-B and 731-TA-696 (Second Review), USITC Publication 3859, July 2006, for additional

information on these actions. In addition, on December 17, 1999, the Commission received a request

from the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) for an investigation under section 332(g) of the

Act for the purpose of providing advice concerning possible modifications to the U.S. Generalized

System of Preferences (“GSP”) for several products including alloy and granular magnesium. 

Subsequently, on December 23, 1999, the Commission instituted investigation No. 332-410.20 In a
 21 Proclamation 7325 of June 29, 2000 to Modify Duty-Free Treatment Under the Generalized System of

Preferences and for Other Purposes, 65 FR 41315, July 3, 2000.

 22 Domestic interested party comments on adequacy, December 11, 2006 (hereinafter “Adequacy Comments”), p.

4.

 23 Section 754 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1675c).

I-7

Presidential Proclamation of June 29, 2000, the President added granular magnesium to the list of GSPeligible articles.21

With respect to the Commission’s affirmative determination in its recent review on pure

magnesium (ingot) from China, the domestic interested party states that “the near-contemporaneity of the

Commission’s affirmative determination regarding the likelihood of material injury due to imports of pure

magnesium in ingot form from China is highly probative of the likely injury that would be suffered by the

domestic industry if the order on pure magnesium in granular form were revoked.”22

COMMERCE’S REVIEWS

Administrative Reviews

Commerce has not completed any antidumping duty administrative reviews of subject

merchandise from China.

Results of Expedited Five-Year Review

Table I-2 presents the margins calculated by Commerce in its original investigation and in its

expedited five-year review. 

Table I-2

Pure magnesium: Commerce’s original and five-year review antidumping duty margins for

producers/exporters from China

Producer/exporter Original margin

(percent ad valorem)

Five-year review margin

(percent ad valorem)

Minmetals 24.67 24.67

All others 305.56 305.56

Source: Antidumping Duty Order, 66 FR 57936, November 19, 2001, and Final Results of the Expedited Sunset

Review of the Antidumping Duty Order, 72 FR 5417, February 6, 2007.

DISTRIBUTION OF CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT FUNDS

The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“CDSOA”) (also known as the Byrd

Amendment) provides that assessed duties received pursuant to antidumping or countervailing duty

orders must be distributed to affected domestic producers for certain qualifying expenditures that these

producers incur after the issuance of such orders.23 During the review period, qualified U.S. producers of

pure magnesium were eligible to receive disbursements from U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(“Customs”) under CDSOA relating to the antidumping duty order on the subject product beginning in
 24 19 CFR 159.64 (g).

 25 The meaning of this term is the same as that used by the American Society for Testing and Materials in its

Annual Book of ASTM Standards: Volume 01.02 Aluminum and Magnesium Alloys.

I-8

Federal fiscal year 2001.24 Table I-3 presents CDSOA disbursements and claims for Federal fiscal years

(October 1-September 30) 2001-06, by firm.

Table I-3

Pure magnesium: CDSOA disbursements, by firm, and total claims, Federal fiscal years 2001-06

Item

Federal fiscal year

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Disbursements (1,000 dollars)

US Magnesium1 0 0 0 0 0 293

Claims (1,000 dollars)

US Magnesium1 0 38,757 37,649 0 37,597 37,533

 1 US Magnesium was the only claimant.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s CDSOA Annual Reports. www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/add_cvd,

retrieved January 11, 2007.

THE PRODUCT

Scope

In its original antidumping duty order, Commerce defined the subject merchandise (pure

magnesium in granular form) as follows:

The scope of this order includes imports of pure magnesium products, regardless of

chemistry, including, without limitation, raspings, granules, turnings, chips, powder, and

briquettes, except as noted above. Pure magnesium includes: (1) Products that contain at

least 99.95 percent primary magnesium, by weight (generally referred to as “ultra-pure”

magnesium); (2) products that contain less than 99.95 percent but not less than 99.8

percent primary magnesium, by weight (generally referred to as “pure” magnesium); (3)

chemical combinations of pure magnesium and other material(s) in which the pure

magnesium content is 50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 percent, by weight, that do

not conform to an “ASTM Specification for Magnesium Alloy”25 (generally referred to as

“off-specification pure magnesium); and (4) physical mixtures of pure magnesium and

other material(s) in which the pure magnesium content is 50 percent or greater, but less

than 99.8 percent, by weight.

Excluded from this order are mixtures containing 90 percent or less pure magnesium by

weight and one or more of certain non-magnesium granular materials to make

magnesium-based reagent mixtures. The non-magnesium granular materials of which the

Department is aware used to make such excluded reagents are: Lime, calcium metal,

calcium silicon, calcium carbide, calcium carbonate, carbon, slag coagulants, fluorspar,

nephaline syenite, feldspar, aluminum, alumina (Al2O3), calcium aluminate, soda ash,
 26 66 FR 57936, November 19, 2001.

 27 Ibid.

 28 HTS subheading 8104.30.00 may contain either pure or alloy magnesium products. However, according to

petitioners in the original investigation, more than 95 percent of the entries under this subheading are pure

magnesium products containing at least 99.8 percent magnesium by weight. Staff Report of October 24, 2001 for

Investigation Nos. 701-TA-403 and 731-TA-895-896 (Final): Pure Magnesium from China and Israel (hereinafter

“Original Staff Report”), p. I-7, fn. 20, citing conference transcript (p. 67).

 29 Pure magnesium in ingot form is generally classified under HTS subheading 8104.11.00 and alloy magnesium

is generally classified under HTS subheading 8104.19.00.

I-9

hydrocarbons, graphite, coke, silicon, rare earth metals/mischmetal, cryolite, silica/fly

ash, magnesium oxide, periclase, ferroalloys, dolomitic lime, and colemanite. A party

importing a magnesium-based reagent which includes one or more materials not on this

list is required to seek a scope clarification from the Department before such a mixture

may be imported free of antidumping duties.

The merchandise subject to this order is currently classifiable under 8104.30.00 of the

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTS”) 26

Commerce further explained in the original antidumping duty order that:

There is an existing antidumping duty order on pure magnesium from the People’s

Republic of China (PRC). See Notice of Antidumping Duty Orders: Pure Magnesium

From the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and Ukraine; Notice of

Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Antidumping Duty

Investigation of Pure Magnesium From the Russian Federation, 60 FR 25691 (May 12,

1995). The scope of this order excludes pure magnesium that is already covered by the

existing order on pure magnesium in ingot form, and currently classifiable under item

numbers 8104.11.00 and 8104.19.00 of the HTS.27

U.S. Tariff Treatment

Table I-4 presents the latest published tariff rates for the subject magnesium in granular form.28

U.S. imports from China of pure magnesium in ingot form and alloy magnesium are also subject to

current antidumping duty orders but are not the subject of this review (see table I-1).29

Table I-4

Magnesium in granular form: Tariff rates, 2007

HTS

subheading1 Article description2

General3 Special4 Column 25

Rates (percent ad valorem)

8104.30.00

Magnesium and articles thereof,

including waste and scrap:

Raspings, turnings and granules,

graded according to size; powders 4.4 Free 60.5

Notes on next page.
 30 Unless otherwise noted, all of the discussion in this section is from the original investigation (see Original

Staff Report, pp. I-7 through I-9) supplemented with information on the public record for the Commission’s full

review in 2006 on pure and alloy aluminum (see Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium

From China (Second Review), USITC Publication 3859, July 2006, pp. I-16 through I-21).

 31 Unless otherwise noted, the term “pure magnesium” consists of pure magnesium ingot and pure granular

magnesium.

 32 “Unwrought” magnesium is pure magnesium that has not been worked in any way. “Wrought” magnesium is

magnesium that has been worked into a desired shape, for example the working of the magnesium to produce

extrusions, rolled product, forgings, etc. Wrought magnesium is not within the scope of any of the current

antidumping duty orders in place for magnesium from China.

 33 Ultra-high purity (“UHP”) magnesium is unwrought magnesium containing at least 99.95 percent magnesium

by weight and is used as a reagent in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Commodity-grade magnesium is

unwrought magnesium containing at least 99.8 percent magnesium but less than 99.95 percent magnesium by weight

and is most commonly used in the aluminum alloying industry.

I-10

Continuation.

1

 While HTS subheadings are provided for convenience and customs purposes, Commerce states that the

written description of the scope is dispositive. 2

 An abridged description is provided for convenience; however, an unabridged description may be obtained

from the respective headings, subheadings, and legal notes of the HTS. 3

 Normal trade relations rates, formerly known as the most-favored-nation duty rate. Imports from China enter

under the general rate. 4

 For eligible goods under the Generalized System of Preferences, Australia Free Trade Agreement, Caribbean

Basin Economic Recovery Act, Andean Trade Preference Act, Israel Free Trade Agreement, Central American

Free Trade Agreement, Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Chile Free Trade Agreement, Morocco Free Trade

Agreement, Singapore Free Trade Agreement, and NAFTA-originating goods of Canada and Mexico. Imports from

Canada are eligible to enter duty-free. 5

 Applies to imports from a small number of countries that do not enjoy normal trade relations duty status.

Source: Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2006).

Description and Uses30

Magnesium, the eighth most abundant element in the earth’s crust and the third most plentiful

element dissolved in seawater, is a silver-white metallic element. It is the lightest of all structural metals

with a density approximately 63 percent of that of aluminum, the principal metal with which it competes

in the U.S. market. Magnesium’s light weight and high vibrational-dampening properties have

encouraged research to develop magnesium-based alloys with improved physical and mechanical

properties for use as a structural metal in applications where minimizing weight is an important design

consideration. Magnesium is available in two principal forms, pure31 and alloy. Magnesium may also be

classified as primary magnesium (which is magnesium produced by directly decomposing raw materials

into magnesium metal) or as secondary magnesium. Secondary magnesium is magnesium produced by

recycling magnesium-based scrap, containing less than 50 percent of primary magnesium. 

Pure magnesium in unwrought form32 contains at least 99.8 percent magnesium by weight.33

Alloy magnesium (or magnesium alloy) consists of magnesium and other metals, typically aluminum and

zinc, containing less than 99.8 percent magnesium by weight but more than 50 percent magnesium by

weight, with magnesium the largest metallic element in the alloy by weight. “Off-specification pure”

magnesium is magnesium that contains 50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 percent, magnesium by

weight, that does not conform to an ASTM specification for alloy magnesium.
 34 Attachment 2 to the Response.

 35 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium), “Magnesium” (Deborah Kramer), p. 46.1, attachment 3 to the

Response.

 36 The domestic interested party stated that pure magnesium continues to be sold mainly for use in (1) aluminum

alloying, (2) steel desulfurization, and (3) chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturing. Response, p. 6.

 37 The ASTM specifications designate the chemical composition of the alloy. The first two letters designate the

two alloying elements most prevalent in the alloy (e.g., “A” for aluminum, “M” for manganese, or “Z” for zinc),

while the numbers represent the percent of other elements contained in the alloy, by weight. For example, AZ91D

contains 9 percent aluminum, 1 percent zinc, and 90 percent magnesium. 

 38 Although alloy magnesium can be in granular form, most granular magnesium is classified as pure or “offspecification pure” magnesium (alloy magnesium not meeting ASTM specifications for alloy magnesium). 

“Off-specification pure” magnesium falls within the scope of the antidumping duty on magnesium from China in

granular form that is subject to this review.

 39 U.S. grinders were reported during the original investigations to typically sell three different steel

desulfurization blends: (1) containing 90 percent pure magnesium powder and 10 percent lime; (2) containing 25

percent magnesium and 75 percent lime; and (3) containing 8-10 percent magnesium with the remainder lime and

calcium carbonate. Fluorspar and a fluidizer are also incorporated in these products.

I-11

Pure magnesium is widely used in commercial and industrial applications because it is easily

machined and lightweight, has a high strength-to-weight ratio, and has special chemical and electrical

properties. It also has special metallurgical and chemical properties that allow it to alloy well with metals

such as aluminum. Pure magnesium was described during the original investigation as typically used in

the production of aluminum alloys for use in beverage cans and in some automotive parts, in iron and

steel desulfurization, as a reducing agent for various nonferrous metals (titanium, zirconium, hafnium,

uranium, beryllium), and in magnesium anodes for the protection of iron and steel in underground pipe

and water tanks and various marine applications. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”)

2000 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium), “Magnesium” (Deborah Kramer), p. 48.1:34

“Aluminum alloying was the largest application for primary magnesium, with about 53%,

but structural magnesium alloy components, particularly diecastings, have grown to

account for about 23% of the total primary magnesium consumed in the United States. 

Smaller quantities of magnesium were used for desulfurization of iron and steel and as a

reducing agent for other nonferrous metals, such as titanium and beryllium.”

The most recently available update indicates that: “Diecasting, aluminum alloying, and iron and steel

desulfurization, in descending order, were the principal end-use applications for magnesium in the United

States in 2005.”35 36

Alloy magnesium is typically produced to meet various industry-recognized American Society

for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) specifications for alloy magnesium such as AM50A, AM60B, and

AZ91D.37 It is principally used in structural applications, primarily in castings (die, permanent mold, and

sand) and extrusions for the automotive industry. Alloy magnesium has certain properties that improve

its strength, ductility, workability, corrosion resistance, density, or castability compared to pure

magnesium. In contrast, pure magnesium is seldom used in structural applications due to its low tensile

and yield strengths.

The granular magnesium that is subject to this review consists of all physical forms of pure

unwrought magnesium other than ingots, such as raspings, turnings, granules, and powders.38 Granular

magnesium is typically used in the production of magnesium-based desulfurizing reagent mixtures that

are used in steelmaking to reduce the sulfur content of steel.39 Lesser amounts of granular magnesium
 40 Original Views, p. 19. The domestic interested party states that this finding remains characteristic of

competition within the U.S. market. Response, p. 6.

 41 Unless otherwise noted, all of the discussion in this section is from the original investigation (see Original

Staff Report, pp. I-9 and I-10) supplemented with information on the public record for the Commission’s full review

in 2006 on pure and alloy magnesium (see Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From

China, pp. I-21 through I-25).

 42 The magnesium content of magnesium-bearing ores typically ranges from nearly 22 percent for dolomite to 69

percent for brucite. The magnesium content of seawater is 0.13 percent, which is much lower than that of the lowest

grade of magnesium ore deposits; however, seawater has the advantage of being abundant, accessible, and extremely

uniform in its magnesium content, allowing for easier standardization of the refining process.

 43 Northwest Alloys ceased production of magnesium in October 2001.

 44 The domestic interested party cites an earlier Commission finding that “the electrolytic cells used in the

production of primary magnesium will deteriorate if they are not kept running constantly. If they deteriorate, they

must be rebuilt. The costs of rebuilding these cells are so high that producers must try to keep the cells in constant

operation. Thus, to be cost effective, producers must maintain a continuous and steady production of the product.” 

Response, p. 6, citing Magnesium From China, Russia, and Ukraine, pp. 10-11.

 45 The raw material source for silicothermic production in China is dolomite (MgCO3•CaCO3). Deborah Kramer,

Magnesium, Its Alloys and Compounds, USGS Open-File Report 01-341, pp. 11-12, as cited in Pure and Alloy

Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, p. I-22.

 46 See testimony of Mr. Ozzie Wilkinson, Manager, Public Affairs, Northwest Alloys, transcript of hearing in

Magnesium From China and Russia (Final), pp. 148 and 174, as cited in the staff report for the original

investigation.

I-12

are used in defense applications, such as military ordnance and flares. The Commission concluded during

the original investigation that Chinese subject imports were “highly substitutable” for domestically

produced pure magnesium, particularly in the production of reagent mixtures in the desulfurization

segment of the U.S. market.40

Manufacturing Process41

Primary Magnesium

Worldwide, most magnesium is derived from magnesium-bearing ores (dolomite, magnesite,

brucite, and olivine) or seawater and well and lake brines.42 Large deposits of dolomite are widely

distributed throughout the world, and dolomite is the principal magnesium-bearing ore found in the

United States. Magnesium-bearing ores are mined the by the open-pit method. In the United States, the

production of primary magnesium is currently done by extracting magnesium from brines of the surface

waters of the Great Salt Lake in Utah (by US Magnesium); the former U.S. producer Northwest Alloys

used dolomite in its process.43

Magnesium metal is normally produced by either an electrolytic process or a silicothermic

process, with the electrolytic process dominating in terms of the volume of United States and world

production.44 The silicothermic process (also known as the Pidgeon process) is used by a majority of the

largest producers in China.45 The silicothermic process was reported during the original investigation to

be less cost-effective than the electrolytic process for production of magnesium.46 In its original views,

the Commission referred to domestic producer Northwest Alloys’ argument that the silicothermic process

involves higher raw material costs than most magnesium production plants in the world (including the
 47 Original Views, pp. 16-17, citing Northwest Alloys/Alcoa’s prehearing brief, pp. 1 and 2-3.

 48 Magnesium chips are ground into powder using a particle reduction process. Magnesium powder can also be

produced by atomization of molten pure magnesium; however, this technique is less frequently used than grinding.

 49 Information from this section is drawn from Deborah A. Kramer, Magnesium Recycling in the United States in

1998, Flow Studies for Recycling Metal Commodities in the United States, pp. E5-E6, as cited Pure and Alloy

Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, p. I-24.

 50 Aluminum beverage can manufacturers are sensitive to the presence of beryllium in melted scrap. Therefore,

these firms generally do not purchase recycled alloy magnesium produced from scrap.

 51 Typically, producers do not set out to produce “off-specification pure” magnesium. Rather, its production 

results from starting or re-starting the primary magnesium production process, or is the result of some malfunction in

the production process. 

I-13

predecessor firm to US Magnesium) that use electrolytic processes because: (1) it is a batch rather than a

continuous process; (2) it requires expensive reductants (ferrosilicon and/or aluminum); and (3) final

processing requires added costs due to the remelting of magnesium.47

Primary magnesium is typically cast into ingots or slabs. Aluminum producers usually purchase

larger pure cast shapes such as rounds, billets, peg-lock ingots, or T-shapes. Producers of magnesium

powder for steel desulfurization applications typically purchase smaller ingots or magnesium “chips” that 

are then ground into powder48 and used internally to produce magnesium-based reagent mixtures or, to a

lesser extent, pyrotechnic products. Diecasters purchase ingots and granular primary alloy magnesium for

use in magnesium alloy castings, and/or recycle scrap magnesium generated in their diecasting operations

into secondary alloy magnesium.

Secondary Magnesium49

Secondary magnesium is produced from recycling magnesium-based “scrap.” Magnesium scrap

arrives at the recycler either in a loose form or contained in boxes. After the magnesium is separated

from other alloys by the recycler, the sorted magnesium is heated in a steel crucible to nearly 675 degrees

Celsius. Alloying elements such as aluminum, manganese, or zinc can then be added to the liquid

magnesium and the alloyed magnesium can then be transferred to ingot molds by hand ladling, pumping,

or tilt pouring. Magnesium scrap can also be generated by the direct grinding of scrap into powder for

iron and steel desulfurization applications.50

“Off-Specification Pure” Magnesium

“Off-specification pure” magnesium is pure primary magnesium containing magnesium scrap,

secondary magnesium, oxidized magnesium, or impurities (whether or not intentionally added) that cause

the primary magnesium content to fall below 99.8 percent by weight. “Off-specification pure”

magnesium products contain 50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 percent primary magnesium, by

weight, do not conform to ASTM specifications for alloy magnesium, and generally do not contain

individually or in combination, 1.5 percent or more, by weight, of the following alloying elements: 

aluminum, manganese, zinc, silicon, thorium, zirconium, and rare earths. No U.S. producer reported

producing “off-specification pure” magnesium during the Commission’s full review in 2006 on pure and

alloy magnesium.51
 52 Unless otherwise noted, all of the discussion in this section is from the original investigation (see Original

Staff Report, pp. I-13, II-11, and V-3).

 53 Published price series for magnesium are found in American Metal Market; these prices are based upon list

prices and, thus, do not necessarily reflect current market transaction prices. 

 54 Original Views, p. 8. Commissioners Miller and Hillman dissented, finding that pure granular magnesium and

pure magnesium ingot were separate domestic like products. Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, p. 37.

 55 Original Views, pp. 8-9.

I-14

Channels of Distribution, Marketing, and Pricing52

Domestically produced and imported pure magnesium in ingot form is primarily sold to

aluminum producers and producers of pure granular magnesium (grinders), with shipments made directly

from the production site, port, or warehouse. Most manufacturers of the subject granular magnesium first

purchase pure magnesium ingots or magnesium chips from domestic or import sources for conversion

into granular form. During the period examined in the original investigation, most granular magnesium

was then used in the captive production of desulfurization reagents. Magnesium in granular form was

also sold to military flare, chemical, pharmaceutical, and other manufacturers. Shipments to end-users

were made directly from the grinding facilities.

*** reported in the original investigation that pricing for pure magnesium in granular form was

generally determined in transaction-by-transaction negotiations and in contracts and depended on such

factors as the prevailing competitive environment and potential purchase volumes. In general, neither

U.S. grinders nor subject importers issued price lists.53 Magnesium prices were usually quoted on a

delivered basis, and typical sales terms were net 30 days. (These pricing practices were also reported in

the original report to be characteristic of the U.S. magnesium ingot market.)

Domestic Like Product and Domestic Industry

Definition of the Domestic Like Product

In its original determinations, the Commission defined the like product as pure magnesium,

consisting of both granular magnesium and magnesium ingot.

54 The Commission determined that:

“Granular magnesium and magnesium ingot are produced in a continuum of forms and

sizes, without any clear dividing line, they share the same chemical properties, and they

were sold through similar channels of distribution. They are interchangeable at least for

significant end uses, particularly in the desulfurization segment. Although the grinding

operations generally took place in separate facilities using separate workers, the same

production facilities, processes, and workers are used to produce magnesium ingot and

granular magnesium up to the grinding stage.”55

The Commission further indicated that with respect to China:

“We find that the lack of a clear dividing line between granular magnesium and

magnesium ingot warrants broadening the domestic like product beyond the scope of the

Chinese investigation, which is limited to granular magnesium, to include magnesium

ingot. In light of the scope language of the existing antidumping duty order on

magnesium ingot from China and Commerce’s explicit exclusion of Chinese magnesium

ingot from the scope of the Chinese investigation, our broadening of the definition of the
 56 Original Views, p. 8, fn. 34.

 57 Original Views, p. 9, fn. 37.

 58 Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-309-A-B and

731-TA-696 (Second Review), USITC Pub. 3859 (July 2006)

 59 The Commission defined one like product in its first investigation involving imported pure and alloy

magnesium, Magnesium from Canada (Final) in August 1992. The issue of granular vs. ingot magnesium was not

presented or discussed. A U.S.-Canadian binational panel subsequently found the Commission’s like product

determination not supported by substantial evidence. On remand, the Commission determined in 1993 that pure and

alloy magnesium were separate like products. After this remand determination, in investigations involving both pure

and alloy magnesium the Commission found pure and alloy magnesium to be separate like products until its 2005

investigations of alloy magnesium from China and pure and alloy magnesium from Russia where the Commission

found pure and alloy magnesium to be a single domestic like product. (Magnesium from China and Russia (Final) in

April 2005.) The Commission found that magnesium in ingot and granular forms were included in this definition. 

(Commissioners Miller and Hillman dissenting). See Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium

from China (Second Review), pp. 3-9 and 34-37, for a full discussion.

 60 The Commission first determined to include secondary magnesium in a single domestic like product in the

preliminary phase of its investigations on magnesium (in alloy form) from China and Russia. It stated that “{i}f

secondary magnesium is compared with primary alloy magnesium, it is clear that the products are similar in terms of

physical characteristics and uses, interchangeability, customer and producer perceptions, channels of distribution,

and price ...” (Magnesium from China and Russia, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1071 and 1072 (Preliminary), USITC

Publication 3685, April 2004, p. 10.) The Commission did not explore this issue any further in its final

determinations, in which it found pure and alloy magnesium to constitute a single domestic like product. 

(Magnesium from China and Russia (Final) in April 2005.)

 61 Chairman Pearson and Commissioners Okun and Lane found one domestic like product that encompassed

primary and secondary magnesium and magnesium in ingot and granular form. Pure and Alloy Magnesium from

Canada and Pure Magnesium from China (Second Review), p. 13. With respect to the inclusion of pure and alloy

magnesium in one domestic like product, the three Commissioners noted the earlier Commission decision to place

pure and alloy magnesium in a single domestic like product in the above-referenced 2005 investigations of alloy

magnesium from China and pure and alloy magnesium from Russia (Magnesium from China and Russia (Final) in

April 2005). In the 2006 reviews (as in the China/Russia investigations), the Commissioners stated that

(continued...)

I-15

domestic like product does not affect our treatment of magnesium ingot from China to the

United States during the period of investigation as non-subject imports.”56

The Commission declined, however, in its original determinations to further broaden the domestic like

product to include alloy magnesium. It stated that:

“We note that in the final phase of these investigations, DSM {an Israeli producer}

abandoned its argument that the domestic like product should include alloy and pure

magnesium, and there were no additional data or arguments in the final phase of these

investigations that warranted reconsideration of the Commission’s finding in the

preliminary phase of these investigations that the domestic like product does not include

alloy magnesium.”57

The Commission’s most recent domestic like product determinations concerning magnesium

were made in Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, Inv. Nos.

701-TA-309-A-B and 731-TA-696 (Second Review),58 where it considered whether to include pure and

alloy magnesium,59 secondary magnesium,60 and granular magnesium in one domestic like product. In

those reviews, three Commissioners61 found one domestic like product consisting of all magnesium that
 61 (...continued)

circumstances had changed sufficiently as to blur the dividing line between pure and alloy magnesium. The three

Commissioners also indicated that interchangeability and overlapping uses in aluminum production (the single

largest use for magnesium) between pure and alloy magnesium had increased over time. Ibid., pp. 9-11. With

respect to the inclusion of secondary aluminum, the Commissioners stated in the 2006 reviews that there was no

indication in the record that the circumstances that led the Commission to include secondary and primary magnesium

in the 2005 China/Russia investigations had changed. Ibid., p. 12. Likewise, the three Commissioners noted that

there was no evidence that the product or characteristics of granular magnesium had changed since prior

investigations where it was included in the domestic like product with cast magnesium. Ibid., p. 12.

 62 For the review of the countervailing duty orders on pure and alloy magnesium from Canada, Vice Chairman

Shara L. Aranoff and Commissioners Jennifer A. Hillman and Stephen Koplan found two domestic like products: 

one encompassing pure magnesium (not including granular magnesium) and the other encompassing primary and

secondary alloy magnesium (but not including granular magnesium). (However, Commissioner Koplan found that

the pure magnesium domestic like product included both cast and granular pure magnesium.) For the review of the

antidumping duty order on pure magnesium from China, the Commissioners found one domestic like product

encompassing pure magnesium coextensive with the scope of the review but not including secondary, alloy, or

granular magnesium. (Commissioner Koplan again found that the pure magnesium domestic like product included

both cast and granular pure magnesium.) Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium from

China (Second Review), pp. 42-43.

With respect to the issue of pure magnesium vs. alloy magnesium, the three Commissioners stated that

“{i}n sum, we find that based on the record in these reviews, a departure from the Commission’s decisions in the

1993 remand determination and in the 2000 first sunset reviews that pure and alloy magnesium are separate like

products is not warranted. Although Petitioner argues that this is a case involving a continuum of products, in our

view there is a clear dividing line between pure and alloy magnesium which is most evident in the different

predominant uses for the two products and the lack of substantial interchangeability between them under normal

market conditions.” Ibid., p. 40. With respect to the issue of including secondary alloy magnesium in the domestic

like product, the Commissioners stated that “there is no indication in the record of these reviews that the

circumstances that led the Commission to include secondary and primary magnesium in the same like product in the

2005 China/Russia investigations have changed” and that “the record indicates that primary and secondary alloy

magnesium are nearly identical in terms of physical characteristics and uses, interchangeability, customer and

producer perceptions, channels of distribution, and price.” Ibid., pp. 40-41. With reference to the issue of ingot

(cast) vs. granular pure magnesium, Vice Chairman Aranoff and Commissioner Hillman cite dissenting views in

earlier 2001 and 2005 investigations where the magnesium products were found to be separate domestic like

products. They stated: “{i}n particular, while ingot (cast) and granular magnesium share some basic properties,

they differ in size, dimensions, shape, and other physical characteristics, such as volatility; granular magnesium has

a different end-use, namely steel desulfurization. There is no meaningful overlap in manufacturing facilities and

employees, with granular magnesium for commercial sale being produced exclusively by grinders, which do not

produce ingot magnesium. Ingot and granular magnesium are not interchangeable since ingot magnesium cannot be

used for steel desulfurization without being converted to granular form; because of the differences in end uses,

producer and customer perceptions differ, as do channels of distribution. Granular magnesium appears to command

a price premium over ingot magnesium.” Ibid., p. 42, citing Pure Magnesium from China and Israel (Final) in

November 2001 and Magnesium from China and Russia (Final) in April 2005.

I-16

included alloy magnesium, secondary magnesium, as well as ingot and granular magnesium. The

remaining three Commissioners determined not to expand the domestic like product beyond the scope

definitions for Canada and China, instead finding domestic like products co-extensive with Commerce’s

scope definitions.62

Information addressing like product issues with respect to pure magnesium in both ingot and

granular forms and the alloy product was provided in the original staff report placed on the record of this
 63 See Original Staff Report, pp. I-12 and I-13 for a discussion of the physical characteristics and uses,

manufacturing facilities and production employees, interchangeability and customer and producer perceptions,

channels of distribution, and price of pure granular magnesium compared to pure magnesium ingot. 

 64 See Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China (Second Review), pp. I-27

through I-32, for recent information on the physical characteristics and uses, common manufacturing facilities and

production employees, interchangeability, customer and producer perceptions, and channels of distribution of pure

vs alloy magnesium, primary vs. secondary magnesium, and cast vs. granular magnesium.

 65 Original Views, p. 11. Commissioner Okun did not join the Commission’s views of the domestic industry,

instead concluding that grinders/reagent producers do not engage in sufficient production-related activity to qualify

as domestic producers. Original Dissenting Views of Commissioner Okun, p. 29. The Commissioner stated that “it

is clear that the value added by grinders/reagent producers is low. Capital investment by grinders/reagent producers

also appears low, particularly compared to the capital investment required to establish and maintain a magnesium

ingot facility. Grinding is not particularly complex even though there is some degree of technical expertise involved

in handling granular magnesium because of its reactivity. While employment levels are not insignificant, they are

low compared to magnesium ingot production employment levels.” Ibid., p. 30.

Commissioners Miller and Hillman also dissented, finding two separate domestic industries, one producing

pure granular magnesium and one producing pure magnesium ingot. Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, p.

39.

 66 Confidential Original Views, pp. 14-15. The Commission further concluded that *** did not engage in

sufficient production-related activity to qualify it as a domestic producer. Ibid.

 67 Original Views, p. 13. The Commission stated that it based its finding on “***.” Confidential Original Views,

p. 18. It also stated that the level of ESM’s imports of *** was significant, equivalent to ***. Ibid. The

Commission did not exclude ESM from its analysis of the effect of subject imports from ***. Ibid., fn. 64.

I-17

review.63 More recent information addressing domestic like product issues for (1) pure vs. alloy

magnesium, (2) primary vs. secondary magnesium, and (3) cast vs. granular magnesium is available in the

public report for the Commission's second five-year full reviews on pure and alloy magnesium from

Canada and pure magnesium from China.64

Definition of the Domestic Industry

In the original investigation, the Commission defined the domestic industry as producers of pure

magnesium, including grinding operations.65 It stated that:

“Although the evidence is mixed, on balance, we find that grinding operations constitute

sufficient production-related activity to qualify these firms as domestic producers. The

capital investment for grinding operations is not insignificant, nor were the capital

expenditures during the period of investigation. Grinding is not a particularly complex

process, but ***, and there is some degree of technical expertise involved in handling

granular magnesium. Moreover, the Commission has found in previous investigations

involving other products that grinding could be sufficient production-related activity. 

The value-added data are of limited use, given the fact that they also include reagent

activities. Although employment levels are low, they are not insignificant.”66

The Commission further found that appropriate circumstances existed to exclude ESM Manufacturing

(“ESM”) from the domestic industry as a related party.67

In the recent second reviews on pure and alloy magnesium from Canada and pure magnesium

from China, Chairman Pearson and Commissioners Okun and Lane determined that there was one

domestic industry composed of the domestic producers of pure and alloy magnesium, again including
 68 Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium from China (Second Review), pp. 14-15. The

Commission had, however, considered diecasters to be domestic producers of secondary magnesium in its views in

the 2004-05 investigations on alloy magnesium from China and pure and alloy magnesium from Russia. It noted at

the time, however, the absence of data from diecasters. See Magnesium from China and Russia, Inv. Nos. 731-TA1071 and 1072 (Final), USITC Publication 3763 (April 2005), p. 12, fn. 62.

 69 Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada and Pure Magnesium from China (Second Review), pp. 43-45. 

Commissioner Koplan determined that diecasters with secondary scrap recycling operations were part of the

domestic industry producing alloy magnesium. Ibid., p. 43, fn. 274.

 70 Response, p. 21.

 71 Letter from US Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 2. 

 72 Unless otherwise noted, all of the discussion in this section is from the original investigation (see Original

Staff Report, pp. III-2 through III-6) supplemented with information on the public record for the Commission’s full

review in 2006 on pure and alloy magnesium (see Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium

From China, pp. I-32, I-33, and III-5).

 73 A third magnesium ingot producer, Dow Magnesium, exited the domestic industry in November 1998.

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primary and secondary magnesium and magnesium in ingot and granular form. The three Commissioners

also included grinders in the domestic industry producing magnesium but did not include magnesium

diecasters in the domestic alloy magnesium industry.68 These three Commissioners noted that there were

no data provided by grinders in those reviews. Vice Chairman Aranoff and Commissioners Hillman and

Koplan found that there were two domestic industries composed respectively of the domestic producer of

pure magnesium (US Magnesium) and the domestic producers of alloy magnesium (US Magnesium and

the secondary producers). For the review regarding China, the latter three Commissioners determined

that there was one domestic industry composed of the domestic producer of pure magnesium (US

Magnesium). With the exception of Commissioner Koplan, they further concluded that diecasters did not

engage in sufficient production-related activities in their scrap recycling operations to be included in the

domestic industry producing alloy magnesium.69

Position of the Domestic Interested Party

The domestic interested party in this five-year review, US Magnesium, urged the Commission in

its response to the Commission’s notice of institution to again include both pure magnesium in granular

form and pure magnesium ingot in the definition of the domestic like product and, further, to expand the

definition to include alloy magnesium. The domestic interested party indicated agreement with the

Commission’s original determination to include grinders in the domestic industry.70 In a subsequent letter

dated December 5, 2006, US Magnesium indicated support for a single domestic like product of primary

(pure and alloy) magnesium and secondary magnesium (or magnesium produced by recycling

magnesium-based scrap).71

THE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. Producers’ Domestic Operations72

At the time of the original investigation there were two producers of pure magnesium ingot that

represented 100 percent of U.S. production of that product in 2000: Magcorp and Northwest Alloys, Inc.

(“Northwest Alloys”).73 The Commission also identified five pure granular magnesium producers that

represented nearly all U.S. production of pure granular magnesium in 2000: ESM Manufacturing

(“ESM”); Magcorp; Reade Manufacturing Co. (“Reade”); Rossborough Manufacturing Co.
 74 As noted earlier, ESM was excluded by the Commission in its original determination from the domestic

industry under the related parties provision; the Commission further concluded that the activities of *** did not

constitute sufficient production-related activity to qualify it as a domestic producer.

I-19

(“Rossborough”); and Superior Powder.74 Table I-5 presents the location of the production facilities,

positions with respect to the original petition, and shares of production, by firm, in 2000.

Table I-5

Pure magnesium: U.S. producers, location of production facilities, position with respect to the

petition, and share of U.S. production, by products, 2000

Product and company Location of

production facilities

Position with

respect to the

petition

Production in

2000

(metric tons)

Share of U.S.

production in

2000

(percent)

Ingot:

Dow Magnesium1 Freeport, TX *** 0 0 

Magcorp Rowley, UT Petitioner *** ***

Northwest Alloys Addy, WA Oppose *** ***

Total -- -- *** 100.0

Granules:

ESM Saxonburg, PA

Kingsbury, IN *** *** ***

Magcorp Rowley, UT Petitioner *** ***

Reade2 Lakehurst, NJ

Tamaqua, PA Oppose *** ***

Rossborough3 Avon Lake, OH

Walkerton, IN Oppose *** ***

Superior Powder Stoneboro, PA Oppose *** ***

Total -- -- *** 100.0

1

 Dow Magnesium exited the domestic industry in November 1998 after its 65,000-metric-ton facility in Freeport,

TX, suffered extensive damage from lightning strikes and flooding. Dow was unable to provide a completed

questionnaire response in the original investigation. ***. 2

 Includes the operations of related firm Hart Metals, Tamaqua, PA. 3

 Remacor and Rossborough merged in August 2001 after Remacor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March

2001. Rossborough ***.

Note 1.--Parties during the original investigation estimated that a metric ton of magnesium ingot was roughly

equivalent to a metric ton of granular magnesium. Original Views, p. 18, fn. 97 (citing hearing transcript, pp.

210-211).

Note 2.–Does not include data for Remacor prior to its merger with Rossborough in August 2001. Remacor was

believed to have produced about *** metric tons of pure granular magnesium in 2000.

Source: Original Staff Report, p. III-2 (table III-1).
 75 US Magnesium is the successor firm to Magcorp, the petitioner in the original investigation.

 76 Response, p. 17.

 77 Response, p. 18.

 78 As noted earlier, the domestic interested party argues that the domestic industry should be defined “to include

the U.S. companies that grind magnesium ingot into granular magnesium and U.S. companies that produce

secondary magnesium, in addition to US Magnesium.” It further states that “{r}egardless of how the Commission

defines the industry, however, US Magnesium alone accounts for a substantial majority of domestic production of

the like product.” Domestic interested party letter dated December 11, 2006 (“adequacy comments”), p. 1, citing its

Response, pp. 6-7.

 79 USMag Press Release (September 23, 2004) from www.usmagnesium.com, retrieved January 31, 2007. 

 80 Alcoa also stated that its magnesium requirements would be sourced through its worldwide contacts.

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US Magnesium75 indicated in its response to the Commission’s notice of institution that it is the only

remaining producer of primary pure (and alloy) magnesium in the United States.76 US Magnesium also

identified the four following current U.S. grinders in its response: ESM Group, Inc.; Hart Metals, Inc.;

Reade Manufacturing Co.; and Rossborough Manufacturing Co., but did not provide any information on

the firms manufacturing secondary magnesium.77 US Magnesium claims that alone it currently accounts

for well over a majority of total U.S. production of the domestic like product (see calculated shares in

footnote 4 of this report that were provided by the domestic interested party).78 Information on firms that

produce pure and alloy magnesium in ingot form (primary magnesium producers) and firms that produce

magnesium in granular form (grinders) follows. Also presented below is available information on

secondary magnesium producers and on diecasters.

Primary Magnesium Producers

Magcorp was, at the time of the original investigation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Renco Metals,

Salt Lake City, UT, which in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of the holding company The Renco

Group, New York, NY. The firm produced both pure and alloy magnesium ingot and slab although, as

shown in table I-5, it accounted for *** of total U.S. production of granular magnesium in 2000. On

August 3, 2001, Magcorp filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Federal Bankruptcy Court in New York,

NY, blaming imports and the cost of electricity. The bankruptcy court authorized the sale of substantially

all of Magcorp’s assets to US Magnesium. The sale was completed on June 24, 2002. Renco Group, a

holding company that is, in turn, owned by Mr. Ira Rennert and certain family trusts, is the direct parent

of US Magnesium. Prior to its purchase by US Magnesium, Magcorp had completed a $50 million

capital modernization program at its Rowley, UT plant, that, according to a company press release,

“resulted in the largest decrease in chlorine emissions in the United States and reduced electrical energy

demand by more than 25%. The modernization has enabled the facility to survive and maintain more than

420 Utah jobs.”79

Northwest Alloys, a wholly owned subsidiary of Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), Pittsburgh,

PA, was *** of pure magnesium in the United States during the original investigation. It also produced

alloy magnesium. Most of Northwest Alloys’ shipments were transferred to parent company Alcoa for

use in the production of aluminum. Northwest Alloy ceased producing magnesium in October 2001. In

its press release of June 22, 2001, Alcoa announced that it would shut down Northwest Alloys as of

October 1, 2001 “due to high production costs and unfavorable market conditions.” (Electricity costs

escalated sharply in the U.S. Pacific Northwest as a result of a power crisis.)80
 81 No grinders provided data in response to the Commission’s questionnaire in Pure and Alloy Magnesium from

Canada and Pure Magnesium from China (Second Review) in July 2006. Most firms returned a “no” response to the

producers’ questionnaire, indicating that they did not produce magnesium but rather provided a service to end users

by transforming cast pure magnesium into powdered magnesium.

 82 Response, p. 18.

 83 ***. 

 84 During the original investigation, ***.

 85 “ESM: Introduction” from ESM II LP USA, retrieved January 31, 2007.

 86 Reade also operated as a division of Magnesium Elektron during the original investigation. “About READE”

from www.reade.com, retrieved January 31, 2007.

 87 ***. Producers’ questionnaire response of Rossborough, p. 3. Rossborough ***. Producers’ questionnaire

response of Rossborough in the original investigation.

 88 From www.magnesium.com, retrieved January 31, 2007.

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Magnesium Grinders81

In its response to the Commission’s notice of institution in this review, US Magnesium indicated that

to the best of its knowledge, the current U.S. magnesium grinders are ESM Group Inc.; Hart Metals, Inc;

Reade Manufacturing Co; and Rossborough Manufacturing Co.82 ESM, Hart, Reade, Remacor (which

merged with Rossborough in August 2001), and Superior Powder were grinders in the original

investigation.

ESM, a wholly owned subsidiary of SKW Americas, Inc., was described in the original investigation

as a grinder of pure magnesium ingot, chips, and granules and produced desulfurization reagents for the

steel industry and powdered magnesium for use in the chemical and munitions industries. ESM was

reported to be related to ESM (Tianjin) Company, Ltd., Tianjin, China, a Chinese producer/

exporter of pure ingot and granular magnesium.83 *** of ESM’s shipments were internal transfers for use

in making downstream products such as reagents.84 At the present time, ESM continues to operate within

the SKW umbrella and is a subsidiary of Degusssa (Germany). It manufactures magnesium-based steel

desulfurization reagents (along with injection equipment and slag conditioners) at three U.S. plants (two

in Pennsylvania and one in Indiana) and at a plant in Canada and one in Tianjin, China.85

Hart Metals, related to Reade in the original investigation, was engaged in the mechanical grinding and

atomization of pure magnesium. It has been acquired by the Luxter Group and is one of the magnesium

powder business units within Magnesium Elektron (Manchester, UK). Hart Metals is still based in

Tamaqua, PA.

Reade produced pure magnesium granules, powder, and chips for use in the *** during the original

investigation. It continues to operate its Lakehurst, NJ facility and remains a division of Magnesium

Elektron (Manchester, UK).86

Remacor produced pure magnesium powder for the steel desulfurization market. *** during the

original investigation. ***. Remacor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2001 and merged with

Rossborough in August 2001.

Rossborough was reported as producing pure magnesium powder for the steel desulfurization market

during the original investigation. The company has a production facility in Walkerton, IN.87 ***. It

continues to sell magnesium products (chips, powder, and blends) for use in steel desulfurization88 and is

described by the USGS as importing a mixture of magnesium and limestone from China for subsequent

blending at the Walkerton, IN plant. After several reorganizations and filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
 89 USGS, “Mineral Industry Surveys,” May 2006.

 90 Confidential Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, p. 64, fn. 77, citing the producer questionnaire

responses of ***. The Commissioners further stated that: “{w}e note that, while ***. Its shipments of granular

magnesium are entirely captively consumed for production of that reagent. Similarly, ***. Thus, the actual portion

of the industry’s shipments that is captively consumed is likely much higher than indicated in the Staff Report.” 

Ibid., p. 55, fn. 35.

 91 Letter from US Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 3.

 92 Amacor began operations in 2001. On April 3, 2003, Amacor purchased Xstrata Magnesium Corporation

(XMC) from Xstrata PLC, Zug, Switzerland, for $1.2 million. The major asset of XMC is a magnesium recycling

plant in Anderson, IN. The Xstrata plant was commissioned in 2000 to recycle scrap to produce magnesium alloy

for the U.S. auto industry. A January 2005 fire at its production facility temporarily halted its production. Pure and

Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, p. III-2.

 93 Magnesium From China and Russia, USITC Publication 3763, April 2005, p. I-33.

 94 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium), “Magnesium” (Deborah Kramer), p. 46.2, attachment 3 to the

Response and USGS “Mineral Industry Surveys,” August 2006.

I-22

Rossborough reorganized as Magnesium Technologies, Inc. In February 2006, Magnesium Technologies

was purchased by Opta Minerals, Inc. (Canada).89

Superior Powder, Stoneboro, PA, produced pure magnesium powder for the steel desulfurization

market. ***.

As shown above, grinders that produced granular magnesium internally consumed the production in

the manufacture of reagent mixtures for desulfurization. In 2000, *** percent of total U.S. producers’

granular magnesium shipments were to the desulfurization market.90

US Magnesium continues to supply *** U.S. grinders with pure magnesium ingot that the grinders

process into granular form.91

Secondary Magnesium Producers

There were four known U.S. producers of secondary alloy magnesium (remelted from scrap) during

2000-05 that sold magnesium commercially, namely Advanced Magnesium Alloys Corp. (“Amacor”);92

Garfield Alloys, Inc.; Halaco Engineering, Inc.; and MagReTech, Inc. Of these firms, only Amacor and

MagReTech currently produce secondary magnesium, as Garfield Alloys’ production facility was

destroyed in a fire on December 29, 2003, and Halaco Engineering filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy

protection on July 24, 2002 and ceased production of magnesium on September 23, 2004.93 A new firm,

MagPro LLC, started magnesium recycling operations in 2006 in Camden, TN.94

Magnesium Diecasters

In addition to firms such as Amacor and MagReTech that sell secondary alloy magnesium

commercially, several diecasters have produced secondary alloy magnesium from scrap for use in their

own diecasting operations, namely Gibbs Die Casting, Inc.; Meridian Technologies, Inc.; Spartan Light

Metal Products, Inc.; and possibly others. Of these, only Spartan provided a full response to the

Commission’s questionnaire in its second review of pure and alloy magnesium from Canada and pure

magnesium from China in 2006, despite staff efforts to obtain full responses from the other firms. The

Commission considered diecasters to be domestic producers of secondary magnesium in its views in the

 2004-05 investigations on alloy magnesium from China and pure and alloy magnesium from Russia and

included them in the domestic industry, although the Commission noted that it had insufficient data on
 95 Magnesium from China and Russia, p. 12, fn. 62.

 96 Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, pp. 15 and 44. Commissioner

Koplan determined that diecasters with secondary scrap recycling operations are part of the domestic industry. Ibid.,

p. 44, fn. 277.

 97 Original Staff Report, pp. III-2-III-6.

 98 Original Views, p. 7.

 99 Letter from US Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 3. US Magnesium did not provide ***. US Magnesium

also estimated that ***. Ibid., p. 4.

I-23

their operations to include them in the industry data.95 However, in the 2005-06 reviews on pure and

alloy magnesium from Canada and pure magnesium from China, the Commission excluded diecasters

from the domestic industry.”96

 U.S. Producers’ Imports and Purchases

*** during the original investigation. With respect to the grinders, ESM ***. As noted earlier, ESM

was also related to ESM (Tianjin) Company, Ltd., Tianjin, China, which is a Chinese producer/exporter

of pure ingot and granular magnesium. *** also purchased pure magnesium ingot from China.97 The

Commission stated in its original views that “there is evidence that over the period of investigation,

grinders, in particular, who use either magnesium ingot (once ground) or granular magnesium in their

production processes, displaced purchases of domestic and imported magnesium ingot with purchases of

granular magnesium from China.”98 US Magnesium estimates that “*** imported *** metric tons of

imported pure magnesium in 2005 to be processed into granular form.”99

U.S. Production, Capacity, Shipments, and Financial Data

Pure Magnesium

Data reported by the U.S. magnesium industry in the Commission’s original investigation and in

response to its review institution notice are presented in tables I-6 (pure granular magnesium) and I-7

(pure magnesium ingot). To avoid double-counting the pure magnesium ingot that is consumed in the

production of the downstream granular product, the Commission separately analyzed data for granules 

and ingots during the original investigation. An added complication to the Commission’s analysis in this

review is its determination during the original investigation to exclude certain grinders from the domestic

industry. Accordingly, table I-6 presents both the data gathered by Commission staff during the original

investigation (shown under header (1) labeled “data for all reporting firms shown in table I-5 of this

report”) and data for the firms that (essentially) remained within (or were not excluded from) the domestic

industry and on which the Commission based its views (shown under header (2) labeled “data for *** and

***”).

Any comparison of total U.S. production of granular magnesium in 1998-2000 to the data shown for

2005 in table I-6 under header (1) is potentially inaccurate in that the 2005 production figure is based only

on US Magnesium’s shipments to U.S. grinders and may not reflect all purchases of imported ingot by

grinders for subsequent granular production. (As shown in the table notes, US Magnesium does,

however, include the estimated *** metric tons of imported ingot known to be purchased for grinding by

***.) With respect to the data listed under header (2) on which the Commission based its original

determination for China, any comparison of the 1998-2000 production figures to US Magnesium’s

reported production figure in header (1) for 2005 is inaccurate to the extent that any of US Magnesium’s 
I-24

Table I-6

Pure granular magnesium: U.S. producers’ capacity, production, and U.S. shipments, 1998-2000,

and 2005

Item

Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

(1) Data for all reporting firms shown in table I-5 of this report

Capacity (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

Production (metric tons) *** *** *** ***2

Capacity utilization (percent) *** *** *** (1)

U.S. shipments:

 Quantity:

 Open-market (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

 Captive consumption (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

 Transfers to related firms (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

 Total (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

 Value:

 Open-market (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** (1)

 Captive consumption (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** (1)

 Transfers to related firms (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** (1)

 Total (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** (1)

 Unit value:

 Open-market (per metric ton) $*** $*** $*** (1)

 Captive consumption (per metric ton) *** *** *** (1)

 Transfers to related firms (per metric ton) (1) (1) (1) (1)

 Total (per metric ton) *** *** *** (1)

(2) Data for *** and ***

Capacity (metric tons) *** (1)

*** (1)

Production (metric tons) *** (1)*** (1)

Capacity utilization (percent) *** (1)*** (1)

U.S. shipments:

 Quantity:

 Open-market (***) (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

 Captive (***) (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

 Total (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

Notes on next page.
I-25

Continuation.

 1

 Not available.

 2

 Calculated by adding the *** metric tons of pure ingot magnesium produced by US Magnesium and shipped to

U.S. grinders plus the estimated *** metric tons of imported pure ingot magnesium ***. Letter from US Magnesium,

December 5, 2006, p. 3. Calculated production is understated in that it excludes any pure magnesium in granular

form that is produced by US Magnesium and sold to firms other than U.S. grinders. There were *** such sales

during the original investigation (table I-5).

Note.–Reporting domestic manufacturers are believed to account for nearly all known U.S. pure granular

magnesium production in 2000. A “portion” of the data supplied by grinders/reagent producers during the original

investigation, however, reflects the production and sale of reagents and therefore overstates their grinding

operations.

Source notes:

1. Aggregate data for 1998-2000: Original Staff Report, pp. III-7 and III-8 through III-10 (tables III-2 and III-3).

2. Data for *** and *** for 1998-2000: Confidential Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, p. 69, fn. 102. 

3. Data for 2005: Letter from US Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 3. 
I-26

Table I-7

Pure magnesium ingot: U.S. producers’ capacity, production, and U.S. shipments, 1998-2000, and

2005

Item

Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

Capacity (metric tons) *** *** *** (1)

Production (metric tons) *** *** *** ***

Capacity utilization (percent) *** *** *** (1)

U.S. shipments:

 Quantity:

 Open-market (metric tons) *** *** *** ***

 Internal consumption (metric tons) *** *** *** ***

 Transfers to related firms (metric tons) *** *** *** ***

 Total (metric tons) *** *** *** ***

 Value:

 Open-market (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** ***

 Internal consumption (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** ***

 Transfers to related firms (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** ***

 Total (1,000 dollars) *** *** *** ***

 Unit value:

 Open-market (per metric ton) $*** $*** $*** $***

 Internal consumption (per metric ton) *** *** *** -

 Transfers to related firms (per metric ton) *** *** *** -

 Total (per metric ton) *** *** *** ***

 1 Plant capacity (pure and alloy) reported at 43,000 metric tons. ***.

Note 1.–Reporting domestic manufacturers are believed to account for all known U.S. pure magnesium ingot

production.

Note 2.–***. Response, attachment 8. US Magnesium states that it *** following Commerce’s 2002 scope ruling

that Chinese pure magnesium ingot imported into Canada, ground into powder, and exported to the United States is

covered by the order. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Source notes:

1. 1998-2000 data: Compiled from data submitted in response to Commission questionnaires as presented in the

Original Staff Report, pp. III-7 and III-8 through III-10 (tables III-2 and III-3).

2. 2005 data: Capacity figure (“About US Magnesium” from www.usmagnesium.com retrieved January 31, 2007). 

Figures for pure magnesium produced by US Magnesium from Response, attachment 8, and letter from US

Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 3. Reported data are overstated in that they include any pure magnesium in

granular form produced by the company. There were *** such sales during the original investigation (table I-5).
 100 ***. As is discussed in greater detail in the section of this report entitled “U.S. importers,” ESM indicated

during the preliminary phase of the investigations that ***. Confidential Original Views, p. 18.

 101 Response, p. 10, and attachment 1. The Commission indicated in its views that grinders “essentially replaced

magnesium ingot purchases with granular magnesium imports during the period of investigation.” Original Views,

p. 9, fn. 35. With respect to Rossborough’s operations, the Commission stated: “ its ***, it admits that some of its

grinding operations have been idled, and ***. ***.” Confidential Original Views, p. 17, fn. 61.

 102 Response, p. 10.

I-27

ingot shipments to U.S. grinders in 2005 were to firms other than *** and ***.100 Finally, as shown in the

note to table I-6, a “portion” of the data for 1998-2000 supplied by grinders/reagent producers during the

original investigation reflected the production and sale of reagents and therefore overstated their grinding

operations; this distortion would not be present in the 2005 production figure, which reflects the volume

of ingot input to the grinding operations.

The 1998-2000 data series and 2005 figures presented in table I-7 for pure magnesium ingot are

believed to be comparable (i.e., measure all U.S. pure ingot magnesium production). The *** percent

decline in U.S. ingot shipments from 2000 to 2005 reflects the October 2001 shutdown of Northwest

Alloys. As indicated earlier, most of Northwest Alloys’ shipments had been transferred to its parent

company, Alcoa. Open-market U.S. shipments of magnesium ingot increased by *** percent from 2000

to 2005. With respect to the individual operations of the petitioner/domestic interested party, Magcorp

produced *** metric tons of pure magnesium ingot in 2000 (table I-5) while US Magnesium reported

production of *** metric tons in 2005 (table I-7), resulting in a production increase of *** percent from

2000 to 2005.

US Magnesium argues in its response to the notice of institution that the order has been beneficial to its

operations and, in support of its position, cites the decline in its shipments of pure magnesium ingot to

U.S. grinders from 1996 to 1999 compared with the increase in U.S. imports of granular magnesium from

China during that period, and the fact that in the period following the imposition of the order, imports of

granular magnesium from China dropped sharply and US Magnesium ***.101

Item 1996 1999 20051

Quantity (metric tons)

Magcorp’s U.S. shipments of pure

magnesium ingot to U.S. grinders ***2 3 ***2 3 ***4

U.S. imports of granular magnesium

from China 1,6525 13,1855 1,4845

 1 US Magnesium cited data only for 1996 and 1999 in its Response.

 2

 Figures do not appear to include a lost sale of *** metric tons annually to ***.

 3 Response, p. 10.

 4

 Letter from US Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 3. 

 5

 Official Commerce statistics for HTS subheading 8104.30.00.

US Magnesium states in its response that it *** in the period following the imposition of the order.102 As

shown above, however, its shipments of pure magnesium ingot to grinders in 2005 *** the 1996 level. 
 103 Virtually all data on the U.S. magnesium industry collected during the recent reviews on pure and alloy

magnesium from Canada and pure magnesium from China were business proprietary and, accordingly, were

redacted from the public report. 

 104 Original Staff Report, pp. VI-13. The Commission cited the individual questionnaire responses of *** in its

views where it stated that *** and capital expenditures and research and development expenses of the domestic

granular magnesium industry *** over the period of investigation. Confidential Original Views, pp. 30-31, fn. 118. 

Commissioners Miller and Hillman noted in their dissent that the data on the record indicated “***.” Confidential

Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, pp. 68-69.

 105 Response, attachment 8. US Magnesium further reported U.S. commercial shipments, in 2005, of *** metric

tons valued at $*** and U.S. exports of ***. Ibid.

 106 As noted in the section of this report on “U.S. Producers’ Imports and Purchases,” *** purchased imported

alloy magnesium to convert to granular form. 

 107 See table 8 of the USGS 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) included as attachment 3 to the Response.

 108 See table 7 of the USGS 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) included as attachment 3 to the Response. 

USGS worldwide capacity data include capacity at operating plants as well as at plants on standby basis, although it

is not clear in the table notes if any such standby data are included in figures reported for the United States.

 109 Calculated from US Magnesium’s reported production of *** metric tons of pure magnesium and *** metric

tons of alloy magnesium in 2005. Response, attachment 8.

I-28

Data on the financial experience of the U.S. magnesium industry for the period following the

imposition of the antidumping duty order are not available.103 See Part VI of the original staff report for

financial data on both trade sales and trade and transfer activities of magnesium ingot for the period

examined during the original investigation. Financial data gathered on magnesium in granular form were

incomplete. According to the staff report: “{n}ot all reporting firms were able to provide profit and loss

information that was specific to pure granular magnesium since the powder is generally used in the

production of downstream desulfurization reagents. With respect to the firms that were defined as the

domestic industry, ***.”104

Alloy Magnesium

With respect to alloy magnesium, US Magnesium manufactured *** metric tons of alloy

magnesium in 2005.105 US Magnesium is currently the only U.S. producer of (primary) alloy magnesium,

although there may be some “U.S. production” of alloy magnesium in granular form from imported

product by U.S. grinders.106 There are no data on the confidential record for this review of the U.S.

industry’s production of alloy magnesium during the period for which data were gathered during the

original investigation (1998-2000). Data on such production were not gathered during the original

investigation and, while collected by the Commission in subsequent investigations and reviews (most

recently in Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China (Second Review)

in July 2006), they were suppressed as confidential in the Commission’s public reports and therefore are

not included in the record of this review. The USGS likewise does not publish data compiled on U.S.

production of primary magnesium (pure plus alloy) to avoid disclosing company proprietary

information.107 The USGS estimates U.S. primary magnesium production capacity at 45,000 metric tons

in 2005.108 US Magnesium produced *** metric tons109 of primary magnesium in 2005.
 110 See table 1 of the USGS 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) included as attachment 3 to the Response.

 111 Letter from US Magnesium, December 5, 2006, p. 4.

 112 Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, p. 40.

 113 Ibid., pp. I-33 and III-2.

 114 Commissioner Koplan did include diecasters in the domestic industry in the 2006 reviews.

 115 USGS 2005 Minerals Yearbook, “Magnesium” (Deborah Kramer), p. 46 (citing “US Magnesium delays

expansion startup, cites excess supply” (Andy Blamey and Karen McBeth), Platts Metals Week, v. 76, no. 43,

October 24, 2005, pp. 1, 7-8), included as attachment 3 to the Response. US Magnesium’s September 2004 press

release indicated that construction was to have begun immediately with an initial increase in capacity to 51,000

metric tons. The President and CEO of US Magnesium is further quoted in the release as follows: “foreign

competition and increasing energy costs demand that we expand the facility and reduce unit costs in order to survive. 

Engineering and cost analysis for future expansion to 59,000 metric tons and even 73,000 metric tons have been

completed and financing will be pursued for further expansion subject to successful resolution of current antidumping trade petitions before the Department of Commerce and International Trade Commission and completion of

energy contract negotiations.” USMag Press Release (September 23, 2004) from www.usmagnesium.com, retrieved

January 31, 2007. 

I-29

Secondary Magnesium

With respect to secondary magnesium, the following tabulation lists figures on U.S. production

published by the USGS:110

U.S. production 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Metric tons

Secondary magnesium 65,800 73,600 70,100 72,000 72,800

US Magnesium, in contrast, estimates that secondary magnesium producers produced *** metric tons of

alloy magnesium in 2005.111 Virtually all secondary magnesium is alloy magnesium.112 Based upon the

calculations provided in notes 7 through 10 to its letter of December 5, 2006, ***. The apparent

discrepancy between the USGS figures for U.S. secondary magnesium production and that supplied by

US Magnesium appears to be due to the “production” of secondary magnesium from scrap by diecasters

for captive use in their diecasting operations.113 As discussed earlier, the Commission did not include

diecasters in its definition of the domestic industry in Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada and Pure

Magnesium From China (Second Review) in July 2006 although it had done so in earlier investigations.114

Other information on the record concerning US Magnesium is an announcement noted in the

USGS yearbook of a delay in the startup of a planned expansion of 11,000 metric tons per year. 

According to the yearbook: “{t}he company cited unfavorable market conditions that did not exist when

the expansion plans were announced in 2004 as the main reason for its decision to delay the expansion. 

U.S. Magnesium did not announce a new date to bring the additional capacity online (Blarney and

McBeth, 2005).”115 
 116 Due to concerns about double-counting, the Commission in its original views compared the volume of subject

imports from China with apparent domestic consumption of granular magnesium (instead of apparent domestic

consumption of all pure magnesium). Parties during the original investigation estimated that a metric ton of

magnesium ingot was roughly equivalent to a metric ton of granular magnesium. Original Views, p. 18, fn. 97

(citing hearing transcript, pp. 210-211).

 117 Original Staff Report, p. IV-1.

 118 The Commission indicated in its views that ***. Confidential Original Views, p. 18. The Commission further

indicated that: “Although ESM purchased ***.” Ibid.

 119 Response, p. 18.

 120 Official Commerce statistics for pure magnesium are based on HTS subheading 8104.30.00 (magnesium

raspings, turnings, and powders). To the extent that subject pure magnesium from China enters the United States

under HTS subheadings 8104.11.00 (pure magnesium (unwrought magnesium containing at least 99.8 percent by

weight of magnesium), 8104.20.00 (magnesium waste and scrap), 8104.30.00, 8104.90.00 (other magnesium),

3824.90.11 and 3824.90.19 (prepared binders for foundry molds and cores), and 9817.00.90 (remelt scrap ingot)),

the subject import data for China presented may be slightly understated. Official Commerce statistics for alloy

magnesium are based on HTS subheading 8104.19.00. 

 121 71 FR 61019, October 17, 2006. The administrative review was requested by Tianjin Magnesium

International (“TMI”), Ltd. on May 26, 2005 in response to Commerce’s May 2, 2005 notice of opportunity to

request an administrative review for the period May 1, 2004 through April 30, 2005. TMI’s request included a

request that Commerce also conduct a new shipper review; Commerce determined, however, that TMI did not meet

the requirements to initiate a new shipper review. Commerce’s preliminary weighted-average LTFV margin for TMI

was 89.05 percent but was subsequently revised downward to zero in the final results published in October 2006. 

Ibid. and 71 FR 18067, April 10, 2006.

 122 Response, p. 10.

I-30

U.S. IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION116

U.S. Importers

The Commission identified the following five importers of pure magnesium in granular form

from China during the original investigation: ***. ***.117 ***.118 The domestic interested party

indicated that it does not have information on firms that currently import granular magnesium from

China.119

U.S. Imports120

As shown in figure I-1 and table I-8, the quantity of U.S. imports of pure granular magnesium

from China rose rapidly during the original investigation but then fell to negligible levels for the period

immediately following the imposition of the antidumping duty order in November 2001 before rising

again in 2004. Available record information does not provide an explanation for the increase in imports

shown in the figure for 2003 to 2004 and they may be in error. The period covered by the only

administrative review of the antidumping duty order on pure magnesium (other than granular magnesium)

from China was May 1, 2004 through April 30, 2005.121 U.S. subject imports fell sharply from 2004 to

2005 but did not reach the minimal levels reported for 2002 and 2003. In its response to the notice of

institution, the domestic interested party points to the decline in U.S. imports of granular magnesium and

argues that the order was “crucial to the improvement in the condition of the U.S. pure magnesium

industry.”122

Canada was the primary source of nonsubject imported granular magnesium during both the

period examined in the original investigation and in 2005 (table I-8). In 2000, Canada accounted for 28.1

percent of total imports while imported Chinese merchandise accounted for 71.5 percent. U.S.

I-32

Table I-8

Primary magnesium: U.S. imports from all sources, 1998-2000, and 2005

Source

Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

Pure granular magnesium:

 China 9,972 13,185 15,262 1,484

 Canada1 4,551 5,236 5,993 758

 All other sources 111 197 104 269

 Total 14,634 18,618 21,359 2,510

Pure magnesium ingot:

 China (nonsubject)2 2,194 0 244 19

 All other sources3 24,266 26,855 22,689 28,693

 Total 26,460 26,855 22,933 28,712

Alloy magnesium:

 China4 3,751 3,644 6,671 36

 All other sources5 34,270 37,439 31,744 41,384

 Total 38,021 41,084 38,415 41,420

Landed, duty-paid value (1,000 dollars)

Pure granular magnesium:

 China 27,562 35,463 33,527 4,211

 Canada1 14,643 13,437 12,583 2,500

 All other sources 780 1,023 448 1,448

 Total 42,985 49,922 46,558 8,159

Pure magnesium ingot:

 China (nonsubject)2 5,469 0 345 35

 All other sources3 75,026 81,838 62,200 85,248

 Total 80,495 81,838 62,545 85,283

Alloy magnesium:

 China4 10,430 9,870 13,497 89

 All other sources5 119,109 128,673 114,399 137,364

 Total 129,540 138,543 127,896 137,453

Continued on next page.
 123 There has not been an antidumping or countervailing duty order in place on pure granular magnesium from

Canada. An antidumping duty order on pure magnesium (not including granular magnesium) and countervailing

duty orders on pure magnesium (not including granular) and alloy magnesium were issued in August 1992. The

antidumping duty order on pure magnesium was revoked effective August 2000 after a NAFTA Binational Panel

final decision was affirmed in October 2004. The countervailing duty orders were revoked following the

Commission’s negative final determinations in its second review of the orders in July 2006.

I-33

Table I-8--Continued

Primary magnesium: U.S. imports from all sources, 1998-2000, and 2005

Source

Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

Landed, duty-paid unit value (per metric ton)

Pure granular magnesium:

 China $2,764 $2,690 $2,197 $2,839

 Canada1 3,218 2,566 2,100 3,298

 All other sources 7,031 5,202 4,321 5,385

 Average 2,937 2,681 2,180 3,250

Pure magnesium ingot:

 China (nonsubject)2 2,493 (6)

1,413 1,835

 All other sources3 3,092 3,047 2,741 2,971

 Average 3,042 3,047 2,727 2,970

Alloy magnesium:

 China4 2,781 2,709 2,023 2,452

 All other sources5 3,476 3,437 3,604 3,319

 Total 3,407 3,372 3,329 3,319

 1 Canada was the primary other source of pure granular magnesium during 1998-2000 and in 2005.

 2

 Imports of pure magnesium ingot from China were under an antidumping duty order throughout the period. 

 3

 Russia, Israel, and Canada were the primary sources of nonsubject pure magnesium ingot during 1998-2000 and

in 2005. China was a substantial source in 1998 but not in subsequent years. 

 4

 Imports of alloy magnesium from China were placed under an antidumping duty order in April 2005.

 5

 Canada was the primary source of nonsubject alloy magnesium during 1998-2000 and in 2005.

 6

 Cannot be calculated.

Source notes:

1. 1998-2000 data: Official Commerce statistics (HTS subheadings 8104.11.00 and 8104.30.00 for pure

magnesium ingot and pure granular magnesium, respectively) as presented in the Original Staff Report, pp. IV-3

through IV-6 (tables IV-2, IV-3, and IV-4) and official Commerce statistics (HTS subheading 8104.19.00 for alloy

magnesium).

2. 2005 data: Official Commerce statistics (HTS subheadings 8104.11.00, 8104.30.00, and 8104.19.00 for pure

magnesium ingot, pure granular magnesium, and alloy magnesium, respectively).

imports of pure granular magnesium from Canada have also declined since 2000123 and, since neither the

Canadian or Chinese-produced product were replaced by U.S. imports from other sources, there was a net
 124 In contrast, total U.S. imports of pure magnesium ingot and alloy magnesium remained relatively level in

2005 compared to 1998-2000 (table I-8).

 125 See tables 7 and 8 of the USGS 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) included as attachment 3 to the

Response.

 126 Response, p. 21.

 127 Table 3 of the USGS 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) included as attachment 3 to the Response.

 128 Response, attachment 8.

I-34

decline in total imports.124 Production of primary magnesium in Canada fell from 83,000 metric tons in

2001 to 54,000 metric tons in 2005. A substantial portion of total Canadian capacity of 123,000 metric

tons in 2005 is reported to be on “standby basis.”125

Apparent U.S. Consumption and Market Shares

Primary Magnesium

The domestic interested party states that demand conditions have not changed since the original

investigation, with demand determined by the downstream industries where magnesium is consumed.126

U.S. consumption of primary magnesium in 2005 was estimated at 100,000 metric tons by the USGS. 

Diecasting (accounting for 52 percent of the total) reportedly was the leading use for primary magnesium

in 2005, followed by aluminum alloying (accounting for 30 percent) and iron and steel desulfurization

(accounting for 7 percent).127 The following tabulation presents (open market) U.S. consumption of

primary magnesium from 1998 to 2005:

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

107,0001 131,0001 104,0001 95,7001 96,100 103,0002 101,0002 100,000

 1

 Figures apparently do not include the internal transfer of pure magnesium. Most such consumption was by

Northwest Alloys to its parent Alcoa. As indicated earlier, Northwest Alloys shut down operations in October 2001. 

Northwest Alloys reported the following related party transfers during the original investigation: *** metric tons in

1998; *** metric tons in 1999; *** metric tons in 2000; and *** metric tons in January-June 2001. (The firm also

reported trade sales of between *** metric tons on an annual basis.) ***. Original Staff Report, pp. VI-10 and VI11 (tables VI-5 and VI-6).

 2

 Revised.

Source: USGS Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) (table 3). The tables from the 2004 and 2005 Handbooks are

included as attachment 3 to the Response and tables from the 1998-2003 Handbooks are on the public record of

this review.

As noted earlier, US Magnesium is currently the only U.S. producer of primary (pure and alloy)

magnesium. US Magnesium reported U.S. shipments of *** metric tons of pure magnesium and ***

metric tons of alloy magnesium in 2005 for a total of *** metric tons128 or approximately *** of U.S.

consumption of primary magnesium.

The Commission’s general practice in defining the domestic industry has been to include in the

industry all of the domestic production of the domestic like product, whether toll-produced, captively
 129 Original Views, p. 9; Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, pp. 37-38.

 130 Data were not collected on primary magnesium during the original investigation.

 131 The Commission majority explained in its views that due to concerns about double-counting the downstream

use of magnesium ingot in grinding operations, they compared the volume of Chinese subject imports with apparent

domestic consumption of granular magnesium (instead of apparent domestic consumption of all pure magnesium). 

Original Views, p. 18, fn. 97.

 132 See the discussion on the description and uses of granular magnesium presented earlier in this report.

I-35

consumed, or sold in the domestic merchant market.129 Table I-9 presents a calculation for the apparent

U.S. consumption that adjusts publicly available data for the period examined during the original

investigation130 to include the internal consumption and company transfers of primary magnesium. As

shown, total apparent U.S. consumption of primary magnesium fell on an overall basis by about ***

metric tons (the *** consumed internally or transferred during the original investigation) from 2000 to

2005. US Magnesium reported *** of primary magnesium; Northwest Alloys shut down in 2001. U.S.

imports of primary magnesium fell by 10,000 metric tons on an overall basis from 2000 to 2005.

Pure Magnesium in Granular Form

As discussed earlier in this report, in the original investigation the Commission majority found a single

domestic like product that combined pure granular magnesium and pure magnesium ingot while

Commissioners Miller and Hillman found two separate domestic like products (granular and ingot). None

of the Commissioners included alloy magnesium in the definition of the domestic like product. Both the

Commissioner majority and Commissioners Miller and Hillman concluded that grinding operators (with

the exception of ***) were within the domestic industry while Commissioner Okun did not support their

inclusion. ESM was excluded from the domestic industry as a related party by both the Commission

majority and Commissioners Miller and Hillman. Tables I-10 and I-11 present the market penetration

ratios cited by the Commissioners in their views. As indicated in the table notes, Commissioners Miller

and Hillman utilized the data shown in table I-10 while the Commission majority131 relied on the data

shown in table I-11. 

The primary use for pure magnesium in granular form is in the production of desulfurizing reagent

mixtures, although lesser amounts are used in other applications including defense.132 The following

tabulation shows data on the U.S. consumption of primary magnesium for use in iron and steel

desulfurization:

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

11,200 9,440 12,200 8,150 8,510 8,130 8,360 7,410

Source notes:

1. 2001-2005 data: USGS Minerals Handbook (Magnesium), tables 3 and 4, on the public record of this review.

2. 2004-2005 data: USGS 2005 Minerals Yearbook (Magnesium), table 3, p. 46.8, attachment 3 to the Response.
I-36

Table I-9

Pure magnesium and primary magnesium (including pure and alloy): U.S. apparent consumption,

1998-2000, and 2005

Source Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

Pure magnesium:

 U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments ***1 ***1 ***1 ***

 U.S. imports of granular 14,634 18,618 21,359 2,510

 U.S. imports of ingot 26,460 26,855 22,933 28,712

 Apparent U.S. consumption2 *** *** *** ***

Primary magnesium:

 U.S. imports3 79,115 86,556 82,706 72,642

 U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments (4) (4) (4) 27,3585

 Apparent U.S. consumption:

 Open-market6 107,000 131,000 104,000 100,000

 Internal consumption/transfers of pure

 magnesium:

 Magcorp7 *** *** *** ***

 Northwest Alloys *** *** *** 0

 Subtotal *** *** *** ***

 Total apparent U.S. consumption ***8 ***8 ***8 ***

 1 Does not include the volume of pure magnesium that *** sold in granular form. In 1998, the firm sold *** of pure

granular magnesium (table I-5). ***.

 2 Calculated from figures in table. Note that the internal consumption and company transfers of pure magnesium

are included in these data. The fall in apparent U.S. consumption from 1998-2000, therefore, is believed to be due

to the shutdown of Northwest AIloys.

 3

 Calculated by totaling U.S. imports of pure granular magnesium, pure ingot magnesium, and alloy magnesium

(table I-8).

 4 Cannot be calculated. Data are not available for the internal consumption/transfers of alloy magnesium.

 5

 Calculated from figures in table (i.e., by subtracting U.S. imports (Commerce statistics) from total apparent U.S.

consumption (USGS data)). The “correct” figure as reported directly by US Magnesium is *** metric tons (*** metric

tons of pure magnesium plus *** metric tons of alloy magnesium). Response, attachment 8. Therefore, there is a

discrepancy of *** metric tons between the figure reported by US Magnesium and the figure obtained by subtracting

U.S. imports from the USGS consumption figure.

 6

 Data are not calculated from the above figures but are derived from a separate data source. (See source notes.)

 7

 Fiscal year basis.

 8 Understated by the volume of any internal consumption/transfers of alloy magnesium by U.S. producers.

Source notes:

1. U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments of pure magnesium: U.S. shipments of pure magnesium ingot (table I-7) for

1998-2000 and Response, attachment 8, for 2005. 

2. U.S. imports: table I-8.

3. Open-market consumption of primary magnesium: USGS Minerals Handbook (Magnesium) (table 3). The tables

for 2004 and 2005 are included as attachment 3 to the Response and the tables for 1998-2003 are on the public

record of this review.

4. Internal consumption/transfers of pure magnesium: Original Staff Report, pp. VI-10 and VI-11 (tables VI-5 and

VI-6) for 1998-2000, and Response, attachment 8 for 2005.
I-37

Table I-10

Pure granular magnesium: U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments (based on all reporting producers),

U.S. imports, and apparent U.S. consumption, on the basis of quantity, 1998-2000, and 2005

Source Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments:

 *** *** *** *** (1)

 *** *** *** *** (1)

 Subtotal *** ***2 *** (1)

 Firms other than *** and *** ***2 ***2 ***2 (1)

 Total3 *** *** *** ***

U.S. imports from–

 China 9,972 13,185 15,262 1,484

 All other sources 4,662 5,433 6,097 1,027

 Total 14,634 18,618 21,359 2,510

Total apparent U.S. consumption *** *** *** ***

Share of quantity (percent)

U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments:

 *** ***2 ***2 ***2 (1)

 *** ***2 ***2 ***2 (1)

 Subtotal ***2 ***2 ***2 (1)

 Firms other than *** and *** ***2 ***2 ***2 (1)

U.S. imports from–

 China *** *** *** ***

 All other sources *** *** *** ***

 Total *** *** *** ***

 1 Not available.

 2

 Staff calculation for this review.

 3

 The figure for 2005 represents shipments of pure magnesium ingot produced by US Magnesium that are shipped

to U.S. grinders. As discussed earlier, total U.S. shipments (including captive use) of granular magnesium by the

grinders are possibly substantially understated in 2005 to the extent that grinders produce granular magnesium from

offshore-purchased ingot. They will also be understated to the extent that US Magnesium sells product to firms

other than grinders. However, production figures for 1998-2000 will be overstated to the extent that they also reflect

the production of the downstream product (reagents).

Note.–The data in this table correspond to those presented in the Original Staff Report, table IV-11 (apparent U.S.

consumption and market shares for pure granular magnesium) except for the separate figures that have been

calculated by staff in this review for *** and for *** in order to provide data corresponding to the definition of the

domestic industry adopted by both the majority and by Commissioners Miller and Hillman in the original

investigation. 

Source notes:

1. 1998-2000 data: Confidential Original Views, p. 22 (for ***’s and ***’s U.S. shipments); Confidential Original

Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, p. 65 (for nonsubject import shares) and p. 66 (for subject import shares); table I-8

of this report (for import data); and Original Staff Report, p. IV-12 (table IV-9) (for apparent U.S. consumption).

2. 2005 data: tables I-6 and I-8.
I-38

Table I-11

Pure granular magnesium: U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments, U.S. imports, and apparent U.S.

consumption (excluding data for grinders other than *** and ***), on the basis of quantity,

1998-2000, and 2005

Source

Original investigation Review

1998 1999 2000 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments:

 *** *** *** *** (1)

 *** *** *** *** (1)

 Total *** ***2 *** (1)

U.S. imports from–

 China 9,972 13,185 15,262 1,484

 All other sources 4,662 5,433 6,097 1,027

 Total 14,634 18,618 21,359 2,510

 Total apparent U.S. consumption3 ***2 ***2 ***2 (1)

Share of quantity (percent)

U.S. producers’ U.S. shipments ***4 ***4 ***4 (1)

U.S. imports from–

 China *** *** *** (1)

 All other sources *** *** *** (1)

 Total *** *** *** (1)

 1 Not available.

 2

 Staff calculation for this review.

 3

 Apparent U.S. consumption as calculated and as cited in the Commission’s views in the original investigation

does not include data for U.S. grinders other than *** and ***.

 4

 These figures do not appear in the Commission’s majority (or dissenting) views but are presented in this table

since they are derived using the methodology employed in the calculation of the import penetration ratios that were

cited in the Commission’s majority views and which appear in this table.

Source notes:

1. 1998-2000 data: Confidential Original Views, p. 22 (for producers’ U.S. shipments), p. 25 (for nonsubject import

shares), and p. 26 (for subject import shares); and table I-8 of this report (for import data).

2. 2005 data: table I-8 of this report.
 133 Original Views, p. 20. It stated: “Average unit values as well as the direct pricing data collected in these

investigations show declining prices of Chinese subject imports, declining domestic prices, as well as considerable

underselling by Chinese subject imports at significant margins over the period of investigation. Chinese subject

imports undersold the domestic like product in all possible price comparisons at average margins that increased from

49.1 percent in 1998 to 72.7 percent in 1999, and to 79.5 percent in 2000. Although most of the shipments of

Chinese subject imports were to the desulfurization segment of the U.S. market ***, the record indicates that

Chinese subject imports had adverse effects throughout the market. The prices of Chinese subject imports in the

desulfurization segment of the market were so low that they were even lower than magnesium ingot prices to that

and other segments of the market.” Confidential Original views, pp. 27-28 (fn. omitted). 

 With reference to the impact of the subject pure granular magnesium, the Commission determined that

“significant volumes of Chinese subject imports at low prices displaced the domestic like product in the

desulfurization segment of the market, and intensified competition throughout the U.S. market, including in the

aluminum alloying segment where the domestic like product also competed with subject imports from Israel and

non-subject imports from countries like Russia. Domestic producer Magcorp declared bankruptcy at the end of the

period of investigation, Northwest Alloys announced the closure of its production facilities in September 2001, and

the condition of the magnesium ingot producers declined during the period of investigation.” Original Views, pp.

29-30. 

 134 Commissioners Miller and Hillman stated that “{t}here is little directly comparable pricing for granular pure

magnesium. The Commission collected pricing data for granular magnesium for two market segments: (1) steel

producers and grinders, and (2) other end users. With respect to the first segment, these subject imports are entirely

or almost entirely purchased by reagent producers, who further process the imports into desulfurization reagents. 

Thus, the reported prices for subject imports are for sales to grinders. (The exception is ***.) In contrast, domestic

producers reported prices for sales of desulfurization reagents to steel producers. Thus, these prices are not directly

comparable. With respect to the second segment, the record indicates a variety of products with different prices. 

Again, these prices are not directly comparable.” Further, “{b}ecause of the very limited direct competition between

subject imports and domestic producers’ end-products, the substantial portion of domestic production that is

internally consumed, and the fact that the domestic producers are themselves the purchasers of *** of the subject

imports,” the two Commissioners stated that they could not “determine that significant underselling has occurred,

nor can we determine that the subject imports adversely affect prices for the domestic like product to a significant

degree.” Confidential Original Miller/Hillman Dissenting Views, pp. 66-67.

 135 Response, p. 7.

 136 US Magnesium reported that the costs to convert magnesium ingot into granular form are “minimal.” 

Response, p. 17, fn. 16.

 137 See the section of this report entitled “The Industry in China” for information on the export tax rebate in

China for magnesium. 

 138 Response, pp. 16-17.

I-39

PRICING

The Commission found significant price underselling by the subject merchandise and price

depression of the domestic like product during its original investigation.133 In contrast, the dissenting

Commissioners could not determine that significant underselling had occurred nor that there had been an

adverse impact on prices of the domestic like product.134 The domestic interested party indicates in its

response to the notice of institution that the U.S. market for pure magnesium is still “highly price

sensitive.”135 Further, China “remains the low-price supplier to the world market” with published f.o.b.

prices in China for magnesium ingot136 well below those for the U.S. market. The domestic interested

party argues that even with the changes to the export tax rebate,137 China “remains the low-priced supplier

to the world market.”138

The USGS yearbook for 2005 provided the following discussion on pricing:
 139 USGS 2005 Minerals Yearbook, “Magnesium” (Deborah Kramer), p. 46.2, attached as attachment 3 to the

Response.

 140 The petition listed 22 firms producing pure magnesium in China and identified an additional 24 firms believed

to be traders and/or exporters of pure magnesium; however, petitioners did not distinguish pure granular magnesium

producers from pure magnesium ingot producers.

 141 See table VII-1 in the Original Staff Report for the data reported by these two firms.

 142 Original Staff Report, pp. II-5 and VII-1 through VII-4. 

 143 Response, p. 18.

 144 Response, p. 12.

I-40

“With the exception of a slight increase at the beginning of the year in anticipation of

antidumping duties being established for magnesium imported from China and Russia,

United States magnesium prices fell throughout 2005. The yearend 2005 U.S.

magnesium price range was 30 to 40 cents per pound lower than that at yearend 2004.

Several reasons were suggested for the downturn in prices, particularly in the latter part

of the year. Oversupply of magnesium, particularly from Russian producers, was cited as

one reason for the drop in prices. Competition from recycled magnesium, which has a

lower price, was cited as another reason. In addition, the phasing out of one of General

Motors Corp.’s (GM) most comprehensive truck and sport utility vehicle redesign

programs, which had been incorporating magnesium parts, contributed to the price

decline (McBeth, 2005). Contract prices among the magnesium producers and large

consuming companies for 2006 were reported to be between $1.25 and $1.32 per pound,

which was less than the 2005 contract level of about $1.40 to $1.50 per pound (Carroll,

2005).”139

THE INDUSTRY IN CHINA 

 The Chinese magnesium metal producing industry at the time of the original investigation was

characterized by a large number of production facilities manufacturing magnesium ingot. The total

number of magnesium metal-producing plants in China was estimated at 84, with production dominated

by nearly 60 export-oriented plants.140 According to the China Magnesium Association (“CMA”), only

22 Chinese manufacturers had plants with an annual capacity of over 3,000 metric tons. The number of

Chinese facilities producing magnesium was also reported during the original investigation to depend

largely on the price level of magnesium ingot. In 1997, when magnesium ingot prices had been relatively

higher, there were an estimated 400 magnesium plants in China. The Commission received completed

foreign producer questionnaire responses from only two Chinese firms (Shanxi Wenxi Yinguang

Magnesium in Shanxi Province and Nanjing Ube Magnesium in Jiangsu Province) during the original

investigation. ***.141 142

The domestic interested party indicated in its response to the notice of institution that it does not

have information on producers that currently export Chinese-manufactured granular magnesium to the

United States.143 However, according to the domestic interested party, the Chinese magnesium industry

has developed very rapidly since the original investigation and most of the world’s supply of magnesium

is produced in China.144 The following tabulation presents primary magnesium production in China for

1998 through 2005: 
 145 Response, p. 15.

 146 USGS, 2000 Minerals Yearbook (Magnesium), table 7, p. 46.10, attachment 3 to the Response.

 147 Response, p. 13. 

 148 The top seven Chinese producers represent 42 percent of Chinese magnesium production capacity. They are,

in descending order: Shanxi Wanke Jinrun Magnesium Co.; Shanxi Wenxi Yinguan Magnesium Industry Group

Corp.; Jishan County Silicon Magnesium Smelter (Huayu); Taiyuan Tongxiang Magnesium Co. Ltd.; Jilin Linjian

Magnesium Industry Group; Qinghai Dongli Machinery Manufacturing Corp.; and Shanxi Qingxu Tongxiang

Magnesium Corp. Ltd. Public spreadsheet supplied by Deborah A. Kramer, Commodity Specialist, USGS,

February 27, 2006. Pure and Ally Magnesium From Canada and Pure Magnesium From China, p. IV-8.

I-41

Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

Production1 70,500 120,000 140,000 200,000 250,000 340,000 442,000 470,000

 1 Estimated.

Source notes:

1. 1998-2000 data: USGS 2000 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium), table 8, on the public record of this review.

2. 2001-2005 data: USGS 2005 Minerals Yearbook (Magnesium), table 8, p. 46.10, attachment 3 to the

Response.

Although only granular pure magnesium is subject to the antidumping duty currently under review, the

domestic interested party argues that product shifting is likely in the magnesium industry, stating that

“virtually all magnesium can be converted into granular form.”145

The USGS estimated China’s capacity for primary magnesium at 528,000 metric tons in 2005.146

US Magnesium notes the reports of the closing of smaller magnesium plants with capacity of less than

1,000 metric tons per year in its response but also refers to reports of 105,000 metric tons of capacity to

be added in 2005 and 2006.147 China’s Shanxi province accounted for 71 percent of the total Chinese

production capacity in 2005, and the top six producers are all located in that province.148

The following tabulation provides China Customs’ export data for magnesium in granular form

(in metric tons):

Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Quantity (metric tons)

Exports to the United

 States 9,111 15,361 15,362 2,794 82 13 6,812 735

Total exports 11,2281 24,4511 28,4082 20,9522 24,2882 33,2232 39,1252 45,2452

 1 Other significant export markets include Germany and Japan.

 2

 Other significant export markets include the European Union and Japan.

Note.–Reported exports of pure granular magnesium to the United States from China are comparable to U.S. imports of subject

merchandise as shown in figure I-1 and table I-8.

Source notes:

1998-1999 data: The World Trade Atlas, 2000, as cited in the Original Staff Report, pp. VII-1 through VII-4. 

2000-2005 data: Global Trade Atlas, on the public record of this review.
 149 Response, p. 13. 

 150 Ibid., p. 14. See also the article entitled “Chinese magnesium producer ready to begin exporting to the US,”

attachment 7 to the Response. TMI is reported in the article to be the sole export sales agent for Wenxi Yinguang, a

50,000 metric ton magnesium producer in northern China. Also discussed in the article is whether other exporters

could obtain comparable margins in Commerce reviews.

 151 Response, p. 16.

 152 2005 Minerals Handbook (Magnesium), “Magnesium” (Deborah Kramer), p. 46.4, attachment 3 to the

Response.

 153 Response, p. 15.

 154 The closure was also cited in the “USGS Mineral Industry Surveys” (November 2006). The survey indicated

that “the timing of the closure is in connection with the end of a 10-year supply contract with General Motors Corp.

... Competition from low-cost magnesium from China was cited as the reason for the company’s decision” (citing, in

turn, “Magnesium market likely to lose world’s largest plant” (Karen McBeth and Michelle de Klerk), Platts Metals

Week, v. 77, no. 44, October 30, 2006, p. 1-2). The anticipated closure was also attributed, in part, to the rise in

energy prices (in Canada) in a Yahoo!News item (2006), cited in “USGS Mineral Industry Surveys” (August 2006). 

 155 Response, pp. 19-21, and attachments 9 through 14.

I-42

US Magnesium argues that the Chinese magnesium industry continues to be export-oriented149 and noted

in its response that Chinese exporter TMI achieved a zero dumping margin effective October 17, 2006 in

an administrative review on pure magnesium (but not including granular magnesium) based on one

shipment of pure magnesium to the U.S. market.150 The domestic interested party stated that “China

remains the low-price supplier to the world market,”151 and also noted that China reduced its export tax

rebate on magnesium from 13 percent to 5 percent beginning on January 1, 2006.152 Antidumping duties

are currently in place in Brazil for imports of pure magnesium (both ingot and granular) and alloy

magnesium from China.153

GLOBAL SUPPLY

The domestic interested party indicated in its response to the notice of institution that the

expansion of Chinese magnesium production capacity and resulting closure of producers in other parts of

the world has led to “a major upheaval” in the structure of the worldwide industry. It cited the closure of

the following producers since 2000: Pechiney in June 2001 (17,000 metric ton primary magnesium

facility in Marignac, France); Northwest Alloys in October 2001 (a U.S. producer with 45,000 metric tons

of capacity); Norsk Hydro Norway in 2002 (42,000 metric tons of capacity in Porsgrunn, Norway); and

Southern Magnesium and Chemical (India). In addition, a new facility in Canada (Magnola Metallurgy)

was idled in 2003 before construction was completed and, further, the Canadian producer,

Timminco, Ltd., announced (although later postponed) plans to shut down primary magnesium

production for several months in 2004 at a 6,000 metric ton per year plant in Ontario. Recently (October

2006), Norsk Hydro (“NHCI”) announced the possible closure (assessed as “likely” in a trade

publication) of the Becancour, Quebec plant with an annual production of 48,000 metric tons of primary

magnesium.154 US Magnesium assessed any closure of this plant in its Response as “particularly

significant” since “NHCI is the world’s largest producer of magnesium and is thought to operate the

world’s most modern and lowest cost plant.” US Magnesium attaches articles and announcements to its

Response that attribute, at least in part, a number of these closures to cheaper imports (most often from

China). The domestic interested party also maintains that “{d}espite these numerous closures of

magnesium production facilities, there has been no shortage of magnesium in world markets. Rather,

there is substantial global excess production capacity for pure magnesium, and it is growing. China

accounts for a significant share of this excess capacity.”155

Table I-12 lists world annual primary magnesium production and production capacity in 2005.
 156 USGS 2005 Minerals Year (Magnesium), table 8, attachment 3 to the Response.

I-43

Table I-12

Primary magnesium: World annual primary magnesium production and capacity, 20051

Country Capacity Production

(metric tons)

Brazil 12,000 6,000

Canada 123,0002 54,000

China 528,000 470,000

India 900 -

Israel 27,500 27,600

Kazakhstan 10,000 20,000

Russia3 46,000 45,000

Serbia and Montenegro 5,000 1,500

Ukraine 15,000 2,000

United States 45,000 (4)

 Total 812,000 626,000

 1 Includes plants on standby basis.

 2

 Includes 63,000 metric tons per year of idle capacity.

 3

 Includes secondary magnesium.

 4

 Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data; not included in total.

Source: USGS 2005 Minerals Year (Magnesium) - tables 7 and 8, attachment 3 to the Response.

As shown in the following tabulation (in metric tons), worldwide non-U.S. production of primary

magnesium has risen steadily since 2001:156

Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Production1 420,000 440,000 485,000 595,000 626,000

 1 Excludes the United States. 
 
A-1

APPENDIX A

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 190 / Monday, October 2, 2006 / Notices 58001 

1No response to this request for information is 

required if a currently valid Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) number is not displayed; the 

OMB number is 3117–0016/USITC No. 07–5–161, 

expiration date June 30, 2008. Public reporting 

burden for the request is estimated to average 10 

hours per response. Please send comments 

regarding the accuracy of this burden estimate to 

the Office of Investigations, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, 500 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 

20436. 

Merchandise in the Subject 

Country(ies), provide the following 

information on your firm’s(s’) 

operations on that product during 

calendar year 2005 (report quantity data 

in pounds and value data in U.S. 

dollars, landed and duty-paid at the 

U.S. port but not including antidumping 

or countervailing duties). If you are a 

trade/business association, provide the 

information, on an aggregate basis, for 

the firms which are members of your 

association. 

(a) Production (quantity) and, if 

known, an estimate of the percentage of 

total production of Subject Merchandise 

in each Subject Country accounted for 

by your firm’s(s’) production; and 

(b) the quantity and value of your 

firm’s(s’) exports to the United States of 

Subject Merchandise and, if known, an 

estimate of the percentage of total 

exports to the United States of Subject 

Merchandise from each Subject Country 

accounted for by your firm’s(s’) exports. 

(10) Identify significant changes, if 

any, in the supply and demand 

conditions or business cycle for the 

Domestic Like Product that have 

occurred in the United States or in the 

market for the Subject Merchandise in 

the Subject Countries after 2000, and 

significant changes, if any, that are 

likely to occur within a reasonably 

foreseeable time. Supply conditions to 

consider include technology; 

production methods; development 

efforts; ability to increase production 

(including the shift of production 

facilities used for other products and the 

use, cost, or availability of major inputs 

into production); and factors related to 

the ability to shift supply among 

different national markets (including 

barriers to importation in foreign 

markets or changes in market demand 

abroad). Demand conditions to consider 

include end uses and applications; the 

existence and availability of substitute 

products; and the level of competition 

among the Domestic Like Product 

produced in the United States, Subject 

Merchandise produced in the Subject 

Countries, and such merchandise from 

other countries. 

(11) (Optional) A statement of 

whether you agree with the above 

definitions of the Domestic Like Product 

and Domestic Industry; if you disagree 

with either or both of these definitions, 

please explain why and provide 

alternative definitions. 

Authority: These reviews are being 

conducted under authority of title VII of the 

Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published 

pursuant to section 207.61 of the 

Commission’s rules. 

Issued: September 25, 2006. 

By order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E6–16082 Filed 9–29–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation No. 731–TA–895 (Review)] 

Pure Magnesium From China 

AGENCY: United States International 

Trade Commission. 

ACTION: Institution of a five-year review 

concerning the antidumping duty order 

on pure magnesium in granular form 

from China. 

SUMMARY: The Commission hereby gives 

notice that it has instituted a review 

pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff 

Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1675(c)) (the Act) 

to determine whether revocation of the 

antidumping duty order on pure 

magnesium in granular form from China 

would be likely to lead to continuation 

or recurrence of material injury. 

Pursuant to section 751(c)(2) of the Act, 

interested parties are requested to 

respond to this notice by submitting the 

information specified below to the 

Commission; 1 to be assured of 

consideration, the deadline for 

responses is November 21, 2006. 

Comments on the adequacy of responses 

may be filed with the Commission by 

December 15, 2006. For further 

information concerning the conduct of 

this review and rules of general 

application, consult the Commission’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedure, part 

201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 

201), and part 207, subparts A, D, E, and 

F (19 CFR part 207). 

DATES: Effective Date: October 2, 2006. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mary Messer (202–205–3193), Office of 

Investigations, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, 500 E Street SW., 

Washington, DC 20436. Hearingimpaired persons can obtain 

information on this matter by contacting 

the Commission’s TDD terminal on 202–

205–1810. Persons with mobility 

impairments who will need special 

assistance in gaining access to the 

Commission should contact the Office 

of the Secretary at 202–205–2000. 

General information concerning the 

Commission may also be obtained by 

accessing its Internet server (http:// 

www.usitc.gov). The public record for 

this review may be viewed on the 

Commission’s electronic docket (EDIS) 

at http://edis.usitc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background.—On November 19, 2001, 

the Department of Commerce issued an 

antidumping duty order on imports of 

pure magnesium in granular form from 

China (66 FR 57936). The Commission 

is conducting a review to determine 

whether revocation of the order would 

be likely to lead to continuation or 

recurrence of material injury to the 

domestic industry within a reasonably 

foreseeable time. It will assess the 

adequacy of interested party responses 

to this notice of institution to determine 

whether to conduct a full review or an 

expedited review. The Commission’s 

determination in any expedited review 

will be based on the facts available, 

which may include information 

provided in response to this notice. 

Definitions.—The following 

definitions apply to this review: 

(1) Subject Merchandise is the class or 

kind of merchandise that is within the 

scope of the five-year review, as defined 

by the Department of Commerce. 

(2) The Subject Country in this review 

is China. 

(3) The Domestic Like Product is the 

domestically produced product or 

products which are like, or in the 

absence of like, most similar in 

characteristics and uses with, the 

Subject Merchandise. In its original 

determination, the Commission defined 

one Domestic Like Product-pure 

magnesium that includes both granular 

magnesium and magnesium ingot. 

Two Commissioners defined the 

domestic like product differently in the 

original determination. 

(4) The Domestic Industry is the U.S. 

producers as a whole of the Domestic 

Like Product, or those producers whose 

collective output of the Domestic Like 

Product constitutes a major proportion 

of the total domestic production of the 

product. In its original determination, 

the Commission defined the Domestic 

Industry as producers of pure 

magnesium, including grinding 

operations. One Commissioner defined 

the domestic industry differently in the 

original determination, and two 

Commissioners defined two separate 

domestic industries. The Commission 

also found that appropriate 

circumstances existed to exclude ESM 

from the Domestic Industry. 


rmajette on PROD1PC67 with NOTICES1
58002 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 190 / Monday, October 2, 2006 / Notices 

(5) The Order Date is the date that the 

antidumping duty order under review 

became effective. In this review, the 

Order Date is November 19, 2001. 

(6) An Importer is any person or firm 

engaged, either directly or through a 

parent company or subsidiary, in 

importing the Subject Merchandise into 

the United States from a foreign 

manufacturer or through its selling 

agent. 

Participation in the review and public 

service list.—Persons, including 

industrial users of the Subject 

Merchandise and, if the merchandise is 

sold at the retail level, representative 

consumer organizations, wishing to 

participate in the review as parties must 

file an entry of appearance with the 

Secretary to the Commission, as 

provided in section 201.11(b)(4) of the 

Commission’s rules, no later than 21 

days after publication of this notice in 

the Federal Register. The Secretary will 

maintain a public service list containing 

the names and addresses of all persons, 

or their representatives, who are parties 

to the review. 

Former Commission employees who 

are seeking to appear in Commission 

five-year reviews are reminded that they 

are required, pursuant to 19 CFR 201.15, 

to seek Commission approval if the 

matter in which they are seeking to 

appear was pending in any manner or 

form during their Commission 

employment. The Commission’s 

designated agency ethics official has 

advised that a five-year review is the 

‘‘same particular matter’’ as the 

underlying original investigation for 

purposes of 19 CFR 201.15 and 18 

U.S.C. 207, the post employment statute 

for Federal employees. Former 

employees may seek informal advice 

from Commission ethics officials with 

respect to this and the related issue of 

whether the employee’s participation 

was ‘‘personal and substantial.’’

However, any informal consultation will 

not relieve former employees of the 

obligation to seek approval to appear 

from the Commission under its rule 

201.15. For ethics advice, contact Carol 

McCue Verratti, Deputy Agency Ethics 

Official, at 202–205–3088. 

Limited disclosure of business 

proprietary information (BPI) under an 

administrative protective order (APO) 

and APO service list.—Pursuant to 

section 207.7(a) of the Commission’s 

rules, the Secretary will make BPI 

submitted in this review available to 

authorized applicants under the APO 

issued in the review, provided that the 

application is made no later than 21 

days after publication of this notice in 

the Federal Register. Authorized 

applicants must represent interested 

parties, as defined in 19 U.S.C. 1677(9), 

who are parties to the review. A 

separate service list will be maintained 

by the Secretary for those parties 

authorized to receive BPI under the 

APO. 

Certification.—Pursuant to section 

207.3 of the Commission’s rules, any 

person submitting information to the 

Commission in connection with this 

review must certify that the information 

is accurate and complete to the best of 

the submitter’s knowledge. In making 

the certification, the submitter will be 

deemed to consent, unless otherwise 

specified, for the Commission, its 

employees, and contract personnel to 

use the information provided in any 

other reviews or investigations of the 

same or comparable products which the 

Commission conducts under Title VII of 

the Act, or in internal audits and 

investigations relating to the programs 

and operations of the Commission 

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3. 

Written submissions.—Pursuant to 

section 207.61 of the Commission’s 

rules, each interested party response to 

this notice must provide the information 

specified below. The deadline for filing 

such responses is November 21, 2006. 

Pursuant to section 207.62(b) of the 

Commission’s rules, eligible parties (as 

specified in Commission rule 

207.62(b)(1)) may also file comments 

concerning the adequacy of responses to 

the notice of institution and whether the 

Commission should conduct an 

expedited or full review. The deadline 

for filing such comments is December 

15, 2006. All written submissions must 

conform with the provisions of sections 

201.8 and 207.3 of the Commission’s 

rules and any submissions that contain 

BPI must also conform with the 

requirements of sections 201.6 and 

207.7 of the Commission’s rules. The 

Commission’s rules do not authorize 

filing of submissions with the Secretary 

by facsimile or electronic means, except 

to the extent permitted by section 201.8 

of the Commission’s rules, as amended, 

67 FR 68036 (November 8, 2002). Also, 

in accordance with sections 201.16(c) 

and 207.3 of the Commission’s rules, 

each document filed by a party to the 

review must be served on all other 

parties to the review (as identified by 

either the public or APO service list as 

appropriate), and a certificate of service 

must accompany the document (if you 

are not a party to the review you do not 

need to serve your response). 

Inability to provide requested 

information.—Pursuant to section 

207.61(c) of the Commission’s rules, any 

interested party that cannot furnish the 

information requested by this notice in 

the requested form and manner shall 

notify the Commission at the earliest 

possible time, provide a full explanation 

of why it cannot provide the requested 

information, and indicate alternative 

forms in which it can provide 

equivalent information. If an interested 

party does not provide this notification 

(or the Commission finds the 

explanation provided in the notification 

inadequate) and fails to provide a 

complete response to this notice, the 

Commission may take an adverse 

inference against the party pursuant to 

section 776(b) of the Act in making its 

determination in the review. 

Information to be Provided in 

Response to This Notice of Institution: 

As used below, the term ‘‘firm’’ includes 

any related firms. 

(1) The name and address of your firm 

or entity (including World Wide Web 

address if available) and name, 

telephone number, fax number, and Email address of the certifying official. 

(2) A statement indicating whether 

your firm/entity is a U.S. producer of 

the Domestic Like Product, a U.S. union 

or worker group, a U.S. importer of the 

Subject Merchandise, a foreign producer 

or exporter of the Subject Merchandise, 

a U.S. or foreign trade or business 

association, or another interested party 

(including an explanation). If you are a 

union/worker group or trade/business 

association, identify the firms in which 

your workers are employed or which are 

members of your association. 

(3) A statement indicating whether 

your firm/entity is willing to participate 

in this review by providing information 

requested by the Commission. 

(4) A statement of the likely effects of 

the revocation of the antidumping duty 

order on the Domestic Industry in 

general and/or your firm/entity 

specifically. In your response, please 

discuss the various factors specified in 

section 752(a) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 

1675a(a)) including the likely volume of 

subject imports, likely price effects of 

subject imports, and likely impact of 

imports of Subject Merchandise on the 

Domestic Industry. 

(5) A list of all known and currently 

operating U.S. producers of the 

Domestic Like Product. Identify any 

known related parties and the nature of 

the relationship as defined in section 

771(4)(B) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 

1677(4)(B)). 

(6) A list of all known and currently 

operating U.S. importers of the Subject 

Merchandise and producers of the 

Subject Merchandise in the Subject 

Country that currently export or have 

exported Subject Merchandise to the 

United States or other countries since 

the Order Date. 


rmajette on PROD1PC67 with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 190 / Monday, October 2, 2006 / Notices 58003 

(7) If you are a U.S. producer of the 

Domestic Like Product, provide the 

following information on your firm’s 

operations on that product during 

calendar year 2005 (report quantity data 

in metric tons and value data in U.S. 

dollars, f.o.b. plant). If you are a union/ 

worker group or trade/business 

association, provide the information, on 

an aggregate basis, for the firms in 

which your workers are employed/ 

which are members of your association. 

(a) Production (quantity) and, if 

known, an estimate of the percentage of 

total U.S. production of the Domestic 

Like Product accounted for by your 

firm’s(s’) production; 

(b) The quantity and value of U.S. 

commercial shipments of the Domestic 

Like Product produced in your U.S. 

plant(s); and 

(c) The quantity and value of U.S. 

internal consumption/company 

transfers of the Domestic Like Product 

produced in your U.S. plant(s). 

(8) If you are a U.S. importer or a 

trade/business association of U.S. 

importers of the Subject Merchandise 

from the Subject Country, provide the 

following information on your firm’s(s’) 

operations on that product during 

calendar year 2005 (report quantity data 

in metric tons and value data in U.S. 

dollars). If you are a trade/business 

association, provide the information, on 

an aggregate basis, for the firms which 

are members of your association. 

(a) The quantity and value (landed, 

duty-paid but not including 

antidumping duties) of U.S. imports 

and, if known, an estimate of the 

percentage of total U.S. imports of 

Subject Merchandise from the Subject 

Country accounted for by your firm’s(s’) 

imports; 

(b) The quantity and value (f.o.b. U.S. 

port, including antidumping duties) of 

U.S. commercial shipments of Subject 

Merchandise imported from the Subject 

Country; and 

(c) The quantity and value (f.o.b. U.S. 

port, including antidumping duties) of 

U.S. internal consumption/company 

transfers of Subject Merchandise 

imported from the Subject Country. 

(9) If you are a producer, an exporter, 

or a trade/business association of 

producers or exporters of the Subject 

Merchandise in the Subject Country, 

provide the following information on 

your firm’s(s’) operations on that 

product during calendar year 2005 

(report quantity data in metric tons and 

value data in U.S. dollars, landed and 

duty-paid at the U.S. port but not 

including antidumping duties). If you 

are a trade/business association, provide 

the information, on an aggregate basis, 

for the firms which are members of your 

association. 

(a) Production (quantity) and, if 

known, an estimate of the percentage of 

total production of Subject Merchandise 

in the Subject Country accounted for by 

your firm’s(s’) production; and 

(b) The quantity and value of your 

firm’s(s’) exports to the United States of 

Subject Merchandise and, if known, an 

estimate of the percentage of total 

exports to the United States of Subject 

Merchandise from the Subject Country 

accounted for by your firm’s(s’) exports. 

(10) Identify significant changes, if 

any, in the supply and demand 

conditions or business cycle for the 

Domestic Like Product that have 

occurred in the United States or in the 

market for the Subject Merchandise in 

the Subject Country since the Order 

Date, and significant changes, if any, 

that are likely to occur within a 

reasonably foreseeable time. Supply 

conditions to consider include 

technology; production methods; 

development efforts; ability to increase 

production (including the shift of 

production facilities used for other 

products and the use, cost, or 

availability of major inputs into 

production); and factors related to the 

ability to shift supply among different 

national markets (including barriers to 

importation in foreign markets or 

changes in market demand abroad). 

Demand conditions to consider include 

end uses and applications; the existence 

and availability of substitute products; 

and the level of competition among the 

Domestic Like Product produced in the 

United States, Subject Merchandise 

produced in the Subject Country, and 

such merchandise from other countries. 

(11) (Optional) A statement of 

whether you agree with the above 

definitions of the Domestic Like Product 

and Domestic Industry; if you disagree 

with either or both of these definitions, 

please explain why and provide 

alternative definitions. 

Authority: This review is being conducted 

under authority of title VII of the Tariff Act 

of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to 

section 207.61 of the Commission’s rules. 

Issued: September 25, 2006. 

By order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E6–16085 Filed 9–29–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

Meeting of the Judicial Conference 

Advisory Committee on Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 

AGENCY: Judicial Conference of the 

United States, Advisory Committee on 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

ACTION: Notice of open meeting. 

SUMMARY: The Advisory Committee on 

Rules of Appellate Procedure will hold 

a one-day meeting. The meeting will be 

open to public observation but not 

participation. 

DATES: November 15, 2006. 

Time: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

ADDRESSES: Thurgood Marshall Federal 

Judiciary Building, Mecham Conference 

Center, One Columbus Circle, NE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

K. Rabiej, Chief, Rules Committee 

Support Office, Administrative Office of 

the United States Courts, Washington, 

DC 20544, telephone (202) 502–1820. 

Dated: September 22, 2006. 

John K. Rabiej, 

Chief, Rules Committee Support Office. 

[FR Doc. 06–8380 Filed 9–29–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 2210–55–M 

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

Hearings of the Judicial Conference 

Advisory Committees on Rules of 

Bankruptcy and Criminal Procedure, 

and the Rule of Evidence 

AGENCY: Judicial Conference of the 

United States, Advisory Committees on 

Rules of Bankruptcy and Criminal 

Procedure, and the Rules of Evidence. 

ACTION: Notice of Proposed 

Amendments and Open Hearings. 

SUMMARY: The Advisory Committees on 

Rules of Bankruptcy and Criminal 

Procedure, and the Rules of Evidence 

have proposed amendments to the 

following rules: 

Bankruptcy Rules: 1005, 1006, 1007, 

1009, 1010, 1011, 1015, 1017, 1019, 

1020, 2002, 2003, 2007.1, 2015, 3002, 

3003, 3016, 3017.1, 3019, 4002, 4003, 

4004, 4006, 4007, 4008, 5001, 5003, 

6004, 8001, 8003, 9006, and 9009, and 

New Rules 1021, 2007.2, 2015.1, 2015.2, 

2015.3, 5008, 5012, and 6011, and 

Official Forms 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 

9, 10, 16A, 18, 19A, 19B, 21, 22A, 22B, 

22C, 23, 24, and new Official Forms 

25A, 25B, 25C, 26, and Exhibit D to 

Form 1. 


rmajette on PROD1PC67 with NOTICES1
3876 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 17 / Friday, January 26, 2007 / Notices 

1Commissioner Jennifer A. Hillman found both 

the domestic interested party group response and 

the respondent interested party group response to 

be inadequate. 

2A record of the Commissioners’ votes, the 

Commission’s statement on adequacy, and any 

individual Commissioner’s statements will be 

available from the Office of the Secretary and at the 

Commission’s Web site. 

3Chairman Daniel R. Pearson and Commissioner 

Deanna Tanner Okun dissenting. 

4The Commission has found the response 

submitted by U.S. Magnesium LLC to be 

individually adequate. Comments from other 

interested parties will not be accepted (see 19 CFR 

207.62(d)(2)). 

and was accompanied by all the rentals 

due since the date the lease terminated 

under the law. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Bernadine T. Martinez, BLM, New 

Mexico State Office, at (505) 438–7530. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: No lease 

has been issued that affect the lands. 

The lessee agrees to new lease terms for 

rentals and royalties of $20.00 per acre 

or fraction thereof, per year, and 182⁄3

percent, respectively. The lessee paid 

the required $500.00 administrative fee 

for the reinstatement of the lease and 

$166.00 cost for publishing this Notice 

in the Federal Register. The lessee met 

all the requirements for reinstatement of 

the lease as set out in Sections 31(d) and 

(e) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 

(30 U.S.C. 188). We are proposing to 

reinstate lease NMNM 108883, effective 

the date of termination, September 1, 

2006, under the original terms and 

conditions of the lease and the 

increased rental and royalty rates cited 

above. 

Dated: January 23, 2007. 

Bernadine T. Martinez, 

Land Law Examiner. 

[FR Doc. E7–1287 Filed 1–25–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4310–FB–P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation No. 731–TA–895 (Review)] 

Pure Magnesium From China 

AGENCY: United States International 

Trade Commission. 

ACTION: Scheduling of an expedited fiveyear review concerning the antidumping 

duty order on pure magnesium from 

China. 

SUMMARY: The Commission hereby gives 

notice of the scheduling of an expedited 

review pursuant to section 751(c)(3) of 

the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 

1675(c)(3)) (the Act) to determine 

whether revocation of the antidumping 

duty order on pure magnesium from 

China would be likely to lead to 

continuation or recurrence of material 

injury within a reasonably foreseeable 

time. For further information 

concerning the conduct of this review 

and rules of general application, consult 

the Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure, part 201, subparts A through 

E (19 CFR part 201), and part 207, 

subparts A, D, E, and F (19 CFR part 

207). 

DATES: Effective Date: January 5, 2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Debra Baker (202–205–3180), Office of 

Investigations, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, 500 E Street, SW., 

Washington, DC 20436. Hearingimpaired persons can obtain 

information on this matter by contacting 

the Commission’s TDD terminal on 202–

205–1810. Persons with mobility 

impairments who will need special 

assistance in gaining access to the 

Commission should contact the Office 

of the Secretary at 202–205–2000. 

General information concerning the 

Commission may also be obtained by 

accessing its Internet server (http:// 

www.usitc.gov). The public record for 

this review may be viewed on the 

Commission’s electronic docket (EDIS) 

at http://edis.usitc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background. On January 5, 2007, the 

Commission determined that the 

domestic interested party group 

response to its notice of institution (71 

FR 58001, October 2, 2006) of the 

subject five-year review was adequate 

and that the respondent interested party 

group response was inadequate.1 The 

Commission did not find any other 

circumstances that would warrant 

conducting a full review.2 Accordingly, 

the Commission determined that it 

would conduct an expedited review 

pursuant to section 751(c)(3) of the Act.3

Staff report. A staff report containing 

information concerning the subject 

matter of the review will be placed in 

the nonpublic record on February 1, 

2007, and made available to persons on 

the Administrative Protective Order 

service list for this review. A public 

version will be issued thereafter, 

pursuant to section 207.62(d)(4) of the 

Commission’s rules. 

Written submissions. As provided in 

section 207.62(d) of the Commission’s 

rules, interested parties that are parties 

to the review and that have provided 

individually adequate responses to the 

notice of institution,4 and any party 

other than an interested party to the 

review may file written comments with 

the Secretary on what determination the 

Commission should reach in the review. 

Comments are due on or before 

February 6, 2007 and may not contain 

new factual information. Any person 

that is neither a party to the five-year 

review nor an interested party may 

submit a brief written statement (which 

shall not contain any new factual 

information) pertinent to the review by 

February 6, 2007. However, should the 

Department of Commerce extend the 

time limit for its completion of the final 

results of its review, the deadline for 

comments (which may not contain new 

factual information) on Commerce’s 

final results is three business days after 

the issuance of Commerce’s results. If 

comments contain business proprietary 

information (BPI), they must conform 

with the requirements of sections 201.6, 

207.3, and 207.7 of the Commission’s 

rules. The Commission’s rules do not 

authorize filing of submissions with the 

Secretary by facsimile or electronic 

means, except to the extent permitted by 

section 201.8 of the Commission’s rules, 

as amended, 67 FR 68036 (November 8, 

2002). Even where electronic filing of a 

document is permitted, certain 

documents must also be filed in paper 

form, as specified in II (C) of the 

Commission’s Handbook on Electronic 

Filing Procedures, 67 FR 68168, 68173 

(November 8, 2002). 

In accordance with §§ 201.16(c) and 

207.3 of the rules, each document filed 

by a party to the review must be served 

on all other parties to the review (as 

identified by either the public or BPI 

service list), and a certificate of service 

must be timely filed. The Secretary will 

not accept a document for filing without 

a certificate of service. 

Authority: This review is being conducted 

under authority of title VII of the Tariff Act 

of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to 

section 207.62 of the Commission’s rules. 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: January 23, 2007. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E7–1286 Filed 1–25–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation No. 332–483] 

Advice Concerning Possible 

Modifications to the U.S. Generalized 

System of Preferences, 2006 Review 

AGENCY: United States International 

Trade Commission. 

ACTION: Institution of investigation and 

scheduling of hearing. 

DATES: Effective Date: January 18, 2007. 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 24 / Tuesday, February 6, 2007 / Notices 5417 

year. We use the data, a component of 

the index of leading economic 

indicators, to estimate the number of 

housing units started, completed, and 

sold, if single-family. The Census 

Bureau also uses these data to select 

samples for its demographic surveys. 

Policymakers, planners, businessmen/ 

women, and others use the detailed 

geographic data collected from state and 

local officials on new residential 

construction authorized by building 

permits to monitor growth and plan for 

local services, and to develop 

production and marketing plans. The 

BPS is the only source of statistics on 

residential construction for states and 

smaller geographic areas. 

Affected Public: State, local or tribal 

government. 

Frequency: Monthly and annually. 

Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary. 

Legal Authority: Title 13, United 

States Code, Section 182. 

OMB Desk Officer: Brian HarrisKojetin, (202) 395–7314. 

Copies of the above information 

collection proposal can be obtained by 

calling or writing Diana Hynek, 

Departmental Paperwork Clearance 

Officer, (202) 482–0266, Department of 

Commerce, room 6625, 14th and 

Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, 

DC 20230 (or via the Internet at 

dhynek@doc.gov). 

Written comments and 

recommendations for the proposed 

information collection should be sent 

within 30 days of publication of this 

notice to Brian Harris-Kojetin, OMB 

Desk Officer either by fax (202–395–

7245) or e-mail (bharrisk@omb.eop.gov). 

Dated: January 31, 2007. 

Gwellnar Banks, 

Management Analyst, Office of the Chief 

Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. E7–1823 Filed 2–5–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Submission for OMB Review; 

Comment Request 

The Department of Commerce will 

submit to the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) for clearance the 

following proposal for collection of 

information under the provisions of the 

Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 

chapter 35). 

Agency: U.S. Census Bureau. 

Title: 2004 Panel of the Survey of 

Program Participation, Waves 10, 11, 

and 12. 

Form Number(s): SIPP 241005(L) 

Director’s Letter; SIPP/CAPI Automated 

Instrument; SIPP 24003 Reminder Card. 

Agency Approval Number: 0607–

0905. 

Type of Request: Extension of a 

currently approved collection. 

Burden: 44,799. 

Number of Respondents: 44,713. 

Average Hours Per Response: 30 

minutes. 

Needs and Uses: The U.S. Census 

Bureau requests authorization from the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) to extend the expiration date for 

the 2004 Panel of the Survey of Income 

and Program Participation (SIPP) to 

February 28, 2008. 

This will provide the time necessary 

to conduct the Wave 10, 11, and 12 

interviews for the 2004 Panel of the 

SIPP. The interviews will include the 

core SIPP, which has already been 

approved by OMB under Authorization 

No. 0607–0905. Due to budget 

constraints, there are no topical 

modules for the Wave 10, 11, and 12 

interviews. 

The SIPP represents a source of 

information for a wide variety of topics 

and allows information for separate 

topics to be integrated to form a single 

and unified database so that the 

interaction between tax, transfer, and 

other government and private policies 

can be examined. Government domestic 

policy formulators depend heavily upon 

the SIPP information concerning the 

distribution of income received directly 

as money or indirectly as in-kind 

benefits and the effect of tax and 

transfer programs on this distribution. 

They also need improved and expanded 

data on the income and general 

economic and financial situation of the 

U.S. population. The SIPP has provided 

these kinds of data on a continuing basis 

since 1983, permitting levels of 

economic well-being and changes in 

these levels to be measured over time. 

The survey is molded around a 

central ‘‘core’’ of labor force and income 

questions that remain fixed throughout 

the life of a panel. 

The SIPP is designed as a continuing 

series of national panels of interviewed 

households that are introduced every 

few years, with each panel having 

durations of 3 to 4 years. The 2004 

Panel is scheduled for 4 years and will 

include 12 waves which began on 

February 1, 2004. All household 

members 15 years old or over are 

interviewed using regular proxyrespondent rules. They are interviewed 

a total of 12 times (12 waves), at 4- 

month intervals, making the SIPP a 

longitudinal survey. Sample people (all 

household members present at the time 

of the first interview) who move within 

the country and reasonably close to a 

SIPP primary sampling unit will be 

followed and interviewed at their new 

address. Individuals 15 years old or over 

who enter the household after Wave 1 

will be interviewed; however, if these 

people move, they are not followed 

unless they happen to move along with 

a Wave 1 sample individual. 

Data provided by the SIPP are being 

used by economic policymakers, the 

Congress, state and local governments, 

and federal agencies that administer 

social welfare or transfer payment 

programs, such as the Department of 

Health and Human Services and the 

Department of Agriculture. 

Affected Public: Individuals or 

households. 

Frequency: Every 4 months. 

Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary. 

Legal Authority: Title 13 U.S.C., 

Section 182. 

OMB Desk Officer: Brian HarrisKojetin, (202) 395–7314. 

Copies of the above information 

collection proposal can be obtained by 

calling or writing Diana Hynek, 

Departmental Paperwork Clearance 

Officer, (202)482–0266, Department of 

Commerce, room 6625, 14th and 

Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, 

DC 20230 (or via the Internet at 

dhynek@doc.gov). 

Written comments and 

recommendations for the proposed 

information collection should be sent 

within 30 days of publication of this 

notice to Brian Harris-Kojetin, OMB 

Desk Officer either by fax (202–395–

7245) or e-mail (bharrisk@omb.eop.gov). 

Dated: January 31, 2007. 

Gwellnar Banks, 

Office of the Chief Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. E7–1836 Filed 2–5–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

International Trade Administration 

Pure Magnesium in Granular Form 

from the People’s Republic of China: 

Final Results of the Expedited Sunset 

Review of the Antidumping Duty Order 

A–570–864 

AGENCY: Import Administration, 

International Trade Administration, 

Department of Commerce. 

SUMMARY: On October 2, 2006, the 

Department of Commerce (‘‘the 

Department’’) initiated a sunset review 

of the antidumping duty order on pure 

magnesium in granular form from the 

People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) 

pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff 

Act of 1930, as amended (‘‘the Act’’). On 

the basis of a notice of intent to 

participate and an adequate substantive 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
5418 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 24 / Tuesday, February 6, 2007 / Notices 

1US Magnesium’s predecessor is Magnesium 

Corporation of America, the original petitioner in 

this proceeding. 

2The meaning of this term is the same as that 

used by the American Society for Testing and 

Materials in its Annual Book of ASTM Standards: 

Volume 01.02 Aluminum and Magnesium Alloys. 

response filed on behalf of domestic 

interested parties and inadequate 

response from respondent interested 

parties, the Department conducted an 

expedited (120-day) sunset review. As a 

result of this sunset review, the 

Department finds that revocation of the 

antidumping duty order would be likely 

to lead to continuation or recurrence of 

dumping. The dumping margins are 

identified in the Final Results of Review 

section of this notice. 

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 6, 2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Hilary E. Sadler, Esq., or Juanita Chen, 

AD/CVD Operations, Office 8, Import 

Administration, International Trade 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 14th Street & Constitution 

Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; 

telephone: (202) 482–4340, or (202) 

482–1904, respectively. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On October 2, 2006, the Department 

published the notice of initiation of the 

second sunset review of the 

antidumping duty order on pure 

magnesium in granular form from the 

PRC pursuant to section 751(c) of the 

Act. See Initiation of Five-year 

(‘‘Sunset’’) Reviews, 71 FR 57921 

(October 2, 2006). The Department 

received the Notice of Intent to 

Participate from US Magnesium LLC1

(‘‘US Magnesium’’), the domestic party, 

within the deadline specified in section 

351.218(d)(1)(i) of the Department’s 

regulations (‘‘Sunset Regulations’’). US 

Magnesium claimed interested party 

status under section 771(9)(C) of the 

Act, as a domestic producer of pure 

magnesium in granular form. The 

Department received a complete 

substantive response only from US 

Magnesium within the 30-day deadline 

specified in section 351.218(d)(3)(i) of 

the Department’s regulations. The 

Department received no responses from 

the respondent interested parties. As a 

result, pursuant to section 751(c)(5)(A) 

of the Act and section 

351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the 

Department’s regulations, the 

Department conducted an expedited 

(120-day) sunset review of this order. 

Scope of the Order 

There is an existing antidumping duty 

order on pure magnesium from the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC). See 

Notice of Antidumping Duty Orders: 

Pure Magnesium From the People’s 

Republic of China, the Russian 

Federation and Ukraine; Notice of 

Amended Final Determination of Sales 

at Less Than Fair Value: Antidumping 

Duty Investigation of Pure Magnesium 

From the Russian Federation, 60 FR 

25691 (May 12, 1995). The scope of this 

order excludes pure magnesium that is 

already covered by the existing order on 

pure magnesium in ingot form and 

currently classifiable under item 

numbers 8104.11.00 and 8104.19.00 of 

the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 

United States (HTSUS). The scope of 

this order includes imports of pure 

magnesium products, regardless of 

chemistry, including, without 

limitation, raspings, granules, turnings, 

chips, powder, and briquettes, except as 

noted above. Pure magnesium includes: 

(1) Products that contain at least 99.95 

percent primary magnesium, by weight 

(generally referred to as ‘‘ultra- pure’’

magnesium); (2) products that contain 

less than 99.95 percent but not less than 

99.8 percent primary magnesium, by 

weight (generally referred to as ‘‘pure’’

magnesium); (3) chemical combinations 

of pure magnesium and other material(s) 

in which the pure magnesium content is 

50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 

percent, by weight that do not conform 

to an ‘‘ASTM Specification for 

Magnesium Alloy’’2 (generally referred 

to as ‘‘off–specification pure’’

magnesium); and (4) physical mixtures 

of pure magnesium and other material(s) 

in which the pure magnesium content is 

50 percent or greater, but less than 99.8 

percent, by weight. Excluded from this 

order are mixtures containing 90 

percent or less pure magnesium by 

weight and one or more of certain non–

magnesium granular materials to make 

magnesium–based reagent mixtures. 

The non–magnesium granular materials 

of which the Department is aware used 

to make such excluded reagents are: 

Lime, calcium metal, calcium silicon, 

calcium carbide, calcium carbonate, 

carbon, slag coagulants, fluorspar, 

nephaline syenite, feldspar, aluminum, 

alumina (Al2O3), calcium aluminate, 

soda ash, hydrocarbons, graphite, coke, 

silicon, rare earth metals/mischmetal, 

cryolite, silica/fly ash, magnesium 

oxide, periclase, ferroalloys, dolomitic 

lime, and colemanite. A party importing 

a magnesium–based reagent which 

includes one or more materials not on 

this list is required to seek a scope 

clarification from the Department before 

such a mixture may be imported free of 

antidumping duties. 

The merchandise subject to this order 

is currently classifiable under item 

8104.30.00 of the HTSUS. Although the 

HTSUS subheading is provided for 

convenience and customs purposes, the 

written description of the scope of this 

order is dispositive. 

Analysis of Comments Received 

All issues raised in this review is 

addressed in the ‘‘Issues and Decision 

Memorandum’’ (‘‘Decision Memo’’) 

from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Import 

Administration, to David M. Spooner, 

Assistant Secretary for Import 

Administration, dated January 30, 2007, 

which is hereby adopted by this notice. 

The issues discussed in the Decision 

Memo include the likelihood of 

continuation or recurrence of dumping 

and the magnitude of the margins likely 

to prevail if the order were to be 

revoked. Parties can find a complete 

discussion of all issues raised in this 

review and the corresponding 

recommendations in this public 

memorandum which is on file in room 

B–099 of the main Commerce Building. 

In addition, a complete version of the 

Decision Memo can be accessed directly 

on the Web at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn, 

under the heading ‘‘February 2007.’’

The paper copy and electronic versions 

of the Decision Memo are identical in 

content. 

Final Results of Review 

We determine that revocation of the 

antidumping duty order on pure 

magnesium in granular form from the 

PRC would be likely to lead to 

continuation or recurrence of dumping 

at the following weighted–average 

percentage margins: 

Manufacturers/Exporters/Producers Weighted–Average 

Margin (percent) 

Minmetals ..................... 24.67 

PRC–wide Rate ............ 305.56 

We are issuing and publishing the 

results and notice in accordance with 

sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the 

Act. 

Dated: January 30, 2007. 

David M. Spooner, 

Assistant Secretaryfor Import Administration. 

[FR Doc. E7–1894 Filed 2–5–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–S 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
B-1

APPENDIX B

STATEMENT ON ADEQUACY

1

 Chairman Pearson and Commissioner Okun voted to conduct a full review in order to reconsider

the like product definition.

2

 In her determination in the original investigation, Commissioner Hillman defined the domestic

like product as granular pure magnesium (the Commission majority found a broader like product

consisting of both granular and ingot pure magnesium). Therefore, she defined the domestic industry to

be producers of granular pure magnesium (the Commission majority defined the domestic industry to

include producers of granular pure magnesium and producers of ingot pure magnesium). In this review,

no domestic producer of granular pure magnesium responded to the Commission’s Notice of Institution. 

Therefore, Commission Hillman found an inadequate domestic interested party group response as well as

an inadequate respondent interested party group response and voted for an expedited review.

EXPLANATION OF COMMISSION DETERMINATION ON ADEQUACY

in

Pure Magnesium from China

Inv. No. 731-TA-895 (Review)

On January 5, 2007, the Commission determined that it should conduct an expedited

review in the subject five-year review pursuant to section 751(c)(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as

amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(5).1

The Commission received a response to its notice of institution from US Magnesium

LLC, a domestic producer of pure magnesium. The Commission determined that this response

was individually adequate. The Commission also determined that the domestic interested party

group response was adequate.2

 The Commission received no response from any respondent

interested party and determined that the respondent interested party group response was

inadequate. In the absence of an adequate respondent interested party group response, or any

other circumstances that warranted a full review, the Commission determined to conduct an

expedited review.

A record of the Commissioners’ votes is available from the Office of the Secretary and

the Commission’s web site (http://www.usitc.gov).