SECURITY PROTECTION

Standardization Issues

Regarding Protection of

Executive Branch Officials

Statement of Bernard L. Ungar

Director, Government Business Operations Issues

General Government Division

and

Robert H. Hast

Acting Assistant Comptroller General

for Special Investigations

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight,

Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m., EDT

on Thursday

July 27, 2000

GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

Summary 

Security Protection: Standardization Issues

Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 1 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

Security protection for executive branch officials is currently being

conducted in a decentralized fashion. Most agencies protect their own

officials, although some officials are protected by other agencies, such as

the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals Service. From fiscal years

1997 through 1999, agencies reported that security protection was being

provided for 42 positions at 31 executive branch agencies. To protect these

officials, agencies reported spending $19.1 million in fiscal year 1997, $26.1

million in fiscal year 1998, and $28.5 million in fiscal year 1999—a 49-

percent increase in those 3 years. They also reported that the number of

full-time personnel employed to protect these officials increased by 73

percent during that 3-year period.

Our review indicated that some of the government’s highest ranking

officials were being protected by personnel who said they did not have

sufficient access to protective intelligence and training. We found that

three-fourths of the agencies did not have detailed, written threat

assessments justifying their decisions to protect officials. Without

assessments that link the level of threat to the size of the protective force,

it would be difficult to determine whether the level of protection provided

and the amount of money spent on protection were appropriate. Further,

some agencies said they lacked the legal authority to make arrests and

conduct threat investigations to protect their officials. Some security

officials also raised questions about potential conflicts of interest that

could result from using protective personnel from agencies’ offices of

inspectors general. Most agencies opposed centralizing security protection

services under one agency. We believe that additional sharing of protective

intelligence, establishing a standardized protection training program, and

providing agencies with specific statutory authority to provide protection

could help enhance security protection for top federal officials.

We also found that no single agency or official was responsible for

handling issues relating to the routine protection of executive branch

officials. This fragmentation of protective responsibilities among multiple

executive branch agencies has national security implications regarding the

functioning of government in part because 14 of the protected officials are

in the line of presidential succession. We are recommending that the OMB

Director, in consultation with the President, designate an appropriate

official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal

officials and report its recommendations to Congress for action. Once the

OMB Director has submitted his recommendations to Congress, Congress

should consider enacting legislation that would give whatever agency or

agencies that provide protection the resources and specific statutory

authority needed to effectively carry out these responsibilities.
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues

Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 2 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our report entitled Security

Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive

Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139, July 11, 2000). As you requested,

this report updates our December 1994 report in which we reviewed

security protection for officials at 10 of the 14 cabinet-level departments.1

You asked that we expand our 1994 report by addressing standardization

and centralization issues regarding security protection. In addition, as

agreed with the Subcommittee, this report includes data on the protection

of all civilian executive branch officials except the President, Vice

President, Central Intelligence Agency officials, and U.S. ambassadors to

foreign countries.

Our report contains information from agency security officials and

protected officials on the following questions pertaining to fiscal years

1997 through 1999: (1) How many federal government officials were

protected, who protected them, and how many security personnel

protected them? (2) How much did it cost to protect these officials? (3)

Under what legal authorities were agencies providing security protection?

(4) Under what circumstances were officials protected? (5) How were

agencies preparing threat assessments, and what are the implications of

standardizing and centralizing threat assessments? (6) What training did

protective personnel receive, and what are the implications of

standardizing and centralizing security protection training? (7) What are

the implications of centralizing protection services under one agency? and

(8) What are the views of the protected officials regarding the need for and

adequacy of their protection?

We collected this information by asking security officials from the 27

agencies that provided the protection to complete detailed questionnaires

on these issues, reviewing documents, and visiting protection training

facilities. We also sent letters directly to officials who were protected from

fiscal years 1997 through 1999 requesting their views on their protection

and on security standardization issues. Although we asked agencies for the

bases of their decisions to protect officials, we did not independently

assess whether particular officials should be protected or whether the

level of protection being provided and resources being expended were

appropriate.

 

1

 Security Protection: Costs of Services Provided for Selected Cabinet Officials (GAO/GGD-95-50, Dec.

30, 1994).
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 3 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

Due to the sensitive nature of this information, we agreed to respond in

two reports. The report we are discussing today addresses all eight

questions by providing aggregate data. It does not provide information by

agency or identify specific protected officials. A separate, classified report

addressed to you on May 31, 2000, provided specific information on the

security provided by position held and agency.

From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, agency security officials said that

security protection was provided to officials holding 42 positions at 31

executive branch agencies. These officials included all 14 cabinet

secretaries, 4 deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking

officials (mainly heads of agencies). The 42 officials were protected by

personnel from 27 different agencies. Thirty-six officials were protected by

personnel from their own agencies or departments, and 6 officials were

protected by personnel from other agencies or departments, such as the

U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Agencies reported that the number of full-time protective personnel

increased by 73 percent in fiscal years 1997 through 1999. The 27 agencies

also reported spending a total of at least $73.7 million to protect the

officials holding the 42 positions during that 3-year period. The agencies

reported that they spent $19.1 million in fiscal year 1997, $26.1 million in

fiscal year 1998, and $28.5 million in fiscal year 1999—a 49-percent

increase in 3 years. The agencies with the largest increases in costs and

full-time protective personnel during those 3 years generally said that

these increases were the result of increased travel by the protected

officials and the provision of enhanced security to respond to potential

terrorist threats.

We did not find that historically, top appointed federal officials have been

frequent victims of harm. However, security officials stressed that effective

security protection serves as a deterrent to harm. In addition, agencies

reported receiving 134 direct threats (threat of direct physical harm,

kidnapping, extortion, etc.) against their officials in fiscal years 1997

through 1999. Moreover, research on threat assessments suggests that top

appointed federal officials may be vulnerable to attack. According to a

1998 study conducted by the Secret Service, many attackers and would-be

attackers considered more than one target before attacking. This finding

has implications for high-ranking government officials, who may become

targets of attack by potentially dangerous individuals who shift their focus

from one government official to another.

Findings
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 4 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

Only two agencies—the Secret Service and the State Department—had

specific statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. The other

agencies relied on a variety of other authorities in providing protection to

officials, such as having their protective personnel deputized by the U.S.

Marshals Service to provide them with law enforcement authority. When

agencies provide protection to their officials without specific statutory

authority to do so, potential problems can arise, particularly with respect

to whether their protective personnel have the necessary law enforcement

authorities to make arrests, conduct investigations, and use force. The

military agencies in our review, for example, indicated that their protective

personnel had the authority to arrest military personnel, but not civilians,

and that they had only the authority to detain civilians who constitute an

immediate threat to the safety of a protected official. Eight agencies also

said that they did not have the authority to investigate threats made

against their protected officials and referred threats for investigation to

other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The primary protective personnel employed at 11 agencies, including 2

offices of inspectors general, were deputized as U.S. Marshals to provide

them with needed law enforcement authorities. The Marshals Service

indicated that it may not renew these deputations after January 1, 2001, to

highlight the need for Congress to provide agencies’ offices of inspectors

general with their own statutory authority to provide protection. Further,

the Marshals Service said that if Congress does not provide statutory

authority to those agencies by January 2001, it might be appropriate for the

Marshals Service to assume those agencies’ protective responsibilities at

that time.

Protective personnel at three agencies were employed by offices of

inspectors general. Some security officials expressed a concern that using

personnel from agencies’ offices of inspectors general could represent a

potential conflict of interest. They said that if offices of inspectors general

were investigating officials whom they were also protecting, it could result

in an atmosphere of distrust between the protective personnel and the

officials. A March 2000 Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel

opinion raised similar concerns. However, officials at the agencies that

employed protective personnel in offices of inspectors general disagreed,

saying that potential conflicts of interest were avoided by separating the

investigative and protective responsibilities within their offices.

Agencies reported that their officials received different levels and

frequencies of protection and that protection was needed to respond to

possible and actual threats. According to agencies with security protection

Legal Authorities

Threat Assessments
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 5 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

as one of their primary missions (the Secret Service, the Marshals Service,

and the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service), threat

assessments form the basis for determining the need and scope of

protection. The agencies with security protection as one of their primary

missions, and most of the Department of Defense agencies, had prepared

detailed, written threat assessments regarding their protected officials.

However, nearly three-fourths of the agencies that provided protection

said they had not prepared detailed, written threat analyses justifying their

decisions to apply certain levels of protection and expend resources. In

addition, the seven agencies that had written threat assessments did not

detail how decisions were made regarding the size of the protective force

needed. Without assessments that link the level of threat to the size of the

protective force, it would be difficult to determine whether the level of

protection provided and the amount of money spent on protection were

appropriate.

Security personnel generally reported that their ability to prepare threat

assessments depended in part on their access to information from other

agencies about potential and actual threats against their officials. Such

information is known as protective intelligence.2

 Three agencies cited

specific examples of instances when they had been unable to obtain timely

protective intelligence from another agency about potential threats against

their officials.

With regard to standardizing threat assessments, it is uncertain how

agencies could obtain the protective intelligence they need from

governmentwide sources in order to prepare the assessments and who

would prepare them. Most agencies favored establishing a central

repository of protective intelligence to facilitate the sharing of threat

information about their officials. Security officials said that establishing a

central repository of protective intelligence to facilitate the sharing of such

information among agencies would involve determining who should

administer the repository, how it would operate, whether specific statutory

authority would be needed, and the cost of establishing and administering

it. The agencies that favored establishing a central repository of protective

intelligence said that it could provide a formal mechanism for sharing

threat data, which could give agencies additional information about threats

against their officials and individuals in their presence. Of the agencies

that favored the establishment of a central protective intelligence

repository, most favored having the Secret Service administer it. Some

 

2

 A Secret Service official defined protective intelligence as the programs and efforts that seek to

identify, assess, and manage persons and/or groups who make or pose threats to public officials.
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 6 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

security officials who opposed the central repository feared that it could

result in the creation of a new bureaucracy and that valuable information

could be overlooked, and questioned whether all agencies would share

protective intelligence, given certain legal restrictions on the disclosure of

information regarding their clients.

The agencies in our review reported that their protective personnel

received different amounts of protection training and from different

sources. Generally, protective personnel from the agencies with security

protection as one of their primary missions reported having more training

than those employed by the other agencies. The agencies with security

protection as one of their primary missions reported that their training

consisted of instruction in firearms; threat assessments; emergency

medical training; practical protection exercises; security advance,

motorcade, airport, and foreign travel procedures; defensive driving skills;

defensive tactics; and legal authorities. Further, several agencies reported

that their field staff who provided protection as part of their collateral

duties received less protection training than the agencies’ full-time

protective personnel based in Washington, D.C., or that their field staff had

received no protection training. Six agencies said they had difficulty

obtaining protection training for their personnel because of class

availability, funding, or workload problems.

With regard to standardizing training for protective personnel, what

subjects the training should include, what agency should provide the

training, and the cost would need to be considered. Most agencies favored

establishing a standardized protection training program so that different

agencies’ protective personnel would be trained in the same procedures

and would react in a similar manner in case of an emergency. Further,

most of the agencies that favored a standardized protection training

program said that it should be conducted by the Secret Service. The

agencies that did not favor standardized training said that training was

important, but that they preferred to conduct their own training tailored to

address their own needs and unique environments.

The issue of centralizing security protection governmentwide has many

implications, including who would decide who is to be protected and the

level of protection to be provided; who would provide the services;

whether Congress would need to grant statutory authorities; and whether

centralization would be a more cost-efficient and effective way of

providing these services than the current decentralized approach. Security

officials at most of the agencies in our review said that they opposed

centralizing security protection under one agency. They said it was more

Protection Training

Centralizing Security Protection

Services
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 7 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

effective to use protective personnel who were employed by the officials’

own agencies because such personnel were more knowledgeable about the

agencies’ culture and operations. Further, some agencies said that they

would lose a measure of control over the protection of their officials if the

responsibility were transferred to a single agency, and also questioned how

resources would be allocated for protecting officials.

The Marshals Service was the only agency that favored centralizing

security protection services. The Marshals Service said that it was

interested in assuming responsibility for protecting agency officials,

provided that it received the needed resources to accomplish this. In

addition, the Marshals Service said that it could use well-trained personnel

who would operate in a consistent and coordinated fashion

governmentwide and could provide certain economies of scale in terms of

resources and equipment. We were unable to determine how the costs of

protection would be affected if a single agency protected agency heads

because of the number of variables involved, such as the threat levels

against different protected officials and the officials’ preferences regarding

their protection.

The Secret Service said it was not currently interested in assuming

responsibility for protecting all agency heads. An official in charge of

protection at the State Department said that the State Department might

be interested in protecting cabinet secretaries if it received the necessary

resources, and that agencies might be more comfortable with having the

Diplomatic Security Service protect their officials, compared to a

traditional law enforcement agency.

We contacted protected officials in our review to ask them for their views

about their protection and about security protection standardization

issues. Those officials who responded to our queries (or their immediate,

nonsecurity staff) generally said that they were satisfied with their

protection and would like to continue with the current arrangements. Most

of the protected officials, or their top aides, said that the individuals

holding such positions automatically should receive security protection

because of their visibility and the types of issues that they handled.

The safety of the government’s highest ranking officials is important to

maintain the orderly functioning of government. Individuals serving in the

government’s highest offices can be vulnerable to threats from individuals

who are opposed to their agencies’ policies and actions or are emotionally

unstable, and terrorists. At the same time, protection for federal officials

should be based on thorough threat assessments using protective

Action Needed to

Address Issues
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 8 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

intelligence from governmentwide sources and documenting the need and

plan for protection. Threat assessments should also show linkages

between identified threats and the nature and level of protection to be

provided.

Our review indicated that some of the government’s highest officials were

being protected by personnel who said they did not have sufficient access

to protective intelligence and protection training. Further, some agencies

said they lacked the legal authority to make arrests and conduct threat

investigations to protect their officials. Additional sharing of protective

intelligence, establishing a standardized protection training program, and

providing agencies with specific statutory authority to provide protection

could help enhance security protection for top federal officials.

We also found that no single agency or official was responsible for

handling issues relating to the routine protection of executive branch

officials. This fragmentation of protective responsibilities among multiple

executive branch agencies has implications regarding the functioning of

government in part because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of

presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat

assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult

to determine the basis for and reasonableness of the protection being

given, especially considering the growth in the costs of protection in

recent years.

We recommended in our recent report that the OMB Director, in

consultation with the President, designate an appropriate official or group

to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a

minimum, this assessment should include such issues as

• how agencies can best obtain protective intelligence from governmentwide

sources needed to prepare thorough threat assessments, including an

assessment of whether a central protective intelligence repository should

be established and, if so, who should administer it;

• how best to ensure that a clear linkage exists between the documented

threat assessments and the need for and level of protection for the routine

protection of top executive branch officials;

• what training should be provided to federal protective personnel, to what

extent the training should be standardized, and who should provide it;

Recommendations
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 9 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

• whether security protection should be centralized under one agency or, if

not, whether any changes in the way protection is currently being provided

should be made;

• whether agencies and/or offices of inspectors general should be provided

with specific statutory authority to provide protection, and whether the

Marshals Service should continue to renew its deputation of agencies’

protective personnel;

• whether the administration should adopt a policy regarding the routine

protection of top executive branch officials; and

• whether an official or group should be designated to oversee security

protection issues for top executive branch officials on an ongoing basis.

To ensure that the benefits of this assessment are realized, we further

recommended that the individual or group conducting the assessment

produce an action plan that identifies any issues requiring congressional

action. We also recommended that this official or group report its findings

to the OMB Director and that the Director report his recommendations on

these subjects to Congress.

Once the OMB Director has submitted his recommendations to Congress,

we suggested that Congress consider enacting legislation that would give

whatever agency or agencies that provide protection specific statutory

authority to effectively carry out these responsibilities. In addition, should

it be determined that centralized protection training, threat assessment, or

protection services are appropriate, we suggested that Congress consider

making the needed resources available to the appropriate agency or

agencies that are designated to provide these services and should make

any needed legislative changes.

Fifteen agencies, including OMB, provided comments on a draft of our July

11 report. The agencies generally agreed with our findings, conclusions,

and recommendations. In particular, OMB agreed to conduct the

assessment of security protection issues we recommended, provided that

it receive sufficient resources and time to accomplish this.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be

pleased to answer any questions you or other Members of the

Subcommittee may have.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Agency Comments
Statement

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch

Officials

Page 10 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Bernard L.

Ungar, Director, Government Business Operations Issues, on (202) 512-

8387, or Robert H. Hast, Acting Assistant Comptroller General for Special

Investigations, on (202) 512-7455. Individuals making key contributions to

this testimony included Robert Homan, Thomas Wiley, and Patrick

Sullivan.

Contacts And

Acknowledgement
Page 11 GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177
Viewing GAO Reports on the Internet

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

Reporting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

To contact GAO's Fraud Hotline use:

Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-Mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Telephone: 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

 (240418)