1

Filed 10/5/21 Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

J. MARTIN ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LARKSPUR COURTS et al., 

Defendants and Respondents.

 A160942

 (Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. CIV 1504551)

Plaintiff J. Martin Robertson, appearing in propria persona, appeals 

from trial court rulings that denied his requests for postjudgment attorney 

fees, costs, and interest, and required him to submit a release and sign a 

dismissal of the action with prejudice. We affirm.

1

I.

BACKGROUND

This is the third appeal Robertson has filed in this matter, the first two 

having resulted in unpublished decisions. (Robertson v. Larkspur Courts

(May 22, 2018, A152226) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson I); Robertson v. Larkspur

Courts (Jun. 19, 2019, A154206) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson II).) Some of the 

1 Robertson’s requests for judicial notice filed on January 15 and 

May 26, 2021, are denied to the extent we have not already ruled on them, as 

the remaining materials sought to be judicially noticed are unnecessary for 

our disposition of this appeal. 
2

underlying facts and relevant history of the case come from our prior 

opinions.

Robertson, who is a lawyer, filed this suit in December 2015 against 

eight entities alleging they inappropriately responded to the discovery of 

mold in his apartment. Four of these entities, the respondents, appeared in 

the case.2 Robertson and respondents reached a settlement and signed an 

agreement under which Robertson agreed to dismiss his claims in exchange 

for $28,000. The trial court entered judgment on May 4, 2017, based on the 

settlement.

Both before and after judgment was entered, respondents tried to pay 

the $28,000 to Robertson. On several occasions, they asked him to provide

personal information, such as a date of birth and social security number or 

tax identification number.

3 They claimed that their insurer, AIG, needed this 

information to process the payment in order to comply with Medicare 

reporting requirements. Robertson “ignore[d] and refuse[d] [respondents’] 

several requests to obtain this information.” 

On May 18, 2017, respondents wrote to the trial court to ask it to order 

Robertson to provide the social security information, explaining that he had 

been unresponsive to their requests for that information. A few days later, 

Robertson moved to vacate the judgment because he was dissatisfied with its 

terms. The trial court eventually denied this motion and separately awarded 

2 Respondents are Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of 

America, Riverstone Residential Group, LLC, Greystar RS CA, Inc., and 

Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC.

3 We refer to this information as “social security information” with the 

understanding that information other than or in addition to a social security 

number was sought.
3

sanctions against Robertson. Robertson appealed, and we affirmed both the 

judgment and the sanctions award in Robertson I.

As Robertson was pursuing his motion to vacate the judgment, 

respondents filed their own motion, styled as a motion to enforce the 

judgment, seeking an order requiring him to provide the social security 

information. The trial court did not rule on respondents’ motion, however,

until after Robertson filed his appeal in Robertson I. In its ruling, the court 

granted respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment and ordered Robertson 

to provide the social security information. Robertson appealed that ruling in 

Robertson II.

In Robertson II, we did not resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute

regarding the social security information. Instead, we vacated the trial 

court’s order granting the motion to enforce the judgment on the basis that 

the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it while Robertson I was pending. We 

reached our “conclusion reluctantly, however, because we recognize[d] the 

possibility that the parties [would] remain cemented in their positions.” 

(Robertson II, supra, A154206.) We concluded by expressing “our fervent 

hope that, to avoid [yet another appeal], the parties [would] reasonably and 

in good faith attempt to resolve their remaining differences.” (Ibid.)

Ignoring this entreaty, Robertson continued to file pleadings and 

documents prolific in both number and size in the trial court. Included

among these filings were three of the four motions at issue in this appeal.4 

These motions sought an award of postjudgment attorney fees in the amount 

of $597,900, postjudgment costs, and interest on the judgment. The fourth 

4 The three motions were titled “Motion for Costs (Other than 

Attorney[] Fees),” “Motion for Attorney Fees,” and “Motion to Determine 

Prevailing Party Under Second Lease for Purposes of Civil Code 1717.” 

(Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) 
4

motion at issue is respondents’ second motion to enforce the judgment. In it, 

respondents asked the trial court to (1) enforce the judgment’s requirement 

that Robertson sign a release and (2) deny him postjudgment interest. 

Robertson filed over 1,300 pages of documents in connection with these four 

motions. 

In April 2020, before the four motions were ruled upon, AIG sent 

Robertson a check for $28,000, even though he had not provided the social 

security information or the release and had not paid the sanctions award or 

appellate costs he owed as a result of Robertson I. In their appellate brief, 

respondents explain that they did so because they were exasperated and, 

“trust[ing] that [the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services] would look 

at the unique circumstances of this case and not impose . . . onerous fines,”

decided to “simply sacrifice their own rights under the [j]udgment by literally 

sending payment to Robertson before he signed a release, and also without 

Medicare reporting information as needed by [AIG].” Robertson returned the 

first check AIG sent to him, complaining about language in a transmittal 

letter, but apparently accepted a second check. 

In August 2020, the trial court heard the four motions. It denied 

Robertson’s three motions, and it granted respondents’ motion to enforce the 

judgment. It ordered the parties to “jointly lodge a signed mutual release[,] if

they agree on [one,] or . . . each separately lodge a proposed mutual release if 

they do not agree on [one].” It also ordered Robertson “to sign a standard 

form Dismissal of Prejudice of this action.” Robertson appealed.5

5 To the extent Robertson challenges aspects of the judgment in this 

appeal, we reject them because the judgment was affirmed in Robertson I. To 

the extent he challenges aspects of trial court rulings on matters other than 

the four motions, we reject them because those rulings were not appealed and 

are not part of this appeal. 
5

II.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider Respondents’ 

Motion to Enforce the Judgment.

Robertson argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider 

respondents’ second motion to enforce the judgment because the “parties 

themselves [had not asked] the trial court to retain jurisdiction” under Code 

of Civil Procedure section 664.6, which addresses judgments entered 

pursuant to a settlement.

6 (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) The 

argument is meritless.

Robertson’s argument is based on the following sentence in 

section 664.6: “If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction 

over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the 

terms of the settlement.” He extrapolates from this sentence that a trial 

court has no jurisdiction to enforce a judgment absent such a request. He is 

mistaken. The Legislature added the sentence in response to a 1989 Court of 

Appeal decision, which held that trial courts lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction to enforce judgments in dismissed cases unless parties first 

moved to set aside the dismissal. (See Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 

217 Cal.App.3d 200, 207.) The sentence was added to make clear that before 

a case is dismissed, parties may ask the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce

the parties’ settlement after dismissal so that it is unnecessary to later seek 

to set aside the dismissal. (Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 433.) 

Thus, the sentence has no bearing on a court’s continued jurisdiction to 

enforce a judgment in a case, such as this one, that has not been dismissed.

6 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 

unless otherwise indicated.
6

In fact, the trial court here retained jurisdiction to consider 

respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment under the judgment’s express 

terms. The judgment specifically stated that the “Stipulation for Settlement 

is binding and may be enforced by a motion under [section] 664.6 or by any 

other procedure permitted by law.” Thus, the court properly heard

respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment.

B. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Robertson’s Request for 

Postjudgment Attorney Fees.

The trial court found that Robertson was not entitled to postjudgment

attorney fees for several reasons. It found that there was no contractual 

basis for such an award, the parties had specifically agreed that each party 

would bear their own fees, and Robertson was not entitled to fees because he 

was representing himself. Finally, it found that Robertson was separately 

not entitled to recover under section 1021.5, which addresses attorney fees in 

cases resulting in a public benefit, because none of the key elements of that 

statute were satisfied. We review the court’s ruling de novo. (See San

Francisco CDC LLC v. Webcor Construction L.P. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 266, 

285 [“ ‘a determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is a 

question of law to be reviewed de novo’ ”].)

We affirm the trial court’s denial of postjudgment attorney fees on the 

basis that Robertson was representing himself. “[T]he term ‘attorney fees’ 

implies the existence of an attorney-client relationship, i.e., a party receiving 

professional services from a lawyer.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 

22 Cal.4th 1084, 1092.) “An attorney who chooses [self-representation], and 

does not pay or become liable to pay any sum out of pocket for legal services, 

may not recover reasonable attorney fees as compensation for the time and 

effort expended by the attorney and the professional business opportunities 

lost as a result.” (Mix v. Tumanjan Development Corp. (2002) 
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102 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1323, citing Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 279–

280.)

Furthermore, even if Robertson were otherwise entitled to attorney 

fees, we would affirm the ruling on the basis of section 685.040, authority 

that was not relied on by the trial court or cited by the parties in their 

appellate briefs. (See Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517

[appellate court reviews decision of lower court, not its reasoning].) This 

section is part of the “Enforcement of Judgments Law,” which governs the 

enforcement of judgments by private parties. (§ 680.010; Cal. Fed. Savings &

Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 346, fn. 1.) 

Section 685.040 states, “Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are 

not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by 

law. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs 

collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of 

attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor.” (Italics added.)

The underlying judgment here did not include an award of attorney 

fees. It expressly stated that “[e]ach [party] shall bear his/her/its attorneys’ 

fees and court costs.” Thus, the trial court properly denied Robertson’s 

request for postjudgment fees—which Robertson sought for the time he spent 

opposing respondents’ position that he needed to provide the social security 

information before respondents would pay the amount due—because neither 

the settlement agreement nor the underlying judgment included an award of 

fees.

Finally, we agree with the trial court’s ruling under section 1021.5 

specifically, because—notwithstanding Robertson’s insistence to the 

contrary—Robertson’s postjudgment efforts vindicated personal, not public, 

interests. (Hall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 182, 
8

192 [“section 1021.5 was not designed to reward litigants motivated by their 

own personal interests who only coincidentally protect the public interest”].) 

In short, the trial court properly denied Robertson’s request for postjudgment

attorney fees because there was neither an award of fees in the underlying 

judgment nor an attorney-client relationship, and he was not separately 

entitled to fees under section 1021.5.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying 

Robertson Postjudgment Costs.

The trial court also denied Robertson his postjudgment costs. It ruled 

that he was not entitled to costs because he was not a “prevailing party” as 

defined in section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), and he was not otherwise entitled 

to costs because the underlying judgment provided that the parties were to

bear their own costs. 

We again affirm the trial court’s ruling, although we do not adopt its 

rationale. Section 1032, the provision relied upon by the trial court, states 

that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party 

is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” 

(§ 1032, subd. (b).) But in the case of costs to enforce a judgment,

section 685.040 expressly provides otherwise, stating, “The judgment creditor 

is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment.” 

(Italics added.) Thus, in contrast to section 1032, section 685.040 sets a 

“reasonable and necessary” standard for recovering the type of costs at issue. 

The difference in the statutory language means that many costs are awarded 

as a matter of right to the prevailing party, but costs to enforce the judgment

are awarded in the discretion of the trial court and regardless of prevailingparty status. 

As a consequence, we review the trial court’s ruling deferentially, 

asking only whether substantial evidence supports its determination that 
9

particular costs were not reasonable. (Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 

1506, 1512; Lubetzky v. Friedman (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 35, 39.) In denying 

Robertson the costs at issue, the trial court found he had engaged in 

“vexatious and obstructionist conduct throughout these proceedings in 

unreasonably preventing the timely satisfaction of the money judgment.” 

Ample evidence supports this finding.

To begin with, soon after the judgment was entered, Robertson filed his 

motion to vacate it. The trial court not only denied the motion but imposed 

sanctions on the grounds that motion was “a bad-faith tactic and . . . frivolous

(‘totally and completely without merit’).” Robertson then appealed the court’s 

ruling, further delaying the proceedings, on grounds that we concluded in 

Robertson I were at best meritless, and at worst frivolous. The remittitur in 

Robertson I, which Robertson unsuccessfully attempted to recall, was issued 

on August 20, 2018.7

The meritless appeal in Robertson I resulted in delays beyond the 

period that the appeal was pending. As we have said, while Robertson I was 

pending, the trial court entered an order attempting to enforce the judgment, 

which led to the appeal in Robertson II and our order vacating the court’s 

order. The remittitur in Robertson II was not issued, and jurisdiction was 

thus not transferred back to the trial court, until September 26, 2019.

The record also demonstrates that Robertson did not work 

constructively to agree upon and provide a mutual release as the judgment

required. He has cited no evidence showing he has ever made any 

meaningful effort to satisfy his obligation to provide a release. And as we 

7 Notwithstanding the finality of the judgment and sanctions order, 

Robertson continued not to pay to respondents the sanctions ($1,280) or 

appellate costs (ultimately calculated to be $463.20) they were due under 

Robertson I. 
10

discuss in more detail below, he was at first unresponsive and later 

unconstructive in attempts to resolve the dispute about disclosure of the 

social security information. Thus, because substantial evidence supports the

finding that Robertson was obstructionist, we cannot conclude under the 

applicable standard of review that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying him his costs to enforce the judgment.

D. The Trial Court Properly Denied Postjudgment Interest.

We lastly consider the trial court’s ruling denying Robertson 

postjudgment interest. The court found that respondents made an 

“unconditional tender of payment of the settlement amount to [Robertson]” 

and that the delay in payment was, again, due to Robertson’s “vexatious and 

obstructionist conduct.” We affirm this ruling as well.

Unlike prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest is not awarded in

the discretion of the trial court. Rather, postjudgment interest “bears 

interest at the legal rate from its date of entry by force of law, regardless of 

whether [the judgment] contains a declaration to that effect.” (7 Witkin, 

California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 326, p. 932; see § 685.020, 

subd. (a); see also Big Bear Properties, Inc. v. Gherman (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 

908, 913 [under Article XV of the California Constitution, “all money 

judgments, by operation of law, bear interest at the legal rate from date of 

entry”].) The Legislature has set the legal rate of interest at 10 percent per 

year (§ 685.010, subd. (a)), which is calculated as simple interest, not 

compound interest. (See Westbrook v. Fairchild (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 889, 

893.)

Section 685.030, however, allows a judgment debtor to stop the accrual 

of some or all postjudgment interest by satisfying the judgment in part or in 

full. The statute provides that “interest ceases to accrue on the date the 
11

judgment is satisfied in full.” (§ 685.030, subd. (b).) Interest also ceases to 

accrue on any part of the money judgment that is “partially satisfied” as of 

“the date the part is satisfied.” (§ 685.030, subd. (c).) The date the money 

judgment is satisfied in full or in part is the earliest of when “satisfaction is 

actually received by the judgment creditor,” when “satisfaction is tendered to 

the judgment creditor or deposited in court,” or when there has been “any 

other performance that has the effect of satisfaction.” (§ 685.030, 

subd. (d)(1)–(3).) These provisions “[p]lace the burden on the [judgment 

debtor] to take [the] steps necessary to terminate accrual of postjudgment

interest.” (In re Marriage of Green (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1324.)8

We review factual determinations made in connection with the 

satisfaction of a judgment for substantial evidence. (Jhaveri v.

Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 740, 748.) “We will presume the existence 

of every fact the finder of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence in 

support of the judgment or order. [Citation.] Moreover, the constitutional 

doctrine of reversible error requires that ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower 

court [be] presumed correct.’ [Citation.] Therefore, all intendments and 

presumptions must be indulged to support the judgment or order on matters 

as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. 

[Citation.] The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no 

substantial evidence to support the findings under attack.” (Id. at pp. 748–

749.)

8 Judgment debtors can suspend the enforcement of a money judgment 

that has been appealed by posting an undertaking, more commonly known as 

a bond. (§ 917.1, subd. (a).) Such an undertaking stays enforcement of the 

judgment, but it does not stop interest from accruing while the appeal is 

pending if the judgment is affirmed or the appeal is withdrawn. (§ 917.1, 

subd. (b).)
12

Robertson fails to demonstrate a lack of evidence supporting the trial 

court’s findings that respondents sufficiently tendered or otherwise satisfied 

the judgment amount and that the delay in payment was due to his 

obstructionism. He argues that respondents’ tender was not unconditional 

because AIG’s initial insistence that he provide the social security 

information was based on an incorrect view that it had a legal obligation to 

report the settlement payment. The argument is unpersuasive.

“ ‘A tender is an offer of performance made with the intent to 

extinguish the obligation. (Civ. Code, § 1485.)’ [Citation.] A tender must be 

one of full performance (Civ. Code, § 1486) and must be unconditional to be 

valid.” (Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 

580.) A judgment creditor must timely voice any objections to the tender. 

(Noyes v. Habitation Resources, Inc. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 910, 913.) In 

particular, “[a]ll objections to the mode of an offer of performance, which the 

creditor has an opportunity to state at the time to the person making the 

offer, and which could be then obviated by him [or her], are waived by the 

creditor, if not then stated.” (Civ. Code, § 1501; Noyes, at p. 913 [law 

governing “routine commercial transactions” applies to payments to 

judgment creditors]; accord Long v. Cuttle Construction Co. (1998) 

60 Cal.App.4th 834, 837.)

Both before and shortly after judgment was entered, respondents sent 

Robertson emails asking him for the social security information so they could 

pay him the judgment amount. In correspondence dated April 20, 2017—

before the judgment was entered—respondents clearly told Robertson that “to 

process the settlement payment, [they] need[ed] to know . . . [¶] [w]ho the 

check should be made payable to, . . . [¶] [w]here is the check supposed to be 

mailed,” and “[w]hat is your Tax ID No. and/or Social Security Number and 
13

Date of Birth.” They promised that “[t]his information will not be disclosed 

or used for any other purpose other than to process the settlement payment.” 

As we have said, on May 18 respondents reported to the trial court that 

Robertson had been “non-responsive to all of these requests,” and they asked 

the court to “require [Robertson] to disclose his [social security information] 

to [their] counsel of record.” They reiterated that the “information will solely 

be used to remit the settlement payment to [Robertson]. [Respondents’]

counsel will destroy said information subsequent to the issuance of the 

settlement payment.” 

In its February 2018 ruling on respondents’ first motion to enforce the 

judgment, the trial court addressed the parties’ dispute about whether 

respondents needed the social security information to pay Robertson. 

Although we vacated the ruling on jurisdictional grounds in Robertson II, we 

appreciate the court’s sensible reasoning and measured approach in 

addressing the issue. The court found that respondents “established that 

access to [Robertson’s social security information was] necessary for them to 

satisfy their federal Medicare reporting requirements. (See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1395y(b)(8)(C).)” It agreed with Robertson that he has privacy interests in 

the information, but it found that those interests were outweighed by AIG’s 

“legitimate and necessary” need for the information, especially since AIG was 

“potentially subject to significant financial penalties if [it failed] to report the 

settlement.” In an effort to protect Robertson’s interests, the court “proposed 

strict terms for a protective order” that would have imposed limits on the

information’s use, and respondents agreed to be bound by such an order. The 

court concluded that the “disclosure of [the] additional information” would 

not materially alter the terms of the settlement, but instead would be “simply 
14

a ministerial act, one reasonably necessary so that material terms of the 

settlement [could] be executed while complying with federal law.” 

We find no fault with the trial court’s ruling, although we need not 

decide whether AIG in fact had a legal obligation to report the settlement. In 

our view, it was enough that AIG had a reasonable and good-faith basis to 

believe it had such an obligation. Thus, AIG’s request for the social security 

information is not fairly characterized as a condition of payment, but is more 

accurately characterized as a good-faith attempt to obtain information AIG 

reasonably believed was necessary to transmit the payment. In turn, we 

view Robertson’s non-responsiveness to be akin to a judgment creditor’s

refusal to give a judgment debtor wiring instructions needed to transmit 

funds to the creditor’s account.

We also find it notable that throughout the postjudgment proceedings, 

alternatives were proposed to alleviate Robertson’s concerns about providing 

the social security information. They included the trial court’s proposal to 

impose a strict protective order on the information and respondents’ 

proposals to agree to use the information for remittance purposes only and 

then to destroy it, to accept a signed release from Robertson saying he would 

be responsible for the reporting, and to accept a letter stating that he was 

ineligible for Medicare. (See Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior

Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371 [“ ‘[I]f intrusion is limited and confidential 

information is carefully shielded from disclosure except to those who have a 

legitimate need to know, privacy concerns are assuaged’ ”].) Robertson fails 

to show that he even responded to these efforts, much less to explain why 

they would not have satisfied any legitimate concerns he had. 

Finally, even if Robertson’s objection to providing the social security 

information had any merit, he waived the objection by failing to raise it in a 
15

timely way. The issue about the social security information was raised first

not by Robertson objecting to disclosing it, but instead by respondents who 

were trying to pay the judgment amount and believed they needed the 

information to process the payment. Rather than expressing a concern about 

providing the social security information or showing a desire to be paid the 

judgment amount, Robertson simply pursued his motion to vacate the 

judgment, which the trial court found to be “a bad-faith tactic and . . .

frivolous.” Thus, even though both before and after the judgment was 

entered Robertson knew that AIG thought it needed the social security 

information to pay him, he expressed no objection to providing the 

information until much later, after he embarked on an unsuccessful effort to 

vacate the judgment. 

This case presents unusual facts and a unique procedural history. But 

the record as a whole reflects substantial evidence supporting the findings 

that respondents sufficiently tendered payment and that the delays in 

payment were due to Robertson’s obstructionism. The trial court properly 

denied Robertson postjudgment interest because satisfaction of the judgment 

was tendered (§ 685.030, subd. (d)(2)) or there was other performance having 

the effect of satisfaction. (§ 685.030, subd. (d)(3).)

III.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s August 2020 orders denying Robertson attorney fees, 

costs, and interest are affirmed. The trial court’s order requiring Robertson 

to sign and provide a release and dismissal of this action with prejudice is 

affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
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_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

Robertson v. Larkspur Courts A160942