Filed 10/21/15 In re Bianca S. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re BIANCA S.

on

Habeas Corpus.

 D068942

 (San Diego County

 Super. Ct. No. JCM237690)

In re D.C.

on 

Habeas Corpus.

 D068943

 (San Diego County

 Super. Ct. No. JCM237689)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus. Roderick W. Shelton, Judge. 

Relief granted.

Dependency Legal Group of San Diego and John P. McCurley for petitioners.

Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney, and Samantha Begovich, Deputy District 

Attorney, for respondent.

Bianca S. and D.C. (collectively petitioners) seek habeas corpus relief from orders 

of the juvenile court detaining them in Juvenile Hall while they await further proceedings 

on petitions seeking to declare them wards of the court. We grant the requested relief.
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BACKGROUND

Petitioners are 13-year-old girls who are dependents of the juvenile court. (See 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.) While they were residing at the Polinsky Children's Center, 

they knocked over a vending machine and took items from inside it. When staff 

confronted petitioners, they fled but later returned to the Center. Staff then reported the 

incident to police, who arrested petitioners and booked them into Juvenile Hall.

The district attorney filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging petitioners

committed two misdemeanors, petty theft and vandalism. (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 594.) The 

district attorney asked the court to declare them wards. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.)

The probation officer prepared detention reports recommending petitioners be 

detained in Juvenile Hall, on the unexplained grounds they were likely to flee the court's 

jurisdiction and such detention was necessary for the protection of person or property and

of petitioners. The report on Bianca stated her social worker "explained that [Bianca] has 

demonstrated poor behavior"; the social worker was looking for a placement for Bianca, 

but was unlikely to find one before the detention hearing; and the social worker 

considered placing Bianca at the Center, but was "concerned [Bianca] will be negatively 

influenced by her peers." The report on D.C. stated: "Given the circumstances of the 

underlying offense, the Probation Department recommends that [D.C.] remain detained in 

Juvenile Hall pending further hearings and that a meet and confer be arranged between 

Health and Human Services and the Probation Department." The reports include 

detention screening forms that showed no grounds for mandatory secure detention and 

that petitioners' risk assessment scores did not warrant discretionary secure detention. 
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Nevertheless, for each petitioner, the probation officer overrode the assessment and 

recommended secure detention because "[t]he minor is a [Welfare and Institutions Code 

section] 300 ward and social work[er] is unavailable." The probation officer further 

recommended petitioners' social workers be allowed to place them "in a suitable 

alternative placement should one become available."

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court adopted the recommendations of the 

probation officer over the objections of the minors' counsel and ordered petitioners

"detained in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing." The court granted petitioners' social 

workers permission to place them in alternative locations should they become available.

Petitioners promptly challenged the detention orders in this court by filing 

petitions for peremptory writs of mandate in the first instance directing the juvenile court 

to vacate the orders. We treated the petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus (see 

Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a); People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340); 

consolidated them for all purposes; issued an order directing the district attorney to show 

cause why the relief requested by petitioners should not be granted; and temporarily 

stayed the detention orders, and ordered petitioners released from Juvenile Hall to the 

custody of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency for appropriate 

placement. (See People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 744 [discussing accelerated 

habeas corpus proceedings].) The district attorney filed a consolidated return conceding 

the detention orders were erroneous and stating she had no objection to our granting the 

relief requested by petitioners. Petitioners filed a consolidated traverse reiterating their 

request for relief. No party requested oral argument.
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DISCUSSION

We agree with the parties that the juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners'

detention in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing. "[T]he Juvenile Court Law protects 

the minor's right to an individualized detention hearing, in which the court may not 

dispose of cases by mechanical rules on a categorical basis." (In re William M. (1970) 3 

Cal.3d 16, 19.) "[T]he intendments are all against detention and it may not be ordered 

unless there is clear proof of the 'urgent necessity' which [Welfare and Institutions Code] 

sections 635 and 636 require." (In re Dennis H. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 350, 354, fn. 

omitted.) No such urgent necessity was shown in this case.

The juvenile court made no findings regarding its decision to order petitioners'

continued detention in Juvenile Hall. Although the detention reports prepared by the 

probation officer listed permissible grounds for secure detention, namely, that petitioners 

were a danger to themselves or to the person or the property of others and were likely to 

flee the court's jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 635, subd. (a), 636, subd. (a)), neither 

report contained any explanation, and the record does not support the existence of any of 

these grounds. The allegations against petitioners concern minor property offenses; these 

are first offenses for both petitioners; and nothing suggests petitioners, 13-year-old girls,

have the means or are likely to flee the county. The facts that the probation officer 

overrode the detention risk assessments solely because petitioners are dependents whose 

social workers were unavailable and the juvenile court granted the social workers 

permission to place petitioners in alternative locations should suitable ones become 

available strongly suggest the court ordered petitioners detained in Juvenile Hall based on 
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the facts they are dependents of the court and their social workers have been unable to 

find placements for them. This was error: "If a minor is a dependent of the court 

pursuant to Section 300, the court's decision to detain shall not be based on the minor's 

status as a dependent of the court or the child welfare services department's inability to 

provide a placement for the minor." (Id., §§ 635, subd. (b)(2), 636, subd. (a), italics 

added.) The juvenile court should have ordered the release of petitioners to the custody 

of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency for placement in a licensed 

or approved setting. (Id., § 635, subd. (c)(2).)

DISPOSITION

The relief requested by petitioners is granted. The juvenile court is directed to 

vacate the September 25, 2015 orders that petitioners be detained in Juvenile Hall and to 

enter new orders releasing them to the custody of the San Diego County Health and 

Human Services Agency for appropriate placement. This court's order of October 2 

temporarily staying the juvenile court's September 25 orders and temporarily releasing 

petitioners from custody is vacated.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, J.

O'ROURKE, J.