United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Progress and 

Challenges 

Statement of Dave A. Powner, Director 

Information Technology Management Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, July 11, 2007 

GAO-07-1099T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1099T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David A. 

Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-07-1099T, a testimony 

before the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

July 11, 2007

ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Progress and Challenges 

Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly, technically 

complex, and critically important to weather forecasting and climate 

monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over 

the 24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for April 

2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, 

schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 

decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program’s 

complexity by reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing its 

estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the first two 

satellites to 2013 and 2016 (see table below). Since that time, the program 

office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition and 

establishing an effective management structure; however, important tasks 

remain to be done and significant risks remain. 

The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and 

scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a much 

earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, GAO reported 

that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had 

issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to 

three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors in 

August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost—

which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion—led the agency, in 

September 2006, to reduce the program’s scope from four to two satellites 

and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report 

that they are reevaluating that decision and may further revise the scope and 

requirements of the program in coming months. GAO also reported that 

NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite 

programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates and 

adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently has work under 

way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges. 

Summary of Changes to NPOESS Program 

Key area Program before restructuring Program after restructuring 

Life cycle range 1995-2020 1995-2026 

Estimated life cycle 

cost 

$8.4 billion $12.5 billion 

Launch schedule 

First satellite by November 2009 

Second satellite by June 2011 

First satellite by January 2013 

Second satellite by January 2016 

Number of satellites 6 (in addition to NPP) 4 (in addition to NPP) 

Number of orbits 

3 (early morning, midmorning, 

and afternoon) 

2 (early morning and afternoon; will 

rely on European satellites for 

midmorning orbit data) 

Number and 

complement of 

instruments 

13 instruments (10 sensors and 

3 subsystems) 

9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 

subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to 

provide fewer capabilities 

Number of data 

records 55 39 (6 are to be degraded products) 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

Environmental satellites provide 

data and imagery that are used by 

weather forecasters, climatologists, 

and the military to map and 

monitor changes in weather 

(including severe weather such as 

hurricanes), climate, the oceans, 

and the environment. Two current 

acquisitions are the $12.5 billion 

National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) program—which is to 

replace two existing polar-orbiting 

environmental satellite systems—

and the planned $7 billion 

Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellites-R (GOESR) program, which is to replace the 

current series of satellites due to 

reach end of their useful lives in 

approximately 2012. GAO was 

asked to summarize its past work 

on the progress and challenges 

facing these key environmental 

satellite acquisitions. 

What GAO Recommends

In April 2007, GAO made 

recommendations to the NPOESS 

program to complete important 

tasks and mitigate significant risks 

to the program. In September 2006, 

GAO made recommendations to 

the GOES-R program to improve its 

management capabilities. 

Implementation of these 

recommendations should reduce 

risks for these critical acquisitions. 
Page 1 GAO-07-1099T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to 

discuss our work on two major operational environmental satellite 

programs: the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program and the planned 

$7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R 

(GOES-R) program. 

Operational environmental satellites provide data and imagery that 

are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to 

map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the 

environment. NPOESS—a tri-agency program managed by the 

Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense/US Air Force, 

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—is 

expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment monitoring satellite 

system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental 

satellite systems. The GOES-R series, managed by NOAA with 

assistance from NASA, is to replace the current series of satellites 

which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 

approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark the first 

major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994. 

The NPOESS and GOES-R programs are considered critical to the 

United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 

weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as 

hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the years 2026 

and 2028 respectively. 

At your request, we are summarizing the results of our previous 

work on operational environmental satellite programs, including 

NPOESS and the GOES-R program.1

 In preparing this testimony, we 

 1

GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but 

Technical Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C. April 27, 2007); 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but 

Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO-07-910T (Washington, D.C. June 7, 2007); Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from 

Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons 

Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-1129T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 
Page 2 GAO-07-1099T

relied on the work supporting our prior reports. Those reports 

contain detailed overviews of our scope and methodology. All of the 

work on which this testimony is based was performed in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief 

NOAA is involved in two major satellite acquisition programs, 

NPOESS and GOES-R, and both are costly, technically complex, and 

critically important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. 

NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 

24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for 

April 2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating 

costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led 

to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby 

decreasing the program’s complexity by reducing the number of 

sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, 

and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016, 

respectively. Since that time, the program office has made progress 

in restructuring the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective 

management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done 

and significant risks remain. Specifically, key acquisition documents 

that were originally due in September 2006 are still not completed, 

the program office is not yet fully staffed, and the early July 

turnover of the program executive officer increases the program’s 

risk. Additionally, technical risks remain in the development of key 

system sensors and the ground-based data processing system. In 

April 2007, we made recommendations to complete key acquisition 

documents, increase staffing at the program office, and delay 

reassignment of the program executive. Implementation of these 

recommendations should reduce risk on this critical acquisition. 
Page 3 GAO-07-1099T

The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and 

scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a 

much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, 

we reported that NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary 

design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected 

to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to 

develop the satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost—which in 

May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion—led the agency, in 

September 2006, to reduce the program’s scope from four to two 

satellites and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program 

officials now report that they are reevaluating that decision and may 

further revise the scope and requirements of the program in coming 

months. We also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement 

lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remained to 

be done to ensure sound cost estimates and adequate system 

engineering capabilities. We made recommendations to the program 

to improve its capabilities for managing this program and agency 

officials agreed with these recommendations and initiated efforts to 

implement them. We currently have work under way to evaluate 

GOES-R risks and challenges. 

Background 

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting operational 

environmental satellites have been used by the United States to 

provide meteorological data for weather observation, research, and 

forecasting. NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and 

Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the 

existing civilian geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as 

two separate programs, called the Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellites and the Polar Operational Environmental 

Satellites (POES), respectively. The Air Force is responsible for 

operating a second polar-orbiting environmental satellite system—

the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). 

Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data 

that are processed to provide graphical weather images and 

specialized weather products. These satellite data are also the 

predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which 
Page 4 GAO-07-1099T

are a primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in 

advance—including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. 

The weather products and models are used to predict the potential 

impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency 

managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar satellites 

also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such 

as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that 

are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate 

monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar 

satellite configuration consisting of two POES and two DMSP 

satellites. 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites 

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a 

relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a 

constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in 

space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is 

primarily focused on the United States (see fig. 2). These satellites 

are uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to 
Page 5 GAO-07-1099T

meteorologists and their audiences on the earth’s atmosphere, its 

surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe 

the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and 

severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to 

reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the 

satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of 

atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to 

NOAA’s weather forecasting operations. 

Figure 2: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage 

Satellite Acquisition Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns, 

and Schedule Delays 

Satellite acquisition programs are often technically complex and 

risky undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical 

problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have 

reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the 

procurement of major satellite systems, including NPOESS, the 

GOES I-M series, the Air Force’s Space Based Infrared System High 
Page 6 GAO-07-1099T

Program (SBIRS-High), and the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency Satellite System (AEHF).2

 Table 1 lists key problems 

experienced with these programs. While each of the programs faced 

multiple problems, all of them experienced insufficient maturity of 

technologies, overly aggressive schedules, insufficient subcontract 

management, and inadequate system engineering capabilities for 

overseeing contractors. 

Table 1: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems 

Problem NPOESS GOES I-M SBIRS–High AEHF 

Insufficient technical readiness prior to critical decision points 

Inadequate preliminary studies prior to the decision to award a development contract X X X 

Insufficient technical maturity prior to the decision to move to production X X X X 

Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates 

 Optimistic assumptions including: 

• savings from heritage systems X X X 

• readiness of technology maturity X X X X 

• constant and available industrial base X 

• no weight growth X X X 

• no requirements growth X 

• savings from lot buys versus single-unit purchase X 

• overly aggressive schedule X X X X 

Poor program and contractor management 

Quality and subcontractor issues X X X X 

Inadequate systems engineering capabilities X X X X 

Inadequate earned value management capabilities X X X 

 2

GAO-07-498; GAO-06-993; GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and 

Keys to Addressing Them, GAO-06-776R (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program’s 

Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule 

Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 16, 2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and 

Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); Defense Acquisitions: 

Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule 

Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003); Military Space Operations: 

Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R

(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon 

Programs, GAO-03-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites: Action Needed 

to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, GAO/NSIAD-91-252

(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory 

Board Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs

(May 2003). 
Page 7 GAO-07-1099T

Problem NPOESS GOES I-M SBIRS–High AEHF 

Insufficient management reserve X X 

Ineffective contract award fee structure X X X 

Poor senior executive level oversight 

Infrequent meetings X 

Inability to make timely decisions X 

Other 

Unstable funding stream X X X 

Unstable requirements X X 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data. 

NPOESS: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs 

would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 

1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to 

converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program 

capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. 3 The 

converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United 

States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather 

forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To 

manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency 

Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA. 

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain 

activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for 

the converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead 

on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for 

facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies 

into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of 

funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects 

and studies. The NPOESS program office is overseen by an 

Executive Committee, which is made up of the Administrators of 

NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

 3

 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (May 5, 1994). 
Page 8 GAO-07-1099T

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated 

to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from 

its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program was to provide 

satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and groundbased satellite data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, 

manufacturing, and development contract was awarded in August 

2002, the estimated cost was $7 billion. Acquisition plans called for 

the procurement and launch of six satellites over the life of the 

program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments—consisting of 

10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems (see table 2). 

Table 2: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical sensors are in bold) 

Instrument Description 

Advanced technology microwave 

sounder (ATMS) 

Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the atmosphere and is to be 

used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS’s cross-track infrared sounder to 

produce daily global atmospheric temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles. 

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols (liquid droplets or solid 

particles suspended in the atmosphere, such as sea spray, smog, and smoke). 

Conical-scanned microwave 

imager/sounder (CMIS) 

Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain rate, ocean surface wind 

speed and direction, amount of water in the clouds, and soil moisture, as well as 

temperature and humidity at different atmospheric levels. 

Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS) Collects measurements of the earth’s radiation to determine the vertical distribution of 

temperature, moisture, and pressure in the atmosphere. 

Data collection system Collects environmental data from platforms around the world and delivers them to users 

worldwide. 

Earth radiation budget sensor Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave radiation released by the earth 

back into space on a worldwide scale to enhance long-term climate studies. 

Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS) Collects data needed to measure the amount and distribution of ozone in the earth’s 

atmosphere. 

Radar altimeter Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and ocean surface roughness, 

which are used to determine sea surface height, significant wave height, and ocean 

surface wind speed and to provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate 

prediction models. 

Search and rescue satellite aided tracking 

system 

Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based users in distress. 

Space environmental sensor suite Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects of space weather on 

technological systems, including satellites and radio links. 

Survivability sensor Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other instruments in case of an attack. 

Total solar irradiance sensor Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance data. 

Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite 

(VIIRS) 

Collects images and radiometric data used to provide information on the earth’s clouds, 

atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces. 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS program office data. 

In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS 

Preparatory Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several 
Page 9 GAO-07-1099T

years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk 

associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure 

continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System 

satellites. 

NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems over Several Years 

Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost 

increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be 

made about the program’s direction and capabilities. In 2003, we 

reported that changes in the NPOESS funding stream led the 

program to develop a new program cost and schedule baseline. 4

 

After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the 

program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 

billion to $8.1 billion, delaying key milestones, including the launch 

of the first satellite, and extending the life of the program until 2020.5

In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to 

experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting 

in schedule delays and anticipated cost increases. This was due in 

part, to problems at multiple levels of management—including 

subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive leadership. 

Recognizing that the budget for the program was no longer 

executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a 

decision in December 2005 on the future direction of the program—

what would be delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved 

deciding among options involving increased costs, delayed 

schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued 

oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making were more 

critical than ever, and we urged the committee to make a decision 

quickly so that the program could proceed. 

However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, 

NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold 

that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress.6

 This placed 

 4

 GAO; Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect Weather Data 

Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T (Washington, D.C., July 15, 2003) 

5 GAO-04-1054

6

 GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review 

and Place Program’s Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006). 
Page 10 GAO-07-1099T

any decision about the future direction of the program on hold until 

the certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the 

program office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 

2006 to continue work on key sensors and other program elements 

using fiscal year 2006 funding. 

Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program 

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when 

a major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase 

thresholds.7

 The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify 

Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun 

its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program 

to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 

percent or more.8 In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 

percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program. 

Certifying the program entailed providing a determination that (1) 

the program is essential to national security, (2) there are no 

alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater 

military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the 

program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure 

for the program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD 

established tri-agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA 

experts—to work on each of the four elements of the certification 

process. 

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner 

agencies) certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to 

cost $12.5 billion through 2026.9

 This decision approved a cost 

increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and 

delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to 

5 years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger 

 7

 10 U.S.C § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy. 

8

 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (e)(2). 

9

 DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program would cost $11.5 

billion. The acquisition portion includes satellite development, production, and launch, but 

not operations and support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion 

for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle cost to $12.5 

billion. 
Page 11 GAO-07-1099T

program management structure, reducing the number of satellites to 

be produced and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of 

instruments on the satellites from 13 to 9—consisting of 7 

environmental sensors and 2 subsystems. It also entailed using 

NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and 

relying on European satellites for midmorning orbit data.10 Table 3 

summarizes the major program changes made under the NunnMcCurdy certification decision. 

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program 

Key area 

Program before the Nunn-McCurdy 

decision Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision 

Life cycle range 1995-2020 1995-2026 

Estimated life cycle cost $8.4 billion $12.5 billion 

Launch schedule NPP by October 2006 

First NPOESS by November 2009 

Second NPOESS by June 2011 

NPP by January 2010 

First NPOESS by January 2013 

Second NPOESS by January 2016 

Management structure System Program Director reports to a triagency steering committee and the tri-agency 

Executive Committee 

Independent program reviews noted 

insufficient system engineering and cost 

analysis staff 

System Program Director is responsible for day-to-day 

program management and reports to the Program 

Executive Officer 

Program Executive Officer oversees program and 

reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee 

Number of satellites 6 (in addition to NPP) 4 (in addition to NPP) 

Number of orbits 3 (early morning, midmorning, and afternoon) 2 (early morning and afternoon; will rely on European 

satellites for midmorning orbit data) 

Number and complement 

of instruments 

13 instruments (10 sensors and 3 subsystems) 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 subsystems); 4 of the 

sensors are to provide fewer capabilities 

Number of EDRs 55 39 (6 are to be degraded products) 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new 

milestones for the delivery of key program elements, including 

launching NPP by January 2010,11 launching the first NPOESS 

 10 The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites’ MetOp 

program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. 

MetOp satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. 

11According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision 

specifies NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to 

reduce the possibility of a climate data continuity gap. 
Page 12 GAO-07-1099T

satellite (called C1) by January 2013, and launching the second 

NPOESS satellite (called C2) by January 2016. These revised 

milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first NPOESS 

satellite available to back up the final POES satellite should 

anything go wrong during that launch. 

Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the 

final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need 

to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until 

NPP data becomes available—almost 2 years later. Although NPP 

was not intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move it 

to a different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of 

a premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will 

not provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS 

spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites 

diminishes—or if NPP data is not available, timely, and reliable—

then there could be a gap in environmental satellite data. 

In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy 

certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors 

from 13 to 9 and reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, 

of the 13 original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were 

replaced with less capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less 

functionality, and 4 were cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to 

NPOESS sensors, including the 4 identified as critical sensors. 

Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold) 

Instrument 

Status of 

instrument 

after the NunnMcCurdy 

decision Change description 

ATMS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites. 

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites 

should another party choose to fund it.a

CMIS Replaced CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office is to procure a less complex 

Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on the second, third, and fourth NPOESS 

satellites. 

CrIS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites. 

Data collection system Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites. 
Page 13 GAO-07-1099T

Instrument 

Status of 

instrument 

after the NunnMcCurdy 

decision Change description 

Earth radiation budget sensor Replaced Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the first NPOESS satellite (and no 

others) by an existing sensor with fewer capabilities called the Clouds and the 

Earth’s Radiant Energy System.

OMPS Modified One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to be included on NPP and on the 

first and third NPOESS satellites; the remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was 

cancelled on the NPOESS satellites, but will be included on NPP a

Radar altimeter Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites 

should another party choose to fund it.a

Search and rescue satellite 

aided tracking system 

Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Space environmental sensor 

suite 

Replaced Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less expensive, legacy sensor called the 

Space Environment Monitor on the first and third NPOESS satellites. 

Survivability sensor Cancelled Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS 

satellites should another party choose to fund it.a

Total solar irradiance sensor Cancelled Sensor contract was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS 

satellites should another party choose to fund it.a

VIIRS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

a

Although direct program funding for these instruments was eliminated, the instruments could be 

reintegrated on NPOESS satellites should other parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy 

decision requires the program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft for these instruments 

and to provide the funding needed to integrate them. 

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of 

the resulting weather and environmental products, called 

environmental data records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the 

restructured program, the agencies placed the highest priority on 

continuing current operational weather capabilities and a lower 

priority on obtaining selected environmental and climate measuring 

capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS system has 

significantly less capability for providing global climate measures 

than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs was 

decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality. The 39 

EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land surface 

temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The 

16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and 

distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the 

atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space 

environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include 

ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy 

in the space environment. 
Page 14 GAO-07-1099T

NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain To Be 

Completed 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule 

of the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in 

restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks 

remain to be done. Restructuring a major acquisition program like 

NPOESS is a process that involves identifying time-critical and highpriority work and keeping this work moving forward, while 

reassessing development priorities, interdependencies, deliverables, 

risks, and costs. It also involves revising important acquisition 

documents including the memorandum of agreement on the roles 

and responsibilities of the three agencies, the acquisition strategy, 

the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the 

integrated master schedule defining what needs to happen by when, 

and the acquisition program baseline. Specifically, the NunnMcCurdy certification decision required the Secretaries of Defense 

and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to sign a revised 

memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It also required that 

the program office, Program Executive Officer, and the Executive 

Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents including 

the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by September 

1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once these are 

completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with its 

prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be 

delivered, by when, and at what cost. 

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the 

acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim 

program plans guiding the contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 

2007 and has made progress in implementing these plans. The 

program office and contractor also developed an integrated master 

schedule for the remainder of the program—beyond fiscal year 

2007. This integrated master schedule details the steps leading up to 

launching NPP by September 2009, launching the first NPOESS 

satellite in January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite 

in January 2016. Near-term steps include completing and testing the 

VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; integrating these sensors with the 

NPP spacecraft and completing integration testing; completing the 

data processing system and integrating it with the command, 
Page 15 GAO-07-1099T

control, and communications segment; and performing advanced 

acceptance testing of the overall system of systems for NPP. 

However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be 

completed. Although the program office made progress in revising 

key acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, 

the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy 

plan, it has not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of 

Commerce and Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the 

memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, nor has it 

obtained the approval of the NPOESS Executive Committee on the 

other key acquisition documents. As of June 2007, these approvals 

are over 9 months past due. Agency officials noted that the 

September 1, 2006, due date for the key acquisition documents was 

not realistic given the complexity of coordinating documents among 

three different agencies. 

Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency 

agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in 

completing other activities related to restructuring the program. 

These other activities include completing an integrated baseline 

review with the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and 

work activities, and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development 

and production contract. Program costs are also likely to be 

adjusted during upcoming negotiations on contract changes—an 

event that the Program Director expects to occur in July 2007. 

Completion of these activities will allow the program office to lock 

down a new acquisition baseline cost and schedule. Until key 

acquisition documents are finalized and approved, the program 

faces increased risk that it will not be able to complete important 

restructuring activities in time to move forward in fiscal year 2008 

with a new program baseline in place. This places the NPOESS 

program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases. 

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management Structure, 

but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems Remain 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an 

effective management structure, but—almost a year after this 

structure was endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification 

process—the Integrated Program Office still faces staffing problems. 
Page 16 GAO-07-1099T

Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about 

management problems at all levels of the NPOESS program, 

including subcontractor and contractor management, program 

office management, and executive-level management.12 Two 

independent review teams also noted a shortage of skilled program 

staff, including budget analysts and system engineers. Since that 

time, the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an 

effective management structure—including establishing a new 

organizational framework with increased oversight by program 

executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and 

program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. 

However, DOD’s plans for reassigning the Program Executive 

Officer in the summer of 2007 increase the program’s risks. 

Additionally, the program lacks a staffing process that clearly 

identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As a 

result, the program office has experienced delays in getting core 

management activities under way and lacks the staff it needs to 

execute day-to-day management activities. 

NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective Management Structure and 

Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive Turnover Will Increase Program Risks 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an 

effective management structure and increasing the frequency and 

intensity of its oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and 

others have raised concerns about management problems at all 

levels of management on the NPOESS program, including 

subcontractor and contractor management, program office 

management, and executive-level management. In response to 

recommendations made by two different independent review teams, 

the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and early 

2006 for revising its management structure. 

 12GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General, Poor 

Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over 

Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In 

addition, two independent teams reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led 

Independent Review Team investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on 

NPP, and a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader 

NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on their findings 

in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively. 
Page 17 GAO-07-1099T

In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a 

Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program 

Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to 

the program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the 

Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer 

and the Program Director proposed a revised organizational 

framework that realigned division managers within the Integrated 

Program Office responsible for overseeing key elements of the 

acquisition and increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the 

Nunn-McCurdy certification decision approved this new 

management structure and the Integrated Program Office 

implemented it. Figure 3 provides an overview of the relationships 

among the Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive 

Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions within 

the program office. 

Figure 3: Overview of New NPOESS Management Structure 
Page 18 GAO-07-1099T

Operating under this new management structure, the program office 

implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, 

and program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and 

mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value 

management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In 

addition to these program office activities, the Program Executive 

Officer implemented monthly program reviews and increased the 

frequency of contacts with the Executive Committee. The Program 

Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in monthly 

letters, apprising committee members of the program’s status, 

progress, risks, and earned value, and the Executive Committee now 

meets on a quarterly basis—whereas in the recent past, we reported 

that the Executive Committee had met only five times in 2 years.13

Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an 

effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk. 

We recently reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased 

risk due in part to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we 

suggested that addressing this will require DOD to consider 

matching officials’ tenure with the development or delivery of a 

product.14 In March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD 

is planning to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive 

Officer in the summer 2007 as part of this executive’s natural career 

progression. As of June 2007, the Program Executive Officer has 

held this position for 19 months. Given that the program is currently 

still being restructured, and that there are significant challenges in 

being able to meet critical deadlines to ensure satellite data 

continuity, such a move adds unnecessary risk to an already risky 

program. 

NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Programwide Staffing Process 

The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a 

staffing process that identifies programwide staffing requirements 

and plans for filling those needed positions. Sound human capital 

 13 GAO-06-249T 

14GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions and Keys to 

Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 
Page 19 GAO-07-1099T

management calls for establishing a process or plan for determining 

staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning 

to fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially 

important for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple 

independent review teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past 

problems. Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the 

number of system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight 

of subcontractor and contractor engineering activities and in the 

number of budget and cost analysts needed to assess contractor 

cost and earned value reports. To rectify this situation, the June 

2006 certification decision directed the Program Director to take 

immediate actions to fill vacant positions at the program office with 

the approval of the Program Executive Officer. 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management 

structure, the program office has filled multiple critical positions, 

including a budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm 

division chief, and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc 

basis, individual division managers have assessed their needs and 

initiated plans to hire staff for key positions. However, the program 

office lacks a programwide process for identifying and filling all 

needed positions. As a result, division managers often wait months 

for critical positions to be filled. For example, in February 2006, the 

NPOESS program estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new 

budget analysts. As of September 2006, none of these positions had 

been filled. As of April 2007, program officials estimated that they 

still needed to fill 5 budget analyst positions, 5 systems engineering 

positions, and 10 technical manager positions. The majority of the 

vacancies—4 of the 5 budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems 

engineering positions, and 8 of the 10 technical manager positions—

are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of 

these positions is in some stage of being filled—that is, recruitment 

packages are being developed or reviewed, vacancies are being 

advertised, or candidates are being interviewed, selected, and 

approved. 

The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the 

right personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not even 

begin to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program 

officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds 
Page 20 GAO-07-1099T

unusual layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative 

functions because each agency has its own hiring and performance 

management rules. In November 2006, the program office brought in 

an administrative officer who took the lead in pulling together the 

division managers’ individual assessments of needed staff and has 

been working with the division managers to refine this list. This new 

administrative officer plans to train division managers in how to 

assess their needs and to hire needed staff, and to develop a process 

by which evolving needs are identified and positions are filled. 

However, there is as yet no date set for establishing this basic 

programwide staffing process. As a result of the lack of a 

programwide staffing process, there has been an extended delay in 

determining what staff is needed and in bringing those staff on 

board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities, such 

as establishing the program office’s cost estimate and bringing in 

needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a programwide 

staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the 

staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that 

NOAA implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the 

NPOESS program office reported that several critical positions were 

filled in April and May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated 

NOAA’s accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, about 10 key 

positions remained to be filled. 

Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks Remain 

Major segments of the NPOESS program—the space segment and 

ground systems segment—are under development; however, 

significant problems have occurred and risks remain. The program 

office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but 

continued problems could affect the program’s overall cost and 

schedule. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, 

integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and developing, testing, and 

deploying the ground-based data processing systems, it will be 

important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the Program 

Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to 

provide close oversight of milestones and risks. 
Page 21 GAO-07-1099T

Space Segment—Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue to Face Major Risks 

The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four 

sensors are of critical importance—VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS—

because they are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 

2009. Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave 

imager/sounder, is also important because this new sensor—

replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor—will need to be developed in 

time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past year, the 

program made progress on each of the sensors and the spacecraft. 

However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced major 

problems. The status of each of the components of the space 

segment is described in table 5. 

Table 5: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of April 2007 

Space segment 

component Risk level Status 

VIIRS High VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In December 2006, the 

contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS’s engineering design unit (a prototype) 

and identified three problems.a

 While these problems were being studied, the program 

office approved the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible for 

integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program officials determined that 

the contractor was able to mitigate all but one of the problems, and they approved the flight 

unit to proceed to system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem before 

a technical readiness review milestone. VIIRS flight unit is scheduled to be delivered to 

NPP by July 2008. 

CrIS High Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the flight unit designated to 

go on NPP experienced a major structural failure during its vibration testing. As of March 

2007, a failure review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program 

office identified causes for failure and has planned an approach to completing flight unit 

development and delivery for NPP. The review board has also initiated inspections of all 

sensor modules and subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart 

acceptance testing in July 2007, and the CrIS flight unit is expected to be delivered to NPP 

by February 2008. 

OMPS Moderate As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one element of the OMPS sensor, 

called OMPS (limb), was removed from the program. In February 2007, program officials 

agreed to reintegrate OMPS (limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding 

was approved in early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP by 

May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit delivery will be so late in 

the integration testing process that there could be an insufficient schedule margin should a 

problem arise. 

ATMS Low The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor and delivered to the 

program in October 2005. NASA integrated the flight unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting 

delivery of the other sensors in order to complete integration testing. 
Page 22 GAO-07-1099T

Space segment 

component Risk level Status 

Microwave imager/ 

sounder 

Not yet rated A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to replace the cancelled CMIS 

sensor. It is planned to be ready for the launch on the second NPOESS satellite. In 

October 2006, the program office issued a request for information seeking industry ideas 

for the design of the new sensor. The program office anticipates awarding a contract to 

develop the sensor by October 2008. 

Spacecraft Low The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on track. The NPP 

spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration testing will be conducted once the 

NPP sensors are delivered. 

Early issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a data 

storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain that could delay the completion of 

the spacecraft. A key risk involves delays in the delivery of the solar array, which may 

arrive too late to be included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the electrical 

power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to resolve. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

a

The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue in which band registration shifts 

with different temperatures; (2) cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into 

other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the instrument’s focus changes with changes 

in temperature. 

Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and 

CrIS is of particular importance because these components are to be 

demonstrated on the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in 

September 2009. Any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the 

overall NPOESS program, because the success of the program 

depends on the lessons learned in data processing and system 

integration from the NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor 

problems could lead to higher final program costs. 

Ground Segment—Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains 

Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface 

data processing system, the ground stations that are to receive 

satellite data, and the ground-based command, control, and 

communications system—is under way and on track. However, 

important work pertaining to developing the algorithms that 

translate satellite data into weather products within the integrated 

data processing segment remains to be completed. Table 6 describes 

each of the components of the ground segment and identifies the 

status of each. 
Page 23 GAO-07-1099T

Table 6: Status of Ground Segment Components, as of April 2007 

Ground segment 

component/description Risk level Status 

Interface Data Processing 

System (IDPS): 

A ground-based system that is 

to process the sensors’ data 

so that they are usable by the 

data processing centers and 

the broader community of 

environmental data users. 

IDPS will be deployed at the 

four weather data processing 

centers. 

Moderate IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS build 1.4 has been 

delivered for testing and recently passed two key data transfer tests. Contractors are 

currently working to develop IDPS build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be 

used with NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm 

performance, and calibration and validation planning. 

Latency—IDPS must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet NPP 

requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the latency of the system’s 

data handling from 93 minutes to 73 minutes and is working to reduce it by 8 minutes 

more by resolving data management issues, increasing the number of processors, and 

increasing algorithm efficiency. 

Algorithm performance—IDPS algorithms are the mathematical functions coded into the 

system software that transform raw data into data products, including sensor data 

records and environmental data records. IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional algorithms, 

which are being refined as the sensors complete various stages of testing. Because 

some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those sensors in order to refine the 

algorithms has also been delayed and may not be completed in time for the delivery of 

IDPS build 1.5 in early 2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to improve the 

algorithms in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP launch. 

Calibration/validation—Calibration/validation is the process for tweaking algorithms to 

provide more accurate observations. The contractor has documented a detailed schedule 

for calibration and validation during IDPS development and is developing a postlaunch 

task list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and uncertainty 

continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A program official noted that, while 

teams can do a lot of preparation work, including building the infrastructure to allow 

sensor testing and having a good understanding of the satellite, sensors, and available 

data for calibration, many issues need to take place after launch. 

Ground stations for receiving 

satellite data: 

15 unmanned ground stations 

around the world (called 

SafetyNetTM) are to receive 

satellite data and send these 

to the four data processing 

centers. 

Low NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain approval to operate 

ground stations to receive satellite data. According to agency officials, the full 

complement of ground stations will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the 

ground stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program office has 

reached agreement with 4 of 15 ground station sites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

Managing the risks associated with the development of the IDPS 

system is of particular importance because this system will be 

needed to process NPP data. 

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Risk 

Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS 

program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical 
Page 24 GAO-07-1099T

weather and environmental observations, in our April 2007 report,15

we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and 

Commerce and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the 

responsible executives within their respective organizations 

approve key acquisition documents, including the memorandum of 

agreement among the three agencies, the system engineering plan, 

the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy, as 

quickly as possible but no later than April 30, 2007. We also 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to 

delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive Officer 

until all sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory 

Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to occur by July 

2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the 

Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written 

process for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for 

streamlining how the program handles the three different agencies’ 

administrative procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately 

filling needed positions. 

In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important 

to finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD 

proposed extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. 

DOD subsequently extended the due dates to September and 

October 2007 and March 2008 in the case of the test and evaluation 

master plan. Because the NPOESS program office intends to 

complete contract negotiations in July 2007, we remain concerned 

that any further delays in approving the documents could delay 

contract negotiations and thus increase the risk to the program. 

In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our 

recommendation to develop and implement a written process for 

identifying and addressing human capital needs and to streamline 

how the program handles the three different agencies’ 

administrative procedures. The department also agreed with our 

recommendation to plan to immediately fill open positions at the 

NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that NOAA identified the 

 15 GAO-07-498 
Page 25 GAO-07-1099T

skill sets needed for the program and has implemented an 

accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA positions in 

the NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made 

NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a strategy—

including milestones—to ensure that all NOAA positions are filled 

by June 2007. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning 

the Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System 

Program Director responsible for executing the acquisition program 

would remain in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce 

also noted that the Program Executive Officer position is planned to 

rotate between the Air Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that 

a selection would be made before the departure of the current 

Program Executive Officer to provide an overlap period to allow for 

knowledge transfer and ensure continuity. However, over the last 

few years, we and others (including an independent review team 

and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that ineffective 

executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program’s cost 

and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that reassigning the 

Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing critical 

cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the program at 

further risk. 

In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director 

remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, 

this position does not ensure continuity in the functions of the 

Program Executive Officer. The current Program Executive Officer 

is experienced in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and 

challenges facing NPOESS and coordinating with Executive 

Committee members as well as the Defense acquisition authorities. 

Additionally, while the Program Executive Officer position is 

planned to rotate between agencies, the memorandum of agreement 

documenting this arrangement is still in draft and should be flexible 

enough to allow the current Program Executive Officer to remain 

until critical risks have been addressed. 

Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap 

between the selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the 

departure of the current one, time is running out. The current 
Page 26 GAO-07-1099T

Program Executive Officer is expected to depart in early July 2007, 

and as of early July 2007, a successor has not yet been named. 

NPOESS is an extremely complex acquisition, involving three 

agencies, multiple contractors, and advanced technologies. There is 

not sufficient time to transfer knowledge and develop the sound 

professional working relationships that the new Program Executive 

Officer will need to succeed in that role. Thus, we remain convinced 

that given NPOESS current challenges, reassigning the current 

Program Executive Officer at this time is not appropriate. 

GOES-R: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 

satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites 

every few years (see table 7). To date, NOAA has procured three 

series of GOES satellites and is planning to acquire a fourth series, 

called GOES-R. 

Table 7: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES 

Series name Procurement durationa Satellites 

Original GOESb 1970–1987 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 

GOES I-M 1985–2001 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 

GOES-N 1998–2011 13, O, P, Qc

GOES-R 2007–2020 R, S, T, Ud

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

a

Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite launch. 

b

The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate contracts for (1) two early prototype 

satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on 

launch) and GOES-7. 

c

NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

d

NOAA recently decided to drop satellites T and U from this series, but is now reconsidering that 

decision. 

Original GOES Satellites 

In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on 

experimental geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While 

these satellites operated effectively for many years, they had 

technical limitations. For example, this series of satellites was “spinstabilized,” meaning that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to 

maintain a stable position with respect to the earth. As a result, the 
Page 27 GAO-07-1099T

satellite viewed the earth only about 5 percent of the time and had 

to collect data very slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each 

time its field-of-view swung past the earth. A complete set of 

sounding data took 2 to 3 hours to collect. 

GOES I-M Series 

In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of 

GOES, called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements 

developed by NOAA’s National Weather Service, NESDIS, and 

NASA, among others. GOES I-M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8 

through GOES-12, and was a significant improvement in technology 

from the original GOES satellites. For example, GOES I-M was 

“body-stabilized,” meaning that the satellite held a fixed position in 

orbit relative to the earth, thereby allowing for continuous 

meteorological observations. Instead of maintaining stability by 

spinning, the satellite would preserve its fixed position by 

continuously making small adjustments in the rotation of internal 

momentum wheels or by firing small thrusters to compensate for 

drift. These and other enhancements meant that the GOES I-M 

satellites would be able to collect significantly better quality data 

more quickly than the older series of satellites. 

GOES-N Series 

In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES 

I-M, called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies 

for the instruments and added system upgrades, including an 

improved power subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing 

accuracy. Furthermore, the GOES-N satellites were designed to 

operate longer than its predecessors. This series originally consisted 

of four satellites, GOES-N through GOES-Q. However, the option for 

the GOES-Q satellite was cancelled based on NOAA’s assessment 

that it would not need the final satellite to continue weather 

coverage. In particular, the agency found that the GOES satellites 

already in operation were lasting longer than expected and that the 

first satellite in the next series could be available to back up the last 

of the GOES-N satellites. As noted earlier, the first GOES-N series 

satellite—GOES-13—was launched in May 2006. The GOES-O and 

GOES-P satellites are currently in production and are expected to be 

launched in July 2008 and July 2011, respectively. 
Page 28 GAO-07-1099T

Planned GOES-R Series 

NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES 

satellites, called the GOES-R series. NOAA is planning for the GOESR program to improve on the technology of prior GOES series, both 

in terms of system and instrument improvements. The system 

improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user 

requirements and to provide more rapid information updates. Table 

8 highlights key system-related improvements that GOES-R is 

expected to make to the geostationary satellite program. 

Table 8: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements 

Key feature GOES-N (current) GOES-R 

Total products 41 ~152 

Downlink rate of raw data collected by 

instruments (from satellite to ground stations) 

2.6 Mbps 132 Mbps 

Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from 

satellite to users) 

2.1 Mbps 17–24 Mbps 

Raw data storage (the length of time that raw 

data will be stored at ground stations) 

0 days 30 days 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the 

clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. Originally, 

NOAA planned to acquire 5 different instruments. The program 

office considered two of the instruments—the Advanced Baseline 

Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—to be the most 

critical because they would provide data for key weather products. 

Table 9 summarizes the originally planned instruments and their 

expected capabilities. 

Table 9: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006 

Planned instrument Description 

Advanced Baseline Imager Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric information of the earth's 

surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key features include 

• monitoring and tracking severe weather, 

• providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and 

• providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 

simultaneously. 
Page 29 GAO-07-1099T

Planned instrument Description 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite Expected to provide information about the earth’s surface to aid in the prediction of 

weather and climate monitoring. Key features include 

• providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support forecasts 

and climate monitoring, 

• monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, coastal erosion, 

and harmful algal blooms, and 

• providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in the prediction of particle 

precipitation, which causes disturbance and disruption of radio communications and 

navigation systems. Key features include 

• measuring magnetic fields and charged particles, 

• providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons and 

protons, and 

• enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, telecom services, 

astronauts, and airlines. 

Solar Imaging Suite Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range of solar X-ray features, from 

coronal holes to X-class flares, as well as estimate the measure of temperature and 

emissions. Key features include 

• providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor solar storms 

and 

• providing improved imager capability. 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over the United States and provide a 

more complete dataset than previously possible. Key features include 

• detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and 

• providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on polar 

satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

After our report was issued, NOAA officials told us that the agency 

decided to cancel its plans for the development of the Hyperspectral 

Environmental Suite, but expected to explore options to ensure the 

continuity of data provided by the current GOES series. 

Additionally, NOAA reduced the number of satellites in the GOES-R 

series from four to two satellites. 

The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements 

and Cost Estimates May Change 

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its 

GOES-R system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion 

and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At 

the time of our most recent review in September 2006,16 NOAA had 

 16GAO-06-993. 
Page 30 GAO-07-1099T

issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R 

system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of 

these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to 

reduce the risks associated with developing new instruments, NOAA 

issued contracts for the early development of two instruments and 

for the preliminary designs of three other instruments. 

However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost—which in May 2006 

the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion—led the 

agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the 

satellite series. In September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the 

agency had made a decision to reduce the scope and complexity of 

the GOES-R program by reducing the number of satellites from 4 to 

2 and canceling a technically complex instrument—called the 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. As of July 2007, agency officials 

reported that they are considering further changes to the scope of 

the program, which are likely to affect the overall program cost. We 

have work under way to evaluate these changes. 

Steps Taken to Reduce GOES-R Risk, More Work Remains 

NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past 

satellite programs, but more remains to be done. As outlined 

previously, key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) 

establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient 

technical readiness of the system’s components prior to key 

decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and 

contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive 

oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA established plans to 

address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, 

performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident 

government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a 

senior executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain 

to fully address these lessons. Specifically, at the time of our review, 

NOAA had not yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the 

independent and government cost estimates. In addition, NOAA had 

not yet determined how it will ensure that a sufficient level of 

technical maturity will be achieved in time for an upcoming decision 

milestone, nor had it determined the appropriate level of resources 

it needs to adequately track and oversee the program using earned 
Page 31 GAO-07-1099T

value management.17 Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces 

an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased 

cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued 

past procurements. 

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce GOES-R Acquisition Risk 

To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the GOES-R 

procurement, in our September 2006 report,18 we made 

recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to direct its NOAA 

Program Management Council to establish a process for objectively 

evaluating and reconciling the government and independent life 

cycle cost estimates once the program requirements are finalized; to 

establish a team of system engineering experts to perform a 

comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager instrument 

to determine the level of technical maturity achieved on the 

instrument before moving the instrument into production; and to 

seek assistance in determining the appropriate levels of resources 

needed at the program office to adequately track and oversee the 

contractor’s earned value management data. In written comments at 

that time, the Department of Commerce agreed with our 

recommendations and provided information on its plans to 

implement our recommendations. 

In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to 

developing weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for 

events such as hurricanes, and maintaining continuity in 

environmental and climate monitoring. Over the last several years, 

the NPOESS program experienced cost, schedule, and technical 

problems, but has now been restructured and is making progress. 

Still, technical and programmatic risks remain. The GOES-R 

program has incorporated lessons from other satellite acquisitions, 

 17Earned value management is a method that compares the value of work accomplished 

during a given period with that of the work expected in that period. 

18GAO-06-993. 
Page 32 GAO-07-1099T

but still faces challenges in establishing the management 

capabilities it needs and in determining the scope of the program. 

We have work under way to evaluate the progress and risks of both 

NPOESS and GOES-R in order to assist with congressional oversight 

of these critical programs. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or members of the committee may 

have at this time. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, 

please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at 

pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include 

Carol Cha, Kathleen S. Lovett, and Colleen Phillips (Assistant 

Director). 

(310853) 
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