NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 190501-U

Order filed April 29, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

In re M.M., )

 ) 

 a Minor ) 

 ) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

Michael M., ) 

 ) 

Respondent-Appellant). )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit,

Tazewell County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-19-0501 

Circuit No. 17-JA-23 

Honorable 

Timothy J. Cusack, 

Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Carter and Schmidt concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s findings complied with section 2-31(2) of the Juvenile Court Act 

of 1987. 

¶ 2 The respondent, Michael M., appeals the trial court’s order vacating its order designating 

the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as guardianship administrator over his 

minor child, M.M. (born August 2005), terminating wardship, and closing the case.
2 

¶ 3 FACTS

¶ 4 In February 2017, DCFS filed a shelter care petition alleging that M.M. was neglected in 

that his environment was injurious to his welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016). The 

petition stated that M.M.’s stepmother and the respondent were mad at him and his sibling, N.M., 

for failing to do their chores, which included emptying the cat litter box and taking out the garbage. 

The stepmother yelled at M.M., and M.M. hit her. The stepmother took the dirty cat litter box and 

dumped it onto M.M.’s bare mattress. The stepmother slapped M.M. in the face. The respondent 

picked up the garbage and dumped it onto N.M.’s bed and slapped him in the face twice.

¶ 5 When the police arrived, they noticed that both minors had a visible redness in their cheeks

and the minors were very upset and crying. M.M. stated that he saw the respondent slap the phone 

out of N.M.’s maternal grandmother’s hand, who is in a wheelchair, when she attempted to call 

the police to report the incident. Police also noted that the home was filthy. M.M. told DCFS that 

he endured approximately two years of excessive punishment by the respondent and his 

stepmother, which included being slapped in the face frequently and being hit with a belt. Some 

of the incidents left marks. M.M. also stated that his stepmother had dumped bunny litter on his 

bed in the past. N.M. told police that the dumping of dirty animal litter on their beds as punishment 

happened more than once and that he was made to sleep in the dirty bed. N.M. also told police that 

a day or so ago, the respondent turned an entire sofa over on him while he was sleeping on it and 

that the respondent bent his arm to the point where it felt like it was going to break. The respondent 

and the stepmother were charged with domestic battery/bodily harm. 

¶ 6 The respondent consented to a default judgment on the shelter care petition and 

adjudicatory and dispositional orders were entered, finding the respondent unfit. The trial court 

made M.M. a ward of the court and designated DCFS as guardianship administrator with 
3 

authorization to place M.M. Thereafter, numerous reports were filed detailing the respondent’s 

lack of progress in this case. For instance, a family counseling session was terminated early due to 

the respondent being verbally aggressive, a counseling report indicated he had a rigid parenting 

style and difficulty demonstrating emotional responsiveness toward M.M., he became angry 

regarding a visitation issue and yelled at a caseworker, he continued to lack control over his 

emotions despite completing anger management, he talked down to M.M. and often called him 

names and cursed at him, and he failed to maintain adequate housing. Regarding housing, a 

caseworker visited his home to complete a safety checklist and noted open piping, hanging exposed 

wiring, exposed wiring in the bedroom light switches, and some bedrooms had no windows. The 

caseworker informed him that the checklist could not be completed due to the home not meeting 

safety requirements. He stated that there was a room that could be used as a bedroom and led the 

caseworker outside to a shed. The shed had electricity, but no insulation. The court found that he 

remained unfit and failed to meet minimum parenting standards.

¶ 7 Meanwhile, M.M. had been placed with his paternal grandparents, who had a licensed 

foster home. Reports indicated that M.M. was thriving in that placement and had no behavioral 

issues at home or school. Additionally, an improvement in M.M.’s behavior was noted since being 

brought into care and moving into his grandparents’ home. M.M. expressed his preference that he 

remain with his grandparents. The State and guardian ad litem recommended that the court grant 

the grandparents guardianship over M.M. 

¶ 8 In August 2019, DCFS filed a motion to vacate guardianship, terminate wardship, and close 

the case. DCFS requested that the court transfer guardianship to M.M.’s grandparents (Tazewell 

County case No. 19-P-227). At the hearing on DCFS’s motion, the court took judicial notice of 

the prior orders and reports that had been submitted and incorporated by reference in DCFS’s 
4 

motion. The court granted the motion and explained: 

“Taking into consideration the 17-JA-23 file as well as the petition [for the 

appointment of guardianship] that’s been filed in 19-P-227 and the statutory factors 

regarding best interest of the child, I believe it is in the best interest of this child 

that the guardianship proceed and continue. I do believe that [the respondent] is 

unable to care for this child specifically for those reasons stated in the earlier reports 

and that he hasn’t gotten himself to a point where he can take care of this child.” 

¶ 9 A written order followed, which provided: 

“1. “It is in the minor’s best interest to remain under the care of [his paternal 

grandparents], and to vacate the order appointing [DCFS] as Guardianship 

Administrator of the minor.

2. Janet Wakus Ahern, Guardian Administrator for [DCFS], is discharged as 

guardian of the minor, [M.M.]. 

3. By separate order, this Honorable Court is appointing [the paternal grandparents] 

as guardians of the person of the minor. 

4. Wardship over [M.M.] is terminated and his case in Juvenile Court is hereby 

closed.” 

¶ 10 The respondent appeals. 

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The respondent argues that the trial court failed to comply with section 2-31(2) of the 

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) when it granted DCFS’s motion thereby vacating the order 

appointing DCFS as guardianship administrator, terminating wardship, and closing the case. 705 

ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2018). Specifically, he argues that the court’s written order was 
5 

insufficient because it failed to reference the (1) health and safety of the minor; (2) best interest of 

the minor in connection with terminating wardship and closing the case; and (3) health, safety, and 

best interest of the public. He asks this court to reverse the court’s order or remand with directions 

for the court to make more specific findings. The State argues that he forfeited this contention of 

error for failing to raise it first in the trial court. Alternatively, the State argues that the court 

sufficiently complied with the statutory requirements, and even if the court’s findings were 

insufficient, the respondent was not prejudiced. 

¶ 13 We first address the State’s forfeiture argument. The record in this case demonstrates that 

the respondent is raising this issue for the first time on appeal. However, as our supreme court has 

indicated, “where the well-being of a child and parental rights are at issue, we elect not to apply 

the rule of [forfeiture] and will consider the case on the merits.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 

371 (2005); see People v. Hughes, 2015 IL 117242, ¶ 37 (waiver is the voluntary relinquishment 

of a known right and forfeiture is the failure to timely comply with procedural requirements). 

Therefore, considering the interests involved, we will address the respondent’s contention. 

¶ 14 Whether a trial court failed to follow statutory requirements is a question of law, which we

review de novo. See In re Aaron R., 387 Ill. App. 3d 1130, 1138 (2009). Section 2-31(2) of the 

Act provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

“Whenever the court determines, and makes written factual findings, that 

health, safety, and the best interests of the minor and the public no longer require 

the wardship of the court, the court shall order the wardship terminated and all 

proceedings under this Act respecting that minor finally closed and discharged.” 

705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2018). 

¶ 15 This court has previously held that, when a trial court makes written findings pertaining to 
6 

a parent’s fitness along with an explicit oral ruling “that it was no longer in the best interest of the 

minors to remain wards of the court[,]” those findings were sufficient to comply with section 2-

31(2) of the Act. See In re M.G., 2018 IL App (3d) 170591, ¶ 21 (citing In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 

3d 830, 833 (2000)). In K.S., the court’s written order stated that the family was not in need of 

further monitoring and it was in the best interest of the minor that the case be closed. 317 Ill. App. 

3d at 833. The court found that the court’s oral findings were more explicit, thereby satisfying 

section 2-31(2) of the Act. Id. (the court orally noted that the children were age appropriate, doing 

well, and healthy and the issues had been addressed through intervention services provided to the 

parents). The court declined “ ‘to remand this cause solely to allow the trial court to reiterate its 

findings in a written order.’ ” Id. at 834 (quoting In re Z.Z., 312 Ill. App. 3d 800, 804 (2000)). 

When examining section 2-27(1) of the Act, our supreme court cited this holding in K.S. pertaining 

to section 2-27(2) with approval: 

“The appellate court held that the trial court’s oral statements sufficiently stated the 

basis for the court’s finding, and remanding the matter to reiterate the findings in a 

written order was, therefore, unnecessary. K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 833. 

Likewise, we also conclude that an oral finding on the record may satisfy 

section 2-27(1), provided that it is explicit and advises the parties of the basis for 

the court’s decision.” Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 377. 

¶ 16 Here, the trial court’s written order provided that it was in the best interest of M.M. to 

remain under the care of his paternal grandparents. On the record, the court explicitly stated that

(1) it considered the statutory factors related to the best interest of the minor, (2) the respondent 

was “unable to care for this child specifically for those reasons stated in the earlier reports,” and 

(3) the respondent “hasn’t gotten himself to a point where he can take care of this child.”
7 

Specifically, the reports indicated, among other things, that the respondent continued to have 

difficulty controlling his anger, communicated to M.M. in an inappropriate manner, and had 

inadequate housing. Meanwhile, M.M. was thriving in the care of his grandparents and continually 

requested to remain in their care. Based on the foregoing, these findings were sufficient to satisfy 

section 2-27(2) of the Act. See M.G., 2018 IL App (3d) 170591, ¶ 21. We reject the respondent’s 

contention that the court’s written finding must contain such specific language. Accordingly, we 

affirm the court’s order vacating guardianship, terminating wardship, and closing the case. 

¶ 17 CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed.

¶ 19 Affirmed.