*The Honorable Denise Page Hood, United States District Judge forthe Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0126P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0126p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________In re: ROBINL.JOHNSTON,Debtor.________________________ROBINL.JOHNSTON,Appellant,v.THOMASHAZLETT,Appellee.;>1No. 98-3954Appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panelof the Sixth Circuit.No. 97-59613—Barbara J. Sellers, Bankruptcy Judge.Argued: September 14, 1999Decided and Filed: April 7, 2000Before: BATCHELDER and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;HOOD,*District Judge.2In re JohnstonNo. 98-3954_________________COUNSELARGUED:Andrew W. Miller, Steubenville, Ohio, forAppellant. Thomas Hazlett, HARPER & HAZLETT, St.Clairsville, Ohio, for Appellee.ON BRIEF:Andrew W.Miller, Steubenville, Ohio, for Appellant. Thomas Hazlett,HARPER & HAZLETT, St. Clairsville, Ohio, for Appellee._________________OPINION_________________ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. DebtorAppellant Robin L. Johnston appeals the decision of theBankruptcy Appellate Panel affirming the Bankruptcy Court’sdenial of her claim that her 1997 earned income tax credit(“EIC”) is exempt from inclusion in her Chapter 7 bankruptcyestate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision ofthe Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.I.On October 20, 1997, Robin L. Johnston filed a voluntarypetition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United StatesBankruptcy Code. Johnston listed in her petition for relief a1997 EIC in the amount of $2,000 and claimed the entireamount as an exemption. The Bankruptcy Court sustained theTrustee’s objection to the exemption, rejecting Johnston’sargument that because she had no “legal or equitable interest”in the EIC at the time she filed her petition, the EIC cannot bedefined as property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541. TheBankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed thedisallowance of the exemption, holding that an EIC isproperty of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541, evenif the bankruptcy petition is filed prior to the end of the taxyear in which the EIC is earned.No. 98-3954In re Johnston31Issues not raised before the trial court are generally consideredwaived.SeeWhite v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6thCir. 1990).2See, e.g.,Baer v. Montgomery(In re Montgomery), 219 B.R. 913(10th Cir. B.A.P. 1998);In re Fraire, No. 96-1241-JTM, 1997 WL 45465(D. Kan. Jan. 2, 1997);In re McCourt, 217 B.R. 998 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio1997);In re Barnett, 214 B.R. 632 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997);In reBeagle, 200 B.R. 595 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996);In re Kurilich, 199 B.R.161 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996);In re Goertz, 202 B.R. 614 (Bankr. W.D.Mo. 1996);In re George, 199 B.R. 60 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996);In reBrown, 186 B.R. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995);In re Goldsberry, 142B.R. 158 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992);In re Buchanan, 139 B.R. 721 (Bankr.D. Idaho 1992);In re Davis, 136 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1991);Inre Richardson, 216 B.R. 206 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).Johnston raises three assignments of error on appeal: (1)because she was not entitled to the EIC until the end of the taxyear, she had neither a legal nor an equitable interest in theEIC at the time she filed her petition, and therefore, it was notpart of the bankruptcy estate; (2) the opt-out provision of 11U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) is unconstitutional; and (3) public policymilitates in favor of allowing her to keep the EIC in light ofher limited earnings. Because she raises the latter two for thefirst time on appeal, we will not address them,1and willconfine our review to Johnston’s first assignment of error.II.Whether the EIC was properly included as property of thebankruptcy estate is purely an issue of law. We review abankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo.Nicholson v.Isaacman(In re Isaacman), 26 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 1994).The overwhelming majority of courts confronted with thisissue have rejected the argument that Johnston makes here.2InBaer v. Montgomery(In re Montgomery), 219 B.R. 913(10th Cir. B.A.P. 1998), for example, the bankruptcy courthad determined that a debtor’s EIC for the pre-petition portionof the tax year was not part of the bankruptcy estate. Thecourt based its reasoning on the opinion inHoffman v. Searles4In re JohnstonNo. 98-3954(In re Searles), 445 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 1978), which heldthat under the “fresh start” provision of § 70a(5) of theBankruptcy Act, EICs are “expectancies” accruable at the endof the tax year and payable in the year following bankruptcy.Searles, 445 F. Supp. at 753. The Bankruptcy AppellatePanel for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, notingthat the bankruptcy court’s conclusions were misplaced inlight of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:The Bankruptcy Act was repealed in favor of themodern Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Reform Actof 1978. Though the “fresh start” maxim rising fromsection 70a(5) of the Act may have been a fundamentalconsideration in the formation of the Code, we recognizethe maxim to be a limited, and no longer a completelyunencumbered, guiding principle. Unlike the Act, theCode requires that all property of the debtor, whether ornot exempt, be included in the bankruptcy estate,mandating that an estate in bankruptcy comprise “alllegal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as ofthe commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)(1994). Legislative history indicates section 541 isintended to be given a broad definition to include “allkinds of property, including tangible or intangibleproperty, causes of action . . ., and all other forms ofproperty specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. . . . [I]t includes as property of the estate all property ofthe debtor, even that needed for a fresh start.” H.R.Rep.No. 95-595, at 367 (1977). Any conclusion that EICs arenecessary or mandatory for a “fresh start” may bereasonably inferred under the Act, but is incorrect in lightof the Code.Montgomery, 219 B.R. at 916 (alteration in original).Montgomeryfurther held that “qualifying individuals mayrequest payment of EICs at the end of the tax year, or at anytime during the tax year,”id. at 917, and, citingIn re Davis,136 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1991), that “[n]eitherpossession nor constructive possession, either prior to orcontemporaneous with the filing for bankruptcy protection, isNo. 98-3954In re Johnston5required to vest an individual with a property interest inEICs.”Id.In the case before us here, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panelreviewed the reasoning and conclusions ofMontgomeryandconcluded, “Montgomeryalso held that EICs are property ofthe estate under § 541, even when the bankruptcy petition isfiled prior to the end of the tax year. ‘Congress intended EICsto be available to qualifying individuals at anytime during thetax year.’ We agree withMontgomery.”Johnston v. Hazlett(In re Johnston), 222 B.R. 552, 555 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1998)(internal citations omitted).We agree with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that thereasoning of theMontgomerypanel is correct. Accordingly,we hold that in the case before us here, the bankruptcy courtand appellate panel properly determined that Johnston’s EICwas property of the bankruptcy estate, despite the fact thatJohnston filed her bankruptcy petition prior to the end of thetax year in which the credit was earned.CONCLUSIONThe decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmingthe judgment of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED.