U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–118 

" ! SENATE 110TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

TREATY DOC. 

2007

110–4 

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF 

ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS 

OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (THE ‘‘CONVENTION’’), ADOPTED BY 

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON APRIL 13, 2005, 

AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2005 

JULY 12, 2007.—Treaty was read the first time, and together with the 

accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate 


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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 12, 2007. 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith for Senate advice and consent to ratification 

the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 

Terrorism (the ‘‘Convention’’), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on April 13, 2005, and signed on behalf of the 

United States of America on September 14, 2005. As of July 3, 

2007, 115 countries have signed the Convention and 23 have submitted their instruments of ratification or accession. The Convention entered into force on July 7, 2007. I also transmit for the information of the Senate a report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention. 

The Convention imposes binding legal obligations upon States 

Parties either to submit for prosecution or to extradite any person 

within their jurisdiction who commits terrorist acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device as set forth in Article 2 of the 

Convention, threatens or attempts to commit such an act, participates as an accomplice, organizes or directs others to commit such 

an offense, or in any other way contributes to the commission of 

such an offense by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, regardless of where the alleged act took place. 

States Parties to the Convention will also be obligated to provide 

one another legal assistance in investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offenses set forth in Article 2, in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements that 

may exist between them or in accordance with their national law. 

The recommended legislation necessary to implement the Convention will be submitted to the Congress separately. 

This Convention is important in the campaign against international terrorism. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give 

early and favorable consideration to this Convention, subject to the 

understandings and reservation that are described in the accompanying State Department report. 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 


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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, April 4, 2007. 

The President, 

The White House. 

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view 

to its transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, subject to the understandings and reservation set forth in the 

enclosed Overview, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (‘‘the Convention’’) adopted by the 

United Nations General Assembly on April 13, 2005. You and 

President Putin of Russia signed the Convention on September 14, 

2005, the first day it was opened for signature. As of March 22, 

2007, 115 countries have signed the Convention and 18 have submitted their instruments of ratification. The Convention will enter 

into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. 

A detailed Overview of the provisions is enclosed with this Report. Recommended legislation necessary to implement the Convention is being prepared for separate submission to the Congress. The 

Department of Justice joins in recommending that this Convention 

be transmitted to the Senate at an early date for its advice and 

consent to ratification, subject to the understandings to Article 4, 

10, and 12, and to the reservation to Article 23. 

Respectfully submitted. 

CONDOLEEZZA RICE. 

Enclosure: As stated. 

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF

NUCLEAR TERRORISM

OVERVIEW

The following is an overview and detailed analysis of the provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 

of Nuclear Terrorism (‘‘the Convention’’), adopted by the United 

Nations General Assembly (‘‘UNGA’’) on April 13, 2005 and signed 

on behalf of the United States of America on September 14, 2005. 

On December 17, 1996, the UNGA adopted resolution 51/210, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee tasked with creating, among other 

instruments, a convention on nuclear terrorism. Culminating in its 

ninth session, from March 28 to April 1, 2005, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended a draft of the Convention to the General Assembly for adoption. The Convention was adopted, by consensus, by 


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resolution 59/290 on April 13, 2005. The President of the United 

States and President Putin of Russia signed the Convention on the 

first day that it was opened for signature at the September 2005 

UNGA summit. 

As of March 22, 2007, 115 countries have signed the Convention 

and 18 have submitted their instruments of ratification. The Convention will enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of 

deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, 

approval, or accession. For each country that ratifies, accepts, approves, or accedes to the treaty after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument, the Convention will enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of that country’s instrument of 

ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. 

The Convention is the first multilateral counterterrorism treaty 

adopted by the UNGA since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001. The Convention provides a legal basis for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those 

who commit offenses involving radioactive material or a nuclear device, or any device that may emit radiation or disperse radioactive 

material. In creating such a legal framework, the Convention follows the precedents set by numerous counterterrorism conventions 

to which the United States is already a party, such as the 1997 

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (‘‘Terrorist Bombings Convention’’) and the 1999 International 

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 

(‘‘Terrorism Financing Convention’’). Like those earlier conventions, 

this new Convention requires Parties to criminalize under their domestic laws certain types of offenses, and also requires Parties to 

extradite or submit for prosecution persons accused of committing, 

attempting to commit, or aiding in the commission of such offenses. 

The Convention also provides for the safekeeping and return to one 

of several appropriate States Parties of radioactive material, devices, and nuclear facilities. 

Articles 1 and 2 together serve to define the offenses covered by 

the Convention, with Article 1 incorporating several definitions of 

phrases used in Article 2. A ‘‘device’’ includes any nuclear explosive 

device, as well as any device that may emit radiation or disperse 

radioactive material that may, owing to its radiological properties, 

cause death, serious bodily injury, or substantial damage to property or the environment. A ‘‘nuclear facility’’ includes nuclear reactors as well as facilities for the production, storage, processing, or 

transport of radioactive material. 

Paragraph 1 of Article 2 describes two categories of principal offenses. First, any person commits an offense under the Convention 

if that person unlawfully and intentionally possesses radioactive 

material or makes or possesses a device, as defined in Article 1 

above, with the intent either to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment. Second, any person commits an offense under the Convention 

if he or she unlawfully and intentionally uses radioactive material 

or a device or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner that 

releases or risks the release of radioactive material, with the intent 

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ural or legal person, an international organization, or a State to do 

or refrain from doing an act. 

The Convention also provides for a range of ancillary offenses. 

Paragraph 2 of Article 2 provides that any person also commits an 

offense if that person credibly threatens to commit an offense as set 

forth in Paragraph 1 or demands by credible threat radioactive material, a device, or nuclear facility. The inclusion of ‘‘threats’’ as an 

ancillary offense is new with this Convention, and is fully warranted by the grave nature of the harm threatened. The threat provision is formulated in a manner that is compatible with threat offenses in U.S. law. There are additional ancillary offenses that are 

present in the prior counterterrorism conventions. Paragraph 3 

provides that any person commits an offense if he or she attempts 

an offense as set forth in Paragraph 1. Paragraph 4 further provides that any person commits an offense if that person participates as an accomplice in an offense under Paragraphs 1, 2, or 3, 

organizes or directs others to commit such an offense, or in any 

other way contributes to the commission of one or more offenses 

under Paragraphs 1, 2, or 3 by a group of persons acting with a 

common purpose. These ancillary offenses will strengthen the ability of the international community to investigate, prosecute, and 

extradite those who conspire or otherwise contribute to the commission of offenses defined in the Convention. 

There is no separate offense for dumping of radioactive waste, if 

done without the relevant criminal intent specified in Article 2( 1) 

of the Convention. Although a few delegations tried to broaden the 

offense provisions to include dumping, the United States and other 

nuclear powers succeeded in resisting this expansion on the 

grounds that it was better addressed in environmental conventions 

and that such a provision would be outside the focus on the terrorist acts that form the basis of the Convention. 

Article 3 makes most of the Convention’s provisions inapplicable 

to offenses that lack an international aspect. In generally limiting 

its scope of application to those cases involving elements from more 

than one State, the Convention follows the precedent set by prior 

counterterrorism conventions, such as the Terrorist Bombings Convention, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the 1979 Convention 

Against the Taking of Hostages. 

Article 4(1) provides that nothing in the Convention shall affect 

other rights, obligations, and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law and follows corresponding provisions 

in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing 

Convention. 

Paragraph 2 of Article 4 contains two important exceptions from 

the scope of the Convention relating to activities of armed forces 

and military forces of a State. Under the first exception, the Convention does not apply to the activities of ‘‘armed forces during an 

armed conflict,’’ where such activities are governed by international 

humanitarian law. This exception is identical to the one found in 

the Terrorist Bombings Convention, and is meant to exclude from 

the Convention’s scope the activities of armed forces, so long as 

those activities are in the course of an ‘‘armed conflict’’ and are 

governed by international humanitarian law, also known as the 


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‘‘law of war.’’ Given that suspected offenders may claim the benefit 

of this ‘‘armed conflict’’ exception to avoid extradition or prosecution under the Convention, it would be useful for the United States 

to articulate an understanding similar to the one issued with respect to the Terrorist Bombings Convention regarding the scope of 

this exception. In this respect, an appropriate source of authority 

would be the widely accepted provision in Paragraph 2 of Article 

1 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 

of Non-International Armed Conflicts (‘‘Additional Protocol II’’), 

concluded at Geneva on June 8, 1977, which President Reagan 

transmitted to the Senate on January 29, 1987, for advice and consent to ratification. Specifically, Additional Protocol II, which applies to non-international armed conflicts, treats situations of ‘‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature’’ as not 

being armed conflicts. Through an understanding, the United 

States would make clear that isolated acts of violence that include 

the elements of the offenses in Article 2 would be encompassed in 

the scope of the Convention, and would not fall within the first exception discussed above. 

As a separate matter, the term ‘‘international humanitarian law’’

is not used by the United States armed forces and could be subject 

to varied interpretations. It therefore would be useful for the 

United States to articulate in an understanding that, for the purposes of this Convention, this phrase has the same substantive 

meaning as the phrase ‘‘law of war.’’ I therefore recommend that 

the following understandings to Article 4 be included in the United 

States instrument of ratification: 

(1) The United States of America understands that the term 

‘‘armed conflict’’ in Article 4 of the Convention does not include 

situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 

isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature; 

(2) The United States of America understands that the term 

‘‘international humanitarian law’’ in Article 4 of the Convention has the same substantive meaning as the law of war. 

The second exception in Paragraph 2 of Article 4 also is identical 

to one found in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and exempts 

from the Convention’s scope of application the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official 

duties. The official activities of State military forces are already 

comprehensively governed by other bodies of international law, 

such as the international instruments relating to the law of war 

and the international law of state responsibility. The comprehensive exclusion of official activities of State military forces from the 

Convention’s scope was an important U.S. objective in negotiating 

the text of this Convention. While such an exclusion might be 

thought to be implicit in the context of the Convention, the Convention’s negotiators thought it best to articulate the exclusion expressly in light of the relatively broad nature of the conduct described in Article 2 and the fact that this conduct overlaps with activities of State military forces. 


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The conduct of certain civilians who act in support of official activities of State military forces are also exempted from the Convention’s scope of application. The phrase ‘‘military forces of a State’’ is defined broadly in Paragraph 6 of Article I as meaning ‘‘the 

armed forces of a State which are organized, trained, and equipped 

under its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense 

or security and persons acting in support of those armed forces who 

are under their formal command, control, and responsibility.’’ In 

addition, because the Convention does not reach the official activities of State military forces, it similarly does not reach persons, including non-military policy-making officials of States, who might 

direct or organize the activities of State military forces or who 

might otherwise have been subject to the ancillary offenses in Article 2 if State military forces had not been excluded from the Convention’s scope of application. Because of the importance of this 

provision, I recommend that the following understanding to Article 

4, which builds on an understanding made with respect to the corresponding provision in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, be included in the United States instrument of ratification: 

The United States of America understands that, pursuant to 

Article 4 and Article 1(6), the Convention does not apply to: 

(a) the military forces of a State in the exercise of their 

official duties; 

(b) civilians who direct or organize the official activities 

of military forces of a State; or 

(c) civilians acting in support of the official activities of 

the military forces of a State, if the civilians are under the 

formal command, control, and responsibility of those 

forces. 

Paragraph 3 of Article 4 clarifies that nothing in the prior provisions is intended to condone or to make lawful otherwise unlawful 

acts or to preclude otherwise lawful prosecution. Finally, in a provision that confirms the view of the United States, Paragraph 4 provides that the Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the 

use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States. 

Article 5 requires States Parties to make the offenses enumerated in Article 2 criminal offenses punishable under their domestic 

laws by appropriate penalties that take into account their grave 

nature. It follows precedents in the Terrorist Bombings Convention 

and the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

Article 6 requires States Parties to adopt any measures that may 

be necessary to ensure the criminal offenses under the Convention, 

in particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke a 

state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. It follows a corresponding provision 

in the Terrorist Bombings Convention. 

Article 7 establishes the basis for cooperation between States in 

the prevention of offenses under the Convention. States Parties 

must take all practicable measures to prevent and counter-preparations in their own territories for an offense under the Convention, 


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including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities 

of persons, groups, and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance, or knowingly provide technical assistance or information or engage in the perpetration of offenses. 

Article 7 also adds significantly to prior counterterrorism conventions in the realm of information sharing. States Parties undertake 

to exchange accurate and verified information in accordance with 

their national law, in particular when information is available concerning the commission and preparation of offenses set forth under 

Article 2, unless doing so would violate national law or jeopardize 

the security of the concerned State or the physical protection of nuclear material. Paragraph 2 requires States Parties to take steps 

consistent with their national law to ensure the confidentiality of 

information received in confidence from another State Party or during an activity carried out to implement the Convention. Each 

State Party is to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its competent authorities and liaison points responsible for 

sending and receiving the information referred to in Article 7(4). 

For the United States, these roles will be performed by the Operations Center of the Department of State. 

Article 8 encourages States Parties to make every effort to adopt 

appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

Under Article 9, each State Party must establish its jurisdiction 

over the offenses set forth in Article 2 when the offense is committed in its territory; on board a vessel flying the flag of that 

State or an aircraft registered under its laws at the time the offense is committed; or where the offense was committed by a national of that State. Each State Party has discretion to establish jurisdiction over offenses set forth in Article 2 where the offense is 

committed against a national of that State; against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or 

other diplomatic or consular premises of that State; by a stateless 

person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of 

that State; in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from 

doing any act; or on board an aircraft that is operated by the Government of that State. Upon becoming a party to the Convention, 

a State must notify the United Nations Secretary-General of the jurisdiction it has established under its domestic law. Moreover, any 

changes to this jurisdiction must be immediately notified to the 

Secretary-General. In addition, a State must take measures, including establishing appropriate jurisdiction, to prosecute offenders 

present in its territory if the State does not extradite them. None 

of the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention excludes the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its own national law. 

Under the terms of Article 9, States Parties may enact a broad 

array of jurisdictional bases over the offenses enumerated in Article 2. Of significant interest and value to the United States, which 

has many government facilities outside of U.S. territory, is the 

Convention’s recognition of jurisdiction over attacks against a State 

or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy 

or other diplomatic or consular premises. This would give the 


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United States internationally recognized jurisdiction based on this 

Convention to prosecute in U.S. courts the perpetrators and organizers of such attacks on all U.S. Government facilities abroad, as 

well as military installations. In addition to the foregoing jurisdictional bases, which correspond to those in the Terrorist Bombings 

Convention, is the provision in Article 9 allowing States Parties to 

establish jurisdiction over offenses committed in an attempt to 

compel a State to do or abstain from doing any act. This provision, 

which is also of significant interest and value to the United States, 

provides jurisdiction over offenses under this Convention where 

terrorists seek to coerce State action even where a national or facility of that State is not the target of the attack. Upon becoming a 

party to the Convention, a State must notify the United Nations 

Secretary-General of the jurisdiction it has established under its 

domestic law. 

As in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and Terrorism Finance 

Convention, Article 10 includes provisions relating to alleged offenders arrested or detained for the purpose of extradition or prosecution. 

Paragraph 1 of Article 10 requires States Parties to take necessary measures under their national law to investigate any information received that an offense has been committed or is being 

committed in the territory of a State Party or that the offender or 

alleged offender may be present in its territory. Paragraph 2 requires the State Party to ensure an alleged offender’s presence for 

the purpose of prosecution or extradition. Paragraph 3 ensures that 

alleged offenders who are arrested or detained are able to communicate without delay with the appropriate representative of the 

State of which they are a national, or of a State otherwise entitled 

to protect them (e.g., a protecting power), or, if they are stateless, 

the State of habitual residence. The rights set forth in Paragraph 

3 must be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of 

the State in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender 

is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which 

the rights accorded under Paragraph 3 are intended. Upon ratification and entry into force, this Convention would supplement other 

treaties on the same subject, such as the Vienna Convention on 

Consular Rights or any applicable bilateral agreement on consular 

relations. These obligations are essentially coterminous except in 

the case of stateless persons, which the consular treaties do not address. 

Article 10, like the Convention as a whole, as well as other similar counterterrorism conventions, is not intended to create judicially enforceable rights. To avoid any unnecessary disputes with 

our treaty partners, I recommend that an understanding on this 

point, with respect to both Articles 10 and 12, be included in the 

United States instrument of ratification. The suggested text of the 

understanding is set forth following the discussion of Article 12. 

In a provision of crucial importance for the Convention and the 

United States, which is consistent with corresponding provisions in 

prior counterterrorism conventions, Paragraph 1 of Article 11 declares that a State Party that does not extradite an alleged offender found in its territory shall, ‘‘without exception whatsoever 


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and whether or not the offense was committed in its territory,’’ submit the case to its competent authorities for purposes of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. 

Those authorities are obligated to take their decision in the same 

manner as in the case of any other offense of a grave nature under 

the law of that State. 

Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, Paragraph 2 

of Article 11 declares that the obligation in Paragraph 1 to extradite or submit for prosecution can be discharged by the temporary 

transfer of nationals for trial in another country by those States 

Parties that cannot otherwise extradite their nationals, provided 

both the Requesting and Requested States agree. Any sentence imposed would be served in the surrendering State. This provision on 

temporary transfer of nationals for trial is a useful recognition of 

this practice by the international community in a binding multilateral legal instrument. 

Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, Article 12 requires States Parties to guarantee to persons taken into custody for 

the offenses set forth in Article 2 fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the 

State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human 

rights law. Like Article 10 above, this Article is not intended to create judicially enforceable rights. I therefore recommend that the 

following understanding with respect to Articles 10 and 12 be included in the United States instrument of ratification: 

The United States of America understands that Articles 

10 and 12 impose no obligation on the United States to 

provide any individual remedy within its judicial system 

for any person who alleges a violation of those articles or 

any other terms of this Convention. 

Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, paragraph 1 

of Article 13 amends existing extradition treaties between States 

Parties to include the offenses defined in Article 2 as extraditable 

offenses and provides that States Parties shall undertake, in subsequent extradition treaties, to include the offenses set forth in Article 2 as extraditable offenses. Paragraph 2 allows States Parties 

that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty providing for extradition between the Parties to utilize the Convention 

to serve as an independent legal basis for extradition between 

States Parties without an independent extradition treaty. It is a 

longstanding United States policy to extradite fugitives only to 

States with which the United States has a bilateral extradition 

treaty. Thus, we do not expect that the Convention will serve as 

an independent legal basis for extradition from the United States. 

Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, Article 14 

establishes general mutual legal assistance obligations between 

States Parties in connection with investigation or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offenses in Article 2. 

Article 15 provides that none of the offenses set forth in Article 

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ingly, a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance may not 

be refused solely on such grounds. This Article applies to extradition and mutual legal assistance requests involving the offenses 

in Article 2, and provides a useful narrowing of the political offense 

exception in such cases. Many modern U.S. bilateral extradition 

treaties already contain provisions that bar application of the political offense exception to extradition with respect to offenses under 

multilateral conventions to which ‘‘prosecute or extradite’’ obligations apply. This provision builds on this trend by making the restriction on the invocation of the political offense exception for requests based on offenses under Article 2 a matter of general application rather than dependent on the terms of individual bilateral 

law enforcement treaties between the Parties. Corresponding provisions are found in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

Article 16 provides that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual 

legal assistance if the requested State Party has substantial 

grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offenses 

set forth in Article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to 

such offenses has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion, or that compliance with the 

request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of 

these reasons. This Article is similar to provisions already included 

in many bilateral extradition treaties and corresponds to provisions 

in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing 

Convention. 

Article 17 provides and establishes various conditions for the 

temporary transfer to one State Party, for purposes of assistance 

under the Convention, of a person in custody in another State 

Party, provided that the person in question consents and the competent authorities of both States Parties agree. This provision is included in prior counterterrorism treaties and is similar to provisions found in virtually all of the bilateral mutual legal assistance 

treaties to which the United States is a party. 

Article 18 provides for the safekeeping and return of radioactive 

material, devices, and nuclear facilities. Upon seizing or otherwise 

taking control of any radioactive material, devices, or nuclear facility, following the commission of an offense, a State Party must take 

steps to render it harmless, ensure that any nuclear material is 

held in accordance with applicable IAEA safeguards, and have regard to physical protection recommendations and health and safety 

standards published by the IAEA. Following the completion of any 

proceedings connected with an offense set forth in Article 2, any radioactive material, device, or nuclear facility must be returned to 

the State Party to which it belongs, the State Party of which the 

person owning such radioactive material, device, or nuclear facility 

is a national or resident, or to the State Party from whose territory 

it was stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. Article 18 also establishes procedures for the handling of such material when no 

originating State exists or when a particular State cannot lawfully 

return, possess, or accept the material. 


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Article 19 requires the State Party in which the alleged offender 

is prosecuted to notify the United Nations Secretary-General of the 

final outcome of criminal proceedings relating to offenses under the 

Convention. Article 20 requires States Parties to conduct consultations with one another directly or through the United Nations Secretary-General to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention. Article 21 provides that States Parties shall carry out 

their obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with 

the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of 

States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 

States. Articles 19 and 21 follow corresponding provisions in the 

Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

Consistent with provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention 

and the Terrorism Financing Convention, Article 22 provides that 

nothing in the Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in 

the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction and 

performance of functions that are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its domestic law. 

Paragraph 1 of Article 23 provides that disputes between two or 

more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 

the Convention that cannot be settled through negotiation within 

a reasonable time shall be submitted at the request of one of them 

to arbitration, or, failing agreement on the organization of such arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. Paragraph 2 provides that a State may make a declaration excluding this disputeresolution obligation at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. In October 1985, the United States 

withdrew its declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the 

International Court of Justice accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 

of the Court. Consistent with that action, I recommend that the following reservation to Paragraph 1 of Article 23 be included in the 

United States instrument of ratification: 

(a) Pursuant to Article 23(2) of the Convention, the United 

States of America declares that it does not consider itself 

bound by Article 23(1) of the Convention; and 

(b) The United States of America reserves the right specifically to agree in a particular case to follow the arbitration procedure set forth in Article 23(1) of the Convention or any other 

procedure for arbitration. 

This reservation would allow the United States to agree to adjudication by a Chamber of the Court in a particular case, if that 

were deemed desirable. The United States filed similar reservations with respect to the dispute settlement provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

As detailed in Article 25, the Convention will enter into force on 

the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second 

instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with 

the United Nations Secretary-General. Pursuant to Article 27, a 

State Party to the Convention may denounce it by written notice 

to the United Nations Secretary-General. Denunciation will take 

effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification by the 

United Nations Secretary-General. 


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cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 240 here TD4.012
13 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 241 here TD4.013
14 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 242 here TD4.014
15 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 243 here TD4.015
16 


cprice-sewell on PROD1PC72 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 244/250 here TD4.016