GAO 

United States General Accounting Office 

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

October 1993 NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Safety, Technical, and 

Manpower Issues Slow 

DOE’s Disassembly 

Efforts 

GAO/RCED-94-9 

GAO United States 

General Accounting Office 

Washington, D.C. 20648 

Resources, Community, and 

Economic Development Division 

ES-253531 

October 20,1993 

The Honorable John Glenn 

Chairman, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

This report responds to your request that we review how the Department of Energy is 

addressing the disassembly of large numbers of retired nuclear weapons. Specifically, this 

report discusses (1) the Department’s success to date in meeting the disassembly schedule and 

the causes of shortfalls, (2) issues that could affect the Department’s ability to meet the 

disassembly schedule in the future, and (3) uncompleted safety analysis reports at disassembly 

facilities. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report 

until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of Energy and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies 

available to others on request. 

This work was performed under the direction of Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and 

Science Issues, who can be reached at (202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any questions. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I. 

Sincerely yours, 

J. Dexter Peach 

Assistant Comptroller General 
Executive Summary 

Purpose Recent treaties and nuclear weapons retirements have resulted in 

dramatic reductions in the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal. To 

accommodate the weapons reductions, the Department of Energy (JIOE) 

has begun the largest nuclear weapons disassembly effort since the 

beginning of the Cold War. As a result, the Chairman of the Senate 

Governmental Affairs Committee asked GAO to provide information on 

(1) DOE'S success to date in meeting the disassembly schedule and the 

causes of any shortfalls, (2) issues that affect DOE’S ability to meet the 

disassembly schedule, and (3) uncompleted safety analysis reports. 

Background DOE is responsible for researching, developing, testing, assembling, and 

disassembling nuclear weapons. After a weapon is retired, it is shipped to 

a DOE facility. In general, for weapons disassembly, the procedures to 

assemble a nuclear weapon are reversed. Initially, the various major 

components are mechanically separated. The component containing the 

plutonium pit and the high explosive is taken to a disassembly cell, where 

the high explosive is removed from the pit. When this process is 

completed, the weapon is considered to be disassembled, and the various 

components are either stored or destroyed. International treaties and 

nuclear weapons retirements are reducing the nation’s nuclear arsenal 

from about 21,000 weapons in 1990 to a planned stockpile of 3,500 in 2003. 

Results in Brief DOE has established a very ambitious schedule for disassembling retired 

nuclear weapons at its Pantex facility in Texas. During fiscal year 1992, 

about 63 percent of the weapons scheduled were disassembled. 

Disassembly at Pantex was curtailed by a transportation problem that 

prevented the delivery of retired weapons to Pantex for about 2 months. 

As a result, Pantex slowed considerably its disassembly operations to 

avoid depleting its inventory of weapons to be disassembled. Unexpected 

problems that could cause disassembly technicians to be exposed to 

radioactive material also curtailed disassembly efforts. 

DOE has scheduled the number of disassemblies to be conducted at Pantex 

for the next 10 years. The disassembly schedule for the first year is firm in 

terms of numbers and weapon type. According to DOE officials, the 

remaining years are more likely to change in terms of the numbers and 

types of weapons planned for disassembly. The prospect for meeting the 

schedule in the next several years is not good. DOE will have to address 

several issues that could decrease its capability to disassemble nuclear 

weapons, These issues include a shortage of disassembly technicians and 

Page 2 GAMUTED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Executive Summary 

problems concerning the adequacy of facilities for and the environmental 

impact of storing large amounts of plutonium at Pantex. 

Safety analysis reports establish a basis to determine that a facility can 

operate safely, The completion of safety analysis reports is a continuing 

problem at the Pantex facility, as more than 50 percent of the required 

reports have not been completed. Many of the uncompleted safety analysis 

reports are for disassembly activities or facilities. 

GAO’s Analysis z 

Transportation and Safety 

Problems Slow 

Disassemblies 

During fiscal year 1992, transportation and safety problems limited the 

number of disassemblies at Pantex to about 63 percent of those originally 

scheduled. DOE revised the schedule several times during the year; 

however, Pantex was only able to disassemble about 81 percent of the 

revised schedule. In the summer of 1991, a special trailer carrying nuclear 

weapons experienced an operational failure that caused concern about 

DOE'S entire trailer fleet. Correcting the problem resulted in a shutdown of 

all weapons transportation by DOE for about 60 days and decreased the 

number of weapons disassembled in fiscal year 1992 by about 100. 

Several safety problems also affected Pantex’s disassembly operations. A 

faulty valve that could have allowed material to escape from a reservoir 

and enter the pit, radioactive material posing a threat of contamination to 

technicians, and a dropped weapon presented unanticipated safety risks 

that shut down disassembly operations and further reduced the total 

number of weapons disassembled at Pantex in fiscal year 1992. 

In an effort to increase disassemblies, DOE increased the number of 

weapons disassembled at its Oak Ridge facility to about 580 percent of the 

scheduled number and postponed quality assurance tests at Pantex to 

make additional staff available for retired weapons disassemblies. Despite 

these efforts, only about 86 percent of the total disassemblies originally 

scheduled for Pantex and Oak Ridge were completed. 

Several Issues Could DOE plans to continue its ambitious disassembly schedule for the next 

Impede Future 

Disassembly Operations 

several years. To accomplish this schedule, DOE will have to address issues 

relating to weapons disassembly and special nuclear materials storage that 

Page 3 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Executive Summary 

r 

could impair Pantex’s disassembly capabilities. The issues include (1) a 

shortage of disassembly technicians, (2) technical concerns about 

weapons disassembly, and (3) the safety and environmental implications 

of storing large quantities of plutonium at Pantex. 

According to Pantex officials, hiring, training, and providing security 

clearances to a sufficient number of weapons disassembly technicians are 

the biggest challenge facing Pantex as it increases its disassembly work 

load. In addition to the inherent staffmg demands of an increasing 

disassembly work load, Pantex experienced unexpected attrition during 

1991 and 1992. Pantex plans to transfer 33 technicians to disassembly 

operations at Pantex and hire 13 new technicians to make up for that 

attrition. 

Technical problems could also challenge Pantex’s ability to meet future 

disassembly schedules. During fiscal year 1993, Pantex was to operate 

fewer disassembly “lines,” allowing it to dispose of a larger number of a 

few types of weapons. Pantex had planned to run four lines during fiscal 

year 1993, but a safety question resulting from a disassembly problem with 

a particular weapon system reduced that number to three lines. Pantex 

had planned to disassemble a large number of W -48 weapons during 1993. 

However, in November 1992, technicians discovered a crack in a W -48 pit. 

The disassembly of all W48s was halted and will not be resumed until 

fiscal year 1994. 

As a result of the nuclear weapons disassembly program, great quantities 

of plutonium will require safe and secure storage. DOE currently plans to 

store the plutonium pits at Pantex until a long-term storage site is 

identified. To store all of the pits in existing facilities at Pantex, however, 

additional storage capacity will be needed, and a safety analysis report and 

an environmental assessment for the storage site must be completed. If 

these items are not completed in a timely manner, Pantex will run out of 

storage space, and disassembly efforts will have to be curtailed. In 

addition, Texas state officials are concerned over the environmental and 

safety impacts of storing a large amount of plutonium at Pantex. If these 

concerns affect plutonium storage at Pantex, disassembly activities could 

also be adversely affected. 

Safety Analysis Reports Safety analysis reports are important because they establish a basis to 

Are Incomplete for Many determine that a facility can operate safely and to conclude that operating 

Disassembly Facilities the facility does not pose an unacceptable risk to public health and safety. 

Page 4 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Executive Summary 

Completing safety analysis reports has historically been a problem at DOE'S 

Pantex facility. This problem still exists as Pantex currently has completed 

fewer than 50 percent of the required safety analysis reports. The 

completion of the reports has, in most cases, been delayed by several 

years. Pantex officials cite a shortage of safety engineers as the primary 

cause of the delays. Many of the safety analysis reports that have not been 

completed and have been delayed are for facilities that are involved in 

Par&x’s ongoing effort to disassemble thousands of retired nuclear 

weapons. 

Recommendations In GAO'S view, DOE'S ambitious disassembly schedule, coupled with 

unresolved safety issues, could lead to a conflict between safety and 

production goals. Therefore, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy 

reevaluate Pantex’s disassembly schedule in view of past performance and 

potential future manpower, technical, and safety problems This 

reevaluation should ensure that the schedule for the number of nuclear 

weapons to be disassembled at Pantex is at a level that allows for the 

resolution of safety problems. 

Agency Comments GAO discussed the facts in this report with DOE headquarters, Albuquerque 

Operations Office, and Oak Ridge Operations Office officials responsible 

for disassembling retired nuclear weapons and with representatives of 

DOE'S operating contractor at Pantex. Changes were made where 

appropriate. However, as requested, GAO did not obtain written comments 

from DOE on a draft of this report. DOE officials commented that a 

discussion of Pantex’s not meeting fiscal year 1992 disassembly goals 

should not be treated in a negative mariner. When safety problems 

occurred that decreased Pantex’s capability to meet the schedule, DOE 

revised the schedule accordingly. DOE officials also commented that safety 

is not solely dependent on safety analysis reports but that the reports are 

the preferred basis for operations. DOE will produce safety analysis reports 

for all operations and is developing a new schedule for completing them. 

As a result, DOE Albuquerque officials believe that judging Pantex’s 

performance on the basis of past schedules is not valid and that safety 

analysis reports produced in accordance with the new schedule should be 

considered to be on time. 

Page 6 GAOIRCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Contents 

Executive Summary 2 

Chapter 1 

Introduction The United States Has Made Reductions in the Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile 

8 

DOE Plans to Disassemble Thousands of Retired Nuclear 

Weapons 

9 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 10 

Chapter 2 13 

Transportation and DOE’s Disassemblies Fell Behind Schedule in 1992 13 

DOE Attempted to Increase Number of Disassemblies 15 

Safety Problems Have 

Limited Nuclear 

Weapons 

Disassemblies at 

Pantex 

- 

Chapter 3 17 

Several Issues Affect 

DOE’s Plans for 

Future Weapons 

Disassemblies 

More Technicians Needed to Meet DOE’s Disassembly Schedule 

Technical Concerns Must Be Overcome to Meet Disassembly 

Schedule 

Meeting Disassembly Schedule Could Strain Storage CapabiIities 

Conclusions 

Recommendation 

17 

18 

18 

20 

21 

Chapter 4 

Safety Analysis 

Reports Not 

Uncompleted Safety Analysis Reports Have Been a Long-Term 

Problem at Pantex 

Safety Analysis Reports for Disassembly Activities Remain 

Co-mpleted for Some Uncompleted 

Disassembly Activities Safety Analysis Reports for Oak Ridge Facilities Need to Be 

Upgraded 

Appendix Appendix I: Major Contributors to This Report 28 

Page 6 GAO/RCED-94-9 Diisembly of Nucleu Weapons 
Contents 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

SST Safe Secure Trailer 

WR War Reserve 

Pa@?7 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for researching, 

developing, testing, assembling, and disassembling nuclear weapons. Over 

the past few years, international treaties and other nuclear weapons 

retirements have resulted in dramatic reductions in the nation’s nuclear 

weapons arsenal. Consequently, the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal has 

been reduced from about 21,000 warheads and bombs in 1990 to a planned 

stockpile of 3,500 nuclear systems in 2003. In order to accommodate the 

weapons reductions, DOE has begun the largest nuclear weapons 

disassembly effort since the 1960s. l

The United States Has Since 1990, when the United States had about 21,000 nuclear weapons, the 

Made Reductions in actual and projected number of nuclear weapons in the nuclear weapons 

arsenal has decreased dramatically. Retirements of weapons that the 

the Nuclear Weapons Department of Defense (DOD) is not planning to replace, retirements 

Stockpile resulting from international treaties and agreements, and a presidential 

initiative to retire a large number of nuclear weapons contributed to this 

decrease. 

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in December 1987, 

did not specific&lly eliminate any nuclear weapons. It did, however, 

eliminate delivery systems for the nuclear weapons. As a result, thousands 

of nuclear weapons associated with the eliminated delivery systems were 

no longer useful and were either retired or placed into inactive reserve, In 

July 1991, the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 

treaty resulted in the retirement of 10 nuclear submarines and a large 

number of missiles. Shortly thereafter, in September 1991, the President 

announced a new arms control initiative that resulted in the withdrawal of 

the Army’s nuclear weapons from overseas bases and the retirement of 

several thousand nuclear warheads. 

During 1992, the nuclear weapons stockpile was further reduced. For 

example, the President’s 1992 State of the Union address included an 

announcement of additional unilateral reductions. The reductions 

included the elimination of warhead delivery systems and nuclear 

warheads and the conversion of some nuclear weapons carriers to 

conventional weapons carriers. Finally, on June 17,1992, the President 

announced that continued discussions with the leadership of the 

Commonwealth of Independent States had resulted in an agreement to 

‘DOE defines weapons disassembly as the removal and disposition of the high-explosive main charge 

around the fkile nuclear material. The final disposition of special nuclear materials such as plutonium 

and highly enriched uranium is not considered in this definition. 

Page 9 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

reduce our nuclear weapons stockpile to an arsenal of about 3,500 by 

2003. 

DOE Plans to As a result of the treaties and agreements, thousands of nuclear weapons 

Disassemble have been retired. Retired weapons may be either stored or disassembled. 

(See footnote 1.) DOE has been disassembling nuclear weapons for more 

Thousands of Retired than 45 years. To deal with the large number of retired weapons, DOE 

Nuclear Weapons began a program to increase its capacity to disassemble the retired nuclear 

weapons. Most retired nuclear weapons are disassembled at DOE’S Pantex 

Plant near Amarillo in the Texas panhandle. Managed and operated by 

Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Company, Inc., Pantex has been assembling 

and disassembling nuclear weapons since 1951.’ 

In September 1990, DOE established a goal of disassembling a large number 

of nuclear weapons per year at Pantex to eliminate the backlog of retired 

weapons. At that time, DOE planned to maintain that rate through fiscal 

year 1993 or 1994 and then decrease the rate for ffical year 1995, when the 

backlog would be substantially reduced. DOE’S planning for disassembling 

nuclear weapons covers a lo-year period. According to DOE officials, the 

scheduling of weapons types to be disassembled during the first year of 

the period is reasonably firm; however, the schedule for the remaining 

years is less firm and more subject to change. 

According to DOE officials, a major factor in their decision to disassemble 

the weapons at a rapid rate was DOE’S belief that storing disassembled 

weapons presents a lower security and safety threat than storing 

assembled nuclear weapons. According to DOE officials, the risk of 

accidental nuclear detonation is eliminated in disassembled 

weapons-that is, weapons in which the high explosive has been 

separated from the plutonium, In addition, many weapons scheduled for 

disassembly in the near future are older weapons with safety features that 

are not as effective as the safety features (such as insensitive high 

explosives and fire-resistant pits-see footnote 4) on newer systems3 

Finally, DOE officials believe that, because the various parts of the weapon 

are separated and stored in different areas, disassembled weapons are a 

much less attractive target for theft and acts of sabotage. 

‘In this report, references to Pantex officials denote Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Company, Inc., 

officials. 

%sensitive high explosives are explosives that are less susceptible to detonation from a variety of 

credible abnormal events. Such abnormal events include a high-velocity impact, projectile attack, fuel 

or propellant fire, and sympathetic detonation. 

Page 9 GAO/ECED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

In general, for warhead disassembly, the procedures followed to assemble 

a nuclear weapon are reversed. After a weapon is retired and shipped to 

Pantex (except for the W -33 weapon), it is subjected to safeguards and 

safety verifications and inspections. A weapon is then moved to an 

“operations bay,” where mechanical disassembly of the weapon is 

performed. The assembly containing the plutonium and the high explosive 

is moved into a “gravel gertie cell,” where the high-explosive material is 

removed from the pit.4 High-explosive materials are disposed of by 

burning at Pantex. Pits are stored in secure storage magazines at Pantex, 

and weapons secondaries are shipped to the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, for the disassembly and disposition of their parts6 Tritium (a 

gas used to boost the explosive power of a nuclear weapon) reservoirs are 

returned to DOE’S Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, where 

the tritium is recycled. 

Objectives, Scope, 

and Methodology 

The Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked us to 

examine how DOE is addressing the disassembly of retired nuclear 

weapons. In subsequent meetings with Senate Governmental Affairs 

Committee staff members, we agreed to provide information on three 

issues. These issues were (1) DOE’S success to-date in meeting the 

disassembly schedule and the causes of any shortfalls, (2) issues which 

could affect DOE’S ability to meet the disassembly schedule in the future, 

and (3) uncompleted safety analysis reports. 

To determine DOE’S success in meeting its planned weapons disassembly 

schedule, we reviewed DOE’S Planning and Production Directives, which 

contain DOE’S weapons retirement plans as directed by the President and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also reviewed the documents prepared by 

DOE’S Albuquerque Field Office and Defense Programs Division to direct 

Pantex and the Y-12 plant on specific short-term monthly weapons 

disassembly rates. We observed Pantex’s disassembly and special nuclear 

material storage operations and discussed the disassembly process with 

Pantex and Y-12 plant operating contractor officials. F’inaIly, we discussed 

weapons disassembly scheduling and the causes of disassembly shortfalls 

with DOE officials from the Defense Programs Division, the Albuquerque 

Field Office, the Amarillo Area Office, and the Y-12 plant. 

“A pit is a metal casing containing plutonium and other material. The pit is where the fission explosion 

originates. 

‘A nuclear weapon secondary is an assembly in a nuclear weapon where a fusion explosion originates. 

Page 10 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

To identify issues which could affect DOE’S ability to meet its disassembly 

schedule in the future, we reviewed DOE'S plans for future nuclear 

weapons disassembly and special nuclear material storage. Through 

discussions with DOE, Pantex, and state of Texas regulatory off&&, we 

identified issues which could affect DOE’S ability to continue disassembling 

weapons and storing plutonium at Pantex. We also discussed with staff 

members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board potential safety 

problems involved in storing and inventorying large quantities of 

plutonium at Pantex. 

To address the issue of uncompleted safety analysis reports, we 

interviewed DOE headquarters officials involved in safety oversight and 

Pantex and Y-12 plant officials responsible for documenting and assuring 

safety in weapons disassembly and special nuclear materials operations. 

We reviewed the completion schedule for Pantex’s safety analysis reports 

and previous evaluations of the completion success rate for the reports. 

We discussed with DOE and Pantex officials the reasons for delays in 

completing safety analysis reports and the actions necessary to improve 

the completion rate for safety analysis reports. We also identified 

safety-related incidents which occurred during the weapons disassembly 

process and reviewed documentation on unusual occurrences to 

determine the safety impact of the occurrences and measures being taken 

to prevent recurrence. 

We conducted our review between December 1991 and June 1993 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

discussed the contents of this report with DOE officials responsible for 

weapons disassembly programs at the Oak Ridge Operations Office, the 

Albuquerque Operations Office and headquarters. Changes to this report 

were made where appropriate. However, as requested, we did not obtain 

written agency comments on a draft of this report. Overall, DOE officials 

commented that a discussion of Pantex’s not meeting fiscal year 1992 

disassembly goals should not be presented in a negative manner. When 

potential safety or health problems emerged, the disassembly process was 

halted, the root cause was investigated, a corrective action was developed, 

and disassembly was restarted. DOE offkials said that they believed this 

methodology to be a strength of the program, not a weakness. 

DOE Albuquerque officials told us that Pantex will produce safety analysis 

reports for all nuclear and nonnuclear operations in accordance with 

current requirements. They stress that safe facility operation is not solely 

dependent on safety analysis reports. They stated that safety analysis 

Page 11 GACVRCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

reports are the preferred basis for operations; however, it is acceptable to 

rely on other measures for safe operations, especially for short periods or 

low-hazard operations. This concept is called “basis for interim 

operations.” According to DOE Albuquerque offkials, Pantex has submitted 

a basis for interim operations for all hazardous facilities. The suitability of 

the basis for interim operations is currently under DOE review. 

Pantex has also submitted a plan for implementing DOE Order 5480.23. The 

plan (first submitted in February 1993 but currently being revised by 

Pantex) will show a new schedule for upgrading existing safety analysis 

reports and for delivering safety analysis reports. DOE Albuquerque 

offkials said that they believe safety analysis reports produced in 

accordance with this new schedule should be considered to be “on time.” 

They said that judging Pantex’s performance in completing safety analysis 

reports on the basis of past schedules is not valid. While the new schedule 

was not available to us because it was still being revised, DOE Albuquerque 

officials told us that all safety analysis reports for nuclear and nonnuclear 

facilities at Pantex will be delivered to DOE by 1996, “if the current 

schedule can be sustained.” The Albuquerque officials also said that they 

do not consider that an extensive backlog of uncompleted safety analysis 

reports exists at Pantex. 

Page 12 GAOIRCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Transportation and Safety Problems Have 

Limited Nuclear Weapons Disassemblies at 

Pantex 

At the beginning of fiscal year 1992, DOE had planned to disassemble a 

large number of retired nuclear weapons at the Pantex facility during 

fiscal year 1992. A much smaller number of disassemblies were scheduled 

for DOE'S Y-12 plant. During fiscal year 1992, transportation and safety 

problems limited the number of disassemblies at Pantex, and the 

disassembly goal had to be decreased several times during the year. DOE 

substantially increased the number of retired weapons disassemblies at its 

Y-12 plant during fiscal year 1992 and postponed quality assurance tests at 

Pantex to make additional staff available for retired weapons disassembly. 

The net result was that DOE was able to disassemble about 86 percent of 

the weapons originally scheduled for both plants combined. Pantex 

disassembled about 63 percent of its original goal, while Y-12 

disassembled about 580 percent of its goal. 

DOE’s Disassemblies In September 1991, DOE planned to disassemble a large number of retired 

Fell Behind Schedule nuclear weapons in fiscal year 1992. The number of weapons planned for 

disassembly in fiscal year 1992 was far greater than the number of 

in 1992 weapons disassembled in prior years. For example, from 1986 through 

1990, the highest number of disassemblies conducted was less than 

one-half the number scheduled for fiscal year 1992. In addition, DOE has 

not sustained a level of disassemblies as high as that planned for fiscal 

years 1992 to 1994 since the 1960s and early 1970s. About 96 percent of the 

fiscal year 1992 weapons were scheduled for disassembly at Pantex; the 

remaining 4 percent were scheduled for disassembly at Y-12. DOE officials 

told us that the schedule was based on Pantex’s capacity to disassemble 

nuclear weapons and on the need to disassemble less-safe weapons as 

soon as possible. 

The contract which DOE has with the operator of the Pantex facility is a 

cost-plus-award-fee contract, whereby the contractor can receive an 

award or bonus if it meets a number of performance criteria. Achieving 

97 percent of the approved schedule for production and disassembly 

activities is one of the criteria that was used to determine the award fee in 

fLscal year 1992. Overall, operations and weapons comprise 15 percent of 

the performance criteria, Other criteria are general management 

(10 percent); environment, safety, and health (55 percent); safeguards and 

security (10 percent); and resources and business management (10 

percent). 

During fiscal year’ 1992, Pantex actually dismantled only about 63 percent 

of the weapons originally planned for that year. Safety and transportation 

Page 13 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 2 Transportation and Safe* Problems Have 

Limited Nuclear Weapons Disaasemblies at 

Pantex 

problems that slowed or temporarily halted the disassembly process were 

the reasons for the lower number of disassembled weapons. Because of 

these problems, DOE lowered the disassembly goal for Pantex during the 

year. The final goal for Par&x was about ‘77 percent of its original goal. 

Using the reduced Pantex goal, about 81 percent of the weapons on the 

revised schedule were disassembled at, Pantex. 

As a result, in the second half of fiscal year 1992, Pantex’s award fee under 

its contract with DOE was reduced because Pantex did not meet the 

schedule for d&assemblies. Pantex was cited for a “notable deficiency” in 

meeting its performance goal of 97 percent of scheduled operations. 

According to DOE, the deficiency “was the result of a inadequate 

performance in War Reserve (WR) Disposal activities . . . .” The award fee 

determination also said that Pantex’s “inability to consistently meet WR 

Disposal schedules impacts the President’s dismantlement program, the 

DOE transportation system, and DOD logistics.” Performance in this area 

contributed to the overall recommendation that Pantex receive 

20.75 percent of the maximum award fee ($1.1 million of a maximum 

possible award of $5.1 million). 

The Oak Ridge Y-12 plant was also scheduled to disassemble a small 

number of nuclear weapons during fiscal year 1992. As discussed later, the 

Y-12 plant disassembled about 580 percent of the scheduled quantity. 

Transportation Delays 

Affected Pantex’s 

Disassembly Work 

DOE transports nuclear weapons in specially built tractor trailers called 

“Safe Secure Trailers” (SST), In July 1991, an SST experienced an 

operational failure. The nature of the failure called into question the 

reliability of the entire SST fleet. As a result of this incident, DOE officials 

suspended all weapons movements until they evaluated the incident. After 

60 days, compensatory actions were taken and DOE resumed 

transportation activities. 

When the incident occurred, Pantex had a 30-day supply of weapons 

awaiting disassembly. Because the suspension of transportation activities 

lasted 60 days, Pantex’s disassembly work was slowed to avoid depletion 

of its inventory of weapons to be disassembled. According to Pantex 

officials, this delay reduced the overall number of fiscal year 1992 

weapons disassemblies at Pantex by about 100. 

Page 14 GAO/ECED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 2 

Transportation and Safety Problems Have 

Limited Nuclear Weapons Disassemblies at 

Pantex 

Safety Problems Slowed 

Pantex’s Disassembly 

Work 

Several disassembly safety problems also slowed Pantex’s weapon 

disassembly rate in fiscal year 1992. In one case, DOE'S laboratories found 

that a safety situation could occur if a valve on a weapon’s reservoir 

opened because of an electrostatic discharge. This could allow material in 

the weapon’s reservoir to enter the pit. Eleven weapons systems-mostly 

older systems-are susceptible to this problem. All disassembly work on 

the 11 systems was suspended, and procedures were developed for each 

system to provide a positive indication that the valves had not opened 

prior to disassembly. During fiscal year 1992, only about 64 percent of the 

scheduled weapons affected by this problem were disassembled. 

A second disassembly safety problem at Pantex involved the possibility of 

exposing disassembly technicians to uranium oxide and thorium during 

disassembly operations on the W -55 nuclear weapon. As a result, W -55 

disassembly was stopped to instaIl additional safety equipment to protect 

the disassembly technicians. Because of this problem, about 25 percent of 

the scheduled W -55 disassemblies were accomplished during fiscal year 

1992. W -55 disassembly has been reprioritized and is now scheduled to 

restart in fiscal year 1997. 

On May 18,1992, a problem occurred during disassembly of a B-57 nuclear 

weapon. While rotating a cased B-57 subassembly, the assembly was 

dropped about 20 inches and landed on a disassembly stand. No 

contamination was found, and no damage was reported other than a gouge 

in the casing. DOE'S investigation found that approved procedures and 

tooling were being used but that the assembly was not properly secured. 

The technicians performed the first step of a two-part procedure to secure 

the assembly but were distracted because they had to look for a required 

cable. Upon resumption of the process, the second step of the procedure 

was not performed. As a result of this accident, all B-57 operations were 

halted for 38 calendar days until the investigation was completed, thereby 

delaying disassembly of 15 weapons. 

DOE Attempted to 

Increase Number of 

D&assemblies 

Because of the previously mentioned problems, Pantex fell behind in its 

efforts to disassemble the scheduled number of retired nuclear weapons 

during fiscal year 1992. In an attempt to increase the total number of 

disassemblies and achieve the scheduled rate of disassemblies, DOE made 

more technicians available to the disassembly effort by postponing quality 

assurance tests and by increasing the number of dlsassemblies performed 

at DOE’s Y-12 plant. 

Page 16 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 2 

Transportation and Safety Problems Have 

Limited Nuclear Weapons Disassemblies at 

pantex 

In order to increase the number of Pantex staff available to conduct 

weapons disassemblies, DOE postponed 39 quality assurance tests from 

fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1993. Quality assurance tests are routinely 

performed to assure the reliability of the nuclear weapons currently in the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal. Quality assurance tests are normally spread out over 

time to accommodate Pantex’s workload-leveling objectives. According to 

DOE'S weapons quality assurance and testing officials, the reduction in 

quality assurance tests will not reduce DOE'S ability to assure the integrity 

of the existing stockpile. DOE officials believe that a delay in testing of up 

to 3 years (depending on the weapon) will not affect the quality assurance 

program because the reliability of older weapons systems can be assured 

on the basis of past quality assurance tests. 

DOE conducted the postponed tests during the first half of fiscal year 1993. 

However, during the first half of fiscal year 1993, Pantex fell behind in 

conducting quality assurance tests scheduled for the year. As of March 31, 

1993-halfway through the fiscal year-Pantex had conducted about 

24 percent of those scheduled for the year. 

As mentioned earlier, DOE attempted to offset disassembly shortfalls at 

Pantex by increasing disassemblies at DOE'S Y-12 plant. A small number of 

W -33 nuclear weapons disassemblies were scheduled to be performed at 

the Y-12 plant during fiscal year 1992. The W -33 weapon entails a relatively 

simple design containing uranium but no plutonium. Disassembly of W -33s 

is performed entirely at the Y-12 plant and does not involve the Pantex 

facility. In order to increase the overall number of disassemblies 

completed during fiscal year 1992, DOE increased the disassembly effort at 

the Y-12 plant. About 580 percent of the weapons originally scheduled for 

disassembly at Y-12 were actually disassembled. According to Y-12 

officials, Y-12 was able to accomplish the increased disassembly work 

because of the simplicity of the weapon and because of a new procedure 

that drastically reduced the time required for W -33 disassembly. No 

significant safety problems were encountered during this process. DOE has 

now disassembled all W -33s. 

Page 16 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 3 

Several Issues Affect DOE’s Plans for Future 

Weapons Disassemblies 

DOE currently plans to dispose of the backlog of retired nuclear weapons 

between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 1997. To accomplish this schedule, 

DOE will have to address a number of issues relating to weapons 

disassembly and special nuclear material storage that could decrease DOE'S 

capability to disassemble nuclear weapons. These issues include (1) a 

shortage of disassembly technicians, (2) technical weapons disassembly 

concerns, and (3) the safety and environmental implications of storing 

large quantities of plutonium at Pantex. 

More Technicians According to Pantex officials, hiring, training, and granting security 

Needed to Meet DOE’s 

clearances to a sufficient number of weapons disassembly technicians are 

t h e b’ iggest challenge facing Pantex as it increases its disassembly 

Disassembly Schedule workload. In addition to the inherent staffing demands of an increasing 

disassembly workload, Pantex must hire additional technicians to make 

up for unexpected attrition during 1991. Pantex’s ability to disassemble the 

scheduled weapons during fiscal year 1993 will depend on its ability to 

attract and train qualified technicians. 

Pantex officials estimate that they will need 333 technicians to conduct 

disassembly, evaluation, and modification/rehabilitation activities over the 

next few years, Pantex is currently authorized 313 technicians but has only 

287 on-board because of an unexpectedly high rate of attrition. During 

fiscal year 1991, Pantex lost 46 technicians: 13 retired, 22 transferred to 

other jobs, 10 were promoted, and 1 was terminated. Pantex plans to 

replace these technicians with 33 workers transferring from other jobs and 

13 new hires. Twelve of the transfers will be from Pantex’s security force. 

Pantex also recruited 15 technicians from DOE'S Kansas City facility; 

however, all but 4 were eliminated during the security clearance process. 

Even if Pantex is successful in replacing the 46 technicians, they will not 

be available for disassembly activities for an extended period. Pantex 

officials estimate that once a “quality” recruit is identified, obtaining 

required clearances and training requires about 18 months. The total cost 

of hiring a new technician, including training and clearances, is about 

$50,000 per technician. 

Page .l7 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 3 

Several Issues Affect DOE’s Plans for Future 

Weapons D&assemblies 

Technical Concerns In order to have a more manageable workload during fiscal year 1993, DOE 

Must Be Overcome to 

decided to run fewer disassembly lines. It planned to disassemble a larger 

number of a few types of weapons instead of disassembling a smaller 

Meet Disassembly number of many types of weapons. DOE had planned to nm four lines 

Schedule during fiscal year 1993, but because of a safety question resulting from a 

W -48 weapon disassembly problem, only three lines were operated. 

During fiscal year 1993, DOE planned to disassemble a large number of 

W -48 nuclear weapons. The disassembly process for the W -48 involves 

using hot water to remove the nonnuclear high explosive from the pit. In 

November 1992, while the high explosive was being removed from the pit 

of a W -48, technicians found that the shell of the pit had cracked. 

Disassembly of all W -48~ was halted. Initially, DOE officials were concerned 

that radioactive contamination could result. DOE officials surveyed the area 

and found contamination only in the pan holding the pit. Further study 

resulted in developing an alternative method of disassembly. Disassembly 

of the W -48 will resume in fiscal year 1994 after certification of new 

tooling and procedures is completed. DOE officials told us that the problem 

with W -48 disassemblies has impaired their ability to reach the fiscal year 

1993 disassembly goal by about 25 percent. 

Meeting Disassembly As a result of the nuclear weapons disassembly program, large quantities 

Schedule Could Strain of plutonium will require safe and secure storage. DOE currently plans to 

store the plutonium in pit form at its Pantex facility until a long-term 

Storage Capabilities storage site is identified. In order to store all pita in existing facilities at 

Pantex, however, additional plutonium pit storage capacity will be needed, 

and a safety analysis report and an environmental assessment for the 

storage must be completed. If these items are not completed in a timely 

manner, Pantex will run out of storage space and disassembly efforts will 

have to be curtailed. In addition, Texas state officials have expressed 

concerns over the environmental and safety impacts of storing a large 

amount of plutonium at Pantex. If these concerns affect plutonium storage 

at Pantex, disassembly activities could also be adversely affected. 

Pantex Needs to Expand 

Plutonium Storage Space 

As a result of the nuclear weapons disassembly program, large numbers of 

pits will require safe, secure storage. The pits disassembled at Pantex 

contain plutonium, a radioactive element with a half-life of about 24,000 

years. In the past, plutonium was recycled at DOE'S Rocky Plats plant in 

Colorado. However, the recycling facilities at Rocky Plats are not in 

operation. DOE officia.ls informed us that they plan to store plutonium pits 

Page 18 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 3 

Several Issues Affect DOE’s Plans for Future 

Weapons Disassemblles 

at Pantex on an interim basis until a decision on long-term storage or 

reprocessing of plutonium is made. 

Pantex is currently authorized to store about 6,800 pits, on an interim 

basis, in storage magazines, a vault, and a cell converted to store special 

nuclear materials. DOE has proposed that, instead of storing pits in a single 

layer in the magazines, the pits be horizontally stacked. If horizontal 

stacking were implemented and additional magazines were made 

available, total pit storage capacity at Pantex would increase to more than 

20,000 pits. DOE officials estimate that existing facilities will provide 

adequate storage until about April 1994. At that time, additional storage 

capacity will be needed to allow Pantex to continue to disassemble 

nuclear weapons. 

To enable Pantex to horizontally stack plutonium pits, Pantex officials 

prepared a safety analysis report and an environmental assessment. The 

safety analysis report has been completed and was approved by DOE in 

December 1992. DOE is now preparing an operational readiness report to 

demonstrate that the facility can be operated within the parameters 

established in the safety analysis report. The environmental assessment 

has been drafted and was issued for public comment in January 1993. 

DOE is aware of at least one health and safety problem associated with 

storing plutonium pits at Pantex. In order to account for and assess the 

condition of the plutonium stored at Pantex, DOE requires that periodic 

physical inventories be taken at storage facilities. However, physical 

inspections of the stacked storage areas would expose Pantex personnel 

to high levels of radioactivity. Conducting a physical inventory in the 

storage magazines requires that two people spend 3 hours in each 

magazine. If plutonium pits are horizontally stacked, exposures to 

personnel are estimated to be 0.1 remi per hour, or 0.3 rem per person per 

magazine. DOE estimates that, at this rate of exposure, 10 people would 

receive more than the maximum allowable yearly exposure of 1 rem from 

a single physical inventory of all the storage magazines. 

To reduce exposures to employees under the current storage arrangement, 

Pantex has obtained an exemption from conducting monthly physical 

inventories of interim pit storage facilities. Instead, physical inventories 

will be conducted every 18 months. The exemption was granted by DOE’S 

Office of Security Affairs on January 12,1993. DOE officials informed us 

‘A rem is a unit of dose of any ionizing radiation that produces the same biological effect as a unit of 

absorbed dose of ordinary X-rays. 

Page 19 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 3 

Several Issues Affect DOE’s Plans for Future 

Weapons Dissssemblies 

that for the currently authorized storage configuration, the exemption will 

result in a reduction in overall exposures. On April 16,1993, DOE 

authorized a change in the single-layer storage configuration that will 

allow increased storage capacity without a corresponding increase in 

exposures-as long as the inventory exemption is in force. Under the new 

arrangement, pit containers are placed on casters and rolled into the 

storage magazines. The additional containers fill the center aisles that in 

the past were required to be vacant to accommodate inventory operations. 

To reduce exposures if horizontal stacking of pits is implemented, DOE is 

taking several actions, To reduce exposures during inventory and stacking 

operations, DOE has had a shielded forklift designed and built. In addition, 

an “Automated Guided Vehicle” to allow for remote handling and 

inventorying of pit containers is in the final stages of design. DOE expects 

the vehicle to be available for operation in the middle of fiscal year 1994. 

Safety and Environmental 

Concerns Expressed by 

State of Texas Officials 

Officials representing the state of Texas have raised concerns about the 

safety and environmental impact of plutonium pit storage at Pantex. These 

concerns focus on storing plutonium at Pantex and the effect that such 

storage would have on a local aquifer. Texas officials are concerned that 

DOE has not performed the safety analysis reports necessary to assure that 

plutonium storage at Pantex does not pose a safety risk. The currency of 

Pantex’s safety analysis reports is discussed in chapter 4 of this report, 

Texas officials’ major environmental concern is the potential affect of 

long-term plutonium storage on the underlying Ogallala Aquifer. The 

aquifer supports ranchers and farmers in the area surrounding Pantex and 

throughout the central United States, and provides drinking water to 

Amarillo and other nearby communities. The Governor stated that “any 

adverse impact to the Ogallala aquifer would be unforgivable.” DOE has 

provided about $6 million to the Bureau of Economic Geology at the 

University of Texas for a geological and hydrological site characterization 

study of Pantex. 

Conclusions DOE has established a very ambitious schedule for disassembling retired 

nuclear weapons at its Pantex facility. During fiscal year 1992, DOE did not 

meet its schedule, disassembling only about 63 percent of the planned 

number of retired weapons at Pantex because of transportation delays and 

safety problems that arose with specific weapons systems. 

Page 20 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons I 
Chapter 3 

Several Issues Affect DOE’s Plane for Future 

Weapons Disassemblies 

Although we found no cases where DOE or Pantex officials gave priority 

attention to disassembly goals over safety, we are concerned that conflicts 

may arise in the future. DOE has established disassembly goals for a lo-year 

period. While the number and type of weapons to be disassembled are 

reasonably firm for the first year, DOE officials said that, beyond the first 

year, the schedule is more subject to change. When ambitious operational 

goals are established and safety issues have the potential to impede 

achievement of those goals, there is always concern that safety could be 

sacrificed. Along with meeting ambitious operational goals, DOE, in future 

years, will have to address many significant budgetary, safety, and 

environmental issues. These include (1) the need for more technicians, 

(2) technical problems with certain types of weapons, and (3) plutonium 

storage and environmental issues such as the potential contamination of 

the Ogallala Aquifer. 

In our view, an ambitious schedule, coupled with unresolved safety issues, 

could lead to a conflict between safety and production goals. In light of 

manpower, technical, safety, and environmental problems known to exist, 

and past experience with unanticipated problems, DOE's overall schedule 

for disassembling weapons may not be appropriate. Reevaluation of the 

disassembly schedule may be necessary to ensure that safety problems 

can be adequately resolved without falling short of disassembly goals. 

Recommendation Because manpower, technical, safety, and environmental issues could 

affect Pantex’s ability to meet disassembly goals, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Energy reevaluate Pantex’s disassembly schedule. This 

reevaluation should ensure that the schedule for the number of weapons 

disassembled is at a level that allows for the resolution of safety problems. 

Page 21 GAOIRCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 4 

Safety Analysis Reports Not Completed for 

Some Disassembly Activities 

DOE requires safety analysis reports for all its facilities. Safety analysis 

reports are important because they establish a basis for both DOE and its 

operating contractors to (1) determine that a facility can operate safely 

and (2) conclude that operating the facility does not pose an unacceptable 

risk to public health and safety. Prepared by the operating contractor, a 

safety analysis report compares the facility with its design criteria and 

analyzes potential accidents that could release radioactive materials to the 

environment. This information is used to identify potential problems so 

that corrective action can be taken. 

Completion of safety analysis reports has historically been a problem at 

DOE'S Pantex facility. This problem still existed in December 1992 as 

Pantex had completed less than 50 percent of the required safety analysis 

reports. Completion of the reports had, in most cases, been delayed by 

several years. Some of the safety analysis reports that had not been 

completed and had been delayed were for facilities that are involved in 

Par&x’s ongoing effort to disassemble thousands of retired nuclear 

weapons. In the summer of 1993, Pantex was in the process of revising its 

safety analysis report delivery schedule and its safety analysis report 

upgrade plan. While DOE'S Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has 

completed required safety documents for all facilities, none of the plant’s 

reports comply with new safety analysis requirements. A plan has been 

developed to bring the documents into compliance. 

Uncompleted Safety DOE has required safety analysis reports for all its defense nuclear facilities 

Analysis Reports Have since 1976. Safety analysis reports are needed to help assure that nuclear f aci 

‘tit. ies are safely designed, constructed, and operated and must illustrate 

Been a Long-Term how a facility’s systems, components, and structures meet established 

Problem at Pantex design criteria. In 1992, DOE Order 5480.23 broadened and made more 

definitive the guidance on the format and content of safety analysis 

reports to make DOE'S reports similar to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

practice. 

Safety analysis reports are required to contain information on a site’s 

characteristics, facility operation, health and safety criteria, radioactive 

and hazardous waste management, radiation protection, and human 

factors. Safety analysis reports also must analyze potential accidents that 

could release radioactive materials. The comparison of a facility with the 

design criteria for that type of facility and the accident analyses are to be 

used to identify problem areas. Contractors are required to update the 

Page 22 GAOtTtCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons I 
Chapter 4 

Safety Analysis Reports Not Completed for 

Some Disassembly Activities 

safety analysis reports annually to assure that the information in the 

documents is current and remains applicable+ 

Reviews of Pantex’s safety analysis report program between 1989 and 1991 

found that Pantex had not completed all required safety analysis reports.’ 

In June 1989, DOE began a Tiger Team Assessment program-a program 

intended to provide the Secretary of Energy with information on DOE’S 

facilities’ compliance with environmental, safety, and health requirements 

and the adequacy of DOE’S and contractors’ environmental, safety, and 

health programs. From October 2 through October 31, 1989, a DOE Tiger 

Team Assessment was conducted at DOE'S Pantex plant. The team found 

that safety analysis reports did not exist for about 48 percent of the 

facilities required to have them. The Tiger Team selected a small sample of 

facilities at Pantex for specific review and found that, overall, the facilities 

did not satisfy the standards and that a systematic review of the facilities 

may be in order. 

In April 1991, we issued a report on safety and health problems at DOE’S 

Pantex plant2 In that report, we noted that, of the facilities required to 

have safety analysis reports at that time, about 52 percent had not been 

completed. Pantex contractor officials blamed a lack of personnel for 

preventing completion of the reports. We also found that safety analysis 

reports that had been completed required updating and concluded that, 

because most of Pantex’s safety analysis reports had not been completed 

or needed to be updated, DOE could not adequately ensure that the plant 

was operating safely. 

From January 27,1992, through February 7,1992, DOE’S Defense Programs 

Office of Inspections conducted a technical safety appraisal of the Pantex 

plant. Technical safety appraisals are multidisciplinary performance 

appraisals of environmental, safety, and health programs. A plant’s 

performance is evaluated on a baseline established by a previous Tiger 

Team Assessment (in this case, by the October 1989 Tiger Team 

Assessment). 

IIn addition, our 1986 report Nuclear Safety: Safety Analysis Reviews for DOE’s Defense Facilities Can 

He Improved (GAOIRCED%-176, June 16,1!%6) found that (1) safety analysis reviews had not been 

approved for some facilities, (2) the accident analysis process used in reviews varied from facility to 

facility, and (3) all reviews and approvals of safety analysis reports were performed in-house-there 

were no independent reviews. 

2Nuclear Health and Safety: More Attention to Health and Safety Needed at Pantex 

(GAO/T&TED-91-103, Apr. 16, 1991). 

Page 23 GAOIRCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 

, 
Chapter 4 

Safety Analysis Reporta Not Completed for 

Some Disassembly Activities 

The appraisers found that significant progress in improving the 

environmental, safety, and health programs at Pantex had been made since 

the Tiger Team Assessment in 1989. In the area of safety analysis reports, 

however, the assessors found that management was still experiencing a 

major problem in preparing new safety analysis reports and updating 

existing reports. About 50 safety analysis reports needed to be written or 

updated. 

Safety Analysis Although at least three previous assessments and reviews of 

Reports for environmental, safety, and health since 1989 have reported problems with 

Pantex’s safety analysis reports process, our review showed that the 

Disassembly Activities situation has not been corrected. As of December 1992 (the date of 

Remain Uncompleted Pantex’s last approved safety analysis report completion schedule), 

Pantex had revised the safety analysis report program to consolidate 

several facilities for reporting purposes. As a result, instead of the 67 or 66 

safety analysis reports required in 1989 and 1990, respectively, 42 safety 

analysis reports were required.3 Pantex had completed safety analysis 

reports for only 17 of the 42 operations/facilities. In addition, Pantex had 

safety analysis reports for parts of five other operationsffacilities. Twenty 

operations/facilities that Pantex has designated as needing safety analysis 

reports are not covered by any reports. 

As of December 1992, the schedule for completing the safety analysis 

reports had slipped dramatically. In our April 1991 report, we noted that 

Pantex planned to have alI new and updated safety analysis reports 

submitted to DOE by December 1993. DOE officials informed us that, 

according to the then-current schedule for the Pantex Plant, all safety 

analysis reports will not be submitted to DOE until January 1998. 

Some of the uncompleted safety analysis reports cover operations and 

facilities directly related to the weapons disassembly process. According 

to Pantex records, 18 of the 42 safety analysis reports required are for 

facilities that are directly involved in disassembly activities. In addition, 

six safety analysis reports are required for facilities that are indirectly 

involved in disassembly activities. Of the 24 disassembly facilities required 

to have safety analysis reports, only 9 have approved safety analysis 

3While the percentage of completed safety analysis reports has varied slightly during the period from 

June 1989 through February 1992, the charges represent no real progress in the number of approved 

safety analysis reports. The percentage of completed safety analysis reports has changed because the 

number of facihties required to have the reports has changed. However, during this period, no safety 

analysis reports were completed by Pantex or approved by DOE. Subsequent to this period, in 

December 1992 (as discussed in ch. 3), DOE approved a safety analysis report for plutonium pit 

storage. 

Page 24 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 4 

Safety Analysis Reports Not Completed for 

Some Disassembly Activities 

reports, and 3 additional facilities have approved reports for part of the 

operation/facility. 

Many of the disassembly facilities needing safety analysis reports or 

revisions to existing safety analysis reports are involved in disassembly 

activities that have been rated as posing a moderate safety risk. (Pantex 

has no facilities that are judged as having a high risk.) For example, 

weapons bays and “gravel gertie” cells, where nuclear weapons are 

disassembled, were scheduled for revisions to their safety analysis reports 

in 1991 and early 1992. As of December 1992, the completion schedule for 

these revisions had slipped to spring and summer of 1993. (As discussed 

later, the safety analysis report schedule is currently being revised.) The 

high-explosive burning ground at Pantex is a 54-acre area where high 

explosives and industrial waste containing high-explosive material are 

burned. A safety analysis report has never been completed for this site and 

is not scheduled to be completed until September 1994, 

According to Pantex and DOE officials responsible for developing safety 

analysis reports, the delays in safety analysis report completion have been 

caused by a shortage of personnel, including qualified safety engineers. 

The Pantex contractor has addressed this problem by hiring a 

subcontractor to prepare some safety analysis reports. But according to 

Pantex and DOE off&&, this is not an ideal solution because a large 

amount of detailed information that should be retained by engineers for 

work on future safety analysis reports is lost. 

Safety Analysis As discussed in chapter 2, DOE'S Y-12 plant at its Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 

Reports for Oak Ridge site disassembles some nuclear weapons that contain no plutonium and all 

secondaries that are removed from nuclear weapons at Pantex. In past 

Facilities Need to Be years, Y-12 prepared and had DOE approve various required safety 

Upgraded documents (including six safety analysis reports and five operational 

safety requirements with technical basis documents) to support the plant’s 

operations. None of these documents, however, meet new DOE 

requirements. 

In 1989, DOE and Martin Marietta, the Y-12 operating contractor, formed a 

joint working group to develop a strategy for updating the safety 

documents to meet current standards. They developed an approach by 

which all operations would be reviewed to identify and eliminate from 

further evaluations those operations that involve insignificant hazards or 

for which standard industrial practices are adequate to define safe 

Page 25 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 4 

Safety Analysis Reports Not Completed for 

Some Disassembly Activities 

practices. For operations that were not eliminated, safety evaluations 

would be conducted in more detail, depending on the level of risk 

involved. A “safety assessment” would be conducted for all facilities or 

operations categorized as minor hazards. Safety analysis reports would be 

required for all operations with hazards classified as greater than minor. 

Y-12 officials believe that 26 safety analysis reports must now be prepared 

to meet DOE'S requirements. The goal of this effort is to complete all 

required safety analysis reports from 1994 to 1998. 

Major differences exist between the requirements for nuclear facilities that 

are not weapons related and those facilities involved with nuclear 

weapons. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has cited these 

differences while stating that they consider that certain basic safety 

principles apply to the handling of nuclear material, regardless of the form 

the material is in. In a January 21,1993, recommendation to the Acting 

Secretary of Energy, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board stated 

that a number of WE orders related to nuclear safety are explicitly 

excluded from applicability to facilities that assemble, disassemble, and 

test nuclear weapons. The Safety board recommended that DOE (1) review 

its orders related to nuclear safety and determine those that apply to 

facilities that assemble, disassemble, and test nuclear weapons; 

(2) evaluate the level of nuclear safety assurance provided by the orders 

and directives applicable to facilities that assemble, disassemble, and test 

nuclear weapons and compare it with the level of safety assurance 

provided by orders applicable to other DOE nuclear facilities; (3) develop a 

plan for any deficiencies found by the above two reviews; and (4) give 

priority to completing sitewide order compliance reviews at facilities that 

assemble, disassemble, and test nuclear weapons-with special emphasis 

on the Pantex plant. 

Page 26 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
E 

Page 27 GAOIECED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons 
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Resources, Jim Wells, Associate Director 

Community, and 

William F. Fenzel, Assistant Director 

Kenneth E. Lightner Jr., Assignment Manager 

Economic 

Development 

Division, Washington, 

D.C. 

Denver Regional 

Office 

(302031) Page 28 GAO/RCED-94-9 Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons t 

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