Silicon Metal From Russia

Investigation No. 731-TA-991 (Final) (Second Remand)

Publication 3910 March 2007
U.S. International Trade Commission

COMMISSIONERS

Daniel R. Pearson, Chairman

Shara L. Aranoff, Vice Chairman

Deanna Tanner Okun

Charlotte R. Lane

Irving A. Williamson

Dean A. Pinkert

Robert A. Rogowsky

Director of Operations

Staff assigned:

Russell Duncan, Investigator

Jack Greenblatt , Industry Analyst

June Brown, Attorney

Diane Mazur, Supervisory Investigator

Address all communications to

Secretary to the Commission

United States International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436
U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436

www.usitc.gov

Silicon Metal From Russia

Investigation No. 731-TA-991 (Final) (Second Remand)

Publication 3910 March 2007

 1 Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Publication 3584, March 2003. Chairman

Okun did not participate in the investigation.

 2 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Slip Op. 04-153, CIT 2004, December 3, 2004.

 3 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

 4 Commissioner Deanna Tanner Okun is recused from this investigation. Vice Chairman Aranoff and

Commissioners Williamson and Pinkert did not participate in the original investigation or first remand

determination, but did participate in this remand proceeding.

In March 2003, the Commission determined that an industry in the United States was materially

injured by reason of imports from Russia of silicon metal.1

 Respondents Bratsk Aluminum Smelter and

Rual Trade Limited (“plaintiffs”) appealed the Commission’s determination to the U.S. Court of

International Trade (“CIT”). On June 22, 2004, the CIT remanded the case to the Commission for further

explanation, and on September 15, 2004, the Commission filed its remand determination with the CIT. 

On December 3, 2004, the CIT affirmed the Commission’s remand determination in its entirety and

dismissed the case.2

 Plaintiffs appealed the CIT’s dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit (“CAFC”). On April 10, 2006, the CAFC vacated and remanded the CIT’s decision so that the

CIT would remand the case back to the Commission to address non-subject imports.3

 

On May 25, 2006, the Commission submitted a petition for rehearing en banc before the CAFC

and on July 24, 2006, the petition was denied. On July 28, 2006, the Commission petitioned the CAFC to

stay issuance of the mandate to the CIT while the Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, considered the filing of a petition for certiorari. On August 7, 2006, the CAFC denied the

motion to stay and remanded the case to the CIT. On August 17, 2006, the CIT remanded the case to the

Commission. The Commission then filed a motion to stay the remand proceedings at the CIT pending a

decision on whether to seek certiorari. On September 22, 2006, the CIT granted the stay. On December

20, 2006, the Commission informed the CIT that it would not be seeking certiorari at this time. On

December 22, 2006, the CIT entered an order lifting the stay and instructing the Commission to submit its

remand results to the CIT within ninety (90) days.

On remand, the Commission again determines that an industry in the United States is materially

injured or threatened with material injury by reason of silicon metal from Russia sold at less than fair

value.4

CONTENTS

Page

Views of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Separate and additional views of Chairman Daniel R. Pearson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Information gathered in the remand proceeding:

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1

Court orders and the Commission’s compliance methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-2

U.S. imports and apparent U.S. consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-4

The global industry and market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12

Global capacity, production, capacity utilization, and excess capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12

Apparent consumption in selected countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12

Global trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-13

Industries in nonsubject countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-20

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-20

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-20

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-23

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-27

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-30

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-34

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-35

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-36

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-36

Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-40

South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-40

Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-44

Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-47

Appendixes

A. Federal Register notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. CIT order and CAFC decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C. Summary data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

Note.–Information that would reveal confidential operations of individual concerns may not be

published and therefore has been deleted from this report. Such deletions are indicated by

asterisks.

 1

 Commissioner Deanna Tanner Okun is recused from this investigation. Vice Chairman Aranoff and

Commissioners Williamson and Pinkert did not participate in the original investigation or first remand

determination, but did participate in this remand proceeding.

 2 Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Pub. 3584 (Mar. 2003).

 3

 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter subsequently filed a voluntary notice of dismissal on December 6, 2004, and is no

longer a party to the litigation.

 4 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Slip Op. 04-75 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 22, 2004). Specifically, the

court remanded with respect to the Commission’s finding that “spot” prices may affect contract prices and for the

Commission to explain the significance or effect of similar pricing trends in the different silicon metal market

segments. 

 5 Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final) (Remand), USITC Pub. 3720 (Sept. 2004).

 6 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Slip Op. 04-153 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 3, 2004).

 7 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375. 

1

VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION

Upon consideration of the Court of International Trade’s remand order that we comply with the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United

States, 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006), we determine that an industry in the United States is materially

injured by reason of imports of silicon metal from Russia that the Department of Commerce

(“Commerce”) has found are sold in the United States at less than fair value (“LTFV”).1

I. Background

The Commission unanimously determined in March 2003 that the U.S. industry producing silicon

metal was being materially injured by reason of subject imports of silicon metal from Russia.2

 In finding

that there was “material injury by reason of the subject imports,” the Commission analyzed the statutorily

mandated factors of the volume of subject imports, their price effects, and their impact on the U.S.

industry in light of the conditions of competition, including the presence of non-subject imports in the

U.S. market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)-(C). 

Sual Holding and another Russian producer of silicon metal, Bratsk Aluminum Smelter,3

appealed the Commission’s determination to the CIT. The CIT affirmed the Commission’s opinion in

part, but remanded to the Commission for further explanation on two pricing issues.4

 The Commission

issued a remand opinion which incorporated its earlier opinion in its entirety and provided further

explanation requested by the CIT on the relevant pricing issues.5

 After remand, the CIT affirmed the

Commission’s determination in its entirety and with respect to all issues briefed and argued by the

parties.6

Sual Holding appealed the CIT’s decision to the Federal Circuit. The sole issue on appeal to the

Federal Circuit was the Commission’s causation analysis. Specifically, appellants claimed that the

Commission failed to properly analyze the presence of non-subject imports of silicon metal under the

Federal Circuit’s previous decision in Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 722 (Fed. Cir.

1997). The Federal Circuit found that the Commission is required to analyze not merely whether the

subject imports were more than a minimal, tangential, incidental, or trivial cause of the injury, but

“whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject imports without any beneficial effect on

domestic producers” in cases where “the antidumping investigation is centered on a commodity product,

and price competitive non-subject imports are a significant factor in the market.”7

 The Court thus

remanded the case, stating as follows:
 8 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1376.

 9 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Order, Consol. Ct. No. 03-00200 (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug. 17, 2006)

(“CIT Remand Order”) at 2. The CIT stayed the remand order pending a decision on whether the Commission

would seek certiorari. After a decision was made in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General not to file a

petition for certiorari at this time, the CIT, on December 22, 2006, issued an order lifting the stay and ordering

the Commission to submit its remand determination within 90 days, or by March 22, 2007. Bratsk

Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Order, Consol. Ct. No. 03-00200 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 22, 2006).

 10 See Memorandum INV-EE-015 (Feb. 16, 2007).

 11 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

2

[T]he Commission's summary finding of material injury is insufficiently detailed

to comply with the requirements of Gerald Metals. We therefore vacate and remand the

Court of International Trade's decision so that it may remand the case back to the

Commission to specifically address whether the non-subject imports would have replaced

subject imports during the period of investigation . . . .The point is that the Commission

has to explain, in a meaningful way, why the non-subject imports would not replace the

subject imports and continue to cause injury to the domestic industry.8

In turn, the CIT issued a remand order on August 17, 2006, in which it,

REMANDS the case to the Commission to specifically address whether the non-subject

imports would have replaced subject imports during the period of investigation; and it is

further 

ORDERED that if the Commission finds material injury where fairly traded commodity

imports are competitively priced, the Commission must explain, in a meaningful way,

why the non-subject imports would not replace the subject imports while continuing to

cause injury to the domestic industry.9

The Commission reopened the record on remand to seek additional information on non-subject

imports in order to comply with the Federal Circuit’s decision and to allow the parties an opportunity to

comment on the new information as well as the Federal Circuit’s decision. Questionnaires were sent to

producers of silicon metal in non-subject countries, with a return date of February 1, 2007. Staff also

compiled available information from secondary sources on non-subject imports and released the new data

to the parties on February 16, 2007.10 On February 27, 2007, the Commission received two sets of

comments, one from domestic producers Globe Metallurgical Inc. and SIMCALA Inc., and the other from

Russian producers Sual Holding and Zao Kremny.

II. Issues on Remand

The Federal Circuit directed the Commission on remand to undertake an “additional causation

inquiry” whenever certain triggering factors are met: “whenever the antidumping investigation is centered

on a commodity product, and price competitive non-subject imports are a significant factor in the

market.” The additional inquiry required by the Court, which we refer to as the Bratsk

replacement/benefit test, is “whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject imports

without any beneficial effect on domestic producers.”11

The Federal Circuit also remanded for further explanation, stating that “[w]hile there may be

support for the Commission’s ultimate determination of material injury in the record here, we find that the
 12 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 13 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 14 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375-76.

 15 CIT Remand Order at 2, citing Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1376.

 16 See, e.g., Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 722 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Nippon Steel Corp. v.

USITC, 345 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 17 Chairman Pearson observes, consistent with his views in Lined Paper School Supplies From China, India, and

Indonesia, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-442-443 and 731-TA-1095-1097 (Final), USITC Pub. 3884 (Sept. 2006) at 51, that

while he agrees with the Commission that the Federal Circuit’s opinion suggests a replacement/benefit test, he also

finds that the Federal Circuit’s opinion could be read, not as requiring a new test, but rather as a reminder that the

Commission, before it makes an affirmative determination, must satisfy itself that it has not attributed material injury

to factors other than subject imports. See Separate and Additional Views of Chairman Daniel R. Pearson.

3

Commission did not sufficiently explain its decision in this regard.”12 The Federal Circuit noted, as an

area requiring further explanation, that even though subject imports undersold the domestic product, nonsubject imports from Brazil, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa generally undersold the domestic

product as well, suggesting that “the elimination of the subject imports from the domestic market might

simply have increased the market share of the non-subject imports.”13 The Federal Circuit further noted

evidence cited in the Commission’s opinion that, when imports from Russia left the U.S. market after

Commerce’s preliminary affirmative determination, spot prices increased and prices for 11 domestic

contracts increased. Again, the court found that, while this evidence may be “pertinent to the causation

question,” the Commission failed “to address directly the causation issue in detail as required by Gerald

Metals” and “did not explain how much the spot prices increased, the significance of that increase, or the

significance of the eleven contracts for the domestic market.”14

The Federal Circuit also stated, in a passage quoted by the CIT in its remand order:

We do not suggest that the mere existence of fairly traded commodity imports at the

competitive prices precludes the Commission from finding material injury. For example,

it may well be that non-subject importers lack capacity to replace the subject imports or

that the price of the non-subject imports is sufficiently above the subject imports such

that the elimination of the subject imports would have benefitted the domestic industry.15

While the remand orders thus do not compel a negative determination, the implication of Bratsk is that

causation is lacking and a negative determination is warranted if we should conclude that the non-subject

imports would have replaced the subject imports without any beneficial effect on domestic producers.

III. Legal Standard for Causation

As described above, the sole issue on appeal to the Federal Circuit was the Commission’s

causation analysis – whether there was material injury to a domestic industry by reason of the subject

imports. We recognize, as the Court has pointed out in Gerald Metals, that if the Commission finds there

are causes other than subject imports which fully explain the injury suffered by the domestic industry, or

these other causes render the impact of the subject imports minimal or tangential, the causation standard is

not satisfied.16 The Commission in its original determination considered non-subject imports in light of

Gerald Metals and made an affirmative determination. The Court in Bratsk, however, has requested

additional discussion of non-subject imports, which we provide in this opinion. 

On remand, we apply the replacement/benefit test fashioned by the Federal Circuit to our analysis

of causation because the Federal Circuit and CIT have ordered us to do so.17 However, we continue to
 18 The Commission’s construction of the statutory requirements are buttressed by the legislative history of the

Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921 and established the current provisions

cited in the text above. See S. Rep. No. 96-249 at 86-87 (1979); see also H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at

46-47. Both the reports of the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Ways and Means stated that the

Commission’s determinations predating the statutory amendments realized by the Trade Agreements Act were, on

the whole, consistent with the requirements of the 1979 legislation. Thus, the House Report explained:

The bill contains the same causation element as present law, i.e. material injury must be

“by reason of” the subsidized or less than fair value imports. In determining whether

such injury is “by reason of” such imports, the ITC looks at the effects of such imports on

the domestic industry. 

 19 Angus Chemical Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1478, 1484-85 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he statute does not

‘compel the commissioners’ to employ [a particular methodology] . . . [however] regardless of what approach is

used, whether it be the two-step or unitary approach or some other approach, the three mandatory factors must be

considered in each case”), aff’g 944 F. Supp. 943, 951 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996). See also Taiwan Semiconductor

Industry Ass’n v. United States, 59 F. Supp.2d 1324, 1328, n.7, 1350 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (Commission need not

weigh causes and need not use a single method of causation analysis or articulate a common causation standard).

 20 Identical language appears in the corresponding provisions of the statute pertaining to countervailing duty

investigations. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).

4

believe that the Bratsk replacement/benefit test is not required by the statute. As discussed below, the

Commission’s assessment of causation determines whether there is a link between the subject imports and

the material injury to the domestic industry. The Commission evaluates the data to ensure that it does not

attribute to subject imports injury caused by other market factors, including non-subject imports.

In antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, Congress has charged the Commission to

determine whether a domestic industry is materially injured by reason of the subject imports. The statute

defines “material injury” as “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.” 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677(7)(A). The statute requires the Commission to consider the volume, price effects, and impact of

the subject imports and, for many aspects of the Commission’s analysis, provides the Commission with

specific and detailed direction. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) and (C).

The Commission interprets the provisions of section 1677(7)(B) and (C) as establishing the

requisite considerations for its statutory determinations of whether an industry in the United States is

materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of subject imports. Therefore, in

considering whether a domestic industry is materially injured by reason of subject imports, the

Commission construes the statute as mandating that it consider the volume and price effects, if any, as

well as the adverse impact, if any, that are by reason of the subject imports. These factors, set forth in

section 1677(7), are the exclusive elements of the causation analysis that the statute requires the

Commission to undertake in its investigations.18 

Beyond these factors, the statute, however, does not define the phrase “by reason of,” indicating

that this aspect of the injury analysis is left to the Commission’s reasonable exercise of its discretion.19 In

construing the “by reason of” language, the Commission has looked to its context in the statute. The “by

reason of” phrase appears in at least three distinct provisions relating to Commission determinations in

original antidumping investigations.20 The first time the language appears with respect to antidumping

investigations is in 19 U.S.C. § 1673:

If–

(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign

merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than 

fair value, and
5

(2) the Commission determines that–

(A) an industry in the United States–

(i) is materially injured, or

(ii) is threatened with material injury, or

(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially

retarded,

by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales)

of that merchandise for importation, 

then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty . . . 

Nearly identical language appears in the provisions relating to the Commission’s preliminary and

final antidumping determinations, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(a) and 1673d(b). While, as noted, only the term

“material injury” is later specifically defined in the statute, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A), other provisions

in section 1677(7) set forth the considerations that the Commission must undertake in making the

determinations required by the aforementioned provisions of section 1673 in preliminary and final

investigations. Thus, section 1677(7)(B) expressly directs that:

[i]n making determinations under sections 1671b(a), 1671d(b), 1673b(a), and 1673d(b)

of this title, the Commission in each case,--

(i) shall consider– 

(I) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, 

(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United

States for domestic like products, and

 (III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers

of domestic like products but only in the context of production

operations within the United States; and

(ii) may consider such other economic factors as are relevant to the 

determination regarding whether there is material injury by reason of imports.

The Commission identifies a causal link, if any, between subject imports and material injury to

the domestic industry by examining the facts of record that relate to the significance of the volume and

price effects of the subject imports and any impact of those imports on the condition of the domestic

industry. Section 1677(7)(C) provides additional direction to the Commission as to what it must consider

in evaluating the required statutory factors relating to volume, price and impact. In examining whether

the volume of subject imports is significant, the Commission considers their absolute quantity, their

shares of the U.S. market relative to the domestic product and other imports, and any increases in absolute

quantity and market share over the period investigated. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(C)(i). In examining price, the

Commission considers whether the subject imports, as well as other imports, undersold the domestic

product, and whether U.S. prices were depressed or suppressed to a significant degree. 19 U.S.C. §

1677(C)(ii). In examining impact, the Commission considers, in the context of the business cycle and

conditions of competition, all the relevant factors that bear on the state of the U.S. industry, including, but

not limited to, output, sales, inventories, capacity utilization, market share, employment, wages,

productivity, profits, cash flow, return on investment, ability to raise capital, and research and

development. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(C)(iii). It examines the state of the U.S. industry in relation to trends in

the volumes and prices of the subject imports to determine whether it can attribute to a significant degree

any adverse aspects of, or changes in, the domestic industry’s condition during the period examined to the

subject imports.

The Commission’s analysis of causation is thus integral to its consideration of the statutorily

mandated factors of volume, price, and impact. The Commission draws reasonable inferences from the

data before it, including, but not limited to, trends and relationships. The courts have agreed that
 21 See Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1121-22 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

 22 Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining the meaning of

the substantial evidence standard of review, noting that the issue is merely whether the Commission’s determination

was reasonable, not whether the court would itself have made the same decision).

 23 See, e.g. Vector Supercomputers From Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-750 (Remand), USITC Pub. 3166 (May 1999)

at 5, 8 (The “by reason of” test requires more than a de minimis (i.e., minimal or tangential) contribution to material

injury or threat thereof . . . it is appropriate to consider significant, non-subject import economic factors that also

may contribute to material injury or threat of material injury. “[I]n our view, we are not required to determine that

subject imports contribute as much or more than any other economic factors. Rather, we understand the Court's

opinion and the other legislative and judicial authority . . . to mean that the Commission may not analyze subject

imports in a vacuum. Instead, we fully consider other significant economic factors in determining that subject

imports themselves contribute in a more than de minimis way to material injury or threat”); Tin and ChromiumCoated Steel Sheet From Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-860 (Final)(Second Remand), USITC Pub. 3674 (Feb. 2004) at 61

(under the statutory standard, the issue in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding “is not whether the

subject imports are a cause of injury that is more important than, or even equal to any effect of nonsubject imports,

but rather whether the subject imports have caused more than a minimal or tangential amount of injury”).

 24 See, e.g., Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d at 722; Nippon Steel Corp., 345 F.3d at 1381.

 25 Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) on Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 103d Cong., H.R. Doc. 103-

316, Vol. I at 851-52 (1994) (“[T]he Commission need not isolate the injury caused by other factors from injury

caused by unfair imports. . . Rather, the Commission must examine other factors to ensure that it is not attributing

injury from other sources to the subject imports.”). By law, the SAA is “an authoritative expression by the United

States concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act in any judicial

proceeding in which a question arises concerning such interpretation or application.” 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d). See also

Stainless Steel Bar From France, Germany, Italy, Korea and the United Kingdom, Inv. No. 701-TA-413 (Final) and

Inv. Nos. 731-TA-913-916 and 918 (Final), USITC Pub. 3488 (Feb. 2002) at 21, nn.102 and 103 (the statute does

not require the Commission to “subtract out” the injurious effects of other causes, such as non-subject imports). 

 26 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,458-59 (1978) (upholding Commerce’s construction of

countervailing duty statute as reasonable and rejecting arguments that it was premised on false economic

assumptions); see also Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d at 1121-22 (affirming Commission’s discretion to refuse

to abide by a theoretical economic model: “it alone is not a substitute for considering the factors specified in the

statute and the data on the record.”). 

 27 Nucor Corp. v. United States, 414 F.3d 1331, 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

6

mathematical precision is not required,21 but that substantial evidence must support the Commission’s

ultimate determination.22 The Commission thus interprets the “by reason of” language in a manner that

implements the statutory requirement of finding a causal, not merely a temporal, link between the subject

imports and the material injury to the domestic industry. 

There are several situations in which this causation standard would not be satisfied. The

Commission may not arrive at affirmative material injury determinations in cases where subject imports

are a minimal or tangential cause of material injury to the domestic industry.23 Alternately, if the

Commission finds that there are other causes that fully explain the injury suffered by the domestic

industry, or that these other causes render the impact of the subject imports minimal or tangential, the

causation standard is not satisfied.24 The legislative history explains that the Commission must examine

factors other than subject imports to ensure that it is not attributing injury from these sources to the

subject imports, but does not require the Commission to isolate the injury caused by other factors from

injury caused by unfair imports.25 Within these guidelines, however, implementation of the “by reason

of” standard in antidumping and countervailing duty cases is not reliant on precise applications of

statistical analysis, given the complexity of the analyses involved.26 

Indeed, the Federal Circuit has examined and affirmed various Commission methodologies and

has disavowed “rigid adherence to a specific formula.”27 Accordingly, the question of whether one out of
 28 Nippon Steel Corp., 458 F.3d at 1350, citing U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.

1996).

 29 See SAA at 851-52, 885.

 30 H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 47 (1979); see also Nippon Steel Corp., 345 F.3d at 1381

(“[D]umping need not be the sole or principal cause of injury.”).

 31 Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 32 SAA at 883-85, 889-90.

 33 SAA at 885.

 34 Wooden Bedroom Furniture From China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058 (Final), USITC Pub. 3743 (Dec. 2004) at 27,

n.222. 

7

several possible causes of injury exceeds the minimal or tangential threshold and is an independent cause

of material injury to the domestic industry is left to the expertise of the Commission, subject to review

under the substantial evidence standard. Congress has delegated these factual findings to the Commission

because of the agency’s institutional expertise in resolving injury issues.28

The statutory scheme clearly contemplates that an industry may be facing difficulties from a

variety of sources, including non-subject imports and other factors, but the existence of injury caused by

other factors does not compel a negative determination if the subject imports themselves are making more

than a minimal or tangential contribution to material injury.29 The legislative history further clarifies that

dumped imports need not be the “principal” cause of material injury and that the “by reason of” standard

does not contemplate that injury from dumped imports be weighed against other factors, such as nonsubject imports, which may be contributing to overall injury to an industry: “Any such requirement has

the undesirable result of making relief more difficult to obtain for those industries facing difficulties from

a variety of sources, precisely those industries that are most vulnerable to subsidized or dumped

imports.”30 Thus, once the Commission establishes the existence of a causal link between subject imports

and material injury, the existence of other concurrent causes is legally irrelevant to its determination.

Similarly, the statute does not permit the Commission to reach a negative determination based on

the likely ineffectiveness of an order relative to market penetration or any other standard of effectiveness. 

The purpose of the statute is not to bar or eliminate subject imports from the U.S. market or award subject

import market share to U.S. producers, but is meant instead to “level[] competitive conditions” by

imposing a duty on subject imports and thus enabling the industry to compete against fairly traded

imports.31 Indeed, the dumping of subject imports may have no impact on respective market shares, but

rather may affect the domestic industry’s selling price and profitability. 

The statutory scheme in fact contemplates that subject imports may remain in the U.S. market

after an order is imposed and even that the industry afterwards may continue to suffer material injury.32

Congress noted that in five-year reviews the Commission should consider whether the industry remains in

a weakened state “due to the possible ineffectiveness of the order.”33 Thus, the statute contemplates that

not all orders will be effective in removing injury to the domestic industry relative to market penetration

or any other standard and does not ask the Commission to perform an additional inquiry to predict the

future impact of import relief. As the Commission has previously explained, 

[N]othing in the statute or case law requires (or allows) us to consider the likely

effectiveness of a dumping order in making our injury determination. The possibility that

non-subject imports will increase in the future after an antidumping order is imposed is . .

. not relevant to our analysis of whether subject imports are currently materially injuring

the industry.34
 35 In this regard, we disagree with respondents’ statement that “[t]he causation question raised in Gerald Metals

was essentially this: if the elimination of subject imports during the POI would simply have resulted in non-subject

imports filling the void left by the subject imports, then how can the injury to the domestic industry be ‘by reason of’

subject imports?” Sual Holding and Zao Kremny’s Remand Comments at 3. The implication of respondents’

analysis is that subject and non-subject imports cannot each be a cause of material injury to the domestic industry –

i.e., that subject imports alone or principally must be shown to be the cause of material injury for the domestic

industry to be entitled to relief. That implication is clearly contrary to what Congress intended.

 36 USITC Pub. 3584, USITC Pub. 3720.

 37 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 38 See Separate and Additional Views of Chairman Daniel R. Pearson.

8

Thus, the Commission has a well established approach to addressing causation. However, we

apply the replacement/benefit test to our analysis because the Court has ordered us to do so,

notwithstanding that, in our considered view, this test is not required by the statute. Further, it is not

consistent with the discretion accorded this agency under the statutory scheme.35

IV. Material Injury to U.S. Industry By Reason of Subject Imports

A. Adoption of Original and First Remand Views

We adopt and incorporate in their entirety into these second remand views the Commission’s

original views and first remand views which found material injury to the domestic industry by reason of

subject imports of silicon metal from Russia.36 Vice Chairman Aranoff and Commissioners Williamson

and Pinkert, who were not members of the Commission at the time of the original investigation or first

remand determination, have reviewed the entire record of this proceeding and adopt the Commission’s

original and first remand views in their entirety.

The Commission’s original views and first remand views provide a comprehensive analysis of all

the statutory factors we are required to examine with respect to: the domestic like product and domestic

industry; conditions of competition; the volume of subject imports; the price effects of subject imports;

and the impact of subject imports.

B. Application of Bratsk Replacement/Benefit Test

Having reached an affirmative determination of present material injury upon application of the

statutorily mandated factors, we now apply the Bratsk replacement/benefit test as ordered by the Court on

remand: “whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject imports without any beneficial

effect on domestic producers.”37 38

In applying the test, we consider all the evidence on the record of this investigation, including the

evidence gathered and added to the record during this remand proceeding. We determined to reopen the

record on remand in order to seek additional information on non-subject imports and to consider the

parties’ comments on any new information obtained and on the Court’s holding in Bratsk. During the

course of this remand, the Commission sent questionnaires to silicon metal producers in 17 non-subject

countries and received responses from foreign producers in four countries and from seven U.S. embassies. 

The Commission also incorporated information from secondary sources on silicon metal production in

non-subject countries during the original period of investigation.

Application of the Bratsk replacement/benefit test requires the Commission to attempt to obtain

considerable data from non-subject producers in countries not under investigation in order to determine

whether these countries are capable of exporting sufficient quantities of the product at issue so as to

replace the subject imports, thereby eliminating any benefit of an antidumping duty order to the domestic
 39 Commission staff (investigative and external relations) spent an estimated $35,500 in attempting to gather

additional information for this remand, and this amount does not include the cost of other Commission personnel or

U.S. embassy and State Department staff who assisted in this effort. EDIS Document #271057.

 40 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375. 

 41 CIT Remand Order at 2.

 42 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1371.

 43 USITC Pub. 3584 at 8.

 44 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

9

industry. This includes data on non-subject producers’ excess capacity, third-country markets, trends in

their home markets, pricing, and other indicia. Such producers, who are not parties to the proceeding,

have no incentive to provide such data to the Commission, and the statute, at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), does

not allow the Commission to take adverse inferences against such non-cooperating persons because they

would not be “interested parties” under the statute. Arguably, the imposition of an order against imports

from the subject country could be advantageous to non-subject producers, and non-subject producers

therefore may have little incentive to provide information. In the instant case, the Commission’s attempt

to gather such data, was, as would be expected, only partially successful but at considerable expense to

the Commission,39 as well as to U.S. embassies in the non-subject countries, which attempted to assist the

Commission in collecting the information.

1. Triggering Factors

The Federal Circuit decision states that the replacement/benefit test “is triggered whenever the

antidumping investigation is centered on a commodity product, and price competitive non-subject imports

are a significant factor in the market.”40 Thus, the Bratsk test is not required in every investigation, but

rather, only in investigations involving a “commodity product” and where “price competitive non-subject

imports are a significant factor in the market.” The decision thus indicates that the Commission could

conclude in certain cases that these criteria are not met and that it therefore does not have to apply the

Bratsk replacement/benefit test. The CIT remand order further seems to recognize that whether the

triggering factors are met is a factual issue for the Commission to decide, as reflected in the CIT’s second

instruction (“if the Commission finds material injury where fairly traded commodity imports are

competitively priced . . .”).41

However, based on its reading of findings the Commission made in its original determination, the

Federal Circuit appears to have assumed that findings the Commission made in the context of its price

effects analysis are equivalent to a finding that the triggering factors are met in the instant case. With

respect to the first factor, the Federal Circuit states that “[s]ilicon metal is a commodity product, meaning

that it is generally interchangeable regardless of its source.”42 The Commission in its original

determination stated that “[s]ilicon metal is generally considered to be a commodity product in that

materials of the same grade are interchangeable.”43 The Commission made this finding in the context of

addressing price effects. It could not have made the finding in the context of whether the Bratsk

triggering factor was met, given that the original determination preceded the Court’s articulation of the

Bratsk test. Moreover, the case law is clear that considerations of interchangeability and substitutability

differ depending on the purpose of the comparison. It is improper to assume, for example, that simply

because goods are generally interchangeable for purposes of the “reasonable overlap of competition”

analysis for cumulation, or are interchangeable for purposes of defining the domestic like product, they

are “commodities” for purposes of assessing causation, which is the function of the Bratsk “test.”44

Simply because the Commission has concluded in one section of its opinion that goods are “generally
 45 See BIC Corp. v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 391, 397, 399 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997) (“[L]ike product, cumulation

and causation are functionally different inquiries because they serve different statutory purposes . . . . As a result,

each inquiry requires a different level of fungibility. Hence the record may contain substantial evidence that two

products are fungible enough to support a finding in one context (e.g., one like product), but not in another (e.g.,

cumulation or causation.”).

 46 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 47 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 48 USITC Pub. 3584 at 8-9.

 49 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1376.

 50 Original Confidential Staff Report (“CR”)/Public Staff Report (“PR”) at Table E-2.

10

interchangeable” thus does not logically render such goods “commodities” for purposes of analyzing

material injury by reason of subject imports.45

Similarly, with respect to the second triggering factor, the Federal Circuit seems to have read the

Commission’s original findings on price effects as equivalent to a finding that the second factor is met in

this case. The Court states that “[n]on-subject imports were present in the U.S. market during the period

of investigation and were a significant factor in the U.S. market.”46 With respect to price competitiveness,

the Court states that “while the subject imports generally undersold the domestic product, there was

evidence that non-subject imports from Brazil, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa generally

undersold the domestic product during the period of investigation.”47 As with the first triggering factor,

while the original Commission determination may have recognized the importance of price and of nonsubject imports in the U.S. market, it was not in the context of the Bratsk test.48

As a general matter, whether the triggering factors are met is a factual determination to be made

by the Commission based on the record evidence, and is separate from other determinations that the

Commission must make. However, given that the record evidence on these issues has not changed, for

purposes of our analysis in this remand, we accept the Federal Circuit’s apparent assumption that the

triggering factors have been met, and we apply the Bratsk replacement/benefit test as ordered by the

Court.

2. Replacement

We next consider whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject imports during

the period of investigation (“POI”). On the replacement issue, the fact that the imports are commodity

products and generally interchangeable might indicate in isolation substitutability or replacement. 

However, the Federal Circuit noted that the non-subject producers might lack the capacity to fully replace

the subject imports in the U.S. market and that “[s]uch a finding would certainly be relevant to the

causation analysis under Gerald Metals.”49 Thus, in assessing replacement, we consider not only

interchangeability, but the non-subject producers’ capacity to fill any void left by subject imports. Other

factors might also affect replacement, such as commitments by non-subject producers under long-term

contracts, transportation costs, or more attractive third-country markets.

At the end of the original POI, in interim (January-September) 2002, subject imports from Russia

were the largest source of imports from any single country, at 26.4 percent of all imports. By volume,

subject imports from Russia were 34,153 short tons in 2001, and 32,643 short tons in interim 2002. The

next largest sources of imports were Brazil, at 27,953 short tons in interim 2002, South Africa, at 26,731

short tons in interim 2002, and Canada, at 13,046 short tons in interim 2002.50 The other non-subject

sources together accounted for 23,144 short tons in interim 2002. Of these, non-subject sources which
 51 INV-EE-015/USITC Pub. 3910 at Table I-1.

 52 The petition was filed on March 7, 2002, and Commerce’s preliminary affirmative determination was made on

September 20, 2002. While subject imports decreased from the second quarter to the third quarter of 2002, for all of

interim (January-September) 2002, the quantity of subject imports was higher than during the same period of 2001. 

Original CR/PR at Tables E-1, E-2.

 53 Original CR/PR at Table E-1.

 54 INV-EE-015/USITC Pub. 3910 at Tables I-4, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-13, I-15, I-17.

11

each represented more than 1.0 percent of total imports in interim 2002 were Norway, Argentina, China,

and Spain.51

We find that the evidence is mixed as to whether and to what extent replacement would have

occurred. While, as explained below, record evidence on non-subject producers’ excess capacity and

non-U.S. exports indicates that some replacement would have occurred, other evidence indicates the

opposite, including: the existence of antidumping duty orders on imports from Brazil and China during

the POI; Argentina’s cessation of production in 2001; relatively small and/or declining excess capacity of

producers in Canada, South Africa, and Norway; and a focus by producers in China, Norway, and Spain

on non-U.S. export markets.

 On the one hand, certain evidence on the record indicates that the non-subject imports would

have replaced at least a portion of the subject imports. For example, from second quarter to third quarter

2002,52 the volume of subject imports fell by 12,400 short tons (from 17,573 short tons to 5,173 short

tons). The volume of non-subject imports during the same period increased by 9,225 short tons (from

30,076 short tons to 39,301 short tons). This evidence suggests some, although not total, replacement of

subject imports by non-subject imports over this limited period.53

In addition, non-subject countries theoretically had enough excess capacity and exports to thirdcountry markets to replace the 34,153 short tons of silicon metal from Russia that entered the United

States in 2001. In 2001, Brazil had excess capacity of approximately *** short tons and non-U.S.

exports of 94,937 short tons; South Africa had excess capacity of *** short tons and non-U.S. exports of

*** short tons; Canada had excess capacity of *** short tons and non-U.S. exports of 23,534 short tons;

Norway had excess capacity of *** short tons and non-U.S. exports of 159,525 short tons; China had

non-U.S. exports of 341,911 short tons; and Spain had excess capacity of *** short tons and non U.S.-

exports of 12,875 short tons.54

 However, the data on non-subject countries’ excess capacity and non-U.S. exports in themselves

do not establish that producers in any of these countries would have replaced the subject imports with

non-subject imports. Indeed, other evidence on the record indicates that at least some of the apparent

excess capacity and exports to third-country markets would not have been available for export to the

United States.

With respect to Brazil, imports from that country were subject to a U.S. antidumping duty order

during the POI. While Brazil continued to export to the United States, the antidumping duty order

restrained price competition by these imports, as lower U.S. prices and increased dumping by imports

from Brazil would lead to higher dumping margins and deposit rates in future administrative reviews. We

note that even Brazilian firms with zero margins would have been subject to the discipline of the order on

Brazil during the POI. If these firms were found to be dumping while the order was in effect, Commerce

would assess duties through its administrative review process. The existence of the order may also

explain the higher unit values for shipments of silicon metal from Brazil to the United States than for

shipments from Brazil to Europe; thus, this price differential does not necessarily indicate that the United

States would have been a more attractive market than Europe for Brazilian exports. In addition, the

record suggests that some of Brazil’s reported excess capacity may not have actually been available for

Brazilian firms to produce silicon metal. Specifically, data on the record indicate that electricity rationing
 55 INV-EE-015 at I-36-37, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-23.

 56 INV-EE-015 at I-46, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-30-31.

 57 INV-EE-015/USITC Pub. 3910 at Tables I-1, I-2, I-11.

 58 INV-EE-015/USITC Pub. 3910 at Table I-4.

 59 INV-EE-015 at I-55-56, Tables I-13, I-14, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-36-37, Tables I-13, I-14.

 60 INV-EE-015 at I-32, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-20.

 61 INV-EE-015 at I-69-72, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-44.

 62 INV-EE-015 at I-63, Table I-3, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-40, Table I-3.

 63 We note that certain post-POI data, discussed in the next section, also indicate that any replacement by nonsubject imports would not have been total in that U.S. producers were able to negotiate contracts for increased

volumes at the end of the POI, after imports from Russia left the U.S. market due to Commerce’s preliminary

affirmative determination. Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at 12, Exhibits 7, 8; GE Silicones’ Posthearing

Brief at Exhibit B-2. While we do not base our finding of material injury by reason of the subject imports on this

post-POI information, it is consistent with our conclusion that the evidence on replacement is mixed and there would

not have been total replacement of subject imports by non-subject imports.

 64 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1376.

12

had reduced actual capacity in Brazil to below nameplate capacity and would not have allowed

production at full nameplate capacity over the original POI.55

Producers in China, like Brazil, were subject to the discipline of a U.S. antidumping duty order

during the POI. With a deposit rate of 139.49 percent, the Chinese producers would thus not have been

likely to increase significantly their exports to the United States; in fact, they appear to have focused on

export markets in Asia.56 Their exports to the United States declined from 1999 through 2001 and

remained a small share of apparent U.S. consumption from 2000 through interim 2002 despite relatively

low average unit values (“AUVs”).57 The excess capacity of producers in Canada and South Africa was

quite small during the POI.58 Norwegian producers had declining excess capacity from 1999 through

2001 and a focus on European markets during the POI.59 Argentina reportedly ceased production of

silicon metal in 2000.60 Producers in Spain exhibited an historic focus on the European market and were

not significant participants in the U.S. market during the POI.61 Although there were relatively lowpriced non-subject imports from Saudi Arabia during part of the POI, that country’s production of 

silicon metal was discontinued beginning in 2001 and imports from Saudi Arabia had declined to zero by

2001.62 63

3. Benefit

While the evidence on replacement is mixed, because certain data on the record indicate there

might have been some replacement of subject imports by non-subject imports, we next consider whether

such replacement would have occurred without any benefit to the domestic industry.

With respect to benefit to the domestic industry, the Bratsk opinion indicates that the price of the

non-subject imports would be an important consideration: “it may well be that . . . the price of the nonsubject imports is sufficiently above the subject imports such that the elimination of the subject imports

would have benefited the domestic industry.”64 In other words, if the non-subject imports would have

fully replaced the subject imports, but at a higher price than the subject imports (even if the price were

lower than that of the domestic product), domestic prices could have increased somewhat, providing some

relief to any price depression or suppression and thus a benefit to the domestic industry. Non-price

factors, such as availability and technical support, may also be relevant to our analysis of benefit.
 65 Original CR/PR at Tables V-4-6. 

 66 Original CR/PR at V-6, n.10. 

 67 Original CR/PR at Figure I-3, n.1. Saudi Arabia reportedly ceased production of silicon metal in 2001. INVEE-015 at I-63, USITC Pub. 3910 at I-40.

 68 Original CR/PR at Tables V-4-6; Staff Table 2. 

 69 We are mindful that the use of AUVs for establishing price trends may present product mix issues in that values

may reflect different merchandise rather than differences in price. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 287

F.3d 1365, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, this is less of a concern where, as here, we have applied the Bratsk

analysis consistent with the Federal Circuit’s statement that silicon metal “is generally interchangeable regardless of

its source.” Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1371.

 70 Original CR/PR at Figure I-3, Table IV-2.

 71 Original CR/PR at Table IV-2. 

 72 Original CR/PR at Table E-1.

 73 Original CR/PR at Tables I-2, I-3, V-6. 

 74 Original CR/PR at Table I-2.

 75 Original CR/PR at Table I-3. AUVs for U.S. importers’ shipments of non-subject imports were higher than

those for their shipments of subject imports from Russia in 13 out of 15 comparisons. Id. See also INV-EE015/USITC Pub. 3910 at Figure I-2. 

 76 Original CR/PR at Table V-6.

13

The record contains purchaser price data on the largest non-subject import sources – Brazil,

Canada, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia – as well as on subject imports and the domestic product.65 The

purchaser price data represent *** percent of the quantity of non-subject imports in 2001, *** percent of

the quantity of domestically produced commercial shipments in 2001, and *** percent of the quantity of

subject imports in 2001.66 Brazil, Canada, and South Africa, together with Russia, accounted for 82.3

percent of total imports of silicon metal in 2001.67 The purchaser price data, which cover all three silicon

metal sectors – secondary aluminum, primary aluminum, and chemical – show that the subject imports

undersold the non-subject imports in 42 of 56 comparisons, that the subject imports undersold the

domestic product in all comparisons, at margins ranging from *** to *** percent and averaging ***

percent, and that the non-subject imports undersold the domestic product in 44 of 56 comparisons, at

underselling margins ranging from *** to *** percent and averaging *** percent.68 

While not as reliable as purchaser price data, the AUV data69 are consistent with what the pricing

data show: that the subject imports were generally priced lower than the non-subject imports.70 These

data, which also break out Brazil, Canada, and South Africa, show that the AUVs of imports from the

individual non-subject countries were always higher on a full-year and interim year basis than the AUVs

of imports from Russia.71 On a quarterly basis, subject import AUVs were also lower than the AUVs for

all non-subject imports, except for four quarters when South African AUVs were lower and one quarter

when all other non-subject import AUVs were lower.72

The record also contains data on the quantities, prices, and AUVs of both subject and non-subject

imports during the POI into the chemical sector, the most important sector for U.S. product.73 While the

portion of imports from Russia into the chemical sector increased substantially over the POI, from ***

percent in 1999 to *** percent in 2001, the portion of non-subject imports into this sector, although

higher, declined.74 Moreover, the record shows that the AUVs of the non-subject imports, while below

those of the U.S. product, were higher than those of the subject imports throughout the period

investigated.75 The pricing data likewise show that imports from Russia undersold South African

chemical grade product in all 11 purchaser price comparisons and undersold Brazilian chemical grade

product in 10 of 11 purchaser price comparisons.76
 77 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375-76.

 78 Globe and SIMCALA’s Remand Comments at 9.

 79 Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at Exhibit 7.

 80 Staff Table 1, derived from Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at Exhibit 7.

 81 Staff Table 1, derived from Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at Exhibit 7.

 82 Original CR/PR at Table VI-2.

 83 Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at Exhibit 8.

14

Thus, the record shows that non-subject imports consistently oversold the subject imports from

Russia. The data indicate that even if the non-subject imports replaced some of the subject imports, the

domestic industry would nonetheless have derived a price benefit from imposition of the order. Higher

prices would have provided some relief to the domestic industry from the price depressing and

suppressing effects of the subject imports in that domestic producers would have been able to raise their

prices to some degree or at least maintain prices rather than suffer price declines.

We therefore find that there would have been a benefit to the domestic industry upon any

replacement of subject imports by non-subject imports, given the generally higher prices of the nonsubject imports as compared to the subject imports during the POI. We therefore continue to find, in

applying the Bratsk replacement/benefit test, that the U.S. industry producing silicon metal is materially

injured by reason of subject imports from Russia.

As described above, the Federal Circuit also noted evidence cited in the Commission’s opinion

that, when imports from Russia left the U.S. market after Commerce’s preliminary affirmative

determination in September 2002, spot prices increased and prices for 11 domestic contracts increased. 

The Court found that, while this evidence may be “pertinent to the causation question,” the Commission

failed “to address directly the causation issue in detail as required by Gerald Metals” and “did not explain

how much the spot prices increased, the significance of that increase, or the significance of the eleven

contracts for the domestic market.”77

As we stated in our original determination, we do not base our finding of material injury by

reason of the subject imports on these post-POI data, but we do find that it is consistent with our

affirmative determination and with our conclusion above that the domestic industry would have benefited

from imposition of an order on the subject imports. We provide here further explanation of the data, in

accordance with the Federal Circuit’s decision.

The data show that U.S. producers made both spot and contract sales at higher prices and were

able to expand their volume of sales after subject imports left the market.78 For Globe, the data show that

*** contracts renegotiated at the end of 2002 for delivery in 2003 represented an *** ton increase in sales

volumes and higher prices, ranging from $*** to $*** per pound for 2003, as compared to prices ranging

from $*** to $*** per pound for 2002. Globe’s *** 2003 contracts likewise showed an increase in

volume of *** tons over 2002 volumes and higher prices, ranging from $*** to $*** per pound for 2003

as compared to $*** per pound for 2002. Globe’s *** contracts for 2002 showed an increase in volume

of *** tons over 2002 levels and higher prices, in the range of $*** to $*** per pound in 2003 as

compared to $*** per pound in 2002.79 The *** contracts alone renegotiated by Globe at the end of the

POI for 2003 represented a *** percent increase over its *** contract volumes for 2002. For all contracts

that Globe renegotiated at the end of 2002 for 2003, the 2003 volumes were *** percent higher than the

2002 volumes.80 The increase in value of Globe’s total contract sales in 2003 was approximately $***,81

which represents approximately *** percent of Globe’s net sales value in 2001 of $***.82

Likewise, SIMCALA reported *** short tons of new *** sales in *** 2002, increasing to ***

short tons in *** 2003.83 These new sales were at prices ranging from $*** to $*** per pound, as
 84 Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at 12, Exhibit 8.

 85 Hearing Transcript at 20, 28; Globe and SIMCALA’s Posthearing Brief at 12; Globe and SIMCALA’s Remand

Comments at 12.

 86 Data provided by GE Silicones, a respondent in the original investigation and a purchaser of silicon metal, do

not detract from this conclusion. While the data show an increase in GE Silicones’ purchases from non-subject

countries in 2003, most notably from ***, and a decline in its purchases of Russian product, the data also show an

increase in purchases from domestic producer ***. Although the 2003 price is lower than the 2002 price, the

increased volumes mean increased sales value for *** of over $*** in 2003 as compared to 2002. GE Silicones’

Posthearing Brief at Exhibit B-2.

 87 Original CR/PR at V-3, n.1 (“Metals Week price data . . . show that silicon metal prices have increased since

the filing of the petition. According to ***, independent industry sources attribute the recovery in silicon metal

prices to the exit of Russian imports from the U.S. market.”); Globe and SIMCALA’s Prehearing Brief at Exhibit 21

(***). 

15

compared to prices below $*** per pound during the first three quarters of 2002.84 Furthermore, the

rising contract and spot prices and increased sales volumes allowed *** domestic producers to restart

furnaces which had been shut down due to lack of orders at prices sufficient to cover operating costs.85 86

Independent industry sources likewise noted the recovery in silicon metal spot prices in the

United States at the end of 2002 and the first quarter of 2003 and attributed such recovery to the

preliminary antidumping duties on silicon metal from Russia and the exit of Russian product from the

U.S. market. They further predicted a rebound in silicon metal output by U.S. producers, notwithstanding

some increase in imports to the United States from other suppliers.87 Thus, the changes in the market that

actually occurred after the Commission’s preliminary determination and Commerce’s consequent

suspension of liquidation corroborate our finding that non-subject imports would not have replaced

subject imports with no benefit to the domestic industry.

V. Conclusion

Based on the Commission’s original and first remand determinations, incorporated herein in their

entirety, and after applying the Bratsk replacement/benefit test as ordered by the Federal Circuit and the

CIT, we find that the domestic industry producing silicon metal is materially injured by reason of subject

imports from Russia that Commerce has found to be sold at LTFV.

 1

 444 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006), quoting Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 722 (Fed.

Cir. 1997).

 2 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375-1376.

 3

 H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. I (1994) at 851-52 (“SAA”); Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Ass’n v. United

States, 266 F.3d at 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

 4 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375, 1376.

17

SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF 

CHAIRMAN DANIEL R. PEARSON

I. Legal Issues Concerning Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States

In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the requisite

causal link to subject imports is not demonstrated if such imports contributed only “‘minimally or

tangentially to the material harm.’”1

 Applying that standard to the underlying investigation involving a

commodity product, i.e., silicon metal, and the significant presence of non-subject imports, the Court held

that the Commission had not sufficiently explained whether non-subject imports simply would have

replaced subject imports during the period of investigation had an antidumping order been in place and

continued to cause injury to the domestic industry.2

As a threshold matter, it is not immediately clear how I should interpret the Bratsk opinion in

terms of its effect on my analysis of causation in this remand. I can discern at least two possible

interpretations which differ substantially: (1) that Bratsk mandates application of an additional test

apparently not contemplated by the statute (the so-called “replacement/benefit test”), and (2) that Bratsk

is a further development of the causation approach prescribed by Gerald Metals. 

A. Separate Causation Analysis – Replacement/Benefit Test

The statute sets forth specific factors for the Commission to consider in analyzing the volume,

price effects and impact of subject imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7). The Uruguay Round Agreements Act

Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) explains further that in analyzing causation the Commission

must examine factors other than subject imports to ensure that it is not attributing injury from these

sources to the subject imports, but is not required to isolate the injury caused by other factors from injury

caused by unfair imports.3

 Beyond this, the statute does not provide any further limitations on how the

Commission’s causation analysis shall be conducted.

The Court’s decision, however, states that the Commission must perform an additional “specific”

causation analysis in the form of a replacement/benefit test. Using somewhat varying phrasing, the Court

stated that the Commission must determine “whether non-subject imports would have replaced subject

imports without any beneficial effect on domestic producers,” must “explain why the elimination of

subject imports would benefit the domestic industry instead of resulting in the non-subject imports’

replacement of the subject imports’ market share without any beneficial impact on domestic producers,”

and must explain “why the non-subject imports would not replace the subject imports and continue to

cause injury to the domestic industry.”4

Such a “replacement/benefit” test is not among the statutory factors Congress has required the

Commission to consider. The statutory scheme contemplates that subject imports may remain in the U.S.

market after an order is imposed and even that the industry afterward may continue to suffer material
 5

 SAA at 851-52, 885, 889-90. The Commission has indicated that the possibility that an order might not be

effective does not preclude a finding of present material injury. The Commission also has concluded that the statute

does not provide for the Commission to perform an additional injury test to predict the future effectiveness of import

relief:

{W}e note that nothing in the statute or case law requires (or allows) us to consider the likely

effectiveness of a dumping order in making our injury determination. The possibility that nonsubject imports will increase in the future after an antidumping order is imposed is . . . not relevant

to our analysis of whether subject imports are currently materially injuring the industry.

Wooden Bedroom Furniture From China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058 (Final), USITC Pub. 3743, n.222 (Dec. 2004). 

 6 Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 7

 The Commission set out in detail its objections to the Court’s decision in its petition for rehearing to the Federal

Circuit. See Petition for Rehearing en Banc (May 25, 2006), Bratsk Aluminum Smelter et al. v. United States, 444

F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(No. 05-1213) (petition denied July 24, 2006). 

 8 Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 722.

 9 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1372.

 10 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 11 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1373-1375.

18

injury.5

 Thus, the decision in Bratsk misconstrues the purpose of the antidumping and countervailing

duty laws, which is not to bar subject imports from the U.S. market or award subject import market share

to U.S. producers, but instead to “level[] competitive conditions” by imposing a duty on subject imports

at a level to offset the amount of dumping or subsidization and thus enabling the industry to compete

against fairly traded imports.6

 It is not uncommon for subject imports to remain in the U.S. market in

significant quantities even after the issuance of an antidumping or countervailing duty order, as shown by

the hundreds of millions of dollars in antidumping and countervailing duties collected every year. 

Bratsk, therefore, appears to require that the Commission apply an extra-statutory causation test

with respect to non-subject imports and to determine that the domestic industry will benefit from the

antidumping duty or countervailing duty order. I respectfully disagree with the Court that such a

causation analysis is legally required.7

 However, given this remand, I join my colleagues’ interpretation

of the Bratsk standard and perform the analysis in the Commission’s remand views as we once again

adopt our affirmative material injury determination.

B. Gerald Metals Causation Analysis

Alternatively, I also find support for interpreting the Bratsk decision to be reminding the

Commission of its obligation under Gerald Metals that the Commission may not satisfy the “by reason

of” causation requirement by showing that subject imports contributed only “minimally or tangentially to

the material harm.”8

This may be a reasonable interpretation of the Bratsk decision as the Court noted that the “sole

point of contention in this appeal is whether the Commission established that the injury to the domestic

industry was ‘by reason of’ the subject imports.”9

 In explaining its conclusion, the Court emphasized that

the Commission had “dismissed” Gerald Metals as being factually distinguishable10 and explained its

holdings in Gerald Metals and Taiwan Semiconductor.

11 Further, the Court noted that:

Gerald Metals thus requires the Commission to explain why – notwithstanding the

presence and significance of the non-subject imports – it concluded that the subject

imports caused material injury to the domestic industry. While there may be support for
 12 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 13 Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1375.

 14 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b).

 15 S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1979). 

 16 S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47.

 17 Bratsk, Slip Op. 04-75 at 14 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 27, 2004).

 18 Bratsk, Slip Op. 04-153 at 2 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 3, 2004).

19

the Commission’s ultimate determination of material injury in the record here, we find

that the Commission did not sufficiently explain its decision in this regard.12

Therefore, the Court may not have been creating an extra-statutory causation test, but rather was

simply reminding the Commission of its existing obligation under the statute, as explained by Federal

Circuit precedent. In other words, the Bratsk Court’s relatively short discussion of the underlying

determination may not have established a new and rigid replacement/benefit test. Rather, the Court may

have discussed the triggering factors (i.e., commodity product and price-competitive non-subject imports)

and the replacement/benefit factors (i.e., whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject

imports without any beneficial effect on domestic producers)13 as a reminder that the Commission, before

it makes an affirmative determination, must satisfy itself that it has not attributed material injury to factors

other than subject imports.

The statute requires the Commission to determine whether the domestic industry is “materially

injured by reason of” the unfairly traded imports.14 Thus, the Commission must evaluate the effects of the

unfairly traded imports on the domestic industry in order to determine if those imports are causing

material injury. In most investigations, there are other economic factors that also may be causing injury

to the domestic industry. The statute’s legislative history states that the Commission “will consider

information which indicates that harm is caused by factors other than less-than-fair-value imports.”15 The

statute is clear that the Commission is not to weigh or prioritize the factors that are independently causing

material injury.16 The Commission must analyze the effects of the unfairly traded imports and other

relevant factors in a way that enables the Commission to conclude that it has not attributed the effects of

other factors to the subject imports. 

If this interpretation of Bratsk is correct, then I concur with the Federal Circuit that we are

required to identify and assess the competitive effects of subject imports to ensure that they contribute

more than “minimally or tangentially to the material harm” of the domestic industry.

II. Application of the Gerald Metals Causation Analysis

The CIT approved the Commission’s finding that subject import volume was significant17 and

also approved the Commission’s finding of significant price effects.18 Neither the Federal Circuit nor the

CIT remanded the Commission’s finding that the domestic industry was suffering material injury. I

believe that the Commission’s original and remand opinions covered in depth the causal link between

subject imports and the injury experienced by the domestic industry. I again adopt those views as my

own, and add the following.

As the Commission noted in its original views, silicon metal is generally considered to be a

commodity product. Materials of the same grade are considered interchangeable by producers and

purchasers, regardless of source. Pricing is thus a primary consideration for purchasers. A significant

portion of the domestic like product is sold by contract, but the contracts may not fix volumes and may

contain mechanisms for price adjustment. Spot prices, such as those published in Metals Week or Ryan’s
 19 Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Pub. 3584 (Mar. 2003) at 7-9.

 20 INV-EE-015 at Table I-1, USITC Pub. 3910 at Table I-1.

 21 Original CR/PR at Table C-1.

 22 Original CR/PR at Table C-1.

 23 The CIT specifically found the Commission’s finding that the volume of subject imports was significant to be

supported by substantial evidence. Bratsk, Slip Op. 04-75 at 14 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 27, 2004). The Federal Circuit

made no comment on the Commission’s finding. 

 24 Original CR/PR at Table C-1.

 25 Original CR/PR at Tables V-1 and V-2.

20

Notes, can affect contract prices.19 Nonsubject imports are a significant presence in the U.S. market. 

Imports from Brazil and China are restrained by antidumping orders. By 2001, Russia had overtaken

Canada as the second leading source of silicon metal imports in the U.S. market, while the import volume

from South Africa, the leading single source, declined between 2000 and 2001. In interim 2002, Russia

was the leading source for silicon metal imports into the U.S. market.20

Between 1999 and 2001, domestic production capacity was reduced by 18.6 percent. Production

capacity in interim 2002 was 2.5 percent lower than in interim 2001. Domestic production declined even

more sharply. Domestic production in 2001 was down 30.6 percent from the 1999 level. In interim 2002,

domestic production was 23.8 percent lower than in interim 2001. The domestic industry’s share of

apparent U.S. consumption in 2001 was 54.6 percent; as recently as 1999, it had been 62.2 percent. U.S.

shipments of the domestic like product were 24.7 percent lower in 2001 than in 1999; shipments in

interim 2002 were 29.7 percent below interim 2001 levels. The average unit value (“AUV”) for those

shipments was 5.5 percent lower in 2001 than in 1999; the AUV for interim 2002 shipments was down

3.7 percent below interim 2001 values.21 

In interim 2002, the domestic industry accounted for only 39.7 percent of apparent U.S.

consumption; in interim 2001, it had accounted for 55.4 percent. In 1999, the domestic industry earned

an operating income equivalent to 8.6 percent of sales; in 2001, its operating losses were equivalent to 4.7

percent of sales. In interim 2002, operating losses were equivalent to 11.4 percent of sales. The domestic

industry registered significant losses in the number of production workers, hours worked, wages paid, the

value of net sales, and capital expenditures between 1999 and 2001. Most of those measures were also

lower in interim 2002 than in interim 2001.22 In virtually every measurable category, the domestic

industry suffered significant losses over the POI.

The volume of subject imports was significant over the POI.23 Both the volume and the increase

in the volume of subject imports was significant both absolutely and relative to apparent domestic

consumption. Subject imports increased relatively, taking market share from the domestic industry. But

the volume of subject imports also increased absolutely in volume, despite an overall decline in apparent

U.S. consumption. In 2000 the domestic industry lost market share to nonsubject imports; in 2001, both

the domestic industry and nonsubject imports lost market share to subject imports.24 

The volume data thus show that subject import volume increased both absolutely and relatively,

that these increases came at least partially at the expense of the domestic industry, and came at a time

when overall apparent U.S. consumption was declining. Pricing data suggest that subject imports had

significant effects on domestic prices as well. Subject imports consistently undersold the domestic like

product. For product 1, sold to primary aluminum manufacturers, subject imports undersold the domestic

like product in 13 of 15 quarters; for product 2, subject imports undersold in 11 of 15 quarters. Prices

received by the domestic industry declined, as did sales volume. The effect was particularly noticeable

for product 2: in the first quarter of 2002, prices were down nearly *** percent, but sales quantity was

down *** percent for the domestic like product, but subject import sales had skyrocketed as prices fell

and underselling margins generally widened.25 Subject imports also generally undersold nonsubject
 26 Original CR/PR at Tables V-4, V-5, and V-7

 27 Original CR/PR at Tables V-8 and V-9.

 28 Domestic Producers’ Remand Comments at 7-12.

21

imports in the U.S. market.26 Domestic producers provided several allegations of lost sales and lost

revenue that were substantiated by purchasers.27

The domestic industry’s shipments declined as the volume of subject imports increased

significantly, and the industry lost market share to those subject imports. The record shows that subject

imports consistently undersold the domestic like product when those products competed in the same

markets. While the record indicates that subject imports were distributed somewhat differently across

channels of distribution, it also indicates that some spot prices can affect the prices received for silicon

metal of other grades sold in other channels, as those spot prices are among the few prices widely known

and published. The domestic industry’s performance suffered significantly in the wake of the increase in

subject import volume, underselling, and price declines. 

The record contains substantial evidence showing that subject imports had a causal connection to

the injury experienced by the domestic industry. Record evidence for the period of time after this

investigation was instituted and after preliminary affirmative determinations were made further support

the finding that subject imports were a cause of material injury to the domestic industry. After

preliminary affirmative determinations were made by Commerce and the Commission, the flow of subject

imports was cut off. When subject imports were removed from the market, prices for the domestic like

product rose significantly; over an eleven-month period prices rose by 22 percent. Domestic producers

were not only able to capture significant price increases but were also able to expand sales volume. One

domestic producer’s increased sales rose by *** percent in the period immediately following preliminary

relief; the value of those sales increased from $***.28

Nonsubject imports were in the U.S. market throughout the POI. However, as noted both in the

original views and in these remand views, nonsubject import volume actually declined between 2000 and

2001, when the domestic industry was beginning to suffer its most significant losses. Subject imports,

conversely, were rising, both absolutely and relatively. All available record evidence, including AUVs

and purchaser pricing reports, indicates that subject imports generally undersold nonsubject imports as

well. Removing subject imports from the U.S. market allowed the domestic industry to capture both

higher prices and additional sales volumes; this pattern further suggests that subject imports were a

significant factor suppressing and depressing prices over the POI. The post-relief data suggest that

subject imports affected the U.S. market and domestic producers somewhat differently than did

nonsubject imports.

For those reasons, and those articulated in the Commission’s original views and its first remand

determination, I find that an industry in the United States is materially injured by reason of subject

imports of silicon metal from Russia that are sold in the United States at less than fair value.

 1 Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Publication 3584, March 2003, p. 1. The

subject product is silicon metal which generally contains at least 96.00 percent but less than 99.99 percent silicon by

weight, and also includes silicon metal from Russia containing between 89.00 and 96.00 percent silicon by weight,

but containing more aluminum than the silicon metal which contains at least 96.00 percent but less than 99.99

percent silicon by weight. Silicon metal was provided for in subheadings 2804.69.10 and 2804.69.50 of the

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

 2 Plaintiff-Intervenors included SUAL Holding, ZAO Kremny, and General Electric Silicones LLC.

 3 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Slip Op. 04-75, CIT 2004, June 22, 2004, (“Bratsk I”).

 4 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, Slip Op. 04-153, CIT 2004, December 3, 2004, (“Bratsk II”).

 5 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Bratsk III”). 

I-1

INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE REMAND PROCEEDING

BACKGROUND

In March 2003, the U.S. International Trade Commission (“Commission”) determined that an

industry in the United States was materially injured by reason of imports from Russia of silicon metal.1

Respondents Bratsk Aluminum Smelter and Rual Trade Limited (“plaintiffs”)2

 appealed the

Commission’s determination to the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”). On June 22, 2004, the CIT

remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to: “(1) explain its reasons for accepting evidence

that ‘spot’ prices may affect contract prices while rejecting contradictory evidence; (2) explain the

significance or effect of the similar pricing trends of the different market segments; and (3) if the

Commission cannot provide sufficient reasons or explanations, to change its determination accordingly.”3

On September 15, 2004, the Commission filed its remand determination with the CIT. On

December 3, 2004, the CIT affirmed the Commission’s remand determination in its entirety and

dismissed the case.4

 Plaintiffs appealed the CIT’s dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit (“CAFC”). On April 10, 2006, the CAFC vacated and remanded the CIT’s decision so that the

CIT would remand the case back to the Commission “to make a specific causation determination and in

that connection to directly address whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject imports

without any beneficial effect on domestic producers.”5

 

On May 25, 2006, the Commission submitted a petition for rehearing en banc before the CAFC

and on July 24, 2006, the petition was denied. On July 28, 2006, the Commission petitioned the CAFC to

stay issuance of the mandate to the CIT while the Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, considered the filing of a petition for certiorari. On August 7, 2006, the CAFC denied the

motion to stay and remanded the case to the CIT. On August 17, 2006, the CIT remanded the case to the

Commission. The Commission then filed a motion to stay the remand proceedings at the CIT pending a

decision on whether to seek certiorari. On September 22, 2006, the CIT granted the stay. On December

20, 2006, the Commission informed the CIT that it would not be seeking certiorari at this time. On

December 22, 2006, the CIT entered an order lifting the stay and instructing the Commission to submit its

remand results to the CIT within ninety (90) days, or by March 22, 2007.
 6 Federal Register notices cited in the tabulation are presented in app. A.

 7 Bratsk III, p. 11. In its determination in the final investigation, the Commission found that “(s)ilicon metal is

generally considered to be a commodity product in that materials of the same grade are interchangeable” and

“(n)onsubject imports are an important factor in the U.S. market.” Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991

(Final), USITC Publication 3584, March 2003, p. 9.

 8 Bratsk III, p. 9.

 9 Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, CIT ORDER, Consol. Court No. 03-00200, August 17, 2006, p. 2.

I-2

Summary information related to this remand proceeding is presented below.6

Date Action

March 7, 2002 Petition filed with Commerce and the Commission1

March 24, 2003 Commission’s final determination published in the Federal Register (68 FR

14260)

September 15, 2004 Commission’s first remand determination of material injury transmitted to the

CIT

April 10, 2006 CAFC vacated the CIT’s affirmation of the Commission’s first remand

determination and ordered a second remand

July 24, 2006 CAFC denied Commission’s request for rehearing en banc

August 17, 2006 CIT ordered second remand

December 22, 2006 CIT lifted stay on remand order

January 10, 2007 Commission issued notice and scheduling of remand proceeding (72 FR 1242)

February 16, 2007 Commission released new information gathered in the remand proceeding to

the parties

February 27, 2007 Final comments of parties submitted to the Commission

March 22, 2007 Commission transmitted its second remand determination to the CIT

 1 Petitioners included Globe Metallurgical Inc., Cleveland, OH; SIMCALA, Inc., Mt. Meigs, AL; the International

Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers (I.U.E.-C.W.A, AFL-CIO, C.L.C., Local

693), Selma, AL; the Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (Local 5-89),

Boomer, WV; and the United Steel Workers of America (AFL-CIO, Local 9436), Niagara Falls, NY.

COURT ORDERS AND THE COMMISSION’S COMPLIANCE METHODOLOGY

The CAFC’s decision In Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States requires that the Commission

undertake an additional analysis of nonsubject imports if certain preconditions are met. This analysis is

triggered “whenever the antidumping investigation is centered on a commodity product, and price

competitive non-subject imports are a significant factor in the market.”7

 In those situations, the

Commission is directed to address “whether non-subject imports would have replaced the subject imports

without any beneficial effect on domestic producers.”8

 

Accordingly, in its August 17, 2006 order, the CIT:9

REMANDS this case to the Commission to specifically address whether the non-subject 

imports would have replaced subject imports during the period of investigation; and it is

further
 10 The list of firms and countries queried was developed from information on foreign production of silicon metal

provided by *** (e-mail dated September 25, 2006), in conjunction with an analysis of official Commerce U.S.

import statistics.

I-3

ORDERED that if the Commission finds material injury where fairly traded commodity

imports are competitively priced, the Commission must explain, in a meaningful way,

why the non-subject imports would not replace the subject imports while continuing to

cause injury to the domestic industry. . .” 

During this remand proceeding, the Commission determined to reopen the record of the original

investigation in order to gather additional information and respond to the CIT’s order. In that regard, the

Commission issued foreign producer questionnaires to 33 firms in 17 countries,10 sent cables seeking

information to U.S. embassies in 17 nonsubject countries, compiled global trade data from secondarysource statistical service providers, and conducted a review of literature published during 2002. 

The countries and firms from which the Commission sought information are presented in the

following tabulation:

Country Firm

Argentina ***

Australia ***

Bosnia Hercegovina ***

Brazil CCBM

***

Canada ***

China ***

France Ferropem

Germany ***

Hungary ***

Italy Metalleghe Group

Norway ***

Philippines ***

Saudi Arabia ***

South Africa Silicon Smelter (Pty) Ltd.

Spain ***

Poland ***

Ukraine ***

The Commission received responses to its foreign producer questionnaires from four of the above

identified firms: CCBM, Brazil; Ferropem (successor to INVENSIL SAS), France; Metalleghe, Italy; and

Silicon Smelters (Pty) Ltd., South Africa. The Commission also received responses from seven U.S.

embassies during this remand investigation: Buenos-Aires, Ottawa, Berlin, Rome, Oslo, Kyiv, and

Pretoria.

Information presented in this memorandum relates to capacity, production, inventories, exports,

and imports of silicon metal for countries other than Russia, during the original period of investigation: 

January 1999-September 2002 (and projections for 2002-03 in foreign producer questionnaires). 

Summary data are presented in appendix C. Because information relating to the pricing of nonsubject

imports was contained in the record of the original investigation, the Commission determined that it

would not reopen the record on pricing. The information presented in this remand memorandum is
 11 Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Publication 3584, March 2003, p. 9.

 12 Ibid., p. 9 and table I-1. In 2001, the Commission determined that revocation of the order on silicon metal

from Argentina was not likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably

foreseeable time. Silicon Metal from Argentina, Brazil, and China, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-470-472 (Review), USITC

Publication 3385, January 2001, p. 1. The Commission reached this determination given that the industry in

Argentina had been reduced to a single firm whose production (i) was not certified for the U.S. market and (ii) was

destined primarily for the European Union. Ibid. The Commission determined that imports from Argentina would

have no discernible adverse impact on the U.S. domestic industry.

 13 This 3,079 short tons of material is *** the estimated actual production of silicon metal in Argentina in 2001

according to *** data. See tables I-1 and I-3 herein. 

I-4

intended for use in conjunction with the confidential staff report issued during the original

investigation, INV-AA-017, dated February 24, 2003.

U.S. IMPORTS AND APPARENT U.S. CONSUMPTION

As found by the Commission in its original determination, “major nonsubject import sources

include Brazil, Canada, and South Africa.”11 In addition, the Commission noted the existence of

outstanding antidumping duty orders on imports of silicon metal from Brazil and China, and the

revocation of the antidumping duty order on imports from Argentina on February 16, 2001.12 Following

revocation of the order, U.S. imports of silicon metal from Argentina increased from zero in 1999 and

2000, to 3,079 short tons in 2001.13 U.S. imports of silicon metal from Argentina were 1,920 short tons

between January and September 2001 and 5,340 short tons between January and September 2002. While

U.S. imports of silicon metal from Argentina increased during the original period of investigation, the

quantities involved were small as a share of U.S. apparent consumption: 2.6 percent at their highest level

during the period January to September 2002. 

Table I-1 presents a detailed listing of U.S. imports from nonsubject sources (including countries

subject to antidumping duty orders) which supplements the information presented in table IV-1 of the

staff report in the original investigation. Nonsubject shares of U.S. imports of silicon metal declined by

6.5 percentage points from 79.5 percent to 73.0 percent during 1999-2001, and declined by 4.1 percentage

points to 73.6 percent during January-September 2002 when compared to the same period in 2001. 

Respective shares (percent) of U.S. imports from nonsubject sources with average unit values above and

below imports from Russia during the five periods of the original investigation are: ABOVE–83.2, 81.3,

91.5, 86.0, and 93.1 percent; BELOW–16.8, 18.7, 8.5, 14.0, and 6.9 percent (see figures I-1 and I-2). 

Apparent U.S. consumption and market shares are presented in table I-2. Nonsubject import

market shares, by quantity, were 30.1 percent in 1999, 35.5 percent in 2000, 33.2 percent in 2001, 34.6

percent during January-September 2001, and 44.4 percent during January-September 2002. Of the

nonsubject sources, imports of silicon metal from South Africa accounted for the largest share of apparent

U.S. consumption during 2001, at 12.7 percent, followed by Brazil and Canada at 6.2 percent each.
I-5

Table I-1

Silicon metal: U.S. imports, by source, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Quantity (short tons of contained silicon)

Russia 25,158 24,643 34,153 20,718 32,643

Brazil 12,429 22,385 17,309 14,722 27,953

China 3,237 4,958 4,292 2,876 4,132

Subtotal, Brazil and China 15,666 27,343 21,600 17,598 32,086

South Africa 28,184 40,329 35,305 29,690 26,731

Canada 25,044 27,347 17,281 12,931 13,046

Norway 8,050 3,293 5,114 4,086 7,221

Spain 942 0 3,453 1,092 1,619

Argentina 0 0 3,079 1,920 5,340

Korea 620 8,967 2,395 2,395 741

Saudi Arabia 12,930 7,938 1,182 1,182 981

United Arab Emirates 0 109 1,036 430 562

Germany 190 656 815 247 1,158

Australia 2,216 159 482 285 434

United Kingdom 462 492 369 266 1

Sweden 17 35 80 59 23

Ukraine 306 0 44 0 113

Belgium 0 1 43 43 10

France 2,397 2 1 1 1

All others 475 237 0 0 807

Subtotal, nonsubject 97,499 116,908 92,279 72,226 90,875

Total 122,657 141,551 126,431 92,945 123,519

Value1

 (1,000 dollars)

Russia 26,201 25,529 35,325 22,936 30,272

Brazil 17,203 29,535 22,650 19,348 36,428

China 2,885 4,029 3,439 2,357 3,146

Subtotal, Brazil and China 20,088 33,564 26,090 21,705 39,575

South Africa 32,195 43,583 36,120 30,278 26,976

Canada 34,064 33,516 19,987 14,943 13,481

Norway 11,967 5,324 7,787 6,206 8,818

Spain 1,043 0 3,503 1,111 1,596

Argentina 0 0 3,043 1,894 5,385

Korea 647 8,510 2,301 2,301 696

Saudi Arabia 13,306 7,784 1,162 1,162 884

United Arab Emirates 0 110 984 416 504

Germany 372 1,002 1,234 390 1,964

Australia 2,929 161 538 315 479

United Kingdom 668 670 522 376 12

Sweden 137 233 527 389 261

Ukraine 345 0 44 5 94

Belgium 0 8 549 549 106

France 3,505 9 22 17 3

All others 967 346 8 8 774

Subtotal, nonsubject 122,231 134,819 104,420 82,064 101,608

Total 148,432 160,349 139,745 105,000 131,881

Table continued on next page.
I-6

Table I-1--Continued

Silicon metal: U.S. imports, by source, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Unit value (per short ton)

2

Russia $1,036 $1,003 $980 $1,018 $928

Brazil 1,253 1,306 1,309 1,314 1,303

China 891 813 801 819 761

Subtotal, Brazil and China 1,178 1,215 1,208 1,233 1,233

South Africa 1,118 1,065 1,039 1,039 1,009

Canada 1,360 1,226 1,157 1,156 1,108

Norway 1,487 1,617 1,523 1,519 1,221

Spain 1,108 (3

) 1,015 1,017 986

Argentina (3

) (3) 989 986 1,008

Korea 1,044 949 961 961 940

Saudi Arabia 1,029 981 983 983 901

United Arab Emirates (3

) 1,009 950 967 897

Germany 1,952 1,527 1,513 1,579 1,696

Australia 1,322 1,012 1,115 1,106 1,105

United Kingdom 1,444 1,360 1,415 1,410 20,625

Sweden 8,005 6,663 6,600 6,642 11,269

Ukraine 1,127 (3

) 1,000 16,911 835

Belgium (3

) 5,406 12,692 12,692 10,546

France 1,462 4,165 22,952 18,995 3,243

All others 2,039 1,458 170,915 170,915 959

Subtotal, nonsubject 1,232 1,145 1,139 1,146 1,129

Average 1,191 1,120 1,096 1,117 1,076

Share of quantity (percent)

Russia 20.5 17.4 27.0 22.3 26.4

Brazil 10.1 15.8 13.7 15.8 22.6

China 2.6 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.3

Subtotal, Brazil and China 12.8 19.3 17.1 18.9 26.0

South Africa 23.0 28.5 27.9 31.9 21.6

Canada 20.4 19.3 13.7 13.9 10.6

Norway 6.6 2.3 4.0 4.4 5.8

Spain 0.8 0.0 2.7 1.2 1.3

Argentina 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.1 4.3

Korea 0.5 6.3 1.9 2.6 0.6

Saudi Arabia 10.5 5.6 0.9 1.3 0.8

United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.5

Germany 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.9

Australia 1.8 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4

United Kingdom 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0

Sweden 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.0

Ukraine 0.3 0.00 0.03 0.000 0.1

Belgium 0.0 0.001 0.03 0.05 0.01

France 2.0 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001

All others 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7

Subtotal, nonsubject 79.5 82.6 73.0 77.7 73.6

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table continued on next page.
I-7

Table I-1--Continued

Silicon metal: U.S. imports, by source, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Share of value (percent)

Russia 17.7 15.9 25.3 21.8 23.0

Brazil 11.6 18.4 16.2 18.4 27.6

China 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.4

Subtotal, Brazil and China 13.5 20.9 18.7 20.7 30.0

South Africa 21.7 27.2 25.8 28.8 20.5

Canada 22.9 20.9 14.3 14.2 10.2

Norway 8.1 3.3 5.6 5.9 6.7

Spain 0.7 0.0 2.5 1.1 1.2

Argentina 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.8 4.1

Korea 0.4 5.3 1.6 2.2 0.5

Saudi Arabia 9.0 4.9 0.8 1.1 0.7

United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.4

Germany 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.5

Australia 2.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4

United Kingdom 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0

Sweden 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2

Ukraine 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1

Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.1

France 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

All others 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6

Subtotal, nonsubject 82.3 84.1 74.7 78.2 77.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1

 Landed, duty-paid.

2

 As indicated in the original investigation, average unit values have been adjusted using proprietary Customs

data to remove certain anomalous entries for Brazil, Canada, Russia, and South Africa. Anomalies included ***. 

Confidential staff report, INV-AA-017, February 24, 2003, table IV-1, fn. 3. 3

 Not applicable.

Source: Compiled from official Commerce statistics for HTS subheadings 2804.69.10 and 2804.69.50.
I-8

1Q 99

2Q 99

3Q 99

4Q 99

1Q 00

2Q 00

3Q 00

4Q 00

1Q 01

2Q 01

3Q 01

4Q 01

1Q 02

2Q 02

3Q 02

Periods

800

900

1,000

1,100

1,200

1,300

1,400

1,500

$ per short ton

So. Africa Russia Brazil Canada

1Q 99

2Q 99

3Q 99

4Q 99

1Q 00

2Q 00

3Q 00

4Q 00

1Q 01

2Q 01

3Q 01

4Q 01

1Q 02

2Q 02

3Q 02

Periods

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

$ per short ton

Russia

Norway

China

Spain

Argentina Korea

Figure I-1

Silicon metal: Quarterly import average unit values, January 1999-September 2002

Top 4 sources1

Russia and next 5 sources2 3

1

 Shares (percent) of total imports accounted for by the top 4 sources during 2001 were: South Africa, 27.9;

Russia, 27.0; Brazil, 13.7; and Canada, 13.7; for a total of 82.3 percent. 2

 Shares (percent) of total imports accounted for by the next 5 sources during 2001 were: Norway, 4.0; China,

3.4; Spain, 2.7; Argentina, 2.4; and Korea, 1.9; for a total of 14.5 percent. 3

 Imports from Norway principally consisted of ***. The imported product was produced through an “acid leach”

(vs. mechanical crush) process which lowers impurities such as iron and boron, and was considered a premium

product. 

Source: Reprinted from Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Publication 3584, March

2003, figure I-3; data taken from official Commerce statistics with adjustments based on proprietary Customs data.
I-9

Figure I-2

Silicon metal: Import volumes, arrayed on the basis of average unit values that are above and

below those of Russia, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and January-September 2002

Note 1.--Respective shares (percent) of nonsubject imports with average unit values above and below imports from

Russia during the five respective periods are: ABOVE–83.2, 81.3, 91.5, 86.0, and 93.1 percent; BELOW–16.8, 18.7,

8.5, 14.0, and 6.9 percent. 

Note 2.--If average unit values were not adjusted, there is a significant difference in respective shares of nonsubject

imports with average unit values above and below imports from Russia during 2001, and January-September 2001: 

ABOVE–45.0 and 44.8 percent; BELOW–55.0 and 55.2 percent. 

Source: Reprinted from Silicon Metal from Russia, Inv. No. 731-TA-991 (Final), USITC Publication 3584, March

2003, figure I-4; data taken from official Commerce statistics with adjustments based on proprietary Customs data. 

1999 2000 2001 J-S 2001 J-S 2002

Time period

0

50

100

150

Quantity (1,000 short tons of contained silicon)

BELOW Russia Russia ABOVE Russia
I-10

Table I-2

Silicon metal: Apparent U.S. consumption and market shares, 1999-2001, January-September

2001, and January-September 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Quantity (short tons of contained silicon)

Apparent consumption 324,202 329,502 278,197 208,615 204,876

Value (1,000 dollars)

Apparent consumption 424,244 405,491 335,989 254,431 233,131

Share of quantity (percent)

U.S. producers’ shipments 62.2 57.0 54.6 55.4 39.7

U.S. imports from--

Russia 7.8 7.5 12.3 9.9 15.9

Brazil 3.8 6.8 6.2 7.1 13.6

China 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.0

Subtotal, Brazil and China 4.8 8.3 7.8 8.4 15.7

South Africa 8.7 12.2 12.7 14.2 13.0

Canada 7.7 8.3 6.2 6.2 6.4

Norway 2.5 1.0 1.8 2.0 3.5

Spain 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.8

Argentina 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.9 2.6

Korea 0.2 2.7 0.9 1.1 0.4

Saudi Arabia 4.0 2.4 0.4 0.6 0.5

United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.3

Germany 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6

Australia 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2

United Kingdom 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0

Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Ukraine 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1

Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

France 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

All others 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4

Subtotal, nonsubject 30.1 35.5 33.2 34.6 44.4

Total imports 37.8 43.0 45.4 44.6 60.3

Table continued on next page.
I-11

Table I-2--Continued

Silicon metal: Apparent U.S. consumption and market shares, 1999-2001, January-September

2001, and January-September 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Share of value (percent)

U.S. producers’ shipments 65.0 60.5 58.4 58.7 43.4

U.S. imports from--

Russia 6.2 6.3 10.5 9.0 13.0

Brazil 4.1 7.3 6.7 7.6 15.6

China 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3

Subtotal, Brazil and China 4.7 8.3 7.8 8.5 17.0

South Africa 7.6 10.7 10.8 11.9 11.6

Canada 8.0 8.3 5.9 5.9 5.8

Norway 2.8 1.3 2.3 2.4 3.8

Spain 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.7

Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 2.3

Korea 0.2 2.1 0.7 0.9 0.3

Saudi Arabia 3.1 1.9 0.3 0.5 0.4

United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2

Germany 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.8

Australia 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2

United Kingdom 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0

Sweden 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1

Ukraine 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0

France 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

All others 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3

Subtotal, nonsubject 28.8 33.2 31.1 32.3 43.6

Total imports 35.0 39.5 41.6 41.3 56.6

Source: Compiled from responses to Commission questionnaires and official Commerce statistics for HTS

subheadings 2804.69.10 and 2804.69.50. 
 14 Reliable data are not available on Chinese production capacity for silicon metal. Reported exports from China

of silicon metal were used as a placeholder for Chinese production capacity in table I-3. This placeholder tends to

underestimate Chinese capacity to produce silicon metal by any amount of (i) capacity dedicated to producing silicon

metal that is consumed internally in China and (ii) any excess capacity idled or otherwise not being used to currently

produce silicon metal. 

 15 Included in the denominator (total excess capacity) of this calculation were capacity to produce silicon metal in

Argentina and Saudi Arabia, both of whose production had ceased all together in 2001, as well as Macedonia, whose

capacity was reportedly not used to produce silicon metal at all over the period of investigation. Excluding the

capacities reported for Argentina, Macedonia, and Saudi Arabia (under the assumption that their exit from the silicon

metal market was permanent), total excess capacity would have been at *** short tons in 2001, and Brazil would

have accounted for *** percent of that total. Again, these data do not include information on any excess capacity in

China.

 16 ***, received by fax, January 17, 2007. ***. 

I-12

THE GLOBAL INDUSTRY AND MARKET

Global Capacity, Production, Capacity Utilization, and Excess Capacity

Table I-3 presents data on global capacity, production, and capacity utilization as reported by

***. As indicated in the table, Brazil, China, Norway, and the United States are the largest producers of

silicon metal in the world, accounting for approximately *** percent of global production of silicon metal

over the original period of investigation. While Europe is the region with the most capacity to produce

silicon metal, China as a single source, has the greatest capacity.14 Brazil had decreasing capacity

utilization rates over the original period of investigation, while Norway maintained its capacity utilization

at approximately *** percent over the period. Countries with less overall capacity by and large

maintained or increased their production levels, thereby increasing their capacity utilization rates–with the

exception of Argentina, Italy, and Saudi Arabia where production of silicon metal was halted altogether

and in some instances capacity apparently was decommissioned. 

Table I-3

Silicon metal: Global capacity, production, and capacity utilization, 1999-2001 and projections for

2002-03

* * * * * * *

Table I-4 presents data on global excess capacity. Excluding China (no available data), total

excess capacity to produce silicon metal in nonsubject countries is estimated at *** short tons in 2001, of

which excess capacity in Brazil accounts for *** percent.15 A portion of the excess capacity in Brazil

may be overstated as “***.”16 

Table I-4

Silicon metal: Excess capacity in nonsubject countries, 1999-2001

* * * * * * *
 17 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom accounted for 43.1 percent of

global imports of silicon metal in 2001. See table I-6. 

I-13

Apparent Consumption in Selected Countries

Table I-5 presents data on apparent consumption in selected nonsujbect countries, estimated using

*** and GTIS data with supplemental data taken from foreign producer questionnaire responses from

firms in France and South Africa. The largest markets for silicon metal identified by the data are France,

Italy, Norway, and Canada.

Table I-5

Silicon metal: Estimated apparent consumption, import penetration, and ratio of exports to

consumption, 1999-2001

* * * * * * *

Global Trade

Trade in silicon metal is global. Table I-6 presents information on global imports during the

period January 1999 through September 2002. Table I-7 presents data on global exports during the period

January 1999 through September 2002.

Based on national treatment, Japan is the largest importer of silicon metal followed by the United

States and Germany. However, the European Union is the largest single market for trans-national

shipment of silicon metal.17 Asian nations, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, import primarily

Chinese silicon metal, which may explain their lower average unit value of imports in table I-6 compared

to average unit values of silicon metal imports in other destinations. European nations primarily import

silicon metal from other European nations and Brazil. 

China, Norway, and Brazil are the largest exporters of silicon metal and accounted for 69.4

percent of silicon metal exports in 2001. China is the global producer with the lowest unit value for its

export shipments over the original period of investigation. 
I-14

Table I-6

Silicon metal: Global imports, by destination, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Destination

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 126,164 145,379 130,422 97,011 122,494

Other importing countries--

 Japan 194,322 209,963 199,602 149,926 152,680

 Germany 94,517 111,873 106,650 81,020 90,742

 United Kingdom 61,604 83,595 92,673 74,538 65,896

 Netherlands 64,276 77,508 71,843 58,334 61,575

 Italy 35,030 48,291 46,549 36,729 30,247

 South Korea 23,160 33,510 26,371 19,344 22,205

 Canada 22,099 29,547 20,769 17,921 21,195

 France 17,080 20,628 22,085 17,284 15,124

 Taiwan 18,738 17,852 12,929 8,847 12,720

 Belgium 17,856 15,561 13,766 10,803 11,883

 All others 112,753 132,701 121,408 (1

) (1)

 Total 787,598 926,409 865,067 (1

) (1)

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 141,149 152,821 132,604 100,135 122793

Other importing countries--

 Japan 196,183 194,939 174,227 133,426 129,370

 Germany 110,654 115,644 111,748 85,183 91,133

 United Kingdom 75,983 89,182 98,778 79,234 70,047

 Netherlands 69,206 75,707 67,521 55,985 54,252

 Italy 37,841 46,320 47,772 37,458 29,166

 South Korea 20,389 26,474 19,312 14,232 16,612

 Canada 24,959 29,326 19,867 16,960 19,267

 France 20,129 20,015 22,989 18,099 15,905

 Taiwan 15,832 14,341 9,420 6,593 9,453

 Belgium 18,317 14,418 13,207 9,860 8,322

 All others 160,625 148,284 121,604 (1

) (1)

 Total 891,267 927,469 839,047 (1

) (1)

Table continued on next page.
I-15

Table I-6--Continued

Silicon metal: Global imports, by destination, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Destination

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Unit value (per short ton contained silicon)

United States $1,119 $1,051 $1,017 $1,032 $1,002

Other importing countries--

 Japan 1,010 928 873 890 847

 Germany 1,171 1,034 1,048 1,051 1,004

 United Kingdom 1,233 1,067 1,066 1,063 1,063

 Netherlands 1,077 977 940 960 881

 Italy 1,080 959 1,026 1,020 964

 South Korea 880 790 732 736 748

 Canada 1,129 993 957 946 909

 France 1,178 970 1,041 1,047 1,052

 Taiwan 845 803 729 745 743

 Belgium 1,026 927 959 913 700

 All others 1,425 1,117 1,002 (1

) (1)

 Average 1,132 1,001 970 (1

) (1)

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 16.0 15.7 15.1 (1

) (1)

Other importing countries--

 Japan 24.7 22.7 23.1 (1

) (1)

 Germany 12.0 12.1 12.3 (1

) (1)

 United Kingdom 7.8 9.0 10.7 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 8.2 8.4 8.3 (1

) (1)

 Italy 4.4 5.2 5.4 (1

) (1)

 South Korea 2.9 3.6 3.0 (1

) (1)

 Canada 2.8 3.2 2.4 (1

) (1)

 France 2.2 2.2 2.6 (1

) (1)

 Taiwan 2.4 1.9 1.5 (1

) (1)

 Belgium 2.3 1.7 1.6 (1

) (1)

 All others 14.3 14.3 14.0 (1

) (1)

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 (1

) (1)

Table continued on next page.
I-16

Table I-6--Continued

Silicon metal: Global imports, by destination, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Destination

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Share of value (percent)

United States 15.8 16.5 15.8 (1

) (1)

Other importing countries--

 Japan 22.0 21.0 20.8 (1

) (1)

 Germany 12.4 12.5 13.3 (1

) (1)

 United Kingdom 8.5 9.6 11.8 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 7.8 8.2 8.0 (1

) (1)

 Italy 4.2 5.0 5.7 (1

) (1)

 South Korea 2.3 2.9 2.3 (1

) (1)

 Canada 2.8 3.2 2.4 (1

) (1)

 France 2.3 2.2 2.7 (1

) (1)

 Taiwan 1.8 1.5 1.1 (1

) (1)

 Belgium 2.1 1.6 1.6 (1

) (1)

 All others 18.0 16.0 14.5 (1

) (1)

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 (1

) (1)

 1 Data on imports of silicon metal broken out on a monthly basis were not available for a number of countries in

the “all others” category that otherwise reported their data on a calendar year basis. Since the number of countries

reporting their data on a monthly basis was a subset of those reporting annual data, staff was unable to compile a

comparable partial year period dataset for the imports of silicon metal by the “all others” basket of countries. Totals

and shares are, therefore, not available for January-September 2001 and January-September 2002.

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 17, 2007.
I-17

Table I-7

Silicon metal: Global exports, by source, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 37,649 17,065 11,682 8,615 7,684

Other exporting countries--

 China 285,344 351,470 348,415 259,600 298,686

 Norway 153,568 167,226 165,261 (1

) (1)

 Brazil 133,108 166,371 112,929 92,213 116,479

 Canada 47,257 64,038 48,626 37,988 31,480

 Russia 36,058 47,999 56,673 (1

) (1)

 South Africa2 36,917 53,695 34,210 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 22,367 36,608 47,675 38,890 44,291

 Australia 36,643 31,182 36,485 (1

) (1)

 Spain 16,189 16,624 15,144 10,803 16,204

 Belgium 7,123 8,808 13,299 10,803 4,321

 All others 12,999 22,414 11,366 (1

) (1)

 Total 825,223 983,500 901,766 (1

) (1)

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 46,678 23,026 25,217 17,838 14,655

Other exporting countries--

 China 224,179 261,275 245,456 184,720 215,952

 Norway 190,771 178,032 175,505 (1

) (1)

 Brazil 136,717 167,156 113,339 93,567 113,355

 Canada 60,309 70,722 52,312 41,089 32,505

 Russia 29,121 34,220 40,048 (1

) (1)

 South Africa2 36,144 41,575 33,398 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 17,370 27,831 84,813 78,308 38,448

 Australia 36,637 37,669 31,636 (1

) (1)

 Spain 16,261 16,542 15,012 10,760 14,207

 Belgium 8,056 8,332 14,250 11,270 4,099

 All others 19,273 28,806 24,359 (1

) (1)

 Total 821,517 895,187 855,346 (1

) (1)

Table continued on next page.
I-18

Table I-7--Continued

Silicon metal: Global exports, by source, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $1,240 $1,349 $2,159 $2,071 $1,907

Other exporting countries--

 China 786 743 704 712 723

 Norway 1,242 1,065 1,062 (1

) (1)

 Brazil 1,027 1,005 1,004 1,015 973

 Canada 1,276 1,104 1,076 1,082 1,033

 Russia 808 713 707 (1

) (1)

 South Africa2 979 774 976 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 777 760 1,779 2,014 868

 Australia 1,000 1,208 867 (1

) (1)

 Spain 1,004 995 991 996 877

 Belgium 1,131 946 1,072 1,043 949

 All others 1,483 1,285 2,143 (1

) (1)

 Average 996 910 949 (1

) (1)

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 4.6 1.7 1.3 (1

) (1)

Other exporting countries--

 China 34.6 35.7 38.6 (1

) (1)

 Norway 18.6 17.0 18.3 (1

) (1)

 Brazil 16.1 16.9 12.5 (1

) (1)

 Canada 5.7 6.5 5.4 (1

) (1)

 Russia 4.4 4.9 6.3 (1

) (1)

 South Africa2 4.5 5.5 3.8 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 2.7 3.7 5.3 (1

) (1)

 Australia 4.4 3.2 4.0 (1

) (1)

 Spain 2.0 1.7 1.7 (1

) (1)

 Belgium 0.9 0.9 1.5 (1

) (1)

 All others 1.6 2.3 1.3 (1

) (1)

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 (1

) (1)

Table continued on next page.
I-19

Table I-7--Continued

Silicon metal: Global exports, by source, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and JanuarySeptember 2002

Source

Calendar year January-September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

Share of value (percent)

United States 5.7 2.6 2.9 (1

) (1)

Other exporting countries--

 China 27.3 29.2 28.7 (1

) (1)

 Norway 23.2 19.9 20.5 (1

) (1)

 Brazil 16.6 18.7 13.3 (1

) (1)

 Canada 7.3 7.9 6.1 (1

) (1)

 Russia 3.5 3.8 4.7 (1

) (1)

 South Africa2 4.4 4.6 3.9 (1

) (1)

 Netherlands 2.1 3.1 9.9 (1

) (1)

 Australia 4.5 4.2 3.7 (1

) (1)

 Spain 2.0 1.8 1.8 (1

) (1)

 Belgium 1.0 0.9 1.7 (1

) (1)

 All others 2.3 3.2 2.8 (1

) (1)

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 (1

) (1)

 1 Data on exports of silicon metal broken out on a monthly basis were not available for a number of countries that

otherwise reported their data on a calendar year basis (including major exporters like Australia, Norway, Russia, and

South Africa). Since the number of countries reporting their data on a monthly basis was a subset of those reporting

annual data, staff was unable to compile a comparable partial year period dataset for the exports of silicon metal. 

Totals and shares are, therefore, not available for January-September 2001 and January-September 2002.

 2

 Global Trade Information Services reports that South Africa exported 679,791 short tons of silicon metal in 2001

(an increase of 1141 percent over the previous year) valued at $36.8 million (a decrease of 11 percent over the

previous year), which results in an unrealistic unit value of $54 per short ton. Staff believes these data to be

misreported. Data from the South African Ministry of Trade (http://www.dti.gov.za) correspond to the data reported

by GTIS by quantity. Further, the South African data indicate that exports of silicon metal from South Africa in the

month of September account for 94 percent of the total quantity in 2001. For purposes of providing data for exports

of silicon metal from South Africa in 2001, staff has backed out the 641,312 short tons reported in September from

the South African Ministry of Trade and its corresponding dollar amount of $3.4 million (calculated using the same

U.S. Federal Reserve published exchange rate apparently used by GTIS in its database,

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/20011203/, or 8.6756 Rand per U.S. dollar September 2001). The data

for South Africa in 2001, therefore, equal exports for only eleven (11) out of twelve (12) months in 2001. 

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 17, 2007.
 18 The reason for this apparent *** in production is unknown. 

 19 U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Buenos-Aires, unclassified, February 1,

2007. 

 20 See table I-3. 

 21 Ibid.

 22 See table I-1. 

 23 The export to consumption ratio for Australia ranged between *** over the original period of investigation,

which means that the Australian industry exported approximately *** times the amount of silicon metal that firms in

Australia apparently consumed. 

I-20

Industries in Nonsubject Countries

Argentina

According to *** data, Argentina accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). The industry in Argentina had capacity to produce *** short tons of silicon

metal over the original period of investigation. Actual production of silicon metal was approximately ***

short tons in 1999 and 2000, and then only *** short tons in 2001.18 

The U.S. Commercial Service indicated that:

“{t}he local firm Electrometalúrgica Andina (EA) informed that they produced silicon

metal until 2000. EA said to have been the only producer of silicon metal in Argentina.

Electrometalúrgica Andina was originally founded in 1948 by Pechiney, a French Group.

In 1982 Argentine capitals acquired 100% of the firm, and it started a process of

technological development and overseas expansion. They produce calcium carbide and

derivatives, calcium silicon and derivatives, ferrosilicon and derivatives, recarburizer,

and microsilica... EA reported that they closed operations due to an inconvenient

cost/price relation.”19

Australia

*** reported that Australia accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal during

2001 (see table I-3). The industry in Australia maintained a constant capacity to produce silicon metal at

approximately *** short tons over the original period of investigation.20 According to the *** data, the

Australian industry maintained a high capacity utilization rate of approximately *** percent over the

period. Australia, therefore, had very little excess capacity to produce silicon metal at approximately ***

short tons each year between 1999 and 2001.21 

U.S. imports of silicon metal from Australia were 2,216 short tons in 1999, 159 short tons in

2000, and 482 short tons in 2001.22 Trends reported in U.S. imports of silicon metal from Australia

correspond to the trends in Australian exports to the United States reported in the GTA® database. The

Australian industry has *** exports to consumption ratio over the period of investigation which indicates

that Australia exported more silicon metal than it consumed internally.23 

Table I-8 presents data on exports of silicon metal from Australia from 1999 to 2001 and figure I3 presents data on shares of Australian exports in 2001. Japan is Australia’s primary export market by

quantity, and exports of silicon metal from Australia to Japan were reported at a higher unit value than

exports of silicon metal from Australia to the United States. 
I-21

Table I-8

Silicon metal: Australian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 1,535 137 337

Other Australian export markets--

 Japan 18,387 22,534 21,366

 Norway1 8,698 0 7,346

 United Arab Emirates 590 1,960 2,553

 Italy 0 151 1,777

 Bahrain 1,273 1,889 1,335

 New Zealand 3,691 2,922 807

 Canada 1,537 519 385

 United Kingdom 346 562 302

 All others 586 509 278

 Total1 36,643 31,182 36,485

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 1,847 147 345

Other Australian export markets--

 Japan 22,927 27,058 23,348

 Norway1 947 0 833

 United Arab Emirates 863 2,179 2,188

 Italy 0 147 1,495

 Bahrain 1,459 2,210 1,421

 New Zealand 5,440 3,506 1,014

 Canada 1,965 637 360

 United Kingdom 336 559 288

 All others 853 1,226 344

 Total1 36,637 37,669 31,636

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $1,203 $1,076 $1,024

Other Australian export markets--

 Japan 1,247 1,201 1,093

 Norway1 109 (2

) 113

 United Arab Emirates 1,462 1,112 857

 Italy (2

) 970 841

 Bahrain 1,147 1,170 1,065

 New Zealand 1,474 1,200 1,255

 Canada 1,278 1,228 936

 United Kingdom 971 995 953

 All others 1,455 2,408 1,240

 Average1 1,000 1,208 867

Table continued next page. 
I-22

Table I-8--Continued

Silicon metal: Australian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 4.2 0.4 0.9

Other Australian export markets--

 Japan 50.2 72.3 58.6

 Norway1 23.7 (2

) 20.1

 United Arab Emirates 1.6 6.3 7.0

 Italy (2

) 0.5 4.9

 Bahrain 3.5 6.1 3.7

 New Zealand 10.1 9.4 2.2

 Canada 4.2 1.7 1.1

 United Kingdom 0.9 1.8 0.8

 All others 1.6 1.6 0.8

 Total1 100.0 100.0 100.0

Share of value (percent)

United States 5.0 0.4 1.1

Other Australian export markets--

 Japan 62.6 71.8 73.8

 Norway1 2.6 (2

) 2.6

 United Arab Emirates 2.4 5.8 6.9

 Italy (2

) 0.4 4.7

 Bahrain 4.0 5.9 4.5

 New Zealand 14.8 9.3 3.2

 Canada 5.4 1.7 1.1

 United Kingdom 0.9 1.5 0.9

 All others 2.3 3.3 1.1

 Total1 100.0 100.0 100.0

 1 Data on exports of silicon metal from Australia to Norway appear to be misreported, either in quantity or in

value. Note the difference in the share of quantity versus the share of value of these exports. Also the data for

exports to Norway cause the fluctuations in average unit values between 1999 and 2001. 

 2

 Not applicable.

Note.–Exports to the United States from Australia reported in the GTA® presented in this table follow the same

trend as reported U.S. imports from Australia. The following tabulation presents the quantities of U.S. imports of

silicon metal based on official Commerce statistics and exports from Australia to the United States:

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics

 (short tons contained silicon) 2,216 159 482

GTA® statistics on exports from Australia

 (short tons contained silicon) 1,535 137 337

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 
 24 See table I-3. 

 25 Ibid.

 26 ***, received by fax, January 17, 2007. The ***. 

 27 See table I-1 for data on U.S. import from Brazil. U.S. imports of silicon metal from Brazil correspond to

Brazilian exports to the United States as contained in GTA® data. 

 28 Silicon metal from Argentina, Brazil, and China, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-470-472 (Review), USITC Publication

3385, January 2001, p. 17.

I-23

Figure I-3

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of Australian exports, 2001

Source: Table I-8.

Brazil

According to *** data, Brazil accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). The industry in Brazil increased its capacity to produce silicon metal by ***

percent between 1999 and 2000, and by an additional *** percent between 2000 and 2001.24 Excess

capacity existed in Brazil during the original period of investigation; *** short tons in 1999, which

decreased to *** short tons in 2000, but then *** to approximately *** short tons by 2001.25 Some of

this reported excess capacity may not have actually been available for Brazilian firms to produce silicon

metal since *** indicated that electricity rationing had reduced nameplate capacity in Brazil over the

original period of investigation.26 CCBM submitted a foreign producer questionnaire response to the

Commission indicating that ***.

In the original period of investigation, U.S. imports of silicon metal from Brazil were subject to

an antidumping duty order and were 12,429 short tons in 1999, 22,385 short tons in 2000, and 17,309

short tons in 2001.27 In its 2000 review of the antidumping duty order on silicon metal from Brazil, the

Commission indicated that, “like China, the Brazilian industry is heavily export-oriented.”28 Data

UAE

6.9

United Arab 

Emirates

7.0

Italy

4.9

Bahrain

3.7

Japan

58.6

All others

0.8

United 

Kingdom

0.8

United 

States

0.9

New Zealand

2.2

Canada

1.1
 29 The export to consumption ratio for Brazil ranged between *** over the original period of investigation, which

means that the Brazilian industry exported approximately *** times the amount of silicon metal that firms in Brazil

apparently consumed. 

 30 Silicon Metal from Brazil; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Revocation of Order

in Part, 67 FR 77225, December 17, 2002. This notice revoked the antidumping duty order on imports of silicon

metal into the United States from Rima in Brazil. 

 31 Silicon Metal From Brazil; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Determination Not

To Revoke in Part, 66 FR 11256, February 23, 2001.

 32 Antidumping Duty Investigation; Silicon Metal from Brazil: Amended Final Determination in Accordance with

Court Decision., 67 FR 61318, September 30, 2002.

I-24

collected in this remand investigation indicate that Brazil exports *** than it consumes internally as

demonstrated by its *** ratio of exports to consumption.29

Table I-9 presents data on exports of silicon metal from Brazil between 1999 and 2001 and figure

I-4 presents data on shares of Brazilian exports in 2001. European nations were Brazil’s primary export

markets, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, which

together accounted for 54.8 percent of Brazilian exports in 2001. The average unit values for shipments

of silicon metal from Brazil to European nations were generally lower than the unit values for shipments

of silicon metal from Brazil to the United States; however, this might be explained in part by the fact that

U.S. imports of silicon metal from Brazil were subject to an antidumping duty order during the original

period of investigation. The antidumping duty rates applicable to Brazilian exporters at the time of the

original investigation on silicon metal from Russia were as follows (in percent ad valorem): 0.0 percent

for CBCC, 0.74 for Minasligas, 0.0 for Rima, and 91.08 for all others.30 Other Brazilian firms such as

Electrosilex maintained antidumping duty rates of 93.2 percent during Commerce administrative reviews

on the antidumping duty order for silicon metal from Brazil;31 whereas Commerce revised the rate for

CCM to 87.79 percent in accordance with a court-ordered remand.32

Table I-9

Silicon metal: Brazilian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 16,262 23,446 17,992

Other Brazilian export markets--

 Netherlands 41,166 29,317 27,945

 Italy 14,781 18,642 14,486

 United Arab Emirates 9,119 14,746 13,198

 Japan 18,260 19,078 8,252

 Canada 6,558 9,598 7,679

 France 4,227 6,711 6,255

 Argentina 5,621 9,643 4,246

 United Kingdom 3,200 11,341 3,625

 Norway 5,872 9,591 2,819

 Germany 369 557 2,512

 All other 7,674 13,701 3,921

 Total 133,108 166,371 112,929

Table continued on next page. 
I-25

Table I-9--Continued

Silicon metal: Brazilian export markets, 1999-2001

Market 1999 2000 2001

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 16,908 27,222 20,922

Other Brazilian export markets--

 Netherlands 39,828 27,295 25,823

 Italy 13,625 17,955 13,824

 United Arab Emirates 11,156 15,782 13,823

 Japan 21,088 19,436 8,170

 Canada 6,052 8,728 7,332

 France 5,055 6,705 5,829

 Argentina 6,448 10,934 4,790

 United Kingdom 3,150 10,002 3,815

 Norway 5,342 9,263 2,705

 Germany 355 522 2,379

 All other 7,711 13,314 3,926

 Total 136,717 167,156 113,339

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $1,040 $1,161 $1,163

Other Brazilian export markets--

 Netherlands 967 931 924

 Italy 922 963 954

 United Arab Emirates 1,223 1,070 1,047

 Japan 1,155 1,019 990

 Canada 923 909 955

 France 1,196 999 932

 Argentina 1,147 1,134 1,128

 United Kingdom 985 882 1,053

 Norway 910 966 960

 Germany 962 937 947

 All other 1,005 972 1,001

 Average 1,027 1,005 1,004

Table continued on next page. 
I-26

Table I-9--Continued

Silicon metal: Brazilian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 12.2 14.1 15.9

Other Brazilian export markets--

 Netherlands 30.9 17.6 24.7

 Italy 11.1 11.2 12.8

 United Arab Emirates 6.9 8.9 11.7

 Japan 13.7 11.5 7.3

 Canada 4.9 5.8 6.8

 France 3.2 4.0 5.5

 Argentina 4.2 5.8 3.8

 United Kingdom 2.4 6.8 3.2

 Norway 4.4 5.8 2.5

 Germany 0.3 0.3 2.2

 All other 5.8 8.2 3.5

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Share of value (percent)

United States 12.4 16.3 18.5

Other Brazilian export markets--

 Netherlands 29.1 16.3 22.8

 Italy 10.0 10.7 12.2

 United Arab Emirates 8.2 9.4 12.2

 Japan 15.4 11.6 7.2

 Canada 4.4 5.2 6.5

 France 3.7 4.0 5.1

 Argentina 4.7 6.5 4.2

 United Kingdom 2.3 6.0 3.4

 Norway 3.9 5.5 2.4

 Germany 0.3 0.3 2.1

 All other 5.6 8.0 3.5

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note.–Exports to the United States from Brazil reported in the GTA® presented in the table, follow the same trend

as U.S. Imports from Brazil reported in official Commerce statistics. The following tabulation presents the quantities

of U.S. imports of silicon metal based on official Commerce statistics and exports from Brazil to the United States:

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics

 (short tons contained silicon) 12,429 22,385 17,309

GTA® statistics on exports from Brazil

 (short tons contained silicon) 16,262 23,446 17,992

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 
 33 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Ottawa, unclassified OTTAWA 000145, January 26, 2007. 

 34 See table I-3. 

 35 Ibid.

 36 Since total reported exports from Canada to all non-Canadian markets was greater than reported production of

silicon metal in Canada in each year, some of the material entering the United States from Canada was possibly

transshipments of silicon metal produced elsewhere. 

 37 See table I-5. The export to consumption ratio for Canada ranged between *** over the original period of

investigation, which means that the Canadian industry exported approximately *** times the amount of silicon metal

that firms in Canada apparently consumed. 

I-27

Figure I-4

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of Brazilian exports, 2001

Source: Table I-9.

Canada

According to *** data, Canada accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). The U.S. Department of State indicated that “there is only one firm

producing and/or exporting the subject merchandise: Becancour Silicon” and cited a total production

capacity of approximately *** short tons.33

*** data indicate that the industry in Canada increased its capacity to produce silicon metal by

*** percent between 1999 and 2000, and then maintained its capacity at approximately *** short tons in

2000 and 2001.34 Canada had high capacity utilization rates and therefore very little excess capacity

during the original period of investigation. 

U.S. imports of silicon metal from Canada were 25,044 short tons contained silicon in 1999,

27,347 short tons contained silicon in 2000, and 17,281 short tons contained silicon in 2001.35 Reported

Canadian exports to the United States in the GTA® were higher than reported U.S. imports of silicon

metal from Canada.36 The Canadian industry had *** ratio of exports to consumption.37 Calculated

Italy

12.8

United Arab 

Emirates

11.7

United Kingdom

3.2

Argentina

3.8

France

5.5

Canada

6.8

Japan

7.3

Germany

2.2 All other

3.5

Norway

2.5

United States

15.9

Netherlands

24.7
 38 See table I-5. The *** import penetration calculation indicates Canada exports more silicon metal than what

the Canadian silicon metal industry produces. 

I-28

import penetration in the Canadian market was *** in each year between 1999 and 2001, which may

indicate that some silicon metal exported from Canada is non-Canadian material.38

Table I-10 presents data on exports of silicon metal from Canada and figure I-5 presents export

market shares for Canadian exports of silicon metal. After the United States, Germany is Canada’s

primary export market. The average unit values of Canada’s exports of silicon metal to Germany are

slightly lower than the unit values of Canada’s exports of silicon metal to the United States.

Table I-10

Silicon metal: Canadian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 31,950 42,574 25,092

Other Canadian export markets--

 Germany 12,687 18,426 16,491

 France 540 0 4,819

 Belgium 2,080 2,539 1,961

 All other 1 499 263

 Total 47,257 64,038 48,626

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 40,939 49,276 27,604

Other Canadian export markets--

 Germany 16,428 18,818 17,245

 France 654 0 5,184

 Belgium 2,266 2,370 1,931

 All other 22 259 348

 Total 60,309 70,722 52,312

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $1,281 $1,157 $1,100

Other Canadian export markets--

 Germany 1,295 1,021 1,046

 France 1,211 (1

) 1,076

 Belgium 1,090 933 985

 All other 22,909 519 1,323

 Average 1,276 1,104 1,076

Table continued on next page. 
I-29

Table I-10--Continued

Silicon metal: Canadian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 67.6 66.5 51.6

Other Canadian export markets-- 

 Germany 26.8 28.8 33.9

 France 1.1 (1

) 9.9

 Belgium 4.4 4.0 4.0

 All other (2

) 0.8 0.5

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Share of value (percent)

United States 67.9 69.7 52.8

Other Canadian export markets--

 Germany 27.2 26.6 33.0

 France 1.1 (1

) 9.9

 Belgium 3.8 3.4 3.7

 All other (2

) 0.4 0.7

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

 1 Not applicable.

 2

 Less than 0.05 percent.

Note.–Exports to the United States from Canada reported in the GTA® are greater than reported U.S. imports from

Canada in official Commerce statistics. The following tabulation presents the quantities of U.S. imports of silicon

metal based on official Commerce statistics and exports from Canada to the United States:

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics

 (short tons contained silicon) 25,044 27,347 17,281

GTA® statistics on exports from Canada

 (short tons contained silicon) 31,950 42,574 25,092

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 
 39 Staff telephone interview with ***, January 17, 2007. 

 40 See table I-3. Chinese export data were used as a surrogate for Chinese capacity and production data for the

purposes of that table.

 41 Silicon Metal from Argentina, Brazil, and China, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-470-472 (Review), USITC Publication

3385, January 2001, p. IV-6.

 42 Notice of Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review of Silicon Metal from the People's Republic of China, 65

FR 35609, June 5, 2000.

I-30

Figure I-5

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of Canadian exports, 2001

Source: Table I-10.

China

The Commission sent foreign producer questionnaires to nine firms identified as producers of

silicon metal in China and received no responses. Little secondary-source data are available concerning

the industry in China. *** reported that the information it had on the industry in China was *** at the

time of the original investigation.39 Relying on global silicon metal export data for subheading 2804.69

of the HTS as reported in the GTA® database and presented in table I-7, China is the world’s largest

exporter of silicon metal, accounting for an estimated *** percent of world production and 39 percent of

world exports during 2001 (see tables I-3 and I-7). Chinese export data reported in table I-11 represent

quantities greater than reported capacities for silicon metal in any other country, indicating that, in turn,

China is the world’s largest producer of silicon metal.40 Both the United States and the European Union

imposed antidumping duty order disciplines on imports of silicon metal produced in China between

January 1999 and September 2002.41 

The United States had an antidumping duty order on U.S. imports of silicon metal from China at

a China-wide antidumping duty margin of 139.49 ad valorem over the original period of investigation.42

In its 2000 review of the antidumping duty order on silicon metal from China, the Commission indicated

that Chinese capacity to produce silicon metal was estimated to range between 250,000 and 400,000 short

United 

States

51.6

All other

0.5 Belgium

4.0

France

9.9

Germany

33.9
 43 Silicon Metal from Argentina, Brazil, and China, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-470-472 (Review), USITC Publication

3385, January 2001, p. 16, fn. 94. The Commission, however, relied on 272,000 short tons as its estimate for total

production capacity in China. This was the figure that the U.S. Geological Survey reported as total Chinese exports

of silicon metal in 1998. This treatment is consistent with data presented in table I-3 of this report, only in that

GTA® data on exports from China are used as a surrogate for Chinese capacity not USGS data in this instance. 

 44 See table I-7.

 45 Silicon Metal from Argentina, Brazil, and China, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-470-472 (Review), USITC Publication

3385, January 2001, p. 16.

 46 E-mail from, ***, January 31, 2007.

I-31

tons in 1998.43 Exports of silicon metal from China increased by 22.1 percent from 1999 to 2001 (with a

peak in 2000), and were 15.1 percent higher in the period January to September 2002 than in the period

January to September 2001.44 The Commission indicated that “{t}he industry in China is

export-oriented” in its review of the antidumping duty order in 2000.45 

Table I-11 presents data on exports of silicon metal from China between 1999 and 2001 and

figure IV-6 presents shares for Chinese exports of silicon metal in 2001. Other Asian nations are China’s

main export destination, including Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, which collectively

represented 57.6 percent of Chinese exports of silicon metal. There is a possibility that U.S. imports of

silicon metal from Japan and Korea, two countries with no known silicon metal production at the time of

the original investigation, were of Chinese origin.46

Table I-11

Silicon metal: Chinese export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 7,213 9,227 6,504

Other Chinese export markets--

 Japan 134,858 139,755 143,989

 South Korea 24,537 31,457 28,531

 Netherlands 17,646 27,087 25,330

 Canada 11,954 26,236 23,768

 Taiwan 13,615 17,250 14,227

 Hong Kong 13,918 16,124 14,050

 India 11,302 11,790 11,324

 Russia 3,478 8,236 10,138

 Mexico 1,461 4,302 8,531

 United Kingdom 2,182 3,522 8,188

 All others 43,180 56,484 53,834

 Total 285,344 351,470 348,415

Table continued on next page. 
I-32

Table I-11--Continued

Silicon metal: Chinese export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 5,287 6,313 4,218

Other Chinese export markets--

 Japan 106,919 105,524 102,245

 South Korea 19,496 22,962 19,719

 Netherlands 13,824 20,678 18,147

 Canada 9,497 20,080 16,853

 Taiwan 10,658 12,098 9,764

 Hong Kong 10,091 10,828 9,095

 India 8,437 8,226 7,324

 Russia 2,852 6,122 7,210

 Mexico 1,149 3,324 5,814

 United Kingdom 1,991 2,921 7,187

 All others 33,978 42,199 37,882

 Total 224,179 261,275 245,456

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $733 $684 $648

Other Chinese export markets--

 Japan 793 755 710

 South Korea 795 730 691

 Netherlands 783 763 716

 Canada 794 765 709

 Taiwan 783 701 686

 Hong Kong 725 672 647

 India 747 698 647

 Russia 820 743 711

 Mexico 787 773 682

 United Kingdom 912 829 878

 All others 787 747 704

 Average 786 743 704

Table continued on next page. 
I-33

Table I-11--Continued

Silicon metal: Chinese export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 2.5 2.6 1.9

Other Chinese export markets--

 Japan 47.3 39.8 41.3

 South Korea 8.6 9.0 8.2

 Netherlands 6.2 7.7 7.3

 Canada 4.2 7.5 6.8

 Taiwan 4.8 4.9 4.1

 Hong Kong 4.9 4.6 4.0

 India 4.0 3.4 3.3

 Russia 1.2 2.3 2.9

 Mexico 0.5 1.2 2.4

 United Kingdom 0.8 1.0 2.4

 All others 15.1 16.1 15.5

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Share of value (percent)

2.4 2.4 1.7

Other Chinese export markets--

 Japan 47.7 40.4 41.7

 South Korea 8.7 8.8 8.0

 Netherlands 6.2 7.9 7.4

 Canada 4.2 7.7 6.9

 Taiwan 4.8 4.6 4.0

 Hong Kong 4.5 4.1 3.7

 India 3.8 3.1 3.0

 Russia 1.3 2.3 2.9

 Mexico 0.5 1.3 2.4

 United Kingdom 0.9 1.1 2.9

 All others 15.2 16.2 15.4

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note.–Exports to the United States from China reported in the GTA® are higher than reported U.S. imports of silicon

metal from China. The following tabulation presents the quantities of U.S. imports of silicon metal based on official

Commerce statistics and exports from China to the United States:

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics

 (short tons contained silicon) 3,237 4,958 4,292

GTA® statistics on exports from China

 (short tons contained silicon) 7,213 9,227 6,504

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 
 47 The average production capacity reported by Invensil was *** percent of nameplate capacity as reported in the

***. Invensil indicated that ***. Ferropem/Invensil’s foreign producer questionnaire response, section II-6.

I-34

Figure I-6

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of Chinese exports, 2001

Source: Table I-11.

France

According to *** data, France accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). Ferropem, the successor firm to Invensil, submitted a response to the

Commission’s foreign producer questionnaire in this remand investigation. Invensil was the only

producer of silicon metal in France during the period of the original investigation. Table I-12 presents

data on the silicon metal industry in France between January 1999 and September 2002. 

Table I-12

Silicon metal: French total capacity, production, inventories, and shipments, 1999-2001, JanuarySeptember 2001, and January-September 2002

* * * * * * *

Invensil increased its capacity to produce silicon metal by *** percent between 1999 and 2000

and *** percent between 2000 and 2001.47 Invensil did not report its capacity for the partial periods

January to September 2001 and January to September 2002. Invensil also increased its production by ***

percent between 1999 and 2000, and by *** percent between 2000 and 2001. Invensil reported ***

percent higher production of silicon metal in January to September 2002 than in January to September

2001. Since production increased by *** than capacity, Invensil’s capacity utilization decreased from

*** percent in 1999 to *** percent in 2001. The data indicate that Invensil had an increasing, but ***

Japan

41.3

Korea South

8.2

United Kingdom

2.4

All other

United States 15.5

1.9

Taiwan

4.1

Hong Kong

4.0

India

3.3

Russia

2.9

Mexico

2.4

Canada

6.8 Netherlands

7.3
 48 See table I-3.

 49 Ibid.

 50 GTIS receives European data from Eurostat for its GTA® database. Eurostat suppresses some countries’

import and export data based on concerns over confidentiality.

 51 The following tabulation compares U.S. imports of silicon metal from France and reported exports of silicon

metal from France by Invensil:

 Calendar year January to September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

U.S. imports 2,397 2 1 1 1

Invensil exports *** *** *** *** ***

According to Invensil, some of the material reported in its exports are ***, which might explain why exports as

reported by Invensil are *** than material reported in U.S. imports near the end of the original period of

investigation. 

 52 The export to consumption ratio for France ranged between *** over the original period of investigation,

which means that the French industry exported approximately as much silicon metal that it consumed internally.

 53 Ferropem’s/ Invensil’s foreign producer’s questionnaire response, question II-6.

 54 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Berlin, unclassified BERLIN 000206, February 1, 2007. 

 55 E-mail from ***, January 22, 2007.

 56 See table I-3. 

I-35

excess capacity of *** short tons contained silicon in 1999, *** short tons contained silicon in 2000, and

*** short tons contained silicon in 2001. The unused capacity in France represented approximately ***

percent of U.S. imports from Russia in 1999, *** percent of U.S. imports from Russia in 2000, and ***

percent of U.S. import from Russia in 2001.48 

U.S. imports of silicon metal from France were 2,397 short tons in 1999, three short tons in 2000,

and 25 short tons in 2001.49 The GTA® does not report any exports from France under the HTS

subheading for silicon metal.50 The trend in exports reported by Invensil, the only known French silicon

metal producer during the original period of investigation, corresponds to the trend reported in U.S.

imports of silicon metal from France.51 The French industry has an exports to consumption ratio ***.52

While data on total exports of silicon metal from France are not available from GTA, Invensil, the only

known producer of silicon metal in France, reports that exports from France to markets other than the

United States accounted for *** short tons in 1999, *** short tons in 2000, and *** short tons in 2001. 

Invensil indicated that its principal export markets are ***.53 

Germany

According to *** data, Germany accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). RW Silicium, the only known producer of silicon metal in Germany,

declined to provide the Commission with a response to the foreign producer questionnaire after

consultation with the EU industry association Euroalliage based in Belgium.54 55 *** data indicate that

the industry in Germany increased its capacity to produce silicon metal by *** percent between 1999 and

2000, and then again increased capacity by *** percent between 2000 and 2001.56 The German industry

increased its capacity utilization from *** percent in 1999 to *** percent in 2000, and then had decreased

its capacity utilization to *** percent in 2001. 
 57 GTIS receives European data from Eurostat for its GTA® database. Eurostat suppresses some countries’

import and export data based on concerns over confidentiality. 

 58 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Berlin, unclassified BERLIN 000206, February 1, 2007.

 59 ***, received by fax, January 17, 2007.

 60 Metalleghe foreign producer questionnaire response. 

 61 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Rome, Unclassified ROME 000233, February 5, 2007. 

 62 See table I-3. Data are not available on the degree to which the industry further processes or purifies the

silicon metal it produces into product used in the semiconductor industry.

 63 See table I-3.

I-36

The GTA® did not report any exports of silicon metal from Germany.57 The U.S. Department of

State provided the Commission with some data on exports of silicon metal from Germany; however, these

data were for both subject (HTS subheading 2804.69) and nonsubject (HTS subheading 2804.61)

products combined.58

Italy

*** reported capacity and production of silicon metal in Italy in 1999 and 2000, but indicated

discontinued operations beginning in 2001 (see table I-3).59 Metalleghe Group submitted a foreign

producer questionnaire response to the Commission indicating that ***.60 In response to the

Commission’s request for information from the U.S. embassy in Rome, the U.S. State Department

indicated that:

“the Italian Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) confirmed the existence of one Italian company

which produces silicon, but declined to name the company for confidentiality reasons. 

They also refused to release production data because the release of these data would

violate ISTAT rules regarding releasing company-specific data. The company is likely

the Metalleghe Group, the Italian company which controls the Bosnian company B.S.I.

d.o.o., mentioned in reftel. The Metalleghe Group (http://www.metalleghegroup.com/)

owns companies in Italy, France, Hungary, Romania and Bosnia-Herzegovina and

focuses on re-carburizing products and raw materials for the steel industry, especially the

production of recarburizers on a carbon basis, the production of ferroalloy briquettes for

cast iron foundries, and the sale of ferroalloys.”61

Norway

According to *** data, Norway accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). The industry in Norway increased its capacity to produce silicon metal by

*** percent between 1999 and 2000, and then again increased its capacity by *** percent between 2000

and 2001.62 The Norwegian industry increased its capacity utilization over the original period of

investigation. Norway had a decreasing amount of excess capacity between 1999 and 2001. 

In the original period of investigation, U.S. imports of silicon metal from Norway were 8,050

short tons in 1999, 3,293 short tons in 2000, and 5,114 short tons in 2001.63 Trends reported in U.S.
 64 However, the reported Norwegian exports are greater than reported U.S. imports in 1999 and slightly lower in

both 2000 and 2001. 

 65 The export to consumption ratio for Norway ranged between *** over the original period of investigation,

which means that the Norwegian industry exported approximately *** times the amount of silicon metal that firms in

Norway apparently consumed. 

 66 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Oslo, unclassified OSLO 000095, February 1, 2007. 

I-37

imports of silicon metal from Norway correspond to the trends in Norwegian exports to the United States

reported in the GTA® database. 64 The Norwegian industry has *** exports to consumption ratio.65 

Table I-13 presents data on exports of silicon metal from Norway between 1999 and 2001, and

figure I-7 presents shares for Norwegian exports of silicon metal in 2001. Other European nations

(Germany, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) are

Norway’s primary export markets and accounted for 83.3 percent of Norwegian exports in 2001. The

average unit values of Norwegian exports to other European nations were lower than the average unit

values of Norwegian exports to the United States. 

The U.S. Department of State was also able to gather data on the production, capacity, and

shipments of silicon metal from the only two known Norwegian producers, Fesil and Elkem, and the data

are presented in table I-14.66
I-38

Table I-13

Silicon metal: Norwegian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 6,687 3,693 5,736

Other Norwegian export markets--

 Germany 66,217 75,706 66,413

 United Kingdom 31,432 34,548 38,292

 Japan 13,694 15,393 15,107

 France 8,886 7,600 9,893

 Netherlands 4,556 3,642 8,132

 Italy 3,089 3,599 6,307

 Sweden 3,407 3,670 4,112

 United Arab Emirates 6,174 8,550 3,343

 Denmark 2,807 2,607 2,557

 Finland 2,446 2,193 1,940

 All other 4,173 6,024 3,430

 Total 153,568 167,226 165,261

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 9,243 5,069 7,748

Other Norwegian export markets--

 Germany 80,153 77,919 67,949

 United Kingdom 40,290 35,889 40,600

 Japan 21,390 21,973 20,012

 France 10,037 7,376 9,703

 Netherlands 5,050 3,426 7,246

 Italy 3,348 3,466 6,551

 Sweden 3,938 3,763 4,160

 United Arab Emirates 7,243 8,974 3,377

 Denmark 3,038 2,808 2,649

 Finland 2,700 2,230 1,994

 All other 4,342 5,138 3,516

 Total 190,771 178,032 175,505

Table continued on next page. 
I-39

Table I-13--Continued

Silicon metal: Norwegian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $1,382 $1,373 $1,351

Other Norwegian export markets--

 Germany 1,210 1,029 1,023

 United Kingdom 1,282 1,039 1,060

 Japan 1,562 1,427 1,325

 France 1,130 971 981

 Netherlands 1,108 941 891

 Italy 1,084 963 1,039

 Sweden 1,156 1,025 1,012

 United Arab Emirates 1,173 1,050 1,010

 Denmark 1,082 1,077 1,036

 Finland 1,104 1,017 1,028

 All other 1,040 853 1,025

 Average 1,242 1,065 1,062

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 4.4 2.2 3.5

Other Norwegian export markets--

 Germany 43.1 45.3 40.2

 United Kingdom 20.5 20.7 23.2

 Japan 8.9 9.2 9.1

 France 5.8 4.5 6.0

 Netherlands 3.0 2.2 4.9

 Italy 2.0 2.2 3.8

 Sweden 2.2 2.2 2.5

 United Arab Emirates 4.0 5.1 2.0

 Denmark 1.8 1.6 1.5

 Finland 1.6 1.3 1.2

 All other 2.7 3.6 2.1

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table continued on next page. 
I-40

Table I-13--Continued

Silicon metal: Norwegian export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of value (percent)

United States 4.8 2.8 4.4

Other Norwegian export markets--

 Germany 42.0 43.8 38.7

 United Kingdom 21.1 20.2 23.1

 Japan 11.2 12.3 11.4

 France 5.3 4.1 5.5

 Netherlands 2.6 1.9 4.1

 Italy 1.8 1.9 3.7

 Sweden 2.1 2.1 2.4

 United Arab Emirates 3.8 5.0 1.9

 Denmark 1.6 1.6 1.5

 Finland 1.4 1.3 1.1

 All other 2.3 2.9 2.0

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note.–Exports to the United States from Norway reported in the GTA® follow the same trends as U.S. imports of

silicon metal in official Commerce statistics. The following tabulation presents the quantities of U.S. imports of

silicon metal based on official Commerce statistics and exports from Norway to the United States.

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics

 (short tons contained silicon) 8,050 3,293 5,114

GTA® statistics on exports from Norway

 (short tons contained silicon) 6,687 3,693 5,736

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 

Table I-14

Silicon metal: Norwegian total capacity, production, inventories, and shipments, 1999-2001,

January-September 2001, and January-September 2002

* * * * * * *
 67 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Pretoria, unclassified PRETORIA 000436, February 6, 2007. 

I-41

Figure I-7

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of Norwegian exports, 2001

Source: Table I-13.

Saudi Arabia

*** reported production of silicon metal in Saudi Arabia in 1999 and 2000, but indicated

operations were discontinued beginning in 2001 (see table I-3). 

South Africa

According to *** data, South Africa accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon

metal during 2001 (see table I-3). As reported by the U.S. embassy in Pretoria, Silicon Smelters is the

only producer of silicon metal in South Africa, and the firm “has never faced any antidumping duties or

quantitative restrictions in foreign markets.”67 In addition, Silicon Smelters submitted a response to the

foreign producer questionnaire in this remand investigation, and the data are presented in table I-15.

Table I-15

Silicon metal: South African total capacity, production, inventories, and shipments, 1999-2001,

January-September 2001, and January-September 2002

* * * * * * *

Germany

40.2

United Kingdom

23.2

Denmark

1.5

All other

2.1

Finland

1.2

Netherlands

4.9

Italy

3.8

United States

3.5 Sweden

2.5

United Arab 

Emirates

2.0

France

6.0

Japan

9.1
 68 Silicon Smelters indicated that “***.” Silicon Smelters’ foreign producer questionnaire response, section II-6. 

 The average production capacity reported by Silicon Smelters was *** than the nameplate capacity reported in

*** data in 1999, which may be explained by the reported ***. 

 69 See table I-3.

 70 The following tabulation compares U.S. imports of silicon metal from South Africa and reported exports of

silicon metal from South Africa by Silicon Smelters (quantities reported in short tons contained silicon):

 Calendar year January to September

1999 2000 2001 2001 2002

U.S. imports 28,184 40,329 35,305 29,690 26,731

Silicon Smelters exports *** *** *** *** ***

 71 The export to consumption ratio for South Africa ranged between *** over the original period of investigation. 

 72 Silicon Smelters’ foreign producer questionnaire response, section II-6.

I-42

Silicon Smelters increased its capacity to produce silicon metal by *** percent between 1999 and

2000 and decreased its capacity by *** percent between 2000 and 2001.68 Silicon Smelters’ capacity ***

by *** percent during January-September 2002 when compared to January-September 2001. Silicon

Smelters also *** its production by *** percent between 1999 and 2000, and *** its production ***

between 2000 and 2001 (*** percent). Production of silicon metal decreased *** percent during JanuarySeptember 2002 when compared to the same period in 2001. Capacity utilization fluctuated from ***

percent in 1999 to *** percent in 2000, and *** percent in 2001. Excess capacity amounted to *** short

tons contained silicon in 1999, *** short tons contained silicon in 2000, *** short tons contained silicon

in 2001, and *** short tons during January-September 2002. 

U.S. imports of silicon metal from South Africa were 28,184 short tons contained silicon in 1999,

40,329 short tons in 2000, and 35,305 short tons in 2001.69 Except for the misreported material identified

in GTA® data for exports of silicon metal from South Africa in 2001, U.S. imports of silicon metal from

South Africa, GTA® data on South African exports and Silicon Smelters’ reported exports to the United

States are consistent and indicate that South African silicon metal was present in the U.S. market during

the original period of investigation between approximately 25,000 to 35,000 short tons, in increasing

amounts between 1999 and 2001.70 The South African industry had an exports to consumption ratio

greater than *** in each calendar year of the original investigation.71

Table I-15 presents data on exports of silicon metal from South Africa between 1999 and 2001

and figure I-8 presents shares of South African exports of silicon metal in 2001. Silicon Smelters, the

only known South African producer of silicon metal, primarily supplied its production to the United

States. Silicon Smelters indicated that its principal export markets besides the United States were ***.72
I-43

Table I-16

Silicon metal: South African export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 25,349 36,626 26,731

Other South African export markets--

 Netherlands 2,094 930 3,972

 United Kingdom 4,511 11,231 3,073

 Germany 1,841 1,872 2,408

 Japan 402 2,865 1,591

 All others 2,721 171 314

 Total 36,917 53,695 38,089

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 24,636 32,143 26,976

Other South African export markets-- 0 0 0

 Netherlands 517 333 1,129

 United Kingdom 4,403 5,638 2,864

 Germany 2,342 1,059 1,489

 Japan 872 2,054 2,410

 All others 3,374 349 533

 Total 36,144 41,575 35,401

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $972 $878 $1,009

Other South African export markets--

 Netherlands 247 358 284

 United Kingdom 976 502 932

 Germany 1,272 566 618

 Japan 2,172 717 1,515

 All others 1,240 2,035 1,695

 Average 979 774 929

Table continued on next page. 
I-44

Table I-16--Continued

Silicon metal: South African export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 68.7 68.2 70.2

Other South African export markets-- 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Netherlands 5.7 1.7 10.4

 United Kingdom 12.2 20.9 8.1

 Germany 5.0 3.5 6.3

 Japan 1.1 5.3 4.2

 All others 7.4 0.3 0.8

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Share of value (percent)

United States 68.2 77.3 76.2

Other South African export markets-- 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Netherlands 1.4 0.8 3.2

 United Kingdom 12.2 13.6 8.1

 Germany 6.5 2.5 4.2

 Japan 2.4 4.9 6.8

 All others 9.3 0.8 1.5

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note.–Exports to the United States from South Africa reported in the GTA® presented in this table follow the same

trend of U.S. imports from South Africa in official Commerce statistics, with the exception of the material or entry(ies)

the South African Customs must have mistakenly entered in 2001. The following tabulation presents the quantities

of U.S. imports of silicon metal based on official Commerce statistics and exports from South Africa to the United

States:

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics,

 (short tons contained silicon) 28,184 40,329 35,305

GTA® statistics on exports from South Africa

 (short tons contained silicon) 25,866 37,373 668,2011

 1 Staff was not able to back out the misreported South African exports to the United States under the HTS

subheading 2804.69 as was done in table I-7 and explained in footnote 2 of that table because the South African

Trade Ministry website did not provide for a query that reports exports by quantity for the 2804.69 HTS subheading

broken out by destination. Instead, staff substituted reported U.S. imports from South Africa (see table I-2) for

exports from South Africa of silicon metal in 2001. 

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 
I-45

Figure I-8

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of South African exports, 2001

Source: Table I-16.

Spain

According to *** data, Spain accounted for *** percent of world production of silicon metal

during 2001 (see table I-3). The industry in Spain had a capacity to produce approximately *** short tons

of silicon metal over the original period of investigation, and was operating at *** percent capacity

utilization in 1999 and then at *** percent capacity utilization in 2000 and 2001. 

Table I-17 presents data on exports of silicon metal from Spain between 1999 and 2001 and

figure I-9 presents shares of Spanish exports of silicon metal in 2001. Europe is Spain’s primary export

market.

United Kingdom

20.9

Japan

5.3

Germany

3.5

Netherlands

United States 1.7

68.2

All others

0.3
I-46

Table I-17

Silicon metal: Spanish export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Quantity (short tons contained silicon)

United States 500 3 2,269

Other Spanish export markets--

United Kingdom 6,009 9,533 6,116

Germany 4,515 2,517 4,102

France 2,208 1,326 1,262

Italy 2,210 2,461 998

Portugal 230 303 283

All others 518 481 114

 Total 16,189 16,624 15,144

Value (1,000 dollars)

United States 527 19 2,126

Other Spanish export markets--

United Kingdom 5,946 9,338 6,254

Germany 4,379 2,481 3,866

France 2,478 1,341 1,308

Italy 2,162 2,501 1,026

Portugal 298 388 330

All others 472 474 102

 Total 16,261 16,542 15,012

Unit value (per short ton)

United States $1,054 $7,290 $937

Other Spanish export markets--

United Kingdom 990 979 1,023

Germany 970 986 942

France 1,122 1,011 1,036

Italy 978 1,016 1,028

Portugal 1,297 1,283 1,165

All others 911 985 898

 Total 1,004 995 991

Table continued on next page. 
I-47

Table I-17--Continued

Silicon metal: Spanish export markets, 1999-2001

Market

1999 2000 2001

Share of quantity (percent)

United States 3.1 (1

) 15.0

Other Spanish export markets--

United Kingdom 37.1 57.3 40.4

Germany 27.9 15.1 27.1

France 13.6 8.0 8.3

Italy 13.7 14.8 6.6

Portugal 1.4 1.8 1.9

All others 3.2 2.9 0.8

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Share of value (percent)

United States 3.2 0.1 14.2

Other Spanish export markets--

United Kingdom 36.6 56.4 41.7

Germany 26.9 15.0 25.8

France 15.2 8.1 8.7

Italy 13.3 15.1 6.8

Portugal 1.8 2.3 2.2

All others 2.9 2.9 0.7

 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

 1 Less than 0.05 percent.

Note.–Exports to the United States from Spain reported in the GTA® follow the same trend as U.S. imports of silicon

metal from Spain in official Commerce statistics. The following tabulation presents the quantities of U.S. imports of

silicon metal based on official Commerce statistics and exports from Spain to the United States

1999 2000 2001

Official Commerce statistics

 (short tons contained silicon) 942 0 3,453

GTA® statistics on exports from Spain

 (short tons contained silicon) 500 3 2,269

Source: HTS subheading 2804.69 of the Global Trade Atlas®, Global Trade Information Services, Inc.,

www.gtis.com, retrieved January 24, 2007. 
 73 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, unclassified KYIV 000220, January 31, 2007. 

 74 Ibid.

I-48

Figure I-9

Silicon metal: Market shares (in percent) of Spanish exports, 2001

Source: Table I-17.

Ukraine

The U.S. Department of State indicated in its response to the Commission’s request for

information that Zaporizhskiy Titanium-Magnesium Combine (“ZTMC”) was known to produce silicon

metal in the Ukraine prior to the original period of investigation but ceased these operations in 1998.73

The U.S. Department of State continued by stating that “{a}lthough ZTMC halted silicon production in

1998, other firms have tried to use ZTMC’s facilities to produce some silicon. From 1999-2004, several

foreign companies rented the silicon-production facilities at ZTMC, including the Russian firm Grafi...

Serhiy Terekhov, Chief Engineer of the semiconductor plant, estimated that ZTMC facilities produced

approximately three to four tons of silicon metal (of various types) per month during 1999-2002.”74

These estimated quantities would indicate an estimated production of only 36 to 48 short tons of silicon

per year during the original period of investigation. 

All others

0.8

Portugal

1.9

United 

Kingdom

40.4

Italy

6.6

France

8.3

United 

States

15.0

UAE

6.9
Public Version

A-1

APPENDIX A

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICES

14260 Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 56 / Monday, March 24, 2003 / Notices 

1The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the 

Commission’s rules of practice and procedure (19 

CFR 207.2(f)).

2Chairman Okun did not participate in this 

investigation.

3For purposes of this investigation, the 

Department of Commerce has defined the subject 

merchandise as ‘‘silicon metal, which generally 

contains at least 96.00 percent but less than 99.99 

percent silicon by weight. The merchandise covered 

by this investigation also includes silicon metal 

from Russia containing between 89.00 and 96.00 

percent silicon by weight, but containing more 

aluminum than the silicon metal which contains at 

least 96.00 percent but less than 99.99 percent 

silicon by weight.’’

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation No. 731–TA–991 (Final)] 

Silicon Metal From Russia 

Determination 

On the basis of the record 1 developed 

in the subject investigation, the United 

States International Trade Commission 

(Commission) determines,2 pursuant to 

section 735(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 

(19 U.S.C. 1673d(b)) (the Act), that an 

industry in the United States is 

materially injured by reason of imports 

from Russia of silicon metal,3 provided 

for in subheadings 2804.69.10 and 

2804.69.50 of the Harmonized Tariff 

Schedule of the United States, that have 

been found by the Department of 

Commerce (Commerce) to be sold in the 

United States at less than fair value 

(LTFV). The Commission further 

determines that critical circumstances 

do not exist with regard to imports of 

silicon metal from Russia that are 

subject to Commerce’s affirmative 

critical circumstances determination.

Background 

The Commission instituted this 

investigation effective March 7, 2002, 

following receipt of a petition filed with 

the Commission and Commerce by 

Globe Metallurgical Inc., Cleveland, OH; 

SIMCALA, Inc., Mt. Meigs, AL; the 

International Union of Electronic, 

Electrical, Salaried, Machine and 

Furniture Workers (I.U.E.–C.W.A, AFL–

CIO, C.L.C., Local 693), Selma, AL; the 

Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical and 

Energy Workers International Union 

(Local 5–89), Boomer, WV; and the 

United Steel Workers of America (AFL–

CIO, Local 9436), Niagara Falls, NY. The 

final phase of the investigation was 

scheduled by the Commission following 

notification of a preliminary 

determination by Commerce that 

imports of silicon metal from Russia 

were being sold at LTFV within the 

meaning of section 733(b) of the Act (19 

U.S.C. 1673b(b)). Notice of the 

scheduling of the final phase of the 

Commission’s investigation and of a 

public hearing to be held in connection 

therewith was given by posting copies 

of the notice in the Office of the 

Secretary, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, Washington, DC, and by 

publishing the notice in the Federal 

Register of September 30, 2002 (67 FR 

61351). The hearing was held in 

Washington, DC, on February 5, 2003, 

and all persons who requested the 

opportunity were permitted to appear in 

person or by counsel. 

The Commission transmitted its 

determination in this investigation to 

the Secretary of Commerce on March 19, 

2003. The views of the Commission are 

contained in USITC Publication 3584 

(March 2003), entitled Silicon Metal 

from Russia: Investigation No. 731–TA–

991 (Final).

Issued: March 18, 2003.

By order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission.

[FR Doc. 03–6942 Filed 3–21–03; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 

[Docket No. ICR–1218–0215(2003)] 

Standards on Personal Protective 

Equipment (PPE) for Shipyard 

Employment (29 CFR part 1915, 

subpart I); Extension of the Office of 

Management and Budget’s Approval of 

Information Collection (Paperwork) 

Requirements

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Request for comment.

SUMMARY: OSHA solicits comments 

concerning its proposal to decrease the 

existing burden-hour estimates, and to 

extend the Office of Management and 

Budget’s (OMB) approval of the 

information-collection requirements 

contained in its Standards on Personal 

Protective Equipment (PPE) for 

Shipyard Employment (29 CFR part 

1915, subpart I).1 The Standards require

1242 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 6 / Wednesday, January 10, 2007 / Notices 

Manufacture, Inc., P.J. Flooring 

Distributor, R.A.H. Carpet Supplies, 

Inc., Salvage Building Material, Inc., 

Stalheim (USA), Inc., Universal Floor 

Covering, Inc., and Vegas Laminate 

Hardwood Floors LLC. 

The Commission has determined that 

the public interest factors enumerated in 

19 U.S.C. 1337(d), (f), and (g) do not 

preclude issuance of the aforementioned 

remedial orders, and that the bond 

during the Presidential period of review 

shall be set at 100 percent of the entered 

value for any covered laminated floor 

panels. 

The authority for the Commission’s 

determinations is contained in section 

337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), and in 

sections 210.45–210.51 of the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure (19 CFR 210.45–210.51). 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: January 5, 2007. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E7–190 Filed 1–9–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Inv. No. 337–TA–580] 

In the Matter of Certain Peripheral 

Devices and Components Thereof and 

Products Containing Same; Notice of a 

Commission Determination Not To 

Review an Initial Determination 

Terminating the Investigation 

AGENCY: U.S. International Trade 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the U.S. International Trade 

Commission has determined not to 

review an initial determination (‘‘ID’’) of 

the presiding administrative law judge 

(‘‘ALJ’’) terminating the above-captioned 

investigation under section 337 of the 

Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337). The 

Commission has terminated the 

investigation based on settlement and 

licensing agreements. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Clint Gerdine, Esq., telephone 202–708–

2310, Office of the General Counsel, 

U.S. International Trade Commission, 

500 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 

20436. Copies of all nonconfidential 

documents filed in connection with this 

investigation are or will be available for 

inspection during official business 

hours (8:45 a.m. to 5:15 p.m.) in the 

Office of the Secretary, U.S. 

International Trade Commission, 500 E 

Street SW., Washington, DC 20436, 

telephone 202–205–2000. General 

information concerning the Commission 

may also be obtained by accessing its 

Internet server (http://www.usitc.gov). 

The public record for this investigation 

may be viewed on the Commission’s 

electronic docket (EDIS) at http:// 

edis.usitc.gov. Hearing-impaired 

persons are advised that information on 

the matter can be obtained by contacting 

the Commission’s TDD terminal on 202–

205–1810. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Commission instituted this investigation 

on September 6, 2006, based on a 

complaint filed on August 1, 2006, by 

Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, 

Washington. 71 FR 52578. The 

complaint alleges violations of section 

337 in the importation into the United 

States, the sale for importation, and the 

sale within the United States after 

importation of certain peripheral 

devices and components thereof and 

products containing same by reason of 

infringement of U.S. Patent No. 

6,460,094 and U.S. Patent No. 

6,795,949. The complaint further alleges 

that an industry in the United States 

exists as required by subsection (a)(2) of 

section 337. The complaint named a 

single respondent: Belkin Corporation of 

Compton, California. The complaint 

further alleged that an industry in the 

United States exists as required by 

subsection (a)(2) of section 337. 

On November 30, 2006, the 

complainant and the only respondent 

filed a joint motion to terminate the 

investigation on the basis of settlement 

and licensing agreements. The 

Commission Investigative Attorney filed 

a response in support of the motion on 

December 11, 2006. 

The ALJ issued the subject ID on 

December 19, 2006, granting the joint 

motion for termination. No party 

petitioned for review of the ID pursuant 

to 19 CFR 210.43(a), and the 

Commission found no basis for ordering 

a review on its own initiative pursuant 

to 19 CFR 210.44. The Commission has 

determined not to review the ID. 

The authority for the Commission’s 

determination is contained in section 

337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), and in 

sections 210.21(a)(2), (b) and 

210.42(h)(3) of the Commission’s Rules 

of Practice and Procedure. 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: January 4, 2007. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E7–122 Filed 1–9–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation No. 731–TA–991 (Final) 

(Remand)] 

Silicon Metal From Russia; Notice and 

Scheduling of Remand Proceeding 

AGENCY: International Trade 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The United States 

International Trade Commission 

(Commission) gives notice of the courtordered remand of its final antidumping 

duty investigation No. 731–TA–991 

(Final) (Remand). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: June 

B. Brown, Esq., Office of the General 

Counsel, telephone (202) 205–3042, or 

Diane Mazur, Office of Investigations, 

telephone (202) 205–3184, 500 E Street, 

SW., Washington, DC 20436, U.S. 

International Trade Commission. 

Hearing-impaired individuals are 

advised that information on this matter 

can be obtained by contacting the 

Commission’s TDD terminal on (202) 

205–1810. General information 

concerning the Commission may also be 

obtained by accessing its Internet server 

(http://www.usitc.gov). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reopening the Record 

In March 2003, the Commission made 

a final affirmative determination in the 

referenced investigation. The 

determination was appealed to the U.S. 

Court of International Trade (CIT), 

which affirmed the Commission upon 

remand, and was then appealed to the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit, which vacated and remanded 

the Commission’s determination. Bratsk 

Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 

F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On August 

17, 2006, the CIT issued an order 

remanding the case to the Commission 

to comply with the Federal Circuit’s 

decision in Bratsk. By order of 

September 22, 2006, the remand 

proceeding was stayed upon the 

Commission’s motion. On December 22, 

2006, the CIT issued an order lifting the 

stay and giving the Commission 90 days 

to issue its remand determination. 

In order to assist it in making its 

determination on remand, the 

Commission is reopening the record on 

remand in this investigation to include 

additional information on the role of 

non-subject imports of silicon metal in 

the U.S. market during the original 

period of investigation. The record in 

this proceeding will encompass the 

material from the record of the original 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 6 / Wednesday, January 10, 2007 / Notices 1243 

1The record is defined in sec. 207.2(f) of the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 

CFR 207.2(f)). 

2Chairman Daniel R. Pearson and Commissioner 

Deanna Tanner Okun dissenting with respect to 

Brazil and Spain. 

investigation and additional information 

placed by Commission staff on the 

record during this remand proceeding. 

Participation in the Proceeding 

Only those persons who were 

interested parties in the original 

administrative proceeding and are 

parties to the ongoing litigation (i.e., 

persons listed on the Commission 

Secretary’s service list and parties to 

Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United 

States, Consol. Ct. No. 03–00200) may 

participate as interested parties in this 

remand proceeding. 

Nature of the Remand Proceeding 

On February 16, 2007, the 

Commission will make available to 

parties who are participating in the 

remand proceeding information that has 

been gathered by the Commission as 

part of this remand proceeding. These 

parties may file comments on or before 

February 27, 2007 on the legal issues 

raised in Bratsk with respect to nonsubject imports and on the information 

on the record that is relevant to how the 

Commission addresses these issues in 

its remand determination. No additional 

new factual information may be 

included in such comments. Such 

comments shall not exceed 25 doublespaced pages. 

All written submissions must conform 

with the provisions of section 201.8 of 

the Commission’s rules; any 

submissions that contain business 

proprietary information (BPI) must also 

conform with the requirements of 

sections 201.6, 207.3, and 207.7 of the 

Commission’s rules. The Commission’s 

rules do not authorize filing 

submissions with the Secretary by 

facsimile or electronic means, except to 

the extent permitted by section 201.8 of 

the Commission’s rules, as amended, 67 

FR 68036 (November 8, 2002). Even 

where electronic filing of a document is 

permitted, certain documents must also 

be filed in paper form, as specified in II 

(C) of the Commission’s Handbook on 

Electronic Filing Procedures, 67 FR 

68168, 68173 (November 8, 2002). Each 

document filed by a party participating 

in the remand investigation must be 

served on all other parties who may 

participate in the remand investigation 

(as identified by either the public or BPI 

service list), and a certificate of service 

must be timely filed. The Secretary will 

not accept a document for filing without 

a certificate of service. Parties are also 

advised to consult the Commission’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedure, part 

201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 

201), and part 207, subpart A (19 CFR 

part 207), for provisions of general 

applicability concerning written 

submissions to the Commission. 

Limited Disclosure of Business 

Proprietary Information (BPI) Under an 

Administrative Protective Order (APO) 

and BPI Service List 

Information obtained during the 

remand investigation will be released to 

the referenced parties, as appropriate, 

under the administrative protective 

order (APO) in effect in the original 

investigation. A separate service list will 

be maintained by the Secretary for those 

parties authorized to receive BPI under 

the APO in this remand investigation. 

Authority: This action is taken under the 

authority of the Tariff Act of 1930, title VII. 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: January 4, 2007. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E7–187 Filed 1–9–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation Nos. 731–TA–678, 679, 681, 

and 682 (Second Review)] 

Stainless Steel Bar From Brazil, India, 

Japan, And Spain 

Determinations 

On the basis of the record1 developed 

in the subject five-year reviews, the 

United States International Trade 

Commission (Commission) determines, 

pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff 

Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1675(c)) (the 

Act), that revocation of the antidumping 

duty orders on stainless steel bar from 

Brazil, India, Japan, and Spain would be 

likely to lead to continuation or 

recurrence of material injury to an 

industry in the United States within a 

reasonably foreseeable time.2

Background 

The Commission instituted these 

reviews on March 1, 2006 (71 FR 10552) 

and determined on June 5, 2006 that it 

would conduct full reviews (71 FR 

34391, June 14, 2006). Notice of the 

scheduling of the Commission’s reviews 

and of a public hearing to be held in 

connection therewith was given by 

posting copies of the notice in the Office 

of the Secretary, U.S. International 

Trade Commission, Washington, DC, 

and by publishing the notice in the 

Federal Register on June 20, 2006 (71 

FR 36359). The hearing was held in 

Washington, DC, on October 12, 2006, 

and all persons who requested the 

opportunity were permitted to appear in 

person or by counsel. 

The Commission transmitted its 

determinations in these reviews to the 

Secretary of Commerce on January 5, 

2007. The views of the Commission are 

contained in USITC Publication 3895 

(January, 2007), entitled Stainless Steel 

Bar from Brazil, India, Japan, and Spain: 

Investigation Nos. 731–TA–678, 679, 

681, 682 (Second Review). 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: January 5, 2007. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E7–191 Filed 1–9–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Office of the Secretary 

Submission for OMB Review: 

Comment Request 

January 5, 2007. 

The Department of Labor (DOL) has 

submitted the following public 

information collection requests (ICR) to 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review and approval in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13, 

44 U.S.C. chapter 35). A copy of each 

ICR, with applicable supporting 

documentation, may be obtained from 

RegInfo.gov at http://www.reginfo.gov/ 

public/do/PRAMain or by contacting 

Darrin King on 202–693–4129 (this is 

not a toll-free number) / e-mail: 

king.darrin@dol.gov. 

Comments should be sent to Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Attn: OMB Desk Officer for the 

Employee Benefits Security 

Administration (EBSA), Office of 

Management and Budget, Room 10235, 

Washington, DC 20503, Telephone: 

202–395–7316 / Fax: 202–395–6974 

(these are not a toll-free numbers), 

within 30 days from the date of this 

publication in the Federal Register. 

The OMB is particularly interested in 

comments which: 

• Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

• Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES


Public Version

B-1

APPENDIX B

CIT ORDER AND CAFC DECISION





United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

05-1213 

BRATSK ALUMINIUM SMELTER, RUAL TRADE LIMITED, 

and GENERAL ELECTRIC SILICONES LLC, 

 Plaintiffs, 

and 

SUAL HOLDING and ZAO KREMNY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

GLOBE METALLURGICAL INC. and SIMCALA, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Frederick P. Waite, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, of Washington, DC, 

argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief was Kimberly R. Young. 

June B. Brown, Attorney, Office of General Counsel, United States International 

Trade Commission, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States. 

On the brief were James M. Lyons, General Counsel, Andrea C. Casson, Acting 

Assistant General Counsel, and Irene H. Chen, Attorney. 

William D. Kramer, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, of Washington, DC, 

argued for defendants-appellees Globe Metallurgical Inc. and Simcala, Inc. With him on 

the brief was Clifford E. Stevens, Jr. Of counsel was Martin Schaefermeier. 

Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade 

Senior Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas 
 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

05-1213 

BRATSK ALUMINIUM SMELTER, RUAL TRADE LIMITED, 

and GENERAL ELECTRIC SILICONES LLC, 

 Plaintiffs, 

and 

SUAL HOLDING and ZAO KREMNY, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

GLOBE METALLURGICAL INC. and SIMCALA, INC., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 ___________________________ 

 DECIDED: April 10, 2006 

 ___________________________ 

Before GAJARSA, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and DYK, Circuit 

Judge. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. Dissenting opinion filed by Senior 

Circuit Judge ARCHER. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

 SUAL Holding and ZAO Kremny (collectively “appellants”) appeal from the 

judgment of the United States Court of International Trade affirming the International 
Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) determination that domestic industry was 

materially injured by reason of silicon metal imports from Russia that were sold at less 

than fair market value (“LTFV”). We vacate the Court of International Trade’s decision 

and remand for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND 

In antidumping proceedings, the Commission is charged with determining 

whether an industry in the United States has suffered, or is threatened with, material 

injury by reason of imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (2000). Material injury 

determinations are particularly difficult where the imports sold at LTFV compete with 

identical imports not sold at LTFV. 

The product involved here is silicon metal. Silicon metal is a commodity product, 

meaning that it is generally interchangeable regardless of its source. Therefore, price is 

the primary consideration for purchasers of silicon metal. The market for silicon metal 

consists of three segments: chemical, primary aluminum, and secondary aluminum. 

During the pertinent time period there were ten countries, other than the United States, 

which supplied silicon metal to the U.S. market: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, 

Korea, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Spain. 

On March 7, 2002, Globe Metallurgical Inc., SIMCALA Inc., and several union 

groups filed an antidumping petition with the Commission and with the United States 

Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), alleging that Russian imports of silicon metal 

at LTFV had materially injured the domestic industry. On February 11, 2003, 

Commerce rendered its final determination that the subject imports were, or were likely 

05-1213 2 
to be, sold at LTFV. On March 24, 2003, the Commission determined that the domestic 

industry was materially injured by reason of the subject imports. 

The Commission relied on market data over a three-year period, 1999-2001, as 

well as data for specific periods between January-September 2001 and 2002, and, as 

required by the statute, considered subject import volume, the effect of subject imports 

on domestic prices, and the impact of subject imports on domestic producers. 19 

U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i), (C) (2000). First, the Commission found that subject import 

volume was significant and that subject import volume increased from 1999 to 2001, 

while domestic producers lost market share. The Commission also noted, however, 

that the domestic industry was able to satisfy only a portion of U.S. silicon metal 

demand.

The Commission next considered what effect subject imports had on domestic 

prices. The Commission noted that “price is very important in purchasing decisions, 

given the commodity-like nature of the subject product.” Using purchaser price data, 

the Commission found that during the period of investigation, subject imports almost 

always undersold the domestic product in all three market segments. In response to the 

argument that all imports, not just subject imports, undersold the domestic product, the 

Commission stated that “price data for nonsubject imports shows that imports from 

Russia have been priced at lower levels than nonsubject imports,” and concluded that 

“[i]n light of subject imports’ increasing volumes and their significant underselling of, and 

high substitutability with, both domestic and nonsubject silicon metal, we find significant 

price depression by the subject imports.” The Commission further noted: 

We recognize that nonsubject imports may have had an independent price 

depressive effect on domestic silicon metal prices. However, given the 

05-1213 3 
significant underselling by subject imports, subject import volume surges 

during the POI, and the high degree of substitutability between subject 

imports and the domestic product, we find that subject imports themselves 

have significantly depressed domestic silicon metal prices in all three 

customer segments . . . . 

 

Finally, the Commission turned to the impact of subject imports on domestic 

producers and concluded that, given the significant volume and price effects of the 

subject imports, subject imports had a significant adverse effect on the domestic 

industry. The Commission considered the domestic industry’s drop in market share, as 

well as the fact that certain silicon metal furnaces had been closed or converted for 

other uses. The Commission “acknowledge[d] that domestic industry lost market share 

to nonsubject imports as well,” but concluded that “[r]egardless of the impact of 

nonsubject imports on the domestic industry, we find, in this investigation, that the 

surges in subject import volume at prices that undersold and depressed domestic silicon 

metal prices to a significant degree during the POI had a material adverse impact on the 

domestic industry.”

 Appellants1

 argued that our decision in Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 

F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997) required a specific determination as to whether the nonsubject imports would simply replace the subject imports, with the same impact on 

domestic products, if the subject imports were excluded from the market. The 

Commission made no such determination and dismissed our decision in Gerald Metals

as being factually distinguishable. 

 1

 Plaintiffs below, Bratsk Aluminium Smelter and RUAL Trade Limited, filed a 

voluntary notice of dismissal on December 6, 2004, and are thus not parties to this 

appeal. However, the remaining plaintiffs, SUAL Holding and ZAO Kremny, continued 

in the litigation and are appellants in this case.

 

05-1213 4 
Appellants challenged several aspects of the Commission’s determination in the 

Court of International Trade, including whether the Russian imports actually caused 

injury to the domestic industry. The court made no ruling with respect to the causation 

issue but remanded the case to the Commission on an unrelated issue. The court 

noted that it would “consider the remaining issues raised by Plaintiffs upon review of the 

remand determination.” Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, No. 03-00200, 2004 

WL 1385848, at *11 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 22, 2004). On remand, the Commission 

incorporated its initial decision by reference and then clarified some of its findings. On 

December 3, 2004, the Court of International Trade affirmed the Commission’s remand 

determination “in its entirety” and dismissed the case, stating that “all other issues have 

been decided . . . .” SUAL Holding and ZAO Kremny timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). 

DISCUSSION 

The sole point of contention in this appeal is whether the Commission 

established that the injury to the domestic industry was “by reason of” the subject 

imports.2

I 

The antidumping statute states that the “Commission shall make a final 

determination of whether . . . an industry in the United States . . . is materially injured . . 

 2

 “We apply anew the standard of review applied by the Court of International 

Trade in its review of the administrative record. We therefore uphold the Commission’s 

determination unless it was arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial 

evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Timken U.S. Corp. v. 

United States, 421 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000). 

05-1213 5 
. . . by reason of imports . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (2000). In making this 

determination, the Commission must consider: 

(I) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, 

(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United 

States for domestic like products, and 

(III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of 

domestic like products, but only in the context of production operations 

within the United States . . . . 

19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i) (2000). “An affirmative injury determination requires both (1) 

present material injury and (2) a finding that the material injury is ‘by reason of’ the 

subject imports.” Gerald Metals, Inc., 132 F.3d at 719 (emphasis added). We have 

previously explained that the “by reason of” requirement “mandates a showing of 

causal—not merely temporal—connection between the LTFV goods and the material 

injury.” Id. at 720. We have not required the Commission to employ any particular 

methodology for determining whether this causation element has been met,3

 and the 

“Commission need not isolate the injury caused by other factors from injury caused by 

unfair imports . . . .” Taiwan Semiconductor Industry v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 266 F.3d 

1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting legislative history of the Uruguay Round 

Agreements Act); see also Nippon Steel Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1379, 

1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“‘[D]umping’ need not be the sole or principal cause of injury.”). 

However, we have made clear that causation is not shown if the subject imports 

contributed only “minimally or tangentially to the material harm.” Gerald Metals, 132 

 3

 In United States Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 

we noted that the Commission uses different methodologies in determining whether the 

domestic injury was “by reason of” the LTFV imports. Id. at 1361-62. We then found 

that the antidumping statute “on its face compels no [ ] uniform methodology, and we 

are not persuaded that we should create one, even were we so empowered.” Id. at 

1362. 

05-1213 6 
F.3d at 722; see also Nippon Steel Corp., 345 F.3d at 1381; U.S. Steel Group v. United 

States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

The Commission, like other federal agencies, “must examine the relevant data 

and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action . . . . Normally, an agency rule 

would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency . . . entirely fail[s] to consider an 

important aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Where commodity products are at issue and fairly 

traded, price competitive, non-subject imports are in the market, the Commission must 

explain why the elimination of subject imports would benefit the domestic industry 

instead of resulting in the non-subject imports’ replacement of the subject imports’ 

market share without any beneficial impact on domestic producers. 

 In Gerald Metals, the Commission determined that Ukranian imports of pure 

magnesium at LTFV injured the domestic industry. The Commission’s determination 

did not discuss whether non-subject imports, namely fairly-traded Russian imports, 

would have replaced all or a greater part of the subject imports. Three dissenting 

commissioners found that the presence of the non-subject imports undermined the 

causation determination. Magnesium from China, Russia, and Ukraine, U.S. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n Pub. 2885, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-696-698 at 29 (Chairman Watson, dissenting), 

35-36 (Vice Chairman Nuzum, dissenting), and 48 (Comm’r Crawford, dissenting) (May 

1995) (final). The dissenters noted that non-subject imports were perfect substitutes for 

the Ukranian subject imports and frequently undersold the domestic product just as the 

Ukranian imports had. Magnesium from China, Russia, and Ukraine at 35 (Vice 

05-1213 7 
Chairman Nuzum, dissenting), 45 (Comm’r Crawford, dissenting); see also Gerald 

Metals, 132 F.3d at 718-19. 

The Court of International Trade, while acknowledging that the Commission did 

not discuss the issue of substitutability, affirmed the Commission’s finding of material 

injury. Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 930, 935 n.22, 936 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 1996). On appeal, we vacated the court’s decision and explained that the 

Commission must “‘take[ ] into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which 

conflicting inferences could be drawn.’” 132 F.3d at 720 (quoting Universal Camera 

Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Given that the fairly-traded non-subject 

imports were substitutable for the Ukranian subject imports and undersold the domestic 

product just as the subject imports had, we held that the Commission must explain, in 

its analysis of the harm caused by the subject imports, why domestic consumers would 

not have purchased the fairly traded non-subject imports. See id. at 718, 720, 721-23.4

 

This court applied the reasoning of Gerald Metals in Taiwan Semiconductor. 

There, the Commission—after two remands from the Court of International Trade on the 

issue of causation—determined that Taiwanese imports of static random access 

memory chips (“SRAMs”) at LTFV had not injured the domestic industry. 266 F.3d at 

1342. The Commission concluded that “the volume of subject imports, and increase in 

volume [of subject imports], are not sufficient to demonstrate that the subject imports 

themselves made a material contribution to any injury experienced by the domestic 

 4

 As we explained in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry v. International Trade 

Commission, 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001), “Gerald Metals applied the antidumping 

law as it existed prior to amendment effective on January 1, 1995, by the Uruguay 

Round Agreements Act (URAA) . . . . The URAA did not deviate from the pre-existing 

causation standard enunciated in Gerald Metals.” Id. at 1345. 

05-1213 8 
industry.” Id. at 1346 (quoting the Commission’s Redetermination). In particular, the 

Commission found that non-subject Korean imports of SRAMs were, like the subject 

imports, priced lower than the domestic product, and were at times priced lower than 

the subject imports as well. Id. at 1347. We affirmed the Commission’s determination, 

noting that “substantial evidence supports the fact that the United States market share 

was impacted largely by non-subject imports,” and that “[i]n Gerald Metals, as in this 

case, the record did not show that the subject imports caused the material injury in light 

of the dominant presence of non-subject imports in the marketplace.” Id. at 1345-46, 

1347. 

 Thus under Gerald Metals, the increase in volume of subject imports priced 

below domestic products and the decline in the domestic market share are not in and of 

themselves sufficient to establish causation. Gerald Metals did not, of course, establish 

a per se rule barring a finding of causation where the product is a commodity product 

and there are fairly traded imports priced below the domestic product. However, under 

Gerald Metals, the Commission is required to make a specific causation determination 

and in that connection to directly address whether non-subject imports would have 

replaced the subject imports without any beneficial effect on domestic producers. 

II 

The antidumping investigation here revealed the same conditions that triggered 

the additional causation inquiry in Gerald Metals and Taiwan Semiconductor, as the 

Commission found silicon metal generally interchangeable regardless of where it is 

produced. Non-subject imports were present in the U.S. market during the period of 

investigation and were a significant factor in the U.S. market. As a percentage of total 

05-1213 9 
imports (by quantity), non-subject imports accounted for approximately 79.6% in 1999, 

82.6% in 2000, and 73.0% in 2001. 

Further, while the subject imports generally undersold the domestic product, 

there was evidence that non-subject imports from Brazil, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and 

South Africa generally undersold the domestic product during the period of 

investigation. These circumstances suggest that the elimination of the subject imports 

from the domestic market might simply have increased the market share of the nonsubject imports. Gerald Metals thus requires the Commission to explain why—

notwithstanding the presence and significance of the non-subject imports—it concluded 

that the subject imports caused material injury to the domestic industry. While there 

may be support for the Commission’s ultimate determination of material injury in the 

record here, we find that the Commission did not sufficiently explain its decision in this 

regard. 

The failure of the agency to explain its causation analysis in accordance with 

Gerald Metals is particularly troubling in this case because of the agency’s claim that it 

is not obligated to follow this court’s precedent. The Commission sought to dismiss 

Gerald Metals as having no precedential value in other anti-dumping investigations, 

stating that “the prior Commission investigations cited by respondents are factually 

distinguishable from the instant investigation.” On appeal, the Commission continues to 

dismiss our precedent by attempting to limit Gerald Metals to its “unique facts” and 

explaining that “the instant investigation is not factually analogous either to Gerald 

Metals or Taiwan Semiconductor.” Commission’s Br. at 33, 35. In particular, the 

Commission stated that Gerald Metals and Taiwan Semiconductor are distinguishable 

05-1213 10 
because in both of those cases, non-subject import volume increased while the subject 

import volume decreased or remained the same. The Commission is obligated to follow 

the holdings of our cases, not to limit those decisions to their particular facts. The 

holding of Gerald Metals is not limited to situations in which non-subject imports 

increased during the period of review. The obligation under Gerald Metals is triggered 

whenever the antidumping investigation is centered on a commodity product, and price 

competitive non-subject imports are a significant factor in the market. 

In its decision, the Commission also attempted to support the link between 

subject imports and the domestic injury by pointing out that after subject imports were 

withdrawn from the market in 2002 following the Department of Commerce’s preliminary 

determination, silicon spot prices increased and prices for eleven domestic contracts 

increased during the fourth quarter of 2002. That spot prices may have increased after 

the Russian imports exited the market may be pertinent to the causation question, but 

that fact does not excuse the Commission’s failure to address directly the causation 

issue in detail as required by Gerald Metals. The Commission did not explain how 

much the spot prices increased, the significance of that increase, or the significance of 

the eleven contracts for the domestic market. 

Finally on appeal, among other things, the Commission argues that the appellant 

“has not demonstrated“ that “nonsubject imports were well positioned to completely fill 

any void left by the withdrawal of subject imports from the market.” Gov’t Br. at 35-36. 

Presumably, this is an argument that non-subject imports could not replace subject 

imports because producers of non-subject imports lacked the capacity to supply the 

necessary volume to the U.S. market. Such a finding would certainly be relevant to the 

05-1213 11 
causation analysis under Gerald Metals. However, it is the Commission’s burden, not 

the subject importer’s, to demonstrate that the subject imports themselves caused the 

domestic injury. See Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 722. In any event, the Commission’s 

decision made no finding on the capacity issue. 

III 

In short, the Commission’s summary finding of material injury is insufficiently 

detailed to comply with the requirements of Gerald Metals. We therefore vacate and 

remand the Court of International Trade’s decision so that it may remand the case back 

to the Commission to specifically address whether the non-subject imports would have 

replaced subject imports during the period of investigation. 

In ordering reconsideration by the Commission, we do not suggest that the mere 

existence of fairly traded commodity imports at competitive prices precludes the 

Commission from finding material injury. For example, it may well be that non-subject 

importers lack capacity to replace the subject imports or that the price of the non-subject 

imports is sufficiently above the subject imports such that the elimination of the subject 

imports would have benefited the domestic industry. The point is that the Commission 

has to explain, in a meaningful way, why the non-subject imports would not replace the 

subject imports and continue to cause injury to the domestic industry. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision below is vacated and remanded for 

further proceedings. 

VACATED and REMANDED

05-1213 12 
COSTS 

 No costs. 

05-1213 13 
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

05-1213 

BRATSK ALUMINIUM SMELTER, RUAL TRADE LIMITED, 

and GENERAL ELECTRIC SILICONES LLC, 

 Plaintiffs, 

and 

SUAL HOLDING and ZAO KREMNY, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

GLOBE METALLURGICAL INC. and SIMCALA, INC., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

 The majority states that Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997), “requires 

the Commission to explain why—notwithstanding the presence and significance of the 

non-subject imports—it concluded that the subject imports caused material injury to the 

domestic industry.” Maj. op. at 10. While acknowledging that there may be support for 

the Commission’s ultimate determination of material injury in the record here, the 

majority “find[s] that the Commission did not sufficiently explain its decision in this 

regard.” Id. I disagree. 

In my view, the Commission adequately considered the effect of both the subject 

imports and the interchangeable nonsubject imports on the domestic industry in its 
determination and found substantial evidence in the record to support its material injury

determination. I would, therefore, affirm the Court of International Trade’s judgment 

sustaining the Commission. 

The majority appears to take no issue with the Commission’s underlying analysis

of whether the domestic industry was in fact harmed. The Commission performed the 

proper analysis and considered the statutorily enumerated factors. See

19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i) (2000).1 It concluded that the volume and increase in volume

of subject imports, both in absolute terms and relative to apparent domestic

consumption and production in the United States, supported a finding of material injury 

determination. The Commission found that 1) the quantity of subject imports increased 

overall by 35.8% from 1999 to 2001 and by 38.6% from 2000-2001 (after showing a 

slight decrease from 1999 to 2000); 2) “[t]he continued increase in subject import 

volume by 57.6 percent between the interim periods resulted in Russia being the largest 

single source of silicon metal imports in interim 2002”; and 3) from 1999 to 2001 and 

from 2000-2001 subject imports outpaced all other imports in gaining U.S. market 

share. 

 1 Section 1677(7)(B)(i) of Title 19 of the United States Code states that in 

making a material injury determination the Commission must consider the following 

factors: 

(I) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, 

(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States

for domestic and like products, and 

(III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of

domestic like products, but only in the context of production operations

within the United States. . . . 

19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i).

05-1213 2
Given that “price is a key factor in purchasing decisions [to buy silicon metal]”,

the Commission also concluded that underselling by subject imports supported a 

material injury determination, “find[ing] that prices have been depressed to a significant

degree by the subject imports.” Although nonsubject goods have at times also

undersold the domestic product, the Commission found that purchaser price data 

“show[s] that imports from Russia have been priced at lower levels than nonsubject 

imports.” Specifically, the Commission noted that imports from Russia undersold South 

African chemical grade product in all eleven purchaser price comparisons and 

undersold Brazilian chemical grade product in ten of eleven purchaser price 

comparisons. In its price analysis, the Commission “recognize[d] that nonsubject 

imports may have had an independent price depressive effect on domestic silicon metal 

prices.” Ultimately, however, the Commission concluded that 

given the significant underselling by subject imports, subject import

volume surges during the [period of interest], and the high degree of 

substitutability between subject imports and the domestic product, . . . the 

subject imports themselves have significantly depressed domestic silicon 

metal prices in all three customer segments (i.e., chemical, primary and 

secondary aluminum customers). 

As part of its material injury determination, the Commission specifically

addressed the respondents’ argument “that there was no causal nexus between subject 

imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry because of the presence of 

interchangeable and readily available nonsubject imports.” The Commission found that 

“[s]ubject imports registered a 4.8 percentage point market share gain while nonsubject

imports lost 2.3 percentage points in market share from 2000 to 2001, the same year 

that the domestic industry suffered an operating loss for the first time during the [period 

of interest] and idled, closed, or converted many of its silicon metal production facilities.” 

05-1213 3
Specifically, the Commission explained that Russian imports’ share of total imports

increased from 7.3% in the first quarter of 2001 to 26.2%, 31.4%, and 40.1%,

respectively, in the remaining three quarters of 2001. Similarly, Russian imports’ share 

of total imports was 31.5% in first quarter 2002 and 36.9% in second quarter 2002, 

before declining to 11.6% in third quarter 2002, following the Commission’s and the 

Department of Commerce’s preliminary determinations in this investigation. The

Commission also observed that by quantity, nonsubject import volume increased only

by 25.8% from interim 2001 to interim 2002, whereas subject import volume increased 

by 57.6% during the same period. 

In view of this data, the Commission concluded that “the fact that nonsubject 

imports may have contributed to the domestic industry’s continued deterioration toward 

the end of the period, along with subject imports, does not negate our finding that

subject imports themselves had a material adverse impact on the domestic industry.” 

This is precisely the causation analysis necessary in view of Gerald Metals. Neither the 

statute nor Gerald Metals imposes the rigidity in findings or analysis that the majority 

seems to require. Indeed, the Gerald Metals opinion acknowledges the “unique 

circumstances” in that case. Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 722. 

Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the Commission here did not “claim that it is 

not obligated to follow this court’s precedent.” Maj. op. at 10. Rather, the Commission 

merely noted that Commission investigations are sui generis and, because of this, its 

prior investigations may not always form the basis for clear precedent that transcends 

different fact patterns. When explaining the factual differences between Gerald Metals

05-1213 4
(and other similar cases2

) and the present case, the Commission found significant that

in Gerald Metals subject import volume had decreased, both in absolute terms and 

relative to domestic consumption, during the last full year of the period of interest. 

These volume trends, explained the Commission, indicated that the significance of 

LTFV imports diminished during the period of interest, thus suggesting that in Gerald 

Metals any injury to domestic injury was not by reason of the subject imports. Because 

of the factual differences between Gerald Metals and the present case, the Commission 

determined that “respondents’ arguments that Gerald Metals precludes an affirmative 

determination in this investigation [were] unpersuasive.” 

As summarized above, the Commission performed a proper material injury 

analysis, including explaining why the subject imports caused material injury to the 

domestic industry despite the existence of interchangeable nonsubject imports. In fact, 

the Commission expressly acknowledged its obligation to consider the effect of 

nonsubject imports in its investigation, citing Gerald Metals and Taiwan Semiconductor: 

We have considered the evidence on nonsubject imports in this

investigation and find, notwithstanding the presence of nonsubject

imports, that subject imports themselves caused material injury to the 

domestic industry and did not simply contribute to the injury in a 

“tangential or minimal way.” Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 722; Taiwan

 2 For example, in discussing Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Assoc. v. 

United States, 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Commission noted that this court 

had affirmed the Commission’s redetermination. There the Commission found that, 

throughout the period of investigation, Taiwanese Static Random Access Memory 

Semiconductor (“SRAMS”) market share, both by value and by quantity, had remained 

relatively flat. The domestic industry’s market share, by quantity, declined by about 

15% while the market share of nonsubject imports increased by almost that amount. 

During the years in which the domestic industry suffered its greatest injury, imports from

Taiwan frequently oversold U.S. product. Thus, the Commission was simply noting the 

clear difference between the fact pattern present in Taiwan Semiconductor and the one 

before it. 

05-1213 5
Semiconductor Industry Assoc. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1339, 1344 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). 

I fail to see what more the Commission should be required to do to explain its 

decision. 

05-1213 6
C-1

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY DATA

Table C-1

Silicon metal: Summary data concerning the U.S. market, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and January-September 2002

(Quantity=short tons of contained silicon, value=1,000 dollars, unit values, unit labor costs, and unit expenses are per short ton; 

period changes=percent, except where noted)

Reported data Period changes

January-September Jan.-Sept.

Item 1999 2000 2001 2001 2002 1999-2001 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002

U.S. consumption quantity:

 Amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324,202 329,502 278,197 208,615 204,876 -14.2 1.6 -15.6 -1.8

 Producers' share (1) . . . . . . . . 62.2 57.0 54.6 55.4 39.7 -7.6 -5.1 -2.5 -15.7

 Importers' share (1):

 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8 7.5 12.3 9.9 15.9 4.5 -0.3 4.8 6.0

 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 6.8 6.2 7.1 13.6 2.4 3.0 -0.6 6.6

 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.6

 Subtotal, Brazil & China. . . 4.8 8.3 7.8 8.4 15.7 2.9 3.5 -0.5 7.2

 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 12.2 12.7 14.2 13.0 4.0 3.5 0.5 -1.2

 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 8.3 6.2 6.2 6.4 -1.5 0.6 -2.1 0.2

 Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 1.0 1.8 2.0 3.5 -0.6 -1.5 0.8 1.6

 Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.8 1.0 -0.3 1.2 0.3

 Argentina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.9 2.6 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.7

 Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 2.7 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.7 2.5 -1.9 -0.8

 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 2.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 -3.6 -1.6 -2.0 -0.1

 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1

 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4

 Australia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 0.1 0.1

 United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1

 Sweden. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0

 Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1

 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0

 France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.0 -0.0

 All other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4

 Subtotal, nonsubject . . . . . . . 30.1 35.5 33.2 34.6 44.4 3.1 5.4 -2.3 9.7

 Total imports . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.8 43.0 45.4 44.6 60.3 7.6 5.1 2.5 15.7

U.S. consumption value:

 Amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424,244 405,491 335,989 254,431 233,131 -20.8 -4.4 -17.1 -8.4

 Producers' share (1) . . . . . . . . 65.0 60.5 58.4 58.7 43.4 -6.6 -4.6 -2.0 -15.3

 Importers' share (1):

 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 6.3 10.5 9.0 13.0 4.3 0.1 4.2 4.0

 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 7.3 6.7 7.6 15.6 2.7 3.2 -0.5 8.0

 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.4

 Subtotal, Brazil & China. . . 4.7 8.3 7.8 8.5 17.0 3.0 3.5 -0.5 8.4

 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 10.7 10.8 11.9 11.6 3.2 3.2 0.0 -0.3

 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.0 8.3 5.9 5.9 5.8 -2.1 0.2 -2.3 -0.1

 Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 1.3 2.3 2.4 3.8 -0.5 -1.5 1.0 1.3

 Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 -0.2 1.0 0.2

 Argentina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 2.3 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.6

 Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 2.1 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.5 1.9 -1.4 -0.6

 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 1.9 0.3 0.5 0.4 -2.8 -1.2 -1.6 -0.1

 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1

 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.7

 Australia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.7 0.1 0.1

 United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1

 Sweden. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.0

 Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0

 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.2

 France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 -0.0

 All other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3

 Subtotal, nonsubject . . . . . . . 28.8 33.2 31.1 32.3 43.6 2.3 4.4 -2.2 11.3

 Total imports . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.0 39.5 41.6 41.3 56.6 6.6 4.6 2.0 15.3

U.S. imports from:

 Russia:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,158 24,643 34,153 20,718 32,643 35.8 -2.0 38.6 57.6

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,201 25,529 35,325 22,936 30,272 34.8 -2.6 38.4 32.0

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,036 $1,003 $980 $1,018 $928 -5.4 -3.2 -2.3 -8.8

 Brazil:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,429 22,385 17,309 14,722 27,953 39.3 80.1 -22.7 89.9

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,203 29,535 22,650 19,348 36,428 31.7 71.7 -23.3 88.3

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,253 $1,306 $1,309 $1,314 $1,303 4.4 4.2 0.2 -0.8

 China:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,237 4,958 4,292 2,876 4,132 32.6 53.2 -13.4 43.7

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,885 4,029 3,439 2,357 3,146 19.2 39.7 -14.6 33.5

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $891 $813 $801 $819 $761 -10.1 -8.8 -1.4 -7.1

Subtotal, Brazil & China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,666 27,343 21,600 17,598 32,086 37.9 74.5 -21.0 82.3

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,088 33,564 26,090 21,705 39,575 29.9 67.1 -22.3 82.3

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,178 $1,215 $1,208 $1,233 $1,233 2.5 3.1 -0.6 0.0

Table continued on next page.

C-3
Table C-1--Continued

Silicon metal: Summary data concerning the U.S. market, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and January-September 2002

(Quantity=short tons of contained silicon, value=1,000 dollars, unit values, unit labor costs, and unit expenses are per short ton; 

period changes=percent, except where noted)

Reported data Period changes

January-September Jan.-Sept.

Item 1999 2000 2001 2001 2002 1999-2001 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002

U.S. imports from:--Continued

 South Africa:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28,184 40,329 35,305 29,690 26,731 25.3 43.1 -12.5 -10.0

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,195 43,583 36,120 30,278 26,976 12.2 35.4 -17.1 -10.9

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,118 $1,065 $1,039 $1,039 $1,009 -7.1 -4.8 -2.4 -2.8

 Canada:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,044 27,347 17,281 12,931 13,046 -31.0 9.2 -36.8 0.9

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,064 33,516 19,987 14,943 13,481 -41.3 -1.6 -40.4 -9.8

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,360 $1,226 $1,157 $1,156 $1,108 -15.0 -9.9 -5.6 -4.1

 Norway:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,050 3,293 5,114 4,086 7,221 -36.5 -59.1 55.3 76.7

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,967 5,324 7,787 6,206 8,818 -34.9 -55.5 46.3 42.1

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,487 $1,617 $1,523 $1,519 $1,221 2.4 8.8 -5.8 -19.6

 Spain:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 0 3,453 1,092 1,619 266.7 -100.0 (3) 48.2

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,043 0 3,503 1,111 1,596 235.7 -100.0 (3) 43.7

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,108 (3) $1,015 $1,017 $986 -8.5 -100.0 (3) -3.1

 Argentina:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 3,079 1,920 5,340 (3) (3) (3) 178.1

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 3,043 1,894 5,385 (3) (3) (3) 184.3

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) (3) $989 $986 $1,008 (3) (3) (3) 2.2

 Korea:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620 8,967 2,395 2,395 741 286.5 1347.1 -73.3 -69.1

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647 8,510 2,301 2,301 696 255.8 1216.0 -73.0 -69.7

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,044 $949 $961 $961 $940 -7.9 -9.1 1.2 -2.2

 Saudi Arabia:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,930 7,938 1,182 1,182 981 -90.9 -38.6 -85.1 -17.0

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,306 7,784 1,162 1,162 884 -91.3 -41.5 -85.1 -23.9

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,029 $981 $983 $983 $901 -4.5 -4.7 0.3 -8.4

 United Arab Emirates:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 109 1,036 430 562 (3) (3) 847.2 30.7

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 110 984 416 504 (3) (3) 791.9 21.2

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) $1,009 $950 $967 $897 (3) (3) -5.8 -7.2

 Germany:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 656 815 247 1,158 328.5 244.8 24.2 369.1

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 1,002 1,234 390 1,964 232.1 169.8 23.1 404.0

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,952 $1,527 $1,513 $1,579 $1,696 -22.5 -21.8 -0.9 7.4

 Australia:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,216 159 482 285 434 -78.2 -92.8 203.8 52.2

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,929 161 538 315 479 -81.6 -94.5 234.8 52.1

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,322 $1,012 $1,115 $1,106 $1,105 -15.6 -23.4 10.2 -0.1

 United Kingdom:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 492 369 266 1 -20.2 6.5 -25.0 -99.8

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 668 670 522 376 12 -21.8 0.3 -22.1 -96.8

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,444 $1,360 $1,415 $1,410 $20,625 -2.1 -5.8 4.0 1362.5

 Sweden:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 35 80 59 23 367.1 104.9 128.0 -60.4

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 233 527 389 261 285.1 70.5 125.8 -32.9

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,005 $6,663 $6,600 $6,642 $11,269 -17.5 -16.8 -0.9 69.7

 Ukraine:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 0 44 0 113 -85.7 -100.0 (3) (4)

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 0 44 5 94 -87.3 -100.0 (3) (4)

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,127 (3) $1,000 $16,911 $835 -11.3 -100.0 (3) -95.1

 Belgium:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 43 43 10 (3) (3) (4) -76.9

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 8 549 549 106 (3) (3) (4) -80.8

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) $5,406 $12,692 $12,692 $10,546 (3) (3) 134.8 -16.9

 France:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,397 2 1 1 1-100.0 -99.9 -56.9 -2.9

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,505 9 22 17 3 -99.4 -99.7 137.5 -83.4

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,462 $4,165 $22,952 $18,995 $3,243 (4) 184.9 451.0 -82.9

 All others:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 237 0 0 807 -100.0 -50.1 -100.0 (4)

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 346 8 8 774 -99.1 -64.3 -97.5 (4)

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $2,039 $1,458 $170,915 $170,915 $959 (4) -28.5 (4) -99.4

 Subtotal, nonsubject:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97,499 116,908 92,279 72,226 90,875 -5.4 19.9 -21.1 25.8

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122,231 134,819 104,420 82,064 101,608 -14.6 10.3 -22.5 23.8

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,232 $1,145 $1,139 $1,146 $1,129 -7.5 -7.1 -0.5 -1.5

 All sources:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122,657 141,551 126,431 92,945 123,519 3.1 15.4 -10.7 32.9

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148,432 160,349 139,745 105,000 131,881 -5.9 8.0 -12.8 25.6

 Unit value (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,191 $1,120 $1,096 $1,117 $1,076 -8.0 -6.0 -2.2 -3.7

Table continued on next page.

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Table C-1--Continued

Silicon metal: Summary data concerning the U.S. market, 1999-2001, January-September 2001, and January-September 2002

(Quantity=short tons of contained silicon, value=1,000 dollars, unit values, unit labor costs, and unit expenses are per short ton; 

period changes=percent, except where noted)

Reported data Period changes

January-September Jan.-Sept.

Item 1999 2000 2001 2001 2002 1999-2001 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002

U.S. producers':

 Average capacity quantity . . . . 243,667 215,245 198,363 148,123 144,450 -18.6 -11.7 -7.8 -2.5

 Production quantity . . . . . . . . . 209,376 195,660 145,324 112,638 85,824 -30.6 -6.6 -25.7 -23.8

 Capacity utilization (1) . . . . . . . 85.9 90.9 73.3 76.0 59.4 -12.7 5.0 -17.6 -16.6

 U.S. shipments:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201,545 187,951 151,766 115,670 81,357 -24.7 -6.7 -19.3 -29.7

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275,812 245,142 196,244 149,431 101,250 -28.8 -11.1 -19.9 -32.2

 Unit value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,368 $1,304 $1,293 $1,292 $1,245 -5.5 -4.7 -0.9 -3.7

 Export shipments:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,591 4,071 1,586 1,088 2,069 -75.9 -38.2 -61.0 90.2

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,951 5,089 1,951 1,332 2,246 -78.2 -43.1 -61.7 68.6

 Unit value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,358 1,250 1,230 1,224 1,086 -9.4 -8.0 -1.6 -11.3

 Ending inventory quantity . . . . . 9,135 11,110 2,306 5,462 3,940 -74.8 21.6 -79.2 -27.9

 Inventories/total shipments (1) 4.4 5.8 1.5 3.5 3.5 -2.9 1.4 -4.3 0.0

 Production workers . . . . . . . . . 719 637 523 531 407 -27.3 -11.4 -17.9 -23.4

 Hours worked (1,000s) . . . . . . 1,632 1,471 1,210 970 793 -25.9 -9.9 -17.7 -18.2

 Wages paid ($1,000s) . . . . . . . 32,438 29,055 23,675 17,692 13,979 -27.0 -10.4 -18.5 -21.0

 Hourly wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 20 20 18 18 -1.6 -0.6 -0.9 -3.4

 Productivity (tons/1,000 hours) 128 133 120 116 108 -6.4 3.7 -9.7 -6.8

 Unit labor costs . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 148 163 157 163 5.2 -4.2 9.7 3.7

 Net sales:

 Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207,173 202,463 169,520 116,758 83,426 -18.2 -2.3 -16.3 -28.5

 Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293,831 267,227 219,034 150,763 103,496 -25.5 -9.1 -18.0 -31.4

 Unit value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,418 1,320 1,292 1,291 1,241 -8.9 -6.9 -2.1 -3.9

 Cost of goods sold (COGS) . . . 251,913 242,020 214,672 152,054 106,554 -14.8 -3.9 -11.3 -29.9

 Gross profit or (loss) . . . . . . . . 41,918 25,207 4,362 (1,291) (3,058) -89.6 -39.9 -82.7 136.9

 SG&A expenses . . . . . . . . . . . 16,743 15,964 14,703 11,459 8,703 -12.2 -4.7 -7.9 -24.1

 Operating income or (loss) . . . 25,175 9,243 (10,341) (12,750) (11,761) -141.1 -63.3 -211.9 -7.8

 Capital expenditures . . . . . . . . 28,546 9,457 7,773 5,411 8,830 -72.8 -66.9 -17.8 63.2

 Unit COGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,216 1,195 1,266 1,302 1,277 4.1 -1.7 5.9 -1.9

 Unit SG&A expenses . . . . . . . . 81 79 87 98 104 7.3 -2.4 10.0 6.3

 Unit operating income or (loss) 122 46 (61) (109) (141) -150.2 -62.4 -233.6 29.1

 COGS/sales (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 91 98 101 103 12.3 4.8 7.4 2.1

 Operating income or (loss)/ 8.6 3.5 -4.7 -8.5 -11.4 -13.3 -5.1 -8.2 -2.9

 (1) "Reported data" are in percent and "period changes" are in percentage points.

 (2) Unit values calcuated from adjusted import statistics.

 (3) Not applicable. 

 (4) Greater than 1,000 percent. 

Note.--Financial data are reported on a fiscal year basis and may not necessarily be comparable to data reported on a calendar year basis. 

Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown. Unit values and shares are calculated from the unrounded figures.

Source: Compiled from data submitted in response to Commission questionnaires and official Commerce statistics.

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