alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Florida draft NOI threshold for aquatic plant management:

Herbicide applications that exceed 10 surface acres of water or, applications by one applicator that

exceed a cumulative total of 20 surface acres of water in a single water body during a one year period.

Most of the large‐scale herbicide applications for aquatic plant control conducted in Florida lakes and

rivers are developed, contracted, permitted and monitored by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation

Commission (FWC).  Permits to control aquatic plants are required by FWC in water bodies that exceed

10 surface acres in size unless they are wholly owned by one person.  Most aquatic herbicide treatments

that exceed 10 surface acres in size are for submersed aquatic vegetation, e.g., hydrilla.  Most

submersed vegetation problems can be managed with 2 herbicide treatments per year, thus the

reasoning behind a cumulative total of 20 acres.  This threshold would capture the large majority of all

aquatic herbicide applications in Florida that are regulated by the FWC. Reducing NPDES Permit

monitoring/reporting requirements for small‐scale herbicide applications would allow staff more time to

work with stakeholders to implement environmentally compatible and cost‐effective large‐scale aquatic

plant management programs.
S upreme Court

No. 2016

- 342

- M.P.

In the Matter of O leg Nikolyszyn:

O R D E R

On October 12, 2016, this Court’s Chief Disciplinary Counsel filed a Petition for Interim

Suspension which avers that the respondent, Oleg Nikolyszyn, a me mber of the Rhode Island

Bar, has engaged in serious professional misconduct. The respondent has requested that he be

allowed to resign from the practice of law in lieu of being suspended on an interim basis, while

acknowledging that he would remain subje ct to the disciplinary authority of the C ourt for any

professional misconduct he may have committed while a member of the Bar.

This Court considered the Petition for Interim Suspension and the respondent’s request to

resign at our conference on November 7 , 2016. Having hea r d the representations of disciplinary

counsel, the respondent, and his attorney, we deem that the petition filed by disciplinary counsel

should be granted.

Accordingly it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the respondent, Oleg Nikol yszyn

, is

hereby suspended from the practice of law in this state until further order of this Court.

It is further ordered that David D. Curtin, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, be appointed as

Special Master to take possession of the respondent’s client files and accounts; to inventory

them; and to take whatever steps are necessary to protect the clients’ interests.

Chief Justice Suttell did not participate.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 1 st d ay of December, 2016

.

By Order,

______________ /s/

_________________ Clerk

### R HODE 

### I SLAND 

### S UPREME 

### C OURT 

### C LERK 

### ’ S 

### O FFICE



### Clerk’s Office Order/O pinion Cover Sheet

TITLE OF CASE: In the Matter of Oleg Nikolyszyn

.

CASE NO : No. 20 1 6

- 3 42

- M.P.

COURT: Supreme Court

DATE ORDER FILED: December 1 , 201 6

JUSTICES: Goldberg, Flaherty

, Robinson

, and Indeglia, JJ.

WRITTEN BY: N/A

– Court Order

JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT :

N/A

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL :

For Petitioner : David D. Curtin, Esq.

Disciplinary Counsel

For Respondent : Dennis S. Baluch, Esq.
#### WILKINSON, ET AL. *v.*DANIEL.

Lost papers — issue—rules of court — motion in anest.

It is error to order a cause on to trial without an issue; if the papers have been lost, they should be supplied before the trial.

The motion in arrest of judgment is receivable after the decision on a motion for a new trial, and a rule of court that prevents the receipt of such a motion is contrary to law, and void. Courts have power to make rules of practice consistent with the law, not contraiy,

Error to the Common Pleas. The case below was assumpsit on the common counts. Plea non assumpsit, and notice of offset. It appeared by a bill of exceptions, that when the cause was called for trial, there were no pleadings on file, and the defendant’s witnesses *369being absent, he objected to going on without the pleadings and issue, but agreed that a declaration had been filed in assumpsit, to which there had been put in the general issue, with notice of setoff. The court ordered the cause for trial, and refused to order the pleadings to be first filed or replaced. After verdict, the defendant moved for a new trial, which was overruled the next day. The defendant then moved in arrest of judgment, that there was no issue for trial: this the court refused to receive, because it was not filed the day after the verdict, and so was filed contrary to one of the rules of court, requiring such motions to be filed the day after verdict. At the same time, the court gave leave to the plaintiff to make up the pleadings. All these matters were assigned for error.

P. *Hitchcock*and *J. H.*Paine, for the plaintiff in error.

Perkins, contra.

By the Court.

, There was no issue here to try, and the court below erred in ordering the cause on to trial without; the verdict is a nullity; 5 0.P.277.

The court were also in error in refusing the motion in arrest, because not filed within its rule. Our courts have power only to make rules not repugnant to the law, (29 O. *L.*72); and the law provides (29 *O.L.*73) that motions for new trial shall be first made, and if denied, the defendant may *then*move in arrest of judgment. In this case, the new trial was not *denied*until the second day after the verdict, and the defendant could not before move in arrest, without waiving his motion for a new trial, or violating the law; the rule must have been adopted inadvertently; it is of no effect when used to contravene the law.

The judgment is reversed with costs, and the cause remanded to be reinstated and proceeded in.
2 Entered:01/25/22 15:21:02 Desc:

 of 1
14910-13-P] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14

# ern Part 39 Cl.



# 'LOIO-003v [DocketNo.FAA-~-*****; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-llO-ADj Amendment 

# 39_L3P~

~g!*~-04-IO ROlITlJ<G SVMElO~

RIN 212o-AA64 Ainvorthiness Directives; Airbus Model A380-841, -842, and -861 Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department ofTransportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule; request forcomments. 

### ,4;";11\-1 

## =,. SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding anexisting airworthiness directive (AD) forth 

### C-.~ m products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MeAl) originated by an aviation authority ofanother country to identify and correct anunsafe condition on an aviation product. The MeAldescribes the unsafi condition as: During the flight test campaign ofthe A380-861 model (Engine Alliance powered), some cracks were found on theMovable Flap Track Fairing number 6 (MITF#6). OuTINGSYMOOl


## 7- ') 

## 10 OliTlNG

SY"l l ANM -IC, "111AlS1SIG

IT These cracks were located atthe pivot attachment support-ring and atthe U-frame inthe attachment areato aft-kinematic. In addition, delamination has been observed within the monolithic Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) structure around the pivot support-ring. This condition, ifnot corrected, could lead to in-flight loss ofthe MFTF#6, potentially resulting in injuries to persons on the ground.



## * 

## * * * * * 

## *
CONTRACT OF SALE.

[Hamilton County Circuit Court,

February, 1896.]

Smith, Swing and Cox, JJ.

#### † The Warner Elevator Co. v. Guthrie.

*The acceptance of an offer to sell must be absolute and unequivocal in order to constitute a binding contract.*

Decision of Common Pleas, 1 O. D., 190,

affirmed.

†

Affirmed by the Supreme Court, 57 O. S., 672; Spear and Shauck, JJ-, dissent. ■

Swing, J.

The main question in this case hinges on the point whether there was a binding contract between the parties. Guthrie made a written proposition to sell to the Elevator company certain real estate. The Elevator company wrote “accepted, title to be good.” There was no statement in the proposal of Guthrie that the title was to be good.

The law on this subject is thus stated: “The acceptance of an offer must be absolute and unqualified, for until there is such acceptance the negotiations amount to nothing more than proposals and counter-proposals.” 3 Am. Ency., 852.

> “Acceptance must be unequivocal, unconditional and without variance from the proposal.” 7 West Rep. (Mo.), 106.

And in 117 Ills., p. 118, the court held, that an offer to sell lands and an acceptance adding “providing the title is perfect,” did not constitute a contract.

It seems to us that under the general rule of law as above stated, and under the decision in the 117 Ills., *supra,*there was no binding contract in this case, for the offer to sell is not accepted unequivocally, unconditionally and without variance. The acceptor adds “the title to be good.” It may be 'that an acceptor cannot be compelled to take an ■estate unless the seller has a good title; but the acceptor may waive this and take the property and rely on his warranty. But here he says he won’t take it unless the title is good.

Besides it seems to us that the evidence in the case clearly shows that the Elevator company did not understand that when Guthrie was ■offering to sell the property that the title was in him, but on the contrary that he was simply the agent of the Harrison heirs in negotiating the *129sale, and that there was in fact a question as to whether a good title could be made, and therefore they were careful to add as a condition to their acceptance “ Title to be good,” and that they thereby intended to vary the proposition to sell to this extent.

*W. P. Biddle*and *Peck & Shaffer,*for the Elevator company.

*Follett & Kelley,*for Guthrie.

Judgment affirmed.
§ 1203b.103 Arrest authority. ( a ) NASA security force personnel may exercise arrest authority, provided that: ( 1 ) They have graduated from an accredited training course (see § 1203b.102(a)); and
( 2 ) They have been certified in writing by the Assistant Administrator for Protective Services, or designee, as specifically authorized to exercise arrest authority.
( b ) The authority of NASA security force personnel to make a warrantless arrest is subject to the following conditions: ( 1 ) The arresting officer must be guarding and protecting property owned or leased by, or under the control of, the United States under the administration and control of NASA or one of its contractors or subcontractors, at facilities owned by or contracted to NASA; and
( 2 ) The person to be arrested has committed in the arresting officer's presence an offense against the United States Government, NASA, or a NASA contractor; or
( 3 ) The arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States.
( c ) The Office of the General Counsel, NASA Headquarters, or the Center Chief Counsel's Office, as appropriate, shall provide guidance as to the applicability of these regulations.
[57 FR 4926, Feb. 11, 1992, as amended at 78 FR 5125, Jan. 24, 2013]
§ 263.8 Conflicts of interest. ( a ) *Conflict of interest in representation.* No person may appear as counsel for another person in an adjudicatory proceeding if it reasonably appears that such representation may be materially limited by that counsel's responsibilities to a third person or by the counsel's own interests. The ALJ may take corrective measures at any stage of a proceeding to cure a conflict of interest in representation, including the issuance of an order limiting the scope of representation or disqualifying an individual from appearing in a representative capacity for the duration of the proceeding.
( b ) *Certification and waiver.* If any person appearing as counsel represents two or more parties to an adjudicatory proceeding or also represents a non-party on a matter relevant to an issue in the proceeding, counsel must certify in writing at the time of filing the notice of appearance required by § 263.6(a): ( 1 ) That the counsel has personally and fully discussed the possibility of conflicts of interest with each such party and non-party; and
( 2 ) That each such party and non-party waives any right it might otherwise have had to assert any known conflicts of interest or to assert any non-material conflicts of interest during the course of the proceeding.
§ 608.803 Definitions. In this part (except where the term is defined elsewhere in this part), the following definitions shall apply: ( a ) Administrative offset or offset, as defined in 31 U.S.C. 3701(a)(1), means withholding money payable by the United States Government to, or held by the Government for, a person to satisfy a debt the person owes the Government.
( b ) *Agency* means a department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive or legislative branch of the Government.
( c ) Claim or debt means money or property owed by a person or entity to an agency of the Federal Government. A “claim” or “debt” includes amounts due the Government from loans insured by or guaranteed by the United States and all other amounts due from fees, leases, rents, royalties, services, sales of real or personal property, overpayment, penalties, damages, interest, and fines.
( d ) *Claim certification* means a creditor agency's written request to a paying agency to effect an administrative offset.
( e ) *Creditor agency* means an agency to which a claim or debt is owed.
( f ) *Debtor* means the person or entity owing money to the Federal Government.
( g ) *FCA* means the Farm Credit Administration.
( h ) *Hearing official* means an individual who is responsible for reviewing a claim under § 608.810 of this part.
( i ) *Paying agency* means an agency of the Federal Government owing money to a debtor against which an administrative or salary offset can be effected.
( j ) *Salary offset* means an administrative offset to collect a debt under 5 U.S.C. 5514 by deductions at one or more officially established pay intervals from the current pay account of a debtor.
#### LODWICK AND OTHERS *v.*JOHNSON AND GLAZE.

Priority of lien — holder of two, one in which another has an interest may be compelled to exhaust the exclusive lien first — equity—notice.

It is a well-settled rule that where tw-o have a lien on one piece of property, and the lien of one of them includes another piece of property, he shall first exhaust that subject to his exclusive lien, and iesovt to the remainder subject to both only for the residue.

Those who deal with equities, must notice the extent of the equities at their peril, as they can only take what the holder had to convey.

In Chancery. The bill claims the foreclosure and sale of twenty-five acres of land held by mortgage, and for the conveyance and sale of twenty-five and a half acres of land, of which Johnson held only the title bond of Glaze; both tracts were mortgaged to secure the payment to the complainants of certain- notes.

Johnson has not answered. Glaze answei’s, and disclaims all knowledge of, or interest in the twenty-five acres; but as to the twenty-five and a half acres, asserts a lien on; it for a debt due him by Johnson, for which he pledged the land with him after the date of the mortgage. He- admitted that at the time of the pledge of the bond with him, he knew of the mortgage-

*Clough,*for the complainants,

claimed an order of sale of the twenty-five acres, of which Johnson had the fee, and that Glaze should convey to the complainants the other twenty-five and a half aci'es.

*S. M. Tracy,*contra,

insisted that no case was made to chai'ge Glaze; nor was there any proof of what sum was due to the plaintiffs.

Collett, C. J.

The question of notice has little to do with this controversy. Glaze only claims to assert his prior lien on the twenty-five and a half acres, the title bond for which he gave, and afterwai'ds received the same in pledge for advances. Those who deal with equities can only take what the holder had to convey, and must notice the extent of the intei’est at his peril.

But there is no proof of any thing due to the complainants. Where are the notes? If unpaid, why are they not pi’odxxced? If paid or transfei’red, the complainant cannot proceed.

It is a well-settled rule, that whex;e two have a lien on one- piece of property,, and one of them has a separate lien on another piece, he shall first exhaust that on which he has an exclusive lien, and chai-ge the property *jointly held*only for the residue. Apply that rule here, and the twenty-five aci’es must be fii'st sold. The case is referred to á master to take an account of what is due the complainánts, the value of the several tracts, &c. and is continued, for repoi't.
#### POSTON v. ALEXANDER.

No. 30650.

Dec. 22, 1942.

*132 P. 2d 343.*

Owen E. Renegar, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Carmon C. Harris, David C. Shapard, and Frank Wilton Jones, all of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

HURST, J.

The plaintiff, Alexander, sued Poston in justice court for damages growing out of a collision between an automobile owned by Poston and a milk truck belonging to Alexander. Alexander prevailed in justice court. Poston appealed to the court of common pleas, where Alexander again prevailed. Poston appeals.

1. Poston first contends that the court of common pleas erred in permitting Alexander to amend his bill of particulars. In the bill of particulars, Alexander alleged that the accident occurred at a street intersection in Oklahoma City and that at the time of the accident his truck was on the right side of the street and proceeding in a slow and careful manner and the accident was result of negligence on the part of the driver of the Poston car. In the amendment complained of, Alexander pleaded the ordinances of Oklahoma City relating to speed limits and the right of way at *654intersections and alleged that the accident was caused by the violation, by the driver of Poston’s car, of the provisions of the ordinance.

Our statute (39 O. S. 1941 § 243) provides that the appellate court in cases appealed from the justice of the peace court may, “in furtherance of justice, allow amended pleadings to be made, or new pleadings to be filed.” The allowance of amendments under this statute is left largely to the discretion of the appellate court, and its action in allowing or refusing an amendment will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Heffernon v. Higdon, 189 Okla. 434, 117 P. 2d 768; Horton v. Early, 39 Okla. 99, 134 P. 436, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 314.

The amendment did not change the nature of the cause of action, as condemned in Overstreet v. Jones, 188 Okla. 634, 112 P. 2d 377, but simply made more specific acts of negligence charged in general terms in the original bill of particulars. The defendant does not point out wherein he was prejudiced by allowing the amendment, and we cannot say that the allowance of the amendment was not in furtherance of justice.

2. It is argued that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment and verdict. The evidence on behalf of Alexander tended to show that the collision was due to fast and reckless driving by Poston’s employee. The jury was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Lowe v. Hickory, 176 Okla. 426, 55 P. 2d 769. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment.

Affirmed.

WELCH, C. J., CORN, V. C. J., and OSBORN, BAYLESS, GIBSON, DAVISON, and ARNOLD, JJ., concur. RILEY, J., not participating.
Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:22665-3 Filed:10/20/22 Entered:10/21/22 13:02:40 Desc:

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Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:22665-3 Filed:10/20/22 Entered:10/21/22 13:02:40 Desc:

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§ 792.55 Times, places, and requirements for identification of individuals making requests and identification of records requested. ( a ) The following standards are applicable to an individual submitting requests either in person or by mail under § 792.54: ( 1 ) Individuals appearing in person, if not personally known to the system manager responding to the request, must present a single document bearing a photograph (such as a passport or identification badge) or two items of identification which do not bear a photograph but do bear both a name and address (such as a driver's license or voter registration card);
( 2 ) Individuals submitting requests by mail or written electronic form, such as facsimile or e-mail, may establish identity by a signature, address, date of birth, employee identification number if any, and one other identifier such as a photocopy of driver's license or other document. If inadequate identifying information is provided, the system manager responding to the request may require further identifying information before any notification or responsive disclosure.
( 3 ) Individuals appearing in person or submitting requests by mail or written electronic form, who cannot provide the required documentation or identification, may provide an unsworn declaration subscribed to as true under penalty of perjury.
( b ) The parent or guardian of a minor or a person judicially determined to be incompetent shall, in addition to establishing identity of the minor or other person as required in paragraph (a) of this section, furnish a copy of a birth certificate showing parentage or a court order establishing guardianship.
( c ) A record may be disclosed to a representative of an individual to whom the record pertains provided the system manager receives written authorization from the individual who is the subject of the record.
( d ) An individual seeking to review records about that individual may be accompanied by another person of their own choosing. In such cases, the individual seeking access shall be required to furnish a written statement authorizing discussion of that individual's records in the accompanying person's presence.
( e ) In addition to the requirements set forth in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this section, the published “Notice of System of Records” for individual systems may include further requirements of identification where necessary to retrieve the individual records from the system.
[54 FR 18476, May 1, 1989. Redesignated at 63 FR 14338, Mar. 25, 1998, as amended at 64 FR 57365, Oct. 25, 1999; 65 FR 63790, Oct. 25, 2000; 73 FR 56939, Oct. 1, 2008]