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SILVERTIP PIPELINE OIL SPILL 

IN YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA 

(112–47) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND 

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 14, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL ONE

Hon. Jon Tester, a United States Senator from the State of Montana ............... 14 

PANEL TWO

Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, United States Department of Transportation ... 17 

PANEL THREE

Douglas B. Inkley, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Conservation Programs, National 

Wildlife Federation .............................................................................................. 29 

Gary W. Pruessing, President, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company ........................... 29 

PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Denny Rehberg, of Montana .......................................................................... 70 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Hon. Jon Tester 1 .....................................................................................................

Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman ................................................................................. 74 

Douglas B. Inkley, Ph.D. ......................................................................................... 79 

Gary W. Pruessing ................................................................................................... 85 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. Corrine Brown, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, 

request to submit statement from Carl Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust .................................................................................................. 7 

Hon. Bill Shuster, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, request to submit daily reports from the Environmental Protection 

Agency about the Silvertip Pipeline oil spill ...................................................... 48 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

Letter from Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of West Virginia, and Hon. Corrine Brown, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, to Gary W. Pruessing, President, 

ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, July 19, 2011 .................................................. 88 

1Senator Jon Tester did not submit a written statement. 

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(1) 

SILVERTIP PIPELINE OIL SPILL 

IN YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA 

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Shuster (Chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The hearing will come to order. Good morning to 

everybody. Good morning, Senator. Thanks for joining us here this 

morning, I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

I ask for unanimous consent to allow Dennis Rehberg from Montana to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

Again, good morning. Welcome, everybody, to this morning’s 

pipeline hearing. We are going to make a little adjustment, I believe, in the panels. The Senator will go first, then the administrator will go by herself, and then we will have the other few folks 

go next. 

So, again, thank you all for being here. And today we are going 

to receive testimony related to the July 1, 2011, release of crude 

oil from the Silvertip pipeline in Yellowstone County, Montana. 

And, as I said, we will be hearing from the Senator, from Ms. 

Quarterman, the administrator of PHMSA, along with Gary 

Pruessing, president of ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, and Douglas Inkley, a scientist from the National Wildlife Federation. 

And also I would like to welcome Congressman Rehberg—— 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER [continuing]. My good friend, for being here today 

and for requesting the hearing, and of course, inviting Senator 

Tester. We also invited Senator Baucus, at your request. He is obviously tied up, but I am sure he is very concerned, as we all are, 

about the situation in Montana. 

I want to offer my heartfelt condolences to all those who have 

been affected by the spill in Montana. And as chairman of the subcommittee, I want to ensure that Congress is being proactive and 

staying on top of these critical safety issues. I also want to ensure 

that State, Federal, and local actors and key stakeholders are 

working together and that the safety concerns are being adequately 

addressed, and that the incidents are subject to appropriate investigation by this committee and Congress. 

2 

The United States has the largest network of energy pipelines— 

2.5 million miles—the largest in the world, and the pipelines remain critical to our energy life, and they power nearly everything 

in our daily lives and activities. America’s pipeline network is the 

safest and most cost-effective means to transport the extraordinary 

volumes of natural gas and hazardous liquid products that fuel our 

economy. 

Both Government and industry have taken numerous steps to 

improve pipeline safety over the last 10 years. And while the data 

shows that Federal pipeline safety programs have been on the right 

track, recent pipeline incidents suggest there continues to be room 

for improvement and, to quote Secretary LaHood, these incidents 

are ‘‘cause for concern, but not for alarm.’’ 

The pipeline companies have shown that they are aggressively 

taking action to address safety concerns, and that safety continues 

to be the top priority. In fact, incidents are down 30 percent over 

the past several years. 

Today we are focusing on gathering information regarding the incident in Montana, and examining what went wrong. I am committed to ensuring the continued safety and enhanced reliability in 

the transportation of the Nation’s energy products by pipeline. 

Additionally, I am committed to enhancing our already strong 

pipeline system, by looking at ways to improve safety and coordination between the Federal Government, State regulators, and pipeline operators. We must ensure that we proceed in a thoughtful 

and balanced way that keeps in place regulatory measures that are 

working, and makes adjustments to measures that are not working. 

So, again, I thank everybody for being here. And with that, I will 

yield to the ranking member, Ms. Brown, for an opening statement. 

Ms. BROWN. I want to thank Chairman Shuster for holding today’s hearing on the ExxonMobil oil spill in Montana’s Yellowstone 

River. This is a very timely hearing, as the U.S. has, unfortunately, 

experienced a high number of pipeline ruptures over the last few 

years that have caused significant environmental damage, health 

concerns, and death. 

I want to begin by expressing my deepest sympathy to the residents of Montana, who are dealing with the aftermath of this tragedy. As a resident of Florida, I know all too well that—the devastating economy and emotional effects these spills can have on 

people. Most of the Gulf Coast is still cleaning up after the damage 

that was taking place a full year ago. And I can assure everyone 

here that the oil just doesn’t simply disappear, and could easily return to our shores, due to another natural disaster. 

Tomorrow will be the 1-year anniversary of capping the BP spill, 

and I am sure that we can use what we have learned in the spills 

to prevent the same mistakes from happening in Montana. I think 

we need not only to ensure that ExxonMobil protects its pipelines 

from the river that is known to be moving fast, and is following the 

law as it relates to pipeline safety, but that the company is also 

properly addressing the health and economic concerns of the people 

impacted by the spill. 

During the Enbridge spill in Michigan, we saw cases of people 

signing away all of their rights for air conditioners. Unacceptable. 

3 

We need to keep ExxonMobil’s feet to the fire, and we can’t let 

things like this happen again to the American people. 

I want to also take this time to express my disappointment that 

the chairman discharged this committee from consideration of the 

bill that would force the President to make a key decision on 

whether to allow the Keystone pipeline to be constructed. This committee on Transportation and Infrastructure is the committee of 

primary jurisdiction over pipeline safety legislation, and is the primary committee to refer for the Keystone legislation. 

There is still major concerns with this project. And, at the same 

time pipelines will be traveling around the Yellowstone River, this 

is being affected today by the Exxon spill. This should have been 

strongly vetted by this committee, and I join Ranking Member Rahall in urging the committee to hold a markup on the legislation 

prior to the floor consideration. It would be a disaster if a spill occurred on the pipeline, and this committee never held a hearing on 

it at all. 

When I was chair of the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 

and Hazardous Materials, I held a series of five separate hearings 

concerning pipeline safety which highlighted significant problems 

with reporting and inspection, as well as the unhealthy relationship between the pipeline industry and the agency regulating 

them. 

In addition, much like the sewer and water infrastructure in this 

country, much of the pipeline infrastructure is reaching the end of 

its useful life, and we are going to need to make significant investments in improving these assets, if we are going to accomplish the 

goals of both delivering critical petroleum to the States, and protecting citizens from the danger of a hazardous pipeline spill and 

deadly explosions. 

We also need to develop new technology and strategies for improving safety in highly populated areas that are now located 

above the aging pipeline. 

With the high unemployment rate in this country it is currently 

facing, we should be hiring and training inspectors, and putting 

contractors to work replacing this aging pipeline infrastructure in 

the United States. Gas and oil companies are making record profit 

while the infrastructure with which they are bringing this product 

to market becomes more and more unstable. 

I hope that those testifying today will have some good ideas 

about how we can prevent future accidents and what Congress can 

do to—immediately to improve the safety of the Nation’s pipeline. 

With that, I welcome today’s panelists, and thank you for joining 

us. I am looking forward to the hearing and their testimony. I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank the gentlelady. And no one on our side has 

an opening statement. Yield to Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding the 

hearing today. The July 1 Silvertip pipeline rupture resulted in the 

release of approximately 31,000 to 42,000 gallons of crude oil in the 

Yellowstone River. Although the causes of this spill are still under 

investigation, its occurrence is alarming to me and to this subcommittee. 

4 

The rupture occurred in a high-consequence area. ExxonMobil inspected the line in 2005 and again in 2009, and PHMSA has not 

found any integrity-threatening defects from these inspections. 

However, there are several concerning facts that have arisen so far. 

First, PHMSA inspectors warned ExxonMobil several times that 

heavy flooding in the Yellowstone River could have a significant 

impact on the pipeline. It is not clear to me that anything was done 

to respond to these concerns. 

Second, the timing of the ExxonMobil’s response to the rupture 

is concerning. It took a total of 55 minutes to close all the valves, 

and one of the valves was closed, reopened, and then closed again. 

This doesn’t make sense. And, frankly, I just look forward to hearing clarification from the witnesses today. 

Finally, I want to take this opportunity to remind my colleagues 

and our witnesses that the 2006 Pipeline Inspection, Protection, 

Enforcement, and Safety Act, or PIPES Act, has expired. It is due 

for reauthorization. I was part of reauthorizing that, I was part of 

writing the 2002 pipeline safety bill, as well, because of a terrible 

tragedy in my own district in 1999 that resulted in the death of 

three young men. 

So, I hope this incident and the others that we have talked about 

so far in opening testimony that have occurred will spur this committee to reauthorize this important law, with the changes that I 

think that need to be made. And I urge my colleagues to work in 

a bipartisan manner to strengthen our Nation’s pipeline safety 

laws. 

And with that, I want to thank you for holding this hearing 

today, and look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

And, Mr. Chairman, just one more thing. Since we are allowing 

Mr. Rehberg to sit in our committee, I am hopeful he will allow us 

to sit in on the Appropriations Committee at some time. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. I am working on that right now. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I appreciate the gentleman’s opening statement, 

and your words. You have been a leader on pipeline safety, and we 

are moving forward. We will be talking with our colleagues on the 

other side here in the next coming days and weeks to get a pipeline 

bill that we can reauthorize. 

Mrs. Napolitano, do you have a statement? 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. No statement, but thank you for holding this 

hearing. I am very interested in what kind of safeguards we may 

have, because what happens in one State is very prone to happen 

in other States. So thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. And with that, I will yield 5 minutes 

to my colleague, Mr. Rehberg, and take Mr. Larsen’s words about 

letting us come on the Appropriations Committee and help out 

there. 

Mr. REHBERG. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really, truly appreciate the opportunity to sit at the dais, and for the rest of the 

committee, as well. When I left this committee in 2005, I had built 

so much seniority I was almost sitting where Mr. Tester is right 

this minute. And I would love to have you join my committee, Rick. 

That would be great. 

5 

Right now, my sister-in-law is visiting. She is, of course, from 

your home district. She is a Tea Partier. Do you want me to keep 

her? So you make your choice. Do you want me to keep my sisterin-law in Billings, or let you join my—— 

Mr. LARSEN. I love all my constituents. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. REHBERG. Good answer. I also want to welcome my colleague, Jon Tester, who accepted my invitation to join us here 

today from the lower chamber. And—that is actually an inside joke 

in Montana, because he was a senator in Montana and I was the 

representative, and we finally surveyed the floor and found out 

that, in fact, the senate was, what, about a quarter of an inch 

lower than the house. And so we always referred to the senate as 

the lower chamber in Montana. 

I look forward to working with Senators Tester and Baucus, and 

the two agencies and companies represented on the panel to accomplish two critical things today. First, we need to figure out what 

went wrong, so we can determine what can be done to prevent it 

from happening again. And, second, I want to be absolutely certain 

that we are doing everything that can be done to mitigate the environmental heath and economic impact from this spill. 

For many, it is just another news story about an oil spill. But 

for Montanans, this is about our home. Water and rivers play a big 

role in the lives of many Montanans. For the Maclean family in the 

famous movie, ‘‘A River Runs Through It,’’ it was the Big Blackfoot 

River. For me and my family, it is the Yellowstone River. 

I grew up in Billings, just a few miles from the river banks of 

the Yellowstone. As a boy, I swam and fished that river. I spent 

time with my family and friends floating down it in inner tubes, 

and barbecuing on its banks. You could say that, like thousands of 

other Montana families, the Yellowstone is our family river. So this 

oil spill is a pretty big deal for us. We have questions, and we deserve answers. 

As Montana’s congressman, I fly into Billings just about every 

week. I fly over the Yellowstone River. But I also fly over the oil 

refinery that provides good—many good jobs for our community. 

Just like the river is a part of Montana’s culture, so is the energy 

industry. Montana is a warehouse of energy options. We have got 

it all: wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, oil, coal, gas, biofuels. This 

energy options helps us provide the energy this country needs, and 

to end our energy addiction on oil from foreign countries. It also 

provides good-paying jobs. 

While there might be some people out there who think we should 

develop our resources without any regard for the environment, that 

is not me. And there are others who think we should stop all 

human impact on the environment whatsoever. That is not me, either. Neither of these options works for Montana. 

Montanans demand a third option, a way to utilize our natural 

resources, while doing everything we can to protect our environment. It is a reasonable and responsible expectation. The United 

States is leading the way in providing clean, effective energy. We 

are not perfect, but when there is a spill or a mistake, you won’t 

find a more scrutinized response anywhere in the world. 

6 

This is one of the reasons domestic energy production is such a 

good idea. Our standard and expectations are so much higher than 

countries that we import oil from. A kilowatt hour of energy produced in the United States on balance is going to be cleaner and 

safer than a kilowatt hour of energy we import. In Montana, one 

of the most valuable resources is nature, itself. 

Montanans get it. We hunt, we hike, we don’t just visit the outdoors, we live there. That is why I have always said Montanans are 

excellent stewards of the land, and that we don’t need Federal bureaucrats telling us how to manage our lands and wildlife. This 

spill was a failure that did not live up to our standards. And I want 

to know why. I want to know what is being done, and what more 

needs to be done to prevent it from happening again. 

It is because energy is such an important part of our economy 

that it is so important to acknowledge our mistakes, so that we can 

learn from them. 

I appreciate everyone for being here today. I look forward to 

hearing your testimony, and asking some questions. I hope I ask 

some tough questions. But that is only because it is so important 

for Montana. And whether you are a part of the energy industry 

or an environmental steward, you are a big part of our Montana 

family. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for having this 

hearing today. It means a lot to me that you would care as much 

about Montana as we care about Montana. And again, Mr. Tester, 

welcome to testify, as well. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Rehberg. And with 

that, Senator—— 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Oh, 1 second. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. I would like unanimous consent to include in 

the hearing record a statement by the Pipeline Safety Trust. 

[No response.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

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14 

Mr. SHUSTER. And with that, Senator, proceed, please. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JON TESTER, A UNITED STATES 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA 

Senator TESTER. Well, thank you, Chairman Shuster. I very 

much appreciate the invitation. Congressman Brown, thank you for 

Monday’s invitation to this hearing to speak on behalf of Montana 

and the recent oil spill in the Yellowstone River. 

Congressman Rehberg, it is good to see you. Thank you for your 

follow-up invitation request yesterday, albeit through the Great 

Falls Tribune. 

I agree on the importance of working together on this critical 

issue. I am pleased to see people are being reasonable on this issue. 

We could stand to have a little more working together and being 

reasonable on other important issues. 

I appreciate this committee’s serious consideration and work to 

make America’s infrastructure safer and more secure. You know, 

Ms. Alexis Bonogofsky was supposed to be here today from Montana. I understand she couldn’t make it because of health concerns, 

and that is too bad. Because, like Ms. Bonogofsky, I make a living 

in production agriculture. My wife, Sharla, and I still farm the land 

homesteaded by my grandparents 100 years ago. In fact, just last 

weekend I was home plowing down peas and stacking hay. I am 

the only Member of Congress who can say that. 

My livelihood is a farmer, and my bottom line depends upon 

clean water and healthy land. If either of those are compromised, 

Montana’s farmers and ranchers cannot produce the high-quality 

feed, food, and fiber that we are so very famous for. 

Of course, it is not just agriculture. Many refinery jobs in Montana are connected with the Silvertip pipeline. And when incidents 

like this happen, those jobs are put in jeopardy. 

I would like to thank Exxon for responding so quickly to my request, to make sure that there would not be any layoffs while this 

pipeline is shut down. 

As chairman of the Congressional Sportsmen’s Caucus, I also 

know that the land, the rivers, the lakes where we hunt, fish, hike, 

boat, and play make Montana the last best place. Montana’s tourism and recreation industry bring in about $3.4 billion to our State. 

It is Montana’s second-largest industry, behind agriculture. 

So, as a farmer and as a sportsman, I have consistently questioned the safety of our current and proposed pipelines in Montana. 

In fact, when TransCanada had plans to lower safety standards for 

sections of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline through rural Montana, I put my foot down. They wanted to run thinner pipe in Montana and across rural America, and a waiver to run higher oil pressure. I said, ‘‘No way,’’ and they changed their plans. 

My message then and my message now is that there is no cutting 

corners in rural America. When I commented about the proposed 

Keystone pipeline to Secretary Clinton, I urged her to assure that 

all safety precautions were taken when permitting and building it. 

I also hinged my support on the fact that safety must come first, 

and that property rights in rural American must be respected and 

treated fairly in all transactions. 

15 

Soon after the Yellowstone River spill on July 1st, I called upon 

Exxon to pay for the full cost of recovery of this cleanup. Taxpayers 

shouldn’t have to pay one dime, in the end. Exxon reported about 

$11 billion in profit in the first quarter this year alone, and Montana taxpayers have already paid their fair share. 

I will continue to hold Exxon accountable through all avenues, 

including legislation. When I found out about a loophole in the 

Clean Water Act that lets companies like BP and Exxon off the 

hook, I proposed a bill to fix it. My bill requires companies that 

spill oil to pay whichever fine is greater, whether the fine is based 

on the number of barrels spilled, or the duration of the spill. We 

have real consequences for polluters that harm jobs and our economy. 

And finally, we expect and deserve full cooperation, accountability, and transparency from America’s biggest and most profitable corporations in the wake of disasters like this. Exxon has been 

ambitious in efforts to keep us informed, and to respond to the 

needs of the communities affected by this spill. That is a very good 

thing. 

But I have been frustrated by the fact that Exxon hasn’t always 

been accurate. We have heard mixed messages about how long it 

took to shut the pipeline down when the spill happened. We have 

heard different stories about how far downstream the oil has traveled. We have heard conflicting reports about how deep the pipeline was buried. 

And in this situation, Exxon was tasked with regulating itself; 

regulators were not on the job. And now we are paying a price for 

it. Does that sound familiar? Wall Street had no regulators, either, 

and it led to the collapse of our Nation’s economy 3 years ago. 

There are always things we can do to streamline and to adjust 

regulation to make sure that they are still protecting consumers 

and the public without strangling small business. But without regulations, we will see more economic meltdowns and oil spills and 

corporate takeovers that hurt small business. Folks who say that 

we are over-regulated in this country are speaking on behalf of 

Wall Street and big oil. I look these folks in the eye and say, ‘‘You 

are wrong.’’ 

Here we are, nearly 2 weeks after the spill, and we still haven’t 

seen the spill response plan. Government regulators haven’t given 

us the plan. Exxon hasn’t given us the plan. I, along with this committee, have asked for a plan. 

Furthermore, Exxon’s cleanup plan was returned to them by the 

EPA, because it was incomplete. I must ask this committee, I must 

ask Exxon, and I must ask the Administration, what good does a 

spill response plan do, if no one can access it to actually respond? 

How do we validate that these companies are well-prepared, if we 

are being stonewalled on getting the information? 

Are there other discrepancies which have yet to be explained? 

Why did Exxon close the valves and then reopen them, only to 

close them again? Why did Exxon cut the pipeline bed instead of 

bore it, when boring would have been safer? 

I hope we will get clear answers to these questions. There are 

more than 13,000 miles of pipelines in Montana. This time it was 

the Billings area. But there are dozens of other communities that 

16 

could easily face the same or worse conditions without smarter 

strategies for pipeline safety. We must fully recover and uncover 

exactly what happened before, during, and after this spill for the 

sake of the folks that were impacted by this spill up and down the 

Yellowstone River. And as we do, it is just as important that we 

strive to build a culture more committed to safety, transparency, 

and full accountability among everyone involved. 

Unfortunately, not everyone is committed to those values. Yesterday, Senator Rockefeller tried to pass the Senate’s pipeline safety 

bill, and I hope it can happen today. We cannot be in the business 

of saying ‘‘no’’ to safety transparency and accountability. We are in 

the business of making those values work for us, for the sake of 

our health, our safety, our economy, and more importantly, for our 

kids and grandkids. 

We are not out of the woods yet. But this hearing is a good sign 

that folks are willing to work together to make sure taxpayers are 

protected, to make sure that jobs are not lost at the local refinery 

when supply is disrupted, to make sure that the Yellowstone River 

and that the land that surrounds it are returned back to the way 

God intended it, to make sure drinking water downstream is clean 

and safe, and to protect our fish and wildlife. 

Looking forward, we need to make sure that all pipelines and 

proposals for pipelines need to put a premium on safety, to take 

every precaution to minimize risk. Make no mistake. We are all for 

jobs. And I am not for—I am all for responsible energy development using all of our Nation’s resources. But above all, we must 

do it safely. 

I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to the 

committee. Thank you again, Congresswoman Brown, for inviting 

me to the committee to speak on this important subject. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Senator. We appreciate your testimony. And, again, we will do our due diligence over here, and get 

to the bottom of this. So thank you very much. Appreciate it. 

Go ahead, Ms. Brown. 

Ms. BROWN. Senator? Senator? I also want to thank you for coming over. It is very good to see someone come over from the other 

body. And I am very excited that you all are close to passing a bill 

on pipeline safety, and sending it over to the House. Usually it is 

the other way around, and we send our bills, and it just kind of 

hangs over there for 2 or 3 years. 

But, seriously, thank you very much. 

Senator TESTER. Well—— 

Ms. BROWN. Looking forward to you all sending bills over. We 

are kind of stalemate over here a little bit in the House right now. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you. As you guys know all too well, and 

as we know in the Senate, it is never done until it is done. But 

hopefully, this pipeline safety bill by Senator Rockefeller will be 

done, and you guys can deal with it in a way that I know will be 

appropriate. Thank you. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. With that, we invite Ms. 

Quarterman, the administrator, to take her place. 

17 

And again, we changed this up a little bit. We are going to have 

Ms. Quarterman testify, and we will ask questions, and then we 

will get the—I guess it will be the third panel. 

So, whenever you are ready, Ms. Quarterman, you can proceed. 

Welcome back for, what, about your 15th visit in the last 2, 21⁄2

years? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Good morning. Thank you for giving me the 

record in the number of hearings. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I think it is the record. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Probably for everybody at the department. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN, 

ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF TRANSPORTATION 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member Brown, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration’s response to and investigation of the July 1, 2011, 

ExxonMobil Pipeline Company oil spill in Laurel, Montana. 

Safety is the number one priority of Secretary LaHood, myself, 

and the employees of PHMSA. We are all strongly committed to reducing safety risks to the public and environment. More than twoand-a-half million miles of pipelines deliver energy to homes and 

businesses across America. And of those, PHMSA oversees 174,000 

miles of hazardous liquids pipelines. 

Despite recent improvements in pipeline safety, I am very troubled by this oil spill, and its significant impact on the surrounding 

communities. Let me join with the chair and the ranking member 

in sending also my regrets to those families who are affected, the 

communities in Montana. 

I assure you that PHMSA is vigorously investigating this incident, and will continue to do so. PHMSA personnel were on the 

scene and directly engaged within 12 hours of notification of the 

spill. 

On July 5th, PHMSA issued a corrective action order requiring 

ExxonMobil to directionally drill the Yellowstone River crossing, 

and assess the risk of other major Silvertip pipeline water crossings. Due to the high river flow, the ruptured pipe is currently inaccessible for further examination. However, I can assure you that 

once the failed pipe becomes accessible, PHMSA will complete this 

investigation as soon as possible. 

Before the incident occurred, PHMSA and the City of Laurel 

Public Works Department jointly reviewed rising river water and 

river flow and erosion near the Yellowstone River crossing. We 

were concerned with the risks to the Silvertip pipeline. In response 

to our request, ExxonMobil performed a depth of cover survey that 

confirmed that at least 5 feet of cover was over the pipeline in the 

riverbed. 

Subsequently, ExxonMobil indicated to us that the south shore 

of the crossing, which was a cause of erosion concern, had averaged 

over 12 feet of cover over the pipeline. 

Historically, PHMSA has conducted routine inspections of the 

Silvertip pipeline for many years. As recently as July of 2009, the 

18 

agency conducted a standard inspection of the pipeline. We issued 

three enforcement actions as a result of this inspection. All of those 

were unrelated to the river crossing that failed. 

From June 6th to June 10, 2011, PHMSA personnel performed 

an integrity management field inspection on the Silvertip pipeline. 

At that time, no regulatory violations were found, with respect to 

the integrity assessment. 

Mr. Chairman, I assure you that PHMSA will remain vigilant in 

ensuring the safety, reliability, and integrity of all pipelines under 

its jurisdiction. We will also ensure that the Silvertip pipeline is 

free of safety and environmental risks before ExxonMobil is granted permission to restart this line. PHMSA will investigate this incident fully, to ensure that the line is operated safely, that the public 

is protected, and that the violations of the Federal pipeline safety 

regulations are swiftly addressed. 

Thank you, and I am happy to respond to any questions you may 

have. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. And I am going to start off 

yielding my time to Mr. Rehberg, if he has some opening questions. 

Mr. REHBERG. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Ms. 

Quarterman, thank you for joining us today. Could you explain to 

me just exactly what the investigation process is going to be? And 

will you, from that investigation, be able to tell us just the exact 

cause of the break, itself? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. That is the purpose of the investigation. Once 

the pipeline becomes accessible—at this point the flood waters are 

still too high to remove it—we will review the pipeline break to determine what the cause was. 

Mr. REHBERG. So the process is you bring the pipe up. You cut 

it, you bring it up, you inspect it. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. REHBERG. At the same time the permitting process is going 

on for the replacement, so that they can possibly get that pipeline 

up and running as soon as possible, so it doesn’t, on the other end, 

affect our economy and such? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. That is up to ExxonMobil, in terms of the permitting for the new pipeline, how they want to stage that. 

We have asked Exxon to do a side scan of the area sonar, to get 

a picture of what is happening at the bottom. 

Mr. REHBERG. OK. Can you give us an indication of what kind 

of timeframe, then, the investigation will take, once the river recedes and you have the ability to bring the pipeline up? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I think it will take several months, probably. 

And in terms of getting the pipeline up, that too may take weeks, 

if not months, before we can—— 

Mr. REHBERG. Are you the one, then, that would be responsible 

for working with Exxon to make a determination just exactly how 

much was spilled into the river? You know, we hear conflicting reports, although—and we seem to go back and forth between barrels 

and gallons, and barrels and gallons. Clearly, you know, whatever 

looks worst gets reported. 

But ultimately, will you be able to make a determination, getting 

the facts of just exactly how much was spilled into the river? 

19 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We hope to be able to make that determination once we review all the data that Exxon will provide. We have 

visited the Houston control room. So once we see what the pipeline 

looks like, we can determine pretty well how much oil should have 

been spilled, given the flow during that day. 

Mr. REHBERG. To your knowledge, was there any outstanding 

violations of the rules and regulations and laws, as you enforce, at 

the time of the—I know there was concern, and there were other 

violations that didn’t have anything to do with the break, itself. 

But, to your knowledge, was there any outstanding violations that 

could have caused this—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Well, that will be the subject of the ongoing 

investigation. 

Mr. REHBERG. Well, it would seem fairly obvious, as to whether 

there is a violation that is sitting there that had not been addressed. I am not talking about something that you might find that 

violates a rule or a regulation as you are doing the inspection. I 

am suggesting, up until that point, is there any violation that was 

pending—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Up until that point in time, I don’t believe 

there were any violations that were pending. 

Mr. REHBERG. OK. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. But—— 

Mr. REHBERG. Could you explain? What is the point of the directional drilling immediately? Was that for the purposes of determining where the stream bed is, or—I just don’t understand why. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We ordered them to do a horizontal directional 

drill, which would make the pipeline go at a much lower—a depth 

much below the riverbed, as opposed to being—in this case, the 

pipeline was in what we call an open cut situation. They cut the 

riverbed open, stopped—— 

Mr. REHBERG. But I thought the pipeline was shut off. What is 

the purpose of the directional drill, if the valve on one end is shut 

off and the valve on the other end is shut off? Why—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Oh, the directional drill is for the new pipeline, if they were to put one in. It would have to be horizontally 

directionally drilled underneath the riverbed at a much lower place 

than it was, initially. 

Mr. REHBERG. Does that make the valves further away from the 

river, so that there is an additional issue of whether it can be shut 

off as fast as is necessary? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. It will have no effect on the valves, unless 

Exxon has a plan that we haven’t seen that we would have to approve to change the location of the valves. I know of no reason why 

the location of the valves would need to change at this point in 

time. 

Mr. REHBERG. All right. OK. No further questions. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, and I yield to the ranking member for 

5 minutes for questions. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. Ms. Quarterman, obviously, DOT, city of 

Laurel, had some concerns. And, according to the staff DOT, inspectors warned ExxonMobil several times that the heavy flooding 

in the river could have a significant impact on the pipelines. Why, 

given the fact that there have been historical flooding in the past, 

20 

why were the inspectors concerned? And if they warned Exxon several times, I mean, why was the problem not dealt with upfront? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I think the original concern was associated 

with the south river bank of the crossing, where there was a concern that there was erosion there. But the City of Laurel Public 

Works approached us. I think they had been trying to figure out 

who is the regulatory authority here. They had contacted FEMA 

and the Corps of Engineers, and eventually discovered PHMSA. 

And when they contacted us, we went with them to Exxon and 

said, ‘‘You need to take a look at this and do a depth of cover survey,’’ which had not been done at that point to determine the depth 

of the pipeline. 

We were concerned, not just with this particular pipeline, but 

with all the pipelines that were in flooded areas throughout the 

United States, and in June had notified operators on a regional 

basis, ‘‘You need to be paying close attention to your pipelines, because of the floods.’’ 

Ms. BROWN. Well, the Silvertip pipeline was built between 1949 

and 1954. But the section closest to the failure was built in 1991. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Correct. Correct. 

Ms. BROWN. I guess I don’t understand. It was a concern that the 

coverage wasn’t enough. It wasn’t proper. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Well, whenever there is flooding and pipelines 

are nearby, it is incumbent upon the operators of those pipelines 

to keep vigilant about the amount of cover that is above their pipeline. They need to be monitoring it on a regular basis. Our inspector, in fact, went out on a daily basis and was monitoring this line 

because of the concerns that had been raised. 

Ms. BROWN. Were you working with ExxonMobil? I mean were 

you telling them—I saw that you verbally told them twice that you 

were concerned. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Yes, we did. 

Ms. BROWN. And what was their response? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. They gave us a depth of cover survey. They 

performed the depth of cover survey, which showed us that there 

were at least 5 feet of cover over the pipeline and the riverbed— 

this is as of December of 2010—and that there was, on average, I 

believe, 12 feet of cover on the south side of the crossing. 

But let me say it is the operator’s responsibility to weigh and assess the risks associated with its pipeline. We have—in terms of 

construction requirements, a pipeline is required, at a minimum, to 

have 4 feet of cover in a riverbed of this size, which is more than 

100 feet wide. But there are additional requirements. When you design a pipeline, you have to be sure that it is capable of dealing 

with stresses and external loads. 

And this particular pipeline happened to be in an area that could 

affect a high-consequence area, which means the integrity management rules were implicated. Pursuant to those rules, an operator 

is required, on a continual basis, to ensure that its pipeline is 

meeting all local environmental requirements. And by that, we include climatic, specifically. 

So, the operator has an ongoing obligation to continually reassess 

and assess the risks associated with its pipeline, especially in conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:45 Jun 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\RR\2011\7-14-1~1\67383.TXT JEAN
21 

ditions like that. That is why we kept saying to them, ‘‘You need 

to check this pipeline out and watch it.’’ 

Ms. BROWN. I guess the last question or concern—the Senator 

raised the—who is responsible for the cleanup plan? Is the plan on 

file? Who is responsible for implementing that? I mean, do we have 

the oversight? How does it work? 

And I mean it is the same thing that happened 1 year ago. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. The oil spill response plan is filed with 

PHMSA, and we do have Senator Tester’s request. I signed a letter 

to him yesterday, telling him that we will be getting him a copy 

of that plan. 

We do have an obligation to go through it and redact certain personal information, and also certain security information that TSA 

has asked us to not include for public disclosure. 

However, the folks who are at the scene—obviously, the Environmental Protection Agency leads these kinds of cleanups—they have 

a copy of the report, as does the Coast Guard. So the response 

team has the oil spill response plan. It is not yet publicly available, 

simply because we haven’t gone through the process of redacting 

whatever needs to be redacted. But it should be available shortly. 

Ms. BROWN. Well—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Ms. BROWN. OK. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We will come back again if you have more questions. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. A question. First, I wanted to ask—Senator Tester 

brought up that—why ExxonMobil shut off the pipeline and turned 

it back on. My understanding—and I want to see if it concurs with 

you, if you think it is reasonable—they shut it off, they turned it 

back on to isolate and figure out exactly where the leak was. Senator Tester brought that up, that he had a question about that. 

Does that sound reasonable to you, for them to shut it off, turn it 

back on, to try to isolate and find where the leak is coming from? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Well, I—that is the subject of our investigation, obviously. 

They shut off a valve on the pipeline. The pipeline, according to 

our timeline, at 10:04 there was a low-pressure alarm. At 10:41— 

not 10:04, sorry, 10:40 p.m. Mountain Time. At 10:41, the Edgar 

Station went down, and the ExxonMobil control center operation 

knew that there was a problem. At 10:47 the control room operator 

shut down the pump station that would be pumping crude through 

the line. At 10:57 the control room closed the Laurel Station valve, 

which was north of the river. Now, this is not the valve that would 

stop crude oil from flowing into the river. 

At 10:57 they closed the valve—I just said that. At 11:36 they ultimately closed the river valve that is south of the river. Now, I understand that there may have been some opening and closing of 

that northern valve. I don’t know why. That will be the subject of 

our investigation. 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. Thank you. And I know that in October 

you started to actively monitor the pipeline. And, of course, the 

failure that occurred last month. Those additional warnings, have 

you—or those additional monitorings, have you had a chance to go 

22 

back and review your monitoring and try to figure out what you 

could have done differently at PHMSA, or you haven’t had an opportunity to really do an after-action report? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We haven’t done an after-action report at this 

time. We are still getting documents, not only internally, but also 

from ExxonMobil, which will be a part of our review of the investigation. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And, additionally, I guess a month before the pipeline failed, you did a review and discovered there was no violation 

of Federal regulations, but you did discover an anomaly in the 

pipeline. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Can you talk about that anomaly? What—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Yes. Because of all the sensitivity associated 

with this pipeline, I believe the inspectors wanted to do an extra 

effort. So, in June of this year, they went to ExxonMobil to look at 

the Silvertip pipeline in-line inspection run. There had been two inline inspections done in 2004, and another in 2009. 

With respect to the 2009 run, they looked at the entire run of 

the river crossing, and looked at the raw data to verify whether 

they agreed with the conclusions that were drawn there. They did 

find one anomaly that was below the regulatory cut-off for taking 

an action. 

Obviously, once the pipeline is removed from the river, we will 

take a close look—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Yes. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN [continuing]. To see if anything—if that anomaly is in place, as it was then, or if it contributed to this in any 

way. 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. And I know additionally for several years 

you—PHMSA—has been concerned about scouring and erosion occurring in the Silvertip pipeline area of the Yellowstone River. Are 

there other examples where scouring erosions occurred, where 

maybe fast-moving debris has caused the damage to the pipeline 

anywhere in the country that you have seen this happen before? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. This has happened before in the country in 

the past. I believe there was a San Jacinto pipeline incident in the 

1990s, where eight pipelines burst in the Texas area on the flood 

plain there. It is not a usual occurrence, but it is something—obviously, when a flood occurs—that you have to be cognizant of and 

vigilant about. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right, OK. Thank you. And I will yield to Mr. 

Larsen. You have 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. LARSEN. Ms. Quarterman, the accessibility of the pipeline, 

you say we have to wait until the river comes down. Do we have 

a timeline on that? Are we looking August/September? Or—yes, 

August/September timeframe? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I—this is a guess on my part—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, right. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN [continuing]. But based on what I have heard, 

it would suggest August—— 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN [continuing]. Is more likely than September. 

23 

Mr. LARSEN. So it is going to be at least in the next month, perhaps, before you can actually get into the river. And the process for 

getting to the pipeline? Your—the agency’s process to actually get 

physically to the pipeline, once the river is low enough? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Exxon will be responsible for exposing the 

pipeline, and we will be there on site to take custody of it, once it 

comes from the water into our examiner—— 

Mr. LARSEN. And then will you remove all the pipeline just within the riverbanks, or between the valves, do you know? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. At this time I think it is too soon to say. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. And this is a—this was in a high-consequence 

area, as defined by the law. Is that right? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. By the regulation, yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. By regulation. And the requirements for testing in 

an HCA for liquid fuel, can you remind us of that? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Once every 5 years. 

Mr. LARSEN. Once every 5 years. With a pig? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. That is what was done in this instance. That 

is the preferred, shall we say? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, sure. OK. And so—and that was last done in 

2009? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. LARSEN. For this. And any visual inspection on the pipeline—I don’t know about—is this above ground when it is not to 

the river, or is this all underground? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. It is all underground, as far as I know. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, OK. So it wouldn’t be visual. All right. 

You said that there was no sign of integrity problems—there 

were three violations, but none of those violations were related to, 

as far as you can tell, to this particular problem. Can you tell us 

why that is the case? Can you assure us that is the case? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I am happy to give you a copy of our findings 

from those particular inspections. I don’t have a catalog right now 

of everything that—what our findings were. But I know they didn’t 

relate to this particular river crossing. 

Mr. LARSEN. If you could, follow up with us so that we can—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. Be assured that that is the case as 

well, as we look into this. I appreciate it. 

So, where does NTSB fit into the investigation? Are they doing 

their own separate investigation? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. No, they are not doing an investigation. The 

NTSB probably investigates a very small percentage of the number 

of pipeline incidents that occur in the country. They usually have 

to be of a certain size. They don’t have as many people as we do, 

who have expertise in this. And I think they are pretty busy right 

now, investigating some of the earlier incidents—— 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN [continuing]. Around the country. 

Mr. LARSEN. I know they were involved with Olympic pipeline 

that exploded in my district—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. About a decade ago. The process that 

you all have right now is strictly investigation. And then what are 

24 

your options when your investigation is done? Generally, what are 

your options? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We are investigating one for cause, but also 

to determine whether there are any violations of the pipeline safety 

regulations. At that point, we have brought authority to issue all 

sorts of penalties, civil penalties, compliance orders, violations, 

amendments to the plans. We will be looking, obviously, at whatever needs to be done, based on our findings. 

Mr. LARSEN. And strictly on the civil side? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. If we see a potential criminal violation, we 

would refer that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate it. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. And now Mr. Hanna from New York, 

recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. HANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You said that your requirements for depth of these pipelines is roughly 4 feet? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. HANNA. And you said that the—in case I am mistaken—that 

the report that was given to you was—showed that the pipeline 

was 12 feet deep, is that right? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. The report covered a span, both underneath 

and to the sides of the crossing. The riverbed requirement is, at a 

minimum, 4 feet for more than 100 feet across. 

Mr. HANNA. Right. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. And it was at least 5 feet. The 12 feet comes 

in on the—— 

Mr. HANNA. Banks. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. The banks of the river, yes. There was some 

concern by the Public Works. I think a lot of their concern was focused, really, on the south bank of the riverbed when we went out 

there initially. 

And so, some time earlier this year we got a request from them 

to further follow up with ExxonMobil, and we asked them, ‘‘What 

is the covering on that south bank?’’ And they said, on average, 12 

feet. 

Mr. HANNA. So—but to the best of your knowledge, it was over 

4 feet through the riverbed? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. To the best of my knowledge. As of December 

of 2010—— 

Mr. HANNA. And your goal, through horizontal drilling, is to 

make it deeper than that, I take it? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. HANNA. And what are you proposing? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We haven’t set a particular number of feet. 

This is a process that, you know, Exxon will have to come with 

us—come to us with a proposal. 

Mr. HANNA. You have no idea yet whether it was a leak caused 

by a lack of cathodic protection, or if it was a leak that was a function of scouring, or if it was just mislaid—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. HANNA [continuing]. And rubbed against stones, or something like that. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. HANNA. Are these lines cathodically protected? 

25 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. They are. 

Mr. HANNA. OK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Hanna. Mrs. Napolitano, recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, 

thank you for being here today. It is good to see you. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. You too. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. According to your staff, the DOT inspectors 

verbally warned ExxonMobil several times that heavy flooding in 

the river would have a significant impact on the pipeline. Question 

is: Why? 

And, given the facts there have been historic flooding at least 

twice—I believe it was in—I don’t have the correct years, I think 

it was 1996 or 1997, or the heavy flood years—why—given the fact 

there is this historic flooding in the past, nothing new in that area, 

why were the inspectors concerned? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. They wanted to be sure that Exxon had taken 

all steps necessary—ExxonMobil had taken all the steps necessary—to ensure that, given the high level of flooding, there would 

not be a problem with this pipeline. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. OK. But I guess maybe I am trying to reach 

why it—do they inspect it regularly? By law they have to inspect 

the area—let’s see. Each—Federal regs require each operator, at 

intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, to at least inspect 26 times each 

calendar year the surface conditions on or adjacent to each pipeline 

right away. 

Was there something that they saw that they—caused them concern and asked Exxon to ensure that they inspected? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I think the source of their initial concern was 

the call from the City of Laurel Public Works, who—— 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. OK. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN [continuing]. Were concerned about the south 

crossing, the south bank of the river. Then, the flood waters began 

to rage throughout the United States, and that added to their concern, not only on this pipeline but on other pipelines that were affected, to make sure that the operators were actually paying attention, and—— 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. OK. Does PHMSA have copies of the— 

ExxonMobil’s integrity management plan and oil spill response 

plan? Do you keep those on file? And when was the last time these 

were reviewed? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We do not have a copy of the integrity management plan. That is something that the inspectors view when 

they go out to perform an inspection. We do have on file a copy of 

the oil spill response plan. That is the document that Senator Tester referred to earlier, and which we are readying to produce to a 

number of people who have requested it. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chair, I don’t know whether that is proper to ask her, for us to be able to see what response plan there was, 

and what the date of that plan would have been. Was it updated? 

Was it upgraded, based on the findings after the floods? Were there 

reviews to ensure that the erosion had not been so bad that it was 

a cause of concern? 

26 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I am happy to supply you with a copy of that. 

My recollection is that it was updated at the end of 2010, but perhaps the witness from ExxonMobil would be better to answer the 

exact date. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. OK. Well, you know, I am going back to if the 

river was as swift and mobile and USGS indicates, then 

ExxonMobil should have been there annually, verifying the depth 

of cover over the pipeline, due to the historical area. You can do 

all the internal diagnosis and diagnostics. But if the overburdened 

cover was thinning, then you are setting yourself up for disaster, 

which may have been what happened here. 

The DOT and the city of Laurel was clearly concerned about the 

river score and bank erosion at Yellowstone River crossing over the 

pipeline. In fact, DOT checked with ExxonMobil twice on the depth 

of cover to confirm results December 1st, last year, when the depth 

of cover survey was first completed, and then again in June, to confirm the current depth of cover. 

Was there a reason DOT kept checking back, besides the city of 

Laurel being concerned? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Well, we were concerned, as well. And we just 

wanted to make sure that they were paying attention. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. OK. And there is also talk about doing the 

new laying of the pipe once—concurrent to the investigation. Is this 

going to be bored? Is it going to be deeper? You talk about lower, 

but you don’t indicate how much lower. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. In our corrective action order, we require 

them to horizontally drill this pipeline beneath the riverbed. We 

did not, the best of my recollection, set a depth number. Exxon will 

be required to come in with a plan for us to approve. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Are there standards for the rivers that have 

higher river flow than others for the amount of sediment that is 

left, or, I mean taken away? 

I am trying to figure out how much lower will that be, enough 

to be able to allay some of the concerns the community may have 

in the future about flooding? Or, I mean, about the spills? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Yes. At this point I don’t know how low it will 

be. It could be as low as 20-some-odd feet below the riverbed. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. And Ms. Richardson, do you have 

questions? We have no one left on our side, so go ahead. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. 

Quarterman, it is my understanding that committee staff has requested information on the crude oil and other chemicals that are 

transported in this Silvertip pipeline but have yet to receive any 

response. What is the gravity of the rating of the crude oil that was 

being transported in the pipeline at the time of the rupture? What 

are the gravity ratings of other crude oil, if any, are transported 

in that line? And will you commit to providing to this committee 

the information requested, including any materials, safety data 

sheets, or shipping papers for the hearing record? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I am unaware of that request from the committee. I do not know the gravity of the crude in that pipeline. 

ExxonMobil, who will testify after, should be able to provide that 

information for the record. We do not keep copies of any shipping 

27 

documents associated with, you know, the movement of crude oil 

on pipelines. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would you be willing—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Excuse me, just want to—we have that information, and we can share it with you at another point. I don’t know 

if your side has access, but we have it, so—— 

Ms. BROWN. Probably not. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. We don’t have the information. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We will get it to you. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. My next question has to do with—also last 

Friday, it is my understanding, on the Democratic side we requested copies of all claim forms. Do you guys have those, as well? 

Mr. SHUSTER. I don’t—repeat that again, please. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. It is my understanding we also requested copies of all claim forms, including any forms dealing with medical 

claims or reimbursement of expenses. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We didn’t request that, but I don’t know if you requested it—we didn’t get it. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. So, would you be able to assist us in getting copies, or has your office determined the need to request copies 

of all the claim forms, including any forms dealing with medical 

claims and reimbursement of expenses? So far we haven’t received 

anything. Would you be able to assist us in that effort? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. That is not something that we collect. The Environmental Protection Agency is the incident command leader in 

this particular spill. They are the ones responding to the spill and 

to claims. ExxonMobil, again, will probably have copies of all those 

claims. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. My last two questions—I have got about 

3 minutes here—does the PHMSA have copies of ExxonMobil’s—I 

think Mrs. Napolitano asked this question—of the integrity management plan, and you said no. And my question would be, is it 

normal for you to have those? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. No, it is not. It is something that is intended 

to be a document that is kept alive, so continually updated. And 

it is one that our inspectors review when they go to visit and inspect an operator, and review it there for accuracy. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. But it was not there, or not available at the 

previous inspections? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. As far as I know, it was there. I am sure it 

was. There were no violations associated with not having such a 

plan. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And do you have any process in place, based 

upon now these things that have happened, to consider, if it is a 

living and breathing document, that you continue to get updates 

throughout? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Well, we don’t have the original plan. I think 

it is an issue that we have been discussing internally, how we can 

have more data associated with pipelines, and how we might gather, store, protect that data. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. What is the reason why you wouldn’t want to 

have the information? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Certainly we would want to have as much 

data as possible. It is not a question of want. 

28 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. So are you officially requesting of this 

committee that we would assist you in having that done? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I can’t state a position on that at this point 

without having it cleared throughout the Administration. I would 

say that we are, as part of our reauthorization package that was 

sent to the Hill in 2010, there was one initiative that related to 

data and the need for data. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. Could you forward that to the committee? 

Because I don’t recall seeing it. Yes. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Sure. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. My last question. In your opinion, 

should MobilExxon—ExxonMobil, excuse me—have addressed the 

unique conditions of the flow of the Yellowstone River in their design, construction, and maintenance of the pipeline? And should 

that be—do you feel that that should be addressed in their integrity management plan? And do you believe that it should be annually verified, the depth of the cover of the pipeline? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I believe that, yes, those things must be considered. I mean it is the operator’s obligation to consider all the environmental aspects of where it is laying its pipeline, including the 

location of a riverbed—river, the historic flow levels, the expectations for floods. All that should be considered in any design for any 

river crossing. 

And in terms of depth of cover, you say once a year. I would say 

as often as is necessary to ensure that that depth of cover is sufficient. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And are you aware if that was in the current 

integrity management plan? And that is my last question, I am 

sorry. 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. I don’t know the answer to that question. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Will you find out for us, and advise the committee? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. We don’t have a copy of that on file. We can 

try to ascertain that. Perhaps ExxonMobil can answer that question, as well. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, I would think, in light of what is going 

on, you probably would want to know that as well, right? 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Well, it will be part of our investigation, obviously. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Quarterman, thank you very much for being 

here. I am confident we will see you again. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, and you are—— 

Ms. QUARTERMAN. Hopefully to reauthorize the pipeline safety 

program. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We are moving forward with that post-haste. So 

thank you very much for being here today. 

And I would like to invite Mr. Pruessing and Dr. Inkley to come 

to the witness desk. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right, again, thank you both, gentlemen, for 

being here today. And, Dr. Inkley, we will start with you. 

29 

Dr. Inkley, as I said earlier, is a scientist from the National 

Wildlife Federation. Thank you very much. And you can proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS B. INKLEY, PH.D., SENIOR SCIENTIST, CONSERVATION PROGRAMS, NATIONAL WILDLIFE 

FEDERATION; AND GARY W. PRUESSING, PRESIDENT, 

EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE COMPANY 

Mr. INKLEY. Thank you, Chairman Shuster. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify this morning. I appreciate that you and the 

ranking member and all of the committee members are here today. 

I am testifying in lieu of Ms. Alexis Bonogofsky, to whom the invitation was originally extended. Her family farm, or ranch, lies 

along the banks of the Yellowstone River, near the site of the spill. 

Unfortunately, she had to be taken to an emergency room earlier 

this week, where she was diagnosed with acute hydrocarbon exposure, and is unable to be here today. 

As we consider pipeline safety, it is important to keep three facts 

in mind. The first of these is that the Yellowstone River oil spill 

is America’s third major oil spill in just 15 months. The second is 

that, in large spills, at best, only 10 to 15 percent of the total oil 

spilled is ever recovered. EPA indicated yesterday that was only 1 

to 5 percent in this spill. And third, the effects of oil on the environment may not be immediately obvious, but can last for years. 

Crude oil from this pipeline is a serious threat to people and 

wildlife. Drinking and irrigation water are at risk of contamination. 

Relatively immobile wildlife, such as frogs and salamanders, turtles, beavers, muskrats, and otters, they are all in harm’s way. Of 

greatest concern to me is the aquatic food chain, including the 

many fish that have no place to seek refuge. The endangered pallid 

sturgeon lives downstream from the spill. 

As I earlier noted, my colleague, Ms. Bonogofsky, fell ill due to 

hydrocarbon exposure. But furthermore, her summer pastures, 

which are critical for her livestock, are ruined by the oil contamination, and she cannot allow her livestock to feed in that. 

The inadequacy of the response has been reported widely in the 

press. Ms. Bonogofsky learned about the spill when she discovered 

oil on her property, and then read about the pipeline rupture in the 

local paper. She was never formally notified. She had to discover 

it herself. 

When she called the county health department, she was told that 

the oil was ‘‘just an irritant.’’ Yet, in the Utah Department of 

Health’s response to a recent 33,000-gallon spill near Salt Lake 

City, they had a long list of potential health impacts, including 

lung, liver, and kidney damage, infertility, and immune system 

suppression. Clearly, crude oil is far more than ‘‘just an irritant.’’ 

When Ms. Bonogofsky was directed to State officials to call—by 

State officials to call an ExxonMobil hotline, initially they provided 

her with no information. They were there just to take her information. A public relations person from ExxonMobil would not tell her 

what chemicals were in the oil, or if any had been added, and she 

still doesn’t know. 

Unfortunately, I am a veteran of previous oil spills, including the 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster last year in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Sadly, I believe that industry is using the same play book to reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:45 Jun 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\RR\2011\7-14-1~1\67383.TXT JEAN
30 

spond to this particular oil spill. Industry assures everyone that operations were safe. Industry responds slowly to the spill. Industry 

understates the size of the spill. 

Industry keeps the public in the dark. Governor Brian Schweitzer pulled Montana out of the incident command center because 

‘‘ExxonMobil was refusing to be transparent with the public.’’ 

And industry keeps the press out. Montana Governor Schweitzer 

again stated, ‘‘They have security guards that don’t let the press 

in.’’ Same thing happened in the Gulf. 

It is not surprising, though, that this is the industry play book. 

There is a lot to hide. From 2000 to 2009, pipeline accidents onshore accounted for more than 2,000 significant incidents, and 161 

fatalities in the United States. Since January 2010, 2.3 million gallons of oil spilled, causing $46 million in damage to private property and to the environment. 

Just weeks prior to the spill, this particular spill, a Federal inspector assessed the pipeline to be in compliance with Federal pipeline safety standards. So, clearly, industry and the existing—the 

existing—pipeline safety standards are failing to protect public 

health and the environment. 

My written testimony contains a list of recommendations to improve pipeline safety. These include, among others, requiring incidents to be reported immediately to Federal and State agencies, 

and to all people potentially affected. Require accurate, independent assessment of spill size. Require long-term monitoring of 

spills down river and in repairing zones, and of impacts to fish and 

wildlife populations. Require immediate public disclosure of the 

chemical composition of spilled oil. 

In closing, it is imperative that safety standards be improved. Industry is now promoting its riskiest project yet: nearly 20 times the 

capacity of the Silvertip pipeline, the Keystone XL tar sands pipeline. Unfortunately, the House may soon vote on a bill to fast-track 

the permitting of this new pipeline. Instead, I believe that Congress should first focus on enacting legislation to improve our Nation’s pipeline safety policies, not fast-track another pipeline. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Doctor. And now, Mr. Pruessing, who 

is the president of ExxonMobil Pipeline Company. 

Mr. Pruessing, please proceed. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member Brown, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the pipeline incident that occurred on July 1st in the Yellowstone River in Montana, and to update you on the progress we 

have achieved to clean up the spill. 

Before I begin, however, allow me to repeat our sincere apologies 

to the people of Montana. We deeply regret that this incident occurred, and are steadfastly committed to not only complete the 

cleanup, but also to build the learnings from this incident into our 

future operations. 

This requires, first, that we understand exactly what occurred. 

We do not yet know the precise cause of the apparent breach in the 

Silvertip pipeline, and we will not likely know until our investigation is complete. 

31 

We do know that the pipeline had met all regulatory requirements, including a 2009 pipeline inspection and a December 2010 

depth of cover survey. Additionally, as recently as last month, the 

United States Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, performed a 

field audit of the pipeline’s integrity management program. 

And, of course, we do know the effects of the incident. The pipeline lost pressure the night of July 1st. And within 7 minutes, our 

employees shut down the pumps. Shortly thereafter, we began closing valves to isolate segments of the pipeline, and minimize any release. We estimate that no more than 1,000 barrels of oil spilled. 

We notified the national response center, and immediately began 

implementing our emergency response plans, drawing upon local 

resources at the ExxonMobil Billings Refinery, as well as our experts across the country. A unified command center, led by the Environmental Protection Agency, and involving almost 700 people 

now, directs the response. 

This coordinated effort, combining the resources and expertise of 

Government, industry, and others, is crucial to effective cleanup 

and recovery. I speak on behalf of our entire company in thanking 

the public servants at all levels of Government, and the volunteers 

from nongovernmental organizations contributing to this effort. 

This includes professionals from PHMSA, the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Department of the Interior, the 

Montana Department of Environmental Quality, Montana Fish, 

Wildlife, and Parks, the Yellowstone County supervisors—or commissioners, local response organizations, International Bird Rescue, 

and many others. 

As part of our cleanup strategy, we have divided the area down 

river of the spill into four zones. In the first two cleanup zones, covering a combined distance of about 19 miles, we have deployed approximately 43,000 feet of boom, 260,000 absorbent pads, and several vacuum trucks, boats, and other equipment to capture oil. Our 

priority is to ensure that the cleanup is safe and effective, a task 

made more challenging by the persistent high-water levels in the 

Yellowstone River. At the same time, through the unified command, we continue to conduct air and water quality monitoring of 

over 200 miles of the river, as well as wildlife assessments and recovery efforts. To date, EPA monitoring confirms there is no danger 

to public health, and no reported water system impacts. 

We have also brought in recognized experts to actively monitor 

the impact on local wildlife. So far, a total of four animals have received treatment: one garter snake, two—one warbler, and two 

toads. In addition, International Bird Rescue has identified several 

oiled birds, and they are assessing if any require capture and 

cleaning. Monitoring and mitigating the impact of the spill on wildlife will remain a priority of ours throughout the cleanup. 

The Silvertip pipeline plays an important role in supplying energy to the Billings area and, therefore, helps sustain local jobs and 

economic growth. We are committed to replace the damaged pipe, 

using horizontal and directional drilling techniques, with a new 

section that will lay approximately 30 feet below the riverbed, consistent with the PHMSA direction. 

32 

Of paramount concern to us is the impact on the local communities. We established a community information line, and have received more than 300 calls. A number of these calls are claims related to property, agriculture, health, and we are actively responding to more than 120 of those. We have also sent 6 teams door to 

door to visit more than 150 residents in the most impacted areas. 

It is our goal to respond to individual concerns within 24 hours. 

I am pleased to report that these outreach efforts have mostly received a very positive response. In fact, more than 130 calls to the 

information line have been offers of help. This outpouring of local 

volunteer support is immensely helpful. It testifies to the resilience, 

industry, and generosity of the people of Montana. We deeply appreciate their understanding and support. 

To repeat, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company takes full responsibility for the incident and the cleanup. And we pledge to satisfy all 

legitimate claims. But even then, our work will not be done. We are 

equally committed to learn from this incident, and to build those 

learnings into our future operations. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Pruessing. And I will first go to 

Mr. Rehberg for questions. 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Inkley, I was listening to your testimony, and I missed the point. Were you suggesting that there is water in—irrigation water violations or damage now, or that you suspect there will be, or were you talking 

about with a oil spill it happens, and it is something we need to 

be cognizant of? I just missed that point, I am sorry. 

Mr. INKLEY. The latter. With an oil spill of this magnitude, we 

need to be cognizant that all of these natural resources are at some 

risk. So the monitoring is appropriate to be done intensely, and for 

a certain period of time. 

Mr. REHBERG. OK. So I suspect that, at this point, there is less 

likelihood of that occurring. 

Mr. INKLEY. At this time there is less likelihood of that occurring. But the thing that concerns me is that the EPA has said that 

there is no danger to public health, yet Ms. Bonogofsky was diagnosed with hydrocarbon exposure, and we have spread some 1,000 

barrels of toxic chemicals across the landscape. 

Mr. REHBERG. Yes. 

Mr. INKLEY. It doesn’t compute, for me, that there is no risk or 

danger to public health. It seems to me that there very much is a 

danger to public health, and we shouldn’t—— 

Mr. REHBERG. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. INKLEY [continuing]. We shouldn’t ignore that. 

Mr. REHBERG. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I did have a meeting, a conference call, that was public and the press was invited, 

with CDC and the NIH. And they both said that there was no 

health risk that they could verify at this time, as well. 

So, the evidence is starting to mount—that is not to suggest that 

we don’t want to continue to monitor, that there aren’t going to be 

problems. We want to be cognizant and vigilant, to make sure what 

you are suggesting does not occur. It is just so far, in hearing at 

least from the EPA and from NIH and CDC to this point—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. REHBERG [continuing]. There is no—— 

33 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. REHBERG [continuing]. No health risk at this time. You had 

mentioned, then, Mr. Pruessing, in your testimony, drinking water. 

How about irrigation? Because, of course, I have a lot of friends 

along the river. They have pastures. They say that the pastures are 

soiled, they cannot graze their cattle. 

So, one, are you seeing any damage to irrigation water? And, 

two, are your adjusters going to go in and remunerate for the loss 

of use, in the particular case of somebody who is trying to graze 

cattle, or whatever? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Well, first, through the unified command there 

is sampling being done of the river water. That work was initiated 

some time ago. The EPA has been the lead in that, and they have 

already indicated to us that they have not found anything in the 

water that would be a problem for irrigation. So, actually, in one 

of the recent public meetings, I did hear them say that it would be 

OK to use that. 

That said, we are very anxious to respond to any claims that people have, or any concerns they have. And we are encouraging people to use the information line if they have questions or concerns. 

And we want to respond to each one of those on an individual 

basis. 

To the extent that people cannot use their fields for feed, or cannot use the water, we are going to respond to those and provide 

that. 

Mr. REHBERG. Does the EPA have a process where there is a 

sign-off? Obviously, with the municipalities and the water systems, 

you know, there is a turn-on date. But with irrigation, is somebody 

out there signing something saying, ‘‘Good to go, open your flood 

gate, or your head gate, go ahead and irrigate’’? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Certainly from our perspective, we are not asking citizens to sign anything. 

Mr. REHBERG. No. I mean some kind of a Governmental entity 

that gives them the go-ahead after all the various assurances and 

testing that EPA is doing. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. The EPA is taking the lead in communicating to the people of the community about the water. But, 

again, as I know, and what I have heard them say, they are not 

indicating there is any issue with the irrigation water. 

Mr. REHBERG. OK. I had read somewhere that the EPA had suggested a September 9th deadline for cleanup. Is that a hard and 

fast rule? I mean is that even possible? 

Mr. PRUESSING. We have not put any end date on the cleanup. 

We are committed—— 

Mr. REHBERG. But EPA? 

Mr. PRUESSING. I am not aware of any dates that the EPA has 

set, as well. I do know that the EPA is in the leadership role, but 

very integrated in the unified command. But we have said many, 

many times that we are committed to do the cleanup until it is finished, and we will be there as long as necessary. 

Mr. REHBERG. Yes, I have seen the pictures of, you know, where 

it has gone over the bank, it is in people’s lawns. That is the easy 

stuff to see, because you can see it when you fly over or when you 

are walking. 

34 

But there is also some underbrush. What do you do? Are you 

going to go in and mow? Do you have a chemical that eats it up? 

How do you get—you know, think of a tumbleweed as an example, 

with oil all over the tumbleweed. Now, it is a great, big bush on 

the stream. How do you get in and clean up that tumbleweed, so 

you know that everything is cleaned off? 

Mr. PRUESSING. You are correct that our early work has been to 

get into the backwater areas where the river is not flowing as 

quickly, to absorb any oil that may still be in that area. As the 

river starts to recede, we will be able to access additional areas to 

inspect, to make sure that there is not damage there. 

Again, the final decision on what is the proper cleanup method 

so that we do not damage the environment, but also can pick up 

the oil, is part of the unified command. And the EPA, the State of 

Montana, and ExxonMobil will work together to make sure that we 

have the right solution from an environmental standpoint. 

Mr. REHBERG. So you will stay until it is clean? 

Mr. PRUESSING. That is correct. 

Mr. REHBERG. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. With that, Ms. Brown, recognized for 5 minutes for 

questions. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to say 

less than 2 weeks ago, people on this committee were trying to 

wipe out EPA. I mean here today we understand the importance 

of having EPA to monitor the system and someone to have oversight. 

Let me just first of all ask a question. They were trying to wipe 

out EPA by cutting the funding. That is wiping it out. I mean leaving something on the books, and not being able to monitor this 

kind of situation is why we have EPA in the first place. Do you 

know when EPA, Mr.—will you pronounce—— 

Mr. PRUESSING. Pruessing. 

Ms. BROWN. Pruessing. Do you know when EPA started to conduct their monitoring after the rupture? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Right after—— 

Ms. BROWN. You know when they started? Because these illnesses could be identified later, as opposed to sooner. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Actually, right after the event, we had industrial 

hygiene people begin doing air monitoring within a couple hours of 

the time we had identified where the incident site occurred. 

Shortly after that, the EPA was on site, and also began doing 

their own monitoring. So we have monitoring data from very early 

after the incident. And again, all of that data at this point indicates 

that we’re—have not created a public health issue. 

Ms. BROWN. The Democratic staff has requested a lot of information, information on several different things, including, but not—request copies of all forms, including any forms dealing with medical 

claims or reimbursement of expenses, and other things. Have you— 

do you have that information, or are we going to be able to get that 

information, so we can monitor this situation, also? 

Mr. PRUESSING. I have not personally reviewed the claims, but 

I can share with you the claims process that we have put in place. 

We now have over 40 claims specialists on site to try to work with 

the community. We try to respond to every claim within 24 hours. 

35 

We then set up a meeting with the individual. Often times that includes a site visit, so we can see what the actual issues are. 

As I mentioned earlier, we are not asking anyone who files a 

claim to sign anything. If they file a claim, that does not mean that 

their claim is completed. All we are trying to do is help individuals 

respond to the actual incident and any impacts they may be feeling 

at this point. We will continue to be there, and respond as necessary until the job is done. 

Ms. BROWN. I think it is—copy of the forms. But I do know that 

we have several requests in to your office, and we have not received any response as of yet. 

Mr. PRUESSING. I will have to get back to you on that item, because I am not familiar with it. 

Ms. BROWN. I know you heard Ms. Quarterman’s testimony. And 

the situation had been monitored. What could we do to prevent this 

from happening again? It was a lot of ill ease as to whether or not 

it was adequate protection. So, as we move forward—— 

Mr. PRUESSING. Well, as Ms. Quarterman relayed to the subcommittee, you know, we had done an inline inspection of this line 

in 2009, and did not find integrity issues with it. We had come 

back and done the depth of cover survey in the end—at the end of 

2010 and, again, felt that we had adequate depth of cover, based 

on previous experience. 

At this point in time, we do not know what occurred with this 

line. That is troubling to all of us. And we realize that we may 

have to wait for the water to recede before we can fully understand 

what occurred here. 

You know, there is certainly speculation that may be related to 

the river flooding. But at this point in time, I do not know what 

happened to this line. What does concern me, though, is that we 

used a very good engineering analysis and credible assessment, as 

we had done in the past, to look at this line from a risk standpoint. 

We had actually taken a one-day shut-down of this line in late 

May, as we worked with the city of Laurel, to show them the data 

we had. 

I know that a lot of their issues were associated with the erosion 

of the south bank, as Ms. Quarterman has already shared. But we 

shared that data with them, as well as with PHMSA. Everything 

that we looked at at this point indicated, from a risk assessment 

standpoint, that we had a safe line. 

Again, we do not know what happened with this line, but we, 

just as everyone, are very anxious to be able to complete that investigation so that we can learn from it, and apply those learnings 

to the other parts of our business. 

Ms. BROWN. We will have another round, I guess? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sure. 

Ms. BROWN. OK, thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I think we will. Dr. Inkley, it is—again, appreciate 

you being here, in place of the witness that my colleagues requested. 

It is concerning to me, though, you are coming before the committee coming from a well-known organization, questioning—and 

we certainly want to, as Mr. Rehberg pointed out, to continue to 

monitor the situation—but you are questioning the safety, the 

36 

quality of the air, when we have got three organizations—the EPA, 

the NIH, and the CDC—that have said they evacuated people but 

they tested the quality of the air and let them come back in. 

And you are here today, it seems to me, saying—you are questioning whether it is safe out there, when we have got, like I said, 

the CDC and the NIH, two very, very highly respected health organizations saying it is fine to go back in. Are you still questioning 

it, even based on what the CDC and the NIH has said? 

Mr. INKLEY. Yes, I am. I am questioning how it is being presented to the public. 

We still know that there is a lot of oil out there. In fact, when 

their cleanup is completed, and they leave the scene, they will have 

recovered only some 5 or 10 percent of the oil. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. INKLEY. The other 90 percent will still be out there, or have 

degraded. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. INKLEY. The public needs to understand that they can still 

be exposed. Fortunately, there has been—you know, there has been 

Ms. Bonogofsky, who ended up in the emergency room—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. INKLEY [continuing]. And there has been some impact to 

wildlife. I am most concerned about the aquatic organisms. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. INKLEY. But—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. And your—— 

Mr. INKLEY [continuing]. You still have to be concerned. 

Mr. SHUSTER. You—— 

Mr. INKLEY. You know, when a grizzly bear is in an area, that 

doesn’t mean there is no risk. There is a risk. The risk doesn’t 

occur only when the grizzly bear attacks. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sir, I understand that. But when a very respected 

organization says, ‘‘We don’t believe the risk is raised to a level 

that people shouldn’t be there,’’ as stated by the CDC and the NIH, 

I have real questions as to whether—again, is your analysis coming—you have been on the ground out there, and looked around. 

Mr. INKLEY. We do have people on the ground. You know, I do 

question the appropriateness of not having independent assessments. It wasn’t until there was an independent assessment of the 

oil spill size in the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico that the Government—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. INKLEY [continuing]. And industry finally backed away from 

a terrible underestimate of one-tenth the actual size, of just 5,000 

barrels per day in that spill. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right, right. 

Mr. INKLEY. Government said that. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, this is—— 

Mr. INKLEY. You are expecting me to believe that. It was wrong. 

Mr. SHUSTER. This is much smaller, and the CDC and the NIH 

are, again, very highly respected organizations. 

So, that being said, the next question to you is, is there another 

way that we can transport hazardous materials that is safer, in 

your view? 

37 

Mr. INKLEY. I think that we need to have improved pipeline 

standards. As I indicated in my testimony, as Mr. Pruessing indicated, they do not know why it failed. It had passed Federal inspection earlier. Obviously, the standards are inadequate to prevent it 

from happening. 

Mr. SHUSTER. But you dispute the past 20 years they have improved, over the past 20 years we have 30 percent less of the number of barrels of oil spilled, and the incidents have gone down significantly. Do you dispute that? 

Mr. INKLEY. Well, I am greatly appreciative of the fact that the 

number of oil spills seems to have declined since the passage of 

that act. But we still have a long way to go. This map shows the 

incidences that have occurred across the United States in the last 

10 years. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sure, I understand. 

Mr. INKLEY. It is very significant, still. 

Mr. SHUSTER. But it has decreased, and we are getting better. 

But my question is, when someone comes before this committee 

and questions pipelines, in light of all the facts—it is getting better—it seems to me that the only way to get to zero incidents is 

just to stop doing it. Are you advocating that we shouldn’t be— 

Mr. INKLEY. No, no. We are advocating to protect public health 

and safety—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, and that is what we are doing here also. But 

whenever you do anything—for instance, you drive a car—there is 

a risk involved. And we try to mitigate and reduce that, and I 

think we have done a good job of going in that direction. 

Do you oppose the Keystone pipeline? 

Mr. INKLEY. The National Wildlife Federation believes that the 

Keystone pipeline should not be built, especially in light of the fact 

that we have these current safety standards that have been—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right, and so—— 

Mr. INKLEY [continuing]. Devastatingly inadequate. 

Mr. SHUSTER [continuing]. You would be advocating for shipping 

hazardous materials by train or truck? Is that what you would be 

advocating for, instead of pipeline? 

Mr. INKLEY. We are looking for improved pipeline safety standards. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And, in the meantime, let it be on trucks and let 

it be on trains, is that—— 

Mr. INKLEY. No, that is not what we are saying at all. We are 

saying that we need to improve the safety standards. 

Mr. SHUSTER. So that you would say that pipeline is probably the 

most—it is the safest way to move hazardous materials? 

Mr. INKLEY. Actually, I am not a biochemical engineer, so I 

couldn’t answer that question. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right, right. Well, thank you very much. Mr. 

Pruessing, can you tell us why it took 2 hours for ExxonMobil to 

report to the National Response Center about the incident that occurred? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Thank you for asking me that question, because 

there seems to be some misinformation about the actual timeline. 

So, let me go through the process that occurred—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sure. 

38 

Mr. PRUESSING. And some of this you heard from Ms. 

Quarterman. But again, I want to make sure that everybody understands. 

At about 10:40 p.m. Mountain Time on July—the evening of July 

1st, we got a pressure indication in our control room, where we 

monitor all of our pipelines on a 24/7 basis, that something unusual 

was going on in the pipeline, there was a pressure reduction. At 

that time we did not know if it was a pump shutting down, or an 

instrument that malfunctioned, or some other event. 

The team in the control room pulled in additional resources, tried 

to analyze the situation, and determined they could not, at that 

point, know exactly what was going on. So, they made the decision 

to shut down the pumps on the line, to stop the line from pumping. 

That was done within 7 minutes. So, at 10:47 p.m. Mountain Time, 

the pumps were shut down. 

They then began a complex series of steps to actually start closing valves that are along the pipeline to isolate various segments 

of the pipeline. 

There was a question earlier about why were some valves opened 

and then later closed and then later reopened. That was on the 

downhill section of the line, downstream of this river, and flowing 

into one of the refineries that we provide crude to. After that valve 

was closed, it was assessed that that was a safe section of line, 

there was not likely any issue there, the pressure reduction had 

been seen while upstream, and they could reopen that valve to 

allow the oil to drain away, down into the refinery. 

So, that was done from a safety perspective, to try to get the material into a safe spot which, in this particular case, was the refinery we were delivering oil to. We later came back and closed that 

valve, because we wanted to isolate all of the line at that point. 

The valve that we closed next to the Yellowstone River was done 

at 11:36. So our period—it took a period of 49 minutes before that 

actual valve was closed, from the time we started closing those 

valves. 

At that point in time, we did not yet know exactly where the incident occurred. All we know was that something unusual was 

going on in the lines, and we were shutting it down and isolating 

it. 

At 11:45 p.m. our control center in Houston received a call from 

the local fire department in Laurel City, indicating they had an 

odor of petroleum. That was really the first indication that we had 

of where the actual site may have been. At 12:19 we called the National Response Center. So, from the time we knew we had an actual spill until the time we called the National Response Center 

was certainly less than an hour. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much for that. Now I will go to 

Mrs. Napolitano for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. One of the things that 

comes to mind, Mr. Pruessing, is the emergency response and corrosion control procedures. Your supervisor’s knowledge of these 

procedures, I understand it is self-certification of the employees. 

How does that happen? Does this—how do you address it? Are 

they certified? If they are self-certified, how do we know that they 

are properly trained in these procedures? 

39 

Mr. PRUESSING. We have a very large and integrated plan to 

maintain the integrity of all of our pipelines across the country. 

And that involves—— 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. I am sorry, but I have to run. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. I am talking about specifically here. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. In this particular area. Do you have a record 

of the self-certified employees, whether you trained them, they 

were trained by video, or were they trained by booklet? How were 

they trained, if they are self-certified? 

Mr. PRUESSING. All of the skills that we have with regard to integrity management are part of the daily activities for many of 

these operators on the line. As was mentioned earlier, not only do 

we do the monitoring of this pipeline in a control room with electronic equipment and pressure and flow rates, but we also actually 

have employees in the field that visit the pipelines on a regular 

basis. We measure the corrosion protection. All of those are pieces 

of data that must be reported to PHMSA. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. I know, but the—— 

Mr. PRUESSING. And—— 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. The training to be able to recognize these—— 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO [continuing]. Instances is what I am concerned 

about. 

Mr. PRUESSING. And the operators on a pipeline must be OQqualified, according to the regulations in PHMSA. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Who records that qualification? 

Mr. PRUESSING. We do the training. We actually have the tests 

on file. We record all of that, and then PHMSA will come in on audits and actually look at all of those training records, to make sure 

that they have been done properly. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Does PHMSA conduct any follow-up on this 

training, to ensure that the certification is proper? 

Mr. PRUESSING. PHMSA has the right to come in and audit us 

in any aspect of our business. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. OK, but they don’t. In other words, this is 

self-certification. 

Mr. PRUESSING. We actually do the work. But as—again, as Ms. 

Quarterman shared earlier, we have the responsibility to meet the 

requirements. They come in and audit all of those various requirements, to make sure we are meeting them. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you. One of the statements I believe 

you might have made—and correct me if I am wrong—that you 

were going to replace a pipeline to 30-feet depth. 

Mr. PRUESSING. That is correct, ma’am. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Then you recognize that the previously placed 

5 feet of cover is inadequate. Why do you now believe the 30 feet 

is adequate, and what are you basing it on? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Well, once again, we do not know the cause of 

this incident at this time. It may be related to the river conditions, 

but it may not be. So we will not know the answer to that until 

the investigation is complete. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. But you will do it at a 30-foot depth? 

40 

Mr. PRUESSING. PHMSA provided a corrective order to us, asking 

us to use this technology when we do replace the line. I have not 

actually seen the final drawings on that, but I have talked with the 

engineers that are working on that. And they have indicated to me 

that we are looking at drilling at about 30 feet, and it will not be 

in the rubble or the sediment of the riverbed, it actually will be in 

rock. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you. In 1997, USGS recorded a flow of 

82,000 cubic feet per second at their gauge in Billings. Did 

ExxonMobil go out and measure the impact then, the effect it had 

on your pipeline? And, if so, what was found? And do you have to 

perform—did you, at that time, have to perform any remedial action? 

Mr. PRUESSING. We have not, in the past, had any issues with 

our pipelines during periods of flood. Again, as I mentioned earlier, 

we had gone back at this particular time, just months ago, and 

done further risk assessment work to confirm that we still had a 

safe pipeline. We had nothing that would indicate that the line was 

not safe. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Well, and my information tells me that USGS 

indicates that anything over 50,000 CFS does move a lot of the 

bedrock, a lot of the riverbed. Is this a problem you have been noticing? 

And when your inspectors look at this, do they gauge the 

changes there are in actual movement? Because there have been— 

in 1996, in 1997, and before that—have been in 1991, and I am 

looking at historical records from USGS. And if this showing an 

erosion, what steps are you taking in areas—and if you are going 

to bury this one 30 under, what about other areas they may be less 

than? 

Mr. PRUESSING. We are constantly looking to try to improve our 

knowledge and improve our operations from a safety and integrity 

standpoint. That is part of the way we try to address our business 

each and every day. We do risk assessments on all parts of our 

business, to make sure that we are comfortable continuing the operations, no matter what the conditions. 

I will share with you that when the Mississippi River was flooding earlier this year, they were going to open the Morganza Spillway for the first time since 1973. We had several lines that crossed 

the Atchafalaya River, downstream of the Morganza Spillway. We 

did a risk assessment on that work, on those lines. We determined 

that, based on historical issues, that we needed to shut those lines 

down. 

So, when they opened that Morganza Spillway, our lines were 

shut down, cleared of oil, and filled with water. We did that as part 

of our normal risk assessment process to say, ‘‘How do we get ourselves comfortable that we are operating in an appropriate way?’’ 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Yes—— 

Mr. PRUESSING. We did that—— 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO [continuing]. I am focusing on Billings, sir. 

That is my focus. 

Mr. PRUESSING. We did that same type of activity here, at the 

Billings crossing. We identified the potential risks, we looked at all 

41 

the data, the integrity data, the depth of cover data, the recent 

PHMSA inspections. We felt like we had a safe system. 

Again, I do not yet know what the cause of this incident was. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I would like to recognize Mr. Hanna for 5 minutes 

of questioning. 

Mr. HANNA. Thank you, Chairman. Couple things. The age of the 

pipeline, do you have a rough idea? 

Mr. PRUESSING. The original line was—first was laid in 1949. 

But this particular crossing was relaid in 1991. It used to run 

across the—underneath the bridge, going across the river. And the 

State highway department had asked us to take it off the bridge 

and relocate it in the river. So we relaid this line in 1991. 

Mr. HANNA. So it is 20 years old. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. 

Mr. HANNA. Do you have—you have sacrificial anodes on this? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. 

Mr. HANNA. Cathodic protection—— 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes, we use cathodic protection—— 

Mr. HANNA. You stated that you have—you checked, and that— 

they were intact, they were adequate? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. One of the regular things that we do, from 

a pipeline maintenance standpoint, is check the rectifier readings, 

to make sure that we have current going appropriately to protect 

the lines, and we have no indication that that was a problem. 

Mr. HANNA. OK. And the valves that you closed, they are all 

hand-closed valves? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Some of those are hand-closed valves, some of 

those are motor-operated valves that actually were operated from 

the control center in Houston. And, in addition, at this particular 

river crossing, on the downstream side there was actually a check 

valve to prevent back flow. 

Mr. HANNA. And this all happened—a lot of this happened in the 

middle of the night? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes, it did. 

Mr. HANNA. So—all right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Hanna. Ms. Richardson, you are 

recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I 

want to say, Mr. Pruessing, thank you for being here and addressing this in the serious manner that it deserves. The fact that you 

have come and participated with this committee, I think, is appreciated by all. 

Sir, just wanted to recap a couple things that I had asked Ms. 

Quarterman. One, would you be willing to submit your— 

ExxonMobil’s—integrity management plan to the committee? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Our integrity management plan, we would be 

glad to review with the committee. I did not realize that that request had been made. But certainly the plan that we have in place 

that we use to monitor our pipelines is something that we would 

be glad to share. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. And then I think, building upon the question of Ms. Brown, her question was would you provide the comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:45 Jun 22, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\RR\2011\7-14-1~1\67383.TXT JEAN
42 

mittee information regarding the claims. And as I heard your response, you said the work that you were doing with the claims, but 

you didn’t say you would supply the information to the committee. 

So, would you be willing to include that, as well? 

Mr. PRUESSING. I will need to get back to you on that, because 

I certainly want to make sure that we protect the privacy of the 

individuals that are making the claims. So that would be my concern. I would have to get back to you on that particular question. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, I think it would be obvious to assume 

that the committee wouldn’t expect necessarily to have the names 

of the individuals, but the fact if X amount of claims have been 

submitted—I think you said 40 or so—you have talked to approximately 120 people, what those claims have been associated with, 

you know, whether it is environment or property damage and so 

on, and where along the process you are in responding. 

Mr. PRUESSING. We would be happy to provide that kind of information. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir, because I think, when we look 

at previous situations that have occurred, those have been some of 

the big issues that have gotten the attention of this committee and 

others, as well. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Well, it is certainly our intent to respond to everyone’s individual claims. And again, I want to reinforce that we 

will honor all legitimate claims. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. OK. And I believe that is my last question. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. And we are going to go to 

a second round for the ranking member. 

I just want to—EPA, we are trying to get EPA to be rational in 

what they do. They are doing a great job here. I see all the press 

releases coming out, EPA saying things are moving in a positive direction, which I appreciate. But just to respond to the ranking 

member’s criticism of our side trying to cut their funding, we are 

trying to cut their funding for new stuff. 

And in my State of Pennsylvania, they are wreaking havoc, telling my Department of Environmental Protection, the Pennsylvania 

Department of Environmental Protection, how to do their job, 

which they have been doing effectively and efficiently for three or 

four decades. So we are trying to get them to back away from overstepping their bounds when it comes to the State of Pennsylvania, 

and a one-size-fits-all regulation. So that is my—that is a big problem I have with EPA. 

So, with that—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would you yield for just a moment? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Yes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I yielded back about 2 minutes—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Yes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON [continuing]. And I forgot to say one thing. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sure. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I just wanted to also note that the staff immediately—when this incident occurred, I did receive an email and received numerous updates. And although this is not a good situation 

43 

and we are looking to address it, I at least want to commend the 

information that was provided in a timely fashion. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Thank you very much. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. And I recognize the ranking member 

for 5 minutes for another round of questions. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. But I need to say something for EPA, 

and I don’t want it taken from my time. But let me just say that 

I didn’t call any names, but someone once told me the squeaky 

wheels, or the squeaky pigs, or whatever, make a lot of noise. I 

didn’t say who was trying to cut EPA funding. I didn’t call any 

names. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I wouldn’t call anybody names, but I have heard 

you squeak before. 

Ms. BROWN. Doctor—yes, sir, would you please tell us a little 

about your background, and who you are, just quick? Because I 

think people need to understand that you come here with some 

knowledge of the situation, and you are not just talking to be talking. 

Monitoring depends on when you take the monitor. And if people 

are sick, we need to analyze what caused it, and it is the ongoing 

process. 

Mr. INKLEY. OK. Well, thank you very much—— 

Ms. BROWN. You are my guest on this committee. 

Mr. INKLEY. Thank you very much. Thank you for the invitation 

to be here today. 

I usually tell people it took me 10 years to get through college, 

but that is because it included a bachelor of science degree, a master of science degree, and a Ph.D., as well. I would add that the 

Ph.D.—— 

Ms. BROWN. But is that—what is it in, your Ph.D.? 

Mr. INKLEY. My Ph.D. is in wildlife ecology from the University 

of Wyoming. So I am quite familiar with western ecosystems, and 

even directed a research project that covered the Billings area, 

with respect to raptors, or birds of prey. 

So, I have—since then, I have worked with the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service, I have worked for the Florida Department of 

Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, and now I have served 

the National Wildlife Federation as their senior scientist for a 

number of years. 

Unfortunately, I was deeply involved over the past year in response to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and have spent more 

time than I wish dealing with that situation. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. And your recommendations, you are 

going to give us in writing what you would recommend how we 

could improve the system. We are not indicating that we don’t 

want to use the natural gas to move the oil, but we want to make 

sure that we are protecting the environment for our children and 

children’s children. 

Mr. INKLEY. That is exactly what we are here for, is to try to protect wildlife for our children’s future. I know that everyone here 

wants to do that. But it is very apparent to me, to the National 

Wildlife Federation, that the current standards are inadequate for 

44 

doing that in an appropriate manner. And all we are seeking to do 

is to strengthen those. 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, sir. Let me just move on. I am familiar with 

what happened in Alaska with ExxonMobil. And the fact is, I am 

probably the only person with institutional memory knowing that 

it is not completely cleaned up, as we speak, even though the people from Alaska want to act like it is cleaned up. 

You indicated that you all have conducted surveys. Did you all 

go down in the river to conduct those surveys, or—I am not a scientist—so how did you all do it? I want to know not so much as 

blaming this moment, but as we move forward, how can we make 

sure it doesn’t happen again? We are looking at a bill. I want to 

make sure we include what we need to in the bill to make sure 

that everybody stay and do what they supposed to do. 

Mr. PRUESSING. We certainly agree that we want to make sure 

any learnings from this incident get built in to the future procedures and the way we operate lines. 

Again, we do not yet know what caused this incident. And so we 

are very anxious to work with PHMSA and do our own investigation as well, so that we can learn that, moving forward. 

Ms. BROWN. Well, how did you conduct the indepth survey, specifically? 

Mr. PRUESSING. The steps that we took over the last couple of 

years, I think again, are important to understand. 

First of all, we ran a smart pig in the line, which actually measures thickness of the line and collects data about the integrity of 

the line. We did that in 2009. In December 2010 we did soundings, 

electronic soundings, over the riverbed to confirm the depth of 

cover. And that was 5 to 8 feet, as has been mentioned earlier. 

Then, in addition, we shut the line down in late May to do an 

additional risk assessment. The city of Laurel was very concerned 

about bank erosion. And that is also part of the data that we provided, as far as the depth of cover on the bank, which, as mentioned earlier, was between 11 and 13 feet. 

In addition to those steps, we do aerial overflights of our pipelines. It is required to do that 26 times a year, but we do it every 

week. We do it twice as often as the regulation requires, just so 

that we are getting eyes on all of our pipelines, to make sure that 

there is not something going on, or right of way encroachment that 

we are not aware of. 

In addition, we have corrosion monitoring that goes on. It was 

mentioned earlier about cathodic protection. That is the method to 

basically cause another piece of metal that is buried in the ground 

to corrode, and keep the pipeline safe. So we have cathodic protection on all of our lines, we go out and we measure to make sure 

that that current is moving appropriately, so that there is no interruption in that. 

And, in addition to all of those things, then, we have PHMSA, 

who comes in and audits all of these activities on a regular basis 

to make sure that we are meeting all those requirements. 

So, again, our integrity program is very broad. It covers many 

different aspects, many different people. But again, as we—even as 

we entered this period of time of high river flow, we had assessed, 

from a risk standpoint, that we still had a safe line. So, obviously, 

45 

there is something that occurred that we are not yet aware of, that 

we are very anxious to find out, so that we can learn from that. 

Ms. BROWN. We had over five different hearings and discussions. 

And, you know, people want to talk about what happened. In the 

last 18 months we separated the agency from the industry, and I 

am very pleased with that, so that everybody could play their proper role. 

And so, we still want to know—one of the problems was we had 

indicated there are some areas that we need to rev up, put additional security, and then there are some areas that, you know, 

the—we need to put people—not just put people to work, but to reinforce the pipelines. What are some of the recommendations the 

industry—you—are making to us, that we can include in the bill 

to make sure that we keep the public safe from these kinds of accidents? 

Mr. PRUESSING. Thank you for that question. Probably the single 

biggest item that the industry has been pushing on, and is currently included in the proposed bill, is that we remove the exemptions for one call for all parties. 

Right now, if you are an individual that wants to do a dig near 

a pipeline right of way, you have to call the State one call and let 

people know you want to dig. It is the call-before-you-dig—— 

Ms. BROWN. Yes, I understand that. That is a very successful 

program. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Yes. But, up to this point, municipalities, State 

departments of transportation, have not been required to make the 

one call. And so, protection of those pipelines, and making sure 

that everyone has to make that call before they begin digging, we 

believe, will be a major step forward in improving pipeline safety. 

And to the credit of Congress, that is included in the proposed bill 

right now. 

Ms. BROWN. OK. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I didn’t take away the gentlelady’s time for responding to me on EPA, and I gave her 2 minutes. If you have one 

final question to wrap up, I would be happy to take that, because 

we want to move along, and we want to get the—— 

Ms. BROWN. You can go and come back to me. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, we want to finish up. So go ahead. Final 

question. 

Ms. BROWN. No, I understand what—that recommendation. I am 

asking you specifically what can you all do, the industry, to—we 

have—you are making billions of dollars. I mean it has never been 

so well for your industry. How can we go in and make sure that 

we are training, monitoring—you all are. What can you do to up 

the safety? That is why I am asking. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Well, I certainly believe that one of the things 

that we can do, as an industry, is make sure that we all learn from 

the instances that do occur, that we share those learnings across 

the industry, so that we do not repeat mistakes. 

Certainly the Association of Oil Pipelines, which we are a member, has been trying to step up that, make sure that we do a better 

job of sharing knowledge, as it is gained, so that incidents or issues 

are not repeated. And that is something the industry is working on 

very hard right now. 

46 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. And a final question? Mr. 

Rehberg, I think, has a follow-up. 

Mr. REHBERG. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And 

I was remiss in not thanking your staff. They have been very easy 

to work with. I really appreciate their desire to have this hearing 

in a timely fashion. And it meant a lot to me that you would be 

as timely, as well. 

So, let me thank you for that; Dr. Inkley, for your kind work and 

good work. I am, in fact, affiliated with the National Wildlife Federation, as a result of my relationship with the Billings Rod and 

Gun Club, and—which are my neighbor, actually, on my fence line. 

Mr. INKLEY. Thank you for requesting the hearing. 

Mr. REHBERG. Yes, I know your good work, and I appreciate it 

as much. 

Mr. Pruessing, first of all, thank you for being on the ground in 

Billings, constantly. I am actually, frankly, surprised and pleased 

you are out here, because you at once promised all of us you would 

never leave Billings until it was done. Clearly, your wife or someone has suggested you need to get away from Billings a little bit. 

But you have been on the ground. You know this issue inside 

and out. When the Governor and I met with you—you made a 

statement that you haven’t repeated—and I just want to, for clarification purposes—you know, one of the criticisms was, well, why 

didn’t you just shut the pipeline off, and I thought your response 

at that time was particularly apropos for this hearing. 

Maybe you could restate why you don’t just shut things down, 

why you have a protocol for shutting this down and then that 

down, and then there is a time lag, and such? Because I think it 

really is an important point for the congressional record. 

Mr. PRUESSING. Thank you very much for that question. When 

you try to shut down a pipeline, you have a large amount of mass 

flowing at very high velocities in a pipe. If you just slam the valve 

shut, all that energy, the kinetic energy that is moving with that 

mass, has to turn into some other form of energy, and that becomes 

pressure. 

So, if you have a very large line moving large amounts of material, just slamming a valve shut means you could actually overpressure a line. So we have a process to avoid that. The first thing 

we do is shut down pumps to get most of the pressure off the line 

and stop it from flowing. But then we have a very detailed plan to 

shut down individual valves, to isolate it, so that we don’t create 

a new problem. 

And so, again, yes, it takes some time to fully isolate a line. But 

it is done with safety in mind, to make sure that we don’t create 

other issues. 

Mr. REHBERG. The other question that we talked about at one of 

our hearings was about the 30-foot depth, and the fact that it 

would, in fact, change where the valves are located. And while Ms. 

Quarterman kind of moved beyond that, or said it shouldn’t, I don’t 

think that is correct, is it? 

Mr. PRUESSING. No. If we go to a depth of 30 feet, we will have 

to dig from farther back to make sure that we don’t have too steep 

a slope. So the valves actually will be moved back, farther away 

from the river bank. 

47 

Mr. REHBERG. And the third question, then, that was brought up 

at one of those meetings was—one of the requirements or suggestions was a different kind of valve. And there was a suggestion 

that perhaps that new valve, or a different kind of valve, might actually create more of a problem than it solves. Is that true, or was 

that just enough of—a throw-away line by somebody? 

Mr. PRUESSING. There has been discussion about automatic shutdown systems, or automatic shut-down valves. We still have control 

of those valves, to make sure we don’t create other issues. So, while 

many of them are motor-operated, and can be remotely moved by 

the control center, we do not have a single button you push to shut 

down a line, because of that concern about over-pressure. 

Mr. REHBERG. OK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Rehberg, and thank you for being 

here today. You bring depth of knowledge to this particular incident that, of course, none of us have. 

Mr. REHBERG. And you don’t want to. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I am sure. And I hope you don’t have to do it 

again. 

But thank you for being here today. And thank you, too, to our 

two witnesses, Dr. Inkley and Mr. Pruessing, for being here today. 

We appreciate you taking the time. And, again, we are going to be 

watching closely what is happening up there. 

I would like to submit for the record the daily EPA reports. They 

are the incident command there. And it appears to me that things 

are getting done, in light of the fact we have a spill. But EPA is 

reporting there on a daily basis what is happening, so I want to 

have that for the record. 

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Mr. SHUSTER. So again, thank you all very much, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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