United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Highways 

and Transit, Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives

MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY

Preliminary Information on 

the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration’s 

Efforts to Identify and 

Follow Up with High-risk 

Carriers 

Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, July 11, 2007

 

GAO-07-1074T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 11, 2007

MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY 

Preliminary Information on the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s 

Efforts to Identify and Follow Up with 

High-risk Motor Carriers 

Highlights of GAO-07-1074T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Highways 

and Transit, Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives 

FMCSA generally does a good job in identifying carriers that pose high crash 

risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the thoroughness and 

consistency of those reviews, and following up with high-risk carriers. 

SafeStat is nearly twice as effective (83 percent) as random selection in 

identifying carriers that pose high crash risks. However, its effectiveness

could be improved by using a statistical approach (negative binomial 

regression), which provides for a systematic assessment to apply weights to 

the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas (accidents and driver, vehicle, and 

safety management violations) rather than FMCSA’s approach, which relies

on expert judgment. The regression approach identified carriers that had 

twice as many crashes in the subsequent 18 months as did the carriers 

identified by the current SafeStat approach. FMCSA is concerned that 

adopting this approach would result in it placing more emphasis on crashes 

and less emphasis on compliance with its safety management, vehicle, and 

driver regulations. GAO believes that because (1) the ultimate purpose of 

compliance reviews is to reduce the number and severity of truck and bus 

crashes and (2) GAO’s and others’ research has shown that crash rates are 

stronger predictors of future crashes than is poor compliance with FMCSA’s 

safety regulations, the regression approach would improve safety. 

GAO’s preliminary assessment is that FMCSA promotes thoroughness and 

consistency in its compliance reviews through its management processes, 

which meet GAO’s standards for internal controls. For example, FMCSA 

uses an electronic manual to record and communicate its compliance review 

policies and procedures and teaches proper compliance review procedures 

through both classroom and on-the-job training. Furthermore, investigators 

use an information system to document their compliance reviews, and 

managers review these data, helping to ensure thoroughness and 

consistency between investigators. For the most part, FMCSA and state 

investigators cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety regulations 

(e.g., driver qualifications and vehicle condition) in 95 percent or more of 

compliance reviews, demonstrating thoroughness and consistency. 

GAO’s preliminary assessment is that FMCSA follows up with almost all 

carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess the maximum 

fines against all serious violators that GAO believes the law requires. FMCSA 

followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent) that received 

proposed unsatisfactory safety ratings from compliance reviews completed 

in fiscal year 2005. For example, FMCSA found that 873 of these carriers 

made safety improvements and it placed 306 other carriers out of service. 

GAO also found that FMCSA (1) assesses maximum fines against carriers for 

the third instance of a violation, whereas GAO reads the statute as requiring 

FMCSA to do so for the second violation and (2) does not always assess 

maximum fines against carriers with a pattern of varied serious violations, as

GAO believes the law requires. 

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA) has the 

primary federal responsibility for 

reducing crashes involving large 

trucks and buses. FMCSA uses its 

“SafeStat” tool to select carriers for 

reviews for compliance with its 

safety regulations based on the

carriers’ crash rates and prior safety

violations. FMCSA then conducts 

these compliance reviews and can 

place carriers out of service if they

are found to be operating unsafely.

This statement is based on a recent 

report (GAO-07-585) and other 

nearly completed work. GAO 

assessed (1) the extent to which

FMCSA identifies carriers that

subsequently have high crash rates, 

(2) how FMCSA ensures that its 

compliance reviews are conducted

thoroughly and consistently, and (3)

the extent to which FMCSA follows 

up with carriers with serious safety 

violations. GAO’s work was based

on a review of laws, program 

guidance, and analyses of data from

2004 through early 2006. 

What GAO Recommends

In June, GAO recommended that

FMCSA use a regression model 

approach to identify high-risk

carriers. FMCSA agreed that this

approach looks promising but is 

concerned that it results in less 

emphasis on other regulatory

areas. GAO is considering several

recommendations, including that 

FMCSA assess maximum penalties

in situations which GAO believes 

the law requires. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1074T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Susan A. 

Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or 

flemings@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing to discuss the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) oversight of 

motor carriers that pose high crash risks. This is an important issue 

because each year about 5,500 people die as a result of crashes involving 

large commercial trucks or buses,1

 and about 160,000 more people are 

injured. These crashes may result from errors by truck, bus, or passenger 

vehicle drivers; vehicle condition; and other factors. Effective oversight is 

important because of the large size of the motor carrier industry (over 

700,000 carriers are registered with FMCSA2

) compared to the number of 

compliance reviews—reviews of carriers at their bases of operations for 

compliance with FMCSA’s safety regulations—that FMCSA and its state 

partners are able to conduct each year (about 15,000 in 2006). As a result, 

it is crucial that FMCSA identify the most unsafe carriers so that the 

carriers either improve their operations or are put out of service. 

My remarks are based on work we have recently completed for this 

Subcommittee and the full committee3

 and on the preliminary results of 

our ongoing work for the Chairman of the full committee. This latter work 

is nearing completion, and we expect to report on our final results on 

these and other topics later this summer. Specifically, we have been 

assessing (1) the extent to which FMCSA identifies carriers that 

subsequently have high crash rates, (2) how FMCSA ensures that its 

compliance reviews are conducted thoroughly and consistently, and 

(3) the extent to which FMCSA follows up with carriers with serious safety 

violations. 

Our work was based on a review of laws, regulations, program guidance, 

analyses of data, and discussions with FMCSA. To determine the extent to

which FMCSA identifies carriers that subsequently have high crash rates, 

we analyzed data from FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Management Information 

 1

Large trucks are those with a gross vehicle weight greater than 10,000 pounds. A bus is a

motor vehicle that is used to carry more than 8 people. 

2

This figure includes an unidentified number of carriers that are registered but are no 

longer in business. Carriers continually enter and exit the industry. Since 1998, the industry

has increased in size by an average of about 29,000 interstate carriers per year. 

3

GAO, Motor Carrier Safety: A Statistical Approach Will Better Identify Commercial 

Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks Than Does the Current Federal Approach, 

GAO-07-585 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007).

Page 1 GAO-07-1074T 
System for its June 2004 assessment of carriers and compared it to data on

crashes the carriers experienced over the subsequent 18 months (July 2004

through December 2005).

4

 To assess how FMCSA ensures that its 

compliance reviews are completed thoroughly and consistently, we 

identified our key internal control standards related to the communication 

of policy, documentation of results, and monitoring and reviewing of 

activities and findings.5

 We gathered information on these key internal 

controls through discussions with FMCSA officials in its headquarters as 

well as in 7 of FMCSA’s 52 field division offices and reviews of policy 

documents and reports. To assess the extent to which FMCSA follows up

with carriers with serious violations and assesses maximum fines in 

certain situations, we reviewed regulations and FMCSA policies directing 

how FMCSA must follow up and track these violators, analyzed data to 

determine if FMCSA had met these requirements, and held discussions 

with FMCSA officials. As part of our review, we assessed internal controls 

and the reliability of FMCSA’s data on motor carriers’ safety history and 

compliance review and enforcement activities pertinent to this effort. 

While there are known problems with the quality of the crash data 

reported to FMCSA, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable 

for our use, which was to assess whether different approaches to 

categorizing carriers could lead to better identification of carriers that 

subsequently have high rates of crashes. We conducted our work from

February 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

By and large, FMCSA does a good job of identifying carriers that pose high 

crash risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the thoroughness 

and consistency of those reviews, and following up with high-risk carriers. 

That being said, we have identified areas that could be improved. In 

summary: 

 4

FMCSA requires that states report crashes within 90 days. Sometimes states report crashes

late. To allow for this occurrence, we analyzed data on crashes occurring from July 2004

through December 2005 that may have been reported as late as June 2006. 

5

GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). In assessing the extent to which 

FMCSA’s management of its compliance reviews is consistent with our internal controls,

we were not able to verify the statements made by FMCSA and state officials and 

investigators about their performance and management of compliance reviews because 

doing so was not practicable given our time and resource constraints.

Page 2 GAO-07-1074T 
• Overall, the data-driven model that FMCSA uses to identify carriers that 

pose high crash risks—the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement 

System (SafeStat)—does a good job of identifying carriers that pose high 

crash risks. In this regard, we found that it is nearly twice as effective 

(83 percent better) as random selection in identifying carriers that pose 

high crash risks. Thus, in our view, it has value for improving safety. 

However, we believe that its effectiveness could be improved through 

either of two enhancements that we analyzed. One enhancement entails 

applying a statistical approach, called the negative binomial regression 

model, to the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas (accidents and driver,

vehicle, and safety management violations) instead of its current 

approach, which relies on expert judgment to assign weights to each of the 

four areas.6

 The other enhancement—the results of which are 

preliminary—uses the existing SafeStat overall design but places greater

weight on carriers that scored among the worst in the accident safety 

evaluation area. Both enhancements performed better than the current 

SafeStat approach. For example, the regression approach identified 

carriers that had twice as many crashes in the subsequent 18 months as 

the carriers the current SafeStat approach identified. We believe that the 

negative binomial regression model approach offers a greater potential for 

improving safety over the other enhancement that we analyzed and the 

current SafeStat approach because it provides for a systematic assessment 

of the relative contributions of accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety 

management violations rather than the use of expert judgment to apply 

weights to these areas. FMCSA agreed that our approach looks promising 

but believes that placing more emphasis on crashes is counterproductive, 

in part, because it would have to place less emphasis on compliance with

its safety management, vehicle, and driver regulations. We disagree 

because the ultimate purpose of compliance reviews is to reduce the 

number and severity of truck and bus crashes, and high crash rates are 

stronger predictors of future crashes than is poor compliance with safety 

regulations.

• Our preliminary assessment showed that FMCSA’s management of its 

compliance reviews meets our standards for internal controls, thereby 

promoting thoroughness and consistency. FMCSA records its compliance 

review policies and procedures in an electronic operations manual and 

distributes the manual to investigators and managers. FMCSA also trains 

investigators on these policies and procedures. Investigators we spoke 

with found both the electronic manual and the training to be effective 

 6

Negative binomial regression is often used to model count data (e.g., crashes). 

Page 3 GAO-07-1074T 
means of communicating policies and procedures. FMCSA and state 

investigators use an information system to document the results of the 

compliance reviews. This information system supports thoroughness and

consistency by alerting investigators if they are not following key policies 

or if data appears suspect; the system also provides managers readily 

available data to review. For the most part, FMCSA and state investigators 

cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety regulations (e.g., driver 

qualifications and vehicle repair and maintenance) in 95 percent or more 

of compliance reviews, demonstrating thoroughness and consistency. 

• Our preliminary assessment showed that FMCSA follows up with many 

carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess maximum 

fines against all serious violators, as we believe is required by law. FMCSA 

followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent) that received

a proposed safety rating of unsatisfactory following compliance reviews 

completed in fiscal year 2005. For example, FMCSA found that 873 of 

these carriers made safety improvements and it placed 306 other carriers 

out of service. FMCSA monitors carriers to identify those that are violating

out-of-service orders, but in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, it cited only 26 of 

768 carriers that its monitoring showed had a roadside inspection or crash 

while subject to an out-of-service order. An FMCSA official told us that 

some of the 768 carriers, such as carriers that were operating intrastate,7

may not have been violating the out-of-service order and that FMCSA did 

not have enough resources to determine whether each of the carriers was 

violating an out-of-service order. Finally, we found that while FMCSA 

assesses maximum fines against carriers that repeat a serious violation, it

does not, as we believe federal law requires, assess maximum fines against 

carriers with a pattern of serious violations. In addition, FMCSA assesses 

maximum fines only for the third instance of a violation. We read the 

statute as requiring FMCSA to assess the maximum fine if a serious 

violation is repeated once—not only after it is repeated twice.

In our June report we recommended that FMCSA use a negative binomial 

regression model approach to identify carriers that pose high crash risks. 

We are considering making several recommendations based on our 

ongoing work, including that FMCSA assess maximum fines, as discussed 

above, in circumstances that we believe the law requires it to do so. 

Finally, we have also reported on other aspects of FMCSA’s operations 

 7

Except for carriers of hazardous materials, FMCSA does not have the authority to prohibit 

motor carriers from operating intrastate. 

Page 4 GAO-07-1074T 
within the past 18 months. These products are listed at the end of this 

statement. 

In the United States, commercial motor carriers account for less than 5 

percent of all highway crashes, but these crashes result in about 13 

percent of all highway deaths, or about 5,500 of the approximately 43,000 

nationwide highway fatalities that occur annually. In addition, about 

160,000 of the approximately 3.2 million highway injuries per year involve 

motor carriers. While the fatality rate for trucks has generally decreased 

over the past 30 years, it has been fairly stable since 2002. (See fig. 1.) The

fatality rate for buses decreased slightly from 1975 to 2005, but it has more 

annual variability than the fatality rate for trucks due to a much smaller 

total vehicle miles traveled. 

Figure 1: Commercial Motor Vehicle Fatality Rate, 1975 to 2005 

Notes: Fewer buses are involved in fatal or non-fatal accidents than large trucks, but they tend to 

involve more people. The latest year for which data were available was 2005. 

FMCSA’s primary mission is to reduce the number and severity of crashes 

involving large trucks and buses. FMCSA relies heavily on the results of 

compliance reviews to determine whether carriers are operating safely 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-07-1074T 
and, if not, to take enforcement action against them. FMCSA conducts 

these on-site reviews to determine carriers’ compliance with safety 

regulations that address areas such as alcohol and drug testing of drivers, 

driver qualifications, driver hours of service, vehicle maintenance and 

inspections, and transportation of hazardous materials. 

FMCSA uses a data-driven analysis model called SafeStat to assess 

carriers’ risks relative to all other carriers based on safety indicators, such 

as their crash rates and safety violations identified during roadside 

inspections and prior compliance reviews. A carrier’s score is calculated 

based on its performance in four safety evaluation areas: accidents and 

driver, vehicle, and safety management violations. (See fig. 2.)

Page 6 GAO-07-1074T 
Figure 2: FMCSA’s Safety Oversight Approach

FMCSA assigns categories to carriers ranging from A to H according to 

their performance in each of the safety evaluation areas. (See table 1.) 

Although a carrier may receive a value in any of the four safety evaluation 

areas, the carrier receives a SafeStat score only if it is deficient in two or 

more safety evaluation areas. The calculation used to determine a motor 

carrier’s SafeStat score is: 

SafeStat Score = 2 x accident value + 1.5 x driver value + vehicle value + safety management value 

Page 7 GAO-07-1074T 
Table 1: SafeStat Categories 

Category Condition

Priority for 

compliance review

Deficient in two or more areas 

A Deficient in all 4 safety evaluation areas or deficient in 3 safety evaluation areas that result 

in a weighted SafeStat score of 350 or more

High

B Deficient in 3 safety evaluation areas that result in a weighted SafeStat score of less than

350 or deficient in 2 safety evaluation areas that result in a weighted SafeStat score of 

225 or more

High

C Deficient in 2 safety evaluation areas that result in a weighted SafeStat score of less than

225 

Medium

Deficient in one area only 

D Deficient in the accident safety evaluation area (area value between 75-100) Low

E Deficient in the driver safety evaluation area (area value between 75-100) Low

F Deficient in the vehicle safety evaluation area (area value between 75-100) Low

G Deficient in the safety management safety evaluation area (area value between 75-100) Low

Not deficient in any area 

H Not deficient in any of the safety evaluation areas Low

Source: GAO summary of FMCSA data. 

Based on the results of a compliance review, FMCSA assigns the carrier a 

safety rating of satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory. The safety 

rating, which is distinct from a carrier’s SafeStat category, reflects 

FMCSA’s determination of a carrier’s fitness to operate safely. FMCSA 

issues out-of-service orders to carriers rated unsatisfactory, and these 

carriers are not allowed to resume operating until they make 

improvements that result in an upgraded safety rating. Carriers rated 

conditional are allowed to continue operating, but FMCSA aims to conduct 

follow-up compliance reviews on these carriers. Regardless of a carrier’s

safety rating, FMCSA can assess a fine against a carrier with violations, 

and it is more likely to assess higher fines when these violations are 

serious. 

Page 8 GAO-07-1074T 
SafeStat identifies many carriers that pose a high risk for crashes and is 

about twice as effective (83 percent) as randomly selecting carriers for 

compliance reviews. As a result, it has value for improving motor carrier 

safety. However, two enhancements that we analyzed could lead to 

FMCSA identifying carriers that pose greater crash risks overall. These 

approaches entail giving more weight to crashes than the current SafeStat 

model does. FMCSA has concerns about these approaches, in part, 

because placing more emphasis on accidents would require it to place less 

emphasis on other types of problems. FMCSA recognizes that SafeStat can

be improved, and as part of its Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 reform 

initiative—which is aimed at improving its processes for identifying and

dealing with unsafe carriers and drivers—the agency is considering 

replacing SafeStat by 2010. 

SafeStat Identifies 

Many High-risk 

Carriers, but 

Enhancements Could 

Identify Carriers with 

Even Higher Risks 

Using Either a Statistical 

Approach or Modifying 

Existing SafeStat 

Categorization Rules 

Could Improve 

Identification of High-risk 

Carriers 

In June 2007, we reported that FMCSA could improve SafeStat’s ability to 

identify carriers that pose high crash risks if it applied a statistical 

approach, called the negative binomial regression model, to the four 

SafeStat safety evaluation areas instead of its current approach.8

 We used 

this approach to determine whether systematic analyses of data through 

regression modeling offered improved results in identifying carriers that 

pose high crash risks over FMCSA’s model, which uses expert judgment 

and professional experience to apply weights to each of the safety 

evaluation areas. The negative binomial model results in a rank order 

listing of carriers by crash risk and the predicted number of crashes. This 

differs from SafeStat’s current approach, which gives the highest priority 

to carriers that are deficient in three or more safety evaluation areas or 

that score over a certain amount—SafeStat categories A and B. 

(See table 1.) 

The other enhancement that we analyzed—the results of which are 

preliminary—utilized the existing SafeStat overall design but examined the 

effect of providing greater priority to carriers that scored among the worst 

5 percent of carriers in the accident safety evaluation area (SafeStat 

category D). We chose this approach because we found that while the 

driver, vehicle, and safety management evaluation areas are correlated 

with the future crash risk of a carrier, the accident evaluation area 

 8

GAO-07-585. 

Page 9 GAO-07-1074T 
correlates most with future crash risk.9

 This approach would retain the 

overall SafeStat framework and categorization—categories A through G 

for carriers with safety problems—but would substitute carriers in 

category D (the accident category) for carriers in categories A and B that 

have either (1) lower overall SafeStat scores or (2) lower accident area 

scores. 

We compared the performance of our regression model approach and

placing greater weight on carriers that scored among the worst 5 percent 

of carriers in SafeStat category D to the current SafeStat model. The 

comparison showed that both these approaches performed better than the 

current SafeStat approach. (See table 2.) For example, the regression 

model approach identified carriers with an average of 111 crashes per 

1,000 vehicles over an 18-month period compared with the current 

SafeStat approach, which identified carriers for compliance reviews with 

an average of 102 crashes per 1,000 vehicles. This 9 percent improvement 

would have enabled FMCSA to identify carriers with almost twice as many 

crashes in the following 18 months as those carriers identified in its 

current approach (19,580 v. 10,076).10 Placing greater emphasis on carriers 

in category D provided superior results to the current SafeStat approach 

both in terms of identifying carriers with higher crash rates (from 6 to 9 

percent higher) and greater numbers of crashes (from about 600 to 800 

more). In addition, the regression approach performed at least as well as 

placing greater emphasis on carriers in category D in terms of identifying 

carriers with the highest crash rates and much better in identifying 

carriers with the greatest number of crashes. 

 9

These results corroborate studies performed by the Volpe National Transportation

Systems Center and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. See GAO-07-585. 

10On average, the negative binomial regression model approach identified larger motor 

carriers than did SafeStat, which is how a 9 percent increase in the crash rate translated 

into 9,500 additional crashes. 

Page 10 GAO-07-1074T 
Table 2: Regression Model Approach Compared With Refined Categorizations of SafeStat Results and with Current SafeStat 

Approach

Approach

Crash

ratea

Number of 

crashes in 18 

months

Regression model approach 111.4 19,580

Refined categorization alternative 1: substitute SafeStat category D (accident) carriers for category A 

and B carriers with the lowest overall SafeStat scores 111.0 10,682

Refined categorization alternative 2: substitute SafeStat category D (accident) carriers for category A 

and B carriers with the lowest accident area scores 107.8 10,887

Current SafeStat approach 102.2 10,076

Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data. 

a

Crash rates are crashes per 1,000 vehicles in the 18 months following the June 2004 SafeStat 

categorization. 

Note: The relationship between number of crashes and the crash rate is not linear because the 

different analyses identified carriers with different fleet sizes as posing a high crash risk. 

Because both the approaches that we analyzed would identify a larger 

number of carriers that pose high crash risks, FMCSA would choose the 

number of carriers to review based on the resources available to it, much

as it currently does. 

We believe that our statistically based regression model is preferable to 

placing greater weight on carriers in category D because it provides for a 

systematic assessment of the relative contributions of accidents and 

driver, vehicle, and safety management violations. We recommended that

FMCSA adopt such an approach. By its very nature the regression 

approach looks for the “best fit” in identifying the degree to which prior 

accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations identify 

the likelihood of carriers having crashes in the future, compared to the 

current SafeStat approach, in which the relationship among the four 

evaluation areas is based on expert judgment. In addition, because the 

regression model could be run monthly—as is the current SafeStat 

model—any change in the degree to which accidents and driver, vehicle,

and safety management violations better identify future crashes will be 

automatically considered as different weights to the four evaluation areas

Page 11 GAO-07-1074T 
are assigned. This is not the case with the current SafeStat model, in which 

the evaluation area weights generally remain constant over time.11

FMCSA agreed that use of a negative binomial regression model looks 

promising but officials said that the agency believes that placing more 

emphasis on the accident area would be counterproductive. First, FMCSA 

is concerned that this would require placing correspondingly less 

emphasis on the types of problems the compliance review is designed to 

address so that crashes can be reduced (i.e., the lack of compliance with

safety regulations related to drivers, vehicles, and safety management that 

is captured in the other evaluation areas). Along this line, FMCSA said that 

compliance reviews of carriers in SafeStat category D have historically 

resulted in fewer serious violations than compliance reviews of carriers in 

SafeStat category A or B. We agree with FMCSA that the use of the 

approaches that we are discussing here today could tilt enforcement 

heavily toward carriers with high crash rates and away from carriers with 

compliance issues. We disagree, however, that this would be 

counterproductive. We found that while driver, vehicle, and safety 

management evaluation area scores are correlated with the future crash 

risk of a carrier, high crash rates are a stronger predictor of future crashes 

than poor compliance with safety regulations. FMCSA’s mission—as well 

as the ultimate purpose of compliance reviews—is to reduce the number 

and severity of truck and bus crashes. 

Second, FMCSA officials said that placing more emphasis on the accident

evaluation area would increase emphasis on the least reliable type of data

used by SafeStat—crash data—and in so doing, it would increase the 

sensitivity of the results to crash data quality issues. However, in June 

2007 we reported that FMCSA has made considerable efforts to improve 

the reliability of crash data. The report also concluded that as FMCSA 

continues its efforts to have states improve crash data, any sensitivity of 

results from our statistically based model to crash data quality issues 

should diminish. 

FMCSA Is Considering 

Replacing SafeStat with a 

New Tool by 2010 

As part of its Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010, a reform initiative 

aimed at improving its processes for identifying and dealing with unsafe 

carriers and drivers, FMCSA is considering replacing SafeStat with a new 

 11The weights on the safety evaluation areas have remained unchanged since September

1999, when the weight on the driver area was increased from 1.0 to 1.5.

Page 12 GAO-07-1074T 
tool by 2010. The new tool could take on greater importance in FMCSA’s 

safety oversight framework because the agency is considering using the 

tool’s assessments of carriers’ safety to determine whether carriers are fit 

to continue operating. In contrast, SafeStat is primarily used now to 

prioritize carriers for compliance reviews, and determinations of 

operational fitness are made only after compliance reviews are completed. 

FMCSA also plans to develop a tool to assess the safety status of 

individual drivers, along with tools for dealing with unsafe drivers. Even 

though FMCSA is considering replacing SafeStat, we believe that 

implementing either of the approaches discussed in this statement would 

be worthwhile because it would be relatively easy to do and result in 

immediate safety benefits that could save lives. 

Our preliminary assessment is that FMCSA manages its compliance 

reviews in a way that meets our standards for internal control, thereby 

promoting thoroughness and consistency in the reviews.12 It does so by 

establishing compliance review policies and procedures through an 

electronic manual and training, using an information system to document 

the results of its compliance reviews, and monitoring performance. We 

also found that compliance reviews cover most of the major areas of the 

agency’s safety regulations. 

FMCSA’s Management 

of Its Compliance 

Reviews Promotes 

Thoroughness and 

Consistency 

FMCSA Communicates Its 

Compliance Review 

Policies and Procedures 

through an Electronic 

Manual and Training 

FMCSA’s communication of its policies and procedures related to 

conducting compliance reviews meets our standards for internal control.

These standards state that an organization’s policies and procedures 

should be recorded and communicated to management and others within 

the entity who need it and in a form (that is, for example, clearly written 

and provided as a paper or electronic manual) and within a time frame 

that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. FMCSA records and 

communicates its policies and procedures electronically through its Field 

Operations Training Manual, which it provides to all federal and state 

investigators and their managers. The manual includes guidance on how to 

prepare for a compliance review (for example, by reviewing information 

on the carrier’s accidents, drivers, and inspections), and it explains how 

this information can help the investigator focus the compliance review. It 

also specifies the minimum number of driver and vehicle maintenance 

records to be examined and the minimum number of vehicle inspections 

 12See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 13 GAO-07-1074T 
to be conducted during a compliance review. FMCSA posts updates to the 

manual that automatically download to investigators and managers when 

they connect to the Internet. In addition to the manual, FMCSA provides 

classroom training to investigators and requires that investigators 

successfully complete that training and examinations before they conduct

a compliance review. According to FMCSA officials, investigators then 

receive on-the-job training, in which they accompany an experienced 

investigator during compliance reviews. Investigators can also take 

additional classroom training on specialized topics throughout their 

careers. 

FMCSA’s documentation of compliance reviews meets our standards for 

internal control. These standards state that all transactions and other 

significant events should be clearly and promptly documented, and the 

documentation should be readily available for examination. FMCSA and 

state investigators use an information system to document the results of 

their compliance reviews, including information on crashes and any 

violations of the safety regulations that they identify. This documentation 

is readily available to FMCSA managers, who told us that they review it to 

help ensure completeness and accuracy. FMCSA officials told us that the 

information system also helps ensure thoroughness and consistency by 

prompting investigators to follow FMCSA’s policies and procedures, such 

as requirements to meet a minimum sample size. The information system 

also includes checks for consistency and reasonableness and prompts 

investigators when the information they enter appears to be inaccurate. 

FMCSA said managers may assess an investigator’s thoroughness by 

comparing the rate of violations the investigator identified over the course

of several compliance reviews to the average rate for investigators in their 

division office; a rate that is substantially below the average suggests 

insufficient thoroughness. 

FMCSA Investigators Use 

an Information System to 

Document the Results of 

Compliance Reviews 

FMCSA Monitors the 

Performance of Its 

Compliance Reviews and 

Has Taken Actions to 

Address Identified Issues 

FMCSA’s performance measurement and monitoring of its compliance 

review activities meet our standards for internal control. These standards 

state that managers should compare actual performance to planned or 

expected results and analyze significant differences. According to FMCSA 

and state managers and investigators, the managers review all compliance 

reviews in each division office and state to ensure thoroughness and 

consistency across investigators and across compliance reviews. The 

investigators we spoke with generally found these reviews to be helpful,

and several investigators said that the reviews helped them learn policies 

and procedures and ultimately perform better compliance reviews. 

Page 14 GAO-07-1074T 
In addition to assessing the performance of individual investigators, 

FMCSA periodically assesses the performance of FMCSA division offices 

and state agencies and conducted an agencywide review of its compliance 

review program in 2002. According to officials at one of FMCSA’s service 

centers, the service centers lead triennial reviews of the compliance 

review and enforcement activities of each division office and its state 

partner. These reviews assess whether the division offices and state 

partners are following FMCSA policies and procedures, and they include 

an assessment of performance data for items such as the number of 

compliance reviews conducted, rate of violations identified, and number 

of enforcement actions taken. The officials said that some reviews identify 

instances in which division offices have deviated from FMCSA’s 

compliance review policies but that only minor adjustments by the 

division offices are needed. The officials also said that the service centers 

compile best practices identified during the reviews and share these 

among the division offices and state partners. 

FMCSA’s review also concluded that most investigators were not 

following FMCSA’s policy requiring them to perform vehicle inspections as 

part of a compliance review if the carrier had not already received the 

required number of roadside vehicle inspections.

13 Since conducting its 

2002 review, FMCSA changed its policy so that inspecting a minimum 

number of vehicles is no longer a strict requirement—if an investigator is 

unable to inspect the minimum number of vehicles, he or she must explain 

why in the compliance review report.14

Each of the Major 

Applicable Areas of the 

Safety Regulations Is 

Consistently Covered by 

Most Compliance Reviews 

From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2006, each of the nine major 

applicable areas of the safety regulations was consistently covered by

most of the approximately 76,000 compliance reviews conducted by 

FMCSA and the states. (See table 3.) For the most part, 95 percent or more 

of the compliance reviews covered each major applicable area in the 

agency’s safety regulations. 

 13The required number of inspections is based on the number of vehicles operated by the

carrier and subject to federal regulations. 

14An inspector would not be able to inspect the minimum number of vehicles if, for

example, fewer than the minimum number of vehicles were available on-site for inspection. 

Page 15 GAO-07-1074T 
Table 3: Percentage of Compliance Reviews for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2006 

That Covered Each of the Major Applicable Areas of the Safety Regulations

Regulatory area Percent

Procedures for handling and evaluating accidents 97

Drivers’ qualifications 96

Drivers’ hours of service 96

Inspection, repair, and maintenance of vehicles 96

Drug and alcohol use and testing 95

Commercial driver’s license standards 95

Driving of motor vehicles 94

Minimum insurance coverage 90

Vehicle parts and accessories necessary for safe operation 80

Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data. 

An FMCSA official told us that not every compliance review is required to

cover these nine areas. For example, follow-up compliance reviews of 

carriers rated unsatisfactory or conditional are sometimes streamlined to 

cover only the one or a few areas of the regulations in which the carrier 

had violations. As another example, minimum insurance coverage 

regulations apply only to for-hire carriers and private carriers of hazardous 

materials; they do not apply to private passenger and nonhazardous 

materials carriers. 

However, according to an FMCSA official, the area of these regulations 

that had the lowest rate of coverage—vehicle parts and accessories 

necessary for safe operation—is required for all compliance reviews 

except streamlined reviews. Vehicle inspections are supposed to be a key 

investigative technique for assessing compliance with this area, and an 

FMCSA official said that the lower rate of coverage for the parts and 

accessories area likely reflects the small number of vehicle inspections 

that FMCSA and the states conduct during compliance reviews. 

Page 16 GAO-07-1074T 
Our preliminary assessment is that FMCSA placed many carriers rated 

unsatisfactory in fiscal year 2005 out of service and followed up with 

nearly all of the rest to determine whether they had improved. In addition,

FMCSA monitors carriers to identify those that are violating out-of-service

orders. However, it does not take additional action against many violators 

of out-of-service orders that it identifies. Furthermore, FMCSA does not 

assess maximum fines against all carriers, as we believe the law requires, 

partly because FMCSA does not distinguish between carriers with a 

pattern of serious safety violations and those that repeat a serious 

violation.15

FMCSA Follows Up 

with Many Carriers 

with Serious Safety 

Violations but Does 

Not Assess Maximum 

Fines for All of the 

Violations Required 

by Law 

FMCSA Followed Up with 

Almost All Carriers That 

Received a Proposed 

Safety Rating of 

Unsatisfactory 

FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent) that 

received a proposed safety rating of unsatisfactory following compliance 

reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. These follow-ups resulted in either 

upgraded safety ratings or the carriers being placed out of service. 

Specifically,

• Based on follow-up compliance reviews, FMCSA upgraded the final safety

ratings of 658 carriers (325 to satisfactory and 333 to conditional). 

• FMCSA assigned a final rating of unsatisfactory to 309 carriers. FMCSA 

issued out-of-service orders to 306 of these carriers. An FMCSA official 

told us that it did not issue out-of-service orders to the remaining three 

carriers either because the agency could not locate them or because the 

carrier was still subject to an out-of-service order that FMCSA issued 

several years prior to the 2005 compliance review. 

• After FMCSA reviewed evidence of corrective action submitted by 

carriers, it upgraded the final safety ratings of 214 carriers (23 to 

satisfactory and 191 to conditional).

• Due to an error in assigning the proposed safety rating to one carrier, 

FMCSA upgraded its final safety rating to conditional. 

 15In December 2005, we reported more fully on FMCSA’s enforcement activities. See GAO, 

Large Truck Safety: Federal Enforcement Efforts Have Been Stronger Since 2000, but 

Oversight of State Grants Needs Improvement, GAO-06-156 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 

2005). 

Page 17 GAO-07-1074T 
For the remaining 14 carriers, FMCSA did not (1) provide us information 

on whether and how it followed up with 7 carriers in time for us to 

incorporate it in this statement and (2) respond to our request to clarify its 

follow-up approach for another 7 carriers in time for us to incorporate it in

this statement. 

Under its policies, FMCSA is generally required to assign the carrier a final

rating of unsatisfactory and to issue it an out-of-service order after either 

45 or 60 days, depending on the nature of the carrier’s business.16 Of the 

about 300 out-of-service orders that FMCSA issued to carriers rated 

unsatisfactory following compliance reviews conducted in fiscal year 2005, 

FMCSA told us that 89 percent were issued on time, 9 percent were issued 

between 1 and 10 days late, and 2 percent were issued more than 10 days

late. We are working with FMCSA to verify these numbers. An FMCSA 

official told us that in the few instances where an out-of-service order was 

issued more than 1 week late, the primary reason for the delay was that 

the responsible FMCSA division office had difficulty scheduling follow-up 

compliance reviews and thus held off on issuing the orders. 

FMCSA uses two primary means to try to ensure that carriers that have

been placed out of service do not continue to operate. First, FMCSA 

partners with states to help them suspend, revoke, or deny vehicle 

registration to carriers that have been placed out of service. FMCSA refers 

to these partnerships as the Performance and Registration Information 

Systems Management program (PRISM). PRISM links FMCSA databases 

with state motor vehicle registration systems and roadside inspection 

personnel to help identify vehicles operated by carriers that have been 

issued out-of-service orders. As of January 2007, 45 states had been 

awarded PRISM grants and 27 states were operating with PRISM 

capabilities. 

Second, FMCSA monitors carriers for indicators—such as roadside 

inspections, moving violations, and crashes—that they may be violating an

out-of-service order and visits some of the suspect carriers to examine 

their records to determine whether they did indeed violate the order. 

FMCSA told us it is difficult to detect carriers operating in violation of outFMCSA Monitors Carriers 

to Identify Those That Are 

Violating Out-of-Service 

Orders, but It Does Not 

Take Additional Action 

against Many of the 

Violators It Identifies 

 16Under certain circumstances (for example, if the carrier is making good faith efforts to

improve its safety), FMCSA may allow a carrier with a proposed rating of unsatisfactory to 

continue to operate for a limited time. 

Page 18 GAO-07-1074T 
of-service orders because its resources do not allow it to visit each carrier

or conduct roadside inspections on all vehicles, and we agree. In fiscal 

years 2005 and 2006, 768 of 1,996 carriers (38 percent) that were subject to

an out-of-service order had a roadside inspection or crash; FMCSA cited 

only 26 of these 768 carriers for violating an out-of-service order. An 

FMCSA official told us that some of these carriers, such as carriers that 

were operating intrastate or that had leased its vehicles to other carriers, 

may not have been violating the out-of-service order. He said that FMCSA 

did not have enough resources to determine whether each of the carriers 

was violating an out-of-service order.

From August 2006 through February 2007, FMCSA data indicate that the 

agency performed compliance reviews on 1,136 of the 2,220 (51 percent)

carriers that were covered by its mandatory compliance review policy.17

The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 

Legacy for Users act requires that FMCSA conduct compliance reviews on

carriers rated as SafeStat category A or B for 2 consecutive months. In 

response to this requirement, FMCSA implemented a policy in June 2006 

requiring a compliance review within 6 months for any such carrier unless 

the carrier had received a compliance review within the previous 12 

months. An FMCSA official told us that the agency did not have enough 

resources to conduct compliance reviews on all of the 2,220 carriers 

within 6 months. 

In April 2007, FMCSA revised the policy because it believes that it required

compliance reviews for some carriers that did not need them, leaving

FMCSA with insufficient resources to conduct compliance reviews on 

other carriers that did need them. Specifically, FMCSA believes that 

carriers that had already had a compliance review were targeted 

unnecessarily after they had corrected identified violations, but these 

violations continued to adversely affect their SafeStat rating because 

SafeStat penalizes carriers for violations regardless of whether they have

been corrected. The new policy requires compliance reviews within 6 

months for carriers that have been in SafeStat category A or B for 2 

consecutive months and received their last compliance 2 or more years 

ago (or have never received a compliance review) and offers some 

FMCSA Conducted 

Compliance Reviews on 

About Half of All High-risk 

Carriers That It Was 

Required to By Statute 

 17An FMCSA official told us that the agency believes that these data overestimate the 

number of carriers that were required to but did not receive a compliance review, primarily

because FMCSA has indications that some carriers are actually inactive. 

Page 19 GAO-07-1074T 
discretion to FMCSA division offices. For example, division offices can 

decide not to conduct a compliance review if its SafeStat score is based 

largely on violations that have been corrected or on accidents that 

occurred prior to the carrier’s last compliance review. We believe that 

these changes are consistent with the act’s requirement and give FMCSA 

appropriate discretion in allocating its compliance review resources. 

FMCSA does not assess the maximum fines against all carriers as we 

believe the law requires. The law requires FMCSA to assess the maximum 

allowable fine for each serious violation by a carrier that is found (1) to 

have committed a pattern of such violations (pattern requirement) or (2) 

to have previously committed the same or a related serious violation 

(repeat requirement).18 However, FMCSA’s policy on maximum fines does 

not fully meet these requirements. FMCSA enforces both requirements 

using what is known as the “three-strikes rule,” applying the maximum 

allowable fine when it finds that a motor carrier has violated the same 

regulation three times within a 6-year period. FMCSA officials said they

interpret both parts of the act’s requirements to refer to repeat violations, 

and because they believe that having two distinct policies on repeat 

violations would confuse motor carriers, it has chosen to address both 

requirements with its single three-strikes policy. 

FMCSA’s interpretation does not carry out the statutory mandate to 

impose maximum fines in two different cases. In contrast to FMCSA, we 

read the statute’s use of the distinct terms “a pattern of violations” and 

“previously committed the same or a related violation” as requiring 

FMCSA to implement two distinct policies. A basic principle of statutory 

interpretation is that distinct terms should be read as having distinct 

meanings. In this case, the statute not only uses different language to refer 

to the violations for which maximum fines must be imposed but also sets 

them out separately and makes either type of violation subject to the 

maximum penalties. Therefore, one carrier may commit a variety of 

serious violations and another carrier may commit the same or a 

substantially similar serious violation as a previous violation; the language

on its face requires FMCSA to assess the maximum allowable fine in both 

situations—patterns of violations as well as repeat offenses.

FMCSA Does Not Assess 

Maximum Fines for All the 

Violations Required by 

Law 

 18Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-159, § 222(b)(2), 113 Stat. 

1748, 1769 (49 U.S.C.A. § 521 Note). 

Page 20 GAO-07-1074T 
FMCSA could define a pattern of serious violations in numerous ways that 

are consistent with the act’s pattern requirement. Our assessment of eight 

potential definitions shows that the number of carriers that would be 

subject to maximum fines depends greatly on the definition. (See table 4.)

For example, a definition calling for two or more serious violations in each

of at least four different regulatory areas during a compliance review 

would have made 38 carriers subject to maximum fines in fiscal year 2006. 

In contrast, a definition calling for one or more serious violations in each 

of at least three different regulatory areas would have made 1,529 carriers 

subject to maximum fines during that time.19

Table 4: Number of Motor Carriers That Would Have Been Subject to Maximum Fines under Various Definitions of a Pattern of 

Serious Violations, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006 

Number of carriers in 2004 with Number of carriers in 2005 with Number of carriers in 2006 with

Regulatory 

areas with

serious

violations

1 or more 

serious

violations per 

area 

2 or more 

serious

violations

per area

1 or more 

serious

violations per 

area

2 or more 

serious

violations per 

area

1 or more 

serious

violations per 

area

2 or more 

serious

violations per 

area

2 or more 2,935 177 3,004 158 3,348 225

3 or more 1,372 64 1,430 58 1,529 114

4 or more 494 16 557 25 530 38

5 or more 83 2 115 9 115 7

Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data. 

We also interpret the statutory language for the repeat requirement as 

calling for a “two-strikes” rule as opposed to FMCSA’s three-strikes rule 

interpretation. FMCSA’s interpretation imposes the maximum fine only 

after a carrier has twice previously committed such violations. The 

language of the statute does not allow FMCSA’s interpretation; rather, it 

requires FMCSA to assess the maximum allowable fine for each serious 

 19Our definitions are for analysis purposes only. We are not suggesting which, if any, of

these pattern definitions FMCSA should adopt as its policy, nor is our exclusive focus on 

patterns involving only violations identified during a single compliance review meant to 

suggest that the definition of pattern could not require that serious violations occur over 

multiple compliance reviews. 

Page 21 GAO-07-1074T 
violation against a carrier that has previously committed the same serious 

violation.20

In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, more than four times as many carriers 

had a serious violation that constituted a second strike than carriers that 

had a third strike. (See table 5.) For example, in fiscal year 2006, 1,320 

carriers had a serious violation that constituted a second strike, whereas 

280 carriers had a third strike. 

Table 5: Number of Motor Carriers That Would Have Been Subject to Maximum 

Fines under Two-strikes and Three-strikes Repeat Violator Policies, Fiscal Years 

2004 through 2006

Policy 2004 2005 2006 Total

Two strikes 1,251 1,292 1,320 3,863

Three strikesa269 284 280 833

Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data. 

a

FMCSA’s policy currently assesses the maximum fine for 3 violations in the same regulatory area. 

Carriers that commit a pattern of violations may also commit a second 

strike violation. For example, three of the seven carriers that had two or 

more serious violations in each of at least five different regulatory areas 

also had a second strike in fiscal year 2006. Were FMCSA to make policy 

changes along the lines discussed here, we believe that the new policies 

should address how to deal with carriers with serious violations that both 

are part of a pattern and repeat the same or similar previous violations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased

to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the 

Subcommittee might have. 

 20The statute (section 222(c)) does allow the Secretary to determine and document that 

extraordinary circumstances merit a lower than maximum fine in a particular case, if for

example a carrier can establish that repetition was not a result of its failure to take 

appropriate remedial action. 

Page 22 GAO-07-1074T 
For further information on this statement, please contact Susan Fleming at 

(202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions 

to this testimony were David Goldstein, Eric Hudson, and James 

Ratzenberger. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgement 

Page 23 GAO-07-1074T 
Page 24 GAO-07-1074T 

Related GAO Products 

Motor Carrier Safety: A Statistical Approach Will Better Identify 

Commercial Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks Than Does the 

Current Federal Approach. GAO-07-585. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007. 

Unified Motor Carrier Fee System: Progress Made but Challenges to 

Implementing New System Remain. GAO-07-771R. Washington, D.C.: May 

25, 2007. 

Consumer Protection: Some Improvements in Federal Oversight of 

Household Goods Moving Industry Since 2001, but More Action Needed 

to Better Protect Individual Consumers. GAO-07-586. Washington, D.C.: 

May 16, 2007. 

Transportation Security: DHS Efforts to Eliminate Redundant 

Background Check Investigations. GAO-07-756. Washington, D.C.: April 

26, 2007. 

Truck Safety: Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed Promise, but 

the Program’s Future Success Is Uncertain. GAO-06-916. Washington, 

D.C.: September 8, 2006. 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration: Education and Outreach

Programs Target Safety and Consumer Issues, but Gaps in Planning 

and Evaluation Remain. GAO-06-103. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 

2005. 

Large Truck Safety: Federal Enforcement Efforts Have Been Stronger 

Since 2000, but Oversight of State Grants Needs Improvement. GAO-06-

156. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. 

Highway Safety: Further Opportunities Exist to Improve Data on 

Crashes Involving Commercial Motor Vehicles. GAO-06-102. Washington, 

D.C.: November 18, 2005.

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