alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### BURBRIDGE *v.*SEELY, MORLY, & CO.

Vender of goods in possession — fraud—error in charge to jury.

Where the vender of goods retains the possession of them, the sale is prima facie fraudulent, and if the claimant under such sale, fail to do away this legal presumption, the sale is fraudulent.

It has been frequently decided so in this state, and that such presumptive fraud may be * rebutted.

It is error to charge the jury that such possession is *conclusive*evidence of fraud, and that the jury *must*find the possession left with intention of defrauding creditors.

Error, to the Common Pleas. The plaintiff below brought trover for property he purchased of one Wheelock, and the defendants claimed under a subsequent sale by Wheelock, and a delivery.

During the trial, it was offered to prove, that the plaintiffs, in their purchase, gave no credit on their books, which was objected to and overruled, because the books were not present. And it appearing that at the purchase by the plaintiffs, they left the property in possession of Wheelock, the court charged the jury they *must*find the possession was left *with intention to defraud creditors,*and must find for the plaintiff.

./. *H. Paine,*for the plaintiff in error,

cited 7 *Cowen R.*334; 2 *T. R.*432; 2 *B. and P.59 ■,*1 *T. R.*91; 4 *Bin. R.*253; 2 *Munf.R.*341; 5 *Serg. and R.*275; 2 *Wend. R.*489; 2 *K. C.*433.

*Mathews*and *R.*Hitchcoch.SQ,r-„the defendants,

cited 1 *Starh.*359, 60, 389, 90; *8John.R.S48;*12 *John. R.*323; 3 *Cowen R.*187 *to*206; 2 *B. and P.*59.

By the Court.

In the sale of goods, where the possession is left unchanged, it is prima facie evidence of fraud. It lies on .the claimant, under such sale, to do away this presumption, and if he *360fail, the sale is esteemed fraudulent. There may also ,be fraud in law, legally deduced from certain acts, even though both parties were strictly honest, and had no intention of fraud. The charge of the court below was against both these principles and the judgment must be reversed, with costs.

Whatever rule obtains in other states, the question is not an open one here, and we must be governed by our laws and practice. It has been frequently ruled in our courts, that possession by the vender, after sale, furnished only prima facie evidence of fraud, which might be rebutted.
# C_2013132EN.01001101.xml

| 9.5.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.5.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/11

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

of 28 January 2013

in Case E-16/11

EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland

(Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes — Obligation of result — Emanation of the State — Discrimination)

2013/C 132/06

In Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland — APPLICATION for a declaration that by failing to ensure payment of the minimum amount of compensation to Icesave depositors in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom provided for in Article 7(1) of the Act referred to at point 19a of Annex IX to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes) within the time limits laid down in Article 10 of the Act, Iceland has failed to comply with the obligations resulting from that Act, in particular its Articles 3, 4, 7 and 10, and/or Article 4 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, the Court, composed of Carl Baudenbacher, President and Judge-Rapporteur, Páll Hreinsson and Ola Mestad (ad hoc), Judges, gave judgment on 28 January 2013, the operative part of which is as follows:

The Court hereby:

| 1. | dismisses the application; |
| --- | --- |

1.

dismisses the application;

| 2. | orders the EFTA Surveillance Authority to pay its own costs and the costs incurred by Iceland; |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders the EFTA Surveillance Authority to pay its own costs and the costs incurred by Iceland;

| 3. | orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

---
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-20658 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHNNIE FOWLER III, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(95-CR-217-1)

July 15, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Joh nnie Fowler III appeals his jury conviction for possession with intent to1 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A).

2 United States v. Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 180 (1996).

3 United States v. Packer , 70 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 75 (1996).

4 United States v. Calverley , 37 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

2 distribute more than 100 grams of phencyclidine (PCP). 1 Our review of the record and

the relevant authorities persuades that no reversi ble error was committed. Fowler

complains of the evidence of the quantity of drugs. The quantity of drugs is not an

element of the offense. 2 The record reflects that Fow ler possessed 28.78 actual grams

of PCP. Under Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(c)(7), the Drug Quantity Table, that

amount of drugs corresponds to a base offense level of 26, the base offense level used

by the district court in the sentencing computation.

Fowler complains of the use of a prior conviction. The government complied with

21 U.S.C. § 851 by filing an information before trial identifying the prior convicti ons

upon which it was relying. Fow ler made no challenge thereto. The district court did not

err in enhancing Fow

ler’s sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

The record is not sufficiently developed for us to address, on this direct appeal,

Fowler’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 3 That must remain for another day.

Finally, Fowler’s complaint concerning the admission of extraneous evidence

about an earlier search of his home, involving his father, does not rise to the level of

adversely affecting his substantial rights. 4 We perceive no basis for reversible error.3

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                          0000797324
<NAME>                         LASERGATE SYSTEMS, INC.   
                                                         
<S>                                <C>   
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                            162,851
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                     428,458
<ALLOWANCES>                      172,690
<INVENTORY>                       159,246
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  649,279
<PP&E>                            509,359
<DEPRECIATION>                    244,354
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  3,750,797
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           2,421,918
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                           225
<COMMON>                          223,862
<OTHER-SE>                      1,104,792
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    3,750,797
<SALES>                         1,215,329
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                1,215,329
<CGS>                             722,764
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     807,729
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  3,059
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (312,105)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (312,105)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                     (312,105)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                       (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                       (0.04)
                              


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTD FROM
THIRD QUARTER 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          13,993
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 1,320
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     69,693
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         104,361
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           103,427
<LOANS>                                        190,109
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,588
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 389,351
<DEPOSITS>                                     335,752
<SHORT-TERM>                                     1,462
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,639
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,482
<OTHER-SE>                                      41,016
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 389,351
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 12,729
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                8,227
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   424
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                21,380
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               9,749
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,772
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           11,608
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      216
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   6
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  6,961
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,262
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       6,262
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,554
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.20
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
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<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
§ 308.528 Sanctions. ( a ) The ALJ may sanction a person, including any party or representative for: ( 1 ) Failing to comply with an order, rule, or procedure governing the proceeding;
( 2 ) Failing to prosecute or defend an action; or
( 3 ) Engaging in other misconduct that interferes with the speedy, orderly, or fair conduct of the hearing.
( b ) Any such sanction, including but not limited to, those listed in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this section, must reasonably relate to the severity and nature of the failure or misconduct.
( c ) When a party fails to comply with an order, including an order for taking a deposition, the production of evidence within the party's control, or a request for admission, the ALJ may: ( 1 ) Draw an inference in favor of the requesting party with regard to the information sought;
( 2 ) In the case of requests for admission, deem each matter of which an admission is requested to be admitted;
( 3 ) Prohibit the party failing to comply with such order from introducing evidence concerning, or otherwise relying upon, testimony relating to the information sought; and
( 4 ) Strike any part of the related pleading or other submissions of the party failing to comply with such request.
( d ) If a party fails to prosecute or defend an action under this subpart commenced by service of a notice of hearing, the ALJ may dismiss the action or may issue an initial decision imposing penalties and assessments.
( e ) The ALJ may refuse to consider any motion, request, response, brief, or other document which is not filed in a timely fashion.
Editorial Note on Part 705
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 705 appear at 84 FR 1607, Feb. 5, 2019.

§ 705.6 Terms and conditions for technical assistance grants. ( a ) Participating Credit Unions must comply with the terms and conditions for technical assistance grants specified for each funding opportunity offered under a Notice of Funding Opportunity.
( b ) NCUA will establish applicable funding limits for technical assistance grants in the Notice of Funding Opportunity.
[81 FR 85112, Nov. 25, 2016]
§ 614.4267 Professional association membership; competency. ( a ) *Membership in appraisal organizations.* A State certified appraiser or a State licensed appraiser may not be excluded from consideration for an assignment for a real estate-related transaction solely by virtue of membership or lack of membership in any particular appraisal organization.
( b ) *Competency.* All staff and fee evaluators, including appraisers, performing evaluations in connection with real, personal, or intangible property taken as collateral in connection with extensions of credit must meet the qualification requirements of this subpart. However, an evaluator (as defined in § 614.4240(n)) may not be considered competent solely by virtue of being certified, licensed, or accredited. Any determination of competency shall be based on the individual's experience and educational background as they relate to the particular evaluation assignment for which such individual is being considered.
230227 ORD OF REFERENCE FOR PREPA DISCOVERY VERSION FEBRUARY 27, 2023 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

In re: 

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, 

as representative of

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO et al., 

Debtors.

1

PROMESA 

Title III 

No. 17 BK 3283-LTS 

(Jointly Administered) 

In re:

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

as representative of

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY,

Debtor.

PROMESA

Title III

No. 17 BK-4780-LTS

ORDER OF REFERENCE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

All discovery matters related to or arising from the proposed Disclosure 

Statement for Title III Plan of Adjustment of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (Docket 

Entry No. 23097 in Case No. 17-3283 and Docket Entry No. 3111 in Case No. 17-4780, as such 

1 The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III case 

number and the last four (4) digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as 

applicable, are the (i) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”) 

(Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-3283-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (ii) 

Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-

BK-3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 8474); (iii) Puerto Rico Highways 

and Transportation Authority (“HTA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-3567-LTS) (Last 

Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) Employees Retirement System of the 

Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“ERS”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-

BK-3566-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); (v) Puerto Rico Electric 

Power Authority (“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-4780-LTS) (Last Four Digits 

of Federal Tax ID: 3747); and (vi) Puerto Rico Public Buildings Authority (“PBA”) 

(Bankruptcy Case No. 19-BK-5523-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3801) 

(Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers due to software 

limitations).

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:23635 Filed:02/27/23 Entered:02/27/23 11:39:12 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 2
230227 ORD OF REFERENCE FOR PREPA DISCOVERY VERSION FEBRUARY 27, 2023 2

has been or may be amended) and Title III Plan of Adjustment of the Puerto Rico Electric Power 

Authority (Docket Entry No. 23094 in Case No. 17-3283 and Docket Entry No. 3110 in Case No. 

17-4780, as such has been or may be amended) are hereby referred to Magistrate Judge Judith 

Dein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2023

 /s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

United States District Judge

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:23635 Filed:02/27/23 Entered:02/27/23 11:39:12 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         646,200
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,558,617
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (348,984)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,941,955
<PP&E>                                      70,044,882
<DEPRECIATION>                            (15,517,656)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              59,916,272
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       15,898,490
<BONDS>                                      7,500,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       157,849
<OTHER-SE>                                  35,164,739
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                59,916,272
<SALES>                                      1,372,002
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,716,473
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,417,699
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             620,121
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (29,321,347)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (29,321,347)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (29,321,347)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.97)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.97)
        

</TABLE>
#### TOWN OF EUTAW V. MALONE.

(Decided June 17, 1913.)

Appeal from Greene Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. Bernard Harwood.

McKinley, McQueen, Hawkins & Snow, for appellant.; Evins & Jack, for appellee.

Per curiam.

Appeal dismissed.
EXHIBIT 10.7

ICAGEN, INC.

Summary of 2011 Bonus Targets

Executive Officer 2011 Bonus Targets



|                                                                                                                          |  |                        |                          | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------- | ------------------------ | 
|Executive Officer                                                                                                         |  | Bonus Targets for 2011 |                         
|P. Kay Wagoner, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer and President                                                              |  |                        | Up to 50% of base salary | 
|Richard D. Katz, M.D., Executive Vice President, Finance and Corporate Development, Chief Financial Officer and
Treasurer |  |                        | Up to 40% of base salary | 

Cash bonuses for
Dr. Wagoner and Dr. Katz for 2011 will be based on the achievement of specified corporate performance objectives. The corporate performance objectives for 2011 are progression of research and clinical development programs; increasing
shareholder confidence; improving financial stability through corporate and business development strategies; and achieving top ethical, financial, legal, reporting and compliance standards. The actual amount of such cash bonuses, if any, will be
determined in the discretion of the Compensation Committee, subject to the maximum bonus targets shown above. The Compensation Committee will evaluate the Companys and each executives performance against the objectives listed above from
time to time during 2011, and may, in its discretion, approve the payment of any bonuses in one or more installments during 2011 or in early 2012.
In Special Term —

Storer, J. presiding.

#### JOHNSON, PRICHARD, & Co. *vs.*R. W. BOOTH.

The officer who takes a deposition, must certify that it was subscribed by the deponent in his presence, and that it was written down in presence of deponent; otherwise the deposition cannot be read on the trial.

Deponent must be sworn, before he is allowed to give any statement in the ease.

Motion to exclude deposition.

Storer, J.

It is objected that the magistrate, who took the deposition, does not certify that the deponent subscribed it in his presence, or that it was reduced to writing by the magistrate in the presence of the deponent.

It is also objected, that the certificate does not state that the deponent was sworn to “ testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

On examining the certificate, there appears to be no foundation for the last exception, as the statement of the *43magistrate as to the form of the oath he administered is sufficiently explicit.

The other exception must be sustained. Depositions cannot be taken with too much care, nor the rights of parties too strictly guarded by legal forms, when testimony that may decide the most important controversies, is given in the absence of those, who are to be directly affected by it.

The practice of all enlightened courts has been to apply a very rigid construction of the law, as well as of their own rules, wherever it appears, the requisites of either have not been pursued. The witness should be sworn before he is permitted to make any statement in the case, and when he is sworn, every part of his narration should be written down in his presence, and the answer to every question propounded to him, should be reduced to writing under his own eye. It would be a fraud upon the administration of justice, if statements should be prepared, in anticipation that they would be sworn to, or the witness be permitted to subscribe what purported to be his own version of the facts, when, in reality, it was the production of another. The deponent himself must relate the facts; the magistrate’s duty is to'reduce them to writing while they are yet fresh from the lips of the witness, and it is only where this course is strictly observed, the spirit and the meaning of the witness can be embodied.

If it does not clearly appear that the' magistrate reduced the deposition to writing in the deponent’s presence, and that the deponent subscribed it in the magistrate’s presence, the Court cannot infer that each of the substantial requisites of the Code has been complied with. This deposition cannot therefore be read. The language of the *44Code is the same substantially as is found in the statute of 1831, and will admit of but one construction.

The principle now decided may be found in Bell *vs.*Morrisson, 1 *Peters*351: Turnpike Co. *vs.*Ridley, 8 *Ver.*404: Bradstreet *vs.*Baldwin, 11 *Mass.*229: Pettibone *vs.*Derringer, 4 *Wash. C. C. R.*215.