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29–761 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–958

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS LEARNED IN

CONTRACTING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 2, 2006

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

JAY W. MARONEY, Counsel 

AMY L. HALL, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Minority Staff Director 

TROY H. CRIBB, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 3

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 5

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 7

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 8

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 8

Senator Chafee ................................................................................................. 9

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 9

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 11

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 20

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 29

Prepared statement: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 39

WITNESS 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 2006

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record ..................................... 49

APPENDIX 

Report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraq Reconstruction—Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, July 2006, ..................... 62

(1)

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS LEARNED 

IN CONTRACTING 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Coburn, Chafee, Warner, 

Levin, Akaka, Carper, Dayton, Lautenberg, and Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good 

morning. 

Today, the Committee will examine the status of the U.S. Government’s contracting efforts in the relief and reconstruction programs in Iraq. Our witness is Stuart Bowen, who has been the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since October 2004. 

The focus of this hearing is the ‘‘Lessons Learned’’ report on Iraq 

contracting, as well as the IG’s newest Quarterly Report, both of 

which have just been released. The ‘‘Lessons Learned’’ report provides a chronological review of the contracting experiences in Iraq. 

It is a story of mistakes made, of plans either poorly conceived or 

overwhelmed by the ongoing violence, and of waste, greed, and corruption that have drained dollars that should have been used to 

build schools and health clinics, improve the electrical grid, and repair the oil infrastructure. 

What I found particularly remarkable about this report is how 

many of the lessons apply to any massive reconstruction undertaking. Iraq and the hurricane-ravaged Gulf Coast present some 

similar challenges. In both cases, massive public and private efforts, indeed more than $112 billion combined, have been mobilized 

to repair infrastructure, to care for people in need, to rebuild communities, and to reinvigorate the economy. In both cases, the Federal Government has awarded many contracts both large and 

small. In both cases, mistakes, mismanagement, and abuse led to 

unacceptable waste of taxpayer dollars and prolonged suffering. 

During this Committee’s Hurricane Katrina investigation, the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security stressed 

that what we often call ‘‘lessons learned’’ are really only lessons 

recognized until the lessons are actually implemented. 

2

Last September, this Committee approved a proposal that Senator Lieberman and I developed that would have expanded the authority of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to 

include oversight of Gulf Coast relief and reconstruction. It is unfortunate that our proposal was blocked by the Administration. 

Had it been enacted, I believe that the thorough audits, extensive 

investigations, and vigorous oversight that have characterized the 

Inspector General’s Iraqi experience would have helped to prevent 

the widespread waste, fraud, and abuse that have plagued assistance and recovery programs in the Gulf Coast. 

The report before us today lists 10 lessons learned regarding contracting in Iraq. Although I will leave it to our witness to explain 

them in detail, I believe that they can be summed up as describing 

the need for better planning and greater coordination in anticipation of what was known to be a massive reconstruction effort. From 

the failure to involve procurement personnel in the preliminary 

planning to the lack of portable and tested systems to an overreliance on non-competitive and expensive design-to-build contracts, 

the lessons of Iraq are in many ways similar to the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. 

The six recommendations in the Inspector General’s report also 

support the recommendations that this Committee made in the 

aftermath of its Hurricane Katrina investigation. In fact, our postHurricane Katrina legislation, which was approved by this Committee just last week, would implement four of the recommendations. 

From Iraq to our own Gulf Coast, recent events have shown that 

the existing procurement structure is inadequate for mounting a 

quick, effective, and accountable relief and reconstruction effort. 

The lessons that have been learned the hard way have resulted in 

wasted tax dollars and unfinished projects. 

We will also discuss today the latest Quarterly Report by the Inspector General, which has been just released. I have been briefed 

quarterly by the Inspector General on his findings and have 

worked closely with his office on oversight. Due in part to his office’s aggressive oversight, the Iraq reconstruction effort is going 

better, but there is still so much room for improvement. It is in 

many ways a good-news/bad-news story. 

For example, in the electricity sector, electricity generation rose 

above pre-war levels for the first time in more than a year. In the 

oil and gas sector, oil production reached the pre-war level of 2.5 

million barrels per day for 1 week in mid-June, but unfortunately 

it then decreased for the following 2 weeks. The report also reveals 

cost overruns, accounting irregularities, unfinished projects, and 

evidence of waste, fraud, and corruption. 

One notable failure was in the health care sector where the 

Basrah Children’s Hospital project used an accounting shell game 

to hide ballooning costs and significant schedule delays. Originally 

budgeted at $50 million, a recent assessment identified several options to complete the hospital, and the most recent cost-to-completion estimates range from $150 million to $170 million. In addition, 

the most recent projected completion date is now July 31, 2007, 

which is 576 days late. 

3

During this past quarter, the Inspector General completed 10 audits and 12 project assessments that provide important new recommendations. In addition, the IG has opened 40 new investigations of alleged fraud and corruption and continues to pursue investigative leads in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, Europe, 

and the United States. 

Mr. Bowen’s previous work has led the Department of Justice to 

file a plea agreement in which an army lieutenant colonel pled 

guilty to felonies. This plea is tied to two previously reported convictions—those of the CPA comptroller and an American citizen 

named Phillip Bloom. The three conspired to steer millions of dollars worth of construction contracts to Mr. Bloom’s company. 

Another part of the IG’s report raises a red flag that I find very 

troubling. Nearly $21 billion has been provided to the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund since the start of this effort. As of the 

date of the Quarterly Report, $1.7 billion remains unobligated. 

Now, why is that of concern? It is of concern to me because the 

rush is on to obligate the remaining funds before they expire at the 

end of the fiscal year on September 30. As we have seen over the 

years, a rush to obligate and spend monies prior to the end of the 

fiscal year often produces projects that are wasteful and of questionable worth. The plan, according to the IG’s report, is to obligate 

these funds now for projects that are not fully fleshed out and then 

to de-obligate them in the next fiscal year for other Iraq projects. 

This seems to me to be completely unacceptable and an invitation 

to waste. 

Never has the phrase ‘‘haste makes waste’’ sounded more ominous. To have almost $2 billion floating around this way is utterly 

unacceptable and will undoubtedly lead to wasteful spending, questionable obligations, and excessive costs. 

Our country has made a tremendous investment to promote freedom and democracy in Iraq, in the lives of our brave men and 

women in uniform, in the lives lost of civilian contractors, and in 

a tremendous expenditure of taxpayer dollars. In this time of transition, the success of the new Iraqi Government depends to a considerable extent upon the success of the ongoing reconstruction effort. Yet the reports of the Inspector General indicate that while 

billions of dollars have been spent, reconstruction has fallen far 

short of promised outcomes. I look forward to hearing from our witness today. 

Senator Levin, we are very pleased to have you in the role of the 

Ranking Member today in the absence of Senator Lieberman. Actually, it is a role that you could have chosen at any point, I guess, 

given your seniority. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thank 

you for calling this hearing, and thank you for your long-standing 

and strong commitment to congressional oversight. It has been so 

critically important in the work of this Committee and other committees on which you serve, and we are very grateful for it. And, 

most important, the Nation is very much in your debt for what you 

do in the area of oversight. 

4

Over the last 3 years, the U.S. taxpayers have spent almost $20 

billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. An additional $30 billion of 

Iraq funds was expended under the control of the U.S. Government 

for the same purpose. And before I continue with my opening statement, I do want to note what the Chairman said about this hurryup, year-end spending, which is being proposed. 

Going way back in time, way, way back in time, I believe that 

one of the facts which produced the Competition in Contracting 

Act, on which our Chairman worked in an earlier capacity, was 

this problem of hurry-up, year-end spending, which proves to be so 

wasteful. And I was glad that our Chairman highlighted that, because it is unacceptable that we are going to hurry up and try to 

obligate money because if it is not obligated, it will not be spent. 

We cannot proceed in that fashion. It is very wasteful, and, again, 

I think our Chairman is very wise to point that out as being unacceptable. 

The area which our Chairman has identified is an area that just 

cries out for strong congressional oversight. We have had any number of reports in the press about contract mismanagement, abuse, 

and even outright fraud in Iraq contracting. For example—and 

these are just examples—the following questions have been raised 

by published articles about two multi-billion-dollar contracts 

awarded to the Halliburton KBR subsidiary. Why was the initial 

contract for reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry awarded on a 

sole-source basis to Halliburton? And why did that contract, which 

was supposed to be a ‘‘temporary bridge contract,’’ have a term of 

2 years, with 3 optional years, and a dollar value of up to $7 billion? 

Why were the prices that Halliburton charged the Coalition Provisional Authority for oil so much higher than market prices? And 

did Halliburton benefit by overcharging the CPA by several hundred million dollars on oil purchased in Kuwait and delivered to 

Iraq? 

Why did Halliburton charge the Department of Defense for thousands of meals that were not actually served? And was this practice permitted by the Halliburton contract? 

Did Halliburton knowingly supply our troops with spoiled food 

and unsafe drinking water? And did the company intentionally 

withhold information from the government to avoid raising questions about the quality of its performance? 

Now, those two Halliburton contracts are by far the largest contracts that we have awarded in Iraq, but they are not unique. Both 

contracts are what we call ‘‘indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 

contracts,’’ or IDIQ contracts. And what we did with these contracts and what we have done with most of our other Iraq contracts 

is to award a huge contract to a single company before we know 

what work the contractor will be asked to perform. These singleaward IDIQ contracts basically give a single contractor the right to 

the sole-source award of innumerable, highly lucrative projects. 

That kind of contract, that IDIQ contract, lends itself to abuse 

because when we finally decide what work we want done, when we 

do that, we will have no competition. As a result, we pretty much 

have to take whatever estimate the contractor offers. Sometimes 

5

we can do the work on a fixed-price basis, but more often we end 

up paying the contractor whatever it ‘‘costs.’’

We are now starting to see the results of contracting without 

competition. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 

who will be testifying before us today, has identified what he calls 

a ‘‘reconstruction gap’’—the difference between what we set out to 

do in the area of Iraq reconstruction and what we have actually 

been able to accomplish. 

For instance, the Inspector General has reported that we set out 

to build 150 primary health care centers, then reduced that number to 141; but, unfortunately, the contractor completed only six of 

these health care centers, and the contract has now been terminated for default. 

This shortfall is not unique to health care centers. Last week, the 

Inspector General released a report on the construction of a prison 

facility in Nasiriyah, Iraq. According to the report, we originally 

planned to build a new prison to house up to 4,400 inmates. Because the prison was to be located in a rural area, with no utilities, 

we would have to build an on-site power generation plant, water 

treatment plant, and wastewater treatment facility. The contractor’s first estimate for this work came in at $118 million. The second was $201 million. We tried to reduce the cost by reducing the 

capacity of the prison by more than half, to 2,000 inmates. The estimate was still too high, so we reduced the capacity to 800 inmates, less than 20 percent of the original planned size. We then 

entered into a definitized contract, which called for the work to be 

done by March 2006 at a cost of $45 million. 

Despite these reductions in the scope of the contract, the contractor proved unable to complete the required work. Construction 

delays resulted in a 410-day schedule slippage and a projected cost 

overrun of $23 million. A month after the scheduled delivery date, 

the project was only 28 percent complete, and we now have initiated actions to terminate the contract with the prison still far from 

built. 

Today’s hearing gives us an important opportunity to examine a 

few of these issues, but it is only a beginning. Every sign that we 

have points to significant waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq contracting. The subject merits a series of hearings, and indeed, many 

significant issues regarding Iraq contracting, including many of the 

questions about the contracts awarded to Halliburton, apparently 

do not fall within the purview of the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction, who is before us today, or they have not been 

addressed by the Inspector General for a number of reasons. 

So I do hope that as we dig into this issue we can produce some 

significant reforms, and, again, I very much want to congratulate 

and thank our Chairman for her leadership and her tenacity when 

it comes to the very critical subject of congressional oversight. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you 

for holding this hearing today to discuss the Special Inspector GenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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eral for Iraq Reconstruction’s report, ‘‘Lessons Learned in Contracting.’’

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government has spent over $437 billion to fund military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans health care. Iraq reconstruction has cost up to $30 billion. We have heard from the Inspector General that only part of it has been spent, and we are 

worried about rapid, quick spending. I think that we also have to 

recognize that these costs are going to continue to rise unless we 

can get more of our allies to pitch in to help with the reconstruction 

costs. 

I think it is important that we realize that we are involved in 

what I refer to as the ‘‘Fourth World War,’’ with the Islamic extremists who want to deny the Iraq people the freedom that is the 

right of all mankind. They have hijacked the Quran and attempted 

to do us harm, and I think the American people should know that 

Osama bin Laden has declared holy war on us, and Islamic extremists will not rest until they have taken over the entire Middle East. 

I think we sometimes don’t put this war in Iraq in the context of 

this war that is going to go on for a long time. 

The men and women of our armed forces are putting their lives 

on the line to build a better future for the people of Iraq and the 

greater Middle East, and these sacrifices will continue to advance 

the security of our country and the principles upon which it was 

founded. Those are monies that we have to spend, and they are 

monies that we have to take care of. 

On the other hand, we owe it to the American taxpayer and our 

children and grandchildren to do everything we can to ensure that 

the money for reconstruction is spent wisely. While we have rightfully spent billions of dollars in response to these events, we continue to squeeze the nondefense discretionary budget. I think sometimes we forget about that. I believe that people are concerned 

about these cuts in the nondefense discretionary budget. 

So given these sacrifices, we must be sure that we have strict accountability for every dollar that is spent in the war and reconstruction efforts. I think one of the reasons the American people 

are concerned about Iraq, besides the loss of lives and those injured, is this enormous sum of money that we are spending. When 

they hear about horror stories of fraud, waste, and abuse, they are 

livid. It is one of the reasons why I think they are so angry; they 

read about the way this money is being spent. And I think they 

have a right to be. 

Mr. Inspector General, I would like you to know that the work 

that you and your team are doing is vital to protecting America’s 

financial future and to respond to the concerns of the American 

people. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, I thought we were 

doing early-bird arrival. I was here at 5 minutes to 10, and it was 

just the Inspector General and me. Perhaps we should have started 

the hearing at the time. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg, the rule of the Committee is when the Committee is gaveled, those Members who are 

there at the time are recognized according to seniority. After the 

7

gavel falls, then it becomes an early-bird rule. That has always 

been the rule. I followed it today, and Senator Akaka is next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Chairman Collins, for scheduling today’s hearing to examine contracting and procurement issues in 

Iraq. Our Committee is responsible for government oversight, and 

nothing facing our Nation is in greater need of review than the 

costs of Iraq’s reconstruction. 

I want to commend the Chairman for her opening statement and 

tell her that her statement justifies this hearing today. 

I want to also welcome you, Mr. Bowen, and to thank you for the 

important service you are providing to our Nation as the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Your reports remind us 

that just as war and crisis motivate citizens to heed the call of government and government service, others see it as an opportunity 

to enrich themselves unjustly at the government’s expense. In 

these trying times, auditors and investigators are often the best 

protection the government has against these unprincipled individuals. 

Approximately $40 billion has been appropriated for the security 

and rehabilitation of Iraq. Given this tremendous sum, it is critical 

that there is oversight on how taxpayers’ dollars and Iraqi funds 

have and will be spent. 

The first reason for the high cost of reconstruction in Iraq is the 

Administration’s failure to plan for the post-war period. This has 

led to large-scale waste, fraud, and abuse, as the Chairman mentioned. During the debate on whether the United States should go 

to war, I said that the President lacked a strategy for winning the 

peace. I fear that the problems and abuses with contracts and procurements today bear out my concern. 

A second reason for the high cost of reconstruction in Iraq is the 

Administration’s lack of truthfulness with the American people. 

Congress and the American people were told that Iraq’s oil wealth 

would fund the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure; this was 

not true. That the American taxpayer would not be funding the reconstruction of Iraq; this was not true. That the Iraqi people would 

stand and put their own house in order; this has not happened yet. 

A third reason for the high cost of reconstruction in Iraq is the 

Administration’s failure to oversee how money is spent. Mismanagement and misuse of American and Iraqi funds are commonplace. Auditors cannot account for over $9 billion in Iraqi funds. 

Contractors are providing incomplete and inadequate services or 

are overcharging for their services. 

For example, in February 2006, the Defense Contract Audit 

Agency found over $200 million in overcharges by Halliburton for 

its contract to import fuel and repair oil fields. I am appalled that 

large, highly recognizable American companies are abusing government contracts. Is the culture of corruption in our country so endemic that publicly known companies feel complacent during a 

time of war to defraud the government without any concern? 

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dertake today determines the future. Given the stakes, there remains no room for error. 

Madam Chairman, the government’s past failures in Iraq cannot 

be undone, but the lessons learned from yesterday should ensure 

that fraud and inadequate oversight do not reoccur tomorrow. 

Thank you again for holding this hearing, Madam Chairman. 

You are providing a great service to all Americans. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Bowen, I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for having the 

hearing, and Mr. Bowen, thank you for your service and that of all 

your staff. You have done an excellent job, and I appreciate it. I 

just have a very few short comments. 

Your recommendations are excellent from your report. Senator 

Obama and I recognized some of the defects that we saw in what 

happened in Iraq, and that is why we recommended a CFO for 

Hurricane Katrina. It was flatly rejected not only by Congress but 

by the President. But basically in your recommendations that is 

what you are saying, is you need somebody in charge, somebody 

that everything flows through, that the Executive Branch can have 

a handle on. My hope is that as we go through this hearing, we 

will all understand the purpose of making one person accountable. 

You have done a great job in looking at it after the fact, but billions of dollars could be saved in Iraq had we had a financial manager with responsibility and authority on the ground to oversee 

this. And it is my hope that the Committee will join as a group 

from the lessons that we have seen and heard and make the appropriate changes in the future so that we do not have a repeat of this 

or a repeat of the waste, fraud, and abuse that we saw in Hurricane Katrina. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, I am glad that we are 

finally holding this hearing, and as you are aware, I sent in eight 

written requests for hearings over the last 3 years. We are obviously long past due for a detailed investigation of 3 years of waste, 

fraud, and abuse in Iraqi war contracts. And perhaps some significant savings for the American people might have occurred had we 

stepped up on time. We did diploma mills and credit card interest 

and DOD travel, but we could not find time in those 3 years to 

have a hearing on what was happening with no-bid contracts. 

I brought the amendment to the floor on a DOD authorization 

bill in May 2003 to make sure that there were no more no-bid contracts. The first step must be to understand what has taken place, 

and then to make sure contractors are held accountable for any 

wrongdoing. 

I am pleased to see Inspector General Bowen here. He has distinguished himself, and he will be able to help us shed light on some 

of the abuses in Iraq. 

9

There are many offenders, but the poster child for profiteering 

from this war is Halliburton, the company formerly run by Vice 

President Dick Cheney and from which he profited substantially 

with his stockholdings and his income from there. Halliburton has 

received more than $16 billion in cost-plus and no-bid contracts in 

Iraq, and the Defense Department auditors have identified more 

than $1.5 billion in questioned or unsupported costs. 

Auditors, whistleblowers, have caught Halliburton risking lives 

and U.S. property by driving empty trucks around Iraq. They have 

caught them overcharging for laundry and food services. And they 

have caught them serving spoiled meals to our soldiers. Those were 

some of the findings of the Pentagon’s auditors, but today we have 

new allegations to discuss, and this information is coming from our 

witness, Inspector General Bowen. 

We will hear that Halliburton ignored the advice of its engineers 

and botched the restoration of an oil pipeline. We will hear that 

this negligence cost the Iraqi Government as much as $1.5 billion 

in lost oil revenue. We will hear that Halliburton could not account 

for more than a third of government property that the Inspector 

General examined. And we will hear about the Defense Department’s incompetence in providing oversight of these contracts. 

Today’s hearing is a good start, but it is only a start. We have 

a lot of ground to cover to make up for 3 years of no Committee 

oversight. 

Inspector General Bowen has done a great job. The surface is 

hardly scratched regarding the possible contract abuses in Iraq. 

For example, of Halliburton’s more than $16 billion in Iraqi contracts, the Inspector General has examined only about $140 million. That is 1 percent of the total amount of these contracts. At 

our next hearing, which I am pleased that you are already planning, Madam Chairman, we should hear from the Defense Contract 

Auditing Agency whistleblowers, like Bunnatine Greenhouse, and 

the accused companies themselves. 

Today we begin to fulfill our constitutional duty to conduct vigorous oversight of the Iraq war contracts. It is about time, but we 

must not rest until we finish the job. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Chafee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHAFEE 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator Collins, and I would like to 

welcome the witness here today. I believe you appeared before the 

Foreign Relations Committee a few months ago, on which I serve, 

and I look forward to any changes that have occurred since then. 

And I know some of the questions are going to be between how 

much your Department has prosecuted some of the cases as opposed to whistleblowers instigating the prosecution. 

So welcome, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you 

for holding this very important hearing. 

I also want to give proper credit to Senator Byron Dorgan, the 

Chairman of the Democratic Policy Committee, who has for the last 

10

3 years been holding various hearings on this very important subject and has done more, I believe, than anybody else in the Senate 

to bring the truth about these misdeeds to his fellow Senators and 

to the American people. 

I would just like to reference excerpts from some of those hearings. One involved reports that KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton, 

had been providing contaminated water, nonpotable but still used 

for bathing, washing, and the like by American soldiers in Iraq, 

putting their lives on the line, and knowingly did so for several 

months, or perhaps longer. 

On March 24, 2005, an e-mail was sent from the water control 

expert for KBR in Iraq to other members of KBR’s administrative 

team, and it said, ‘‘He had by inspection seen ‘small worms’ moving 

in the toilet bowl. I went to inspect this myself and saw what I believe were mosquito larvae. During the same time, I went to the 

military ROPU site to inquire about the chlorination of the nonpotable water. I was informed they do not chlorinate this water at 

all. It is my opinion that the water source is, without question, contaminated with numerous microorganisms, including coliform bacteria. There is little doubt that raw sewage is routinely dumped upstream of intake much less than the required 2-mile distance.’’

Four months later, in July 2005, a response from one of the public relations people in KBR Halliburton said, ‘‘It is possible we 

could receive some queries on this if these former employees decide 

to go to the press. Therefore, can you please run some traps on this 

and see what you can find out? I don’t want it to turn into a big 

issue right now.’’

The next day she got a response from the man who was in 

charge of KBR operations in Iraq, who said, ‘‘Fact. We exposed a 

base camp population, military and civilian, to a water source that 

was not treated. The level of contamination was roughly two times 

the normal contamination of untreated water from the Euphrates 

River. Duration of exposure undetermined. Most likely, though, it 

was going on throughout the entire life of the camp up until 2 

weeks after my investigation concluded, in other words, possibly a 

year. I am not sure if any attempt to notify the exposed population 

was ever made.’’

That is from the KBR water quality, so-called, for Iraq. 

Last week, Senator Dorgan had a hearing—and I ask, Madam 

Chairman, for 2 more minutes to conclude my remarks 

Chairman COLLINS. Certainly. 

Senator DAYTON. I thank the Chairman. Regarding another company, Parsons, presented by an Iraqi physician, who said, ‘‘Parsons 

is said to have taken a tender of over $4 million to reconstruct a 

hospital in Iraq. Parsons’ local subcontractor did not perform the 

essential tasks like fixing the hospital’s roof, which was weak and 

cracked because of the weather and other factors. Because of this 

flaw, rainwater is likely to damage the painting that Parsons did 

inside the hospital and possibly the flooring as well. The worst failure of the reconstruction efforts at the hospital is the lack of medical equipment, including incubators. The hospital has 14 in the 

NCU, 2 in the ICU, and 1 in the ER. All of those are old models, 

made in 1970, and many of them are broken and in very bad condition. Last, but not least, from my own observations and my conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11

versations with hospital officials, it appears that Parsons did not 

do the most essential work necessary in any building—a fire alarm 

system. I don’t know if Parsons can build a hospital in the United 

States without installing a fire alarm, but in Diwaniyeh, they did 

so because they said it was not part of the reconstruction’s scope 

of work.’’

And, finally, there are other examples. Last week, it was also reported that the United States had dropped Bechtel, the American 

construction company, from a project to build a children’s hospital 

in the southern Iraqi city of Basrah after the project fell nearly a 

year behind schedule and exceeded its expected cost by as much as 

150 percent. 

The tragedy of these incidents—and these are just a few of 

many—is first of all that the Iraqi people are let down; and, second, that when they feel understandably angry toward the United 

States for its failure, our soldiers, who are putting their lives on 

the line in Iraq, bear the brunt of that. This is not only immoral, 

it should be illegal, it should be prosecuted to the maximum extent 

possible, but then they ought to have to face up to the families of 

the Americans who are maimed or killed in Iraq and explain to 

them why they have failed under these contracts to fulfill their responsibilities and why the sons and daughters and husbands and 

wives of Americans are left to bear those consequences. It is unpatriotic, and it is disgraceful, and, again, Madam Chairman, I look 

forward to the testimony, and I thank you for holding this hearing. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank 

you for holding this hearing, and certainly I know that Senator 

Lieberman has been a real leader on this, as well as Senator Levin, 

and I want to thank the witness for being here today. I share the 

concerns of the Committee. Some of the reports I hear about waste, 

fraud, and contractor abuse are very disturbing. I think a lot of 

Americans feel like some of these contractors are soaking the taxpayer, and we are not getting our money’s worth. But even more 

fundamentally than that, this is not good in the long term for Iraq. 

And I think that most Americans want to see us succeed in Iraq. 

They want us to transform that country into a democracy. But 

when you have circumstances like this around DOD contracting, I 

think a lot of Americans really scratch their heads and ask, Can 

we possibly get the job done with this type of abuse going on inside 

Iraq? 

So, Madam Chairman, I want to thank you for your commitment 

in trying to see this issue through, and I want to thank the witness 

for his testimony and his hard work. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Bowen, you have been very patient sitting through all these 

opening statements. We look forward to hearing from you now. 

12

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

TESTIMONY OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR.,1 SPECIAL INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Levin, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to address you today on the important matters regarding the 

U.S. role in the reconstruction of Iraq. 

Oversight works, and it’s at work in Iraq in the 50 SIGIR personnel—auditors, inspectors, investigators—that today are carrying 

out the mission that you have assigned us. My Deputy Inspector 

General, Ginger Cruz, returned this week after 2 months in Iraq, 

and her work is emblematic of what we have been doing. She made 

28 trips outside the Green Zone. You cannot find out what is going 

on from inside the walls of the U.S. Embassy there. 

My Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Mickey McDermott, 

just returned this morning from Iraq. He spent the last quarter 

there. He oversees 28 auditors who are carrying out the very extensive and focused audits that SIGIR has underway. 

We have completed 65 audits with well over 100 recommendations, and fulfilling my mission, what I have told my auditors to 

do, and that is, make a difference in real time. As you discover a 

finding, take it to the managers of Iraq reconstruction, whoever has 

oversight, bring that issue to their attention and change the way 

they are doing business. And I believe that is how we can best 

steward the taxpayers’ dollars that are at work over there. 

Today, we are releasing our report, ‘‘Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons 

in Contracting and Procurement,’’ the second in our Lessons 

Learned Initiative. The first one addressed human capital management. The third one will address project management, how the program has been executed, and that will be out at the end of the 

year. We have also released our 10th Quarterly Report, and that 

encapsulates 10 audits, 12 inspections, and the progress on 84 investigations going on there. 

In January 2004, I was appointed the Inspector General of the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. We were assigned then to provide 

oversight of CPA programs and operations with about a dozen staff 

in Baghdad. It was a big job, and it was primarily overseeing the 

Development Fund for Iraq, Iraqi money that the U.N. put under 

CPA stewardship for essentially the restart of that country’s government. 

In October 2004, the Office of the Special Inspector General was 

created, 2 months before the scheduled termination of the CPA Inspector General. It renewed and extended our mandate to cover the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the $21 billion in grants Congress has appropriated for Iraq. Our job is to work on the ground 

in Iraq to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and to 

prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs there. 

SIGIR reports, interestingly, jointly to the Secretary of State and 

the Secretary of Defense, keeping them fully informed about the 

problems and deficiencies in IRRF programs, the need for and 

progress or corrective action, and we also report to six congressional committees. 

13

Of note, there is already response in the Department of Defense 

to our Iraq lessons learned on contracting. The Deputy Secretary 

of Defense has created a task force on Iraq contracting, appointed 

Paul Brinkley Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business 

Transformation to address exactly the issues that SIGIR has identified in this report. 

SIGIR is a temporary organization overseeing a finite set of programs. We will exist until 10 months after 80 percent of the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund is disbursed. 

We have gone beyond the traditional purview of Inspectors General, as I was saying, beyond just issuing report cards, but into 

real-time consultative oversight that, when it identifies a problem, 

seeks to have it fixed well before any written report comes out. 

Most of our reports document the problems that we have detected, but they also show that we have corrected them. Virtually 

all of our findings have been concurred with and in most times resolved by the time the written report comes out. 

The Lessons Learned Initiative arose from the recognition that 

the situation in Iraq must direct improvement within the government system, an adjustment in how we approach contingent operations. Indeed, Secretary Rice said this spring that we must learn 

our lessons from the Iraq experience, and that is exactly the mandate that we are seeking to carry out through this process. 

We began the Lessons Learned Initiative in late 2004. We 

reached out to those who served in Iraq and collected information 

from documents and hundreds of interviews with individuals with 

on-the-ground experience in Iraq. 

Our research also encompasses the audits and inspections and 

investigations of other oversight organizations, other studies, afteraction reports, and interviews by other entities that are conducting 

Lessons Learned programs. 

Each report, like this one, is preceded by a forum which draws 

together the leading experts on the issue, and with respect to the 

contract one, we had two forums. We had one that addressed the 

government experts, those who actually were involved in contracting from the government side, but we also had a second forum 

in this case that pulled together contractors because we wanted to 

get the other side of the story, what was the experience of contractors in working with government contracting personnel. It was very 

insightful and broadened our perspective in this report. 

The report tracks the evolution, as you pointed out, Madam 

Chairman, of the contracting experience from pre-war planning 

through the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, ORHA, their brief existence in the spring of 2003, through 

the succeeding organization, the Coalition Provisional Authority, 

until June 2004, and the experience of contracting since then driven by Joint Contracting Command-Iraq and other contracting entities. 

We examine the creation, deployment, and contracting activity of 

ORHA, how CPA stood up through the appointment of a head of 

contracting activity, how they managed the Development Fund for 

Iraq, how there were several different sets of regulations at work 

in Iraq regarding contracting, and the issues and problems that 

arose from that. 

14

After the termination of CPA in the summer of 2004, we look at 

the problems that were associated with transition to State Department management and how those problems were addressed. And, 

indeed, as I say in the overview of this report, the story of contracting in Iraq reconstruction is a story of progress. There were 

issues unanticipated and the structures left uncreated to address 

the contracting problem that was presented in the summer and fall 

of 2003. The United States responded by developing entities over 

time that addressed it, and contracting is significantly better today 

than it was even just a year ago. 

Our key lessons learned are divided into strategy and planning, 

policy and process. 

From a strategy and planning perspective, SIGIR observes that 

we should include contracting and procurement personnel in all 

planning stages for post-conflict reconstruction operations. The predeployment interagency working groups for Iraq reconstruction did 

not adequately include contracting and procurement personnel. 

The U.S. Government must clearly define, properly allocate, and 

effectively communicate essential contracting and procurement 

roles and responsibilities to all participating agencies. The failure 

to define these roles at the outset of the Iraq contracting experience 

resulted in a fragmented system, foreclosing opportunities for collaboration and coordination in contracting and procurement. 

The U.S. Government must emphasize contracting methods that 

support smaller projects in the early phases of contingency reconstruction programs. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program and similar initiatives proved the value of relatively small, 

rapidly executable projects that meet immediate local needs. 

The U.S. Government must generally avoid using sole-source and 

limited-competition contracting actions. These exceptional contracting actions should be used as necessary, but the emphasis 

must always be on full transparency in contracting and procurement. The use of sole-source and limited competition contracting in 

Iraq should have virtually ceased after hostilities ended. 

In the realm of policy and process, these are the lessons: 

The U.S. Government should establish a single set of simple contracting regulations and procedures that provide uniform direction 

to all contracting personnel in contingency environments. The contracting process in Iraq reconstruction suffered from the variety of 

regulations applied by diverse agencies, which caused inconsistencies and inefficiencies, thus inhibiting management and oversight. 

The U.S. Government must develop deployable contracting and 

procurement systems before mobilizing for post-conflict efforts and 

test them to ensure that they can be effectively implemented in 

contingency operations. Contracting entities in Iraq developed ad 

hoc operating systems and procedures which limited efficiency and 

led to inconsistent documentation, a fact demonstrated repeatedly 

in our audits during CPA. 

The U.S. Government must designate a single unified contracting 

entity to coordinate all contracting activity in theater. A unified 

contract review and approval point would help secure the maintenance of accurate information on all contracts and enhance management and oversight. The fragmented oversight, the fragmented 

15

management really has made it extremely difficult for SIGIR to get 

our arms around all the contracting that is going on. There are so 

many different forms of it that have occurred. 

The U.S. Government must ensure sufficient data collection and 

integration before developing contract or task order requirements. 

This means, know what you are contracting for before you go contract. That is a challenge, admittedly, in a complex situation, but, 

nevertheless, be diligent and close those gaps, those information 

gaps on contracting. The lack of requirements, which is what it is 

called in contracting terms, resulted in waste. 

Let me just divert this discussion just for a moment to say that 

fraud has not been a pervasive component and is not a pervasive 

issue within the U.S. reconstruction program today. Waste is the 

chief issue that I think that these lessons that we need to learn can 

help address. 

Now, there has been egregious fraud, and we continue to pursue 

84 cases, and we will prosecute and ensure the imprisonment of 

those who violated the law. But I want to be sure that the Committee understands that, as a percentage of the total experience in 

Iraq, it is very small. 

The U.S. Government should avoid using expensive design-build 

contracts to execute small projects. It seems self-evident, but it was 

not the experience in Iraq. The use of large construction consortia 

may be appropriate for very extensive projects, but most projects 

were small in Iraq and could have been executed through fixedprice direct contracting. More to the point, those kinds of contracts 

energize the economy in Iraq and build capacity because they put 

Iraqis to work. 

The U.S. Government should use operational assessment teams 

and audit teams to evaluate and provide suggested improvements 

to post-conflict reconstruction contracting processes and systems. 

That is the SIGIR experience. Real-time auditing that provides consultative advice that changes the way things are going on on the 

ground can save taxpayer dollars. That is my experience in Iraq. 

These oversight entities, as I said, should play a consultative role 

because the rapid pace of reconstruction in a contingency operation 

cannot easily accommodate the normal process of 9-month audits. 

By the time such an audit comes out, the situation is completely 

changed on the ground in the contingency situation. 

We have six recommendations, some of which, as Chairman Collins noted, are being addressed in legislation, some of which are 

being addressed by the DOD task force on contracting, some of 

which are being addressed by proposed amendments to the FAR 

under Part 18. Collectively, though, these efforts need to capture 

these recommendations and make them real for contingency planning. 

Recommendation No. 1. Explore the creation of an enhanced 

Contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation, the CFAR. This is the 

first thing that General Casey told me when I met with him last 

November and said we are doing a Lessons Learned Program on 

contracting. He said: Great, we have a problem. We have regulations all over the board, and our contracting officers are operating 

off a whole variety of menus of regulations. We need to consolidate 

them and make it easy for them so that we don’t have this drawnVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
16

out process, confused process pointing to, ultimately, waste. Thus, 

it is No. 1 on our list. 

Although the existing FAR provides avenues for rapid contracting activity, the Iraq reconstruction experience suggests that 

the FAR lacks ease of use. Moreover, promoting greater uniformity 

through a single interagency CFAR, Contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation, could improve contracting and procurement practices in multi-agency contingency operations, which, by definition, 

is a contingency operation. They are always multi-agency. An interagency working group led by DOD should explore developing a single set of simple and accessible contracting procedures for universal 

use in post-conflict reconstruction situations. 

FAR Part 18 as proposed leaves it up to agency and department 

heads to decide what special regulations to use. Thus, I think it is 

a good start, but it needs to push beyond that. There needs to be 

uniformity in situations like Iraq. 

Recommendation No. 2: Pursue the institutionalization of special 

contracting programs. This is CERP. SIGIR has done two audits of 

the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. It is a program 

that pretty much evolved on the ground amongst Army units that 

arrived in the spring and summer of 2003 and saw immediately 

what the needs were in the Iraqi villages that they were occupying, 

and they, up the chain, asked for funds, ‘‘We want to fix this water 

treatment facility, we want to build this school, we want to repair 

this hospital,’’ and that money came down. And you know what? It 

worked. And as a result, then word got up to Ambassador Bremer. 

He created it, formalized it through a CPA organization, giving it 

the name CERP, and eventually almost $2 billion have been spent. 

And our audits show that these represent the most successful programs and, indeed, mind- and heart-changing programs in Iraq. 

They meet the Iraqi needs at the ground level, which is what is 

happening now through the Provincial Reconstruction Development 

Councils and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

Recommendation No. 3: Include contracting staff at all phases of 

planning for contingency operations. Again, should be self-evident. 

Did not happen. Because of the classified nature of the pre-war 

planning, contracting was not deemed important. There may be 

other issues connected to that, too, but as a rule, they should be 

included in all planning from the start for contingency operations. 

Recommendation No. 4: Create a deployable reserve corps of contracting personnel who are trained to execute rapid relief and reconstruction contracting during contingency operations. There has 

been a reduction over the past 10 years in the number of Federal 

contracting officers. I think we paid a price for that in Iraq, the 

lack of personnel available who were up to speed to do the kind of 

work necessary. As part of the State Department’s movement to 

plan better for future contingency operations, contracting should be 

a part of it, and planning for a contracting contingent within the 

civilian reserve corps, which is a recommendation in our human 

capital management report, should be part of that. 

Recommendation No. 5: Develop and implement information systems for managing contracting and procurement in contingency operations. Again, axiomatic perhaps, but not present in the Iraq experience. In fact, our audits revealed that there was no system in 

17

place for managing contracts. It was difficult to account for them. 

We found missing contracts, lack of documentation. That’s improved. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq has helped put order 

on top of that driven by our audits, as we have been told. But that 

should be done before contingency operations begin. 

Finally, pre-compete and pre-qualify a diverse pool of contractors 

with expertise in specialized construction areas. In Iraq, as this report points out, the Project Management Office, when things got 

going, had to wait for the competition on these design-build contracts to be completed, which took months. So they went searching 

for existing IDIQs and found one within the Air Force in San Antonio and began using that to build projects. Well, that kind of ran 

at cross-purposes, when I first learned about it, with what Congress was saying—be sure that all Iraq contracting is properly competed for Iraq. We did an audit of that. There were some issues 

with it. But in order to avert that kind of expediency, there should 

be a set of approved and competed construction entities before contingency operations begin so you do not have to go searching for 

mechanisms on an ad hoc basis. 

I see that my time is almost up. Our Quarterly Report is also out, 

and it addresses a number of issues that are significant and contemporary, and we can address them in the question-and-answer 

period, but the primary issues I will just briefly go over. 

As the year of transition continues—we are past the midpoint—

security continues to be the biggest challenge limiting efforts on all 

sides. Corruption in Iraq is a major issue. When I talk about that, 

I mean within the Iraqi system, and we are working to improve 

that. We have an audit of the anti-corruption program on the U.S. 

side, and the Embassy has concurred with our findings there. 

There needs to be more coordination in transition. Capacity 

building is a continuing issue, and it needs to be pushed. The PRTs 

are pushing that as part of Ambassador Khalilzad’s issue. And to 

me, the most important issue as we move forward in this next 

phase of Iraq reconstruction is to multilateralize the reconstruction 

effort. A compact is under consideration, managed by the U.N., 

that will try and realize the promise of Madrid. We have talked 

about the lack of participation by other donor nations in the reconstruction effort today. Indeed, Madrid promised $13 billion, just 

over $3 billion has come forward, mostly from the Japanese and 

the British. The rest have stood on the sidelines, perhaps because 

of the security and the corruption situation. But, nevertheless, the 

United States has carried the ball on reconstruction, well over $21 

billion. It is time to multilateralize the effort and finally move it 

into what will be the long-term relief and reconstruction in Iraq, 

which must be executed by Iraq with Iraqi funds. 

Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much for your excellent testimony. 

We are now going to begin a round of questions limited to 6 minutes each. I want to inform my colleagues that we will have a second round, so I would appreciate their cooperation in abiding by 

the time limits. 

18

Senator Levin has made a request to me that he be allowed to 

question first, so I am going to accommodate him and defer to him 

for the first round of questioning. 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, thank you very much for 

switching positions with me on this because of a scheduling problem. 

Mr. Bowen, thank you for being here. I raised and pointed out 

a number of questions about Halliburton’s performance in Iraq in 

my opening comment. I made reference to questions such as why 

was the contract, which was supposed to be a temporary bridge 

contract that had a term that was supposed to be very temporary, 

end up with a term of 2 years, with 3 optional years, and a dollar 

value up to $7 billion. What about the prices that Halliburton 

charged for oil that were so much higher than market prices? What 

about the charges of Halliburton for meals that were not actually 

served? Why did Halliburton receive a follow-on contract for the reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry when the Defense Contract 

Audit Agency had warned that the company’s systems were not up 

to the challenge of running two multi-billion-dollar contracts in 

Iraq? Did Halliburton knowingly supply our troops with spoiled 

food, unsafe drinking water? Did they withhold information intentionally from the government? 

Now, those issues are not covered, for the most part, in your report, and I am wondering why. Is there something about your jurisdiction or something else that did not include those issues? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, we do cover the evolution of KBR’s receipt of 

the initial oil task order under LOGCAP. Then the no-bid oil contract and then the competitively bid oil contract for the southern 

region in Iraq. But let me answer the global question you ask about 

jurisdiction, and you are right, SIGIR has oversight of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Most of the money that KBR has received in Iraq has come through MILCON funding under LOGCAP 

or through Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (Task Force RIO). 

Senator LEVIN. And who has jurisdiction for the oversight of 

those particular contracts? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is the Department of Defense Inspector General’s Office. 

Senator LEVIN. And so you did not include those in your report, 

except as you have indicated. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. We did not get into the details of all 

that KBR has been involved in contracting-wise. As I said, we addressed the oil issue, which I think was——

Senator LEVIN. Except for that——

Mr. BOWEN [continuing]. In the report because it was the first 

contracting event in preparation for Iraq reconstruction. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. So it is the DOD IG. Is there any other 

IG that should be reporting to Congress on those other issues? 

Mr. BOWEN. The Defense Contract Audit Agency has been looking fairly regularly at KBR, so any discussion of KBR’s involvement in Iraq should include DCAA. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Thank you. 

Now I would just like to discuss for a moment the so-called reconstruction gap, which you have identified as the gap between 

what the Administration promised to do with the $18 billion alloVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
19

cated for Iraq reconstruction and what it has actually done. I made 

reference to the construction of a prison facility in Nasiriyah, Iraq. 

I went through in my opening statement some of the problems with 

that deal where we were supposed to build a prison for 4,400 inmates that ended up being reduced to one-fifth of that, about 800 

inmates. And yet the original cost for the work, the original estimate of $118 million for that larger prison ended up costing us, 

with the overrun—I believe we have already spent almost $50 million, and it is only one-third completed. So we have ended up 

spending $48 million, according to your report, for less than onethird of the work. 

Now, that is under a definitized contract, which means that we 

are supposed to know specifically what we are getting for what 

price. Is that true? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is actually under the Parsons IDIQ contract, 

which a task quota was issued for that prison that had a budget, 

but it was not definitized. So the costs were not all the way because—indeed, we have an audit in this latest quarterly addressing 

the issue of definitization, and I think it is a significant issue because the view that we uncovered was that definitization was voluntary under IDIQs and not required. And I think that raises real 

questions in a cost-plus environment about waste. 

But I visited the Nasiriyah——

Senator LEVIN. Well, let me finish because I have one minute 

left. 

Why did we tolerate, why did you find that we spent $48 million 

larger than the price of the contract was finally supposed to be for 

one-third of the work? 

Mr. BOWEN. I asked that exact question in May in Nasiriyah of 

the commander of the Gulf Region South for the Corps of Engineers, and I said: You started out to build for 4,400 prisoners, you 

are down to 800, but the cost of the project was not concomitantly 

reduced. And I did not get——

Senator LEVIN. But why did we pay—we ended up agreeing to 

pay for the smaller prison that was supposed to be $45 million, we 

ended up spending $48 million for a third of the work? 

Mr. BOWEN. This is one of the problems associated with cost-plus 

contracts. 

Senator LEVIN. But who is responsible? Who is being held accountable? Did anyone screw up here that should be held accountable? That is the bottom line. 

Mr. BOWEN. The project is managed by the Corps of Engineers 

Gulf Region Division. So if you are looking for a place to apply accountability, that is it. 

However, in examining that issue, the cost of security—when I 

was touring that prison in May, we were walking through it, and 

let me say first off that the prison itself, the construction that I 

saw, and as our inspection of it indicates, is quality, and it will provide a very modern facility, even though much smaller than expected. But the security was extraordinary; we had 15 guards 

walking with us, and there were only two Parsons personnel assigned to oversee that site. 

So I was concerned, and I raised it at the time, that the scope 

of extra costs related to security may be enormous in connection 

20

with that project, which may be emblematic for the entire program; 

and, second, the lack of oversight presence on the ground at sites 

is an issue that we have repeatedly identified. 

Senator LEVIN. Oversight by whom? 

Mr. BOWEN. By the contractor and the Corps of Engineers. But 

in that case, the Corps was present because Nasiriyah is fairly 

close to the headquarters of the Gulf Region South. 

Senator LEVIN. Just to conclude, this is not a question, but if you 

take a look at Modification No. 2 dated March 11, 2005, it did definitize the task order, according to the document that I have. We 

will give you a chance to answer that for the record as to the apparent difference on this. 

Mr. BOWEN. OK. 

Senator LEVIN. Because I am out of my time. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator Warner also is leaving with Senator Levin for the same 

important meeting. I would like to give him one minute, literally. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Yes, one minute. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I recall when we were on the floor in the debate with the 

Armed Services annual bill, I recommended that this Committee 

get into this very important subject. You have the staff, the 

breadth, the historical perspective to look into this type of work. 

And I have had the opportunity now to work with Mr. Bowen, and 

you are just back. The last I saw you, you were on the way over. 

Mr. BOWEN. And I am leaving on Monday again. 

Senator WARNER. Leaving on Monday again. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Well, perhaps between now and Monday we 

could spend a few minutes together by phone. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. I would appreciate that because I am very appreciative of your hard work, and I want to follow it. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Bowen, I want to get back to one of the audits that you just 

referred to that has to do with the pervasive use of what I would 

call a letter contract. I guess you can call it an undefinitized contract, but I think most people know it as a letter contract. And 

those are contracts issued by letter where the terms, important 

terms, such as the complete scope of the work, the cost, the performance standards, the schedule for completion, have not been 

spelled out. 

Now, I understand that letter contracts may be necessary in certain urgent circumstances, but you identified an overuse, it seems 

to me, of letter contracts that ultimately did not have the important information filled in within the amount of time that procurement regulations require. 

You also identified 194 task orders issued under indefinite duration, indefinite quantity contracts valued at some $3.4 billion, 

21

which were not definitized. In other words, those critical details 

were not filled in. 

I am alarmed that so much money could be spent on contracts 

that lack basic terms. It seems to me that opens the door to wasteful spending and to a lack of expectations and understanding on exactly what is going to be delivered. 

What is necessary to fix that problem? Do we need new regulations? Do we need new legislation? What is the answer to the overuse of open-ended letter contracts? 

Mr. BOWEN. First let me address the issue on the ground in Iraq 

today, and I think the problem has been addressed by the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq and Ambassador Khalilzad’s emphasis 

on moving from design-build IDIQs to direct contracting. That shift 

began a year ago and has had enormous effect, particularly over 

the last 6 months. Virtually all contracting has moved to direct 

contracting; it is not being done by the design-build. And, second, 

a lot of the design-build contracts are being canceled and re-bid as 

direct contracts, most of them to Iraqi firms. So as a practical matter on the ground, the contracting managers have addressed the 

issue. 

But you are asking from a planning perspective. How do we adjust the system to avoid repeating this kind of situation, and I 

think it is a careful examination, perhaps a regulatory framework, 

for the appropriate use of cost-plus contracts in contingency situations, whether it be administrative guidance or time-driven legislation that requires definitization regardless of situation by a certain 

date. I don’t know the precise solution, but you put your finger on 

the problem, and that is, the use of cost-plus contracts means that 

the taxpayer pays for everything. Successes, failures, whatever 

happens in the duration of that cost-plus contract is billed, and 

there is not a legal basis for challenging it. 

Definitization is supposed to help give notice to managers about 

how much money is going to be needed. Cost to complete, which 

you asked for in the legislation and which we did three audits on 

and it never really was complied with, is the other regulatory tool 

to try to control spending under cost-plus contracts. So cost-to-complete and requiring definitization and enforcing it, really, I think 

are the keystones. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I mentioned in my opening statement my concern about the enormous cost overruns and schedule 

delays for completing the children’s hospital in Basrah. Congress 

specifically authorized $50 million for this project. It is way over 

cost. It is way behind schedule. There is also, though, a disturbing 

issue about information related to the cost overruns being reported 

in an accurate and timely way to Congress. 

In your judgment, was there a deliberate effort by USAID to conceal the extent of the cost overruns? 

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t think there was—I can’t speak to the motivations. What I can tell you is that in the Section 2207 Report, which 

is the Quarterly Report due to Congress about progress on Iraq reconstruction projects, there was insufficient reporting about overhead costs associated with the Basrah Children’s Hospital that 

failed to notify you of the actual cost of the project. 

22

Second, there was insufficient reporting as there should have 

been, in that Quarterly Report to you, about delays. The project was supposed to have cost $50 million and should have been done 

last December. It is going to cost $150 million and will not be done 

until a year from today. We did not find out about that until our 

audit. 

Chairman COLLINS. And it is very difficult for us to exercise oversight if accounting games are being played and if there is not information that is accurate and timely. 

Senator COBURN. Madam Chairman, will we have an opportunity 

to submit questions for the record? 

Chairman COLLINS. Absolutely. 

Senator COBURN. I have to leave, and so I will submit my questions to the record. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Bowen, there have been some improvements in Iraq’s reconstruction. For example, outputs in electricity have risen above prewar levels for the first time in a year. But much work remains to 

be done. Your July 2006 report notes that 178 projects within the 

electricity sector have not been started, even though Congress appropriated more than $4.2 billion of the IRRF funds to the sector. 

This 30 percent gap represents the largest percentage of projects 

not started for all of Iraq’s critical infrastructures. 

Why is there a delay in implementing projects and programs for 

the electricity sector? And are these delays caused by security 

issues or mismanagement issues? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think security issues certainly affect everything 

that goes on in Iraq and have accounted for the delays. But the 

other issues I don’t think are mismanagement, I think that as the 

move toward direct contracting has developed away from designbuild contracting, the contracting entities in Iraq and the project 

contracting office that manages this sector must identify Iraqi 

firms that can perform contracts, and that process has taken time. 

Moreover, there is a schedule of programs that are spaced out 

over time to coordinate so that different pieces of the electrical system that are being constructed are produced and connect up. That 

has been a problem in our oversight, as you know. For instance, 

in Basrah we had inspections of five transfer substations that were 

done, were perfectly well done, but the connecting wires were not 

part of the project so they are not providing electricity to the citizens of Basrah. 

I think that the electrical sector is trying to respond to that need 

for coordination and, thus, carefully reviewing the projects ahead 

to ensure that the grid gets the most benefit. 

Senator AKAKA. What improvements will we see in the electrical 

infrastructure throughout Iraq as the remaining $2 billion of 

IRRF–2 is applied? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, there are some significant generation and 

transmission projects that will come online over this quarter. The 

al-Dura project will be completed, and that will put additional 

megawatts on the grid. As long as infrastructure security is maintained—and we have a classified audit we produced this quarter 

that addresses this issue and notes progress—then I think we can 

23

expect the output on the grid to continue to stay above pre-war levels. But I say as a cautionary note, the lack of security last year 

caused it to drop below and stay below pre-war levels for over a 

year. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I believe one of the major problems 

with assessing the progress of reconstruction in Iraq is that there 

is no overall strategy. There is no big picture that links reconstruction efforts with counterinsurgency efforts, and despite the Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, many strategic 

questions remain. 

How confident are you that the overall reconstruction strategy 

has improved the two critical areas of security and infrastructure 

in Iraq? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think the strategy has significantly improved 

under Ambassador Khalilzad’s leadership. Most importantly is the 

development of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which advise 

Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils, Iraqis at the local 

level that make decisions about what projects need to get done. 

That is a process that mirrors, I think, the CERP program and is 

aimed at winning hearts and minds, which will have a pacifying effect in the long term and ultimately energize local economies. 

Senator AKAKA. Reconstruction programs and projects will fail 

unless the Iraqi Government can sustain these programs without 

continued American technical assistance and funding. Your new report discusses how the sustainment and transfer of critical reconstruction programs and projects remains a challenge for the new 

Iraqi Government. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Senator AKAKA. An earlier SIGIR report found no overall strategic plan for turning over control to the Iraqi Government. What 

are the key issues that are standing in the way of transferring so 

many reconstruction programs? 

Mr. BOWEN. Sustainment is an enormous issue. It is one that 

SIGIR has been focusing on since our October report of last year. 

The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office in the Embassy responded to that audit by creating a Sustainment Office. Sustainment is now discussed at every strategy meeting. There is a working group that addresses sustainment every week. So the issue is 

on the front burner. It is a matter of funding and capacity building—funding to ensure that what the United States has provided 

continues to operate after those assets are transferred, and capacity building which seeks to ensure that Iraqis are able to operate 

that new infrastructure. 

Our review of the advanced first responders network in this 

Quarterly Report is a caveat, a cautionary tale about the failure to 

ensure sustainment. That system is not working. It is too complicated really for the Iraqis to operate, and it requires more funds 

than they have budgeted to continue. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I have been thinking about the big picture here, and if you go 

back in our history, I don’t know that we ever had the kind of postconflict challenges that we have had in Iraq. If you go back maybe 

24

to the Second World War, the Marshall Plan, and then I don’t 

think we had anything up until this. Not even Afghanistan is like 

what we have in Iraq. 

When I think back to when I was governor of Ohio, there was 

very careful deliberation prior to the Persian Gulf War. We took a 

lot of time, figured it out, trained the forces, tried to anticipate the 

future. But there was not any contemplation at the time of reconstruction of Baghdad because the decision was made that we were 

not going to go into Baghdad. 

I have to believe that from a historical point of view, this miscalculation or failure to calculate the post-conflict challenges is one 

that will go down as a major mistake. I cannot help but think, 

Madam Chairman, that before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member, we had witness after witness talking about what are you going to do after you win the war. If you 

really think about it, somebody should have put a sign up, ‘‘Stop, 

look, and listen,’’ and started thinking about all of these things 

that we are now dealing with today. In other words, we really did 

not properly plan and prepare for Iraq’s needs: Security, infrastructure, the utilities, water, sewer, electricity, and general governance. 

We are paying the price for it today. Hopefully, should this occur 

in the future, we will be better prepared. 

Obviously we did not have the right people with the right knowledge and skills at the right place and at the right time. That gets 

back into human capital again, which is something that I have 

been focused on for the last 8 years. We now know that we did not 

have the right people on board after this happened. 

What is the status of the workforce today, the procurement and 

the contracting staff? 

For example, what is the longevity of somebody that is over there 

doing this kind of work? 

What kind of help are we giving to the Iraqi Government? Somebody asked the question: Are we letting them take over? Well, the 

main thing is are they competent to take over. 

I will never forget when I became mayor of Cleveland, we started 

looking at contracting and some management concerns. We had 

commissioners that did not have the necessary skills to get the job 

done, so we brought in the private sector to provide training. My 

main concern is that reconstruction has to start providing more 

electricity, more water, more sewers, more hospitals, and more 

schools. Otherwise, the local Iraqis are just going to throw up their 

hands and lose faith in our efforts. 

What is the status of the contracting workforce in Iraq and the 

training for these individuals? 

Mr. BOWEN. Good question, Senator Voinovich. We are several 

orders of magnitude better than we were 2 years ago. The turnover 

issue is still there, but it was uncontrolled 2 years ago. Now we 

have a Joint Contracting Command-Iraq. We have 70 contracting 

officers working in there, at least. We had three working in CPA’s 

head of contracting office. 

Senator VOINOVICH. What are the incentives for them to continue 

in their job? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, most of them are military, and there has been 

a move by the commander of JCC–I to achieve more uniformity. 

25

But you are right, the problem with turnover is still there. But 

back 2 years ago, the Air Force was there for 2 to 3 months, the 

Navy for 4 to 6 months, the Marines for 6 months or a year, and 

the Army. So there was a lack of uniformity. There was a constant 

turnover and, thus, there were contracts that were left unmanaged, 

as our audits revealed. 

Our study on ‘‘Lessons in Human Capital Management,’’ released 

in January of this year, tells this unfortunate story in detail. But 

it also acknowledges the fact that under JCC–I, Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq, the issue has been recognized and addressed. 

There is now training that is effective. Indeed, the commander of 

JCC–I now gives this report to every new contracting officer who 

comes into the country so they understand what came before. 

There is strategic planning going on for it, and there is sufficient 

predecessor/successor handoff to ensure that the gaps in contracting oversight don’t recur. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks, 

Mr. Bowen, for your comments and your work. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is very important that we recognize 

what is taking place there, and though you said there is not too 

much fraud, the fact is there is plenty of waste. I learned something when I was but a buck private in the Army and I had KP 

on a train, and as we neared our destination—this was in America. 

As we neared our destination, the cook said, ‘‘OK, now throw everything overboard.‘‘

Well, I came from a poor family, and I was unaccustomed to 

throwing out jars of pickles, or whatever it was, cans of pineapple. 

So I said, ‘‘Sarge, why are we doing this?’’ He said, ‘‘Because if we 

don’t get rid of it now, when we put in our next order, we’re not 

going to get as much as we got this time.’’ So I think that attitude 

still exists, and it is too bad. 

How many permanent staff members does DOD Inspector General have in Iraq? 

Mr. BOWEN. Right now, none. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Zero? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. I talked to the Acting DOD IG yesterday, and he is in the process of deploying some auditors. We have 

made space for them in the Embassy, and I expect their arrival 

soon. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Does it surprise you that they do not have 

any personnel there on scene? You described it as there is nothing 

like being there to understand what is taking place? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think I welcome their presence in the oversight effort. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. When you audited the Halliburton subsidiary, KBR’s use of government property vehicles, generators, 

under its contract, could they account for all the government property that they had? 

Mr. BOWEN. No, they didn’t. Our audit pointed out—and we did 

several audits of KBR’s support to CPA, in part of our mission as 

CPA IG, and found that they could not account for over a third of 

26

the property that they had on their books for CPA, including a generator, an expensive power generator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I am glad they did not work for me when 

I was in the industrial world. 

Did your audits find missing property and problems that DOD 

did not identify in its investigations? 

Mr. BOWEN. You are referring to the Kuwaiti Hilton issue or the 

property accountability issue? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The property accountability issue. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, again, we just focused on CPA, which is a 

small fraction of the LOGCAP support in Iraq. And we did two audits of that. We did an audit of property accountability in Baghdad, 

property accountability in Kuwait. We did an audit of the support 

services to the Kuwaiti Hilton, and we did an audit of Task Order 

44, which was——

Senator LAUTENBERG. What did you find? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, we found them wanting in every case—shortfalls, missing property. The Kuwaiti Hilton story is an issue. When 

I first visited Iraq—this is about being on the ground, as you saw 

in your shipboard experience. When I arrived at the Kuwaiti Hilton 

and I looked around and I saw how many things were free—free 

laundry, the food was free, and it was being given to contractors 

and others—it raised concerns. So I immediately got with my Director of Audit and said we need to review this, it does not seem 

appropriate. Indeed, our audits held them accountable on that 

front, and during the next visit, they were no longer free. There 

were signs up that said, ‘‘Unless you qualify, you do not get this 

service.’’

Senator LAUTENBERG. In your third audit of Halliburton’s 

LOGCAP contract, you found this and said, ‘‘During the initiation 

of our field work, we found we could not effectively address the 

overall audit objective due to the weaknesses in the KBR cost reporting process.’’ You used plain English, KBR, accounting system 

so bad you were not able to do an audit, you did not have the basic 

information that you needed to do an audit? 

Mr. BOWEN. That was a problem with KBR in several areas in 

Iraq that they had the same issue with respect to their southern 

oil contract. Cost accounting procedures were inadequate, and they 

were put on notice by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. For a 

full report on that, I would direct you to the DCAA as they have 

done a fairly extensive review of KBR’s cost accounting procedures 

and have documented their shortfalls. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Other than outrage, it is hard to understand what it is that would have people so careless with the resources that the American taxpayers provide, soldiers putting their 

lives on the line, all kinds of awful occurrences taking place there, 

and these folks not worried enough about how they are spending 

the money to make it look like they are part of this serious effort. 

What proportion of Halliburton’s more than $16 billion in contracts in Iraq have you examined? 

Mr. BOWEN. We only look at the part that falls under the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund. You talked about four audits we 

did of KBR during CPA. That was the LOGCAP support. We are 

currently performing an audit of their support to the Department 

27

of State, Task Order 130—in other words, the follow-on to Task 

Order 144, and that was done at the request of Ambassador Engle, 

who was Director of Management at the Embassy and was very 

concerned and raised those concerns to me directly about cost 

issues related to KBR’s provision of services to the Embassy. We 

will have that report out in the next quarterly. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So what portion do you think you had a chance to look at, what portion of the $16 billion worth of work? 

Mr. BOWEN. I will have to get back to you on a percentage number, but as I said most of the KBR dollars are MILCON or 

LOGCAP money, and they fall under the ambit of the DOD IG or 

DCAA. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, we have more questions, and I would ask that we keep the record open long enough 

for us to submit those questions in writing. 

Chairman COLLINS. The record will remain open for 15 days for 

the submission of any additional questions. In addition, we are 

going to do a second round of questions, as I explained earlier. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Dayton. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, Mr. Inspector General, I want to say that for your 

staff to go even once outside of the Green Zone, much less 28 times, 

to perform on-site audits takes a lot of courage and a lot of dedication, and to you and to all of them, I would say I really respect that 

enormously, having been in Iraq myself and recognizing the real 

risks that are involved in that. Thank you. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DAYTON. You said at the beginning of your remarks that 

oversight works, and as a former State auditor, I agree with you 

about that. My father said that in business you get what you inspect, not what you expect, and that is true in other aspects of life, 

too. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Senator DAYTON. So I am taken by what you just said, and I 

want to ask if you would clarify this because I was just returning 

from another hearing when Senator Lautenberg asked you are 

there any—is this correct?—Department of Defense auditors currently in Iraq auditing projects, and you said none. Could you clarify what——

Mr. BOWEN. DOD IG is what I said. 

Senator DAYTON. OK. 

Mr. BOWEN. The Department of Defense has more auditing entities. There are and there have been since the beginning of the program Defense Contract Auditing Agency auditors on the ground in 

Baghdad and other places across Iraq. 

Senator DAYTON. Do you believe that the oversight—you are 

issuing this report today. These contracts from their inception have 

been underway for almost 3 years now, various lengths of time but 

some of them. Do you believe that there has been proper oversight—setting aside your work—has there been proper oversight 

into these projects on an ongoing basis? What is being performed, 

the work being performed on a daily basis? What quality of work 

is being performed? 

28

Let me just qualify it. Some of these overcharges or some of 

these statements made about shoddy work, the lack of contractors 

and subcontractors, employees actually on site performing work, 

the number of meals that supposedly have not been provided, 

whatever, I mean for months on a scale that it would seem that 

anybody who is providing proper, ongoing supervision would be 

aware of that. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, we know about the overcharge for meals, we 

know about the overcharge for fuel because of oversight on the 

ground in Iraq. DCAA discovered——

Senator DAYTON. But how long has it been going on before that 

oversight either occurs or at least before these reports are brought 

to light and we find out about them? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, those two issues were discovered early on, but 

the point you are making is beyond that, what has not been uncovered, and I think that the oversight presence, an aggressive oversight presence on the ground has a twofold effect: One, it deters 

wrongful conduct. I remember when I first showed up in Iraq, and 

I was walking down the halls of the Embassy, just appointed, and 

walking behind somebody, and they were talking about something. 

I did not hear what they were talking about, but I heard this sentence: ‘‘We cannot do that anymore; the Inspector General is here.’’ 

And that told me that I had a big job ahead of me. And I think 

that is true. 

The point is this: It has deterrent effect. And, therefore, I am not 

here to point fingers at any oversight entity. I am here to say that 

oversight works, and it works when it shows up. 

Senator DAYTON. With all due respect, I agree with everything 

you have just said, but one of the problems I think exists because 

you and your counterparts are unwilling to point fingers at any 

other oversight entity. I respectfully disagree with what you said 

earlier about the extent of sufficient oversight on these projects. 

Again, I do not have time to put into these comments all of the 

back-up information that has come to light, where these e-mails 

and reports and other whistleblowers, employees of these companies on site are aware of these serious deficiencies: Hospitals not 

being built, roofs not being repaired, water leaking in, incubators 

from the 1970s provided, the lack of fire codes, and the like. And 

this is not just one instance. These are repeated. And as I said earlier, this puts our troops at greater risk, no question about it, not 

to mention if they are using water for washing or whatever purposes that is contaminated by raw sewage dumped in less than 2 

miles upstream, and they are not even told about it, even after 

they come back to the United States. These matters are not 

brought to light. Somebody is looking the other way. Somebody either does not know and should know, someone knows and does not 

care, or somebody is not performing their responsibilities. And then 

everybody—by the time the reports come out, months or even years 

have gone by. Some of the perpetrators, I think some of the corporate entities are starting to be held accountable, but very little 

accountability by the Department of Defense. 

Again, I am not saying you, but I am saying those who are responsible for administering these contracts, for standing up to 

these companies, I think some of this has been made more probVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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lematic by the fact that Halliburton is a major contractor and the 

Vice President used to be the CEO. I do not blame the Vice President for the conduct of Halliburton after he left that position. The 

chief executive and the other executive members and the board of 

Halliburton are responsible for the company after that time. And 

they are not the only perpetrators—Bechtel, Parsons, whoever else. 

But they have not been held accountable, and not only have they 

not been held accountable, they get another sole-source contract, or 

they just go on and contract somewhere else in the Department of 

Defense. 

There is not nearly enough accountability. There is very little 

consequence other than maybe a bad story that somebody hires a 

public relations outfit or internally deals with, and then that 

passes. And it is just more business as usual. And it is endemic 

throughout the whole system, and it is even more apparent in a 

place like Iraq, and it is even more consequential in a place like 

Iraq because those failures count and are used against our own 

best efforts there. 

It is frustrating because it is very hard to manage an Executive 

Branch agency from the Legislative Branch. I have been in Executive Branch agencies in State and local government. I have been 

in the Legislative Branch now here in Congress. It is very hard for 

us to do anything more than appropriate money, hold oversight 

hearings, which we properly should, but the day-after-day responsibility is in the Executive Branch, and these failures are so egregious and so ongoing and so consequential in their magnitude in 

dollars and in effects and in human lives that it is a national disgrace. And, meanwhile, things will just continue as normal tomorrow. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Bowen thank you for being with us today. 

Just initially just a question about how often do you go to Iraq? 

When you are there, what do you do? Who do you meet with? 

Mr. BOWEN. I go on my 13th trip this Monday. My rhythm currently is to go every third month, although this trip will be for 7 

weeks. I meet with senior leadership—Ambassador Khalilzad; General Casey, Commander of MNF–I; General McCoy, Commander of 

the Gulf Region Division; and then down to their deputies; the 

Deputy Chief of Mission, Ambassador Speckhard; the Director of 

the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Ambassador Saloom, 

whom I have been dealing with regularly on the phone and I think 

is doing a great job in his new appointment. And then I go down 

and I meet with each sector, the contractors that are managing oil 

and gas, water facilities, health, and spend hours with them debriefing. And I have been doing those debriefings every visit now 

for over a year. And that has provided the meat for Section 2 in 

this report. Section 2 of our Quarterly Report gives a detailed 

breakdown of how taxpayer dollars are being spent in Iraq. Project 

by project, program by program, which is what the statute that you 

all have directed us to do provides. 

And then I travel outside the wire, and I visit sites. I visited the 

Nasiriyah prison, as I said, this last quarter. I visited the Erbil 

30

water treatment plant. I visited the Basrah airport, which we report on in this report as well. And I will be doing the same thing 

this trip, making trips out with my inspectors to see what we have 

actually gotten for our investment in Iraq reconstruction. 

Senator CARPER. When you look at the areas we have been investing our money in, a lot of it, and you feel that the money has 

been especially well invested, what are some of those areas? And 

when you look at some of our investments where we are not getting 

what we ought to be getting, what might they be? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think the schools, the school program has been 

very effective. Thousands of schools have been built. The vaccination program, extremely successful. USAID’s vaccination program 

has eliminated polio and other serious infectious diseases from 

Iraq, period. And I think that we see progress at the airports. Five 

airports are now functioning, and they were not at the end of the 

war. We have a lot of facilities that are ready to operate if security 

would permit. There are around 90 railway stations refurbished, 25 

engines ready to work, but they are not running because of the security situation. 

There have been shortfalls in health care. The primary health 

care clinic program is the most notorious among them. The hospital 

program is not much more successful, and the prison program. 

Those are all Parsons’ projects. It is my intent to do an audit of 

all of Parsons’ work in Iraq and provide a listing of what they have 

produced, how much it cost, what the value of what they have produced is, and what the delta is. 

Senator CARPER. Would you talk with us a little bit about the 

part of your operation that touches on the development of Iraq’s oil 

capabilities and their ability to ship oil around the world and sell 

it? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, we did an audit this quarter of infrastructure 

security, an issue we raised in January as a significant challenge 

to the oil sector. Last year, attacks on the pipelines accounted for 

the drop of production below pre-war levels. They have been below 

pre-war for over a year until they rose above them, 2.5 million barrels per day in mid-June. It was down to 1.7 million in January. 

Senator CARPER. What is the potential? Is it roughly twice that? 

Mr. BOWEN. Potential capacity? I will have to get back to you on 

the exact number for that, but it is much higher. But exports have 

resumed out of the northern pipeline, which has been the subject 

of many attacks, to Turkey, and that accounts for the increase in 

revenue into the treasury, which is essential because the Iraqis ultimately, as I said earlier, must fund and execute the ultimate relief and reconstruction of their own country. 

Our program, the U.S. program, has gotten them off to a good 

start. The multilateral phase, which is just beginning, will be a 

bridge to the phase that must be Iraqi driven. 

Senator CARPER. Initially, I had heard that a big part of the 

problem with the inability to produce oil to their capacity was laid 

at the feet of those who were sabotaging the pipelines. More recently, I have read that the problem is as much corruption and 

thievery as sabotage. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, you are exactly right. Corruption in Iraq, as 

we point out in this Quarterly Report, is endemic. We call it a panVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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demic. And, indeed, the focus of it has been primarily in the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Oil is 

beset by smuggling problems and by sheer thievery. 

The new Minister of Oil is, I am told, a man of integrity and a 

man who recognizes the problem. The Deputy Prime Minister, 

Barham Saleh, recognizes the problem. The Prime Minister Maliki 

recognizes the problem. There are efforts to build institutions to 

fight that problem. The Minister of Oil IG has issued his own report giving us all the details of it. 

So I think those are positives that, in light of the big negative 

of corruption, there is some fighting going on. 

Senator CARPER. I don’t mean to be rude in interrupting, but it 

seems like we have a pretty good idea what the problem is. Whose 

job is it to fix it? 

Mr. BOWEN. Our audit of the anti-corruption effort in Iraq has 

found it wanting. It is my expectation that the Embassy’s concurrence with our findings will mean there will be more funding to 

bolster and train Iraqis to fight corruption. 

Senator CARPER. Who is tasked with fixing this problem, on our 

side or on the Iraqi side? 

Mr. BOWEN. It is a joint effort. I mean, the Iraqis ultimately have 

to fight the battle. It is our task to teach them how. 

Senator CARPER. Yes, but who? Who is tasked with that responsibility on our side and on the Iraqi side? 

Mr. BOWEN. The anti-corruption working group in the Embassy 

is a working group comprised of representatives from all agencies 

operating in Iraq. On the Iraqi side, it is the Commissioner on Public Integrity. It is the Board of Supreme Audit, the President of the 

Board of Supreme Audit, and it is 29 Inspectors General. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Madam Chairman, thanks very much. 

I have other questions I would like to submit for the record, if I 

might. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

In your report, you talk about the reconstruction gap. You have 

just outlined several successes, but there are also many projects 

that are left unfinished in this year of transition. You state in one 

of your audits, you concluded that, ‘‘There is no overall strategic 

plan for transitioning the reconstruction projects and assets to the 

Iraqi Government.‘‘

Now, this would be less of a problem if we did not have the reconstruction gap, if the projects that had been contracted for actually had been brought to completion before the handover. 

What do you believe are the potential consequences of a lack of 

a plan for transitioning these projects? 

Mr. BOWEN. There are three I can think of right off the bat. One 

is breakdown. The lack of a coordinated plan to ensure operations 

and maintenance training and funding for the assets we are handing over means that they will not operate as expected or needed for 

Iraq’s infrastructure. 

Two, the lack of a plan means there are pieces within that infrastructure that need to be there that are missing, caused by the reconstruction gap, and that means that the outputs on the infraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Aug 27, 2007 Jkt 029761 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\29761.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
32

structure, particularly in electricity and oil, will be less than optimal. 

And, three, the breakdown, the lack of connectivity, the lack of 

strategic connectivity within infrastructure planning means more 

money will have to be invested. That means donor money, and that 

means perhaps U.S. funding as part of the donor plan, and ultimately Iraqi funds to fix—to pay for shortfalls in planning. 

Chairman COLLINS. To get to an issue that several of us have 

mentioned, whose job was it to come up with a strategic plan to 

guide the transitioning of these half-finished projects? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, the Ambassador has the lead under NSPD–36 

for all Iraq reconstruction planning, but it is a collective effort 

among the DOD, the Corps of Engineers, USAID, the Department 

of State, and other participating entities, as well as the contractors, 

to draw together all the issues connected to transition and develop 

a strategic plan that pushes them forward. 

Chairman COLLINS. I guess the reason that many of us keep asking you who is accountable, who is going to fix the problem, is you 

have identified some very serious problems, ranging from inadequate planning to wasteful spending. And our frustration is that 

we do not know who is going to fix those problems, who is going 

to hold contractors accountable if they have fallen down on the job, 

who is going to ensure this does not happen again, who is going 

to take the remedial steps that your reports outline. 

It is a frustration on our part because you have done a great job 

identifying the problems, but that does not fix anything. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, part of our effort is to apply lessons learned 

in real time, and this is a good area where it is happening. We 

have raised this issue in the course of performing this audit, and 

as a result, there is a working group meeting weekly and now coordinating on asset transfer, specifically just on this issue, Asset 

Transfer Working Group, to address sustainment and O&M costs. 

There is a real challenge on Iraqi capacity. The capacity within 

ministries is very inconsistent. The Oil Ministry has more capacity 

over time, but Health much less, just as an example. And so there 

is no one-size-fits-all solution. What needs to be done is the analysis to recognize which area needs focused effort to ensure 

sustainment. 

Chairman COLLINS. Let me turn to a specific case. I mentioned 

in my opening statement my concern that there is $1.7 billion left 

that, if it is not obligated by September 30, within the next 2 

months, will expire. It will revert to the Treasury. That is going to 

produce a use-it-or-lose-it mentality, a rush to obligate the funds in 

ways that may not be wise, or a rush to obligate the funds for 

projects knowing that those are not really the projects the money 

is going to be used for ultimately because the money can be reobligated later. But the whole focus is to prevent this money from lapsing. 

You have raised a red flag about that. I am grateful that you 

have. But who is going to ensure that nearly $2 billion is not 

frittered away in an attempt to prevent the money from expiring? 

Who are you going to be working with or sharing your concerns 

with to make sure that does not happen? 

33

Mr. BOWEN. We already have shared our concerns with the Commander of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq, who has primary 

responsibility for managing this contracting process. He is aware of 

the issue, and he is aware of our concerns and of our intent to 

audit the issue down the road. So I expect that will serve—I hope 

it serves as an appropriate deterrent or motivating factor in ensuring that your worries are not realized. 

Chairman COLLINS. And you will continue to audit this money as 

well? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, we will. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Bowen, we had a DPC hearing last year, and we heard testimony from a former Halliburton employee, Rory Mayberry, and he 

said that when he was going to talk to auditors, he was threatened 

that he should not do it, and as a result of his challenge, he was 

sent to another location under fire in Fallujah. 

Have you heard anything that says that people were asked, prohibited, directed not to talk to you? 

Mr. BOWEN. No, we haven’t, and indeed we have talked to whistleblowers specifically from KBR, and we have ongoing cases. Beyond that I cannot say anything. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But the guy in the hall who let you know 

that the fox was in the chicken coop had to kind of behave a little 

bit differently. 

Mr. BOWEN. I think oversight provides deterrence. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I agree with you. Do you think the fact 

that the LOGCAP contract was cost-plus contributed to KBR’s lax 

attitude toward controlling costs? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think the cost-plus issue needs review, not just in 

the context of LOGCAP but as a general policy matter. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator Dayton mentioned some overcharges at the Kuwait Hilton. What did your audit find that they 

overcharged for such things, let’s say for laundry? If controlling 

costs were not an issue at all, would Halliburton have used the expensive hotel laundry services, do you think? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I cannot speculate what they might have done. 

What I can tell you is that when I saw what I believed was inappropriate service provision, I ordered an audit, and that audit, I 

think, provided the appropriate deterrence. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. How egregious was it? Just give us a clue 

on what kind of advantage was being taken advantage of. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, the free laundry services, the food provision 

was generally free, and that changed after our audit. Certain services were removed, and regulations were put in place, and in my 

subsequent visits, I was satisfied that corrective action was appropriate. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Services you say were free, but they were 

paid for by somebody. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is correct. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And there were significant overcharges in 

your review, enough that you commented on them. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

34

Senator LAUTENBERG. And I asked for any recall that you might 

have had. What was the size of the overcharge? 

Mr. BOWEN. I will have to give you that answer for the record 

to give you details on the numbers. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is a small issue, but I think it is demonstrative of what was taking place. 

You did some work overseeing KBR’s rebuilding of the Al Fatah 

oil pipeline project under the Tigris River. What happened, briefly, 

on that project? 

Mr. BOWEN. That was an attempt to—at the Al Fatah crossing, 

which is a critical oil and gas node in Iraq, 13 pipelines crossed 

there going from Bayji to Baghdad to Turkey. Some are export 

pipelines; some are refined fuel pipelines; some are crude pipelines. 

So it is just a critical—perhaps the most critical node in Iraq. 

There was a bridge actually that was taken out during the war. 

One of the pipelines was attached underneath it. That pipeline had 

to be rebuilt. The proposal was to drill under the river and put that 

in, rather than separate the river as normally done and lay it. 

Because of the consistency of the soil, that became virtually impossible to do. The point you are alluding to, though, is that KBR 

was advised by its subcontractor not to pursue that approach because of the sandy soil issue, and a lot of money was wasted while 

the horizontal drilling project was pursued anyway. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So how much money was thrown away as 

a result of that misadventure? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I will have to give you that exact number for 

the record, but it was millions of dollars that was wasted on the 

horizontal drilling part of the program until finally it was recompeted or actually the project was given over to Parsons International Joint Venture, and they proceeded to pursue the pipeline 

laying in the manner that I described earlier. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Did you see any evidence that DOD paid 

Halliburton, KBR, or other contractors for work that was not done? 

Mr. BOWEN. We do not look at KBR DOD contracts. We only look 

at IRRF contracting, and so I don’t have any answers for you on 

the DOD KBR LOGCAP. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Any way you could get that information 

for us, or is that just out of province? 

Mr. BOWEN. That would be the Defense Contract Audit Agency, 

I think, would have answers on that matter, and the Department 

of Defense IG has purview of it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Bowen, I want to thank you very much 

for the sacrifice that you have made to serve your country. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And thanks to your family for the sacrifice 

they make so you can do this job. It is important that we restore 

the American people’s confidence in our mission in Iraq, and I really believe that reconstruction of the infrastructure there may be 

more important than anything else. 

Does Prime Minister Maliki understand how important this is 

substantively and politically for a successful future? 

35

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir, I believe he does. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How about the people that he has hired to 

do the work? Are they competent? 

Mr. BOWEN. I cannot give a general answer to that. I can tell you 

that the Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh is very competent 

and comprehends these issues in detail. 

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the things that I am concerned about, 

and you are, is the high turnover of the American civilian workforce in Iraq. I would like to have for the record the number of people that we have there and how long they have been there. I also 

would be interested to know your suggestions on what might be 

done to provide some stability within that workforce. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. We have some recommendations in our 

Human Capital Management Lessons Learned report. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Another concern I have is funding. We were 

led to believe that we were going to get financial help from some 

of our allies for reconstruction. I think that if you look back to 

Desert Storm, about 80 percent of that war was paid for by our allies, and during this conflict we are picking up almost the entire 

tab. What is the status of financial commitments from other countries for reconstruction? Are there any joint projects with our allies 

underway? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. Multilateralizing the reconstruction process is 

essential to the future success of Iraq. Getting the political and economic buy-in of a broad scope of donor nations will move the country forward, the fledgling democracy forward. 

The promise of Madrid 2003 has not been realized by any 

stretch—$13 billion was pledged; between $3 and $4 billion has 

come forward. 

The U.S. pledge, by the way, was our IRRF, and we have come 

fully forward with that, of course, as we have been talking about. 

The compact, which is under discussion now, is the key to the 

multilateral phase, and it is also essential to realizing the promise 

of Madrid and ultimately achieving that international political and 

economic buy-in. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would say that their performance based on 

the pledge and what they have done is not that encouraging. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is true. The security situation and the corruption situation would probably account for the disinclination of 

donor nations to have advanced more funds than they have to date. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Madam Chairman, I recall that when we 

provided the money for Iraq reconstruction, we are supposed to get 

reports about the participation of our allies. Have we ever gotten 

those reports, do you know? 

Chairman COLLINS. I don’t know. 

Mr. BOWEN. There is in this Quarterly Report a detailed explication of how donor nations have contributed or not contributed to 

the program. 

Senator VOINOVICH. What is the State Department doing to encourage our allies to fulfill their promise? 

Mr. BOWEN. The compact for the future of Iraq is the initiative 

that is driving that issue. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Are you making any progress? 

36

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir, they are. It is an issue that has been ongoing since the spring, and I think we will be seeing reports of 

progress on that front soon. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You were saying that the State Department 

ought to have a deployable reserve corps of contracting personnel 

trained to execute reconstruction contracting and contingency operations. Do you want to elaborate that? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it was not so much the State Department having—the State Department has a new Office of Stability and Reconstruction, and they, along with DOD, are taking the lead in systemic adjustments to the U.S. Government to prepare for future 

contingency operations. Part of that planning must include contracting. 

Our Lessons Learned Report on Human Capital Management 

proposed this civilian reserve corps. This report says, as a part of 

that civilian reserve corps, there should be a contingent of contracting officers. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, it is tough to get them. 

Mr. BOWEN. It is. Yes, sir. The reality is that the government has 

reduced the number of contracting officers over the last 10 years, 

and to a certain extent, we are suffering the consequences of that, 

both in Iraq and in the Gulf Coast. 

Senator VOINOVICH. It gets back to the nondefense discretionary 

budget. If you look at some of the budgets of the departments, they 

are getting less money than they got last year and being asked to 

do more. It just does not make any sense at all. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Dayton. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Again, I want 

to thank you for holding this very important hearing, and I want 

to follow up on your line of inquiry, which I think is a very important one, about how do we go forward and make these efforts more 

effective. How do we avoid this catch-22 situation where, if we turn 

more of the responsibility, as we must and should have been able 

to do already, to the Iraqi Government, and they—you talk about 

the rampant corruption, which others have also cited within the 

government, the Iraqi subcontractors, and the like. And they mismanage these projects as badly or even worse than they have been 

heretofore, so the projects don’t forward or they are substandard or 

whatever, the Iraqi people, directly or indirectly, blame the United 

States for those continuing failures, problems. For example, I am 

told electricity in Baghdad is about 8 hours a day, and in many 

parts of the country, it is less than it was previously under Saddam 

Hussein. I was in Iraq along with the Chairman when it was 115 

degrees in the middle of the summer and without electricity. That 

is no air conditioning, no refrigeration, in some of the cities no 

sewer or no running water and sanitation, and now we are in the 

fourth summer since the military deposed Saddam Hussein. Understandably, people there are extremely unhappy. And, again, our 

soldiers bear the brunt of this, and that is what disturbs me most 

of all. 

So they are in a sense held hostage, given the President’s policy, 

which I accept as the necessity in this current predicament of not 

37

allowing the country to fall into civil war and a bloodbath or anarchy. But the longer these projects fail, the longer somebody is going 

to be consigned to be there to hold the glue of the country together. 

So how are we going to get beyond this? As you hand these 

projects over—not you, but as our government hands over these 

projects to the Iraqi Government, who is your successor indigenous 

to the country that is going to try to pursue these and see that they 

do not fall apart? 

Mr. BOWEN. Let me say this first about Iraqi subcontractors. 

When proper oversight is provided, they have done very well, and 

they have done well at less cost than the cost-plus contractors. But 

as you say, oversight is an essential component to proper conduct 

and effective outcomes. 

The keystones for that in Iraq are the Ministry IGs, 29 Inspectors General that were created by the CPA. They need more training. They need more coordination. They need funding. And they 

need law, actually, to ensure their continuation. They are not protected by any current law in Iraq. 

Second, the Commissioner of Public Integrity is essentially their 

FBI. He has hundreds and hundreds of cases involving corruption, 

upwards of $5 billion. Those need to be prosecuted. All investigations are window dressing until someone is prosecuted and put in 

prison. Then deterrence kicks in. There have been very few convictions to date for corruption in Iraq. The central criminal court of 

Iraq is in charge of that. Their procedures have tended to limit 

progress there as well as their limited number of judges. There is 

an effort to expand that, but that is still an ongoing capacity-building issue. 

Third, the Board of Supreme Audit, that is their GAO. And let 

me say, GAO has been very aggressive and present on the ground 

in Iraq providing good oversight. Their GAO, the Board of Supreme 

Audit, we have met with him. He seems like a good man. They 

have the legacy of having existed under Saddam’s reign and served 

as a cover. So they are going to have to overcome that burden of 

history, of their own history, but they have an important and a 

central role, the one you are pointing to, to play in Iraq, and that 

is to make sure oversight works. You cannot do that unless you develop credibility through meaningful audits that change behavior. 

Senator DAYTON. Well, I hope that we can look ahead with some 

of the cautious optimism that you have noted here. Again, there 

was a hearing of the Democratic Policy Committee that Senator 

Byron Dorgan of North Dakota chairs last week, one of several that 

he has held on these contracting abuses. And one of the witnesses 

was Dr. Richard Garfield, a professor of nursing at Columbia University, who had been involved with the efforts in the health care 

system in Iraq. He said that, ‘‘The first post-CPA Iraqi Minister of 

Health believes he has largely rooted out corruption in the medicine supply system, while people in the system say it became more 

corrupt than under Saddam Hussein.’’ So I think that is indicative 

of the magnitude of the problems, and that is just one segment of 

their society. Again, my concern is that there are limits to what we 

can do to affect this, especially as we turn these responsibilities 

over. But to the extent that we are turning them over and they are 

not being followed through, that there is no oversight, as I say, our 

38

troops will suffer and our efforts there will suffer. And so whatever 

you can do to help us, if we can play any role here in designing 

and funding systems to help assure that, I certainly would ask you 

to do so. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Bowen, I want to thank you for being here today and for all 

of your hard work. I want to echo the comments made earlier by 

the Senator from Minnesota about the courage that you and your 

staff have exhibited. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. I have been to Iraq twice. I know how dangerous it is to go beyond the Green Zone, and I noticed that many 

people associated with the American Government stay within the 

Green Zone. And your staff has been the exception to that rule, 

going out to actually inspect projects to see what is occurring and 

getting the kind of ground truth that is really essential for you to 

do your work effectively. But you do so at considerable risk to your 

personal safety, and I want to join my colleague in acknowledging 

your courage and thanking you. The work that you are doing is extremely important, and we want to continue to work closely with 

you. 

I am also grateful that you have given me quarterly updates on 

all of your work. I found those briefings to be very helpful. So we 

wish you well, and we all urge you to be safe as you return to Iraq. 

And, again, my gratitude to your staff as well. The work you are 

doing is enormously important, not only to this Committee but to 

the American taxpayer. So thank you for your efforts. 

This hearing record will be held open, as I mentioned earlier, for 

15 days for the submission of questions and any additional materials. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

I thank the Chairman for holding this essential hearing examining our reconstruction contracts in Iraq. 

In virtually every past war, shameless profiteers have swindled the government 

for an easy buck. Investigations led to shocking revelations after both World Wars. 

It is the Federal Government’s job to do its utmost to prevent these abuses, to detect 

them when they occur, to punish the guilty, and to shed light on the offenses so 

that we can learn from them. Already, the Administration’s failure to ensure the 

integrity of the contracting process in Iraq has caused immeasurable harm, and 

gross neglect by contractors and by agencies responsible for overseeing them has undermined our war effort. 

I supported our war in Iraq but I have always questioned the way it was being 

executed. From the beginning, I have called on the Administration to engage in better advance planning and to commit resources more effectively to ensure a successful reconstruction and transition to democracy. Instead, it has been a much rockier 

road than it had to be—a just cause marred by poor planning and implementation. 

For years I and others in Congress have criticized the Administration’s failure to 

ensure sound contracting practices with respect to Iraq reconstruction, but the problems continue. Our hearing today is focusing on lessons we can learn for the future, 

and our witness, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, has provided 

a valuable set of recommendations that this Committee should seriously consider. 

Waste, mismanagement, and fraud have occurred on a massive scale. Billions of 

taxpayer dollars have been squandered. Our soldiers in the field have been shortchanged, and the war effort impeded. And the only beneficiaries of waste and fraud 

are the same bad apples who are responsible for it. Halliburton, for one, has overcharged the government over $1 billion, with the apparent approval of the agency 

responsible for overseeing the contracts. U.S. Government employees have colluded 

with contractors in flagrant embezzlement schemes. Some have been prosecuted, but 

how many other crimes have gone unpunished? 

The Special Inspector General has done an exceptional job bringing to light many 

of the abuses we do know about. Stuart Bowen quickly established a large office in 

Baghdad, and he and his staff courageously travel throughout Iraq to inspect 

projects large and small. In one report he documented that the Coalition Provisional 

Authority could not account for nearly $9 billion it distributed to Iraqi ministries. 

He documented how Halliburton wasted $75 million on a failed pipeline river crossing project, after the company and the Army Corps of Engineers ignored the determination of its engineering consultant that the complex soil conditions required further study. Just this week, the IG released a damning report describing how the 

U.S. Agency for International Development resorted to accounting tricks to hide 

huge cost overruns from Congress. 

Unfortunately oversight has been lacking elsewhere, and the IG has found few allies in this Administration. The Department of Defense Inspector General has never 

maintained a permanent presence in Iraq. Although the Department of Justice established a task force and announced a zero tolerance policy with respect to Hurricane Katrina fraud, the Department’s investigative work on Iraqi contracts fraud 

has been less than zealous. I’m unaware of DOJ having initiated any criminal prosecutions other than those cases it received from the Special Inspector General. And 

the Administration has been attempting to phase out the office of the Special Inspector General for some time. 

Poor policies and practices have marred every aspect of the contracting process 

in Iraq. In many instances U.S. agencies awarded contracts without using competitive procedures at great expense to the Treasury and, ultimately, the American taxpayers. For example, the Department of Defense improperly awarded Halliburton a 

40

$7 billion contract for reconstructing Iraq’s oil sector, without first opening the 

award to competitive bidding. Similarly, USAID waived regulations requiring competition in its reconstruction contracts, an action it could have avoided with better 

planning. Our government contracting system relies on fair and open competition 

to ensure the best products and services will be provided at the best price, and in 

Iraq that principle was too readily abandoned. 

Agencies also have failed to oversee contracts they awarded. The CPA lacked contracting regulations or trained contract officers, and the contracting environment 

there remained chaotic until the CPA’s dissolution. More inexcusable, established 

agencies sometimes seemed more interested in protecting their contractors than exercising their responsibility to oversee them. 

The collusive relationship between the Army Corps of Engineers and Halliburton 

provides a telling example of this phenomenon. In December 2003, a DOD auditing 

agency made a preliminary finding that Halliburton was overcharging the U.S. and 

the Iraqi people tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, for importing 

fuel into Iraq; the final audits determined that the contractor’s overcharges amounted to $263 million. The Army Corps went to great lengths to suppress the results 

of the audits and to ignore their findings. First, the Corps waived the regulatory 

requirement that Halliburton justify its prices with supporting data, in a transparent effort to negate the auditors’ findings. When the U.N. oversight board responsible for safeguarding Iraqi funds requested a copy of the final DOD audits, the 

Pentagon allowed Halliburton to redact all of the audits’ negative findings before 

turning them over. Finally, the Corps rejected the audits’ findings and paid Halliburton for 96 percent of the costs that had been challenged by DOD auditors. 

This incident and similar ones starkly illustrate a central problem that has 

plagued the contracting environment in Iraq. The combination of lack of competitive 

bidding, poor oversight, and absence of accountability eliminated the safeguards designed to prevent waste and fraud by contractors. These safeguards are doubly important in time of war, as poor contractor performance can imperil our troops and 

undermine the war effort. 

Committing troops to battle is the most consequential decision our government 

can make. When it does so, it must take no shortcuts in formulating and executing 

its strategy. When it came to planning and implementing the reconstruction of Iraq, 

this Administration took far too many shortcuts. We continue to suffer the consequences, as do the Iraqi people.

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