. 

Hon. Ben Ramsey, Chairman Opinion No. C- 527 

Railroad Commission of Texas 

Tribune Bulldlng Re: Reconsideration of Attorney 

Austin, Texas General's Opinion WW-201, 

relating to the question of 

whether a Railroad Commlsslon employee may also serve 

as a joint board member for 

the State of Texas under 

appointment by the InterDear Mr. Ramsey: state Commerce Commission. 

you have requested a reconsideration of Attorney General's 

Opinion WW-201 (1957) which held: 

"A substitute member of a. joint board 

appointed.by the Interstate Commerce.Com- 

;lsSsE under the provisions of Title 49, 

Section 395 (Interstate Commerce 

Ait: ia?% II) hol.ds an offlce.of honor and 

trust under the .Unlted.States Government 

and while serving as a member of a joint 

board he cannot receive any salary or 

compensation for his services as an examiner 

for the Railroad Commission of Texas under 

the provisions of Article XVI, Section 33 

of the Constitution of Texas. The office 

of a joint board member and the position of 

an employee of the Railroad Commission of 

Texas are 'not incompatible." 

An analysis of the provisions of Section 33 of Article 

XVI of the Constitution of Texas, the cases construing Sections 

12, 33 and.40 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas, and 

opinions of this Office on the subject of dual offlceholding 

in Texas leads to the conclusion that Attorney General's Opinion 

W-201 should be overruled for the reasons hereinafter discussed. 

The proper characterization of the service performed by a 

joint board member is that of research,.advlce, and recommendation for orders to be officially promulgated and enforced by 

the Interstate Commerce Commission. The decision making and 

-2482- 
. . 

Hon. Den Ramsey, Page 2 Opinion No. C-527 

enforcement of orders Is the exercise of federal sovereign 

powers by the Commission. 49 U.S.C.A., Ch. 8, Sects. 303, 

305. Although the duties of hearing evidence and making 

recommendations from findings may be likened to that of an 

officer of the court, such as a Master in Chancery, It is held 

that such officers of a court are.not deemed to be holding an 

office or analogous position under the United States In the 

sense of dual office*holding. See Benjamin Watkins Leigh's 

Case, 15 Va. National Sav. Bank of D.of C. v. 

100 U.S. 195 

Ward, 

Kimberly v. Arms, 9 S.Ct. 355, 359, 

129 U.S. 512 

It thus appears that the joint board member for the State 

of Texas has not been delegated any federal sovereign powers 

to exercise, 'his duties are sporadic, and he receives no salary 

or compensation for such service. His service may not be 

characterized as rising to the dignity of an office or position 

of honor or trust under the United States. Although his service 

might be said to be anaddltlonal duty Imposed upon hlm as an 

employee of the Railroad Commission, he Is nevertheless not 

serving in such capacity as an office or position of honor or 

trust under the State of Texas. 

The key to any decision to the question propounded lies 

In the construction of the Intent or meaning of the words 

"Office of profit or trust, under the United States,:' as used 

In the Texas Constitution In Sec. 12 of Art. 16, or "Civil 

Office of emolument," as used in Sec., 43 of Art. 16, or "office 

or position of honor, trust or profit under . . . the United 

States," as used In Art. 16, Section 33. 1t.l.s evldent that 

the real intent of these sections of the Constitution was to 

trohlblt $a1 office holding:, whether the public "office" or 

position be one of "profit or 

%rustw or Ithonor." 

"emolument' or merely one of 

These .were additional strictures Inserted 

therein for implementing the l%ndamental rule of law in this 

country forbidding one person from holding at one time two 

public offices or positions, the duties of which were 

Incompatible or against public policy and which Is applicable 

whether or not named in the excentlons in the Constitution. 

Biencourt v. Parker, 27 Tex. 558; State v. Brlnkerhoff, 66 Tex. 

45; Thomas v. Abernathy County Line Independent School Dlst., 

290 S.W. 152; Prultt'v. Glen Rose Indevendent School Dlst., 

84 S.W.2d 1004; Knuckles v. Board of Education of Dell County 

(KY.), 114~S.W.2d.511, ,514; 22 R.C.L. 414, spar. 56; Atty.Gen. 

Opinions Nos. v-63; 0-5145;.0-4957. 

-2483- 
Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 3 Oplnloti No. C-527 

Section 33 of Article 16 of the Texas Constitution provides, 

"The Accounting Offloers of this State 

shall neither draw nor pay a warrant 

upon the Treasury In favor of any 

person, for salary or compensation 

as agent, officer, or appointee, who 

holds at the same time any other office 

or position of honor;trust or profit, 

under this State or the United States, 

except as prescribed In this 

Constitution. '. . .n (emphasis added) 

This Section was not Included In the Constitution of 1876 

a.s a'safeguard against a recurrence of the evils and abuses of 

the "carpetbag" era, since It made Its first appearance In the 

Constitution of 1869, a constitution drafted by Reconstruction 

Republicans, and Its policy reasons are at best conjectural. 

See Vol. 43, Tex.Law Review, p. 951; Tex.Const. .Art. XII, Sec. 

42 (1869). 

The only~pollcy basis for the section has been stated to 

be that of Insuring fill value for state services rendered in 

the payment of salary or compensation out of state monies. 

Thus the safeguard was aimed at preventing a person from holding 

at the same time two state offices or positions, or a state and 

federal office or position , the effect of whlch.would cause 

that person to divide his time and fidelity, to'the detriment. . 

of hle state servlce.~ See Attorney General Opinion No. o-2637 

(193); Vol. 43, Texas Law Review, p. 952. 

In construing the meaning df the Constitutions and statutes, 

a court will never adopt a construction that will make them 

absurd or ridiculous or one that ~111 lead to absurd conclusions 

or consequences If the language of the enactment Is susceptible 

of any other meaning. 53 Tex.Jur.2d 241, 243, Sec. 165, Statutes. 

Furthermore, wherever possible, that construction shall Abe 

adopted which shall promote the public Interest in accord with 

sound economic or governmental policy. 

Tex. 242, 11 S.W. 1029 (1888). 

State v. UeGress, 72 

In view of the urgent policy arguments against a too narrow 

and 

431 

restrictive consttictlon of Section 33, as set out in Vol. 

Texas Law Review, pages 952-955,~ it seems clear that a 

liberal rather than a technical, narrow construction should'be 

indulged so as to permit St&e employees to render valuable and 

beneflclent service through intergovernmental,cooperation on 

-2484- 
Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 4 Opinion No. C- 527 

advisory or study committees. This 1s in the best interest 

of state government, and It would be unreasonable to Impute a 

meaning to the Constitution which would lead to the opposite 

conclusion. In other words, a strict construction should be 

given to the words "office or position of honor or trust" so. 

as not to hold anything to be within the prohibition unless 

clearly exvressed and named and not to exnand It bv lmolIcatlon 

or constru&.lon. Commonwealth, ex rel B&he v. B&s,'17 

Sergeant & Rowles Rep: 219 (1828). 

Generally, in arriving at the meaning of the Constitution, 

we find it should not be given a 

tlon" but It Is to be given a 

"narrow or technical construe-. 

"liberal meaning in order to 

effectuate the purpose of the provision of which it Is a part?' 

and "words will be considered to have been used In their natural 

sense and ordinary signification, unless the context Indicates 

the contrary." 12 Tex.Jur.2d 362-363, Sec. 14; p. 364, Sec. 16, 

Constitutional Law, and cases there cited. Furthermore, it is 

to be construed to meet changed conditions as they arise. m 

v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 221 S.W. ,880 (1923). 

The words In the phrase "Office or position of honor, 

trust, or~proflt under the.United States," are each words having 

a meaning ascertainable by reference to the other words with 

whi&h they are associated under the maxim, noscltur a soclis. 

53 Tex.Jur.2d 221, Sec. 154, Statutes. 

Since the appointment to the Joint Board Is without compensatIon,-It is unnecessary to discuss whether It Is en office 

or position of "profit" or "emolument" under the United States. 

In this connection, the payment of "expenses" is to be dlstlngulshed from "compensation." "Compensation" Is synonymous 

with salary, pay, or emolument and 1s Intended to convey the 

Idea of reward or compensation for official services; It does 

not convey the idea of re-payment of out-of-pocket expenditures 

or exoenses. such as travelinn and. subsistence while awav from 

home &d in-performance of duly, which may be,allowed by law. 

Terre11 v. King?.118 Tex. 237, 241, 14 S.W.2d 786, 791 (1929), 

State v.. Aronson ~, 314 P.2d 849, 853 (Sup.Ct., Montana 1957), 

and many cases there cited. 

The questlon~ Is thus narrowed to a determination whether 

-it would be such an ofSlce .or position of honor or trust within 

the,constltutlonal meaning. Even though.the. committee be 

created by Congress and be subject to some quasi-gov.ernmental 

supervision, through audit and by report to Congress, this 

would not constitute a member thereof, with principal duties of 

recommendation, research, study, and advice, the holder of an 

-2485- 
Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 5 Opinion No. C- 527 

office or position of honor and trust under the United States 

withinthe purview of the meaning of such terms. as used in the 

above provisions of the Constitution. 

Thus, unless It Is an office or position of honor or trust 

under the United States within the sense intended or meant by 

the Constitution, a state employee may serve In such a capacity 

and still draw his salary from the Comptroller. 

The words "office or position of honor or trust" as used. 

in Section 33 of the Constitution should be held to have been 

used analogously, and as having the same characteristics and 

general though not Identical meaning, when given a practical, 

natural. ordinary, and reasonable construction. Webster's 

Third New International Dictionary, p. 1769; Black's Law 

m0ti0w, 4th Rd., 

"Position;" 

p. 1234, 33 Words & Phrases, p. 53, 

and cases there annotated. The authorities hold 

that .a "position" is analogous to an "office" in that the duties 

that pertain to It are permanent and certain. The same 

essentials, attributes, and characteristics are present ~lnsofar 

as the duties are governmental. Frazier v. Elmore, -180 Tenn. 

232, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565; Fredericks v. Board of Health of Town. 

of West Roboken, 82 ~.528, 529, 82 N.J.L. 200; Rlsley'v. Board 

of Civil Service Comr's. of City of Los Angeles, 140 P.2d 167, 

169, 6CCal.App.2d 32; Murphy v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of 

Bergen County, Sup., 163 A. 555, 556, 110 N.J.L. 9. 

An "office" means "place'! or "position" and they.are deemed 

atklogous and ltiterch eable as understood In law. 

Phrases, p. 270, unde?Cffice 

29 words 6c 

-- Place or position;" and 1965 

Pocket Part pp. 97-98 and cases there annotated. 

As stated in 22 R.C.L. 383, Sec. 16, Public Officers, 

"Constitutions and la.ws.sometlmes 

contain provisions applying to offices of 

trust or honor and offices or'places of 

trust or profit. The line between 

'offices' and 'places of trust or profit' 

within the meaning of such provisions 

has not been clearly marked, and they~may 

be considered as approaching each other 

so closely that they are In all essential 

features identical. A place of trust or 

profit is not, however, Identical with an 

office, yet it occupies the same general 

level in dignity and importance. . . ..' 

-2486- 
Hon. Ben Hamsey, Page 6 

We'have, therefore, 

Opinion No. C-527 

heretofore correctly held on this . 

subject In Opinion No. O-5341, dated July 19, 1943, that there 

Is no material legal distinction in meaning as to essential 

characteristics between the term "office and pos:tion of honor 

or trust" and that as used In our Constitution, 'office under 

the United States' means that the holder thereof must exercise 

some governmental function, or be the depository of some 

sovereignty of the United States (Federal Government) before It 

rises to the dignity of an 'office' under the United States. 

There must be delegated to the person holding such 'office' 

some of the sovereign functions of the United States Government. 

There are several persuasive, though not conclusive, 

characteristics of what constltutes*a public office; or to 

express it in another way, what constitutes holding an 'office 

under the United States.' We mention a few: Tenure and 

duration, oath of office, official bond, etc. But one indlspensable characteristic, as the cases hereafter noted affirm, 

is that the duties performed shall Involve the exercise of 

sovereign power, whether great or-small. 

in a,comparatlvely early case, 

Our own Suptieme Court, 

Kimbrough v. Barnett, 93 Texas 

301, 55 S.W. 120, quoted with approval Mechem on Public Officers 

as follows: 

"@A public office Is the right, authority, 

and duty created and conferred by law, by 

which, for a given period, either fixed 

by.law or enduring at the pleasure of the 

creating power, an.lndlvidual 'is Invested 

with some portion of the sovereign functions 

of the government, to be exercised by him 

for the benefit of the~publ1c.l" 

In the above Opinion No. O-5341, and from the authorities 

we found that "office" had a definite legal meaning In the sensi 

employed in the Constitution: 

.'('The term "office" Implies a delegation of 

a portion of the sovereign power to, and 

possession of, lt.by the person filling the 

office; a public office being an agency for 

the state, and the person whose duty It is 

to perform the agency being a public officer. 

The term embraces the idea of tenure, duration, 

.emolument and duties, and has respect to a 

permanent public trust to be exercised in 

behalf of government, and not to a merely 

transient, occasional or incidental employment. 

A person In the. service of the government who 

derives his position from a duly and legally 

authorized election or appointment, whose 

-2487- 
Hon. Ben RamseY, Page 7 0pir;i.m No. C-527 

duties are continuous in their nature 

and defined by rules prescribed by government, and not by contract, consisting of 

the exercise of important public powers, 

trusts, or duties, ag a part of the 

regular administration of government, the 

place and the duties remaining, though the 

incumbent dies or is changed, every office 

in the constitutional meaning of the term 

implying an authority to‘exercise some 

portion of the sovereign power, either in 

making, executing or administering the 

laws. Mechem on Public Officers, 0 l-9.'" 

The recent case of Willis v. Potts (19641, 377 S.W.2d 622, 

by the Supreme Court of Texas, construing Art. 3, Sec. 19, and 

Art. 11, Sec. 5 of the Constitution, held that a City Councilman of the City of Ft. Worth held an "office under the State." 

Utilizing the reasoning of the earlier declslons, the Court's 

decision is in harmony with our Opinion and not in conflict with 

it or the distinctionsought to be made. 

Those authorities so construing the meaning of ?office" or 

"position" as comprehending continuous performance of defined 

permanent publicduties, compensation, tenure, exercise of 

sovereignty, and other essential requisites are in accord and 

are thoroughly discussed and briefed in our Opinion O-5341. 

See Witkowski-v. Rurke, 65 A.2d 781; Sowers v; Wells, 150 Nan. 

630, 95 P.2d 281,.Abbott v. McNutt, 218 Cal. 225, 22 P.2d 

510, 89 A.L.R. 1109; Howard v. Saylor, 305 Ky. 504, 204'S.W.2d 

815; United States v. David Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307, 81 L.Ed. 

463; People ex rel Attorney Qeneral v. Leonard, 14 P. 853; In 

Re Doe's Estate. In Re. Wheeler. Mallory, as Public Adm'rTv. 

Wheeler, 138 N.W. $97; Patten v. Miller, 8 S.E.2d 757, wherein 

the Supreme Court of Georgia approved of a state employee 

(member of the Highway Do&d) holding at the same time. a 

position as a member of the Advisory Commlttee.of the Atlanta 

Agency of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the' Court 

holding that his office "is not an office of profit or trust 

under the Government of,the United States"; Hartigon v. Board 

of Regents of West Virginia University 38 S.E. 698; Hirschfeld Commonwealth ex rely Attorney GeneGal, 76 S.W.2d am(I(y.1; 

State ex rel v. Hawkins, 257 P. 411, 53 A.L.R. 583; and 

Kingston Assoclates'v. La Guardia, 281 N.Y. Supp. 390, wherein 

it was held that members of the Advisory Committee .on Allotments, created by the President of the U. S., were not holding 

an "office of honor, trust, or emolument under the government 

of the United States.:' The Court said: 

-2488- 
Hon. Ban Ramsey, Page 8 Opinion No. C- 527 

"'Clearly, the members of the Advisory 

Committee on Allotments possess none of 

the powers of the sovereign. They 

perform no Independent governmental 

function. Such function In general is 

either legislative, judicial, or executive. 

It is too plain to require discussion 

that the Advisory Committee exercises no 

legislative or judicial prerogatives. It 

appears to be fairly evident that It llkewise possesses no powers of the executive 

. . . . The committee. thuslacks the most 

Important characteristic or attribute 

associated with the idea of public office, 

,namely, the right to exercise some part 

of the power of the sovereign."' 

Opinion o-5341, of July 19, l943, that a District Attorney 

could receive his salary and also serve as Chairman of the Local 

Chapter of The American National Red Cross, a Corporation 

chartered by Congress, because the latter was not an office or 

position under the United States, Is consistent width our earlier 

Cplnlon No. O-5314, of July 2, 1943, holding that a state or 

county official could not be excluded from drawing his salary 

while serving as a member of an advisory board for registrants, 

the latter not being a position of honor, trust or'profit under 

this State or the United States within the contemplation of our 

Texas Constitution. 

-Our still earlier Opinion No. 0-4458, of. April 8, 1942, 

holding that a s,tate employee could serve without loss of salaT: 

as a member of a County Tire Rationing Board for the same legal 

reasons is likewise consistent with the above Opinions. 

Char earlier and thoroughly considered Opinion No. O-4313, 

of Jan. 24, 1942, written by Zollie C. Steakley, now a member 

of the Texas Supreme Court,- %s likewise consistent with the 

above opinions In holdi 

State Board of Education 7 

that a state employee (member of 

could,still draw his salary and serve 

on an Allen Enemy Hearing Board, created by the federal government through the U. S. Attorney General, paying only nominal 

compensation but requiring the member to -take an oath. The 

Board appointment was temporary, for an lndefinite,term, with 

only occasional meetings Andy sporadic activities. .It was 

merely a fact finding and advisory administrative instrumentality, which could neither make nor enforce decisions.. We 

expressly held that membership upon such a Board, which would 

-2489- 
Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 9 Opinion No. C~- 527 

be presumably identical to a National Study Committee, dld 

not constitute the holding or exercising of an office of 

trust, honor, or profit under the United States. We there 

held that "It does not constitute a 'position' as that term 

was intended by the Framers of the Constitution." 

The precise question has still never been determlned,by 

a Texas court but other $urlsdlct,ions are in general accord 

with our cited holdings. _( '- . 

In McIntosh v. Hutchinson, 59 P.2d 1117, the Supreme Court 

of .Washlngton held th t a State Senator could still draw his 

salary and serve as aa"Distrlct Supervisor" of the Federal 

Works Progress Administration, which was not deemed to be the 

acceptance of a "civil office," cltlng Barney v. Hawkins, 79 

Mont. 506, 257 P. 411, 53 A.L.R. 583, as to the meaning of 

the term "office," to-wit: 

"After an exhaustive examination of the 

authorities, we hold that five elements 

are Indispensable In any position of 

public employment, In order to make'lt a 

public ~offlce of a civil nature: (1) It 

must be created by the Constitution or 

by the Legislature or created by a 

municipality or other body thro h authority 

conferred by the Legislature; (2 7 It must 

possess a delegation of a portlon of the 

sovereign power of government, to be 

exercised for the benefit of the public; 

(3) the powers conferred, and the duties 

to be discharged, must be defined, directly 

or lmplledly, by the le lslature or through 

legislative authority; ? 4) the duties must 

be performed Independently and without 

control of a superior power, other than the 

law, unless they be those of an Inferior 

or subordinate office, created or authorized 

by the Legislature, and by It placed.under 

the.general control of a superior officer or 

body; (5), It must have some permanency and 

contlnulty, and not be only temporary or 

occasional. In addition, In this state an 

officer must take and file an official oath, 

hold a commission or other written authority, 

and give an official bond, if the latter be 

required by proper authority." 

-2490- 
. 

Hon. Een Ramsey, Fage 10 Opinion No. C- 527 

The Court concluded that the Senator was not appointed 

to an office since "the great weight qf authority well supports 

the necessity of meeting all of the conditions laid down by the 

Montana Court and . . . it Is notmade to appear that these 

conditions? or any of them, have been here met . . .'I. 

In accord and Involving similar questions and constitutiona 

prohibitions are , 172 Atl. 415 (Del.); Cut-tin 

v. State, 214 P. , 156 p.216 

m State v. OY v. Board of 

g;er;lsors, 114 P.2d 569, citing Carpenter v. Sheppard, 135 

13, 145 S.W.2d' 562, fbr'the necessity of taking a liberal 

view toward the encouragement of such enactments that their 

protective purposes "may be fulfilled without undue Imposition 

of constitutional limitations or hlderance through narrow 

judicial construction." 

In Parker v. Riley, 113 P.2d 873, 875. 876,. 18 Cal.2d 83, 

114 A.L.R. 1405, the California Supreme Court upheld a statute 

pFovldlng for ihe creation of the ballfornla Coimisslon on 

Interstate Cooperation and prqvidlng for members of the legislature to serve thereon. Although the Constitution expressly 

prohibited the members from accepting "any office, trust, or 

employment under this state,' the Court held that the 

constitutional meaning of "office" or "trust" was not.applicable 

thereto as follows: 

"'It may be note,d, however, that the 

positions created by the statute where 

attacked.lack certain elements usually 

associated with an "offlce!'.or "trust . 

Thus, It Is generally said that an office 

or trust requires the vesting in an 

Individual of a portion of the sovereign 

powers of the state. (Citation of 

authorities) The positions here created 

do not.measure up to so high a standard. 

They Involve merely the Interchange of 

Information, the assembling of data, and 

the formulation of proposal tom. be placed 

before the Legislature. Such tasks do 

not require the exercise of;a tart of the 

.soverelgn power of the state.' 

The Riley case doctrine was recently recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of California In State v. Aronson, 314 P.2d 849, 856-857 (1957). In accord, see also 

Gillespie v. Barrett, 15 N.E.2d 513 (Ill.); Johnson v. Chambers, 98 S.E. 263 (Ga.); and Readinp;.v. Maxwell, 52 P.2d 1155 

-2491- 
. 

Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 11 opi,nlOn NO. c- 527 

(Arlz.), for the proposition that certain essential elements 

are required to constitute an "office" or "position" as used 

In such constitutional sense and the meaning of these terms 

as so used do not preclude the acceptance of such duties and 

service involving honor and trust and from which any citizen 

could not escape without evading his civic or patriotic duty 

to aid his government or country in times of temporary 

emergencies. 

The term "office or position of honor or trust" therefore 

necessarily implies, among other elements, compensation, 

stability, duration, permanency, continuity, taklng,oath and 

giving bond, and the making and administering of governmental 

declslonslndependentlyand without control of a superior power, 

etc. The substantial absence of these essentials appertaining 

to membership on the Joint Board frees a state employee from 

the constitutional Inhibition to such service while continuing 

to draw his state salary. We do not believe that the 

constitutional framers in 1869 Intended by their use of the 

words being construed to prohibit state officers and employees 

from rendering free beneficial service,to the public on such 

advisory boards In furtherance of their state duty and in the 

interest and betterment of their federal government and its 

administration. 

If there are other Attorney General's Oplnions'which 

necessarily conflict with this Opinion In Its result.and holding, they are overruled.' However, all of the Attorney General 

Gplnlons appear to have tnvolved different facts or ClrCuSk 

stances, such as the holding of two public "offices" or 

"positions" of honor, trust, or profit, two offices deemed 

incompatible at common law. They are thus distinguishable. 

For example, in Opinion No.~ O-1898, of February 19, 1943, 

It was held that a State Health Officer or employee could not 

accept a commission from the Secretary of Agriculture under 

Sec. 702(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and 

thereby became an officer authorized to conduct examinations 

and Investigations ln.administerlng the act. Such would be a 

position of honor or trust under the United States within the 

constitutional meaning of the~terms, ~though,no-compensation 

was payable therefor. Likewise, in Opinion No. 0-58, of 

February 14, 1939, we held that the position of ~"Speclal Agent" 

of the Bureau of Census was one of honor, trust, or profit 

under the United States, prohibiting the State Registrar from 

.accepting same and drawing his state salary. Also, In Opinion 

NOS. O-5232 and o-5107, we held on the 'same grounds that the 

President of the College of Mines and Metallurgy as well as 

a District Judge could not accept the position of Public Panel 

-2492- 
Hon. Zen Ramsey, Page 12 Opinion No. C- 527 

Member of.the Eighth Regional War Labor Board, which apparently. 

required the making and carrying out of governmental decisions 

and exercise of sovereignty, as distinguished from mere 

investigative and advisory functions. 

we held ln Opinion o-2226, May 23, 1940, that a member of 

the County Board of School !Prustees could not also serve as a 

member of the local community committee of the Agricultural 

Adjustment Admlnlstrat'lon, created by Congress, and by which. 

the committeemen were elected by majority Vote of the producersin the county to serve a definite term and/or until their 

successor was elected, and were pald at a Certain Per diem fork 

each day served. Here, they apparently made decisions and 

admlnlstered the program, and we pointed out that whlf;e the 

taking of an oath was not an "Indispensable criterloff to 

constitute the appointment, an "office" or "position under 

the case holding of Commissioners Court of Limestone County v. 

Garrett (Com.App.), 236,S.W. 970, 972, nevertheless. the 

committeeman "meets the prescribed essentials as an 'Officer' 

and holds an 'office' within the ContemPlation of our 

constl.tutlonal lnhibltlons." Thus this opinion does not 

sonfllct with the other Attorney General Opinions cited above 

hut I:: In harmony with them and clearly dlstingu~shable. 

air *JFIn:5r, !b. Y-7*, dated December 16, 1948; ur:tten 

by cJ<ir .+.m Whloh cites %fld Pet-et-2 to ml?* ctkr or 0u.r 

aplnlw4 f+6 3he wfn* ~'a2 &:s VC-pg ei3tff5.eion h dUtleE 

111 ':'lhsl'Jering Whether a state employee can serve also as a 

Weatherman for the federal.government: 

?h3 accounting officers of this State 

may not pay a state employee from the 

TreaSW who holds at the same time a 

Position of honor, trust, or profit 

wlth the U. S. Government. If the U. 

S- Weatherman in question holds such a 

posltlon he should not be paid for his 

state employment. 

unpaid observer, 

If he is simply an 

who holds no appointments Section 33 has no appllcatlon, 

and he may be paid for his state 

employment. Art. XVI, Sec. 33.” 

-2493- 
Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 13 Opinion No. C- 527 

------- SUMMARY 

The substitute member of a joint board 

appointed by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the provisions of Title 49, 

U.S.C.A., Section 305 (Interstate Commerce 

Act,.Part II), does not hold an office of 

honor, trust, or profit urider the United 

States .Government and while serving as a 

member of a joint board he can receive his. 

salary or compensation for his services 

as an examiner for the Railroad Commission 

of Texas under the provisions of Article 

XVI, Section 33 of the Constitution of 

Texas. The office of a joint board member 

and the position of an employee of the Rallroad Commission are not incompatible. 

Opinion WW-201 is overruled. 

Yours very truly, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General of Texas 

Kerns B. Taylc6r 

Assistant Attorney General 

KBT:dl 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Arthur Sandlin 

Roger Tyler 

Bob Flowers 

Jerry Brock 

Ii. Grady Chandler.- 

APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY:" T. B. Wright 

-2494-