IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DIAZ CASTRO, ET AL.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET 

AL.

Defendants

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Civil No.: 16-2873 (CCC)

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AT 

DOCKET 10

NOW COME PLAINTIFFS, Maria J. Diaz Castro and her minor age son, W.C.D. and 

respectfully oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

and Mario Rivera Geigel, in his personal capacity. It is beyond serious question that plaintiffs 

have alleged sufficient facts to withstand dismissal on the pleadings. They have asserted viable 

causes of action and ample factual allegations demonstrating the plausibility of their claims. The 

complaint states causes of action against the defendants which are plainly cognizable even 

pursuant to the Iqbal (Iqbal v. Ashcroft, U.S. 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) pleading 

standards. Defendant, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, moreover, cannot claim the protection of 

Soveriegn Immunity in light of the recent Supreme Court decision Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. ___ (2016). Defendant Mario Rivera cannot claim the protection 

of Absolute Immunity. Plaintiffs’ allegations are unquestionably sufficient to allow a trier of fact 

to conclude the actions and omissions of these. The instant case garnered considerable attention 

when after being wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for over twelve (12) years for a crime she 

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did not commit, plaintiff Maria J. Castro, was finally released from the Vega Alta women’s 

institution. In opposition to the request for dismissal, plaintiffs assert and pray as follows: 

1. Iqbal and “plausibility” - the appropriate standards

The primary focus of defendants’ arguments in support of Dismissal is on the pleading 

standard of Twombly and Iqbal (hereinafter “the Iqbal” standard.) Defendants maintain that 

plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient factual allegations to support the conclusion that their 

claims against them are plausible. 

In response, plaintiffs point out that defendants make these arguments without due 

consideration to the actual allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiffs’ averments clearly

demonstrate the “plausibility” of their claims against these defendants. Plaintiffs have gone well

beyond purely conclusory allegations, presenting specific factual allegations respecting the 

conduct of each of the defendants.

Although the defendants give lip service to the purported inadequacy of plaintiffs’ 

averments, this notion is belied by the specific factual allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiffs’

allegations clearly surpass those which were found lacking in Iqbal. The Complaint sets forth 

precise facts from which it is more than “plausible” to conclude that the actions and omissions of 

the defendants caused the violation of clearly established rights. The allegations in the complaint 

clearly are not mere “conclusions,” which are not entitled to the presumption of truth. The 

assertions, rather, are factual and detailed; see Complaint ¶ ¶ 12-38.

The question which this court must answer in the post-Iqbal environment is whether these 

specific, concrete allegations suffice to demonstrate the “plausibility” of plaintiffs’ claims 

against these defendants. In performing this analysis, this court can look to a number of sources. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court counseled judicial officers to use “judicial experience and common 

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sense” to distinguish cases presenting a “mere possibility of misconduct,” from those showing 

“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 129 S.Ct., 1292. 

The factual underpinnings of plaintiffs’ claims, as laid out in the Complaint, more than 

pass muster on their own merit. Plaintiffs have asserted specific facts and situations which called 

out for each of the defendants to act in protection of the constitutional rights of citizens. All the 

elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are alleged in the complaint. The causal connection 

between the defendants conduct and the deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is also 

alleged. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico tolerated the illegal conduct of having someone 

unjustly incarcerated for over twelve years and failed in its supervision of its police officers and 

state prosecutors. Mario Rivera Geigel along with the other defendants directly participated in 

the wrongful conviction of plaintiff Maria J. Diaz Castro. Defendant Rivera Geigel also 

intervened in the familial relationship between Diaz Castro and her son. 

A. The Eleventh Amendment Immunity no longer bars suits claiming monetary 

relief against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Defendants claim that the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 

bars the instant suit claiming compensatory relief against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 

federal court, without its consent. Before Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 

U.S. ___ (2016) was decided, defendants would be correct in their assertion. However, Sanchez 

Valle changed the law as it applies to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In Sanchez Valle, the 

Supreme Court decided unequivocally that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United 

States are not separate sovereignties, they are the same. Granted that Sanchez Valle was decided 

in the context of the double jeopardy clause, but the principal remains, that is, the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United States is one sovereign. Having decided that 

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Puerto Rico is not a sovereign, we see no exception to the Rule that the Eleventh Amendment 

applies to sovereigns. The Commonwealth cannot have it both ways and limit the Sanchez Valle 

decision as it intends the Court to do. It would be a clear contradiction to imply that the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not a sovereign for one constitutional provision (double 

jeopardy), but it is a sovereign for another (Eleventh Amendment), and even more so, when the 

purpose of the Eleventh Amendment Immunity clause is in fact to provide immunity to a 

sovereign. Indeed, with the Sanchez Valle decision, the Supreme Court has overruled previous 

First Circuit precedent pertaining to this issue. Thus, plaintiffs submit that based on Sanchez 

Valle, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico no longer enjoys the Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Defendants assert that the complaint fails to state an actionable Due Process claim, under 

the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has stated that in order to make 

out a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct which is extremely 

“egregious” and “outrageous” County of Sacremento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1988). The 

First Circuit, in turn, has taken this language from Lewis to mean that there must be “stunning 

evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond mere violations of state law, even 

violations resulting from bad faith, to something more egregious and more extreme.” J.R. v. 

Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010). While the standard is very strict, the Court of Appeals 

has nonetheless continued to affirm the viability of such claims, even in the post-Iqbal climate. 

See, Maldonado v. Fontanés, the case involving the killing of dogs in Barceloneta, in which the 

First Circuit recently reaffirmed that certain governmental actions could be so “shocking” as to 

be “beyond the constitutional pale.” 568 F.3d at 21. “[O]fficial conduct most likely to rise to the 

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conscience-shocking level is conduct intended to injury in some way unjustifiable by any

government interest.” Id, at 22.

The allegations in the Complaint describe how defendants actions and omissions causing 

plaintiff to have been wrongfully been convicted and incarcerated for twelve years are so 

shocking to the conscious, and are committed with an actual intent to inflict unspeakable harm, 

that they also fall under the rubric of the Substantive Due Process protection. Hence, defendants’

motion to dismiss under the Fourteenth Amendment should be denied.

C. Fourth Amendment Claim

Defendants also allege that plaintiffs’ claim under the Fourth Amendment should be 

dismissed. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit noted in Becker v. Kroll 494 F.3d 

904 (10th Cir. 2007), “We have repeatedly recognized in this circuit that, at least prior to trial, 

the relevant constitutional underpinning for a claim of malicious prosecution under [Section 

1983] must be 'the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” The First 

Circuit has held that “[t]he crux of the inquiry is whether a ‘seizure’ occurred, for as we have 

stated before, ‘the essential elements of actionable Section 1983 claims derive first and foremost 

from the Constitution itself, not necessarily from the analogous common law tort.’” Britton v. 

Mahoney, 196 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1999). It makes little sense to say that the Fourth 

Amendment was not implicated in Diaz Castro's pretrial detention. She was arrested, charged, 

arraigned, wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for over twelve years based on trumped-up 

charges that were ultimately dropped. She spent over twelve years behind bars after being 

wrongfully convicted on murder charges that the defendants knew for a fact to be baseless. Put 

differently, Diaz Castro was detained at length without probable cause, prosecuted, wrongfully 

convicted and incarcerated for twelve years, a classic Fourth Amendment violation. Where, as 

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here, officers and prosecutors mislead magistrates and juries to sustain detentions without 

probable cause, wrongful convictions and incarceration, the detentions thus violate the Fourth 

Amendment just as surely as when misrepresentations cause detentions under an unfounded 

arrest warrant. Thus, defendants request to dismiss plaintiffs claim under the Fourth Amendment 

should be denied.

D. 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim

Section 1983 is a federal law that provides individuals with a cause of action against state 

and local officials who have violated their federal rights. The text of Section 1983 states that 

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable” to the 

injured party.” 42 U.S.C. §1983. The Supreme Court has held that the “very purpose of § 1983 

was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the 

people’s federal rights.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). It is beyond doubt that 

plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts in the complaint that garner a claim actionable under 

section 1983. Defendants, under color of state law, caused plaintiff Diaz Castro to be wrongfully 

convicted and incarcerated and are thus liable to her.

E. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel 

and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. Plaintiff Diaz Castro was wrongfully 

convicted of murder and sentenced to ninety nine (99) years imprisonment for a crime the 

defendants knew she did not commit. She served twelve (12) years in the Vega Alta correctional 

facility for women, ten (10) of which were served in the maximum facility, see Complaint ¶ 31-

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32. While in maximum security, Diaz Castro was confined to twenty two (22) hours a day in a 

tiny cell. During her stay in prison, Diaz Castro was beaten to almost death and had to be 

hospitalized, see Complaint ¶ 66-67. Having to endure what plaintiff Diaz Castro endured, 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss her Eighth 

Amendment claim should be denied. 

F. Defendant Rivera does not enjoy absolute immunity

As a general rule, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damage liability for the 

initiation and prosecution of a criminal case. Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 

However, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor who advised police officers on Fourth 

Amendment considerations in an ongoing criminal investigation performed an investigatory 

rather than a prosecutorial function and was, therefore, not entitled to absolute immunity. Burns 

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). The First Circuit has held that a prosecutor's knowing use of 

perjured testimony or other false evidence violates procedural due process. Limone v. Condon, 

372 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004). 

The complaint specifically avers that defendant prosecutors acted in an investigatory 

function by interviewing eye witnesses before the institution of charges, falsely and purposefully 

instituted criminal charges against plaintiff Diaz Castro, participated in the continuation of 

charges against plaintiff, failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, impeded the liberation of 

plaintiff Diaz Castro after she was incarcerated knowing she was innocent, influencing the 

Puerto Rico criminal justice system into wrongfully convicting plaintiff. See Complaint ¶ 40. 

The complaint asserts the defendant prosecutors participated in the investigation of the case 

against plaintiff and provided legal advice to the police officers, see Complaint ¶ 18, thus 

performing investigatory and not just prosecutorial functions. Furthermore, the complaint alleges 

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that defendant prosecutor Mario Rivera not only participated in the investigatory phase and 

authorized the filing of the charges against plaintiff Castro Diaz, but also intervened in the 

familial relationship between plaintiff Castro Diaz and her son, requesting that plaintiff W.C.D. 

be removed from the custody of Diaz Castro, see Complaint ¶ 19. 

Hence, none of the defendant prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity and defendant 

Rivera’s request to dismiss the complaint against him should be denied. 

G. Plaintiff W.C.D. claim

Accepting as true all material allegations in the complaint and construing it in favor of 

Plaintiffs, it is apparent that W.C.D. has individual standing to bring this lawsuit. Plaintiffs’ have 

stated a claim for deprivation of familial relationship (see Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (9th 

Cir. 2008)). By filing the trumped up murder charges against Plaintiff Diaz Castro and requesting 

the removal of her minor aged son, plaintiff W.C.D., from her custody defendants directly 

interfered in the familial relationship of the Plaintiffs, see Complaint ¶ ¶ 19 and 27. Defendants 

violated Plaintiffs’ rights to a continuing familial relationship and violated Plaintiffs’ rights to 

substantive due process. Plaintiff W.C.D. was deprived of having his mother raise, care and be 

with him during his childhood due to the wrongful conviction and sentence levied against his 

mother, see ¶ 60. Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff W.C.D. claim should be denied.

H. Plaintiffs Pendent Claims Under Article 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil 

Code

Under Puerto Rico law, over which this Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. §1367, under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. §5141, “are 

compensable not only the damages which suffer directly the victim or the prejudiced due to a 

negligent or intentional act but also the moral damages suffered by those ‘persons connected by 

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family, love and tenderness ties' with the victim or the prejudiced. Hernández v. Fournier, 80 

D.P.R. 93, 97 (1957); Santini Rivera v. Serv-Air, Inc., 137 D.P.R. 1, 9 (1994). Since 28 U.S.C. 

§1367(a) was pleaded in the complaint (see complaint ¶ 2), Defendants cannot defeat Plaintiffs’ 

state law claims arguing that they there is no vicarious liability under article 1983 of the Puerto 

Rico Civil Code. Plaintiffs describe in detail the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s liability to the 

plaintiffs, see complaint¶ ¶40-69. Accordingly, this argument set forth by the defendants should 

also be denied.

CONCLUSION

Defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Mario Rivera are requesting this court to 

dismiss a case which clearly meets all applicable pleading standards and as to which they cannot 

seriously claim that the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to establish sufficient facts 

to support a violation of civil rights. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that this court 

should DENY defendants’ motion to dismiss filed at docket 10.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Dated: February 14, 2017 

 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this date I electronically filed the forgoing Motion with the 

clerk of the court using the CM/ECF electronic filing system, which will send notification of 

such filing to the attorneys of record.

Juan A. Albino Gonzalez

/s/ JUAN A. ALBINO GONZALEZ

Attorney for Plaintiff

U.S.D.C. – P.R. #225405

Capital Center Building

South Tower Suite 702

239 Arterial Hostos Ave.

Hato Rey, San Juan, P.R. 00918

albinogonzalezlaw@gmail.com

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