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THE FUTURE OF NATO:

HOW VALUABLE AN ASSET?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 22, 2007

Serial No. 110–86

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

DAVID FITE, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 
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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. European Command, Supreme 

Allied Command of Europe, United States Army ............................................. 7

The Honorable Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................... 15

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida: Prepared statement ................................................................. 3

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 6

General Bantz J. Craddock: Prepared statement ................................................. 9

The Honorable Daniel Fried: Prepared statement ................................................ 18

Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith ...... 30

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Illinois: Prepared statement ................................................................. 49

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Prepared statement ................................................................... 49

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THE FUTURE OF NATO:

HOW VALUABLE AN ASSET? 

FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman 

of the committee) Presiding. 

Chairman LANTOS. NATO was the great military alliance of the 

20th century. The question before the committee today is whether 

it will retain this distinction in the 21st century. 

For decades, NATO was the powerful military defensive line 

against the ambitions of the Soviet Union. A show in solidarity 

against the totalitarianism and degradations of the Communist 

East and the tripwire for the use of nuclear weapons by the United 

States. 

Without NATO, tanks could have rolled from Moscow to the Mediterranean or to the Atlantic. 

Today, had there been no NATO, we would be discussing the Soviet Socialist Republic of Belgium or the Soviet Socialist Republic 

of Portugal. 

Not only did NATO prevent a European red tide, but it has actually reclaimed much of the Soviet Bloc. NATO’s founders 58 years 

ago never could have dreamed that some of the alliance’s most stalwart and enthusiastic members in 2007 would be those same Central and Eastern European nations the Soviets had dominated and 

occupied and that the alliance would have grown organically from 

12 members to 26. 

But for all of its success, NATO was never actually tested in battle, a true blessing given the devastating consequences of a possible 

thermonuclear conflict. 

Now, in the early 21st century, the world has thrust an entirely 

new identity upon NATO, one that many of its members seem reluctant in the extreme to assume. 

The alliance is involved in its first real combat in the mountains 

of Afghanistan, a real shooting war. While soldiers of some NATO 

countries are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, many more countries are doing little more than hunkering down in their secure 

bases, marking time, while their brothers and sisters in arms confront the real battle. 

But some European governments ought to wake up and realize 

that the moment of truth is at hand for the entire enterprise of 

NATO. 
2

NATO and its member nations face a stark choice. The alliance 

could evolve into a reliable global military alliance, halting terrorism and rogue regimes that threaten both Europe and the 

United States and democracies everywhere, or it could evolve into 

a conglomeration of governments that are only rhetorically committed to the common defense; a coalition of the partially or feebly 

willing whose individual nations may or may not tackle the security challenges of the post-9/11 planet. 

The grand NATO alliance, once a bright light for freedom and democracy, either will flicker and then fade into the dark night, or 

it will shine brighter than ever. 

The results in Afghanistan are an early indicator of which road 

NATO will take. NATO’s efforts there since 2001 demonstrate that 

the United States and the Europeans are willing to conduct tough 

combat operations and do so in a country outside of Europe. But 

the treadmill in Afghanistan is going faster and faster under our 

feet, demanding more and more of every country’s efforts. The 

Taliban is back and is organized, and it is bearing down on the 

southern part of the country. 

To allow a resurgence of the Taliban would be to allow a statesponsored launching pad for terror and a state sponsor of narco 

trafficking. The twin threat of a terror state and a narco state 

wrapped into one would be disastrous for the people of Afghanistan, for the fight against terror and for the entire world. 

But it will also be a devastating blow to the future of NATO because it would represent the failure of NATO’s most ambitious mission since its founding in 1949. 

We will not let Afghanistan fail. But the question is whether the 

United States will present—will prevent its failure with only some 

of our allies or with the full concert of all NATO members. 

Europe must be our full partner in our mission if NATO is to be 

redeemed. 

So far, European nations have only partially fulfilled their part 

of the bargain. Dutch, British, Danish and Canadian troops have 

been among the most brave, standing shoulder to shoulder with 

United States troops fighting the Taliban daily. 

But we need German and French and other European troops, 

whose grandparents we freed from Nazi tyranny in World War II, 

to fight on the front lines, too. 

Mothers in Nebraska and New Jersey are no more eager to have 

their sons die in Kabul than mothers in Berlin and Bordeaux. If 

NATO had a more robust commitment in Afghanistan, the Taliban 

would be defeated in a short time, particularly if the civilian infrastructure would move along as capably as NATO is. 

That brings me to the future of NATO after Afghanistan. 

If NATO is to be revitalized, its member nations must come to 

grips with the expanding definition of the term ‘‘invaded,’’ whereby 

terror groups can invade a country without a standing army. 

It must come to grips with the expanding geographic reach of 

dangerous countries developing weapons of mass destruction, like 

Iran, the greatest planetary threat today. 

NATO and its member nations must define what role the alliance 

is able or willing to perform in military conflicts outside of the relatively peaceful confines of Europe. 
3

We should consider seriously NATO’s own expansion beyond the 

borders of Europe and North Africa. Why not allow firmly democratic nations, such as South Korea, New Zealand, Australia and 

Israel, to join the world’s greatest military alliance? Their interests 

and their ideas are joined with ours. 

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed here in Washington 

in April 1949, its founder and the great Canadian Prime Minister 

Lester Pearson marked out the crucial mission of NATO that 

echoes forcefully today, and I quote:

‘‘This treaty, though borne of fear and frustration, must lead 

to positive social, economic and political achievements if it is 

to live.’’

Indeed, if NATO is to live, if we are to rejuvenate it, if it is to 

fulfill its promise in this century, all its partners must be committed steadfastly to the social and economic and political principles this great democratic military alliance symbolize. 

I now turn to my good friend and distinguished colleague, Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to make any comments. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a carefully 

thought out, utterly fascinating and captivating opening statement 

that I would like to ask to be made part of the record so that we 

can go on with our witnesses. 

I just want to say, thank you, to them both. I have known them 

a long time. Thank you to Ambassador Fried, and as you know, Mr. 

Chairman, although General Craddock has many wonderful parts 

of his resume, what really stands out is that he is a former Miamian because he was the head of SOUTHCOM, located right in my 

home town of Miami, Florida. Once a Miamian, always a Miamian. 

Come back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I welcome our two witnesses today: Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and 

Eurasia Dan Fried and United States Army General Bantz Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. 

What value does the NATO Alliance hold for the United States today, fifteen 

years after the end of the Cold War? 

That is the general question posed by our hearing today. 

Perhaps a good way to answer that question is to ask ourselves what Americans 

would lose—and Europeans as well, since they are our partners and have a big 

stake in the answer—if NATO ceased to exist. 

First, the United States would lose a major means of influencing trends and policies in Europe. 

It might lose access to a source of military manpower that is of proven use in 

peacekeeping missions. 

It would lose bases and facilities that are a force multiplier for the American military. 

Above all, it would most likely lose a stable Europe once NATO dissolved. 

That stability is also the most important thing our European allies might stand 

to lose if NATO were to cease to exist. 

It is easy to forget today that, after centuries of European conflict and two world 

wars, trust and cooperation between major European states did not always come 

easy or last long. 

It is also easy to forget that instability in Europe led to American involvement 

in two world wars. 
4

Reconciliation between France and Germany seemed an impossible concept in the 

late 1940s, but look at how well they cooperate and consult today. 

An independent Poland, lying between Germany and Russia, faced invasion and 

dissection at the hands of its neighbors in the late 1700s and again before World 

War II. 

What do we see today? 

Poland as a comfortable neighbor of Germany, its new ally—a Poland that does 

not overly fear a possible, future Russian aggression, knowing that it has the support of the United States and the leading states of Europe. 

I would suggest that, if NATO were to end tomorrow, the European states’ historic distrust might well rise again, and, within a short time, the integration and 

unity that blossomed behind NATO’s shield would begin to unravel. 

Some observers say that the awareness of these obvious benefits do not mean 

that, in the absence of a common threat, NATO won’t fade away in any event. 

Time will tell if they are right. 

It seems obvious that we do indeed see a problem in NATO in the sense that 

Americans and Europeans have differing views on the threats that now face them 

and how to address them. 

Whether it is terrorism, proliferation of weapons and technology of mass destruction, or conflicts in other regions that might cause instability and allow trans-national criminal networks and terrorists to gain ground—many in Europe do not see 

those threats in the same way that the United States does. 

And, if threats are not seen in the same way, a common strategy cannot really 

be developed. 

Without a common strategy, military capabilities in turn tend to be ignored and 

start withering away. 

We have seen that general weakening of military capabilities among the European NATO allies since the end of the Cold War—to a degree that, when the United 

States led the NATO operation against Serbia in 1999, the extent to which its success relied on American military force and technology came as a disappointing surprise to the United States. 

Many of us today look at the United States mission in Iraq and the reluctance 

of some of the major states of Western Europe to have NATO more actively support 

the invasion and stabilization of that country as a first sign of divergence within 

NATO. 

In fact, however, the NATO experience in the Balkans in the 1990s had already 

led American officials to worry that many European NATO allies’ general lack of 

readily-deployed military capabilities meant that they would not be that useful if 

NATO engaged in major military operations in other regions. 

Following the Kosovo operation, the United States chose to take the lead in the 

invasion of Afghanistan, with NATO taking command of the peacekeeping force 

there only after more than a year and a half had subsequently passed. 

As a result of the sharp differences over Iraq, some again see NATO, as potentially splintering. 

But, let’s recall just a few of the other serious disagreements that NATO has survived:

• French opposition to West German rearmament in the 1950s;

• US opposition to the British and French military operation in the Suez canal 

area of Egypt in 1956;

• US and European differences over support for Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur 

War.

Yes. There are serious issues that the NATO allies now need to address. 

But let’s recall those past disagreements that NATO survived and also look at 

what has gone right in NATO since the end of the Cold War.

• The American commitment to NATO has allowed the peaceful reunification 

of Germany;

• NATO’s expansion has promoted the consolidation of democracy in Eastern 

Europe;

• The US commitment to NATO has provided the reassurance within Europe 

that there will be no rebirth of the old geopolitical divisions within Europe.

• The strengthening of the European Union has continued, while American has 

stayed in NATO.

Both the United States and its European NATO allies have tough questions confronting them. 
5

The United States still does not know how to best persuade its European allies 

to devote the resources necessary to ensure that so-called ‘‘out of area’’ NATO operations can be effective. 

The United States also cannot agree that its ability to protect its vital interests 

from terrorist attack must be constrained through often-slow consensus decisionmaking, such as that used within NATO. 

European states still have to come to grips with the meaning for them of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe and the plots for other attacks that 

have been foiled. 

Europe also has to come to an understanding of what the potential radicalization 

of parts of its growing Muslim minority communities might mean for its security. 

As allies, we should work to find answers to these and other truly difficult questions. 

I hope that our witnesses today will give us some insights as to how those answers may be found.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, and I will make a normal introduction of our two most distinguished witnesses. 

But I think the most useful way to proceed in view of the couple 

of votes on the floor will be to introduce the chairman of our Parliamentary NATO group, my good friend Congressman Tanner, for 

whatever opening remarks he wants to make. Then we will take 

a brief break, and then we will hear our two distinguished witnesses. 

Mr. TANNER. I don’t know if that was intentional that they cut 

my microphone off or not. 

Welcome, General Craddock and Secretary, we have had many 

conversations before about NATO. I want to just welcome you both 

here and to express from the NATO PA delegation the fact that we 

believe now NATO might well be in fact more important than even 

it was in the Cold War, because it is the—if not premier—maybe 

the sole international, clearly international, organization that has 

the ability to both go into a place that is in chaos and restore some 

order and do it with a military presence that is able and capable. 

And so I think that this hearing not only is important for NATO, 

but it is important for our country. We need the help that NATO 

can potentially give us, and I would just like to talk about maybe 

what your ideas are when we get back from the votes, a policy that 

coordinates the policy of the United States with the NATO policy 

as it relates to engagement with countries in the neighborhood of 

Afghanistan. 

This is the largest, as both of you well know, out-of-area military 

expedition NATO’s ever undertaken. And in that light alone, it 

seems to me that failure is not an option, as they say. We have to 

make this work for the future, not only of NATO, but for the alliance and what it means to the United States. 

So thank you both, and I look forward to when we get back from 

voting. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. The committee will stand in a few minutes’ 

recess. We apologize to our witnesses. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LANTOS. The committee will resume. We will have an 

opening statement by Congressman Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I do have a full statement I would 

ask to be made part of the record. 

And I welcome our very, very distinguished witnesses today and 

thank them and commend them for their extraordinary service. I 
6

would like to raise one issue and commend the General and Ambassador Fried for the work that they have done in the area of 

human trafficking. 

NATO, I remember when we were trying to get Nicholas Burns, 

who did take the lead to try to take the Bush policy of zero tolerance to NATO, and there was pushback. I remember meeting with 

a few of the top people. I will never forget. One of the top admirals 

said, what happens when my guys offload in Greece, and they are 

on R&R. I said, they don’t have entitlement, in my opinion, to go 

and rape and abuse young women. And I pointed out to him that 

both my wife and I had just left a shelter in Athens, two shelters, 

as a matter of fact, where we found a number of woman who had 

been trafficked and who had been abused in the most horrific ways, 

raped day in and day out, and unfortunately, servicemen of various 

nations had been part of that complement of people who had 

abused them. 

Thankfully that, I hope and I believe, is changing, the TIP report 

has made it very clear that progress is being made. The zero tolerance policy is becoming part and parcel of all that NATO is doing. 

Obviously, we need to take the lead when it comes to respect for 

women, and it seems to me that NATO is making a Herculean effort in that regard. 

So thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith of New Jersey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to everybody. First of all, I’d like 

to propose my answer to the question this hearing proposes: NATO, how valuable 

an asset? Very, very valuable, today as yesterday. 

In fact I’d like to commend our President and present and recent Secretaries of 

State and Defense for improving cooperation with so many of our NATO allies since 

the difficult years of 2003 and 2004. I’d like to commend you for your success in 

moving the alliance through its transition from a regional into a global security organization, and from an alliance prepared to defend us against massive conventional 

and nuclear Soviet aggression—aggression which, I thank God, never took place—

to one preparing to meet the much more elusive threats of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and instability in failed states. 

This transition is a tremendous undertaking, and, in working so hard to promote 

it, our President and his Cabinet have shown the courage to make difficult decisions. 

Second, and this connects to respect for human rights, one of the things we have 

to do in enlarging NATO is integrate not just militaries but military cultures. 

After World War II, we made great efforts to ensure that the new West German 

army would not continue the old Germany military culture, which was harsh and 

emphasized blind obedience to any order, no matter how cruel. We worked with the 

new democratic West German government to create a new military culture, which 

respected the conscience and dignity of soldiers and civilians. What a success that 

effort was! How deeply the German military reformed! Now the German army is, 

from the perspective of respect fro human rights, in peacekeeping and in combat, 

a model NATO military. 

Many of our new NATO allies come to us with military cultures about which we 

should ask hard questions—I am thinking here about the involvement of the armies 

of East-Central Europe in terrible anti-Semitic abuses during World War II. I am 

skeptical whether, during their forty years in the Warsaw Pact, the communist dictators of Eastern Europe reformed their country’s military cultures. 

So I will say now, I am going to be asking you later: What we are doing about 

the military cultures of our new allies? 

Third, two weeks ago I read, in the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2007, that 

our State Department gives a very positive report of the measures being taken by 
7

NATO to prevent both military and civilian personnel under its authority from engaging in human trafficking or sexual exploitation and abuse. 

I am very glad to be able to say this. I look forward to exploring those measures 

in more detail with our witnesses, including how those practices might serve as best 

practices for other military entities.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Any other colleague would like to make an opening comment? 

If not, it is my extraordinary pleasure and honor to introduce our 

two most distinguished witnesses. 

General John Craddock is one of the most accomplished military 

officers in the United States. He serves as NATO’s Supreme Allied 

Commander in Europe. In this role, he is the top military commander for the entire alliance, and he is responsible for the security of all member states. 

Among his many career distinctions, let me just mention that he 

was Commander of United States forces for the initial all-important historic mission in Kosova. He served as Commander of U.S. 

Southern Command. It is a long list of extremely important military assignments. 

We are honored to hear directly today from NATO’s top commander about the future of the alliance. 

General Craddock, we are delighted to have you, and the floor is 

yours. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, COMMANDER, 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND OF 

EUROPE, UNITED STATES ARMY 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Lantos, distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Before providing you a few thoughts on the future of NATO, I 

would like to highlight the current operations in which the alliance 

is involved. 

By doing so, I believe I will provide you with the strategic context through which NATO’s future is entwined. 

Mr. Chairman, I submitted a written statement and ask that it 

be made an official part of the record. 

Chairman LANTOS. Without objection. 

General CRADDOCK. The 50,000 deployed NATO military forces 

are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO’s resolve to collectively meet the security challenges. 

The men and women of the alliance, plus 17 other contributing 

nations, are redefining the role of NATO and operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics and 

Africa. 

The International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, in Afghanistan remains NATO’s most important and challenging mission 

with over 40,000 personnel from 37 nations. The alliance has responsibility for ISAF operation throughout the entire country, 

working alongside U.S.-lead coalition forces of Operation Enduring 

Freedom and other international participants. 

ISAF’s mission is to provide a secure and stable environment in 

which Afghan institutions can develop and expand their influence. 
8

NATO also continues its mission in the Balkans, notably Kosova, 

whose future status is currently under discussion in the United 

Nations. 

Today NATO has over 15,500 well-trained capable personnel providing for a safe and secure environment in their province. 

Operation Active Endeavor, NATO’s only ongoing Article 5 mission, aims to disrupt, deter and defend against terrorism in the 

Mediterranean. In this operation, maritime forces are patrolling 

sea lines of communication, sharing relevant intelligence and information with littoral nations and, when required, conducting compliant boarding of suspect ships. 

In Iraq, NATO nears completion of its training missions in support of the Iraqi Army. We are on track to turn over command and 

control of the officer training programs to the Iraqi army in July. 

Recently, the North Atlantic Council agreed to adapt this mission 

to include providing gendarmerie-type training for the leadership of 

the Iraqi national police with a target date of this fall to begin that 

effort. 

In Africa, NATO also assists the African Union with its peace 

keeping mission in Sudan. The alliance has provided airlift for 

troop rotations, conducted staff capacity-building activities at key 

headquarters in Ethiopia and Darfur, and deployed mobile training 

teams to work with our AU counterparts. 

The strategic partnership between NATO and the European 

Union has never been more important. With 21 of the 26 nations 

of the alliance, also members of the European Union, it is vital that 

we take a broad approach to the security challenges we collectively 

face. 

With respect to NATO’s future, the heads of state endorse the 

comprehensive political guidance at the 2006 Riga Summit. The 

guidance laid out broad parameters for how NATO should develop 

and respond to the challenges of the 21st century. I believe the document actually captures the future direction of the alliance. And I 

would like to highlight the key points from this document. 

First, NATO will continue——

Chairman LANTOS. General, could you pull the mike a little closer to you, sir? 

General CRADDOCK. Yes. 

Chairman LANTOS. I want to be sure everybody hears you. 

General CRADDOCK. First, NATO will continue to follow the 

broad approach to security outlined in the 1999 Strategic Concept. 

Second, the strategy calls for the alliance to perform fundamental 

security tasks, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and partnership. 

The alliance will remain ready on a case-by-case basis and by 

consensus to contribute to conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management. This includes non-Article 5 crisis response operations. 

While the focus for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE, headquarters is on successful execution of military 

operations on three continents, these operations are simultaneously 

helping NATO to achieve a more enduring goal for the alliance. 

And that goal is transformation. 
9

The ambitious NATO transformation agenda includes development of more agile, flexible and expeditionary military forces. 

A few of the major components of transformation are the NATO 

Response Force, strategic airlift, optimization of force structures 

and partnership. 

The NATO Response Force is an initiative proposed by the 

United States and adopted by the alliance at the 2002 Prague 

Summit. It provides an adaptable, deployable force capable of responding to emergency crises and conducting the full range of military missions from crisis management to forced entry operations. 

Another major component of NATO transformation is an ongoing 

effort to acquire dedicated strategic airlift. Long-term initiatives include the purchase of C–17 and A400 aircraft by consortiums within NATO. 

The optimization of national force structures is a third transformational effort. This concept encourages alliance militaries to invest in special and high-demand capabilities in lieu of the traditional full spectrum of forces. 

These investments are greatly needed within the alliance and are 

particularly viable options for member nations with smaller militaries. 

Finally, NATO’s Partnership for Peace, or PFP program, is an 

important transformational factor in bringing the 23 partner nations closer to the alliance. This program has been instrumental in 

assisting nations to move beyond their Cold War legacy and adapting their military forces to alliance norms. 

In conclusion, the Alliance is confronted with an unstable world. 

NATO has demonstrated a growing capability to adjust to the rapidly changing global security challenges since the end of the Cold 

War. The leadership and the capabilities that our nation contributes to the alliance remain fundamental to preserving transatlantic 

partnership and security. The dedicated men and women of our 

militaries are committed to assuring our collective security both at 

home and at strategic distances. 

It is imperative that the political leadership of NATO nations 

provide the resources and support required to accomplish accepted 

missions. Continued Congressional support for this alliance and its 

effort is essential. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to responding to your committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND OF EUROPE, UNITED STATES ARMY

Before providing you my thoughts on the Future of NATO, I would like to highlight current operations in which the Alliance is involved and by doing so, provide 

you with the strategic context through which NATO’s future is entwined. 

NATO OPERATIONS

The 50,000 deployed NATO military forces currently under my command in my 

other role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) are a visible demonstration of NATO’s resolve to collectively meet security challenges. While political 

consultations among nations help sustain unity of purpose, men and women of the 

Alliance, plus 17 other troop-contributing nations, are essentially redefining the role 

of NATO by their actions in operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics, and Africa. 
10

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains NATO’s most important and challenging mission. With over 40,000 forces from 37 nations, nearly 

39,000 of which are contributed by the 26 NATO member nations, the Alliance has 

responsibility for ISAF security and stability operations throughout Afghanistan. 

Working alongside U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(OEF) and other international actors, ISAF’s approach is to provide a secure and 

stable environment in which Afghan institutions can develop and expand their influence, while simultaneously supporting the development of an enduring Afghan capability to provide for their own security. The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs) under ISAF leadership are at the forefront of NATO’s efforts for reconstruction and stability. 

NATO continues its mission in the Balkans, notably in Kosovo, whose future status is currently under discussion in the United Nations. Today NATO has over 

15,000 well-trained and capable forces in Kosovo providing for a safe and secure environment. These forces maintain close coordination with the international and local 

authorities in Kosovo and are prepared to continue their military responsibilities in 

a post-status environment. They are equally prepared to address a broad range of 

contingencies or potential unrest associated with the determination of Kosovo’s future status. 

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE) is NATO’s only on-going mission under 

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the key article of the Treaty which considers 

an attack against one nation as an attack against all member nations. The OAE 

mission, launched in the aftermath of the attack on America in September 2001, 

aims to disrupt, deter, and defend against terrorism in the Mediterranean. Maritime 

forces of OAE are patrolling sea lines of communication, sharing relevant intelligence and information with littoral nations, and conducting compliant boarding of 

suspect ships, when required. 

ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR is important for not only its anti-terrorism activities, but 

also as a catalyst for transformation as it works to implement a network-centric 

maritime monitoring capability, which provides for real-time tracking of maritime 

vessels and notification to national authorities. This network will make our operation more effective, and ultimately, should reduce the requirement for a physical 

maritime security presence. 

In Iraq, the Alliance continues to provide essential training to the Iraqi security 

forces. Recently, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand the Iraqi training mission to include providing gendarmerie-type training for the leadership of the Iraqi 

National Police. The Alliance continues to provide training opportunities for Iraqi 

Security Force personnel outside of Iraq, at national training facilities or NATO institutions such as the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy and the NATO School 

in Oberammergau, Germany. We are on track to turn over command and control 

of the senior and midlevel officer training programs at the Iraqi Military Academy 

to the Iraqi Army in July. The second aspect of the Iraq mission includes assisting 

in the provision of equipment to the Iraqi armed forces. To date, NATO nations 

have provided arms and equipment ranging from small arms ammunition to T-72 

tanks. 

NATO has also assisted the African Union (AU) with its African Mission in Sudan 

(AMIS) peacekeeping mission. It has provided airlift for troop rotations of peacekeepers, provided staff capacity building activities at key AU headquarters in Ethiopia and Darfur, and deployed mobile training teams to work with our AU counterparts. NATO’s capacity building approach to increase stability and security on the 

continent intends to deliver long-term effects with minimal, focused resources. 

NATO-EU

The strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union (EU) has 

never been more important. With 21 of the 26 nations of the Alliance also members 

of the EU, it is absolutely vital that we take a broad approach to the security challenges we collectively face, where both military and civilian instruments are employed. The goal is to use the respective strengths of each organization to achieve 

the intended effects. 

In implementing the Berlin Plus arrangements for NATO-EU cooperation, an EU 

liaison cell was activated within my headquarters in Belgium, communicating and 

coordinating with my staff on a daily basis those operational issues that affect both 

organizations. Our NATO commanders on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan have developed practical mechanisms to communicate and coordinate their respective mandates with EU representatives on a routine basis. 

Despite this pragmatic approach by our soldiers in the field, the institutional 

NATO-EU relationship still needs to adapt, with more robust, flexible and enduring 
11

arrangements to promote more efficient, practical cooperation for our increasingly 

interdependent efforts. The ongoing operations in Afghanistan and anticipated roles 

in supporting the outcome of status talks for Kosovo should not be held hostage to 

institutional bureaucracy. Both organizations must focus on operations vice competition. 

NATO’S FUTURE

With respect to NATO’s future, Heads of State and Government endorsed ‘‘The 

Comprehensive Political Guidance’’ at the 2006 Riga Summit, laying out broad parameters for how NATO should develop in response to the challenges of the 21st 

Century. I believe the document accurately captures the future direction of the Alliance and I highlight for the committee the following key points from the document:

• The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 

Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, 

namely security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, 

and partnership.

• The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to 

contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including non-Article 5 crisis response operations. NATO needs to 

focus on ensuring that its own crisis management instruments are effectively 

drawn together. It also needs to improve its ability to cooperate with partners, relevant international organizations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organizations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and 

conducting operations.

• The Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major 

joint operations and smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance.

• Among qualitative force requirements, the following have been identified as 

NATO’s top priorities: 

— joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them; 

— high-readiness forces; 

— the ability to deal with asymmetric threats; 

— information superiority; and 

— the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance 

brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well 

as the ability to coordinate with other actors. 

TRANSFORMATION

While the focus for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) 

is on successful execution of NATO’s military operations on three continents, these 

operations are simultaneously helping NATO to achieve a more enduring goal for 

the Alliance, that of transformation. 

NATO is embracing an ambitious transformation agenda to develop more agile, 

flexible, and expeditionary military forces. Allied Command Transformation (ACT), 

NATO’s strategic headquarters based in Norfolk, Virginia, has the lead role in developing concepts and managing NATO transformation programs. It is in our nation’s interests to ensure that our collective efforts are complementary and contribute to joint and multinational interoperability. 

NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is an initiative proposed by the U.S. and adopted by the Alliance at the 2002 Prague Summit. It is a vital part of the Alliance’s 

ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises and conduct the full-range of military 

missions, from crisis management to forced entry operations, at strategic distances. 

The NRF is organized around a brigade-sized force whose units and capabilities are 

provided collectively by all members of the Alliance. This composite force maintains 

an increased level of readiness that allows portions of it to deploy on very short notice, with the entire force able to deploy no later than 30 days after notification. 

This joint and multinational force further serves as a catalyst for transformation 

and interoperability, improving NATO’s expeditionary capability in key areas such 

as multinational logistics and deployable communications. Following a comprehensive and successful live exercise (LIVEX) in June 2006, with further contributions 

of critical capabilities by nations, NATO declared at the Riga Summit the NRF to 

have attained Full Operational Capability (FOC). At FOC, the NRF is capable of 
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deploying at strategic distance and supporting the full range of potential Alliance 

missions, to include evacuations and disaster management, counter-terrorism and 

acting as an initial entry force for a larger, follow-on force. Despite the declaration 

of FOC at Riga, the future sustainability of the NRF, as it is currently structured, 

is at risk. For the upcoming NRF rotations, we are seeing repeated shortfalls across 

the spectrum of key capabilities such as logistics, combat support, strategic lift, and 

intelligence assets. With the high optempo of NATO operations, coupled with the 

commitment of forces by nations to other operations such as United Nations and European Union operations, it has become increasingly difficult to secure member nation commitments for the six-month rotations of the NATO Response Force. The financial costs of committing forces to the NRF, coupled with competing demands for 

our limited pool of military forces, are having a significant impact on nations’ willingness to provide the necessary capabilities. NATO authorities are currently working to develop initiatives to improve the implementation of the agreed NRF Concept. 

These initiatives include a long-term force pledging plan, common NATO funding 

for strategic lift for short-notice NRF deployments and, potentially, linkages of NRF 

capabilities with NATO’s strategic reserve forces. 

STRATEGIC AIR LIFT

The utility and credibility of the NRF and our deploying forces depends on the 

quick and assured availability of strategic lift. Unfortunately, the current arrangements for strategic lift of NATO forces are inadequate, depending on assets generated through national contributions or contract arrangements with commercial 

carriers. With the strategic distances involved, the threat, and austere environment 

of many of our deployment destinations, charter airlift is often not a viable option. 

It is imperative that we have the support of the nations for the two complementary initiatives aimed at providing NATO with strategic airlift capabilities. The first 

of these initiatives involves a group of 15 NATO nations, plus Sweden, currently involved in negotiations to acquire three C-17 aircraft, to be flown and maintained by 

multinational crews under multinational command from the participating nations. 

These planes would be used to support strategic airlift requirements, which could 

be NATO operations or national in character. The second of these complementary 

initiatives involves a consortium of 16 nations, led by Germany, to charter AN-124 

aircraft to provide strategic lift. 

INTEROPERABILITY

NATO’s transformation depends in large measure on the ability of disparate 

units, headquarters and nations to work together. Interoperability is a key enabler 

and is recognized as an important force multiplier. Interoperability objectives cover 

the ability to communicate with each other, to operate with each other from a procedural perspective, and to have equipment that is compatible. 

With accelerated advancements in technology, maintaining interoperable equipment is particularly difficult. Recent requirements for equipment to combat improvised explosive devices (IED) and increased needs for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, 

and Surveillance (ISR) capabilities highlight NATO’s challenge. 

Adaptation of NATO forces continues with an entire range of initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to collectively address contemporary threats and 

challenges. While these initiatives are welcomed, we also recognize the realization 

of these projects is hampered by NATO’s outdated procurement procedures that do 

not allow for the rapid purchase of emerging technologies. 

Additionally, to completely achieve the transformational goal of providing rapidly 

deployable, expeditionary forces, there is a requirement for a commonly funded logistics system that has the agility to provide immediate and comprehensive 

sustainment support. 

NATO is currently developing ideas to provide this common logistics support. In 

the last year, for example, the Alliance expanded its eligibility rules for common 

funding, to assist in theater-level logistics support of forces involved in deployments. 

Developing and approving the enduring concepts and procedures for common funding of multi-national logistics is currently on the Alliances’ horizon. 

Six broad initiatives for multinational logistic development and commitment of 

military capabilities were developed.

• Encourage more balance in the development and commitment of military capabilities

• Identify and reduce barriers to national contributions

• Further develop and enable multinational support capabilities

• Enhance logistics training and medical certification
13

• Enhance the use of contractor support capabilities to augment or where appropriate, replace military support capabilities

• Integrate the contributions of smaller nations into an optimized logistics support structure 

OPTIMIZATION OF NATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES

The cornerstone of NATO security is for Alliance members to maintain military 

capabilities that can provide mutual support to member nations. Consequently, nations (Iceland, which has no military, is an exception) have established force structures that are similar in design but with major differences in the relative size of 

each force. However, given the widely varying sizes of each nation’s military and 

military budgets, it is challenging for the smaller nations to maintain a standing 

military that is modern, and capable of performing all military tasks across the 

land, sea, and air environments. This situation is currently manifested with the Baltic nations’ inability to provide for their own air policing. 

Given these conditions, it may be time for NATO to consider developing a more 

integrated and optimized force structure. The concept for this modified force structure could investigate asking Alliance nations to focus on development of specified 

military capabilities rather than attempting to provide all elements and organizations traditionally found in a national military. The advantages of this method for 

developing force structure include: allowing a nation to channel their research and 

development budget in a more focused manner; improves the ability for NATO to 

generate the necessary and often scarce niche-capabilities, such as rotary wing assets and medical support; and lastly would facilitate a more consistent security posture across the Alliance. 

MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile Defense is not a new issue within NATO. I believe that there is a shared 

perception amongst Allies that a threat from ballistic missiles exists, as well as a 

shared desire that any US system should be complementary to any NATO missile 

defense system, and visa versa. 

The Alliance intends to pursue a three-track approach to missile defense. Firstly, 

it will continue an ongoing NATO project to develop, by 2010, a ‘‘theater missile defense’’ for protecting deployed troops from short- and medium- range missile threats. 

Secondly, NATO has committed to fully assessing the implications of the US missile 

defense system for the Alliance. The objective is to determine the possibility of linking the NATO and US defensive systems to ensure that all Alliance territory would 

be covered from missile threats. Finally, NATO is committed to continuing existing 

cooperation with Russia on theater missile defense, as well as consultations on related issues. 

MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

The Mediterranean Dialogue reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe 

is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and is an important 

component of the Alliance’s policy of outreach and cooperation. 

Seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 

Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) participate in the Dialogue whose overall 

aim is to contribute to regional security and stability through practical cooperation 

and political dialogue and to achieve better mutual understanding. 

Three of the Mediterranean Dialogue nations, Algeria, Morocco, and Israel, have 

indicated a willingness to participate at varying degrees in NATO’s Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, which focuses on countering terrorism in the Mediterranean 

Sea. Three other nations have contributed military forces and assets to NATO-led 

operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Jordan is currently contributing to the 

ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Morocco contributes to the KFOR mission in the Balkans, and Egypt had contributed forces previously to NATO operations in Bosnia. 

Each of the initiatives strengthens the relationship with NATO, increases our interoperability and contributes to our mutual security. 

NATO-RUSSIA

NATO has taken a very open, inclusive approach vis-&-vis Russia, recognizing 

Russia’s legitimate national security interests, while showing a strong determination to build a new European security order together with Russia. 

NATO and Russia have come a long way in the ten years since the NATO-Russia 

Founding Act, and the five years since the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. There has been increasingly more cooperation between our respective military 
14

forces. We have agreed on a comprehensive Action Plan on Terrorism as well as ambitious programs of technical cooperation in airspace management and theater missile defense. Just last month, the State Duma in Moscow ratified the Partnership 

for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and Russia, a step 

that will allow even closer practical cooperation and facilitate the potential exercise 

of Alliance and Russian military forces on Russian territory. 

We understand that there are Russian concerns—about Missile Defense, about 

NATO enlargement, and about arms control. These are complex political and legal 

issues that will not be easy to resolve. But NATO Allies are committed to discussing 

them, in the NATO-Russia Council as well as in other international fora. 

Clearly there is even more that we can do together—in making our forces more 

interoperable, contributing to peace support missions, in supporting each other in 

disasters and emergency situations, in fighting terrorism, and in consulting on new 

challenges such as defense against proliferation. 

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Now let me turn to the topic of NATO Enlargement. Since the Alliance was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founders to today’s 26 members—and the door to new membership remains open. At the 2006 Riga Summit, 

Heads of State and Government declared that the Alliance intends to extend further 

invitations to nations that meet NATO standards at the next Summit in 2008. Although no decision has been made on the next round of NATO expansion, three nations currently participate in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)—Albania, 

Croatia, and Macedonia. In addition to the three aspirant countries already noted, 

two other nations, Ukraine and Georgia, participate in an intensified dialogue with 

NATO, an important step in the commitment to a closer relationship with the Alliance and its members. 

While the Membership Action Plan (MAP) provides specific advice and practical 

support tailored to the individual needs of nations wishing to join NATO, NATO’s 

Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has been an important, additional factor in 

bringing a number of the 23 Partner nations closer to, and more interoperable with, 

the Alliance. The PfP has been instrumental in helping Partner nations move beyond their Cold War legacy, assisting with a number of initiatives to restructure 

and reform Partner military institutions, to include disposing of redundant or obsolete weapons and reintegrate military personnel into civilian life. Increasingly, Partner nations are adapting their military forces to Alliance operational norms. PfP 

training initiatives and joint exercises have helped make Partner forces more interoperable with those of NATO, encouraging and enhancing their contribution to 

NATO-led operations. 

CONCLUSION

NATO has demonstrated a progressive nature and capability to adjust to the 

rapid changes confronting European and global security since the end of the Cold 

War. The Alliance has been confronted with an unstable world, humanitarian crises, 

regional conflict, and terrorism on a multi-national scale simultaneously as the 

speed of global change, the impact of new threats and risks to our collective security—and the second and third order effects of these types of threats from events 

around the world—have increased in this interdependent, interconnected world. 

This is the reality of the 21st Century. NATO has responded with capabilities at 

hand and developed new capabilities, new policies, and new partnerships to address 

these challenges. 

NATO is now entering its most challenging period of transformation, adapting not 

only to the realities of a changed Europe, but facing the multi-faceted demands of 

constantly adapting to a changing world. It is institutionalizing the Alliance’s role 

as a modern instrument of security and stability for its members. NATO is taking 

important steps to complete its transformation from a static, reactive Alliance focused on territorial defense to an expeditionary, proactive Alliance working with nations to deter and defeat the spectrum of 21st Century threats confronting our collective security. The Alliance is overcoming institutional inertia, out-dated business 

practices, and Cold War era understandings of its role, thereby erasing self-imposed 

limits that directly reduce the security of its members and partners, individually 

and collectively. At the same time, the Alliance is assessing the threats we face, understanding better their interaction, and developing new capabilities and partnerships to successfully address these threats. 

NATO was founded in 1949 as an Alliance based on democratic values and collective defense. Although the threat environment and our operational capabilities have 

changed significantly over the last, nearly 60 years, the core values we represent 
15

and the need for cooperation and collective security have not changed. The NATO 

Alliance, its Partnerships and special relationships with other nations remain important to our own nation, now and into the future.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much for a very comprehensive and thoughtful overview, General Craddock. 

Our next witness is Ambassador Daniel Fried, who currently 

serves with great distinction as Assistant Secretary of State, the 

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. He has been one of our 

most preeminent Foreign Service officers whose career in the diplomatic service began 30 years ago. 

He witnessed the Cold War at close range, having been stationed 

in Belgrade in what was then called Leningrad and then with a 

distinguished diplomatic service as our Ambassador in Warsaw. He 

served in Warsaw from November 1997 until May 2000. 

Prior to his current position, Ambassador Fried was Assistant to 

the President and Senior Director for European and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council. 

We are delighted to have you, Ambassador Fried. 

The microphone is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FRIED. Thank you, Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member RosLehtinen, and members. 

I appreciate you giving my colleague, General Craddock, and myself the opportunity to share thoughts about NATO. 

The title of this hearing asks a question: How valuable an asset, 

with respect to NATO? And I would like to start with a simple answer. 

NATO has critical value to the United States. NATO is in action 

now and will be in the future. And if NATO did not exist, we would 

have to invent it. NATO, simply put, is the great security arm of 

the transatlantic alliance of democracies. To illustrate that, I will 

mention NATO’s current operations and highlight also NATO’s 

transformation, which is perhaps halfway through. We have done 

much to prepare NATO for its 21st century role; though more 

needs to be done. 

Mr. Chairman, during the Cold War, NATO focused on Europe 

because that is where the dangers were. Now, without abandoning 

its core missions, NATO increasingly looks outward to dangers that 

can have roots far beyond Europe. These dangers can include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states and insecurity of energy 

resources. 

Protecting NATO members now requires building partnerships 

around the globe and developing new capabilities. 

This shift is historic. Europe’s western half, thanks in large part 

to NATO, has been at peace since 1945, the longest peace in Western Europe since Roman times and one now extended throughout 

Europe. Eleven states once behind the Iron Curtain are now democracies contributing to security within NATO. NATO’s mission 

spans a wide geography and wide array of activities. That trend is 

only going to continue. 
16

NATO’s scope is demonstrated by NATO’s two largest ongoing 

operations: Kosova and Afghanistan. 

In Kosova, the alliance has over 15,000 personnel deployed, less 

than 10 percent of them American; 24 of 26 NATO nations contribute forces to KFOR and so do 11 non-NATO contributing countries. 

When Kosova’s status is resolved, which we believe will be soon, 

and through supervised independence, KFOR will continue to 

maintain a safe and secure environment during the critical period 

ahead. Every poll taken in Kosova shows NATO to be the single 

most respected institution there. Kosova is a challenge, but it is 

also a success story for the alliance. By proceeding with resolution 

of its status, we can move toward ending this post-conflict military 

involvement. 

NATO’s largest and most challenging mission is in Afghanistan, 

and the nature of that mission says a lot about NATO’s transformation today. 

Consolidation of the stable, democratic Afghanistan is a critical 

national interest for all our allies. The tools that NATO needs to 

succeed in Afghanistan, expeditionary capability, counter-insurgency capacity and, most important, an ability to combine security 

with governance and development, and to work with other organizations to that end will define the directions NATO must go in the 

future. 

Reports on a Taliban offensive this spring were all of the journalistic rage for months. But this offensive never materialized thanks 

largely to the efforts and sacrifices of Afghan, United States and 

allied forces. Instead, it was NATO that took the offensive this 

spring with our own civil and military efforts: 37 countries, 26 allies, 11 non-NATO partners participate in the U.N.-mandated ISAF 

force; 40,000 troops, 24,000 are from our allies and partners and 

serve throughout all of Afghanistan. 

As you did, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note especially the 

contributions of allies, such as the Canadians and the Dutch, who 

have fought and suffered casualties in the south. But NATO allies 

are doing their job throughout Afghanistan. Someone has to serve 

in the west and the north, and the Spanish, the Italians, and Germans are doing so. 

We have continued to press allies to fulfill shortfalls in ISAF, 

and since last fall, allies and partners have pledged over 7,000 new 

troops, most without caveats. Half of those are American, but half 

are allied. Although some caveats remain a concern, allies have expressed a willingness to come to each other’s aid should a need 

arise. We do believe there is a flexibility. 

Today Afghanistan has a democratically elected President and 

Parliament. Five million refugees have returned. The number of 

children attending school has increased fivefold to 6 million, 2 million of those girls, who had no access to schools of any kind under 

the Taliban. 

NATO faces the possibility that some of the world’s most threatening and unstable regimes could develop nuclear weapons. Iran 

already possesses hundreds of medium-range and short-range ballistic missiles and is developing longer-range capabilities. The 

United States has proposed a long-range missile defense system in 
17

Europe, and at April’s meeting of NATO’s ministers in Oslo, our 

NATO allies were nearly unanimous in support. 

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has noted that United States 

missile defense plans do not upset a strategic balance of Europe as 

some outside NATO had charged and that NATO could help bolt 

together, his words, bolt together United States plans with allied 

plans and NATO’s own plans, hopefully even in cooperation with 

Russia. 

As has always been the case in NATO, ours and other national 

defense efforts contribute to the security as a whole. Security, as 

we learned the hard way, in the 20th century is indivisible. If Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. 

NATO is also transforming. In 1994, NATO had 16 members and 

no partners. It had never conducted a military operation. At the 

end of 2005, the Alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously and had 26 members and partnership relations with 

20 other countries around the world. Developing the capabilities so 

NATO can launch and sustain such missions takes political will 

and resources, and here NATO has much to do yet. 

The Riga Summit last November marked an important step forward in NATO’s transformation to meet these new challenges. At 

Riga, the NATO Response Force was declared to have reached full 

operational capability. This is a 25,000 soldier-strong land, air and 

sea force, and NRF can act as a quick-reaction expeditionary force 

with as little as 5 days warning time. 

The Strategic Airlift Initiative is an important step in addressing 

one of NATO’s chronic weaknesses, the lack of dedicated strategic 

lift and a key capability as NATO increasingly operates thousands 

of miles from Europe. 

NATO Special Operations Force Initiative will improve the coordination of interoperability of allied special operations forces. 

And NATO’s various partner initiatives, such as the NATO 

Training Cooperation Initiative, constitutes part of our outreach to 

new partners, including in the broader Middle East. 

There has been progress since Riga on all, but there is still much 

work to do on all. 

Another significant transformation has been the growth in 

NATO’s membership. NATO enlargement is one of the great successes in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. This process 

continues as Albania, Croatia and Macedonia complete another 

cycle of the Membership Action Plan and seek invitations in 2008. 

Georgia and perhaps the Ukraine are pursuing reforms and may 

seek eventual NATO and possibly EU membership. Other countries, such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia, may also choose this 

path. 

The April 2008 Bucharest Summit will seek to build on these 

successes, strengthening NATO’s capabilities and its global reach 

to undertake global missions with partners around the world. 

NATO has more to do in each category, as I said, but it is in action in key operations around the world. It is the greatest security 

instrument of the transatlantic democratic community with which 

we can deal with security challenges today and tomorrow. 
18

Mr. Chairman, members, thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee, 

thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you our thoughts on NATO’s 

value to international security and defense. 

I want to make two key points. First, I will describe how NATO is critically important in meeting the security challenges North America and Europe face today. Second, I will highlight the significant transformation that NATO has undergone and 

which it will continue to undergo. NATO is perhaps halfway through this transformation, in terms both of policies and capabilities. Some Allies could be doing 

more to support NATO operations. But the trend over the past several years is good: 

we see an Alliance effectively transforming itself and taking on the security challenges of the twenty-first century. 

MEETING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Consider at the outset where we started. During the Cold War, NATO focused almost exclusively on Europe—recovering from WWII, building democracy in its aftermath, and defending freedom against Soviet aggression. While NATO has not abandoned its core missions and is aware of concerns from some of its new members, 

NATO increasingly looks outward—because the challenges to our common security 

are global, with their roots far beyond Europe. These dangers include violent extremism that preys on fragile societies, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

failed states, cyber attacks, and insecurity of energy resources, to name a few. Effectively protecting the security of NATO members in the face of these global challenges requires NATO to take on operations far afield, build partnerships with others who share NATO’s values and can contribute to common goals, and develop new 

capabilities to meet these new kinds of challenges. 

We should consider the magnitude of this historic shift. Europe’s western half has 

now been at peace since 1945, the longest general peace since the Pax Romana, and 

this peace is now extended throughout Europe. Eleven states once behind the Iron 

Curtain are now democratic nations contributing to common security within NATO. 

There is still critical work to be done in Europe—for example, helping the nations 

of the Balkans maintain security while building democratic, prosperous societies 

and joining the European mainstream. We are aware of security challenges in Europe’s East. But the most critical security challenges NATO faces today have their 

roots outside of Europe. And so NATO today is focused on how the United States 

and Europe can work together to deal with challenges in the rest of the world. 

NATO’s missions have spanned a wide geography—from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Darfur and Louisiana. And they can span a wide array of activities: from 

high-intensity peacekeeping, with combat as necessary, to airlift in support of other 

humanitarian or peacekeeping goals, to counter-terrorist naval operations. We expect that this trend is only going to continue. Because when faced with daunting 

security problems, our leaders always ask, ‘‘Who can help deliver a solution?’’ The 

answer often is NATO. 

Clearly, there were differences within Europe, and between much of Europe and 

the United States, over the war in Iraq. Yet these differences never paralyzed 

NATO. In 2003, NATO established air defenses for Turkey against a possible Iraqi 

response to coalition operations. In August 2003, as differences over Iraq flared, 

NATO took over the ISAF operation in Kabul, and began the long process of expanding that operation to cover the entire country of Afghanistan. Though their role 

is different, there are now more forces under NATO command in Afghanistan than 

under Operation Enduring Freedom. And in 2004, Allies agreed to establish a 

NATO Training Mission inside Iraq, charged with the critical role of training and 

mentoring Iraqi security forces officers. All 26 Allies contribute to NATO’s mission 

in Iraq, either through personnel or funding. 

Critics may argue that the United States does not believe in NATO, and instead 

prefers coalitions of the willing. Others charge that Europeans are not assuming 

their share of the hard military burden. Neither accusation is true today, and it is 

the job of Allied leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to make sure they never become true. 
19

In fact, the United States and Europe are working together, through NATO, dealing effectively with the real security challenges we face as a democratic community. 

This cooperation is demonstrated by NATO’s two largest operations today: Kosovo 

and Afghanistan. 

KOSOVO

It has been eight years since NATO intervened to stop Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing 

in Kosovo. Starting from a bombing campaign to drive out Milosevic’s killers and 

then an initial Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment of approximately 40,000, the Alliance currently has over 15,500 personnel deployed. Twenty-four of 26 NATO nations 

contribute forces to KFOR, along with 11 non-NATO contributing countries. 

Just over 1,500 of these are American: U.S. National Guard soldiers, currently led 

by the Virginia-based 29th Infantry Division. Our Guardsmen and women have 

played an important role in community building in both Serb and Albanian areas 

and are viewed by both groups as vital to the success of NATO’s operations. 

NATO is in Kosovo with the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and others—providing basic 

security, while the work of building a society goes on in many other ways. NATO’s 

role is critical, but it is only part of the picture. 

When Kosovo’s status is resolved, which we believe will be through supervised 

independence, KFOR will continue to maintain a safe and secure environment during this critical time, by providing a robust security presence throughout its area 

of operations. Every poll taken in Kosovo shows NATO to be the single most respected institution there. 

After status resolution, KFOR will supervise the establishment of a small, lightly 

armed, multiethnic Kosovo Security Force and oversee the creation of a civilian institution to provide civilian control over it. Development of these structures will hasten the day when Kosovo can provide its own security and NATO can successfully 

conclude its deployment in the region. Kosovo’s provisional government has already 

signaled that it will wish to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace when possible, and 

begin contributing to NATO operations itself. 

I also want to note, that as we implement Kosovo’s final status, we must not leave 

Serbia behind. Serbia deserves a European future. As Serbia takes the steps it must 

take—reforms at home and cooperation with the ICTY war crimes tribunal at The 

Hague, the transatlantic community must take clear, strong steps to bring Serbia 

into our family and institutions. For that reason, I was pleased that Serbia and the 

European Union have re-opened talks aimed at Serbia’s closer integration into Europe. 

Kosovo has been a success story for the Alliance. By proceeding with the resolution of its status, we can move toward ending our post-conflict military involvement 

and put the Balkan region on the road to becoming an exporter, rather than a consumer, of security. 

AFGHANISTAN

NATO’s largest and most challenging mission today is in Afghanistan, a mission 

that says a lot about NATO today, and where it is going. The fact that NATO is 

in Afghanistan at all is a reflection of the changing security environment facing our 

Alliance. Events thousands of miles from NATO territory have a direct impact on 

the security of NATO members. The strengthening of a stable, democratic society 

in Afghanistan is likewise a critical national interest for all Allies. The tools that 

NATO needs to succeed in Afghanistan—from combat forces, to peacekeeping, to 

global partners, to coordination with civilian donors and institutions largely define 

the directions in which NATO must grow in the future. 

Afghanistan provided the training ground for the September 11, 2001 armed attack on a NATO member—the United States. The Alliance reacted with speed and 

unity in invoking Article 5 for the first time. Europe recognizes that global jihadist 

ideology and organizations threaten not only the United States, but also either inspired or directly coordinated attacks on NATO Allies in Madrid, London, and 

Istanbul. While NATO did not immediately engage militarily, it began consultations 

about Afghanistan, individual Allies gradually joined coalition operations, and in 

2003 NATO took the first step by taking over the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul. 

Many were concerned that this spring would bring a Taliban offensive of greater 

strength and severity than 2006. Reports on this enemy campaign were all the rage 

for months. That offensive never materialized thanks largely to the efforts and sacrifices of Afghan, U.S. and Allied forces. 

Instead, NATO has taken the initiative this spring with our own civil and military 

efforts: NATO and Afghan forces have increasingly denied the Taliban safe haven 
20

in Afghanistan, and the Government of Pakistan has done same across the border. 

We have taken many mid- and senior-level Taliban leaders out of the fight; and we 

have more closely linked military operations with follow-on reconstruction efforts to 

help the civilian population. 

Our ‘‘comprehensive approach’’ in Afghanistan, where soldiers and reconstruction 

experts work hand-in-hand, where NATO security efforts support the priorities of 

Afghanistan’s democratic leadership, shows how NATO is likely to operate in coming decades. 

Today, 37 countries—26 Allies and 11 non-NATO partners—participate in NATO’s 

UN-mandated International Security Assistance Forces, providing over 40,000 

troops. About 24,000 of these troops—nearly 60 percent—are from our Allies and 

partners, and (since October 2006) serve throughout all of Afghanistan. Many of our 

allies also continue to contribute to the separate Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) mission in Afghanistan, spearheaded by the United States. 

At a time when our own military is stretched, it is important to recognize the tremendous impact that Allied contributions have on our own security. Together with 

growing Afghan forces, Allied forces are fighting off the Taliban, securing Afghan 

territory, protecting Afghan counternarcotics teams, helping extend the authority of 

the democratically elected Afghan government, and enabling reconstruction and development that is improving the lives of the Afghan people. 

At the NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006, as well as at four Foreign and 

Defense Ministerial meetings since January, NATO Allies and partners reaffirmed 

their commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We have continued to press Allies to 

fill force shortfalls in ISAF, and since last fall Allies and partners have pledged well 

over 7,000 new troops to the mission—half of them U.S., and half European—and 

most without caveats. Although some caveats restricting operations of longstanding 

deployed forces remain a concern, Allies have expressed a willingness to come to 

each others’ aid, should the need arise, and new forces are providing commanders 

with increased flexibility. 

NATO forces increasingly serve side-by-side with Afghan National Security 

Forces. The United States, along with its NATO Allies and partners, are doing everything possible to train and equip Afghan National Army and Police forces so they 

can take an ever increasing role in providing for Afghanistan’s security. Allies and 

partners are adding new embedded training teams and sending much needed arms 

and equipment. The recent supplemental passed by Congress, which provided funding to better train and equip Afghan forces, has helped us leverage even more from 

other contributors. 

We are also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion over 

the last year in new multi-year assistance. Afghanistan deserves our full effort and 

we believe the international community can and should do still more. Europe recognizes that Afghanistan matters for its own security and European partners have 

provided, individually or through the European Commission, over $2.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction since 2002. 

It’s important to underline the scope and scale of the changes over the past five 

years in Afghanistan, due in large part to the combined efforts of the United States 

and its Allies. Afghanistan has a democratically elected President and Parliament. 

Five million Afghans have returned to their country. The number of children attending school has increased five-fold since 2001 to six million, two million of those 

girls—who had no access to schools under the Taliban. Over 80 percent of Afghans 

have access to basic healthcare and approximately 6,000 kilometers of new roads 

are expanding commerce and opportunity. However, the challenges that remain are 

real and our commitment must not waiver. 

NATO AND MISSILE DEFENSE

A final example of how Europe is working together with the United States to address security challenges is through missile defense. 

Today, NATO faces the possibility that some of the world’s most threatening and 

unstable regimes can develop nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver 

them to Europe and even the United States. Iran already possesses hundreds of medium range Shahab-3 and short-range ballistic missiles. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all 

of Europe and the United States by 2015 if it continues on its present course. 

NATO has also begun to explore options to protect the Alliance against ballistic 

missile threats. NATO’s work on missile defense has focused on three activities: the 

Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, technical 

work to support decisions on possible missile defense for the protection of NATO ter-
21

ritory and population centers, and cooperation with Russia on Theater Missile Defense. 

In 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved the ALTBMD program, a NATOfunded Command and Control structure to integrate member states’ sensors and 

missile defense interceptors. This system is focused on protecting of NATO deployed 

forces against ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km (shorter-to-medium 

range missile defense). NATO plans to achieve by 2010 an initial capability to defend NATO forces; a fully operational system capable of protecting defined areas

against missiles up to 3,000 km is tentatively planned for the 2015–2016 timeframe. 

At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which found that missile defense 

for all NATO territory is technically feasible within the assumptions and limitations 

of the study. At April’s meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo there was near 

unanimity in support of missile defense from our NATO allies. Minister after minister acknowledged that a genuine threat exists. Now that the United States is proposing a long-range missile defense system in Europe, Allies have agreed to assess 

the implications for the Alliance of the U.S. system and the possibility of integrating 

NATO’s short- to midrange system to ensure all allied territory is protected. Allies 

also expressed support for our offers to increase cooperation with the Russians in 

the field of missile defense. 

During his press statement on April 26, Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer noted 

that U.S. missile defense plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe. He 

stated, ‘‘It is clear that there is a full understanding between the Allies that the 

plans in the framework of the third site cannot, and will not, and do not upset the 

strategic balance in Europe. There was a lot of support for the wide-ranging United 

States proposals vis-a`-vis our Russia partners for closer cooperation on missile defense.’’

Transatlantic security is indivisible. As we learned the hard way in the twentieth 

century, if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have 

U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral 

or isolationist approach to security. Our goal is to see NATO bolt its own missile 

defense efforts onto the burgeoning U.S.-led long range missile defense system, thus 

helping ensure full spectrum coverage for the entire Alliance. We need a common 

level of protection from threats for the United States and for our European allies, 

and with our NATO Allies we are working to develop that. We welcome the chance 

to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Putin’s proposal at the G8 

Summit for cooperation using the Russian radar in Azerbaijan may be an opening. 

Ideally, NATO, U.S. national efforts, and U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation 

could all work together to provide more general and comprehensive security from 

this challenge. 

TRANSFORMATION

NATO is going through its own transformation to develop its capacities and intellectual horizons to deal with these new challenges. Much more needs to be done, 

but much has been done already. 

Consider 1994: NATO was an alliance of 16 countries. It had never conducted a 

military operation. It had no partners. Now consider NATO just 11 years later, at 

the end of 2005: the Alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously; 

had 26 members, and partnership relationships with another 20 countries in Eurasia, seven in the Mediterranean, a growing number in the Persian Gulf, and a 

number of Contact Countries. 

Many of us hoped that NATO’s transformation would happen faster. We set transformational goals at the Prague Summit in 2002. We refined them at the Istanbul 

Summit in 2004. But transformation does not end—not because we fail, but because, 

in a changing world, the challenges facing NATO change. And this requires new approaches to meeting them. 

Developing the capabilities so that NATO can launch and sustain these missions 

takes political will and money. So far, the will has been in the hand-off to NATO—

but not necessarily in the will to give NATO more resources to do the job. 

NATO CAPABILITIES

The Riga Summit last November marked an important step forward in NATO’s 

transformation to meet twenty-first century challenges. 

At Riga, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was declared to have reached full operational capability. The NRF is a prime example of NATO’s transformation to meet 

global challenges. Twenty-five thousand strong land, air, and sea elements when at 

full strength, the NRF can act as a quick reaction expeditionary force capable of be-
22

ginning deployment of elements with as little as five days notice. NATO operations 

in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s showed that NATO needed a scalable option for 

dealing with operations that required limited number of troops and special capabilities, different from the Cold War era force structure. The NRF concept, launched 

at the 2002 Prague Summit, emerged in response to this perceived need. 

Even before it was declared fully operationally capable, NATO needed to mobilize 

the NRF. Elements of the NRF were used to provide additional security to the 2005 

Afghanistan elections and to provide air transport and medical assistance to refugees from the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and to the U.S. Gulf region after Hurricane Katrina. Important lessons have been learned from these operational deployments, as well as from the joint training exercise in Cape Verde. 

The NRF construct has served well as a catalyst for the transformation of Allied 

forces and capabilities but much work needs to be done to make it a viable option 

for the range of missions to which NATO may need to respond. More analysis on 

its composition, deployability, potential uses in extremis, and as a reserve force, as 

well as approval of common funding for short notice deployments, will improve the 

utility of this key capability. 

The Strategic Airlift Initiative marks an important step forward in addressing one 

of NATO’s chronic weaknesses—a lack of dedicated strategic airlift. Airlift has become increasingly important over the last five years as NATO operations have taken 

the Alliance thousands of miles from Europe. Fifteen Allies and two Partner nations 

formed a consortium to operate a small fleet of C–17 aircraft that could be used by 

consortium nations to provide airlift when needed. Participating Allies would proportionally share ownership of the fleet based on their projected annual airlift requirements. The aircraft will be nationally owned but operated by the contributing 

nations from a European airfield. All ten of the newest NATO members are participating. The initiative also offers to coordinate support structures for A–400M strategic airlift. 

The Strategic Airlift Initiative will greatly increase NATO’s capabilities to fight 

expeditionary warfare. Authorization and appropriation of the U.S. in-kind contribution of one aircraft is still underway. Allies who are not participating have expressed concerns on ownership issues, but seem closer to endorsing the NAMO 

Charter which will formalize the consortium. This initiative is important because it 

also sets an important precedent for voluntary, shared Allied investment in high 

priority strategic assets that are needed for NATO-led operations. UAVs and Air Refueling strategic assets are two examples that may follow this model. 

The Special Operations Force (SOF) Initiative will improve the coordination and 

interoperability of Allies’ special operations forces. The complex and challenging environments in which today’s military operations take place differ greatly from the 

Cold War realities NATO’s military structure was originally designed to address. 

SOF will possess the ability to span the operational continuum and are uniquely 

suited for operations in unconventional environments. The SOF initiative will enable NATO to respond to the rapidly growing need for increased SOF capabilities 

in its operations. The initiative will facilitate SOF interoperability between nations, 

disseminate key lessons learned, expand and improve SOF training, and enhance 

SOF capability among Alliance nations. 

The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI) constitutes part of NATO’s outreach to new partners in the Broader Middle East. It will deepen cooperation and 

reciprocal training opportunities with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and 

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners. NTCI seeks to promote the ability of 

NATO and the MD and ICI nations to work together; strengthen regional security 

relationships; promote durable, democratic civil-military defense structures; and enhance military-to-military cooperation. To start this effort, NATO is working to establish a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome and to possibly 

bring NATO-supported Mobile Training Teams visiting interested regional partners 

to make this training more accessible by bringing it to the region. And as interest 

and demand grow, NATO could also support developing a Strategic Cooperation 

Center in the region. 

NATO ENLARGEMENT

In addition to building its capabilities, a second significant transformation has 

been the growth in NATO’s membership. 

It is easy to forget that, back in 1989 and 1991, people spoke of a ‘‘security vacuum’’ in Central and Eastern Europe, and debated how it could be filled. Many argued that the newly free countries of Europe should have been relegated to a ‘‘gray 

zone’’ of Russian influence. But the Bush and Clinton Administrations rejected that 

course, and, today, the growth of democracy and prosperity in Central Europe, and 
23

the integration of Central European nations into NATO and the European Union, 

is a fact, so successful it is taken for granted. 

This was a great success of three U.S. Presidents. NATO acted boldly and invited 

ten countries to become members—three at the Madrid Summit in 1997, and seven 

more at the Prague Summit in 2002. These actions, along with the expansion of the 

European Union, secured a future of freedom, democracy, market economy, human 

rights, and the rule of law for over 100 million people. We rejected a gray zone, and 

helped the people of Central Europe consolidate the freedom they had gained. 

To be clear—it was not NATO and EU membership itself that made the difference, but the realistic prospect of membership that convinced nations to make 

hard decisions about political, economic and defense reform. In the pursuit of NATO 

(and EU) membership, countries pursued reforms that improved the lives and opportunities of their citizens in ways far beyond basic security and defense. These 

reforms strengthened individual rights and freedoms, institutionalized democratic 

systems, fostered market economies, resolved border disputes, and protected minorities. All were challenging; many were hard; none could have been accomplished 

without political will. 

Today, this process continues as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, and 

Ukraine pursue reforms and seek eventual NATO and possibly EU membership. 

Others, such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia, may also choose this path. 

NATO enlargement is still playing this transformative role. European countries 

still seek to join NATO, strengthening their democracies, their economies, and their 

militaries through reform and through working together with NATO. They believe 

that NATO membership is in their interest. But it is also in NATO’s interest to add 

new members that meet NATO’s performance-based standards. Democratic, market 

economies strengthen the Alliance with their commitment to share values and their 

determination to contribute to common security—whether by reducing tensions 

among neighbors or deploying troops as part of NATO operations. 

Despite recent rhetoric on this topic, gone are the days when security in these regions was a cold calculus. Zero-sum thinking when it comes to security is an anachronism. NATO’s history demonstrates the ability not only of nations, but of entire 

regions to transform fundamentally. Every state has the right to choose its own security orientation, its own future, for its own people. And by building strong, stable, 

democratic, prosperous societies, everyone’s security is strengthened. A more secure 

Europe means a more a secure United States and, though they would disagree, it 

means ultimately a more secure Russia as well. 

As was agreed at the November 2006 Riga Summit, NATO should issue new invitations for membership to qualified candidates at its next Summit in Bucharest in 

2008. NATO is prepared to do its part, and they must do theirs by putting in place 

the reforms and policies necessary to meet NATO standards and contribute to the 

Alliance. 

THE WAY AHEAD

The April 2008 Bucharest Summit will address many, if not all, of these issues. 

For us, Bucharest is about using NATO effectively to deal with today’s security challenges, and strengthening NATO, with new capabilities and new members, so it is 

prepared to face the challenges of tomorrow. At the fourth major NATO Summit in 

this Administration, our goal is to consolidate and strengthen what we launched in 

Prague, refined in Istanbul, and built upon at Riga. 

Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look 

forward to your questions.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Ambassador Fried. 

Both you and General Craddock have given us extraordinarily 

valuable presentations, and I would like to begin by picking up 

your phrase, Ambassador Fried, that if NATO did not exist, we 

would need to invent this. 

I have given this a lot of thought over many years because clearly were we to invent NATO today, it would be a very different entity with very different geographic composition and very different 

missions. 

One of the most powerful stories of the Second World War is the 

story of the guns of Singapore which were aimed at the sea because 

the Brits expected that to be a sea-born invasion. But the enemy 

came over land, and the guns of Singapore were never used. 
24

Now, NATO is not like that, because with the creativity and the 

leadership that General Craddock and other leaders have provided, 

NATO has attempted to adapt to an entirely new set of challenges 

and problems and geographic locations. 

But let me just raise the broadest philosophical question, because 

both of you are not only great military leaders and diplomats but 

thinkers about global security. 

In a period of globalization where everything is globalized, from 

academics to trade, clearly NATO ideally would be transformed 

into a global security mission. Is there any serious planning ongoing, General Craddock, under your auspices, and, Ambassador 

Fried, within the confines of the State Department, to seriously explore the transformation of this absolutely unique alliance which 

kept Europe from being overrun by the Soviet Union, which is no 

mean task, because my flippant phrase about socialist Belgium, Soviet Republic, or Portuguese Republic is not that fanciful because 

the Kremlin would have loved to have taken over Western Europe 

had it not been for NATO? 

What kind of serious thinking and planning, if any, is ongoing 

either within NATO or within the confines of the State Department? And what kind of work would you like us to authorize and 

support financially and intellectually and in other ways that would 

more rapidly transform NATO into a global security alliance designed to deal with the challenges of the 21st century, which is 

very unlikely to be big army, big air force, big navy challenges, although we cannot discount that possibility, but much more likely 

to be terrorism challenges, weapons of mass destruction challenges 

from rogue nations and the like? 

General Craddock, would you start with sort of a speculative answer on a very speculative question? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, chairman. 

Indeed, it is a global perspective. 

If I may, maybe I’ll start small and try to widen the construct. 

The notion of a global security organization is indeed fascinating 

and provocative. There obviously are political constraints that will 

tenure and flavor all of the arguments in the North Atlantic Council. If I may, from a Supreme Headquarters Allied-Powers Europe 

perspective, address the notion of partners at this time. 

We obviously have 26 members, and we have partners and we 

have different categories of those who would aspire to be members 

or who would like to gain contact status, if you will. 

Any active planning? Right now, we are working through the 

sourcing and the long-term viability of the NATO Response Force. 

As Ambassador Fried indicated, this is a 25,000-person force, 

very robust, specified missions from a high-order conventional combat capability to a low-order response to humanitarian disaster. It 

is a graduated readiness requirement. So all nations have to come 

together and bid on what capabilities they want to contribute. 

And we are finding now a difficult task at my headquarters when 

we asked the nations to come in and subscribe to these capabilities 

for them to do so. So what we call our fill of the requirements is 

not where we want it to be. 

Now part of looking broadly at this issue is, where can, not only 

members but partner nations who might have capabilities and 
25

want to be a part of that, contribute in an expansion of the capability of NATO? So we are exploring, what is the possibility, the 

range of possibilities, for partner nations? What are the ranges of 

possibilities that we might want, ask or need from nations, maybe 

not partners, but our contact nations throughout the world? 

So, from a perspective of planning and preparing, at my headquarters, we are looking at the ability to expand. Is that a first 

step to a global enlargement? I don’t know. That will be, obviously, 

a political decision. But I think it is indeed a recognition that the 

level of ambition is significant, and, quite frankly, and it may be 

a harsh judgment, but I think, my judgment, it is not matched by 

political will of the nations to meet that level of ambition. And we 

must continue to push on our member nations to provide that capability. Absent that, then we will either have to reduce the level of 

ambition, which hasn’t happened, or look for partners who can provide support and capability so that we are ready when called. 

I think NATO’s honor is at stake; that if the force is not ready 

when called, we will be called to answer for it. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Fried. 

Mr. FRIED. You have raised a question of how NATO can match 

the reality of missions around the globe with its original identity 

as a North Atlantic security organization. 

And NATO is wrestling with that, both intellectually and organizationally. 

As General Craddock said, the current policy answer that we 

have is to develop our global partnerships with nations like Australia and Japan and other nations willing and able to work with 

NATO who are in fact working with NATO in, for example, Afghanistan through ISAF. 

The immediate answer to your question is NATO is a transatlantic organization with global partners, global missions and 

global capabilities. 

Now that is the current answer. 

There is a debate going on about whether NATO’s identity and 

membership should be expanded and reflect the reality of a potentially global field of activity, and in this context, Article 5 does not 

mention the Soviet Union or communism; nor is it bounded geographically. 

It talks about threats to the alliance, the members of the alliance. 

And Article 5 was invoked for the first time on September 12th, 

2001, the day after the attacks on the United States and invoked 

in response to an attack originating in Afghanistan. 

Now what I don’t have for you is an answer whether or not 

NATO will ever be ready to take that step. Right now, it is—right 

now, it is not ready to do so, and partners is where we are as an 

alliance. That is, we are developing global partnerships. These are 

useful. These contributors are important. General Craddock talked 

about what they have to contribute, and it is a very interesting notion about partners with the NATO Response Force. 

But this debate is ongoing. NATO is getting its collective minds 

around the issue of its 21st century missions. 
26

You asked what you could do to contribute, what the committee 

could do to contribute to this debate. 

I think the discussions such as this and discussions with NATO’s 

global partners would be useful. And I think helping the Congress 

and getting the executive branch used to the idea, all of us used 

to the idea of NATO’s new reach, and working with the global partners could be very useful as this debate develops. And I think it 

is going in a good direction. 

Chairman LANTOS. It is probably just youthful impatience that 

makes me feel somewhat dissatisfied with your answer because 

global conditions will not wait until our slow-moving bureaucratic 

structures catch up with the global challenges. So let me just state 

one specific example. 

General Craddock and I—I had the pleasure of having breakfast 

with him, and he mentioned this, and I hope I am not violating any 

confidences. I know I am not. 

What prevents Australia, with which we share values, with 

which we have cooperated, going back a century, in a military fashion, which has the willingness and capability and the political will 

to do the things that we are doing—after all, they took the lead in 

their part of the world in a military operation and did so magnificently—what, except the word Atlantic, prevents Australia, with 

flexibility on the part of NATO, to become a member of a renamed 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Would it not be good for General Craddock to be able to look down to Sydney and Melbourne 

and this magnificent continent with its great military capability as 

part of his domain? 

Similarly, you mentioned Japan. Clearly, there is a democratic 

peace-loving, contributing nation with significant military capabilities. Would it not make the supreme allied commander feel more 

comfortable about upcoming global crises if he would have a NATO 

of a global reach? 

Mr. FRIED. I think having robust partnerships that could contribute to NATO’s capabilities, particularly partnerships with democracies that share our values and are willing to share the burdens of security responsibilities, brings nothing but good. 

I welcome this debate, and I welcome suggestions and even pressure to make these partnerships ever more robust. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is nothing more dangerous than speculating, but I found that it is useful to start building consensus one 

step at a time with a large vision. And never say never. 

Chairman LANTOS. General Craddock, would you like to add anything, sir? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, from a best military advice perspective, 

it would indeed be enormously helpful to have democratic peaceloving nations as a part, more democratic peace-loving nations, as 

part of alliance. And the ability for them to bring, as they see fit, 

based on their judgments and their political decisions, capabilities 

to the alliance no doubt would be very helpful. 

We find that, by and large, when partners are interested, they—

we are able to work through the military modalities because we 

have common interests, maybe it is called doctrine or how we are 

brought up in multilateral organizations throughout the military 

experience around the world, particularly in this day and age. 
27

So I think that I am a bit impatient. I agree with Ambassador 

Fried. We need to have a dialogue. Enormously helpful. This dialogue is helpful. People will read about it, and I think it will be influential. 

But I think we need to crack the whip a little harder and move 

a little faster because NATO is involved today in operations, not in 

planning and preparing to counter the Warsaw Pact. Those days 

are over. And we have our service members, our soldiers, airmen, 

sailors engaged every day in operations. There are those who are 

making the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan, and I think we need 

to push harder to find answers quicker. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Continuing on the chairman’s theme of global security organization and the transformation of NATO, I wanted 

to ask a question on Israel and a question on Darfur. 

First, on Israel, if you could comment on the decision by Israel 

to contribute to Operation Active Endeavor and to finalize the cooperation agreement with NATO. Do you think this represents a 

significant step forward in a cooperation with the alliance? And do 

actions, such as Operation Active Endeavor, have the potential to 

be integrated into an action that is aimed at enforcing an embargo 

on arms to Hezbollah that is in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701? 

And, secondly, on Darfur, though NATO has provided logistical 

and other support to the African Union Mission in Sudan, advocates consistently have called on NATO to play a more direct role 

in stabilizing Darfur. Please describe, if you would, the support 

that NATO has already provided to the African mission in Sudan. 

And what role NATO would be willing to play in the future as even 

the most optimistic estimates tell us it will take at least 1 full year 

for the proposed hybrid African Union peacekeeping mission to 

reach full deployment in Darfur? Would it be appropriate for NATO 

to provide a bridging force during the interim? What would such 

a mission entail? Or given the difficulty that NATO has encountered in fielding troops for existing missions in Kosova and Afghanistan, as successful as it has been, but could the organization realistically undertake a new mission in Darfur? 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRIED. With respect to your question about Israel, Israel has 

indeed developed its relations with NATO. It is participating in Operation Active Endeavor. It is one of three Mediterranean Dialogue 

partners doing so. It has agreed to place liaison officers at various 

subcommands at NATO’s Joint Force Command at Naples, and it 

has concluded an individual cooperation plan with NATO. 

So these routine and working-level contacts and operational contacts between NATO and Israel are developing, and we welcome 

this. 

You asked a speculative question about NATO and Israel possibly operating to enforce an arms embargo against Hezbollah. 

Now, it is the nature of speculative questions that they are dangerous to try to answer. But let me anticipate other such questions 

by saying this: On September 10th, 2001, no one would have 

dreamt that NATO would be undertaking security operations in Af-
28

ghanistan. Ever. It would have not made it to an agenda item of 

any NATO meeting. And yet here we are. Here we are. 

So experience suggests that, in the 21st century, NATO can undertake operations that seemed impossible. And the distance between the impossible and the inevitable is shorter than we think. 

So I am not—I don’t want to say never. We want to see what is—

what is needed. That is not forward-leaning speculation, but it is 

a recognition that we have to be open to contingencies that may 

arise. 

General CRADDOCK. If I may add to it, I would only endorse Ambassador Fried’s statement with regard to—does Operation Active 

Endeavor have the potential to be a part of an embargo against 

Hezbollah arms. The capability is definitely resonant in Active Endeavor. The multilateral aspect, multinational contributions, the 

fact we were just recently joined by a Ukrainian ship, and there 

will be a Russian ship that will join that operation in September, 

I think is proof of the value of that operation. 

So the capability exists. The question would become one of political will and consensus to do so. 

If I may, moving on to Darfur. What have we done to date? The 

NATO contribution has been an airlift of the movement of battalions of the African peacekeepers of the African Union from their 

home station to the Darfur area. We also have participated in 

training of staffs for the African Union battalions and brigades who 

are the identified designated peacekeeping forces at this time moving into Darfur. That has been pretty much the general limit of 

participation at this time. 

What more could NATO do? That will depend, again, on the political decisions being made. 

I will tell you that, based upon the effort in Afghanistan and the 

fact that what is required there to accomplish that mission has yet 

to be sourced by the nations of NATO, I am suspect that NATO 

will take on in any large way another commitment in Darfur. 

Could NATO provide a bridging force? That could be a potential 

mission for the NATO Response Force if there were political consensus to do so. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I am going to try to marry two questions, so we can kind of get 

through to an answer. 

I want to talk about trafficking. And we have seen how NATO’s 

efforts in order to stem the small arm’s trade have had successes. 

So how can NATO or can NATO or will NATO work with international governmental organizations for a similar effort in trafficking of persons, especially since the sex trafficking is being seen 

throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? 

So is there a military civilian partnership coordinated with these 

efforts? And along with that, with Kosova, did we learn anything? 

I mean, that was happening in Kosova. Did we stem that? Have 

we learned from the Kosova experience what we need to be doing 

regarding trafficking in other parts of Europe and the world? And 
29

are we learning from Kosova what we can and should be doing in 

Afghanistan all the way around, not just on trafficking? 

That is a big question, I know that. 

Mr. FRIED. Let me start with the last piece of the question. 

Certainly some of the lessons of Afghanistan and Kosova—some 

of the lessons we have learned in Kosova we have applied to Afghanistan. And some of the difficulties we have encountered in Afghanistan have played back into Kosova, and we have learned in 

Kosova how to do things better because of that experience. 

I will illustrate that with a story. The last time I was in Kosova, 

I visited the American troops who were delivering some assistance 

to some Serbian villages, and the captains and lieutenants came up 

to me and said, this is the kind of thing we need to learn to do all 

over in Iraq, in Afghanistan. We need to learn how to get the trust 

of the local people to work with them so that troublemakers, terrorists, extremists, are marginalized and have no place. So we are 

learning that the information, the lessons learned are going back 

and forth. 

With respect to trafficking, there may be more that NATO could 

do. We have looked at this in a couple of places. 

One of the assets, one of the capabilities NATO will have to pick 

up is how to interface——

Chairman LANTOS. Could you put the mike closer to you? 

Mr. FRIED. NATO will have to learn how to work more closely 

with organizations like the European Union and NATO. We need 

to develop a seamlessness of European and military agencies, so 

you don’t have things like trafficking out of the competence of one 

organization and falling through the cracks. That is a general problem, and we are working at it. 

General CRADDOCK. Let me just add, on Operation Active Endeavor, in the Mediterranean, where we are patrolling, to stop traffickers of mass destruction, arms, things like that, if NATO would 

decide—if the decision politically would be to add to that mission 

set, search suspect vessels who may be trafficking in persons, then 

I think that would be a subset of the other mission, and it would 

be doable. 

Now let me caveat that. I hate to use that word, but it is a very 

appropriate word at this point. 

I think the nations of Europe have each, and rightfully so, their 

own judgments of and definitions of public security and national security. And in many cases, what we view as an opportunity to use 

military forces to assist the public security forces, the police, it 

sometimes, oftentimes are viewed differently there. And this may 

well be differences among nations of whether or not this is their 

sovereign police authority that they don’t want to grant to multinational forces, say, on the high sees of the Mediterranean. So 

there will have to be debate and discussion on that if that mission 

set were to be changed. 

How do we do it better? I think we are focused now on leveraging 

commercial technology into the operation. Instead of patrolling 

with Frigates and corvettes out on the Mediterranean, we are tying 

in the capability to see what is moving. 

On any one day in the Mediterranean, there are about 7,000 

ships that are out there moving around that we know about. And 
30

there are a few we don’t, and those are the ones we have to find. 

So that is the first set. 

The second is: What about the 7,000 we know? If we can tie into 

commercial shipping networks, and we know from this port to that 

port, this would be the normal path, and if we then understand 

there are variations and ships may move out of that normal steaming path and maybe do an unannounced port visit somewhere else, 

that is an aberration, and we have got to follow aberrations and 

understand these things are happening. Those will be the tippers 

that we need. 

So we are leveraging this network technology to be able to bring 

this in by coordinating agreements by nations to support this. I 

think that is the future; fewer ships out there, but where we have 

them out there, they are focused where the problems occur. 

With regard to Kosova, I think we indeed did learn lessons about 

trafficking. Kosova sits astride the centuries-old smuggling routes 

of everything from commodities to people to weapons back and 

forth, and we watched that closely. We have applied some of those 

lessons into Afghanistan, but it is a different environment with different regional consideration. But we might migrate those in. Are 

they as fast and effective as we like? Probably not. And more effort 

is required. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Congressman Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much. 

First of all, I would like to ask unanimous consent that an article 

by Captain Keith Allred on NATO anti-trafficking initiatives be 

made a part of the record. He is the senior military judge in the 

Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the U.S. Navy. And I also ask 

unanimous consent that a transcript of a video interview with the 

Assistant Secretary, General John Colston, who is NATO’s new 

anti-trafficking coordinator, be made a part of the record. 

Chairman LANTOS. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANALYSIS

COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Captain Keith J. Allred examines NATO policy on countering trafficking in human 

beings.

One of the lesser-known outcomes of NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit was the adoption of a NATO Policy Against Human Trafficking. The Policy calls human trafficking a crime meriting universal condemnation, describing it as a ‘‘modern day 

slave trade that fuels corruption and organised crime’’ bringing with it the potential 

to ‘‘destabilise fragile governments.’’ The Policy was adopted by all heads of state 

and government, and applies to all nations contributing troops to NATO operations. 

Two years on, progress is beginning to show and the initiative has led to many efforts to tackle the problem of trafficking. 

It may seem odd for NATO to have decided to make a security issue of what appears to be a social or police problem, but the initiative reflects a growing awareness 

that human trafficking poses a threat to NATO operations, which themselves can 

create or increase the demand for trafficked women. Various international organizations have estimated that hundreds of thousands of victims are trafficked each year. 

Human trafficking is a significant source of revenue for criminal organisations 

whose activities may destabilise legitimate governments and undermine the NATO 

mission. Hence, human trafficking should be viewed as a security threat that merits 

NATO’s attention. 
31

While the Policy addresses all aspects of human trafficking, it specifically 

recognises the impact that deployed troops can have on the demand for women trafficked for the sex trade. When deployed forces patronise prostitutes, they are often 

purchasing services from organised criminal enterprises and are creating the ‘‘demand’’ for trafficked women. NATO troops engaged in such activities are often patronizing sex slaves and filling the coffers of organized criminals in countries where 

NATO operates. Neither of these outcomes is worthy of NATO or its members. 

NATO’s decision to address human trafficking coincided with other incidents that 

demonstrated the role of deployed troops in the illegal sex trade. Allegations of sexual offences by UN peacekeepers surfaced in Congo in 2003 to the embarrassment 

of the United Nations. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was outraged to learn that UN 

peacekeepers were accused of raping and molesting Congolese women and children. 

Similar accusations over the previous decade made the reports credible. In a 2002 

UN Development Fund for Women study entitled Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment of the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-Building, authors Elizabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf substantiated UN peacekeepers’ involvement in sexual offences, including human trafficking in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of 

Congo, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Somalia. 

When peacekeepers deployed in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, they brought 

with them a demand for sexual services that was promptly met by an increase in 

women trafficked there for the purpose. Brothels sprang up almost overnight outside these compounds, with club names and atmospheres that appealed to the nationality of the troops in the nearest base. When bases closed, the brothels closed 

as well. Many of the women employed in these brothels had been trafficked to the 

former Yugoslavia expressly to serve UN Peacekeepers. The relationship between 

deployed troops and the demand for trafficked women was unmistakable. 

The United States also suffered an embarrassing incident that demonstrated the 

overly close relationship between troops and trafficked women. In May 2002, a Fox 

News television report suggested that US troops in South Korea carried out ‘‘courtesy patrols’’ to protect brothels that exploited trafficked women. The broadcast of 

this television expose ́ in the United States caused 14 Congressmen to write to the 

Department of Defense Inspector General urging him to investigate what appeared 

to be official participation in or support for human trafficking. While the Inspector 

General concluded that there was no overt military support for human traffickers 

in South Korea, he did find an ‘‘overly familiar’’ relationship between US forces 

there and the sex trade. US forces in South Korea were embarrassed by these findings and took swift steps to prevent US soldiers from any further involvement. 

NATO policy 

In part as a result of incidents such as these, the Norwegian and US ambassadors 

to NATO initiated consideration of a wide-ranging NATO policy on the issue of 

human trafficking in March 2004. The Policy, finally adopted at Istanbul, set NATO 

on a course that should prevent Allied troops from engaging in activities that facilitate or support human trafficking. 

HUMAN TRAFFICKING THREATENS TO DESTABILISE GOVERNMENTS AND EMBOLDEN

CRIMINAL NETWORKS

It requires member states to take a variety of actions to reduce human trafficking. 

These include reviews of national legislation; ratification, acceptance or approval of 

the UN Convention Against Organised Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 

and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; training of all 

personnel taking part in NATO-led operations; contractual provisions that prohibit 

contractors from engaging or facilitating human trafficking; and a commitment to 

evaluate implementation of their efforts as part of ongoing reviews carried out by 

the competent authorities. 

All NATO nations had signed and many had ratified both the UN Convention 

against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocol long before the Istanbul 

Summit called for it. Since the Summit, two more NATO nations—Belgium and the 

United States—have ratified the Convention on Organised Crime and the Protocol 

on Human Trafficking. Nine have yet to ratify either treaty: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. 

Much recent progress in combating human trafficking has come via enacting new 

laws; building the capacity of non-governmental organisations, law-enforcement 

agencies and the judiciary to provide services to trafficked persons; and learning 

best practices for investigation and prosecution. 
32

Norway, for example, put in place a National Plan of Action to Combat Human 

Trafficking in 2003 and published a revised plan in June 2005. This plan provides 

for identification of victims and increased efforts to identify and prosecute traffickers, and will be implemented between 2006 and 2008. The Norwegian Armed 

Forces Code of Conduct prohibits the purchase of sexual services and relations that 

might otherwise weaken confidence in the impartiality of the force. Norwegian military personnel who violate the code are subject to punishment. 

The United States has implemented a new article in its military code, effective 

on 15 November 2005, which prohibits members of its armed forces from patronising 

prostitutes. The new article will allow military commanders to punish soldiers who 

pay for sexual services. US Forces in Korea have a robust and far-reaching programme to prevent American Soldiers deployed there from patronizing establishments where trafficked women may be kept. 

Capacity-building 

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Romania have collaborated on a regional anti-trafficking ‘‘best practices’’ training manual for law enforcement officers. The manual is the result of two years of intensive cooperation 

between USAID/Romania, the UN Development Programme, and Romania’s Ministry of Administration and the Interior. 

Written for border police officers, specialised police units, and prosecutors, the 

manual was officially adopted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime at the regional 

law enforcement senior officials meeting in Vienna in December 2003. The regional 

anti-trafficking training strategy has been endorsed by 13 Southeastern European 

countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, 

Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as the UN Mission in Kosovo—and 

is projected to be the most advanced anti-trafficking training programme for law enforcement in the world. Several hundred police officers in the region have already 

received specialised anti-trafficking training based on this new manual, and police 

academies in several countries have adopted its modules in their student curricula. 

The manual includes a legislative compendium and a contact directory specific to 

Southeastern Europe. The best practices section, which includes an overview of trafficking methodology, practical suggestions for international cooperation, specialist 

investigative techniques, and tactics for disrupting trafficking, can be adapted 

throughout the world. 

The International Organization for Migration (IOM), USAID and the Turkish government have implemented an anti-trafficking in persons project initiated by the 

IOM office in Ankara. The project takes a comprehensive approach to combating 

human trafficking, increasing the prosecution of traffickers, protecting trafficked individuals and preventing trafficking through public awareness and intervention. 

The $600,000 project included funds for a ‘‘157 Helpline.’’ Passport inserts given to 

potential trafficking victims as they pass through immigration checkpoints alert 

them to this service. Similar to the 911 emergency number popular in the United 

States, 157 is a dedicated emergency response line that has already helped coordinate the rescue of 60 trafficking victims, and has helped IOM return more than 200 

trafficked women to their homes. A national referral network for trafficked persons 

is in development. 

The NATO School has developed three modules that it offers in eight of its resident courses taught at Oberammergau, Germany. A General Module, a Module for 

Military Commanders, and a Law Enforcement Module alert NATO School students 

to the issues of human trafficking. All of these modules are available to other NATO 

and Partnership for Peace (PfP) training institutions, with a web version for advanced distributed learning purposes. The Turkish PfP Training Centre in Ankara 

created a one-week course on Combating Smuggling and Trafficking in Human 

Beings, and delivered it via mobile training teams to Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

Kazakhstan, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan and Ukraine during the past year. 

These initiatives, and many more like them, are in various stages of planning and 

implementation throughout the Alliance. NATO recognised at Istanbul that it could 

no longer ignore the two-pronged threat that human trafficking poses. First, as a 

business enterprise that provides millions of dollars to organised crime each year, 

human trafficking threatens to destabilise local governments and embolden the 

criminal networks that oppose them. NATO troop patronage of these establishments 

funds and supports a security threat that is intensely counter-productive to the 

NATO mission. Furthermore, the NATO Allies have also recognised that NATO 

troops who patronise brothels or otherwise facilitate human trafficking are themselves involved in the criminal enterprise as customers. For reasons of principle and 
33

to maintain the integrity of NATO operations, this must be prevented. To date, however, only Norway and the United States are known to have taken action to prohibit 

their military personnel from patronizing prostitutes while deployed. 

Other NATO Partners are moving to implement the Policy in other ways. In addition, NATO is conducting a thorough review of the Policy with a view towards possible enhancements should they be deemed necessary by the North Atlantic Council. 

While there has already been some positive movement, it is still too early to assess 

the impact of all the initiatives that are currently under development. But there is 

reason to hope that initiatives that are now coming into force will begin to disrupt 

and weaken the criminal enterprises that profit from organised human trafficking. 

More governments must take steps to prohibit their forces from facilitating human 

trafficking by patronizing establishments where trafficking victims may be kept 

against their will. Only time will tell the extent to which the new Policy helps reduce what is one of the great evils of our day.

Captain Keith J. Allred is a Senior Military Judge in the Judge Advocate General’s 

Corps, US Navy. Between 2003 and 2005 he was on the faculty of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. 

The views expressed are those of the author alone, and do not represent the views 

of any government agency. 

NATO’S ANTI-TRAFFICKING COORDINATOR EXPLAINS PRIORITIES

VIDEO INTERVIEW WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENCE POLICY

AND PLANNING, MR. JOHN COLSTON

May 7, 2007

INTERVIEWER: We’re here today with Mr. John Colston, the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning Division. Welcome. 

You have just been assigned as NATO’s special co-ordinator on combatting trafficking in human beings. We know that both allies and partners feel strongly about 

this subject, but why is this subject important for NATO? 

JOHN COLSTON (Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, 

NATO): Well this subject is important for everybody. Trafficking in human beings 

constitutes a universally condemned crime and all nations and all international 

organisations, including NATO, have to do whatever they can to combat it. 

Just to give you one or two facts and figures by way of example: this is an illegal 

industry, a criminal industry, which is estimated to generate some seven billion 

euros a year for the criminals who are engaged in it. We estimate that somewhere 

between 400,000 and 800,000 people, mostly women and children, are engaged in 

the trafficking of human beings. Nearly 130 countries are involved in this trade in 

some form or other. And I have to say unfortunately Southeast Europe, where 

NATO is engaged both politically and militarily, is one of the areas where this 

criminal activity is concentrated most. It is potentially de-stabilizing of nations and 

so it works against our interests in building stability and security in countries 

throughout the world, but particularly in Europe. There are also risks that illegal 

funds on this scale are potential sources of income for terrorism. 

So both in political and in military, as well of course as in humanitarian terms, 

it’s essential that NATO tries to do whatever it can to contribute to the response 

to this problem. 

INTERVIEWER: Does NATO have a role in combatting human trafficking? 

COLSTON: Yes it does and I think it has a very important role. There are two aspects in which NATO has a responsibility in relation to combatting human trafficking. The first is the way in which our military personnel behave when they are 

deployed on operations. We must make sure that they do not become part of the 

problem; that NATO, our peacekeepers, do not become part of the problem. And so 

we’ve developed a series of policies and a series of educational training practices to 

try to address this. 

When NATO Heads of State and Government met in Istanbul in 2004, they 

agreed a zero tolerance policy in relation to human trafficking and that said that 

any of our personnel, military or civilian, deployed on operations must not act in 

a way which contributes to the problems of human trafficking. Our partner nations 

were fully involved in the development of this policy and our partner nations are 

also fully involved in its implementation. We working together, allies and partners, 

to ensure that we deliver our commitments to our relevant United Nations conventions in relation to human trafficking and that we undertake a series of actions to 

respond to these threats; that we review our national legislation and we report on 
34

national efforts to meet our obligations under the United Nations conventions; that 

we encourage nations who are contributing forces to operations to abide by the relevant UN and OSCE documents and that we provide appropriate training for all 

personnel who are serving on NATO-led operations. 

But I said that there were two ways in which we can help. The way in which our 

own military and civilian personnel behave is the first of those reasons. The second 

is what we can do to help the host governments in countries where we are deployed 

militarily; what we can do to help those countries who are our partners within the 

Partnership for Peace, but who face challenges from organized crime in general and 

human trafficking in particular, to respond to those challenges. 

So there is a political, as well as military dimension to what NATO can do in response to this problem. 

INTERVIEWER: But what are your main challenges and priorities as NATO’s senior 

co-ordinator on combatting human trafficking? 

COLSTON: The challenges are considerable, not least since I’ve only just begun this 

role and I recognize how much hard work lies ahead in trying to assist the nations, 

allies and partners, in responding to this challenge. As far as what I will be seeking 

to do, I think it falls into three broad areas. 

The first of those is working with allies and partners to encourage the necessary 

action to put the right legislation, the right national legislation in place, in each of 

our countries; and to put the right military procedures to ensure that the disciplinary codes, the codes of conduct, are there which minimize the risks that our military personnel will contribute to the problem, as well as working with partner nations where human trafficking may have become an issue in terms of organized 

crime in those countries. 

The second area where I see myself having a role is working closely with colleagues inside NATO and working closely with the military commanders for the 

NATO operations to ensure that everybody understands what needs to be done, that 

everybody is putting in place the right procedures, the right training modules and 

so on, in order to ensure that service personnel are as well prepared as possible. 

And the third and last area where I think I will have a particular responsibility 

is in liaising, is in talking to other international organisations. NATO has to recognize that other organisations, the United Nations, OSCE, have more experience and 

more understanding of these issues than we do. We’re in a supporting role. We want 

to learn from them and we want to work closely with them to deliver our common 

aims. 

INTERVIEWER: Can you explain more about the implementation of NATO’s zero 

tolerance policy? 

COLSTON: Let me try and do so. What we need in particular is to ensure that we 

have good feedback from the nations and from the military chain of command. It 

is one thing to say that we have a zero tolerance policy, but we need to know that 

it’s working; we need to know that it’s having a real impact on the way in which 

our personnel operate. Now we have asked our military commanders to report positively that all NATO personnel, including contractors, working in a mission or operation are aware of NATO’s zero tolerance policy. So awareness training is a major 

element of our work. 

But it must go beyond that as well and we’re looking at the designation of focal 

point offices at each operational headquarters who would be responsible for this 

issue. We are looking at the content of the courses at the NATO school in 

Oberammergau and the NATO Defence College in Rome to ensure that they take 

proper account of the requirement to train personnel in relation to the risks of 

human trafficking. Training is primarily a national responsibility, but we want to 

make sure that each of the nations has the information that they need in order to 

implement this effectively. And we’re also looking to see whether alongside or as 

part of the process of certifying troops as fit to contribute to NATO-led operations 

as part of that process. We’re also looking to see whether there should be an element of certification specifically in relation to combatting trafficking in human 

beings. So a whole range of very practical things that we’re trying to put in hand. 

INTERVIEWER: Well obviously NATO cannot do this alone. What partners will 

NATO seek out to help? 

COLSTON: Well indeed NATO cannot do this alone and nor should we be expected 

to do so, nor should we try to do so. There are a great number of national and international organisations who are actively involved in trying to address the challenges 

of human trafficking and close co-operation with those organisations is absolutely 

essential. NATO’s policy itself is based on the experience of the United Nations and 

co-operation with the United Nations, both at headquarters level and in the context 

of specific operations, is going to be very important indeed. 
35

We’re also trying to develop regular contacts with other organisations involved in 

countering human trafficking, such as the OSCE, such as the European Union, to 

ensure that we can work with them and learn from them. And I should say that 

in our operational theatres where NATO forces are deployed operationally, there is 

already a very good pattern of co-operation and liaison with other international 

organisations working in that theatre. 

So in summary we have still a big task ahead of us, but I am sure that NATO 

and NATO nations in close co-operation with all of those who are working so hard 

and so well, will really help to combat this terrible crime. 

INTERVIEWER: Let’s hope so. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me say again to our very distinguished guests how grateful we are for your leadership. I would 

like to focus on the trafficking issue if I could. 

I have been working on this issue for well over a decade. After 

the breakup of the Soviet Union, many thought there would be a 

peace dividend, that democracy would begin flourishing, and obviously, that turned out to be a Pollyannish view. And trafficking became a dominant, ever-expanding nefarious enterprise that took off 

like a rocket in the 1990s. 

We wrote the Trafficking Protection Act in 2000, 2003, 2005, ever 

improving our tool box to try and mitigate and hopefully end this 

modern day slavery. 

And the effort, just so you know, General, with regards to the 

military, began—not began but was given an impetus—when a Fox 

News reporter walked into my office with a tape of, unfortunately, 

our military in South Korea outside of brothels, inside of brothels; 

Russian women had been trafficked to those brothels. 

We asked John Schmidt, then the Inspector General, to do a 

global review of trafficking and prostitution vis-a`-vis our military. 

He came back. First segment was in South Korea. Second was in 

the Balkans. And it was a devastating report. 

To the credit of our military and President Bush, his zero tolerance policy was initiated in 2002. It was sweeping. The Uniform 

Court of Military Justice was updated more recently to make the 

crime of prostitution an actionable offense. So we are really, I believe, showing tremendous leadership for the world and especially 

on the military side. 

I chaired several hearings; General Port came, our Supreme Allied Commander, and discussed with us his best practices that he 

employed working with the Government of South Korea. South 

Korea just shut down the visa that was allowing these Russian, 

Moldavian and Filipino women to be brought in by the mob to be 

exploited. Many brothels were put off limits. 

The bottom line is that good, solid actionable or action-oriented 

efforts were made, led by the United States military. 

The effort to get NATO to adopt zero tolerance in like manner 

was done by our State Department working with our military commander. 

So I am saying this to commend you and to thank you for that 

leadership. 

We have had hearings on the U.N. zero tolerance policy. I had 

two on the Congo and on the peacekeeping effort there, and despite 

the fact that those peacekeepers face considerable difficult challenges, that is no excuse when U.N.-deployed troops rape 13-yearolds for a loaf of bread, which became commonplace. 
36

We hear there is a U.N. zero tolerance policy, but as many of us 

have realized, that is zero enforcement and compliance, although 

maybe it is getting a little bit better now. 

But, so best intentions, what is good on paper often doesn’t 

translate in the field. 

So my question with regards to John Colston’s new mission, does 

he have the resources to really make implementation of zero tolerance meaningful? Is there a general sense of seriousness and clout 

that this is not something that is going to appease the human 

rights or human right types and others? Because, from my point 

of view, it is first about exploitation of the women and holding 

them harmless and helping them, and secondly, and maybe 1A, it 

is force protection. We need to make sure that our military men 

and women are protected in all means of that word. 

Finally, the 2005 act says that, by January 2008, we will now 

make part of the minimum standards a review of a country’s military, how well or poorly they are doing in the role of human trafficking. The cultures of many of the militaries that are being integrated into NATO are questionable, as we know. 

I met with several defense secretaries on trips in Eastern and 

Central Europe, and I will never forget one in particular, and I 

won’t do it on the record as to who he was, but he was the top guy 

in that country. And when I talked about trafficking, he laughed. 

And he said, basically, what the admiral said in 2001 when I met 

with him at NATO command headquarters in Brussels, when he 

said that this is an outlet; this is all about recreational sex. I said, 

‘‘You don’t understand what these women go through.’’ And so we 

had a give and take, but it was not a positive one. 

I am wondering, as we reform, integrate the military cultures of 

some of these post-Communist countries who have a jaundiced view 

when it comes to women and they see them as play things, and 

that means trafficked women, what do we do to get them on the 

same page so that trafficking ends and ends quickly? 

General CRADDOCK. Let me address that, and I don’t know if Ambassador Fried wants to or not. 

With regard to the NATO participation in a zero tolerance and 

non-trafficking issue. I think NATO is on board. Does John Colston 

have the resources? In my judgment, this is not a resource issue. 

This is a leadership issue. I think that your point, new nations 

come in that may not have the background, the cultural perspectives that we generally share. The value of engagement, of exercises, of participation, of habitual relationships is what I think is 

essential here for this process. 

This is, again, it is leadership. It is, when I meet with my counterparts, and then NATO leaders, through exercises, through conferences, seminars, operations, meet with their counterparts; and it 

is about deeds, not words. It is about watching how these militaries, established militaries over a long period of time, have integrated females into the military in a very productive manner. That 

is the first part. 

And secondly, then, is to watch the contributions, quite frankly, 

of females in the military, minorities in the military, and this becomes an extraordinarily powerful message and signal sent to those 
37

who want to be NATO members, those who are and want to be better and who want to have security sector reform. 

So, in my meeting with my subordinate commanders throughout 

the Allied Command Operations, I have experienced no concern 

over our ability to do this, whole-hearted support for this effort and 

the fact that we need to continue to set the example for those who 

may not share the same values, but once they see, understand, I 

think, that they—my experience has been—I was in Kosova when 

we all went in initially. And there were a lot of different value sets 

that, over time, changed because of the realization that there was 

a different perspective out there, and if one understood it, then 

they could see the value of changing your mind set. 

Mr. FRIED. Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Congressman Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the committee. 

I am, as John Tanner is our distinguished chairman of NATO’s 

Parliamentary Assembly, I am also a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and my first question involves them. 

During our most recent meetings, the issue consistently came up 

of the United States involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. I feel 

that it is a very piercing concern, none more demonstrative than 

on the very week we were over in Europe, as we were flying into 

Italy, was the same weekend that that government basically dissolved. 

And it basically dissolved around two major issues, paramount, 

of course, was anti-American attitude in terms of our involvement 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with Italy’s troops demanding that 

they remove themselves from any involvement in Afghanistan. 

The other one was the building of and expansion of an air base 

and military facility in Italy. 

Both of those reasons. 

There were constant discussions. There was a considerable 

amount of erosion in our relationship with NATO because the public tide of opinion has turned in many of these NATO nations 

against the United States as a result of the involvement in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

I would like an answer, the first part of my question is your assessment of the relationship and just how damaging is that? What 

do we have to look for for the future of our relationship with our 

NATO allies, especially because of the damage that is because of 

our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. FRIED. Congressman, we certainly had a major difference 

with many European governments about Iraq, and European governments had differences among themselves. That—those differences erupted in a very bitter debate in 2003 and 2004, and 

there is no question that it hurt our relations with Europe. 

In 2005, President Bush made an intense effort to reach back to 

Europe and get past the disagreement over Iraq, and happily, European governments reached back. And our relationships with European governments have greatly recovered since the low point 

over that debate. 
38

Differences over Afghanistan were never as acute as they were 

over Iraq. And there remains much greater support generally in 

Europe for their countries’ involvement in Afghanistan than in 

Iraq, although that is also a divisive issue. 

I will put it this way, though, to be responsive to your question: 

There are some segments of European opinion which we will never 

reach. The Italian hard left will never appreciate—will never like 

the United States and what we do, no matter what we do. Now 

that is a pretty sweeping statement, but the hard left is a pretty—

hard lefts in Europe tend to be, well, pretty hard. 

There is a larger body of opinion in Europe that has differences 

with the United States over certain of our policies but is not antiAmerican, per se. And we need to work with them and work 

through the differences. We also need to work with European governments so that when they do have individual policy differences 

with us, it doesn’t expand into an overall strategic split. 

And in that, we are most fortunate that the current leaders of 

Germany and France are leaders who can have and express differences with the United States over particular policies but want 

to work to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and NATO. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ambassador, if I may, my time is inching on. It leads 

me into my next question. Because I, quite frankly, believe that it 

has damaged our relationship going forward. 

And I think an example of that is within the missile defense system that is being proposed. I would like to get your thoughts on 

that. I mean, global warming; I mean, all of the other areas that 

we need vital cooperation. 

At the recent G–8 Summit, for example, the discussion of a missile defense system came up and Mr. Putin put forth a proposal. 

I would like to get your thoughts on that. I would like to get your 

thoughts of what the Russians are up to and the complications that 

we are entering now with getting cooperation from our allies with 

our missile defense system. 

Mr. FRIED. I was at the G–8 Summit and am familiar with President Putin’s proposal, and, frankly, we welcome it as a very promising idea. And we look forward to working with the Russians in 

a cooperative way on missile defense as well as in other areas. 

It is true that missile defense sparked a very exaggerated initial 

debate in Europe. But in the months since that debate erupted, we 

have taken pains to explain our intentions, to be completely transparent about what we have in mind and why. And I am happy to 

report to you that NATO governments have been far more supportive recently than they were when they felt, for good reasons or 

not good reasons, less informed about our plans. 

At the latest NATO ministerial, support for missile defense was 

pretty strong. And at the defense ministers—at the NATO Defense 

Ministers’ meeting in the past 10 days, support for missile defense 

was, I would say, overwhelming. 

Now countries want us to be—NATO met—countries want us to 

be willing to work with Russia, and we are. They want us to be 

transparent in our plans, and we are. And they want our national 

plans to be compatible with NATO plans so that they don’t see us 

going off, as they say, unilaterally. And we are not. We are working 

with NATO so that all countries, Europe, all countries in Europe 
39

and the United States and hopefully Russia find their security increased, not decreased, through missile defense. 

Chairman LANTOS. Would you like to add something, General 

Craddock? 

General CRADDOCK. I would only endorse the fact that I was at 

the Defense Ministerial recently. Indeed, as Ambassador Fried indicates, there was support across the board from the defense ministers there. 

A couple of months ago, in Oslo, Foreign Ministerial, same support, and I think the Secretary General has already announced 

publicly there is NATO support with this, with the intent to pursue 

the opportunities for integration with NATO efforts. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let 

me recommend that you take the opening statements that you have 

made before this committee and put them in a book so that young 

people can read them in the years to come because they are exemplary of the best that Congress has to offer, and I was impressed 

by your opening statement. 

General, you said that the NATO leaders there were across-theboard supportive of the missile defense now. How much money 

have they put into our missile defense technology? 

General CRADDOCK. I don’t know the exact answer to that. But 

at this point, I think it is very little, if any. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So their report means zero in terms of 

financial support? 

You know, I think it is nice for us to think how wonderful it is 

to have, you know, some sort of people giving us their good will, 

you know, and I don’t beg for people’s good will. I do what I think 

is right. I think the United States won the Cold War because that 

is what we did. We didn’t curry people’s good will before we acted. 

The last thing we need to do is put billions of dollars into a missile defense system like missile defense and then decisions on 

where to deploy and how to use that system is based on the acceptance of people who have never invested in it. 

Now let me note that yesterday we had some members of the 

Duma from Russia here, and I suggested they go out, and the 

chairman used his influence to make sure they got to go out and 

see the airborne laser system that was on display at Andrews Air 

Force Base. And let me note that was no longer classified, so that 

was perfectly all right. 

And the Russians were very impressed by this and Russia may 

have something to contribute rather than good will. They actually 

have technology and maybe they are willing to invest in this. 

So perhaps we have to evolve out of the thought pattern that 

having the acceptance of those people in Europe means anything 

to our security in the new world, in the new era. 

Let me ask you this. What is the budget of NATO? 

General CRADDOCK. I don’t know. I don’t deal with the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What is the budget of NATO? 

Mr. FRIED. The NATO common budget, I think, is several hundred million dollars, but if you were looking at it more broadly, you 
40

would have to combine the defense budgets of all of the NATO 

countries. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am interested in NATO as an organization. 

And how much do we pay of that? 

Mr. FRIED. We pay somewhat under 25 percent. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So they are paying for the actual management operations, and the number of personnel that they have 

assigned to NATO as an organization is roughly——

Mr. FRIED. NATO assets include the headquarters, the AWACS 

facility. We are working on strategic lift capability. And there are 

just, for the record, NATO missile defense programs that are real 

that will help link certain NATO members, national short and midrange missile defense programs. So there are some NATO countries 

that are indeed investing their own national funds in missile defense programs. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I can imagine the General didn’t know about 

it because they are so miniscule that you need a microscope to find 

it. The planes that flew into Darfur, whose planes flew in? Who are 

they? 

General CRADDOCK. They are ours. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did we finance it? Did it come out of America’s military budget or did it come out of something where they 

helped pay for the time, the plane, the fuel? 

General CRADDOCK. Could I take that for the record and respond 

to you? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

My guesstimate is where we look at this NATO operation we 

have the good will of our friends in Europe, but the United States, 

again, carried the full load. And what we need in the future is a 

system that is based on those people are helping carry the load. Actually we need to pay attention to them and we need to talk to 

them, we need their good will. We do not care about the good will 

of people who only are there to harp and criticize if we make a mistake, but never to be there if we actually have a mission. 

Let me note in Afghanistan, which we have heard much about 

today, Mr. Chairman, we had a hearing on Afghanistan. It is very 

nice that our NATO allies are spending, expending something in 

Afghanistan. But let us note that it is being done by ignoring their 

commitments to reconstruction and development. Our NATO allies 

have all committed early on to large amounts of reconstruction/development money, which they have not been coming forth with. 

So I am very happy that they have got some of their people on 

the line and that they have made that type of commitment, but if 

it is being done simply by, well, we are going to spend it here instead of fulfilling our obligations for reconstruction and development, it is a rather hollow contribution. 

So as we enter the future, Mr. Chairman, I think the idea of alliances with the willing is a good idea, it is a good concept, and perhaps we should be looking instead of at people who don’t have a 

track record of actually participation, in actually helping, maybe 

we should look to countries like India and like Japan and like Russia who are non-NATO countries who our association with them 

may be much more important for our national security than the alliance of yesteryear NATO. 
41

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Tanner. 

Mr. TANNER. Thank you very much. I have two or three just sort 

of specific questions I would like to get you all to comment on if 

I might. 

First of all in Afghanistan, the provincial reconstruction teams. 

We get mixed reports on those when we attend NATO meetings, 

and I wondered if there was an overall strategic plan to coordinate 

the various teams that are administered by, as I understand it, 

various countries so that we have some way to judge how well we 

are doing with regard to stabilizing the entire country and not just 

by section. 

That is first of all. 

Secondly, as we discussed with Ambassador Nuland every time 

we go to a meeting, the caveats by other member nations, General, 

how are they coming along? We do what we can to talk to the parliamentarians in that regard. 

Third, I think the United States would reap enormous benefit 

from some sort of coordination of a regional policy in the area in 

regard to Pakistan and even Iran as we go forward there and as 

we try to figure out how to bring stability to Afghanistan, Pakistan 

and Iran, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

But does NATO have an overall strategic plan, and if so, are we 

coordinating it with our own interests so that we can basically leverage the United States’ interest there with our European allies 

in NATO? 

David Scott asked about the question about the missile question, 

and I want to finish with the Mediterranean Dialogue. 

We, from the NATO meeting in Portugal just in May, went to 

Tunisia and Morocco. Both are, I want to say, moderate voices in 

a particularly difficult place in the world, may we say. 

In both instances, and in Tunisia we met with the President and 

in Morocco we met with the Minister, and so on, in both countries. 

There was a concern that the trend line with respect to fundamentalism is not going in the direction we would like to see. 

And I wondered what, if anything, we are thinking about either 

diplomatically, militarily, how are we combating that? Because if 

we know the trend line is going in the wrong direction, we need 

attention to that before it becomes something that evidences itself 

in violent ways. Mr. Boozman, of course, was with us on that trip. 

He may have further comment on that. 

Thank you both for being here. 

Mr. FRIED. Let me answer some of those the best I can. 

With respect to the PRTs and coordination of assistance, the task 

in Afghanistan, as General Craddock said, is not simply military. 

We can’t win simply by killing our enemy. We have to win by helping the people and the Afghan Government win. And the non-military side of that is at least as important. 

The PRTs are an instrument of that consolidated, that coordinated strategy. They are supposed to help local governance and 

bring together security, local governance and economic dependence. 

We do try to coordinate PRT efforts, and there is an overall coordination mechanism where the U.N., World Bank, IMF, NATO 
42

all sit where we make sure our plans are pulling in the same direction. 

Now in reality the only coordination that counts is on the 

ground, and that is where the PRTs are critical. We have gotten 

a lot better at this in the past year. We took a hard look at our 

strategy, starting a year ago developed what we call the comprehensive approach which is this combined civil-military approach. Now we are implementing it. 

It is working much better. Our efforts are doing much better 

overall in the country than they were a year ago. That is close to 

a universal impression I get from talking to people on the ground. 

There is more to do. I don’t want to be too rosy. This is a hard 

struggle. Some places it is better than others. But I think we have 

come to the right place. Now we need to implement it and make 

it work. 

You are right that NATO needs to work with Pakistan, and it 

has to regionally. 

The tribal areas along the border are tough places, and the General Craddock has been to Pakistan and so we are beginning to 

think in a regional way. General Craddock might have more to say 

with respect to NATO’s efforts in North Africa and the Mediterranean Dialogue. 

Military interaction can be an important asset as we struggle to 

help moderates in the region and reformist forces in the regime 

against Islamists and radicals. 

Military and military-to-military contacts can’t do it all. That is 

only one dimension, but it is an important piece of what we are trying to do. And that is a piece, of course, of a larger political, almost 

in a sense ideological struggle. NATO can play a part through its 

Mediterranean Dialogue contacts. The NATO parliamentary assembly can also play a part, as I know you are doing, and you have 

been a leader in those efforts. 

We are doing all of this. We have a lot more to do. And Secretary 

Rice has often used the analogy of the post-Cold War, immediate 

post-World War II Europe where it took us a few years to get our 

minds around the new challenge and develop the institutions which 

eventually led us to victory in the Cold War 40 years later. This 

will be a generational struggle. 

General CRADDOCK. PRTs. Getting better. Still work to be done. 

Twenty-five PRTs. I think 12 are U.S. That is pretty well coordinated. I will tell you we need better U.S. Government interagency 

representation. 

I just came back. Visited two PRTs. One United States, one German. There was not a USAID person at either one. We need more 

USDA Department of Agriculture representation there. Critical 

there. Agriculture can be a huge offset to the poppies, but we need 

help to get that working. 

We are sharing best practices. We have quarterly conferences. 

We bring commanders into Kabul or Kandahar. They bring in their 

projects. It is coordinated now, so we are having the PRTs projects 

that complement both the district center, the provincial and the national efforts. 

So I think there is progress here. It is not perfect. We have got 

to continue to work it harder. 
43

Mr. TANNER. May I ask you, we help put together the aid or Department of Agriculture? Is there some way we can help make that 

happen? This is critical, in my judgment, to our success. 

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, I am sure there is leverage 

here. I take that information back and pass it into our Ambassador. He is aware, and he is working to get representation. 

Part it is a changeover. Part of it is a lack of personnel. There 

are a lot of reasons. We just need, I think, in our interagency, emphasis out to these departments and agencies for their support. As 

we said earlier, this is not a military solution. The military will set 

conditions for security that other elements of national power, economic, diplomatic, in this case, agricultural, justice, things like 

that, will have to work. 

So any engagements you would have would be possible. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. In regards to the caveats that—I don’t think we 

got to that. 

Can you tell us, General Craddock, kind of how that is going? I 

know that most Americans don’t understand that many of our allies in NATO that are deployed can do everything but fight because 

of the restrictions that are put on them as they go. 

Can you talk a little bit about that? Tell us if it is moving in the 

right direction. Tell us who are the worst offenders and who are 

the people who have the least caveats. 

General CRADDOCK. I think we are making some marginal 

progress as a result of caveats. I think as a result of the Riga Summit, all of the nations affirmed there would be no caveats from any 

participating NATO member state with regard to in extremis use 

of forces. In other words, if there are NATO or partner nations who 

have forces in Afghanistan under duress from enemy opposition, no 

nation would say we cannot use their forces to alleviate and solve 

that situation for the forces under duress. 

To my knowledge, since then, we have not had an occasion where 

any nation has said no, and we have had a few instances where 

we had forces under fire and had to move other forces for them 

then to be able to break contact or to prevail. 

However, there are still too many caveats, geographical caveats, 

functional caveats, that we continually work with the nations as we 

can to get them to either eliminate or to loosen, to mitigate. 

We do not have the full statement of requirements, the troop list 

sourced, we are still short. We also have caveats. That is a 

compounding factor that limits the commander of ISAF, limits his 

regional commanders, and I think increases the risk to every 

NATO service member on the ground in Afghanistan. 

And we have got to continually redouble our efforts at the highest military and political levels to fill up that requirement to 100 

percent and then knock down those caveats. 

With regard to nations worst offenders. I would not want to—privately, I would provide my insights, but I would not want to do it 

in this public forum. 

Chairman LANTOS. Will you provide your best performers, General Craddock? 

General CRADDOCK. For the record, yes. 
44

Mr. FRIED. I would say that Chairman Lantos mentioned the 

Dutch and the Canadians, and they have been in hot places doing 

very good work. The Dutch went into Uruzgan Province knowing 

it would be a combat assignment. They did so after a debate knowingly, willingly and it has been rough and they have been there. 

The Canadians have had some serious losses, but they have been 

there. 

And I think that since the contributions of our NATO allies has 

been raised, as a question—the ones that are fighting allies ought 

to be recognized. Also mentioned that when the commander of 

ISAF asked for more troops, the Poles almost overnight offered a 

combat battalion, no caveats. It is moving out for the east, which 

is a tough place. 

So just to mention a few of the fighting allies for you. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. And I think that is very important, and we appreciate their efforts. 

Mr. Lantos alluded to the expanding NATO and perhaps getting 

out of the geographic area. One of the problems that we are having 

a little bit is with the EU itself. You know, coming about with—

there is a lot of talk of them having their own forestructure. 

Can you tell us a little bit about where you see that going, and 

if that is creating problems, how you see that in the future as far 

as what is happening now and kind of down the line? 

Mr. FRIED. The issue of the EU military force and its relation to 

NATO has been debated for years and years. We, as a Government, 

don’t have an objection in principle to the Europeans developing 

more capable forces. And if giving it an EU label gets us more 

deployable forces that we can use where we have to, I am willing 

to swallow a certain amount of theoretical to and fro to get what 

we need. 

Now I have to say recently this has been less of a hot issue partly because NATO’s relations with the EU are better in practice 

than they are in theory and also because now countries are involved in serious operations, and so the debate tends to be less theoretical and less labels and more real forces for real missions. 

That said, ideally what we want is a kind of seamlessness between NATO and the European Union. They are going to be tasked 

for things better suited for the European Union, maybe lower-end, 

peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks, other higher-end, rougher tasks 

where you need NATO, and we need to be able to have a smooth 

continuum so we don’t worry about who is doing the job, we worry 

about getting the job done. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this once 

again robust and informative hearing. 

I want to ask a specific question, General, and then I want to ask 

a broader question to both of you. 

When I was in Afghanistan over a year ago with a group, one 

of the problems that the NATO forces expressed by one of the—two 

of the Generals actually that we had had an extended briefing with 

was the logistics in the multinational forces that were gathered 

there that seemed to be, as explained to us, costly and duplicative, 

in terms of the bivouacking of these different forces, the common 
45

things like meals and other kinds of things. That in fact—and I 

note they are stationed, of course, in different areas but the ability, 

if you provide a brigade or if you provide a limited amount of resource to have to reinvent all of the logistics to support that brigade without having just a general ability to support it, would 

seem to be much more efficient. 

Is that, in your view, still a problem, and if it is, is there work 

being done to try to provide for better responses for these multinational forces that come together in NATO? 

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, I think it is still a problem. I 

think there has been progress made within countries in the regional commands. 

Mr. COSTA. I know they have different diets and different tastes. 

General CRADDOCK. But they all bring in their own national support elements. They are expensive. They obviously share different 

requirements, but each country is doing their own. 

We have tried repeatedly at NATO headquarters, at my command, to go after a multinational logistics capability to the extent 

that we have even started conceptually looking at a multinational 

logistics command. We are trying to put that into the transformational effort, the NATO Response Force, and have a joint logistics element there that the nation would subscribe to, is where 

one nation brings a certain capability and another brings another 

inside, then have a package as opposed to each nation bringing 

their own. It has not been as successful as we would like it. 

Mr. COSTA. I would urge, and if there is something that we can 

do to be of some assistance with our counterpart here, Mr. Tanner 

and others, who are part of the international or the NATO delegation—it just seems to me not only from a cost effective standpoint 

but this would be the effort in Afghanistan, a prototype, if we figure out how to really do this in a much more cost-effective fashion. 

It saves these countries money, by the way. If they have less of 

a burden to do this logistical stuff, they can add a second brigade. 

So it seems to me that it would be multiple benefits, and I would 

urge you to continue to work on it. Because the long-term benefits 

of NATO—I am just a lay person, of course. 

To both of you, I think we have had a robust conversation about 

NATO present, NATO future, and I think the chairman and others 

have talked, I think, at extensive lengths to what we would like to 

envision NATO to be. 

When we talk about getting the current commitments today from 

those who have had a long-term partnership in NATO, I am not 

talking about the expansion, of course. Some of the new expansion 

we seem to have more eagerness or more enthusiasm. So I am not 

sure really what that denotes. 

But I wonder if either of you would care, or both of you, to put 

a finger specifically on whether we are talking about the lack of 

commitment when we talk about the amount of GNP spent by 

these individual countries to fulfill their role, whether it is political 

or economical or in some cases both, and do you think, as a followup to that, that with the change in the governments in France and 

now last year in Germany and soon the U.K., that we may get 

some greater commitment? 
46

Mr. FRIED. I think European commitment varies. I think certainly the British have been both staunch politically, strong militarily, enormously active and important contributors. 

A lot of NATO’s new members have contributed at tremendous 

cost to their small or military budgets. They have contributed fighting forces, very expensive, and they have done it. 

I do think that in some especially West European countries there 

are issues of political will to support militaries with expeditionary 

capabilities. 

The French military is a very serious outfit. They are fighters. 

They know and are unsentimental when it comes to what needs to 

be done. I think now with strong leadership, strong new leadership 

in France, you may see a development of France’s relations with 

NATO. 

But so this is going to be an issue for some time to come. We 

are going to want our NATO partners to develop expeditionary capabilities and the will to use them, and despite all of the progress 

in Afghanistan and all of the progress in transforming NATO, this 

will be an issue for a while. 

General CRADDOCK. If I may, 26 nations, six meet the 2 percent 

for GDP for defense that we asked for. We have set a benchmark 

of 40 percent of the forces, the nations’ own land forces, should be 

deployable. Ten nations meet that benchmark. We have a benchmark of 8 percent of that should be sustainably deployable; in 

other words, deploy and continue to sustain that over time. Eleven 

nations meet that benchmark. 

I think if you look at economic indicators and you look at the 

growth of most of the countries there and the alliance, the reasons 

that these levels of support have not been reached are by and large 

political. I think the economic capacities are there, but they will be 

made by political decisions that the nations will choose based on 

their priorities and interests. 

Mr. COSTA. My time has expired, but for the record, on those 

benchmarks, if you could provide a more detailed expression and 

some history as to whether or not they are better or worse or about 

the same over the last 5- or 10-year period. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and the 

ranking member for having a series of very important hearings, 

and let me thank the witnesses as well for their testimony and recognizing the importance of the relationship between the United 

States and NATO. 

I don’t always necessarily believe that a military action is always 

the only and best action, but I do believe that NATO is more than 

that. It is a strong representative of unity and coalition and collaboration. And in many instances, diplomacy is as much a factor 

in NATO as is the military cooperation. 

Let me say to both the Ambassador and to General Craddock, my 

experiences with NATO on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and 

my meetings at the NATO headquarters have always been open. 

Certainly the border is challenging, but the Generals who had 
47

briefed us when we have gone have done their very best to be able 

to be as forthright as they possibly can be. 

So I want to pose a series of action questions, if I can, and my 

colleagues may oppose these, and I hope not in the framework that 

I offer them. 

I am troubled by hearing that Kosova is somewhat beyond where 

we will wind up, but its whole situation is somewhat unstable. 

When I say that remembering the efforts that were made by NATO 

but also, if my recollection is correct, General, from the Bosnia incident on into Kosova, it seems to me that NATO was slow in moving, that we initiated it or the United States sought to be aligned 

by. It seems they were slow in moving. 

My question for both would be then beyond where and how 

Kosova will ultimately wind up militarily, how do we see NATO’s 

involvement in Kosova and is Kosova in crisis? 

I am going to raise these questions so that you can take them. 

Sudan——

Chairman LANTOS. Let me remind my colleague that if she has 

many more complex questions, the answers will have to be in writing because we will be closing this hearing within a few minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the distinguished gentleman. 

And Sudan, and I will leave it at that, NATO’s involvement in 

Sudan. 

Why do we have trouble with our allies helping us in Afghanistan and what do we do with a Russia which seems to be somewhat 

hostile continually to NATO’s collaborative efforts? And I thank 

both gentlemen if they would be able to answer those. And I imagine the answers would have to be abbreviated. 

Mr. FRIED. With respect to Kosova, NATO forces have done a 

good job and have been successful in keeping the peace. There has 

been one major incident of disorder of March 2004. NATO has improved its capability since then. 

I would not say that Kosova was in crisis now. But it is our judgment that without movement toward a settlement of Kosova status, 

the current calm will not last, and it is because of that assessment 

that we have tried to move ahead in the U.N. to the resolution of 

Kosova’s final status in line with Ahtisaari’s plan with supervised 

independence of Kosova. 

With respect to Sudan, as General Craddock said earlier, countries might feel—there might be an issue of how much NATO could 

contribute, but I think that NATO does have some assets, and 

under the right circumstances, I can imagine NATO providing an 

important support role to the hybrid force now being contemplated. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I let General Craddock answer the Afghanistan question? 

General CRADDOCK. My trouble with the allies helping in Afghanistan, I think the allies are helping. We have got all 26 NATO 

nations. They have yet to subscribe to the level of effort that they 

gave us with regard to the mission. That is the problem. The level 

of effort is not matched by political will. We continue to chip away 

at this. There are more contributions. We will have another British 

battalion that will tap into the fall, winter. We will have another 

Danish battalion coming into the south later this year. So we are 

getting contributions. We have yet to realize the full extent. 
48

There are niche capabilities. ISR, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, helicopters, that there just are not capacities left in 

NATO, and the U.S. has those. 

So we still have to continue to transform NATO to get it to the 

expeditionary capability that they don’t have today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. I will take my answers in writing, Mr. Chairman. 

I address these comments very quickly to Ambassador Fried. 

There have been some concerns, and certainly they are my concerns, about the NATO-Russia relationship, and it looks like there 

is a deterioration there. 

And our administration’s decision to build a missile defense system is viewed by the Putin government as a provocation. So I am 

curious why NATO has made the decision to place a limited number of missile interceptors and radars in Eastern Europe at a time 

when missile defense will suffer. 

And finally, we are aware that Estonia has been the subject of 

a coordinated cyber attack on its governmental computer system allegedly carried out by the Russians. So the attack represents a new 

and growing threat to national security. 

So I would be interested in you responding as to what role NATO 

can play or should play. 

And, General Craddock, if you want to respond to that, I would 

be happy to receive your response in writing. 

Thank you so very much. 

Chairman LANTOS. May I express on behalf of the entire committee our deepest thanks, General Craddock and Ambassador 

Fried, for a singularly valuable and analytical and informative session. 

This hearing is concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the future of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For almost six decades NATO has 

faithfully defended the people of Europe and America against the threats of communism and terrorism. Now, as we look forward to the future of NATO, there is 

an important need on both sides of the Atlantic to update our policies to ensure that 

our alliance remains strong. 

We currently have a healthy defense trade relationship. However, it is at risk. We 

must seriously examine our own domestic policies to ensure that America’s export 

policies, such as the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR), do not 

inadvertently tie the hands of our closest allies from modernizing its forces. Because 

our export control policies contain extraterritorial constraints, European countries 

and their firms are now designing out U.S. parts and content. It is my understanding that Great Britain’s equivalent to the Future Combat Systems, the Future 

Rapid Effect Systems (FRES) is designed to be 100 percent free of U.S. parts and 

technology and is being advertised as ‘‘ITAR free.’’ The United Kingdom (UK) is concerned that if the FRES has U.S. parts and content, they will have to submit their 

national sovereignty to U.S. rules and regulations. These policies that were originally meant to unite NATO allies against communism are now beginning to divide 

us and must be changed. I am heartened by the treaty signed yesterday by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair and I look forward to its ratification in the Senate. I also look forward to working with the Chairman, Ranking Member, and the 

Administration on policies that will allow greater collaboration with our other 

NATO allies. 

Our NATO allies must increase their own investment in the defense sector to 

boost combat readiness and interoperability. They must also be willing to continue 

to stand against tyranny and oppression by blocking the transfer of arms and military technology to countries that trample the rights of their citizens or are a threat 

to the peace and safety of the rest of the world. 

Strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty in this new century is important for the 

overall security of Europe and the United States. The threats we face today are different and ever evolving. Adapting to combat new and asymmetrical threats is vital 

to the long-term sustainability of the Alliance. The threat is real and we must be 

prepared to meet it. 

Our colleagues will remember that NATO came to our assistance following the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, and they remain to this day alongside the United 

States in Afghanistan. I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Fried and 

General Craddock about the Administration’s plans to ensure that NATO continues 

to serve a strong foundation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening today’s hearing. May I also take this opportunity to thank the Ranking Member, and to welcome our distinguished witnesses The Honorable Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs from the U.S. Department of State; and General Bantz J. 

Craddock, of the United States Army. I look forward to your informative testimony. 
50

Yesterday, members of this committee gathered in this room to exchange ideas 

with our Russian counterparts, something that would have been unthinkable in the 

days of NATO’s inception. As yesterday’s friendly meeting indicates, much has 

changed since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April of 1949, but we continue to value our important partnership with our NATO allies. 

Mr. Chairman, we share a long and proud history with our NATO partners. Since 

the end of the Cold War, NATO has shown its willingness and ability to adapt to 

a world full of new threats, as well as new promises. As NATO works to meet these 

emerging challenges as it becomes a global, rather than a regional, security instrument, I welcome today’s effort to examine the role the NATO alliance currently 

plays within broader U.S. and European security interests. 

Europe, and the individual states that comprise it, have remained valuable allies 

in this new age of global terrorism and weapons proliferation. European support following the attacks of 9/11 was reciprocated following the July 7, 2005 bombings of 

London’s transit system. I continue to believe that it is in the interests of both the 

United States and Europe to work to address these issues together. 

NATO clearly proved its post-Cold War value in Kosovo, where it was able to intervene quickly, decisively, and multilaterally to end ethnic cleansing. NATO has 

maintained an active presence through the Kosovo Force, or KFOR, which currently 

has over 15,500 personnel deployed. As we work through the United Nations to finally resolve Kosovo’s status, I would like to pay tribute to the NATO soldiers who 

have worked to make Kosovo a secure environment. 

Mr. Chairman, NATO has also proven a valuable asset in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Though much still remains to be done, NATO has made brave efforts to 

quell the insurgency, encourage improved governance, and combat the narcotics 

trade. Only two days ago, on Wednesday, three Canadian NATO soldiers were killed 

by a roadside bomb in southern Afghanistan, making them the most recent of the 

approximately 90 foreign troops killed in Afghanistan this year alone. I would like 

to express my condolence to their families, and my gratitude for their service. 

Afghanistan presents a new challenge to NATO, and is in many ways testing the 

organization’s political will and global posture. As civilian and military casualties 

exceed the estimates made by most NATO governments, many critics believe that 

NATO lacks an overall strategic plan to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan, and 

they contend that such an effort is beyond the resources or expertise of NATO. 

NATO has made significant efforts in recent years to become a more mobile, more 

‘‘deployable’’ force. In 2004, NATO launched a new capabilities initiative, in an attempt to make its forces more able to travel long distances and to sustain themselves in the field. The organization has also developed the NATO Response Force 

(NRF), which is now operational. The NRF was conceived as a rapid-reaction insertion force of 25,000 troops. 

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in the value of multilateralism. In the context 

of the global war on terrorism, it is vital that we continue to work with our NATO 

allies. I believe that NATO is robust enough to adapt to emerging security threats, 

that it remains important in meeting these new challenges, and that it can effectively transition to its new global role. NATO membership also continues to be a 

valuable incentive to encourage the states of Central and Eastern Europe to institute important political, social, and economic reforms. 

Recent years have seen a number of important issues place new strains on our 

relationship with our long-time European allies. In particular, the Bush Administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq has garnered strong disapproval in many nations across 

Europe. Other issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, treatment of 

detainees by the United States, and climate change have compounded disputes. In 

particular, the United States’ willingness to bypass international organizations and 

use force unilaterally has found much disfavor among many European allies, who 

have shown a strong reluctance to this approach. 

I sincerely believe that it is in the interests of all involved to make a concerted 

effort to address the range of concerns that have been raised on both sides, and to 

work to move forward together, in pursuit of our common goals. I continue to advocate a policy of constructive engagement and dialogue, and I believe we should continue to seek multilateralism in our efforts to fighting terrorism. 

I look forward to the insightful testimony of our witness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

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