### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00679- CV

Lis a So va , A ppe lla nt

v. Bill Miller Bar- B-Q En ter prises, Ltd., App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. GN301623 , HO NORAB LE PAUL DAVIS, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt L isa Sov a a pp e a ls t he su mma

ry jud g me nt e nte re d in fa

vo r o f a pp e lle e B ill Miller Ba r-B -Q on the slip-a

nd-fa ll claim that she broug ht ag ainst the restaurant. The sole issue on appea l asks whether

a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t remains about whether Bill Miller had a ctual or construc tive knowledg e of a n unrea sonably

dang erous c ond i t i o n on its premises. Be cause the
re c or d d e mon str a te s n o g e nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f

a c t, w e wi ll a ff

ir m.
BACK GR OUND On No ve mbe r 1 , 2 00 1, L isa Sov a we nt t o lu

nc h w itha

c o-work er at an A us tin l o c a t i o no f

B i l l M i l l e r B ar - B
- Q
. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e a c c i d e n t r e p o rt f i l l e d o u t b y S o v a l a t e r

t h a td ay, and as c onfirmed in Sova’s subseque nt deposition, Sova “put down [her] food tray and purse at the table with [her] fr i en d ” an d “we nt to the condiment bar to g et a small conta iner of pic o de g allo.2

When leaving the condiment bar [she] slipped on the water , pico de g allo flew e very wher e, and [she] hit the floor!” I n th e a c c ide nt r e po rt , So va de sc ri be d th e c a

us e of he r a c c ide nt a s “ [a] sma ll p ud dle of water [that] was on the tile floor nex t t o t h e co ndiment bar.” Sova testified that, when she approa ched the condiment bar, she di d not see any thing on the floor, but she saw the puddle afte r she fell. Although Sova te stified that she did not know how long the puddle had be en on the f loor nor how it had gotten t here , she was confide nt that the puddl e was water beca use “[ i] t was clear.” Also, Sova believed the puddle was c reated by a piec e of ic e that had f

allen fr om the condiment bar and
me lte d, g ive n th e size of the pu dd le (a bo ut the same dia

me te r a s “ the top of

[a] c up ” ), its pr oximi ty to the condiment bar , its clear a ppear ance , and the fac t that the spot on her jea ns that g ot wet in the fall f el t co o l to the touch. B ased on the se obser vations about the puddle, Sova a lleg ed in her live ple a din g that “ [t]he fo re ig n s ub sta nc e on the fl oo r n e xt to the c on dim e nt b ar c re ate d a n unr e a so na

ble risk of har

m . . . [ of] which Def

endant kne w or should have known.” As an al t ernative theory

for he r pre mises liabilit y claim, Sova also pled that the “condiment b ar an d s u r r o u n d in g f

lo o r . . . w a s a c o n d it io n o n th e p r e mi s e s th a t p o s e d an
unrea sonable risk of ha

rm . . . [of] which Def

endant kne w or should have known.” This ar g ument was ba sed on the c ondiment bar be ing a “hig h traff

ic ar ea . . . w here condiment items, water, ic e, and soft drinks often fell to the floor cre ating an unreasonably dang erous sli ppery condition on the .
. . cory [si c] stone tile floor surrounding the condiment bar.” Sova alleg ed that Bill Mil ler wa s awa re of this dang er, y et “f

ailed to make the condition re as onably safe by utiliz ing f

loor mats or other viable mea

ns to reduce the risk.”Al tho ug h So va do e s n ot c on te st B il l Mi lle r’ s st a te me nt t hat it s mo tio n p re se nte d b oth 1 traditional and no e vidence g rounds, a thoroug h revie w of its motion shows that Bill Mil ler soug ht summary judgme nt pursuant only to r ule 166a(i) for no e vidence
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ). Thus , our a n al y s i s o f whether

a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t remains will be limited to the standard of re vie w a pp lic a ble to n o e vid e nc e mot ion s. 3 Sova claimed that, a s a result of the fall, she bruised her left hip, suffe red a

contusion t o h e r l e f te l b o w , a n d d i s l o c a t e d

h e r l e f ts h o u l d e r , f

o r w h i c h s h e u n d e r

w e n t art h r o s c o p i c s u r g e r

y. Sova soug ht approxim ately $20,000 in medical expenses and lost wa g es, plus damag es for past and futur e pa in, me nta l anguis h, dis fi g ur e me nt, and ph y sic a l im

pa ir me nt. Bill Miller fi led a no e vidence motion for summary judgme nt asser

ting that Sova 1 could not establish that Bill Miller had ac tual or construc tive knowledg e of the dang erous c ondition. On September

27, 2004, the trial court g rante d Bill Miller’s summary judgme nt, or dering that Sova take nothing on her claims and that she reimburse Bill Miller for its incur red costs pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil P roce dure 131. N o g rounds wer e provide d for the judg ment. Sova now appe als the trial court’ s g ranting of summary judgme nt.
AN AL YSI S Stand ard of review

A n o e vid e nc e mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt m

us t be g ra nte d if , a ft e r a n a de qu a te time f or discovery , (1) the moving party asser ts that the re is no evidenc e of o n e o r m o re essential
e le me nts of

a c la im o r d e fe ns e on

wh ic h a n a dv e rs e pa

rt y wo uld have the burd e n o f p ro of a t tr ia l; and (2) the nonmovant fails to pr oduce more than a scintilla of summary judgme nt evidence raising a g enuine issue of

materia l f

act on those elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) . I n a ca se whe re the trial4

c ourt ’s jud g me nt doe s not spe c if y the g ro un ds re lie d u

po n f or its ru lin g , th e su mma

ry jud g me nt m

us t be af firmed if a

ny of the theor ies adva

nced is mer itorious. Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W .2d 567, 569 (T e x. 19 89 ); Sh esh un off

v . S he sh un off , 172 S.W .3d 686, 692 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). I n revie wing a no evidenc e summary judgme nt, we “must examine the entire rec ord in the light most favor able to the nonmovant, indulg ing ever y rea sonable infere nce and resolving any doubts ag ainst the motion” to determine whe ther more than a scintilla of evidence was presented on the challeng ed elements of the nonmovant’s c laim. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 825 (T e x. 20 05 ); W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Rodriguez , 92 S.W .3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002); Perdue v . Patten Corp. , 142 S.W .3d 596, 604 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, no pe t.). More tha n a scintilla of supporting
e vid e nc e e xists if th e e vid e nc e wo uld a llo w r e a so na

ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le to d if fe r i n th e ir conclusions. King Ranch, Inc. v

. Chapman , 1 18 S.W. 3d 74 2, 75 1 ( Te x. 20 03 ). “ L e ss tha n a sc int ill a of evide nce e x ists when the evidenc e is ‘so we ak as t o d o n o m o re t h an cr eate a mer e surmise or
su s p i ci o n ’ of a f

act.” Id
. (q u o t i n g Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc ., 650 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). Be ca u s e t h e propriety

of g ranting a summary

judgme nt is a question of law, we revie w the trial court’s de cision de novo
. Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc ., 875 S.W .2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994).
P rem ises liabi lity

Bill Miller owed Sova, its invitee, a duty to exercise re asonable care t o protec t her fr om u nr e a so na bly da ng e ro us c on dit ion s o n the re sta ur ant p re mis e s th a t w e re kn ow n o r r e a so na bly discovera ble to B ill Mi ller. See W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Ree ce , 81 S.W .3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002); W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Gonzales , 968 S.W .2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). This duty , howeve r, neither ob lig a te d B ill Mil le r t o e ns ur e Sov a ’s sa fe ty no r m a de B ill Mil le r s tr ic tly lia ble for he r i nju

ri e s.5

Ree ce , 81 S.W .3d at 814-15. To preva il on a premises liability claim, a plaintiff m ust establish that the pre mises ow n e r

/o p e r a to r h a d a c tu al or c onstructive knowledg e of some c ondition on the premises that po se d a

n unr e a so na

ble ri sk of ha rm , y e t fa ile d to exer c ise re a so na ble c are to r e du c e or

e lim inate the risk, which pr ox imately cause d the plaintiff’s injuries. See Ke etch v . Kroger Co. , 845 S.W .2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc ., 648 S.W .2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983).

I n a slip-and- fall ca se, the knowle dg e ele ment may b e satisfied with proof that the defe ndant (1) c reated the condition, (2) a ctually knew of the condition, or (3) should ha ve known of the c on dit ion

be c a us e it e xiste d fo r lon g e no ug h to pr ov ide the de fe nd ant a re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to discover it. Ree ce , 81 S.W .3d at 814, 816. I n deter mining whe ther the pr emises owner /operator had construc tive knowledg e under the third method of proof , known as the “time-notice r ule,”
re le va nt f a c tor s to c on sid e r i nc lud e the pr oximi ty of e mpl oy e e s to t

h e c o n d i t i on , th e c on sp ic uo us ne ss of the c ondition, and the leng th of t ime that the conditi on exis ted. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Spates , 18 6 S.W.3 d 5 66 , 5 67 -6 8 ( Te x. 20 06 ); Ree ce , 81 S.W. 3d a t 81 6. “ Whe n c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e is
re lie d up on to pr ov e c on str uc tiv e no tic e , the e vid e nc e mus t e sta bli sh that it

is more like ly than not that th e da

ng e ro us c on dit ion e xiste d lon g e no ug h to g ive the pr op ri e tor a re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to discover the condition.” Gonzales , 96 8 S. W.2 d at 93 5 ( emp has is a dd e d) (e vid e nc e sh ow ingon ly “possibility ” that condition exist ed long enoug h to put store on notice wa s insufficient).

Th e on ly iss ue he re is w he the r S ov a pu t f or th mor e tha

n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e to
cre ate a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t about whether Bill Miller had a ctual or co n s t ructive knowledg e of an unreasonably dang erous condition on its premises. Sova and B ill Mi ller, howe ver, prese nt differ ent interpre tations a bout w hat constituted the dang erous condition in this case : SovaAlthough Bill Miller’s s ummary judgme nt motion focused on whethe r there was e vidence 2 that it had knowledg e of the puddle on the floor, the essenc e of its motion challeng ed whe ther Sova had any evidenc e of the first eleme nt of her pr emises liability claim—that B ill Mi ller had a ctual or constructive know ledg e of a dang erous c onditio n o n its premises. See Ke etch v . Kroger Co. , 845 S.W .2d 26 2 , 264 (Tex. 1992) (setting forth re quired e lements). Considering this, along w ith the fa c ts that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t art ic ulate a g ro un d fo r its jud g me nt and Sov a sp e c if ic a lly a sk s th is Court to d e te rm ine wh e the r a

g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t r e ma ins a

bo ut B ill Mil le r’ s awa

re ne ss of the da ng er pose d by

the condiment bar

are a, our r eview of

whether Bill Miller had a ctual or constructive knowledg e of a dang erous condition e ncompasses both the ories of w hat constituted the condition—the specific puddle and the g ener al condiment bar are a. 6 argues that the c ondiment bar a nd s u rr o unding f

loor g ener ally

posed an unr easona

ble risk about which Bill Miller had actua l or constructive knowledg e, y et failed to a lleviate. Bill Miller narr ows th e is s u e to w h e ther it knew or sh o u ld h a v e k n o w na b o u t t h e p arti c u la

r p u d d le o nth e f

lo o r . We consider both theor ies to determine w hether Sova demonstrated that a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t
rema ined. 2
P udd le on f

loor as un reasonably dan gerous condition Although Sova be lieved that the puddle w as cr eate d by a piec e of ice that ha d fallen
and me lte d, sh e a dmi tte d th a t sh e did no t kn owwh e re the pu dd le c a me fr om. Th e on ly c re dib le evidenc e about the puddle is that, after Sova fell, she sa

w a small puddle of c lear

liquid on the floor
near the condiment bar , and the we t spot on he r jeans felt cool to the touch. This evidenc e no more de mon str a te s th a t th e pu dd le re su lte d fr om fa lle n, me lte d ice tha n f ro m a sp ill e d d ri nk of le mon -l ime soda or water. Even if it were ice, it could have fallen f rom a c ustomer’s drink just as ea sily as fr om the condiment bar . Fur

thermore , Sova also admitted that she di d not know how long the condition ha d e xiste d. She te sti fi e d th a t sh e did no t se e the pu dd le a s sh e a pp ro a c he d. Thus , it is j us t a s li ke ly that the puddle wa s cre ated while S o v a wa s standing at the condiment bar (leaving B ill Mi ller7

virtually no time to discover and reme dy the condition) as it wa s that the substance had bee n on the floor for some time. Whe re te sti mony “ c ou ld g ive ri se to any numbe r of inf e re nc e s, no ne mor e pr ob a ble than another ,” as he re, the n the evidenc e d o es n o t ri se to “more than a sc intill a to withstand a no-evide nce c halleng e.” Blount v. Bordens, Inc ., 9 1 0 S
. W
. 2 d 931, 933 (Tex. 1995). Sova’s subject i v e belief

s about the puddle’s or igin a nd its temporal longe vity wer e not supported by

any oth e r e vid e nc e and , th

us , amou nt t o n oth ingmor e tha

n c on je c tur e and

sp e c ulati on in su ff

ic ie nt t o negat e a no evide nce summar y judgme nt motion. See G onzales , 968 S.W .2d at 937-38; se e als o Tex. R. Evi d. 602 (per sonal knowledg e require d for witness testimony). Althoug h Sova’s testimony may raise a g enuine issue about whether she slipped on a puddle of water, it does nothing to prove how the puddle g ot the re, how long it had be en ther e, or w hether Bill Miller knew or

should have known about it s exi stence at the time of Sova’s f all. J ust as in Ree ce , th e re c or d in thi s c a se de mon str a te s

no e v id e n c e to in d ic a te h o w lo n g th e s p il l e xis te d b e f o r e s h e f e ll
. T here was no evidenc e that the spill was conspicuous—it was not larg e and c onsisted of a c lear liquid on a light tile floor. The re w as no evidence that [ a store e mploy ee] saw the spill before [appellant] fell. .
. . There was no evidenc e indicating when or how the spill came to be on the floor. Nor was there evidenc e conc erningthe condition of the spilled liqui d that might indicate how long it had been the re.
81 S.W.3d a t 81 6- 17 ; see also W right v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc
. , 7 3 S. W. 3 d 5 5 2 , 5 5 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st D ist .] 20 02 , n o p e t.) . T he re fo re , c on sid e ri ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to Sova, we hold that there is no evide nce to support the conclusion t hat Bill Miller had actua l or construc tive knowledg e of the puddle on the floor a s a dang erous c ondition. Se e id
.The analy sis in Corbin , albeit a dire cted ve rdict, is fully applicable to this case bec ause “ [a] 3 no-evide nce summar

y judgme nt is essentially

a pre trial direc ted ver dict, and we apply the same le g al s u ff i ci en cy s t an d ar d i nre v i ew i n g a n o -e v i d en ce s u m m a r y j u d gm en tas we ap p l y

i nre v i ew i n g a direc ted ver dict.” King Ranch, Inc. v . Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 750-51 (Te x . 2003). 8 Condime nt bar area as unreasonably d angerous condition

I n C orbin v. Safeway Stores , the supreme court re cog nized that, although “ in the ty pic a l c a se , th e on ly

da ng e ro us c on dit ion that is a lle g e d is the sp e c if ic [] ite m on

the fl oo r, ” in s ome
case s the dang erous c ondition may be base d on an alleg ation “tha t the store owne r maintained a n
unrea sonably

dang erous method of

display that fre quently

cause d s u ch [ ] i t ems to become f loor hazards.” 648 S.W.2d at 297. Noting that “a store keepe r may be held liable f

or any dan gerous premises c ondition about which he should be a war e, not just for spec ific objec ts left on the floor,” the Corbin court re verse d the direc ted ver dict beca use there was more than a sc intill a of e vidence 3 demonstrating Safew ay ’s ac tual or construc tive knowledg e that the way it maintained its self-servic e g rape display

was unre asonably

dang erous, “ even in the a bsence of evide nce s h o wi n g the store
owner ’s ac tual or construc tive knowledg e of the prese nce on the floor of the specific object ca using the fa ll.” Id . at 295, 298. The pro b at i v e evidenc e in Corbin was that Safe way employ ees acknow ledg ed the store ’s awa rene ss of the risks pos ed by the g rape display

bin: “[S afe way ] knew from its experience that the gra pe bin was an unusually hazardous and continual source of slippery materia l on which customers ma y fall.” Id . at 29 5; see also H. E. Butt Groc ery Co. v. Resende z , 988 S
. W
. 2 d 2 1 8 , 2 1 9 (T ex . 1 9 9 9 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g Corbin ). Since Corbin , the Dallas, Te x arka na, and H ouston courts of appe als have issued opinions with si milar ana ly ses. I n Crosby v. Minyard Food Store s, Inc ., the pla int if

f tr ipp e d and

fe ll9

on a buckle d floor mat at the e ntranc e of the store. 122 S.W .3d 899, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). The court a ffirme d the trial cour t’s denial of a

direc ted ver dict beca

use “Crosby

prese nted evidenc e that Miny ard w as aw are of the fa ct that the mat . . . wa s often buc kled and c aused customers to fa ll,” including a n employ ee’ s testimony that “he ha d to straig hten the mat betwe en 48 and 86 ti m es d u ri ng an eig ht hour shift” and a ccide nt reports “ showing that sever al people ha d tripped and f

allen on the mat within a f ew we eks bef

ore Crosby ’s ac cident.” Id . at 901. I n Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor , the plaintiff slipped and f ell on a we t substance in the deli, which she a lleg ed wa s a piece of ice that had fallen from a Coke dispenser. 102 S.W.3d 816, 819-20 (Tex. A

pp.—Texarkana 2003, pet. filed). Taylor claimed that the manner i n which Br ookshire maintained its drink-f ountain are a constituted a da n ger o us condition, where as “f rom Br ookshire’s point of view , the puddle wa s the dang erous c ondition.” Id
. at 820. The c ourt aff irmed the summary judgme nt, holding that Ta y lor established that B rookshire w as aw are that its Coke dis pe ns e r c on sti tut e d a

da ng e ro us c on dit ion

ba se d o n a

n e mpl oy e e ’s te sti mony that ic e fr e qu e ntl y fell fr om the dispenser onto the floor a nd the store’ s admission that such previously fallen ic e had landed on the ha

rd floor, be y ond the mats it had in place
. Id . at 822, 824-25. I n Nat ion al C

on v e nie nc e Sto re

s, In c . v . E

re v ia , the plaint i ff s l i p ped and f ell on a pu dd le of ic e and /or wate r. 73 S.W. 3d 51 8, 52 1 & n. 1 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 02 , p e t. denied) . The court upheld the jury ’s verdic t on the premises liability claim bec ause, ba sed on “the manag er’ s testimony

that ice f alling f rom iced barr els was a common problem assoc iated with the nature of t h e dis play ” and “ the company policy requiring[absorbent] mats under such display s,” which the c ompany

had fa i l ed t o u se, there was suff icient evidenc e that the pr emises owner hadWe also take note of a fe dera l case from Mississippi rec og nizi ng this “unrea sonably safe 4 are a” theory of premises liability
. Merritt v W al-Mart Stores , 9 11 F . Su

pp . 2 42 , 2 44 -4 5 ( S.D . M iss
. 1995). In Me rit t , the court reve rsed the summar y judgme nt, which had be en g rante d in Wal-Mart’s favor perta ining to this theory , on the basis that the plaintiff’ s expert’s deposition testimony cre ated a fa ct question about the unre asonably dang erous nature of the condition. Id . at 247. 10 actua l or construc tive knowledg e that its use of self -ser ve ice d-drink bar

rels constituted a dang erous condition. Id. at 523 & n.2.

T h u s , wh i l e co u rt s fo l l o wi n g Corbin have r ecog nized that a g ener al ar ea or method of dis pla y may c on sti tut e an unr e a so na

bly da ng e ro us c on dit ion , in e a c h o f t he se c a se s th e de fe nd ants
or on e of the ir e mpl oy e e s a dmi tte d to kn ow inga bo ut t he ha zar ds a sso c ia te d w iththe mann e r i n which an a

rea was maintaine d or g oods were display ed. See Corbin , 6 48 S.W. 2d a t 29 5; Crosby , 12 2 S. W.3 d at 90 1; Taylor , 1 02 S.W. 3d a t 82 2, 82 4- 25 ; Er e v ia , 7 3 S
. W
. 3 d a t5 2 3
. A d d i t i o n a l l y,

4 in Crosby the re we re a c c ide nt r e po rt s sh ow ingthat si mil a r i nc ide nts ha d r e c e ntl y

oc c ur re d, and in Er e v ia the company ’s policy manual demonstrated the known risk associate d with the display and the nee d for f

loor mats to remedy

it. Crosby , 1 22 S.W. 3d

a t 90 1; Er e v ia , 73 S.W .3d at 523. Unli ke the af firmative testimony

or docume ntary evidenc e produce d by the plaintiffs in these ca ses, Sova failed to put for

th a scintilla of evidence to demonstrate that Bill Miller knew or should have known that the condiment bar

are a g ener ally

posed an unr easona

bly dang erous c ondition. The re cord r efle cts that the basic a rra ng ement of the condiment bar is undisputed: pic kle s, on ion s, pico de g a llo , b utt e r, le mon s o r l ime s, so ur c re a m, b a c on , a

nd c he e se are a ll display ed in the condiment ba r, housed in a

n “ice bath.” During the lunch hour, which is w hen Sova fell, the c ondiment bar’s loc ation is a “hig h traff ic ar ea.” The floor

surrounding the condiment bar is made of ha

rd, re latively

smooth, quarry

tile. B ill Miller does not have a c ompany policy of using11

fl oo r m a ts o r wa

rn ing sig ns in the c on dim e nt bar ar e a , an d n e ith e r o f t he se wa s p re se nt at th e tim e of Sova’s fa ll. The pa

rties’ primar

y point of disag ree ment about the condiment bar conce rns the “ic e bath.” Sova alleg ed that ice can easily spill over or leak out of the condiment bar onto the floor. To the contra

ry , Bill Miller’s mana g er of five y ear s, Alan Scar

boroug h, testified that t h e i ce i s kept under a cover , not e x posed on the surfa ce of the condiment bar , and ther efor e could not fa ll from the bar to the f

loor except when ne w ice is be ing filled into the bi n. He further te stified that ice is neve r ad d edt o t h e c o n d i m en tb ar d u ri n g t h e h o u rs o f op er at i o n ; i t i s o n l y fi l l ed o n ce a da y , i nt h e m o rn i n g. A l s o , B i l l M i l l e r ’ s d i r e c t o r o f p e r s o n n e l , S t a c y H u s e r , w h o h a d w o r k e d f o r t h e c o mp an y f

o r t w e n t ythree y ear s, descr ibed the ice bin as a “ long, na rrow tub that fits .
. . inside” the c ondiment bar. She explained that, as the i ce melts throug hout the day , the water accumulates insi de the bin, and af ter the store c loses, the rubbe r stopper inside the bin i s u n p l ug g ed, and the water drains into a five

g allon bucket, which is then emptied. Scar boroug h acknow ledg ed that, if the dr ainag e bucke t was
no t e mpt ie d, wate r cou ld o ve rf low fr om t he c on dim e nt b ar, bu t he te sti fi e d th a t th is h a d o nly happene d twice in a f

ive-y ear period. Huser a nd Scarbor oug h both testified that, althoug h spill s co u l d occur near the condiment bar , floor mats should not be pl ace d in that are a bec ause the y would pose a la

rg er “tripping hazard” than they would preve nt slips, especially in light of the fa ct that B ill Mi ller has alternative policies in place to keep the a rea safe . The c ompany

policies they

testified about included desig nating four e mploy ees—the busser, c ashier, dr ink-filler, a nd manag er—to be responsible for p at ro l l i n g the ar ea thr oug hout the day and, “if there ’s any

thing ther e, to g et it up.” Scar borou gh testif i ed that he a

nd his employ ees “ constantly ” monitor the ar ea a nd clea n up any spills. The12

employ ee manual ref

lects this g ener al patrolling policy and also dire cts the ca shier “to spot swee p around the condiment bar at 12:30 to keep the floor cle an.” T hus, Huser a nd Scarbor oug h conclude d that, beca use there was such a low risk of sl ip-and-f alls near the condiment bar—due to the enclose d ic e b i n an d dr a i n a g e s y s t e m , a s w e l l a s t h e p o l i c i e s u s e d t o k e e p t h e ar e a c l e an
— i t w a s n ot w or th incurringthe g reater ha zard of trip-a nd-fa lls that would b e cr ea t ed by the use of f

loor mats in the
are a. Hu se r a lso te sti fi e d th a t, a s th e dir e c tor of pe rs on ne l, she ov e rs e e s a ll c la ims a g a ins t the compan y , in c lu d in g a ll a c c id e n t r e p o rts f il e d b y p a tr o n s , an d th a t in h e r tw e n ty
- thr e e y e ar s of
e mpl oy me nt w ithB ill Mil le r, sh e wa s n ot a wa re of any oth e r s lip -a

nd -f a ll c la ims ari sin g fr om t

his location. Scar

boroug h confirme d that, in his five y ear s as the mana g er of t h e Bi l l M iller location wher e Sova fe ll, there ha d not been a ny other slip-and- falls. I n an attempt to contra dict Huser a nd Scarbor oug h’s testimony , S o v a offere d the testimony of Ke n Hende rson, who wa s Bill Miller’s assistant manag er at the time of Sova’s fa ll but had subseque ntly

been te rminated. He nderson averr ed that the f loor in front of the c ondiment bar
wa s “ g e ne ra lly

sli pp e ry .” He cla ime d to have re c omm e nd e d to up pe r m ana g e me nt t hat th e “ til e floors [be repla ced] with a diffe rent surf ace that woul d b e more resistant to being slippery ,” but Scarbor oug h denied that a ny such conve rsation occ urre d. Hende rson furthe r t es tified that the condiment bar ’s ice bin wa s replenishe d and its drainag e bucke t was emptied duringthe hours of operation (rather

than beingfilled befor e openingand dra ined af ter c lose) and that “[a]s a re sult, ice is sometimes spil led on the floor.” Finally , Hende rson testified that “[o] n occa sion, Ihad customer s complain about the g ener al slippery condition of the re staurant’ s floors.” None theless, Hende rson13

a lso c on fi rm e d that th e re ha d n ot b e e n “ any oth e r s lip -a

nd -f a ll a c c ide nts by

c us tom e rs ” duri nghis employ ment with Bill Miller. Even takingHende rson’s testimony as true, the re is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t
a bo ut w he the r t

he c on dim e nt b ar c on sti tut e d an un re a so na bly da ng e ro us c on dit ion a

bo ut w hic h B ill Miller knew or

should have known. A ssuming that the f loor surroundingthe condiment bar was “g ener ally

slippery ,” or that ice occ asionally fell from the condiment bar to the floor, as He nderson
aver red, this is not evidence of an unr easona bly dang erous condition that e x isted on the day or at the tim e that So va

fe ll. No on e dis pu te s th a t th e fl oo r i n th a t are a c ou ld b e sli pp e ry

or that sp ill s c ou ld
occur —but this does not make the ar ea unreasonably dang erous, e specia lly in light of the f

acts that the ar ea w as constantly monitored for spills and that the ice bin a nd draina g e sy stem wer e enc losed, loweringthe possibilit y

of fa llen ice or

leake d water
. Finally , when r e ly

in g o n a th e o r y that there was a

n unrea sonably

dang erous c ondition, a plaintiff must produce evidenc e that would demonstrate some re as o n why the pre mises owner knew or should have known that the are a wa s unrea sonably dang erous. H e r e , Hende rson’s testimony at most provides evidenc e of a n occa sional dang er a ssociated with the c ondiment bar, but it does not tend to show that the are a, g ener ally speaking , was unrea sonably dang erous. And , u n l i k e t he plaintiffs in Corbin , Crosby , Taylor , and Er e v ia , Sova failed to put forth any aff irmative evide nce to demonstrat e t h at Bill Miller was a war e of a n unrea sonable da

ng er. See Corbin , 648 S.W .2d at 29 5; Crosby , 1 22 S.W. 3d a t 90 1; Taylor , 1 02 S.W. 3d at 822, 82 4- 25 ; Er e v ia , 73 S.W .3d at 523. Whil e a pla int if f i s n ot b arr e d f

ro m r e c ov e ry

sim ply be c a us e sh e wa s the fi rs t pe rs on to s lip and

fa ll in an ar ea, it is rele vant that Sova was una ble to produce any

evidenc e of any prior slip-and- falls at th e res ta ur ant. Con sid e ri ngthat th e re ha d b e e n n o p ri or sli p- and -f

a lls , it wo uld be dif fi c ult to14

pr e su me that B ill Mil le r s ho uld have re g ard e d th e are a a s unr e a so na

bly da ng e ro us . T hu s, we ho ld that Sova failed to put for th a scin t i l l a o f ev i d ence to raise a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t about whether Bill Miller had a ctual or c onstructive knowledg e that its condiment bar are a constituted an
unrea sonably

dang erous c ondition. See H uckabe e , 19 S.W .3d at 422.
CO NC LU SION I t was S ova’s burden t o produce more than a scintilla of evide nce de monstrating that B ill Mil le r h a d a c tua l or

c on str uc ti ve know le dg e of

an unr e a so na

bly da ng e ro us c on dit ion

on its premises, ba sed on either

a spec ific puddle that wa s on the floor long enoug h for Bill Miller to have discovere d and rec tified it or on the manner in w hich the condiment bar w as g ener ally maintained. B a se d on the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d, no re a so na ble a nd fa ir -m ind e d pe rs on c ou ld c on c lud e th at Bi ll Miller was a ctually

awa re or should hav e b ee n aw ar e that either the puddle on the f

loor or the condiment-ba

r area posed an unreasonably dang erous condition on its premises. See King Ranch , 1 1 8 S
. W
. 3 d

a t7 5 1
. T h u s , S o v a

f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y h e r b u r d e no ne i t h e r

t h e f i r s to r s e c o n d t h e o r y. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Sova’ s only issue and af

firm the summary

judgme nt.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: June 30, 2006