Report on

Activities and Programs for Countering

Proliferation and NBC Terrorism

Volume I – Executive Summary

May 2006

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee

Active Defense WMD Consequence 

Management

Security Cooperation 

and Partner Activities

Threat Reduction 

Cooperation

Elimination

Offensive Operations

Passive Defense

Interdiction

Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Submitted by USD(AT&L)
Report on Activities and Programs for 

Countering Proliferation

and NBC Terrorism

Volume I 

Executive Summary

May 2006 

Counterproliferation 

Program 

Review 

Committee
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

ii

FOREWORD 

I am pleased to forward to the Congress the 2006 Counterproliferation Program Review 

Committee’s (CPRC) Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC 

Terrorism. This report reflects the collective views of more than 20 organizations, including 

those within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the 

Intelligence Community (IC). 

The 2005 CPRC major findings highlighted the need to improve chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sensors and detectors, to enhance the ability to detect 

adversaries’ intentions and planned operations, and to enhance vaccines, pretreatments, and 

therapeutics. Additionally, missile defense and CBRN material control were identified as areas 

where development should be continued as planned. Notable progress in these areas includes the 

following: 

Detection 

• Close-in or point detection of unauthorized activities has been improved. DOE 

completed a multiagency test characterizing and validating advanced remote 

sensing instrumentation for nuclear and other WMD proliferation. 

• The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) developed radiological detection 

technologies and equipped and trained combatant commander operator teams. 

• The Navy and DTRA jointly began efforts to rapidly field unmanned surface 

vessels for detection of waterborne radiological sources. The Coast Guard and 

the Department of Homeland Security are also partners in this effort. 

• Biological and chemical detection improvements have been made with the 

prospect of increasing standoff distance. 

• Advances in predictive models for adversarial intention are making progress. 

• Standoff nuclear and other WMD detection remains the most elusive capability 

for now. It is addressed in a subsequent paragraph. 

Vaccines, Pretreatments, and Therapeutics 

• The Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program provided new contracts for vaccine 

production. 

• Basic research in enteric disease and unconventional therapeutics is expanding. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

iii

Missile Defense 

• The level of effort in this area has been sustained and progress is being made in 

increasing appropriate capabilities. 

• Funding for missile defense has increased 20 percent. Key projects entered 

system development. An initial operational capability against long-range ballistic 

missiles was achieved. 

Our analysis of resources indicates that basic research for combating WMD should be 

increased. It represents 7.6 percent of the science and technology accounts considered by the 

CPRC (Budget Activity (BA) 6.1 through BA 6.3). DoD-wide, BA 6.1 is approximately 13 

percent. Given the high priority of combating WMD and WMD threat reduction, basic research 

for combating WMD should be significantly higher. Increases in BA 6.1 research should be 

focused on the detect, identify, and characterize technology functions with emphasis on WMD 

standoff detection. 

Our CPRC process continues to improve as we reach out to the broad community of 

interest. This is a very important mission with many challenges and much work ahead. 

Dale Klein 

Executive Secretary 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

iv

CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 1 

CPRC ORGANIZATIONS AND STANDING COMMITTEE...................................................................... 2 

NATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE CPRC PROCESS ............................................................................. 2 

CPRC AREAS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT.............................................................................. 3 

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING

WMD GOALS .................................................................................................................................. 4 

COMBATING WMD ACTIVITIES OF CPRC MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS ............................................ 7 

FUNDING OF CPRC-MONITORED PROGRAMS ................................................................................ 14 

CPRC RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................... 14 

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK........................................................................................................ 16 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.................................................................................................. 17 

FIGURES 

1. DOD’S APPROACH TO COMBATING WMD .................................................................................. 8 

TABLES 

1. 2006 ACES AND ACE PRIORITIES OF CPRC-REPRESENTED ORGANIZATIONS ........................... 4 

2. ACE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY..................................................................................................... 5 

3. HIGHLIGHTS OF DOD’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS............................... 9 

4. HIGHLIGHTS OF DOE’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS............................. 12 

5. HIGHLIGHTS OF IC’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS................................. 13 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The war on terror is a new kind of war against the most ruthless of 

enemies––and the fight we are waging is every bit as urgent as it is 

 dangerous.... [These enemies] are looking to obtain chemical, 

biological, or even nuclear weapons by any means they can find, and 

would not hesitate to use such weapons at the first opportunity. 

Vice President Richard B. Cheney 

February 28, 2006 

46th Annual American Legion Conference remarks 

Washington, D.C.

INTRODUCTION 

This Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism

is submitted to the United States Congress as required by the 1994 National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) (as amended). The report provides the findings of the interagency 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC). The CPRC was chartered by 

Congress in 1994 to report on the activities and programs of the Department of Defense (DoD), 

Department of Energy (DOE), and the intelligence community (IC) that address improvements in 

the U.S. Government’s efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of 

delivery, as well as terrorism involving these weapons. 

This report is the principal executive branch report on research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs to combat WMD. However, other interagency committees or 

department-specific groups also publish related but separate reports on nonproliferation, arms 

control, and combating terrorism programs. 

The report comprises two volumes. Volume I is the unclassified executive summary. It 

provides an overview of the offices and principals that make up the CPRC and its Standing 

Committee; the linkage of CPRC efforts to national strategy and guidance; areas for capability 

enhancement; an assessment of progress in meeting combating WMD requirements; a 

presentation of the main efforts of DoD, DOE, and the IC in combating WMD; an overview of 

the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) funding for CPRC-monitored programs; CPRC recommendations 

for 2006; and finally, the principal conclusions and outlook for future CPRC challenges. A list 

of the abbreviations and acronyms that appear in the text is included at the end of the volume. 

The executive summary is available on line at www.acq.osd.mil/cp. 

Volume II contains the main report and appendices. It is classified and provides an 

introduction on the purpose of this report, including a summary of national strategy perspectives 

to combat WMD; an overview of the threat from WMD; assessment highlights of CPRC 

programs and activities; recommendations; and appendices. The appendices provide information 

and source documentation on the CPRC itself, including its background, establishment, reporting 

requirements and participants; data on DoD, DOE, and IC programs and activities involved with 

combating WMD; Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and Joint 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

2

Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs); WMD consequence management (CM) and 

counterterrorism efforts; and 2006 combating WMD capability shortfalls. 

CPRC ORGANIZATIONS AND STANDING COMMITTEE 

DoD, DOE, and the IC form the CPRC, and contribute working-level representatives to 

it. In addition to the working level, a higher-level CPRC Standing Committee (SC) meets 

several times each year to address major issues identified during the CPRC review and report 

cycle. The SC, which was established in 1997 by agreement of the member organizations, is 

composed of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) (as chair); the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation, DOE (as vice chair); the Special Assistant to the Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI) for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC); 

the Deputy Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J–8); 

and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

(ASD(SO/LIC)). 

NATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE CPRC PROCESS 

Participants in the CPRC process conduct their review of combating WMD activities and 

programs within the context of national strategy. The 2002 National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction defines three pillars: strengthened nonproliferation to combat 

WMD proliferation, counterproliferation to combat WMD use, and consequence management to 

respond to WMD use. This strategy places emphasis on missions to stop, neutralize, or defend 

against WMD before such weapons can be used against the United States, its friends, or allies 

across a full range of mission areas, as well as measures to mitigate the effects of an attack with 

WMD. 

The first pillar of the National Strategy, strengthened nonproliferation, entails: 

Active nonproliferation diplomacy 

Multilateral regimes (arms control and other agreements) 

Nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation 

Controls on nuclear materials 

U.S. export controls 

Nonproliferation sanctions (i.e., proliferation prevention). 

The second pillar, counterproliferation, entails: 

Interdiction 

Deterrence 

Defense and mitigation (i.e., active defense, passive defense, and mitigation of 

crises). 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

3

And the third pillar, consequence management, entails actions to respond to and 

minimize the consequences of WMD against our: 

Citizens 

Military forces 

Friends and allies. 

These three combating WMD pillars were reaffirmed in the March 2006 version of The 

National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This document outlined the 

requirements of a comprehensive strategy for countering the proliferation of WMD: (1) 

strengthened nonproliferation efforts, (2) proactive counterproliferation efforts, and (3) improved 

protection to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. 

CPRC AREAS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT 

To effectively respond to its charter, the CPRC SC established Areas for Capability 

Enhancement (ACEs). The ACEs address all three pillars of the National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction––nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 

management. The ACEs serve as a means to categorize mission areas where progress is needed 

to enhance the combating WMD capabilities of the United States. The ACEs provide a 

framework for: 

Reviewing progress and assessing combating WMD requirements. 

Measuring RDA investment associated with combating WMD activities and ‌programs. 

The ACEs are aligned with the strategic mission areas described in the 2006 National 

Military Strategy to Combat WMD and DOE’s Defense Strategic Goal, described in the 2004 

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan. The ACEs also generally correspond 

to required capability areas across other federal government agencies that have combating WMD 

missions. 

The combating WMD ACEs for 2006 are listed in Table 1. The ACEs are prioritized 

internal to each member organization (see DoD, DOE, and IC columns), and the CPRC SC 

determines the overall prioritization (see SC column). ACE priority should be regarded by 

decision-makers and resource managers as only one factor among many others to consider when 

building investments in combating WMD capabilities. However, it is important to maintain 

capabilities in all ACE areas in order to meet the U.S. Government’s combating WMD 

objectives. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

4

Table 1. 2006 ACEs and ACE Priorities of CPRC-Represented Organizations 

ACE Priorities 

SCa DoD DOE IC Areas for Capability Enhancements 

1 1 3 2 

Interdiction. Operations to stop the transit of WMD, delivery systems, and associated technologies, 

materials, and expertise from transiting between states, and between state and nonstate actors of 

proliferation concern in any environment 

2 2 4 1 Elimination. Operationsb to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy a state or 

nonstate actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in hostile or uncertain environments 

3 5 1 5 

Threat Reduction Cooperation. Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host-nation 

authorities to enhance physical security, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, or improve protection of a 

state’s existing WMD program, stockpiles, and capabilities 

4 3 c 7 

Passive Defense. Measures to minimize or negate the vulnerability and effects of WMD employed 

against U.S. and partner/allied armed forces, as well as U.S. military interests, installations, and critical 

infrastructure 

5 7 2 3 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities. Activities to improve partner and allied capacity to 

combat WMD across the eight mission areas through military-to-military contact, burden-sharing 

agreements, combined military activities, and support to international activities 

6 4 c 4 Offensive Operations. Kinetic (both conventional and nuclear) or nonkinetic operations to defeat, 

neutralize, or deter a WMD threat or subsequent use of WMD 

7 6 c 6 

Active Defense. Military measures to prevent, deter, or defeat the delivery of WMD. Measures include 

offensive and defensive, conventional or unconventional actions to detect, divert, and destroy an 

adversary’s WMD or delivery means while en route to their target 

8 8 5 8 WMD Consequence Management. Actions taken to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or event and 

restore essential operations and services at home and abroad 

a Integrated Standing Committee priorities based on input from five members: ATSD(NCB), DOE, Joint Staff, WINPAC, and ASD(SO/LIC). 

b This description omits the word “military” from “military operations” found in the description from the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD in order to accommodate activities 

other than military.

c DOE did not rate the Passive Defense, Offensive Operations, or Active Defense ACEs. 

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS 

IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS 

During this year’s CPRC process, representatives of participating CPRC organizations 

formed ACE Assessment Groups (AGs) corresponding to the eight mission areas. The AGs 

analyzed the contribution of more than 200 programs in this report in the context of current 

national strategy guidance, and considered existing analytical products to make assessments of 

capabilities required to meet the goals of each ACE. The groups identified the main goals for 

each ACE, assessed the current status of programs and activities, identified high-priority 

shortfalls, and developed recommendations to address the goals of the ACE. 

Table 2 provides a summary of ACE assessments and the recommendations to pursue for 

CPRC organizations to address the corresponding ACE goals. See the main report (Volume II) 

for additional details. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

5

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary 

Goals Ongoing Efforts Shortfalls Recommendations 

Interdiction 

Develop and deploy capabilities to 

locate, tag, and track WMD and related 

materials and components 

Link information on trade or transfer of 

WMD 

Develop interdiction capabilities, 

including nonlethal means 

Improve special operations forces 

(SOF) interdiction capabilities 

Develop a comprehensive national 

nuclear detection architecture 

Detection/sensors for 

high-priority threat 

materials 

Multilateral cooperative 

interdiction initiatives 

Render-safe 

technologies 

Intelligence and 

information management 

tools 

Standoff detection Leverage ongoing U.S. research in 

sensor technology to develop 

comprehensive nuclear material detection 

capabilities with a suite of sensors 

optimized for the interdiction mission 

Incorporate air interdiction exercises into 

the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

Improve maritime interdiction capabilities 

to include ports and harbors 

Elimination 

Develop capabilities to locate, detect, 

identify, characterize, tag, and track 

WMD production and storage 

Develop WMD render-safe skills and 

capabilities, to include reachback 

Increase speed of response to 

elimination mission requirements 

Develop capabilities for joint command 

and control to address elimination 

mission requirements (Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) capability 

requirement) 

Training/exercise 

development

SOF detection and 

location capabilities

Agent defeat capabilities 

(i.e., render safe)

Wide-area and persistent 

long-range surveillance 

Lack of capabilities to 

destroy WMD 

Lack of capabilities and 

procedures to secure and 

exploit WMD sites 

Improve capability to conduct exploitation 

of WMD sites, including characterization 

of local WMD, onsite analysis, and data 

exfiltration 

Develop capabilities to defeat, and 

destroy WMD at sites, or provide reliable, 

secure transportation and storage for 

further disposition of WMD-related 

materials 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

Enhance capabilities to improve 

safeguards, physical security, and 

materials protection, control, and 

accounting of chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives (CBRNE) stockpiles 

Enhance capabilities to consolidate, 

reduce, or dismantle CBRNE 

Expand threat reduction activities to 

other high-threat regions by adapting 

existing or developing new cooperative 

frameworks 

Multilateral safety and 

security initiatives 

Foreign proliferation 

prevention training and 

equipment

Need for improved 

capabilities to detect WMD 

materials in transit at border 

crossings 

Need for improved 

capabilities to detect and 

monitor dismantlement of 

WMD capabilities 

Need for increased 

emphasis on sustainability 

of threat reduction 

capabilities 

Coordinate U.S. threat reduction 

cooperation efforts through a coordinating 

committee or group 

Improve development of more 

discriminating and sensitive sensors to 

monitor strategic transportation nodes 

Passive Defense 

Sense chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

hazards 

Shape the operating environment 

Shield the force 

Sustain operations 

Reconnaissance, 

detection, and 

identification 

Battlespace management 

Individual/collective 

protection and medical 

countermeasures 

Decontamination and 

restoration 

Lack of standardized test 

configuration and evaluation 

criteria for National Guard 

WMD Civil Support Teams 

(WMD-CSTs) 

Inadequate process to 

address WMD-CST science 

and technology (S&T) 

requirements 

Bio standoff detection 

Integrated early warning 

Lack of precision in hazard 

assessment tools 

Utilize agile acquisition methods to field 

capabilities sooner while material 

developers work more stringent far-term 

goals 

Develop new test and evaluation 

methodologies to ensure adequate 

operational testing meets the needs of 

the capability documents and 

developmental programs 

Develop processes for standardizing 

installation protection and WMD-CST 

requirements 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

6

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary (continued) 

Goals Ongoing Efforts Shortfalls Recommendations 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

Develop, implement, and support 

focused cooperative activities, 

particularly research and development 

(R&D) between the United States and 

our international partners, to improve 

their capabilities to combat WMD 

Provide technologies and systems to 

monitor and verify global regimes 

restricting the production, storage, and 

testing of WMD, WMD-related 

materials, and components 

Multilateral arms control 

and nonproliferation 

treaties and agreements

Current monitoring 

regimes lack ability to 

handle advanced 

reprocessing technologies 

Need for improved widearea, remote, and 

environmental monitoring 

capabilities 

Lack of efficient 

interagency data exchange 

Continue efforts to integrate and 

coordinate U.S.-international partnering 

activities 

Offensive Operations 

Implement end-to-end command, 

control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities 

directed at WMD and related 

infrastructure 

Employ offensive capabilities against 

in-transit, fixed, or WMD-related targets 

or infrastructure 

C4ISR systems (e.g., 

detection, location, 

targeting) 

Strike capabilities (e.g., 

kinetic and nonkinetic)

Inadequate physical 

defeat 

Provide full support to the ongoing U.S. 

Strategic Command-initiated capabilitiesbased assessment (CBA) scheduled for 

completion in summer of 2006 

Improve physical defeat capabilities, with 

minimal collateral damage 

Active Defense 

Continue to develop and field a single, 

integrated, layered Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS) to protect the 

United States, our deployed forces, 

and our allies and friends against 

ballistic missiles at all ranges and in all 

phases of flight 

Develop and field an integrated cruise 

missile defense capability and a UAV 

defense capability 

Enable U.S. forces to neutralize WMD 

threats worldwide––be they from 

national military programs, paramilitary 

organizations, or terrorists––by means 

of specially developed capabilities 

BMDS Challenges in countering 

ballistic missiles in boost 

phase and cruise missiles 

in all phases 

Technical challenges in 

detecting hidden 

explosives at standoff 

ranges up to 100 yards 

Continue to fully fund the ballistic missile 

defense program 

WMD Consequence Management (CM) 

Provide material solutions to enable 

joint commanders and others to 

respond, mitigate, and restore services 

in a post-engagement scenario 

characterized by damage and collateral 

hazard from CBRNE attack inside or 

outside the continental United States 

(CONUS) 

Develop processes and systems to 

ensure effective communication and 

coordination with domestic authorities 

Advisory and 

augmentation assets 

(e.g., federal, state, local 

coordination)

Equipment initiatives

Forensic capabilities 

(e.g., attribution)

Lack of standoff detectioninteroperability and quantity 

Lack of medical 

prophylaxis capabilities 

Limitation of current 

respiratory and ocular 

protective systems 

Lack of adequate 

coordinated CM data 

exchange and 

communications systems 

Deficiencies in several key 

medical response 

capabilities 

Improve the level of interagency 

coordination and training through the 

establishment of coordinated data 

exchange systems (such as the Medical 

Situational Awareness In-Theater (MSAT) 

ACTD) and agreements on the use of 

interoperable communications systems 

Develop and expand joint-service and 

multiservice CM doctrine 

Establish a readiness and training 

reporting system for installation protection 

Conduct a comprehensive CM CBA within 

the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System (JCIDS) 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

7

COMBATING WMD ACTIVITIES 

OF CPRC MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS 

DoD, DOE, and the IC have separate responsibilities for combating WMD. DoD’s 

activities span all three national strategy pillars and all eight combating WMD mission areas. 

DOE is concerned primarily with the nonproliferation pillar, in particular nuclear detection, 

proliferation prevention, and security of nuclear materials, which are the core of the Threat 

Reduction Cooperation, and Security Cooperation and Partner Activities ACEs. The IC supports 

both DoD and DOE, among other organizations, with activities across the mission areas. Tables 

3, 4, and 5 highlight selected combating WMD activities for DoD, DOE, and the IC, 

respectively, which have occurred since the issuance of the 2005 CPRC report. The highlights 

presented in the tables meet three important criteria: 

Fulfilling specific ACE goals and performance measures. 

Meeting the requirements of corresponding policy guidance or international 

agreements. 

Reducing identified shortfalls or capability gaps within an ACE. 

DoD Selected Activities To Meet Combating WMD Goals. DoD activities and programs 

cut across the spectrum of combating WMD. Figure 1 depicts DoD’s approach to the 

proliferation threat environment and the combating WMD mission areas designed to prevail 

against it. DoD’s primary focus is on providing warfighters with required capabilities to defeat, 

deter, defend, respond to, and recover from WMD and related threats or attacks. Key elements 

of DoD’s approach include maintaining a strong deterrent capability; developing capabilities to 

identify, characterize, destroy, and interdict the production, transfer, storage, and weaponization 

of WMD; developing active defenses to interdict delivery means; developing passive defenses to 

provide detection, medical countermeasures, and individual and collective protection; training 

and equipping U.S. forces to operate effectively in a WMD-contaminated environment; and 

developing the ability to restore operations and manage the consequences of WMD use. In 

environments where international partners have agreed to cooperate to reduce the threat of 

WMD, DoD’s contributions of expertise and technology for international military-to-military 

cooperation are crucial to the success of these nonproliferation missions. The key elements of 

these international cooperative efforts are supporting U.S. diplomacy, arms control, and export 

controls; and encouraging U.S. allies and coalition partners to make the three pillars of 

combating WMD a part of their military planning. 

In February 2006, DoD released the most recent version of its Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) Report. The QDR report outlined four main priority areas that frame the 

capabilities needed to address future challenges identified in the National Defense Strategy: (1) 

defeating terrorist networks, (2) defending the homeland in depth, (3) shaping the choices of 

countries at strategic crossroads, and (4) preventing hostile states and nonstate actors from 

acquiring or using WMD. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

8

The QDR report identified important capabilities needed by DoD for combating WMD. 

They are summarized below:1

SOF forces to locate, characterize, and secure WMD. 

Systems to locate, tag, and track WMD and related materials (and transportation 

methods). 

Sensors to detect fissile materials at standoff ranges. 

Interdiction capabilities to stop all shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, 

and related materials. 

Persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabilities or hostile 

forces. 

Human intelligence, language skills, and cultural awareness to better understand 

the intentions and motivations of potential adversaries and to speed recovery ‌efforts. 

Capabilities and specialized teams to render WMD safe and secure. 

Nonlethal weapons to secure WMD sites. 

 

1 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, page 35.

Figure 1. DoD’s Approach to Combating WMD 

Enemy capable of WMD use/subsequent use Enemy uses WMD

Potential adversaries or others attempt to

possess or proliferate

Others agree to destroy or secure

current WMD

Defeat, Deter Defend, Respond, Recover

Prevent, Dissuade, Deny Reduce, Destroy, Reverse

Mission: Dissuade, deter, defend against and defeat those who seek to harm the United 

States, its allies, and partners through WMD use or threat of use. If attacked, mitigate the 

effects and restore deterrence.

Detection

Intelligence

Offensive Operations

WMD Elimination

Active Defense

Passive Defense

WMD

Interdiction

Passive Defense

Active Defense

WMD Consequence

Management

Security Cooperation &

Partner Activities

Threat Reduction Cooperation

Offensive

Operations

WMD Interdiction

Enemy capable of WMD use/subsequent use Enemy uses WMD

Potential adversaries or others attempt to

possess or proliferate

Others agree to destroy or secure

current WMD

Defeat, Deter Defend, Respond, Recover

Prevent, Dissuade, Deny Reduce, Destroy, Reverse

Mission: Dissuade, deter, defend against and defeat those who seek to harm the United 

States, its allies, and partners through WMD use or threat of use. If attacked, mitigate the 

effects and restore deterrence.

Detection

Intelligence

Offensive Operations

WMD Elimination

Active Defense

Passive Defense

WMD

Interdiction

Passive Defense

Active Defense

WMD Consequence

Management

Security Cooperation &

Partner Activities

Threat Reduction Cooperation

Offensive

Operations

WMD Interdiction
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

9

Capabilities to shield critical and vulnerable systems and technologies from the 

catastrophic effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP). 

Joint command and control (C2) tailored for elimination. 

Capabilities to deploy, sustain, protect, support, and redeploy special operations 

forces (SOF) in hostile environments. 

In addition, the QDR states that DoD should have planning constructs in place to allow 

for surge capacity to contribute to the Nation’s response to and management of the consequences 

of WMD attacks or a catastrophic event, such as Hurricane Katrina. 

Recent DoD activities addressing the QDR-identified required capabilities, as well as the 

combating WMD goals, are highlighted in Table 3. 

Table 3. Highlights of DoD’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

Interdiction 

Detection and tracking of illicit WMD will be improved by Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Navy research on unmanned 

surface vessels (USVs) that will alert personnel to the presence of undeclared radiological or special nuclear material on ships or 

barges from a USV 

International cooperation efforts to stop the illicit flow of WMD and their means of delivery (WMD/M) were furthered through U.S. Navyhosted multination PSI wargames to explore operational capability and interoperability issues; and through border control and export 

control training provided by DTRA to enhance maritime and border forces/capabilities in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan

Elimination 

Joint C2 capabilities for elimination operations were enhanced when the U.S. Army Nuclear Employment Augmentation Team (NEAT) 

supported combatant commander (COCOM) exercises and Joint Targeting Boards; DTRA provided combating WMD planning teams to 

COCOMs to assist in developing and executing WMD elimination-focused tabletop exercises and planning sessions

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

Safeguards at host-nation facilities were improved under the Biological Threat Reduction program, which completed construction of six 

Epidemiological Monitoring Stations in the Republic of Georgia and Uzbekistan; in addition, DTRA successfully transferred copies of 

especially dangerous pathogen collections from Georgia and Azerbaijan to the United States for further diagnostic analysis; WMD

monitoring capabilities were furthered by the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, which continued installation of radiation portal 

monitors and related support in Uzbekistan; our capability to reduce CBRN stockpiles was enhanced by the chemical weapons 

destruction program, which continued to build a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia to destroy one-half of their stock of 

man-portable, nerve-agent-filled weapons; the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) eliminated 42 intercontinental ballistic 

missiles, 21 sea-launched ballistic missiles, 75 silos and missile launchers, 16 strategic bombers, 95 nuclear air-to-surface missiles, and 

1 strategic submarine; CTR deactivated 337 nuclear warheads and helped transport another 300 for dismantlement or long-term 

storage 

Passive Defense 

Sense capabilities were furthered by the completion of construction and laboratory characterization of prototypes to demonstrate and

compare competing passive and infrared (IR) spectrometry approaches to detect and discriminate biological and nonbiological agents 

for relatively low concentrations at useful standoff ranges. This provides the Joint Biological Standoff Detection System (JBSDS) with 

tested technology solutions to extend range, increase sensitivity, reduce false alarms, and allow daytime operation 

Shape capabilities were furthered by the demonstration and transition of the Simulation, Training, and Analysis for Fixed Sites 

(STAFFS) model, which forms the technology base in the Joint Operation Effects Federation (JOEF) Phase I Prototype. Warfighters will

use JOEF as a battlefield analysis tool to predict operational effects of CBRN weapons to support decision-making and training 

Shield efforts were furthered by demonstration of the ability to produce materials employing self-detoxification chemistries for G-nerve, 

V-series nerve agents, and mustard agent in electrospun fibers 

Sustain capabilities were improved by the U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) Health Facilities fielding of patient 

decontamination to 50 medical treatment facilities both inside and outside CONUS 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

10

Table 3. Highlights of DoD’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

(continued)

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

Increased participation in international combating WMD agreements was achieved when the States Parties discussed enhancement of

capabilities for responding to cases of alleged use of biological weapons and strengthening disease surveillance under the Biological 

Weapons Convention 

Capabilities to support the international agreements were enhanced by the completion of computer simulations of hyperspectral imaging 

Offensive Operations 

Our ability to locate, find, and target potential WMD and related targets was improved by the U.S. Army NEAT support to COCOM 

exercises and Joint Targeting Boards, and instruction at the Theater Nuclear Operations Course and Joint Flag Officer Warfighting 

Course 

Our ability to locate, find, and target potential WMD and related targets was furthered by the Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT) program,

which obtained live data from field operations and exercises 

The ability to offensively strike WMD targets was furthered by the Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability program, which 

completed development of a new weapon capability 

Active Defense 

To develop and operationalize global ballistic missile defenses, DoD completed the following activities: 

Warfighters are conducting limited defensive operations of the Ballistic Missile Defense System; for the first time, we have a thin-line 

capability to defeat long-range missiles that threaten the U.S. homeland 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) continued to deliver capabilities against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; MDA 

increased the inventory of interceptors, expanded the sensor network, and enhanced command and control, battle management, and 

communications functionality 

MDA resumed flight testing of its Ground-Based Interceptor with an interceptor characterization flight in Feb 06; MDA continued

successful flight testing of Standard Missile-3 and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense interceptors and conducted a number of useful 

ground and system tests 

To develop a cruise missile defense capability, DoD achieved the following program key milestones: 

Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), a joint acquisition effort cruise missile defense system,

completed the system/software requirements review and fire unit critical design review 

Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) successfully completed Milestone B Army Systems 

Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) and Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review, Jun 05; was approved for entry into the system 

development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the program life cycle, Aug 05; and issued contract change order for SDD 

WMD Consequence Management

To improve CM response capabilities, the DTRA Research and Development Analysis Center (RDAT) institutionalized 24/7 subject 

matter expertise reachback and technology outreach services 

To improve DoD coordination with other organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, the CBRNE Coordination Element provided 

support to JTF-CM (Exercise Ardent Sentry ’05, Hurricane Rita), JTF-CS (Exercise Ardent Sentry ’05, National Scout Jamboree/ 

National Security Special Event (NSSE) CM planning and C2 operations), and USEUCOM (Exercise Flexible Response ‘06/CM 

planning augmentation to HQ USEUCOM staffs) 

DOE Selected Activities To Meet Combating WMD Goals. DOE’s combating WMDrelated activities and programs are directed toward providing capabilities in nonproliferation 

mission areas. Within DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has the mission to provide policy and technical leadership to 

limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to WMD; advance the 

technologies to detect the proliferation of WMD worldwide; and eliminate or secure inventories 

of surplus materials and infrastructure usable for nuclear weapons. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

11

Activities that address this nonproliferation mission include: 

Developing new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor 

nuclear weapons production, proliferation, and prohibited nuclear explosions 

worldwide. 

Preventing and countering WMD proliferation by providing policy and technical 

support to implement and monitor transparent WMD reductions; strengthening 

indigenous international safeguards and export controls systems in other 

countries; transitioning WMD expertise and infrastructure to peaceful purposes; 

and improving international and multinational safeguards, export control, and 

interdiction regimes. 

Working in Russia and other regions of concern to (1) secure and eliminate 

vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material; and (2) install detection equipment at border crossings and megaports to prevent and detect the illicit 

transfer of nuclear material. 

Enabling the Russian Federation to permanently cease production of weaponsgrade plutonium by replacing plutonium-producing nuclear reactors with fossilfueled powerplants to provide alternative sources of heat and electricity and 

provide for the shutdown of the reactors. 

Eliminating surplus Russian plutonium and surplus U.S. plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium (HEU). 

Identifying, securing, removing, or facilitating the disposition of high-risk, 

vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a potential threat to the United States and the international community. 

DOE primarily supports the combating WMD missions of DoD and the IC through its 

nuclear proliferation prevention and counterterrorism activities. DOE also plays a critical role, 

through its core nuclear work, in addressing ACE priorities supporting inspection and monitoring 

activities of arms control agreements and regimes; protection of WMD and WMD-related 

materials and components; detection and tracking of these materials and components; and export 

control activities. In addition, DOE is working closely with DoD and the IC to detect, 

characterize, and defeat WMD and WMD-related facilities. 

DOE activities in the combating WMD mission areas are highlighted in Table 4. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

12

Table 4. Highlights of DOE’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals*

Interdiction 

NNSA has trained over 1,000 officials from licensing, scientific/technical, customs, and border guard organizations on WMD commodity 

recognition, nonproliferation principles, license review, and multilateral export controls 

Elimination 

DOE transitioned Sonoma, a state-of-the-art proliferation detection persistent surveillance airborne system, to DoD under the rapidresults initiative to support war-on-terrorism efforts 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

To improve the physical security and accountability of nuclear material at foreign sites, DOE (1) completed rapid materials protection, 

control, and accounting (MPC&A) upgrades to all 19 Strategic Rocket Forces sites, signed all comprehensive upgrade contracts, and 

secured 150 buildings in Russia containing weapons-useable material or warheads; and (2) completed installation of radiation detection 

equipment to detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials at 83 strategic transit/border crossings and sea 

transshipment hubs in Russia and other countries, and at four megaports 

To reduce the quantity of HEU available globally, NNSA has downblended 80 metric tons of surplus U.S. HEU for peaceful use as 

nuclear reactor fuel 

To bring under control many potential sources of “dirty bomb” radioactive material, (1) the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program 

has recovered more than 11,000 sources since 1997 and (2) the International Radiological Threat Reduction Program has recovered

approximately 1,500 sources from 16 sites in Russia, has completed physical security upgrades at 231 facilities containing vulnerable 

high-risk radioactive materials, and is in the process of finishing projects at an additional 211 locations in over 40 countries 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

DOE delivered operational space-based nuclear explosion monitoring sensors to the Air Force on a schedule that supports Air Force 

launch timelines, thus sustaining the Nation’s capability to monitor and report nuclear detonation that occurs on or above the Earth’s 

surface 

DOE provides updated calibration and geophysical models to improve the monitoring performance of regional seismic stations, thus 

improving the Nation’s capability to monitor and report underground nuclear detonations in specific threat regions of the globe

DOE completed development and testing of the next generation of space-based optical explosion monitor, which was delivered to the 

Air Force in early FY06 and will be launched on a future Air Force satellite. This enhanced sensor has greater sensitivity and will 

improve the Nation’s monitoring capability for very small surface explosions. All future nuclear explosion monitoring payloads will 

incorporate the enhanced optical sensor 

As part of the HEU Transparency program, 30 metric tons of HEU is downblended annually. As of September 2005, the program has 

monitored the conversion of 255 metric tons of weapons-useable HEU. This represents the equivalent of 10,000 nuclear weapons 

permanently eliminated, in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency-defined standards 

*DOE did not highlight activities in the Passive Defense, Offensive Operations, Active Defense, or WMD Consequence Management ACEs. 

IC Selected Activities To Meet Combating WMD Goals. The IC provides strategic, 

tactical, and operational intelligence on WMD threats to all U.S. Government organizations, a 

critical enabling function throughout all eight ACEs. Recently the IC’s counterterrorism and 

counterproliferation efforts have been significantly restructured to correspond to new U.S. 

national security and homeland security guidance. Several new entities were established, 

including the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterproliferation Center 

(NCPC), and the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to better manage, direct, 

and coordinate IC activities and interagency support in the areas of combating terrorism, 

counterproliferation, and homeland security. This restructuring is partly due to the recent 

Intelligence Capabilities Commission Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

Intelligence Capabilities Commission Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Upon 

receiving the report entitled Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the administration assigned responsibility for some 75 

recommendations to respective departments and agencies and established working groups to 

address them. DoD participated in these working groups and in the development of the final 

recommendation to the President. Since this assessment process, DoD has continued to be 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

13

involved as some of the initial working groups transitioned to the next phase—development of 

implementation plans for the agreed-to recommendations. 

Although the commission’s report offered very good recommendations with respect to 

U.S. intelligence and WMD, almost all were associated with areas outside the purview or 

concern of the CPRC report to Congress. For example, many recommendations addressed the 

areas of information sharing, personnel, training, and analysis, or authorities outside DoD. Even 

in the instances where technology was mentioned in the report and recommendations, the context 

was more strategic (e.g., utilize more measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) in 

collection) or tied to the management and oversight of technology (e.g., the newly established 

DNI should appoint someone to oversee science and technology for the IC and develop S&T 

strategies) rather than to specific programs or funding recommendations. 

Of note, however, is the fact that the report recommended (and the President implemented) the establishment of an NCPC to manage and coordinate IC activities related to nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons, as well as their delivery systems. Through this focal point, 

analysis, technology, and intelligence can be coordinated and integrated. 

To respond to the recent emphasis in the national strategy to prevent WMD attacks as 

early as possible, the IC has placed high priority on the Elimination and Interdiction ACEs. The 

IC’s recent activities toward achieving combating WMD goals are highlighted in Table 5. 

Table 5. Highlights of IC’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals

Interdiction 

To improve capabilities to locate, tag, and track WMD, the IC identified and tracked WMD-related shipments (the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency and others also helped) 

IC support to various PSI activities helped to improve interdiction capabilities 

As part of the effort to link information on trade and transfer of WMD, the IC produced a wide range of estimates and analytical projects, 

and continued work on databases to track and to link WMD proliferation 

Elimination 

As part of the effort to increase the speed of response to elimination mission requirements, the IC identified and characterized WMD 

and missile facilities, and supported coalition operations in Iraq 

As part of linking information on the trade or transfer of WMD, the IC assisted the Department of State in providing actionable

information to international inspections 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

IC efforts in assessing safety and security of WMD and delivery systems helped to improve safeguards, physical security, MPC&A, and 

CBRN accountability 

Passive Defense 

To further sense, shape, shield, and sustain capabilities, the IC characterized traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

IC inputs to diplomatic and other nonproliferation efforts (through WINPAC) enhanced U.S. focused cooperative activities 

Offensive Operations 

IC estimates and analytical products, including analysis of terrorists’ potential CBRN capabilities, helped to improve end-to-end C4ISR 

capabilities directed at WMD and related infrastructure 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

14

Table 5. Highlights of IC’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

(continued)

Active Defense 

The IC provided early warning of imminent missile tests 

The IC produced estimates and technical analysis of various missile systems 

WMD Consequence Management 

IC characterization of traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents enhanced CM material solutions 

IC provision of detailed consequence assessment analytical products significantly improved tool suites used by warfighters, planners, 

and homeland defense customers 

FUNDING OF CPRC-MONITORED PROGRAMS 

Combating WMD efforts build on the substantial investments made in the Armed Forces 

and defense infrastructure necessary for the security of the United States. The combined DoDDOE President’s budget request in combating WMD programs for FY07 is in excess of $16 

billion compared with over $14.6 billion in FY06. All FY07 budget figures in this report are 

from the President’s Budget. Additional information on combating WMD investment is 

presented in Volume II, Chapter 4. 

The President’s budget request from DoD for FY07 is over $14 billion. DoD allocates 

the bulk of its combating WMD investment in the areas of missile defense; detecting, 

identifying, characterizing, locating, predicting, and warning of traditional and nontraditional 

CW and BW agents; and supporting threat reduction cooperation efforts to reduce, dismantle, 

redirect, and secure global WMD stockpiles and capabilities. 

DOE continues its investment in nonproliferation activities with over $1.8 billion 

requested for FY07 compared with the FY06 level of $1.74 billion. As part of its core national 

nonproliferation program, DOE focuses on protection, tracking, and control of nuclear weaponrelated materials and components and export control activities; and supporting the inspection and 

monitoring of arms control agreements and other nonproliferation initiatives. 

CPRC RECOMMENDATIONS 

Combating WMD remains an established and institutionalized priority within each of the 

CPRC-represented organizations. These efforts reflect the Nation’s firm commitment to stem 

the proliferation of WMD and WMD-related materials, and negate terrorist WMD threats. 

Moreover, as decision-makers, policymakers, and warfighters continue to reprioritize their 

nonproliferation, counterproliferation, consequence management, and WMD counterterrorism 

policy and strategy objectives, the CPRC will continue to review related DoD, DOE, and IC 

activities and interagency programs to ensure that they meet evolving needs and requirements. 

The CPRC’s recommendations for 2006 are summarized below. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

15

The CPRC recommends that Congress reassess the scope of the formal CPRC coordination body and its annual report requirement as mandated by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 (as 

amended). A number of organizational and national strategy changes have occurred since the 

CPRC was established in 1994 that impact the effectiveness of its reporting and coordination 

requirements. A reassessment of the purpose, composition, and requirements of the CPRC is 

warranted in view of these national level changes. 

The CPRC recommends that Congress authorize the replacement of the Director of 

Central Intelligence (DCI) with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the IC member. 

The responsibilities of national intelligence organizations have been affected by the 

establishment of the Office of the Director for National Intelligence, and it is more appropriate 

that DNI assume responsibility for CPRC-related intelligence matters. 

The CPRC recommends that Congress support the President’s FY07 budget request. 

CPRC organizations will undertake additional efforts to improve our capability to combat 

WMD, highlighted below. 

This report documents over 40 sensor development efforts across DoD, DOE, and the IC. 

Although improvements are being made in several capability areas, such as point and close-in 

detection of WMD materials, significant shortfalls remain in standoff detection of all WMD 

materials. Improved detection capabilities are needed in all three areas of the national strategy—

counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management. To meet the threat of 

WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism, improvements are needed over the medium and long 

term. The CPRC process should stress interdepartmental communication by sponsoring an 

interdepartmental working group to:

Identify and coordinate with relevant sensor development efforts across the U.S. 

Government (e.g., ensuring coordination with the Director of National Intelligence’s Integrated Collection Architecture effort as well as efforts of other ‌departments). 

Articulate technical goals and requirements needed to address current and 

emerging WMD threats. 

Identify technologies of sufficient maturity to warrant accelerated transition to 

initial deployment. 

Identify high-risk/high-payoff technologies that merit additional, supplemental 

investment. 

Nuclear detection is an area that continues to require significant attention. There are 

limitations in detecting nuclear and radiological material at sufficient distances and in near-real 

time to detect proliferation, to warn personnel about the presence of radiological material, and to 

address many other missions. The Domestic Nuclear Defense Research and Development 

Working Group to the National Security Council/Homeland Security Council Domestic Nuclear 

Policy Coordinating Committee is developing R&D roadmaps in deficiency areas that could 

serve as the starting point to more comprehensive national nuclear detection capabilities. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

16

Improved capabilities are needed to defeat and destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons with minimum collateral damage. Options for securing, controlling, and destroying 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or weapon-materials are limited. Technologies are 

not yet mature to destroy WMD agents from standoff ranges in nonpermissive environments 

with high precision and limited collateral damage, whether as part of interdiction, elimination, or 

offensive operations missions. Improved capabilities are needed to defeat and destroy nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons or related material, which are encountered in either 

nonpermissive or permissive environments, with minimal collateral effects. 

Improved CBRN test and evaluation capabilities are needed to ensure that testing meets 

user requirements. Testing CBRN equipment under operational conditions requires improved 

test equipment (e.g., sensors, diagnostic equipment, etc.) to verify the adequacy of material 

solutions under development. Diagnostic sensors, for example, cannot detect to the level of 

decontamination that current capability documents are specifying, resulting in longer 

development times for decontaminants. Test and evaluation capability improvements are also 

needed to support two specific efforts—the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 

Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) and the Guardian Installation Protection Program. 

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 

Improving integration and coordination for combating WMD remains an important goal 

for the U.S. Government and its various agencies and organizations. Leveraging the synergies 

among CPRC member organizations is crucial to enhancing and improving the diverse portfolio 

of combating WMD capabilities already possessed by the United States. 

The CPRC member organizations continue to make strides in further developing and 

fielding the refined plans and advanced technologies required to counter the threat posed by 

WMD. Yet challenges remain, and it will take continued vigilance, resolve, and determination 

on the part of the United States, its friends, and its allies to protect against and respond to a 

future WMD attack on their Armed Forces or citizens. 

There is a continuing need to expand dialog and information sharing among U.S. ‌Government agencies and international entities to further prevent WMD proliferation. CPRC 

member agencies, other U.S. Government agencies, and interagency groups (e.g., the 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group) are involved in strategic 

planning processes dealing with integrating aspects of combating WMD. The CPRC, through its 

member organizations, should engage and consult with these groups to identify processes that 

can be leveraged to improve interagency and international cooperation on RDA issues relevant to 

combating WMD. 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

17

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

ACE Area for Capability Enhancement 

ACTD Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration 

AG Assessment Group 

ASARC Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 

ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs 

 

BA Budget Activity 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

BW biological warfare 

BWC Biological Weapons Convention 

 

C2 command and control 

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

‌reconnaissance 

CBA capabilities-based assessment 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 

CM consequence management 

COCOM combatant commander 

CONUS continental United States 

CPRC Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction 

CW chemical warfare 

 

DAB Defense Acquisition Board 

DCI Director of Central Intelligence 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DTT Dynamic Tactical Targeting (program) 

 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

 

FY fiscal year 

 

HEU highly enriched uranium 

HQ headquarters 

 

IC intelligence community 

IR infrared 

 

JBSDS Joint Biological Standoff Detection System 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

JLENS Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 

JOEF Joint Operation Effects Federation 

JTF-CM Joint Task Force Consequence Management 
2006 CPRC Report to Congress 

18

JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support 

 

MASINT measurement and signatures intelligence 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MPC&A material protection, control, and accounting 

MSAT Medical Situational Awareness In-Theater (ACTD) 

 

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NCPC National Counterproliferation Center 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NEAT Nuclear Employment Augmentation Team (U.S. Army) 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE) 

NSSE National Security Special Event 

 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 

 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

 

R&D research and development 

RDA research, development, and acquisition 

RDAT Research and Development Analysis Center (DTRA) 

 

S&T science and technology 

SC Standing Committee 

SDD system development and demonstration 

SLAMRAAM Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 

SOF special operations forces 

STAFFS Simulation, Training, and Analysis for Fixed Sites (model) 

 

USAMEDCOM U.S. Army Medical Command 

USEUCOM U.S. European Command 

USV unmanned surface vessel 

 

WINPAC Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD-CST Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team 

WMD/M weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery