Report on Activities and Programs

for Countering Proliferation

and NBC Terrorism

Volume I

Executive Summary

July 2009

Counterproliferation

Program

Review

Committee

Distribution Statement A. Approved for public 

release; distribution is unlimited

Submitted by USD(AT&L)
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

Report on Activities and Programs 

for Countering Proliferation

and NBC Terrorism 

Volume I 

Executive Summary

July 2009 

Counterproliferation 

Program 

Review 

Committee 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

ii

CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 1 

CPRC ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW................................................................................................... 2 

NATIONAL STRATEGY AND COMBATING WMD............................................................................... 2 

AREAS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT ......................................................................................... 3 

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS .............................................. 4 

CAPABILITIES OR DEVELOPED ITEMS FIELDED IN FY 2007-2009................................................... 10 

COMBATING WMD PERSPECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES OF CPRC MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS............ 14 

FUNDING OF CPRC-REPORTED PROGRAMS ................................................................................... 27 

2009 CPRC RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 28 

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 38 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.................................................................................................. 39 

WORKS CONSULTED ...................................................................................................................... 43 

FIGURES 

1. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................... 3 

TABLES 

1. AREAS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT..................................................................................... 4 

2. ACE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY..................................................................................................... 5 

3. HIGHLIGHTS OF DOD’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS............................. 17 

4. HIGHLIGHTS OF DOE’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS............................. 21 

5. HIGHLIGHTS OF DHS’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS ............................. 24 

6. HIGHLIGHTS OF DOS’S PROGRESS IN MEETING COMBATING WMD GOALS ............................. 27 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

1

INTRODUCTION 

This Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism provides the latest findings of the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC). The CPRC was chartered by Congress in 

1994 to report on the activities and programs of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Intelligence Community (IC) that address improvements in the 

U.S. Government’s efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of 

delivery. In 1997, Congress broadened the CPRC’s responsibilities to review those research and 

development (R&D) activities and programs related to countering terrorist nuclear, biological, 

and chemical threats. With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Congress further broadened the scope of the CPRC by expanding its 

membership to include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 

State (DOS), and by changing the IC’s CPRC representative from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Congress also extended the committee’s 

termination year to 2013 and changed the reporting requirement from being an annual report to a 

biennial report, thereby removing the requirement for a May 1, 2008 report to Congress. 

This report is the principal Executive Branch report on activities and programs that provide technologies and capabilities to combat WMD. The term WMD used in this report refers to 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons that can kill large numbers of 

humans and/or cause great damage to man-made structures, natural structures, or the biosphere 

in general. Other interagency committees or department-specific groups also publish related, but 

separate, reports on nonproliferation, arms control, and combating terrorism programs. The 

findings and recommendations of the CPRC’s biennial review are presented in this, its 15th 

report to Congress. 

The report comprises two volumes. Volume I is the unclassified, publicly releasable, Executive Summary. It provides an overview of the offices and principals that make up the CPRC 

and its Standing Committee; the linkage of national strategy and guidance to CPRC efforts; 

Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACE); capabilities fielded since the publication of the 2007 

CPRC report; a presentation of the main efforts of DoD, DOE, DHS, DOS, and the IC in combating WMD (CWMD); an overview of the FY 2009 and 2010 funding for CPRC-reported 

programs; recommendations; and the principal conclusions. The Executive Summary is available online at www.acq.osd.mil/cp. 

Volume II contains the classified main report and appendices. It provides an introduction 

on the purpose of this report, including a summary of the national strategy context to combat 

WMD; an overview of the threat from WMD; progress achieved vis-à-vis the CPRC recommendations presented in the May 2007 CPRC report; an assessment of CWMD programs and 

There are few greater challenges than those posed by chemical, 

biological, and particularly, nuclear weapons. Preventing the 

spread of these weapons, and their use, requires vigilance and 

obligates us to anticipate and counter threats. 

 – National Defense Strategy, June 2008 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

2

activities; limitations and impediments to the DoD’s biological weapons counterproliferation 

efforts; recommendations; and appendices. The appendices provide information on the current 

law regarding the CPRC; the current participants in the process; data on DoD, DOE, DHS, DOS, 

and the IC programs and activities for CWMD, as well as Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstrations (ACTDs) and Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs); the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding programs’ utility and 

requirements; and a discussion of programs in support of countering WMD terrorism. 

CPRC ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW 

The CPRC Standing Committee (SC) was established in 1997 by agreement of the member organizations and meets each year, as required, to address major issues. To update the 

purposes of the SC and respond to changes in the CWMD community, including the addition of 

DHS and DOS as new CPRC members, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was completed 

in June 2009. The SC is currently composed of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) (as chair); Assistant 

Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation Research & Development, National Nuclear Security 

Administration, DOE (as vice chair); the Senior Strategist, National Counterproliferation Center 

(NCPC), Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Deputy Director for Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment, Joint Staff (J–8); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 

Strategic Affairs (ASD(GSA)); the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and 

Technology (USHS(S&T)), DHS; the Director of the Office of Technology and Assessments, 

Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, DOS; and the Director of the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA was added as a full SC member in September 2008. 

Composition of the Standing Committee has changed over time to represent appropriate organizations. 

An important goal of the SC is to include other Federal departments with significant 

CWMD responsibilities as participants in the CPRC process. Prior to their addition as formal 

CPRC members by the NDAA for FY08, DOS and DHS participated informally in SC and 

action officer meetings, as well as review processes for the CPRC report. The SC worked with 

congressional staffers to initiate appropriate legislation to add DHS and DOS as CPRC members. 

As part of the SC’s ongoing effort to include other Federal agencies, the Department of Justice’s 

(DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) WMD Directorate began informal participation in 

CPRC processes in September 2008. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY AND COMBATING WMD 

National strategy forms the context to develop implementing guidance and policies, as 

well as doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) (see Figure 1). At its highest level, the essential task of national security 

strategy with regard to the threat of WMD is to prevent our enemies from threatening us, our 

allies, and our friends with WMD.

1

 The 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction defines the three pillars of this essential task: strengthened nonproliferation (NP) to 

combat WMD proliferation, counterproliferation (CP) to combat WMD use, and consequence 

management (CM) to respond to WMD use. These national-level documents provide strategic 

 

1

 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

3

guidance for U.S. Government departments and agencies to develop goals and objectives, 

identify capability requirements, and ultimately provide the material and nonmaterial solutions 

for CWMD. 

High-level goals and objectives 

for the CPRC member organizations are 

published in strategic guidance documents tailored to the needs of their own 

internal communities: 

• DoD: The Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff’s 2006 National 

Military Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

defines eight broad CWMD mission areas for the Military Departments and other DoD organizations. 

• DOE: The 2004 National Nuclear Security Administration 

Strategic Plan places emphasis 

on capabilities to stop or deter 

potential adversaries from proliferating or using WMD. 

• DNI: The National Intelligence Strategy for 2006-2008 and the National Intelligence 

Plan for Countering Proliferation, 2009-2011 identify goals, priorities, and actions to 

proactively position the IC to provide information and insights the U.S. Government 

needs to combat the development and spread of WMD. 

• DHS: The 2008 Strategic Plan focuses on preventing WMD from entering the Nation’s 

borders and strengthening our capabilities to respond and recover from a WMD attack. 

• DOS: The Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-12 discusses CWMD objectives in terms 

of building international coalitions to interdict and disrupt proliferation of WMD, while 

also strengthening verification and compliance enforcement. 

AREAS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT 

To organize efforts effectively, the CPRC Standing Committee established Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACE) categories. The ACEs address the three pillars of the National 

Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and, beginning with the May 2005 CPRC 

report, have been the same as the eight mission areas identified in the National Military Strategy 

To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. During the current biennial report process, the SC 

added a ninth ACE to highlight intelligence capabilities as a strategic enabler, one of three such 

enablers identified in the National Military Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

2

 

The ACE structure generally corresponds to required capability areas applicable to Federal 

government departments and agencies with CWMD missions. The ACEs provide a framework 

for reviewing progress, assessing CWMD requirements, and measuring investment in technolo-

 

2

 The other two enablers in the National Military Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction are Partnership 

Capacity and Strategic Communication. 

Figure 1. Strategic Guidance Framework

National

Security

Strategy

National Strategy

To Combat WMD

U.S. Government

Departments’ and Agencies’

Strategic Guidance Documents

for Combating WMD

CWMD Goals and Objectives

CWMD Capability Requirements

CWMD Material and Nonmaterial Solutions

Strategic goals flow down through the 

government’s planning systems and 

set the parameters for identifying 

capability requirements that 

lead to material and 

nonmaterial solutions.
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

4

gies and capabilities for CWMD. It is important to maintain capabilities in all ACE areas in 

order to meet the U.S. Government’s CWMD objectives. The ACEs are listed in Table 1. 

Table 1. Areas for Capability Enhancement* 

ACEs are broad and comprehensive areas for combating WMD. They reflect the National Military Strategy To 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction mission areas and strategic enablers, address DoD, DOE, DOS, and 

DHS’s strategic goals and objectives, and include capability needs developed by the IC and other Federal 

departments and agencies.

Interdiction. Operations designed to stop the transit of WMD, delivery systems, associated and dual-use technologies, materials, and 

expertise between states of concern and non-state actors, whether undertaken by the Armed Forces or by other agencies of 

government. 

Elimination. Operations to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or non-state actor’s WMD 

programs and related capabilities in hostile or uncertain environments. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation. Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical 

security, emplace detection equipment, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, or improve protection of a state’s existing WMD program, 

stockpiles, and capabilities. 

Passive Defense. Measures to minimize or negate the vulnerability and effects of WMD employed against U.S. and partner/allied 

armed forces, as well as U.S. military interests, installations, and critical infrastructure. 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities. Activities to improve partner and allied capacity to combat WMD across the eight 

mission areas through military-to-military contact, burden-sharing agreements, combined military activities, and support to international 

activities. 

Offensive Operations. Kinetic (both conventional and nuclear) and/or non-kinetic options to deter or defeat a WMD threat or 

subsequent use of WMD. 

Active Defense. Measures, to include but not limited to, missile defense (ballistic and cruise), special operations, and security 

operations to defend against conventionally and unconventionally delivered WMD. 

WMD Consequence Management. Actions taken to reduce the effects of a WMD attack or event, including toxic industrial chemicals 

(TIC) and toxic industrial materials (TIM), and assist in the restoration of essential operations and services at home and abroad. 

Intelligence. Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to combat the development and spread of 

weapons of mass destruction and detect, identify, and characterize the location, nature, and ownership of WMD. This includes 

collection and analysis of intentions, motivations, and disincentives policymakers can use to dissuade, deter, and otherwise counter 

WMD. 

* The CPRC ACEs are based on the descriptions of CWMD military mission areas found in the 2006 National Military Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

During the 2009 CPRC report process, the CPRC community added the Intelligence ACE and modified some of the descriptions of ACEs in order to accommodate activities 

other than those of the Armed Forces and more accurately reflect CWMD activities across the expanded CPRC membership. 

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN MEETING 

COMBATING WMD GOALS 

The assessment of progress of CWMD capabilities accounts for the broad range of activities reported by the CPRC member organizations and includes the unique perspectives of a 

widening community-of-interest (COI) for CWMD. Each of the member organizations provided 

prioritized shortfalls, current and projected future capabilities, and programmatic details of more 

than 200 CWMD programs and projects. The analysis of this information was supported by 

recent official U.S. Government reports and analytical products of congressionally appointed 

commissions, the R&D community, and CWMD issue-specific working groups. Overall, 

significant progress is being made, as illustrated by capabilities recently fielded, newly developed, or transitioned to end users, summarized in the section following Table 2. Table 2 presents 

a summary assessment of goals, ongoing efforts, shortfalls, and recommendations to address the 

shortfalls identified for each ACE. The table has been updated to reflect changes since the 2007 

CPRC report to Congress. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

5

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary 

Goals* Ongoing Efforts Recommendations 

Interdiction 

Develop plans, policy, and doctrine for interdiction. 

Enhance joint command and control (C2), 

communications systems, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and 

capabilities to locate, tag, and track WMD and 

related materials and components and to link 

information on trade or transfer of WMD. 

Provide operational constructs, force structure, 

CWMD expertise, and interdiction capabilities, 

including non-lethal means, and special 

operations forces (SOF) capabilities. 

Improve logistics to support interdiction. 

Build and implement a Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture (GNDA). 

Build allied and partner military capabilities to 

conduct WMD interdiction in support of their own 

national authorities. 

Focus intelligence collection on possible transfer 

methods and activities to identify and track the 

potential transfer of WMD-related material, 

technology, or expertise. 

Surveil and intercept the transit of suspected 

WMD materials and components by land, sea, or 

in the air. 

Identify and characterize the suspected WMD 

materials or components. 

Implementation of solutions 

recommended by the WMDInterdiction capabilities-based 

assessment (CBA) within the DoD 

Joint Capabilities Integration 

Development System (JCIDS) 

process. 

Establishment of the Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Joint 

Integrating Concept as a framework 

to support future CWMD CBAs. 

Multilateral cooperative interdiction 

initiatives (e.g., Proliferation Security 

Initiative, Global Initiative on Nuclear 

Terrorism). 

Detection/sensors for high-priority 

threat materials. 

Intelligence and information 

management tools. 

Enhancement of interdiction 

architecture by DOE’s Megaports 

radiological detection program. 

Coordination of nuclear/radiological 

detection technology R&D efforts 

between DHS, DoD, DOE, DOS, the 

FBI, and other agencies. 

Continuing installations of radiological/nuclear detection equipment by 

DOE/DHS at strategic international 

borders, airports, and feeder ports. 

Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) 

establishment of a Nuclear Defense 

Joint Assessment Team to review 

related nuclear defense activities and 

recommend actions. 

DoD Combating WMD Coordination 

Group efforts to improve planning 

and doctrine to facilitate WMD 

interdiction operations. 

Improve intelligence gathering and analysis 

(e.g., information management systems, 

decision support systems, sensor development, and intelligence support) regarding 

state and nonstate WMD proliferation and 

development activities. 

Apply socio-behavioral models and 

assessments of adversaries to develop 

indicators of an individual or group’s interest, 

motivation, and intent to develop, acquire, 

and use WMD. 

Provide threat-based warnings to border and 

immigration officials in the United States and 

abroad to enhance screening of known or 

suspected WMD-related persons. 

Develop detector materials and systems to 

locate and identify nuclear/radiological 

materials at stand-off distances. 

Improve maritime interdiction capabilities to 

prevent illicit CBRN material from entering 

U.S. ports and harbors (in progress). 

Improve portability of CBRN sensor systems 

by leveraging both commercial and 

government-developed sensor technologies. 

Develop or adapt, and operationally prove 

capabilities for in-transit detection of 

nuclear/radiological materials aboard ships 

and aircraft. 

Improve connectivity for operational elements 

in order to enable remote access to subject 

matter expertise. 

Provide threat-based technical assessments 

and reachback assistance to border officials 

to enhance screening operations of 

weapons-useable materials, components, 

devices, and other materials of concern. 

*ACE goals were initially developed in preparation for the 2006 CPRC report. These goals were and continue to be based largely on goals 

identified from ongoing CBAs in the CWMD mission areas. In addition to the goals reflected in the CBAs, CPRC organizations also provide 

updated goals to reflect current priority areas for CWMD.
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

6

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary (continued) 

Goals Ongoing Efforts Recommendations 

Elimination 

Develop plans, policy, and doctrine for 

elimination. 

Enhance joint C2, communications systems, ISR, 

and capabilities to locate, detect, identify, 

characterize, tag, and track WMD production and 

storage. 

Provide operational constructs, force structure, 

and WMD render-safe skills and capabilities, to 

include reachback. 

Improve logistics to support elimination. 

Secure suspected WMD sites, material, 

equipment, or personnel. 

Destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer, or dispose 

of an adversary’s WMD material, weapons 

equipment, and infrastructure. 

Conduct intelligence exploitation of program 

experts, documents, and other media as well as 

secure weapons, material, agents, delivery 

means, and related processes and facilities. 

Monitor, redirect and convert elements of an 

adversary’s WMD program to ensure that 

eliminated programs are not reconstituted.

Implementation of solutions 

recommended by the DoD WMDElimination CBA. 

Training/exercise development. 

SOF detection and location 

capabilities. 

Agent defeat/neutralization 

capabilities. 

U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating 

WMD Agency Planning Assistance 

Teams. 

Expansion of 20th Support Command 

capabilities for command and control 

for WMD elimination missions. 

Expansion of render-safe technologies and teams. 

Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, and 

fusion (e.g., information management systems, 

decision support systems, sensor development, 

intelligence support) regarding state and nonstate WMD proliferation and development 

activities. 

Encourage and fund research in agentenvironment interaction and novel high-energy 

material science. 

Explore applicability of commercial technologies for CBRN remediation for possible use in 

elimination missions. 

Improve capability to conduct exploitation of 

WMD sites, including characterization of local 

WMD, onsite analysis, and data exfiltration. 

Provide reliable, secure transportation and 

storage for further disposition of WMD-related 

materials. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

Enhance capabilities to improve safeguards, 

physical security, and materials protection, 

control, and accounting of CBRN stockpiles. 

Enhance capabilities to consolidate, reduce, or 

dismantle CBRN stockpiles and capabilities. 

Expand threat reduction activities outside the 

former Soviet Union by adapting existing or 

developing new cooperative frameworks and 

diplomatic initiatives. 

Increase transparency through confidencebuilding arrangements and encourage higher 

standards of conduct in controlling CBRN 

materials. 

In coordination with all relevant federal agencies, 

enable international partners to detect and 

capture WMD crossing their borders. 

Develop plans, policy, and doctrine for Threat 

Reduction Cooperation. 

Ongoing CBA within the DoD JCIDS 

process to define Threat Reduction 

Cooperation requirements and 

potential solutions. 

Multilateral safety and security 

initiatives. 

Proliferation prevention training and 

equipment. 

Improve detection of nuclear materials. 

Improve development of more discriminating 

and sensitive sensors to monitor strategic 

transportation nodes. 

Increase biological threat reduction activities to 

consolidate and secure pathogens and to build 

detection and response systems to provide 

early warning of a disease outbreak or bioattack. 

Improve intelligence gathering and analysis 

(e.g., information management systems, 

decision support systems, sensor development, and intelligence support) regarding state 

and non-state WMD proliferation and 

development activities. 

Continue to fund nonproliferation efforts. 

Coordinate U.S. threat reduction cooperation 

efforts through a coordinating committee or 

group. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

7

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary (continued) 

Goals Ongoing Efforts Recommendations 

Passive Defense 

Sense. Provide real-time and continuous 

capability to detect, identify, and quantify all 

potential or validated CBRN threats in all 

operational environments and on personnel, 

equipment or facilities. 

Shape. Characterize CBRN hazards throughout 

the operational environment through the 

collection and fusion of information from all CBRN 

defense assets and integration of that data with 

other relevant information and C2, communications, and ISR systems. 

Shield. Protect personnel and equipment from 

degradation caused by CBRN hazards by 

preventing or reducing exposures, mitigating 

negative physiological effects, and protecting 

critical equipment. 

Sustain. Enable the quick restoration, recovery, 

and maintenance of combat power or essential 

functions that are free from the effects of CBRN 

hazards and return to pre-incident operational 

capability as soon as possible. 

Deter. Provide significant CBRN defensive 

capabilities to deny potential adversaries from 

achieving their desired effects of creating a 

catastrophic event with WMD. 

Updating CBAs within the DoD 

JCIDS process to define CBRN 

passive defense requirements. 

Development of network-centric 

sensor reporting and coordination of 

medical information and reporting 

systems for early warning of 

biological attack. 

DTRA/DHS memorandum of 

agreement (MOA) with DHS/DNDO 

to provide rigorous, repeatable test 

and evaluation support for nuclear, 

radiological, and fissile material 

detection, standoff detection 

technologies, and prototype systems. 

Legacy Aircraft CBRN Contamination 

Survivability Initial Capabilities 

Document (ICD). 

Fielding of CBRN installation 

protection and response capabilities. 

Continued integration of national biomonitoring efforts at DHS and other 

federal agencies, including the 

Centers for Disease Control, 

Environmental Protection Agency, 

and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Ongoing development is occurring at 

DARPA to advance CBRN sensing 

abilities and countermeasures. 

Ongoing DoD Chemical and 

Biological Defense Program (CBDP), 

which develops and fields capabilities 

to address the Sense, Shape, Shield, 

and Sustain goals. 

Continuing efforts to establish full 

operational capability of the Air Force 

Counter-Biological Warfare Concept 

of Operations (CONOP). 

Emphasize development of new laboratory 

technologies that reduce the time required to 

conduct multiplex assays. 

Investigate new detection methods that identify 

common pathogenic mechanisms or properties 

of biological agents. 

Develop advanced sensors and techniques, 

including higher resolution detectors and more 

efficient analysis algorithms. 

Improve methods and technologies for 

detecting secondary products or surrogate 

signatures of special nuclear materials. 

Continue efforts to transition mobile laboratory 

capabilities for analyzing samples to identify 

non-traditional chemical agents. 

Continue to investigate the operational viability 

and performance of distributed sensor 

networks. 

Continue procurement of collective protection 

systems and R&D for integration of protective 

fabrics into existing shelters. 

Continue fielding tiered CBRN Installation 

Protection Program (IPP) capabilities to 

CONUS and OCONUS military installations. 

Continue development of investigative new 

drugs (IND) using broad spectrum approaches 

against viruses and bacterial pathogens. 

Continue efforts to integrate and coordinate 

U.S.-international partnering activities to 

reduce duplication. 

Provide WMD threat awareness outreach and 

technical reachback to state and local 

authorities through intelligence fusion centers 

and other information sharing initiatives. 

Provide indicators to state and local law 

enforcement officials to recognize and report 

suspicious activities that may involve WMD 

materials, devices, components, and 

infrastructure. 

Conduct joint threat analysis with state and 

local analysts to characterize events. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

8

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary (continued) 

Goals Ongoing Efforts Recommendations 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

Develop, implement, and support focused 

cooperative activities, particularly research and 

development between the United States and its 

international partners, to improve their capabilities 

to combat WMD. 

Provide technologies and systems to monitor and 

verify global regimes restricting the production, 

storage, and testing of WMD, WMD-related 

materials, and components. 

Secure, control, monitor, and track WMD 

materials and related components through 

increased commitments from foreign governments. 

Develop plans, policy, and doctrine for Security 

Cooperation and Partner Activities. 

Ongoing CBA within the DoD JCIDS 

process to define Security Cooperation and Partner Activities requirements and potential solutions. 

Multilateral arms control and 

nonproliferation treaties and 

agreements. 

Expansion of DHS Container Security 

Initiative (CSI) to additional strategic 

locations around the world to 

examine high-risk maritime cargo. 

Ongoing assessments of critical 

verification technology programs.

Improve detection of nuclear materials 

sufficiently to distinguish proliferation activity in 

nuclear facilities. 

Offensive Operations 

Plan operations. 

Detect and identify targets. 

Conduct decisive operations; employ offensive 

capabilities against in-transit, fixed, or WMDrelated targets or infrastructure with little or no 

collateral effects. 

Assess engagements. 

Deter potential adversaries through significant 

WMD defeat capabilities as a viable response to 

WMD use or threats against the United States, its 

friends, or allies. 

Implementation of solutions 

recommended by the DoD WMDOffensive Operations CBA. 

C2, communications, and ISR 

systems (e.g., detection, location, 

targeting). 

Strike capabilities (e.g., kinetic and 

non-kinetic). 

Ongoing hard and deeply buried 

target (HDBT) efforts in DTRA, 

DARPA, USAF, and 

DIA/Underground Facility Analysis 

Center. 

Ongoing agent defeat/neutralization 

capabilities to address the 

employment of offensive capabilities 

with little or no collateral damage. 

Improve intelligence and near-term detection. 

Conduct research and development for 

capabilities to improve conventional prompt 

global strike. 

Tailor investment in hard and deeply buried 

target defeat (HDBTD) capabilities to objective 

criteria defined in HDBTD Mission Area ICD. 

Improve fidelity and reliability of predictive 

tools for design and development of optimized 

weapons and concepts through rock, soil, and 

other structures. 

Active Defense 

Continue to develop and field a single, integrated, 

layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

to protect the United States, its deployed forces, 

and its allies and friends against ballistic missiles 

at all ranges and in all phases of flight. 

Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend 

the United States, its deployed forces, and its 

allies and friends against rogue nation attacks. 

Develop and field an integrated cruise missile 

defense capability and an unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV) defense capability. 

Enable U.S. forces to neutralize WMD threats 

worldwide––be they from national military 

programs, paramilitary organizations, or 

terrorists––by means of specially developed 

capabilities. 

Develop options to dissuade current rogue state 

and near-peer threats. 

Ongoing BMDS efforts 

Cruise missile defense program. 

SOF programs. 

Ongoing CBAs within JCIDS process 

to define integrated air and missile 

defense requirements. 

Continue to fund and develop comprehensive 

ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities 

using a test-validated and sustainable building 

block approach. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

9

Table 2. ACE Assessment Summary (continued) 

Goals Ongoing Efforts Recommendations 

WMD Consequence Management 

Provide integrated material solutions to enable 

joint commanders and others to respond, 

mitigate, and restore services in a postengagement scenario characterized by damage 

and collateral hazard from CBRN attack inside or 

outside the continental United States. 

Develop processes and systems to ensure 

effective communication and coordination with 

domestic authorities. 

Provide specialized expertise, operational 

personnel, or capabilities to the U.S. homeland or 

friendly nations, as required, to respond to or 

recover from attacks or disasters associated with 

WMD. 

Equipment initiatives. 

Advisory and augmentation assets 

(e.g., Federal, state, local coordination). 

Ongoing CBAs within the DoD JCIDS 

process to define WMD CM 

requirements. 

DoD/Department of Health and 

Human Services (DHHS) interagency 

agreement to implement a single, 

integrated national stockpile for 

Anthrax and Smallpox vaccines, 

meeting the requirements for the 

Strategic National Stockpile. The 

agreements will result in a cost 

avoidance of more than ten million 

dollars, annually. 

DoD/DHS collaborative efforts to colocate bio-detection technologies for 

BioWatch at DoD installations.

Improve capability for rapid biological and 

chemical detection, identification, and 

characterization, including at standoff 

distances. 

Continue research in the medical/genomics 

field. 

Develop improved individual protection 

capabilities. 

Establish a readiness and training reporting 

system for installation protection. 

Develop and expand joint-service, multiservice, and interagency CM doctrine. 

Intelligence 

Acquire high-value intelligence to support U.S. 

policies and actions to discourage, prevent, 

rollback, deter, and mitigate threats and 

consequences of WMD. 

Provide planning, integration and improvements 

to U.S. Government nuclear forensics capabilities. 

Develop capability for robust assessments of CW 

or BW alleged use and attribution. 

Ongoing CBAs within the DoD JCIDS 

process to define National Technical 

Nuclear Forensics requirements. 

Collaboration efforts with international partners in the areas of nuclear 

detection, collection, and forensics. 

Ongoing collaborative working 

relationships between DNDO, DOE, 

DTRA, and the FBI within the 

National Technical Nuclear Forensics 

Center. 

Ongoing development of the 

Biodefense Knowledge Management 

System (BKMS) at the DHS 

Biodefense Knowledge Center. 

Forensic capabilities (e.g., 

attribution). 

Develop next-generation pattern analysis tools 

to support the identification of nuclear forensic 

signatures. 

Initiate international discussions to develop 

memoranda of understanding for pathogenic 

strains. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

10

CAPABILITIES OR DEVELOPED ITEMS 

FIELDED IN FY 2007-2009 

Numerous ongoing efforts reported fielded capabilities since the last report in May 2007. 

Capabilities were fielded in the following areas: 

Interdiction. The Joint Staff issued the Maritime Counterproliferation Interdiction Execute Order (EXORD), which revised an order previously promulgated under the WMD Maritime 

Interdiction EXORD. 

Elimination. The U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency achieved full operational capability in FY07. It provides planning assistance support to Army component CBRN 

planners, improved connectivity and staffing, better support for reachback to technical information, and timely coordination resulting in improved Army support to joint capability. The 

Army’s 20th Support Command Operational Command Post achieved initial operational capability in FY07, providing a deployable headquarters command and control capability for WMD 

elimination missions. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program had 

significant capability achievements. Under CTR’s Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) program, 

especially dangerous pathogen collections from Azerbaijan and Georgia were transferred to the 

United States for further diagnostic analysis. In 2007, the BTR program also completed infrastructure elimination of biological weapons facilities at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan and Tblisi, 

Georgia. 

Passive Defense (CBRN detection). In support of national strategies, the DoD Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) (Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD)) provides dual-purpose capabilities that address the broadened 

threat context. The Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System Block I (JBAIDS 

Blk I) is an ongoing fielding effort. The Air Force and Army are now at full operational capability with 103 and 91 JBAIDS systems, respectively. Fielding events began in FY08 to provide 

the Marine Corps with 16 systems. Fielding events for the Navy began in December 2008. The 

Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) program fielded (interim) systems in limited 

quantities to the Army and Navy in FY07. Full Rate Production for JBPDS is expected to begin 

in the 3rd Quarter of 2009. The Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector will 

be employed on the Stryker Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. Increment 1 

began low-rate initial production fielding in March 2007. Since 2007, the Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological and Nuclear Installation Protection Program (CBRN IPP) fielded CBRN protection and response capabilities to 89 military installations. It also established the CBRN IPP 

Portal to provide CBRN awareness information to military members and their families and 

information on national initiatives to emergency managers on military installations world-wide. 

The Army Emergency First Responder Program fielded equipment to first responders at 89 

Army installations. In 2008, the DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) fielded tiered CBRN detection and 

response capability to an additional 27 continental United States (CONUS) and six outside 

CONUS (OCONUS) military installations through the CBRN IPP. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

11

Generation 1 and Generation 2 of the BioWatch System transitioned to DHS’s Office of 

Health Affairs on April 1, 2007. BioWatch is an early warning system that can rapidly detect 

trace amounts of biological materials in the air, whether they are due to intentional release or due 

to minute quantities that may occur naturally in the environment. The system assists public 

health experts and provides early warning indication of the possible presence of a biological 

agent release, allowing federal, state, and local officials to more quickly determine emergency 

response, medical care and consequence management needs. At the time of transition, the 

BioWatch system was being operated in more than 30 U.S. cities in partnership with the Centers 

for Disease Control, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the FBI, and state and local 

partners. Over the long term, BioWatch and other federal bio-monitoring efforts will become 

part of the National Integrated Bio-Monitoring System, as described in the National Biomonitoring Architecture. The Rapidly Deployable Chemical Detection System (RDCDS) transitioned to the Office of Health Affairs in September 2007, after successful field demonstration 

and testing. RDCDS is a deployable chemical monitoring system for use at National Special 

Security Events and other high priority special events. 

Passive Defense (individual and collective protection). The DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) 

Protective Clothing program provides the Warfighter with a chemical biological protective 

ensemble in NBC environments. This program fielded the following systems in FY07: 1) Joint 

Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST), Block 2 Glove Upgrade Non-Flame 

Resistant (NFR); and 2) JSLIST Chemical/Biological Footwear System Alternative Footwear 

Solution (AFS)/Integrated Footwear Solution (IFS). The JSLIST Block 2 Glove Upgrade NFR

provides hand protection against liquid, vapor, and aerosol CBRN agents and is semi-permeable 

to prevent excessive moisture buildup and improve user comfort. Its performance will not be 

degraded by exposure to petroleum, oils, lubricants, or field contaminants. The Joint Service 

General Purpose Mask (JSGPM)/Joint Service Chemical Environmental Survivability Mask 

(JSCESM) program provides a lightweight protective mask system to protect U.S. forces from 

anticipated threats. JSGPM began fielding in FY08. JSCESM fielded in FY07. 

In 2008, the Navy fielded the new chemical and biological (CB) protective flight suit 

known as the Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble (JPACE). The suit is ready for issue upon 

deployment for all naval aircrews. In 2008, the Navy also fielded the new CB Integrated Footwear System for aviation and special warfare missions. 

The Air Force expanded its non-material capabilities substantially over the past two 

years. In late 2007, the Air Force successfully instituted the Counter-Chemical Warfare (C-CW) 

Concept of Operations (CONOP) throughout the Air Force. This was accompanied by confirmation by the Joint Services of the effectiveness of the Air Force-developed Split Mission Oriented 

Protective Posture concept, which uses modeling and detection capabilities to optimize mission 

effectiveness and force survivability. In 2009, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force formally 

approved the Counter-Radiological Warfare (C-RW) CONOP. The C-RW CONOP integrates 

radiological defense technologies and information sources, while optimizing the coordinated 

employment of existing specialized teams and programs. It also provides specific guidance on 

operational risk management decisions in a radiation-contaminated environment. 

The Collective Protection Systems Backfit program completed fielding aboard the LHD-7 

(USS IWO JIMA) and the LHA-4 (USS NASSAU) in FY07. This program for filtering air to 

the most critical interior spaces remains one of the most effective ways of protecting ship 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

12

personnel. This capability has been backfitted to 11 Navy amphibious ships in 2008. Another 

four ships will be completed in the 2009 to 2011 timeframe. 

Passive Defense (decontamination). In FY08, the DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) began 

fielding the Joint Service Personnel Decontamination System with Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion (RSDL). RSDL is a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-cleared, individuallycarried skin decontamination kit. It provides the Warfighter with the ability to decontaminate the 

skin after exposure to chemical and biological warfare agents. RSDL supports the immediate 

and thorough personnel decontamination operations—an improved capability over the previous 

M291 skin decontaminating kit. RSDL neutralizes, as opposed to removing, the agent. Additionally, it can be used to decontaminate individual equipment, weapons, and casualties (unbroken skin only). The CBDP (JPEO-CBD) is conducting new equipment training with RSDL, both 

in CONUS and OCONUS. 

The DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) Joint Service Transportable Decontamination System—

Small Scale (JSTDS-SS) completed all testing in preparation for a full rate production decision in 

FY09. The JSTDS-SS will be used to decontaminate tactical and non-tactical vehicles, ship 

exterior surfaces, crew-served weapons, aircraft, aircraft support equipment, building/facility 

exteriors, and terrains that have been exposed to chemical warfare agents/contamination. 

Passive Defense (medical systems). In FY08, the DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) obtained 

FDA approval for two Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System assays. Also 

in FY08, the DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) delivered 440,000 doses of Smallpox vaccine and 1.3 

million doses of Anthrax vaccine to the Strategic National Stockpile and fielded 31 JBAIDS 

assays. In FY08, the DoD entered into agreements with the Department of Health and Human 

Services to implement a single, integrated stockpile for Anthrax and Smallpox vaccines, meeting 

the requirements for the Strategic National Stockpile established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness, and the recommendations from the 

Government Accountability Office Report 08-88, Actions Needed to Avoid Repeating Past 

Problems with Procuring New Anthrax Vaccine and Managing Stockpile of Licensed Vaccine. 

The agreements will result in a cost avoidance of more than $10 million dollars, annually. 

Offensive Operations. The DTRA Target Assessment Technologies program provides 

development, integration, and application of technologies to find, characterize, and assess hard 

and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) and WMD facilities for the combatant commands and the 

Intelligence Community. Initiation of a WMD threat research and analysis capability in collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) began in FY08. 

Air Force simulation systems have improved CWMD targeting and planning. The Simulation Environment & Response Program Execution Nesting Tool (SERPENT), version 2.2, 

improved the prediction of chemical and biological agent behavior to support target analysis for 

conventional and agent defeat weapons. Improvements to the Empirical Lethality Methodology 

(ELM) program enhanced prediction of the neutralization effects that various environments have 

on chemical and biological agents. 

Active Defense. In FY07, FY08, and the first half of FY09, the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) made major strides in the fielding, deployment, and support of an integrated missile 

defense capability. MDA emplaced 14 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI); completed Missile 

Field 3 at Fort Greely, Alaska; delivered 41 Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptors and 17 Aegis 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

13

BMD-capable ships; transitioned the X-band radar and command and control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) equipment to Shariki Air Base, Japan; delivered an X-band 

radar to Vandenberg AFB; completed work toward delivery of the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) 

radar; delivered additional capability to the Beale (California) and Fylingdales (United Kingdom) upgraded early warning radars; completed integration of the Fylingdales upgraded early 

warning radar into the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); delivered an X-band radar to 

Israel; updated the fire control software for our long-range defenses; dedicated initial operations 

of the 24/7 BMDS Network Operations Security Center, and fielded the C2BMC Spiral 6.2 

software for operational use. The Air Force delivered sensors for a Highly Elliptical Orbit host 

satellite for the Space Based Infrared System High configuration, adding a critical element of the 

Nation’s next-generation missile warning system. 

WMD Consequence Management. DoD participates in WMD Consequence Management operations, such as the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF). U.S. Code, Title 50, Section 2314 directs DoD to develop and maintain 

at least one terrorism response team capable of aiding federal, state, and local officials in responding to CBRNE incidents. As a result, DoD established the requirement for three CCMRFs 

to be trained and ready to respond to a request from civil authorities.3 The mission of the 

CCMRFs is to provide CBRNE consequence management support, as approved by the Secretary 

of Defense, or as directed by the President, in response to deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE 

incidents. The CCMRFs will be employed at the request of DHS or designated lead agency 

when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed state and local capabilities. 

The current fielding plan incrementally sources three separate CCMRFs to provide the 

capability to respond to multiple near-simultaneous CBRNE events. CCMRF #1, comprised 

primarily of Active component units, has been operational since October 1, 2008. The Army’s 

3rd Infantry Division/1st Brigade Combat Team and the 1st Medical Brigade provide the current 

core force structure of CCMRF #1. Specialized units, such as the Marine Corps Chemical 

Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and Air Force Radiation Assessment Team 

(AFRAT), round out this capability. CCMRFs #2 and #3, comprised primarily of Reserve 

component units, are scheduled to become operational October 1, 2009 and October 1, 2010, 

respectively, resulting in three CCMRFs by October 1, 2010. 

Two additional DoD WMD Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) received their certification 

on June 1, 2009: the 23rd WMD-CST (Virgin Islands) and the 94th WMD-CST (Guam). This 

increases the number of certified WMD-CSTs to 55. WMD-CSTs provide local and state officials in every U.S. state and territory with expert assistance and ready access to WMD CB 

detection, mobile CB agent laboratory analysis, and interoperable communications equipment. 

The WMD-CST Equipment program has fielded 62 Analytical Laboratory Systems (ALS), 64 

Unified Command Suites (UCS), Increment 1, and 36 Advanced Echelon Vehicles since FY07. 

In FY08, the DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) completed fielding of a significantly upgraded communications package for the UCS to 55 WMD-CSTs. The DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) fielded enhanced CBRN detection and identification capabilities for the ALS to ten WMD-CSTs. The 

 

3

 A CCMRF is comprised of forces with unique CBRNE-trained and equipped personnel, as well as general purpose 

forces trained to operate in a CBRNE environment. Each CCMRF is a multi-Service, task-organized force comprised of various Active, Reserve, and National Guard units, numbering approximately 4,700 personnel. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

14

Marine Corps has acquired the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Consequence Management sets. These sets will increase the MAGTF commander’s awareness of the operational 

environment through specialized teams capable of operating in environments too hazardous for 

more commonly fielded CBRN equipment. This ability to detect, identify, and mitigate hazards 

is critical to force protection and mission accomplishment when dealing with CBRN/toxic 

industrial materials (TIM) threats. 

DHS’s Biological Warning and Incident Characterization (BWIC) system was introduced 

in three BioWatch cities and transitioned to DHS’s Office of Health Affairs. BWIC is a set of 

software integration tools to help local public health and emergency management officials more 

rapidly and effectively assess the public health significance when BioWatch systems yield 

positive results for biological agents. It was designed with strong input from the local organizations and has been very well received by them. 

The DHS Portable High-throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System 

(PHILIS) implements a rapidly deployable, mobile chemical laboratory system to support highthroughput analysis (several hundred samples per day) of environmental samples that may 

contain toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and chemical warfare agents (CWAs). This capability 

was transitioned to the EPA in March 2008 and will allow for the onsite, high-throughput 

analysis of environmental samples thus facilitating an accelerated disposition of the high volume 

of samples that are collected during the hazard mapping, decontamination, and remediation 

phases of a chemical attack or release. 

COMBATING WMD PERSPECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES 

OF CPRC MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS 

The CPRC members universally agree that the WMD threat from hostile states and terrorist groups, combined with the existence of potentially unsecured WMD materials, technology, 

or knowledge in regions of concern, is one of the most serious security challenges facing the 

United States. The CWMD activities of CPRC member organizations are integrated, but each 

member organization has separate responsibilities for CWMD. 

DoD’s activities span all three pillars of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. DoD is pursuing an integrated CWMD approach with a combination of 

offensive operations capabilities, missile defenses, and cooperative threat reduction activities. 

DOE’s principal CWMD goals are to ensure a safe, secure, effective and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; promote international nuclear safety, and nonproliferation; and reduce the global 

danger from WMD. 

DHS seeks to enhance the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) through the 

implementation of the domestic portion of the GNDA, while also providing the Nation with an 

enhanced defensive posture against high-consequence events through investments in biological, 

chemical, and agricultural defense capabilities. DOS provides oversight of both policy and 

resources on all matters relating to verification of compliance with international arms control, 

nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments. The IC concentrates its 

CWMD activities on acquiring high-value intelligence to support U.S. policies and actions that 

discourage, prevent, rollback, deter, and mitigate the consequences of WMD. The CPRC 

members’ CWMD perspectives are presented in Volume II, Section 4. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

15

Tables 3 through 6 highlight selected CWMD activities for DoD, DOE, DHS, and DOS, 

respectively, that have occurred since the issuance of the 2007 CPRC report. The highlights 

presented in the tables meet three important criteria: (1) fulfilling specific ACE goals and 

performance measures; (2) meeting the requirements of corresponding policy guidance or 

international agreements; and (3) reducing identified shortfalls or capability gaps within an ACE. 

DOD SELECTED ACTIVITIES TO MEET COMBATING WMD GOALS 

DoD activities and programs cover the full spectrum of CWMD, providing Warfighters 

with required capabilities to defeat, deter, defend, respond to, and recover from WMD and 

related threats or attacks. Key elements of DoD’s approach include maintaining a strong deterrence capability; developing capabilities to identify, characterize, destroy, and interdict the 

production, transfer, storage, and weaponization of WMD; developing active defenses to intercept delivery means; developing passive defenses to provide detection, medical countermeasures, 

decontamination, and individual and collective protection; training and equipping U.S. forces to 

operate effectively in a WMD-contaminated environment; developing the ability to restore 

operations and manage the consequences of WMD use; and developing capabilities to support 

the National Technical Nuclear Forensics program. In environments where international partners 

have agreed to cooperate to reduce the threat of WMD, DoD’s contributions of expertise and 

technology for international cooperation are crucial to the success of these nonproliferation 

missions. The key elements of these international cooperative efforts are supporting U.S. 

diplomacy, arms control, and export controls; and encouraging U.S. allies and coalition partners 

to address CWMD as part of their planning. 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

Report outlined four main priority areas that frame the capabilities needed to address future 

challenges identified in the National Defense Strategy: (1) defeating terrorist networks; 

(2) defending the homeland in depth; (3) shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; 

and (4) preventing hostile states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using WMD. 

The QDR report also identified important capabilities needed by DoD for CWMD. These 

capabilities are cross-referenced here to the ACEs. 

Interdiction 

• Capabilities to locate, tag, and track WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, 

including the means to move such items. 

• Capabilities to detect fissile materials, such as nuclear devices, at standoff ranges. 

• Interdiction capabilities to stop air, maritime, and ground shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. 

Elimination 

• Joint command and control tailored for the WMD elimination mission. 

• Persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabilities or hostile forces. 

• Capabilities to detect fissile materials, such as nuclear devices, at standoff ranges. 

• Capabilities and specialized teams to render safe and secure WMD. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

16

• Special operations forces (SOF) to locate, characterize, and secure WMD. 

• Non-lethal weapons to secure WMD sites so that materials cannot be removed. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

• Capabilities to help friendly governments improve controls over existing weapons, materials and expertise. 

Passive Defense 

• Capabilities to shield critical and vulnerable systems and technologies from the catastrophic effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP). 

• New defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats, 

such as EMP, man-portable nuclear devices, genetically engineered biological pathogens, 

and next generation chemical agents. 

Offensive Operations 

• Persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabilities or hostile forces. 

• Capabilities to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent. 

• Strike capabilities, including prompt global strike capabilities, to defend and respond in 

an overwhelming manner against WMD attacks. 

• Capabilities to deploy, sustain, protect, support, and re-deploy SOF in hostile environments. 

Active Defense 

• Integrated defenses against short-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic, and 

cruise missile systems. 

WMD Consequence Management 

• New or expanded authorities to improve access to National Guard and Reserve forces for 

use in the event of a man-made or natural disaster. 

Intelligence 

• Human intelligence, language skills, and cultural awareness to understand better the intentions and motivations of potential adversaries and to speed recovery efforts. 

• Persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabilities or hostile forces. 

During the QDR, the senior leadership of the Department considered transformational 

changes already underway and identified desired future force characteristics. As a result, the 

QDR report proposed a CWMD capability portfolio, among others. Although CWMD was not 

adopted as a Tier I portfolio in DoD’s most recent Joint Capability Areas framework, approved 

in January 2009, a portfolio concept for CWMD is still valuable for those organizations responsible for oversight of CWMD. 

U.S. Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) Role in CWMD. Another important 

development in the Nation’s approach to CWMD has been the work of USSTRATCOM to 

synchronize planning and advocate for CWMD capabilities in DoD. USSTRATCOM has 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

17

engaged in discussions within DoD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOE, and other Federal 

agencies to improve coordination. USSTRATCOM completed Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 

8099-08, Global Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Campaign Plan, in March 2009. The 

CONPLAN incorporates national-level guidance for CWMD with the Guidance for Employment 

of the Forces (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2008 (JSCP 08). CONPLAN 8099-08 

synchronizes DoD CWMD plans by providing a common framework and methodology for 

CWMD planning which puts into effect a global strategy to combat WMD. USSTRATCOM 

also completed a Joint Integrating Concept, approved in December 2007, for CWMD that 

describes how a Joint Force Commander will conduct future CWMD operations. Based on 

CONPLAN 8099 and other analytical efforts not previously captured in Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documentation, USSTRATCOM produced a 

CWMD Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). The JCD, which was approved in October 2008, 

documents and prioritizes combatant command capability needs. Accordingly, the CWMD JCD 

forms the basis for initiating programs and making associated decisions and funding requests. 

Warfighter prioritization of CWMD shortfalls is provided in Volume II, Section 4. 

DoD activities in the CWMD mission areas are highlighted in Table 3. 

Table 3. Highlights of DoD’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

Interdiction 

DTRA sponsored a successful demonstration of an Idaho National Laboratory Bremsstrahlung-Gamma radiation active interrogation 

system to detect the presence of radiological and/or nuclear (rad/nuc) material. 

Elimination 

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) has successfully demonstrated and started the transition process for the Chemical Unmanned Ground 

Vehicle (CUGV) as part of the Chemical Unmanned Ground Reconnaissance ACTD. This robotic platform will allow initial entry into 

sensitive sites or HAZMAT incidents without endangering personnel and provide an array of sensor information, live video footage, and 

data for follow-on exploitation/response. 

CBRNE Command has retained one CUGV for deployment/incident response and additional training for units in the area of responsibility 

(AOR) once they are fielded. 

USSTRATCOM, in coordination with U.S. Joint Forces Command, established the Joint Elimination Coordination Element to provide 

joint command and control for Elimination Operations. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 5963 expanded the authority of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to expend funds outside 

the states of the former Soviet Union, facilitating the program’s ability to draw down WMD stockpiles in a broader range of countries. 

The U.S. Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is designed to strengthen IAEA nuclear 

safeguards in the United States. Current DoD AP implementation efforts are focused on interagency coordination and discussions with 

IAEA counterparts to establish the necessary procedures and requirements to implement the AP in the U.S., while also protecting U.S. 

national security. 

The DoD CTR program completed updates to the physical security systems at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites in support of the 

Bratislava commitments. 

In FY07-08 the DoD CTR program eliminated 84 SS-25 ICBMs, 54 SS-25 road-mobile launchers, and twelve SS-N-20 SLBMs as part of 

the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program. In addition, the last Russian SS-24 ICBM was eliminated in April 2008 under that 

program. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

18

Table 3. Highlights of DoD’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

(continued) 

Passive Defense 

The Office of Naval Research supported research to enhance understanding of bacterial cell-cell communication mechanisms, with a 

goal of exploiting these to develop new antibiotics or vaccines that target highly conserved communication pathways. 

The CBDP Advanced Technology Development Program completed feasibility studies on using Raman spectroscopy for the detection/identification of biological materials; developed models to predict passive standoff technology response to aerosols; completed 

development of portable technology to completely sequence entire pathogen genomes based upon the sequencing through synthesis 

concept. 

The CBDP Basic Medical Research Program established basic research to support the future production of monoclonal antibodies, 

enhanced active immunization, and novel therapeutic targets for bacterial and viral pathogens. It identified common biomarkers for 

several classes of pathogenic agents and investigated novel modeling to speed the future drug approval process. These projects also 

investigated in-silico and other methodologies to identify potential therapeutics from genetic sequences of chemical agents and continue 

to leverage advances in genomics, proteomics and systems biology studies. These projects conducted basic research experiments to 

identify mechanisms of injury and common sites for therapy against chemical warfare agent exposure. Additionally, in vitro and in vivo 

model systems were developed, improving upon existing human tissue models and molecular modeling capabilities against the action of 

multiple classes of chemical agents. 

JPEO-CBD established the Decontamination Family of System to look at a range of possible solutions for the replacement of high test 

hypochlorite, super-topical bleach, and decontamination foam-200. 

The CBRN IPP was fielded to 89 installations, and the CBRN IPP Portal was established to provide CBRN awareness information to 

military members and their families and information on national initiatives to emergency managers on military installations world-wide. 

The IPP partnered with the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Life Cycle Management Command to execute 

integrated sustainment of CBRN IPP equipment at Army installations. 

The Army Emergency First Responders Program was fielded to 89 installations. 

The Spectral Sensing of Bio-Aerosols Program has developed a standardized approach and testbed to evaluate point trigger sensor

performance for aerosolized bio-threat agent simulants in cluttered environments. 

The Stryker Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle completed production verification testing and initial operational test & 

evaluation in 2007 and achieved MS III Extended LRIP in 2008. 

The CBRN Defense Life Support Program began the Readiness Assistance Visit Program in late 2007. The program completed visits to 

22 ships prior to their deployment. It also completed ship installation of eight Biological Point Detectors. 

The CBDP Biological Vaccine Procurement Program fielded Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed, Smallpox Vaccine, and Vaccinia Immune 

Globulin Intravenous vaccines. 

DoD entered into interagency agreements with the Department of Health and Human Services to implement a single, integrated 

stockpile for Anthrax and Smallpox vaccines, meeting the requirements for the Strategic National Stockpile, and resulting in cost 

avoidance of more than $10 million, annually. 

DoD launched a new initiative, called the Armed Forces Institute of Regenerative Medicine, a multi-institutional interdisciplinary network 

managed and primarily funded by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, leveraging cutting-edge medical technologies and aimed at developing advanced treatment options, such as patient personalized stem cell therapy for assisting severely 

wounded servicemen and women for CWMD and/or managing WMD consequences. 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

DTRA provided indirect support to the Moscow Treaty’s Bilateral Implementation Commission in the form of technical advice to the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

DTRA developed and continues to administer and maintain the Global Initiative Information Portal, a web-based portal to promote

information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation among the partner nations of the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 

USARPAC will field and train two additional federal fire departments in Japan. This increases the protection of forces stationed on the 

installations and critical infrastructure facilities by providing almost immediate detection and presumptive analysis in the event of a 

WMD/HAZMAT incident. 

The DoD International Counterproliferation Program conducted 34 training events in 13 Former Soviet countries and two additional 

courses in two additional countries in FY08. The training was conducted in partnership with the FBI and DHS, and focused on WMD 

investigations, border security, and hazardous material response.
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

19

Table 3. Highlights of DoD’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

(continued) 

Offensive Operations 

DTRA conducted more than 80 test events to evaluate data regarding the phenomenology effects of a variety of advanced energetic

explosive materials that could be employed against in-transit, fixed, or WMD-related targets or infrastructure. 

DTRA conducted several test and evaluation events to collect, analyze, verify, and validate data to improve fidelity and reliability of 

predictive tools for design and development of optimized weapons and concepts to effectively penetrate and operate through rock, soil, 

and other structures. This included a unique test and evaluation event to collect, analyze, and provide weapon effects data regarding 

the ability of existing conventional weapons to defeat/destroy HDBTs with little or no collateral effects. 

Air Force analytic tools provided enhanced validated predictions of CB agent effects to support target analysis for conventional and 

agent defeat weapons (SERPENT); and neutralization effects of various environments on CB agents (ELM). 

Active Defense 

MDA expanded its capabilities to defend against limited long-range missile threats by emplacing 14 Ground Based Interceptors, 

upgrading early warning radars, and completing Missile Field 3 at Fort Greely, Alaska. MDA also expanded capabilities to defense 

against short- to medium-range missile threats by delivering 41 Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptors and 17 Aegis BMD-capable ships. 

MDA completed five Aegis BMD intercept tests and three Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercept tests, building on

capabilities that can be employed to defend U.S. deployed forces and allies from theater and regional medium-range missile threats. 

In flight tests since the beginning of FY07, MDA completed two successful intercepts of targets using Ground Based Interceptors, 6 

successful intercepts of targets using SM-3 Block 1A interceptors, and 5 successful intercepts of targets using THAAD interceptors. The 

December 2008 test using a GBI was the first long-range intercept of an operationally realistic target within the integrated missile 

defense sensor framework. 

WMD Consequence Management

The DoD CBDP (JPEO-CBD) fielded the Analytical Laboratory System (Increment 1), Unified Command Suite (Increment 1) and the 

Advanced Echelon vehicle to provide improved command and control and mobile analytical laboratory capabilities to WMD Civil Support 

Teams. 

DoD established the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management 

Response Forces (CCMRF) to provide a robust, timely and effective federal response to a request for assistance from civil authorities in 

a CBRNE crisis. The first of three CCMRFs is allocated to USNORTHCOM under its DoD Support to Civil Authorities mission. Two 

more CCMRFs will be developed and allocated over the next two years. 

USEUCOM is completing a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 

Change Recommendation for OCONUS consequence management, describing and proposing theater-based CBRN solutions and 

capabilities, both for installation protection and assisting friends and allies. 

The USSTRATCOM Center for CWMD (SCC-WMD) conducted an evaluation of geographic combatant command OCONUS Consequence Management mitigation capability requirements against combatant command-stated gaps and provided a briefing with 

recommendations to address gaps in the combatant commands’ ability to respond to CBRN incidents in their respective AORs to the

Joint Staff’s Force Protection Functional Capability. 

The SCC-WMD is developing an operations concept for using CONUS-based CBRN CM capabilities to support combatant commands’ 

responses to CBRN incidents overseas. 

DoD and DHS continued cooperation on the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) to provide a coordinated systems 

approach to the recovery and restoration of wide-urban areas following the aerosol release of a biological agent. 

USARPAC is creating an Active component first response capability within the 71st (Hawaii) and 95th (Alaska) Chemical Companies, 

scheduled to reach initial operational capability by the 3rd Quarter of FY09, with the capability to conduct CBRN CM independently or as 

augmentation to a WMD-CST within the USPACOM AOR. 

The Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters (ODATSD(NM)) continued to further consequence 

management goals via exercises and exchanges through its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Intelligence

ODATSD(NM) enhanced collaboration with the United Kingdom and France in the areas of nuclear detection, collection, and forensics. 

DTRA is leading the development of collection, analysis and evaluation capabilities for post-detonation National Technical Nuclear 

Forensics (NTNF). 

ODATSD(NM) co-chaired the Attribution Working Group under the Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Nuclear Defense 

Research and Development Subcommittee. 

The Air Force began executing DoD’s NTNF responsibilities, which include fielding the objective DoD NTNF capability; providing support 

to nuclear forensic activities; planning, programming, and budgeting to satisfy NTNF requirements; and supporting combatant 

commands in which NTNF operations occur. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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DOE SELECTED ACTIVITIES TO MEET COMBATING WMD GOALS 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is the DOE agency responsible 

for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear energy. NNSA 

maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear 

weapon stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass 

destruction; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and 

abroad. Within the NNSA, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) detects, 

prevents, and reverses the proliferation of WMD, while mitigating the risks from nuclear operations. The National Nuclear Security Administration Act for Fiscal Year 2000 made DNN the 

organization within the NNSA responsible for preventing the spread of materials, technology, 

and expertise relating to WMD, and for eliminating inventories of surplus fissile material. DNN 

accomplishes its mission by working closely with its international and regional partners as well 

as key federal agencies. 

DOE activities that address the nonproliferation mission include the following: 

• Developing next-generation detection technologies and methods to detect and monitor 

foreign nuclear materials, weapons production, and prohibited nuclear explosions worldwide. 

• Preventing and countering WMD proliferation by providing policy and technical support 

to implement and monitor transparent WMD reductions; strengthening indigenous international safeguards and export controls systems in other countries; transitioning WMD 

expertise and infrastructure to peaceful purposes; and improving international and multinational safeguards, export control, and interdiction regimes. 

• Working in Russia, Libya, and other regions of concern to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, and install detection equipment at 

border crossings and megaports to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material. 

• Enabling the Russian Federation to permanently cease production of weapons-grade plutonium by replacing plutonium-producing nuclear reactors with fossil-fueled powerplants to provide alternative sources of heat and electricity and provide for the shutdown 

of the reactors. 

• Eliminating surplus Russian plutonium and surplus U.S. plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium. 

• Identifying, securing, removing, or facilitating the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable 

nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a potential threat to the 

United States and the international community. 

DOE supports CWMD missions through its nuclear proliferation prevention and counterterrorism activities as well as through access to the many sites engaged by its scientific cadre. 

DOE plays a critical role, through its core nuclear work, in addressing inspection and monitoring 

activities of arms control agreements and regimes; protection of WMD and WMD-related 

materials and components; detection and tracking of these materials and components; removal of 

materials from compliant nation states; and export control activities. DOE is working closely 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

21

with DoD, DHS, DOS, and the IC to detect, characterize, and defeat WMD and WMD-related 

facilities. 

DOE activities in the CWMD mission areas are highlighted in Table 4. 

Table 4. Highlights of DOE’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals

Interdiction 

NNSA’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) Core Program, working closely with DHS, completed installations of equipment to detect the 

illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials at an additional 63 strategic borders, airports, and strategic feeder ports in 

Russia and other countries, for a cumulative total of 213 sites completed. The SLD Core Program also concluded cooperation 

agreements with Mongolia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, and Estonia. The SLD Megaports Initiative completed installations 

at an additional seven Megaports, for a cumulative total of 19 Megaports completed. The Megaports Initiative also concluded 

agreements with three additional countries. 

Elimination 

The Proliferation Detection Program completed several multi-agency tests to characterize, validate, and integrate advanced remote 

sensing instrumentation for detection of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities. 

The Nuclear Detonation Detection Program delivered operational space-based nuclear detection sensors to the Air Force on time in 

support of Air Force launch schedules—sustaining the nation’s capability to monitor and report nuclear detonations that occur on or 

above the earth’s surface. It completed development and testing of the next-generation space-based optical explosion monitor sensor. 

This enhanced sensor will improve the nation’s monitoring capability for very small atmospheric nuclear explosions and is now the 

baseline for all future optical payloads. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Program removed or disposed of an additional 425 kilograms of nuclear material

(plutonium and highly enriched uranium), increasing the program total to 1,791 kilograms--enough for over 65 crude nuclear weapons. 

The GTRI Program protected an additional 100 high priority radiological sites, increasing the program total to 600 sites containing eight 

million curies--enough for over 8,000 radiological dirty bombs. 

The Zheleznogorsk (Russia) Plutonium Production Elimination Project is currently expected to meet its December 2010 completion date 

on cost and schedule. The completion will provide district heat, allowing shutdown of the Zheleznogorsk reactor and eliminate 400 kgs 

of plutonium production annually. 

The International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program completed installation of equipment to secure radiological material at 

92 IRTR sites, increasing the total number of sites secured to 590. 

In FY08, material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) upgrades were completed on 39 additional buildings containing 

weapons-usable material within the Rosatom (Russia) weapons complex and civilian nuclear sites. In FY09, NNSA plans to complete 

MPC&A upgrades to an additional 33 buildings containing weapons-usable material. 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

NNSA developed and delivered several new technologies, systems, and methods to verify declared nuclear activities and detect 

undeclared nuclear materials and activities, including technologies that will strengthen the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA 

safeguards. 

NNSA worked with former WMD scientists, engineers and technicians at over 180 institutes in the former Soviet Union and Middle East 

to redirect their skills to non-weapons related purposes. They trained over 4,100 U.S. and international export control officials in over 46

countries on strategic trade controls and identification of WMD-related items. 

NNSA completed MPC&A upgrades to five Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) sites, increasing the total SRF sites secured with 

either completed rapid or comprehensive upgrades to 19 sites.

Offensive Operations 

The NNSA Office of Defense Programs manages the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Stockpile Stewardship 

Program maintains the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of full-scale nuclear testing. 

The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile contributes to the defense policy goals of assuring our allies, deterring our adversaries, and 

dissuading other countries from developing WMD capabilities. The nuclear weapons stockpile was determined to be safe, secure, and 

reliable during the FY08 stockpile assessment process.
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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IC SELECTED ACTIVITIES TO MEET COMBATING WMD GOALS 

The IC provides strategic, tactical, and operational intelligence on WMD threats to all 

U.S. Government organizations, a critical enabling function that cuts across all ACEs. The 

National Counterterrorism Center, under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI), continues to mature and gain acceptance in its efforts to better manage, direct, and 

coordinate IC activities and interagency support in the areas of combating terrorism and homeland security. 

The ODNI’s National Counterproliferation Center was established as a result of 

recommendations from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Center conducts strategic counterproliferation 

planning for the IC to support policy efforts to dissuade, prevent, deter and otherwise counter the 

proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials and technologies. It works 

with the IC to identify critical intelligence gaps or shortfalls in collection, analysis, or 

exploitation, and develop solutions to ameliorate or close these gaps; identify long-term 

proliferation threats and requirements; and develop strategies to ensure that the IC is positioned 

to address these threats. NCPC also works with elements inside and outside of the IC and the 

U.S. Government to identify new methods or technologies that can enhance the capabilities of 

the IC to detect and defeat future proliferation threats. 

IC activities in support of the CWMD mission are reported annually to Congress in the 

classified document Report to the Director of National Intelligence on the State of the Counterproliferation Intelligence Community. 

DHS SELECTED ACTIVITIES TO MEET COMBATING WMD GOALS 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Act of 2002

served to mobilize and organize the nation in the mission of securing the homeland from terrorist 

attacks. This complex mission requires a focused effort. To this end, one primary reason for the 

establishment of DHS was to provide the unifying core for the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to secure our nation. DHS coordinates with DoD, DOE, 

the IC, DOS, and other federal departments to enhance CWMD capabilities. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was chartered within DHS on April 15, 

2005, through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-14 to coordinate efforts of federal, state, and local partners to strengthen 

national radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) detection capabilities to address the threat of nuclear 

terrorism. Together with the Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Justice, DNDO will 

develop and deploy a comprehensive system to detect and report any attempt to import, assemble, or transport a nuclear device, or fissile or radiological materials within the United States. 

The DHS Chemical and Biological Division (CBD), within the Science and Technology 

Directorate, conducts analyses for better threat characterization and prioritization of chemical 

and biological threats; develops detection systems to provide early warning of a possible attack; 

conducts forensic analyses to support attribution; and helps develop technologies and systems to 

enable rapid decontamination and restoration from CB attacks. While the primary target 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

23

beneficiary of these programs is the nation’s citizenry and infrastructure, component solutions 

from these programs may see beneficial application in DoD and other departments and agencies’ 

areas of concern. DHS works closely with multiple Federal partners to enable broad coordination and to leverage national investments in WMD defense of civilians and infrastructure. DHS 

efforts in CWMD mission areas address primarily the Passive Defense and Consequence Management ACEs. 

DHS activities with direct relevance to CWMD include the following: 

• Developing the underlying strategy that guides the U.S. Government’s nuclear detection efforts. 

• Developing a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) that will contribute to 

a robust, layered defense for the United States. 

• Coordinating rad/nuc detection technology R&D programs, ensuring collaboration 

between DHS, DoD, DOE, DOS, the FBI, and other agencies. 

• Enhancing and coordinating Federal, state, and local efforts to detect and protect 

against nuclear and radiological terrorism against the United States. 

• Screening cargo at overseas seaports to detect and interdict terrorists' weapons and 

other illicit material before arrival on U.S. shores. 

• Leading the development, among executive branch departments, of a coordinated architecture for bio-monitoring that includes biosurveillance, aerosol detection, clinical 

syndrome detection, mail room observation, and suspicious substance management. 

• Increasing the nation’s preparedness against chemical and biological threats through 

improved threat awareness, advanced surveillance and detection, and protective countermeasures. 

• Developing policies, methods, plans and applied technologies to restore large urban 

areas, DoD installations, and critical infrastructures following a biological attack. 

• Serving as the lead Federal facility to conduct and facilitate the technical forensic 

analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following a biological attack in 

support of the appropriate lead federal agency. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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DHS activities in the CWMD mission areas are highlighted in Table 5. 

Table 5. Highlights of DHS’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals

Interdiction 

DNDO and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) worked together to secure the Southern border at 100 percent, Northern border

at 97 percent and Seaports at 98 percent. 

DNDO conducted test campaigns with DHS/CBP at Andrews Air Force Base to evaluate rad/nuc scanning systems in the international 

general aviation environment, as well as controlled laboratory tests using next-generation human portable devices. 

DNDO initiated the West Coast Maritime Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection (PRND) Pilot Project in Puget Sound, 

Washington, in support of the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy; conducted a test campaign to characterize the performance of 

rad/nuc detection equipment in the maritime environment; and led a maritime symposium to engage relevant stakeholders in the 

maritime community with regard to PRND programs. 

DNDO continued implementation of the Securing the Cities initiative in the New York City region, enabling state and local jurisdictions to 

coordinate and execute PRND screening operations for various events. 

DNDO worked with DOE/NNSA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the manufacturers and users of irradiators to develop lowcost engineering upgrades to make cesium chloride irradiators less vulnerable to terrorist attack. 

DNDO supported DHS/CBP in completing congressionally mandated covert testing at the top 22 seaports. 

DNDO conducted a red team assessment of the California Highway Patrol’s PRND capability. 

DNDO established the Graduated Rad/Nuc Detector Evaluation and Reporting Program to facilitate independent testing and assessment

of commercially available rad/nuc detection equipment against American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N42 performance 

standards to inform the government procurement and grant process. 

DNDO executed seven distinct data collection or test campaigns for rad/nuc detection systems and four data collection efforts with 

stakeholders to support future radiation test campaigns for on-dock rail. 

Passive Defense 

The Biological Threat Characterization Center, as part of its systematic end-to-end risk assessments on both traditional and engineered 

biological agents, completed Population Threat Assessments for all the traditional biothreat agents of significant public health concern in 

2007.

The Secretary of DHS issued Material Threat Determinations (MTDs) for nine additional biological agents in September 2007. These 

MTDs are required under Project BioShield before a countermeasure can be considered for acquisition. 

The DHS Science & Technology Directorate/Chemical Biological Division (DHS S&T) completed the 2008 biennial update of its 

quantitative probability-based risk assessment to guide development of countermeasures against highest risk biological agents and 

acquisition of medical countermeasures by DHHS. 

DHS S&T completed the first comprehensive quantitative chemical risk assessment, providing guidance in the development and 

deployment of countermeasures against highest risk chemical agents (including toxic industrial chemicals, chemical warfare agents, 

non-traditional [chemical] agents) and completed four Population Threat Assessments on four classes of chemical agents. 

DHS S&T completed the first Integrated CBRN quantitative risk assessments, providing a basis for comparing risks due to agents across 

the chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) spectrum. 

The BioWatch and Rapidly Deployable Chemical Detection Systems were developed and transitioned to DHS Office of Health Affairs for 

operations. 

The next-generation BioWatch Gen 3 candidate Biological Autonomous Networked Detector, an automated stand-alone biological 

identifier targeted to provide more rapid detection of biological releases in the BioWatch framework, completed field testing. 

Chemical detection systems for use by responders and for building protection were advanced to prototype stage and placed in 

operational environments for extensive testing. 

In December 2008, DHS S&T and DoD USD(AT&L) signed an MOU on cooperation in the areas of CB defense to minimize duplication 

of effort, leverage capabilities, and promote interoperability. 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

DHS/CBP expanded the Container Security Initiative (CSI) by increasing participating ports to 58. CSI now screens 86 percent of U.S.-

bound maritime containers. 

DNDO partnered with other nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the European Union through the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines for a GNDA that will serve as a plan for an integrated defense-indepth strategy. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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Table 5. Highlights of DHS’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals 

(continued)

WMD Consequence Management 

DHS S&T completed and transitioned to EPA a mobile laboratory capable of high-throughput analysis of environmental samples 

containing TICs and CWAs. 

DHS S&T completed and transitioned to local authorities two prototype labs for screening of suspicious materials that may be of

explosive, chemical, or radiological nature to protect the infrastructure of public health laboratories. 

DHS S&T advanced the capability of fixed laboratories in the NY and DC regions to analyze environmental samples containing CWA 

contamination. 

DHS S&T drafted templates guiding the restoration of critical infrastructure after contamination with biological or chemical agents. 

DHS S&T continued to lead interagency efforts to advance the coordination of the nation’s laboratory response networks to provide 

requisite analytical support in surveillance, characterization, and restoration from attacks with CBR agents via air, food, and water 

against humans, animals, and plants. 

DHS and DoD continued the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration, a joint initiative that seeks to reduce the time and 

resources necessary to recover and restore wide urban areas, military installations, and critical infrastructure following a large-scale 

biological attack. 

DOS SELECTED ACTIVITIES TO MEET COMBATING WMD GOALS 

DOS leads the interagency policy process on nonproliferation and manages global U.S. 

security policy, principally in the following areas: Nonproliferation, including the missile and 

nuclear threat areas, as well as chemical, biological, and conventional weapons proliferation; 

Arms control, including negotiation, ratification, verification and compliance, and implementation of agreements on strategic, non-conventional, and conventional forces; and regional security 

and defense relations regarding U.S. security commitments worldwide, the use of U.S. military 

forces in unilateral or international peacekeeping roles; and arms transfers and security assistance 

programs and arms transfer policies. DOS also provides foreign policy input into the interagency processes overseeing research and development of nonproliferation, arms control and 

counterterrorism technologies that have applications to CWMD missions. 

Within DOS, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 

serves as Senior Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State for issues of arms control, 

nonproliferation, and disarmament. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation 

(ISN) leads U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological 

weapons) and their delivery systems and is responsible for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms control functions. The Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation (VCI) provides oversight of both policy and resources on all matters 

relating to verification of compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation and 

disarmament agreements and commitments and supports the Secretary and the Under Secretary 

for Arms Control and International Security in developing and implementing robust and rigorous 

verification and compliance policies. 

DOS activities that address CWMD include the following: 

• Promoting international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. 

• Addressing WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups 

by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, preventing the 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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spread of WMD and applicable expertise, and actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G-8 

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G-8 Global Partnership), and promoting the aims of the United Nations Security 

Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and other international nonproliferation regimes. 

• Working closely with international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD. 

• Supporting efforts of foreign partners to prevent, protect against, and respond to the 

threat or use of WMD by terrorists. 

• Ensuring that appropriate verification requirements and capabilities are fully considered and integrated throughout the development, negotiation, and implementation of 

new treaties, agreements and commitments. 

• Assessing other nations' compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, agreements and commitments. 

• Serving as the principal policy liaison to the U.S. Intelligence Community for verification and compliance matters. 

• Ensuring the effective implementation of existing nuclear arms control treaties and 

agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 

• Leading U.S. efforts to develop and implement the elimination and verification requirements for the denuclearization of North Korea. 

• Working bilaterally and multilaterally with the international community to resolve 

longstanding concerns regarding other states' compliance with their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation obligations. 

• Establishing the scientific, institutional, and organizational arrangements to ensure 

that the U.S. Government can effectively discriminate between naturally occurring 

outbreaks of disease and a biological weapons attack and identify the perpetrator. 

• Managing the Key Verification Assets (V) Fund and co-chairing the interagency 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) and 

Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which identify and develop arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism technologies that can also find applications to CWMD missions. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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DOS activities in the CWMD mission areas are highlighted in Table 6. 

Table 6. Highlights of DOS’s Progress in Meeting Combating WMD Goals

Elimination 

VCI co-chaired the NPAC TWG, which coordinates the R&D response to arms control and nonproliferation. 

VCI managed the V-Fund, which provides stopgap funding to preserve existing assets, provide impetus for new acquisitions, and 

support R&D on new technologies. 

VCI, working through the U.S.-UK-Libya Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee, reviewed Libya’s compliance with its agreement 

to eliminate its WMD programs. 

Threat Reduction Cooperation 

Working closely with DOE and other USG agencies, ISN focused its scientific engagement, redirection and biological security efforts in 

countries and regions where the threat of terrorism and proliferation is greatest, including Pakistan, Iraq, Indonesia, and other key 

nations and regions. For scientist redirection activities in Russia and the former Soviet Union, ISN focused efforts on ensuring selfsustainability for key personnel and their institutes. 

Passive Defense 

The Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) co-chaired the TSWG, interagency R&D forum for combating terrorism. 

The TSWG CBRN Countermeasures subgroup developed useful technologies in the Passive Defense and WMD Consequence 

Management mission areas. 

Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

ISN, along with the Department of the Treasury, ensured implementation of Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the U.S. 

Government to freeze assets and block transactions of designated entities and persons engaged in proliferation activities. 

ISN led negotiations with selected countries on peaceful nuclear cooperation and managed diplomatic aspects of the Global Nuclear 

Energy partnership. 

ISN successfully promoted geographic expansion of the G-8 Global Partnership to address WMD threats worldwide. 

ISN furthered the goals of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and promoted UNSCR 1540. 

VCI continued focused verification and compliance efforts with North Korea, Iran, Russia, China, Libya, and Iraq and promoted full 

compliance with agreements and commitments, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

FUNDING OF CPRC-REPORTED PROGRAMS

Improving the Nation’s capabilities to meet and respond to the threat of WMD requires 

continued and substantial investment throughout many U.S. Government organizations. This 

report includes more than $29.6 billion in FY09 and $26.4 billion in FY10 of planned investment 

from DoD, DOE, DOS, and DHS. The IC’s total investment in CWMD is not included in these 

CPRC-reported summary figures but is reported to Congress through other fora.4 All budget 

figures in this report are consistent with the President’s Budget. More detailed budget information on DoD, DOE, DOS, and DHS programs is presented in Volume II, Chapter 4 and 

Appendix C. 

DoD’s planned investment is $22.4 billion for FY09 and $19.1 billion for FY10, compared to the FY08 level of $14.3 billion reported in the May 2007 CPRC report. The higher 

level of funding is due primarily to increases associated with the inclusion in this year’s report of 

funding for nuclear strike forces and assets and the Chemical Demilitarization Program. DoD’s 

main investments are in the areas of ballistic missile defense, nuclear strike forces and assets, 

treaty obligations for reducing chemical agent stockpiles, detection of CW and BW agents, threat 

reduction cooperation activities; and medical countermeasures against WMD threat agents. 

 

4

 Appendix C of the classified Volume II of this report contains some portions of the IC budget for selected 

programs. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

28

DOE’s planned investment of $6.6 billion in FY09 and $6.8 billion in FY10 includes 

NNSA’s nuclear weapons surety, safety, and security activities—a newly-tracked capability area 

in this report—in addition to the nonproliferation activities that have been included in past 

editions of the CPRC report. Nonproliferation investment is $1.2 billion in FY09 and $1.6 

billion in FY10, compared to $1.7 billion in FY08. DOE’s FY09 and FY10 investments include 

additional emphasis on global threat reduction activities, international cooperation to protect 

nuclear materials, and capabilities to respond to and mitigate nuclear and radiological incidents 

worldwide. 

DHS’s planned investment is $670 million in FY09 and $528 million in FY10 for activities to respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological threats to the U.S. homeland. This is the first 

CPRC report to include DHS’s CWMD budgets. The budgets for FY09 and FY10 support 

improved capabilities for chemical and biological defense countermeasures, detection and 

interdiction of nuclear and radiological materials and threats, advanced surveillance and detection of chemical and biological threats, and protection and response to WMD attacks against 

critical infrastructure. 

Along with DHS, DOS became a formal member of the CPRC in FY08. DOS’s Bureau 

of Verification, Compliance and Implementation (VCI) and Bureau of International Security and 

Nonproliferation (ISN) are specifically charged with the missions of putting constraints on 

WMD and their means of delivery, and reducing the threat to the United States and its allies. 

VCI and ISN support overseas preparedness against WMD attacks, diplomatic activities to 

engage foreign states in formal and informal arrangements for WMD threat cooperation, and 

verification and compliance of existing WMD-related treaties and agreements. The VCI CWMD 

budget requests for FY09 and FY10 are $1.5 million, and $3.7 million, respectively. 

2009 CPRC RECOMMENDATIONS 

The 2009 CPRC Report recommendations are summarized below. The recommendations 

generally follow from shortfalls identified in this report. They are presented below in order of 

the ACEs they address. In many cases, the recommendations apply to more than one ACE. The 

recommendations are numbered for readability, not indicative of priority. 

This report identifies and discusses shortfalls and priorities in CWMD capabilities. The 

President’s Budget development considers all necessary aspects of budget development for 

applicable years. This report supports the programs in the FY10 President’s Budget request. 

Recommendation 1: Undertake a broad analysis of U.S. and allied non-kinetic capabilities and technologies, which may have 

CWMD applications, and determine how they may be better 

exploited. 

Applicable ACE(s): Interdiction, Active Defense, Offensive 

Operations, Elimination 

CWMD capabilities might benefit from application of non-kinetic technologies currently 

deployed by the defense community, as well as those technologies still in development. A 

number of DoD programs in Appendix C of this report are exploring non-kinetic technologies as 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

29

options to traditional kinetic technologies for offensive operations. DTRA, for example, is 

investigating kinetic and non-energetic solutions to hold WMD assets and associated infrastructure at risk. Non-lethal disruptive radio frequency and other electronic countermeasures, such as 

those being investigated in the Navy’s Joint Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive 

Device Electronic Warfare program, are being used more frequently in counter-terrorism efforts 

and could find application supporting the Interdiction, Active Defense, Offensive Operations, 

and Elimination ACEs. Additionally, CWMD-dedicated application of other government 

functions, such as diplomatic, economic, and intelligence, should be continued or enhanced, as 

recommended by the 9/11 Commission. 

Recommendation 2: Develop, test, and deploy improved capabilities for standoff or remote detection of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) materials related to WMD. The 

improved capabilities should enable detection from a greater distance than current capability provides, and, for biological threat 

agents in particular, decrease the time between detection and identification of the biological agent to enable effective warning and 

treatment. 

Applicable ACE(s): Interdiction, Passive Defense, WMD 

Consequence Management, Intelligence 

Improved standoff or remote detection of CBRN materials continues to be a capability 

that would benefit all organizations with CWMD missions. Attacks of a biological and nuclear 

nature have the most potential to cause catastrophic damage and are the two areas that require the 

most attention at this time. In the case of nuclear standoff detection, increasing the range at 

which nuclear weapons and related components or materials can be detected translates into a 

wider search area and an increased probability of interdicting nuclear devices, whether at fixed 

transit and border points or through gap areas over land, at sea, or in the air. 

In terms of more rapid detection and identification of biological threat agents, a longer 

term goal is to be able to detect and identify specific agents in a mass pathogen attack in near 

real time. This would allow authorities the maximum amount of time to issue warnings and take 

actions to protect, remove, or treat populations in the event of an attack. A nearer term goal, 

such as that of the Department of Homeland Security’s BioWatch Generation 3 system, is to 

detect and determine the specific threat agent involved in a suspected attack within 3-6 hours for 

a wide range of biological threat agents. 

Section 3 of this report, “Discussion and Assessment of the Status of May 2007 CPRC 

Report Recommendations,” describes some modest progress in detection capabilities. However, 

fielded capabilities in certain detection areas—notably standoff detection—are several years 

away. Only one standoff biological detection system, DoD’s Joint Biological Standoff Detection 

System, Increment II, mentioned in Section 3, with programmatic details provided in Appendix 

C, is scheduled to reach initial operational capability by FY12. For standoff nuclear detection, 

all of the programs covered in this report are in early stages of research and development. 

There still exists a need for integration and coordination of rapid standoff or remote detection efforts being developed by several U.S. Government departments and agencies for many 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

30

potential applications. One example, provided in Section 3, is the need to pursue high-risk/highpayoff research, such as the work of the National Institutes of Health in developing a standalone, 

automated, genomic identification capability for biological surveillance. A task force may be 

useful to facilitate the synchronization of efforts across government agencies. 

Recommendation 3: Develop a range of capabilities to improve 

U.S. abilities to conduct conventional prompt global strike. 

Applicable ACE(s): Elimination, Offensive Operations 

The need for capability to engage time-critical targets worldwide was identified as an ongoing capability gap. In 2006, the conference report accompanying the FY07 Department of 

Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 5631/Public Law 109-289) directed the National Academy of 

Sciences to conduct a study to analyze the mission requirement for using existing Trident II (D5) 

missiles with conventional payloads to provide a prompt global strike capability, and, where 

appropriate, consider and recommend alternatives that meet the prompt global strike mission in 

the near term (1-2 years), mid-term (3-5 years), and the long term. A 2007 CPRC Report recommendation reaffirmed conventional prompt global strike as a deficiency area. As noted in 

Section 3 of this report, Congress removed all FY08 funding for the Conventional Trident 

Modification (CTM) and redirected a portion of the funding to alternative technologies for 

conventional prompt global strike technologies. Although CTM is no longer being pursued, 

conventional prompt global strike, as noted in the Strategic Deterrence discussion in Section 

4.6.2, remains a highly desired capability that offers the possibility of new, and, possibly better, 

options for deterrence than currently exist. 

Near-term options for prompt global coverage are limited to nuclear-armed, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, to some extent, cruise missiles. Cruise missiles provide some 

capability, but do not meet the critical requirements of timeliness, range, and global coverage. 

Specifically, due to their longer flight times, cruise missiles are generally not viable against timeurgent or fleeting targets. Moreover, given their range limitations, cruise missiles are highly 

dependent on the location of the associated U.S. ships and aircraft used as launch platforms. 

Technology options for conventional prompt global strike systems need to be developed to deal 

with the nexus of rogue states, nonstate actors, and terrorists armed with WMD. 

In addition to options for new or improved delivery systems, areas in need of work include weapons effects on targets; weaponeering tools; programmed intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control (C2

) to support weapon systems and operations; and battle damage assessment systems. In FY03, DTRA began a research and development program to provide integrated support to global strike planning, execution, and assessments, including development of a long-range combat assessment system using weapon-borne 

sensors. This program has evolved to focus primarily on prototyping of a battle damage assessment sensor system and includes ongoing studies relative to dispensing sensors from hypersonic 

delivery vehicles. Other DoD studies have been conducted to evaluate new concepts for hypersonic glide vehicles, novel test platforms, and basing alternatives. Based upon this body of 

work, DoD should develop capability options for conventional prompt global strike. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

31

Recommendation 4: Develop better, or improve existing, coordination mechanisms and information systems to support communities of interest (COI) awareness of ongoing security cooperation 

activities in foreign regional areas of responsibility. 

Applicable ACE(s): Threat Reduction Cooperation, Security 

Cooperation and Partner Activities 

The diverse nature of security cooperation activities in foreign regions requires information-sharing among multiple departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The Department of State’s CWMD perspective in Section 4 illustrates the web of agencies involved in 

international CWMD activities. DOS cooperates with DHS for border control issues; DoD for 

counterterrorism, counternarcotics and arms transfers; the Department of Energy for nuclear 

nonproliferation issues; the Department of Justice for rule-of-law issues; and the Department of 

Commerce for export control matters. Another case in point is threat reduction cooperation 

activity in the former Soviet Union, which involves offices in DOS, DOE, DoD, and two geographical combatant commands (U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command). Geographical combatant commands have suggested that improvements are needed to ensure mutual 

awareness of activities by and between all organizations involved in a region. The issues identified may be remedied, to some extent, by establishing common notification procedures (e.g., 

conveying information to the agencies through a central information venue, such as embassies or 

consulates in the region). However, there is a need for an overarching information system to 

provide a common operational picture of appropriate granularity to stakeholders with overlapping responsibilities in the region. 

The agencies involved in these activities should establish processes to discuss problems 

in this issue area and propose information-sharing solutions to address the counter terrorism and 

CWMD capability deficiencies they have identified.

Recommendation 5: Develop, test, and deploy capabilities for detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination, and protection against Non-traditional [chemical] Agents and emerging 

biological agents. 

Applicable ACE(s): Passive Defense, WMD Consequence 

Management 

Non-traditional [chemical] agents (NTAs) and toxic industrial materials and chemicals 

may pose challenges to current detectors.5

 Current sensors are not sensitive enough to detect 

sublethal, but still harmful, levels of chemical or biological agents. Such a detection capability 

would support safe, unprotected operations at fixed and mobile sites, adequate collective protection in a contaminated environment, and provide verification of the completeness of personnel 

and equipment decontamination. 

 

5 Non-traditional agents are novel chemical threat agents or toxicants requiring adapted countermeasures. Toxic 

industrial materials and chemicals are toxic substances in liquid or gaseous form that are used or stored for use for 

military or commercial purposes. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) – 18, “Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction,” January 31, 2007.
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

32

CPRC organizations, as discussed in this report, are working toward the development of 

capabilities to counter NTAs, but these are in early stages of R&D. For example, Appendix C, 

Table C-14 provides details for DHS’s Non-traditional Agent – Laboratory Capability program, 

a newly initiated effort to develop conceptual designs for high-throughput analysis of NTAs; it is 

scheduled to reach initial operational capability in FY12. DHS also is conducting proof-ofconcept decontamination demonstrations against NTAs, traditional agents, and persistent TICs in 

the FY10-13 timeframe. DoD is currently conducting considerable work to increase scientific 

understanding in physical and chemical properties, toxicity, and agent fate to facilitate NTA 

defense capability developments. DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program completed 

the design parameters for an NTA chamber that will assist with the development, testing, and 

fielding of countermeasures against NTAs by providing capabilities to challenge technologies in 

an NTA atmosphere. Significant efforts are needed to address NTAs in the areas of detection, 

medical countermeasures, decontamination, and individual protection. 

Biological agents remain significant potential threats to the United States and its allies. It 

is anticipated that, over the next decade, the threat from non-state use of biological agents is 

likely to become more complex due to the increased variety of agents and the sophistication of 

clandestine development programs. Section 5, “Discussion of Limitations and Impediments to 

the DoD’s Biological Weapons Counterproliferation Efforts,” emphasizes that the dual-use 

nature of the biological industry will continue to make discovery of these clandestine programs 

increasingly complex. Such agents are easier and cheaper to develop than nuclear weapons and 

are potentially destructive to unprotected military forces or civilian populations. Additionally, 

adversaries may use humans by infecting themselves or others to spread certain biological agents 

within a civilian or military population. Emerging biological agents6

 have been viewed as 

potential threats from non-state entities. Therefore, it is critical to develop and leverage new 

technologies to advance capabilities to monitor, detect, and counter next generation chemical 

agents and emerging biological agents. 

Recommendation 6: Create a global community of interest to matrix existing and future international partnerships to share information to more fully understand all ramifications of the present 

WMD challenge.

Applicable ACE(s): Security Cooperation and Partner Activities, 

Threat Reduction Cooperation, Interdiction, Intelligence 

Responses to WMD threats require collaborative approaches. This is articulated in 

DOS’s CWMD perspective in Section 4, which recognizes that strengthening our common 

capacity to prevent, deter, and manage the consequences of WMD is best achieved through 

building and working through international partnerships. Experience has demonstrated that no 

single country has sufficient information to understand all aspects of the WMD challenge. For 

example, intelligence agencies operating largely on the basis of classified information will see, at 

best, only part of the puzzle. The CWMD community needs to more aggressively and systematically exploit the broad reservoir of knowledge that exists among experts and specialists around 

 

6

 Emerging agents are previously unrecognized pathogens that might be naturally occurring and present a serious 

risk to human populations, such as the virus responsible for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

33

the world, both inside and outside of the governments. Tapping this knowledge base requires a 

networked COI focused explicitly on WMD threats and response capabilities. 

A potential example of this approach, although at a smaller scale, is within the counterdrug mission space to create a collaborative forum, both virtual and face-to-face, for multidisciplinary task forces, working groups and research. This multidisciplinary approach would involve, not only the international law enforcement community through its work on antiterrorism, 

illicit networks, and global interrelationships, but also the diplomatic, financial, and intelligence 

communities through their knowledge networks. Bringing these communities together presents 

significant challenges due to conflicting organizational cultures and priorities, but the framework 

for success should be established by building these global partnerships. 

Recommendation 7: Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the 

future technology requirements of the nuclear weapons arsenal 

and stockpile, accounting for the fundamental role of deterrence 

and the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. 

Applicable ACE(s): Offensive Operations 

The Strategic Deterrence discussion in Section 4.6.2 of this report states that maintaining 

safe and credible nuclear forces are fundamental elements of our strategic deterrence. However, 

the U.S. nuclear weapon arsenal and stockpile are aging, bringing some critical elements into 

question. Most of the current warheads in the stockpile were built in the 1970s and 1980s, and 

their designs and technologies have not been updated since that time period. Although the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program currently maintains and replaces weapon components, the 

reliability of the refurbished weapons cannot be experimentally confirmed due to the U.S. 

moratorium on nuclear testing, in place since 1992. Not only are the material nuclear weapon 

assets aging, the scientific base of knowledge has been declining since the 1990s with the loss of 

scientific expertise through retirement, attrition, or lack-of-interest in the nuclear-related fields. 

These developments point to a legitimate concern about capabilities to continue to maintain a 

credible deterrent beyond the near future. 

The strategic assumptions behind the force structure requirements of our nuclear weapons 

are scheduled for review during the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Future technology 

requirements for our nuclear assets also should be assessed according to the guidance and 

assumptions of the new NPR. A comprehensive assessment should take place over the next 2-3 

years, the results of which should yield sizing requirements of our nuclear forces and weapon 

stockpile, future technology options for maintaining a credible deterrent with a combination of 

nuclear and conventional forces, and well-supported cost estimates associated with the 

technology options. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

34

Recommendation 8: Develop, test, and deploy capabilities for enhanced consequence management efforts, communications, awareness (i.e., common operational picture), and infrastructure to improve local responders’ capabilities to deal with mass casualties. 

Continued exercises and education, training more personnel, and 

dedicating more resources to preparedness are also needed to improve nation-wide CWMD consequence management capabilities..

Applicable ACE(s): WMD Consequence Management 

DoD and DHS have worked with state and local authorities to improve first responder 

expertise in dealing with WMD mass casualty events. Providing an integrated response architecture to enhance coordination, optimization, and capacity of laboratory response networks to 

support restoration of public health, critical infrastructure, and key resources after highconsequence CBR attacks remains a high-level DHS priority, as represented in their shortfall 

priorities list in Section 4 of this report. Table 4-2 on “Capabilities Fielded in FY07-09” and the 

program details provided in Table C-14 document examples of DHS programs that provide 

WMD consequence management capabilities to state and local authorities. The National Guard 

has established 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive 

(CBRNE) Enhanced Force Packages (CERFP) to provide immediate response personnel, and 55 

WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs) to assess hazards, advise civil authorities, and facilitate 

military support of civil authorities during emergencies and incidents of suspected WMD. In 

addition, the CSTs advise civilian responders on appropriate actions through on-site testing and 

expert consultation, and assist and facilitate the arrival of follow-on state and federal military 

forces. DoD exercise programs provide opportunities for DoD components to practice cooperation with state, local, and tribal authorities as well as interagency response forces in consequence 

management, communications, and other crisis response activities. This includes national-level 

exercises to train the USNORTHCOM CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force. 

Much remains to be done to improve command, control, and response capabilities among 

local political, medical, public information and law enforcement entities. In particular, there is a 

need for federal agencies to maintain continuous coordination with state, tribal, and local elements before during and after a WMD event. DHS and DoD are the main conduits of capabilities for state and local elements. Although DHS has the lead on domestic WMD CM, DoD 

maintains considerable WMD recovery expertise and equipment and must be prepared to support 

civilian entities responding to WMD events. Consequently, domestic WMD CM capabilities 

may benefit through additional training and equipping activities supplied to Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) regions through DoD’s Defense Coordinating Officers. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

35

Recommendation 9: Improve foreign WMD consequence management (FCM) capabilities by establishing more international 

cooperative agreements with allied host nation governments in coordination with DOS and accounting for variations in countries 

organic capabilities. Specifically, these should define roles, responsibilities, and procedures for host nation and U.S. military 

WMD consequence management. 

Applicable ACE(s): WMD Consequence Management, Security 

Cooperation and Partner Activities 

FCM agreements with all countries hosting U.S. military installations, or those requiring 

U.S. FCM assistance, are needed to define roles and responsibilities for response to a WMD 

incident. Some agreements are in place now, but the process of establishing them is very complex. Experience has shown that some countries have varying levels of capability and sensitivities about U.S. involvement in FCM on their soil. Some are wholly self-sufficient, some include 

commercial chemical companies to augment their organic government capabilities, and others 

have very little capability. Currently, the DoD and DOS have independent efforts to establish 

FCM memoranda of agreement. Those efforts could be integrated to improve the process and to 

inform each department of the other’s initiatives and capabilities. Coordination of these efforts 

also should lead to the review of FCM planning requirements for the geographic combatant 

commanders to enable better DoD capability alignment in support of USG FCM efforts. 

Recommendation 10: Develop, test, and deploy capabilities for 

improved WMD forensics, to include improvements to coordination procedures among relevant national and local agencies.

Applicable ACE(s): Intelligence, WMD Consequence 

Management, Passive Defense 

Attribution, the capability to accurately determine the source of illicit WMD materials 

and devices, both pre- and post-attack, remains an important factor in deterring or preventing a 

WMD attack. A theme of this report, as discussed under Strategic Deterrence in Section 4.6.2, is 

the need to seek improvements that would contribute to highly effective deterrence against 

adversaries with WMD. If the two main elements of effective deterrence are (1) the capability to 

respond with overwhelming force to an adversary pursuing WMD, and (2) the capability to deny 

him benefits despite his actions, attribution provides the “foundation for deterrence,” according 

to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) – 10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century.” In 

this regard, strong forensic capabilities serve notice to an adversary that his deeds will not go 

undiscovered. 

It is important to note that nuclear and biological forensics are distinct attribution processes that present unique challenges requiring individual attention. Nuclear forensics may be 

complicated by many factors, including elevated radiation levels, the accessibility of the detonation site, and the highly specialized scientific capabilities required to conduct technical nuclear 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

36

forensics. In the case of a biological attack, the source of the materials may be far removed in 

space and/or time from the scene of the event.7 

This year’s CPRC Report illustrates significant interagency collaboration on the National 

Nuclear Technical Forensics program. In the discussion of near-, mid-, far-term capability 

options in Section 4, DHS identifies strong collaboration between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and DOE on nuclear forensics. Details of DTRA’s participation in the NTNF program are listed in Table C-5 in Appendix C. In terms of chemical and biological forensics 

capabilities, DHS’s CWMD perspective in Section 4 and its programs in Table C-14 indicate 

that, among CPRC member organizations, DHS has assumed a significant role in chemical and 

biological forensics capabilities. 

Despite the aforementioned forensics efforts, significant challenges remain for improving 

both biological and nuclear forensics capabilities. Improvements in both areas of forensics will 

necessitate increased investments in technological advancements, better interagency coordination, cross-discipline communication, training and exercise, as well as a much greater degree of 

international collaboration on forensic data collection and interpretation. 

Recommendation 11: Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, 

and dissemination (e.g., information management systems, decision support systems, sensor development, and intelligence support) regarding state and non-state WMD proliferation and 

development activities. 

Applicable ACE(s): Intelligence 

The need for improved capabilities for gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information is ongoing. Improvements should be made to place more emphasis on data 

fusion from law enforcement, intelligence partners, and sensors to support the common operating 

picture. In particular, technologies to correlate and fuse sensor data into a comprehensive 

representation are needed. A step in the right direction, discussed in Section 3, is DTRA and 

DIA’s effort to put together intelligence analysts and tool developers to better characterize WMD 

facilities. There also is a need for improved cross-agency reporting of suspicious activity, in 

particular, technologies that would improve real-time awareness through alerting others to, and 

sharing information about, suspicious activities and persons. 

 

7

 Davis, Jay C., “The Attribution of WMD Events,” Journal of Homeland Security, April 2003, 

<http://www.homeland security.org>. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

37

Recommendation 12: Develop, test, and deploy capabilities to 

understand and predict the motivations, actions, and reactions of an 

adversary seeking to acquire and employ WMD against the United 

States, its interests, friends and allies, whether the adversary is a 

state or non-state (e.g., terrorist cell—affiliated or non-affiliated) 

actor. 

Applicable ACE(s): Intelligence 

Many efforts to determine the threat from WMD are focused on discerning our adversaries’ acquisition or attempted acquisition of WMD capabilities through various methods of 

observation or information-gathering. Following the signs that lead to WMD acquisition is only 

one part of the threat equation. Another important element of threat assessment is adversarial 

intent. Our knowledge and understanding of adversarial intent is still limited. Looking forward, 

the United States faces a different and varied set of actors who may attempt to use WMD, as 

compared to our recent past, which saw WMD acquisition carried out almost exclusively by state 

actors. Our way of thinking about adversarial intent should be adjusted commensurate with this 

new set of actors, some of whom bring difficult-to-comprehend political, social, economic, and 

religious motivations to the table. This more complex environment requires a new mode of 

analytical thinking, which in turn implies changes to our current approach for the acquisition, 

education, and training of our analytical personnel. It also requires analytical tools that more 

fully exploit technological advancements in the information sciences. 

One potential area of capability improvement is automated adversarial modeling. Current 

methods of providing predictive adversary simulations are largely manual, thus time-consuming. 

The dynamic nature of adversary force behavior with respect to the changing capabilities, biases, 

beliefs, goals, intentions, and perceptions of friendly force actions must be addressed. Elements 

of a dynamic, automated adversary modeling capability must include operational patterns, 

behaviors, or doctrines of present-day non-traditional adversaries (e.g., terrorist cells, local 

insurgents, guerillas, and pirates), as well as more conventional force elements. 8 

Among the programs in this year’s CPRC Report, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Persistent Operational Surface Surveillance Engagement (POSSE) program is 

being pursued with specific objectives to bridge these capability gaps. As described in Table C-4 

in Appendix C, POSSE is designed to detect patterns of adversarial activities by receiving a wide 

variety of data from many different sensors, correlating these data in time and space, and interacting with human analysts to discover and track activities of interest—activities associated with 

the networks of insurgent, terrorist, and proliferation behavior. Applying a joint- or sharedfunding approach, within DoD through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) or the Director, Defense Research and Engineering’s JCTD program, or through 

interagency technology groups, such as the Technical Support Working Group or the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, may provide additional opportunities in 

this area. 

 

8

 Gilmour, Duane, et al, “Intent Driven Adversarial Modeling and Simulation,” Paper presented at the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The Future of C2, June 2005. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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CONCLUSION 

CPRC member organizations continue to make improvements in capabilities to address 

the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The addition of the activities and programs of the 

Departments of State and Homeland Security in this report shows important contributions by 

those two new CPRC member organizations and illustrates the fact that the WMD threat can be 

addressed most effectively through a combination of U.S. Government organizations. 

Improving integration and coordination for CWMD remains an important goal for the 

U.S. Government. Information sharing among participating CPRC organizations and achieving 

an efficient allocation of available resources are crucial to enhancing and improving the diverse 

portfolio of CWMD capabilities already available. Numerous Federal entities engage in CWMD 

research and development. The challenge is to coordinate all these activities in order to better 

“nationalize” this problem. 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

39

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

ACE Area for Capability Enhancement 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team 

AFS Alternative Footwear Solution 

ALS Analytical Laboratory System 

AOR area of responsibility 

ANSI American National Standards Institute 

AP Additional Protocol 

ASD(GSA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs 

ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs 

 

BKMS Biodefense Knowledge Management System 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

BTR Biological Threat Reduction 

BW biological warfare 

BWIC Biological Warning and Incident Characterization 

 

C-CW counter-chemical warfare (Air Force CONOP) 

C-RW counter-radiological warfare (Air Force CONOP) 

C2

 command and control 

C2BMC command and control, battle management and communication 

CB chemical and biological 

CBA capabilities-based assessment 

CBD Chemical and Biological Division (DHS) 

CBDP Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

CBIRF Chemical Biological Incident Response Force 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection (DHS) 

CBR chemical, biological, and radiological 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRN IPP Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Installation Protection Program 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 

CERFP Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosives Enhanced Force 

Package 

CCMRF CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces 

CM consequence management 

COI community of interest 

CONPLAN concept plan 

CONOP concept of operations 

CONUS continental United States 

CP counterproliferation 

CPRC Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 

CSI Container Security Initiative 

CST Civil Support Team 

CTM Conventional Trident Modification 

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction 

CUGV Chemical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

CW chemical warfare, chemical weapon 

CWA chemical warfare agent 

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DHS S&T DHS Science & Technology Directorate / Chemical Biological Division 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DNN Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DOE/NNSA) 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

 

ELM Empirical Lethality Methodology 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EXORD execute order 

 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCM foreign (WMD) consequence management 

FDA Food and Drug Administration 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS) 

FY fiscal year 

 

GBI Ground Based Interceptors 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Forces 

GNDA Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 

GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

 

HAZMAT hazardous material 

HDBT hard and deeply buried target 

HDBTD hard and deeply buried target defeat 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IBRD Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration 

IC Intelligence Community 

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 

ICD Initial Capabilities Document 

IFS Integrated Footwear Solution 

IRTR International Radiological Threat Reduction Program 

ISN Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (DOS) 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

 

J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (Joint Staff) 

JBAIDS Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System 

JBPDS Joint Biological Point Detection System 

JCD Joint Capabilities Document 

JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

41

JPACE Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble 

JPEO-CBD Joint Program Executive Office—Chemical and Biological Defense 

JSCESM Joint Service Chemical Environment Survivability Mask 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSGPM Joint-Service General-Purpose Mask 

JSLIST Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suite Technology 

JSTDS-SS Joint Service Transportable Decontamination System—Small Scale 

 

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MPC&A material protection, control, and accounting 

MTD Material Threat Determination 

 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NCPC National Counterproliferation Center 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NFR Non-Flame Resistant (glove) 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE) 

NP nonproliferation 

NPAC TWG Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group 

NPR Nuclear Posture Review 

NSPD National Security Policy Directive 

NTA non-traditional [chemical] agent 

NTNF National Technical Nuclear Forensics 

 

O&M operation and maintenance 

OCONUS outside the continental United States 

ODATSD(NM) Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

 

PHILIS Portable High-throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System 

POSSE Persistent Operational Surface Surveillance Engagement 

PRND Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection Pilot Project 

 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

 

R&D research and development 

RDT&E research, development, test, and engineering 

RDA research, development, and acquisition 

RDCDS Rapidly Deployable Chemical Defense System 

RN radiological-nuclear 

RSDL Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion 

 

S/CT Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (DOS) 

SBX Sea-Based X-band (radar) 

SC Standing Committee 

SCC-WMD USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

SERPENT Simulation Environment & Response Program Execution Nesting Tool 

SLD Second Line of Defense program 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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SM Standard Missile 

SOAE Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination 

SOF special operations forces 

SRF Strategic Rocket Forces 

 

TIC toxic industrial chemical 

TIM toxic industrial material 

TSWG Technical Support Working Group 

 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UCS Unified Command System 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 

USAF United States Air Force 

USARPAC United States Army Pacific 

USEUCOM United States European Command 

USHS(S&T) Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

 

V-Fund Key Verification Assets Fund 

VCI Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation (DOS) 

 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD-CST Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team 
2009 CPRC Report to Congress 

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WORKS CONSULTED 

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. Report to the President, March 2005. 

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. World at Risk, 2008.

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report, 

July 2004. 

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. Report on Activities and Programs for 

Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, May 2007.

Department of Defense. Department of Defense Research and Engineering (DoDR&E) Strategic 

Plan, 2007. 

Department of Defense. Defense Science Board. Defense Imperatives for the New 

Administration, August 2008.

Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006. 

Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons 

Management. Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, December 2008. 

Government Accountability Office. Mass Care in Disasters, Publication No. GAO-08-1175T, 

September 23, 2008.

Homeland Security Council. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) – 9, “Defense of 

United Sates Agriculture and Food,” February 3, 2004. 

Homeland Security Council. HSPD – 10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” April 28, 2004. 

Homeland Security Council. HSPD – 18, “Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass 

Destruction,” January 31, 2007. 

Homeland Security Council. HSPD – 21, “Public Health and Medical Preparedness,” 

October 18, 2007.

National Academy of Sciences. National Research Council. Report on Conventional Prompt 

Global Strike Capability: Issues for 2008 and Beyond, 2008. 

National Security Council. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

December 2002. 

Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget. 

Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on “FY 2009 Administration Research and Development Budget Priorities,” August 14, 2007.