United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 19-1321

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United States

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roger Erick Splettstoeszer

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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 Submitted: March 12, 2020

Filed: April 15, 2020

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Before ERICKSON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge. 

Roger Splettstoeszer was charged with distribution, possession, and receipt of

child pornography. At trial, the district court1 admitted evidence that Splettstoeszer

had sexually abused his daughter and stepdaughter years prior. He was convicted and

1The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.
sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment. Splettstoeszer appeals both the conviction

and the sentence. We affirm. 

I. Background

Roger Splettstoeszer owned a computer repair shop in Aitkin, Minnesota. FBI

agents determined that child-pornography files were being downloaded and shared

from the computer shop’s IP address. The agents obtained a warrant to search the

shop and seize any electronic devices that might contain child pornography.

After executing the warrant, the FBI agents found hundreds of childpornography videos and images stored on the electronic devices in Splettstoeszer’s

shop. As the FBI agents soon discovered, Splettstoeszer’s computer files, internet

history, and file-sharing data indicated pornographic content related to pre-pubescent

girls and father-daughter incest.

At trial, the government sought to introduce evidence that Splettstoeszer had

pled guilty to molesting his daughter and stepdaughter in the 1990s. Splettstoeszer

objected, arguing the evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 404

and 414. The district court rejected Splettstoeszer’s argument and admitted the

evidence. Ultimately, the jury found Splettstoeszer guilty of child pornography

distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), receipt of child pornography

under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), and possession of child pornography under

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).

In accord with the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the

government recommended a 1,440-month prison sentence for Splettstoeszer’s crimes. 

The district court acknowledged this harsh recommendation, but imposed instead a

sentence of 210 months of imprisonment.

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II. Analysis

Splettstoeszer raises two issues on appeal. First, he challenges the district

court’s admission of evidence disclosing his past sexual crimes. Second, he

challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. We address his arguments in turn. 

A. Admissibility Under Rule 414

The district court found the evidence of Splettstoeszer’s prior sexual abuse

convictions admissible. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2016).

According to Federal Rule of Evidence 414, when a criminal defendant is

accused of child molestation — including child-pornography crimes under 18 U.S.C.

chapter 110 — “the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other

child molestation.” Fed. R. Evid. 414(a), (d)(2)(B). “The evidence can be used for

any purpose for which it is relevant, ‘including the defendant’s propensity to commit

such offenses.’” Emmert, 825 F.3d at 909 (quoting United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d

954, 959 (8th Cir. 2001)). However, the balancing test described in Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 still applies to evidence admissible under Rule 414. United States v.

Furman, 867 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2017). That is, the district court “may exclude

relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,

or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Our decision in Emmert is on point. In Emmert, the defendant was charged

with child-pornography crimes. 825 F.3d at 908. Under Rule 414, the district court

admitted evidence that the defendant had sexually abused minors twenty years prior. 

Id. To prevent unfair prejudice under Rule 403, the district court issued a limiting

instruction to the jury. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued his prior sexual-abuse

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conviction was too remote from and dissimilar to the presently-charged childpornography crimes. Id. at 909. Splettstoeszer’s case presents us with the same

scenario.

Splettstoeszer nevertheless argues the evidence is inadmissible and unfairly

prejudicial. According to Splettstoeszer, his previous conviction was not probative

of a material issue at trial. We disagree. Evidence of his past child molestation is

particularly probative insofar as his conduct — sexually abusing his daughter and

stepdaughter — tracks the father-daughter-incest files and searches on his computers. 

See Furman, 867 F.3d at 988 (finding the defendant’s past sexual assault of his

children probative of his interest, intent, and motive for distributing, receiving, and

possessing child pornography). Moreover, Rule 414 evidence can be used to show

a defendant’s propensity to be sexually interested in minors. See Emmert, 825 F.3d

at 909. And while Rule 403 cautions against creating “unfair prejudice,” prejudicial

Rule 414 evidence indicating the defendant’s propensity to sexually exploit children

is not, in itself, unfair. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added); see United States v.

Hollow Horn, 523 F.3d 882, 888 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Furman, 867 F.3d at 988. 

We therefore find no abuse of discretion. 

B. Reasonableness of Splettstoeszer’s Sentence

Splettstoeszer contends that his 210-month sentence is substantively

unreasonable. “We review all sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines

range, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Pepper, 518

F.3d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 2008). “[W]here a district court has sentenced a defendant

below the advisory guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused

its discretion in not varying downward still further.” United States v. Spencer, 700

F.3d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Moore, 581 F.3d 681, 684

(8th Cir. 2009)). 

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We regularly uphold sentences similar to Splettstoeszer’s for childpornography convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Sebert, 899 F.3d 639, 640–41

(8th Cir. 2018) (affirming 240-month sentence); Emmert, 825 F.3d at 908, 910

(same); United States v. Moore, 572 F.3d 489, 490, 492 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming

210-month sentence). 

But Splettstoeszer claims the district court was influenced by the unduly harsh

Guidelines-recommended sentence proposed by the government. The Guidelines, he

argues, unfairly generate steep penalties for child pornographers and get in the way

of individualized sentencing. And the government, he insists, wanted a long sentence

to punish him for his largely unpunished crimes against his daughter and

stepdaughter. Contrary to Splettstoeszer’s claims, however, the district court

provided an individualized sentence. Relying on the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) — and never indicating a desire to punish Splettstoeszer for other crimes —

the court varied downward considerably from the sentence recommended by both the

Guidelines and the government. It did not abuse its discretion.

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Rule 414

evidence, nor did it abuse its discretion at sentencing. We therefore affirm both

Splettstoeszer’s conviction and sentence. 

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