United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Air and 

Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

UNMANNED 

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

Advance Coordination 

and Increased 

Visibility Needed to 

Optimize Capabilities 

July 2007 

GAO-07-836 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2007

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Advance Coordination and Increased 

Highlights of GAO-07-836, a report to the Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

Combatant commanders carrying

out ongoing operations rank the

need for intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities as high on their priority

lists. The Department of Defense 

(DOD) is investing in many ISR 

systems, including unmanned

aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the 

growing demand for ISR assets to

support the warfighter. GAO was 

asked to evaluate DOD’s efforts to 

integrate UAS into ongoing 

operations while optimizing the use 

of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, 

this report addresses the extent 

that (1) DOD has taken steps to 

facilitate the integration of UAS 

into combat operations, and 

(2) DOD’s approach to allocating

and tasking its ISR assets considers 

all available ISR capabilities, 

including those provided by UAS. 

GAO also reviewed the extent that

DOD evaluates the performance of

its ISR assets, including UAS, in 

meeting warfighters’ needs. To

perform this work, GAO analyzed

data and guidance on the use of

ISR assets, and interviewed DOD 

officials, including those 

supporting ongoing operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending actions to 

improve DOD’s ability to 

coordinate the deployment of its 

UAS and other ISR assets, consider 

the availability of all ISR assets in 

allocating and tasking them, and 

evaluate the performance of its ISR 

assets. DOD generally concurred 

with our recommendations. 

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of 

UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to 

coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed 

guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of 

Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address 

coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing 

operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in 

integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for 

DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in 

successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations 

and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth. 

DOD’s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, 

hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does not 

consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command charged 

with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to 

support operational requirements does not have awareness of all available 

ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for obtaining this 

information. Similarly, the commander responsible for coordinating ongoing 

joint air operations does not have information on how assets controlled by 

tactical units are being used or what missions they’ve been tasked to 

support. Nor do tactical units have information on how theater-level assets 

and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked, which results in 

problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack of visibility occurs because

DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking the missions both theater- and 

tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or how they are being used. Without 

an approach to allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for 

considering all ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all 

available ISR assets and optimize their use. 

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because it 

lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback 

to ensure the warfighter’s needs were met. Although the Joint Functional 

Component Command for ISR has been tasked with developing ISR metrics, 

DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics 

such as the number of targets planned versus captured. While these metrics 

are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not 

capture all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR 

asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous 

ISR missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional 

quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide milestones 

have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of 

the results of joint operations; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this 

feedback is not consistently occurring due to the fast pace of operations in 

theater. Without metrics and feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how 

well the warfighters’ needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of 

existing assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 7

DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but 

Further Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges 10 

DOD’s Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR 

Assets Does Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets 13 

DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating 

the Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter’s Needs 

Are Met 17 

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 27 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 31 

Related GAO Products 32 

Table 

Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics 8 

Page i GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Abbreviations 

CENTCOM Central Command 

CONOPS concept of operations 

DOD Department of Defense 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander 

JFCC-ISR Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 

 Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

UAS unmanned aircraft systems 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 11, 2007

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being transformed 

by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strike 

capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the use of 

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early warning 

of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military 

forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. ISR data can 

come from a variety of sources, including surveillance and reconnaissance 

systems such as satellites; manned aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft

systems like the Air Force’s Global Hawk and Predator and the Army’s 

Hunter; other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment; and human 

intelligence teams. 

Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being transformed 

by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strike 

capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the use of 

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early warning 

of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military 

forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. ISR data can 

come from a variety of sources, including surveillance and reconnaissance 

systems such as satellites; manned aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft

systems like the Air Force’s Global Hawk and Predator and the Army’s 

Hunter; other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment; and human 

intelligence teams. 

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by 

the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level ISR

assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR 

priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support operational 

units including conventional and special operations forces, and assets 

acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to

aid in the identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices. 

Additionally, combatant commanders receive support from ISR assets 

controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the National Security 

Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR assets to support ongoing 

combat operations. 

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by 

the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level ISR

assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR 

priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support operational 

units including conventional and special operations forces, and assets 

acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to

aid in the identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices. 

Additionally, combatant commanders receive support from ISR assets 

controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the National Security 

Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR assets to support ongoing 

combat operations. 

Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the information 

they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in DOD’s 

planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level of 

command is growing, and DOD is making investments in a number of ISR 

systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and 

space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems. Specifically, for UAS, 

Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the information 

they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that is reflected in DOD’s 

planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR assets at every level of 

command is growing, and DOD is making investments in a number of ISR 

systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, manned platforms, and 

space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems. Specifically, for UAS, 

Page 1 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
funding has increased from $363 million in fiscal year 2001 to $2.23 billion 

in fiscal year 2007, and DOD has requested $2.54 billion for fiscal year 

2008.

1

 As of February 2007, DOD had more than 3,900 unmanned aircraft in

its inventory2

 compared to fewer than 50 in 2000. The majority of these 

aircraft are currently being used in support of ongoing operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

In December 2005, we reported that while commanders are experiencing

mission success with UAS in ongoing operations, they face challenges in 

fully optimizing the use of these assets, due in part to the growing number 

of UAS.3

 Specifically, we reported that DOD had achieved operational 

successes with UAS, but challenges such as interoperability and limited 

communications bandwidth were hampering joint operations or 

preventing timely UAS deployment. Additionally, in April 2006, we testified 

that while DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for 

acquiring UAS, it lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development 

and investment decisions.4

You asked us to review DOD’s efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing 

combat operations while optimizing the capabilities offered by all DOD 

ISR assets. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has 

taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; and 

(2) DOD’s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all 

available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. We are also 

providing information on the extent to which DOD evaluates the 

performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting the warfighters’ 

needs. 

 1

Figures include procurement, operations and maintenance, and research, development 

and evaluation funding provided through DOD’s regular appropriations and do not include 

funding provided in supplemental appropriations. 

2

This number represents the number of unmanned aircraft including test and training 

assets, rather than unmanned aircraft systems, which include aircraft, sensors, 

communications equipment, and ground control stations. 

3

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 13, 2005). 

4

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can

Help Address Operational Challenges, GAO-06-610T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

Page 2 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
To address our objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service 

publications and documentation pertaining to ISR, including those specific 

to UAS such as joint publications, concepts of operations, manuals on 

tactics and procedures, and the 2005–2030 UAS Roadmap. We also 

interviewed officials from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task 

Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the military services; 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and associated Army and Air Force 

component commands; and the Joint Functional Component Command 

for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). Further, 

we reviewed documentation, such as joint publications and briefings that 

explain the process for tasking ISR assets, and interviewed officials at 

CENTCOM to better understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific 

missions. Additionally, we discussed the use of UAS in military operations

with Combined Air Operations Center officials in Qatar and units that 

recently returned from or are currently supporting ongoing operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. To understand how requests for ISR support are 

generated and satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke with units that 

recently returned from, or are currently supporting, ongoing operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan as well as units within the services such as the 

Marine Corps’ Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in determining if 

tactical assets are available to satisfy those requests or if the requests need

to be forwarded for theater-level support. We performed our work from 

June 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. More details on our scope and methodology are 

presented at appendix I. 

In addition to this report, we recently issued a report that discussed 

whether DOD is acquiring its ISR assets in the most efficient manner. We 

are also conducting work for the committee examining how DOD 

determines its requirements for ISR systems and expect to report on this 

work early next year. 

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of 

UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully 

coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical 

Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.5

 This guidance represents an 

important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations and DOD 

officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD 

learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other ISR assets and their 

application in combat operations. However, the guidance does not 

address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance coordination, which 

CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into 

combat operations by enabling efficient deployment and utilization of 

assets and by allowing the combatant commander time to plan to support 

incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance, CENTCOM has 

established procedures for the services to coordinate system requirements 

prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM’s theater of operations. These 

procedures apply only to CENTCOM’s theater of operations. However, we 

found that CENTCOM’s procedures for advance coordination were not 

always followed because the services indicated that they were not aware 

of the requirement. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed 

these procedures to each of CENTCOM’s service components, such as 

Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, 

but were not aware if they were distributed further, and the service 

officials we interviewed were not aware of the requirement. As a result of 

this lack of advance coordination, CENTCOM is not always aware, on a 

timely basis, of assets entering theater, which can potentially exacerbate 

existing operational challenges such as limited interoperability and 

communications bandwidth. While this example is limited to CENTCOM, 

the potential exists for DOD to need to establish operations in other areas 

of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide procedure for advance 

coordination is critical to enable DOD to quickly support UAS and other 

ISR assets once deployed to support these operations. Until DOD takes 

steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may 

continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR 

assets into combat operations and may exacerbate existing integration 

challenges such as the lack of interoperability and limited bandwidth. 

Therefore, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in 

conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders, 

establish DOD-wide requirements for coordination in advance of 

introducing ISR assets into theater; develop a plan for communicating 

 5

The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of

Unmanned Aircraft Systems was prepared under the direction of representatives from the

Army, Navy, and Air Force for use by their respective commands and other commands as 

appropriate. The Joint Concept of Operations for UAS was prepared under the direction of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Page 4 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
those requirements throughout DOD; and establish a mechanism to ensure 

the services comply with these requirements. DOD generally concurred 

with this recommendation. DOD noted that it currently has a well-defined 

process to coordinate with the combatant commanders on the 

introduction of UAS into theater and cited several examples including the 

annual process for allocating theater-level UAS, and actions between 

stateside units and units in theater to plan for deployment of ISR 

capabilities. DOD, however, acknowledged that a more standardized 

method could improve efficiency of the coordination process and stated 

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be tasked to look at standardizing the 

coordination process and evaluate and provide direction for an improved 

coordination process. Further, DOD noted that, based on this evaluation, if 

direction is required, it will be issued via a Chairman’s directive which is 

mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism that ensures 

compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes related to UAS 

but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD, represent a 

standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and combatant 

commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of deploying 

UAS assets, regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we believe that a 

directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure compliance, 

and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing how

implementation of the directive will be monitored. 

DOD’s current approach to allocating and tasking DOD’s ISR assets, 

including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of DOD’s ISR assets 

because it does not consider the availability of all ISR assets in 

determining how best to meet warfighting needs. The Joint Functional 

Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(JFCC-ISR), which is charged with recommending to the Secretary of 

Defense how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support 

the operational requirements of combatant commanders, has an 

awareness of, or visibility into, most DOD ISR assets, but it does not have 

an awareness of all ISR assets available to support the combatant 

commanders, such as assets that are owned and controlled by U.S. 

national intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency or by 

our allies supporting ongoing operations. According to JFCC-ISR officials, 

although they are working to gain better visibility over all ISR assets, they 

currently do not have this level of visibility. DOD does not currently have a 

mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, 

national, and allied assets, operating in each of the combatant 

commanders’ area of operations. Absent a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been

trying to learn more about the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by 

building relationships with other national and allied intelligence agencies 

Page 5 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
and addressing limitations related to intelligence agency system access. 

Similarly, during ongoing operations, the Joint Forces Air Component 

Commander (JFACC), who is responsible for planning, coordinating, and 

monitoring joint air operations, does not have information on how tactical 

assets embedded in and controlled by tactical units are being used on a 

daily basis or what missions they have been tasked to support. Nor do 

tactical units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets 

embedded in other units are being tasked. DOD does not currently have a 

mechanism for tracking the missions both theater and tactical-level ISR 

assets are supporting or how they are being used on a daily basis. This 

lack of visibility at all levels into how ISR assets are being tasked could 

result in unnecessary duplicative taskings and limit DOD’s ability to 

leverage all available ISR assets. DOD recognizes the opportunity to better 

plan for and control its ISR assets and has initiated a study to assess this, 

but this study is not expected to be completed until August or September 

2007. Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that 

considers all ISR capabilities, DOD may not be in a sound position to fully 

leverage all the capabilities of available ISR assets and to optimize the use 

of those assets, and therefore cannot be assured that it is addressing 

warfighter needs in the most efficient and effective manner. To provide 

greater visibility into the availability and use of ISR assets, including UAS, 

we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism 

to gain information on all available ISR capabilities, where they are 

operating, and how they are being used. DOD generally concurred with 

this recommendation. DOD agreed that a mechanism for obtaining 

information on all ISR assets is needed and commented that work is 

underway to develop such a mechanism. DOD also stated that it is not 

currently practical to provide situational awareness on some UAS, such as 

the small, hand-launched UAS at the lowest operational level because of 

technological limitations. It noted it will determine the operational levels 

that will provide widespread situational awareness. We recognize that 

obtaining situational awareness may not currently be practical for some 

UAS but would encourage the department to seek to maximize coverage in 

exploring options for improved situational awareness. 

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the success of its ISR missions because it 

lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback 

from operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the warfighter’s needs 

were met. Although the JFCC-ISR has been tasked with developing metrics 

and standards of performance to assess DOD ISR mission 

accomplishment, DOD evaluates its ISR missions with limited quantitative 

metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the number of 

targets collected. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials 

Page 6 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account all of the 

qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset 

effectiveness, such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous 

ISR missions, or provide insight on how the intelligence collected 

contributed toward accomplishment of the mission. JFCC-ISR is working

with the combatant commanders to develop additional quantitative ISR

metrics as well as qualitative metrics to evaluate the performance of ISR 

collection assets, but no DOD-wide milestones have been established. 

Milestones would include the required steps and planned dates for 

completion of those steps leading up to metrics development. 

Furthermore, Joint Publication 2-01 calls for intelligence personnel and 

consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well 

intelligence operations perform to meet commander’s intelligence 

requirements; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is 

not consistently occurring due, mainly, to the fast pace of operations in 

theater. Without feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR assets, DOD may 

not be in the best position to validate how well the warfighter needs are 

being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and whether it is optimizing the 

use of existing assets, or which new systems DOD should acquire in order 

to best support warfighting needs. To improve DOD’s ability to evaluate 

the effectiveness of its ISR missions, we recommend DOD establish DODwide milestones for metrics development, develop a process for 

systematically capturing feedback on how effective ISR assets are in 

meeting warfighter requirements and consider this information when 

making ISR acquisition, allocation, and tasking decisions. DOD generally 

concurred with this recommendation. DOD agreed milestones for 

development of ISR metrics should be established, but pointed out that 

organizations within the department collect feedback or conduct lessons 

learned studies. While the feedback captured by those organizations is 

noteworthy, it is often not immediate or specific to individual missions. 

DOD further commented that it has mechanisms in place to inform its 

decision-making processes on the acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its 

ISR assets such as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System which assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. 

We agree that the mechanisms mentioned in DOD’s response exist; 

however, DOD currently does not have sufficient qualitative and 

quantitative metrics needed to collect data on UAS performance nor does 

it have a means for incorporating such data into the processes currently 

used to make decisions on ISR assets. 

UAS represent one of many DOD airborne ISR assets available to support 

ongoing combat operations. Unmanned aircraft are deployed and Background 

Page 7 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
controlled at different levels of command and can be categorized into 

three main classes: man-portable, tactical, and theater. Table 1 illustrates 

examples of UAS in each category. Man-portable UAS are small, selfcontained, and portable and are generally used to support the small 

ground combat teams in the field. Tactical UAS are larger systems that are 

generally used to support operational units at tactical levels of command 

such as the battalion or brigade. Tactical UAS are locally operated and 

controlled by the units. Theater UAS are operated and controlled by the 

Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and are generally used 

to support combatant commander ISR priorities, although in certain 

circumstances they can be assigned to support tactical operations, such as 

when troops are being fired on. Theater UAS traditionally have been more 

capable than tactical or man-portable systems. For example, theater UAS 

typically contain characteristics that make them more capable than other 

categories of UAS, such as their more robust communications architecture 

and more capable payloads that allow for production of more diverse 

intelligence data products. However, some tactical systems, such as the 

Army’s Warrior UAS, are being developed that are capable of performing 

theater-level requirements and, as currently envisioned, will be embedded 

in and controlled at the tactical level by units. 

Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics 

Maximum 

altitude (feet) 

Maximum 

endurance 

(hours)

a

Man-portable UAS 

Dragon Eye 500 AGLb 1 

Raven 1,000 AGL 1

Tactical UAS 

Hunter 15,000 MSLc 8-9 

Shadow 15,000 MSL 5

ERMP (Warrior) 29,000 MSL 36 

Theater UAS 

Predator 26,000 MSL 20

Global Hawk 60,000 MSL 28 

Source: DOD. 

a

Endurance equals total time from takeoff to landing. 

b

AGL is feet above ground level. 

c

MSL is feet above mean sea level. 

Page 8 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available DOD 

theater-level airborne ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant 

commanders. The allocation process is managed by U.S. Strategic 

Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). In 2003, DOD altered its 

unified command plan to give U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for 

planning, integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and 

global operations. To execute this responsibility, U.S. Strategic Command 

established the JFCC-ISR in March 2005. The JFCC-ISR is charged with 

recommending to the Secretary of Defense how DOD’s theater-level ISR 

assets should be allocated, or distributed, among combatant commanders 

and for the integration and synchronization of DOD, national, and allied 

ISR capabilities and collection efforts. 

Once DOD’s ISR assets are allocated to the combatant commanders, they 

are available to be assigned or tasked based on combatant commander 

priorities against specific missions in support of ongoing operations. 

Authority for tasking ISR assets, including UAS, is generally determined by 

the level of the objective the asset is deployed to support and the 

command level of the unit that controls the asset. Therefore, most theaterlevel UAS assets that are controlled and tasked by the JFACC are generally

used to support theater-level objectives and priorities, as established by 

the combatant commander. Most tactical UAS assets controlled by the 

services or the U.S. Special Operations Command are used to support 

tactical objectives and priorities, which may differ from theater-level 

priorities. For example, authority to task the Army’s Hunter resides with 

the commander of the unit in which it is embedded, whereas authority for 

tasking the Air Force’s Predator resides with the JFACC. 

In August 2005 DOD issued its current UAS Roadmap which was 

developed to assist DOD in developing a long-range strategy for UAS 

development, acquisition, and other planning efforts as well as to guide 

industry in developing UAS related technology. According to DOD 

officials, DOD is in the process of developing an update to this Roadmap 

and expects to issue the updated version in late summer 2007. The UAS 

Roadmap is intended to guide UAS planning; however, it does address 

limited operational aspects such as operational issues or challenges that 

have emerged as a result of operating UAS in support of ongoing 

operations. For example, the Roadmap acknowledges that the limited 

number of bandwidth frequencies constrains DOD’s ability to operate 

multiple unmanned aircraft simultaneously. 

Page 9 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD components have developed guidance—such as a Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS—

to facilitate UAS integration. However, DOD continues to face UAS 

integration challenges, such as the lack of interoperability and limited 

communications bandwidth. These challenges may be exacerbated 

because DOD has not established DOD-wide advance coordination 

procedures for integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD takes 

steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may 

continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat 

operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges. 

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of 

UAS into combat operations. For example, in August 2006 DOD issued its 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical 

Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This document was designed 

to serve as a planning, coordination, and reference guide for the services 

and provides a framework for warfighters employing UAS. Furthermore, in 

March 2007 DOD issued its Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems, which provides overarching principles, a discussion of 

UAS capabilities, operational views, and a discussion of UAS use in 

various operational scenarios. Each of the above documents represent an

important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations, and DOD 

officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD 

learns more about the capabilities of UAS and their application in combat 

operations. 

DOD continues to face challenges, such as interoperability and 

communications bandwidth, in integrating UAS into combat operations. In

December 2005 we reported that challenges such as the lack of 

interoperability and limited communications bandwidth have emerged to 

hamper recent joint operations or prevent timely UAS employment.6

Specifically, some UAS cannot easily exchange data, sometimes even 

within a single service, because they were not designed with interoperable 

communications standards. Additionally, as we previously reported, U.S. 

forces are unable to interchangeably use some payloads from one type of 

UAS on another, a capability known as “payload commonality.” 

DOD Has Taken Steps 

to Facilitate the 

Integration of UAS, 

but Further Steps Are 

Needed to Address 

Integration 

Challenges 

DOD Has Developed 

Guidance to Facilitate the 

Integration of UAS 

DOD Continues to Face 

UAS Integration 

Challenges 

 6

GAO-06-49. 

Page 10 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Furthermore, electromagnetic spectrum frequencies, often referred to as

bandwidth, are congested by a large number of UAS and other weapons or 

communications systems using the same frequency simultaneously. While

some UAS can change to different, less congested, frequency bands, most 

UAS were built without the ability to change frequency bands. Thus, 

commanders have had to delay certain missions until frequency 

congestion cleared. DOD is taking steps to address these challenges such 

as equipping UAS with the Tactical Common Data Link7

 and, according to 

DOD officials, it is developing common ground control stations to improve 

interoperability of its UAS. 

Lack of DOD-wide 

Advance Coordination May 

Exacerbate Integration 

Challenges of UAS and 

Other ISR Assets 

Existing UAS integration challenges may be exacerbated because DOD has 

not established DOD-wide advance coordination procedures for 

integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations. Specifically, 

DOD officials indicate that assets arriving in theater without advance 

coordination may exacerbate UAS integration challenges, such as further 

taxing the limited available bandwidth. As additional ISR assets are rapidly 

acquired and fielded to meet the increasing demand for ISR support in 

ongoing operations, CENTCOM has recognized that advance coordination

is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling 

efficient deployment of assets and effective utilization of them once they 

are in theater. Furthermore, advance knowledge of system requirements is 

crucial to allow the combatant commander sufficient time to adequately 

plan to support incoming assets. DOD officials acknowledge that having to

incorporate assets quickly into the theater infrastructure creates 

additional challenges and further emphasizes the need for advance

coordination. 

In response to this issue, CENTCOM has developed procedures to ensure 

the services coordinate their plans prior to deploying UAS to CENTCOM’s 

theater of operations. In May 2005 CENTCOM established the Concept of

Operations for Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, which states that 

 7

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 141 

(2006), required that the Secretary of Defense take such steps to ensure that all service 

tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (except those for which the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has waived this requirement through the 

procedures outlined in the Act) are equipped and configured so that the data link used is

the Tactical Common Data Link and those vehicles use data formats consistent with the

architectural standard for tactical UAS. Use of the tactical common data link will allow 

UAS to be programmed to a wider range of frequencies, thus reducing dependence on the 

currently congested frequencies such as C band. 

Page 11 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
when a full-motion video-capable asset8

 or weapons system is scheduled 

for deployment to CENTCOM’s theater of operations, the controlling unit 

will notify CENTCOM of the deployment no later than 30 days prior to 

arrival of the asset in theater. It also states that the controlling unit will 

provide a system and platform concept of operations to CENTCOM no 

later than 15 days prior to the asset’s arrival. According to CENTCOM 

officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM’s service 

components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces 

Central Command. However, they were unaware if the procedures were 

distributed further to the services, and service officials we interviewed, 

including those at the service Headquarters as well as those stationed 

within units returning from ongoing operations, indicated they were not 

aware of the requirement. CENTCOM officials indicate that the procedures 

have not always been followed. 

The Warrior Alpha, which was fielded by the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization and operated by the Army to aid in the 

identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices, illustrates 

why this advance coordination is so critical. As a result of coordinating 

with CENTCOM, the Army was made aware of limitations such as 

bandwidth and limited ramp space and decided to deploy the Warrior 

Alpha to an alternate location. While CENTCOM and Army officials 

disagree on whether the coordination was completed in a timely manner, 

all agree it was ultimately completed. While this example is limited to 

CENTCOM’s area of operations, the potential exists for DOD to have to

quickly establish operations in other areas of the world, which makes the 

need for advance coordination even more critical. 

CENTCOM officials acknowledge the need for advance coordination for 

all ISR assets entering CENTCOM’s theater of operations, not just those 

assets that are capable of full-motion video. To address this need, 

CENTCOM developed in November 2006 an ISR Systems Concept of 

Operations Standardization Memo. CENTCOM officials stated that the ISR

memo is intended to provide CENTCOM with awareness of what assets 

are coming into theater and to allow CENTCOM to ensure the asset is able

to be incorporated into the existing infrastructure, given operational 

challenges such as limited communications bandwidth. This memo 

requires the inclusion of certain elements in all ISR system concepts of 

 8

A full-motion video–capable asset has the capability to collect and transmit real-time fullmotion video imagery. 

Page 12 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
operations, including how the asset will be tasked; how intelligence will be 

processed, exploited, and disseminated; and system bandwidth 

requirements that must be coordinated with CENTCOM prior to 

deployment of ISR assets. 

This ISR memo applies only to CENTCOM’s theater of operations and does 

not constitute DOD-wide guidance. While the Warrior Alpha example is 

limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to establish 

operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide 

procedure for advance coordination would be critical for quickly 

supporting UAS and other ISR assets once deployed. Until DOD takes 

steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be 

unable to successfully integrate UAS and other ISR assets into combat 

operations and existing integration challenges may be exacerbated. 

DOD’s current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including 

UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets because it lacks 

an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities available to support the 

combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets are being used, which 

hinders DOD’s ability to optimize the use of its assets. Although DOD has 

established a process for allocating available DOD ISR assets, including

UAS, to the combatant commanders to meet their needs, it does not have

an awareness of all ISR assets, which impairs its ability to distribute or 

allocate DOD assets while considering the capabilities of all ISR assets. 

Additionally, DOD’s process for tasking its ISR assets does not currently 

allow for information at all levels into how DOD’s ISR assets are being 

used on a daily basis, which hinders its ability to leverage other assets 

operating in an area and to avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings. 

Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that considers 

all ISR capabilities, DOD is not in a sound position to fully leverage all the 

capabilities of available ISR assets and to optimize the use of those assets, 

and therefore cannot be assured that it is addressing warfighter needs in 

the most efficient and effective manner. DOD recognizes the opportunity 

to better plan for and control its ISR assets and has initiated a study to 

examine the issue. 

Although DOD has established a process for allocating available DOD ISR 

assets to the combatant commanders to meet the warfighters’ needs, it 

does not have an awareness or visibility over the total number and types of

ISR assets available to support combatant commanders or the capabilities 

represented by those assets. DOD uses an annual process for allocating or 

DOD’s Approach to 

Allocating and 

Tasking UAS and 

Other ISR Assets 

Does Not Consider 

the Capabilities of All 

ISR Assets 

DOD Does Not Have 

Visibility over All ISR 

Assets Available to Meet 

the Warfighters’ Needs 

Page 13 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
distributing its available ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant 

commanders to meet theater-level needs. That process is managed by U.S. 

Strategic Command’s JFCC-ISR, which is tasked with making 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate 

DOD ISR resources for theater use across the combatant commands and 

ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD, national, and allied 

ISR capabilities and collection efforts. DOD officials indicate that annual

allocation levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in DOD’s 

inventory and believe that JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to 

the combatant commanders ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all 

requests for ISR support. However, our work suggests that additional 

information is needed to assess the true demand for ISR assets and the 

best way to meet this demand. Specifically, JFCC-ISR’s ability to fulfill its 

mission of integrating DOD, national, and allied partner ISR capabilities 

and making recommendations on how best to allocate ISR assets to 

support the warfighter depends, in part, on the extent to which it has 

awareness and visibility over all ISR assets, including DOD, national, and 

allied ISR assets. JFCC-ISR does not have complete visibility into all assets

that could be used to support combatant commanders’ needs, which 

hinders its ability to optimally distribute or allocate DOD ISR assets. JFCCISR officials estimate it has 80–90 percent visibility into DOD ISR assets 

but does not have the same level of visibility into other national and allied 

ISR assets available to support theater-level requirements, such as assets 

that are owned and controlled by U.S. national intelligence agencies such 

as the National Security Agency or by our allies supporting ongoing 

operations. According to JFCC-ISR officials, although they are working to 

gain better visibility over all ISR assets, they currently do not have this 

level of visibility because DOD does not currently have a mechanism for 

obtaining information on all ISR assets—including all DOD, national, and 

allied assets—operating in each of the combatant commanders’ area of 

operations. Absent such a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn

more about the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building 

relationships with other national and allied intelligence agencies and 

addressing limitations related to intelligence agency system access. 

Without an approach to its allocation process that considers all available 

ISR capabilities, JFCC-ISR does not have all the information it needs to 

leverage the capabilities of all available ISR assets and to optimize the 

allocation of DOD’s ISR assets. 

Page 14 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD’s process for tasking its airborne ISR assets, including UAS, does not 

provide for visibility at all levels into how DOD airborne ISR assets are 

being used on a daily basis. Once DOD ISR assets have been allocated,

those assets are available to the combatant commanders to be assigned, or

tasked, against specific requests for ISR support in ongoing operations. 

The JFACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint 

air operations to focus the effect of air capabilities and for assuring their 

effective and efficient use in achieving the combatant commanders’ 

objectives. However, while the JFACC has visibility into how all theaterlevel ISR assets, like the Air Force’s Predator, are being used, he or she 

does not have visibility into how tactical ISR assets, such as the Army’s 

Hunter, are being used on a daily basis or what missions they are 

supporting. The JFACC generally tasks assets that support theater-level 

objectives, while assets that support tactical-level objectives are tasked 

and controlled by the services or by the U.S. Special Operations 

Command. Tactical units utilize their embedded, or tactical, assets first to

satisfy unit intelligence needs. However, when tactical assets are not 

available or capable of satisfying a unit’s need for ISR support, the unit 

requests theater-level ISR support. Requests for most theater-level assets 

are entered into a central DOD database, but there is no similar database 

that captures requests for tactical-level assets. While there are procedures, 

such as the Air Tasking Order and Airspace Control Order, for tracking 

where theater- and tactical-level assets are operating for airspace control 

and deconfliction purposes, a comparable mechanism for tracking the 

missions these assets are supporting or how they are being used on a daily 

basis does not exist. For example, the Air Tasking Order would track the 

time, date, and location where a UAS was operating, but there is no 

mechanism that would track what intelligence the UAS was supposed to 

gather on a mission or why the UAS was being used on a mission. Without 

a database or similar mechanism providing visibility into how tactical-level

assets are being tasked, the JFACC is limited in his or her awareness of 

how those assets are being used on a daily basis, which hinders the 

JFACC’s ability to optimize the use of those assets. 

DOD Does Not Have 

Visibility over the Tasking 

of All DOD Airborne ISR 

Assets, Including UAS 

This lack of visibility limits the JFACC’s ability to leverage those assets 

using techniques such as cross-cueing, which is the collaborative effort of

using capabilities offered by multiple ISR platforms to fulfill a mission. By

using techniques such as cross-cueing, the JFACC has been able to use the 

different types of capabilities brought by different theater-level manned 

and unmanned ISR assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For 

example, a manned Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System was 

tasked to monitor an area. When this system sensed movement in the area, 

a Predator was then tasked to collect imagery to confirm suspected 

Page 15 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
activity. Without visibility into how tactical assets are being utilized, the 

JFACC is limited in his or her ability to optimize the use of all available 

DOD ISR assets and to focus the effect of these assets to ensure their 

efficient and effective use. Such visibility will become even more 

important given that services such as the Army are acquiring, and planning

to embed in units, ISR assets capable of satisfying theater-level 

requirements, such as the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose or Warrior UAS, 

which could otherwise be leveraged to support JFACC requirements. 

Duplicative taskings that occur are often driven by a lack of visibility into 

where ISR assets at all levels are operating and what they are tasked to do. 

For example, a DOD official shared with us an example of unnecessary 

duplication where an Army unit requested a full-motion video-capable

asset to support a high-priority requirement. When the asset, a Predator 

UAS, arrived to support the requirement, its operator realized the Army 

unit had also tasked one of its tactical assets, a Hunter UAS, against the

requirement. As a result of the lack of visibility over all assets, the 

potential exists for multiple ISR aircraft to be tasked to operate in the 

same area and against the same requirement. However, some level of 

duplication may be necessary when driven by mission requirements and 

system capabilities. Certain missions, such as special operations, often 

need a certain amount of duplication in order to achieve the desired result. 

For example, a mission intended to track activity of suspected terrorists 

may require multiple systems to follow identified individuals who flee the

scene in different directions. Furthermore, assets such as the Predator 

UAS experience system limitations when equipped with a full-motionvideo sensor in that they are only able to provide surveillance of a narrow 

or “soda straw” view. A certain level of duplication of UAS may be 

necessary to support a mission to obtain a complete view of the area 

under surveillance. 

Greater visibility at the tactical level could provide units with a greater 

awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater-level and 

those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what they are 

being used to do. A mechanism that provides this visibility would allow 

tactical units, when appropriate,9

 to leverage other assets operating in 

their area to optimize the information captured and avoid unnecessary 

duplicative taskings. 

 9

Some missions, such as special operations are classified and it is not always appropriate to

share specifics of the missions. 

Page 16 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR 

assets and has initiated a Persistent ISR Capabilities Based Assessment 

Study. The study, sponsored by the Battlespace Awareness Functional 

Capabilities Board, focuses on what other actions such as better planning, 

direction, command and control, and better fusion and exploitation of 

information can provide the warfighter with more persistent surveillance 

capability. The study is expected to be completed in the August–

September 2007 time frame. 

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because 

it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive

feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure the 

warfighter’s needs are met. Specifically, although JFCC-ISR is tasked with 

developing metrics and standards of performance to measure the success 

of DOD ISR missions, existing metrics are limited and no DOD-wide 

milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD officials 

acknowledged that they do not consistently receive feedback from 

operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the warfighter’s needs are 

met. Without feedback and a complete set of metrics for evaluating its ISR 

assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how well the 

warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and 

whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or to acquire new 

systems that best support warfighting needs. 

DOD is working to develop additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as 

qualitative metrics to measure the success of its ISR assets, but existing 

quantitative metrics are limited and no milestones have been established. 

The JFCC-ISR is tasked with developing metrics and standards of 

performance to assess DOD ISR mission accomplishment. Moreover, we 

recommended in a December 2005 report10 that DOD ensure its 

performance measurement systems measure how effectively UAS perform 

their missions, identify performance indicator information that needs to be 

collected, and systematically collect identified performance information. 

We continue to believe this recommendation has merit, and DOD officials 

agree that metrics are needed not only for UAS, but for all ISR missions. 

However, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited 

quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the 

DOD Lacks Complete 

Metrics and Feedback 

for Fully Evaluating 

the Performance of Its 

ISR Assets to Ensure 

Warfighter’s Needs 

Are Met 

DOD Is Developing Metrics 

to Measure Success of Its 

ISR Assets, but Progress 

Has Been Limited and 

DOD Has Not Established 

Milestones 

 10GAO-06-49. 

Page 17 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
number collected against. While these metrics are a good start, DOD 

officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account all 

of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset 

effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous 

ISR missions, whether the ISR asset did what it was intended to do, 

whether it had the intended effect, and whether the intelligence captured 

contributed towards accomplishment of the mission. 

The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop 

additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to assess 

the effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials acknowledge the 

progress in developing metrics has been limited. In developing these 

metrics, the JFCC-ISR is leveraging national intelligence attributes, which 

include characteristics such as whether the intelligence is comprehensive 

to perform all missions anywhere and at anytime in any weather; credible

to allow users to make sound decisions and take appropriate action; 

persistent to collect often and long enough to get the job done; and timely

to meet user needs. Furthermore, the JFCC-ISR has not made any progress 

in establishing DOD-wide milestones for the development of these metrics. 

Milestones are the required steps and planned dates for completion of 

those steps leading up to metrics development. 

DOD officials indicate that determining the success of ISR missions is 

difficult given the nature of intelligence collection. Specifically, hundreds

of hours of ISR missions and target tracking could culminate in the 

capture of a high value target; however, it may be difficult to measure the 

effectiveness of each individual ISR mission that led to the ultimate 

capture and mission success. This cumulative knowledge provided by ISR 

assets is difficult to quantify. An official from the Office of the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics also 

acknowledged that it may be more difficult to evaluate the success of 

ongoing operations due to the dynamic and subjective nature of 

requirements. The official noted, however, that DOD is better equipped to 

measure the success of its more mature and traditional ISR missions, such 

as sensitive reconnaissance operations, because the objectives are better

defined allowing more direct determination of success. 

Page 18 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
In addition to metrics, DOD also relies on feedback for evaluating how 

successful its ISR assets are in meeting the warfighter’s needs. However, 

DOD lacks consistent feedback on whether ISR assets meet the needs of 

the warfighters. Joint Publication 2-0111 calls for intelligence personnel and 

consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well 

intelligence operations perform to meet commander’s intelligence 

requirements. This information could be used to inform DOD’s acquisition,

allocation, and tasking of ISR assets. While DOD officials indicate they 

occasionally receive feedback on ISR asset performance, they

acknowledge that feedback specific to how ISR assets performed in 

individual ISR missions is not consistently occurring. While there is realtime communication among unmanned aircraft system operators, 

requesters, and intelligence personnel during an operation, and agency 

officials indicate this communication is beneficial to providing real-time 

feedback, there is little to no feedback after the operation to determine 

whether the warfighters’ needs were met. Officials indicate that the fast 

pace of operations in theater affects the ability of end users to provide 

feedback on every ISR mission. For example, according to Marine Corps 

officials, there is a mechanism for Marine Corps units to provide feedback, 

but the feedback is not consistently provided because there is no 

systematic process in place to ensure that this feedback is captured. 

Without developing metrics and systematically gathering feedback that 

enables it to assess the extent to which ISR assets are successful in 

supporting warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the true 

demand for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and tasking its 

ISR assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new systems that best 

support warfighting needs. 

DOD has achieved operational success with UAS in ongoing operations, 

but it continues to face operational challenges that limit its ability to fully 

optimize the use of these assets. These operational challenges have been 

exacerbated by the lack of advance coordination when new assets are 

being deployed in theater. While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have

been ongoing for some time, the potential exists for DOD to need to 

establish operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide 

procedure for advance coordination is critical to enable DOD to quickly 

support ISR assets once deployed to ongoing operations. Until DOD takes 

DOD Lacks Consistent 

Feedback on Whether ISR 

Assets Meet Warfighters’ 

Needs 

Conclusions 

 11Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to

Military Operations, page III-56 (Oct. 7, 2004). 

Page 19 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be 

limited in its ability to efficiently deploy and utilize UAS assets and may 

not allow the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming 

assets. 

With the operational successes that have been realized with UAS, 

commanders are requesting them in greater numbers. In spite of a 

dramatic increase in UAS funding, DOD officials indicate that annual 

allocation levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in the 

inventory and JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to the combatant

commanders DOD ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all requests for 

ISR support. However, our work indicates that DOD’s approach to UAS 

may not leverage all of the DOD ISR assets currently available and DOD 

may not be in the best position to determine if perceived demand is wellfounded. Given the substantial investment DOD is making in UAS and the 

increasing demand for them, it is critical that DOD’s approach to managing 

its ISR assets, including UAS, allow it to optimize the use of these assets. 

Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that considers 

all ISR capabilities, DOD may not be in a position to leverage all available 

ISR assets and to optimize the use of those assets. Moreover, DOD lacks 

visibility over the true demand for and use of ISR assets, which could 

hinder its ability to make informed decisions about the need to purchase 

additional UAS assets and what quantities should be purchased. 

Furthermore, without developing metrics and systematically gathering 

feedback that enables DOD to assess the extent to which ISR missions are 

successful in supporting warfighter needs, decision makers may not be in

a position to determine which UAS systems would best support the 

warfighters’ needs. 

To mitigate challenges in integrating UAS, and other ISR assets, into 

combat operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in 

conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders, take 

the following three actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• establish DOD-wide requirements for coordinating with the combatant 

commanders in advance of bringing UAS into the theater of operations; 

• develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout DOD; 

and 

• establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these 

requirements. 

Page 20 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR assets 

when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for 

• obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national, and 

allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders’ area of 

operations; and 

• allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational 

awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not 

prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to do. 

To improve DOD’s ability to evaluate the performance of its ISR missions,

we recommend the Secretary of Defense 

• establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and 

quantitative metrics; 

• develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from intelligence 

and operations communities to assess how effective ISR assets are in 

meeting warfighters’ requirements; and 

• create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD’s 

acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 

with all of our recommendations. DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the 

service secretaries and combatant commanders, establish DOD-wide 

requirements for coordinating with the combatant commanders in 

advance of bringing UAS into the theater of operations; develop a plan for 

communicating those requirements throughout DOD; and establish a 

mechanism to ensure the services comply with these requirements. DOD 

noted that it currently has a well-defined process to coordinate with the 

combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into theater and cited

several examples including the annual process for allocating theater-level 

UAS, and actions between stateside units and units in theater to plan for 

deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however, acknowledged that a more 

standardized method could improve efficiency of the coordination process 

and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be tasked to look at 

standardizing the coordination process and evaluate and provide direction

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 21 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
for an improved coordination process. Further, DOD noted that, based on 

this evaluation, if direction is required, it will be issued via a Chairman’s 

directive which is mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism 

that ensures compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes 

related to UAS but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD, 

represent a standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and 

combatant commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of 

deploying UAS assets, regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we 

believe that a directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure 

compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing 

how implementation of the directive will be monitored. 

DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for obtaining information on 

all ISR assets—including all DOD, national, and allied assets—operating in 

each of the combatant commanders’ area of operations; and allowing 

users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational awareness on 

where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the 

mission, what they are being used to do. Specifically, DOD agrees that a 

mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets is needed and 

commented that work is underway within the JFCC-ISR to develop such a 

mechanism. DOD commented that it is not currently practical to provide 

situational awareness on some UAS such as the small, hand-launched UAS 

at the lowest operational level because these systems do not have the 

capacity or capability to communicate their position to a common point. 

DOD noted that it will determine the UAS operational levels that will 

provide widespread situational awareness, including operational details 

and timelines of data reporting. We recognize that situational awareness 

may not currently be practical for some UAS but would encourage the 

department to seek to maximize coverage in exploring options for 

improved situational awareness. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and 

quantitative metrics and stated that JFCC-ISR is standing up an 

Assessments Division that will be responsible for the development of 

metrics. We recognize the Assessment Division has been tasked with 

development of ISR metrics and reemphasize the need to develop 

milestones for metrics development. DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendations that it develop a process for systematically capturing 

feedback from intelligence and operations communities to assess how 

effective ISR assets are in meeting warfighters’ requirements and create a

mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD’s acquisition,

Page 22 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets. DOD agreed that an improved and 

standardized process for collection and reporting of feedback would 

enhance visibility and provide more effective warfighter support, but 

pointed out that organizations within the department collect feedback or

conduct lessons learned studies. We acknowledge that DOD has 

organizations such as the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned that are 

responsible for capturing feedback and developing lessons learned based 

on that feedback. However, these organizations are charged with 

capturing lessons learned on a number of issues and are not focused on 

ISR effectiveness. Furthermore, our recommendation pertains to DOD’s 

guidance which states it is imperative that intelligence personnel and 

consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on how well 

individual intelligence operations perform to meet commanders’ 

intelligence requirements. While the feedback that may be captured by 

those lessons learned organizations is noteworthy, it is often not 

immediate and specific to individual missions. As we noted in our report, 

DOD officials acknowledged that feedback specific to how ISR assets 

performed in individual ISR missions is not consistently occurring. DOD 

further commented that it has mechanisms in place to inform its decision 

making processes on the acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR 

assets such as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

which assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. We 

agree that the mechanisms mentioned in DOD’s response exist; however, 

DOD currently does not have sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics 

needed to collect data on UAS performance nor does it have a means for 

incorporating such data into the processes currently used to make 

decisions on ISR assets. 

The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II. DOD 

also provided technical comments separately and we have made 

adjustments where appropriate. In particular, the Army provided 

additional information on the coordination of the Warrior Alpha UAS in its 

technical comments, including a timeline for introduction of the asset into

theater. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. We will 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 

be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you 

or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Page 23 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
of this report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III. 

Sharon Pickup 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 24 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken 

steps to facilitate the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into

combat operations, we examined DOD and military service publications 

and documentation on UAS such as the 2005–2030 UAS Roadmap, the 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical 

Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Joint Concept of 

Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Concept of Operations for 

Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, and the ISR Systems Concept of

Operations Standardization Memo. Additionally, we met with key DOD 

and service officials, including those from the Joint UAS Center of 

Excellence and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force 

within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Land Sea Application Center. We 

also met with officials from U.S. Central Command and the services, 

including units that had returned from deployment to the theater, or that 

were currently supporting ongoing operations, to discuss the integration

of UAS into U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility and to better 

understand integration challenges. 

To determine the extent to which DOD’s approach to allocating and 

tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, 

including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to optimize their 

capabilities, we met with key DOD and service officials, including those 

from U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air Force 

component commands, the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid 

Air Base in Qatar, the Joint Functional Component Command for 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and other organizations. 

We interviewed and obtained documentation including the fiscal year 2007 

ISR allocation briefing from officials of the Joint Functional Component 

Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance to better 

understand the allocation process. We also reviewed documentation such 

as joint publications and briefings that explain the process for tasking ISR 

assets and interviewed officials at U.S. Central Command, Central 

Command Air Forces, and the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar to

better understand how ISR assets are assigned to specific missions. To 

understand how requests for ISR support are generated and satisfied at the 

tactical level, we spoke with units that recently returned from, or are 

currently supporting, ongoing operations in Iraq as well as units within the 

services such as the Marine Corps’ Tactical Fusion Center that are 

involved in determining if tactical assets are available to satisfy those 

requests or if the requests need to be forwarded for theater-level support. 

To understand how manned and unmanned assets are being leveraged to

optimize the intelligence captured, we met with manned and unmanned 

Page 25 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

units stationed at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. To 

understand DOD’s ongoing efforts to study its process for tasking ISR 

assets, we reviewed documentation and interviewed an official from the 

Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board. 

To assess whether DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, 

including UAS, to ensure that warfighters’ needs are met, we interviewed 

DOD and service officials to discuss the metrics for evaluating the 

performance of its ISR assets. We discussed with the Joint Functional 

Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

its efforts to establish metrics for evaluating ISR assets performance. We 

reviewed metrics routinely captured to assess the success of DOD’s ISR 

missions. We also met with service officials and service units recently 

returned from Iraq to determine the extent to which feedback is received 

on how effective ISR support is in meeting the warfighters’ needs. We 

performed our work from June 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 26 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 27 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 28 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 31 GAO-07-836

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Patty Lentini, Assistant 

Director; Renee Brown; Jamie Khanna; Kate Lenane; LaShawnda Lindsey;

Elisha Matvay; and Susan Tindall made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. GAO-07-578. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2007. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary 

Observations on DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New 

Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition 

Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49. 

Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition 

Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005. 

(350891) Page 32 GAO-07-836 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER