United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Border, Maritime and Global 

Counterterrorism, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

HOMELAND SECURITY: For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1 p.m. EDT 

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Prospects For Biometric 

US-VISIT Exit Capability 

Remain Unclear 

Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director 

Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

GAO-07-1044T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 28, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Prospects for US-VISIT Biometric Exit 

Highlights of GAO-07-1044T, a report to Capability Remain Unclear 

Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and 

Global Counterterrorism, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) has spent and 

continues to invest hundreds of 

millions of dollars each year in its 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status 

Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) 

program to collect, maintain, and 

share information on selected 

foreign nationals who enter and 

exit the United States at over 300

air, sea, and land ports of entry 

(POEs). The program uses

biometric identifiers (digital finger

scans and photographs) to screen 

people against watch lists and to 

verify that a visitor is the person 

who was issued a visa or other

travel document. 

GAO’s testimony addresses the 

status of US-VISIT entry and exit 

capabilities and DHS’s 

management of past and future exit

efforts. In developing its testimony,

GAO drew from eight prior reports

on US-VISIT as well as ongoing

work for the committee. 

What GAO Recommends

In light of the department’s

longstanding challenges in 

delivering an operational exit 

capability and the uncertainty 

surrounding its future exit efforts, 

GAO urges the department to 

approach its latest attempt at 

deploying mission critical exit 

capabilities with the kind of rigor 

and discipline that GAO has

previously recommended. 

After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered essentially 

one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry capabilities

are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs but comparable exit 

capabilities are not. To the department’s credit, operational entry 

capabilities have reportedly produced results, including more than 1,500 

people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. 

However, DHS still does not have the other half of US-VISIT (an operational 

exit capability) despite the fact that its funding plans have allocated about 

one-quarter of a billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts. During this 

time, GAO has continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS is managing 

US-VISIT in general, and the exit side of US-VISIT in particular, and has 

made numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program 

delivers clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and benefits on 

time and within budget. 

The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are as 

uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The department’s latest available 

documentation indicates that little has changed in how DHS is approaching 

its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit efforts. Specifically, 

DHS has indicated that it intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal

year 2007 funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on 

air and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either plans or 

analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these 

funds. Rather, it has only described in general terms near-term deployment 

plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged 

that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Beyond 

this high-level schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define

what will be done by what entities and at what cost. 

In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit 

intentions, it is unlikely that the department’s latest efforts to deliver 

near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different from the 

past. Therefore, the prospects for having operational exit capabilities 

continue to be unclear. Moreover, the longer the department goes without 

exit capabilities, the more its ability to effectively and efficiently perform its 

border security and immigration enforcement missions will suffer. Among 

other things, this means that DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the 

immigration system by identifying and removing those people who have 

overstayed their original period of admission, which is a stated goal of USVISIT. Further, DHS immigration and customs enforcement entities will

continue to spend limited resources on investigating potential visa violators 

who have already left the country. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randy Hite at 

(202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or Rich 

Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the subcommittee’s 

hearing focusing on the exit side of the United States Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). As you know, 

US-VISIT is a multibillion dollar program of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) that is to, among other things, enhance 

the security of our citizens and visitors and ensure the integrity of 

the U.S. immigration system. To achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to 

record certain travelers’1

 entry and exit to and from the United 

States at over 300 ports of entry (POEs), verify their identity, and 

determine their compliance with the terms of their admission and 

stay. 

Since fiscal year 2002, we have produced eight reports that have 

identified fundamental challenges that DHS continues to face in 

defining and justifying the program’s future direction and delivering 

program capabilities and benefits on time and within cost.2

 Our 

testimony today draws on the above cited reports as well as our 

ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security on 

the definition and completion of US-VISIT’s strategic solution. All 

the work on which this testimony is based was performed in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, DHS has invested about $1.3 billion over 4 years and 

delivered basically one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically 

enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and 

land POEs, but comparable exit capabilities are not. Moreover, the 

 1

 US-VISIT applies to foreign travelers that enter the United States under a nonimmigrant 

visa or are traveling from a country that has a visa waiver agreement with the United States

under the Visa Waiver Program. The Visa Waiver Program enables foreign nationals of 

certain countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for stays of 90 days 

or less without obtaining a visa. 

2

 See, for example, GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and

Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 19, 2003); GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, 

and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: 

December 6, 2006); and GAO, Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor

and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-

278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007). 

Page 1 GAO-07-1044T 
prospects for this changing are essentially as uncertain today as 

they were 4 years ago, despite the fact that the department’s funding 

plans have provided about one-quarter of a billion dollars to exitrelated efforts. During this time, we have continued to cite 

weaknesses in how DHS was managing US-VISIT in general, and the 

program’s exit capability in particular, and have made numerous 

recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program 

delivered clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and 

benefits on time and within budget. Today, as DHS embarks on yet 

another attempt to deliver long-overdue exit capabilities, these 

recommendations still apply. Unless the department implements 

them, it runs the serious risk of repeating the mistakes it made on 

prior exit efforts and producing similar results. Accordingly, we urge 

the department to approach its latest attempt at deploying mission 

critical exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and disciplined 

fashion that we have recommended. If it does not, the prospects for 

having an operational exit capability will be diminished, which in 

turn will limit the department’s ability to effectively and efficiently 

perform its border security and immigration enforcement missions. 

Background 

US-VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the 

security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and 

trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and 

protect the privacy of our visitors. To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is 

to collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign 

nationals who enter and exit the United States; detect fraudulent 

travel documents, verify traveler identity, and determine traveler 

admissibility through the use of biometrics; facilitate information 

sharing and coordination within the immigration and border 

management community; and identify foreign nationals who (1) 

have overstayed or violated the terms of their admission; (2) may be 

eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) 

should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials. 

The scope of the program includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and 

exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter 

and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. 

Page 2 GAO-07-1044T 
The US-VISIT program office is responsible for managing the 

acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT 

systems in support of such DHS agencies as Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

As of March 31, 2007, the program director reports to the Under 

Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate. 

In 2003, DHS planned to deliver US-VISIT capability in 4 increments: 

Increment 1 (air and sea entry and exit), Increment 2 (land entry and 

exit), Increment 3 (land entry and exit), and Increment 4, which was 

to define, design, build, and implement a more strategic program 

capability. Since then the scope of the first three increments has 

changed. The current scope is Increment 1 (air and sea entry), 

Increment 2 (air, sea, and land entry), and Increment 3 (land entry).

Increment 4 is still intended to define, design, build, and implement 

a more strategic program capability, which program officials stated

will consist of a series of incremental releases or mission capability

enhancements that will support business outcomes. In Increments 1 

through 3, the program has built interfaces among existing

(“legacy”) systems, enhanced the capabilities of these systems, and 

deployed these capabilities to air, sea, and land POEs. These first 

three increments have been largely pursued through existing system 

contracts and task orders. Increment 4 strategic system 

enhancements are being pursued through a systems integration 

contract awarded to Accenture and its partners in May 2004. 

Through fiscal year 2007, about $1.7 billion has been appropriated 

for US-VISIT. According to the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2007,3

 DHS may not obligate $200 million of the 

$362.494 million appropriated for US-VISIT in fiscal year 2007 until 

DHS provides the Senate and House Committees with a plan for 

expenditure that meets several criteria. The department has 

requested $462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the program. As of 

January 31, 2007, program officials stated that about $1.3 billion has 

been obligated for US-VISIT activities. 

 3

 Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1357-58 (Oct. 4, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-07-1044T 
US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs 

A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at 

most POEs. On January 5, 2004, the program office deployed and 

began operating most aspects of its planned biometric entry 

capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports for certain foreign 

nationals, including those from visa waiver countries.4

 As of 

December 2006, the program office also deployed and began 

operating this entry capability in the secondary inspection areas of 

154 of 170 land POEs. According to program officials, 14 of the 

remaining 16 POEs have no operational need to deploy US-VISIT 

because visitors subject to US-VISIT are, by regulation, not 

authorized to enter into the United States at these locations. The 

other two POEs do not have the necessary transmission lines to 

operate US-VISIT, and thus they process visitors manually. 

According to DHS, these entry capabilities have produced results. 

For example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric 

hits in primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having 

adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. 

Further, about 14,000 leads were referred to ICE’s immigration 

enforcement unit, resulting in 315 arrests.5

 Another potential 

consequence is the deterrent effect of having an operational entry 

capability. Although deterrence is difficult to demonstrate, officials 

have cited it as a byproduct of having a publicized capability at the 

border to screen entry on the basis of identity verification and 

matching against watch lists of known and suspected terrorists. 

Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT 

Exit Is Not Operational 

Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and 

resources towards establishing an operational exit capability at air,

 4

 On September 30, 2004, US-VISIT expanded biometric entry procedures to include 

individuals from visa waiver countries applying for admission. 

5

 We did not verify this information. 

Page 4 GAO-07-1044T 
sea, and land POEs. For example, between 2003 and 2006, DHS 

reports allocating about $250 million6

 for exit-related efforts. 

Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and 

resources, DHS still does not have an operational exit capability. 

Our prior reports have raised a number of concerns about DHS’s 

management of US-VISIT’s exit efforts. 

As we and others have reported,7

 the absence of a biometric exit 

capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data are 

available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit 

capability, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration 

system by identifying and removing those people who have 

overstayed their original period of admission—a stated goal of 

US-VISIT. Further, ICE’s efforts to ensure the integrity of the 

immigration system could be degraded if it continues to spend its 

limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have 

already left the country. 

Air and Sea Exit Efforts Have Not Been Managed Well 

Between January 2004 and May 2007, the program office conducted 

various exit pilots at one air and one sea POE without fully 

deploying a biometric exit capability. Throughout this period, we 

have reported on the limitations in how these pilot activities were 

planned, defined, and justified. For example, we reported in 

September 2003,8

 prior to the pilots being deployed, that DHS had 

not economically justified the initial US-VISIT increment (which was 

to include an exit capability at air and sea POEs) on the basis of 

benefits, costs, and risks. As a result, we recommended that DHS 

determine whether proposed incremental capabilities would 

produce value commensurate with program costs and risks. We 

 6

 As reported in the fiscal year 2005, revised 2006, and 2007 expenditure plans. The fiscal 

year 2007 plan reported that of this amount, $53.1 million is still available as prior year 

carryover. 

7 GAO-07-248 and Department of Homeland Security, Inspector General, Review of the 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Compliance Enforcement Unit, 

(September 2005). 

8 GAO-03-1083. 

Page 5 GAO-07-1044T 
later reported in May 20049

 that DHS had not deployed a biometric 

exit capability to the 80 air and 14 sea POEs as part of Increment 1 

deployment in December 2003, as it had originally intended. Instead, 

as we mention above, the pilot exit capability was deployed to only 

one air and one sea POE on January 5, 2004. 

In February 2005, we reported10 that the program office had not 

adequately planned for evaluating its exit pilot at air and sea POEs 

because the pilot’s evaluation scope and time line were compressed, 

and thus would not provide the program office with sufficient 

information to adequately assess the pilots and permit the selection 

of the best exit solution for deployment. Accordingly, we 

recommended that the program office reassess its plans for 

deploying an exit capability to ensure that the scope of the pilot 

provided an adequate evaluation of alternatives. 

A year later in February 2006, we reported11 that the program office 

had extended the pilot from 5 to 11 POEs (nine airports and two 

seaports) and the time frame by an additional 7 months. 

Notwithstanding the expanded scope and time frame, the exit pilots 

were not sufficiently evaluated. In particular, on average only about 

24 percent of those travelers subject to US-VISIT actually complied 

with the exit processing steps. The evaluation report attributed this, 

in part, to the fact that compliance during the pilot was voluntary, 

and that to achieve the desired compliance rate, the exit solution 

would need an enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing 

persons to reenter the United States if they do not comply with the 

exit process. Despite this limitation, as of February 2006, program 

officials had not conducted any formal evaluation of enforcement 

mechanisms or their possible effect on compliance or cost, and 

according to the then Acting Program Director, no such evaluation

 9

 GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program

Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004). 

10 GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S.

Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington,

D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005). 

11 GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border 

Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).

Page 6 GAO-07-1044T 
would be done. Nonetheless, DHS continued to operate the exit 

pilots. 

In February 2006, we also reported that while DHS had analyzed the 

cost, benefits, and risks for its air and sea exit capability, the 

analyses did not demonstrate that the program was producing or 

would produce mission value commensurate with expected costs 

and benefits, and the costs upon which the analyses were based 

were not reliable. A year later, we reported12 that DHS had not 

adequately defined and justified its past investment in its air and sea 

exit pilots and its land exit demonstration projects, and still did not 

have either an operational exit capability or a viable exit solution to 

deploy. We further noted that exit-related program documentation 

did not adequately define what work was to be done or what these 

efforts would accomplish, did not describe measurable outcomes 

from the pilot or demonstration efforts, and did not indicate the 

related cost, schedule, and capability commitments that would be 

met. We recommended that planned expenditures be limited for exit 

pilots and demonstration projects until such investments were 

economically justified and until each investment had a well-defined 

evaluation plan. In its comments on our report, DHS agreed with our 

recommendation. 

Land Exit Efforts Have Not Produced a Viable Solution 

In January 2004, DHS committed to delivering a biometric exit 

capability by December 2005; however, we reported13 that program 

officials concluded in January 2005 that a biometric land exit 

capability could not be implemented without having a major impact 

on land POE facilities. According to these officials, the only proven 

technology available to biometrically verify individuals upon exit at 

land POEs would necessitate mirroring the entry processes,which 

the program reported was “an infeasible alternative for numerous 

reasons, including but not limited to, the additional staffing 

 12 GAO-07-278. 

13 GAO-07-248. 

Page 7 GAO-07-1044T 
demands, new infrastructure requirements, and potential trade and 

commerce impacts.”14 

In light of these constraints, the program office tested radio 

frequency identification (RFID) technology15 as a means of recording 

visitors as they exit at land POEs. However, this technology was not 

biometrics-based. Moreover, testing and analysis at five land POEs 

at the northern and southern borders identified numerous 

performance and reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID 

readers to detect a majority of travelers’ tags during testing. 

According to program officials, no technology or device currently 

exists to biometrically verify persons exiting the country that would

not have a major impact on land POE facilities. They added that 

technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it 

possible to biometrically verify persons exiting the country without 

major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring those 

exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles. 

In November 2006, during the course of our work on, among other 

things, the justification for ongoing land exit demonstration 

projects, DHS terminated these projects. In our view, the decision 

was warranted because DHS had not adequately defined and 

justified its investment in its pilots and demonstration projects. As 

noted earlier, we recommended in February 2007, that planned 

expenditures be limited for exit pilots and demonstration projects 

until such investments are economically justified and until each 

investment has a well-defined evaluation plan. DHS agreed with our 

recommendation. 

 14 US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment—FINAL (Rosslyn, Va.:

Jan. 31, 2005). 

15 RFID technology can be used to electronically identify and gather information contained 

on a tag—in this case, a unique identifying number embedded in a tag on a visitor’s

arrival/departure form—which an electronic reader at the POE is to detect. 

Page 8 GAO-07-1044T 
Lack of Definition and Justification of Future US-VISIT Exit 

Capabilities Risks Repeating Past Mistakes 

According to relevant federal guidance,16 the decision to invest in a 

system or system component should be based on a clear definition 

of what capabilities, involving what stakeholders, will be delivered 

according to what schedule and at what cost. Moreover, such 

investment decisions should be based on reasonable assurance that 

a proposed program will produce mission value commensurate with

expected costs and risks. As noted earlier, DHS funding plans have 

collectively allocated about $250 million to a number of exit efforts 

through 2006, but without having adequately defined or 

economically justified them. Now, in 2007, it risks repeating these 

same mistakes as it embarks on yet another attempt to implement a 

means by which to biometrically track certain foreign nationals 

exiting the United States, first at airports, and then at seaports, with 

land exit capabilities being deferred to an unspecified future time. 

Based on the department’s latest available documentation, it intends 

to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and 

$20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit 

capabilities. However, it has not produced either the plans or the 

analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest 

these funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-term 

deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, 

and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land 

POEs is not possible. 

More specifically, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan 

states that DHS will begin the process of planning and designing an 

air and sea exit solution during fiscal year 2007, focusing initially on

air exit and then emulating these technology and operational 

experiences in completing the sea exit solution. According to this 

plan, air exit efforts will begin during the third quarter of fiscal year 

2007, which ends in 2 days. However, US-VISIT program officials 

 16 See, for example, OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of 

the Budget (June 2006).

Page 9 GAO-07-1044T 
told us as recently as three weeks ago that this deadline will not be 

met. 

Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will 

be done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire, 

deliver, deploy, and operate this capability, including plans 

describing expected system capabilities, defining measurable 

outcomes (benefits and results), identifying key stakeholder (e.g., 

airlines) roles/responsibilities and buy-in, and coordinating and 

aligning with related programs. Further, there is no analysis 

available comparing the life cycle costs of the air exit solution to its 

expected benefits and risks. The only additional information 

available to date is what the department characterized as a 

high-level schedule for air exit that we obtained on June 11, 2007. 

This schedule shows that business requirements and a concept of 

operations are to be completed by September 3, 2007; a cost-benefit 

analysis is to be completed by October 1, 2007; testing is to be 

completed by October 1, 2008; and the exit solution is to be fully 

deployed in 2 years (June 2009). However, the schedule does not 

include the underlying details supporting the timelines for such 

areas of activity as system design, system development, and system 

testing. According to program officials, more detailed schedules 

exist but were not provided to us because the schedules had not yet 

been approved by DHS. 

Further, while the expenditure plan states that DHS plans to 

integrate the air exit solution with the commercial airlines’ existing 

check-in processes and to integrate US-VISIT’s efforts with CBP’s 

pre-departure Advance Passenger Information System and the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) Secure Flight,17 the 

program office did not provide any documentation that describes 

what has been done with regard to these plans or what is planned 

relative to engaging with and obtaining buy-in from the airlines. 

 17 The Advanced Passenger Information System captures arrival and departure manifest 

information provided by air and sea carriers. Secure Flight is a program being developed by

TSA for domestic flights to prescreen passengers or match passenger information against 

terrorist watch lists to identify individuals who should undergo additional security scrutiny. 

Page 10 GAO-07-1044T 
Nevertheless, DHS plans to issue a proposed regulation requiring 

airlines to participate in this effort by December 17, 2007. 

With regard to land exit, the future is even more unclear. According 

to the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, the department has 

concluded that a biometric land exit capability is not practical in the 

short term because of the costly expansion of existing exit capacity, 

including physical infrastructure, land acquisition, and staffing. As a 

result, DHS states an intention to begin matching entry and exit 

records using biographic information in instances where no current 

collection exists today, such as in the case of individuals who do not 

submit their Form I-94 upon departure. According to DHS, it has 

also initiated discussions with its Canadian counterparts about the 

potential for them to collect biographical exit data at entry into 

Canada. Such a solution could include data sharing between the two

countries and would require significant discussions on specific data 

elements and the means of collection and sharing, including 

technical, policy, and legal issues associated with this approach. 

However, DHS has yet to provide us with any documentation that 

specifies what data elements would be collected or what technical, 

policy, and legal issues would need to be addressed. Further, 

according to DHS, it has not yet determined a time frame or any cost 

estimates for the initiation of such a non-biometric land exit 

solution. 

 --------------------------------------------------------------- 

In closing, we would like to emphasize the mission importance of a 

cost effective, biometrically enabled exit capability, and that 

delivering such a capability requires effective planning and 

justification, and rigorous and disciplined system acquisition 

management. To date, these activities have not occurred for DHS’s 

exit efforts. If this does not change, there is no reason to expect that 

DHS’s newly launched efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution 

will produce results different from its past efforts—namely, no 

operational exit solution despite many years and hundreds of 

millions of dollars of investment. More importantly, the continued 

absence of an exit capability will hinder DHS’s ability to effectively 

and efficiently perform its border security and immigration 

enforcement mission. Hence, it is important that DHS approach its 

Page 11 GAO-07-1044T 
latest attempt to deploy its exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous 

and disciplined fashion that we have previously recommended. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes our statement. We would be 

happy to answer any questions that you or members of the 

subcommittee may have at this time. 

Contact and Acknowledgements 

If you should have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or 

Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Other major 

contributors include Deborah Davis, Kory Godfrey, Daniel Gordon, 

David Hinchman, Kaelin Kuhn, John Mortin, and Amos Tevelow. 

(310649) Page 12 GAO-07-1044T 
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