UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MAYTAG CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 96-1224

MARY E. CLARKSON; ROBERT A.

CLARKSON,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.

(CA-95-335-3-19)

Submitted: August 22, 1996

Decided: September 13, 1996

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

S. Jahue Moore, KIRKLAND, WILSON, MOORE, ALLEN, TAYLOR & O'DAY, P.A., West Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. H. Simmons Tate, Jr., Manton M. Grier, Hamilton Osborne, Jr.,

SINKLER & BOYD, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Robert A. and Mary E. Clarkson appeal from the district court's

order granting summary judgment for Maytag Corporation in its

action seeking to set aside allegedly fraudulent conveyances. On

appeal, the Clarksons challenge only the portion of the district court's

order finding that Robert's conveyance of the marital home to Mary

was fraudulent. We find that summary judgment was appropriate;

consequently, we affirm.

The Clarksons are married and live at 115 Old Sawmill Trail in

Chapin, South Carolina, a property Robert bought in 1988 for

$212,000. After becoming indebted to Maytag Corporation for

$1,500,000, Robert conveyed the home to Mary. The deed recited

consideration of $5 and love and affection. Mary paid off the existing

loan of $117,716.05 and obtained a new loan of $118,000. With the

new financing, the monthly mortgage payment decreased from $2038

to under $800.

In December 1994, Maytag obtained a judgment for $1,500,000

against Robert, and in February 1996, Maytag filed this action against

Robert and Mary Clarkson, seeking to have several allegedly fraudulent conveyances set aside, including the conveyance of the marital

home to Mary. The district court granted partial summary judgment

for Maytag and set aside several of the conveyances, including the

conveyance of 115 Old Sawmill Trail to Mary. On appeal, the Clarksons challenge only the portion of the district court's summary judgment order setting aside the conveyance of 115 Old Sawmill Trail.

This court reviews de novo district court orders granting or denying

summary judgment. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 3222, and cert. denied, 63

U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (Nos. 93-1893, 94-9). District

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courts may enter summary judgment only where there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.3d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990)(in

banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).

South Carolina law prohibits fraudulent conveyances to avoid creditors. S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1991). A conveyance

will be set aside under this statute if one of two conditions exists:

First, even though a conveyance is made for valuable consideration, it will be set aside if it is made by the grantor

with actual intent to defraud and that intent is imputable to

the grantee. . . . Second, where the transfer is made without

consideration and the transferor retains insufficient property

to meet his debts, the transfer will be set aside regardless of

the intent of the debtor or the transferee.

NCNB Nat'l Bank of North Carolina v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 938 (4th

Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Busby v. Crown Supply,

Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990). The Clarksons challenge the district court's finding that the transfer of 115 Old Sawmill Trail was

void for lack of consideration.

Generally, if a property's value exceeds the amount of debt owed

on the property, then a transferee's agreement to pay off the encumbrances is not valuable consideration as against the transferor's creditors. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corp., 203 N.W.2d

770, 779 (Neb. 1973); see also United States v. Chapman, 756 F.2d

1237, 1241 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985) (transfer may be fraudulent as to creditor where only consideration is assumption of mortgage which is substantially less than value of property); cf. Dufresne v. Regency Realty,

Inc., 366 S.E.2d 256, 258 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (transfer of corporate

assets deemed void where consideration paid was substantially less

than value of assets). Here, it is undisputed that the consideration

Mary gave for 115 Old Sawmill Trail was assumption of a mortgage

debt of approximately $118,000. Six years earlier, Robert bought the

property for $212,000--nearly double the value of the consideration

Mary paid. Because the value of the transferred property was substantially greater than the consideration paid, the district court properly

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concluded that the transfer was fraudulent for purposes of S.C. Code

Ann. § 27-23-10 and set aside the transfer.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment for Maytag and setting aside the conveyance of 115

Old Sawmill Trail. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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