alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 628.301 Initial compliance and reporting requirements. ( a ) A System institution that fails to satisfy one or more of its minimum applicable CET1, tier 1, or total risk-based capital ratios or its tier 1 leverage ratio at the end of the quarter in which these regulations become effective shall report its initial noncompliance to the FCA within 20 days following such quarterend and shall also submit a capital restoration plan for achieving and maintaining the standards, demonstrating appropriate annual progress toward meeting the goal, to the FCA within 60 days following such quarterend. If the capital restoration plan is not approved by the FCA, the FCA will inform the institution of the reasons for disapproval, and the institution shall submit a revised capital restoration plan within the time specified by the FCA.
( b ) *Approval of compliance plans.* In determining whether to approve a capital restoration plan submitted under this section, the FCA shall consider the following factors, as applicable: ( 1 ) The conditions or circumstances leading to the institution's falling below minimum levels, the exigency of those circumstances, and whether or not they were caused by actions of the institution or were beyond the institution's control;
( 2 ) The overall condition, management strength, and future prospects of the institution and, if applicable, affiliated System institutions;
( 3 ) The institution's capital, adverse assets (including nonaccrual and nonperforming loans), ALL, and other ratios compared to the ratios of its peers or industry norms;
( 4 ) How far an institution's ratios are below the minimum requirements;
( 5 ) The estimated rate at which the institution can reasonably be expected to generate additional earnings;
( 6 ) The effect of the business changes required to increase capital;
( 7 ) The institution's previous compliance practices, as appropriate;
( 8 ) The views of the institution's directors and senior management regarding the plan; and
( 9 ) Any other facts or circumstances that the FCA deems relevant.
( c ) An institution shall be deemed to be in compliance with the regulatory capital requirements of this subpart if it is in compliance with a capital restoration plan that is approved by the FCA within 180 days following the end of the quarter in which these regulations become effective.
Dismissed; Opinion Filed October 21, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-01653-CV

THOMAS ALLEN POWELL D/B/A ARCHITECTURE UNLIMITED 

AND J. KEITH WEBB, Appellants

V.

PENHOLLOW, INC., JOHN O. PENHOLLOW, AND YVONNE L. PENHOLLOW, 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 429-03464-2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS

Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Lang

 

On June 1, 2015, this Court issued an opinion in this case modifying the trial court’s 

judgment and affirming the judgment as modified. Appellants Thomas Allen Powell d/b/a 

Architecture Unlimited and J. Keith Webb filed timely first and second motions for rehearing on 

June 29, 2015, and August 12, 2015, respectively. On July 28, 2015, we denied appellants’ first 

motion for rehearing, withdrew our opinion of June 1, 2015, vacated the corresponding judgment 

of that date, and issued an opinion on motion for rehearing. Additionally, on September 21, 

2015, we denied appellants’ second motion for rehearing, withdrew our July 28, 2015 opinion,

vacated the corresponding judgment of that date, and issued an opinion on second motion for 

rehearing.
–2–

On October 15, 2015, the parties filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal” in this Court 

in which they (1) state they have “reached an agreement to compromise and settle their 

differences” in this lawsuit; (2) ask this Court to dismiss this appeal, withdraw the opinion 

issued, and tax costs on appeal against appellants; and (3) stipulate that their agreement is not 

conditioned on withdrawal of the Court’s opinion. 

We grant the parties’ October 15, 2015 joint motion and dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.1(a)(2). Further, we withdraw our September 21, 2015 opinion on second motion for 

rehearing and vacate the judgment of that date. See id. 42.1(c). This is now the opinion of the 

Court. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the costs of this appeal are taxed against appellants. 

See id. 42.1(d). 

131653F.P05

/ Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE
–3–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

THOMAS ALLEN POWELL D/B/A 

ARCHITECTURE UNLIMITED AND J. 

KEITH WEBB, Appellants

No. 05-13-01653-CV V.

PENHOLLOW, INC., JOHN O. 

PENHOLLOW, AND YVONNE L. 

PENHOLLOW, Appellees

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 429-03464-2011.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices 

Bridges and Schenck participating.

We WITHDRAW our opinion and VACATE our judgment of September 21, 2015. 

This is now the judgment of the Court.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal. 

It is ORDERED that appellees PENHOLLOW, INC., JOHN O. PENHOLLOW, AND 

YVONNE L. PENHOLLOW recover their costs of this appeal from appellants THOMAS 

ALLEN POWELL D/B/A ARCHITECTURE UNLIMITED AND J. KEITH WEBB.

Judgment entered this 21st day of October, 2015.
```

[110th Congress Public Law 46]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ046.110]

[[Page 121 STAT. 240]]

Public Law 110-46
110th Congress

                                 An Act

 
 To designate a United States courthouse located in Fresno, California, 
  as the ``Robert E. Coyle United States Courthouse''. <<NOTE: July 5, 
                           2007 -  [S. 801]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The United States courthouse bordered by O Street, P Street, Tulare 
Street, and Capitol Street in Fresno, California, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Robert E. Coyle United States Courthouse''.
SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the United States courthouse referred to 
in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Robert E. Coyle 
United States Courthouse''.

    Approved July 5, 2007.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 801:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 153 (2007):
            Apr. 10, considered and passed Senate.
            June 25, considered and passed House.

                                  <all>
```
# C_2014081EN.01001301.xml

| 20.3.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 81/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 81/13

---

Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Hæstiréttur Íslands dated 14 November 2013 in the case of the Icelandic State v Atli Gunnarsson

(Case E-26/13)

2014/C 81/12

A request has been made to the EFTA Court by a letter dated 14 November 2013 from Hæstiréttur Íslands (The Supreme Court of Iceland), which was received at the Court Registry on 15 November 2013, for an Advisory Opinion in the case of the Icelandic State v Atli Gunnarsson, on the following questions:

| 1. | Is it compatible with Article 28 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area and/or Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC that a State (A), which is party to the Agreement, does not give spouses the option of pooling their personal tax credits in connection with the assessment of income tax in circumstances in which both spouses move from State (A) and live in another State (B) in the European Economic Area and one of them receives a pension from State (A) while the other has no income, yet the tax position of the couple would be different if both lived in State (A), including the fact that they would be entitled to pool their personal tax credits? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is it compatible with Article 28 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area and/or Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC that a State (A), which is party to the Agreement, does not give spouses the option of pooling their personal tax credits in connection with the assessment of income tax in circumstances in which both spouses move from State (A) and live in another State (B) in the European Economic Area and one of them receives a pension from State (A) while the other has no income, yet the tax position of the couple would be different if both lived in State (A), including the fact that they would be entitled to pool their personal tax credits?

| 2. | When Question 1 is answered, is it of significance that the Agreement on the European Economic Area does not contain any provision corresponding to Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union? |
| --- | --- |

2.

When Question 1 is answered, is it of significance that the Agreement on the European Economic Area does not contain any provision corresponding to Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

---
#### William O. Chesser, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

Opinion Filed February 3, 1923.

1. Technical error committed by a trial court in the reception or rejection of evidence does not necessarily constitute harmful error. It is injury resulting from error that warrants an appellate court 'in reversing a judgment of the trial court.

2. Where the accused becomes a witness in his Own behalf and from his own statement a verdict against him is justified, a judgment of conviction will not be reversed even if technical errors were committed in rulings on the admissibility of evidence.

*152A Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for St. Johns County; George Couper Gibbs, Judge.

Affirmed.

*JS. Noble Calhoun,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Rivers Buford,*Attorney General, for the State.

West, J.

Upon an indictment charging murder in the first degree plaintiff in error was tried and convicted of murder in the second degree. To review the judgment imposing the sentence writ of error was taken from this court.

Assignments of error question the propriety of rulings of the court below made during the'progress of the trial excluding or admitting evidence, but the view we take of the case renders it unnecessary to discuss these assignments. The evidence excluded, accepting the theory of the defense, went only to the question of the credibility of certain State witnesses, while the evidence admitted over objections of defendant went to the question of the reputation of the deceased. Even if technically erroneous, it is clear, considering the entire case, that there is harmful error in none of these rulings, and the rule is well established in this jurisdiction that it is injury resulting from error, not error alone, that warrants an appellate court in reversing a judg*ment of conviction upon an indictment for crime. Sec. 2812, Rev. Gen. Stat.

The ruling denying the motion of ■ defendant for new trial is assigned as error. This motion presents the question of the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. Defendant testified as a witness in his own behalf. From his own statement of the facts surrounding the homicide *153tbe jury was justified in finding Mm guilty of murder in the second degree. In this situation he is in no position to find fault with rulings even though technically erroneous, excluding or admitting evidence of the character involved here. The principal is well established that a judgment of conviction will not be reversed, even if technical errors were committed- in rulings on the -admissibility of evidence, where the evidence of- guilt is ample and no fundamental rights of the defendant are infringed. (Ward v. State, *supra)*; Ward v. State, 82 Fla. 383, 90 South. Rep. 157; Poyner v. State, 81 Fla. 726, 88 South Rep. 762; McQuagge v. State, 80 Fla. 768, 87 South. Rep. 60; Dixon v. State, 79 Fla. 587, 84 South. Rep. 541; Higgins v. State, 78 Fla. 459, 83 South. Rep. 267.

The judgment is affirmed.

Taylor, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis and Browne, J. J., concur.
#### § 622.76 Definitions.

Unless noted otherwise, the definitions set forth in § 622.2 of subpart A shall apply to this subpart.
Case:17-03283-LTS   Doc#:23146   Filed:12/22/22   Entered:12/22/22 13:08:03    Desc: MainDocument     Page 1 of 3

Case:17-03283-LTS   Doc#:23146   Filed:12/22/22   Entered:12/22/22 13:08:03    Desc: MainDocument     Page 2 of 3

Case:17-03283-LTS   Doc#:23146   Filed:12/22/22   Entered:12/22/22 13:08:03    Desc: MainDocument     Page 3 of 3
#### Catherine A. Pope, Respondent, *v.*John A. Wilbur et al., Appellants.

Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court of the city of Hew York, and from a judgment entered thereon, affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon -the verdict of a jury and affirming an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial.

Dudley R. Horton, for appellants.

Benjamin E. Edsall (Isaac L. Miller, of counsel), for respondent.

*774
      *Per Curiam.*

The defendants claimed, and were accorded the affirmative. It then became incumbent upon them to show that the premises became untenantable, and this, according to the verdict, they failed to do.

There was no error in the charge. The jury were left to say whether the damages rendered the building untenantable, and were instructed properly in regard to the defendants’ nonliability in case of untenantability. There is no merit in any of the exceptions.

Present: Truax, P. J., Scott and Dugro, JJ.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MAY 17, 2019

NO. 03-17-00483-CV

Integrity Global Security, LLC; and Green Hills Software, Inc., Appellants

v.

Dell Marketing L.P., a Texas Limited Partnership, Dell Federal Systems, L.P., a Texas 

Limited Partnership; and Dell Products, L.P., a Texas Limited Partnership, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES KELLY AND SMITH

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART --

OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court on May 5, 2017. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment as to Integrity Global Security, LLC’s claims for the $1.75 million and $1.25 

million minimum license commitment payments. Therefore, the Court reverses and remands the 

trial court’s order granting summary judgment as to those two payments. We affirm the 

remainder of the trial court’s rulings on summary judgment. The parties each shall bear one-half 

the costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.31


                               FIRST AMENDMENT TO
                             OPERATING AGREEMENT OF
                       HEART HOSPITAL OF SOUTH DAKOTA, LLC


         THIS FIRST AMENDMENT (the "Amendment") to the Operating Agreement (the
"Operating Agreement") of HEART HOSPITAL OF SOUTH DAKOTA, LLC, a North Carolina
limited liability company (the "Company") is made and entered into effective as
of July 31, 1999 by and among the undersigned Members of the Company. All terms
not defined herein shall have the meaning provided therefore in the Operating
Agreement.

                                    RECITALS:

         1.       The Operating Agreement has previously been executed by and
among the Members of the Company;

         2.       The Members desire to amend the Operating Agreement in
accordance with the terms of this Amendment;

         NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as
follows:

         1.       The following provision is hereby added to the Operating
Agreement as Section 5.10(b)(viii):

                  No Member or Affiliate of a Member who is a physician shall be
                  prohibited from personally providing professional medical
                  services to patients through his or her medical practice and
                  from billing and receiving professional fees payable as a
                  result of his or her professional medical services provided
                  directly to patients, it being acknowledged that this is not
                  intended to permit any investment, ownership or other
                  beneficial interest in the equipment, facilities or technical
                  components of any CV Services or Facilities.

         2.       Except as provided above, the Operating Agreement remains in
full force and effect.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as
of the day and year first above written.

[***]

[***] These portions of this exhibit have been omitted and filed separately
with the Commission pursuant to a request for confidential treatment.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Aldila, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned officers of Aldila, Inc. hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Aldila, Inc.

/s/ Peter R. Mathewson Peter R. Mathewson
Chief Executive Officer/s/ Scott M. Bier Scott M. Bier
Chief Financial Officer


A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Aldila, Inc. and will be retained by Aldila, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

March 16,
2009

---



QuickLinks
§ 1248.6 Covered programs, policies, and practices. ( a ) *Enterprise Change Management Processes.* Each Enterprise must establish and maintain an Enterprise-wide governance process to ensure that any proposed changes to covered programs, policies, and practices that may cause misalignment are identified, reviewed, escalated, and submitted, in writing, to FHFA for review and approval in a timely manner, including proposed changes to covered programs, policies, and practices that were previously aligned at the direction of FHFA as conservator. ( 1 ) Submissions to FHFA must include projections for prepayment rates and for removals of delinquent loans under a range of interest rate environments and assumptions concerning borrower defaults.
( 2 ) Submissions to FHFA must include an analysis of the impact on borrowers and impact on the fastest paying quartile of each cohort.
( 3 ) Submissions to FHFA must include an analysis of identified risks and may include potential mitigating actions.
( b ) *Enterprise Monitoring.* Any changes to covered programs, policies, and practices that an Enterprise reasonably should identify as having been a likely cause of an unanticipated divergence between Enterprises in the three-month CPR of the same cohort shall be reported promptly to FHFA in writing.
( c ) *FHFA Monitoring.* FHFA will monitor changes to covered programs, policies, and practices for effects on cash flows to TBA-eligible MBS investors.
EXHIBIT A

PARTY APPEARANCE SHEET 

Name of Party Grisell Cuevas-Rodríguez

Party Name Abbreviation 

(For Use with Zoom) 

GCR / Pico, Jaime / Labor 

Counsels 

Omnibus Hearing Participant 

Attorney(s) Representing Party (provide the listed 

information for each attorney who may appear for the 

Party): 

• Name, 

• Email, 

• Law Firm, 

• Phone Number and 

• Docket Entry No. for the Attorney’s Notice of 

Appearance 

• Zoom Screen Name 

Jaime E. Picó-Rodríguez 

pico@laborcounsels.com

Labor Counsels LLC 

787-758-1400 

No. 3268 

GCR / Pico, Jaime / Labor 

Counsels

If a Party files a supplemental Party Appearance Sheet, 

the Party must include the Docket Entry No. of the 

original appearance sheet in the new filing which must 

be clearly marked as a “Supplemental” Party 

Appearance Sheet.

Note: Pursuant to the December Omnibus Hearing 

Procedures Order ¶ 1, the Financial Oversight and 

Management Board for Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico 

Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority shall 

each be limited to 4 attorneys appearing in the Zoom 

session at any given time, and each other party-in-interest 

shall be limited to 2 attorneys at any given time.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:19882-1 Filed:01/25/22 Entered:01/25/22 14:23:32 Desc:

Exhibit Party Appearance Cover Sheet Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 1-D

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:22660-4 Filed:10/21/22 Entered:10/21/22 10:47:13 Desc:

Exhibit 1-D Page 1 of 7
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 4496** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. QUINTON RASHARD STEVENSON , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Spartanburg
. J. Michelle Childs , District Judge. ( 7:15

- cr - 00846

- JMC

- 1 )

Submitted : February 23 , 2017 Decided: February 27, 2017

Before SHEDD and DIAZ , Circuit Judges, and DAVIS , Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alan Lance Crick, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Quinton Rashard Stevenson appeals his within

- Guidelines 40

- month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to being a felon in possess ion of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Stevenson’s counsel filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that he found no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the length of Stevenson’s sentence. Stevenson filed a supplemental pro se brief claiming that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government has not responded to the Anders brief or the supplemental pro se brief
. In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Because the record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that those claims should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. See United States v. Benton , 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008)
. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment
. This court requires that counsel inform Stevenson , in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further rev iew. If Stevenson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to3 withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served o n Stevenson
. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED