_______________________________ 

 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 489009 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor 

Robert P. Young, Jr. Opinion Stephen J. Markman 

FILED MAY 19, 2004 

STEVEN J. VALCANIANT and KATHLEEN A. 

VALCANIANT, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v No. 121141 

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee 

and 

DE ANGELIS LANDSCAPE, INC., 

Defendant. 

PER CURIAM 

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether Detroit 

Edison Company owed plaintiff1

 a legal duty to de-energize 

an overhead power line that was severed by equipment being 

operated under plaintiff’s direction. Relying on Groncki v 

1 Throughout this opinion, "plaintiff" refers only to

Steven J. Valcaniant. Although plaintiff’s wife, Kathleen

A. Valcaniant, is also a party to the lawsuit, her claims

are derivative. 
 

 

Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644; 557 NW2d 289 (1996), the 

Court of Appeals held that Edison had no reason to foresee 

plaintiff’s injury because it had no reason to foresee that 

plaintiff was the cause of the fault and, as a result, did 

not owe a legal duty to plaintiff.2 We affirm. 

I 

In 1974, plaintiff purchased a four-acre gravel lot in 

Imlay City; in 1987, he opened a used car business. At all 

times, uninsulated power lines owned by Edison existed 

along the back property line. These lines were suspended 

more than twenty-five feet in the air. Plaintiff admitted 

that he was aware of the lines and the danger they posed. 

On August 15, 1995, plaintiff was injured while giving 

directions to the driver of a dump truck delivering fill 

dirt to the back portion of his property. As the truck 

became free of the weight of its load, it rose upward and 

its highest edge severed an overhead power line. The 

ground was wet, and the electricity that flowed through the 

truck continued through the ground to plaintiff, who was 

standing six or seven feet away, knocking him unconscious. 

A sensor known as an automatic reclosure device 

detected the fault in the severed line almost immediately, 

2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 19,

2002 (Docket No. 227499). 

2
 
 

 

and momentarily stopped the current flow. Because many 

faults are temporary, the sensor is designed to restart the 

current flow three times within a period of six seconds, 

checking each time to see whether the fault remains. If 

the fault has cleared, the sensor will allow the line to 

remain energized. If, after these three cycles, the fault 

remains, the sensor will completely de-energize the line. 

By using this sensor, Edison can avoid unnecessary 

interruptions of its customers’ service that would be 

caused by faults occasioned by a power line’s fleeting 

contact with objects like tree limbs and small animals. 

Here, the sensor operated as intended; it restarted 

the current three times and then de-energized the line when 

the fault failed to clear. Plaintiff suffered seconddegree burns to his back and arm from the shocks that he 

received while the sensor completed its cycles. 

II 

Plaintiff and his wife sued Edison, alleging that the 

company was liable in tort.3 Edison moved for summary 

disposition, arguing that it owed no legal duty to 

plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed the motion by arguing that 

Edison owed it a legal duty to de-energize the severed 

3 They also sued the contractor who operated the dump

truck. That party was later dismissed by stipulation. 

3
 
 

 

 

power line immediately. Plaintiff asserted that Edison 

should have foreseen that its use of the sensor could cause 

injury. The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied 

Edison’s motion. 

The Court of Appeals granted Edison’s application for 

leave for interlocutory appeal and reversed the decision of 

the trial court. After considering this Court’s opinion in 

Groncki, it concluded that Edison owed no legal duty to 

plaintiff and was entitled to summary disposition. 

We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to 

appeal. 468 Mich 868 (2003). 

III 

We review de novo appeals relating to summary 

disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 

817 (1999). The existence of a legal duty is a question of 

law.4 Groncki, 453 Mich 649; Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 

124, 130; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). In determining whether a 

legal duty exists, courts examine a variety of factors, 

including “foreseeability of the harm, degree of certainty 

4

 Duty concerns whether a defendant is under any legal

obligation to act for the benefit of the plaintiff.

Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 100; 490 NW2d 330 (1992).

This concept should be distinguished from the standard of

care, which, in negligence cases, always requires

reasonable conduct. See id. (distinguishing “between duty

as the problem of the relational obligation between the

plaintiff and the defendant, and the standard of care that

in negligence cases is always reasonable conduct”). 

4
 
 

 

 

of injury, closeness of connection between the conduct and 

injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of 

preventing future harm, and . . . the burdens and 

consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability 

for breach.” Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101 n 4; 490 

NW2d 330 (1992) (citing Prosser & Keaton, Torts [5th ed], 

§ 53, p 359 n 24). See also Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 

443 Mich 445, 450; 506 NW2d 175 (1993). 

In this case, plaintiff does not argue that Edison 

failed to inspect the power lines, or that the lines were 

in disrepair.5 Instead, plaintiff argues that Edison had a 

legal duty to de-energize the power line immediately and 

completely after it was severed by the dump truck. This 

Court addressed a power company’s legal duty to de-energize 

a power line in Groncki. That case consolidated three 

lawsuits brought against Edison by individuals who were 

injured when equipment they were using outdoors came into 

contact with overhead power lines.6 453 Mich 650-653 

5 As a result, this Court’s opinion in Schultz, 443

Mich 451, in which we held that the standard of care

requires a power company “to reasonably inspect and repair

wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and 

remedy hazards and defects,” is not pertinent to this case. 

6 In Groncki, a condominium complex’s maintenance 

supervisor accidentally brought an aluminum ladder into

contact with a power line twenty-one feet overhead. In 

Bohnert, a truck driver deployed his truck’s unloading boom

in a way that caused it to contact a power line twenty-six 

5
 
 

 

 

(opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.). In the lead opinion, Chief 

Justice BRICKLEY concluded that the injuries suffered by the 

three plaintiffs were not foreseeable and that Edison owed 

them no legal duty. He added that public policy 

considerations, including the “public’s need for electric 

power at a reasonable cost,” further militated against 

imposing a legal duty under the circumstances. Id. at 661.7 

Similar considerations are implicated in this case. 

However, we need not reach the balancing required by 

Buczkowski. See Buczkowski, supra at 101 (“Other 

considerations may be, and usually are, more important 

[than foreseeability].”). The circumstances surrounding 

plaintiff’s injury fail to satisfy even the lowest 

threshold requirement—that the harm incurred was 

foreseeable. See Brown v Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc, 459 

Mich 874 (1998). 

feet overhead. Finally, in Parcher, a construction worker

used a forklift to move scaffolding and caused the 

scaffolding to contact a power line that was thirty-five

feet overhead. 

7 No other justice signed the lead opinion. Justice 

Boyle concurred in the result only. Id. at 665. Justice 

Weaver, joined by Justice RILEY, concurred with Chief 

Justice BRICKLEY regarding the rationale and disposition of

the claims against Edison, but dissented regarding the

liability imposed on a nonutility defendant. Id. at 674. 

Justice MALLETT, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, concurred in the

disposition of Bohnert and Parcher, but dissented in 

Groncki because they believed that the harm suffered by

that plaintiff was foreseeable. Id. at 665. Finally,

Justice LEVIN dissented in all three cases. Id. at 681. 

6
 
 

 

 

 

Edison had no obligation to anticipate that the dump 

truck operated under plaintiff’s direction would sever an 

overhead power line that was suspended more than twentyfive feet above the ground, much less that plaintiff would 

be standing on wet ground several feet away. As a result, 

Edison had no legal duty to anticipate that plaintiff might 

be injured when the sensor device briefly re-energized the 

line, as it was designed to do, or to take other steps to 

prevent plaintiff’s injury. Because we conclude that 

plaintiff’s injuries were unforeseeable as a matter of law, 

we need not consider other variables that might militate 

against the imposition of a legal duty where harm is 

foreseeable. See Buczkowski, supra at 102.8 

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals opinion 

reversing the decision of the trial court and remanding 

this case for entry of an order of summary disposition in 

favor of Edison. MCR 7.302(G)(1). 

Maura D. Corrigan

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

8 We noted in Buczkowski that “[w]here foreseeability

fails as an adequate template for the existence of a duty,

recourse must be had to the basic issues of policy

underlying the core problem whether the plaintiff’s

interests are entitled to legal protection against the

defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 102. 

7
 
_______________________________ 

 

 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

STEVEN J. VALCANIANT and 

KATHLEEN A. VALCANIANT, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

No. 121141 

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

DE ANGELIS LANDSCAPE, INC., 

Defendant. 

KELLY, J. (concurring in result only). 

The majority concludes that defendant Detroit Edison 

Company has no duty to de-energize an electrical line that 

is accidentally severed by another’s negligence. I find 

its analysis flawed. 

As Justice Levin recognized in Groncki v Detroit 

Edison Co,1 this Court continues to confuse duty and 

proximate causation with respect to electric utility 

companies. The result has been that these companies are 

now exempt from a broad duty to exercise due care for the 

1 453 Mich 644, 679-680; 557 NW2d 289 (1996) (Levin,

J., dissenting). 
welfare of others. Because I cannot agree that this should 

be the law, I must dissent from the analysis. 

CLARIFYING TORT LIABILITY 

Traditionally, there are four elements to a tort: 

duty, breach, causation, and damages. Case v Consumers 

Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). All but the 

last are at issue in this case. 

Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff is a 

question of law. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 

NW2d 842 (1995). Recognition of a duty implicates various 

considerations: the relationship between the parties, the 

nature and foreseeability of the risk to be avoided, and 

the burdens and benefits of recognition. See Buczowski v 

McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101-103; 490 NW2d 330 (1992). Among 

strangers who lack a special relationship to one another, 

the duty owed is most basic, that of reasonable conduct 

under the circumstances. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 

443; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), citing Restatement of Torts, 2d, 

§ 283. 

Whether a defendant fulfilled or whether it breached 

its duty in a given case is a question of fact. Murdock v 

Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 53; 559 NW2d 639 (1997). In a 

controversy among strangers who lack a special 

relationship, the trier of fact must decide whether the 

2
 
defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable care for 

the safety of others. 

The element of causation addresses whether a 

defendant’s breach of its duty caused the plaintiff’s 

injury. Causation has two components. The first is actual 

causation: whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the 

defendant’s breach of its duty toward the plaintiff. It is 

a question of fact, which is also resolved by the trier of 

fact. 

The second component is proximate or legal cause. A 

defendant’s breach of duty is said to have proximately 

caused a plaintiff’s injury only where the defendant 

reasonably could have foreseen the kind of harm that befell 

the plaintiff. It is unnecessary that the exact mechanism 

or sequence of events leading to the harm be reasonably 

foreseeable. Dobbs, Torts, Proximate Cause, ch 10, § 180, 

p 444 (2001). The foreseeability requirement arises from 

the principles that liability should be limited in a 

practical manner and should comport with notions of 

justice. Dobbs, § 181, p 446. Proximate cause is a 

question of law. Moning at 440. 

The effect of foreseeability on duty and proximate 

cause confounded Judges Cardozo and Andrews in the famous 

3
 
 

 

 

case Palsgraf v Long Island R Co2 and continues to vex 

jurists today. This Court has adopted Judge Cardozo’s view 

that whether a duty is owed depends on whether harm is 

reasonably foreseeable. See Moning at 439, 441. 

ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES OWE THE PUBLIC A BROAD DUTY 

The Court today affirms the holding in Groncki that 

inadvertent contact with overhead electric utility lines is 

not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law. Therefore, 

electric utilities do not owe a duty to others to take 

reasonable precautions to guard against that risk. I 

cannot agree. 

It is quite reasonably foreseeable that someone may 

act in negligent disregard for his own safety and contact 

an overhead electric utility line. I take judicial notice 

that, with respect to electrical lines, about five percent 

of all workplace fatalities each year are electrocutions. 

United States Dep’t of Labor, 2002 Census of Fatal 

Occupational Injuries (Charts), <http://www.bls.gov/ 

iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0001.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2004). Heavy 

equipment that reaches great heights is routinely operated 

in modern society. Thus, under the appropriate negligence 

analysis, electric utilities owe a duty to the general 

2 248 NY 339; 162 NE 99 (1928). 

4
 
public to conduct their business so as not to create an 

unreasonable risk of accidental electrocution. 

As this Court has held: 

Those engaged in transmitting electricity 

are bound to anticipate ordinary use of the area

surrounding the lines and to appropriately

safeguard the attendant risks. The test to 

determine whether a duty was owed is not whether

the company should have anticipated the 

particular act from which the injury resulted,

but whether it should have foreseen the 

probability that injury might result from any 

reasonable activity done on the premises for 

business, work, or pleasure. . . . 

Where service wires erected and maintained 

by an electric utility company carry a powerful

electric current, so that persons coming into

contact with or proximity to them are likely to

suffer serious injury or death, the company must

exercise reasonable care to protect the public

from danger. The degree of care required is that

used by prudent persons in the industry, under 

like conditions and proportionate to the dangers

involved, to guard against reasonably foreseeable

or anticipated contingencies. [Schultz v 

Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 452-454; 506

NW2d 175 (1993) (emphasis added).] 

In short, electric companies have a duty to conduct 

themselves reasonably under the circumstances. 

In this case, the majority frames the issue as whether 

defendant had a duty to do a specific act: de-energize a 

severed line until the cause of the fault can be 

determined. It then treats Steven Valcaniant’s negligence 

as conclusive evidence that defendant does not owe a duty 

to perform that act. The majority finds that it is not 

5
 
 

reasonably foreseeable that someone in Mr. Valcaniant’s 

position would contact the electrical line involved here. 

The majority’s analysis might be appropriate in a 

contributory negligence jurisdiction where the effect of 

the plaintiff’s negligence, even when slight, is to absolve 

the defendant of all legal liability. But, Michigan long 

ago abandoned this harsh tort theory. Placek v Sterling 

Hts, 405 Mich 638, 701; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). Rather, a 

defendant may be liable to a negligent plaintiff to the 

extent his negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury. See 

MCL 600.2956. 

Here, it is reasonably foreseeable that heavy 

equipment, such as the raised bed of a dump truck, would 

contact an overhead electrical line, causing injury. Thus, 

defendant owed plaintiffs a duty to install its 

distribution lines in a manner that does not create an 

unreasonable risk from such a vehicle. I do not agree 

that, as a matter of law, electric utility companies owe 

the public no duty to take reasonable precautions to 

protect it from accidental contact with their lines. The 

absence of a duty encourages utility defendants to rely on 

customs in the industry and discourages innovation of new 

and safer ways to deliver electricity. 

6
 
Blind reliance on industry customs was rejected more 

than seventy years ago in the famous case of The TJ Hooper, 

60 F2d 737 (CA 2, 1932). See also 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, 

§ 295A, illus 2. There, the owners of a tugboat failed to 

furnish emergency radios to their crew, because such radios 

were not standard equipment in the industry. The federal 

appeals court held that reliance on custom was a 

consideration in whether the defendant acted reasonably in 

providing for the crew’s safety, but was not conclusive. 

That decision has encouraged the standard of care to evolve 

as technology advances. The same principle applies here. 

WHY SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 

Once we recognize that defendant has a broad duty to 

exercise due care to protect the public, the question 

becomes whether it breached its duty. The jury should 

determine whether defendant acted reasonably in this case 

by placing its lines (1) high off the ground, (2) in plain 

view near the back of plaintiffs’ property, (3) away from 

easy access by the public, and (4) by installing a 

reclosure device to minimize dangerous power failures and 

protect plaintiff from being exposed to a continuous 

charge. 

The following facts are without contest: (1) plaintiff 

Stephen Valcaniant knew that defendant’s electrical lines 

7
 
were in the air at the back of his property and that they 

were dangerous; (2) defendant had placed its lines higher 

than the height recommended by the National Electric Safety 

Code, American National Standards Institute, National 

Electric Safety Code, Table 232-1 (1989); (3) the lines 

remained more than seven feet above that recommendation at 

the time of the accident, even after plaintiff had raised 

the grade of the ground below; (4) had the lines been 

placed underground, they could have been susceptible to 

flooding and accidental contact with digging equipment; (5) 

defendant installed automatic reclosure devices to avoid 

unnecessarily mobilizing repair crews to restore electrical 

service interrupted by intermittent short circuits from 

tree limbs and wildlife; (6) these reclosure devices have 

become standard in the industry, and can eliminate up to 

eighty percent of power disruptions; (7) interruptions in 

electrical service can endanger lives in such ways as 

disabling medical devices and traffic signals; (8) the 

lines and equipment were in good repair. 

Considering today’s limitations on maintaining a 

reliable electrical system, no reasonable juror could 

disagree that defendant met its duty. Therefore, on the 

basis of facts and reasoning not given in the opinion per 

8
 
curiam, I agree that the Court of Appeals properly ordered 

a grant of summary disposition for defendant. 

CONCLUSION 

I believe that the proper analysis of this case is 

that electric utility companies have a broad duty to take 

reasonable care for the safety of others. The commodity 

they provide carries risks from which the public must be 

protected. Defendant must fulfill its duty to protect the 

public against reasonably foreseeable negligent contact 

with its electrical lines. 

In this case, defendant presented unrebutted evidence 

that its actions comported with industry standards and that 

preferable alternatives are not reasonably available. I 

would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and 

direct an order entering summary disposition for defendant. 

Marilyn Kelly 

9