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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0112p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

MYRON BASS, 

Plaintiff, 

KAREN MOBLEY; LAWRENCE EVERETT REED, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

TOM LEATHERWOOD, Register of Deeds, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 14-6321 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. 

No. 2:13-cv-02882—James D. Todd, District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: June 4, 2015 

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GILMAN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

ORDER

_________________ 

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Karen P. Mobley and Lawrence Everett Reed filed a pro se 

complaint on behalf of the Karen Mobley Gunn Estate and the Lawrence Everett Reed Estate, 

respectively. They contended that various financial institutions fraudulently transferred real 

estate properties in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling 

properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed the complaint on the 

ground that a nonattorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an 

estate, even though Mobley and Reed claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their 

respective estates. On appeal, the financial institutions have again moved to dismiss the case for 

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No. 14-6321 Bass, et al. v. Leatherwood, et al. Page 2 

lack of jurisdiction because Mobley and Reed each signed the notice of appeal as the 

“Authorized Representative” of the estates. R. 82; see 28 U.S.C. § 1654. 

 Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by 

counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. In 1997, the Second Circuit interpreted this language to impose a 

barrier on pro se litigants wishing to appear on behalf of “another person or entity,” including a 

corporation, a partnership, a minor child, or “an estate . . . when the estate has beneficiaries or 

creditors other than the litigant.” Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997). The 

court reasoned that “appearance pro se denotes (in law latin) appearance for one’s self,” but 

“when an estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the administratrix or executrix, the 

action cannot be described as the litigant’s own.” Id. This court adopted the Second Circuit’s 

reasoning in Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 2002), prohibiting a litigant from 

proceeding pro se “because he is not the sole beneficiary of the decedent’s estate.” Id. at 970 

(citing Pridgen, 113 F.3d at 393). 

Although the above cases imply that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors 

may represent the estate pro se, this court has never resolved the issue directly. We now hold 

that he or she may do so. “The rule against non-lawyer representation ‘protects the rights of 

those before the court’ by preventing an ill-equipped layperson from squandering the rights of 

the party he purports to represent.” Zanecki v. Health Alliance Plan of Detroit, 576 F. App’x 

594, 595 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 

400 (4th Cir. 2005)). The purpose of the rule, then, is to protect third parties. But that purpose 

has no role to play when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the 

nonattorney herself. 

The Second Circuit has reached the same conclusion. “[T]he administrator and sole 

beneficiary of an estate with no creditors,” it has concluded, “may appear pro se on behalf of the 

estate.” Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 2010). Writing for the court, Judge Calabresi 

reasoned: 

It is only a legal fiction that assigns the sole beneficiary’s claims to a paper 

entity—the estate—rather than the beneficiary himself. Accordingly, pro se

representation is consistent with our jurisprudence both on the right to selfrepresentation and on the prohibition of appearances by non-attorneys on behalf 
No. 14-6321 Bass, et al. v. Leatherwood, et al. Page 3 

of others. Because the administrator is the only party affected by the disposition 

of the suit, he is, in fact, appearing solely on his own behalf. This being so, the 

dangers that accompany lay lawyering are outweighed by the right to selfrepresentation . . . . 

Id. In this case, the appellants have stipulated that they are the sole beneficiaries of their 

respective estates and that their estates lack creditors. R. 66 ¶ 3. The appellees have not 

contested either point. Although the record does not reveal why the appellants are litigating on 

behalf of estates and not on behalf of themselves as individuals, § 1654 does not bar this appeal. 

 The appellees insist that we have misread Shepherd, which in their view held that 

nonattorneys may not represent any artificial entities, including estates in which the pro se 

litigants are the sole beneficiaries. The district court read the case the same way. See R. 64 at 

10–11. It is true that, under longstanding tradition, “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” 

Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 829 (1824) (emphasis added), perhaps because 

by definition another person—natural or artificial—is involved, see Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. 

v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636–37 (1819); United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, 416 

F.2d 1244, 1245 (6th Cir. 1969). But we have never extended the logic of this rule to estates. In 

Shepherd and similar cases we held only that § 1654 “does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se 

where interests other than their own are at stake,” 313 F.3d at 970—a situation distinct from the 

one here. 

 For these reasons, we deny the appellees’ motion. 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

 _________________________________ 

 Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk