No. 3--05--0724

______________________________________________________________________________ Filed August 15, 2007. IN TH E AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS

THIR D DI STRICT A.D., 2007 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court IL LI NOI S, ) of the 10t h Judicial Cir

cuit, ) Peoria Co

unty , Illi nois Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 04-CF-897 v. ) ) MARTEZ H

ARRIS, ) Honorable ) James E. Shadid, Defend ant-App ellant. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CARTER del ivered t

he opinion

of the co urt:

______________________________________________________________________________ After a jury

trial, defendant, Martez Harris, was found g uilty of armed robbe

ry (720IL CS 5/18-2(a)(2) (We st 2004)) and was s entence d to 24 y ears’ im prisonme nt. Defe ndant app eals his convictiona nd sentence and argue s that: (1)

he was de

nied a fa ir trial w hen the Sta

te imprope

rly im peac hed him in rebuttal with a certified copy of one of his prior juvenile adjudications; and (2) the trial judg e erre d in

sentencing by

consideringunreliable hearsay testimony reg arding defendant’s involveme

nt in other

criminal activity . We affir

m.

FACTS Defendant

was charged with the Aug ust 23, 2004, armed robberies of Steve Johnson (count one) and Mary H elms (counts two and three). The indictment alleged that the defendant committed2

the offense s whilearmed with a handgun. The case pr oceeded to jury

trial three times. The first two times ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The ev idence pres ented in the third trial, relevant to this appeal, can be summarized as follows. On August 23, 2004, at about 1:00 a.m., Sparky’s Ring side Tap in Peoria was robbed. At the time of the robbery , Steve Johnson was working in the bar as the bartender. The lights were on and Johnson had just closed the bar for the evening . Mary Helms wa s inside the

bar visiti ng with Johnson and was t

he only other pe rson in the

bar. A short, stocky

male black sub

ject with frizzy hair and wearing a puffy black win

ter coa t came int o the bar . The subj ect appe ared to be about 20 yea rs old. Johnson wen

t up to the subject to tell him that the bar w as close d. A second subjec t came int o the bar behind the first. The second subject had a mas k on his fa

ce and a gun in his

hand. Johnson yelled to Helms that the bar was being robbed and told her to duck and

run. Johnson and Helms ran out of the back door of the bar and away from the area and called the police. Onthe witne ss stand, b oth Johnson a nd Helms identified defendant as the first subject who had entered the bar. Helms testified further that af ter she ran

out of the bar, she saw def endant, the subject wearing the mask, and a third subject running away

from the bar. Defendant was carr ying Helms’s purse and the subject wearing the ma sk was carry ing the cash register fr

om the bar. Defendant

denied c ommitting

th e armed ro bb er y. Du

ring his direct testimony, de fendant was specifically a sked by his attorney if he committed the crime. Defendant responded: “No sir. There is no possible way that I could have committed this crime. I mea

n people w

ho commit

robberi es, thing s like that , have a motive, have a reason for do ing thing s like that . But I am a professional man. I

work. I go to college. I we

nt to Rober

t Morris,3 ICC, Midstate. I mean, it’s no reason--I mea n Ilive a productive life. Ilive just like any of the 12 jurors, like y ou live. I don ’t co mmit crimes.” Inrebuttal, the prosecu

t or soug ht to introd

uce evid ence of defenda nt’s prior juvenile adjudications for ag grava ted batte ry with a fir

earm, a ggra vated dis charg e of a fi

r earm, th eft, and possession of a c ontrol led substance. The aggr avated battery

and aggravated disc

harge were committed

in August of 2000, about one mon th before defendant’s 16th birthday . Sentence was entered in February

of 2001 and was upheld by the appellate court. The theft adjudication occurr ed in1997 and the unlawful possession of a contro lled substa nce adjudication occurred in 1998 and again i n 2000. All five offenses were felonies. The pr osecutor argued that defenda nt had made a falsestatement and had presented a false portra yal of himself when

he told the jury that he does not commit crimes. The trial judge initially denied the prosecutor’s request. However, upon reconsideration, the trial judge g

ranted t he prose cutor’s

request , in

part, and decided to allow the prosecutor to impeach defendant’s testimony

with his prior juvenile adjudication for aggra vated battery

with a firearm and aggravated

discharge of a firear

m finding that the admission was “necessary

for a fair determination
on the issue of guilt or innocence in this case”. Defense counselobjected and argued that under the test set f orth in People v. Montgomery , 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-519, 268 N.E. 2d 695, 698-700 (1971), the prior adjudications were too prejudicial to beadmitted because of their similarity to the current offense in that

the prior offense s and the c

urrent o ffense

each inv olved the

use of a gun. The trial judge o verrule d defens e counse l’s objection, and i n doing s o, made th e followi ng comme

nts: “Well, Montgomery

r eq uires me to determine that the probative value4 is not outweighed by

the danger of unfair prej udic e, and c ertainly there is some prejudice here. Certainly there is prejudice a nytime a prior conviction is brought in as to a witne ss or a De fendant . In th is
caseI understand your poi nt, [defense counsel], that there is a gun case, that aggravated di s charge of a firea rm is a gun charge, ar

med robbery is complet

ely different elements and

circumstances, but the Courtalso cannot overlook the Defendant’s testimony that I don’t commit crimes as being factored in her e. This came

up during direct
ex aminati on. So when weighing the whole, when given the weight and weighing all the factors that I need to weigh, I am going to allow the most recent, the 2000 case ***.” A ce rt if ie d c op y o f the 200 0 adju dicat ion wa s admi tted i nto ev idenc e and t he tri al jud ge informed the jury that the exhibit indicated that defenda nt had been adjudicated a delinquent for aggravated

battery with a fir

earm an d agg ravate d dischar

ge of a firear m in a juve

nil e c ase in February of 2001. Immediately

after a dmi ttin g the pr ior ju venil e adju dicat ion, the tr ial j udge instructed the members of the jury

that “evidence of Defendant’s pre vious juvenile adjudication may be considered by

you only as it may affec t his belie

vability as a witness and must not be considered by y ou as evidence of his guilt of the offense f or which he is charged.” During the instruction ph ase of the trial, the jury was given a modified version of I PI 3.13 (Ill inois Patte

rn Jury Instr uction, Cr

iminal, No . 3.13 (4th

ed. 2000) ), which

read as follows: “Evidence of

a defen dant’s pr evious juv enile ad

judication(s) may be considered

by y ou only as it may

affect his believability

as a witness5 and must not be co nsidered by y ou as evidence of his guilt of the offense with which he is charged.” After deliber ation, the jury found de fendant

guilty of all three counts of

armed robbery . The
m atter was set for sentencing and a pre sentence investigation report (PSI) was ord ered. T he PS I provided further detail on defendant’s juvenile recor d. Only the major offe

nses are described below. InJune of 1997 , defend

ant was a djudic ated delinque nt for theft, a Class 3 Felony . The offense occurred in October of 1996. Defe ndant wa s sentenced t o two years pr obation in July of 1997. In March of 1998, a petition was filed alleging that defe ndant had violated his sentence by failing to repor

t to probation. During the pendency of the petition, defendant was placed on electronic moni torin g. A warrant was issued for defenda nt’s arrest for violation of home detention. Probation was revoked, and in July of 1998, de fendant was sentenced to a new term of probation

and to a 30 day per

iod of home detention. In Decemb er of 1998, defendant was adjudicated de linquent for unlawful possession of a controlled

substanc e, a Class

4 Felony . The off

ense occ urred in November of 1998. Defendant was sentenced to three yea

rs in the juve

nile Department of Corrections. I n May of 1999, def

endant was puton parole. In June of 1999, defendant was re turned to the Dep artment o f Correc tions on a p arole violation and a new offense. InMay of 2000, def

endant was adjudicated

delinquent for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 Felony
. The offense occurred in October of 1999. Defendant was sentenced to three ye ars in the

juvenile Departm ent of Cor

rection s in

May of 2000. He

was paroled inJune of 2000. In August of

2000, defendant was returned to the Depar tment of Corrections on a parole violation. Defendant’s sentence was later discha rged while he was serving a term in j uvenile6

Department of Corrections on another case. InJanuary of 2001, defe ndant was adjudicated delinquent for agg ravated ba ttery with a firear m, a Class X F el on y, and for unlawful discharge of a firearm, a Class 1 Felony . The offenses occurred in August of 2000. In Fe

bruary of 2001, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term inthe juvenile Department of Corrections. He was paroled in January of 2002. In October of 2002, defendant was returned to the Department of Corrections on a parole violation. Defendant was again paroled later that same month. Defendant

was returned to the Department of Corrections in July of 2003 on a parole violation. In Septe mber of 2003, defendant was aga in paroled. Defendant was discharged from his sentence in May of 2004. Other no table offenses listed in the PSI are as follows. I n June of 1998, defendant pled gu ilty to fle eing an d att empting to elude a police officer and wa s ordered to pay fines and costs. The defendant’s driver’ s license was subse quently

suspende d. In

April of 2 004, def

endant pl ed guilt

y to driving on a suspended license and was sentenc ed to court supervision. His supervision was later revoked for subsequent offenses, and a conviction was ente red. In September of 2004, d efenda nt
was convicted of two separate incidents of driving on

a suspended license. He was ordere d to pay costs and sentenced to 30 day s in jail. At the se ntenc ing hea ring, the prosecutor and defense counsel a

greed that sente

nce shou ld only be imposed

on o ne o f th e th ree cou nt s of arm ed r obb ery. In aggravation, the prosec utor called Detective Shannon Wa

ld e n to the stand. Walden was assigned to investigate three othe r armed robberies that occurred in Peoria at about the same time as the one in the c ur rent case. All of the robberi es, including the one in the current case, occurred

within approximately one week during the early morning

hours and involved subjects wearing masks and car rying ha ndguns.7

One of the other robberies that Walden investigated occ urred o n August

2 3, 2004, at 4:00
a.m. at the King’s Inn

Hotel. The attendant working thehotel at the time of the robbery stated that two black ma

le subjects came in

to the hote l wearin

g masks. The atte

ndant des cribed one of the subjects as beingshorter and wearing a blac k puffy winter c oat, similar to the description that was given of the de fendant

in the pre sent cas e. The su bjects fo rced the attenda nt to lay on the flo or while they ransacked the office. The attendant thought he recog nized the short male’s voice as someone who had rented a room at the hotel on several prior occasions and thought t hat the su bject’s n ame
was Martez or Martinez. The attendant checked the hotel rec ord s and found that defendant had rented from him seve r al times and that defendant was the person of whom he wa s thinking. The att endant identifie d a pictur

e of def endant a s the per son who ha d rented from him se

veral tim e s whose voice he thought he recog nized. Walden testified further

that he interviewed Andre Bowie re garding his involvement in the robberies and

Bowie gave a statement

implicating defendant in the King’s I nn robbery. B owie stated that defendant told him that

he had c ommitted th e robber y withAntwoin H arris an d that he w as a little bit worried because he thought that the attendant at the hotel might have recognized his voice since he had rent ed a room there se veral tim es in the p ast. Walden also was i

nvolved in

th e inv estigation of the Best Western armed robber y that occurred on August 24, 2004, at about 6:00 a.m. In that ca se, the a ttenda nt stated t hat two ma

le subjects came into the hotel wearing masks and forc ed her into a back room where they

tied her up. One of the subjects was taller and one was shorter. The subjects appeared to be in their late teens
or early twe nties. The two subjects ransacked the office a rea, put a safe up on a chair, and w heeled it out. A main

tenance person a nd custome

rs who ha ppened u pon the ro

bbery as it was i

n progr ess8

were also forced to the back room at gunpoint. At one point during the robbery , the shorter

subject ripped a key box off of t

he wall a nd threw it over to t

he taller subject. Bowie’s fingerprints were found on the key box. Bowie admitted to Walden that he was the person that the key box was thrown to and told Walden that defe ndant was the other person involved inthe robbery. Bowie’ s stateme nt to Walden

was cons istent with

what the v

ictims of th e Best Western robbery

had also told Walden. Walden was also involved in the investigation of the Clark Gas Station armed robbery that occurred on August 2 9, 2004, a

t about 3:0 0 a.m. In tha

t case, t he cler k stated that two mal e subjec ts
came into the gas station and that one of the subjects was wearing a mask. A short while later, a third subject came in. All three subjects were brandishing guns. They

forced the clerk down

on the ground and stole cigarettes, lottery tickets, and the surveillance video recorder, and then ran out of the station and left in a car. The clerk called the police and gave a description of the car. The police located the car and gave

chase. A license plate check re vealed that

the vehicle belonged to Debra Smullen. The officers giving cha se stated that a white female was driving the car and that there were three black males inside the vehicle. The c hase was eventually ca lled off for safety

reasons. The vehicle was later found abandoned with the video recor der and some of the other proc eeds o f the robbery and a ski mask still inside. A canine officer was able to trac k from the vehicle and found two handguns that

had been dropped. Fingerpr ints found on the video recorder and on the trunk area
were identifie d as Bowie’s. De fendant ’s fing erprints were found on the rear driver’ s side door. The clerk later ide ntified A ntwoin Ha rr is as on e o f t he su bj ec ts th at wa s i nv ol ve d i n t he ro bb er y, the one that wasn’t w earing

a mask. Smu

ll en and Bow ie both gave videotaped statements in which they implicated

th emselves and the defend ant. T he vid eotap es were played du ring th e sent encin g hearin g.9

Bowie and Smulle

n’s stateme nts were consistent with how the clerk described the robbe ry and consisten twith the video captured by a second surveillance recorder that was located in t

he ga s station. Oncros s exam

inati on, Wa

lden testified that defendant was arrested for the three other robberi es, but that no charges had been filed . Walden admitted that he was not present when Smullen was interviewed and that he had only reviewed the videotape. The defense presented no evidence in mitig ation. The prosecutor recommended that defendant be sentenced to 24 y

ears ’ imprisonment, largely because of the nature of the curr ent offense, the number and

nature of his previous offenses, and the need to prote ct the public. D efense counsel recomme

nded a ra nge of sentenc e more to wards the minimum of s ix ye ars’ imprisonme nt. Indetermining the length of imprisonment to impose, the trial judge found that none of the factors in mitigation

applied. As for the statutory factors in aggravation, the trial judge found that defendant had a history of prior de linquency or cr iminal activity and that the sentence was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. The trial judge noted that although defendant wa s young, he had acc

umulated quite a r ecord f or himself

in such a short per

iod of time . In r

egard s to the evidence presented that defenda nt was involved in other robberies, the trial judge stated: “[Defen se counsel] points out *** you shouldn’t be sentenced for four armed robberi es, whi ch the Court is not sentencing him for, [defense counsel], but it is re levant to determine the character and extent of pun ish ment. The Court is not

limited to c onsideri

ng only informationwh ic h would be admissible under adversarial circumstances of a trial, bu t I will exercise care to ensur e that the10 informationwas reliable, and I be lieve that the information was reliable based upo n the testimony of Detec tive Walde

n, and it is permissib le to look for

facts in a

ddition to th e facts

of the crime, search anywher e within reasonable bounds for other facts which tend to aggravate or

mitigate the offe nse and ma

y in dicate the defendant’s ge ne ral moral character, habits, social environment, ave rsion or inclination to commit crime. Motivations, for examp le, would be admissible, would

be relevant inquiry , and that’s what the C ourt will ba s e some of the information presented on under the--under that relevant inquiry.” The tria l judge s ubseque ntly sentenc ed defe

ndant to 24 years’ imprisonment. In imposing sentence, the trial judge commented:

“Your actions and your c

riminal activity

disrupt people’s lives from goingabout the ir daily

business w

hich they shoul d be ab le to go about freely and without looking over their shoulder, and

without the thought or the fear of

someone sticking them up, and it just comes down to that.” This appeal followed.

ANA LYSIS As his first contention on appeal, defendant argue s that he was denied a fair trial when the State improper

ly im peache d him in reb

uttal with a

certifi ed copy

of one of

his prior j uvenile11

adjudica tions. The State argues that defendant opened up the door to the subsequent impeachment by te stifying in direct examination that he does not commit crimes. We will not disturb a tria l judge’s decision to allow impeach ment with a

prior co nviction a

bsent an a buse of discretion. People v. Flowers , 306 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264, 714 N.E. 2d 577, 581 (1999). A juvenile ad

j ud ic at io n i s g en er al ly n ot ad mi ss ib le to im pe ac h a de fe nd an t’ s c re di bi li ty. Peop le v. Montgomer

y , 47 I ll. 2d 510, 5 17, 268 N. E. 2d 695, 6 99 (1971) . This ge neral pr inciple regarding the inadm

issibility of juveni le adjudica

tions prote cts individuals from the indiscretions of youth. See G. O’Reilly, Illinois Lifts the Veil On Juvenile Conviction Records , 83 Ill. B.J. 402, 403 (1995). However, when an adult defendant takes the stand and testifies falsely or inconsistently or present s a false or

misleading portray

al of himself to the jury, the juvenile a djudication may

become admissible, in the trial judge’s discretion, for the limited

purpose of impea ching that testimo ny. This is so, not simply

because of the notion of curative admissibility or bec ause the defendant “opened up the door” to t

he subseq uent impe achment , but rather, because the integrity of the entire judicial process depends upon it. A defendant who takes the stand has an obligation to speak truthfully and
ac cu ra te ly. Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222, 225, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 4, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-646 (1971). There is no right to testify false ly. S e e Harris , 401 U.S. a t 225-226, 28 L. E d. 2d at 4- 5, 91 S. Ct. at 645-646. A defendant cannot be allowed to use the policy- based prohibition against the admission of a juvenil e adjudic ation as a license to provide false testimony to the jury
. See Harris , 401 U.S. at 225-226, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 4-5, 91 S. Ct. at 645-646. I n fact, even where a much stron ge r prohibition exists, a constitutiona l one, the United St ates Sup reme Court has recognized that the State may have a

right to admit prohibited evidence to impeach a defendant’s false or inconsistent te st im on y. See Harris , 401 U.S. at 225-22 6, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 4-5, 91 S. Ct. at 645-646 (statement12

taken in violat ion of Miranda allowed to be used in cross examination to impeach defendant’s testimony); Oregon v. Hass , 42 0 U. S. 714 , 72 2-7 24, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 577-578, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1221 (1975) (statement taken in violation of Miranda allowed to be used in rebut tal t o impeach defendant’s testimony) United States v. Havens , 446 U.S. 620, 627-629, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 566-567, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 1916-1917 (1980) (evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment a llowed to b e admitt ed in reb

uttal to imp each de fendant ’s testimo ny) ; Michigan v. Harvey , 494 U.S. 344, 345-346, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293, 299, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1177-1178 (1990) (statement taken in violation of Sixth Amen

dment allowed to be

used in cr

oss examination to impeach defendant’s testimony)
.

Our supreme court has adopted and applied the rule set for th in Harris v. New York
. See People v. Sturgis , 58 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 317 N.E. 2d 545, 548 (1974) ; People v. Rosenberg , 213 I ll. 2d 69, 80, 8 20 N.E. 2d

440, 447- 448 (2004 ). Thus, it can be concluded on the facts of the present
casethat defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was properly admitted as an exercise of judicial discretion. See Harris , 401 U.S. at 225, 28 L . Ed. 2d at

4-5, 91 S. Ct . at 645-6 46; Hass , 420 U.S. at 722-724, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 577-578, 95 S. Ct. at 122 1; Havens , 446 U.S. at 627-629, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 566-567, 100 S. Ct. at

1916-191 7; Harvey , 494 U.S. at 345-346, 108 L. Ed. 2d

at 299, 110 S. Ct. at 1177-1178; Sturgis , 58 I ll. 2d at 216, 317 N.E. 2d at 548; Rosenberg , 213 Ill. 2d at 80, 820 N.E. 2d at 447-448. Defendant took the stand and made false stateme nts on direct examina tion , arguably attempting to portra

y hi mself and his char acter in a false manner. Had defendant not done so, the prior juvenile adjudication

would not have been admissible. See Montgomery , 47 Ill. 2d at 517, 268 N.E. 2d at 699. We are not persuade d by defenda nt’ s alternative argument that the prior juvenile adjudica tion13

should not have b een admi

tted bec ause its probativ e value w as outwe ighed b y its prejudic ial effe ct. It’s clear from the record that the trial judg e weighed the probative value and the prejudicial effect indetermining the admissibility of the prior adjudication. As a result of that balancing test, the trial judge ruled that only the most rece nt adjudicationwould be a dmissible and prohibited the State from introducing defendant’s other prior juvenile adjudications. In ma kin g that r ulin g, the t rial j udge considered

the general pr

ohibition a

gainst a dmitti ng a juvenile adjudica ti on to impeach a defendant’s testimony and also considered the harm that would result from allowing defendant’s false portray al to stand. The trial judge’s ruling struck a careful balanc e between the two competing concerns. The admission of the juvenile record as rebuttal evidence was not prejudicial err or where the defendant himself raised the issue of his character and past behavior. See People v. Williams , 192 I ll. 2d 548, 571, 736 N.E. 2 d 1001, 1014 (2000) (a criminal defendant cannot complain on appe al of the introduction of evidence which he procures or invites). N or are we persuad ed by defenda nt’s cont ention tha t the prop er rec ourse wa s to allow th e State to questio n defend

ant in cr oss examina

tion about his prior juvenile record, rather than to allow the State to introduce a certified a c op y o f the prior adjudication. The recourse sug gested by defendant here on appeal is far more p rejud icial than t he cou rse of a ction chose n by the tr ial j udge and would have possibly

subjecte d defend

ant to a br oad inquir y r egard ing his pr ior juven ile hi st or y. The trial judge properly

exercised his discretion. It need not b e deter

mined whe

ther in thi s context, the Montgomery test must be followed or whether the Harris v. New York

rule and the Montgomery test should be combined into a single rule. It is clear from the record before us that the trial judg e followed Montgomery and the parties do not argue that issue here. F urther e xamination o f that issu

e is bette r left to b e resolv ed when t he fact s14

give rise to the issue and the parties have briefed and a rgued the issue. For the purposes of this case, defendant’s affirmative resort to false or misleading testimony allows for exposure by i mpeachm ent. Thus, we decline to exclude that impeachment under Montgomery
. It is recognized that this decision on the first issue is direc tly c ontrary

to that of other distri cts of the appe llate cou

rt, which ha

ve held th at a defendant’s prior juvenile adjudications may ne ver be admitted under Montgomery
. See People v. Kerns , 229 I ll. App. 3d 938, 940-941, 595 N.E. 2d 207, 208-209 (1992); People v. Sneed , 274 I ll. App. 3d 287, 295 , 653 N.E. 2d 1349, 13 55 (1995) ; People
v. Massie , 137 Ill. App. 3d 723, 731, 484 N.E. 2d 1213, 1218-1219 (1985). Such a rule, however, cannot be reconciled with Harris v. New York
. It is also recognized that the rationale that is applied inthis opinion di ffers fro m the rule applied i n the appe llate dist

ricts tha t allow a prior juve

nile adjudicationto be admitted. See Peoplev. Bunch , 159 Ill. App. 3d 494, 513, 512 N.E. 2d 748, 761 (1987) (prior juvenile adjudication admitted as impeachment evidence whe re defendant “opened up the door” to the subsequent impeachment by testifying in direc

t examination about some aspect of his criminal record). The Harris v. New York rule provides much stronger support for a trial court’s decisionto allow the impeachment of a defenda nt with his prior juvenile adjudication and has been adopted by our supreme c ourt. See Sturgis , 58 Ill. 2 d at 216, 3 17 N.E. 2d at 548; Rosenberg , 213 Ill. 2d at 80, 820 N.E. 2d at 447-448. As his secon

d content ion on app eal, defenda

nt argu es that the trial judg e committe d an abus e of discretion in determining the appropriate sentence by placing significant weight on the unr

eliable hearsay testimony of Detective Walde n regarding defenda

nt ’s in vo lv em en t i n o th er cr im in al ac ti vi ty. Defe ndant

asserts that the proper method of proving those matters up at se ntencing is to have the witnesses who have personal knowledge of the events testify, ra

ther than to have the investigating15

officer testify

about what the witnesses told him. It is well settled that the ordinary r ules of evidence which govern a t trial are relaxed at

the sentencinghearing. People v. Jett , 294 Ill. App. 3d 822, 830, 691 N.E.2d 145, 152 (1998). Instead,
a sentencing court is given broad dis cretionary power to consider various sources and ty pes of informationso that it can make a sentencing determination within the para meters outlined by the legislature. People v. Williams , 149 Ill. 2d 467, 490, 599 N.E. 2d 913, 924 (1992). The court may search any where w ithin reasonable bounds for other facts which may serve to aggr avate or mitigate the offense. People v. Moore , 2 50 Ill. App. 3d 906, 919, 620 N.E. 2d 583, 592 (1993). It may inquire into adefendant’s gener al moral c haract er, habi ts, socia l environ ment, abn ormal ten dencies , age, natural inclination

or aver sion to com

mit crime, and stimuli

motivating

his conduc

t, in addition to his family life, occupation, and c riminal record. Moore , 250 Ill. App. 3d at 919, 620 N.E. 2d at 592. Thus, criminal conduct not resulting in prosecution or conviction may be considered. People v. Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d

401, 452, 626 N.E. 2d 161, 183 (1993) . Even conduct for which defendant has been acquitted may

be considered. Peoplev. Robinson , 286 Ill. App. 3d 903, 910, 676 N.E. 2d 1368, 1373 (1997). The only requireme

nt for admission of evidence in a sentencing hearing is that the evidenc e must be reliable and relevant

as determined

by the trial court within its sound discretion. Jett , 294 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 691 N.E.2d at 152. Thus the mere fact that the te st im on y presented contains hearsay does not make it per se inadmissible nor does it deny the de fendant his right to confront witnesses. Peoplev. Perez , 108 Ill. 2d 70, 86, 483 N.E. 2d 250, 258 (1985). A hearsa y objection affec ts the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Jett , 294 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 691 N.E.2d at 152. Hearsay

evidence may

be fo un d to be re levant, r eliable, and admis sible whe n it is16

corroborated

by other evidence. Jett , 294 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 691 N.E.2d at 152. A s entenci

ng cour t, however, must exercise care to insure the accurac y of information consider e d and to sh ield itsel f fromwhat might be the prejudicialeffect of improper materials. Williams , 149 Ill. 2d at 490, 599 N.E. 2d at 924. If it is shown that the d efend ant has been prejudiced by the procedure adopted or by the material considered by the trial court in conducting its inquiry , the resultant penalty will not be allowed to stand. People v. Crews , 38 Ill. 2d 331, 337-338, 231 N.E. 2d 451, 454 (1967). The instant defendant would have this Court adopt a rule which would require the State

to
c all all of its witnesses to defendant’s other criminal activity to prove up the other crime at sente ncing, essentially holding a mini-trial on the other crime at the sentencing hearing. Howe ver,
our supreme court has consistently upheld the method used by the State in the present case. See Perez , 108 Ill. 2d at 85-88, 483 N.E. 2d at 257-259 (allowing correctional office r’s testimony that his superior told him that another inmate had told superior

that somet

hing co uld possibl

y ha ppen to officer if defe ndant wa s broug

ht back in to office r’s unit) ; Peoplev. Morgan , 112 Ill. 2d 111, 142- 144, 492 N.E. 2 d 1303, 131 6-1317 (1 986) (al lowing o fficer ’s testimo ny t hat he inv est igated an armed robbery and shooting and discovered that defendant had shot two women in his apartment); Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d at 448-453, 626 N.E. 2d at 181-183 (allowing correctional investigator’s testimony that another inmate had told him about an escape plan that defendant was involved in and that further investig ation cor

roborat ed inmate ’s statem ent; also allowing other officer’s testimony that he investigated three robberies and a n aggravated assa

ult and that

his investigationresulted in defendant’s arrest). Other courts have followed this approach as we ll. See People v. Aleman , 355 Ill. App. 3d 619, 627, 823 N.E. 2d 1136, 1143 (2005) (allowing hearsay testimony of

investigating officer regar ding de fendant ’s involve

ment in ar

med robbe

ry ); Moore , 250 Ill. App. 3d at 918-921,17

620 N.E. 2d at 592-594 (allowing hearsay testimony

of social worker regar

ding defendant’s sexual contact with child). Thus we conclude tha t th e State may prove

up defendant’s other criminal activity at sentencing

by having

the investigating officer

testify about wha

t the witne sses told h

im and about what he learned

during his investigation

of the other crime. See Perez , 108 Ill. 2d at 85- 88, 483 N.E. 2d at 257-259; Morgan , 112 I ll. 2d at 14 2-144, 49 2 N.E. 2d a t 1316-131 7; Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d at 448-453, 626 N.E. 2d at 181-18 3; Aleman , 355 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 823 N.E. 2d at 1143; Moore , 250 Ill. App. 3d at 918-921, 620 N.E. 2d at 592-594. Any objection to the hea rsay nature of that testimony goes to the we ight the testimony is to be given, not to admissibility
. Jett , 294 I ll. App. 3d at 830, 691 N.E.2 d at 152. I t is for the

trial cou rt, in its so

und discr etion, to u

ltimately determine if that testimony is reliable. Jett , 294 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 691 N.E.2d at 152. Inthe present case, Detective Walden took the stand and testified regarding his investig ation of the three other armed robberies. Walden desc ribed the evidence that had b een acquired and specific ally

identified

the sources of that evidence, whether it was the statements of

the victims, the statemen ts of acco mplices, the state ments of o ther off

icers, or physical evide

nce that was recovered
or processed. As Walden’s testimony indica ted, the three other robberies all took place around the
same time as the instant

offense and were

similar in circumstance. Walden obtained statements from th e victims involved and from one of the subjects who allegedly committed some of the c rimes
. Walden noted that the statement of the accomplice was consistent with the statements given by the victims. Walden also noted that cer tain phy sical evidence, finger

prints, implicated defendant in one of the robberies and that another pi ece of physical evide nce, a surveillance tape, corrobor ated the
v ictim and accomplice accounts of what had oc curred. Walden’s testimony was subject to cro s s examination and the videotaped statements of the accomplice and of another subject involved in one18

of the robberies were play

ed for the trial judge to consider. Under the se circumstances, the trial judge was well within his discretion in determining that the evidence was reliable. See Perez , 108 Ill. 2d at 85-88, 483 N.E. 2d a t 257-259; Morgan , 112 Ill. 2d at 142-144, 492 N.E. 2d at 1316-1317; Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d at 448-453, 626 N.E. 2d at 181- 183; Aleman , 355 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 823 N.E. 2d at 1143; Moore , 250 Ill. App. 3d at 918-921, 620 N.E. 2d at 592-594. Fur thermore, it’s clear fromthe trial judge’s comment s at sen tencing that he did not place undue weig ht upon Walden’s te st im on y. The trial judge made it clear on the re cord that he was only sente

ncing defendant for one
ar med robbery

and that he was only c onsidering Walden’s testimony a s evidence of defendant’s charac ter and motivations
. Defendant’s reliance upon our previous case of People v. Kirk , 62 Ill. App. 3d 49, 378 N.E. 2d 795 (1978), is misplaced. Our decision in Kirk

stands for the principle that such evidence should be present ed in the f

orm of live testimony, rather tha n from hearsay

allegations contained in the presentence report

where the information may be vague and the source of the information may be
un known. Kirk , 62 Ill. App. 3d at 54, 378 N.E. 2d at 799. This is a principle which our supr em e court has espoused and

to which we still adhere. See People v. Jackson , 149 Ill. 2d 540, 548, 599 N.E. 2d 926, 930

(1992); People v. English , 353 Ill. App. 3d 337, 339, 818 N.E. 2d 857, 859 (2004). It is not a principle, however, whic h compels that the sentence in the present case be va cated. Fo r t he fo re go in g r ea so ns , w e a ff ir m t he ju dg me nt of

th e c ir cu it co ur t o f P eo ri a C ou nt y. Affirmed. JUS TICE HOLDR IDGE, sp ecial ly concurr ing: Iconcur w

iththe result reached in Justice Carter's opinion. I n the spirit of

Ockham's razor, however, I wr

it e separately

to articulate a simpler analy sis. Under People v. Bunch , 159 Ill. App.19

3d 494 (1987), a prosecutor may cross-examine a

witness r egard ing prior juvenile

convictions where the witness has opened the proverbial door by giving testimony

about some aspect of his criminal record. That

is wha t happ ened h ere. Al thou gh the po licy unde rlying Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222, 28 L . Ed. 2d 1, 9 1 S. Ct. 643 (1971), is instructive by way of comparison, I do not agr ee with establishing a

new Harris -based rule governing impea chment with prior juvenile convictions. In my view, any err

or that could rightly

be remedied under such a rule would also be remedi able t hrough Bunch
. There is consequently no reason to go bey

ond the ex is ti ng la w a nd ap pl y Harrisout of its factual context. I would simply affirm the judge's evidentiary ruling under Bunch
. JUS TICE O’BR IEN, dis senti ng: Becau se I d

o not belie

ve, as the majority appare ntly does, tha t in respo nse to this a

ppeal, we should

adopt a po sition “dir

ectly contrar y to that of oth er distri cts of the [Illino is] [A]ppella

te [C]ourt” (slip op. at 14), I respectfully dissent from the majority. Apply ing Illinois law to the instant case, I believe Ha

rris’s juvenile record was inadmissable pursuant to the rule adopte d in People v. Montgomery , 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), and I do not beli eve his statemen ts on the wi

tness stan d were s ufficie nt to “ope n the door

” to the Sta

te’s use of his juvenile record for impea

chment pu

rposes. As the majority notes, it is well settled in I llinois that a defendant’s juvenile criminal history is not admissible in another procee ding against that same defendant. People v. Montgomery , 47 Ill. 2d 510, 517-19, 268 N.E.2d 695, 699-700 (1971). This is true eve n when the prose cution se eks to use evidenc e of the d

efenda nt’s pre vious juve

nile crim inal histor

y to impeach the defendant. People v. Kerns , 229 Ill. App. 3d 938, 940, 595 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1992). Moreover, the trial court has no discretion to admit juvenile adjudications for impeac hment20

purposes when the witness is the accused in a criminal case
. Kerns , 229 Ill. App. 3d at 940, 595 N.E.2d at 208. I am not persuaded by

the majority’s attempt to deviate f rom this general rule based on the pronouncements of the United State’s Supreme Court in Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222, 225-26, 2 8 L. E d. 2d 1, 4- 5, 91 S. Ct. 64 3, 645-46(1971), w here the Supreme C ourt held

that a defenda nt may be impea ched at t rial by the introd

uction of prior sta tements th at were

obtained in violation of Miranda . Significantly, the e vidence the State sought to use in Harriswas not evidence of juvenile adjudications and the evidence was used by the State to dire ctly contradict the defendant’s in-court statements. The court in People v. Sturgis , 58 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 317 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1974), in adopting the rational of Harris , narrowly ta ilored its own holding. The Sturgiscourt he ld “the te stimony of a def endant or document s voluntar

ily a ttested to by h im in conjunction with his motion to suppress evidence *** may be use d for purposes of impeachment should the defendant choose to testify at trial.” Sturgis , 58 Ill. 2d at 216, 317 N.E.2d at 548. Again, the evidence introduce d in Sturgiswas not of juvenile adjudications. Sturgis , 58 Ill. 2d at 216, 317 N.E.2d at 548. The law in Illinois does allow an exception to the ge neral rule that evidence of a defendant’s juvenile criminal history is not admissible for the purposes of impeachment. The trial court may admit evidenc e of a defendant’s juvenile criminal rec ord if the defendant “opens the door” by testify

ing on direct examination to some aspect of his criminal record. People v. Bunch , 159 Ill. App. 3d 494, 513, 512 N. E.2d 748, 761 (1987). An exception is recog nized where “the witness admits convictions of both admissible and inadmissible kinds under the gener al rule a nd affir matively states tha t this list of

convicti ons is comp lete,” o r the witn ess21

affirmatively sta

tes on direct examination that he has never been arre sted. People v. Brown , 61 Ill. App. 3d 180, 184, 377 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (1978). Under these circumstances, the prosecutor may then cro ss-examine

the witne ss rega

rding a ny prior arr

ests or c onviction s. Brown , 61 I ll. App. 3d at 184, 377 N.E.2d at 1203 . In the instant case, the State asser ts Harris sufficiently ope

ned the door for the admission of his juve

nile rec ord by

testify ing as f ollows: “No Sir. T

here is no possible

way that I could hav e committe d this crime. I mean people

who commit robberies, things like that, have a motive, have a r

eason for doing t

hings lik e that. B ut I a

m a profess ional man . I work. I go to co llege. I we

nt to Rober

t Morris, ICC, Midstate. I me an, it’s no reason–I mean I live a productive life. I live just the wa

y a ny o f the 12 ju

rors, like you live. I don’t com

mit crimes.” The trial court found Harris’s statement opened the door to the a dmission of his adjudication for an offense which occurred in Aug ust 2000. I believe the trial court e

rred in admitting Harris’s juvenile record. I do not believe the trial court was correct in construing Ha rris’s testimony as a discussion of his criminal history
. Harris was not making an affirmative r eference to his criminal record, nor was he misstating or falsifying his criminal record. His statement “I don’t commit crimes,” was not in response to any inquiry about his criminal history and as such was not a sufficient statement to “open the door.” Harris m ade only

gener ic, pres ent tense

statemen ts rega rding li ving like the juror s, going

to school, not committing crimes. This is important to emphasize, especially in lig ht of the fact that22

the evidence the State sought to use was the rec ord of Harris’s last criminal conviction, a conviction that occurred four y ears prior to the offense at issue here. Becau se this wa s Harris ’s third tr ial on the same cha rge an d the firs t two trial s ended in mistrials, the error committed by the tria l court in admitting his juvenile court record cannot be deemed harmless error. See People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 310, N.E.2d __ ( 2007) (stating that a mistrial based on the jury’ s failure to agree on a ver dict was illustrative of the closeness of the evide nce). T his was pla

in error and it was

presumpt ively prejudic ial to Har

ris since his previous two trials , conduc ted withou t the use o f his juve

nile rec ord (but i

n all othe r respe cts substantia lly i dentica

l), ende d in mistria

l. Theref ore, I respec tfully

dissent. I believe Harris’ s convict

ion should b e reversed and th is matter r emanded to the tria

l court for furthe

r proce edings. Because I believe the trial court should be reversed, I do not believe we should reach the argument of whether Harr is’s sentence was excessive.