Table of Contents

Introduction ..............................................................

The Threat Is Real And Growing .............................

Bene

fi ts Of Ballistic Missile Defense In Europe ....

Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets In Europe Addressing Concerns .............................................
IntroductionSome of the world’s most dangerous and unpredictable regimes either have already acquweapons of mass destruction. These regimes are also developing and/or acquiring ballipayloads, lethality, and sophistication as a means of delivery. In the future, these regiweapons to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and/or intimidation as they Today’s ballistic missile threat from potentially hostile states is fundamentally differenrisks. In response, the United States is fi elding limited and purely defensive capabilities. combat weapons of mass destruction, missile defense is just one element of a multi-facplomacy, export controls, threat reduction assistance, nonproliferation regimes, and cousame time, missile defense is our ultimate insurance policy if these other elements of ous that, despite our best efforts, the free world will be challenged by military surprises atelligence, and deterrence. Given this reality, missile defenses have become highly desideterrence and hedge against its failure.Because of the expanding ballistic missile threat, it is essential that we develop and deprotecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends anindivisible. We have learned from experience that decoupling our defenses from Europests of the United States and our European allies. If Europe is not secure, the United Scommon security, we need defenses stationed and operational in Europe before a thre

negotiations are currently underway to locate up to ten silo-based long-range missile dea midcourse tracking and discrimination radar in the Czech Republic. These defensive inand destroy attacking reentry vehicles by kinetic energy, that is, a body-on-body collisitween the kinetic kill interceptor and the reentry vehicle.

The Threat Is Real And GrowingThe pace of ballistic missile proliferation, and the threat this creates, is rapidly increasin

• In 1972, only nine states possessed ballistic missiles • In 1990, as the Cold War was drawing to a close, 16 states possessed ballistic mi• By the end of 2006, the number increased to 25 states 

The number of states that currently possess medium-, intermediate-, and/or interco(missiles that can reach our friends and allies, and in some cases the United States 

to nine. Clearly, the international security environment is more complex and less predWall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Of particular concern are the ballistic missile development and testing programs undertheir related proliferation activities.
A ballistic missile is a weapon that is launched 

and follows a predictable arc towards its intendtravel anywhere from short distances (as little adistances (10,000 kilometers or more). Dependsophistication, ballistic missiles can be armed with ons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biol

2

parts of southeastern and central Europe, Turmilitary bases in the Persian Gulf. Iran is also seeking to develop medium-range increasing ranges, intermediate-range ballpossibly intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICCommunity assesses that with continued foreable to develop an ICBM capable of reaching gions of Europe before 2015. Iran is also deve– a key building block for an ICBM.

On January 11, 2007, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, testifi ed to the U.S. Senate that “North 

Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles and missile technology to other countries, including Iran.” General Maples also pointed out that North Korea continues to develop and test the Taepo Dong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear weapons,as evidenced by their well-publicized series of missile launches onJuly 4, 2006, and their nuclear test in October 2006.On November 2, 2006, during the “Great Prophet II” exercise, Iran launched numerous short-range rockets as well as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Among the missiles launched was the Shahab-3, which has a 1,300 kilometer range and is capable of reaching Turkey and Tel Aviv. The Iranian missile development program has received considerable assistance from Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities. The Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. Iranian offi cials have publicly claimed that a 2,000 kilometer range variant of the Shahab-3 is underdevelopment as well as a new solid-propellant medium-range ballisticmissile (MRBM). That would provide Iran the capability to strike signifi cant 

Noting the strong international consensus NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop April 19, 2007, North Atlantic Council meabsolutely a shared threat perception betwethat there is a threat from ballistic missiles.” 

Great Prophet II Starts With Launches From Jalnabad

• Missiles launched as part of exercise during early hours of November 2, 2006• Iranian TV showed: - Scud-class SRBMs, Shahab MRBM. - Multiple launch of six rockets and/or missiles• Reported by Iranian government as “dozens” of launches with claims of cluster warheads

Iranian Missile Th
• An additional option to deal with  offensive retaliation or military preem• The ability to dissuade potentially  development or foreign acquisition 

 place, by undermining their milit European and U.S. nonproliferation • Enhanced deterrence against att European allies and friends

Benefi ts Of Ballistic Missile

Defense In Europe

The deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe would provide:

• An improved capability to defend the United States against ballistic missile attack from the Middle East• The capability to extend defensive coverage to Europe against longer-range ballistic missiles which would enhance the collective security of the NATO Alliance, strengthen trans-atlantic unity, reaffi rm

 America’s commitments to European security, and avoid the decoupling of European and American security interests• An opportunity for technology sharing and cost savings that can substantially enhance development of the envisioned NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program• An opportunity for NATO to potentially utilize the U.S. sensor in- frastructure for use in a future NATO defensive system for protecting population and territory – if NATO approves such a military require- ment – against ballistic missiles of all ranges and increasing sophistication• Increased situational awareness and information sharing for Host Nations, NATO, and its Member States

Proposed U.S. Miss

Assets In Europe

The proposal to deploy components of tSystem (BMDS) to Europe consists of:Ten interceptors proposed to be based interceptors, nearly identical to those in housed in underground silos in an interceball fi eld. As with the interceptors based interceptors are designed only for defenhit-to-kill vehicles (weighing about 75 kildestroy their targets at collision speeds iat more than 200 km above the earth’s s

• European interceptor site - Up to ten silo-based long-range in Europe (2011-2013)• European midcourse radar - Relocation of a narrow-beam, mid used in our Pacifi c test range to ce

Defense Coverage Against Long-Range Iranian Missiles

Without Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets In Europe

Europe Is Not Protected Without

Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets
The interceptors planned for

Poland are nearly identical to the three-stage interceptors based in the U.S. except that they are a two-stage variant that is quicker, lighter, and better suited for the engagement ranges andtimelines for Europe. The silos that house the ground-based interceptors have substantially smaller dimensions (e.g., diameter and length) than those used for offensive missiles, such as the U.S. Minuteman IIIICBM. Any modifi cation would require extensive, lengthy, and costly changes that would be clearly visible to any observer.The ground-based interceptors are comprised of a booster vehicle 

and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). Upon launch, the booster fl ies to a projected intercept point and releases the EKV which 

then uses on-board sensors (with assistance from ground-based assets) to acquire the target ballistic missile. The EKV performs fi nal

discrimination and steers itself to collide with the enemy warhead,destroying it by the sheer kinetic force of impact. 

EKV

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A Midcourse Radar proposed for deploymThis X-band radar will be optimized to poinballistic missile threats in fl ight. This is not a continuously through 360 degrees, but insearly warning satellites and other transposensors (such as mobile forward-based X-bballistic missile threat locations for earlier acqto pinpoint or “cue” its very thin beam to fi nd athey are launched. The emissions of this radathe beam is extremely narrow (diameter of a cof 25 km) and must be elevated from grounfl ight. X-band radars are used at most airporisk. The X-band radar will not operate contina week. 

The informatiwill be used to missile warhe(such as separtential counterit will be used to the projectmissile warhea

The radar proposed for deployment to the Czeed at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands (

it has been used to support missile defense Upon completion of negotiations and site prepEurope. It is important to note that this radwithout any harmful effects to the people in thor the children in the nearby school. 

Command and control support composed and communications equipment. This net

command and control system, transmits and rlaunches, missile fl ight profi les, and projected 

political and military leaders to determine weapons to intercept them. The system is dwide range of information to decision makers bin Europe and the great speed of ballistic msessment and interceptor launch decisions in 

Future European Missile Site – Size Comparison
The command and control system enables approved decision makersand the operational crews to be alerted to ballistic missile launches,understand and assess the situation, make informed decisions, feedinformation to interceptors to fi nd and destroy incoming ballistic missilewarheads, and then evaluate mission success. Proposed U.S. Assets in Europe Supported by the U.S. BallisticMissile Defense System (BMDS)The siting of ground-based interceptors in Poland and a midcourseradar in the Czech Republic is supported by other additional existing and developing assets of the global BMDS. The BMDS provides an integrated network of sensors, short- and medium-range interceptors,and command and control capabilities that can enhance the proposed U.S. European missile defense assets. The information required to assess and make interceptor launch decisions is enabled by the command and control and communications network provided by the global BMDS system, which is incorporating, assessing, and distributing crucial track information that is obtained by satellites, and/or by land-based and seabased radars and sensors.U.S. PATRIOT, Aegis/SM-3, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) could be made available to provide augmenting coverage for short- and medium-range threats. These assets could be used to support 

emerging NATO and national capabilities erage for all European nations requiring sTransportable forward land-based radar

to the capabilities of the proposed Euro

radar sites. This type of radar is a high-rarray radar based upon the THAAD design. It is designed to be air tratransportable, and rail transportable. Thdeployed closer to the threat, it provides eatracking data that expands coverage aresophisticated engagement strategies. deployed in Japan. While deployment hahost nations closer to the threat in the Mradar will be available to support (as nU.S. missile defense assets. 

• Forward-based radar - Available to deploy to area closer to Iranian threat to provide earlier detection, cueing, and enhanced tracking information

Comparison Of Midcourse Radars

European Components – Ho
Why Poland and the Czech Republic?

• U.S. missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California do not provide protection for Europe• Technical analysis shows that Poland and the Czech Republic are the optimal locations for fi elding U.S. missile defense assets in Europe: - Provides defensive coverage for the majority of Europe from longer-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East - Provides redundant coverage for the U.S. against ICBMs launched from the Middle East• Placing the interceptor fi eld in Poland and the radar in the

 Czech Republic maximizes the defensive coverage of both Europe and the United States• As the following graphic demonstrates, Poland and the Czech Republic are geographically well located on the European continent to defend against longer-range ballistic missiles

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Addressing Concern1. Why the sudden concern? Reality and timing of Iranian threat

• Defenses take years to deploy. Work o must begin now in order to meet the gro• Iran has demonstrated the capability to  ballistic missiles of increasingly longe short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM)  missile (MRBM) technology)• Public announcement of space-launch  cannot confi rm)• In 1998, intelligence experts indicated  from testing multi-stage rockets; the n capability. We cannot afford to be s morning and discovering that Iran has a

Poland And Czech Republic Basing Maximizes European

Coverage Against Longer-Range Ballistic Missile Threats

Defense Coverage Against Long-Ra

With Proposed U.S. Missile Defense 
2. How do we know the system is effective and safe?

In 2003, ballistic missile defenses consistently demonstrated the ability to effectively intercept short-range enemy missile attacks during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 intercepted nine out of nine short-range ballistic missiles. Defenses against intermediate- and longrange attacks have not yet been needed in war. Through ground and fl ight tests, and modeling and simulation, such defenses have been repeatedly and successfully tested over the past decade. Hit-to-kill technologies have been demonstrated to work, and the ballistic missile defense system has been successfully integrated. Over the last few years, the Missile Defense Agency has had 17 successes in the last 18 fl ighttests in the Patriot PAC-3, the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), THAAD, and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) programs. Since 2001, there have been 27 out of 35 successful hit-to-kill midcourse and terminalintercepts.Safety is very important when fi elding ballistic missile defenses. X-band 

radars have been operating for decades to observe weather and track aircraft and satellites. The beam from the radar is only several meters wide at 25 kilometers above the ground and is pointed into the sky and away 

Kwajalein Island

from people on the ground. In fact, the Uradar on the Kwajalein Atoll only a short dworkers and school children. 

3. Would these missile defense capabNo. The United States has kept, and iformed about U.S. missile defense policused both bilateral diplomatic and Depafense channels, as well as the multilaterAny prospective U.S. missile defense anot be directed at Russia. Instead, thprovide optimal defensive coverage agMiddle East involving a limited number tal-range ballistic missiles launched at eiU.S. missile defense deployments in Eusia’s strategic nuclear forces. Under the ted between 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclelocation of any possible U.S. defensive offensive force could overwhelm the Udeployed interceptors. Furthermore, in ments, U.S. interceptors in central Eu

Interceptors Cannot Catch 
8

intercepting Russian ICBMs launched at the United States. As the graphic above demonstrates, there would not be suffi cient time to detect, track, 

and intercept ballistic missiles launched from western Russia toward the United States. Fielding U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe will not trigger an arms race between Russia and the United States. We have proposed transparency and con

fi dence-building measures to Russia. 

Additionally, in April 2007, senior U.S. offi cials tabled a comprehensive 

proposal for bilateral missile defense cooperation with Russia.

4. Would the X-band radar in the Czech Republic affect the use of cell 

phones, radios, garage door openers, and televisions? 

No. Such personal devices operate outside the X-band frequency and 

would not be affected.5. Would an intercept of a ballistic missile attack over Europe

create debris that would fall on people in Europe? 

Most debris from a successful destruction of a ballistic missile attack would burn up during reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere. Another way to look at this issue is to consider that any harm caused by this debris would pale in comparison to a successful nuclear attack on a European city.

Intercept Debris

• Intercept debris is minor compared to an intact Weapon of

Mass Destruction (WMD) warhead hitting a major populationcenter

• An intercepted warhead produces very little debris - Closing speed between the interceptor and warhead is 

 more than 7 km per second

 - Intercept occurs at an altitude of more than 200 km, well

 outside the earth’s atmosphere

 - Resulting kinetic energy vaporizes much of the reentry

 vehicle, warhead, and kill vehicle

• U.S. 

fl ight tests have shown that very little debris reaches the

earth – pieces average no more than 21 cm long

• Probability of any casualty on the ground is very low - 3 in 1,000 intercepts to 1 in 2.5M intercepts depending on

 population density

6. Can a ballistic missile defense capabili

Yes. Ballistic missile defense can work to reduces the political and military utility of ople, if Allied deployed forces or civilian populmay view its ballistic missile arsenal as an other countries and/or even attack them. If Irballistic missile attack might be defeated by a deterred from building up and using that apower. Missile defenses are not a replacemcapability; they instead constitute an additiocontemporary deterrence. Also, over the lodiscourage the proliferation of ballistic missilweapons of mass destruction by underminiballistic missiles.

7. Will the U.S. missile defense assets in 

all countries in Europe?

• U.S. missile defense systems in Europe 

extend coverage to all European NATO ballistic missile attack from the Middle several countries (e.g., Greece and Turkeyrange missile attack from Iran due to their pthey are vulnerable to short- and mediumhas demonstrated capabilities

• The U.S. European assets could, in the fu

States, Poland, and the Czech Republic capability to defend against long-range military requirement to acquire a missile population and territory against ballistic m

• The future NATO ALTBMD capability or 

missile defense system could complemedefense deployments by providing covthreats 

• Current NATO Air Command and Contr

ture and the U.S. BMDS C2BMC systemcompatible, easing their integration

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