Report on

Building International Coalitions to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism 

International Security Advisory Board 

February 5, 2007 
Disclaimer

This is a report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), a Federal Advisory 

Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of 

independent insight, advice and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and 

public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and 

nonproliferation. The views expressed herein do not represent official positions or policies of 

the Department of State or any other entity of the United States Government.
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD 

Report on

Building Coalitions to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Report on Building International Coalitions to Combat WMD Terrorism..................................... 1

Appendix A –Summary of Recommendations ........................................................................... A-1

Appendix B - Terms of Reference.............................................................................................. B-1

Appendix C - Members and Project Staff................................................................................... C-1

Appendix D - Individuals Consulted .......................................................................................... D-1

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Report on

Building International Coalitions to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism

TASKING. The International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) was asked to undertake four 

tasks: review weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist threats; assess U.S. efforts to build 

international coalitions to combat WMD terrorism; identify effective means of building

international coalitions to combat WMD terrorism; and, identify elements of a public-private 

outreach strategy to industries essential to combating WMD terrorism. Additionally, the 

Secretary of State asked that ISAB specifically focus on the example of the Global Initiative to 

Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

At the outset, ISAB determined that a framework for analyzing how best to dissuade, deter, and 

coerce terrorists is essential. This methodology is similar to that required for the “targeted 

strategies” recommended for North Korea and Iran contained in the ISAB Report on the Review 

of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. This framework is not 

only a guide for information collection and analysis; its employment can inform the formulation

of policy, defense strategy, and strategic communications.

This report is divided into two sections. The first is a suggested methodological framework for 

analysis. The second section addresses the specific tasks assigned in the Terms of Reference for 

our study, with a specific focus on recommendations to improve international coalition-building.

SECTION I: Combating WMD Terrorism: Deterrence, Dissuasion 

and Coercion

Background. During the Cold War, the U.S. policy of mutual nuclear deterrence was geared to 

the specific conditions of the Cold War and was intended to prevent Soviet attack against the 

United States and its friends and allies. While the success of deterrence during the Cold War

cannot be proven per se, it appears to have played an important role in preventing superpower 

and possibly regional conflict.

Today, there are not two principal actors and a single paramount threat, but a spectrum of 

opponents and threats. Rogue states, sub-national and non-state terrorist groups, elements of 

organized crime, and perhaps even individuals acting alone may have the capability to use or 

realistically threaten to use WMD against the U.S. and its allies. Each of these types of 

opponents must now be deterred to the extent practicable.

Establishing effective policies to deter these opponents and threats, especially including terrorists 

armed with WMD and their state sponsors, poses significant and unprecedented challenges. Our 

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Cold War experience and traditional deterrence policies provide limited guidance in this new 

threat environment.

For example, during the Cold War, there was heavy emphasis on order-of-battle information to 

support our deterrence efforts, and there was essentially only one target, the Soviet Union. Now 

there are multiple and diverse opponents, and the information we need to understand how best to 

deter them is both broader and more target-specific than was considered necessary during the 

Cold War.

In addition, states and non-state actors with apocalyptic worldviews may not be deterred 

predictably and reliably by traditional U.S. deterrence threats of escalation and retaliation. As 

Bernard Lewis points out: “At the end of time [according to the apocalyptic vision] there will be 

general destruction anyway. What will matter will be the final destination of the dead—hell for 

infidels, and heaven for the believers. For people of this mindset, MAD [mutually assured 

destruction] is not a constraint; it is an inducement.”1

This conclusion does not suggest that deterrence of contemporary terrorist threats should, a

priori, be considered impossible. Considerable historical evidence exists to illustrate that 

deterrence was made to “work” in the past against some extremely violent, eccentric, and highly 

determined non-state actors. Nevertheless, the greater limits of what can be expected of 

deterrence vis-a-vis contemporary terrorist threats must be recognized, as is the need to identify 

new approaches to deterrence better suited to these threats.

During much of the Cold War, declared U.S. deterrence policy focused on “punitive” deterrence 

threats, i.e., targeting what we believed to be of great value to the Soviet leadership. Punitive 

deterrence may contribute to deterring today’s apocalyptic groups, including threats to terrorists’ 

social and familial support networks, and organizational leaderships. Deterrence by “denial”

threats, however, may also be important against terrorists. Deterrence by denial includes, in 

particular, our ability to prevent terrorists and their sponsors from realizing the desired effect of 

WMD terrorism. Denial measures could include defensive measures designed to protect 

potential targets and drive up the price of attack. Examples include active and passive defenses 

for seaports, airports and aircraft, forward deployed forces, and urban and industrial centers.

To deal with this enormously complicated and highly variable environment, the U.S. must 

develop a new intellectual framework for deterring, dissuading, and coercing terrorists, their 

organizations and state-sponsors. These are three separate and related goals identified in the 

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Dissuasion includes discouraging WMD acquisition and military challenges by terrorists and 

their state supporters. Should dissuasion fail, we may seek to deter WMD possessors from

carrying out attacks and/or transferring WMD capabilities to others, and to coerce them to give 

up their WMD programs, capabilities and tactics. Each of these goals—dissuasion, deterrence,

and coercion—must include U.S. threats and capabilities, strategic communications, and 

diplomacy tailored to the target audience.

1 Wall Street Journal, “August 22,” August 8, 2006.

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The United States may be able to dissuade, deter, and coerce target audiences who are one step 

removed from terrorist organizations but nevertheless are critical to their operations, including 

terrorists’ state sponsors and support networks. This may be particularly important with regard 

to the potential for nuclear terrorism because no terrorist organization is capable of enriching

uranium or reprocessing plutonium.

To be as effective as possible, our efforts to deter, dissuade, and coerce should be informed by an 

understanding of the potentially unique motives, goals, practices, risk propensities, 

communication channels and vulnerabilities of those who sponsor, support and enable terrorists, 

as well as the terrorists themselves. We need an understanding of their various strategic 

decision-making processes, the optimal combination of U.S. and allied tools and threats for 

making WMD terrorism too costly, risky, difficult, or ineffective, and the optimal channels and 

modes for communicating our threats. To gain this level of understanding of contemporary 

opponents for these purposes requires that we acquire and integrate information far beyond our 

Cold War practice.

The first step in doing this is to learn as much as we can about the terrorists, their supporters and 

sponsors—the “targets” whose decision-making we want to influence. This requires heavy 

emphasis on intelligence and analysis at the levels of individual, familial, state and non-state

organization decision-making. Answers to the types of questions and topics listed below, 

primarily from the intelligence community and other potential sources of information, will be 

critical to this effort:

1.

2.

Who are the terrorists, their supporters and sponsors, and what are their assets, values and 

goals we might threaten for the purposes of dissuasion, deterrence and coercion?

A. Who is the state sponsor and what motivates its leaders? 

B. Who are the terrorists’ leaders and what motivates them?

C. What is the social and familial supportive infrastructure?

D. Who are the individual “trigger-pullers” who will carry out the attacks?

E. What are the values, goals, power, authority, and organizational structure of the 

various actors?

F. What are the incentives for each group in the terrorist chain to support terrorists?

G. What are our available channels of communication to these target audiences and how 

can we best communicate credible threats?

How are they acquiring WMD?

A. What are the sources of personnel, information, education, training, and insight that 

are available to potential WMD terrorists?

B. Are there freelancers such as A.Q. Khan who are providing WMD technologies? 

C. Are there states that are providing WMD technologies?

D. Are there rogue scientists who are providing the necessary knowledge?

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E. What might paths to acquisition of WMD include, highlighting critical junctures and 

technologies?

3.

4.

How do they operate?

A. Who are the terrorist recruiters and their operatives?

B. What are their goals, values, and motivations?

C. How is WMD terrorism financed, from recruiters to “trigger-puller”?

D. Where and how the terrorists are trained? 

E. Do they have/need safe haven to develop WMD and operations?

F. How and where do they obtain the equipment and material they need to acquire and 

deploy WMD?

G. Where do they carry out their activities, store their materials, and locate their facilities

for WMD activities?

H. How can the U.S. develop deep insight into the above?

Where are the points we might detect and influence in the chain from sponsor/director to 

operative?

A. Which specific target audiences are most susceptible to U.S. threats and actions?

B. What communications channels are potentially vulnerable to disruption or influence? 

C. What financial networks are subject to our intervention?

D. Are the terrorists’ organizational ties vulnerable to disruption or influence?

E. Can we identify doubters who question the terrorist mission or see the consequences 

as too costly?

The goal of addressing this list of questions is to identify the specific target audiences, types of 

threats and forces, channels and modes of communication, and contributing actions that will best 

serve our dissuasion, deterrence and coercion goals. Essentially, the task is to develop an 

understanding of terrorist groups, their supporters and state sponsors to inform our efforts to 

tailor our threats and supporting actions to specific opponents. Although a complete

understanding of each audience is impossible, our goal is to increase our useful understanding of 

specific targets, their importance in planning, enabling, and executing WMD terrorist operations, 

and their potential vulnerabilities. Once this information is assembled, the United States will be

in a stronger position to identify the states and private partners needed to construct tailored 

coalitions to deter, dissuade and coerce specific terrorists and terrorist organizations.

The collection, analysis, and integration of this type of information pose significant challenges.

Pertinent expertise and resources are dispersed among various government departments and 

agencies. For example, the Department of Defense in February 2006 assigned U.S. Strategic 

Command with the responsibility for combating WMD. In turn, Strategic Command established 

a Combating WMD Center at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

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The Intelligence Community has multiple sources of expertise, including the National Counter 

Terrorism Center, which is implementing a strategic framework designed to prevent terrorists’

acquisition and use of WMD. A central element of this plan is to determine terrorists’ intentions,

capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD. The plan also emphasizes understanding and 

being able to affect terrorists’ capacities at several levels, including: travel, communications,

recruitment and training, funding, foreign sponsorship, and intelligence tradecraft. As part of 

this effort, the plan specifies that as much information as possible should be obtained regarding 

terrorist leaderships and their motivations.

In addition, the Department of State has a draft Diplomatic Strategy to Combat WMD Terrorism.

This Strategy, which needs to be completed, has a principal objective of defeating WMD

terrorists by undertaking a number of steps, including: developing targeted regional country 

plans; improving information-sharing; building partnerships with other nations, international

organizations, and the private sector; and, undertaking exercises and initiatives to counter 

terrorism.

Information about this array of adversaries and access to them may also come from foreign 

governmental sources and non-governmental sources. The private sector, including NGOs, 

industry, and academia, both at home and abroad are potentially critical sources of important

information.

Tools. All tools that will help dissuade, deter, and coerce WMD terrorists, their supporters and 

sponsors must be examined. A wide range of tools—political, military, economic, diplomatic,

and psychological—will be necessary to exploit the potential vulnerabilities of these diverse

opponents. The U.S. government has autonomous control over some tools, but not all. They are 

scattered institutionally and not traditionally integrated across the departments and agencies.

Also, the private sector has considerable influence over some possible tools, especially financial 

and economic. And, of course, other nations, international bodies, and multinational groups have 

influence over some tools. Because of the diverse origins of information and tools, there is likely

to be much less U.S. autonomy than was the case during the Cold War.

Communicating the Message. Effective strategic communication is essential to dissuasion, 

deterrence and coercion. It communicates to terrorists and their sponsors the potential cost of 

WMD acquisition, threats, transfer or employment. It conveys our will, determination and 

capabilities.

The means of communication affects how the recipient understands the message. The more a 

message is tailored to the audience, the better the chances are that it will be understood correctly 

with predictable effect. For any given audience, we must assess which communication channels 

are available, the optimal mode of signaling, and what level of confidence we have in the 

information flow to the target. In other words, are we able to communicate our message to the 

target and is the target capable of receiving and understanding what we intend to communicate? 

Even though a message may be carefully and clearly communicated, many factors may intervene 

helpfully or otherwise to influence how our intended signals are perceived by the recipient, 

particularly including “background noise” unintended for these purposes. Former Soviet leaders 

have commented, for example, that President Reagan’s strict handling of the domestic air traffic 

5
controllers’ strike early in his tenure had a strong impression on them with regard to the 

credibility they attributed to him.

Clearly, combating WMD terrorism remains an interagency responsibility and will require close

coordination and integration among many organizations in the U.S. Government and our private 

sector, as well as with our allies and friends. The Department of State’s role in identifying, 

establishing and implementing contemporary U.S. policies of deterrence, dissuasion, and 

coercion will be much greater, however, than was the case during the Cold War, particularly

relative to the Department of Defense. Prior to completion of the draft Diplomatic Strategy to 

Combat WMD Terrorism, it is important that the Department of State conduct the analysis 

described above and prepare a thorough assessment of how best to dissuade, deter, and coerce 

WMD terrorists.

Recommendation 1. The Department of State should establish a Task Force to 

prepare a Framework for Combating WMD Terrorism. It should identify the 

appropriate parameters of the State Department’s role in deterring, dissuading and 

coercing terrorists, including how State’s global assets can contribute to the 

accumulation and integration of the detailed information necessary for targeted 

dissuasion, deterrence and coercion, and to coherent and integrated strategic 

communications for these purposes. This should be completed in conjunction with the 

Diplomatic Strategy to Combat WMD Terrorism. These efforts should draw on 

interagency expertise in order to leverage and enlist cooperative activity across the

interagency.

SECTION II: BUILDING INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS TO

COMBAT WMD TERRORISM 

TOR TASK #1: Review Current and Projected WMD Threats

At the outset, it is important to make a distinction between the three types of WMD. Chemical

weapons (CW) can kill large numbers of people and can cause economic havoc, but it is 

relatively easy to mitigate their effects, and the devastation they can cause is likely to be much

less than that of biological weapons (BW) and, particularly, nuclear weapons. BW, depending 

on the type of agent involved, can cause many more deaths and have more lasting economic

effects than CW. Capable terrorists can produce CW and BW. As the Japanese terrorist group 

Aum Shinrikyo proved, some types of CW and BW are relatively easy to develop 

technologically and are not costly. Also, several states that are known to be in possession of 

these weapons, arms control treaties notwithstanding, could supply CW or BW to terrorists. In 

the future, we can expect that more terrorists will acquire CW and BW, if they have not already 

done so. 

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In comparison to CW and BW, nuclear weapons, and particularly the special nuclear materials

they require, are extremely difficult and expensive to develop. A terrorist group might be able to 

steal a nuclear weapon, or be given or sold one by a possessor state. Alternatively, it might even 

be able to steal, buy, or otherwise receive special nuclear materials from which it might make a 

nuclear device. 

Radiation dispersal devices (RDDs) use conventional explosives to spread radioactive materials.

They can contaminate property, resulting in economic costs (not only for clean-up, but also 

denial of use until clean up is completed) and psychological setback. However, these weapons 

are not weapons of mass destruction and do not pose the same threat as a nuclear weapon.

The risk that terrorists may acquire a nuclear weapon is grave. In the past, there has been great 

worry that a weapon might be obtained from entrepreneurial, disgruntled or careless Russians.

That threat has faded to some degree with the increased controls over Russian nuclear 

capabilities. Today, there is increasing concern that Iran will acquire weapons and supply them

to its proxy terrorists, that North Korea will supply them to terrorists, or that a country currently

in possession of nuclear weapons will become so destabilized that control of its nuclear weapons 

will be lost.

Terrorists have attempted to acquire WMD, particularly CW and BW. But, the ongoing wars in 

Afghanistan and Iraq have significantly reduced the capabilities of al Qaeda and other terrorists 

to conduct operations against the U.S. and its allies to-date. At the same time, we expect that 

extremists will continue to organize and present threats to the U.S. and its allies well into the 

future. In the case of the Middle East, the continuing expansion of Iranian influence since the 

fall of Saddam and the election of Ahmadinejad will feed further terrorist organization and 

activity. Dealing with the source of WMD is the single best way that the U.S. can prevent WMD

terrorism because the terrorists themselves will be difficult to dissuade or deter. 

TOR TASK #2: Assess the Effectiveness of Current Efforts to Build International Support for, 

and Coordination of, WMD Counter-Terrorism Activities

International support for U.S. counter-terrorism policies and activities has been excellent in some

cases, but weak in others. An example of where the US worked effectively with the international

community to address the WMD terrorism threat was the unanimous passage of UNSCR 1540 

that requires states to enact legislation that criminalizes proliferation activities. The Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI), which focuses on interdiction of WMD-related shipments, is another 

example of success. Over 70 nations participate in PSI activities and dozens of interventions 

have occurred, including one that led to unraveling of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and 

Libya’s decision to give up WMD. Two other initiatives that have garnered significant

international participation are the Container Security Initiative and the Megaports Initiative. A 

fourth initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, has gotten off to a good start 

and holds great promise. Begun in 2006, this group already has 13 partner nations and is moving

forward on exercises and other cooperation. 

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Other efforts have not been so successful. International support for efforts to deal with Iran and 

North Korea has been difficult to muster. In the case of North Korea, South Korea has not 

supported taking a harder line, despite the fact that years of taking a soft position have failed.

China, although it denounced North Korea’s nuclear test, has tended to take a middle road in 

trying to influence Pyongyang’s behavior and has indicated it is unwilling to apply sanctions in 

retaliation for the test.

In the case of Iran, European partners shy away from dealing firmly even though their own 

efforts to offer Iran carrots instead of sticks have been an abject failure. Middle Eastern 

countries, particularly those that border Iran, should have a direct interest in curtailing Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions. Not only are they unwilling to oppose Iran’s nuclear activities, they talk of 

matching Iran’s efforts. 

In South Korea, Europe, and the Middle East, the governments are not out-of-step with their 

peoples. Opinion polls show that publics there do not share the depth of U.S. concern about 

Iranian and North Korean proliferation. In some cases, publics indicate greater concern over 

U.S. reactions to these proliferation threats than to the proliferation itself.

Why are some efforts to muster international support for counter-terrorism more successful than 

others? A central obstacle to garnering support is the reticence of nations to undertake punitive 

action against any other state. When the objective of a coalition is more general—such as 

interdicting any illegal WMD shipment or enhancing nuclear security on facilities everywhere—

there is more cooperation. If a specific nation is the target of a coalition, then fewer nations are 

likely to want to be party to it. The issue of sanctions provides an instructive example.

The U.S. has sought, with minimal success, to organize international coalitions to cajole or 

coerce Iran to give up its WMD programs. The most potent diplomatic tool, perhaps, would be 

sanctions. Yet, nations are unwilling to apply strong sanctions against Iran for several reasons.

One basic reason is that Iran has something that they want, oil. Iran has the 5th largest oil 

reserves in the world—approximately 100 billion barrels—and currently produces about 4 

million barrels/day. Europe, Russia, Japan, and China have multi-billion-dollar energy deals 

with Iran. If they participate in sanctions against Iran, their investments and their energy 

supplies will be at risk. 

Another reason that nations are reticent to join the U.S. in a coalition to sway Iran and North 

Korea is that they do not share the U.S. perception of threat. For cooperation to work it is 

imperative that the U.S. successfully convey why a goal is important and why it requires the 

actions we want taken. Communication with allies is every bit as important as communication

with those whom we want to dissuade or deter.

For the future, building coalitions with European partners is likely to become more difficult and 

maintaining them even harder. One complicating factor is that European birthrates are very low 

and immigration has been an important factor in maintaining economic growth. The pool of 

immigrants is mostly Muslims from the Middle East, Turkey, and North Africa. Currently, there 

are some 28 million Muslims residing in Europe, increasing by about 2.5 million per year. They 

are becoming a significant political force with which European politicians must reckon. These 

immigrants bring with them a decidedly anti-American stance because of U.S. support for Israel 

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and other actions in the Middle East. Also, given that an estimated 10-30 % of these immigrants 

support a radical jihad against Israel and Western interests, European politicians need to tread 

lightly for fear of internal instability. The change in government following the terrorist attack in 

Spain was clearly driven by this concern.

Additionally, China and Russia—both of which we need to make counter-terrorism work—have 

their own Muslim jihadist problems. Siding with the U.S., which is widely perceived as antiIslamic, will not always be opportune for them and the easier course is to let the U.S. take the 

brunt of criticism.

The complex problems associated with radical Islam affect not only our abilities to create and 

maintain coalitions, but also, of course, are tied closely with the overall WMD terrorism threat.

A principal tool being used by the Department of State in combating WMD terrorism—a 

coalition or initiative—could be employed to address radical Islam as well. 

Recommendation 2. The Department of State should consider formulating a Global 

Initiative on Religious Tolerance and Moderation. States as well as groups and local 

governments could be invited to subscribe to its statement of principles. Fora could be 

held to consult with moderate Muslim leaders on key issues such as assimilation, 

counter-terrorism, and equality.

As the above discussion suggests, communication with allies can be critical to our ability to 

dissuade and deter. There will be some cases in which we may never be able to reach common 

ground with those from whom we want cooperation simply because they have interests or 

objectives that conflict directly with our own. However, in most cases, at least a degree of 

cooperation will be achievable, depending on the success of our communication to build shared 

goals, perceptions, and knowledge-base. As we discuss in greater detail below, more and better 

U.S. public diplomacy is essential to improving international cooperation and coalition-building.

TOR TASK #3: Identify the Most Effective Means of Securing International Cooperation and 

Building International Coalitions to Prevent and Respond to WMD Acquisition or Use by 

Terrorists, Including the Role of Formal Agreements and Combined Exercises

Even though other nations may have different priorities than the U.S. (such as valuing oil supply 

over nonproliferation goals) or differing perceptions of threat, it is imperative that the U.S. 

succeed in building effective international coalitions; we are unlikely to dissuade, deter or defeat 

WMD terrorism alone. In building coalitions, we should keep some key points in mind. First, 

coalitions shouldn’t necessarily be formal structures with associated statements of principles and 

work programs. At times, informal cooperation, tailored to a specific, limited objective, can both 

better succeed and result in a more lasting relationship. Also, a proliferation of formal initiatives 

can result in “initiative burnout” by our partners, some of whom have only limited personnel to 

send to the meetings and exercises. Our measure of success should not be how many initiatives 

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we create and partners we sign up; it should be what work is accomplished through the

partnerships we forge. 

Second, we should not assume that the G-8 or traditional allies need be involved in every 

counter-terrorism coalition. For example, we may want to pursue WMD counter-terrorism with 

Black Sea states. The best way to do this might be to start, informally, with a subset that does 

not involve a major partner.

Third, although it may be more cumbersome, it may be better to pursue some counter-terrorism

work through existing international organizations. For example, some of the work that might be 

pursued in the context of the Global Initiative (e.g., building regulatory oversight in countries 

with nuclear materials and facilities) might be better done under the International Atomic Energy 

Agency. This would have the added benefit that the financing for the training or exercises would 

be internationalized.

Fourth, spending financial and diplomatic resources on reducing the threat of RDDs does not 

necessarily reduce the threat of catastrophic WMD terrorism. Indeed, one could question, for 

example, whether several initiatives on ports and container security that are expensive and timeconsuming are likely to have much impact on the high-consequence threats of nuclear, 

biological, and chemical weapons. An evaluation of the effectiveness of these strategies in 

addressing the WMD threat should be undertaken to determine what funding levels, resource 

allocation, and priority is warranted. 

Some measures that might make our international coalitions and cooperative efforts more 

successful are suggested below.

Widening Bases of Coalitions. Although there are exceptions, the U.S. turns less frequently to 

regional states (e.g., in Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia) for support on counterterrorism and nonproliferation. This is partly because the dominant WMD proliferation 

problems are in the Middle East and North Asia. Also, to some extent, the U.S. tends to focus on 

like-minded states and those whose participation is most essential.

Nations in these other regions should be included, however. One reason is that they can wield 

influence in the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international 

fora. A second reason is that we should have long-range vision; the next proliferation challenge 

or WMD terrorist threat could emerge from one of these regions. By engaging these nations in 

counter-terrorism efforts now, we heighten their awareness of the problems and help build their 

capabilities to fight terrorism. Thirdly, these states often have greater access and rapport with 

those whom we wish to dissuade. It is therefore likely that U.S. nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts will be more successful if they involve an ever-wider set of nations.

An excellent example where broadening the participation would be useful is the Global Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI). The 13 GI partner nations do not include some of the nations 

that would be highly useful partners—those which would not only have much to offer, but which 

would greatly benefit by participation. For example, Pakistan and India should be invited to join, 

as should South Korea. 

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Recommendation 3. The Department of State should engage nations in all

geographic regions in formal and informal cooperative efforts to combat WMD 

terrorism. In particular, countries integral to WMD counter-terrorism should be invited 

to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In some important cases, 

informal and non-public participation by key states may be preferable to joining formal 

initiatives.

Public Diplomacy. One of the most important obstacles to securing international cooperation or 

building coalitions is low or negative public support abroad. In some cases, governments may be 

willing to help the U.S., but feel that they cannot because of likely adverse public reaction. In 

others, governments themselves do not share the same set of values and objectives that would 

prompt them to participate in U.S.-led nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. The jobs 

of gaining international cooperation and building coalitions would be easier if U.S. public 

diplomacy—the communication of U.S. policies, perceptions, values, facts, and intent to foreign 

publics and elites—were more effective.

The U.S. public diplomacy task is made more difficult by the fact that others have recognized the 

value of having public opinion on one’s side. For example, Iranian President Ahmadinejad

visited numerous foreign capitals of Muslim nations, and has even appeared on 60 Minutes, to 

drum up support for Iran’s position that its nuclear program is peaceful. He achieved a fair 

measure of success abroad; a number of high-level statements of support were issued and his 

arguments, in detail, were repeated in the news media.

State Department public diplomacy resources are underutilized in the campaign to achieve U.S. 

nonproliferation and counter-terrorism policy goals. To some extent, adversaries like al Qaeda 

have shown a greater capacity for using the Internet, distributing influential DVDs, and using 

audio media than has the U.S. This must change if we are to accomplish our goals. 

Good public diplomacy doesn’t just happen; it is the product of intensive planning and effective 

use of a host of media. Those experts who are responsible for public diplomacy must understand 

very, very well the audience, the message, the means available to deliver the message, and must

have metrics to gauge the success of message delivery. If public diplomacy isn’t working, then 

new or different techniques must be brought into play to improve it (e.g., red team-blue team

exercises, tabletop exercises, trial runs, focus groups, etc.). 

Clearly, the U.S. is not winning the hearts and minds of most foreign audiences regarding 

proliferation in Iran and North Korea or, on the subject of WMD counter-terrorism. And, we are 

failing to appeal to moderate Muslims as a counter to the growing threat of radical Islam. U.S. 

public diplomacy needs to be more creative, responsive, and pro-active.

Recommendation 4. Public diplomacy related to WMD terrorism should be expanded 

and strengthened. Some steps that should be considered are: 

A. A clear plan is being implemented to guide U.S. public diplomacy efforts related 

to proliferation in Iran. A similar plan to that for Iran should be developed for the 

North Korea proliferation problem. Responsibility for the plan should be 

11
assigned and a working group for implementation set up. 

B. The focus of U.S. public diplomacy regarding nonproliferation and counterterrorism, which has been on Europe and like-minded nations, should be 

broadened both in terms of countries and arenas of engagement. Countries 

neighboring countries of concern should be targeted specifically, as should 

Muslim nations2

.

C. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, should 

actively incorporate the U.S. deterrent posture into public diplomacy.

D. Radio Farda and Radio Sawa should develop significantly more programming on 

nonproliferation and why WMD programs are a threat to all. Review of progress 

should be by an appropriate interagency working group. 

E. Increasingly, people receive news and information via the Internet, DVD, textmessaging, etc. The U.S. public diplomacy effort should utilize these media.

For example, the U.S. should establish more local-language chat rooms and 

should update information pages much more frequently.

F. U.S. officials responsible for nonproliferation and counter-terrorism policies 

should regularly give briefings and policy perspectives at, for example, the 

Foreign Press Center and to Radios Sawa and Farda. 

Top-Level Guidance. Documentation that conveys U.S. goals and intent can play an important

role in recruiting others to join coalitions. Additionally, it can guide those who have the job of 

making our public diplomacy effective. A good example of such top-level guidance is the 

National Military Strategy for Combating WMD.

Top-level guidance on WMD counter-terrorism, a draft of which is in a very preliminary stage, 

should address all six objectives contained in the President’s Strategy for Winning the War on 

Terror, including a prioritization of our diplomatic and policy efforts. Specifically, it should 

provide guidance on how we will respond to terrorists’ threats or use of WMD.

We urge that the following three key points be considered for inclusion in the guidance. First, 

the U.S. response to WMD terrorism will be broad: we will retaliate against any person, group, 

or state that has aided or abetted the attacker(s), wittingly or unwittingly. Second, there should 

be provision for the policy being shared; any country that wishes to subscribe to our policy in 

advance should be welcomed. Third, we should extend deterrence against WMD terrorist attacks 

to our allies explicitly.

2

 One Board Member believes that U.S. efforts should include an enhanced set of cooperative activities in education

as well as Science and Technology (S&T) in addition to traditional areas of diplomatic effort dealing with

nonproliferation and counter-terrorism.

12
Recommendation 5. The Department of State should establish a working group to 

develop a publicly releasable Diplomatic Strategy for Combating WMD Terrorism. It 

should clearly address how the U.S. will respond to terrorists’ threats or use of WMD.

Results should be presented to the Secretary within 60 days.

Formal Agreements. In combating terrorism, formal agreements with international partners can 

be of use in a host of ways—interdiction of supplies, control of financial transactions, capture 

and extradition, etc. Not only do such agreements facilitate action, they also increase other 

nations’ understanding of U.S. concerns and goals. At present, however, the U.S. focus is 

primarily on the supplier, not the buyer. That is, we seek agreements mostly with those nations 

that can play a role in restricting the flow of technology, materials, or weaponry. Formal 

agreements with potential proliferants can also be of great use. For example, there may be 

additional states that would forgo seeking WMD if they were protected by the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella.

Recommendation 6. The Department of State should task an existing or new 

organizational unit with reviewing what role security assurances might play in reducing 

the motivations of some states to acquire WMD, with specific reference to the Middle

East.

Often, coalitions are cumbersome means to an end that could be better achieved by short, 

tailored formal agreements. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), for example, don’t require 

the extensive clearance processes that would be necessary for legally binding agreement. MOUs 

can facilitate international cooperation by providing for the exchange of points-of-contact, 

training exercises, and procedures for enabling technical assistance.

Recommendation 7. The Department of State should consider expanding the use of 

Memoranda of Understanding to strengthen targeted cooperation and coalition-building

on high-priority WMD counter-terrorism activities. 

Exercises And Training. Most U.S. initiatives on WMD counter-terrorism focus on training 

and exercises as means of beefing up security around WMD-related materials and facilities, 

preparing partner nations to respond to WMD events, and enabling prosecution of terrorists. For 

example, the Biosecurity Engagement Program is helping to build biological threat reduction

activities such as lab pathogen security and biosafety infrastructure upgrades. Similar efforts are 

underway regarding nuclear, chemical, and radiological technologies. A host of U.S. agencies 

are involved in these exercises and they, overall, appear productive. It is important to keep in 

mind, however, that many nations do not have the breadth of bureaucracy and personnel as is 

found among the G8 countries. The exercises and training that are most important for a given 

country should be carefully prioritized. 

A disincentive for potential coalition partners to participate in exercises or other projects is cost.

Although the U.S. intends that the funding burden be shared, the willingness of others to 

13
participate may diminish as the costs they are asked to pay increase. The U.S. should take care 

to assure appropriate international funding prior to undertaking new training and exercises. This 

is of particular concern with regard to the Global Initiative, which has the objective of involving 

private sector entities. 

For example, one of the most important contributors to the Global Initiative will be the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. In particular, the NRC can help non-G8 countries with information and 

procedures on how to protect their civilian nuclear materials and facilities. Because it is likely 

that the NRC’s services will be in much demand by GI member countries, it is important to 

determine in advance how these services will be paid for. Unlike other US Government

agencies, the NRC is required by law to recover most of its budget each year through fees to 

licensees and applicants. It would be both unfair and irregular to expect these entities to fund 

education and collaborative efforts abroad.

TOR TASK #4: Identify the Elements of a Targeted Public-Private Outreach Strategy to 

Industries whose Cooperation is Essential to Combating WMD Terrorism

There is no more dangerous threat than terrorists with nuclear weapons. As no terrorist group is 

likely to be able to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, the most likely source for such 

weapons materials would be a state in possession of fuel cycle capabilities. There is no question 

that nuclear power is a global necessity, so nations will continue to build new nuclear power 

plants. It is therefore imperative that there be secure, economical fuel supplies for these reactors 

and that enrichment and reprocessing be restricted to the nations that have historically performed

these services. In this context, we would like to reinforce our recommendation made in our 

Report on the Review of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Namely, we strongly encourage immediate action to assure that the Global Nuclear Energy 

Partnership receive the priority and funding to advance at the fastest possible pace. 

Private Involvement in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In July 2006, 

Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to 

expand and accelerate our individual and collective partnership capacity to combat nuclear 

terrorism. Since then, thirteen partner nations, as well as the IAEA have joined the effort.

However, national governments lack substantial control over privately owned or operated ports, 

airports, or financial institutions; large metropolitan area governments; and many civilian nuclear 

facility operators through which nuclear terrorist threats and resources are likely to pass or 

against which they are likely to be targeted. As the 9/11 Commission made clear, terrorist 

organizations such as al Qaeda seek to exploit such gaps between national government will and 

capabilities at the local and private sector level. City governments and private sector entities, 

such as nuclear power operators and financial institutions, share a strong common interest in 

seeing the Global Initiative succeed, and they can and will be galvanized to act if invited to do 

so.

14
Recommendation 8. The Department of State should seek to accelerate public 

endorsement of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism by local 

governments and private sector entities, especially those in a position to support and 

contribute to the activities of the Initiative. 

Private Involvement in Countering Bio-Chemical Terrorism. The President’s WMD 

Commission (Robb-Silberman Commission) highlighted the growing global threat we face from

biological and chemical weapons (CBW) in the hands of terrorists. As noted above, the relative 

simplicity of the technologies to produce CBW, together with the dual-use nature of the requisite 

materials and equipment needed to produce CBW, make it impossible to counter CBW terrorism

through technology controls.

To combat this complex and diffuse threat, the WMD Commission advocated a closer role 

between government and the private sector. Although several programs are underway to reach 

out to U.S. private sector, no focused international outreach effort exists to galvanize the

international private sector or local governments of willing partner nations to work together

against the bio-chemical terrorist threat.

A good example of outreach to the private sector is the U.S. Department of Justice Chemical and 

Biological Outreach Program, which helps suppliers, distributors, and manufacturers nationwide 

become aware of the risks of CW and BW terrorism. It provides them with information such as 

checklists of materials to keep special tabs on and guidance on what information can guide law 

enforcement in counter-terrorism.

Recommendation 9. The Department of State should consider establishing a global 

public-private partnership to reduce the risk of bio-chemical terrorism. A central 

element of this new partnership initiative could entail partner nations gaining the public 

endorsement of and adherence to a voluntary code of management best practices by 

willing private sector entities and local governments.

Private Involvement in WMD Terrorism Insurance. In passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance 

Act of 2002 and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Congress and the 

President recognized the unique challenge associated with developing a private insurance market

to help mitigate the risks of WMD terrorism and protect our citizens and economy from such 

risks. The 2005 law called on the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets to examine

the availability and affordability of WMD terrorism insurance, on which it recently issued an 

inconclusive report.

Private industry has begun to respond to the need for WMD terrorism insurance. Recently a 

London-based transport insurer announced that in 2007 it will make WMD and RDD coverage 

available for physical loss, business interruption and liabilities, and will be applicable in 

incidents involving both actual damage as well as trade disruption. 

While U.S. law acknowledges the relationship between insurance and the mitigation of

catastrophic WMD terrorism risks, there has been no systematic effort to examine the 

15
appropriate role of international insurance markets in mitigating global WMD terrorism risks and 

the kinds of laws, regulations, and agreements that would enable such a role. The pace of 

economic globalization as well as the limited federal government resources available to allocate 

to incremental security measures that might otherwise be borne by the private sector has made

such an examination increasingly urgent.

Recommendation 10. The Department of State should consider establishing an 

interagency working group to examine the relationship between international insurance 

markets and WMD terrorism risk and to consider appropriate reforms to laws, 

regulations, agreements, and conventions to strengthen private insurance markets’ role 

in mitigating catastrophic terrorism risk. This working group should include national 

security, economic, legal, and technical experts and should report its recommendations

within 90 days.

16
Appendix A – Summary of Recommendations 

The recommendations contained in this report can be grouped into five categories: (1) Building 

the Methodology; (2) Enhance and Improve Communications; (3) Expand the Set of Coalition 

Partners; (4) Engage Muslims Specifically; and (5) Try New Approaches. These categories can 

be used to develop priorities for implementation of the recommendations and to identify how the 

recommendations collectively reinforce and interact with each other. Some recommendations 

contribute to two categories and therefore are listed twice below.

Building the Methodology

Recommendation 1. The Department of State should establish a Task Force to prepare a 

Framework for Combating WMD Terrorism. It should identify the appropriate parameters of 

the State Department’s role in deterring, dissuading and coercing terrorists, including how 

State’s global assets can contribute to the accumulation and integration of the detailed 

information necessary for targeted dissuasion, deterrence and coercion, and to coherent and 

integrated strategic communications for these purposes. This should be completed in 

conjunction with the Diplomatic Strategy to Combat WMD Terrorism. These efforts should 

draw on interagency expertise in order to leverage and enlist cooperative activity across the 

interagency.

Enhance and Improve Communications

Recommendation 4. Public diplomacy related to WMD terrorism should be expanded and 

strengthened. Some steps that should be considered are: 

A. A clear plan is being implemented to guide U.S. public diplomacy efforts related to 

proliferation in Iran. A similar plan to that for Iran should be developed for the North 

Korea proliferation problem. Responsibility for the plan should be assigned and a 

working group for implementation set up. 

B. The focus of the U.S. public diplomacy regarding nonproliferation and counter-terrorism,

which has been on Europe and like-minded nations, should be broadened both in terms of 

countries and arenas of engagement. Countries neighboring countries of concern should 

be targeted specifically, as should Muslim nations3

.

C. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, should 

actively incorporate the U.S. deterrent posture into public diplomacy.

D. Radio Farda and Radio Sawa should develop significantly more programming on 

nonproliferation and why WMD programs are a threat to all. Review of progress should 

be by an appropriate interagency working group. 

3

 One Board Member believes that U.S. efforts should include an enhanced set of cooperative activities in education

as well as Science and Technology (S&T) in addition to traditional areas of diplomatic effort dealing with

nonproliferation and counter-terrorism.

A-1. Summary of Recommendations
E. Increasingly, people receive news and information via the Internet, DVD, text-messaging,

etc. The U.S. public diplomacy effort should utilize these media. For example, the U.S. 

should establish more local-language chat rooms and should update information pages 

much more frequently.

F. U.S. officials responsible for nonproliferation and counter-terrorism policies should 

regularly give briefings and policy perspectives at, for example, the Foreign Press Center 

and to Radios Sawa and Farda.

(also contributes to: Engage Muslims Specifically)

Recommendation 5. The Department of State should establish a working group to develop a 

publicly releasable Diplomatic Strategy for Combating WMD Terrorism. It should clearly 

address how the U.S. will respond to terrorists’ threats or use of WMD. Results should be 

presented to the Secretary within 60 days.

Expand the Set of Coalition Partners

Recommendation 3. The Department of State should engage nations in all geographic regions

in formal and informal cooperative efforts to combat WMD terrorism. In particular, countries 

integral to WMD counter-terrorism should be invited to join the Global Initiative to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism. In some important cases, informal and non-public participation by key 

states may be preferable to joining formal initiatives. (also contributes to: Engage Muslims

Specifically)

Recommendation 8. The Department of State should seek to accelerate public endorsement of 

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism by local governments and private sector 

entities, especially those in a position to support and contribute to the activities of the Initiative.

(also contributes to: Try New Approaches) 

Recommendation 9. The Department of State should consider establishing a global publicprivate partnership to reduce the risk of bio-chemical terrorism. A central element of this new 

partnership initiative could entail partner nations gaining the public endorsement of and 

adherence to a voluntary code of management best practices by willing private sector entities

and local governments. (also contributes to: Try New Approaches) 

Recommendation 10. The Department of State should consider establishing an interagency 

working group to examine the relationship between international insurance markets and WMD

terrorism risk and to consider appropriate reforms to laws, regulations, agreements, and 

conventions to strengthen private insurance markets’ role in mitigating catastrophic terrorism

risk. This working group should include national security, economic, legal, and technical 

experts and should report its recommendations within 90 days. 

A-2. Summary of Recommendations
Engage Muslims Specifically

Recommendation 2. The Department of State should consider formulating a Global Initiative 

on Religious Tolerance and Moderation. States as well as groups and local governments could 

be invited to subscribe to its statement of principles. Fora could be held to consult with 

moderate Muslim leaders on key issues such as assimilation, counter-terrorism, and equality.

(also contributes to: Try New Approaches) 

Recommendation 3. The Department of State should engage nations in all geographic regions

in formal and informal cooperative efforts to combat WMD terrorism. In particular, countries 

integral to WMD counter-terrorism should be invited to join the Global Initiative to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism. In some important cases, informal and non-public participation by key 

states may be preferable to joining formal initiatives. (also contributes to: Expand the Set of

Coalition Partners) 

Recommendation 4. Public diplomacy related to WMD terrorism should be expanded and 

strengthened. Some steps that should be considered are: 

A. A clear plan is being implemented to guide U.S. public diplomacy efforts related to 

proliferation in Iran. A similar plan to that for Iran should be developed for the North 

Korea proliferation problem. Responsibility for the plan should be assigned and a 

working group for implementation set up. 

B. The focus of the U.S. public diplomacy regarding nonproliferation and counter-terrorism,

which has been on Europe and like-minded nations, should be broadened both in terms of 

countries and arenas of engagement. Countries neighboring countries of concern should 

be targeted specifically, as should Muslim nations4

.

C. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, should 

actively incorporate the U.S. deterrent posture into public diplomacy.

D. Radio Farda and Radio Sawa should develop significantly more programming on 

nonproliferation and why WMD programs are a threat to all. Review of progress should 

be by an appropriate interagency working group. 

E. Increasingly, people receive news and information via the Internet, DVD, text-messaging,

etc. The U.S. public diplomacy effort should utilize these media. For example, the U.S. 

should establish more local-language chat rooms and should update information pages 

much more frequently.

F. U.S. officials responsible for nonproliferation and counter-terrorism policies should 

regularly give briefings and policy perspectives at, for example, the Foreign Press Center 

and to Radios Sawa and Farda.

(also contributes to: Enhance and Improve Communications) 

4

 One Board Member believes that U.S. efforts should include an enhanced set of cooperative activities in education

as well as Science and Technology (S&T) in addition to traditional areas of diplomatic effort dealing with

nonproliferation and counter-terrorism.

A-3. Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation 6. The Department of State should task an existing or new organizational 

unit with reviewing what role security assurances might play in reducing the motivations of 

some states to acquire WMD, with specific reference to the Middle East.

Try New Approaches

Recommendation 2. The Department of State should consider formulating a Global Initiative 

on Religious Tolerance and Moderation. States as well as groups and local governments could 

be invited to subscribe to its statement of principles. Fora could be held to consult with 

moderate Muslim leaders on key issues such as assimilation, counter-terrorism, and equality.

(also contributes to: Engage Muslims Directly) 

Recommendation 7. The Department of State should consider expanding the use of 

Memoranda of Understanding to strengthen targeted cooperation and coalition-building on 

high-priority WMD counter-terrorism activities.

Recommendation 8. The Department of State should seek to accelerate public endorsement of 

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism by local governments and private sector 

entities, especially those in a position to support and contribute to the activities of the Initiative.

(also contributes to: Expand the Set of Coalition Partners)

Recommendation 9. The Department of State should consider establishing a global publicprivate partnership to reduce the risk of bio-chemical terrorism. A central element of this new 

partnership initiative could entail partner nations gaining the public endorsement of and 

adherence to a voluntary code of management best practices by willing private sector entities

and local governments. (also contributes to: Expand the Set of Coalition Partners)

A-4. Summary of Recommendations
Appendix B - Terms of Reference

B-1. Terms of Reference 
B-2. Terms of Reference 
B-3. Terms of Reference 
Appendix C - Members and Project Staff

Board Members 

Senator Fred Thompson (Chairman)

Dr. Michael R. Anastasio Dr. Keith B. Payne 

Dr. Kathleen Bailey Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff 

Dr. Ashton B. Carter Senator Charles Robb 

Ms. Alison B. Fortier Dr. C. Paul Robinson 

Dr. William Graham Dr. Amy Sands 

Mr. Mitchel B. Kugler Dr. James Schlesinger 

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman Dr. William Schneider 

VADM Robert Monroe, USN (ret.) Dr. William Van Cleave 

Dr. Gordon Oehler Mr. James Woolsey 

Task Force Members

Senator Charles Robb (Chairman)

Dr. Kathleen Bailey 

Dr. Gordon Oehler 

Dr. Keith B. Payne 

Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff 

Dr. Amy Sands

Dr. William Schneider 

Project Staff 

Dr. George Look 

Executive Director, ISAB 

 Maj. Chris Byrom, USAF 

Executive Secretary

Mr. Matthew Zartman

Deputy Executive Director, 

ISAB

Mr. Brandon Buttrick 

Deputy Director, Office of 

Strategic Planning and Outreach 

(SPO), DOS

Ms. Thelma JenkinsAnthony

Executive Assistant

Ms. M. Wendy Reid 

Mr. Gonzalo Suarez 

SAIC Senior Analysts 

C-1. Members and Project Staff 
Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Task Force

 Persons Consulted in Task Force Meetings 

May 10, 2006 

Mr. David Conway Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

Weapons Expert, Office of Weapons Tactics and 

Training, Directorate of Intelligence, National 

Counterterrorism Center 

Mr. Doug Humphries Director, Office of Weapons Tactics and Training, 

Directorate of Intelligence, National 

Counterterrorism Center 

Carol Burans Director, Strategic and Operational Planning,

National Counterterrorism Center 

Mr. Mike Hutton Strategic and Operational Planning Directorate,

National Counterterrorism Center 

Mr. Jason Herring Strategy and Evaluation Directorate, National 

Counterproliferation Center 

Dr. Carol Linden Senior Scientist, Directorate for Science and 

Technology, Department of Homeland Security 

Thomas Lehrman Director, Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Terrorism, Department of State 

June 16, 2006 

Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 

Department of Energy 

Mr. Stephen DeAngelis President and CEO, Enterra Solutions, LLC 

July 06, 2006 

Mr. Edward Salazar Secretary’s Office for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT), 

Department of State 

D-1. Individuals Consulted by Task Force 
Other Persons Consulted by Task Force Members 

June - December 2006 

Dr. Shmuel Bar Director of Studies, Institute of Policy and Strategy, Herzliya, 

Israel

Mr. Bernard P. Bogdan, 

Jr.

Intelligence Operations Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Joyce L. Connery Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration

Mike Evenson Director, Operations Enterprises, Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency

Patrick Heffernan Department of Treasury 

Stephanie E. Lenzenweger Program Manager, Chemical Counterterrorism Team, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation 

Vahid Majidi Assistant Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Ambassador David Miller Independent Advisor 

Jeff Muller Unit Chief, WMD Countermeasures Unit, Counterterrorism

Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Linh Nguyen Counterproliferation Initiatives Unit, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Robert M. Scripp Bioterrorism Program Manager, Counterterrorism Directorate, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Mark Shaffer Nuclear Regulatory Commission

William Tobey National Nuclear Security Agency 

Thomas Whalen WMD National Preparedness, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Mark Wittrock Senior Advisor, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department

of Energy (DOE) 

D-2. Individuals Consulted by Task Force