NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MEIMEI NI; XINZHONG LIU, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-71106 

Agency Nos. A087-693-851 

A088-172-944 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 13, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ARTERTON,***

District Judge.

Petitioners MeiMei Ni (Ms. Ni) and Xinzhong Liu (Mr. Liu), married citizens 

of China, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States District Judge for the District 

of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 15 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility determination against them 

that resulted in the denial of their applications for asylum and withholding of 

removal.

1

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the 

petition.2

The BIA repeatedly cited to the IJ’s decision and found no clear error in its

reasoning on the relevant issues, so we review both decisions. See Garcia-Martinez 

v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Where, as here, the BIA agrees 

with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” (citation omitted)); see also 

Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006); Medina-Lara v. 

Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Thus, we refer to the Board and IJ 

collectively as ‘the agency.’”). 

We review the agency’s “factual findings, including adverse credibility 

determinations, for substantial evidence.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 

(9th Cir. 2020) (citing Bassene v. Holder, 737 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 2013)). We 

uphold an adverse credibility determination unless “any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Manes 

1 Petitioners consolidated their cases on January 4, 2014, after getting married on 

November 2, 2011, and were listed as derivative beneficiaries on their respective 

applications. 

2 Because Petitioners did not raise any argument before the BIA or this court with 

respect to the denial of their claims for relief under the Convention Against Torture, 

they are waived. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
3 

v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Accordingly, “only 

the most extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility 

determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Here, the agency’s adverse credibility determinations with respect to both 

Petitioners are supported by substantial evidence. The agency did not err in relying 

on Petitioners’ inconsistent testimony before U.S. immigration officers and the 

immigration court as reflecting negatively on their credibility. Moreover, 

Petitioners’ claims of past harm centered around alleged persecution on account of 

their religious practices. But Petitioners’ testimony before the IJ as to their religious 

practices and past harm was internally inconsistent, conflicted with their prior sworn 

statements, and was inconsistent with other testimonial evidence presented to the IJ. 

As to Ms. Ni, she gave false testimony before the IJ when she repeatedly 

denied ever applying for a U.S. visa (which she failed to plausibly explain). See

Cortez-Pineda v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining “[t]he IJ 

did not have to accept [the petitioner]’s unpersuasive explanations for the[] 

inconsistencies”); see also Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(explaining that the agency is not compelled to accept the petitioner’s explanations 

for testimonial discrepancies). 

After Ms. Ni’s sister testified that Ms. Ni had submitted multiple student visa 
4 

applications with false information, Ms. Ni eventually corrected her 

misrepresentations before the IJ and admitted to submitting three student visa 

applications that contained false information. Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 

1180–81 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “intentional deception toward the 

immigration authorities is culpable conduct and one of the several indications of 

dishonesty that casts doubt on the applicant’s entire story” (cleaned up)); see Singh 

v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “lies and fraudulent 

documents when they are no longer necessary for the immediate escape from 

persecution do support an adverse inference”). 

Ms. Ni also gave conflicting dates about when she departed China and entered 

the United States, and was unable to explain the discrepancies. Finally, Ms. Ni gave 

inconsistent descriptions of who allegedly injured her while she was detained in 

prison and the nature of those injuries. Before the IJ, Ms. Ni claimed that her 

cellmates beat her in prison, but no cellmate beating was mentioned in her asylum 

statement or asylum interview. Further, Ms. Ni’s sister described visible bruising 

on Ms. Ni’s arms after her release from prison, but no such injuries were mentioned 

by Ms. Ni in her asylum application or testimony before the IJ. Shrestha, 590 F.3d 

at 1047–48 (upholding an adverse credibility determination where the IJ “relied on 

factors explicitly permitted by the REAL ID Act including unresponsive and 

undetailed testimony, and inconsistent testimony for which there was no explanation 
5 

or corroboration”). 

As to Mr. Liu, he gave irreconcilable accounts of his religious background

that allegedly contributed to his past harm and formed the basis of his fear—which 

he was unable to explain. Before the IJ, Mr. Liu claimed that he was raised as a 

Buddhist and arrested in China for practicing Falun Gong, and that he was 

introduced to Christianity only after he entered the United States in 2008. But in his 

2010 asylum application and 2011 asylum interview, Mr. Liu claimed that he was 

born into a Christian family in China where he attended a family church—making 

no mention of Buddhism, Falun Gong, or any past arrest for such a practice. Mr. Liu 

was unable to explain his untruthful testimony to the asylum officer and, on appeal 

to the BIA, did not contest the IJ’s reliance on his testimonial discrepancies. 

Mr. Liu’s demeanor and evasive answers when asked to explain the inconsistencies 

in his testimony also prompted the IJ to make an adverse credibility determination. 

Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding substantial 

evidence supported an adverse credibility determination where the petitioner 

demonstrated “a pattern of long pauses after certain questions, followed by an 

explanation or excuse”); Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041 (“IJs are in the best position to 

assess demeanor and other credibility cues that we cannot readily access on 

review.”). 

The agency’s adverse credibility determinations are supported by substantial 
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evidence and Petitioners’ remaining contentions lack merit. 

PETITION DENIED.