AFFIRM AS MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed May 28, 2024 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-01324-CR TAISHA MAYFIELD RILEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1930351-J MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Smith, Miskel, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Smith Taisha Mayfield Riley appeals the tria l court’s judgment convicting her of theft of property with an aggregate value of at least $30,000 but less than $150,000 from a non-profit organization. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §§ 31.03(a), (e)(5), (f)(3)(B). In two issues, appellant asserts that her sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense in viola tion of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution. In a crosspoint, the State requests that the Court refo rm the judgment to correctly reflect of the names of the attorneys representing th e State at trial. Because the judgment–2– contains an error that we may correct on a ppeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. Background Appellant was charged by indictment with theft of property having an aggregate value between $30,000 and $150,000 from a nonp rofit organization, the South Grand Prairie High School Chey-Anne Booster Club. She judicially confessed to the offense, entered a guilty plea pursuant to an op en plea agreement, and proceeded to trial before the court on punishment. Laura Rohloff, director of the Chey-Anne Dance Team, testified that appellant was the team’s booster club president and, in that position, oversaw fundraising, purchasing team necessities, helping with costuming, providing meals for game nights, and leading team bonding events. Spirit of America, a company that coordinates dance and cheer, invited the da nce team to perform in the 2018 Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade. Th e trip was self-funded, and each team member paid approximately $2,800 to participate. R ohloff testified that appellant, who had complete control over the booster club’s fina nces, was responsible for collecting the payments and forwarding them to Spirit of America. Approximately a week before the trip , Spirit of America informed Rohloff that it had received only an initial deposit for the trip and a $59,000 balance remained due. Rohloff spoke with a ppellant, who said she woul d forward a tracking number for the payments. When Rohloff did not receive anything, she asked appellant to–3– confirm that the balance had been paid. Appellant did not provi de confirmation, and Rohloff notified the dance team parents. Ultimately, the school district and Texas Trust, the booster club’s bank, paid the bala nce due and the team was able to travel to and perform in the parade. Rohloff testified that she a nd appellant had an extremely close relationship a nd, as a result of appellan t’s actions, Rohloff suffered from trust issues and had to attend therapy. Rohloff believed that appellant needed to serve some time because she broke the tr ust of children, hurt them emotionally, and stole from them. Ginny Diaz testified that appellant wa s a close friend and a “second mom” to Diaz’s daughter, who was on the dance team. Diaz’s family planned to go on the trip and raised money to pa y for it. Appellant was coll ecting the money for the trip, and receipts show Diaz gave appellant more than $10,000 in cash. Diaz testified that the experience hurt the morale of th e team and many, incl uding her family, did not give money directly to the booster club afterwards. Guadalupe Salazar was elected booster club president after appellant was removed. He testified that the organization “owed mone y everywhere,” there were two separate bank accounts that no one coul d access, and the “money wasn’t there.” The booster club learned that appellant had been stealing for years, and it took the club “years and years” and “a lot of s acrifice” to pay the club’s debts. Grand Prairie Police Detective Trent Alle n investigated the theft. Rohloff assisted in reviewing bank records to iden tify inappropriate purch ases by appellant.–4– In all, they identified unauthorized booste r club spending of more than $55,000 in 2018. An exhibit admitted at trial showed some of the unauthorized transactions, including $14,275 in cash withdrawals, $8 ,349.42 to Sprint, mu ltiple expenses for out of town restaurants and hotels unrela ted to team travel, vehicle dealership expenses (despite the fact that the team did not have a vehi cle), and utility bill payments. There also was a Carnival Crui se charge, and Detective Allen located a photograph on Facebook of appellant on a Carniva l Cruise a month after the charge. Appellant testified that she was involved with the booster club from 2014 to 2018, first as a parent and later as treasurer and presiden t. She testified that she had been in declining health since 2015. She was diagnosed with fluid and pressure in her brain, which required placement of a sten t. She also had been diagnosed with other ailments requiring medical treatment , including Hodgkin’s lymphoma, thyroid problems, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep apn ea, cardio neuropathy, and hypertension. Appellant was placed on disability in 2015. As booster club president, appellant was responsible for accepting the payments for the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Pa rade trip. She explained that “[a] lot was going on at home,” including “financi al issues,” and her stealing “became greed.” She testified that she freely and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the offense and accepted responsibility for her actions, but she did not steal the money with malicious intent. She acknowledged that her actions had a tremendous impact on the victims and expressed re morse for having affected gi rls and families with whom–5– she was close. South Grand Prairie is a close-knit community, a nd she betrayed that community. However, appellant also testified that there were times when she would pay for things for the dance team with her own money and sh e used booster club cash to purchase items like hangers, food, or decorations. She paid Sprint $8,349.42 for iPads, but explained that “it really was just one iPad” on her account and she used it for the dance team. Appellant described how th is case had impacted he r mentally, physically, and emotionally. She suffered from depression and attended counseling. She also no longer lived with her immedi ate family; she moved to Te nnessee because there were better doctors there, but also because she received personal threats and no longer felt safe living in Grand Prairie. Her health had continued to deteriorate. To appellant, that was “punishment for what [she] did.” She explained to the trial court her plan to pay restitution should the court place her on probation. She also testified that she had no prior felonies, although she prev iously served probation for a 2003 misdemeanor worthless check charge. After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court found appellant guilty and a ssessed punishment at four years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
Punishment In two issues, appellant asserts that he r sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense and inappropriate to her in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the–6– United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Te xas Constitution. According to appellant, the evidence s hows the punishment wa s severe and she needed probation instead of incarceration. Constitutional rights, however, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, may be waived. See Castaneda v. State , 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet. ). Subject to two narrow exceptions for absolute rights or waivable-only rights not at issue in this case, the record must show that an appellant made a timely reque st, objection, or motion to the trial court for error to be preserved on appeal. See T EX

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. P. 33.1(a)(1); Garza v. State , 435 S.W.3d 258, 260–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Appellant did not object that her sentence was grossly disproportionate when the sentence was announced or raise her complaint in a post-conviction motion. Accordingly, she has not preserved her complaint for appellate review. See Sims v. State , No. 05-18-00572-CR, 2019 WL 2266547, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2019, no pe t.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (argument that trial court violated Eighth Amendment by imposing grossly disproportionate punishment not pr eserved for review when defendant failed to object at time sentence was impos ed or in motion for new trial). Even had appellant properly preserve d her complaint for our review, her sentence is not grossly disproportionate. The concept of prop ortionate punishment is embodied in the Eighth Amendment, but it “is a narrow principle that does not–7– require strict proportionality betw een the crime and the sentence.” 1 State v. Simpson , 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “[I]t forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. (citing Ewing v. California , 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (plurality opinion)). A se ntence is grossly disproportionate to the crime only in the exceedingl y rare or extreme case. Id. at 322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade , 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). Further, a se ntence within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or unusual unde r the Eighth Amendment or the Texas Constitution. See id. at 323; Lambright v. State , 318 S.W.2d 653, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958). To determine whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly disproportionate to a defendant’s crime, we conduct a threshold comparison, judging “the severity of the sentence in light of th e harm caused or thr eatened to the victim, the culpability of the offender, and the offender's prior adjudicated and unadjudicated offenses.” Simpson , 488 S.W.3d at 323 (citing Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). In the rare case in which this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportio nality, we then compare the defendant’s sentence with sentences received by other o ffenders in the same jurisdiction and with

1 Because “there is no significant difference between the protections afforded” by the state and federal constitutions with respect to cruel and unusual punishment, see Forbit v. State , No. 05-19-00946-CR, 2021 WL 1884655, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), we address appellant’s challenges under the Eighth Am endment and Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution together.–8– sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. (citing Graham , 560 U.S. at 60). If this compar ison validates an initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual. Id. Here, appellant pleaded guilty to theft of property from a non-profit organization in the amount of more than $30,000 but less than $150,000, a seconddegree felony, and her four-yea r sentence was well within the statutory limits of two to twenty years for the offense. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §§ 12.33(a), 31.03(e)(5), (f)(3)(B). In assessing punishment, the tria l court stated that the amount of money taken and what appellant us ed it for was egregious, a nd we agree. Among other things, appellant used booster club funds to pay for a car, a cruise, her utilities, and other personal expenses, incl uding restaurant and hotel charges. In doing so, she betrayed teenagers, parents, and a community that relied on and trusted her. And, it took considerable time and sacrifice for th e booster club to pay de bts that appellant wrongfully incurred. Appellant had serious health issues, but many of those existed well before she committed the offense. She also expr essed remorse and had no prior felony convictions. However, appella nt’s sentence was on the low end of the statutory limit for her offense. Considering the severity of appellant’s sentence in light of those factors, the harm caused to her victims, and her culpability, we conclude that the sentence is not one of those rare or ex treme cases raising an inference of gross disproportionality. Accordingly, we need not compare appellant’s sentence to–9– sentences imposed on others. See Simpson , 488 S.W.3d at 323. We overrule appellant’s first and second issues. Modification of Judgment In a cross-issue, the State requests that we modify the trial court’s judgment to correctly reflect the names of counsel re presenting it at trial. This Court has the power to modify a judgment to speak th e truth when we have the necessary information to do so. See T EX

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. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Here, the record reflect s that Steve Fawcett and Melinda Chancy represented the State at tr ial, but the judgment indicates that the State was represented by Brandie Wade. Ac cordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s final judgment should be modified to read: “Attorney for State: Steve Fawcett and Melinda Chancy”. We su stain the State’s cross-issue.
Conclusion We modify the trial court’s judgment to show that Steve Fawcett and Melinda Chancy represented the State at trial. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed.

Do Not Publish T EX

. R. A PP . P. 47.2(b) 221324F.U05 /Crai g Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE–10– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
TAISHA MAYFIELD RILEY, Appellant

No. 05-22-01324-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dall as County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1930351-J. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Miskel and Breedlove participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date , the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The “Attorney for State” section of th e judgment is modified to replace “Brandie Wade” with “Steve Fa wcett and Melinda Chancy”.
As MODIFIED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 28th day of May, 2024.