COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-09-00437-CR

JOHN MURRAY 

BENNETT

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

In a sole point, Appellant John Murray Bennett appeals from the trial 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. Procedural History

Bennett was charged with DWI-felony repetition. The trial court carried 

Bennett’s motion to suppress until trial and held a suppression hearing during 

Azle Police Officer Rusty Wingate’s testimony, discussed below. Following the 

hearing, the trial court denied the motion and proceeded with trial. The jury 

convicted Bennett of felony DWI, the trial court assessed five years’ confinement 

as punishment, and this appeal followed.

III. Discussion

Bennett argues that the trial court erred by finding that his detention was 

properly supported by the evidence and by denying his motion to suppress.

A. Community Caretaking Function

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 

seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede v. State, 214 

S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). An officer’s community caretaking 

function is a narrowly applied exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 

Under the community caretaking exception, an officer may stop and assist an 

individual whom a reasonable person would believe is in need of help given the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. However, in order to invoke his community 

caretaking function, the officer’s primary motive must be concern for the 

individual’s well-being. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002).
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Determining whether the officer properly invoked his community caretaking 

function is a two-step process. Swaffer v. State, 258 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277). We must 

first determine whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community 

caretaking purpose and then whether the officer’s belief that his assistance was 

required was reasonable. Swaffer, 258 S.W.3d at 260–61. Then we consider 

these non-exclusive factors: (1) the nature and level of distress exhibited by the 

individual; (2) the individual’s location; (3) whether the individual was alone or 

had other access to assistance besides that of the officer; and (4) to what extent 

the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Wright, 7 

S.W.3d at 151–52. The first factor is entitled to the greatest weight. Corbin, 85 

S.W.3d at 277.

B. Analysis

During the suppression hearing, Officer Wingate testified that on the night 

of November 5, 2006, during his conversation with two pedestrians who had 

been walking in the street ―right down a hill from where the accident occurred . . . 

a vehicle . . . [a] guy stops me and says, hey, a guy wrecked out on his 

motorcycle, you need to go check on him.‖ He stated that he stopped Bennett 

because he thought an accident had occurred and that the parties involved were 

in distress and that ―[i]f anyone had come around that blind corner where they[

2

]

 

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There were two people on the motorcycle. The parties do not dispute that 

Bennett was the driver.
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were stalled out there, it would have been easy for them to have been r[u]n over.‖

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court overruled Bennett’s 

objection.

During trial, Officer Wingate added that the streets were wet and slippery 

that night and that he learned of the motorcycle accident, which was about a 

block away from his location, around 8:00 p.m. The DVD from his patrol unit’s 

dashboard camera, which was admitted in evidence and published to the jury 

during his testimony, shows that the roads were wet, that it was very dark, that 

Bennett pulled into a parking lot shortly after restarting his motorcycle, and that a

highway road sign warns of curves in the road just beyond the parking lot 

entrance.

The trial court reasonably could have found that Officer Wingate was 

primarily motivated by his community caretaking function because Officer 

Wingate testified that he stopped Bennett and his passenger because they 

appeared to be in distress and that he ―was unsure if anyone was hurt or not.‖ 

See Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277; Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet ref’d).

Furthermore, the trial court could have reasonably found that the Wright

factors support a finding that Officer Wingate acted reasonably in stopping 

Bennett to determine if he needed help because Officer Wingate could have 

concluded that Bennett did not have access to assistance; Bennett’s passenger

was also involved in the accident; the accident occurred at night; and,
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immediately after the accident, Bennett pulled into an empty parking lot. We 

conclude that Officer Wingate’s exercise of his community caretaking function 

was reasonable; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Bennett’s motion 

to suppress. We overrule Bennett’s sole point.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Bennett’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BOB MCCOY

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: January 27, 2011