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S. HRG. 109–942

U.S–BURMA RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 29, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska, Chairman

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Aung, Thin Thin, joint general secretary, Women’s Rights and Welfare Association of Burma, New Delhi, India .................................................................... 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36

Green, Dr. Michael J., senior advisor and Japan chair, Center for Strategic

and International Studies ................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11

John, Eric G., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

Affairs, Department of State ............................................................................... 44

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47

McConnell, Hon. Mitch, a United States Senator from Kentucky, opening

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, a United States Senator from Alaska, opening

statement .............................................................................................................. 1

Turnell, Dr. Sean, Burma Economic Watch, Economics Department,

Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; Visiting Fellow, Southeast Asia

Program, Cornell University ............................................................................... 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Eric G. John to written questions submitted by the following

Senators:

Lisa Murkowski ................................................................................................ 55

Lincoln Chaffee ................................................................................................. 56

Responses of Dr. Sean Turnell to written questions submitted by Senator

Murkowski ............................................................................................................ 56

(III)

(1)

U.S.–BURMA RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 2006,

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Lisa Murkowski

(chair of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Murkowski and McConnell.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good afternoon and welcome to the Senate

Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Today, we are going to look at the situation in Burma, what impacts U.S. sanctions have had in affecting change in the country,

and how we should move forward to further our policy goals.

We have a different order in the testimony today than we normally would have. Eric John, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State, is currently testifying on the House side this afternoon and

will not be able to join us until later. So in a bit of a switch, we

will hear from the nongovernmental panel prior to hearing from

the administration’s witness.

When the subject of Burma comes up, we often think of Aung

San Suu Kyi and her National League of Democracy party. She is

the primary voice for political reform in a nation run by a repressive military junta. Yet for all the support, the international community has demonstrated for Suu Kyi and her party and the pressure applied in one form or another on the Burmese government,

Suu Kyi remains under house arrest and the National League of

Democracy’s election victory in 1990 remains unhonored.

With the purging of Khin Nyunt and hundreds of his followers

from the government in 2004, the State Peace and Development

Council has limited the Burmese government’s contact with foreign

officials and international sentiment. The sudden announcement of

the capital move to Pyinmana has further limited the international

contact, as embassies in Rangoon were told to communicate with

officials in Pyinmana via fax even though there is inadequate

power in the new capital to operate fax machines or any other machines.

Since the student demonstrations in 1988, our policy toward

Burma has been to sanction and isolate, with increasing limitations

on assistance and trade. Yet the SPDC has effectively minimized

2

the effect of these sanctions by playing interested investors off one

another as it offers access to Burma’s considerable natural resources, and nations compete to see who has greater influence in

the region.

The SPDC continues to have access to financial assistance and

the means to continue its authoritative rule despite Burma’s ranking among the poorest of the poor. Outside investment and assistance is moving forward in areas that are cause for great concern.

In 2001, Russia announced its intent to build a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor, research reactor, in central Burma. An agreement

was signed in 2002, but information on further activity has not

been readily available or transparent. Instead, reports suggest it is

North Korea who is now providing assistance to Burma’s nuclear

program.

A November 2003 article in the Far Eastern Economic Review

notes that North Korean technicians were seen unloading large

crates and heavy construction equipment from trains in central

Burma and aircraft from North Korea’s national airline, Air Karyo,

were landing at military airfields also in central Burma. While this

information does not directly link North Korea to a nuclear project

in Burma, it is an issue that we need to be paying attention to.

The limited contacts that western governments have with Burma

also impact other arenas. Burma’s recent revelation that the H5N1

strain of the bird flu was found within its borders is surprising

only in that it has taken so long for an official announcement. The

inability of international responders to access Burma’s bird population and provide assistance should be a concern to all nations. As

the spring migratory path of wild birds from Asia will soon reach

Alaska and move on to the rest of the United States, our lack of

knowledge of the true impact of the bird flu in Burma makes our

job in preventing its outbreak here in the United States that much

more difficult.

With the reality of the current situation in Burma and the ineffectiveness of the current sanctions, there has been some discussion

by Burma watchers of finding another way to move toward openness and political and economic reform in Burma, and that is one

of the topics that I would like to explore with our witnesses today.

Some have suggested the possibility of establishing a Burma

version of the Six Party Talks, bringing India and China as Burma’s prime investors and large neighbors to the table with representatives from ASEAN, the EU, and the United States to provide a united front.

Setting aside the pressure that it would place on Burma’s military junta, I believe that one of the benefits of such a forum is a

cohesive regional approach. This past January, I traveled to Seoul,

Tokyo, and Beijing and the overarching message that I heard from

each of the governments was that the North Korea Six Party Talks

had created an atmosphere of cooperation and common ground

among the parties at a time when there was clearly growing tension in the region. A Six Party Talk forum on Burma has the potential to minimize Burma’s ability to play its suitors off against

each other. It would also pressure the ASEAN nations to come up

with a single policy to be represented at the forum.

3

Looking at other possibilities, many are interested to learn more

about the December 2005 U.N. Security Council meeting that the

United States was able to achieve and whether the Security Council might be an appropriate forum to address Burma. Both scenarios are worth discussion on their merits to determine their potential effectiveness and pitfalls.

A second issue I believe needs to be kept in mind as we are looking to make progress in Burma is the role of Burma’s ethnic minorities. Aung San Suu Kyi tends to get the majority of media and

political attention, but even if the results of the 1988 election are

recognized or new legitimate elections are held, that does not solve

the armed resistance offered by groups like the Shan State and the

Karen National Union.

Both China and India are looking to sustain their domestic economic growth. Likewise, one third of Thailand’s natural gas supply

comes from Burma. These nations are eager to avoid turmoil on

their borders. It is simply not in their interests. So for that to happen a resolution must be reached with the ethnic minority groups.

So, with these thoughts in mind, I look forward to hearing from

our witnesses this afternoon and gaining their insights into the

issue. I welcome to the subcommittee this afternoon the Senator

from Kentucky. Senator McConnell has been a leader on the issue

of Burma, and I am quite pleased that he is able to join us this

afternoon. With that, Senator, if you would care to address the

committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. MITCH MCCONNELL,

U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I thank you

also for your interest in this important subject and for having these

hearings today.

Let me say that I first became interested in this issue in the

early 1990s about the time that Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded

the Nobel Peace Prize. I remember reading an article about her in

one of the weekly magazines that we have here in the United

States and began to learn more about the situation in Burma. Regretfully, after some 16 years it is hard to quantify any significant

progress at all, as you were referring to the election in the late

1980s. Shortly after that, of course, she was put under house arrest. Except for about a 11⁄2-year period in 2003, during which her

motorcade was attacked and she was injured and put in a real prison for a period of time now she is back in her home detention arrangement, this is a woman who has been largely sequestered from

the Burmese people themselves, as well as the rest of the world.

We all know during this period her husband, who was living in

England, became ill and passed away without her presence. It is

a truly tragic story.

As we all know, Burma is run by a pariah regime. If they had

nuclear weapons or the prospect of getting nuclear weapons, we

would be paying a lot of attention to this regime because it would

be in the category of North Korea and Iran in terms of international interest and concern.

So the question arises, what can you do? In 2003 I introduced,

with lots of support on a bipartisan basis, a bill that provided for

4

unilateral sanctions against the regime, knowing full well at the

time that unilateral sanctions are rarely good enough, that you

have to have the cooperation of a lot of others. You were mentioning the multilateral approach to North Korea as a potential

framework for addressing the Burma situation. You clearly have to

have broader cooperation.

The good news is the Europeans, I think, are beginning to kind

of wake up to the inappropriateness of interacting with this regime.

I was in India about a year ago and raised the issue with them.

I gather from listening to you, you raised the issue with others in

the region in your own travels. I think it is becoming increasingly

embarrassing to the neighborhood, which is a positive step.

But beyond just being embarrassed, I think there needs to be

some motivation for serious action. I think multilateral sanctions

are the only way you can really squeeze this regime. Unfortunately,

the Thais and the Indians and the Chinese are all basically doing

business there and are not terribly concerned, frankly, with what

internal conditions are in terms of human rights and abuses of

other kinds. So that’s the situation that we confront at the moment.

With that, let me turn to my prepared text. I want to, as I said,

thank you for having this hearing. Certainly your interest and support for the struggle for freedom in that country has ensured that

no one forgets the litany of abuses that have been committed by

this incredibly repressive and illegitimate regime, which has all

kinds of oddball names. It is currently calling itself the State Peace

and Development Council (SPDC).

I will not recount all the horrors of General Than Shwe’s misrule. They are well documented by the State Department, the U.N.,

and other organizations. I do want to highlight the tragic fact that

Burmese leader Aung San Suu Kyi and over 1,000 other prisoners

of conscience are imprisoned in Burma today. Suu Kyi and her

compatriots should be immediately and unconditionally released.

This was originally to be the year that Burma was going to host

the ASEAN meeting. At least ASEAN was too embarrassed to go

forward with that meeting, which will not occur in Rangoon in

2006, and I think this shows that this regime is an absolute embarrassment to the neighborhood.

The SPDC has engaged in arrests, torture, harassment, and intimidation of the National League for Democracy (NLD), which got

80 percent of the vote when the regime mistakenly allowed a vote

to occur. I bet they regret that because it has certainly demonstrated where the support is.

While the situation inside Burma remains both dire and opaque,

analysts continue to ponder the SPDC’s recent bizarre relocation of

the capital, moving the capital to a jungle site, further indicating

how inward-looking they are and how consumed they are with just

maintaining power.

Under President Bush’s leadership, the State Department has

imposed a full court press in foreign capitals across the globe, seeking both dialogue and action. I can tell you, Madam Chair, that

Secretary Powell always had this on his agenda when he was at

ASEAN meetings in the neighborhood, and Secretary Rice was before my Subcommittee on Foreign Operations yesterday, during

5

which we also had an opportunity to discuss this issue. She is intensely interested in it as well. I think the United States is certainly doing its part here in leading. What we need are a few more

followers.

It is no understatement that Burma remains a priority talking

point and the President, as I indicated, brings it up whenever he

is in that part of the world, as does the Secretary of State.

In addition to diplomacy, Secretary Rice and her team are keenly

attuned to the humanitarian needs of the Burmese people. I was

impressed with the State Department’s rapid response to the outbreak of Avian influenza inside Burma, which until recently, represented Southeast Asia’s bird flu black hole. Secretary Rice understands, as we do, that the root cause of Burma’s myriad health,

economic, and social problems is essentially political in nature. The

SPDC has done little to invest in its own health infrastructure or

to combat deadly diseases, including HIV–AIDS, and recently

issued draconian guidelines that restrict the ability of the international NGOs to conduct programs inside the program.

While we may all want to do more to help the people of Burma,

our efforts essentially are stymied by the junta. Governments in

the region, as I suggested earlier, are tiring of the Burma problem.

Last year, Burma actually was prevented from becoming chairman,

as I indicated, of the ASEAN organization, in large part because

of the loss of prestige that grouping would have endured with the

SPDC as its head.

Frustration with the junta is palpable in some capitals, whether

due to disbelief at the wholesale move of the capital out into the

jungle, or because last year’s sacking and sentencing of a Than

Shwe rival, General Khin Nyunt. It is becoming clear to many in

Southeast Asia that Burma’s problems are becoming the region’s

problems, whether it is illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking

or diseases such as HIV–AIDS, refugees, sexual violence against

women, internally displaced peoples, or even Avian flu.

So let me suggest three necessary steps to sustain support for

the struggle for freedom in Burma over the next year. First, Congress ought to renew existing import sanctions against the SPDC.

We have done that every year since 2003 and we will do it again.

We appreciate the State Department’s strong support for renewing

sanctions and I hope we can count on our colleagues’ support as we

have every year.

I want to be as clear today, as I have been in the past, that sanctions ought to remain in place until Suu Kyi and other Burmese

champions of freedom, themselves, call for the sanctions to be lifted. We must take our cues from those who suffer for justice.

Former political prisoner Min Ko Naing, who served 16 years in

Burma’s notorious prisons, recently said, and this is a quote: ‘‘We

categorically state today that we will never, never bow to injustice.’’

Second, the President and the administration must continue to

aggressively engage foreign governments. I believe they have been

doing that and will continue to do it. Secretary Rice is extremely

passionate on this issue. All of our officials in the administration,

National Security Adviser Hadley and U.N. Ambassador Bolton,

are extremely interested in pursuing this issue.

6

Finally, the United States needs to continue to push the United

Nations Security Council to again discuss and debate myriad security threats Burma poses to that whole region. While last year’s

unprecedented briefing is a good first step, an important step includes formal discussion, debate, and passage at the U.N. of a

Burma resolution. Last year, former Czech President Vaclav Havel

and South African Archbishop Tutu commissioned a report entitled

‘‘Threat to Peace: A Call for the U.N. Security Council To Act in

Burma.’’ This report serves as ample justification for Security

Council action.

Let me close on a somber note. The murder of former political

prisoner Thet Naing Oo by Burmese police and fire officials earlier

this month is absolutely despicable. In many respects, this murder

demonstrates the SPDC’s total disregard for the human rights and

dignity of the people in Burma. If it can happen to him, it can happen to anybody in that country.

The United States and all the world’s democracies must make

clear to General Than Shwe that he, he, is responsible for the security and welfare of all Burmese prisoners of conscience, particularly

Suu Kyi.

Again, Madam Chair, I want to thank you for having this hearing and giving me an opportunity to express myself on this important issue.

[The prepared statement of Senator McConnell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MITCH MCCONNELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY

It is only appropriate that I begin my remarks with a word of thanks to Senators

Murkowski and Kerry for holding this hearing on Burma. Your interest and support

for the struggle for freedom in that country has ensured that no one forgets the litany of abuses committed by the repressive and illegitimate State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) against the people of Burma.

I will not recount today the horrors of Burmese General Than Shwe’s misrule as

they are well-documented by the State Department, the United Nations and other

organizations. However, I do want to highlight the tragic fact that Burmese democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and over 1,000 other prisoners of conscience

remain imprisoned in Burma. Suu Kyi and her compatriots should be immediately

and unconditionally released, and SPDC arrest, torture, harassment and intimidation of National League for Democracy activists and ethnic minorities should cease.

Only then can a meaningful process of national reconciliation move forward. Together we must seek permanent irreversible steps to freedom.

While the situation inside Burma remains both dire and opaque—analysts continue to ponder the SPDC’s bizarre relocation of the capital to the jungle site of

Pyinmana—the march for freedom in Burma progresses. Under President Bush’s

leadership, the State Department has imposed a full court press in foreign capitals

across the globe seeking dialog and action on Burma. It is no understatement that

Burma remains a priority talking point on the President’s agenda, whether he is

in Tokyo, New Delhi or Washington, D.C.

Secretary of State Rice has equally championed this cause. She, along with Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill and Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Barry Lowenkron, have aggressively lobbied the Philippines, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia to play a more constructive role in support of democracy and justice in Burma.

In addition to diplomacy, Secretary Rice and her team are keenly attuned to the

humanitarian needs of the Burmese people. I commend the State Department’s

rapid response to the outbreak of avian influenza inside Burma, which, until recently, represented Southeast Asia’s bird flu black hole. Secretary Rice understands,

as do we, that the root causes of Burma’s myriad health, economic and social problems are political in nature. The SPDC has done little to invest in its own health

infrastructure or to combat deadly diseases, including HIV/AIDS, and recently

issued draconian guidelines that restrict the ability of international NGO’s to conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
7

duct programs inside Burma. While we may all want to do more to help the people

of Burma, our efforts are stymied by the junta.

Governments in the region are tiring of the Burma problem. Last year, Burma

sidestepped its chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) in large part because of the loss of prestige that grouping would have endured with the SPDC at its head. Frustration with the junta is palpable in some

capitals, whether due to disbelief with the wholesale move of the capital to the jungle, or because of last year’s sacking and sentencing of Than Shwe rival General

Khin Nyunt. It is becoming clear to many in Southeast Asia that Burma’s problems

are the region’s problems—whether illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, refugees, sexual violence against women, internally displaced peoples, or even avian influenza.

Let me briefly outline three necessary steps to sustain support for the struggle

for freedom in Burma over the next year.

First, Congress must renew existing import sanctions against the SPDC. I appreciate the State Department’s strong support for renewing sanctions, and I hope I

can count on my colleagues’ support when Senator Feinstein and I offer legislation

in the weeks ahead to do so. I want to be as clear today as I have been in the past:

sanctions must remain in place until Suu Kyi and other Burmese champions of freedom call for them to be lifted. We must take our cues from those who suffer for justice. Former political prisoner Min Ko Naing, who served 16 years in Burma’s notorious prisons, recently said: ‘‘We categorically state today that we will never bow

to injustice.’’

Second, the President and the administration must continue to aggressively engage foreign governments on supporting democracy in Burma. I suspect Secretary

Rice will be as aggressive as she has been in the past, and I encourage all our officials—from National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley to our Ambassador to the

United Nations John Bolton—to keep pace with the Secretary and the President on

this issue.

Finally, the United States must continue to push the United Nations Security

Council to again discuss and debate the myriad security threats Burma poses to the

region. While last year’s unprecedented briefing is a good first step, a better second

step includes formal discussion, debate and passage of a Burma resolution. Last

year, former Czech President Vaclav Havel and South African Archbishop Emeritus

Desmond Tutu commissioned a report entitled ‘‘Threat to Peace: A Call for the U.N.

Security Council to Act in Burma’’ that serves as ample justification for Security

Council action. I ask that the Executive Summary of that report appear in the

record following my remarks.

Let me close on a somber note. The murder of former political prisoner Thet

Naing Oo by Burmese police and fire officials earlier this month is despicable. In

many respects, this murder demonstrates the SPDC’s total disregard for the human

rights and dignity of the people of the Burma. If it can happen to Thet Naing Oo,

it can happen to anybody. The United States and all the world’s democracies must

make clear to General Than Shwe that he is responsible for the security and welfare

of all Burmese prisoners of conscience, particularly Suu Kyi.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I appreciate your comments

and again truly your leadership on this issue. I think if you think

of one Senator out there who has really taken the lead as it relates

to Burma and raising the discussion, it is you, and we appreciate

that and are very thankful for your leadership on it. So thank you

for the opportunity to be here with us today.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator MURKOWSKI. With that, let us move to our second panel.

This is: Dr. Michael Green, who is the senior adviser and Japan

Chair, the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in

Washington, DC. We also have Dr. Sean Turnell, who is the cofounder and editorial board member of the Burma Economic Watch

at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, and Ms. Thin Thin

Aung, Joint General Secretary of the Women’s Rights and Welfare

Association of Burma, located in New Delhi, India.

Welcome to all of you this afternoon. Thank you for taking the

time to join us and to provide us with your insights and perspective

on the issue of Burma. What we will do is just begin here with you,

8

Dr. Green, if you can provide your testimony. We would ask that

you try to keep it within the time limits and we will move in order

to Dr. Turnell and Ms. Aung after that.

With that, Dr. Green.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER

AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is a privilege to be able

to speak to this subcommittee, a privilege I did not have, of course,

when I was on the staff of the National Security Council working

these problems as the senior director for Asia until December. Now

that I am in the academic world, I can speak my mind, and I appreciate the chance to do so.

You and Senator McConnell and the members of this subcommittee are to be commended for keeping this issue on the front

burner. I think—I know that it gives encouragement to the many

in Burma who look for the day when their nation of 50 million people will join the community of nations free and at peace with their

neighbors and taking full advantage of their beautiful country.

The demise of Burma under the junta and Than Shwe has been

well chronicled by the State Department, by this subcommittee, by

Senator McConnell. The ideals of the American people will not

allow us to turn away from this. What one often hears on the other

side of the argument is that our national interests, our security interests, our realist interests, would point to a different path, that

if we were, quote unquote, ‘‘realists’’ about this, we would take an

approach of loosening sanctions, of engaging the regime, of trying

to keep up with China’s influence.

The main point I want to make today is that I think this argument is wrong, that when it comes to Burma our ideals and our

national security interests are in complete harmony. I say this for

two reasons. First, Burma is a trans-national security threat. The

details are well documented in the pamphlet mentioned by Senator

McConnell. From HIV/AIDS to drugs to trafficking in persons, internally and externally displaced persons, Burma is a source of instability for its neighbors.

Now, I cannot prove this, but I suspect that, to some degree, this

is a deliberate element of the regime’s national security strategy,

that by destabilizing its neighbors, it creates a situation where the

neighbors are more inclined to, in effect, bribe the regime to try to

keep these problems under control. It is a tactic that one sees often

with North Korea, as well.

The regime has spent almost no effort for resources to deal with

the problems of Avian influenza, of HIV/AIDS, of internally displaced persons, which is why I think that this is not only a crime

of omission, but may actually be part of a deliberate strategy. It

therefore fits all of the characteristics one would expect for attention from the Security Council, and I agree completely with the testimony of Senator McConnell. This is under chapter 7 of the Security Council’s responsibilities an item that should be pushed towards a resolution.

I believe that it will be a move that helps us on the Burma issue

no matter how it comes out. There are obviously tradeoffs in the

9

Security Council. You have to spend efforts on issues like Iran. But

I think this one should be right at the front of our agenda.

The second reason I would argue that Burma is fundamentally

a national security interest for us draws on the logic of the national

security strategy that the White House just produced. That document makes a point that Secretary Rice and the President and others have made in the past, that in Asia, the future of stability and

peace will not just be a matter of how we manage rivalry among

great powers like Japan or China or India. It is going to be a matter of how ideas are formed and how countries define their purpose

in this volatile and unpredictable region.

I think when it comes to the world of ideas, the United States

can be very proud and take great satisfaction in the kind of debates

we are hearing in India or in Japan or in Indonesia. In my testimony, which I have submitted for the record, I chronicled how

Prime Minister Koizumi or Prime Minister Monmahon Singh, or

President Yudhoyono talk more about their country’s purpose and

interests in terms of democracy and values than ever before. This

is a trend that we want to support and we want to push. This is

a trend that we want to have define the agenda for Asia in the 21st

century, because if it does, it is going to set the right kind of context for China’s own involvement in Asia and in the international

community and for other states in transition.

In Jakarta and in Delhi and in Tokyo, the state of democracy

and the state of internal affairs in Burma are in many ways the

cutting edge issues or the proxy debate about how much democracy

and how much these values should characterize the strategy and

the agenda for our democratic friends and allies. So I believe it is

in our interests to be pushing this further with all of our friends

and allies. Secretary Rice and the President, as Senator McConnell

has said, have raised this with every one of their leaders and counterparts in the region. It is a mixed picture. Japan is talking democracy, but just announced $42 million in aid to teach Japanese

in Burma. My understanding is the Japanese government is undertaking a major review of its Burma policy to try to reconcile its new

articulation of democracy as a foreign policy priority and its somewhat legacy approach of mercantilism with Burma.

In India, of course, the Indian president was in Burma March 12,

the week after President Bush was in Delhi, a week after President

Bush and Prime Minister Singh agreed to a democracy-building

agenda for our relationship. To his credit, the Indian president

raised the status of Daw Aung Sann Suu Kyi, raised democracy.

But the main theme that came through was about energy cooperation, $40 million in proposed packages for LNG development, and

the Burma Road. These are real national interests for India and

they are legitimate. We should respect them, but we need to engage India and push the Indian government to live up to its ideals,

because I think their debate is in play and their strategic culture

is evolving.

In Southeast Asia, President Yudhoyono’s trip, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid’s recent trip, demonstrated that our Southeast Asian friends and especially the democracies are willing to

push Burma, not only privately, but publicly, to release Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi, to push for a return to democracy. But there again,

10

it is a mixed signal. Foreign Minister Hamid came out without

being able to see Aung San Suu Kyi, clearly a frustrated mission,

but he declared it a success, as our ASEAN friends are wont to do.

He will have to be honest with his colleagues. They meet on April

17th to review progress in Burma, and I think we should be pushing our ASEAN friends to be realistic about the state of play in

Burma.

In all of these countries, the Burma issue is at the tipping point,

as Senator McConnell suggested, as you suggested in your opening.

I would argue, even in China, the state of play is changing. The

Chinese worry about the destabilizing effects of Than Shwe’s behavior. I think they worry about, in a strategic sense, countries in

the region coming together on this issue of democracy, and in a

healthy way, we should make the Chinese worry. We should be

pushing this agenda to get China to sign on as much as possible

with its long-term interests in stability in the region, which means

returning Burma to the path of democracy. Even if China is not

going to be an open advocate of democracy-building in Asia, they

can be an advocate of stability, and their interests would suggest

they participate and cooperate.

You mentioned, Madam Chair, the idea of a Six Party Talks format or a multilateral format. I was involved in the Six Party Talks,

both the formulation and the implementation, and there are aspects of that that I would draw on in dealing with this. There are

other aspects which I would try to avoid. I think in the case of

Burma, what we want is to work assertively with other parties that

we know share our basic values—Japan, the EU, I would argue

many of the ASEAN nations, India—and break out from there, include the Chinese as we can, include others as we can, but push

for a common set of talking points and a common roadmap. The

word ‘‘roadmap’’ has certain connotations in the Burma context,

but essentially a roadmap with concrete benchmarks.

We ought to try to get a common picture. We’ve not done that

yet. We’ve pushed at high levels for attention to this. I think it is

time now to push for a common set of benchmarks that we expect

from the regime. It obviously would include the release permanent

and irreversible of Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD leadership, ethnic

leaders. It would include a sustained process of reconciliation leading to restoration of democracy.

I think we should push others. I do not think we will get Japan

or India to agree to sanctions per se, but we ought to push them

to put sticks on the table, which would include controlling and limiting further investment or aid in the future. I think we should be

prepared to put certain carrots on the table—incremental lifting of

sanctions as progress is made on these benchmarks.

The mechanics can be debated and worked out. Our colleagues

in the State Department will know on the ground how to work this.

It will not be exactly like the Six Party Talks, but I think the time

is ripe to start multilateralizing this problem, not only in the U.N.,

but in the region as well.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]

11

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL JONATHAN GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND

JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Madame Chair, I appreciate the opportunity to address this committee on the situation in Burma from the perspective of international security. The members of this

committee are to be commended for their consistent support for Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi and the legitimate winners of the 1990 election in Burma. Your bipartisan

stand for democracy and human rights in Burma is a source of inspiration for those

who quietly prepare for the day when this nation of fifty million citizens can rejoin

the international community as a free people in a beautiful and well-endowed land

at peace with its neighbors.

Today I want to call the committee’s attention to the international security implications of the demise of Burma under General Than Shwe. Than Shwe and the military junta are responsible not only for the reversal of a democratic election result,

but also for abuses ranging from persecution of ethnic minorities to systematic rape

and the recruitment of child soldiers. Our ideals will not allow us to turn our attention from the fate of the people in Burma or to relent in applying pressure on the

regime to return to the path of democracy.

Some argue that these ideals are blinding us to larger strategic interests in

Burma. They maintain that a pragmatic and ‘‘realist’’ national security strategy

would point to a different course—one of increased engagement with the regime and

a relaxation of pressure. They assert that by isolating the military junta in Burma,

we are weakening our own strategic position in Asia.

This argument could not be more wrong. I stepped down as Special Assistant to

the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council

staff in December and I come away from that experience firmly convinced that on

the question of Burma, our ideals and our national security interests coincide. In

short, a strong and unrelenting stand for democracy in Burma is an indispensable

element in our overall strategy for maintaining peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.

I say this for two reasons. First, the tragic mismanagement of Burma’s internal

affairs by Than Shwe and his government has created an arsenal of transnational

security problems that threaten to undermine stability in the entire region. Since

1996 the Burmese Army’s ‘‘Four Cuts’’ strategy has led to the destruction of over

2500 villages and the internal displacement of about one million people, mostly from

the Karen, Shan and other ethnic minorities. Millions also live in hiding or as open

exiles in Thailand, China, Bangladesh, India and Malaysia. These refugee flows are

a social and security burden on the neighboring states that are further complicated

by the attendant problems of trafficking in persons, drugs and transmission of HIV/

AIDS. The most chilling example of how these problems build on each other is the

practice of drug traffickers to distribute heroin with HIV-tainted needles to villagers

as they ply their illegal trade across the borders into India, China and Thailand.

Avian influenza now also joins the list of transnational threats emanating from

Burma.

The regime in Burma has done almost nothing to address the health and social

disasters their Four Cuts strategy has caused. I suspect that this is not just a crime

of omission, but part of a deliberate strategy that parallels North Korea’s own approach to China and the Republic of Korea. These regimes use their status as a

source of transnational instability as tools of blackmail to deter their larger neighbors from stepping up pressure for reform. They are behaving like criminal gangs

extorting money from shopkeepers in the neighborhood in exchange for keeping

other criminal elements ‘‘under control.’’ They can do this because they do not care

about the vast majority of people under their care and find that leaving potentially

disloyal segments of the population in a state of constant fear and near-starvation

is a useful tool for maintaining control. The neighboring states make these bargains

with the regime out of fear of what might come next and with the hope that they

are contributing to stability, when in fact the problems are just being allowed to fester and grow and will inevitably reach beyond the borders with tremendous security

and social implications.

The transnational problems caused by the regime’s behavior represent a threat—

perhaps a deliberate threat—to the peace and security of South and Southeast Asia.

It is for this reason that the United Nations Security Council should take up Burma

with its authority under Chapter VII (Article 41) of the United Nations Charter.

The votes are there and I hope that the administration pushes with other like-minded nations for a resolution on Burma in the current session. Even if the resolution

fails or the Security Council does not take immediate action, there is merit in sharpening our friends and allies’ focus on the state of democracy and human rights in

Burma. And this is because the debate over Burma in these countries has signifiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
12

1Foreign Minister Taro Aso, ‘‘Asian Strategy as I See it: Japan as the Thought Leader of

Asia,’’ December 7, 2005. The text is available on http://www.mofa.jo.ip/announc/fm/aso/

speech05l2. Foreign Minister Aso echoes this them with respect to Sino-Japanese relations in

a March 13, 2006 op/ed in the Wall Street Journal titled ‘‘Japan Awaits a Democratic China.’’

cance in the context of the broader national security strategy of the United States

in the Asia Pacific region.

Let me turn to this second reason why the Burma question bears on our national

security interests. The future of Asia is being debated in terms of relative power

and rivalry among China, Japan, India and other rising states. What is often overlooked, and what will ultimately be just as important for peace and security in the

region, will be the competition of ideas. China’s rise thus far has been marked by

a mercantilist approach coupled with an outmoded policy of ‘‘non-interference in internal affairs’’ of other states. Japan and India once held similar views in many respects, despite their democratic roots. However, increasingly these two nations are

defining their national interests in terms of the democratic ideals that distinguish

them from China and that they recognize are critical to their own stakes in the

international system. Even in Southeast Asia where the Association of South East

Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created on the premise of ‘‘non-interference in internal

affairs’’—governments and parliaments are debating whether they can sustain peace

and stability in their neighborhood without pressing members to clean up their domestic problems and adhere to norms and rules that are fundamental to the region’s

continued economic success.

It is a critical U.S. interest that democracies in Asia continue moving toward national strategies based on shared values and shared rules. The debate over Burma

in these capitals is the cutting edge issue. How Tokyo or Delhi or Jakarta decides

to manage the Burma problem—whether they stick to non-interference or step up

pressure on Burma to adhere to international norms—will prove the major proxy

battle of how they approach the region’s broader agenda in the future. If Japan,

India, Indonesia and other nations with influence on Burma choose to take a stronger stand in support of the norms that underpin their own democracies, this will not

only accelerate the day when the citizens of Burma return their nation to the international community, it will also shape the choices of other nations in transition—

particularly China.

Realists who argue for more ‘‘engagement’’ on Burma are right, but the target of

that engagement strategy should be the democratic nations that surround Burma

and not yet the junta itself. I would therefore like to briefly review where the debate

on Burma is in each of these neighboring states and then suggest steps we can take

to mobilize them into a more effective coalition.

Japan is the most promising example of the positive evolution of interests and

strategies that I am describing. Japan originally supported Burma’s entry into

ASEAN. Tokyo was motivated by a sentimental attachment to Burma dating back

to the Second World War and by a desire to distinguish itself from Washington in

the region, particularly in the context of U.S.-Japan trade friction and disagreements over how to respond to the 1997 financial crisis in the region. In those days

Japanese strategic thinkers took pains to distinguished ‘‘Asian values’’ from the socalled ‘‘global values’’ espoused by Washington. Japan also began worrying about

China’s growing strategic influence in Burma as Sino-Japanese competition heated

up and the Japanese government matched Chinese aid hundreds of millions of dollars at a time in order to keep up its own influence and not lose out to Beijing.

Things have changed, however. Prime Minister Koizumi himself has acknowledged that the Japanese government’s policy of engagement has not led to greater

democratization. Just as important, Japanese political leaders have stopped alluding

to distinct ‘‘Asian values’’ and have increasingly been pointing to Japan’s own democratic values as critical to its national identity and international role. I would particularly recommend to the members of the committee Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s

December 7, 2005 speech on ‘‘Japan as the Thought Leader of Asia’’ in which he

argued that Japan stands as a model for the rest of Asia based on its success

through adherence to the principals of market economics and democracy.1 Political

scientists can debate the causes of this change. It may result from a distinctly realist assessment of the competition with a non-democratic China or from fundamental

changes in Japan’s own domestic politics and economy. The result, however, is a

new ferment in Tokyo and a new articulation of Japan’s purpose based on values

that should have a bearing on Japan’s approach toward Burma. Recognizing just

how important these values are, the Japanese government is undertaking a top-tobottom review of its Burma policy. The outcome is not certain and we should be

fully engaged with Tokyo on that process.

13

2The transcript of Prime Minister Singh’s remarks at the India Today Conclave, New Delhi,

February 25, 2005 is available on http//www.pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm (cited in C. Raja

Mohan, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India United States and the Global Order. Delhi: India Research Press, 2006, p. 93). 3 U.S.-India Joint Statement, March 2, 2006. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2006/03.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is undergoing a similar

shift in thinking. Originally, ASEAN opted for a policy of ‘‘constructive engagement’’

based on the assumption that inclusion in the regional grouping would incentivize

the junta in Burma to make the right choices. For years our Thai counterparts argued that the so-called Bangkok Process of international meetings with Burma

would lead to concrete results, including a detailed roadmap for returning to democratization, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, and inclusion of the NLD in the constitutional convention. It is now obvious that these results have not happened as

Than Shwe has purged Kin Nyunt and others involved in the Bangkok Process.

As a result, ASEAN and its member governments have begun recasting their approach to Burma, calling on the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi and convincing

Than Shwe last year to pass on chairing ASEAN when his turn came up in 2006.

ASEAN leaders’ embarrassment at Burma’s non-response to constructive engagement has led to even tougher words from the governments in the region both privately and publicly since then. With the first direct Presidential elections in Indonesia 2004 and increasing pluralism and parliamentary activism in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, the character of other ASEAN member states is itself changing and many within are taking their nation. These changes have been pushed by

transnational groups within ASEAN such as the Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar

Caucus. Indonesia’s new activism is most encouraging, with President Yudyuhono’s

early March visit to Burma to establish a joint commission between Rangoon and

Jakarta with the primary focus of monitoring the junta’s progress toward democratic reform. And just this week Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid went last week

to Burma on behalf of ASEAN to press for democracy, but left in frustration after

being blocked from seeing Aung Suu Kyi or Than Shwe . He is set to report on his

visit to the rest of ASEAN on April 17th and although he called his visit a success

publicly, I expect the private discussion among ministers will be about how to deal

with the further retrenchment and backsliding of the regime.

The picture is still decidedly mixed in ASEAN, however. The bureaucracies and

foreign ministries worry about the transnational problems presented by the junta’s

mismanagement of the Nation and continue to resort to the default position of paying them off with aid in order to avoid further troubles. The strategic mentality in

these foreign ministries also remains mired in the non-aligned tolerance for bad internal governance and ideological resistance to interference in internal affairs from

the developed world. New leaders like Susilo Bambang Yudyuhono in Indonesia, Lee

Hsien Loong in Singapore, and Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia, are often more enlightened than their bureaucracies and recognize the need to push Burma on democracy. However, these ASEAN leaders are also competing among themselves for the

spotlight and the regime is using the competition for regional leadership within

ASEAN to divide ASEAN leaders against themselves and to weaken the message

many are clearly carrying on the need for change. The growing democratic instincts

of ASEAN leaders are right, but are still not being met with results in implementation.

India is also embracing democracy as a central tenet of its international role and

is moving away from older, mercantilist and non-aligned ways of thinking about

international security. Like Japan, India’s strategic culture may be shifting because

of a combination of internal political and economic change and the implications of

China’s rise. Prime Minister Monmahon Singh has clearly articulated this aspect of

India’s identity in speeches, declaring in 2005, for example that:

If there is an ‘‘idea of India’’ that the world should remember us by and

regard us for, it is the idea of an inclusive and open society, a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society. All countries of the world will

evolve in this direction as we move forward into the 21st Century.2

This shared value with the United States has become one of the pillars of the

United States transformed strategic relationship with India under President Bush.

In their March 2 joint statement in New Delhi, for example, Prime Minister Singh

and President Bush agreed to work together on the promotion of democracy through

the U.N. Democracy Fund, and cooperation in international forums such as the

International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT).3 Rhetorically, the Indian

government has said that it wishes to see a strong, prosperous and democratic

14

Burma and Prime Minister Singh has said that he would like to see the release of

Aung San Suu Kyi.

However, where the rubber meets the road the Indian government has been sending mixed signals to the regime. The lure of enhanced economic interaction with

ASEAN through the Burma road and fears that Burma might allow cross-border destabilization of the Assam region in India have both led Delhi to opt for aid over

pressure for real change. Indian President Abdul Kalam’s March 12 visit to Burma

with a new $40 million aid package and a deal on natural gas was dissonant with

the Bush-Singh joint statement on democracy, to say the least. President Kalam did

call on his counterparts to release Aung San Suu Kyi and to keep on the path to

democracy, but the theme he emphasized much more was the importance of Burma

as India’s ‘‘gateway’’ to Southeast Asia. There are also contradictory signals being

sent by the Indian military’s ongoing engagement with the Burmese Army.

Nevertheless, I believe that India’s new focus on democracy promotion is real and

that there is an intense debate about overall strategic purpose and direction in

Delhi. For now, the many actors in India’s national security bureaucracy, the hardedged realist mentality they bring to regional problems and the lingering NAM

mentality, have all conspired to prevent the new strategic should therefore be a

major topic for U.S.-India dialog at all levels. It is critical that we keep Burma front

and center as a point for U.S.-India cooperation, respecting India’s interests but

pushing Delhi to live up to its ideals.

That brings us to China. China is Burma’s strongest supporter. China-Burma trade was $1.2 billion in 2005 (of $5 billion total trade for Burma) and Beijing is

negotiating new investments in economic ‘‘free trade zones’’ in Syriam and in the

construction of a pipeline to ship Burma’s untapped offshore natural gas reserves

to Yunnan Province. In February this year Premier Wen Jiabao visited Burma and

told Soe Win that China opposes the imposition of economic sanctions. Fears that

Beijing might ‘‘Finlandize’’ the regime or develop military facilities in the Andaman

Sea and Bay of Bengal have in turn been major motivating factors for Tokyo, Delhi

and ASEAN’s own counterbalancing policy of engagement with the regime. (I am

once again reminded of North Korea, where fear of China’s unchecked influence has

propelled the Republic of Korea to take a more accommodating stance toward

Pyongyang.) While it is unlikely that Beijing will adopt democracy promotion as

part of its foreign policy toolkit anytime in the near future, I do think it is possible

to have an influence on China’s approach to Burma which is ultimately going to be

indispensable if we are going to change the regime’s behavior.

First, there is growing evidence to suggest that China is unhappy about the selfdefeating behavior of the Than Shwe regime and that Beijing is beginning to push

quietly for internal reforms. In part this is because of the export of drug and HIV/

AIDS problems from Burma into neighboring province of Yunnan. I suspect that

Beijing also worries about the possible implosion of Burma under Than Shwe. Chinese leaders clearly fear the domino of ‘‘colored revolutions’’ that began spreading

from Eastern Europe through Central Asia and would probably not like to see collapse of an authoritarian regime right in their own neighborhood. In short, Beijing

has real self-interest in stopping the leadership in Burma from taking further steps

that lead to instability internally and in the region.

Second, we must make it clear to Beijing that China will be held accountable in

Washington for the ‘‘company it keeps.’’ Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s

Senior Dialogue with Chinese Executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingquo on China’s role as a ‘‘stakeholder’’ in international society has been effective in this regard.

Hu Jintao has espoused a policy of ‘‘peaceful development’’ to emphasize that China’s concerns are internal and China seeks to be a benign force in international relations. Through the Zoellick-Dai dialog, I believe the Chinese are learning that on

questions like Burma, a policy of commercial engagement unencumbered by expectations of adherence to international norms is mercantilist and therefore anything but

benign. I also think we can convince Beijing to appreciate that short term accommodation of the regime may only prolong and complicate longer-term problems of instability emanating from Burma.

Taking this argument directly to China is necessary but not sufficient. Beijing

must also see that democracy and the rule of law are the region’s agenda as well.

A successful strategy to mobilize the regional actors that increasingly care about the

internal state of affairs in Burma will create a coalition that Beijing cannot ignore.

China will not want to be the anti-status quo outlier in Asia. I believe China will

move pre-emptively for change in Burma rather than see the change dictated by

democratic powers aligned with the United States. And this need not be seen in

zero-sum terms in the U.S.-China relationship. Ultimately, action by Beijing to

change the behavior of regimes like Burma and North Korea will provide the substance for a more strategic and mutual beneficial U.S. China partnership.

15

Given that the Burma question is one that touches not only on American values,

but also on our national security interests, how should we organize ourselves? I

have three specific recommendations.

First, the United States should press for the U.N. Security Council for a resolution on Burma based on Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This will take diplomatic

energy and will rile some members whose votes we need for other Security Council

debates over Iran. However, as I have argued here, the issue is larger and more

strategic than Burma itself. And, frankly, it is the right thing to do.

Second, the United States should take the lead on organizing the international

community to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Burma to contain

and reverse the transnational threats of HIV/AIDS and Avian Influenza. In fact, the

United States, recognizing the serious threat that HIV/AIDS poses not just to

Burma but to the region, led the effort to get the Global Fund involved in Burma

and it was decisions by the junta that ultimately led to the unfortunate but unavoidable decision to pull back. The U.S. Government has also provided the initial

equipment necessary to help detect and contain Avian Influenza outbreaks and

should continue to do so as necessary. Burma’s neighbors and traditional advocates

of ‘‘constructive engagement’’ have been far less willing to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Burma to respond to these health threats. We should press

them to do so, for example, as part of a coordinated international approach to meet

the World Health Organization’s call for $4 million in assistance for fighting avian

influenza in Burma.

Third, we should organize an international coalition for change in Burma to replace the now moribund Bangkok Process. The President has raised Burma with

every regional leader he has met and senior officials like Undersecretary of State

for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns and Undersecretary for Global Affairs Paula

Dobriansky have carried on the message at their level. It is time to push for a common roadmap that can succeed through strength of numbers. I would organize this

effort with Japan, India, Australia ASEAN and the European Union. The United

Nations should also be involved, of course. And I would avail China of the opportunity to join other regional players to enhance stability by pushing collectively for

changed behavior by Burma, but China’s participation would have to be premised

on recognizing the need to press for change.

In fact, my colleagues and I began some of this process informally while I was

at the National Security Council and found that counterparts in key ASEAN states

were eager for more. They know that ‘‘constructive engagement’’ and the Bangkok

process have not led to results. They know that the status quo is fundamentally unstable and that they will only face more cross-border problems from Burma in the

future. They see Than Shwe’s decision to move the capital to Pyinmana as evidence

of an increasingly delusional leadership driven by the recommendations of soothsayers and astrologers. They recognize that ASEAN’s clout vis-a`-vis other international actors is being weakened. They worry about China’s growing influence, but

they say that they can build consensus for a new approach if we can bring on board

Japan and India. They are not yet ready to abandon engagement, but they are

ready to look at adding more sticks to their menu of carrots.

If we are to organize for a deliberate multilateral approach to the Burma problem,

the goal should not be immediate ‘‘engagement’’ of Burma per se. Instead, we should

focus our energy on the production of a common roadmap that outlines concrete

goalposts we need to see as evidence of a return to democracy. These goalposts must

include the immediate and irreversible release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the leadership of the NLD and ethnic leaders and their full participation in a transparent and

sustained process of national reconciliation aimed at the restoration of democracy.

In order to build a multilateral consensus even among our closest allies, we will

have to include both carrots and sticks. The carrots can easily include reassurances

about the territorial integrity of Burma, but will also have to involve incremental

sanction lifting at some stage in the process. From regional actors we should insist

on more sticks if the regime does not take the right steps. These sticks might include freezing further investment in commercial projects. We should also push for

coordination on humanitarian relief.

The specific mechanics of this multilateral effort should be left to the administration, but I think the time is ripe to put forward a consensus message to the regime

that its neighbors are willing to assist with the transition to democracy, but prepared to impose consequences on Burma collectively for non-action.

The Burma problem has reached the tipping point in the view of many of the regime’s neighbors. If we work with like-minded states on an approach that pools our

collective sticks and carrots in a systematic way, the regime will not be able to ignore its neighbors’ collective will. Moreover, we will help move our friends and allies

16

to a values-based strategy that strengthens the prospect for continued democratization and adoption of the rule of law across the entire region.

Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Dr. Green.

Dr. Turnell.

STATEMENT OF DR. SEAN TURNELL, BURMA ECONOMIC

WATCH, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA; VISITING FELLOW, SOUTHEAST

ASIA PROGRAM, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Dr. TURNELL. First, I would just like to say, as well, how honored

I am to give this testimony here today and also express my appreciation for the role that this subcommittee has played on Burma

and its individual members.

Today, I am going to be talking about Burma and its economy,

and it is a topic that one would think an economist could bring

quite a light heart to. According to the official figures released by

the Burmese regime, in 2005 Burma grew by 12.2 percent, on top

of 12 percent in 2004, and pretty much a decade of double digit

growth. Now, if that is the case, of course, then Burma is the fastest growing economy in the world. Not only that, over this period

it used less energy, it used less natural resources, and it negotiated

a banking crisis that was at least as serious as the one that

brought so many of its neighbors down in 1997.

So in a sense we are dealing with a miracle economy. Unfortunately, we are not dealing with Burma. We are dealing with something else that I guess escapes me.

The real Burma, of course, is mired in poverty and despair and

it is a poverty and despair that is the deliberate consequence of the

policies of the regime that has been in place for four decades. Reconstructing some of the economic numbers, the group that I am

a member of, Burma Economic Watch from Macquarie University

in Sydney, we actually think that Burma’s economy went backwards in 2003 and 2004. We think there is some growth in 2005

and 2006, but in a sense it is really technical only. It is coming

from increasing exports of gas, which has meant that the trade balance has turned positive, but part of that positive turn has also

come from a dramatic decline in imports, which tells us something

about economic circumstances in the country. So the recent positive

growth we do not think is necessarily suggestive of anything good

going on in the country.

Fifty years ago Burma was the wealthiest country in Southeast

Asia and at the time of independence, in 1948, it was the country

that everyone thought would make it. All of the trends in a sense

suggested that wealth and so on would continue. But it has not,

and that it has not is really the direct result of the regime, which

took place in 1962.

To give some of the broad issues about the economy in Burma,

one of the things we can say is that the country lacks the institutions, such as private property rights, such as freedom of contract,

that we know—that history tells us are at the heart of economic

development.

It is also the case, over the last four decades, that policymaking

in Burma has been erratic, contradictory, and, frankly, irrational.

17

It is the case that the state takes, by far, the lion’s share of the

resources in the country, but it does not have any legitimacy to tax

and so what it resorts to is, in the time-honored fashion, to the

printing press and the central bank and floods the economy with

money, essentially. As a consequence of this, of course, Burma has

a distrusted currency, a dysfunctional financial system, and rampant inflation.

The path to wealth in Burma is not through enterprise or innovation. If one were to go down that route, I think you would find

that your enterprise would be seized by the junta anyway. But

rather, it is to use the state apparatus in various ways. Apart from

corruption, there are many aspects of Burma’s economy that are,

in fact, just straight-out criminal, and in that, of course, I am alluding to the narcotics trade and money-laundering and so on,

which I will refer to in a little bit more detail later.

What I might do now is just move to some specific issues and

specific sectors. The data for this is all in my written testimony.

Turning first to policy, I mentioned that it was quite erratic and

so on. In some ways it is almost a misnomer to talk about economic

policy in Burma. There really is only one policy in Burma and that

is to garner as much resources as possible for the regime. So fiscal

policy and monetary policy are both bent to this task. Fiscal policy

is just simply raising enough funds for the military, it plays in a

sense no real counter-cyclical or developmental role. Monetary policy is in a sense rendered ineffective by the fact that the regime

just borrows from the central bank and floods the country with

money. But not only that, in order to keep its funding costs down

on the bonds that it issues to the central bank, the Burmese regime

has various interest rate caps and so on which are well below the

inflation rate, which again just counts out monetary policy as being

a viable tool of economic policy.

Policymaking is, as I have mentioned a couple of times now, irrational, erratic, and sudden, and so on. We see lots of examples of

this. We saw it 2 days ago with the decision to increase the salaries

of senior civil servants by up to 1,200 percent. That is fairly typical

of decisionmaking in Burma in the sense everything is left to the

last minute, at which there will be sudden and dramatic changes.

Last year it was increasing fuel prices eightfold. At other times in

the past it has been demonetizing whole currencies, etcetera.

In some ways it is exemplified, I think, by exchange rate policy

in Burma. Burma formally has a fixed exchange rate system which

sets its currency, the kyat, at 6 kyat to 1 U.S. dollar, but in a sense

no one really pays much attention to that. The focus instead is on

the informal market or black market and the current exchange

rate, as of today, is 1250 kyat to the U.S. dollar. So in other words,

the official exchange rate is over 200 times overvalued.

That is very much a moving feast, I might add, because my written testimony has 1100 kyat to the U.S. dollar, but after the announcement of the wage increases the other day that has blown

out, as I say, to about 1250 today.

If we look at trade and foreign direct investment, if this were a

normal country, we would think that this would be quite positive.

Burma is selling increased quantities of natural gas through its

two pipelines to Thailand and there are other schemes about to

18

come on line off Arakain. Unfortunately, we are not dealing with

a normal country and, in the past, these windfall gains that have

come from higher energy prices and so on have been used by the

regime in all sorts of ways that are inimical to the country’s development. Last time it was to buy a fleet of Mig-29s, which no longer

fly, and who knows what might come from this particular one.

Turning to the monetary and financial sector, this was a sector

that until fairly recently might have been a sector that suggested

the economy was actually making some gains. Burma’s financial

sector was ‘‘liberalized,’’ quote unquote, in 1990 and by 2002 some

20 private banks had emerged and the numbers seemingly looked

quite positive. Later that year, though, Burma underwent a substantial banking collapse which, as I mentioned, was as serious as

we have ever seen in history, quite frankly, and since that time the

system is essentially moribund.

The authorities’ response to that banking crisis is almost a

checklist of what not to do in response to a banking crisis. Economists do not know many things about many things, but we do

know something about how to respond to a banking system, and

Burma seemed to go about everything to exacerbate the crisis.

So Burma’s financial system does not provide the country with

the financial assets it needs. Trust, which is never a commodity

that is particularly abundant in Burma, is now almost irredeemably lost, I suggest, when it comes to the financial sector.

The financial sector is affected by something else, of course, and

that is the shadow of money-laundering. Burma is one of only two

jurisdictions to be named by the Financial Action Task Force of the

OECD as a primary money-laundering jurisdiction. The other, incidentally, is Nigeria. Burma is also subject to section 311 of the

USA Patriot Act, which quite rightly identifies Burma also as a

money-laundering jurisdiction, and for the first time ever, actually

named specific institutions in Burma as being money launderers.

They were the largest and third largest of Burma’s banks, respectively. Since then, another of the largest banks has come into focus

as well.

This aspect is an interesting one because it sort of slipped below

the radar screen, I suspect. It has had a big impact on other countries, including China. The Bank of China, for example, will not

handle U.S.-dollar transactions for Burmese firms. Again it is not

something I think that has been widely reported.

I will end just briefly talking about the sanctions issue. I would

like to echo the comments of previous speakers and to say that I

think the sanctions currently imposed by the United States and the

European Union and some other countries are having an effect. I

think that they are extraordinarily well targeted when it comes to

Burma. The great majority of the Burmese citizens have no contact

whatsoever with the traded goods sector or the external economy.

The one group that does are the elite of that society. So in a sense,

if sanctions are all about putting the appropriate incentives in

place for the people that matter, I think we can say that that is

the case in Burma.

Some people have criticized sanctions because of job losses in the

garment industry and so on. I think, if you look at the issue, you

will see actually that most of those job losses have everything to

19

do with the ending of the Multi-Fiber Agreement, which has seen

China increase its exports in any case.

Finally, to end, I am from Australia, but I spend a lot of time

traveling around Southeast Asia and I can say that the sanctions

imposed by the United States and European Union, things like this

USA Patriot Act, catching the money launderers and so on, has

had a big effect in the region. Countries like Singapore are very

frightened of getting caught up in money laundering and other

things to do with the sanctions.

So thanks again for this opportunity to speak to you today.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Turnell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SEAN TURNELL, BURMA ECONOMIC WATCH, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA; VISITING FELLOW,

SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

OVERVIEW

According to official statistics released by Burma’s ruling military regime, the selfstyled ‘‘State Peace and Development Council’’ (SPDC), Burma’s economy grew by

an astonishing 12.2 per cent in 2005. Beating even the previous year’s stellar performance of 12.0 per cent, and coupled with double-digit growth all the way back

to 1999, by these measures Burma is the fastest-growing economy in the world.

What’s more, Burma achieved this astonishing growth using less energy, less material resources and, in the middle of it all, while negotiating a banking and financial

crisis that was as serious as any in history. Truly, a miracle economy indeed.

It is, alas, also a fantasy economy. Under the SPDC, the real Burma is a wasteland of missed opportunity, exploitation and direst poverty. More realistic numbers

of Burma’s economic performance calculated by Burma Economic Watch show that

far from stellar growth, Burma’s economy actually shrank in 2003 and 2004. In

2005 Burma will likely have returned to growth, but at a rather more modest 2 to

3 per cent. Similar growth can be expected for the coming year. None of this growth,

however, has anything to do with improved economic fundamentals, but with the

windfall gains accruing to the state from the rising demand for Burma’s exports of

natural gas.

The real Burma is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. Only 50 years

ago, it was one of the wealthiest. The dramatic turnaround of Burma’s fortunes is

the product of a state apparatus that for decades has claimed the largest portion

of the country’s output, while simultaneously and deliberately dismantling, blocking

and undermining basic market institutions. The excessive hand of the state, which

for many years was wedded to a peculiar form of socialism, has manifested itself

in a number of maladies that are the direct cause of Burma’s current disarray.

These include:

• The suppression of the fundamental economic institutions—effective property

rights, contract enforcement, the measures that define the ‘‘rules of the game’’

for efficient economic transactions—that history tells us are necessary for sustainable long-term growth.

• Macroeconomic policymaking that is arbitrary, often contradictory and ill-informed.

• A regime claim to Burma’s real resources that greatly exceeds its ability to raise

revenue through taxation. As a consequence, like many such regimes around

the world and throughout history, it resorts to the printing press to ‘‘finance’’

its expenditure. Inflation and monetary chaos have been the predictable consequences.

• A currency, and a financial system, that is widely distrusted. People in Burma

store their ‘‘wealth’’ in devices designed as a hedge against inflation and uncertainty. As a result, financial intermediation is underdeveloped and the allocation of capital is distorted.

• Rent-seeking through state apparatus that offers the surest route to prosperity,

at the expense of enterprise. Burma’s leading corporations are mostly owned

and operated by serving and retired military officers. Corruption is endemic.

• Important sectors of Burma’s economy that are starved of resources. Negligible

spending on education and health have eroded human capital formation, and reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
20

1Minister quoted in The Myanmar Times, vol.16, no.305, 20–26 February 2006.

duced economic opportunities. Agriculture, which provides the livelihood for the

overwhelming majority of the Burmese people, is chronically (and, often deliberately) starved of critical inputs.

• Economic mismanagement by the regime that means that Burma attracts little

in the way of foreign investment. What does arrive is strongly concentrated in

the gas and oil sectors, and other extractive industries. Little employment is

generated from such investments, and there is little in the way of technology

or skill transfer. All of the revenues from Burma’s exports of gas and oil are

accrued by the regime.

• At a micro-level, the almost complete stifling of economic innovation by the military regime. Whenever there has occurred enterprise development in particular

sectors, these are ‘‘shaken-down’’ for kickbacks of various kinds—usually they

are threatened with expropriation and even nationalisation.

Such then are some of the broad factors that inform Burma’s current economic

circumstances. Below we will detail more closely specific sectors of Burma’s economy, their current condition, and immediate prospects.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

In February 2006, Burma’s Minister of National Planning and Economic Development, Soe Tha, announced that his country’s growth rate for 2005 would be 12.2

per cent.1 This topped even 2004’s strong growth of 12.0 per cent, and made Burma

(certain small oil producing countries excepted), the fastest growing economy in the

world.

Table 1.—Claimed Annual GDP Growth Rates, Burma 1999–2004

[ % p.a.]

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

10.9 13.7 11.3 10.0 10.6 12.0 12.2

Source: ADB (2004 and 2005).

If only it were true . . .

Stating anything definitive with respect to economic growth in Burma is fraught

with the difficulties pertaining to a country in which the official statistics are notoriously unreliable (even deliberately mis-stated), and collecting data otherwise is difficult. Burma does not publish national accounts statistics, and the only growth data

that is made available is that which accompanies ministerial statements such as the

one above. Nevertheless, we can be sure that economic growth in Burma is well

below the Minister’s claims. His boast is greatly at odds with even the most cursory

glance at the economic circumstances on the ground in Burma, circumstances which

point to ever deeper levels of poverty for the average citizen, and of an economy that

at worst is on the verge of collapse, and at best cycles through bare subsistence.

More substantially, however, we can dispute the Minister’s claims through various proxy measures and indicators of economic growth. For instance, if Burma was

truly growing along the lines claimed by the SPDC, one would expect to see it using

more productive resources—energy, land, labour, capital, and so on. We do not see

this. Indeed, as the Asian Development Bank (2005:30) notes, electricity usage in

Burma actually fell by 32.4 per cent across 2004–05. Amongst other indicators—in

the same period cement output fell 8.5 per cent, sugar production fell by 2 per cent,

and credit extended to the private sector (Table 3 below) was only fitfully recovering

from its collapse the year before. In 2005 it is likely that manufacturing as a whole

contracted—not a result one would expect to see (the sector contributes just over

10 per cent of GDP) for an economy growing in double-digits (EIU 2006:18). In addition to these ‘‘internal’’ proxies, however, if Burma was actually growing at the rates

claimed by the SPDC, we would also presume to see certain patterns in its economy

that history tells us to expect of rapidly growing economies (Bradford 2004). We

should see less reliance on agriculture, greater reliance on industry, and even the

emergence of services. Of course, these are long-term patterns, but shorter-term

trends are generally at least consistent with them in countries that truly have enjoyed high growth (and for which the Asian ‘‘tiger’’ economies and China are exemplary). Burma displays none of these structural dynamics. Indeed, as demonstrated

by Bradford (2004), agriculture has assumed a greater role in Burma’s economy in

21

recent years. In short, either the military regime’s claimed economic growth numbers are greatly at odds with reality, or the country has truly found a unique path

to economic prosperity.

An alternative set of growth numbers (Table 2 below), more consistent with our

critique here (and with Burma’s recent economic history), have been estimated by

the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2006):

Table 2.—Economic Growth Estimates (EIU)

[% p.a.]

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

5.3 5.3 ¥2.0 ¥2.7 2.9 1.9

As can be seen from the estimates above, moderate economic growth returned to

Burma in 2005 and this will likely continue through 2006. Such growth is in no way

reflective of any bout of economic reform in the country, but instead is driven by

the increasing global demand for energy which has pushed up the price of natural

gas. Burma currently exports natural gas only to Thailand in sizable quantities, but

new projects are currently being brought on stream via a series of deals with Chinese, Indian and South Korean investors. Increasing gas prices and export volumes

caused Burma’s trade balance to turn positive in 2005 (EIU estimate: 4.4 percent

of GDP), and it was this contribution that was responsible for the country’s estimated positive rate of economic growth overall. Contributions from agriculture remain flat (despite relatively good harvests), whilst other sectors of the economy—

manufacturing, transport, services, tourism—are likely to detract from economic

growth. These sectors face particular downside risks in 2006, ranging from further

disastrous policy choices by the military regime, high oil prices, potential avian influenza outbreaks, political unrest at home and abroad (especially Thailand), capricious policy changes, consumer boycotts, and so on.

MACROECONOMIC POLICY

Fiscal Policy

Macroeconomic policymaking in Burma is coloured by one overwhelming fact—the

irresistible demand of the state upon the country’s real output. This demand far exceeds the state’s ability to raise taxation revenue, and accordingly has led to a situation in which the state ‘‘finances’’ its spending by the simple expedient of selling

its bonds to the central bank. This policy (in economics parlance, ‘‘printing money’)

distorts every other aspect of policymaking in Burma. Fiscal policy is simply concerned with the raising and spending of funds, monetary policy likewise with keeping interest rates sufficiently low (as shall be examined, negative in real terms) to

minimise financing costs. Neither plays a counter-cyclical or developmental role, and

both seriously blunt the functioning of the market economy.

Table 3 below illustrates the financial demands of the state in Burma on the

country’s financial system.

Table 3.—State Share of Burma’s Financial Resources: Selected Indicators

[Kyat millions]

Year

Central bank

lending to

Government

Commercial

bank lending

to Government

Commercial

bank lending

to private

sector

Public

holdings of

Government

bonds

1999 ............................................................................. 331,425 12,460 188,149 378

2000 ............................................................................. 447,581 36,159 266,466 463

2001 ............................................................................. 675,040 40,985 416,176 504

2002 ............................................................................. 892,581 43,248 608,401 563

2003 ............................................................................. 1,262,588 35,546 341,547 544

2004 ............................................................................. 1,686,341 89,217 428,391 505

2005* ........................................................................... 2,065,038 74,693 559,555 **457

*As at end—October.

**As at end—January.

Sources: IMF (2006), Myanmar Central Statistical Office (MCSO 2006)

As can be seen from Table 3, the demands of the state upon Burma’s financial

resources swamps all others. Central bank lending to the government is the faVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
22

2 Not that, under the present regime, the CBM would be allowed any real power anyway. This

fact was dramatically revealed during the 2002/03 banking crisis, when the CBM was sidelined

in favour of an obscure brigade commander in the (unsuccessful) attempts to manage matters

(Turnell 2003). 3Technically, the Kyat is fixed to the IMF’s ‘‘Special Drawing Rights’’ at a rate of

K1:SDR8.5085—which yields are more or less constant K6:$US1. 4The author can confirm that the $US also remains the favoured medium through which larger Burmese businesses continue to conduct their activities.

voured device for financing government expenditure. Yet, as can also be seen from

the data above, the state is also a borrower from Burma’s (nominally) commercial

banks. The latter provides the private sector with little more than a quarter of the

funds that Burma’s financial system provides to the central government. The small

amount of government bonds held by the general public, an infinitesimal proportion

(substantially less than one percent) of the bonds sold to the central bank, is indicative of the lack of confidence the citizens have in such state-created financial assets.

In recent years the SPDC has introduced dramatic increases in the taxes it levies.

Customs duties alone rose by over 400 percent in 2004/05 (due to a mix of increases

in tax rates, and exchange rate formulae—more on which below). Notwithstanding

this, total central government tax revenue in fiscal year 2004/05 came to just

K278,024 million (EIU 2006:17). The SPDC does not publish data on its spending,

but given that new advances to the regime from the central bank came to K378,697

million in roughly the same period, it is reasonable to assume that taxes account

for little more than 40 percent of government spending.

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy in Burma is formally the responsibility of the Central Bank of

Myanmar (CBM). However, a number of factors determine that it is incapable of

yielding any influence over monetary conditions in Burma.2 The first and most simple of these factors is that Burma has in place interest rate controls that cap lending rates at 15 percent per annum, and do not allow deposit rates to fall below 9.5

percent per annum. These rates, and the rate at which the CBM will provide funds

to the commercial banks (the so-called ‘‘CBM rate’, currently at 10 percent), have

not changed for a number of years (Turnell 2006). Given that Burma’s inflation rate

was (conservatively) put at just over 20 percent in 2005, this implies that ‘‘real’’ interest rates in Burma have been substantially negative (EIU 2006:5). The motivation of the regime for locking in such rates (which result in substantial distortions

in capital allocation), is to minimise the interest rates paid on government debt.

Currently, 3 and 5-year Burmese government bonds have fixed-yields of 8.5 and 9.0

percent respectively (MCSO 2006). In common with other countries with an underdeveloped financial system (on which, more below), the CBM is likewise unable to

employ devices (open market operations, rediscount facilities, repurchase agreements) that are part of the standard tool box of central banks. The distrust of Burma’s currency, the Kyat, has created parallel (black-market) foreign currency

spheres in Burma, and these are also beyond the influence of the CBM. Finally, it

perhaps goes without saying that the CBM does not enjoy operational independence

from the state, and accordingly has no credibility beyond it.

Exchange Rate

Burma has a fixed-exchange rate policy that officially links the Kyat to the US

Dollar at the grossly inappropriate rate of K6:$US1.3 This official rate, however, is

just one of a number of exchange rates applicable to Burma’s currency. The most

important of these rates, and the only one relevant to the people ‘‘on the street’’ in

Burma, is the ‘‘black market’’ or ‘‘unofficial’’ rate. Currently this rate stands at

around K1,160:$US1, nearly two hundred times below the official standard promulgated by the regime. This rate is, of course, subject to daily, even hourly, fluctuation

according to the perceptions of the country’s prospects. Wild swings in the unofficial

rate are reasonably frequent, to which the SPDC’s counter, instead of engaging in

meaningful currency reform, is invariably to order the rounding up of a cohort of

‘‘usual suspect’’ foreign exchange dealers. As a consequence of the United States

highly effective sanctions imposed on Burma, the SPDC has employed various coercive measures to try to discourage the use of the US dollar, and in favour of the

Euro, the Singapore dollar, the Thai Baht and the Yen. These measures have had

only limited success, and the US dollar remains a highly prized store of value (especially, in this context, ‘‘new’’ $US 100 bills).4

In addition to its sometimes wild fluctuations, the unofficial value of the Kyat has

been in secular decline for some time, and in this it acts as something of a baromVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
23

5 Information provided to the author by an official, but confidential, source. This matter has

been subsequently reported in the press (Parker and Yeni 2006).

eter of Burma’s macroeconomy under the military regime. Table 4 below records its

declining value vis-a`-vis the US dollar over the last decade:

Table 4.—Indicative (Unofficial) Exchange Rates

[Kyat/$US1]

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

240 340 350 500 650 960 900 1,000 1,300 *1,160

*As at March

Source: Burma Economic Watch.

In addition to the ‘‘official’’ and ‘‘unofficial’’ exchange rates there are other, ‘‘semiofficial’, rates that apply depending on the counterparties and circumstances. For instance, a rate of K450:$US1 currently applies for all funds brought into Burma by

U.N. agencies and international NGO’s.5 This rate, when enforced, means that such

organisations provide the SPDC with foreign exchange effectively at less than ‘‘halfprice’’ (the organisations are likewise compelled to conduct their foreign exchange

operations via the state-owned Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank). This same exchange

rate applies, for the purposes of excise calculation, to many exporters and importers

in Burma (regardless of the rate they actually conduct their business in).

The regime’s multiple and divergent exchange rates are the public face of Burma’s

macroeconomic malaise. They also provide for extraordinary opportunities for corruption. It is clear, for instance, that having access to foreign currency at anything

close to the official exchange rate presents the recipient with the potential of immediate windfall gains. Reforming and unifying Burma’s exchange rate regimes, which

almost certainly should mean allowing the Kyat to ‘‘float’, should be a first-order

priority in any future reform program. Unfortunately, such a reform program is unlikely from a regime that is clearly the existing system’s leading beneficiary.

‘‘Capricious’’ Policy Making

One of the most damaging features of macroeconomic policymaking in Burma (of

all types), is that it is often made in ways that to observers appears highly capricious, arbitrary, selective and even simply irrational. Examples of such decisionmaking are legion, of which the following are but a small but indicative recent sample:

• In October 2005, the SPDC suddenly announces an eightfold increase in the retail price of gasoline.

• In 2004, in order to stem rising domestic prices, the SPDC announces a ban on

rice exports. Just a year earlier the SPDC had brought in measures designed

to substantially liberalise the avenues through which rice producers could export.

• Various announcements through 2005 that exporters/importers in Burma were

to henceforth use the Euro rather than the $US in their transactions.

• The (numerous) changes to tax and duty levies on commodities.

• Reflexive cycles of relaxation/restriction on border trade.

• Sudden arrests and purges of regime insiders when, occasionally, they call attention to the regime’s follies and incompetence. Legal procedure scarcely matters in Burma, but ‘‘economic crime’’ is the usual charge.

• The sudden announcement in 2005 that Burma’s administrative capital would

relocate from Rangoon to Pyinmana. Not strictly an economic decision, but there

is little to suggest that the economic dislocation costs of the move were seriously

entertained.

EXTERNAL SECTOR

Trade

As noted in the overview, it is only from the external sector that any growth in

Burma’s economy is apparent, or likely. Driven by rising gas export prices and volumes, and augmented by a precipitous decline in imports (more on which below),

Burma recorded a trade surplus in 2004 of over $US900 million. For the first 3

months of 2005, the latest data publicly available, the surplus in this item stood

at nearly $US470 million (IMF 2006). With gas prices rising across 2005 and greatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
24

6This figure, based on Burmese official data, is lower than that suggested by Thai import

data. Accordingly, it probably understates Burma’s gas exports in 2004.

er volumes likely to have been shipped, a large trade surplus just in excess of $US

1 billion for the year as a whole is expected. For 2006 this trend will almost certainly continue, with the EIU (2006:5) predicting an annual trade surplus of $US

1.2 billion. It will be noted from Table 5 below, however, that imports in Burma

have been falling in recent years. This seems unlikely to continue for much longer,

especially as Burma imports required infrastructure to develop the new gas fields

that have been the subject of recent deals. Table 5 also reveals that, to a considerable extent, Burma’s trade surpluses are offset by deficits in services and in income

payments—all of which diminish the overall surplus on current account. This trend

likewise will continue into the future—driven by the repatriation of profits by the

(largely foreign) firms investing in Burma’s energy sector.

Table 5.—Burma’s External Sector: Selected Indicators

[$US millions]

Year Goods

exports

Goods

imports

Current

account

balance

1999 ........................................................................................................................ 1,293.9 2,181.3 ¥284.7

2000 ........................................................................................................................ 1,661.6 2,165.4 ¥211.7

2001 ........................................................................................................................ 2,521.8 2,443.7 ¥153.5

2002 ........................................................................................................................ 2,421.1 2,022.1 96.6

2003 ........................................................................................................................ 2,709.7 1,911.6 ¥19.3

2004 ........................................................................................................................ 2,926.6 1,998.7 111.5

2005* ...................................................................................................................... 836.6 364.5 296.6

*As at end—1st Quarter, Source: IMF (2006)

Table 6 below reveals the source of Burma’s exports, and illustrates the dominance of gas exports over other items. The growth of gas exports is also dramatically

revealed—their value exceeding that of the whole of 2004 by the end of the first

quarter 2005. So far most of this gas is sourced from the existing Yadana and

Yetagun fields (the product of which is exported to Thailand), but this will shortly

be joined by gas piped from sites soon to come on stream, including that of the (offshore) Korean/Indian/Burmese ventures in Rakhine State. From Table 6 we can also

see that the vast bulk of Burma’s exports are from extractive industries of various

types. Worryingly, as the EIU (2006:24) notes, exports of Burmese teak are likely

to be substantially understated when one considers the pervasiveness of ‘‘illegal’’

logging in the country. Burma’s exports of garments and textiles have substantially

contracted over the last 2 years, overwhelmingly a function of the ending of the

Multi-Fibre Agreement that has seen China increase its share of the global garment

industry, at the expense of smaller-scale players such as Burma (Turnell 2006).

Table 6.—Composition of Exports

[Kyat millions]

Export type 2002 2003 2004 2005*

Gas ................................................................................................. 4,247 5,919 63,334 3,461

Teak and other Woods ................................................................... 1,880 1,874 2,149 810

Pulses ............................................................................................. 1,898 1,744 1,407 503

Garments and Textiles ................................................................... 2,985 2,973 1,298 368

Shrimp and Fish Products ............................................................. 829 829 1,003 230

Metal and Ore ................................................................................ 288 288 503 220

Rice ................................................................................................ 754 754 112 90

Rubber ............................................................................................ 76 89 81 61

*At end—April.

Source: EIU (2004, 2005, 2006), MCSO (2006)

Investment

Burma6 is not a large recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). The country

is regarded as a highly risky destination for foreign investment, and a difficult location to do business. In a recent report on economic freedom, the Washington-based

Heritage Foundation ranked Burma third from the bottom (in front of only Iran and

North Korea) with regard to restrictions on business activity. According to the FounVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
25

7This figure for agricultural investment, which is consistent with other sources, was rather

surprisingly reported in the Rangoon-based Weekly Eleven News in December 2005. The report

was reproduced the same month in the online edition of The Irrawaddy, http://

www.irrawaddy.org.

dation, ‘‘pervasive corruption, non-existent rule of law, arbitrary policymaking, and

tight restrictions on imports and exports all make Burma an unattractive investment destination and have severely restrained economic growth’’ (Miles, O’Grady

and Holmes 2006:125).

As can be seen from Table 7, FDI in Burma is overwhelmingly directed to the gas

and oil sectors. Very little FDI makes its way to industry, and even less to agriculture (which has received FDI of a mere $US34.4 million since the ‘‘opening’’ of

Burma 17 years ago).7 In terms of source country, the traditional largest investors,

Singapore and Thailand, have in recent times been overshadowed by China. This

trend is likely to continue, albeit with China joined by greater investment in Burma’s gas sector by Indian and Korean investors.

Thailand’s role as an investor in Burma has eroded in relative terms as noted,

but it remains a pervasive influence on Burma’s economy nonetheless. One recent

investment project with far-reaching implications is a joint venture agreement with

Burma (signed in 2005) to construct four large dams on the Salween River. The

dams are designed to provide hydro-electricity for Thailand, and foreign income for

Burma. Unfortunately, however, the externalities of the project are far from benign.

The dams are located in a region of Burma populated by Karen, Karenni and

Shan—three of the largest of Burma’s ethnic groups, and amongst the most economically marginalised. Such groups have greatly suffered in the past during the

construction of various infrastructure projects in Burma, and one can only fear that

they are likely to do so again. The United States Congress has itself found that the

military regime’s actions against these ethnic groups constitutes a form of ‘‘ethnic

cleaning’. Like so many of the regime’s ‘‘big ticket’’ development projects, this one

shows all the signs of being a disaster in the making (Akimoto 2004).

Table 7.—Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Sector and Source

[$US millions]

2003 2004 *2005

Sector:

Gas and Oil ........................................................................................................ 44.0 54.3 142.6

Real Estate ......................................................................................................... .................... .................... 31.3

Mining ................................................................................................................. 3.4 1.5 6.0

Manufacturing .................................................................................................... 13.2 2.8 3.5

Transport ............................................................................................................ .................... 30.0 ....................

Agriculture & Fisheries ....................................................................................... 26.4 2.6 ....................

Source Country:

China (incl. Hong Kong) ..................................................................................... 12.9 2.8 126.6

Thailand .............................................................................................................. .................... 22.0 29.0

Japan .................................................................................................................. .................... .................... 2.7

Malaysia ............................................................................................................. 62.2 .................... ....................

South Korea ........................................................................................................ 0.3 34.9 ....................

United Kingdom .................................................................................................. .................... 27.0 ....................

*As at end—April.

Source: EIU (2004, 2005, 2006)

Foreign Exchange Reserves

Table 8.—Foreign Exchange Reserves: Selected Countries

[$US millions]

Year Burma Thailand Cambodia South

Korea Vietnam

1999 .......................................................................................... 265 34,063 393 73,987 3,326

2000 .......................................................................................... 223 32,016 502 96,131 3,417

2001 .......................................................................................... 400 32,355 587 102,753 3,675

2002 .......................................................................................... 470 38,046 776 121,345 4,121

2003 .......................................................................................... 550 41,077 815 155,284 6,224

26

8Determining what is ‘‘private’’ or not is difficult in Burma—a country where business can

scarcely escape the clutches of the regime. 9 Information confidentially supplied to the author by the agency concerned. Of course, even

if more credit was available it would make little difference to the circumstances of Burma’s

farmers in the absence of other reforms—notably the exit of the regime from its incessant meddling and demands on the rural sector. Making credit alone more accessible raises the risk of

simply making Burma’s farmers more indebted.

Table 8.—Foreign Exchange Reserves: Selected Countries—Continued

[$US millions]

Year Burma Thailand Cambodia South

Korea Vietnam

2004 .......................................................................................... 672 48,664 943 198,997 7,042

2005* ........................................................................................ 774 50,728 939 210,317 8,602

* End 1st Quarter, Source: IMF (2006)

Burma’s trade surpluses and (to a lesser degree) the flows of FDI, have swelled

the country’s official foreign exchange reserves—from $US 265 million in 1999, to

over $US 774 million today (Table 8 above). The latter number, however, is still

very low by global or even regional standards. Table 8 contains a sample of countries that, for a variety of reasons, Burma might be compared to. It can be seen that

Burma has, by some margin, the lowest level of reserves ‘‘comfort’, even when compared to tiny and poor Cambodia. Of course, Burma’s foreign assets must also be

set against its foreign liabilities. These currently stand at around $US 7 billion (or

around 14 times the size of the country’s reserves), and consist for the most part

of defaulted loans to the World Bank and other multilateral lenders (IMF 2006).

MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SECTOR

Burma’s financial system, a mix of state-owned institutions, 17 surviving ‘‘privately owned’’ banks of varying degrees of health, and a dominant informal sector,

is failing to meet the country’s need for capital.8 As noted in Table 3 earlier, the

largest claimant on credit creation in Burma is the state. Private sector trade and

industry in Burma can access some credit from the private banks, but the macroeconomic instability of the country means much of this is of a short-term nature

only, and concentrated in such inflation-hedging sectors as real estate and precious

metal and stone trading. Long-term credit for industrial development is almost completely non-existent. Personal credit in Burma is available from formal financial institutions for a handful of well-connected cronies of the regime, but for the average

person in Burma ‘‘credit’’ is supplied by friends, relatives or, less agreeably, the local

moneylender—for time immemorial a ubiquitous presence in the country (Turnell

2006). For agriculturalists in Burma the availability of credit is especially dire. According to a recent U.N. agency survey, 80 percent of Burma’s agriculturalists are

without access to formal credit of any kind.9

To an uninformed observer, it must have seemed possible at the dawn of 2002

to entertain some optimism with regard to the financial system in Burma, particularly with respect to the private banks. These had emerged only since 1990, and the

implementation of certain financial-sector reforms (principally the ‘‘Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law’’ and the ‘‘Central Bank of Myanmar Law’). By 2002 the

private banks appeared to be growing strongly and, amongst the largest of them,

the creation of a degree of trust and even ‘‘brand recognition’’ seemed apparent. Beneath the surface, however, all was not well. Burma’s interest rate restrictions imposed by the regime (noted above) greatly hampered the private banks in traditional

intermediation (taking in deposits and making loans), forcing them into activities

of high risk and questionable legitimacy. That said, some of the private banks had

been established in the first instance precisely to conduct and disguise unorthodox

and criminal activity (regarding the latter, the laundering of narcotics money especially), while others were little more than corporate ‘‘cash boxes’’ for various entities

connected with the regime. In 2002, however, all of this bubbled to the surface as

a financial crisis engulfed Burma.

At the centre of Burma’s 2002/03 financial crisis was a banking collapse that was

almost archetypal of such phenomena. However, the crisis did not begin in the

banks. Rather, it began, in late 2002, with a series of failures amongst what were

known in Burma as ‘‘private finance companies’—in effect, ‘‘institutions’’ that were

27

10For a detailed account of Burma’s 2003 banking crisis, see Trnell (2003). Ponzi schemes pay

extremely high returns to their members out of the capital of new members. They must ultimately fail when the supply of new members dries up. 11That is, these schemes were not authorised under The Financial Institutions of Myanmar

Law (1990).

for the most part little more than gambling syndicates and ‘‘ponzi’’ schemes.10

Though these firms were not legally authorised deposit-taking institutions, they presented a tempting investment opportunity for Burmese seeking a non-negative return on their funds.11 Such temptation had an irrational side in promised rates of

returns typical of ponzi schemes, but there was a rational aspect to it as well since,

as noted, the rates the banks could pay on deposits was effectively ‘‘capped’’ at 9.5

percent. In 2002 inflation was estimated to be in excess of 55 percent per annum,

meaning that putting money in the bank was a (certain) losing proposition in real

terms (IMF 2006).

The crisis in Burma’s private finance companies quickly spread to the private

banks—a contagion perhaps unremarkable given the country’s history of periodic

monetary and financial crises under military rule. Long lines of anxious depositors

formed outside the banks, a phenomenon that rapidly swelled into a classic ‘‘bank

run’. From this moment on, the response of the relevant monetary authorities in

Burma (principally the CBM) was almost wholly destructive. Late and inadequate

liquidity support to the banks by the CBM was overwhelmingly negated by the imposition of ‘‘withdrawal limits’’ on depositors that escalated into an outright denial

of depositors of access to their money. Even worse, loans were ‘‘recalled’’ with little

consideration given to capacity to repay. More potent breaches of ‘‘trust’’ in banking

would be difficult to imagine. With a full-scale banking crisis now in play, there followed the usual symptoms of such events—bank closures and insolvencies, a flight

to ‘‘cash’, the creation of a ‘‘secondary market’’ in frozen deposits, the cessation of

lending, the stopping of remittances and transfers, and other maladies destructive

of monetary institutions. By mid-2003 the private banks had essentially ceased to

function. In 2004 selected banks reopened, some of the largest closed completely (including the Asia Wealth Bank and the Myanmar Mayflower Bank, then the largest

and third largest respectively of Burma’s private banks), and a weak recovery

began.

Table 9.—Selected Financial Indicators

[Kyat millions]

Year Demand deposits

Time, savings and

foreign currency

deposits

Money + Quasi money (M2)

1999 72,707 216,549 562,224

2000 119,746 335,574 800,542

2001 206,349 450,560 1,151,713

2002 290,520 541,307 1,550,778

2003 82,948 386,298 1,572,402

2004 139,880 594,169 2,081,824

2005* 164,855 693,465 2,536,861

*As at end 1st Quarter.

Source: IMF (2006) and MCSO (2006).

Table 9 above reveals the progress thus far of this anaemic recovery. As can be

seen, both demand as well as less-liquid deposits have bounced back, though the

former are still below the levels of late 2002. Taken together, in 2005 total bank

deposits of K858,320 million were a mere 33.8 percent of the total money supply

(M2)—indicating, as of course did the data on lending in Table 3 earlier, that the

state remains by far the dominant actor in Burma’s financial sector.

Of course, the data in Table 9 can also be profitably employed to once more critique the SPDC’s growth claims in recent years. For instance, the regime boasted

that Burma’s economy grew a vigorous 10.2 percent in 2003—a year in which new

lending to the private sector ceased, loans financing existing activities were recalled

and all the measures of private monetary assets declined dramatically. If matters

were not serious they could be laughable. According to the SPDC, Burma can not

only grow strongly without the increased use of energy and other ‘‘real’’ factors of

production—it can also do it seemingly without money.

28

12 Also, information privately supplied to the author. 13This finding, re-stated in FATF’s annual report for 2005, was confirmed most recently at

a plenary meeting of FATF held in Cape Town in February 2006 (FATF 2006). 14The legislation concerned is the ‘‘Law to Control Money and Property Obtained by Illegal

Means’, promulgated on 17 June 2002. For a review of the Law and its deficiencies, see Turnell

(2004).

AGRICULTURE

Burma remains an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Agriculture accounts for

around 57 percent of Burma’s GDP and engages over 70 percent of its labour force

(UNDP 2003). Nevertheless, for many years it has been a sector of profound neglect

and routine exploitation by the Burmese government. Critical inputs such as

fertiliser are unavailable to most farmers at prices they can afford, and over 80 percent of Burma’s land under cultivation lacks irrigation of any form (Dapice 2003,

EIU 2006:22). As noted earlier, credit from formal institutions is unavailable to

most farmers in Burma, and at present less than 3 percent of bank lending in

Burma is extended to agriculture. Inexplicably, the private banks are forbidden to

lend for farming. Meanwhile, recent experiments in microfinance under the auspices

of the UNDP are moving toward failure in ways sadly familiar to such interventions

(Turnel12005).

In 2003, Burma’s military regime made great noises about liberalising the trade

in rice, internally and externally. In practice, however, great interference by the

state in the basic decisions taken by farmers—what, how and how much to

produce—has continued unabated. Of course, in many areas of Burma a final blow

is the exactions of Burma’s military forces, the Tatmadaw, forced by the country’s

strained finances to ‘‘live off the land’’ (Vicary 2003, 2004).

In recent years the SPDC has adopted a number of programs designed to increase

the amount of land under cultivation in Burma. Such efforts, which include the socalled ‘‘summer paddy program’, and various schemes designed to reclaim land in

the Irrawaddy Delta, have invariably failed to achieve their desired outcomes because of the lack of critical inputs noted above. Farmers without sufficient fertiliser

to prepare new fields, or without credit to allow the construction of dykes, fences

and other land improvements, have been unable to make effective the exhortations

for more ‘‘extensive’’ production (Okamoto et.al., 2003, Thawnghmung 2004).

The end result of these ‘‘supply side’’ problems, caused by the regime’s inability

to avoid interfering in the basic decisions taken by farmers, is that Burma’s agricultural sector, once the jewel of its economy (the famed ‘‘rice bowl’’ of the British Empire) is operating well-below potential. Indeed, it is likely that the production of

Burma’s great staple, rice, is lagging behind even the country’s population growth

rate—bringing with it then the likelihood that in recent years hunger has been increasing (Dapice 2003, Aung Din Taylor 2002, Vicary 2004).12

MONEY LAUNDERING

The shadow of money laundering continues to linger over Burma’s financial sector, and Burma remains one of only two countries (the other is Nigeria) to be

deemed a ‘‘non-cooperative’’ jurisdiction with respect to money-laundering by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).13 FATF, an associate body of the Organisation

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), is the world’s premier agency

for dealing with money-laundering globally. Burma has been named as a non-cooperating country in each of FATF’s annual reports since the organisation’s inception in 1998. Some progress has been made on the surface—Burma now has legislation designed to counter money-laundering for instance—but the problem, as is so

often the case with respect to laws in Burma, is enforcement.14 As yet it is simply

not credible that Burma’s military rulers are serious about eliminating a problem

that they themselves are implicated in.

The acute concern with respect to money-laundering in Burma is that the country

remains one of the world’s largest producers of illicit drugs. Burma is, indeed, the

second largest producer in the world of illegal opium, and it is the single largest

producer in Southeast Asia of methamphetamines (Department of State 2005).

Down the years a number of financial institutions in Burma have been identified

as money launderers, and in 2003 two of the countries largest banks, the Asia

Wealth Bank and the Myanmar Mayflower Bank, were publicly identified as such

by the United States Treasury (an unprecedented move). According to the Treasury,

the banks were:

. . . controlled by and used to facilitate money lending for such groups as the

United Wa State Army—among the most notorious drug trafficking organizations in Southeast Asia. The Burmese government has failed to take any reguVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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15This ruling is set out in the Federal Register, vol.68, no.227, Tuesday, November 25, 2003,

pp.66305–66311. 16 ‘‘Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’’ (PATRIOT)

Act, 2003. 17The Federal Register, op. cit. 18 Ibid. 19 As an example of the ‘‘broad’’ definition of ‘‘state-owned enterprise’, is the EU ban on dealings with companies associated with Burmese-military controlled entities such as Union of

Myanmar Economic Holdings. Two of Burma’s banks, Innwa Bank and Myawaddy Bank, have

been caught in this particular net. It should be noted that material support to Burma from both

the World Bank and IMF would be on hold for reasons unconnected to sanctions—given that

the country is currently in default on its loans from these institutions.

latory or enforcement action against these financial institutions, despite their

well-known criminal links.15

In addition to the specific naming of these two specific banks, however, and consistent with the FATF declarations on Burma, the US Treasury also announced that

Burma as a jurisdiction was of ‘primary money laundering concern’. As such, the

Treasury Secretary was authorised (under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act),16

in collaboration with the US State Department, Department of Justice and various

financial regulators, to direct financial institutions in the US to take ‘‘special measures’’ against Burma’s banks.17 Such measures ‘‘range from enhanced recordkeeping

or reporting requirements to a requirement to terminate correspondent banking relationships with the designated entit[ies]’. In the case of the Burma ruling specifically:

The designation of Burma is intended to deny Burmese financial institutions

access to the U.S. financial system through correspondent accounts. Thus, the

proposed rule would prohibit U.S. financial institutions from establishing or

maintaining any correspondent account for, or on behalf of, a Burmese financial

institution. This prohibition would extend to any correspondent account maintained by a U.S. financial institution for any foreign bank if the account is used

by the foreign bank to provide a Burmese financial institution indirect access

to the U.S. financial system. In such a case, the U.S. financial system would

be required to ensure that the account no longer is used to provide such access,

including, if necessary, terminating the correspondent relationship.18

In addition to the United States, many other countries (and individual financial

institutions) have placed limitations on financial sector linkages with Burma out of

money laundering concerns. A particularly notable example of which was the decision taken by the Bank of China, in January 2006, to terminate all $US business

with both the state-owned Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and Myanmar Investment

and Commercial Bank (Ye Lwin 2006).

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Broadly speaking, there is no a priori case, either for or against, the efficacy of

economic sanctions in delivering desired objectives. History yields instances where

economic sanctions have failed to deliver all the changes desired, but it is also replete with examples where they have proved decisive. Whether or not economic

sanctions will be useful depend on circumstances and context—of the target country,

and of the countries imposing sanctions.

Of course, in Burma’s case the most important ‘‘context’’ to be considered is that

the country’s democracy movement, the representatives who won 82 percent of the

seats in the country’s last parliamentary election in 1990, continue to call for them.

Gainsaying such a call might rightly be considered as somewhat presumptuous.

Nevertheless, of concern in these pages are the economics of the matter. Here too,

however, the answer is, in the view of the present writer, unequivocal. As shall be

examined below, economic sanctions are necessary in Burma to help dislodge the

real obstacle to the country’s economic development. This obstacle, the regime that

has been oppressing the country for four decades, has never given any hint that it

can engage in meaningful economic reform.

Burma is presently subject to economic sanctions from a number of countries. The

most rigorous economic sanctions on Burma, however, are imposed by the European

Union and the United States. Under the so-called ‘‘Common Position’’ of European

Union Foreign Ministers, member countries ban EU investment in state-owned enterprises (broadly defined), effectively veto lending to Burma by agencies such as the

World Bank and IMF, preclude travel to the EU by SPDC officials and their families, and freeze European assets held by the same officials and family members.19

The United States sanctions are authorised under the ‘‘Burmese Freedom and DeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
30

20 A similar list, to which the author is indebted, is provided by the eminent economic historian David Landes in his 1998 book, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998:217–218)

mocracy Act’’ of 2003, and indirectly via measures to control money laundering

(noted above, and captured under Section 311 of the Patriot Act). The United States

goes one step further than the EU, by imposing a ban on imports from Burma.

Other countries, including New Zealand, Canada and others, impose various restrictions on their activities in and/or with Burma, most concerned with aid allocation,

the activities of Burmese financial institutions, and travel by members of the regime.

Unlike some other sanctions regimes, EU and United States sanctions on Burma

are carefully calibrated so as not to block critical exports to the country of food,

medicine and similar essential supplies.

All of the above said, sanctions alone are not going to bring about the change required in Burma, but in the view of this author they are a critically important component of a multi-faceted strategy that must contain ‘‘sticks’’ as well as ‘‘carrots’.

This support for sanctions is based on the following propositions:

• The existing sanctions on Burma are well-targeted. Certainly, it is true that a

small number of Burmese workers have lost their jobs because of sanctions,

mostly in the garments industry. Such numbers affected, however, are an infinitesimal proportion of Burma’s population, the vast bulk of whom have no contact whatsoever with the traded goods sector. Moreover, an important simultaneous development to the levying of sanctions—to wit, the ending, on 1 January

2005, of the Multi-Fibre Agreement on Textiles (MFAT)—would have meant

that the few jobs that were lost from sanctions would almost certainly have

been lost anyway. The MFAT had previously limited the exports of various textile categories by assigning countries ‘‘quotas’’ of the principal textile consuming

markets. The effect of the MFAT above all was to thus artificially limit the exports of China (by a large margin the cheapest producer) in all sorts of textile

categories. The lifting of these quotas caused the long-expected surge in China’s

exports, and a whole host of ‘‘marginal’’ exporters such as Burma, who were

previously viable principally because of the quota system, to lose market share.

In short—even without sanctions, Burma’s garment-exporting industry would

have greatly contracted. Of course, the proof of this can be seen in the dramatic

fall in Burma’s garment exports beyond the United States—a consequence not

of sanctions, but the ‘‘squeeze’’ imposed by China (Turnell 2006).

• It is the elite of Burma’s economy, instead, who are most affected by the sanctions thus far imposed on the country. A sizable number of this elite are ‘‘connected’’ with the ruling regime in Burma, and a high proportion are personally

related to the members of the SPDC itself. Sanctions are likely to contribute

to a successful policy when the relevant incentives of important groups are consistent with the change desired. The sanctions currently imposed upon Burma,

by the EU but most effectively by the United States, seem to meet this requirement.

• Burma’s poverty is solely a consequence of the policies of the military regime

that has ruled the country for four decades. Poverty in Burma (in a nation unusually blessed with natural resources) is the result of a political-economy that

has been consciously shaped by a regime in ways that are not conducive to

growth. Stated simply, the military regime has actively undermined and prevented the development of the institutions that history tells us are necessary

for growth. Such institutions include:

— secure property rights (including of the person) which encourages saving, investment, innovation, entrepreneurship;

— a stable and responsive government—not necessarily democratic, but

a government that acts according to rules rather than individual caprice,

and which will address at least the primary concerns of the populace;

— relatively honest government—the market is the venue for trading,

rather than the state;

— limited government—keeping the state’s claim on the nation’s surplus

to merely that required to fulfil a consensus of ‘‘reasonable’’ functions;

— a primacy, of rationality and reason in national decisionmaking.20

It takes but a moment’s reflection to conclude that Burma enjoys scarcely any of

these attributes. Burma’s problems manifestly did not and do not come from the

sanctions that countries impose upon it. Overwhelmingly, Burma’s economic problems are home-grown, but they require fundamental political reform to solve. The

31

efficacy of particular measures in bringing about such fundamental reform—whether sanctions or any other device—should be the criteria against which judgments

are made.

It is the case, at the time of writing, that sanctions combined with increased diplomatic activity under Secretary Rice at the U.N. Security Council, are having an

impact. Equally important, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, as

well as the subsequent efforts to refer Burma to the U.N. Security Council, have

stirred Burma’s neighbours into doing something about a country that imposes all

sorts of problems on them (from narcotics and people trafficking, to the flows of refugees across their borders). In 2005 the countries of the Association for South East

Asian Nations (ASEAN), undertook a number of measures designed to bring about

change in Burma—including; pressuring Burma to relinquish its ‘‘turn’’ to chair

ASEAN, appointing a number of special ASEAN delegates to meet with Burma’s

leaders and promote dialog, calls for political reform and the release of political prisoners by the highest ASEAN bodies, and so on. Beyond ASEAN, at the United Nations and in approaches to Burma even from countries such as China and India,

change does seem to be ‘‘in the air’. Rewarding Burma through the removal of sanctions, despite its leaders’ recalcitrance yet at the moment that pressures upon them

seem to be building, is surely ill-advised.

REFERENCES

Akimoto, Y. 2004, ‘‘Hydro-powering the regime,’’ The Irrawaddy, vol.12, no.6, June,

available online at: http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=3757&z=102.

Asian Development Bank (ADB) 2004, Asian Development Outlook 2004, Manila,

ADB.

Asian Development Bank 2005, Asian Development Outlook 2005, Manila, ADB.

Aung Din Taylor, D. 2002, ‘‘Signs of distress: Observations on agriculture, poverty,

and the environment in Myanmar,’’ paper delivered to the Conference on Burma:

Reconciliation in Myanmar and the Crises of Change, School of Advanced International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 22 November 2002.

Bradford, W. 2004, ‘‘Fiant fruges? Burma’s sui generis growth experience,’’ Burma

Economic Watch, no.2 2004, pp.6–14.

Dapice, D. 2003, ‘‘Current economic conditions in Myanmar and options for sustainable growth,’’ Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper no.

03–04, Tufts University.

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 2004, Burma (Myanmar): Country Report, London: EIU.

Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, Burma (Myanmar): Country Report, London: EIU.

Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, Burma (Myanmar): Country Report, London: EIU.

Financial Action Task Force 2005, Annual Report 2004–05, available online at:

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/41/25/34988062.pdf.

Financial Action Task Force 2006, Chairman’s Summary, Cape Town Plenary, 15–

17 February 2006, available online at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/23/

36174130.pdf.

Fullbrook, D. 2006, ‘‘Resource-hungry China to devour more of Burma’s gas and oil

industry,’’ The Irrawaddy, 1 February, online edition at: http://

www.irrawaddy.org.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2006, International Financial Statistics, February, Washington D.C.: IMF.

Landes, D.S. 1998, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, New York: W.W. Norton.

Miles, M.A., O’Grady, M.A., and Holmes, K.R. 2006, 2006 Index of Economic Freedom: The Link Between Economic Opportunity and Prosperity, Washington D.C.:

Heritage Foundation.

Myanmar Central Statistical Office (MCSO) 2006, Selected Monthly Indicators, Rangoon, MCSO, available online at http://www.csostat.gov.mm/

Okamoto, I., Kurita, K., Kurosaki, T. and Fujita, K. 2003, ‘‘Rich Periphery, Poor

Center: Myanmar’s Rural Economy under Partial Transition to Market Economy,’’

mimeo, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, October.

Parker, C. and Yeni 2006, ‘‘Rangoon agencies await their fate,’’ The Irrawaddy, 8

February 2006, available online at http://www.irrawaddy.org

Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung 2004, Behind the Teak Curtain: Authoritarianism,

Agricultural Policies and Political Legitimacy in Rural Burma, London: Kegan

Paul.

Turnell, S.R. 2002, ‘‘Reforming the banking system in Burma: A survey of the problems and possibilities,’’ Technical Advisory Network of Burma, Working Papers 7,

Washington D.C.: The Burma Fund.

32

Turnell, S.R. 2003, ‘‘Myanmar’s banking crisis,’’ ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol.20,

no.3, December, pp.272–282.

Turnell, S.R. 2004, ‘‘Burma bank update,’’ Burma Economic Watch, No.1 2004.

Turnell, S.R. 2005, ‘‘A Survey of Microfinance Institutions in Burma,’’ Burma Economic Watch, no.1/2005.

Turnell, S.R. 2006, ‘‘Burma’s economy 2004: Crisis masking stagnation,’’ in T.Wilson

(ed), Burma Update 2004, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2003, Human Development Initiative, Myanmar: Report of Independent Assessment Mission, New York: UNDP.

United States Department of State 2005, International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report, Washington D.C., State Department, available online at http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43018.htm

Vicary, A.M. 2001, ‘‘Foreign direct investment and the garments industry in

Burma,’’ Burma Economic Watch, no.1 2001.

Vicary, A.M. 2003, ‘‘Economic non-viability, hunger and migration: The case of

Mawchi Township,’’ Burma Economic Watch, no. l 2003.

Vicary, A.M. 2004, ‘‘The state’s incentive structure in Burma’s sugar sector and inflated official data: A case study of the industry in Pegu Division,’’ Burma Economic Watch, no.2 2004.

Ye Lwin 2006, ‘‘Traders urged to use Euro for transactions,’’ The Irrawaddy, 6–12

February 2006.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, doctor.

Now let us at least go to Ms. Thin Thin Aung. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF THIN THIN AUNG, MEMBER OF THE

PRESIDIUM, WOMEN’S lEAGUE OF BURMA

Ms. AUNG. Thank you, Madam Chair, for inviting me here today

to discuss the situation in Burma and Burma–India relations and

how Burma represents a new and nontraditional security threat to

the region. I also want to express my gratitude to Senators Mitch

McConnell and Dianne Feinstein. All freedom-loving Burmese welcome and honor their efforts and actions to promote democracy in

Burma. Their work is widely known and deeply appreciated.

By way of background, I am Burmese. I participated in the nationwide pro-democracy uprising in Burma in 1988. After the military coup and the crackdown on the peaceful demonstrators by the

military regime, I had to flee my country for India, where I have

been living for nearly 18 years. I belong to an organization called

Women’s Rights and Welfare Association of Burma, based in New

Delhi, and currently I am a member of the presiding board of the

Women’s League of Burma, which is an umbrella group of exiled

women’s organizations from Burma.

I came to India not only to flee from the arrest of the military

regime, but also to get help from the Indian government for the

restoration of democracy in Burma. The Indian government was extremely supportive of Burma’s democracy movement. India was the

first neighboring country to extend active support to the pro-democracy movement in Burma and the Indian government provided refuge to Burmese students who came to India after the wake of the

1988 uprising that was brutally crushed by the military.

India internationally also condemned Burma’s authoritarian military regime when it refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu

Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, following

the 1990 general elections. The NLD won those elections with over

80 percent of the vote.

Because India and Burma have centuries-old historical connections, the two nations have enjoyed mutual contact and ties in the

realm of religion, culture, trade, law, political philosophy, and toVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
33

getherness in their struggle for independence from colonial rule. In

1993 the Indian government honored Aung San Suu Kyi with their

highest civilian award, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding.

Madam Chair, what was once a noble policy towards Burma

based on democratic values has been replaced during the last decade by one that marginalized aspirations for freedom of the Burmese people and our ethnic nationalities. Since the mid-1990s the

Indian government has sought to develop its relationship with Burma’s military generals. Successive Indian governments have refused to acknowledge or speak out against the horrors that Burma’s military regime is inflicting on my country.

Due to a perception within Indian national security circles that

better relations with Burma’s military regime is needed to check its

own insurgency and Chinese influence, India’s relationship with

Burma has considerably warmed. For example, India is now providing military training and reportedly selling arms and military

hardware to the ruling junta. This apparently is to check the Chinese push to acquire more Burmese bases so it can project power

into the Indian Ocean.

It is unbelievable that the relationship between India, the largest

democracy in the world, and the ruling junta in Burma lacks any

discussion of democracy, political pluralism, or even the simple fact

that murdering political prisoners is wrong. Earlier this month

when former political prisoner Thet Naing Oo was bludgeoned to

death in a political killing by the regime militias, international condemnation was swift, but India’s silence was deafening.

Today Burma is ruled by a group of thugs who lack any political

legitimacy and use liberal doses of terror and intimidation to maintain their grip on power. The state they have created is what I call

a nontraditional threat to our region. For example, Burma’s SPDC

spends billions of dollars on arms that are used to oppress the people and outfit the second largest military in Southeast Asia.

Madam Chair, the budget for HIV/AIDS in Burma is reported by

head experts as less than $25,000 per year. Burma is the epicenter

of new streams of drug-assisted HIV/AIDS that are transferred to

China, India, and throughout the region through illicit narcotics

smuggling routes. The same routes that bring Burmese opium and

methamphetamines, often grown and manufactured in junta-controlled regions, to flood the region are also bringing these new

strains of HIV/AIDS.

The recent announcement of bird flu is another example of the

danger the regime poses to the region. On March 17, 2006, Burmese authorities announced that they found the H5N1 strain and

were culling chicken and duck flocks. However, it was already happened 5 days before they made official announcement to the Burmese people. This delay could have, and we are still not sure if it

has not, opened the door to the spreading of the disease throughout

the country and made the jump into Bangladesh, India, China, and

other neighboring states. There is no doubt about that that we

need to convince the Indian government that its own national interests are best met, not by coddling a murderous regime, but

using its resources to help realize the aspirations of the Burmese

34

people for a state based on democracy, individual liberties, and

human rights.

A Burma under a democratic government can address the social

ills within the country and create dynamic economic conditions that

can provide new markets for Indian and regional products while

providing energy and materials that both India and China need to

fuel their growing economies.

The formation of the Indian Parliamentarians for Democracy in

Burma, IPFDB, last December was an important step in this direction. This group of Indian members of parliament is dedicated to

raising the issues of Burma in the parliament and questioning the

government for its policy towards Burma. I hope that the forum

will be able to increase the amount of pressure on the government

of India to review its policy towards Burma, especially as more and

more members of parliament join the effort. I hope that the U.S.

Congress can strongly encourage the Indian parliamentarians to

continue their great work.

I want to congratulate President Bush on raising Burma during

his trip this month to India. It is encouraging to learn that President Bush and Prime Minister Monmahon Singh agreed to call for

the regime to release our leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. I want to ask

the United States to use its close relationship to convey to India

the threat posed by the regime and encourage the country to play

a meaningful and responsible role in the restoration of democracy

in Burma.

I want to spend a moment discussing the horrible human rights

situation in Burma. The military regime, SPDC’s, violations of

human rights include the destruction of villages, massive forced relocation, rape of ethnic women and girls by the SPDC soldiers, and

widespread forced labor. There are more than 1,100 political prisoners, including 13 members of parliament elect, languishing in

various jails inside Burma. Harassment of political activists, torture and murder continue unabated.

Almost 700,000 refugees have poured out of Burma in recent

years as a result of the military’s attacks against ethnic groups and

political oppression. As reported by Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, TBBC, between 600,000 and 1 million ethnic peoples are

hiding in the jungles and mountains in the eastern part of Burma

to avoid the killings of the Burmese army.

Recently, the Burmese military attacked villages in Karen State

and caused more than 1,000 villagers to flee their homes to become

internally displaced persons. According to Human Rights Watch,

more than 70,000 children are forcibly recruited into the Burmese

army.

The report ‘‘License to Rape,’’ produced by the Shan Women’s Action Network, SWAN, and the Shan Human Rights Foundation,

SHRF, in 2002 documents 173 incidents of rape and other forms

of sexual violence involving 635 girls and women committed by the

SPDC troops in Shan State, mostly from 1996 to 2001. The majority of rape incidents were committed in the areas of central Shan

State, where over 300,000 villagers have been forcibly relocated

from their homes since 1996 as part of an anti-insurgency campaign.

35

The report ‘‘Shattering Silences’’ by the Karen Women’s Organization, published in April 2004, documents 125 cases of sexual violence committed by the SPDC military troops and Karen State

from 1998 until 2004.

Other sexual violence by the Burmese military and trafficking of

women and girls are also documented in ‘‘Driven Away,’’ produced

by the Kachin Women’s Association, Thailand; ‘‘Catwalk to the

Barracks’’ by the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, Burma,

and the Women and Children’s Rights Project, Southern Burma.

These reports expose how the military regime is allowing its

troops systematically and on a widespread scale to commit rape

with impunity in order to terrorize and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan, Mon, Kachin, and Karen States. All reports conclude

that the restoration of genuine peace, democracy, and the rule of

law in Burma are necessary to end the systematic sexual violence.

Here I would like to offer several policy options. First and foremost, continue the economic sanctions against Burma, and I urge

bringing Burma up for a resolution within the United Nations Security Council. Please continue regional efforts to hold ASEAN accountable for the actions of the regime. ASEAN accepted Burma

into its ranks 10 years ago with the belief that constructive engagement would bring political change.

Finally, use U.S. diplomatic weight to engage the Indian government at all levels to convince India that a democratic Burma is in

India’s long-term strategic interest.

In closing, I here would like to express gratitude to the U.S. Congress and government for their efforts to help restore the democracy stolen from us by the military junta. Today, a sit here proudly

on behalf of the millions of Burmese to say thank you for the U.S.

Congress and U.S. administration for your words, your deeds, and

steadfast determination to stand with us during our hours of darkness.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Aung follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THIN THIN AUNG, MEMBER OF THE PRESIDIUM, WOMEN’S

LEAGUE OF BURMA

I want to thank you, Madame Chairwoman, for inviting me here today to discuss

the situation in Burma, Burma-India relations, and how Burma represents a new,

non-traditional security threat to the region. I also want to express my gratitude

to Senators Mitch McConnell and Dianne Feinstein. All freedom loving Burmese

welcome and honor their efforts and actions to promote democracy in Burma. Their

work is widely known and deeply appreciated.

By way of background, I am a Burmese. I participated in the nationwide pro-democracy uprising in Burma in 1988. After the military coup and brutal crack-down

on the peaceful demonstrators by the military regime, I had to flee my country for

India where I have been living for nearly 18 years.

I belong to the organization called Women Rights and Welfare Association of

Burma based in New Delhi. I am a member of the Presidium Board of the Women’s

League of Burma which is an umbrella group of exiled women organizations from

Burma.

I came to India not only to flee from the arrest of the military regime but also

to get help from the Indian government for the restoration of democracy in Burma.

The Indian government was extremely supportive of Burma’s democracy movement.

India was the first neighboring country to extend active support to the pro-democracy movement in Burma. The Indian government provided refuge to Burmese students who came to India after in the wake of the 1988 uprising that was brutally

crushed by the military. India internationally also condemned Burma’s authoriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Jul 24, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33725.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
36

tarian military regime when it refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi

and her party National League for Democracy following the 1990 general elections.

The NLD won those elections with over 80 percent of the vote.

Because India and Burma have a centuries-old historical connection, the two nations have enjoyed mutual contacts and ties in the realm of religion, culture, trade,

law, political philosophy and togetherness in their struggle for Independence from

colonial rule.

In 1993, the Indian government honored Aung San Suu Kyi with their highest

civilian award, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding.

Madam Chairwoman, what was once a noble policy toward Burma based on democratic values has been replaced during the last decade by one that marginalizes aspirations for freedom of the Burmese people and our ethnic Nationalities.

Since the mid 1990s, the Indian government has sought to develop its relationship

with Burma’s military generals. Successive Indian government has refused to acknowledge or speak out against the horrors that Burma’s military regime is inflicting on my country.

Due to a perception within Indian national security circles that better relations

with Burma’s military regime is needed to check its own insurgency and Chinese

influence, India’s relationship with Burma has considerably warmed. For example,

India is now providing military training and reportedly selling arm and military

hardware to the ruling junta. This apparently is to check the Chinese push to acquire more Burmese bases so it can project power into the Indian Ocean.

It is unbelievable that the relationship between India, the largest democracy in

the world, and the ruling junta in Burma lacks any discussion of democracy, political pluralism, or even the simple fact that murdering political prisoners is wrong.

Earlier this month, when former political prisoner Thet Naing Oo was bludgeoned

to death in a political killing by the regime militias, international condemnation was

swift, but India’s silence was deafening.

Today, Burma is ruled by a group of thugs who lack any political legitimacy and

use liberal doses of terror and intimidation to maintain their grip on power. The

state they have created is what I call a non-traditional threat to our region.

For example, Burma’s SPDC spends billions of dollars on arms that are used to

oppress the people and outfit the second largest military in South East Asia. Madam

Chairwoman, the budget for HIV/AIDS in Burma is reported by health experts at

less than $25,000/year. Burma is the epicenter of new strains of drug resistant HIV/

AIDS that are transferred to China, India and throughout the region through illicit

narcotics smuggling routes. The same routes that bring Burmese opium and

methamphetamines (often grown and manufactured in junta controlled regions) to

flood the region are also bringing these new strains of HIV/AIDS.

The recent announcement of Bird Flu is another example of the danger the regime poses to the region. On March 17, 2006, Burmese authorities announced that

they found the H5N1 strain and were culling chicken and duck flocks—however, it

was already happened 5 days before they made official announcement to the Burmese people. This delay could have—and we are still not sure if it has not—opened

the door to the spreading of the disease throughout the country and made the jump

into Bangladesh, India, China and other neighboring states.

There is no doubt about that we need to convince the Indian government that its

own national interests are best met not by coddling a murderous regime, but using

its resources to help realize the aspirations of the Burmese people for a state based

on democracy, individual liberties and human rights. A Burma under a democratic

government can address the social ills within the country and create the dynamic

economic conditions that can provide new markets for Indian (and regional) products while providing energy and materials that both India and China need to fuel

their growing economies.

The formation of the Indian Parliamentarian’s Forum for Democracy in Burma

(IPFDB) last December was an important step in this direction. This group of Indian members of parliament is dedicated raising the issues of Burma in the parliament, and questioning the government for its policy toward Burma. I hope that

the Forum will be able to increase the amount of pressure on the government of

India to review its policy toward Burma, especially as more and more members of

parliament join the effort. I hope that the US Congress can strongly encourage the

Indian parliamentarians to continue their great work.

I want to congratulate President Bush on raising Burma during his trip this

month to India. It is encouraging to learn that President Bush and Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh agreed to call for the regime to release our leader Aung San Suu

Kyi. I want to urge the US to use its close relationship to convey to India the threat

posed by the regime and encourage the country to play a meaningful and responsible role in the restoration of democracy in Burma.

37

I want to spend a moment discussing the horrible human rights situation in

Burma. The military regime, SPDC’s violation of human rights include the destruction of villages, massive forced relocation, rape of ethnic women and girls by the

SPDC soldiers and widespread forced labor.

There are more than 1100 political prisoners, including 13 Members of Parliament

elect, languishing in various jails inside Burma. Harassment of political activists,

torture and murder continue unabated. Almost 700,000 refugees have poured out of

Burma in recent years as a result of the military attacks against ethnic groups and

political oppression. As reported by Thailand-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), between 600,000 and one million ethnic peoples are hiding in the jungle and mountains in Eastern part of Burma to avoid the killing of the Burmese army. Recently,

Burmese military attacked villages in Karen State and caused more than one thousand villagers to flee their home to become Internally Displaced Persons. According

to Human Rights Watch, more than 70,000 children are forcibly recruited into Burmese military.

The report ,‘‘License to Rape’’ produced by the Shan Women’s Action Network

(SWAN) and Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) in 2002 documents 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence involving 625 girls and women,

committed by the SPDC troops in Shan State, mostly from 1996–2001. The majority

of rape incidents were committed in the areas of Central Shan State where over

300,000 villagers have been forcibly relocated from their homes since 1996 as part

of an anti-insurgency campaign.

The report ‘‘Shattering Silences’’ by the Karen Women’s Organization published

in April 2004 documents 125 cases of sexual violence committed by the SPDC’s military troops in Karen State from 1988 until 2004. Other sexual violence by the Burmese military and trafficking of women and girls are also documented in ‘‘Driven

Away’’ produced by the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), ‘‘Catwalk to

the Barracks’’ by Human Rights Foundation of Monland (Burma) and Women and

Child Rights Project (Southern Burma). I would like to submit these reports for the

record.

These reports expose how the military regime is allowing its troops systematically

and on a widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and

subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan, Mon, Kachin and Karen States. All reports

conclude that restoration of genuine peace, democracy and the rule of law in Burma

are necessary to end the systematic sexual violence.

I would like to offer several policy options:

• First and foremost, continue the economic sanctions against Burma;

• I urge bringing Burma up for a resolution within the United Nations Security

Council.

• Please continue regional efforts to hold ASEAN accountable for the actions of

the regime. ASEAN accepted Burma into its ranks 10 years ago with the belief

that constructive engagement would bring political change.

• Finally, use US diplomatic weight to engage the Indian government at all levels

to convince India that a democratic Burma is in India’s long-term, strategic interest; and

In closing, I here would like to express gratitude to the U.S. Congress and Government for their efforts to help restore the democracy stolen from us by the military junta. Today, I sit here, proudly, on behalf of millions of Burmese to say

‘‘Thank You’’ for the U.S. Congress and U.S. administration for your words, your

deeds and steadfast determination to stand with us during our hours of darkness.

Thank You.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I appreciate your comments,

certainly your very specific suggestions.

Dr. Green, a couple of questions for you. There has been a fair

amount of discussion about the ASEAN nations and the various relationships with Burma. Is there a divide within the ASEAN members on how to approach Burma, and if that is the case, what does

this mean in the long run for ASEAN as a regional forum to deal

with the Burma issue?

Dr. GREEN. I think there is a division not only within ASEAN,

but within each ASEAN state, on how to handle Burma because it

touches on how these states characterize their own values, their

own roles, their own institutions. ASEAN itself was created on a

38

principle of noninterference in internal affairs. It was an organization created so that these countries with multi-ethnic, multi-religion populations within in many cases colonial borders, so that

they would not interfere in each other’s affairs, and it succeeded in

making war among Southeast Asian nations very unlikely. They

got that part.

The strategy was to bring in Burma and through cooperative,

constructive engagement to socialize Burma to this same concept.

I think what many in ASEAN now are realizing is that this principle of noninterference in internal affairs just is not good enough,

that they are going to be as governments less effective, that

ASEAN itself will have less clout vis-a`-vis the United States or the

EU. You also have new parliamentary leagues growing across the

borders of these states.

So, in many ways, the debate is within many of these ASEAN

capitals. My experience in the White House suggests to me that

many of the leaders of ASEAN are among the more enlightened

thinkers on this in their countries. President Yudhoyono, for example, is, I think, quite forward thinking and his trip, I think, was

probably on balance a good thing in having Indonesia, a successful

democracy, pushing harder for democracy.

But this is an area of ferment and debate and I do not think that

ASEAN as a whole has figured out how to organize themselves for

it. That is why the United States can, I think, helpfully play a role

in helping ASEAN come to the right approach and the right conclusions and organize themselves to push more deliberately for democracy.

There are some divisions among the leaders, I think, that the

junta is exploiting. Traditionally Indonesia was the heart and soul

and leader in ASEAN. There was a period where that was not the

case and I think Prime Minister Yudhoyono is coming back and

trying to put Indonesia at the center. Prime Minister Takshin

would like for Thailand to play a leading role. Abdullah Bedali, in

Malaysia, would like to play that role. There is a certain amount

of competition for the spotlight among these ASEAN leaders and

I think the regime is exploiting that to some extent, trying to play

them against each other.

But on the whole, I think the debate is moving in a direction that

we should encourage through very active engagement with ASEAN

as a whole and with individual member states to get more concrete

about what we expect from Burma. I think that’s one of the main

points or recommendations I would like to leave.

We need to start putting on paper with like-minded states what

we expect, what we are willing to do if they do not perform, what

we are collectively willing to do if they do perform, begin putting

that together. The Six Party Talks analogy that does not work. In

the Six Party Talks we brought North Korea in from the beginning

and North Korea caused the rest of us to use a lot of our diplomatic

leverage to pay them just to show up, and we had to pull our

punches to get them to show up. I would not worry about whether

Burma participates in this process. In fact, I expect they will not

want to participate at all. The important thing is to start working

with ASEAN and India and others to start setting in concrete a

39

roadmap we can all live with and work on together. Then we will

worry about how to structure the engagement with the junta.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, recognizing just the competition that

does go on for the resources, for the natural resources that exist

within Burma, and recognizing that everybody is coming into it

with a different need does make it a much more complicated relationship there. Now, a fair amount has been discussed today, certainly the India relationship, a fair amount about China’s relationship with Burma. How much attention should we be giving to other

geopolitical relations within the area, other countries that may be

perhaps selling military equipment to Burma or constructing military capabilities within Burma? Are we forgetting about those or

are they in the midst of the discussions as well?

Dr. GREEN. That is an excellent point. I want to ask for my testimony back so I can pay more attention to it. I think you are absolutely right. Senator McConnell briefly touched on the North Korea

connection. That is very worrisome. The regime, both regimes, are

clearly beginning to mirror each other in terms of criminal activities, misuse of their own people to create instability for their neighbors for negotiating purposes. The autarchy that the junta seeks in

Burma I think would lead them in directions where they will seek

weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons. They are not interested in opening and engaging. They are interested in not

changing and in deterring and defying the world, and I think this

is a junta that is extremely paranoid, that is worried that we or

others will attack them, and one that is interested in weapons.

They are not, as Professor Turnell said, they are not a resourcerich country in terms of cash, but they do have resources. They

have food, they have things that North Korea wants. It’s a connection that I think we should be watching very, very carefully.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do we really know that much about the relationship between the two or is a lot of what we are saying assumptions, supposition?

Dr. GREEN. You know, I think both North Korea and Burma are

hard intelligence targets in the traditional sense. On the other

hand, they both have policies that create refugees, that create dissatisfied people. I think information is starting to come out about

both places. There is some evidence, as Senator McConnell suggested, that there are North Koreans active in Burma. I do not

think we know a lot about what they are doing, but I think we

should be trying to learn more.

We also need to put a little bit of pressure on our Indian friends

and on our Thai friends, who are developing relationships with the

Burmese military for the purpose of dealing with these

transnational or transborder problems, but I think they are sending the wrong signals and enabling the military. They are not, obviously, doing the kind of thing North Korea would do, but it is another area that bears careful watching.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We have not had an ambassador there in

Burma since 1991. How has this affected the formulation, the implementation of any U.S. policy towards Burma?

Dr. GREEN. I think what is far more important is how we interact with the Japanese or the Indians or others on the ground and

also in those capitals. Our charge ́, as I understand it, is doing an

40

excellent job, and it is a traditionally important part of the role of

the mission in Rangoon to start comparing notes. If we are going

to multilateralize this problem and build a coalition, I do not think

you have to have an ambassador. You have to have a very good

charge ́, a very effective team that can work with other capitals.

The engagement we should be worrying about at this point is not

with the regime; it is with the other players who have influence on

the regime, and I think we are configured to do that.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Dr. Turnell, I appreciated your comments and the description of

the miracle economy, when actually, looking at it, that they have

actually gone backwards rather than this incredible forecast that

they have presented. It causes one to wonder what kind of training

in economics the Burmese have and what they teach in terms of

economic factors in their schools. But we appreciate your review of

it.

When you speak of the level of corruption, the criminal activity,

the extent of money laundering, and just the effect that this has

on a society, on an economy, when you look to those western companies, for instance, that go in to operate, go in to do business into

a country, into Burma, I have to assume that they do have a positive impact on the society there. That is the assumption that I have

been making. But when you have the level of corruption and criminal activity that you have, what kind of—what kind of an effect,

what kind of an impact do you have when you have these western

companies coming in to do business into an economy like you have

in Burma now?

Dr. TURNELL. A very good question because we normally do have

that presumption, of course. I think the first thing to say about

that is that there is not that many western companies involved in

Burma anyway.

Of the small number that are, most are involved in extractive industries of various kinds, whether it be mining or logging and so

on. So those good things of corporate governance and so on which

we might think might be shared by western companies being involved in Burma essentially don’t happen just because of the nature of those industries. Those industries are not about trying to

secure customers or develop new products or ideas or anything like

that. It really is just about extracting resources in some way.

So unfortunately some of those, the good aspects of business involvement in a particular country, I think are just not there in the

case of Burma because of the nature of the activities that they are

engaged in.

Senator MURKOWSKI. If western companies should decide to divest their operations in Burma, what happens? Who comes in?

Dr. TURNELL. A mixture of things happen. Sometimes companies

from other countries come in and take over. Sometimes the economic activity, whatever it is, just ceases. That very often happened around a decade ago when many of the western companies

were leaving Burma, simply because those activities were fairly

marginal in any case. So sometimes some of the companies were

in there for various legacy reasons and that is particularly relevant

in the case of the U.K. There were lots of—the U.K. still to this

day appears quite high up on the list of countries involved in

41

Burma, but it really goes back to that colonial period and so on.

So for various historical reasons there were British companies involved.

A lot of those left around a decade ago and essentially whatever

it was they were doing just ceased to function.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You mentioned that there is just not that

many western companies that are operating there, and when you

recognize just the financial uncertainty of any investment in

Burma, what percentage or what is the ratio of the private-owned

enterprises versus state enterprises?

Dr. TURNELL. I think one thing I should say is that data on

Burma of course is almost completely unavailable. So what you

have to do is use various proxies to try and work out what is going

on. So in answer to your question, I think we can say that around

two-thirds of the economy is owned by the state. We can do that

just simply by looking at the amount of financial assets created in

the country—borrowing, lending, deposits, etcetera. Roughly twothirds of that is commanded by the state, leaving a third for the

private sector.

So we are dealing with a country, in other words, that notwithstanding so-called reforms begun in the 1990s, is still very much

a state-controlled economy.

Senator MURKOWSKI. There has been a couple mentions of the

fact that this radical suggestion to move the capital—what is that

going to do to the economy? Any ideas?

Dr. TURNELL. I think that is a wonderful example of the arbitrary and irrational policymaking that goes on in the country. My

understanding is that there was, for instance, not one single economic assessment of that move, not a single thing.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Is there anything out there? I looked on the

map and it looks like an area that is not around what are identified as the larger cities. Does this build up an area that needs to

be built up? Is there anything economically to be gained from this?

Dr. TURNELL. I have heard some stories from time to time that

it is somehow on various trade routes from China and so on, but

my understanding is in fact that that is not the case. It is roughly

halfway between Rangoon and Mandalay. There is an age-old historical episode to do with Aung San during the Second World War

and it was where his troops turned against the Japanese and so

on. But apart from that, it certainly has no economic importance

at all, and the move just from an economic point of view makes no

sense whatsoever.

Senator MURKOWSKI. One last question for you. You had mentioned in your comments that Singapore has shown great concern

over the money laundering issue. Is Singapore the biggest player,

if you will, in Burma? Do you see them continuing in that role or

do China and India overshadow what is happening with Singapore

and Burma relationships?

Dr. TURNELL. I think the whole issue of Singapore really nicely

illustrates what we are saying, actually. Singapore used to be the

biggest player in Burma, but it has withdrawn at a rapid rate. If

we look at new investments in Burma, we find that Singapore has

been completely pushed aside in favor of China, to some extent

42

India and South Korea, but in those countries it is very, very limited and just relates to a couple of projects.

So it is really interesting, I think, the Singapore withdrawal from

the country, which is directly as a consequence, I think, of the pariah status and in particular the problems with money laundering

and so on. Singapore is very anxious to set itself up as a clean and

honest financial hub in Southeast Asia and I think, to be honest,

it largely is. So the movement of Singapore out of the country over

the last years I think is really indicative of some of the things

going on there and some of the reactions of Burma’s neighbors to

Burma.

Senator McConnell mentioned at the start that Burma is increasingly becoming an embarrassment to its neighbors and I think the

situation with Singapore is perhaps the best example of that.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I appreciate your response.

Ms. Aung, you commented about the change in India’s behavior

toward Burma, in part because of China’s influence within the region. As we look to ways to, whether it is Six Party Talk type of

a format or whatever the negotiation might be, is it possible for

change to occur in Burma without including both India and China

at the negotiating table? Do they both have to be there?

Ms. AUNG. India and China are very important, as was said, and

if you can bring Indian government into that it is very important,

because India is a democracy, but at the moment they are using

the policy, on the one hand they are allowing us to live there and

we have freedom of movement there, but on the other hand they

are dealing with the military regime for business and other security measures. But India has sympathy for Aung San Suu Kyi and

also for democracy movement also. I think it is possible that if you

can use your close relationship with the Indian government, because the prime minister also said that they are working for the

release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Senator MURKOWSKI. A great deal has been spoken and, Dr.

Turnell, you certainly indicated that there is no fiscal policy in

Burma; basically the policy is get as much money to the regime as

possible. Recognizing this, that the vast majority of the resources

have gone to the military, has there been any effort by the military

junta to provide for the health, the well-being of the citizens in

your opinion?

Ms. AUNG. The several reports, we can clearly see that the military regime of Burma uses most of its GDP. In Burma, 40-plus percent of the budget is for the military, compared to health and education which is less than 1 percent.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Less than 1 percent?

Ms. AUNG. Yes. So in 2001, they said that they have increased,

but 0.3, 0.5 percent is for the social sector. But still it is very much

behind the minimum standards.

Senator MURKOWSKI. One last question. In terms of the ethnic

minority groups, is there much contact at all with the National

League of Democracy with the ethnic minority groups at all? Are

the ethnic minorities part of the leadership in any way? Is there

any relationship there where they are included?

Ms. AUNG. Aung San Suu Kyi had the CRBB be formed, the committee representing the parliament people and the parliament,

43

where she was able to bring all the ethnic nationality political bodies and won in the 1990 elections in Burma. So they are all discussing for a common strategy against military rule in Burma. It

is very much collected.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am told that we have about 5 minutes left

on a vote, so we are going to take a brief recess here. This concludes the questions that I have for this panel. I thank all of you

for your testimony, for your time, and for all your work in this

area.

I am told that we will have Mr. John with us when we come

back. So if we can just take about a 5-minute break here and we

will resume. Thank you.

[Recess from 3:47 p.m. to 4:01 p.m.]

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good afternoon again. Sorry for the short

delay. I would like to welcome to the committee Eric John, the

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs for the Department of State. I am going to apologize

ahead of time, Mr. John. I am told that we are going to have another vote here shortly, but we do not know when ‘‘shortly’’ is. So

until that time, you certainly have an opportunity to present your

testimony, and hopefully, I will have a chance to get some of my

questions in before we have to go.

But I appreciate your flexibility with the schedule this afternoon.

We heard some good testimony from our panelists. Senator McConnell was with us. And I understand that you have been over on the

House side keeping busy, so we appreciate your taking the time to

join us this afternoon.

STATEMENT OF ERIC G. JOHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. JOHN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I thank you

for the invitation to update you and the committee on the situation

in Burma and the administration’s strategy for effecting meaningful change in that tragic country. I would ask that my entire testimony be submitted for the official record.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We will include it as part of the record.

Mr. JOHN. Thank you.

Before I delve into the substance of our policy, I would first like

to relate a recent event that highlights the violence the people of

Burma face on a daily basis. Less than 2 weeks ago, Burmese security officials accosted a former political prisoner, Thet Naing Oo,

accusing him of public indecency. They provoked a confrontation

with him in full view of numerous horrified onlookers and in the

end beat him to death.

Incidents such as this weigh the Burmese people down with a

palpable sense of fear and oppression, reminding us of the regime’s

brutality and the need for the international community to do all it

can to bring about change there. Burma remains a high priority for

the President and Secretary Rice. We are working intensively and

closely with partners and others in Asia and with the U.N. to maximize diplomatic pressure on the junta to initiate genuine political

reform. While there have been signs of some progress, the road to

44

bringing freedom, peace, and democracy to Burma remains uncertain.

To fully understand the tragedy that Burma has become, we

should look back 60 years to a time when Burma enjoyed some of

the highest rates of scholastic enrollment in Asia and boasted a

well educated, highly regarded civil service. It was rich with natural resources and was one of the world’s leading rice exporters.

Sadly, Burma’s leaders did not capitalize on these assets and the

country’s potential. Instead, a series of generals have for over 40

years implemented irrational and repressive policies that have

caused the Burmese people to suffer needlessly.

As Secretary Rice recently said in Jakarta: ‘‘A country that was

once the jewel of Southeast Asia is now out of step with the entire

modern experience of its region. A once thriving economy has collapsed. Universities that once attracted the best Asian minds are

locked shut. The Burmese regime is now literally retreating into

the depth of the country, closing its people off from the world and

robbing them of their future.’’

The latest chapter in Burma’s increasingly depressing story is

the advent of Avian influenza. Although the regime cannot be

blamed for the Avian influenza outbreak, its failure to devote adequate resources to the health sector, its repressive policies and restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance greatly increase the risk of this and other outbreaks spreading.

On a much broader scale, the junta’s policies and corrupt practices have severely hurt the economy, exacerbated the deterioration

of social conditions, led to a steady outflow of refugees and illicit

narcotics, thwarted peace among ethnic minority populations, and

forced the Burmese people to live in a state of perpetual fear. On

the political front, the regime continues to promote a sham political

process.

So how do we bring about a transition from the repressive isolationist Burma of today to a free and democratic country integrated

into the global community? Although there are no easy solutions,

we have developed a bilateral and multilateral strategy predicated

on maximizing the international pressure on the regime to reform.

This approach includes sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and statements of public support.

Perhaps the most important component of our strategy is our intensified diplomatic efforts. We continue actively to engage with

partners and key players to develop support for a common message

to the regime on the need for an inclusive and credible peace process—political process. We have stressed that the first steps would

have to be the release of political prisoners and the regime’s engagement in a genuine political dialogue with the opposition and

ethnic minorities.

At the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on March 18, Secretary Rice,

Japanese Foreign Minister Aso, and Australian Foreign Minister

Downer underscored the need for progress in democratization in

Burma. Following Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s visit to Rangoon, senior Indonesian officials confirmed that he intends to use

his influence to press the Burmese regime to release Aung San Suu

Kyi and pursue a democratic transition. We will continue to work

with New Delhi at the highest levels on this issue. We believe

45

India should press the regime to take meaningful steps rather than

appearing publicly to accept the status quo.

Multilaterally, we continue to work for ways to keep Burma on

the United Nations agenda, actively exploring ways to build U.N.

Security Council consensus on the need for further discussions and

possible Council action in follow-up to the December 16 landmark

Council briefing. As we do so, we have been considering factors

such as the results of the just-completed visit to Burma of Foreign

Minister Hamid and other events. We also continue to advocate

discussion of Burma in other U.N. bodies and to encourage U.N.

Secretary General Kofi Anan to remain engaged.

We continue working with the U.N. Secretariat to identify a successor for the Secretary General’s former special envoy and to

strengthen the special envoy’s mandate.

Another component of our strategy is sanctions. Let me state

clearly for the record that the administration fully supports the renewal of the import ban contained in the Burmese Freedom and

Democracy Act. Failure to renew it absent meaningful reforms by

the regime would send the wrong political message. Our sanctions

continue to play a critical role, reminding the regime that its behavior is unacceptable and that its leaders will remain isolated as

long as they continue this behavior. They also provide important

moral support for the democratic opposition in Burma and ensure

that American companies will not help fund the luxurious lifestyles

of a select few.

Our strategy also includes public support for Burma’s democratic

opposition. The United States has spoken out for years against the

regime’s repression of the Burmese people and its imprisonment of

Aung San Suu Kyi and other courageous advocates for democracy.

Just last week, we highlighted the horrific March 17 fatal public

beating of Thet Naing Oo, calling on the regime to renounce the

use of violence and engage all elements of Burmese political life in

a meaningful dialogue that empowers the people to determine their

own future.

Partners and other key players also are speaking out. After his

recent visit to Burma, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid expressed public concern about the pace of reform and the regime’s

failure to allow him to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. Just last month

at the time of the Burmese prime minister’s visit to China, Beijing

for the first time publicly called for national reconciliation in

Burma.

Madam Chair, because of the regime’s self-imposed isolation and

apparent imperviousness to outside pressure, it will take an extraordinary effort by the international community to persuade Burma’s rulers to begin and sustain a process of credible and full national reconciliation. While we still are not all on the same page,

we are much closer than we were. The administration is engaged

at the highest levels. Key countries in the region have begun to

speak out and international pressure on the regime to change its

misguided policies is slowly mounting.

Burma’s road to democracy is neither short nor straight, but by

pressing on with our intense efforts we believe we can effectively

shorten the time it will take to achieve the freedom, prosperity,

and security for which Burma and its people so desperately yearn

46

and richly deserve. The brutal killing just days ago of Thet Naing

Oo reminds all of us how high the stakes are there.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. John follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC G. JOHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Madam Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

Thank you for the invitation to come before the subcommittee today to update you

on the situation in Burma and the administration’s strategy for effecting meaningful

change in that tragic country.

Before I delve into the substance of our policy toward Burma, I would like to take

a moment to relate a recent event that highlights, in a very human and tragic way,

the oppression and violence that the people of Burma face on a daily basis. Less

than 2 weeks ago, several security officials accosted a former political prisoner

named Thet Naing Oo, accusing him of public indecency for relieving himself near

a Rangoon teahouse. In most countries, urinating in public might warrant a citation

or a warning. Not in Burma. The security officials provoked a confrontation with

Thet Naing Oo, and in the end, beat him to death, in full view of numerous horrified

onlookers.

Incidents such as this hang over the heads of all Burmese people, weighing them

down with a palpable sense of fear and oppression. They remind us of the brutality

of the regime, and of the need for the international community to do all it can to

bring about change.

Burma remains a high priority for the President and Secretary Rice, and, as I

know, for many Members of Congress as well. We are working intensively and closely with like-minded partners and others in Asia, and with the U.N. in New York,

to coordinate and maximize diplomatic pressure on the Burmese regime to initiate

genuine political reforms. While there have been signs of some progress in recent

months among our international partners—and I will cover that later in my testimony—the road to ultimately bringing to Burma and its people the freedom, peace

and democracy they so richly deserve remains long and uncertain. However, it is

a path the United States and others will continue to traverse no matter what the

obstacles.

To fully understand and appreciate the tragedy that Burma has become, we

should look back 50 or 60 years, when that country seemed poised to play a significant and positive role in the region and the world. Burma enjoyed some of the highest rates of enrollment in primary and secondary schools in Asia, and boasted a well

educated, highly regarded civil service. It was rich with natural resources, and was

one of the world’s leading rice exporters.

Sadly, Burma’s leaders did not capitalize on these assets and the country’s potential to be a regional leader. Instead, a series of generals have, for over 40 years,

implemented irrational and repressive policies that have caused the needless suffering of Burma’s more than 50 million people. As Secretary Rice recently said in

Jakarta, ‘‘A country that was once the jewel of Southeast Asia is now out of step

with the entire modern experience of its region. A once thriving economy has collapsed. Universities that once attracted the best Asian minds are locked shut. The

Burmese regime is now literally retreating into the depths of the country, closing

its people off from the world and robbing them of their future.’’

The latest chapter in Burma’s increasingly depressing story is the advent of Avian

Influenza. On March 12, Burma reported an AI outbreak in poultry near Mandalay.

to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and requested assistance from

the international community. In response to its ‘‘immediate need’’ request, we made

available to the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) up to 2,000 units

of protective clothing and disinfectant with sprayers for use in Mandalay to contain

the outbreak. Others in the international community are responding as well, albeit

not as rapidly. A WHO/FAO team was sent in to investigate. Sadly, more than 56

commercial farms have since been infected, and the regime has had to suspend the

sale of ducks, chickens and quails in affected areas.

Although the regime cannot be blamed for the AI outbreak itself, its failure to devote an adequate share of budget resources to the health sector, along with its repressive policies—including unnecessary restrictions on U.N. agencies, NGO’s and

other health-related organizations within the country—greatly increase the risk of

this and other outbreaks spreading, both within Burma and to neighboring countries.

47

On a much broader scale, the regime’s policies and corrupt practices have contributed to a host of other ills, severely hurting the economy and exacerbating the deterioration of social conditions. They have led to a steady outflow of refugees and illicit narcotics, thwarted peace among Burma’s ethnic minority populations, and

forced the Burmese people to live in a state of perpetual fear. This downward spiral

is increasingly worrying not only to Burma’s people, but to the region and the world.

On the political front, the regime continues to promote a sham political process

from which the opposition is barred—one that prohibits free and open debate and

includes only delegates hand-picked by the military. Over 1,100 Burmese are still

detained for peacefully expressing their political views. Freedom of press, assembly,

religion and movement continue to be greatly restricted. Forced labor, rape, torture,

and conscription of child soldiers remain prevalent as tools of the regime, particularly in ethnic minority areas.

Ironically, as the suffering of the Burmese people worsens, the regime continues

to insulate and isolate itself from the harsh realities of life in Burma—for which

it is responsible—and from the international community as well. There is no example more indicative of this trend than the regime’s bizarre decision last year, without notice to its people or the world, to move the capital to a heretofore undeveloped

town in the hinterland some 200 miles north of Rangoon. Of course, governments

have the right to move their capitals, but the way in which the regime made the

move is both troubling and emblematic of the character of the quixotic regime. It

did not notify the Burmese people, let alone its ASEAN partners or other foreign

governments or embassies, and it forced civil servants to leave their families behind

indefinitely to make the move.

Madam Chairman, in such a dynamic region as Southeast Asia, which is enjoying

strong economic growth, increased freedom and democracy, and an enhanced role in

global affairs—Burma stands out as a glaring exception. The international community has reached out repeatedly to help Burma get back on its feet, but the regime

has rejected all of these efforts.

So how do we bring about a transition from the repressive, isolationist Burma of

today to a free and democratic country—one that is integrated into the global community and poses no risk to the stability of the Southeast Asia region? Although

there are no easy solutions here, we have developed a bilateral and multilateral

strategy predicated on maximizing international pressure on the regime to initiate

credible reforms. This multi-pronged approach includes diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and statements of public support for those struggling for freedom and democracy in Burma. We also continue to use funds appropriated by Congress to support

democratic ideals through programs that promote democratic values, human rights,

the rule of law, and good governance.

Perhaps the most important component of our strategy is our intensified diplomatic efforts focused on building international pressure on the junta to reform. Over

the past several months, we have actively engaged with like-minded partners in Europe and key countries in the Asia region, including Japan, ASEAN members,

China, India and Australia, to develop support for a common message to the regime

on the need for launching a truly inclusive and credible political process leading to

a democratic transition. We have stressed that the first steps would have to be the

release of political prisoners, including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and the

regime’s engagement in a genuine political dialog with the opposition and representatives of Burma’s ethnic minorities.

It is our sense that elements of our message are getting through to the regime.

We strongly supported the firm public stance taken by ASEAN back in December,

and welcomed Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid’s visit to Rangoon last week. At

their Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on March 18, Secretary Rice, along with Japanese Foreign Minister Aso and Australian Foreign Minister Downer, underscored

the need for genuine progress in democratization in Burma, including the release

of political prisoners. Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s visit to Burma in March

provided another opportunity to press the regime. Following the visit, senior Indonesian officials confirmed that President Yudhoyono intends to use his influence—

and Indonesia’s example—to press the Burmese regime to release Aung San Suu

Kyi and pursue a democratic transition. We will continue to work with New Delhi,

at the highest levels, on promoting a democratic transition in Burma. We believe

India should press the regime to take meaningful steps such as releasing Aung San

Suu Kyi, rather than appearing publicly to accept the status quo.

Multilaterally, we continue to look for ways to keep Burma on the U.N. agenda.

We believe the Security Council has a critical role to play in promoting positive

change there, and we have been actively exploring ways to build UNSC consensus

on the need for further discussions and possible Council action in follow-up to the

December 16 landmark Council briefing on Burma. In our internal discussions on

48

next steps, we have been considering factors such as the results of the just-completed visit to Burma of FM Hamid and other events.

We also continue to advocate discussion of Burma in other U.N. bodies, such as

the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Third Committee. Last year,

the United States co-sponsored the European Union’s annual Burma human rights

resolution at the United Nations General Assembly, which called for ‘‘a genuinely

inclusive’’ political process through the ‘‘unhindered participation of all political parties and representatives of ethnic nationalities,’’ as well as the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners. Separately, we are supporting the International Labor Organization’s request to place Burma on the 2006 ECOSOC agenda.

We will continue to encourage U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to remain engaged in Burma, and to work with the U.N. Secretariat to identify a successor for

the Secretary General’s former Special Envoy to Burma, Razali Ismail, who, along

with the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, has not been permitted by the

regime to visit Burma for the past 2 years. We will also strive to strengthen the

Special Envoy’s mandate to include coordination with other governments.

Another component of our strategy is sanctions. Let me state clearly for the

record, Madam Chairman, that the administration fully supports the renewal of the

import ban contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. Failure to renew

it, absent meaningful refoims by the regime, would send the wrong political message. Our sanctions continue to play a critically important role, reminding the regime—and everyone else concerned with Burma—that the junta’s behavior is unacceptable, and that its leaders will remain isolated as long as they continue this behavior. These measures also provide important moral support for the democratic opposition, the vast majority of whom favor tough international sanctions; and they

ensure that American companies will not help fund the luxurious lifestyles of a select few.

Our strategy also provides public support to Burma’s democratic opposition. The

United States has spoken out for years against the regime’s repression of the Burmese people and its imprisonment of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo,

Hkun Htun Oo and other courageous advocates for democracy. We have encouraged

others to do so as well. Just last week, we highlighted the horrific March 17 fatal

public beating of Thet Naing Oo, calling on the regime to renounce the use of violence and engage ‘‘all elements of Burmese political life in a meaningful dialog that

empowers the [Burmese] people to determine their own future.’’

Partners and other key players have also been speaking out. On February 28, the

European Union issued a statement calling for the immediate release of Aung San

Suu Kyi and all political prisoners and for a genuine dialog between the regime, the

National League for Democracy, and ethnic minority representatives. The statement

also expresses the EU’s support for national reconciliation and respect for human

rights. Just last month, at the time of the Burmese Prime Minister’s visit to China,

the Chinese government, for the first time, publicly called for national reconciliation

in Burma.

Madam Chairman, because of the regime’s self-imposed isolation and apparent

imperviousness to outside pressure, it will take an extraordinary concerted and coordinated effort by the international community—the U.S., the countries of Southeast Asia, China, Japan, India, South Korea, the European Union, the United Nations, and many others—to persuade Burma’s rulers to begin and sustain a process

of credible and full national reconciliation that the country so desperately needs.

While we still are not all on the same page, we are much closer than we were: the

administration is engaged at the highest levels; key countries in the region have

begun to speak out about the need for reform; and international pressure on the regime to change its misguided policies is slowly mounting. Burma’s road to democracy is neither short nor straight, but by pressing on with our intense efforts, we

believe we can effectively shorten the time it will take to achieve the freedom, prosperity, and security for which Burma and its people so desperately yearn and richly

deserve. The brutal killing just days ago of Thet Naing Oo reminds us all of how

high the stakes are.

Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. John. We appreciate those

comments and the reminder of the kind of regime that we are dealing with at this time.

You have made several comments about the efforts by the international community, the need for intensified diplomatic pressure by

those within the neighborhood. What are your thoughts—you were

not here when I gave my opening statement where I said that

49

there are those that are considering a Six Party forum type of approach to dealing with Burma, somewhat along the lines of the

North Korea Six Party Talks. What are your thoughts about that

type of a forum?

Mr. JOHN. I would be concerned that the efforts, the diplomatic

efforts that would go into setting up just the mechanics of a

multiparty forum, no matter how many parties it would be, would

detract significantly from the time we need to spend on the diplomatic efforts to pressure Burma to reform the regime. Obviously,

the issues in North Korea and Burma are quite different. In Burma

it is a fairly black and white issue about what needs to be done.

There needs to be national reconciliation, in Burma. The Burmese

do need to give greater access to NGOs. They need to allow the

U.N. into Burma.

There is a variety of steps that need to be taken. I would not like

to detract from the bilateral and multilateral efforts that we have.

I think the UN, however, does provide an existing mechanism for

bringing that multilateral dialogue to the Burmese about what

needs to be done.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, what do you think the odds are of

achieving any kind of action by the Security Council, then?

Mr. JOHN. Well, I think it is a step by step process. First, the

December 16th briefing was action in and of itself. It is the first

time ever that the United Nations Security Council has taken up

the issue of Burma. Just by receiving a briefing on what is occurring in Burma is significant, because heretofore one of the problems that we have had with getting international pressure on

Burma is that you have a lot of nations who have been willing to

effectively turn a blind eye to what is happening in Burma and

stating that it is just really an internal matter for the Burmese to

deal with and it is not our responsibility.

The fact that at the United Nations Security Council is hearing

an authoritative briefing on what is happening on the ground in

Burma, how the regime’s policies are hurting the Burmese people,

and how in the end it is destabilizing for the region, makes the

case that there is an obligation for other nations to be interested

and be involved in finding a solution for Burma.

Moving on from there, I think we need to go back and redouble

both bilateral efforts with members of the Security Council, and

with other nations who are not members of the Security Council,

to develop a consensus approach in the Security Council about a solution in Burma.

I think one of the important things in the UNSC is to work on

consensus, to make sure that we do not have any efforts that we

bring to the UNSC blocked by lack of it. Therefore, in sort of a long

way to get back to the original question, it is hard to predict an

exact timeline, diplomatic timeline, when we would get these actions at the United Nations. But we are looking at the UNSC,

other U.N. bodies, and we want to keep up that pressure as long

as it takes.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Can you speak publicly about any of the

conclusions that were reached at that December U.N. Security

Council meeting?

50

Mr. JOHN. Let us see. The briefing—I would rather take that

question and just give you a more thorough answer about what the

results of the briefing were, if I may. One of the conclusions was

that ASEAN should take a leading role in resolving, helping to resolve the situation in Burma.

Since that briefing, we have had a couple of remarkable developments regarding ASEAN’s attitude toward Burma. Again, up until

our concerted diplomatic efforts on Burma the ASEAN nations adhered to the principle of noninterference in member nations’ affairs. Starting with late last year at an ASEAN foreign ministerial

meeting, the foreign ministers did express concern about what was

going on in Burma and did express the need for the Burmese to

develop a real democratic roadmap. They also expressed the need

for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners.

The visit of Foreign Minister Hamid to Burma is important because he went in his capacity as representing the ASEAN foreign

ministers, the first time that the ASEAN nations have directly confronted the Burmese regime on what is going on inside Burma.

ASEAN is beginning to recognize that what is going on in Burma

is no longer simply the internal affairs of the regime, but a matter

of concern to the region.

Senator MURKOWSKI. With the second panel that we had, one of

the comments—this was from Dr. Green—was that he believed

that there was a divide or a split within ASEAN members as to

really how to approach Burma on the issue. Do you sense that they

are coming closer to a consensus as to how to approach Burma or

is that still an issue for us to deal with, recognizing that you have

different nations certainly with very different interests as they relate to Burma?

Mr. JOHN. I think that remains an issue, about how ASEAN is

going to approach the Burmese problem. I would say that there are

two things that ASEAN needs to wrestle with. One is recognizing

that there is a problem in Burma and the second is therefore developing an approach to resolving that problem.

I would say up until recently ASEAN members were not united

in thinking—as to the question of whether there is a problem indeed in Burma. Now I would say there is. There might be differences in how they would grade the degree of the problem. I cannot speak for ASEAN, but I would say that there is consensus

among the members, based on my conversations, that there is a

problem there in Burma, that the political opposition should not be

in jail, that the regime should begin a political dialogue for national reconciliation, and that what is happening in Burma does

have the potential for destabilizing the region.

To get to the next level of what ASEAN is going to do about it,

what type of approach they are going to take, there is a difference

still, I think. There is no consensus on that.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You mentioned the reported outbreak of

bird flu in Burma. Have we, has the United States, had any contact with Burma directly or through any international organizations to talk about what the situation is there in Burma? Do we

have any idea how widespread the outbreak may be?

Mr. JOHN. The U.N. FAO and WHO have, first of all, made an

appeal for resolving the Avian influenza issue. We in response to

51

that, immediately provided 2,000 protective suits that the Burmese

could use in culling the chickens from the farms. We have had a

USAID Avian influenza expert and a USDA employee travel to

Rangoon and Mandalay earlier this month with FAO and WHO

personnel to assess the situation on the ground.

That said, the real problem I believe still remains with the regime. They reported it a month ago. You do not know how long it

had been between the outbreak, detection, and the time they decided to report it. It is a problem of their isolation and their lack

of willingness to have international organizations, NGOs, go out

into the countryside and do the work they need to do.

Hopefully, on Avian influenza that would be different, and we

are working with FAO, WHO, and other donors on what, if necessary, we would need to do. But I believe that other U.N. agencies

should take the lead in addressing Burma’s needs here and other

donor nations as well.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Discussion about the moving of the capital

and the difficulty in communication, moving from Rangoon to this

location. I asked a little bit earlier, is there an economic benefit to

this? Is this something that needs to happen? Dr. Turnell indicated

from his perspective there was certainly no economic advantage to

doing it; it was just yet another example of the regime’s volatility.

What kind of difficulties have our officials in the U.S. embassy

in Rangoon encountered in communicating with the Burmese government officials in the new location? I understand they do not

have—they are saying communication by fax, but we do not have

the ability to even do that.

Mr. JOHN. That is correct, because they will not give us the fax

number. They moved last November. They moved from Rangoon to

Pyinmana. I think last week they changed the name of the capital

from ‘‘Pyinmana’’ to ‘‘Naypyidaw.’’ So I am not really sure what it

will be called next month.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Is it still in the same spot, so far as we

know?

Mr. JOHN. It is in the same spot, but it is kind of growing in a

mushroom-like fashion in there, and it is done under the cloak of

darkness. It is a very unfortunate situation.

No, it does not make any economic sense. You are moving from

what was once, decades ago, a thriving city and one that had international connections throughout Southeast Asia and the world, to

one that is 240 miles inland in the middle of a jungle, that is mosquito-infested and ridden with malaria. It is separating government workers from their families. It is a forced relocation of those

who work for the regime.

There is really no political rationale, no economic rationale that

we can ascertain. One theory is that throughout history in Burma

the old rulers—as you would have a new dynasty come into place

in Burma, the ruler would move the capital to assert his new regime in Burma. And unfortunately, in a way the SPDC, led by

Than Shwe, by moving the capital is almost acting like a monarchy

in moving the capital to the jungle and establishing a new regime.

I think it is largely a political step driven by a backwards-looking

mentality. It is terrible.

52

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am told that we just had our vote start,

so I have got one last question for you before I have to excuse myself. It has recently been reported that Burmese refugees who were

to be resettled here in the United States have hit a snag because

of their material support for opposition groups within Burma. Of

course, the Patriot Act denies entry to those who provide material

support to a terrorist or to an armed rebel group, so those groups

that were resisting the Burmese military junta end up now being

included.

I do not think that this was the intent of the Patriot Act. So my

question to you, Mr. John, is whether or not the State Department

is doing anything to address this scenario?

Mr. JOHN. We are. The administration as a team is addressing

this issue. You are correct, that was not the intent of the Patriot

Act at all and everybody realizes that, and we are trying to find

a way to best resolve it. The Department of State is led by the Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration (PRM), and working

very closely with the Department of Homeland Security because

DHS has the lead on this.

It is a cooperative effort, though, and I am quite confident that

we are going to find a way to resolve this that is equitable.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do we have a handle on how many refugees we are talking about?

Mr. JOHN. I cannot state with clarity. I think the number we are

looking at right now is about 9,000 or so—9,800.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So it is a fair number.

Mr. JOHN. It is, it is. It is a large number, but obviously even

if it were just one, it would not be right and we would still be working on it.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good. Well, I am glad to hear that that effort is under way.

I appreciate your time here this afternoon and all that you have

given us. I appreciate the good work that you are doing as it relates to Burma and the situation on the ground there.

With that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

(53)

APPENDIX

Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSE BY ERIC JOHN TO QUESTION FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question. In December 2005 the United Nations Security Council took an important step forward by considering the situation in Burma for the first time. The Security Council action came soon after a groundbreaking report by Archbishop

Desmond Tutu and former Czech President Vaclav Havel which made a compelling

case that Burma presents a transnational threat to regional security in Southeast

Asia. The report called for a binding Security Council resolution on Burma in 2006.

The State Department was instrumental in getting the Council to even consider

Burma, which was a useful first step, but I hope we can go further this year. Will

the U.S. support efforts to pass a binding Security Council resolution calling for constructive action on Burma?

Answer. We are continuing to work with partners and key players in the region

to raise Burma again in the U.N. Security Council, and to discuss what Council action would be appropriate. At this time, despite growing concern among Council

members about the situation in Burma, there would not be sufficient support in the

Council for a resolution to pass. Some Council members clearly stated they viewed

the December Security Council briefing as a ‘‘one-time’’ exercise and would not support efforts to bring Burma before the Council again.

We worked hard last year to gain consensus for the Council briefing, and that discussion had a significant impact in terms of intensifying international pressure on

the regime. Now, with several new members on the Council, we are working to

maintain consensus in that body for continued Council engagement on Burma. At

the same time, we also continue to coordinate our bilateral diplomatic efforts with

partners and key players in the region, and seek to shine a spotlight on Burma in

other U.N. organizations; for example, the appalling situation of forced labor in

Burma is on the Economic and Social Council’s agenda for its meeting this July.

RESPONSE BY ERIC JOHN TO QUESTION FROM SENATOR CHAFFEE

Question. Two weeks ago, a leading Burmese human rights activist, Bo Kyi, who

spent over 7 years in prison, traveled to Rhode Island. While there, he shared his

powerful story with many of my constituents. It is a tragedy that Nobel Laureate

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and more than 1,000 other prisoners of conscience remain

imprisoned in Burma. They should be immediately released and the human rights

abuses should stop. While in Rhode Island, Bo Kyi asked that the United States

lead an effort to press for a U.N. Security Council resolution on Burma. What are

the administration’s plans for pursuing U.N. Security Council action?

Answer. As we have said consistently, we believe the U.N. Security Council has

a critical role to play in pursuing a resolution to the deteriorating situation in

Burma and the problems the country poses for its neighbors and the region. That

said, some Council members clearly stated they viewed the December 16 Security

Council briefing as a ‘‘one-time’’ exercise and will not support our efforts to bring

Burma before the Council again.

We worked hard last year to gain consensus for the Council briefing, and that discussion had a significant impact in terms of intensifying international pressure on

the regime. Now, with several new members on the Council, we are working to

maintain consensus in that body for continued Council engagement on Burma. At

the same time, we also continue to coordinate our bilateral diplomatic efforts with

partners and key players in the region, and seek to shine a spotlight on Burma in

54

1The Report, by the United Nations Environment Programme, was released on 11 April. It

can be found at: http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=475&

ArticleID=5255&1=en

other U.N. organizations; for example, the appalling situation of forced labor in

Burma is on the Economic and Social Council’s agenda for its meeting this July.

RESPONSES BY DR. SEAN TURNELL TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question. Can you describe the social and environmental problems that could result from these dams being built?

Answer. Burma’s ruling military regime, the ‘‘State Peace and Development Council’’ (SPDC), has been waging war for decades against ethnic peoples (including the

Karen, Karenni and Shan) living in eastern Burma. All of the projects (including

dams) that are currently located in these areas are associated with ongoing patterns

of human rights abuses such as rape, forced labor, forced ‘‘portering’’ (for Burmese

army operations), extrajudicial executions, and torture. When the new dam projects

on the Salween proceed, additional Burmese troops inevitably will be brought in to

‘‘secure’’ the areas. In Burma, such an increase in military deployment invariably

leads directly to an increase in human rights violations. The construction of the

dams will permanently displace tens of thousands of people, causing yet another influx of refugees into Thailand as well as a sharp increase in the number of internally displaced persons within Burma.

By damming the Salween—the longest free-flowing river in Southeast Asia—much

of eastern Burma will be inundated or otherwise impacted by the dams themselves,

and related construction. The dams will have irreversible impacts on the environment such as a loss of wildlife habitats, diminished biodiversity, and harm to fisheries. These impacts will destroy local people’s means of living, such as fishing,

farming, and transportation. Burma’s regime has a poor record of infrastructure

maintenance, and in the past excessive ‘‘siltification’’ of rivers has been a reliable

aftermath of dam construction.

The SPDC is most likely to spend income generated from the dams to finance expansion and modernization of its military. Since 2002, when it began receiving revenue from the export of natural gas to Thailand, Burma’s generals have purchased

hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons and arms. By comparison, in 2004, the

HIV/AIDS budget in Burma was $22,000, one of the lowest levels of national spending on HIV/AIDS in the world.

As these answers were being compiled a U.N. report1 has just been released that

has found a link between hydropower projects and the spread of bird flu. The postulated connection is that the destruction of habitat for wild birds for hydroelectric

projects forces wild birds on to alternative sites, such as farm ponds and paddy

fields, bringing them into direct contact with (infected) domestic poultry. Burma’s

irresponsible ‘‘policies’’ with respect to bird flu are, of course, the subject of much

concern in the region.

Question. What are the mechanisms by which local residents and stakeholders living in potentially impacted areas, have opportunity to provide input into the decisionmaking process for these dams?

Answer. No such mechanism have been established. No consultations have been

held with local stakeholders in Thailand (much less Burma) during the decisionmaking process over the Salween dams. Thai authorities so far have proceeded with

the dam projects in a secretive and non-transparent manner, withholding vital information on construction plans such as feasibility studies, environmental and social

impact assessments, and co-financing agreements.

In Burma, of course, there has not only been no consultation, but any questioning

of the project places the ‘‘questioners’’ in the gravest danger. All of the information

we have on the Burmese-side of the Salween dams project has come to us via clandestine sources.

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