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37–094 PDF 2007

WEAPONIZING SPACE: IS CURRENT U.S. POLICY

PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 23, 2007

Serial No. 110–18

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

——— ———

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 23, 2007 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Grego, Laura, Ph.D., staff scientist, Global Security Program, Union of

Concerned Scientists; Theresa Hitchens, director, Center for Defense

Information; Jeff Kueter, president, the George C. Marshall Institute;

and David Cavossa, executive director, Satellite Industry Association ... 52

Cavossa, David .......................................................................................... 107

Grego, Laura .............................................................................................. 52

Hitchens, Theresa ..................................................................................... 67

Kueter, Jeff ................................................................................................ 93

Mahley, Donald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, U.S.

Department of State; Major General James B. Armor, Jr., Director,

National Security Space Office, U.S. Department of Defense ................... 24

Armor, Major General James B., Jr. ....................................................... 32

Mahley, Donald ......................................................................................... 24

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Armor, Major General James B., Jr., Director, National Security Space

Office, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of ..................... 35

Cavossa, David, executive director, Satellite Industry Association, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 109

Grego, Laura, Ph.D., staff scientist, Global Security Program, Union of

Concerned Scientists, prepared statement of ............................................. 56

Hitchens, Theresa, director, Center for Defense Information, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 69

Kueter, Jeff, president, the George C. Marshall Institute, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 95

Mahley, Donald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, U.S.

Department of State, prepared statement of .............................................. 26

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts:

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 14

Various statements ................................................................................... 3

(1)

WEAPONIZING SPACE: IS CURRENT U.S. POLICY PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, McCollum, Platts, and Foxx.

Staff present: Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Dave

Turk, staff director; Andrew Su and Andy Wright, professional staff

members; Davis Hake, clerk; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel;

Christopher Bright, minority professional staff member; Nick

Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; and Benjamin Chance, minority clerk.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for joining

us here today. I am pleased that our witnesses are able to make

it here today.

I want to briefly take care of some business, if I might, before

we get started.

A quorum is present for the subcommittee hearing on

Weaponizing Space: Is the Current U.S. Policy Protecting our National Security? The hearing will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking minority member of the subcommittee make an opening statement,

provided that the ranking minority member can delegate that to

another Member. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee may

be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without

objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the following written statements

and materials be placed into the hearing record: a statement by

Mr. David McGlade, the CEO of Intelsat General Corp.; a written

statement from Iridium Satellite LLC; a written statement from

Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation; a written statement from Dr. James Clay Moltz, the deputy director of the Center

for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute for International Studies; and two articles from Space News International

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and two articles from Defense News authored by Dr. Michael

Krepon from the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Since the dawn of the space age, the U.S. leadership has put a man on the Moon, has allowed us to see to the edge

of the universe, saved countless lives by helping to better predict

hurricanes, and revolutionized the way the peoples of the world

communicate.

Our country’s leadership over the years in helping to establish a

clear understanding among all nations that the peaceful use of

space is of paramount importance has repaid us untold benefits,

and it promises to increasingly do so in the future.

Our country owns or operates 443 of the 845 active satellites

around our planet. It is a $100 billion a year industry. Global Positioning System technology is taking off, and even space tourism is

becoming more and more of a reality.

And our military and intelligence capabilities have become huge

beneficiaries of a weapons-free space. Without space, our smart

bombs would not be precise. Without space, our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq would not have the real-time information they need.

Without space, crucial intelligence gathering would simply vanish.

Satellites have, quite literally, become the eyes and ears of our national security.

However, there are potentially ominous clouds on the horizon.

Space experts, some of whom we will hear from at today’s hearing,

charge that over the last handful of years the current administration has undertaken a series of actions and changes in policies that

could have a profound impact on the future of space and the future

of our national security.

Exhibit A is President Bush’s new space policy. Though the new

policy had been widely anticipated for years, the unclassified version was stealthily posted on a Web site late on the Friday prior

to Columbus Day weekend in 2006. The rest of the world, both our

allies and our potential adversaries, took notice, particularly at its

aggressiveness and unilateral tone.

The previous space policy spoke of the need for a ‘‘stable and balanced national space program,’’ one in which ‘‘[t]he United States

will pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national and international space activities and work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and use of space for

peaceful purposes.’’

The Bush administration policy, on the other hand, treats space

as one more battlefield besides air, land, and sea, and states unequivocally, ‘‘The United States will oppose the development of new

legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit

U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements

or restrictions must not impair the right of the United States to

conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.’’

But the aggressive and unilateral record of this administration

is not just limited to the one document. For example, in 2002 the

United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on

the grounds that it needed greater capabilities against rogue states

following the September 11th terrorist attacks.

In September 2004, then Under Secretary of State John Bolton

stated, ‘‘We are not prepared to negotiate on the so-called arms

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race in outer space. We just don’t see that as a worthwhile enterprise.’’

In October 2005, the United States was the only country in the

world to vote against a United Nations resolution calling on the

need for a treaty to limit weaponization of space; 160 countries

voted in favor.

The Air Force doctrine during the Bush administration has also

been criticized as being overly unilateral and aggressive. Air Force

doctrine and top officials repeatedly speak of ‘‘space dominance,’’

with one document noting: ‘‘Space superiority provides freedom to

attack.’’

Our hearing today will explore the Bush administration’s space

policies and actions and what impact they have had and will have

in the future.

Will others in our world use the administration’s language and

actions as justification and cover to build their own weapons capabilities in space, thereby threatening the very assets and advantages we seek to protect? Or will other countries in the world ramp

up their own space weapons capabilities no matter what United

States policies and actions are? In other words, is the

weaponization of space inevitable, and to think otherwise would

only cause us to lose ground?

Our hearing will also explore the apparently successful anti-satellite missile test by China earlier this year. China has long been

viewed as a potential competitor to the U.S. interest in space and

a potential threat because of its emerging space program and the

increased frequency of its satellite launches. We have watched

them closely. We were well aware when they attempted two antisatellite missile tests in 2005 and 2006.

So it should not have been a surprise to anyone when China used

a ground-based ballistic missile to successfully hit their own orbiting weather satellite in January of this year. We knew when they

were going to conduct the test and were certain which satellite

they were going to hit. We stepped up monitoring of the satellite

and Chinese launch pads. We knew that the test would cause thousands of shards of space debris to float around for decades in lowearth orbit, potentially harming everything and anything in their

path.

But following the destruction of the satellite the silence was deafening. Though they didn’t do anything to hide their launch preparations, the Chinese did not initially own up to the test, and the

United States apparently decided not to do anything beforehand to

try to prevent the Chinese test.

We understand that this single Chinese test alone raised the

threat to satellites in frequent low-earth orbits by as much as 40

percent. This incident should caution all of us about the stakes of

getting space policy correct.

What, if anything, could our country and our allies and our partners around the world have done to prevent all that debris? What

should have done, if anything?

This hearing will explore the administration’s space policies and

actions and ask the simple question of whether this is the path we

should be going down.

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By alienating friends and potential adversaries alike, is the current approach weakening our national security through its actions

and inactions toward space policy? Should our country take a leadership role in engaging our allies bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the

Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in order to preserve

space for peaceful and commercial interests? Should we work with

other countries to lay out rules of the road for space conduct; to put

in place confidence-building measures and to work together to limit

space debris?

Or is the administration’s approach the only real option for us

in a world in which it and some others contend international cooperation and treaties will only serve to weaken our national security assets and interests?

Up until the present, space has been a frontier that has been

used peacefully by all of mankind, in many respects because it is

inherently a global commodity.

As the undeniable leader in space, the U.S. actions and policies

will play a huge role in shaping the future of space and how it impacts our economy, our science, our exploration, and our national

security. We must act with a sense of responsibility here and ask

tough questions now while this renewed interest in the

weaponization of space is in its infancy. We must ask tough questions now, before it is too late.

Over the first 50 years of space exploration and use we know

where U.S. leadership has taken us. This hearing will essentially

ask where U.S. leadership should take us over the next 50 years.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. I would now like to yield to the ranking member

for an opening statement, Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Ranking

Member Chris Shays and myself, we appreciate your holding this

important hearing on a vitally important topic, and also that we

have with us today two panels of witnesses, both representing the

administration and outside experts.

Today’s safe and secure access to space is essential for a wide

range of commercial activities. Satellites are an integral component

of telephone and television service. They also provide GPS services

used daily by many Americans, and they aid in weather forecasting, mapping, and many other functions.

Space is also critical to American security. Satellites provide important capabilities to the intelligence community and the Defense

Department. They are an indispensable tool on the global war on

terror.

The integration of space capabilities into most aspects of modern

military operations is one of the distinctive and essential ingredients of America’s military prowess. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the United States and all other nations continue to

enjoy safe and peaceful access to space. This makes some events in

recent years very troubling. Most disturbing is what occurred in

January, China fired a ballistic missile into space and destroyed

one of its own outmoded satellites. This created a huge amount of

debris in orbit and had the potential to damage or destroy other

satellites.

Many experts wonder what motivated China to take such provocative action. They question whether China was signaling that it

had dangerous capabilities which they might use against the

United States in the event of some future crisis.

Today we will hear about the Bush administration’s national

space policy, which is meant to guide every aspect of America’s endeavors in space. Some have suggested that the points it sets forth

are a radical departure from past practice. Critics have claimed

that it will cause other nations to threaten our space capabilities.

Others vigorously disagree with all of these contentions.

We will be honored to hear from several experts with varying

perspectives today. I look forward to their presentations, to their

assessment of the Chinese action, and to their evaluation of the appropriate American response.

I am also interested to learn the perspective of the witnesses on

the viability of arms control agreements or other regulatory efforts

to restrain threats in space. I wonder if such treaties will be enforceable, and certainly question the effect of such treaties, given

that terrorist groups would certainly not consider themselves

bound by them.

Finally, I seek to find out what one means when referring to

weaponizing space. I am not certain if this is an allusion to arms

placed in orbit, weapons fired into space from the ground, or simply

ground-based arms which travel through space.

Mr. Chairman, we stand together in recognizing the indispensable role which space plays in the American economy and the Nation’s security. I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ testimony

and the opportunity to have questions thereafter.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I want to begin now, for our witness testimony section by introducing our witnesses on the first panel. We have representatives

from both the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

Ambassador Donald Mahley, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Threat Reduction, and we have Major General James B. Armor,

Jr., Director of the National Security Space Office within the Pentagon.

I want to thank you both for coming and welcome you to our

hearing today.

It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in before you

testify, so would you please stand and raise your right hands, and

if there is anybody else that will be testifying with you, we ask that

they also stand and take the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Let the record reflect that both witnesses answered

in the affirmative.

With that, Ambassador Mahley, would you be kind enough to

begin with your statement? I think you know from ample past experience it is a 5-minute clock. We try not to be too strict on that,

but you need not read directly from your remarks if you do not care

to. You can summarize it any way you wish. The remarks for both

you and the General will be placed on the record, at any rate.

Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF DONALD MAHLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THREAT REDUCTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE; MAJOR GENERAL JAMES B. ARMOR, JR., DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF DONALD MAHLEY

Mr. MAHLEY. Chairman Tierney, members of the committee,

staff, thank you very much. I greatly appreciate the fact that you

have already indicated that my written statement will be placed on

the record. I would, if I could, like to summarize it orally in just

a few short sentences.

In accordance with the committee’s request, my statement encompasses three topics: The administration’s national space policy;

China’s January 11th anti-satellite test; and the administration’s

position on space arms control.

I would offer two caveats to my testimony at the outset. First,

because it is an unclassified hearing, there is, of course, a certain

limit on some discussion of some sensitive topics that will occur.

Second, the Department of State does not execute the material elements of national space policy. For that information, I will, of

course, defer to my very able colleague from the Department of Defense sitting to my left here.

In June 2002, the President directed an interagency review of

national space policy. The resulting directive, signed by the President on August 31, 2006, and publicly released on October 6, 2006,

supersedes the space policy directive signed by President Clinton

nearly a decade earlier.

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This policy reaffirms the basic principles articulated a half century ago by President Dwight Eisenhower, our Nation’s commitment to a free exploration and use of outer space by all nations for

peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.

U.S. space policy also continues to recognize the necessity to protect our assets in space. Defense and intelligence-related activities

in pursuit of national security interests fall within the scope of and

are consistent with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’s provisions mentioning the peaceful uses of space.

On January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China conducted

a test of an ASAT weapon that destroyed an old Chinese weather

satellite in orbit. The administration has conducted numerous classified briefings to Congress in the wake of that test, and some even

preceding it. The United States has sought an explanation from

China regarding its test. To date, we have not received a satisfactory response.

And it is also true the Chinese test generated some 1,500 pieces

of trackable debris, and is estimated to pose a risk to both human

space flight and satellites for the next 100 years.

The Chinese proposals for arms control negotiations in outer

space would only ban a ground-based ASAT weapons testing and

use, not its deployment or development. An additional space treaty

would not improve the existing legal regime which has functioned

effectively for over 40 years. A number of U.S. administrations

have recognized the futility of seeking additional formal space arms

control agreements. However, in response to international interest,

as Ambassador Roca recently noted in Geneva, the United States

is prepared to discuss but not to negotiate outer space topics in the

Conference on Disarmament.

I do thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahley follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

General.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JAMES B. ARMOR, JR.

General ARMOR. Chairman Tierney, Congressman Platts, members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before the subcommittee today as the Director of the National Security Space Office and the Executive Secretariat for the Department of Defense

Executive Agent for Space.

It is a very timely issue to discuss national space policy and the

policy implications of China’s counter-space development, specifically their January 2007, anti-satellite test. I must admit I am

heartened by both your comments in pointing out the critical importance to national security in space. I also appreciate having Ambassador Mahley at my side here to discuss the Department of

State policy issues.

Our appearance today is our affirmation that space capabilities

are vital to U.S. national interests and underscores the importance

of continued unity of effort in implementing U.S. national space

policy. I have been in the space business over 30 years, and every

President since President Dwight D. Eisenhower has addressed

space policy.

Each administration has evolved space policy to reflect the increasing maturity and cumulative experience of the Nation’s activities in space. Basic policy tenets have remained remarkably consistent: free passage and peaceful use of space; compelling need for

a strong civil, industrial, and national security space sectors; and

that, since they are vital to national interests, the United States

has the inherent right to defend those interests in space.

The current national space policy issued by the President last

August addresses current opportunities, challenges, and threats

facing the United States and our space capabilities. The policy provides direction as we conduct a host of space activities.

The evolution of space technology coupled with continued integration of space capabilities into our Defense forces has, as you

noted, revolutionized U.S. military operations. Space technology

has radically enhanced the effectiveness of our now smaller combat

forces, and reduced collateral effects on non-belligerence.

Space capabilities enable us to employ our armed forces within

the guidelines established by the international laws of armed conflict.

Space capabilities provide us with the eyes and ears that give us

unmatched battlefield awareness, advanced warning and characterization of missile attacks, precise application of force, synchronization of our combat forces, and essential command and control

functions.

More broadly, space capabilities form the bedrock of our Nation’s

infrastructure, including diplomatic, informational, military, scientific, and economic elements of our national power.

The new policy, consistent with previous national space policies,

reaffirms longstanding principles: U.S. commitment to the use of

outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, continued encouragement to cooperate with others, strict adherence to existing

international agreements regarding the use of outer space, rejecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:09 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37094.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion of any claim of sovereignty by any nation over outer space, the

right to use or acquire data from space, and the free passage

through and in space without interference.

The Defense Department’s goal for space and space-related activities is to possess the necessary space capabilities to achieve our

national security objectives. The Secretary of Defense is further

charged with developing capabilities, plans, and options to ensure

freedom of action in space and, if directed, to deny that to its adversaries.

Along these lines, our focus is on, first, space situational awareness, then preservation of our space capabilities, protection of our

space capabilities, and, finally, protection of our terrestrial forces,

our boots on the ground, if you will, from harm by adversary’s

space capabilities.

Many nations and organizations around the world have recognized the benefits of space, and with the growing availability of

technology, the general economic prosperity, and longstanding free

passage and useful peace of space created under the current treaties, space has become a critical enabler for the global economy.

China is one such nation, and they are pursuing space capabilities

on a very broad front—economic, scientific, military, intelligence.

They should be rightly congratulated for the impressive technical

achievement of becoming the third nation in history to conduct

manned space flight.

Other nations have also recognized the asymmetric advantage in

space power that the United States retains. Potential adversaries

have and will continue to seek capabilities and to deny our advantage in space, and, as was made dramatically clear by China’s test

of an ASAT, space is now a contested environment. We believe China’s testing of a direct ascent ASAT system, specifically the onorbit destruction of a satellite that resulted in thousands of pieces

of long-lived orbital debris, is not responsible behavior for a spacefaring nation. It is inconsistent with China’s stated position on preventing an arms race in outer space, its signed agreement to mitigate space debris, and the constructive relationship outlined by

President Bush and President Hu.

China is developing a wide range of anti-access and aerial denial

capabilities, such as direct ascent ASAT, radio frequency jammers,

and other capabilities, as part of a general transformation of their

military forces. In addition to the counter-space capabilities, China

is developing and deploying modern intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance satellites with advanced command and control,

communications, and targeting capabilities.

Today many nations are taking their first steps as space-faring

nations. These nations should strive to adhere to international

outer space legal guidelines and ensure they are ready to operate

safely in space.

The United States has long urged the international community

to focus on gaining universal adherence to current treaty guidelines. Not all countries have signed the Outer Space Treaty, for example.

Space activity is strategically significant to the health of our Nation’s security, defense, and economic well-being. The U.S. Government and Department of Defense policies recognize that fact, and

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access and use of space are central in preserving peace, protecting

U.S. national security, and promoting civil and commercial interests. Space, bottom line, is vital to U.S. national interest.

I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to discuss the implications of the new national space policy and the anti-satellite test

by China, and look forward to any questions you might have.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Armor follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, General. Thank you both for your testimony, both oral and what will be submitted on the record.

Let me just start the questions by asking this. Under Secretary

John Bolton made a statement I mentioned in my opening remarks

on September 2004. He said, ‘‘We are not prepared to negotiate on

the so-called arms race in outer space. We just don’t see that as

a worthwhile enterprise.’’ Ambassador, why isn’t that a worthwhile

enterprise?

Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think I could answer that most

succinctly by saying that no arms control is better than bad arms

control. We have indicated in the Conference on Disarmament that

we are prepared to discuss the topic and see if we can find some

way in which one could frame it in a fashion which might be constructive. But, frankly, the kind of framework that has long been

promoted as the prevention of arms race in outer space [PAROS],

and the Conference on Disarmament documentation, including the

most recent P–6 proposal, the A–5 proposals that were there for a

long time, allow things that simply do not have either a verifiable

or an enforceable means of trying to actually prevent an arms race

that would be inimical to our national interest.

As I indicated in my opening statement, the particular proposal

there, for example, would, indeed, make it illegal for the Chinese

to exercise an anti-satellite weapon, but it would not in any way

constrain them from developing it and deploying it. So we do not

believe that is simply a means by which we are going to advance

our national security in that kind of a negotiation.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that would be some of the things that

you would be negotiating?

Mr. MAHLEY. It is my experience in these, at least, that when we

start out with a negotiation that already has that kind of a serious

flaw in it, the exercise is one in which you are going to try to find

out how many more flaws you end up with, as opposed to trying

to get rid of some of those that are in there. It has simply been

there for a long time that no one was prepared to take that out in

terms of the opening proposal, despite the fact that we have frequently indicated that is one of the things which is unacceptable.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just on a personal note, you have testified before

us, we discussed outside, on chemical, biological. Your consistent

opinion is you can’t verify any of these treaties, so we shouldn’t do

them, period, right?

Mr. MAHLEY. It is my view that when you have a treaty it is the

responsibility of everybody that is a party of that treaty to comply

with it, and that, unfortunately, in the course of the world there

are probably going to be countries at one time or another which are

not going to want to do that because they seek some advantage.

In that case, the inability to determine that they are, indeed, not

complying with their obligations is a serious, if not fatal, drawback.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. So bottom line is no treaties ever, in your view?

Mr. MAHLEY. I would not wish to draw that conclusion, because

I think we have done some in the past, and I think there is even

the possibility of looking at things in the future that might be able

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to meet those standards, but I do think that we shouldn’t get into

any that don’t meet the standards.

Mr. TIERNEY. Give me a call some time, Ambassador, when you

think of one that you think you might support, all right, because

your numerous testimony, I think we haven’t got there yet on that.

General, where we are talking about debris and things of that

nature, wouldn’t that be at least something that we would want to

be concerned about, the amount of debris that any of these actions,

like China’s action, happen, and something we want to engage

rather vigorously in trying to make sure that we mitigate or stop?

General ARMOR. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And there are ongoing

international discussions on debris mitigation. I think it is the

Interagency Debris Coordination Committee, of which China was a

signatory. This ASAT was not consistent with their signature on

that.

I know that, consistent with the international discussions we

have on those rules, we have Department directives that direct us

to minimize debris on all of our space activities, and it is pretty rigorously enforced.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you talk about the United States establishing international space debris mitigation guidelines, essentially

that is what they are, guidelines, and just——

General ARMOR. Yes, sir, voluntary guidelines, if I understand it

correctly. I am not a lawyer.

Mr. TIERNEY. Has there been, to your knowledge, any negotiation

trying to get some sort of regime that goes beyond the voluntary

compliance aspect?

General ARMOR. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that would be useful?

General ARMOR. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that such a regime would be useful,

given the amount of debris—this is one incident—and the potential

that exists if others were to follow suit.

General ARMOR. These guidelines are very useful, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you saying that there would be no use for having something that could be enforced?

General ARMOR. I don’t know what enforce means in that context, sir, but guidelines like this that help stimulate responsible behavior and good rules in space are, I think, beneficial to all responsible users, all space powers.

Mr. TIERNEY. It wasn’t too beneficial to us with respect to China’s actions, was it?

General ARMOR. Well, we are a little bit——

Mr. TIERNEY. Guidelines.

General ARMOR. We are a little bit mystified as to China’s intent

and behavior in this case, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. But we weren’t mystified to the fact that they did

it, because we knew well in advance that they were gearing up to

do it, right?

General ARMOR. There were intelligence indications. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you able to share with us why it is that we

made the decision to not even make any public statement in advance that might have stopped them from doing that, or at least

shined a light on them to make them think twice about doing it?

45

General ARMOR. I would defer to others on that, sir. I had no insight into that decision process.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who are the others that you would defer to?

General ARMOR. I would defer to the White House and the other

departments.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Ambassador, on the question of the current administration’s not pursuing a space arms control agreement, and that

would be an effective approach to take, am I correct in saying that

is consistent with the previous several administrations, as well,

that President Clinton, President Bush 41, President Carter, that

they took this similar approach?

Mr. MAHLEY. Sir, I think what is most accurate to say is that the

last time that we attempted to negotiate a legally binding outer

space treaty was in the Carter administration with the then Soviet

Union. We did that for a number of years and we came to a conclusion that we could not even define the terms of what we were trying to negotiate at that point, let alone the question of what actually constituted weaponization of outer space and what would constitute an effective means to try to prevent it in any fashion.

Since that time, I can say that there have been a number of internal deliberations in which we have tried to look at, in various

U.S. administrations, things that might appear to be effective. And

you are absolutely correct that it is a consistent view for at least

the last four administrations that I am aware of that we have not

been able to find anything that looked like it would be a productive

means of trying to reach an international legally binding agreement. Yes, sir.

Mr. PLATTS. On the issue of China, I think both of you reference

in your statements the inquiries, both through the military channels and diplomatic channels, as to seek to get an explanation, and

nothing of substance has been forthcoming. In this setting are you

able to share what answers we have been given thus far?

Mr. MAHLEY. Sir, the only thing that I can share with you diplomatically, because it happens to constitute the extent of my

knowledge on the matter, not necessarily because it is all there is—

and I will be happy to take the question to give you a more complete answer in terms of exactly what we have heard back from the

Chinese. But the issue is that we demarged them about that and

we have not as yet gotten from them anything which, in our general terminology, we consider satisfactory. By that I mean we have

gotten nothing which attempted to indicate what their purpose was

or to indicate what their intent was in doing it.

We have gotten a flat statement from them which, in diplomatic

terms, is sort of a push off, which simply says that it was not directed at any specific country. That is fine. It wasn’t. It was their

own satellite. We knew that to begin with. And beyond that, we

have gotten no constructive dialog from the Chinese in response to

our query.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Ambassador and General, would you, either one,

want to conjecture, given that China has been one of the nations

46

pushing for arms control agreement, that since they are the only

nation in the last 20 years that has actually pursued a weapon in

space, as this test or this action in January exemplifies, their

thought process? They are the only ones that have done it, yet they

are seeking to limit that ability, from a diplomatic standpoint or a

military standpoint.

Mr. MAHLEY. Sir, I will take a stab at that, even though getting

inside Chinese minds is not one of the things which is useful in

most cases, or possible.

I think the answer would, in some respects, be that the Chinese

have generally been developing an overall military improvement

operation, and so therefore that would make—and I would defer to

my Defense colleague to contradict me if he thinks I am incorrect

here—but therefore that kind of a test would not be inconsistent

with their overall general military policy that they have been pursuing.

In terms of why they would do that when they are continuing to

push the preventions arm race in outer space idea and Conference

on Disarmament, again, I would refer you back to my opening

statement when I indicated that certainly their proposal for an

agreement would not have prevented their development and deployment of such a system. The fact is that it wasn’t a choice in

place, and so therefore it could well be something like a nuclear

test. If you will recall back when we were doing the CTBT negotiations, the Chinese went through an entire series of nuclear tests

when they thought they might want to try to get that done before

the conclusion of the negotiations.

Whether that same kind of philosophy was engaged here, I really

have no knowledge to say, but I would simply refer that to you historically.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. PLATTS. General, did you have something you would like to

add?

General ARMOR. Congressman Platts, no, I really don’t have that

much to add. I mean, that test is consistent with the broad Chinese

investment in space, and so if you are pursuing that technology,

that is a logical technology thing to do, but it is not consistent with

the other things they have said openly and/or in agreements at the

President-to-President level, so I am still a little mystified.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. In October 2005, I mentioned this also in the opening remarks, we had sort of an annual vote at the United Nations,

and the vote generally talks about preventing an arms race in

outer space, the need to do that, and in past years the United

States has always voted present. This year it was a 160-to–1 vote.

The United States was the one to vote no.

Ambassador, what was the change of heart there for that vote

change? Just being obstinate, or was there something deeper in

policy?

Mr. MAHLEY. Well, sir, I would not try to tell you that I, again,

am perfectly familiar with all of the internal deliberations that

went into making the determination on that vote, but I will tell you

the following: this year the resolution did have changes in the

wording, and what it did is, particularly in conjunction with the

47

other things that were going on in the Conference on Disarmament

proposals at that same time, led us in language down a slippery

slope into exactly the kinds of things that we had been protesting

about in the Conference on Disarmament that we were not going

to engage in, and so therefore it was the judgment of the administration that we ought, in this case, to simply make very clear that

we were not going to let that language then be thrown back at us

in the Conference on Disarmament context as having agreed to

something which we were not prepared to agree to, and therefore

the best way to do that was to vote no.

Mr. TIERNEY. General, in your written testimony you made the

statement that China is pursuing a broad-based, comprehensive

transformation of its military forces to include space, counter-space,

and information operations, including a modern intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance architecture with advanced space-enabled command and control and targeting capabilities, also developing a wide range of anti-access and aerial denial capabilities, including the direct ascent anti-satellite radio frequency jammers, lasers supporting space surveillance and information, warfare capabilities. Then you go on to talk about the lack of transparency in

their expenditure.

Are you able to say that the United States and other nations are

not walking down the same path?

General ARMOR. Other nations not walking down——

Mr. TIERNEY. Not pursuing a broad-based, comprehensive transformation of forces, including space, not dealing with counter-space,

not dealing with information, operations, not doing any of that?

General ARMOR. We can share intelligence assessments on all the

space-faring nations with you, gentlemen, in another venue, and

we have shared those intelligence——

Mr. TIERNEY. And I have seen them, so I am not asking you for

specifics.

General ARMOR. I see.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am asking you for a broad statement. Are you

able to state that no other country except China is taking that path

or doing those things?

General ARMOR. As broadly as China is doing it, I believe they

are the only ones, as well as us, that are that broad and deep

from——

Mr. TIERNEY. So the United States and China?

General ARMOR. Yes, at the current time.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now, there is some information out there that

some people in the Chinese community didn’t know that the test

was happening. It was a relatively small group of people that were

informed about that, and, in fact, the Chinese Foreign Ministry

might have been largely cut out of the decisionmaking process on

that. Is that something we should believe, Ambassador Mahley, or

is that something they would like us to believe but is not real?

Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any specific information, so when I tell you that I don’t know the answer to that question it is not that I can’t share it with you, it is that I don’t know

the answer to that question. But I will tell you that it has been my

experience, in dealing with the Chinese government over a number

of years and over a number of topics, that they have internal comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:09 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37094.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
48

munications problems within their government at times, and so

therefore it certainly would not surprise me to hear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not fully briefed by their Ministry of

Defense on that test and the impending nature of that test. Yes,

sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. General, do you want to add anything to that? I

think that is what you were signaling me?

General ARMOR. No, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hitchens, who is going to testify on the second

panel today, makes an important observation in her written testimony and states, ‘‘The more the United States seeks high-power

means to both protect itself in space and ensure that others cannot

use space against it, the more threatening U.S. intentions seem

and the more others will seek to counter U.S. actions.’’ Do you gentlemen agree with that observation? If not, why not? General?

General ARMOR. Let me start. No, I don’t really agree with that.

I think most countries are now recognizing that space is in their

national interest, economically, and a wide variety of domains, and

they are going to pursue it to the extent that their nation is able

to. There are even some organizations, consortiums that see the

economic benefits and will put resources in space. Space tourism,

like you said, is another example of another organization. So I just

see this as a general growth and mankind expanding into the space

domain, and I don’t see it as necessarily one versus the other.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me proceed a little on that, because we just

talked about the comment that at least the United States and

China, with some depth, and others in less depth, are pursuing

comprehensive transformation of military forces to include space,

counter-space, information operations, intelligence, all those things,

so yes, they are all doing it, but I think Ms. Hitchens point seems

to be—we will hear more from her—that the more the United

States seeks sort of hard power, or China or any of these others,

to protect themselves in space and ensure that others can’t use

space against them, the more threatening this whole thing becomes, and it has a potential to spin a little bit out of control. You

don’t agree with that?

General ARMOR. No, Mr. Chairman, I don’t. I mean, we are the

world’s super power. We sort of are on the leading edge in space.

When you say space, people think of America. It has been that way

for decades now. And so I think this is just part of the natural evolution of other nations expanding into the space domain.

We are No. 1 so you could say that we were the cause of all of

their behavior, but I also think this is a natural progression of expanding into the space domain.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that includes all the military uses and things

of that nature?

General ARMOR. Well, yes, sir, when mankind goes anywhere, it

tends to take its defensive nature with it, as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. And both of you gentlemen are fine with the idea

that we shouldn’t do anything on the diplomatic end about trying

to get some sort of a treaty or agreement to slow that down or stop

it?

General ARMOR. Well, just like in the air and the sea, there are

conventions and rules and guidelines that are very helpful to reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:09 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37094.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
49

sponsible behavior, navigation of the seas. Our militaries follow all

of the air rules for traveling in air space, as does our Navy traveling in sea space, and so I believe that rules like that are genuinely

signed up to an agreed-to conventions, rules—I am not a lawyer.

I am not sure I know the right terminology, but those are generally

helpful to prevent purposeful interference or to create situations

where there is miscalculation of intent or just good, responsible behavior in the space domain.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to make sure I understand both your positions on the

issue of pursuing or the ability of a space arms treaty, that the position you have is based on the complexity of the issue and the ability to actually pursue one that would not compromise our national

security and be verifiable and it is the issues around a space arms

treaty that is why this administration and previous administrations have not pursued and actually engaged in one. It is not that

you are not receptive, but it is just not a possibility that is going

to not diminish our national security in today’s environment.

Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Platts, I think I would answer that in the following fashion. The United States has as a policy right now, the

fact that we are prepared to pursue equitable, effectively verifiable

treaties that are in the national security interest of the United

States and its allies. Now, that is not new. That is a policy that

has been generally the nature of U.S. negotiating practice for at

least the last 15 years that I have been engaged in negotiations.

So, therefore, I think that it is safe to say that if we could find

that kind of a treaty, that there is no inherent reason we would

not be prepared to pursue it. But, as we have indicated, I think

that we have had a number of false starts in the space area along

that line which have been unsatisfactory. When I say false starts

I go all the way back, as I say, to the ASAT negotiations that we

engaged in with the Soviet Union some—I hate to look as old as

I am, but some 30 years ago in that. And then the case that we

have had, for example, the prevention of arms race in outer space

proposal the Chinese have and the Conference on Disarmament.

That has been around with only minor modifications for at least

the last 12 years, and so therefore all of that is something which

says those are not the ways to do that answer.

I would also point out, with just one side note, the Chinese have

been pursuing an active anti-satellite program for at least the last

decade, so again I don’t think that is because of any wording that

is in the current national space policy that caused them to do that.

Thank you.

Mr. PLATTS. General.

General ARMOR. I have been impressed with the Outer Space

Treaty the last 40 years and the framework that it has laid out.

Look at the way space has prospered now over the last 40 years.

Again, I do feel that, now that there is more and more space-faring

nations and entities in space, that we do need to help augment the

rules or just coordinate guidelines on how to operate responsibly in

space. In fact, we have made our space situational and space surveillance data available on an Internet site to all users in space;

www.spacetrot.org goes right into the Cheyenne Mountain data

50

base so that people who are moving in space can sort of see that

they don’t bump into each other and otherwise know what is going

on. That is the kind of responsible behavior that I think we would

like to try and stimulate.

Mr. PLATTS. On the issue of a specific arms treaty, the actions

of China in January kind of add additional concerns why that is

not necessarily feasible if we take the answer of the Chinese Defense Ministry not well communicating with the Foreign Ministry

in the sense of the military trumping diplomacy. An arms treaty,

in essence, is a diplomatic agreement, and it kind of makes the

point that, when dealing with China, we maybe all the more need

to be careful because within their government some friction between their foreign ministry and diplomatic efforts and their military pursuit of expanded and more-developed capabilities. Is that

a fair statement?

Mr. MAHLEY. Congressman, I think it is always a fair statement

to say that when you have any kind of friction like that you tend

to get policy which does not necessarily satisfy all the kinds of

things that you would like to have done with it. And by that I

mean that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has certainly been

among the people in the Chinese Government that have been pursuing the PAROS Agreement in Geneva.

I would not want to say that the Ministry of Defense was trying

desperately to undercut their efforts in Geneva, but I will say that

it is not clear that diplomatic effort by the Chinese in Geneva constitutes a consensus opinion of the Chinese government, in which

case you may get actions which are not consistent with it. And certainly we think that the ASAT test was not consistent with any

kind of an arms control agreement that they have been pursuing.

Mr. PLATTS. And certainly the actions in January, the launching

of the satellite, didn’t bolster the diplomatic efforts, and the refusal

to give very much information in response to the launch doesn’t

bolster the diplomatic position of the Chinese.

Mr. MAHLEY. No. Neither that action nor their response to the

action, not only to us but to a number of other countries that have

made an inquiry, has done anything to promote their diplomatic efforts to try to get a negotiation going on outer space. That is a fair

statement.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have one more. One other one for both of you. If you had

to highlight the most significant difference between the 1995 directive under President Clinton for a space policy and this one, what

would you highlight as the most significant change? General?

General ARMOR. Why don’t I start. I thought it was easy. I have

been working in the framework of the 1996 policy for 10 years, and

when I read the new one the two things that jumped out at me

was, No. 1, more cooperation internationally, and especially with

our allies. So I personally have been doing that. I have been out

talking with our allies. I went to Geneva to the U.N. Institute of

Disarmament Research a couple of months ago. I am planning another trip to Europe here soon, and working with the Australians.

So there was an emphasis in the new policy about, hey, working

with allies and cooperative countries works, why don’t we do more

of that.

51

The other one was creation of new organizations within the executive branch, the Director of National Intelligence, Homeland Defense Department also, to bring more unity of effort within the executive branch.

Those were the two things that jumped out at me, from my experience.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. MAHLEY. Substantively I think I would first of all agree with

General Armor. I would also say that I think the language is more

explicit in identification of space as not only a top priority but as

being vital to our national security. And I also think that there are

some welcome changes in the new space policy in terms of the bureaucratics in the sense of organizing and assigning responsibility

for the establishment of the resource base to pursue space policy

that we need to pursue.

Those are the things that I would think are changes, sir.

Thank you.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you both for your testimony and your answers.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

I think we are pretty much at the end of this particular panel.

I only make the note that the Foreign Ministry in China might

be at odds with its Defense Department. That would never happen

in this country. The Secretary of State’s office would be at odds

with the Department of Defense? We have not seen any of that in

our recent history at all.

I do want to thank both of our witnesses for appearing here

today and for your testimony, both oral and written.

At this point, with your assent, we will move on to the next

panel, and we give you our gratitude for your time and effort here

today.

Thank you.

Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to impose on just one

comment. If it were the case that the Defense Department and the

Department of State were at odds with each other in this Government, we wouldn’t tell the Congress about it, but we will tell the

Congress that we think that is the case with the Chinese. Thank

you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

We are going to take about a 2-minute break here, if the witnesses of the second panel would like to come forward and take

their places. We will change the name tags. Mr. Platts will be back,

I think he said in a minute or two, and we will get started on the

second panel. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. TIERNEY. We are going to reconvene the meeting.

Mr. Platts is tied up for a couple of moments, and he has said

he is fine if we start to proceed. He will join us when he can.

I want to introduce our second panel, which represents the scientific community, space and nonproliferation experts, as well as

the commercial space industry. On this panel we have Dr. Laura

Grego, staff scientist from the Union of Concerned Scientists based

in Cambridge, MA; Ms. Theresa Hitchens, who is the Director for

the Center for Defense Information; Mr. Jeff Kueter, who is the

52

president of the George C. Marshall Institute; and Mr. David

Cavossa, who is the executive director of the Satellite Industry Association, originally from Lowell, MA, just outside my district in

Massachusetts, and I may have some family members moving in.

Welcome to all of you.

Again, it is the policy of the subcommittee to swear in witnesses

before they testify. I am going to ask you to stand and raise your

right hands, and if there are any other persons who are going to

be responding to questions, might they also rise.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please indicate that all witnesses

have answered in the affirmative. In case you didn’t hear me the

first time, we would love you to give a summary of your comments.

You can read, if you wish, but a summary of about 5 minutes. We

won’t hold you strictly to that, but in order that all of you get your

statements in and we allow for some questioning and answering,

that would be a terrific thing. Your full statement will be put in

the record, in any event. Thank you.

Ms. Grego.

STATEMENTS OF LAURA GREGO, PH.D., STAFF SCIENTIST,

GLOBAL SECURITY PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; THERESA HITCHENS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION; JEFF KUETER, PRESIDENT, THE

GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE; AND DAVID CAVOSSA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

STATEMENT OF LAURA GREGO

Ms. GREGO. Mr. Chairman and distinguished representatives,

thanks for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today.

I would like to address the question of what approach the United

States should take to develop an effective and sustainable policy toward space security. I am a physicist by training and currently

apply my technical background to analysis of space security issues.

An important part of understanding security issues is understanding both the possibilities and the limits of technical approaches to security.

I have four main points that I made in my submitted statement,

and I thank you for submitting that to the record. They are discussed in more detail in there, but I will summarize them quickly.

The first is that in recent years the United States has taken a

largely unilateral approach to space security, based on pursuing

technical measures and capabilities. The unclassified version of the

national space policy released in 2006 formalized at the highest Administrative levels what was essentially already U.S. policy. Arms

control and diplomatic approaches are considered largely irrelevant

to solving outstanding space security issues.

Two, while there are useful technical measures the United States

can and should take to improve security, because of the increasing

technical capabilities of other countries and the dual use nature of

micro satellites and other space technologies, the current unilateral

technical approach is ultimately going to be neither effective nor

sustainable. Defensive space weapons are not a solution to providing security to our critical satellite capabilities.

53

The third point is that, as a result, there is a need for diplomatic

efforts to pursue rules of the road and operational constraints on

space operations, as well as verifiable legal constraints on systems

intended to damage and destroy satellites. In the future, limits on

specific technologies will not be sufficient and operational constraints and other rules of conduct will be essential to maintain security.

And the last point was that, as a first step toward controlling

anti-satellite systems, an international ban on debris-producing

anti-satellite weapons similar to the weapon that China tested in

January will be a way of starting an international process in taking an important step toward preserving the use of space for the

future. If such a ban could be negotiated and respected, it would

prevent the production of a large amount of space debris that

would be generated in testing programs, and the single biggest

threat to the future of the space environment could be mitigated.

It would also reduce the military utility of extant or developing destructive ASAT weapons due to the decreased confidence in an untested or an incompletely tested system. Such a ban would be verifiable, perhaps with already existing surveillance assets.

A ban on destructive anti-satellite weapons will derive still greater relevance and usefulness as part of a comprehensive regime of

technical measures to preserve satellite capability and arms control

measures, rules of the road for space conduct, and confidence-building measures between space-faring nations.

In the remaining time I just wanted to spend a few minutes talking about in more depth a couple of points in my written testimony.

The first is space debris. The Chinese ASAT test in January increased the amount of debris in low-earth orbits by about 20 percent. I would like to emphasize that the approximately 1,600 pieces

of debris cataloged in the space catalog by the U.S. Air Force are

only those that can be tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, specifically, pieces of debris bigger than about 10 centimeters

or 4 inches in size. That does not include the pieces of debris that

are too small to track reliably but which still can create significant

damage to a satellite during a collision.

The destruction of the Fengyun 1C satellite released, according

to our calculations, over 40,000 pieces of debris of that untrackable

but still very dangerous type.

Fortunately, the absolute risk to satellites due to this debris is

still low. However, the situation could become much worse if China

or other countries continue testing these weapons, and it is critical

to stop this now. We have been calculating the amounts of debris

that would be produced by destructive ASAT weapons, and find

that destroying a single large satellite such as a U.S. spy satellite

would double the amount of dangerous debris in low-earth orbit.

This is the same amount of debris that would be avoided during

70 to 80 years of space activity under the strict debris mitigation

guidelines of the kind being considered at the United Nations and

to which the United States is a consulting party.

At the Union of Concerned Scientists we continue to conduct research on the subject of the debris from ASAT attacks and would

be happy to provide our expertise to Congress.

54

This brings me to my comments on the lead up to China’s ASAT

test. The Chinese research program on hit-to-kill technologies appears to have begun in the 1980’s, probably sparked by observing

the United States and Soviet Union developing and testing ASAT

weapons during that time and the United States pursuing homing

missile defense technologies. The research likely continued at a low

level through the 1990’s and may have been boosted in recent years

in response to U.S. missile defense tests, as it would be in the Chinese self interest to understand this technology if it wanted to

counter it for its own missile defense and to plans released by the

United States for new military uses of space.

The Chinese ability to master the difficult technical challenge of

maneuvering a high-speed interceptor to hit a high-speed satellite

about the size of a golf cart indicates the advanced state of China’s

space technology. However, the complexity of this technology does

also indicate that, without further testing, this nascent ASAT

weapon could not be considered an operational military capability.

We are not privy to the internal decisionmaking process that led

China to pursue this final destructive test, but we do know that the

United States was not taken by surprise by the test, having observed the preparations for it, which reportedly China made no attempt to disguise, and the United States did see it take place.

We also know that the United States also observed at least two

previous tests of the ASAT system reaching back at least 18

months in which the interceptor passed near to but did not collide

with the satellite.

It has been reported again that, after seeing the earlier tests,

that the United States decided not to contact China to protest or

ask about them. Since China would have known that the United

States could see this test with its early warning sensors and understand it for what it was, it may have interpreted the lack of reaction by the United States as a lack of concern, if not tacit approval.

So one does wonder what might be characterized as unverifiable

about that.

While the responsibility for this test rests fully with China, the

United States may have missed an opportunity to avoid it if it used

thoughtful diplomacy. Reports indicate that the U.S. officials assumed China was committed to this test and let the United States

have little leverage to stop it. This assumption can’t be evaluated

since the United States didn’t actually attempt to dissuade China.

Moreover, we do have evidence that suggests this assumption may

not be correct.

Based on information we have collected about the January test,

there appears to be an ongoing debate within China about the wisdom of this test and about possible future tests. It appears that the

Chinese leadership did not anticipate the strong international reaction to the test. The decision process may have included a narrow

set of people, in particular the Foreign Ministry appears to have

been largely cut out of the decision to conduct that test, which may

have led to this surprise. And Chinese decisionmakers may not

have been adequately advised on the degree of consequences and

the harm it would do to other space-faring nations, a number of

which China has strong partnerships with.

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Had the United States raised this issue with China prior to the

test, that would have almost certainly broadened the set of people

who were involved in the decisionmaking process. This could have

had a significant effect on the Chinese decision.

So what happens next or doesn’t happen is important. Some in

the United States argue that the ASAT program is central to China’s military strategy of disrupting U.S. space assets, so it would

not have stopped the test even if the United States had protested;

that it would continue developing and testing the program, despite

the strongly negative international reaction.

The system, itself, cannot yet be considered a proven capability.

If China refrained from future tests, this would call into question

just how central China sees this ASAT system is to its military

posture, and that Chinese decisions may be influenced by international concerns.

I will leave you with the idea that technical solutions cannot get

us all the way to a secure future in space. Diplomacy and arms

control measures will be essential to building our future in space,

a future where the enormous potential of space as an agent of prosperity and stability is realized.

I urge the distinguished members of this committee to ask the

hard questions. Why isn’t the United States using all the tools

available to ensure security on space and on earth? Why are we not

vigorously pursuing all the potential diplomatic avenues, when

there are many? And while the United States has apparently abandoned the development of its own kinetic energy ASAT weapon

back in the 1980’s, it has taken a very welcome leadership role in

developing international guidelines for debris mitigation and has

the most to lose from space debris, owning over half the active satellites in orbit. Why doesn’t it do more to make sure that no other

country develops and tests this kind of weapons? Specifically, why

did it apparently stand by and watch while China tested its massive kinetic energy ASAT system and did not vigorously try to dissuade the Chinese from the test in which they actually destroyed

a satellite, especially with so much at stake?

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Grego follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. Hitchens.

STATEMENT OF THERESA HITCHENS

Ms. HITCHENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee, for inviting me today to discuss what I believe is one

of the most important subjects for the 21st century, and that is the

future security of space and, in particular, the impact of U.S. policy

on that security.

Warfare in space would endanger all space operations, civil, commercial, and military. As the world’s preeminent space power, the

United States will have the most to lose if space becomes a battlefield. Unfortunately, U.S. policy is leading us in exactly that direction, toward embracing space weaponization and away from international diplomacy that could reduce future threats to our space

assets.

As has been stated, the Bush administration on October 6, 2006,

released international space policy superseding the previous Clinton policy. While there are similarities to previous policies in that

new national space policy, the wording is strikingly different from

its predecessors in its unilateralist tone and its focus on the exercise of military space power. In seeking to assert unhindered U.S.

rights to act in space, the new policy, at best, ignores the rights

of others under the Outer Space Treaty, which deems space a global commons.

The new policy not only repeats the 1996 language asserting a

right to deny U.S. adversaries the use of space, but it goes further

by stating U.S. intentions to deter others from even developing capabilities that can challenge U.S. freedom of action in space. That

is a difficult thing to uphold, considering that most space technologies are dual use.

It stops short of overtly authorizing space weapons, but when

read in concert with current military documents designed to implement it, which detail the missions of offensive space control and

space force application, U.S. intentions to pursue such weaponry

seem clear.

Reaction to the new policy, especially abroad, has been exceedingly negative. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese of the U.S. Navy War College provided this assessment: ‘‘The blunt and even confrontational

language of the new policy puts the United States at odds with the

priorities of other space-faring nations. The language is so broad

that it reads more like a blanket claim to hegemony in space.’’ And

the document, as the chairman has already noted, further distances the United States from international efforts to establish collective security in space.

Sadly, this aggressive U.S. declaratory policy and the Just Say

No attitude to diplomacy is utterly failing to protect America’s interest in space. To the contrary, it is backfiring, alienating allies

and prompting our potential adversaries into seeking ways to

counter any expansion of U.S. space power.

Certainly if the aim of U.S. policy is to dissuade and deter others

from obtaining capabilities to threaten us, it has failed at doing so.

As we heard, China has tested an ASAT weapon. India is threatening to develop similar capabilities which would no doubt spark an

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Asian ASAT arms race involving Pakistan and possibly others. And

we have already heard about the debris problem.

The time has come for the United States to rethink its failing

strategy. A first step would be to engage other space-faring nations

in efforts to define peacetime rules of the road, as mentioned by

General Armor. A space code of conduct would bolster U.S. national

security by serving to reduce tensions and making it easier to identify and constrain bad apples.

Second, the United States should renounce not only the development and deployment of debris-creating ASATs, but it should also

urge an international ban on testing and use of these indiscriminate satellite killers. While such a ban may not prevent people

from working on them, it certainly would discourage other nations

from using them or testing them, which is where I mentioned

would make it less likely that they would want to rely on them in

warfare.

As they say, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and

in the case of space debris this is doubly true since there are currently no technologies available for cleaning it up. There is no such

thing as a Space Hoover.

Finally, the United States needs to sit down with other spacefaring nations to discuss how to avoid an arms race in the heavens,

and I am glad to hear that Ambassador Mahley said that the

United States is no longer refusing informal discussions in the CD.

That is a change, and it is a welcome one. But I would hope that

we would be willing to at least talk about crafting a treaty to ban

space-based weapons, even though we know it would be fiendishly

difficult to do. Certainly there can be no harm from an honest discussion.

My last point is that a new focus on diplomacy and collective security in space does not and should not mean that the United

States should abandon necessary efforts to protect its satellites, for

example, by improving space situational awareness, but the fact is

that what any one operator does in space directly affects all others,

and not any one nation, not even the United States, can guarantee

safety and security in space on its own.

Thank you. I will be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hitchens follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Hitchens.

Mr. Kueter.

STATEMENT OF JEFF KUETER

Mr. KUETER. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss this very

important issue. I agree completely with Theresa that it is, I believe, the national security question of the 21st century.

Our use of space has clearly changed, and what it means for the

strategic environment has clearly changed. As has been mentioned,

the missions provided by space are integral to the American way

of warfare. This way of warfare brings us enormous advantages. It

requires less manpower, puts fewer U.S. forces in harm’s way, and

integrates all space-based missions into real time boots-on-theground and stand-off precision strike operations.

By fulfilling these real-time war fighting needs, as well as the

broader strategic reconnaissance and intelligence missions, space

assets no longer just tell us where people are and what they are

doing, they are integrated with and improve the effectiveness of

weapons systems that are used to target and destroy. That is not

a convenience to the war fighter; they are now part of the weapons

systems that we use every day, and not an insignificant part of

that.

These capabilities are uniquely American strength and provide

clear incentive for attacking American spacecraft. Other nations

have clearly taken notice. China’s demonstration of its direct-ascent anti-satellite system in January 2007 shows those emerging

capabilities. Last September, reports surfaced that China had successfully conducted laser blinding tests against U.S. reconnaissance

satellites, and further investigation reveals that these blinding

tests had been ongoing for several years. China has made no secret

of its efforts to develop techniques to jam navigation satellites, as

have many other nations.

China’s perceptions of its security environment and the nature of

the future conflicts explain their investment in military space capabilities. They understand that the control of space is essential to

success in future warfare. Without control of space, Chinese military leaders believe neither they nor an adversary can expect to assert air or naval dominance or win a ground war.

In light of this changed environment, what are we to make of the

national space policy? Released after many years in the making,

the policy charts a reasonable course, upholding established beliefs

about safeguarding the security of the United States in space while

preserving the flexibility needed to respond to the uncertain security environments of the future.

The policy is not without its failings, but it does reiterate the

commitment to preserving and protecting U.S. assets in space, as

has been directed by Democratic and Republican Presidents, alike,

over the years. But as the first space policy written for the age of

the space-enabled reconnaissance strike complex, the policy rightly

asserts that the national security establishment should ‘‘develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space

and, if directed, deny such freedom of actions to adversaries.’’

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This goal draws its origins from the earliest days of the U.S.

space program, nor is there really anything unique about directing

the security establishment to develop plans and options to deny

freedom of action to adversaries. Even President Carter ordered the

Defense Department to ‘‘vigorously pursue development of an antisatellite capability’’ and allowed for the production of such systems.

Nevertheless, this mandate is widely interpreted as presaging

the deployment of new U.S. space weapons rather than for what it

actually is, a reaffirmation of the continuing strategic approach.

The declaration that the United States will ‘‘oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space’’ also is offered as evidence that the new policy is part of some nefarious framework to

expand U.S. hegemony in space. Instead of just simply a statement

that the United States will not support international agreements

that it considers contrary to its interests, it is not the blanket prohibition on arms control, as is often asserted.

Past space policies include similar qualifying language. For example, President Clinton’s 1996 policy stated that the United

States should ‘‘conclude agreements on such measures only if they

are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the

United States or our allies.’’ The new policy sends the same message as the old policy: the United States will not become a party

to an agreement that it feels is contrary to its interests. Nevertheless, the new policy does not eschew internationally. For example,

it strongly calls on the United States to assume leadership on overall debris mitigation.

So the question now facing America’s leaders is, how does the

United States best deter, deny, and dissuade the Chinese and other

emerging space powers from hostile actions in space?

The first step I suggest is moving beyond the tired lexical dispute

over what is militarizing or weaponizing space. That is too late.

Space is already both of those. A positive step would be to build

on recognition of the new reality in space to enable public and political support necessary to begin the work to protect critical space

programs. A new emphasis on policies and programs likely to improve our capabilities to respond and react to incidents in space is

needed. The United States should not foreclose the option of developing active defenses, if necessary. And, finally, diplomatic efforts

can play important roles in preserving U.S. security, but only in

combination with other measures.

There are a number of topics that I suggest we consider there,

most importantly involving more actively our NATO allies.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kueter follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Kueter.

Mr. Cavossa.

STATEMENT OF DAVID CAVOSSA

Mr. CAVOSSA. Mr. Chairman, Representative McCollum, Representative Platts, on behalf of the Satellite Industry Association it

is my goal today to provide you with an overview of the critical role

satellites play in our global economy, the role they play in support

of our military and first responders, and then finally speak for a

few moments on the importance of space situational awareness and

being a responsible actor in space.

Whether broadcasting television programming to viewers

throughout the world, enabling the U.S. military to conduct large

and small scale operations across large distances, or providing communications to first responders during disasters, satellites are

there.

Today satellites permeate our every-day lives and contribute over $106 billion to our global economy. Today commercial satellites

support daily activities such as truck fleet management, credit card

validations, pay-at-the-pump services, ATM withdrawals, highspeed Internet access, traffic and weather reports, and almost all

television and radio distribution. In rural areas where terrestrial

communications do not reach all residents, satellite broadband, satellite television, and satellite radio provide consumers services they

otherwise would not have access to through terrestrial means.

As we all know, satellite communications have also played a critical role during the response to each of the natural and man-made

disasters in recent memory. In 2005, satellite communications provided a lifeline for aid workers and victims in the remote islands

of the Indian Ocean following the Asian tsunami, and in the earthquake-desolated towns and villages of Pakistan. In response to

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the recent tornadoes in Kansas,

satellite communication’s once again proved their essential value

when all other forms of terrestrial communications were wiped out.

In many of these affected areas, satellite communications provide

the only means of communication.

Military forces are also perhaps the most dependent upon satellite communication systems today. Telemedicine via satellite puts

the resources of the world-class specialists and surgeons at the disposal of medical teams in the field. Unmanned aerial vehicles such

as the Predator and Global Hawk are heavy users of satellite bandwidth today. Other bandwidth-intensive activities such as secure

video teleconferencing and encrypted command and control are also

supported by satellite communications. The DOD estimates that

satellite systems provided over 60 percent of all communications

during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Given this reliance on satellite communications, during the last

5 years the satellite industry has spent thousands of hours and

millions of dollars working with the government, both domestic and

allied, to improve the performance, security, and reliability of our

satellite infrastructure. These activities are being coordinated,

again, both domestically and with our allied partners through what

is called the Commercial Satellite Mission Assurance Working

Group [MAWG].

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Through the MAWG we meet on a regular basis with representatives of the combatant commands, the military services, and Defense agencies, as well as the U.S. State Department, the intelligence community, and representatives of allied governments. The

issues we discuss are space situational awareness, information

sharing, jamming and intentional interference to commercial communication satellites, and how to handle close approaches in space

between commercial satellites and government satellites.

For the past few years our companies have worked closely with

the U.S. Government to develop a series of best practices to reduce

the chances of orbital collisions and close approaches between commercial satellites and government satellites. As part of that effort,

for the past 3 years our companies have used space surveillance

data provided by Air Force Space Command. Their commercial and

foreign entities pilot program is very essential to avoid collisions

with other natural or man-made objects in space.

A key piece of this coordination effort, as General Armor mentioned during the question and answer session, is in jeopardy, however. The CFE program, or the Commercial and Foreign Entity

program, is currently on a list of unfunded priorities in the DOD

budget, and therefore we urge Congress to fully fund the CFE program to ensure we are all able to continue safe operations and responsible operations in space. We need that data from the Department of Defense.

We believe that the U.S. Air Force should fully implement the

congressional mandated CFE program and that the program

should include launch support, conjunction assessment, end-of-life

and re-entry support, anomaly resolution, and emergency services

during close approach times. This will all help us operate safely.

In closing, satellite systems, as I have mentioned, represent a

critical infrastructure for the United States, its allies and our trading partners. As such, Congress must ensure that space commerce

is as protected as maritime commerce is today, and therefore we

need to invest to raise the robustness of the space infrastructure

to mute the effect an attack would have on any one object.

The commercial satellite industry is fully focused on reducing potential vulnerabilities in our systems and, further, we are working

proactively with the U.S. Government and with allied governments

to establish these best practices that I have referred to to promote

safe and responsible operations.

Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you for having me

today. I look forward to answering any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cavossa follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the witnesses

on the panel.

If you are good enough to key up a small video that I would like

to play just for a minute and a half on this, this is a video by

sellerstrack.com, which uses debris data from the Air Force. As we

watch it, I think we can remember the model-sized piece of debris

in low-earth orbit would hit a satellite with the same force as a one

ton safe dropped from a five-story building on earth. But after this

I want to ask a question of Mr. Cavossa.

[Video presentation.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The red that you see there is obviously a depiction

of the debris from the Chinese satellite being shot down.

[End of video presentation.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Cavossa, can you talk to us a little bit about

the challenges of space debris to your commercial satellite sector?

Mr. CAVOSSA. Our commercial satellite operators are located both

in low-earth orbit, in relative proximity to what you saw there in

that illustration, but a great number, a majority of our satellites

are located in geostationary orbit, which is 23,000 miles away,

quite a bit further away. But our satellite operators today, both in

low-earth orbit and geostationary orbit, work very closely with each

other. They make sure that when a satellite from one company is

going to perhaps maneuver to a different orbital slot, it coordinates

with all the satellites around it to make sure that everyone knows,

hey, I am about to move, and give that data on where you are

going to move your satellites so everyone is aware. We call it Nation Watch of Space Situational Awareness.

Mr. TIERNEY. But debris doesn’t give you much of an opportunity

to plan with anything, does it?

Mr. CAVOSSA. No. If it is, of course, debris that we don’t know

about, that is a problem, and that is why this CFE program that

I mentioned that the Air Force Space Command runs is so critical

to commercial satellite operators. We don’t have the ability to track

objects in space, the same ability that the U.S. Government has.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you think tracking would be enough if a number

of nations decided they were going to test as China did and all that

debris got in there? Do you think the ability to track that would

give comfort to your commercial sector?

Mr. CAVOSSA. Well, sir, tracking alone would be important, of

course, but if there was quite a bit more debris up there, yes, that

would cause a problem for our satellites.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hitchens, would you respond a little bit to Mr.

Kueter’s testimony and to the first two witnesses of this concept

that we can’t really verify any treaty on that, we can’t define the

terms, I think the first panel said what’s weaponization, they can’t

determine what’s a violation, can’t be verified and can’t be enforced. Do you have a reaction to that?

Ms. HITCHENS. I think everyone who works on this issue recognizes that it would be very difficult to craft a sort of generic space

weapons ban treaty, and Laura referred to it with the idea of the

difficulty of banning technology, and in particular the difficulty of

discerning between dual use technology on what is a weapon and

what is not a weapon.

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On the other hand, that doesn’t necessarily mean that it is not

doable. The United States has signed treaties that don’t have verification provisions. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe the Biological Weapons Convention does not have verification protocol, because the United States insisted that it did not.

Certainly there are other approaches like the ASAT testing and

use ban, which we have rejected, and I don’t know why because

you can verify testing and use of a debris-creating ASAT.

So there are a lot of different approaches that need to be explored. The problem here has largely been a lack of will and not

a lack of way.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Kueter, on that other point, I heard you say

pretty clearly that U.S. warfare and intelligence relies on satellites.

I don’t think anybody disputes that, or that it is a useful thing to

have, but can’t we differentiate between not interfering with a nation’s ability to use satellites for those purposes and the prospect

of people attacking those satellites and then creating debris from

it or other difficulties on that, and then go back to Ms. Hitchens’

point of wouldn’t it be useful to at least make a differentiation and

then talk about having some agreement that would not allow people to do that.

Mr. KUETER. The satellites that we use for real-time war fighting

capabilities, the communication satellites, the GPS signals that enable precision navigation and timing, are integrated into terrestrial

power projection capabilities today. That is the point that I am trying to make in terms of why those assets are now very attractive

strategic targets for a real or potential adversary of the United

States to go after. If they were to successfully eliminate our access

to those capabilities or deny our use of those capabilities when we

desire to use them, they would gain an enormous asymmetric advantage over us at a particular point in time.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess that is the point. So isn’t that what we

want to negotiate with them so that they wouldn’t be able to do

that without some sort of agreement prohibiting that?

Mr. KUETER. Well, sir, there are two specific responses to that.

The first is I don’t see where it would be in the interest of any

other nation to negotiate their right away to exploit that asymmetric advantage at some future point in time; and, second, I don’t believe that it is possible to verify all of the numerous ways that one

might hold those assets at risk, both electronic, which we have not

talked about very much, or through direct threats, such as the direct-ascent ASAT that we have talked about.

Mr. TIERNEY. On the first point, isn’t that a little bit like saying

people won’t want to negotiate away their right to have nuclear

weapons, so we shouldn’t have any weapons nonproliferation agreements in that respect, and biological, chemical, the whole idea that

somebody might want an advantage that they think they can get

some day means that they will never negotiate in good faith and

preclude that?

Mr. KUETER. Well, the first point I guess I would make against

that statement is that we are talking about a set of capabilities

today that China clearly possesses and that other nations have

nascent capabilities to possess. In the sense of being able to launch

a ballistic missile from the surface of the earth carrying a nuclear

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warhead into space, exploding it, and destroying any number of

satellites in its path, those capabilities exist in the hands of numerous nations today. So you would be talking about an arms control

effort that would require rolling back capabilities.

I would suggest that we have very few arms treaties that we can

point to that suggest a rolling back of capabilities on a multilateral

level.

Mr. TIERNEY. I can name a few.

Ms. Hitchens and Ms. Grego, why don’t we ask you for a comment on that?

Ms. GREGO. Well, I think really the question is are we better off

in a world where we have unrestrained ASATs or not. You can

argue that you can’t define every threat, that you can’t verify every

threat, and that may be true. I don’t think that we have gone far

enough to really determine that. But the question is: would we be

better by moving ahead with diplomatic efforts to restrain the most

dangerous technologies; for example, direct-ascent ASATs. I think

the answer really is yes. And I think that is the type of ban that

is actually verifiable, that is doable with our capabilities right now.

Whether or not countries have the technology to approach or to

develop those weapons, well, I think soon enough anyone who is interested or finds it in their interest to have an ASAT weapon would

be able to develop some technology that can do that. That is the

reality we have to face, and I think we will best face that if we

have some kind of comprehensive arms control agreement to manage that transition to the future.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Cavossa, as to the specific national space policy for

your industry, do you think it adequately addresses the role of commercial space travel and involvement as it is written currently?

Mr. CAVOSSA. Sure. Representative Platts, as an industry association, we are a consensus-based trade association, so all 30 members of our group have to agree before we go forward with any position, so on that issue the industry doesn’t have a position of supporting or opposing.

I can highlight, though, that there was some interest in the

things we did see in the space policy we hadn’t seen in the past,

which was the focus on interference becoming a problem. Jamming

up commercial communication satellites is a problem, and it was

mentioned in the national space policy as an issue that the U.S.

Government was looking at and viewed as a serious threat. So we

were happy to see that.

Mr. PLATTS. OK. And certainly you mentioned the funding on the

CFE issue, not part of the space policy but just the importance of

that to your industry?

Mr. CAVOSSA. Yes, sir.

Mr. PLATTS. OK. Ms. Hitchens, you talk about in your testimony

that the space policy, we are, in essence, giving China an excuse

or a basis to pursue the weaponization of space. Given the timing

of this launch in January, I think it is fair to say it was really

under the language of the last policy of 1996, because the new policy had just come out in the fall of 2006. So how do you reconcile

that if this new policy is so dramatically different and more miliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:09 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37094.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tary focused, China went ahead with their launch, anti-satellite

launch, under the Clinton policy, so why would this one be more

encouraging given that it happened already under the Clinton policy?

Ms. HITCHENS. I think there are two parts to that question, sir,

so I am going to try to answer maybe the last one first.

It is obvious that China has been interested in what we call

counter-space technologies, things we have been pursuing for more

than a decade, for a long time due to their recognition that United

States and other’s space power is something that might be vulnerable. OK? So there is no denying that.

Second, it is probably not true that China’s test was a direct response to the new national space policy. I think what I was trying

to say in my testimony is that such a national space policy that can

be read as very aggressive, especially when you read it along with

Air Force doctrine that talks about counter-space operations, offensive counter-space operations, attacking satellites, you can see that

it could give political cover to the Chinese to say we are doing this

because the United States is a threat.

And the Chinese, indeed, have said that we are a threat, the

United States is a threat, both with its efforts to create hegemony

in space and contain the Chinese and, second, with the U.S. missile

defense effort, which the Chinese have long been concerned will

nullify their very small nuclear deterrent.

So U.S. space power has been an issue for China for more than

a decade, and it has numerous factors.

Mr. PLATTS. So is it your contention, then, that if we had just

continued under the Clinton space policy, China would not be pursuing its endeavors as it is?

Ms. HITCHENS. Actually, no. I think obviously the Clinton administration didn’t pursue space arms control, either. Although they

did not, they ruled out space weapons and anti-satellite weapons.

They canceled programs. Despite the language in the policy, their

implementation of it was very, very different. They did not approve

of the weaponization of space.

That said, I don’t necessarily think the Chinese might not have

gone down this path if we would have continued the Clinton policy,

because we have failed. This administration has taken a harsher

line, but we have failed for more than a decade to properly pursue

diplomacy as one end of our space policy.

Mr. PLATTS. I guess when I read the sections of the 1996 policy

that you quoted and the 2006, I would look at it similarly to Mr.

Kueter that I don’t see a whole lot of difference. There are some

slight words, but I think the key is, when they talk about an arms

control agreement, only if they are equitable, effectively verifiable,

and enhances the security of the United States and our allies.

Maybe they put that at the end of the sentence as opposed to

lead with that, but the focus is still we are not going to pursue and

enter into arms agreements that are not in the national security

interest of our country.

Ms. GREGO. No country would enter into an arms control agreement that wouldn’t be in their interest. That would be silly. And

I don’t believe that is what I or others who are advocating for certain kinds of agreements and diplomacy are trying to advocate. InVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:09 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37094.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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deed, in my humble opinion it is in the U.S. national security to

try to use diplomatic tools to counter some of these problems, because I don’t believe that we can do that using hard power.

Mr. PLATTS. One real quick.

Mr. TIERNEY. We have four votes coming up, so that everybody

gets a chance to ask questions.

Mr. PLATTS. OK. Final one is just, 1996, the last policy, is a very

different world coming out of the end of the cold war to 2007 and

the global war on terror and the threat that exists today. Would

you acknowledge that you can’t compare 1996 and the decisions

then directly to 2006, given the changes in the threats to American

security?

Ms. HITCHENS. I actually think that is a very good point, sir. One

of the things that I believe that we need to look at currently with

regard to space is the fact that there are more and more space actors and that the technology has spread, and we have to really

think about how we handle space in a globalized world as opposed

to in a bipolar world, and that makes it a lot more difficult but it

makes it a lot more crucial that we figure out things like rules of

the road for space actors. I think that is what you and General

Armor were talking about, the expansion of space technology and

the need to——

Mr. PLATTS. I would like to explore further, because the issue

that has not been mentioned is the difference in terrorism today

versus 1996 in a global sense, but I am out of time.

I thank all of you for your testimony.

Mr. TIERNEY. There may be more time for you after Ms. McCollum, but I want to make sure Ms. McCollum has an opportunity.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To the difference in language—and I might add that the Bush

administration, when it is working on language like this product

doesn’t hold discussions, hearing from the best and brightest in a

public venue, talk to Members of Congress about things. Usually

it gets released on a Friday after Congress has adjourned to go

home to work for the weekend in our Districts. But I found it interesting in your testimony, Ms. Hitchens, I think words do have

meaning, and I think the meaning is very, very different.

The Clinton policy: ‘‘Consistent with treaty obligations, the

United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure the freedoms of action in space, and if directed

denies such freedom of access to adversaries. These capabilities

may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal, or military measures to

preclude an adversary’s hostile use of space systems and services.’’

Clearly, going to defend the country but clearly wants to work with

the international community for a solution.

This is our new doctrine: ‘‘The United States considers space capabilities, including ground segments, as supporting links and vital

to its national interest. Consistent with the policy, the United

States will preserve its rights and capabilities of freedoms and actions in space.’’ But here’s where the language, I think, in my opinion, really changes: ‘‘Dissuade or deter others from either impeding

those rights or developing capabilities to do so, to take actions necessary to protect space capabilities, to respond to interference and

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deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile

to the United States’ interest.’’

One is inclusive, kind of to what you were saying about your industry doesn’t have a position on it but let’s get people together

and talk about what is in the common good, making sure that the

U.S. security interests are taken care of, and the other one is saying I don’t have to worry about the common good, I just have to

worry about my good. And when I just worry about myself, or if

we just worry about the United States, other countries quite often

perceive that as hostile, that they are not being included in it.

So if you could comment, internationally what have you heard

from even some of our allies internationally on this different tone

that is being taken, and perhaps you, as well, sir, from the industry perspective internationally.

Ms. HITCHENS. Well, as I said, the reaction, particularly internationally, to the new space policy was exceedingly negative. I

want to point out that this didn’t just come from places that would

be likely to bash the Bush administration or the United States. I

mean, Aviation Week, the industry journal, called the new policy

judalistic and fretted that it would harm NASA’s ability to find

partners for the Moon and Mars. The Times of London called the

policy comically proprietary about the United States’ wish to control everyone’s access to space. And you heard my quote from Joan

Johnson-Freese, who is a tenured professor at the Naval War College. So we are not exactly talking about the flaming liberal left

commentators here.

Language is important. Language is important, and the language

in this policy talks about U.S. rights, U.S. rights, protecting U.S.

freedom of action; whereas, if you look at the Clinton policy and

you look at the words, it talks about sovereign rights of any nation.

Those are differences. In fact, the Reagan policy talked about sovereign rights of any nation. So this is a change in tonality.

While we may think that is no big deal in the substance, on the

international stage that is what diplomacy is about. It is not only

about what you say, but it is about how you say it.

Mr. CAVOSSA. Congresswoman, all I can say is, as an industry we

tend to be a global industry. The satellite industry is very much

the telecommunications industry, so the companies that are represented by the Satellite Industry Association across the board are

U.S. and non-U.S. companies. What we have seen, I mentioned in

my testimony the Mission Assurance Working Group, that we have

been working with the Department of Defense and allied governments. In those meetings, allied governments are in the room, representatives of the government or of the ministries of defense are

there, and they are trying to work with us. To the DOD’s credit,

they are inviting them to be involved in these discussions.

That is all I can speak to.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

We are going to have to go to vote, but if anybody has a final

comment that they want to make in 30 seconds, I will give you

each an opportunity to do that, and then apologize for the fact, but

I don’t want to make you wait around for another hour before we

come back.

Does anybody care to say anything? Mr. Kueter.

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Mr. KUETER. I would just like to comment on your question. I

think the reactions that we saw in the immediate aftermath of the

release of the policy reflect the greatest failure that the administration pursued in releasing this policy, which was the failure to come

out publicly and articulate what they meant when they used the

language in this particular document. I think the language that

you quoted compared to the Bush administration or the new space

policy is consistent in terms of an interpretation that one could put

on it.

And I would say that, in terms of the real rubber meets the road

part of international cooperation, I would refer you to General Armor’s comments on the first panel, where he said that, in fact, from

his perspective the new policy encouraged greater international cooperation on a military-to-military side, something that he didn’t

see in the earlier program.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Cavossa, anything to close?

Mr. CAVOSSA. No, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Grego.

Ms. GREGO. No, thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hitchens.

Ms. HITCHENS. I just want to mention that I do want to thank

you, Mr. Chairman, and the panel for undertaking this, because I

believe this has been the first hearing on space policy, the first

public debate, and we really do need to have more of these.

And the second thing I wanted to say is the one thing I think

you will hear agreement on across the board here if you listen hard

is the question of rules of the road and the idea of establishing new

rules for people to operate together particularly in peacetime. That

is an issue that I think there is more and more consensus about,

and I would really urge the committee and the subcommittee to

look into that in more depth.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thank you all very, very much for your

time, patience, and your contributions.

I would invite you to write the committee with any suggestions

you have on what a further hearing would focus upon. If it could

be helpful to the debate, we will then discuss it as a committee and

decide if we are going to do that. We do want to make sure that

this issue gets covered. We think it is important also or we

wouldn’t have had the hearing.

Thank all of you, thank my colleagues.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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