BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 

Report To The Swbcoimmittee 

On International Security And Scientific Affairs 

Committee On Forei~gn Affairs 

House Of Reprewntatilves 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

Resource reduetiolns at the Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agen’cy during the past 

few years caused concerns about its ability 

to perform several of its legis’lated duties, 

including thase related to arms co’ntrol 

policymaking and research. Because of 

these concerns, GAO was asked to examine 

certain aspects of ACDA’s operations, including its internai control system, res’earch 

efforts, and computer-bas’ed support activities. In 1983 GAO issued reports on these 

topics to the Director of ACDA. ACDA agreed 

to act on most of GAO’s recommendations 

ta improve its management in these areas. 

Also, ACDA’s resource levels have been subsequently increased and efforts h’ave been 

made to strengthsen ACDA’s policy role. 

GAO/NSIAD-84-19 

APRIL 11, 1984 

I 

, / .:,,.* ; c. ,i 
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; 

.” 
B-212009 

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell; Chairman 

The Honorable William S. Broomfield, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Subcommittee on International Security 

and Scientific Affairs 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

In response to the Subcommittee's request of March 31, 

1983, we have reviewed several issues related to the ability of 

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to effectively 

carry out its responsibilities. This report discusses longstanding concerns and recent actions regarding ACDA's policy 

role and resource levels; adequacy of its internalanyn;;;;f; 

management of its arms control research program 

coordination of government-wide arms control research; and 

development and operation of computer-based support for ACDA 

programs and activities. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested 

congressional committees, officials of the agencies involved, 

and other parties upon request. 

Comptroller General 

of the United States 

COMPTROLLER GE'MEIUL'S REPORT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT 

TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRACTLCES AND INCREASE RESOURCES 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND AT THE ARMS CONTROL AND 

SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRSIF DISARMAMENT AGENCY 

COMMITTEE ON FORESGN AFFAIRS, 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

DIGEST 

. ..----- 

The Arms Control and, Disarmament Act of 1961 

established the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency (ACDA) as the central U.S. drganization 

for formulating and implementing U.S arms eontrol policy. ACDA's primary functions also 

involve arms control negotiations, research, 

verification, and public information.. Over 

the years, concerns have been expressed periodically by some Members of Congress about 

ACDA's ability to perform its functions, most 

often focusing on ACDA's policy role and the 

adequacy of its resources. 

Concerns over ACDA's ability to perform some 

of its legislated duties prompted a request 

from the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, for GAO to review the extent 

to which ACDA was fulfilling several of its 

legislated duties, including those related to 

arms control policymaking and research. After 

GAO testified before the Subcommittee in March 

1983, the Subcommittee's Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member requested that GAO continue 

the development of the issues it had testified 

on, including those related to adequacy of 

ACDA's internal controls, the management of 

its arms control research programs, and the 

development and operation of computer-based 

support for its proqrams and activities. (See 

appendix.) 

In September 1983, GAO issued a series of 

three reports to the Director, ACDA, addressing the manaqement improvement opportunities 

in each of these three areas. This report to 

the Subcommittee summarizes those three 

reports, including ACDA's official comments 

and GAO's evaluation of them, and describes 

certain recent actions taken by ACDA in 

response to the reports' findings. This 

report also discusses longstandinq concerns 

about, and recent actions on, ACDA's resource 

levels and policy role. 

Tear Sheet i GAO/NSIAD-84-19 

APl?lk. 11, 1984 
J48$ ,WB~OUT ACDA'S 

,S(?XW? LEVELS 

As a res~u~'t ccuif their concerns regarding ACDA's 

policy role, sio~u~ Members of Congress have 

occasionally @ought to enhance ACDA's influence. ACDA officials and outside observers 

generally agree that the Agency's influence is 

largely d@psndia;lnt on the ACDA Director's relationship with th:e President and the Secretary 

of S'tats'. HY~~wwB~, goold relationships between. 

these officials cannot be legislatively mandated. Congrs'ss'ional attention has instead 

focused on 'thi!' Agency's role in two of the 

executivcl brinch"s .formal decisionmaking mechanisms--the intsrkgency groups and the 

National S'ecvrity Caiuncil. 

Interagency groups have representation from 

interested agencies and function as policymaking bodies in m&y. areas, including arms 

control. These groups address and help set 

policy,for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, 

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces neqotiations, arms transfers, anti-satellite warfare, 

and other issues. In the past, ACDA had 

chaired some arms control-related interaqency 

groups. Howeverc ACDA began losing its formal 

leadershipapositions in 1969. Until recently, 

ACDA chaired none of the various arms controlrelated interagency groups, although it 

remained a member of them and chaired some of 

the lower-ranked working groups. All of-the 

arms control-related interagency groups were 

instead chaired by the Departments of State or 

Defense. In mid-1983, the' Director of ACDA 

expressed concern about his agency's lack of a 

leadership role and indicated that ACDA would 

again seek chair positions. ACDA has since 

begun to -co-chair two of the more than 20 

interagency groups and committees it participates in. (See p. 3.1 

Continuing congressional concern about the 

lack of a sustained ACDA role on the National 

Security Council has twice prompted legislation involving the Director's relationship to 

the Council. In 1975, the ACDA Director was 

established as the Council's principal arms 

control adviser. In 1983, the Congress mandated that the Director attend Council meetings involving arms control-related subjects. 

(See P. 4.) 

ii 

;.:’ 

‘. 

7 : , 
ACDA's resource levels for funding and 

personnel have fluctuated over time and, in 

recent ywrs~ have been declining without 

related rsductfons in ACDA's legis'lated 

responsibilities. In its 1984-85 authorization report folr ACOA, the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs expressed concerns regarding 

ACDA's resource levels. In August 1983, the 

administration asked for both staffing and 

funding in:creas~es fo'r ACDA, with a fiscal year 

1984 budget level set at more than $2 million 

OV@lr the $lC#'.4 million it had previously 

requested. The Congress subsequently authorized a filscal year 1984 budget level of $20.9 

millio'n, about $4.5 million more than the 

administration's initial request. These budget levels exclude a proposed program transfer 

from the Department of Energy to ACDA because 

the Congress has twice rejected the proposal. 

(See p. 5.) 

The Congress has acted since 1961 to broaden 

the Agency's mandate and arms control activity 

has recently increased. The fundinq constraints ACDA has faced in recent years emphasize the need far efficient and effective 

manaqement of its operations. 

ACDA can, and should, improve its current 

management practices. The following sections 

summarize our findings regarding ACDA management opportunities in the areas of: 

--internal controls, including 

internal audit; 

--the Agency's external research 

prwram and coordination of 

government-wide arms control 

research; and 

--automatic data processing and 

operations analysis activities. 

NEED FOR IJ!JTERNAL CONTROL 

IYPROVEMENTS 

In April 1983, when GAO began the review 

underlying its report on ACDA'S internal controls (GAO/NSIAD-83-68, Sept. 30, 19831, ACDA 

had yet to comply with an Office of Management 

and Budget (OMR) directive prescribing policies and standards to be followed by executive 

Tear Sheet iii 
branch agencies in designing, installing, and 

maintaining their internal control systems. 

GAO found that ACDA needed to implement key 

internal control requirements such as assigning responsibility for internal control. ACDA 

began to do so while GAO's work was in progress. (See p. 9.) 

GAO also found (see p. 10) that ACDA has not 

had the expanded-scope internal audit coverage 

it needs. ACDA .does not have an internal 

audit staff and the limited audit services it 

obtains from other agencies did not meet OMB 

requirements. If expanded-scope internal 

audit coverage had been available, it might 

have helped identify certain matters for top 

management attention, such as . 

--differences in assigned versus 

performed arms control verification activities, and 

--noncompliance with various OMB 

directives on internal controls, internal audit, and 

security of automated information systems. 

GAO recommended that the Director, ACDA, take 

a series of actions designed to address the 

matters discussed, including implementing key 

internal control requirements and establishing 

expanded-scope internal audit coverage. In 

September 1983 ACDA agreed to act on most of 

the recommendations. As of March 1984, ACDA 

and the General Services Administration were 

developing an expanded-scope audit plan for 

possible use at ACDA.(See p. 14.) 

BETTER MANAGEMENT AND MORE 

COORDINATION OF ARMS CONTROL 

RESEARCH NEEDED 

In another report (GAO/NSIAD-83-67, Sept. 30, 

1983), GAO found that ACDA needed to improve 

the management of the arms control research 

done for it by others--external research--and 

to either fulfill its responsibility for coordinating arms control research throughout the 

government or ask to be relieved of this 

responsibility. (See p. 17.) 

iv 
External research funding uncertainties have 

complicated planninq and opet;:f;g the program. Resfearch funding, has been 

declitrllng &er WIN, peaked at about $6 miliion in f"jl'scal year 1966 and fell to a low af 

about $? tifllfo~~’ in fiscal year 1975. The 

fiscal ylearc 191'84 research budget, set initially at apprbximately $1.1 million, was 

authorized ait about $1.5 million. The declfning research budget had previously caused some 

bureaus to scale back their research efforts 

and to forego desirable research. Itn addition, since at least 1978, ACDA has periodftally held funds for research projects in 

reserve unti.2. late in the fiscal year, in part 

to fund unforeseen needs in areas other than 

research. (cjee’p. 18.) 

The external research program also was found 

to hawe several management problems, such as 

the absence o'f criteria for selecting projects, no routine use of available information 

for identifying related research being done 

elsewhere, and inadequate preparation and use 

Of research contractor evaluations. (See 

pp. 19 and 20.) 

Under its responsibilities in the Act and the 

administrative directive for coordinating arms 

control research, ACDA is required to develop 

and keep current a government-wide arms control research program. However, it does not 

do so. ACDA daes not oversee other agencies' 

research and the agencies do not routinely 

seek ACDA's advice about research they want to 

do. Also, ACDA does not prepare a required 

inventory of arms control research activities. 

ACDA officials say they lack the resources and 

the "clout" to do what is required. (See 

p. 21.) 

GAO recommended that the Director, ACDA, take 

a series of actions designed to correct the 

problems discussed, includins settinq project 

selection criteria, improvinq the preparation 

and use of research contractor evaluations, 

defining the scope of arms control research, 

estimating the resources needed to perform 

effective government-wide coordination, and 

determining whether ACDA will perform its 

coordination role or ask to be relieved of 

this responsibility. ACDA told GAO in September 1983 that GAO's report would be useful in 

reviews it was initiatinq on external research 

Tear Sheet V 

,;,: .” 

;,.a: * .< .; 

. . ...‘-’ ._I ‘,’ :. 

: .. ” :, ) _ I-:‘, 
planning and procedures and on coordination of 

federal arms control research. ACDA also said 

it was taking action to correct the other 

problems noted by GAO. A subsequent review by 

a consulting firm contracted by ACDA generally 

confirmed GAO's findings, and, in February 

1984, the ACDA Director announced several 

changes in the external research program. 

(See p. 24.) 

BETTER MANAGEMENT OF AUTOMATIC 

DATA PROCESSING AND OPERATIONS 

ANALYSIS NEEDED 

ACDA has used automatic data processing and 

operations analysis for more than 15 years. 

At the end of fiscal year 1982, however, it 

abolished its Office of Operations Analysis, 

retitled and transferred the analysts to other 

parts of ACDA, and gave up its largest computer. ACDA said that abolishing the office 

was a necessary part of a series of actions to 

achieve a fiscal year 1983 OMB-imposed budget 

reduction of $1.3 million. In its report on 

ACDA's computer activities (GAO/NSIAD-83-66, 

Sept. 30, 1983), GAO noted that about $683,000 

in savings could be attributed to changes ACDA 

made in operations analysis and computer support. (See P. 27.) 

Overall, GAO found that ACDA does not adequately plan for, or evaluate the use of, data 

processing systems. ACDA does not have a comprehensive automatic data processing plan and 

its present informal means for planning for 

computer support are inadequate. Fundamental 

planning improvements are needed to afford 

management a supportable basis for making computer resource decisions. (See p. 28.) 

Since 1981 ACDA had deemphasized and reduced 

its operations analysis capabilities. Agency 

officials disagree among themselves over 

whether this reduced level of capabilities 

would diminish the Agency's abilities to carry 

out its operations analysis functions in the 

future. GAO was unable to determine the correctness of either viewpoint partly because 

insufficient documentation precluded an objective determination of the merits of the abolished office or of alternate arrangements for 

obtaining operations analysis services. HOWever, ACDA had neither thoroughly evaluated 

vi 

.,’ ,_/, ’ ‘. ‘. ‘; ‘: .,:.: 

.,. 

,. ‘. .i: 
the o~er~ti~~,n~~~~I,, $wat,ypis cap.abi1itie.s r+,q,qired ,, 

in the,, Ph,tike, tQ ‘fulfill i,ts m$ssion.,, nor 

decided ‘d&w: ,,qu’c$ requirements ycqu.Ld .beak b4 ., 

met, P~&.$$!~~t: * 

operatbo~~~ mah#$$q,,i$, 

Agency-wide pladning fcx 

yduld help : prdvideq I ,of f i- cials w&h &&&” absuran<e’ +-hat d’ehandg ,ffr’ 

such analysBes; would be met. (See p. 31.) 

GAO recmmmended that the Director, ACDA, correct the problems discussed by developing a 

comprehensive automatic data processing planning procesas, implementing guidance on computer services cost accounting, establishing a 

computer security program, and periodically 

assessinq ACDA's operations analysis needs and 

adjusting capabilities if necessary. In September 1983, ACDA stated that the report would 

be helpfuL and that ACDA was initiating 

reviews of its computer planning procedures, 

computer security, requirements for operations 

analysis, and the information management 

requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1980. (ACDA did not comment on GAO's recommendation that ACDA implement a computer cost 

accounting system that complies with executive 

branch guidance. GAO believes that such a 

system is needed and that its specific features should be considered durinq the Agency's 

reviews.) In February 1984, the Director of 

ACDA informed two Senate and House subcommittees that an internal review of GAO's report 

and other factors had resulted in establishment of an augmented operations analysis unit 

within ACDA's Verification and Intelligence 

Rureau. (See p. 34.) 

MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION 

BY THE CONGRESS 

In its 1983 report on ACDA's management of 

arms control research, GAO discussed ACDA's 

practice of using research funds for other 

purposes. This practice has been conducted 

for a number of years, most recently to help 

avoid sersonnel reductions when ACDA's overall 

funding was cut back. Because this practice 

could result in inadequate support for arms 

control research, the Congress may want to 

consider designating a portion of ACDA’S funding for the external research program. (See 

PP. 18 and 24.) 

Tear Sheet vii 
GAO did not obtain official agency comments on 

this report. However, comments were obtained 

on the three reports that GAO issued to the 

Director of ACDA on September 30, 1983. The 

reports and ACDA's comments are summarized in 

this report. 

viii 

., ,. 

,,‘,, ‘. .._ 
Contents 

Page 

DIGEST 

CHAPTER 

1 

i 

INTRODUCTION 1 

ACDA's responsibilities 2 

Longstanding,concerns about and recent 

actions on ACDA'S policy role and 

resource levels 3 

Objectives, scope, and methadology 7 

NEED FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS, 

INCLUDING ADEQUATE INTERNAL AUDIT 

COVERAGE 9 

ACDA needs to implement additional 

internal control requirements 9 

ACDA has not had the expanded-scope 

internal audit coverage it needs 10 

Various approaches to obtain internal 

audit coverage 13 

Conclusions 14 

Agency actions and our evaluation 14 

COORDINATION OF FEDERAL ARMS CONTROL 

RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL 

RESEARCH PROGRAM STILL NEED IMPROVEMENT 17 

Management difficulties persist 

in ACDA's external research 

program 17 

ACDA is not fulfilling its 

government-wide research role 21 

Conclusions 23 

Matter for consideration 

by the Congress 24 

Agency actions 24 
Page 

CHAPTSQ 

4 

APPYNDIX 

ACDA 

ADP 

cs 

DOD 

GAO 

GSA 

ITJF 

NSC 

OA 

OMB 

SALT 

ST2QT 

VI 

NEED TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF 

COYPUTER-BASED SUPPORT 

WNCTIONS 

Evolution of ADP and operations 

analysis activities 

ACDA does not have the comprehensive ADP management it needs 

ACDA offjcials disagree over 

operations analysis: a thorough 

review of needs could help 

Conclusions 

Agency actions and our evaluation 

Letter dated March 31, 7983, from 

the Chairman and Ranking Minority 

Wmber, Subcommittee on International 

%curity end Scientific Affairs, 

Commit+e on Foreign Affairs, 

U.S. %use of Representatives 

ABBREVIATIONS 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

Automatic nata Processing 

Computer Services Group 

Delnarl-,ment of Defense 

General Accounting Office 

General Services Administration 

Tntermediate-ranae Nuclear Forces 

National Securitv Council 

Office of Operat.ions Analysis 

Office of Manacwment and Budget 

Str>?",egie Awns Limitation Talks 

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 

Bureau sf Verification and Intelligence 

27 

27 

28 

31 

33 

34 

36 
CRAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

In January 1983, the Rouse Foreign Affairs Committee’s 

Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs 

asked us for assistance in preparing for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) fiscal years 1984 and 1985 budqet authorization hearings. The Subcommittee was interested in determining 

the extent to which ACDA was fulfilling several of its legislated 

duties, including those related, to arms control policymakinq and 

research. In Yarch 1983, we testified before the Subcommittee on 

ACDA's ability to carry out its major responsibilities.' Our 

testimony focused on ACDA's role in formulating arms control policy and conducting negotiations; managing research needed to support these efforts; performing its arms control verification 

functions; carrying out some of its general management activities; 

and reducing its computer capabilities. 

Following our testimony, the Chairman and Ranking Minority 

Member of the Subcommittee requested that we continue our work at 

ACDA and complete the development of the issues we had presented 

in our testimony, such as 

--adequacy of ACDA's internal controls, 

--management of ACDA's arms control research 

program, and 

--development and operation of computer-based 

support for ACDA's programs and activities. 

They asked that we report on each issue as it was developed. 

Accordingly, we issued a series of reports to the Director, 

ACDA.2 Those reports are summarized in chapters 2, 3, and 4. 

'Statement of Frank C. Conahan, Director, International Division, 

before the Subcommittee on March 24, 1983. 

2Need for Internal Control Improvements at ACDA, Including 

Adequate Internal Audit Coverage, (GAO/YSIAD-83-681, 

Sept. 30, 1983. 

ACDA's Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research and 

Management of Its External Research Proqram Still Need 

Improvement, (GAO/NSIAD-83-67), Sept. 30, 1983. 

Need to Improve Management of ACDA's Automatic Data Processing 

and Operations Analysis Functions, (GAO/NSIAD-83-661, 

Sept. 30, 1983. 

1 
ACBA'S RESPONSIBItITIES 

The 1961 Arm,s Control and Disarmament Act established that 

ACDA be the central U.S. arms control and disarmament3 policy 

agency. ACDA was intended to have the primary role in U.S. arms 

control policymaking. The Act specifies that: 

"The formulation and implementation of United 

States arms control and disarmament policy in a 

manner which will promote the national security 

can best be ensured by a central organization 

charged by statute with primary responsibility 

for this field." 

According to the Act, ACDA must have such a position within the 

government that it can (1) provide recommendations on U.S. arms 

control policy to the President, the Secretary of State, other 

executive branch officials, and the Congress, and (2) assess the 

foreign policy, national security, and economic effects of these 

recommendations. The Act also states that ACDA must be able to 

provide the scientific, political, military, and other types of 

information essential to realistic arms control policies. Moreover, the Director of ACDA is authorized and directed to prepare 

for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other 

appropriate agencies, recommendations on U.S. arms control 

policy. 

The Act authorizes ACDA, under the direction of the President 

and the Secretary, of State, to perform four primary functions. 

Specifically, ACDA is to 

--conduct, support, and coordinate arms control 

research; 

--prepare and manage U.S. arms control negotiations: 

--prepare, operate, or, as appropriate, direct 

U.S. participation in "control 

and 

--disseminate and coordinate public 

on arms control. 

information 

Since 1975 the Congress has enacted additional legislation 

that requires ACDA'S 

3Henceforth referred to as "arms control." 

4"Control systems" are considered by ACDA as systems relating to 

the verification of arms control agreements. 

2 
--participation in the assessment and export of 

U.S. weapons systems; 

--involvement in controlling nuclear exports; 

and 

--reports to the Congress on the verifiability 

of arms control proposals and treaties. 

LONGSTANDING CONCERNS AHOUT AND RECENT 

ACTIONS ON ACDA'S POLICY ROLE AND 

RESOURCE LEVELS 

Since enactment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 

some Members of Congress periodically have expressed concerns 

about ACDA's ability to fulfill its legislated responsibilities. 

Most often such members have questioned ACDA's policy influence 

within the government and the adequacy of the Agency's resources. 

In 1983, the House Foreiqn Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on 

International Security and Scientific Affairs held budget authorization hearings to help assess whether concerns regarding ACDA's 

policy role and resources were justified. The Committee's report 

concluded that there were deficiencies in both areas. 

ACDA's policy role 

As a result of their concerns reqarding ACDA's policy role, 

some Members of Conqress have occasionally sought to enhance 

ACDA's influence. ACDA officials and outside observers generally 

agree that the Agency's influence is largely dependent on the 

ACDA Director's relationship with the President and the Secretary 

of State. However, good relationships between these officials 

cannot be legislatively mandated. Congressional attention has 

instead focused on the Agency's role in two of the executive 

branch's formal decisionmaking mechanisms-- the interagency groups 

and the National Security Council (NSC). 

Interagency groups 

The executive branch uses interagency groups to help formulate policy in many areas, including arms control. In the past, 

ACDA had chaired some arms control interagency groups. At the 

time Of our fieldwork, however, ACDA chaired none of the interagency groups and only a handful of the working groups which support them. 

Accordinq to a 1981 analysis prepared by ACDA's General 

Counsel, ACDA initially chaired various arms control policymaking 

qroups. However, ACDA began losing the leaderships of those 

groups in 1969. Through the 1970's ACDA did not lead the principal. arms control croups, although it did chair various nonpolicymakinq groups for negotiation 'backstopping." 

3 
ACDA presently participates in over 29 different interagency 

groups and committees and about as many working level groups. The 

qroups cover such arms control-related matters as the Strategic 

Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Intermediate-range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) talks, anti-satellite warfare, export control, arms 

transfers, and nuclear non-proliferation. ACDA chaired none of 

these interagency groups at the time of our fieldwork, althouqh it 

did chair four of the lower-ranked working groups.5 The Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD) chaired the 

principal arms control-related interagency groups. 

Some ACDA officials believed that ACDA can adequately ' 

influence the interagency groups without chairing them because 

--the chair does not automatically confer great 

influence; 

--a number of knowledgeable ACDA analysts are 

assigned to work on arms control issues in 

the groups; and 

--ACDA prepares most of the draft papers in 

certain ke,y working groups. 

Notwithstanding this belief by some Agency officials, ACDA 

has tried to regain 'the chairs of at least some groups. We were 

told by a senior ACDA official that such an attempt was made by 

the ACDA Director in 1981. After our March 1983 testimony before 

the Subcommittee o'n International Security and Scientific Affairs 

pointed out the lack of ACDA chairmanships of the arms control 

policymaking qroups, the House Foreign Affairs Committee noted 

that this situation was "unacceptable and verges on violation of 

ACDA statutory responsibilities." The Committee considered ACDA 

chairmanship of appropriate arms control policy and working groups 

to be "essential" if ACDA were to fulfill its responsibilities and 

satisfy the intent of the Congress. 

The new Director of ACDA informed the Subcommittee in May 

1983 that the lack of ACDA chairmanships concerned him and that he 

would attempt to "work that out." ACDA subsequently assumed the 

co-chair of the interagency policy qroups for outer space and for 

anti-satellite warfare. 

ACDA and the NSC 

Congressional concern regarding ACDA'S policy role has twice 

led to leqislation involving the ACDA Director's relationship to 

5The four working groups were those on the Standinq Consultative 

Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards 

Action Plan, Arms Control Impact Statements, and Confidence 

Building Measures. 

4 
the NSC. In 1975, the Congress established the ACDA Director as 

the principal arms control adviser to the NSC. In 1983, concerned 

that the ACDA Director should be involved in NSC meetings which 

directly or indirectly concern arms control matters, the Congress 

mandated that the Director attend NSC meetings involving weapons 

procurement, arms sales, the defense budget, and arms control matters. 

ACDA's resource levels 

Over the years ACDA's resource levels --for both funding and 

personnel--have fluctuated. In 1981, the trend aqain turned downward and concern was expressed 'by some Members of Congress about 

the impact of the lower levels on ACDA's fulfilling its responsibilities. 

Funding 

Following its establishment, ACDA's budget increased each 

year until fiscal year 1966, when funding was about $10 million. 

From then to fiscal year 5974, annual budget levels fluctuated 

around an average of $9.1 million, falling to about $8 million in 

1974. Subsequently, budgets rose rather steadily to a fiscal year 

1981 level of more than $18 million. 

declined over the following two years.6 

The budget level then 

The Congress was originally asked to authorize fiscal year 

1984 funding of $16.4 million for ACDA (excludin 

gram transfer from the Department of 

c+ a proposed proEnergy). This request 

represented a slight increase over the total 1983 ACDA budget. 

The Director of ACDA characterized the requested 1984-85 authorization levels as "adequate", but said that "they are very lean 

budgets, ones without reserves whatsoever, and should really not 

be reduced below the requested levels." During the House authorization hearings in the spring of 1983, Subcommittee members 

raised bipartisan concern about the requested budget levels, 

focusing on the impact of the proposed funding levels on particular ACDA functions. 

6According to the Director, ACDA's initial fiscal year 1983 budget 

level was 7.9 percent less than the year before. After a 

supplemental request for $564,000 was approved by the Congress, 

ACDA's fiscal year 1983 budget authority was actually 4.5 percent 

less than in fiscal year 1982. 

'The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is 

a Department of Energy project intended to develop a low-enriched 

nuclear fuel to replace weapons-grade material in research and 

test reactors throughout the world. The administration proposed 

including funds for the project in ACDA's fiscal years 1983 and 

1984 budgets. The Congress twice rejected this proposal. 

5 
In August 1983, the President asked the Congress to increase 

ACDA's fiscal 1984 budget by about $2.1 million over the level 

initially requested "to invigorate the Agency." The Congress subsequently provided a 1984 budget increase of about $4.5 million 

over the initiallv requested level by authorizing about S20.9 million and $21.9 million for fiscal years 1984 and 1985, respectively. 

Personnel 

In recent years the number of positions at ACDA declined and 

vacancies continued for long periods in high-level positions. 

However, ACDA's responsibilities were not reduced. To the con- ' 

trary, arms control activity increased in recent years with new 

concurrent initiatives such as START and INF; evolving issues such 

as anti-ballistic missile technologies, anti-satellite warfare and 

new strategic systems; and increasing levels of conventional arms 

transfers. 

Following its establishment, ACDA'S authorized fulltime permanent personnel level generally rose until it peaked at 189 in 

fiscal year 1969. By fiscal year 1974 it had fallen to 156. It 

subsequently rose to 199 by fiscal years 1979-80. However, by 

fiscal year 1983 it had fallen to 154--the lowest level since 

ACDA's first operating year. The administration initially 

requested this level again for fiscal year 1984. According to the 

ACDA Director ACDA absorbed a 16 percent decrease in personnel 

from January 1981 to October 1982. 

ACDA'S personnel situation has also included prolonged vacancies in high-level management positions. During much of 1983 the 

Agency had about 30 percent of its top management slots vacant or 

filled only on an acting basis. Prom January 1981 to June 1983, 

ACDA had no confirmed Deputy Director. Also, the Agency had no 

confirmed Director for a combined total of 8 months since January 

1981. 

ACDA's personnel shortages apparently affected ACDA's 

performance. According to Agency officials, ACDA was understaffed 

and its expertise was often devoted to supporting competing 

demands. ACDA bureaus claimed they had experienced difficulty in 

staffing negotiation delegations and providing backstopping support in Washington for the delegations. In addition, the Assistant Director for the Bureau of Verification and Intelligence 

informed us that, because of personnel shortages, he was unable to 

adequately perform all of his verification responsibilities 

related to (1) coordinating with other groups, (2) commenting on 

verification material sent to him for review, and (3) ensuring 

that verification matters were adequately considered for all arms 

control issues. 

The administration has recognized AMA'S personnel problems. 

In May 1983 the new ACDA Director said that his goals for the 

Agency were "to staff it up and settle it down from the personnel 

6 
turmoil that... it has endured over the past months in particular, 

and even a larger period of time in general..." In August 1983 

the White House announced amended personnel requgsts providing an 

additional 25 positions over the next 2 years. Also, most of 

ACDA's top management positions are now filled, including all but 

one of its senior positions. 

Need for efficient and 

effective management 

The Congress has acted since 1961 to broaden the Agency's 

mandate and arms control activity has recently increased. The 

funding constraints ACDA has faced in recent years emphasize the 

need for efficient and effective management of its operations. 

ACDA can, and should, improve its current management practices. The following chapters summarize the findings of our three 

September 30, 1983 reports regarding ACDA management opportunities 

in the areas of: 

--internal controls, including internal audit; 

--the Agency's external research program and 

coordination of government-wide arms control 

research; and 

--automatic data processing and operations 

analysis activities. 

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Our objectives were to develop information on ACDA's policy 

role and resource levels, and to evaluate ACDA's 

--compliance with legislative and administrative directives on internal controls, including internal audit; 

--management of its external research program9 

and its coordination of all federal arms control research; 

8The administration also requested legislation to upgrade several 

top ACDA positions--the Deputy Director, Assistant Directors, and 

the START and INF Negotiators-- to Executive Levels III and IV. 

gExternal research is research done for ACDA by othersl in contrast to research done in-house by ACDA's own employees. 
--justification for abolishing its Office of 

Operations kna:lysis (OA)lO; and 

--planning and aperation of computer-based support actfvXtlC'@, 

We interviewed officials and examined documents of ACDA; the 

Departments of S'tate, D'efense, Energy, and Commerce; the Office of 

Management and Budlget (OMe;); and the General Services Administration (GSA). We also analyzed legislation, executive orders, and 

OMB directiwes related to internal controls, research activities, 

and management of oaaputer resources. 

In reviewing ACDA's iexternal research prolgram, we were 

principally concerned with the overall policies and procedures 

implementing the program. we did not attempt to evaluate individual contracts or resea'reh projects. Also, we did not address the 

research activities of #&DA's own employees. 

ACDA's justification for abolishinq OA had two principal 

components--budget savings and OA's alleged inefficiency. We were 

unable to objectively assess this latter claim because of an 

absence of adequate records needed to determine the degree of OA's 

responsiveness to other ACDA organizational units. Also, in our 

analysis of ACDA's claimed budget savings, we generally relied on 

ACDA's explanations of how savings were measured. We did not 

verify the accuracy of claimed costs or savings by examining 

source documents. 

Our work was done in accordance with generally accepted 

government audit standards, except that, as requested by the Subcommittee, we did not obtain official agency comments on this 

report. However, we did receive official comments on our three 

September'30, 1983 reports to the Director, ACDA. Those comments, 

and our evaluation of them, are summarized in the final sections 

of chapters 2, 3, and 4. These sections also include more recent 

information concerning actions announced in 1984 by ACDA in 

response to our three reports. We did not verify this 

information. 

loOperations analysis (also known as operations research) has been 

defined as ‘f a scientific method of providing executive 

departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regardinq 

operations under their control," and as "the application of 

scientific methods and techniques to decisionmakinq oroblems." 

Operations analysts use computers as tools to help solve 

difficult problems. 

8 
CHAPTER 2 

NEED FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS, 

INCLUDING ADEQUATE INTERNAL AUDIT COVERAGE 

Since the early 1950’s, executive branch agencies have been 

responsible for maintaining internal controls over operations, 

including providing internal audit coverage. Over the years, we 

have issued numerous publications to guide agencies in establishing and maintaining their internal control systems. In October 

1981, OYB issued Circular A-123, which prescribes policies and 

standards to be followed by executive branch agencies in designing, installing, and maintaining internal control systems. More 

recently, the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 

(32 U.S.C. S3512) has increased attention on improving controls 

over government operations. The Act requires that agencies' 

internal control systems be desiqned in accordance with our standards, and that the heads of executive agencies periodically evaluate and annually report on these systems. Executive agency 

awareness of weaknesses in existing controls and identification 

of such weaknesses for corrective action are of primary importance. 

Althouqh relatively small, ACDA is an executive branch 

a9-v I obligated to comply fully with legislative and administrative requirements related to internal controls and audit. We 

found that ACDA needs to implement additional requirements for 

internal control. 

ACDA NEEDS TO IMPLEMENT 

ADDITIONAL INTERNAL CONTROL 

REQUIREMENTS 

As a forerunner to the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity 

Act, OMB Circular A-123 identified many basic design features and 

standards for internal control systems. The Act directs new 

emphasis on the need to strenqthen internal controls. Among other 

things, the Act required that agencies' internal control systems 

be (1) established in accordance with GAO standards, and (2) 

periodically evaluated and annually reported on by the heads of 

executive agencies, in accordance with OMB guidelines. In March 

1983 @MB revised A-123 to provide policy guidance to be used by 

executive branch agencies in evaluating, improving, and reporting 

on internal controls in their program and administrative 

activities. 

9 
Implementation of A-123 by agencies would better enable them 

to meet the GAO standards. For example, a favorable evaluation 

would be more likely if adequate, written, organizational 

documentation-=-called for by A-123--were in place. We therefore 

focused on A-123 implementation because problems in this area 

would affect ACIDA's ability to comply with the standard set by GAO 

pursuant to the Act, 

When our work was started, ACD'A had yet to implement A-123. 

After our review boganl ACDA met with OMR officials concerning 

ACDA's planned prolgram for compliance and 

--established an Internal Control Committee to 

coordinate guidance, develop procedures for 

conducting reviews, and supervise review and 

assessment activity; 

--assigned responsibility for internal control 

to key officials; and 

--prepared an internal control plan. 

Also, ACDA told us during our review that it planned to conduct 

vulnerability assessments and internal control reviews, and to 

report their results to the Director. 

ACDA HAS NOT HAD THE EXPANDED-SCOPE 

INTERNAL AUDIT COVERAGE IT NEEDS 

In March 1978, OMB issued Circular A-73, Audit of Federal 

Operations and Programs (revised June 20, 1983 ) , in order to 

(1) promote audit practices, (2) achieve more efficient use of 

audit staff, (3) improve coordination of audits, and (4) emphasize 

the need for early audit of new or substantially changed programs. 

Although A-73 applies to all audit functions of every executive 

branch agency, ACDA has not implemented its provisions. 

ACDA% internal audit 

coverage is inadequate 

ACDA currently has no internal audit staff and its very 

limited internal audit coverage falls short of meeting A-73 

reouirements. A small imprest fund and some research contracts 

have been audited for ACDA by other agencies. Also, GSA audits 

ACDA financial transactions on a limited basis. 

10 
ACDA officials informed us that an internal audit function 

would not be effective because (1) ACDA is small, and (2) audits 

by GAO and others are adequate for ACDA's type of operations and 

relatively small appropriation. We disagree, principally because 

A-73 applies to all executive branch departments and agencies. 

Moreover, adequatexternal audit coverage would result in management benefits. ACDA officials believed that ACDA has operated 

successfully for more than 20 years with minimum internal audit 

coverage and, consequently, saw increased costs and limited benefits from expanding such coverage. Although establishing adequate . 

expanded-scope internal audit coveraqe would increase ACDA costs, 

our work in ACDA provides numerous illustrations of potential 

benefits. For example, the following situations are typical of 

those that could be addressed under expanded-scope audits of 

agency programs and activities; none would be addressed under the 

type and level of internal audit coverage ACDA now obtains. 

Out-of-date policies and 

procedures in the official 

ACDA Manual, and Instructions 

Although ACDA has issued at least 26 Instructions and 61 

Notices on administrative procedures since October 1981, most 

documentation governing the structure and operation of ACDA was 

outdated. The Manual's most recent update was in 1978, and more 

than 60 percent of the Instructions have needed revision for more 

than 4 years. In addition, functional statements of the responsibilities of organizational units had not been formally updated 

since a major reorganization in October 1981. ACDA officials told 

us that the Manual would be updated. 

Differences in the duties assigned 

versus those performed 

ACDA's functional statement for arms control verification 

activities assigns them to the Bureau of Verification and Intelligence (VI). However, other bureaus were performing verification 

activities instead of VI. Specifically, ACDA's Assistant Director 

for VI stated that the Sureau was not 

--meetinq all the responsibilities identified 

in VI functional statements, 

--reviewinq all the verification papers which 

other organizations in ACDA prepare, or 

11 
--attending high-level meetings on verification 

issues. 

ACDA has indicated its intent to enhance VI's capability as the 

focus for its verification work. 

ACDA's authorizing legislation 

needs more thorough study 

Laws passed by the Congress are important elements of internal control because they authorize agencies to carry out government functions and can establish the extent to which such functions are to be performed. A standard starting noint for defining 

and assigning respansibilities is a thorough legislative study to 

determine what a law requires. Legislative analyses are important 

criteria for measuring agency resource utilization and performance. 

ACDA's General Counsel told us that comprehensive legislative 

analyses have not been done. The General Counsel could provide 

only two limited-scope analysesc dealing with (1) ACDA authority 

to participate in interagency groups and (2) the congressionally 

mandated titles of the ACDA Assistant Directors. After our fieldwork was completed, we found an additional analysis ACDA did in 

1977 of its obligations under the then-new Section 37 of the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Act, which specifies that the Director 

report to the Congress on the verifiability of arms control proposals and agreements. 

Without thorough legislative analyses, ACDA does not have a 

defensible basis for concluding that it is meeting its responsibilities and mandates. In commenting on a draft of our 1983 

report, ACDA agreed to determine the need 

tive analyses. 

for additional legislaSection 37 reporting to the Congress 

and noncompliance with administrative 

requirements 

ACDA has not provided the Congress reports on a timely basis 

on the verifiability of some significant arms control proposals 

under Section 37(a)(l) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act 

(22 u*s.c* S2577(aHlH, which provides that the Director of ACDA 

furnish verification reports on arms control proposals to the Congress on a timely basis, or upon a request by an appropriate committee of the Congress. Reports for significant proposals have 

not been provided for the Mutual and Ralanced Force Reductions and 

INF negotiations. However, on two occasions (February 1978 and 

12 
November 1982) a report has been submitted upon request to a 

committee of the Congress, in keeping with Section 37(a)(l). 

In recent years ACDA has not provided OMB with the arms control research reports required by Executive Order 11044, nor has 

it implemented various OMB directives, such as A-73, A-123, and 

A-75 (Transmittal Memorandum Number 1) on Security of Federal 

Automated Information Systems. 

Past GAO work 

Our past work yields further examples of the types of issues 

that can be developed under expanded-scope audits and brought to 

ACDA manaqement's attention for corrective action. In our March 

17, 1980, report entitled Coordination of Federal Arms Control 

Research Programs To Be Improved (ID-80-6), we discussed 

--ACDA's failure to implement required 

government-wide research coordination procedures, and 

--the uncertainties in the scope of research to 

be coordinated. 

The report also pointed out that ACDA needed to improve management 

of its own external research program. 

More recently, in our January 25, 1983 report entitled 

RECOVER: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards, 

But Greater International Commitment Is Needed (GAO/ID-83-9), we 

pointed out that 

--the REmote Continual VERification system, 

designed by ACDA and costing over $4.0 million through 1982, had an uncertain future: 

--ACDA lacked in-house capability to develop 

the system; and 

--the project was behind schedule by as much as 

2 to 3 years. 

VARIOUS APPROACHES TO OBTAIN 

INTERNAL AUDIT COVERAGE 

ACDA must decide what type of arrangement would best ensure 

effective internal audit coverage in compliance with leqal and 

administrative requirements. Federal agencies, including small 

13 
ones like ACDA, generally provide internal audit coverage by 

establishing an organi%ation and hiring staff. If ACDA does not 

elect to do so, it could contract for expanded-scope audit services with the inspsetor general organization of another federal 

agency, with GSA, (3~ with a non-federal organization (such as a 

public accounting or management consulting firm). 

Using an alternative to an in-house organization would not 

eliminate or reduce ACDA's responsibilities under A-73, A-123, or 

other internal control directives. For example, ACDA would still 

be responsible for (t) seeing that the contractor met applicable s 

audit standards, (2) developing the annual audit plan required by 

A-73, and (3) establishing and implementing other policies and 

procedures related to internal control, including internal audit. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Although ACDA has recognized the need to comply with internal 

control requirements and has taken some action, it must do more, 

especially in regards to adequate internal audit coverage--an 

important internal control element. We have long advocated the 

benefits of effective internal audit to good management. The 

problems discussed ab'ove clearly illustrate situations which 

internal audit coverage--either in-house or contractual--could 

bring to management's attention. 

AGENCY ACTIONS AND, 

OUR EVALUATION 

In our September 30, 1983 report to the Director, ACDA, we 

recommended that he 

--establish an internal control system which 

accords with legislative requirements and 

administrative directives; 

--establish internal audit coverage in accordance with the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 

53512, and of OMB A-73, Audit of Federal 

Operations and Programs; and 

--correct the matters discussed in the report 

related to the Manual and Instructions, differences in assigned versus performed verification duties, ACDA's legislative authorities, and Section 37 (a)(l) of the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Act. 

14 
In commenting on these recommendations, ACDA agreed to act on 

most of them. It indicated, for example, that (1) it had begun to 

improve internal controls; (2) GSA would provide expanded-scope 

internal audit coveraqe; (3) ACDA's General Counsel would review 

existing legislative analyses and recommend to the Director additional analyses as appropriate; and (4) VI's resources would be 

increased to enable it to perform assigned verification duties. 

In December 1983, the Director of ACDA notified the President 

that an evaluation of A@DA'S accounting and administrative control 

system had been performed in accordance with A-123 and found that 

the system had provided reasonable assurance that its objectives 

had been achieved, within certain limits. In February 1984, an 

ACDA official informed us that vulnerability assessments had been 

prepared with the assistance of a major accounting firm and that 

ACDA had virtually completed actions to comply with A-123. 

As of March 1984, ACDA and GSA were continuing efforts to 

develop an excanded-scope audit plan for GSA's use at ACDA, but 

had yet to agree upon one. ACDA efforts to acquire audit coverage 

should not be limited to GSA if this agency is unable to provide 

adequate resources. ACDA management should pursue the other 

alternatives discussed above until sufficient controls and audit 

coveraqe are acquired to satisfy the requirements of,,"31 U.S.C. S 

3512. 

ACDA believes that it has fulfilled its responsibilities 

under Section 37(a)(l) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. 

ACDA's comments implied that the Director is not required to 

provide verification reports under Section 37(a)(l) because such a 

requirement would interfere with the President's responsibility 

for arms control negotiations. ACDA stated that the Director has 

provided reports when directed by the President and that all congressional committee requests for reports have been met. However, 

based on information we obtained from ACDA, the Aqency has issued 

only two reports under Section 37(a)(l), both at the request of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These reports were a 

February 23, 1978 report on the then-ongoing Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) and a November 18, 1982 report on START. 

ACDA also furnished us with information that it had provided a 

SeCtiOn 37 Verification report concerning the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty 

on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and its Protocol (which 

resulted from SALT II) to the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence. However, the report was furnished on July 18, 1979, 

1 month after the United States had signed the treaty. Although 

the treaty still needed the advice and consent of the Senate to 

become effective under U.S. law, it was no longer a “proposal” 

because negotiations had been concluded. 

15 
Notwithstanding these reports --provided in response to 

congressional committee requests --ACDA has provided no verification reports to the Conqress itself on "a timely basisp" pursuant 

to Section 37(a)(l). We have no evidence that the Director of 

ACDA provided such reports to the Congress throuqh briefings, 

meetings, or other written or oral communications, although 

several major arms control negotiations have taken place since 

Section 37 was enacted in 1977. For example, no reports have been 

furnished with respect to negotiations concerning INF and Mutual 

and Balanced Force Reductions. 
CHAPTER 3 

COORDINATION OF FEDERAL ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH 

AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL RESEARCH PROGRAM 

STILL NEED IMPROVEMENT 

ACDA needs to improve the operation of its external research 

program. The same or similar problems which we found hindering 

the research program's efficient operation in 1980 were still present when we conducted our fieldwork in 1983.l For example, 

ACDA's external research program had no formal project selection 

criteria, little internal coordination, no routine review of 

available research listings to help avoid project duplication, and 

inadequate use of contractor evaluations. 

Tn addition, ACDA is not meeting its responsibilities to 

coordinate all arms control research within the federal government, as specified in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and 

Executive Order 11044. 

MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES PERSIST 

IN ACDA'S EXTERNAL RESEARCH PROGRAM 

In 1980, we reported on a series of problems ACDA had in 

managing its external research program. At that time, ACDA had 

just begun to direct its program through a central External 

Research Council. Since then, ACDA has abolished the Council and 

the problems we identified persist. These problems could hamper 

ACDA's ability to effectively use its limited and uncertain 

research funding. 

Corrective action terminated 

In his response to our 1980 report, ACDA's Director generally 

agreed that problems existed. He stated that a new External 

Research Council had been established to improve external research 

program management. This 14-member advisory Council was ACDA's 

forum for all matters related to the external research program 

from August 1979 until October 1981. The ACDA Director and Deputy 

Director made final decisions on the research program. 

Although ACDA officials agreed that the Council was a good 

concept and that it improved intra-agency coordination and awareness of research projects, most attributed serious problems to it. 

Officials described it as "acrimonious" and said the time, effort, 

1See our report, Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research 

Program To He Improved, (ID-80-e) March 17, 1980. 

17 
and paperwork needed to support the program were excessive. After 

the current administration came into office, a Deputy Directordesiqnate abol.ished the Council. 9e believed that research proqramming should be a line bureau responsibility and that the 

Council was not working. 

At the time of our fieldwork, the process for selecting 

external research projects and allocating funding involved a 

selection committee of the Assistant Directors, the Deputy Director , and the Administrative Director. According to an Assistant . 

Director, this was essentially the same process that existed 

before the Council was created. 

Funding of research is Limited 

and, sometimes', uncertain 

Uncertainties over external research program funding levels 

have made planning and operating the program difficult. The overall decline in the research budget has prevented the funding of 

some desirable, if not urgent, projects. Moreover, once overall 

ACDA funding has been appropriated, ACDA has limited its research 

program by using research funds for other purposes and by holding 

funds until late in the fiscal year, 

Research fundinq 

has been declining 

ACDA funding for external research has been declining. The 

research budget, which fell from a peak of $6 million in fiscal 

year 1966 to a low of about $1 million in fiscal year 197S, was 

initially set at about $1.1 million for fiscal year 1984. At this 

level, research would have comprised less than 7 percent of the 

originally nroposed fiscal year 1984 budget, down from a hiqh of 

58 percent of the Agency budget in fiscal year 1966. The fiscal 

year 1984 budget authorized by the Congress increased research 

fundinq to slightly more than 7 percent--about $1.5 million. Furthermore, because inflation causes the loss of purchasing power 

over time, the fiscal year 1983 research program's $1.15 million 

had the purchasing power of less than $950,000 in 1980 dollars. 

In 1980 the program's budget was about $3.8 million. 

The declining budget had caused some bureaus to scale back 

research efforts and forego initiating studies which ACDA officials identified as desirable, Two areas so identified were 

nuclear test ban verification and chemical weapons. 

Even after research funds have been appropriated, they can be 

transferred to meet other Aqency needs. Tn fiscal year 1982, 

after having obligated nearly its full research budget for the 

previous 2 years, ACDA obligated 11.5 percent less (amountinq to 

18 
$248,000) than originally programmed for research. ACDA used more 

than half of this sum for non-research needs. For some time now, 

ACDA has reduced its research budget and diverted research funds 

to avoid personnel reductions. In 1978, ACDA's Director told a 

congressional committee that the Agency had diverted funds from 

research to meet personnel costs. More recently, the research 

budget was cut to avoid reductions-in-force. 

Research funds committed 

late in the dia~cFz1 year 

ACDA still held funds for research projects in reserve until 

late in the fiscal year. For the first two-thirds of fiscal year 

1983, ACDA obligated only 31 percent of its research funds. In 

some cases, ACDA deliberately held back funding for research earlier in the year, while in other cases late funding resulted from 

the timing of the projects involved. 

ACDA has institutionalized holding back funds for research 

and other needs in a Director's Reserve Fund. Established under a 

former Director, it is to be used for high priority, quick turnaround projects, or, if not required for that purpose, for lower 

priority projects or those needing more money than expected. Rowever, the fund is not designated exclusively for research needs. 

ACDA lacks criteria for 

systematically selecting 

research projects 

At the time of our fieldwork, the participants in ACDA's 

research selection process stated that either no formal criteria 

existed or that they did not know what criteria the Director or 

his Deputy used to select projects. A former Deputy Directordesignate identified his selection criteria as "what things could 

assist in the job; what would help ongoing or imminent negotiations." A Division Director told us that criteria for selecting 

projects were probably based on the "feelings" of top management 

about the needs and performance of the bureaus. However, few top 

officials have served at ACDA long enough to know the Agency's 

needs. At the time of our fieldwork, only one official had 

served in the office of the Director for as long as 2 years, and 

he said he had only a limited perspective on the research program. 

Moreover, this official subsequently left the Agency. 

Little systematic coordination of research occurs 

A number of ACDA's organizational units are interested in the 

same research areas. However, other than the Assistant Directors' 

project selection meetings, little formal coordination is required 

79 
‘i 

or occurs ins8ide ACDA, Instead, research coordination is left to 

each organization. Monthly "Status Reports" on research projects 

circulate throughout the Agency, but ACDA directives do not 

require that research planning documents be sent to all bureaus. 

The effectiveness of coSordination to review ACDA research for 

duplication during the selection and budget process is uncertain. 

Officials identified as "checks" in the system have limited review 

capabilities. Furthermore, the Contracting Officer, identified by 

ACDA officials as the person who should spot redundancies, is less 

involved and informed about the system now than in the past. 

ACDA does not use gvailable 

fistings to identify related research 

While pl.anning projects, ACDA Project Officers still do not 

routinely use available listings to identify research related to 

their proposed efforts. Many use informal measures for identifying related research, which consist largely of talking to contacts in other agencies and attending interagency meetings. Some 

officials did not know about the data base listings which are 

available throughout the government. ACDA Project Officers were 

concerned that reviewing data base listings would divert resources 

from other work.' 

Preparation and use of contractor 

evaluations are inadequate 

ACDA's use of formal contractor evaluations is inadequate. 

Project Officers fill out evaluation forms to judge contractors' 

performance and to provide a record for negotiating future work. 

Since November 1979, Project Officers have been required to complete the two-page "Contractor Evaluation Statement" at the conclusion of each research contract. To a large extent, however, 

the evaluations were either not being completed or were being completed improperly. A review of ACDA records indicated that almost 

a fourth of the required evaluations have not been prepared. Of 

those available, some were not sufficiently detailed. Moreover, 

it was not clear whether Project Officers were effectively using 

evaluations to become aware of prior performances by individual 

contractors. Apparently, only the Contracting Officer and an 

assistant routinely read the evaluations in order to prepare for 

contract negotiations. 

Finally, although the evaluation process requires the Project 

Officer to discuss anticipated value and use of the contract 

results to the government, it requires no follow-up to determine 

what use ultimately was made of the research results. 
ACDA IS NOT FULFILLING ITS 

GOVERNMENT-WIDE RESEARCH ROLE 

ACDA is not meeting its mandate to coordinate all arms 

control research within the federal government, as specified in 

the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and Executive Order 11044. 

In addition, limited access to other agencies' information would 

hinder ACDA if it attempted to carry out its coordination responsibilities. ACDA also has not followed through on commitments it 

made in response to our 1980 report on arms control research. 

ACDA is not complying with its 

research coordinating mandate 

ACDA has arms control research coordination responsibilities 

under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.2 Executive Order 

11044 requires ACDA to 

--develop and keep current a comprehensive and 

balanced program of arms control and disarmament research needed to be done throughout 

the government; 

--advise other agencies as to their respective 

participation in this arms control research 

program in order " to produce harmonious 

action" and prevent duplication of effort; 

--maintain a continuing inventory of federal 

activities related to the planned program of 

arms control research; and 

--submit periodically a consolidated schedule 

and evaluation of such arms control research 

activities to OMB. 

ACDA meets none of these requirements. ACDA's Assistant General 

Counsel acknowledges that the Act and the executive order are not 

"being literally complied with." As far as he knows, agencies do 

not submit reports to ACDA on their arms control research. ACDA 

2Under the Act the Director is authorized and directed to insure 

the acquisition of a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge concerning disarmament. To carry out this objective, he is 

also authorized, under the direction of the President, to 

coordinate research by or for other government agencies in 

accordance with procedures established under Section 35 of the 

Act. 

21 
: could not provide us with evidence to demonstrate that it has 

complied with the requirements of the Act and the executive order 

since 1974. Moreover 8 officials at both OMB and ACDA knew nothing 

of the periodic schedule required to be sent to OMB, even though 

ACOA continues to list the schedule among its reporting requirements, Furthermore, ACDA neither oversees other agencies' 

research, nor do other agencies routinely seek ACJlA's advice on 

their research efforts. 

ACDA officials said that they are not coordinating research . 

activities because: 

--QMB had directed ACDA to stop preparing the 

schedule on arms control research 10 years 

awe 

--The scope of arms control research has not 

been adequately determined. 

--Ad hoc, informal coordination arrangements 

xth- ather agencies, especially through 

interagency wows 8 keel? participants 

adequately informed. 

--ACDA has never had sufficient resources or 

"clout" to do any additional coordination or 

to direct other agencies' research. 

Constrained acce.ss to agencies' 

information impairs ACDA's planning 

for arms control research 

Limited access to other agencies' information impairs ACDA's 

arms control research planning and would hinder ACDA if it 

attempted to carry out its coordination responsibilities. ?lanning information on research is not shared a great deal between 

the agencies, according to one DOD official who has never seen 

ACDA's lists of proposed projects nor shown ACDA his lists. In 

order to ensure access to such information, ACDA sometimes 

contributes funds to other agencies' research. 

ACDA did not follow through 

on its previous commitments 

We concluded in our 1980 report that ACDA had not fulfilled 

its coordination responsibilities. We recommended that the 

Director should either fulfill his coordination responsibilities 

or urge the Congress to amend the Act and seek to have the 

executive order revised or rescinded. 
The Director of ACDA at the time stated that, to the extent 

adequate coordination may be lacking, a remedy would be sought. 

He said that the affected agencies and OMB would meet to ensure 

that ACDA's legislated coordination requirements would be met in a 

practical and workable manner. Yowever, ACDA, DOD, and OMB officials could not provide evidence that such a meeting ever occurred. 

According to an official who helped prepare ACDA's response 

to our 1980 recommendations, there was no particular follow-up to 

the report. An Assistant General Counsel said that changing the 

Act is not a priority on his list of legislative actions. . 

Although he stated he was sure that he had drafted language for 

changing the Act, ACDA could not find any such document in its 

files. 

CONCLUSIONS 

After dismantling the mechanism established to direct 

research activities, ACDA continues to have management problems 

similar to those noted in our 1980 report. Although the Agency 

may not need to resurrect the External Research Council, it should 

formalize a process that will help in 

--developing research proposals with a clear 

understanding of Agency goals, 

--planning and coordinating research activities 

throughout the Agency, 

--identifying and eliminating duplication in 

research projects, and 

--evaluating research efforts and results 

adequately. 

ACDA Still is not complying with the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Act or Executive Order 11044, which detail its responsibilities for coordinating all federal arms control research. 

Although ACDA recognizes that it has certain government-wide 

research responsibilities, it has been unconcerned about its 

inability to fulfill them and has not followed through on its previous commitment to resolve problems with its federal arms control 

research role. 

ACDA should first determine the scope and cost to effectively 

implement its federal research coordination role and, then, either 

implement its research mandate or, failing to receive from the 

Congress adequate resources necessary to implement the mandate, 

ask the Congress to amend the Act and seek to have the executive 

order revised or rescinded. 

23 
MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION 

BY THE CONGRESS 

In responding to our September 30, 4983 report, ACDA stated 

that its ability to reprogram funds is an essential management 

tool for quickly adjusting to changing needs and that external 

research is one of few budget categories which is available to 

help achieve such adjustments. We recognize that, given the kinds 

of responsibilities ACDA has, unexpected needs can arise. However, this practice could result in inadequate support for arms 

control research. 

Therefore, to assure that ACDA's external arms control 

research program is adequately supported in the future, the Congress may want to consider specifically designating a portion of 

ACDA's funds for the external research program. 

AGENCY ACTIONS 

In the 1983 report to the Director, ACDA, we essentially 

repeated the thrust of our 1980 recommendation, designed to have 

ACDA perform its coordination role or urge the Congress to amend 

the Act and seek to have the executive order revised or 

rescinded. We also recommended that the Director, ACDA, 

--establish criteria for use by bureaus in 

their development and selection of research 

projects: , 

--require Project Officers to use available 

listings of federal government research in 

order to more comprehensively identify 

research related to proposed projects; 

--direct that contractor evaluations be properly completed, that they include specific 

discussions of any problems with the contractors, and that they be used to assess proposed contractors' prior performances; 

--establish a follow-up tracking system to 

determine the actual use made of ACDA 

research products over a designated period of 

time: 

--define the scope of arms control research 

being conducted by or for the federal government, after consulting with the Secretaries 

24 
of State, Defense, Energy, and Cqmmerce, and 

the Directors of the Central Intelligence 

Agency and of other affected agencies; 

--estimate the resources ACDA needs to effect-" ~ ,' ' 

ively coordinate federal arms control 

research, based on the defined scope; and -; I 

--determine whether ACDA will carry out its 

federal coordination role or seek relief from. 

the requirements, after *defining scope and 

estimating resources. 

I’(’ , 

_ : - 

In his September 9, 1983 comments for both OMB and ACDA,' the 

Director of the Agency said that the report would be useful-to him 

in two reviews he was initiating. The first covered external 

research planning and procedures and the second involved coordination of federal arms control research. The Director also noted 

that ACDA would amend instructions for Project Officers to require 

that they use all readily available data bases to identify 

research related to their projects. He also stated that ACDA 

would ensure that all required contractor evaluations are completed appropriately and that ACDA would review the content of 

evaluation statements to identify needed revisions. If necessaryp 

he noted, ACDA either would institute new coordinating procedures 

for government-wide arms control research or would "seek legislative relief" to eliminate the coordination requirement. 

During the fall of 1983, a consulting firm under contract to 

ACDA reviewed the Agency's external research program. The firm's 

final report, issued in February 1984, concluded that our findings 

were generally valid. On February 6, 1984, the Director of, ACDA 

announced his decision to establish a Research Review Board under 

the Deputy Director. The Board's mission includes 

--conferring with the Assistant Directors and 

Office Heads and reviewing proposed research 

projects: 

--developing a program budget structure for 

external research based on ACDA's purposes, 

objectives, and priorities (rather than on 

organizational sponsor), and identifying 

issues of importance to ACDA over the next 

five years, key decisions to be made, and 

information that would be needed or desirable 

for such decisions; and 

25 
--meeting periodically to review progress on 

current research. 

Among other actions, the Director also specified questions to 

be addressed in project justifications and directed that the relevant bureau or office provide the Director and Deputy Director a 

report on a project's findings and direct relevance to ACDA within 

30 days of the project's completion. 

A DOD official who reviewed our draft report commented that 1 

an ACDA reassessment of its federal arms control research coordination role would be useful, but that DOD would oppose any reinterpretation of ACDA's role which allowed ACDA to tell DOD how to 

operate its research programs. 

26 
CHAPTER 4 

NEED TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF 

COMPUTER-BASED SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 

ACDA has not adequately planned its automatic data processing 

(ADP) support activities or complied with OMB guidance on computer 

security. Management decisions have been made without comprehensive knowledge of the Agency's ADP needs or of the cost and performance of its ADP systems. ,Although this lack of information 

does not necessarily mean that ACDA's past ADP management decisions have been wrong, it does raise questions about the scope and 

focus of ACDA's current computer-based support activities. 

One such activity involves operations analysis. Here, too, 

ACDA had not thoroughly evaluated its needs at the time of our 

fieldwork. Moreover, ACDA officials at varying levels of management within ACDA disagreed among themselves about the adequacy of 

the level and organizational arrangement of ACDA's operations 

analysis support. 

EVOLUTION OF ADP AND 

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES 

Under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, ACDA "must have 

the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, oolitical, military, psychological, and technological information upon 

which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be 

based." ACDA uses ADP for analysis of arms Control issues; 

retrieval of information on negotiations, arms transfers, and 

nuclear materials; and administration. Fiscal year 1983 and 1984 

ADP costs were 

respective1y.l 

estimated by ACDA at $300,000 and $573,000, 

ACDA began using ADP and operations analysis over 15 years 

ago. By 1970 ACDA had established an Operations Analysis Division 

in one of its bureaus. Although it initially relied on commercial 

timesharing services for computer support, ACDA purchased a small 

Wang computer in 1976. In 1977 ACDA replaced the Division with 

the Office of Operations Analysis (OA), which was responsible for 

quantitative and interdisciplinary studies and reported directly 

'However, these estimates do not include some cost elements we 

consider ADP costs. For example, they do not include the cost of 

a data retrieval system run on a Department of State computer 

(budgeted at $55,000 in fiscal year 1983), or the cost of a 

secure enclosure for ACDA's Wang computer (about $91,000 in 

fiscal year 1983). 

27 

‘,‘.’ . . ..y.. :, :< ’ ,l 

,.“_ . ‘:. 
to the Office of the Director. In 1979 ACDA, in an effort to 

further decrease its use of commercial computer services, entered 

into a 'I-year lease-purchase contract for a Digital Rquipment Corporation DEC-20 computer. 

At the end of fiscal year 1982, ACDA reversed this trend of 

increasing ADP and operations analysis capabilities by abolishing 

OA, transferring OA analysts to other ACDA organizations, and giving up the DEC and other ADP resources. ACDA also returned OA's 

detailees to their home agencies and reduced its use of leased 

office space. These and other actions were intended to help ACDA 

achieve about an 8 percent cost savings. In total, ACDA claims 

that it saved over $1.3 million in fiscal year 1983. Ye estimate 

that, of this amount, about $683,000 is attributable to the OA 

changes and reductions in computer support. ACDA disagrees with 

our revision of its estimate, (ACDA'S position and our analysis 

are presented in detail in GAO/NSIAD-83-66, September 30, 1983.) 

Some ACDA officials stated that OA was an inefficient organization, unresponsive to bureaus' needs. Some opponents of the 

abolishment believed that charges of inefficiency against OA were 

politically inspired. We could not evaluate OA's efficiency due 

to the lack of available records to support an objective determination. 

At the time of our fieldwork in mid-1983, ACDA had (1) a 

small Wang computer, (2) reimbursable agreements for access to 

computers at the United States Railway Association and the Department of Yate, and (3) arrangements for some access to DOD 

resources. A small Computer Services Group (CS) located within 

the Verification and Intelligence Bureau operated the Wang computer and was charged with providing computer support to ACDA. 

One former OA official in VI was responsible for providing centralized operations analysis support to ACDA. Other former OA 

analysts worked in various bureaus throughout the Agency. 

ACDA DOES NOT HAVE THE 

COMPREHENSIVE ADP MANAGEMENT IT NEEDS 

ACDA does not adequately plan for or evaluate the use of ADP 

systems. Moreover, it is not complying with OMB guidance on computer security. As a result, ACDA management cannot be sure 

21n January 1984 ACDA took delivery of a VAX-11/750 computer to be 

put in operation by mid-1984. The VAX will eventually supersede 

both the Wang and the access agreement with the [Jnited States 

Railway Association. 

28 
that (1) the level of resources employed is appropriate, (21 

resources are directed to applications with the greatest potential 

for improving mission performance or productivity, or (3) computerized information is adequately protected from accidental 

loss. 

Improvements needed in 

ADP planning 

Over the years we have emphasized the need for federal agencles to establish a comprehensive planning process which would 

ensure that ADP resources are 'used in the best way to support 

agency missions and programs, Such a planning process would 

--require tap management involvement in each of 

the agency's major organizational units; 

--cover a time period consistent with that of 

the agency programs requiring data processing 

support; 

---identify opportunities far improving productivity or effectiveness, based on the 

agency's missions and programs, and on 

changes in ADP technology; 

--validate and set priorities for meeting identified needs through cost/benefit studies; 

--develop a strategy for meeting needs, establish criteria for measuring performance 

against the plan's objectives, establish 

decision points when performance would be 

assessed, and assign responsibility for 

innlementing the plan; and 

--provide for review by the internal audit 

staff, or by some other means, to ensure that 

the plan supports mission requirements and 

that estimates are reasonable and based on 

factual. information. 

ACDA has not had a comprehensive ADP plan. ACDA maintained 

that it had accomplished ADP planning through the budget process 

and ad hoc studies. However, ACDA's budget process does not (1) 

establish milestones for implementing plans, performance criter.ia 

for measuring how well a plan has met its objectives, or decision 

points for assessing performance; (2) directly involve user and 

29 
data processing management; or (3) provide well-supported 

justifications of stated needs. The Budget and Accounting Officer 

told us that ongoing projects received only a cursory review and, 

essentially, were funded at the previous year’s level with an 

adjustment for inflation. Cost/benefit studies were seldom, if 

ever, prepared. 

At the time of our fieldwork ACDA was studying a potential 

computer acquisition. ACDA had carried out similar ad hoc studies 

in the past when contemplating major equipment purchases. 

Although studies of proposed equipment purchases are valuable 

planning tools, they cannot replace a comprehensive, continuous 

ADP planning process which periodically compares existing and 

planned capabilities. 

Better information on cost and 

performance of ADP systems is needed 

ACDA has not complied with OMB guidance on ADP cost accounting and does not require data processing users to periodically 

report how well existing ADP systems are meeting their 

requirements. 

ACDA does not have information on ADP costs needed to plan 

for and evaluate the use of ADP resources. OYB Circular A-121, 

which implements our Federal Government Accounting Pamphlet Number 

4, Guidelines for Accounting for Automatic Data Processing, 

requires agencies 'to account for or estimate the total cost of 

each software program and the cost of providing computer services 

to each user. ACDA has not complied with these requirements. 

Compiling this information would help ACDA to: 

--assess the full costs of user requests, 

--evaluate the relative worth of current and 

proposed systems, 

--make informed decisions as to whether systems 

should be designed and operated in-house or 

by outside sources, 

--measure efficiency and effectiveness of ADP 

services, and 

--foster cost-consciousness among ADP users. 

In addition to inadequate cost information, ACDA has no 

system for periodically contacting data processing users regarding 

their satisfaction with current systems, changes they would like 

30 

I 

_‘.‘.’ 

. . . :_ 

: 
made, or systems that no longer meet their needs and should be 

terminated. Although users are free to raise concerns through the 

chain of command to their bureau heads, we believe that actively 

soliciting feedback from them is necessary because users have no 

incentive to ask that unneeded systems be terminated when they are 

not responsible for establishing and maintaining these systems. 

ACDA has not complied with 

OMB cruidance on computer security 

Transmittal Memorandum Number 1 to OMB Circular A-71 requires 

the head of each executive branch agency to establish a computer 

security program, and sets minimum requirements for these programs. ACDA has not complied with this guidance. 

The Chief of CS believed that, although there were no written. 

policies or procedures regarding computer security, personnel 

under his supervision took appropriate steps to safeguard data. 

Because he had not been assigned responsibility for implementing 

the OMB guidance, however, he believed he lacked authority to 

require all Agency users to take similar steps. He stated that 

valuable data may be lost because backup copies of programs and 

files are not always maintained. 

ACDA OFFICIALS DISAGREE OVER 

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS: A THOROUGH 

REVIEW OF NEEDS COULD HELP 

There was no consensus among ACDA officials on whether the 

reduced level of operations analysis capability following OA's 

abolishment and other actions was sufficient to meet the Agency's 

needs. ACDA had not thoroughly assessed what operations analysis 

capabilities would be required in the future to fulfill its mission, or decided how these requirements would best be met. 

Periodic, ACDA-wide planning for this support function would give 

management some assurance that it has the appropriate organization 

and resources to meet changing demands for operations analysis. 

No consensus within ACDA 

on operations analysis 

A 1982 reduction of ACDA'S operations analysis capabilities 

led to disagreement among ACDA officials over its impact and the 

role operations analysis should play in the future. A thorough 

examination of these issues by the ACDA directorate could help 

resolve this disagreement. 

At the end of fiscal year 1982, ACDA reduced its operations 

analysis capabilities by 

31 
--abolishing OA, transferring OA's analytical 

staff to positions within the bureaus, giving 

them new titles, and in some cases, assigning 

them duties not related to operations analysis: 

--cancelling the DEC contract; 

--giving up access to large strategic exchange 

models located at a contractor facility; and 

--shelving two computerized models which were 

used to estimate the effect of major disruptions on a nation's economy and the budgetary 

impact of arms control decisions. 

At the time of our fieldwork we found that ACDA officials at 

various levels disagreed over whether the reduced level of operations analysis capabilities and the existing organizational structure would reduce the Agency's ability to carry out its functions 

in the future. Some officials believed ACDA's ability to fulfill 

its mission could suffer if its operations analysis capabilities 

were not augmented or reorganized; others did not. 

Some officials maintained that operations analysis was less 

important to ACDA than in the past, and that recent reductions 

helped bring capabilities into line with the Agency's needs.Other 

officials disagreed, and believed that ACDA's capabilities were 

not adequate to maintain its influence in the interagency policymaking process. 

Moreover, some officials believed that a decentralized 

arrangement improves operations analyst efficiency. Others maintained that a centralized operations analysis group would enhance 

efficiency, provide an independent viewpoint on bureau products, 

and anticipate the bureaus' future needs. 

We could not determine the correctness of either point of 

view regarding the abolishment of OA due to (1) a lack of available documentation to objectively determine the merits of OA, current arrangements, and possible future arrangements, and (2) the 

subjective nature of many of the opposing arguments. 

ACDA has not thoroughly evaluated 

its operations analysis needs 

In our report to the Director of ACDA we'noted that ACDA had 

not thoroughly evaluated the operations analysis capabilities 

required in the future to fulfill its mission, nor had it decided 

32 
how such requirements would be best met. Periodic, Agency-wide 

planning for this support function would provide some assurance 

that changing demands for operations analysis could be met. 

Planning efforts related to operations analysis have been 

essentially limited, ad hoc exercises. Because planning for 

operations analysis may be complex (the demand is said by some 

government officials to be very uneven and difficult to predict), 

reliance on sporadic or ad hoc planning exercises tends to 

increase the likelihood that demands will arise unforeseen or that 

unnecessary resources will be maintained indefinitely. 

In periodically determining the extent and nature of operations analysis capabilities needed by ACDA to fulfill all aspects 

of its mandate under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the 

Director should consider a number of key factors, including the 

--expected scope and type of ACDA activities, 

given its legislative authorities; 

--current and future needs of ACDA's bureaus 

and other consumers of operations analysis 

support; 

--degree to which ACDA needs the capability to 

adequately and independently evaluate the 

arms control-related positions and analyses 

of other U.S. agencies; and 

--opportunity to develop greater access to 

operations analysis capabilities of other 

agencies, including DOD. 

After identifying ACDA's operations analysis needs, the Director 

must resolve the question of organizational arrangement. 

CONCLUSIONS 

ACDA must improve all aspects of its ADP management, so that 

the Agency can assure itself that ADP resources are adequate and 

that they are directed to their best use. ACDA also needs to 

comply with OMB directives on ADP security. Al though more formal 

management mechanisms are needed, they need not be 'expensive or 

overly burdensome. A small agency, like ACDA, should not require 

the complex procedures used by a much larger department or agency. 

ACDA officials disagreed among themselves as to the potential 

impact of the level of operations analysis resources and organizational structure at the time of our fieldwork. Because, in part, 

33 
of a lack of adequate records, we could not adequately analyze the 

relative merits of these various points of view. Nonetheless, a 

number of officials indicated at least some degree of concern 

regarding ACDA's operations analysis capabilities. Because of 

this concern, as well as the potential difficulties in predicting 

demand for operations analysis support services, we believe that 

ACDA should periodically and systematically plan for operations 

analysis. Such planning should help ACDA ensure that it will have 

the resources it will need to meet its responsibilities without 

maintaining unnecessary capabilities. 

AGENCY ACTIONS AND 

OUR EVALUATION 

In our report to the Director of ACDA, we recommended that he 

--develop a comprehensive ADP planning process, 

which requires top management involvement, 

well-supported justification of stated needs, 

and periodic feedback from users; 

--implement ,an ADP cost accounting system which 

complies with A-121; 

--establish a computer security program which 

complies with Transmittal Memorandum Number 1 

to A-71; and 

--periodically review and assess ACDA's operations analysis needs and capabilities, and 

determine what adjustments in allocated 

resources, organizational structures, and 

access to other agencies' resources are 

required to best meet identified needs. 

In his September 12, 1983 comments on these recommendations, 

the Director of ACDA informed us that the report would be helpful 

to ACDA in its review of its operating procedures and practices. 

Moreover, the Director noted that he was initiating ACDA reviews 

on (1) ADP planning procedures, (2) computer security, (3) the 

Agency's requirements for operations analysis, and (4) implementation of the information management requirements of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1980. The Director did not respond to our recommendation that the Agency implement an ADP cost accounting system 

which complies with OMB Circular A-121. We believe that such a 

system is needed and its specific features should be considered by 

ACDA in its reviews of ADP management. 

34 
In February 1984, the Director informed the Senate and House 

Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary that, 

on December 9, 1983, he had directed an internal review of (1) our 

report, (2) resources needed to meet ACDA program requirements, 

and (3) procedures and management structures to achieve effective 

operations research for ACDA’S maximum benefit. As a result of 

that review, he approved 

--establishing an operations analysis organization within VT, with overall ADP and opera-' 

tions analysis responsibilities; 

--augmenting the operations analysis staff by 

transferring an analyst to VI and establishing two new positions; and 

--increasing the fiscal year 1984 computer budget by $80,000. 

DOD, in its September 1983 comments, took no position regarding our findings and recommendations. An OMB official informed us 

that OMB concurred with ACDA's September 1983 comments. 

35 

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DANTE 8. F4SCELL. FL.4 

LEE W HAMILTON. IND 

GUS YATRDN. PA 

STEPHEN J SOLARZ. N.” 

DON EONKER. WASH. 

GERRY E. STUDOS, MASS. 

4NDY IRELAND. FL9 

D&N MICA. FLIP. 

MICHAEL 0 BARNES. MD. 

HOWARD WOLPE, MICH. 

GE0 W. CRmxm. ~8.. MICM. 

SAM GEJOENSON. CONN 

MERWN M. DYMALLY. CALiF 

TOM LILNTOS. CALIF. 

PETER H KOSTMAYEA. PA. 

ROBERT G. TORAICELLI. NJ 

L*WAENCE J SMETH. FLA 

HOWARD L. BERMAN CALIF 

HARRY M REID. NE” 

MEL LEWNf CALIF 

EDWARD F FEIGWAN. OWIG 

TED wmss. NY. 

ROBERT GARCIA. N Y 

.OCKL WM., CWAIRMAN 

WILLIAM 0 B1100MFlEtD. MICU 

LAARY WINN. JR.. #AM 

BENJAYlN A GILMA& k.Y 

PLOI’ERT J. tAGOMAR$I~#O, CALIF. 

JOEL PRITCHARD. WASH 

JM.4 LEACH. IOWA 

TOW ROTH. WIS 

OLYM’PIA J. BNOWE, MAW’E 

WlNWf J. H’VOE, ILL. 

G,EArZLtl8. H. S~OILOYON. M.Y. 

‘NXJWAS K. &REWTPR. NEBR. 

MARK Q. SIWAWIQ’ER. MICW. 

ED i%CIIAU, CALIF. 

JOHN J. ORAD,‘. JR. 

CHIEF OF STAFF 

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher 

Comptroller General of the 

United States 

441 G Street, M.W. 

Room 7026 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Dear Mr. Bowsher: 

In January of this year, the Subcommittee on International 

Security and Scientific Affairs asked your staff for assistance 

in preparing for hearings this Spring on the fiscal year 1984- 

1985 authorization request for the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency (AcDA). After reviewing the information furnished by 

your staff, we asked the General Accounting Office to testify 

on the first day of the hearings. Mr. Frank Conahan testified 

before the subcommittee on March 24, and presented a number of 

pertinenti issues bearing on ACDA's ability to effectively carry 

out its responsibilities as mandated by law. 

We would like your staff to continue its work and complete 

the development of the issues presented by Mr. Conahan regarding 

ACDA, such as: 

-- adequacy of its internal controls; 

-- management of its arms control research programs: 

and 

-- development and operation of computer-based support 

for its programs and activities. 

We would appreciate the final report on these, as well as 

other matters which may arise, be available to the subcommittee 

by no later than this September. We recognize, however, that 

ACDA should take corrective actions as soon as possible. 

36 
APPENDIX 

Page Two 

Therefore, interim reports by your staff should continue to be 

submitted to the subcommittee on these issues as they are 

developed. 

This request 

Staff Director of 

should be coordinated with Mr. Ivo Spalatin, 

the subcommittee. 

Thanking you for your attention to this request, we are 

Sincerely yours, 

h,W. 

u 

Ranking Minority Member 

(465279) 
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