J-S77028-17

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PATRICK DOYLE 

Appellant

v.

ESTATE OF WANDA A. MARVIN,

 DECEASED

 Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 946 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered June 9, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Civil Division at No(s): 

0100-CV-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2018

Patrick Doyle appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Tioga County, granting the motion of the Estate of Wanda Marvin, 

Deceased, to strike a lis pendens. Upon careful review, we quash.

Foster Marvin, in his capacity as executor of the will of Wanda A. Marvin, 

Deceased, sought to dispose of the decedent’s residence (“Property”) as well 

as certain personalty contained therein. He listed the Property for sale and

subsequently received a proposed contract from a realtor acting on behalf of 

Doyle. The contract consisted of an agreement of sale for the Property and 

an addendum for the personal property, both signed by Doyle. The 

consideration offered by Doyle consisted of $113,000 for the Property and 

nothing attributable to the personalty. Marvin, through his realtor, submitted 
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a counteroffer requesting $113,000 for the Property and $3,500 for the 

personalty. Doyle countered with an offer of $113,000 and $2,200 for the 

Property and personalty, respectively, which Marvin rejected. Ultimately, 

Marvin obtained a buyer willing to purchase the Property and personalty for 

his desired price and entered into a sales contract with that individual. 

Upon learning of Marvin’s agreement to sell the Property to a third party, 

Doyle filed a lis pendens against the Property. Doyle did not, however, file an 

action for specific performance, or any other form of relief. On February 23, 

2017, Marvin filed a motion to strike the praecipe for lis pendens. After a 

hearing, the court granted Marvin’s motion, finding that the parties had not 

entered into an enforceable contract, because the sales agreement and 

addendum were a non-severable contract that was never fully agreed upon or 

executed by the parties. Doyle filed a motion for post-trial relief, which the 

court denied. This timely appeal follows.

Prior to reaching the merits of Doyle’s appeal, we must determine 

whether this appeal is properly before us. We conclude that it is not. 

A lis pendens is the jurisdiction, power, or control which courts 

acquire over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance 

of the action, and until its final judgment thereon. Bungar v. St. 

Michael's Greek Catholic Church, [] 116 A. 389 ([Pa.] 1922). 

The existence of a lis pendens merely notifies third parties that 

any interest that may be acquired in the res pending the litigation 

will be subject to the result of the action and is not therefore an 

actual lien on the property. Dice v. Bender, [] 117 A.2d 725 

([Pa.] 1955). An order lifting a lis pendens during the course of 

an equity action fixes neither rights, duties, nor liabilities between 

the parties, puts no one out of court, and does not terminate the 

underlying litigation by prohibiting parties from proceeding with 
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the action. Accordingly, the requisite “finality” is not present when 

a lis pendens is lifted and the order, therefore, is interlocutory.

U.S. Nat. Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 487 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. 1985). 

Because the trial court’s order striking Doyle’s lis pendens was 

interlocutory, we lack jurisdiction to consider Doyle’s appeal.1 

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/26/2018

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1 We note that, because there was no underlying action, either at law or in 

equity, pending before any court with regard to the Property, Doyle was not 

entitled to a lis pendens in the first instance and, on that basis alone, the court 

properly granted Marvin’s motion to strike. See Psaki v. Ferrari, 546 A.2d 

1127, 1128 (Pa. Super. 1988) (purpose of lis pendens merely to give notice 

to third persons that real estate subject to litigation and that any interest 

acquired therein will be subject to result of action).