In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 99-1791, 99-2316 & 99-2373

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel Torres-Ramirez, John Douglas Byers,

and Rickey W. Franklin,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.

No. 3:98CR00017--Richard L. Young, Judge.

Argued April 10, 2000--Decided May 23, 2000

 Before Easterbrook, Kanne, and Rovner, Circuit Judges.

 Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. Derrick Hardin

managed a long-running cocaine distribution

operation in Evansville, Indiana. Dissatisfied

with the price his principal suppliers wanted for

wholesale quantities, Hardin turned to his friend

George Tyson, then living in California. Tyson

came up with some cocaine and introduced Hardin

to Enrique Rivera, who became Hardin’s new

principal source. When Rivera raised his price in

June 1996, Hardin cut back his purchase from five

kilograms to three and sought an alternate source

for the remainder. Tyson suggested Rivera’s

brother-in-law, Daniel Torres-Ramirez, who Tyson

had known for 10 years and from whom Tyson’s

brother Monte had acquired small quantities

between 1993 and 1995. Torres-Ramirez beat

Rivera’s price, selling Hardin two kilograms of

cocaine for a total of $31,000. But Hardin never

dealt with Torres-Ramirez again, for Rivera cut

his price (and expressed annoyance at having to

compete for the business). Later in 1996 the

distribution network collapsed when a courier was

arrested carrying cocaine from California to

Indiana. Eight persons were indicted in

Evansville for conspiring to distribute cocaine.

Five pleaded guilty; the three who went to trial

were convicted and appeal.

 Plenty of evidence demonstrates that John Byers

and Rickey Franklin conspired not only to

distribute cocaine but also to launder the money

produced by their criminal activities. Several
confederates, including Tyson, testified for the

prosecution at trial. But after trial Tyson had

a change of heart. Tyson furnished Franklin’s

lawyer with a statement that "[t]he Government

made me say things to hurt Ricky [sic] Wayne

Franklin that was [sic] not true." Tyson also

asserted that a prosecutor "would read to me what

I was to say and would make me read what I was to

say until I had it the way they wanted it." A

motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 based on this

recantation was summarily denied by the district

court, and Franklin now argues that he is

entitled to at least a hearing on the subject.

But the judge already had heard Tyson’s testimony

and knew that the prosecutor did not lead Tyson

by the nose in court. If his testimony had been

rehearsed--well, that happens all the time.

Franklin had ample opportunity to cross-examine

Tyson about the events that preceded his

testimony and the inducements he received for

cooperation, and he did so at length. Under

cross-examination Tyson denied that the

prosecutor had put words in his mouth and stated:

"basically they told me just to tell the truth."

Tyson’s effort to assist his former partner in

crime by claiming that he committed perjury

during the trial does not require the district

judge to extend the proceedings.

 Details adding verisimilitude could have

justified a hearing, but Tyson’s recantation was

essentially fact free. What portions of his

testimony, exactly, were untrue? What is the

truth? Why should we think that the coaching was

designed to replace truth with fabrication,

rather than the other way ’round? Witnesses who

have had criminal careers often must be

forcefully reminded that trial is a time for

scrupulous accuracy. Because Tyson’s recantation

was so sketchy, the district judge did not abuse

his discretion--though it would have been prudent

to give a short explanation rather than to deny

the motion without comment, as the judge did.

 Byers’ principal appellate contentions concern

his sentence. He believes that the district court

credited "unreliable" evidence when calculating

the quantity of cocaine for which he is

accountable under the Sentencing Guidelines, and

that the judge’s explanations of his decision are

insufficient. When a judge accepts the

calculation of the presentence report, however,

it is rarely necessary to add details. United

States v. Berkey, 161 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (7th

Cir. 1998). Here the judge accepted the proposed

calculation, which depended on a credibility

assessment. Derrick Hardin testified at trial to

precise quantities of drugs he had furnished to

Byers. Like the jury (which would not have

convicted had it disbelieved Hardin), the judge
credited Hardin’s testimony. Byers calls Hardin

"unreliable," but a defendant’s entitlement to

"reliable evidence" does not mean that appellate

courts second-guess decisions to credit live

testimony. The point of opinions insisting that

evidence at sentencing be "reliable" is that,

although courts may rely on hearsay or evidence

with uncertain provenance, they should not go

overboard: hearsay must have some indicia of

reliability (e.g., corroboration). See U.S.S.G.

sec. 6A1.3(a); Berkey, 161 F.3d at 1101-02. When

the sentence rests on testimony under oath,

however, it is enough that the judge believe the

witness--unless the testimony is illogical or

contradicted by documents or other physical

evidence, making it clearly erroneous to accept

the witness’s version of events. Byers does not

contend that the district judge committed a clear

error by accepting Hardin’s account of drug

quantities. Byers does observe that Rahmon

Graves, who saw part of a transaction in June

1996, testified that Hardin gave Byers one

kilogram of cocaine; Hardin testified that he

handed over 4 kilograms that month. These

accounts do not conflict, because Graves did not

testify that he witnessed all of the transactions

between Hardin and Byers. Once again, however, by

saying a few words along these lines the district

judge would have avoided misunderstandings and

averted an appellate issue. No more need be said

about Byers’ conviction and sentence; his other

arguments have been considered but do not require

discussion.

 Torres-Ramirez has a much stronger argument, one

that goes to the core of the prosecution.

Evidence presented at trial demonstrates that

Torres-Ramirez is a big-time drug dealer, able to

sell multi-kilogram quantities on short notice.

But he was not charged with distributing drugs,

and for a very good reason: venue for that

offense would be in California. See United States

v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999). The

only crime that could be prosecuted in Indiana is

conspiracy in Indiana, but Torres-Ramirez

contends that, whatever his misdeeds, that

offense is not included. Taken in the light most

favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence

supports these propositions about Torres-Ramirez:

He sold two kilograms of cocaine to

Derrick Hardin in Los Angeles,

California, in June 1996.

He met Hardin through George Tyson.

Between 1993 and 1995 he fronted modest

quantities of cocaine to George’s

brother Monte.
Hardin and George Tyson demonstrated

their trust in him by allowing him to

leave with the money and return later

with the cocaine.

He agreed to entertain proposals for

future sales to Hardin but would not

commit to terms. He invited Hardin to

page him when he was in California and

wanted to buy cocaine. A jury could

believe that he furnished Hardin with

his pager’s number.

Do these facts support an inference that TorresRamirez conspired with Hardin (and others) to

distribute cocaine in Indiana? Certainly TorresRamirez did not agree to do so expressly. He must

have known that Hardin had his own customers, but

nothing implies that he knew or cared who

Hardin’s confederates were, or where they resold

the cocaine. Torres-Ramirez was asked to commit

to future sales; he declined but invited

proposals. Torres-Ramirez and Hardin did not make

a second transaction. Unsurprisingly, TorresRamirez contends that his only relation to Hardin

was that of seller to buyer, a relation that

differs from conspiracy. "[T]he sale agreement

itself cannot be the conspiracy, for it has no

separate criminal object. What is required for

conspiracy . . . is an agreement to commit some

other crime beyond the crime constituted by the

[sale] agreement itself." United States v.

Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1993) (en

banc) (plurality opinion). See also United States

v. Duff, 76 F.3d 122 (7th Cir. 1996).

 The district court told the jury (over

objection) that a "mere one time sale of a large

quantity of drugs is not sufficient, by itself,

to prove the seller has joined a drug

distribution conspiracy." That is true. The

instruction added: "To establish the seller has

joined a conspiracy to distribute cocaine the

government must also prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the existence of evidence of an enduring

relationship that directly or indirectly shows

the seller had knowledge of the conspiracy to

distribute drugs." This sentence is both

misleading and false.

 It is misleading because it tells the jury that

only "the existence of evidence" must be shown

beyond a reasonable doubt; instead the jury

should have been told that the evidence must show

a criminal agreement beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).

 It is false to the extent it tells the jury

that conspiracy has been established if "the

seller had knowledge of the conspiracy to
distribute drugs." Knowing of a conspiracy

differs from joining a conspiracy. United States

v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 285 (7th Cir.

1992); United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221,

1225 (7th Cir. 1990). Every seller of large

quantities knows that his buyer intends to

resell, and thus knows that his buyer is involved

in a criminal conspiracy. No one distributes two

kilograms on the street by himself. Lechuga

considered and rejected an argument that

knowledge of impending resale equates to

conspiracy, so this instruction is reversible

error. 994 F.2d at 347-50. (The lead opinion,

which was joined by three judges, Judge Rovner’s

concurring opinion, id. at 357, and the

dissenting opinion, id. at 357-64, also joined by

three judges, agreed on this point. The lead

opinion therefore establishes the holding of the

case. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193

(1977).) Although Lechuga is an en banc opinion,

heavily relied on by Torres-Ramirez, the United

States does not so much as cite it. But this does

not make Lechuga go away. The district judge

needed to tell the jury to look for an agreement

to join the Indiana distribution network, not

just for knowledge of its existence.

 Remand is not appropriate, however, because we

conclude that the evidence would not have

supported a conviction under the proper legal

standard--that the prosecution demonstrate beyond

a reasonable doubt an agreement to commit a crime

other than the immediate sale. Torres-Ramirez

therefore is entitled to acquittal. Cf. Burks v.

United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). Even giving the

prosecution the benefit of every inference that

a reasonable jury could draw, we think that this

is a one-sale case. Asked directly to agree to

future sales, Torres-Ramirez declined. He gave

Hardin a pager number, not an agreement. When

L.L. Bean sends out a catalog, it does not agree

to sell every item on demand, or enter into a

conspiracy with the catalogs’ recipients. The

evidence demonstrates that Hardin trusted TorresRamirez, but many a buyer in an ordinary

commercial sale pays first and receives delivery

later.

 Payment before delivery differs from delivery

before payment, the "fronting" transaction from

which an inference of agreement may be drawn. See

United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1065 (7th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Baker, 1 F.3d 596,

597 (7th Cir. 1993). A dealer who "fronts" drugs

to his customer depends for payment on the

success of the resale venture, making it possible

to infer that the dealer has agreed to

participate in it: the dealer becomes at least a

debt investor in the redistribution venture, if

not an equity investor. The dealer wants the
redistribution to succeed, so he can collect.

Torres-Ramirez and Monte Tyson thus may have

conspired to distribute drugs in California. But

Hardin’s advance payment did not make TorresRamirez a partner in Hardin’s business in

Indiana; at most it made Hardin a (brief)

creditor of Torres-Ramirez’s business in

California. Torres-Ramirez did not care whether

the Evansville redistribution venture succeeded;

he had his money already.

 This record does not demonstrate the multiple

sales that may support an inference of

conspiracy. See Direct Sales Co. v. United

States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943); United States

v. Menting, 166 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 1999);

Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 349-50. It affirmatively

establishes that Torres-Ramirez did not front

drugs to the Indiana conspiracy and declined an

invitation to agree to supply the Evansville

group with its requirements. And the sentence

implies that the district judge himself must have

thought Torres-Ramirez innocent of conspiracy.

The judge attributed to Torres-Ramirez two

kilograms of cocaine as relevant conduct--the two

kilograms Torres-Ramirez sold to Hardin. Yet

conspirators are accountable under U.S.S.G.

sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) for "all reasonably

foreseeable acts and omissions of others in

furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal

activity". To say that Torres-Ramirez was

responsible for only two kilograms is to say that

no criminal acts of the Evansville group were

"reasonably foreseeable" to him. The judge added

when imposing sentence that Torres-Ramirez "did

not, at least as far as the court knows, did not

know it [the cocaine] was coming here [Indiana]

or did not really care whether it was coming

here." Yet if Torres-Ramirez was ignorant of the

Evansville venture, how is it possible to say

that he joined that venture? The sentence

reflects a considered judgment by the district

court that the only agreement into which TorresRamirez entered was an agreement to sell two

kilograms of cocaine to Hardin, and that

agreement is miles (about 1,740 miles) apart from

an agreement to distribute cocaine in Evansville,

Indiana. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 34

F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1191 (7th Cir. 1991);

United States v. Kimmons, 917 F.2d 1011, 1015

(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d

1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1990).

 The judgments with respect to Byers and

Franklin are affirmed. The judgment with respect

to Torres-Ramirez is reversed, and the case is

remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of

acquittal.