U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

D r i v e - B y S h o o t i n g s

by Kelly Dedel

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

No. 47
www.PopCenter.org

Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site 

at www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help 

you deal more effectively with crime and disorder in your 

community, including:

• Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides

• Interactive training exercises

• Online access to research and police practices

• Online problem analysis module.

Designed for police and those who work with them to 

address community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great 

resource in problem-oriented policing.

Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
Drive-By Shootings

Kelly Dedel

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#2005CKWXK001 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained 

herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 

the official position of the Department of Justice. You should not 

consider references to specific companies, products, or services as 

an endorsement thereof by the author(s) or the Justice Department. 

Rather, the references are intended to supplement discussion of the 

issues.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

March 2007

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

Guide No. 47

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series i

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about 

how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime 

and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention 

and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to 

investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. Neither 

do they cover all of the technical details about how to 

implement specific responses. The guides are written for 

police—of whatever rank or assignment—who must address 

the specific problem the guides cover. The guides will be 

most useful to officers who:

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles 

and methods. The guides are not primers in problemoriented policing. They deal only briefly with the initial 

decision to focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze 

the problem, and means to assess the results of a problemoriented policing project. They are designed to help police 

decide how best to analyze and address a problem they have 

already identified. (A companion series of Problem-Solving Tools

guides has been produced to aid in various aspects of problem 

analysis and assessment.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the 

complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to spend 

perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and responding to 

it. Carefully studying a problem before responding helps you 

design the right strategy, one that is most likely to work in your 

community. You should not blindly adopt the responses others 

have used; you must decide whether they are appropriate to 

your local situation. What is true in one place may not be true 

elsewhere; what works in one place may not work everywhere.

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing police 

business. The guides describe responses that other police 

departments have used or that researchers have tested. While 
ii Drive-By Shootings

not all of these responses will be appropriate to your 

particular problem, they should help give a broader view 

of the kinds of things you could do. You may think 

you cannot implement some of these responses in your 

jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when 

police have discovered a more effective response, they have 

succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving 

the response to the problem. (A companion series of 

Response Guides has been produced to help you understand 

how commonly-used police responses work on a variety of 

problems.) 

• Understand the value and the limits of research 

knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful 

research is available to the police; for other problems, 

little is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series 

summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate 

the need for more research on that particular problem. 

Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to 

all the questions you might have about the problem. The 

research may help get you started in designing your own 

responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This 

will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local 

problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, 

not every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has 

every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so 

would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The 

references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 

on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of 

research on the subject. 

• Are willing to work with others to find effective 

solutions to the problem. The police alone cannot 

implement many of the responses discussed in the guides. 

They must frequently implement them in partnership with 

other responsible private and public bodies including other 
About the Problem-Specific Guides Series iii

government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 

private businesses, public utilities, community groups, 

and individual citizens. An effective problem-solver must 

know how to forge genuine partnerships with others 

and be prepared to invest considerable effort in making 

these partnerships work. Each guide identifies particular 

individuals or groups in the community with whom 

police might work to improve the overall response to that 

problem. Thorough analysis of problems often reveals 

that individuals and groups other than the police are in 

a stronger position to address problems and that police 

ought to shift some greater responsibility to them to do 

so. Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility 

for Public Safety Problems, provides further discussion of this 

topic.

The COPS Office defines community policing as 

“a policing philosophy that promotes and supports 

organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce 

the fear of crime and social disorder through problemsolving tactics and police-community partnerships.” These 

guides emphasize problem-solving and police-community 

partnerships in the context of addressing specific public 

safety problems. For the most part, the organizational 

strategies that can facilitate problem-solving and policecommunity partnerships vary considerably and discussion of 

them is beyond the scope of these guides.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police 

practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, 

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and 

Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police 

practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that 

the police everywhere experience common problems. In 
iv Drive-By Shootings

a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is 

important that police be aware of research and successful 

practices beyond the borders of their own countries.

Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the 

research literature and reported police practice and is 

anonymously peer-reviewed by line police officers, police 

executives and researchers prior to publication. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to 

provide feedback on this guide and to report on your 

own agency’s experiences dealing with a similar problem. 

Your agency may have effectively addressed a problem 

using responses not considered in these guides and your 

experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This 

information will be used to update the guides. If you wish 

to provide feedback and share your experiences it should 

be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.

For more information about problem-oriented policing, 

visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 

www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access 

to:

• the Problem-Specific Guides series

• the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools series

• instructional information about problem-oriented policing 

and related topics

• an interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise

• an interactive Problem Analysis Module

• a manual for crime analysts

• online access to important police research and practices

• information about problem-oriented policing conferences 

and award programs. 
Acknowledgments v

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are produced by the 

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, whose officers are 

Michael S. Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate 

Director) and Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). 

While each guide has a primary author, other project 

team members, COPS Office staff and anonymous peer 

reviewers contributed to each guide by proposing text, 

recommending research and offering suggestions on 

matters of format and style. 

The project team that developed the guide series 

comprised Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin 

Law School), Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), 

John E. Eck (University of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott 

(University of Wisconsin Law School), Rana Sampson 

(Police Consultant), and Deborah Lamm Weisel (North 

Carolina State University.) 

Members of the San Diego; National City, California; 

and Savannah, Georgia police departments provided 

feedback on the guides’ format and style in the early 

stages of the project.

Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS 

Office. Research for the guide was conducted at the 

Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 

direction of Phyllis Schultze. Suzanne Fregly edited this 

guide.

Contents

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of Drive-By Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

What this Guide Does and Does Not Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Factors Contributing to Drive-By Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Gang Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Vehicle and Gun Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Times and Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Incidents and Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Times and Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Current Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Specific Responses to Reduce Drive-By Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Reducing Weapon Availability or Prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Identifying Situations With the Potential for Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Making Environmental Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Responding to Incidents and Increasing Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Responses with Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Contents vii
viii Drive-By Shootings

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Drive-By Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Problem of Drive-By Shootings 1

The Problem of Drive-By Shootings

What This Guide Does and Does Not Cover

This guide begins by describing the problem of drive-by 

shootings and reviewing factors that increase its risks. It 

then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze 

your local drive-by shootings problem. Finally, it reviews 

responses to the problem and what is known about them 

from evaluative research and police practice.

Drive-by shootings are but one aspect of the larger set 

of problems related to gang and gun violence. This guide 

is limited to addressing the particular harms drive-by 

shootings cause. Related problems not directly addressed 

in this guide, each of which requires separate analysis, 

include:

gun trafficking and availability

gun possession

general gun violence by adult and juvenile 

offenders

drug markets

gang violence

road rage

assaults in and around bars

witness intimidation.

Some of these related crime problems are covered in other 

guides in this series, all of which are listed at the end of 

this guide.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
2 Drive-By Shootings

Problem Description

A drive-by shooting refers to an incident when someone 

fires a gun from a vehicle at another vehicle, a person, a 

structure, or another stationary object. Drive-by shootings 

are a subset of more general gun violence and are less 

common than incidents in which someone approaches 

another on foot and fires at him or her.§ Many drive-by 

shootings involve multiple suspects and multiple victims. 

Using a vehicle allows the shooter to approach the 

intended target without being noticed and then to speed 

away before anyone reacts. The vehicle also offers some 

protection in the case of return fire. In some situations, 

drive-by shootings are gang-related; in others, they are 

the result of road rage or personal disputes between 

neighbors, acquaintances, or strangers and are not related 

to gang membership. Non-gang-related drive-by shootings 

are not well researched, but journalistic accounts and 

police reports suggest that these constitute a significant 

proportion of the drive-by shootings to which police 

respond. Because of their prevalence, they are included 

in this guide, despite the dearth of research about their 

motivations and the lack of evaluative research showing 

which responses are most effective with this type of driveby shooting. Even if a drive-by shooting problem is not 

patently gang-related, some of what is known about gangrelated shootings may inform responses to other kinds of 

drive-by shootings.

Although some drive-by shootings result in the victim’s 

death, many result in nonfatal injuries to the intended 

victim or innocent bystanders.§§ Whether the shooting is 

lethal depends less on the intent of the offender and more 

on the location of the wound and the speed of medical 

§ Gun violence perpetrated by other 

means is far more prevalent than 

gun violence facilitated by vehicle 

use. For example, in West Oakland, 

California, offenders were 10 

times more likely to walk up to the 

intended victim and shoot him or 

her than to use a vehicle to facilitate 

the attack (Wilson and Riley 2004). 

Similarly, an analysis of San Diego 

homicides from 1999 through 2003 

revealed that drive-by shootings 

accounted for about 10 percent of 

all of them (Wilson et al. 2004).

§§ For example, in Los Angeles, 

of over 2,000 victims of drive-by 

shootings in 1991, only 5 percent 

were fatally injured. Over half 

sustained a gunshot wound to the leg 

(Hutson, Anglin, and Eckstein 1996; 

Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts 1994). 
The Problem of Drive-By Shootings 3

attention.1 The intended targets may be slow to mobilize 

in the face of an unanticipated attack, and their reactions 

may be delayed by drugs or alcohol.2 The specifics of a 

drive-by shooting—in which the shooter is aiming a gun 

out the window of a moving vehicle at a moving target, 

and is often inexperienced in handling a gun—mean that 

shots often go wild and injure people or damage property 

that was not the intended target.3,§ Deaths of innocent 

bystanders often receive significant media attention and 

result in passionate public outcry, particularly when the 

victim is extremely young, has a debilitating medical 

condition, or was shot while inside a supposedly “safe” 

structure, such as their home or place of worship.4

There are no national data on the volume of driveby shootings. National statistical databases such as 

the Uniform Crime Reports record the outcome (e.g., 

homicide, aggravated assault, weapons law violations) 

rather than the method (i.e., drive-by shooting). Local data 

on the scope of the problem are sometimes generated 

for the purposes of conducting research, but generally 

are not available on a consistent basis so that long-term 

trends can be tracked. What data are available suggest that 

large metropolitan cities with entrenched gang problems 

are more likely to be challenged by drive-by shootings 

than smaller suburban or rural jurisdictions. While smaller 

jurisdictions may have isolated drive-by shooting incidents 

stemming from a dispute between neighbors or customers 

at a bar or nightclub, they do not face the problems of 

retaliatory gang violence that characterizes the problem in 

large cities.

§ One study of Los Angeles drive-by 

shootings in the early 1990s found 

that the proportion of those injured 

in drive-by shootings who were 

innocent bystanders ranged between 

38 to 59 percent each year (Hutson, 

Anglin, and Eckstein 1996). 
4 Drive-By Shootings

In these cities, an individual drive-by shooting is often 

one in a series of confrontations between street gangs 

with ongoing tensions.5 Attacks are followed by reprisals, 

which are followed by counterattacks. As a result, the 

same individual may come to the attention of police as a 

perpetrator, victim, and witness.6 Police often receive very 

limited information from witnesses because most drive-by 

shootings occur at night, happen very quickly and thus are 

very chaotic, and occur in neighborhoods in which gang 

members intimidate residents, some of whom distrust the 

police. 

Factors Contributing to Drive-By Shootings

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem 

will help you frame your own local analysis questions, 

determine good effectiveness measures, recognize key 

intervention points, and select appropriate responses.

Gang Membership§

Although gang membership is certainly not a prerequisite 

to being involved in a drive-by shooting, studies have 

shown that larger proportions of gang members reported 

being involved in drive-by shootings than at-risk youth 

who were not gang-involved.7 While approximately equal 

proportions of males and females reported taking part 

in drive-by shootings, females were less likely to admit to 

having actually shot anyone, which suggests that their role 

in the event may have been minor or secondary.

Gang membership may facilitate involvement in drive-by 

shootings by placing members in risky situations—ones 

in which guns are present and behavioral norms often 

include violence.8 Gang members are more likely than 

nongang members to own guns for protection, are more 

§ Police departments use different 

thresholds in determining whether 

an event is “gang-related.” The 

Los Angeles Police Department 

applies the label if the victim or 

offender is a known gang member. 

In Chicago, however, the event must 

exhibit a gang-related motive such as 

retaliation, initiation, or turf defense. 

Mere membership is not sufficient 

for the “gang-related” classification 

(Rosenfeld, Bray, and Egley 1999; 

Block and Block 1993). 
The Problem of Drive-By Shootings 5

likely to have friends who own guns for protection, and 

are more likely to carry guns when outside the home.9

Further, while not all gang members engage in driveby shootings, those who do are often attracted by the 

opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and enhance their 

group status.10

Motivations

Depending on whether the drive-by shooting is gangrelated or not, motivations differ. Those that are ganginvolved tend to be motivated by mutual antagonism 

with rival gang members, disputes over territory or turf, 

a desire to show fearlessness or loyalty to the group, an 

effort to promote one’s social status or self-image, or 

retaliation against real or perceived disrespect or insults.11

The desire for excitement can provide momentum for 

the event, making the participants restless and unruly.12

Sometimes, those involved in drive-by shootings use drugs 

and alcohol to rationalize their actions. 

Disputes among drug dealers may also provide the 

motivation for drive-by shootings. Gang members and 

those involved in drug enterprises tend not to rely on the 

formal criminal justice system to resolve their disputes. 

Instead, they respond with their own forms of justice, 

often violent, to punish others for perceived wrongs and 

to deter future aggression.13 Drive-by shootings are one 

way in which gang members and other street criminals 

exact revenge and enhance their status. These conflicts 

build and retaliation tends to lead to counter-retaliation, 

with each side believing they are acting in self-defense.14
6 Drive-By Shootings

Drive-by shootings that are not gang- or drug-motivated 

tend to occur in reaction to disputes among neighbors or 

acquaintances, or as an escalation of altercations that may 

have begun in a bar, restaurant, or nightclub. Obviously, 

not all disputes or tensions escalate to the point of 

violence, and research has not yet demonstrated what 

distinguishes those events that do from those that do not. 

At the most basic level, the aggressors must have access 

to both a vehicle and a gun, but beyond that, these events 

appear to be rather unpredictable. Newspapers are replete 

with accounts of incidents with unclear motivations 

involving shots fired from a vehicle at another vehicle, 

stationary target, person, or group of people.

Drive-by shootings that occur as an extreme form of road 

rage often occur in reaction to seemingly trivial events 

(e.g., another driver is driving “too slow,” won’t let another 

driver pass, is tailgating, fails to signal before turning). 

While triggered by these events, the underlying motivation 

usually appears to be a series of unrelated stressors in 

the perpetrator’s life.15 The protection, anonymity, sense 

of power, and ease of escape provided by the vehicle 

lead some motorists to feel safe expressing their hostility 

toward other drivers.16

Vehicle and Gun Availability

A drive-by shooting’s prerequisites include access to a 

vehicle and a gun. Those who carry out drive-by shootings 

may use their own vehicle or one that has been borrowed, 

rented, or stolen. Because many drive-by shootings occur 

at night, dependable descriptions of the vehicle involved 

may be difficult to obtain. 
The Problem of Drive-By Shootings 7

When gun ownership is more prevalent, the risk of driveby shootings increases as well. Although both juveniles 

and adults participate in them, most research on driveby shootings has focused on the prevalence of gun 

ownership among adolescents. Substantial numbers of 

adolescents have owned guns at some point in their lives, 

although their ownership tends to be sporadic.17 In recent 

years, as gun possession among juveniles has become 

more widespread, the threshold for using guns to resolve 

conflicts appears to have lowered.18 Surveys of juvenile 

offenders have shown that over half obtained their first 

gun without a specific plan to do so; rather, they reported 

finding the gun or said a peer, sibling, or other relative 

gave it to them to use for self-protection.19 Those who 

carry guns for protection may be resistant to voluntarily 

forfeiting their weapons, as they fear harm from peers or 

rival gang members more than they fear legal sanctions.20

It is not so much the number of guns in circulation, but 

rather the number of people carrying them in high-risk 

places and at high-risk times that creates the potential for 

a drive-by shooting.21 Further, the number of events in 

which guns are actually used is only a fraction of the times 

in which guns are present.22 As a result, it is important to 

know the times and places in which guns are present, and 

the factors that contribute to their use.

Times and Locations

Many drive-by shootings occur under the cover of 

darkness, either to help the shooters avoid detection or 

because the precipitating events occur at night.23 Gang 

members tend to target rival groups at parties or lingering 

on the street. Not only do these people have little time to 

react, but also the offenders can boast about carrying out 

the shooting when they were vastly outnumbered.24 
8 Drive-By Shootings

Wide open streets are often chosen as the preferred venue 

because they allow the shooters to approach without 

detection and to escape unhindered. Proximity to major 

roadways may facilitate access to and from the shooting 

location.25 Targets may include people on the street, those 

in vehicles that are stopped at a light or parked, and those 

who are inside their homes.26 Drive-by shootings that 

occur as an extreme form of road rage appear to be rather 

unpredictable in terms of the times and locations where 

they occur. 
Understanding Your Local Problem 9

Understanding Your Local Problem

The information provided above is only a generalized 

description of drive-by shootings. You must combine 

these basic facts with a more specific understanding of 

your local problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully 

will help you design a more effective response strategy. 

Stakeholders

In addition to criminal justice agencies, the following 

groups have an interest in the drive-by shooting problem 

and should be considered for the contribution they might 

make to gathering information about the problem, and 

responding to it:

local hospitals and emergency services

city public works agencies (e.g., parking, streets, 

transportation, utilities)

federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., Drug 

Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives)

probation and parole agencies

corrections departments (particularly those with 

reentry programs that monitor offenders’ return to 

the streets and their impact on the community)

bar and nightclub owners and managers

social service providers

gang members and members of other 

neighborhood “groups”

neighborhood associations.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
10 Drive-By Shootings

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should 

ask when analyzing your particular problem of driveby shootings, even if the answers are not always readily 

available.§ Your answers to these and other questions will 

help you choose the most appropriate set of responses 

later on. 

Incidents and Motivations

How many drive-by shootings have occurred?

What proportion of the incidents appears to 

have arisen from spontaneous arguments or 

interpersonal conflicts? 

What proportion of the incidents appears to be 

connected to known tensions or rivalries among 

local gangs? 

What proportion of the incidents appears to be 

drug-related? 

What proportion of the incidents appears to be 

retaliatory?

What other motivations for the incidents can you 

identify? 

Did anyone other than the victim witness the 

incidents? 

How did you identify the witnesses?

Of what quality was the information obtained 

from witnesses? If poor, what interfered with the 

ability to get useful information from them? 

Victims 

What were the characteristics of drive-by shooting 

victims (e.g., gender, age, race, or ethnicity)?

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

§ The analysis phase of problemoriented responses to gun violence 

has historically been weak. See Braga 

(2005) for guidance on making the 

analysis phase more robust.
Understanding Your Local Problem 11

Did the victims have any connections to or 

ongoing conflicts with the offenders? Or did they 

appear to be innocent bystanders?

Were the victims gang-affiliated? Were they 

involved in the drug trade? Were they armed when 

the shooting occurred?

Did the victims or bystanders return fire? 

What were the victims doing just before the 

shooting? Were they alone or with others? 

How did the victims arrive at the shooting 

location? 

Were the victims under the influence of drugs or 

alcohol during the shooting? 

What was the extent of the injuries sustained? 

How quickly was medical attention obtained? 

What were the characteristics of nonperson targets 

(e.g., car, house, other structure)? Why were these 

targets selected? Where there any characteristics 

making them vulnerable to attack? 

Offenders

What were the offenders’ characteristics (e.g., 

gender, age, race, or ethnicity)? 

Did they have previous involvement with the 

criminal justice system? Were they currently under 

some form of criminal justice supervision that 

could be leveraged?

Were the offenders gang-affiliated? Were they 

involved in the drug trade? 

Were the offenders under the influence of drugs 

or alcohol during the shooting? 

Did they target the victims specifically, or did they 

select them randomly? 

What type of gun was used, and how was it 

obtained? What happened to the gun after the 

shooting?

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
12 Drive-By Shootings

Why was the offender carrying the gun at that 

time? 

What were the reasons offenders offered for 

owning a gun? Under what conditions might they 

be convinced to relinquish them?

Whose vehicle was used? Was it owned, borrowed, 

rented, or stolen? 

How many other people were in the car during the 

shooting? What were their roles in the incident? 

How did they facilitate or discourage the offender 

from shooting? 

Was anyone in the vehicle injured? What was 

the extent of injury? How quickly was medical 

attention obtained? 

Times and Locations

Where do drive-by shootings occur? Are they 

concentrated in any identifiable patterns? 

What are these hotspots characteristics? Are they 

clustered near main thoroughfares? Businesses 

(e.g., bars and night clubs)? Other places where 

people congregate (e.g., residential parties, liquor 

stores, illegal gambling houses)? Do they provide 

for easy access and escape?

Are there features of the immediate environment 

that shield the offenders from view (e.g., poor 

lighting, overgrown vegetation) or that otherwise 

make the location attractive? Are there any 

physical barriers at other locations that appear to 

prevent the problem? 

Do other types of crime affect the area? 

What times of the day and days of the week do 

drive-by shootings occur? 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
Are there other features of the environment 

that are connected to these times and days (e.g., 

bar closing times)? Which of these could be 

strategically modified? 

Current Responses

How are intergang tensions currently monitored? 

Has your department made any efforts toward 

mediation? Which of these were successful?

Are any controllers—i.e., people who could 

prevent the offenders from causing harm—

available?

How do bars and nightclubs monitor and try to 

defuse interpersonal conflicts on their premises? 

How could the managers of these places be 

engaged?

Does traffic congestion or the physical condition 

of roads appear to contribute to road rage? How 

could these be modified?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree 

your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you 

might modify your responses if they are not producing 

the intended results. You should take measures of your 

problem before you implement responses, to determine 

how serious the problem is, and after you implement 

them, to determine whether they have been effective. 

All measures should be taken in both the target area and 

the surrounding area. For more detailed guidance on 

measuring effectiveness, see the Problem-Solving Tools 

Guide, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide 

for Police Problem-Solvers. 

•

•

•

•

•

The Problem of Drive-By Shootings 13
The following are potentially useful measures of the 

effectiveness of responses to drive-by shootings. Processrelated measures identify whether responses have been 

implemented as designed. These include:

increases in the number of searches for illegal 

guns conducted in high-risk places

increases in the number of guns seized, followed 

by a reduction in the number of guns seized

increases in the number of intergang disputes that 

are mediated and settled without violence

reductions in the number of instances in which 

gun owners rearm themselves after seizure

increases in the number of bars and nightclubs 

that enact violence prevention measures

improved witness cooperation with investigations 

of drive-by shootings

increases in perceptions of safety among residents 

and local merchants.

Outcome-related measures are used to determine whether 

responses have reduced the size or scope of the problem. 

These include:

reductions in the number of drive-by shooting 

incidents

absence of displacement to other locations;

reductions in the number of victims of drive-by 

shootings

reductions in the number of stationary targets 

(e.g., structures, vehicles) damaged by drive-by 

shootings

reductions in the severity of injuries victims 

sustain

reductions in the number of nonfatal and fatal 

injuries victims sustain. 

•

•

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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

14 Drive-By Shootings
Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings 15

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By 

Shootings

Your analysis of your local problem should give you 

a better understanding of the factors contributing to 

it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and 

established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, 

you should consider possible responses to address the 

problem. 

The following response strategies provide a foundation 

of ideas for addressing your particular problem. These 

strategies are drawn from a variety of research studies 

and police reports. Several of these strategies may apply 

to your community’s problem. It is critical that you tailor 

responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify 

each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, 

an effective strategy will involve implementing several 

different responses. Law enforcement responses alone 

are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem. 

Do not limit yourself to considering what police can 

do: carefully consider who in your community shares 

responsibility for the problem and can help police better 

respond to it. The responsibility of responding, in some 

cases, may need to be shifted toward those who have the 

capacity to implement more effective responses. (For more 

detailed information on shifting and sharing responsibility, 

see Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility 

for Public Safety Problems).

As discussed in the previous sections, while drive-by 

shootings are often gang-related, they are also carried 

out by people who are not affiliated with gangs and 

who execute a drive-by shooting during the course of 

interpersonal conflict. These incidents are both random 
and unpredictable and do not lend themselves well to a 

problem-oriented response strategy. Therefore, most of 

the responses discussed below address those drive-by 

shootings carried out by gang members.

General Considerations for an Effective 

Response Strategy

1. Focusing on proximate causes. Given the 

complexity of factors driving gang membership, 

interpersonal violence, the facilitating influence of alcohol 

and drugs, and other motivations for drive-by shootings, 

police often feel overwhelmed by the prospect of 

addressing these root causes. A problem-focused approach 

suggests focusing on proximate causes, namely addressing 

those factors that make the drive-by shooting easier to 

carry out. For example, decreasing offenders’ mobility in 

traveling to and from the targeted location or reducing 

the availability of weapons used to carry out drive-by 

shootings, while not addressing the underlying motivation, 

can frustrate the offenders’ intention and result in a 

reduction of the problem.27

2. Targeting the activity, not the individual. One 

of the criticisms of civil gang injunctions and other 

measures that target individual group members is that 

they can inadvertently increase group cohesiveness.28

By focusing on the activity (i.e., drive-by shootings) 

rather than the individual’s gang membership, police can 

avoid conferring additional status on gang membership. 

Further, community relationships are often strained by the 

community’s perception that police are focusing unfairly 

on underprivileged minorities. By remaining focused on 

the harm caused, rather than group membership, police 

can reinforce their fair and unbiased approach to crime 

prevention.29 Many of the specific responses to drive-by 

shootings, discussed below, take this approach. 

16 Drive-By Shootings
3. Understanding gang membership dynamics. 

Although not all drive-by shootings are carried out by 

gang members, a large proportion are motivated by the 

desire to join a gang, enhance one’s status, satisfy peer 

expectations, establish dominance, or exact revenge in 

the gang’s name. Knowledge of local gang dynamics, 

affiliations, rivalries, and tensions is essential to be able 

to understand and intervene effectively in the drive-by 

shooting problem.30

Specific Responses To Reduce Drive-By Shootings

Reducing Weapon Availability or Prevalence§

4. Conducting crackdowns. Enhancing police visibility 

and intensifying enforcement actions can effectively 

reduce the number of weapons available for use in driveby shootings and other forms of violence.31 This response 

is also commonly referred to as directed patrol, saturation 

patrol, and proactive patrol.§§ After deploying additional 

officers to a specific geographic area (i.e., “saturating” the 

area), police are directed to stop people for any offense 

in which probable cause exists (i.e., “directed” patrol). 

Most often, motorists are stopped for traffic violations to 

ascertain whether the person has a weapon and whether 

it can be seized legally.§§§ Focusing on specific people 

exhibiting suspicious behaviors can yield a greater number 

of weapons and arrests than a general strategy that does 

not target high-risk people or specific behaviors.32

Police can also set up roadblocks or checkpoints to 

identify and confiscate illegal weapons.§§§§ A careful 

strategy should be developed to avoid claims of unlawful 

searches or racial profiling.33 In addition, police should try 

to minimize the inconvenience to law-abiding residents. 

Police should meet with residents and community group 

§ Responses that intensify 

enforcement activities, target highrisk offenders, or obtain consent 

to search private property must be 

supported by precise documentation 

that will protect the department 

from alleged civil rights violations if 

challenged in court.

§§ See the POP Guide titled The 

Benefits and Consequences of Police 

Crackdowns (Scott 2003) for a more 

thorough discussion of crackdowns.

§§§ This approach has been 

used successfully in Kansas City 

(Missouri), Indianapolis, and Dallas, 

among other places (see Sherman, 

Shaw, and Rogan 1995; McGarrell, 

Chermak, and Weiss 2002; and 

Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor 1999). In 

Kansas City, directed patrol activities 

using traffic stops resulted in a 65 

percent increase in gun seizures 

and a 49 percent reduction in gun 

violence (e.g., homicides, drive-by 

shootings) versus a comparison 

area, without causing displacement 

(Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan 1995). 

§§§§ Crawford (1998) offers several 

recommendations for ensuring that 

checkpoints do not raise Fourth 

Amendment concerns. Among them: 

the purpose of the checkpoint must 

clearly advance the public’s interest 

in resolving a serious community 

problem; residents should be given 

advanced notice and signs should 

be posted; officers must give clearly 

worded explanations for the stop 

and should limit its duration; all cars 

should be stopped to diminish fear 

or surprise; searches should not be 

conducted unless the situation gives 

rise to one of the search warrant 

exceptions; and legal consult should 

be sought before implementation. 

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings 17
leaders to explain the initiative and gain their support 

before implementation.34 Further, officers should be 

trained to treat residents with respect and to clearly 

explain the reason for their being stopped. Community 

support is also vital, and thus police should meet with 

community leaders, businesspeople and residents whom 

crackdown activities will affect. One benefit to this 

approach is that crackdowns and checkpoints do not 

require complex coordination with other agencies and 

therefore can be implemented relatively quickly. 

5. Initiating “sweeps” targeting known offenders.

In addition to implementing crackdowns at high-risk 

locations, police can also target high-risk people using 

“sweeps.” In cooperation with probation and probation 

agencies, police can identify people already under criminal 

justice supervision who have a high propensity for gun 

violence.35 Using the probation’s search provisions and 

parole agreements, teams of police and probation and 

parole officers can search offenders’ residences, vehicles, 

and persons and confiscate any illegal weapons found.36

Not only can sweeps be carried out swiftly, but also they 

can have a rather immediate impact on the gun violence 

level, although these reductions may be hard to sustain 

over time. Further, these searches can be perceived as 

harassment of offenders who are complying with their 

supervision’s conditions.

6. Obtaining consent to search for and seize 

weapons. Parents of at-risk youth may be willing to allow 

police to enter their homes to search for and confiscate 

weapons.

37 Locations likely to yield weapons can be 

identified through citizen information or from reports 

from other police units. Permission for the search is 

granted in exchange for a promise from police that neither 

18 Drive-By Shootings
§ In St. Louis, Missouri, the 

Consent to Search program yielded 

a high cooperation level (98 percent 

of those approached gave consent 

for their homes to be searched) and 

a high gun volume (guns were seized 

in half the homes searched, totaling 

402 guns in the first year) (Decker 

and Rosenfeld 2004). Also, see 

Rosenfeld and Decker (1996) for a 

sample consent form.

§§ See the POP Guide titled Assaults 

in and Around Bars (Scott and Dedel 

2006) for ideas on how lower-level 

tensions can be dissipated before 

they escalate into gun violence. 

§§§ Successful mediation of gang 

conflicts requires an awareness of 

the forces that can deter members 

from participating, and the needs 

and interests that must be satisfied 

once they agree to mediation. Jones 

(2002) identifies the following 

essential elements: 1) developing 

personal, positive, and trusting 

relationships between gang members 

and mediators; 2) offering “excuses” 

for participating in mediation that 

allow gang members to “save face”; 

3) showing respect for the gang 

members and their conflict through 

the formality of the process and by 

requiring each side to listen to the 

other; and 4) personalizing members 

of each gang so that the hostility 

originating from group membership 

is less potent. 

the parents nor the youth will be charged or prosecuted if 

any weapons are found. Once the purpose of the search is 

explained and permission is granted, the responsible adult 

at the location should sign a consent form.§ “Consent to 

Search” programs are most effective when community 

expertise is engaged to identify locations, and when the 

police department places an absolute priority on seizing 

guns rather than prosecuting those who have them.38

Identifying Situations With the Potential for Violence

7. Tracking current tensions and past altercations. 

Although some drive-by shootings occur spontaneously, 

many are catalyzed by past altercations and ongoing 

tensions between individuals or among rival gang 

members. Some bars and nightclubs have regular 

customers who may clash with other peer group members; 

gangs involved in the drug trade may have ongoing 

disputes over territory or may try to gain control of a 

certain segment of the drug market; more general gang 

rivalries may escalate into lethal violence. Most drive-by 

shootings are not isolated events, but rather are one in a 

series of confrontations. Specialized gang units can be an 

excellent source of intelligence on the alliances, rivalries, 

and ongoing tensions among local gang members, but this 

information must be shared freely with those addressing 

the drive-by shooting problem.39 For those incidents 

that are instigated at a bar or nightclub, police can work 

with owners and managers to identify and intervene in 

those tensions with a potential for escalation.§§ A targeted 

response requires knowledge about the specific people’s 

activities, as well as the ongoing conflicts and alliances 

among other groups and gangs.40 This information can 

also be passed on to mediators in an effort to prevent 

lethal violence.§§§

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings 19
8. Coordinating with hospitals. Drive-by shooting 

victims may not be identified by police and may seek 

medical attention on their own. When hospital emergency 

rooms notify police of all patients seeking treatment 

for gunshot wounds, police may be able to identify and 

intervene in situations with a potential for retaliation and 

escalating violence.§

9. Prohibiting high-risk people from riding in cars 

with each other. If police can identify gang members 

likely to be involved in drive-by shootings, they can use a 

variety of legal strategies to prohibit their riding in cars 

with each other. For example, such restrictions could 

be part of probation or parole conditions, or could be 

specified in a civil gang injunction. Assuming police are 

notified when the people violate these conditions, the 

violation could be sufficient probable cause for an arrest, 

possibly intercepting a planned shooting. 

Civil gang injunctions have been used to combat gangs 

in several jurisdictions in southern California and Texas. 

In collaboration with prosecutors, police gather evidence 

that individual gang members represent a public nuisance. 

This evidence can include the people’s criminal histories, 

community police officers’ statements, or residents’ 

statements. The injunction prohibits named people 

from participating in specific activities (e.g., associating 

with other gang members, loitering in parks, carrying 

pagers); violations are grounds for arrest. Research on 

the injunctions’ effectiveness is somewhat limited and has 

shown mixed results, but some jurisdictions have found 

them to result in decreased visibility of gang members, 

fewer episodes of gang intimidation, and reduced fear of 

crime among residents.41

20 Drive-By Shootings

§ The National Violent Injury 

Statistics System at the Harvard 

School of Public Health is a 

national reporting system for 

gun-related injuries involving 

collaborations between the public 

health community and police. More 

information is available at www.

hsph.harvard.edu/nviss/index.htm. 

The San Antonio (Texas) Police 

Department developed a “Cops 

and Docs” program to foster twoway communication between police 

and emergency medical services. 

When a shooting occurs and the 

police do not identify the victim, an 

alert is sent to the hospital with a 

description and the suspected injury’s 

location. Conversely, when a gunshot 

victim seeks medical attention, the 

emergency room staff fax an injury 

report to police (David 1997). 
Making Environmental Changes

10. Closing streets. When drive-by shootings are 

concentrated in a specific geographic area, closing streets 

that provide access to the neighborhood can reduce 

the ability of potential offenders to carry out drive-by 

shootings.§ These closures block entry points and escape 

routes, forcing offenders to take a more circuitous route 

to their destination and often requiring them to backtrack 

to leave the area. The specific architecture of the closures 

should specify which streets will be closed, how they 

will be closed, how they will be supported by patrol, 

how they will be monitored, and when or whether to 

remove the barriers.§§ Traffic flow is a key consideration: 

traffic should be routed into streets that offer the lowest 

opportunities for drive-by shooting and other crime 

(e.g., avoiding gang members’ hangouts; focusing on 

routes bordered by open areas where the line of sight is 

unobstructed).42 This response is most effective when 

offenders are from outside of the target area, which can 

be difficult to ascertain given the complexity of gang 

turf boundaries. Given the impact of street closures 

on the residents’ normal daily activities, a wide range 

of stakeholder concerns must be addressed before 

implementation.43 Coordinating with first responders—

firefighters, EMTs, ambulance drivers, etc.—is essential to 

ensure their safe and efficient passage. 

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings 21

§ The Los Angeles Police 

Department determined that 

drive-by shootings were clustered 

on the periphery of a specific 

neighborhood, which was linked 

to major thoroughfares. They 

erected barriers to block the major 

roads leading to and from the 

neighborhood and supplemented 

them with high-visibility foot, 

bicycle, and horseback patrols. An 

immediate reduction in serious 

crime (e.g., homicides and drive-by 

shootings) was evident (Lasley 1998). 

§§ See the POP Guide titled Closing 

Streets and Alleys To Reduce Crime

(Clarke 2004) for guidance on 

implementing this response and on 

the considerable effort required to 

address stakeholders’ concerns. 

Closing streets that provide access to the neighborhood 

can be effective when drive-by shootings are 

concentrated in a specific geographic area.

Ronald V. Clarke
Responding to Incidents and Increasing Sanctions

11. Deploying response teams. The crime scenes 

of drive-by shootings often disintegrate rapidly as 

physical evidence is destroyed, witnesses leave the scene, 

and recollections of what occurred are influenced by 

discussions among witnesses and neighbors. Responding 

effectively to drive-by shootings not only increases the 

chances that those responsible will be charged, but also 

offers an opportunity to intercept plans for retaliation as 

they are created. Some jurisdictions immediately deploy 

specially trained response teams to freeze the scene, 

preserve physical evidence, and ensure that witnesses 

remain present for questioning and are kept separate from 

one another.§ These teams develop high-level expertise 

in local gang dynamics and, with the continuity provided 

by a permanent assignment, can identify patterns among 

seemingly unrelated events.44 

12. Creating witness incentives. Victims and other 

citizens who witness drive-by shootings are often reluctant 

to provide information to police. This reluctance may 

stem from a fear of reprisal, from general community 

norms discouraging cooperation with police, or from 

some planning among themselves for retaliation for the 

shooting.45 Minimizing the risks witnesses who want to 

cooperate face, strengthening ties with the community, 

and offering support in the form of financial assistance 

and temporary relocation can encourage those with 

information to come forward.§§ Improving the quality 

of information from witnesses helps police to identify 

offenders and to intervene in plans for retaliation. 

22 Drive-By Shootings

§ The El Paso (Texas) Police 

Department’s Response Team 

noted improved cooperation from 

witnesses and an increase in the 

number of cases cleared. Arrests 

were made within 24 hours in 

approximately 90 percent of 

shootings. In addition, the number 

of drive-by shootings decreased over 

time (El Paso Police Department 

2002). 

§ See the POP Guide titled Witness 

Intimidation (Dedel 2006) for more 

information. 
13. Implementing a “pulling levers” focused 

deterrence strategy. Significant decreases in the rate of 

gun violence have been noted by several jurisdictions that 

have implemented a “pulling levers” focused deterrence 

response.46,§ Targeting gang members with chronic 

involvement in serious crime, an interagency working 

group composed of police, prosecutors, and social service 

providers, among others, convenes groups of offenders, sets 

clear standards for their behavior (e.g., cease involvement 

in gun violence), and reinforces the message by “pulling 

every lever available” when standards are violated. The 

consequences for continued involvement in gun violence 

are specifically expressed, and pro-social alternatives (e.g., 

education and employment opportunities, drug treatment) 

are made available. If members of the target group are 

involved in gun violence, all of the members of the group 

are subjected to intensified supervision and other forms of 

enhanced enforcement. On-going communication with the 

targeted group makes a definitive connection between their 

involvement in gun violence and the consequences imposed. 

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

14. Targeting gun traffickers. As part of a comprehensive 

response strategy, some jurisdictions try to reduce gun 

violence by targeting gun traffickers. Any effort to restrict 

the flow of guns into a community is generally a good 

idea, although such broad efforts are unlikely to have a 

demonstrable effect on a localized problem. The effectiveness 

of this response is limited by the fact that many people 

get their guns informally, from friends and relatives, rather 

than buying them from a dealer.47 However, if the problem 

analysis demonstrates that straw purchasers are bringing large 

numbers of guns into the community, a response targeting 

these people would certainly be reasonable.

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings 23

§ See the POP Guide titled Gun 

Violence Among Serious Young Offenders

(Braga 2004) for specific guidance 

on implementing this response. 
§ In 1992, the New York Police 

Department cordoned off an eightblock area of the Bronx, denying 

access to all motorists except 

residents, commercial vehicle drivers, 

those dropping off children, and 

those visiting church. Others wishing 

to enter the area were allowed to 

park and travel within the boundaries 

on foot. The checkpoint operated 

on a random schedule of six hours 

per day, three days per week. This 

response’s effectiveness in reducing 

the volume of drive-by shootings 

was not discussed in published 

research (Crawford 1998). 

15. Implementing “gun buyback” programs. Some 

jurisdictions try to reduce gun violence by trying to reduce 

the number of people who own guns. Gun owners, under 

the promise of amnesty or anonymity, exchange their guns 

for money, goods, or services. While a significant number 

of guns may be taken off the street this way, research has 

shown that “gun buyback” programs do not target the guns 

that are most likely to be used in drive-by shootings and 

other violent crimes.48

16. Teaching conflict resolution skills. While conflict 

resolution skills curricula are a part of effective gang 

prevention programs (e.g., Gang Resistance Education 

and Training), their usefulness is more limited with people 

who are already affiliated with gangs and deeply involved 

in the conflicts that lead to gun violence. The curricula’s 

limitations derive from the fact that the skills are taught 

out of context. The classroom setting does not mimic the 

typical situation in which violence unfolds—one with high 

levels of emotional arousal, the presence of drugs and 

alcohol, and other factors that alter the cognitive state of 

those involved.49

17. Restricting entry to high-risk neighborhoods. If 

the drive-by shooting problem is severe and confined to a 

small area, the neighborhood could be cordoned off and all 

vehicles trying to enter the area could be screened, allowing 

entry only to residents and people with legitimate business 

in the area. While this response would deny access to those 

intending to do harm to residents, it is very obtrusive 

to residents and business owners and will likely receive 

strong community opposition. Research on this response’s 

effectiveness is quite limited, and it has raised serious 

Fourth Amendment concerns that must be addressed.§

24 Drive-By Shootings
Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings 25

18. Impounding cars that are not properly registered. 

Similar to a DUI checkpoint, police can stop all vehicles 

to determine whether the vehicle is properly registered 

and the driver is appropriately licensed.50 If not, the car 

can be impounded for a short time, thus denying potential 

offenders access to one of the needed tools for a driveby shooting. Although only one jurisdiction has published 

research reporting this response’s limited effectiveness, 

like other responses in this section, the low yield of 

weapons and inconvenience to residents suggest that it 

does not have sufficient power to decrease the number of 

drive-by shootings substantially.

Appendix: Summary of Responses to 

Drive-By Shootings

The table below summarizes the responses to drive-by 

shootings, the mechanism by which they are intended 

to work, the conditions under which they should work 

best, and some factors you should consider before 

implementing a particular response. It is critical that you 

tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can 

justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most 

cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing 

several different responses. Law enforcement responses 

alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the 

problem.

1.

2.

3.

16

16

17

Focusing on 

proximate causes

Targeting the 

activity, not the 

individual

Understanding 

gang 

membership 

dynamics

Addresses those 

factors that 

make driveby shootings 

easier to carry 

out; frustrates 

shooters’ 

intention

Avoids 

conferring 

additional 

status on gang 

membership; 

avoids 

increasing group 

cohesiveness

Focuses 

efforts on the 

motivations 

and current 

tensions that 

motivate driveby shootings

...responses 

target the tools 

and situations 

that give rise to 

the problem

...responses 

focus on the 

harm caused 

by the behavior 

rather than 

the group 

membership 

of the people 

causing the harm

...quality 

information on 

local gangs is 

available

Does not address 

the underlying 

factors that 

contribute to 

interpersonal 

violence, gang 

membership, or the 

facilitating influence 

of alcohol and 

drugs

Requires a narrow 

focus on a specific 

behavior and may 

leave other problems 

unaddressed

Requires 

close, candid 

communication 

between gang 

units and officers 

combating the driveby shooting problem

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Drive-By Shootings 27
4.

5.

6.

17

18

18

Conducting 

crackdowns

Initiating 

“sweeps” 

targeting known 

offenders

Obtaining 

consent to 

search for and 

seize weapons

Enhances 

police visibility; 

deters potential 

offenders from 

carrying guns; 

incapacitates 

potential 

offenders when 

police seize 

weapons

Incapacitating 

high-risk 

offenders by 

removing tools 

used to commit 

violence

Sends message 

that the 

police and the 

community will 

not tolerate 

gun possession; 

incapacitates 

gun owners by 

removing tools 

used to commit 

violence

Can waste time 

and resources if 

large numbers 

of guns are not 

seized; can have a 

negative effect on 

police-community 

relations

Interagency 

collaboration can 

be challenging; 

reductions are 

likely to be short 

term; can be 

difficult to agree 

on most-highrisk offenders; 

can be perceived 

as harassing 

offenders who 

are complying 

with supervision 

conditions 

Can aggravate 

some of the 

conditions it 

is intended to 

alleviate (e.g., 

rebellion against 

parents); youth 

may rearm 

themselves; will 

not reduce crimes 

adults commit

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

...specific 

offenses, places, 

and offenders 

are targeted; its 

directed by crime 

analysis; those 

likely to commit 

gun violence 

drive, rather than 

walk

...high-risk 

offenders are 

carefully targeted; 

offenders do not 

rearm themselves

...a low-key 

approach is used; 

great care is 

taken to ensure 

that consent is 

truly voluntary; 

the department 

places priority 

on reducing gun 

availability rather 

than prosecuting 

those who have 

guns; the program 

is of sufficient 

size to ensure that 

the number of 

weapons seized 

will affect the 

crime rate

28 Drive-By Shootings

Specific Responses To Reduce Drive-By Shootings

Reducing the Availability or Prevalence of Weapons
7.

8.

9.

19

20

20

Tracking 

current tensions 

and past 

altercations

Coordinating 

with hospitals

Preventing 

high-risk people 

from riding in 

cars with each 

other

Allows police 

to identify and 

intervene in 

situations with 

the potential for 

lethal violence

Increases the 

likelihood 

of victim 

identification 

and 

understanding 

victims’ 

relationships to 

offenders

Allows police 

to intervene in 

situations that 

could result 

in a drive-by 

shooting

Need dependable 

sources of 

intelligence; 

need to be able 

to respond 

immediately to 

crisis situations; 

may legitimize 

gang membership; 

information needs 

to be continually 

updated; can be 

difficult to sustain 

analysis

Need to negotiate 

legal barriers to 

sharing medical 

information; could 

deter victims from 

seeking medical 

attention

Injunctions 

have faced First 

Amendment 

challenges for 

prohibiting 

otherwise 

legal activities; 

injunctions are 

difficult and timeconsuming to set 

up; probation and 

parole conditions 

must be enforced 

to carry a deterrent 

value

...information 

is properly 

organized so 

patterns can be 

identified; local 

gang dynamics 

are understood; 

skilled mediators 

are available

...a simple 

communication 

procedure is 

established; 

police are 

dispatched to 

hospitals when 

victims are not 

known to them

...people likely 

to participate 

in drive-by 

shootings can be 

identified; police 

are notified 

when named 

people are seen 

in a car together

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Drive-By Shootings 29

Identifying Situations With the Potential for Violence
10. 

11.

12.

13.

21

22

22

23

Closing streets

Deploying 

response teams

Creating 

witness 

incentives

Implementing 

a “pulling 

levers” focused 

deterrence 

strategy

Controls access 

to targets; 

decreases 

offender 

mobility; 

increases 

defensible space

Provides rapid 

response to crime 

scenes; affords 

the opportunity 

to intercept 

retaliation plans

Increases the 

likelihood 

that police 

will identify 

offenders; affords 

the opportunity 

to intercept 

retaliation plans 

Makes a clear 

connection 

between 

involvement in 

gun violence and 

consequences 

imposed; exploits 

the social 

structure of 

gangs by holding 

the group 

responsible 

for individual 

behavior 

Addressing 

the concerns 

of various 

stakeholders 

requires significant 

time and effort; 

the effects are 

likely to evaporate 

if barriers are 

removed; rival 

gang turf may 

not be clearly 

identified

Special 

assignments take 

officers out of 

regular patrol 

rotation; witnesses 

may remain 

unwilling to 

cooperate

Must have 

resources for 

monetary 

incentives and 

relocation; 

community 

outreach efforts 

require time and 

patience

Strategy based 

on collective 

responsibility may 

not be effective 

if gangs are 

not cohesive; 

interagency 

coordination 

requires significant 

time and effort

...supported 

by police and 

citizen patrols; 

offenders come 

from outside of 

the targeted area

...assigned 

officers have 

expertise in local 

gang dynamics; 

residents trust 

assigned officers

...community 

norms 

discouraging 

cooperation 

are addressed; 

expensive 

resources are 

conserved for 

witnesses at 

greatest risk

...a daunting 

array of 

sanctions and a 

tempting array 

of services are 

available

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Responding to Incidents and Increasing Sanctions

30 Drive-By Shootings

Making Environmental Changes
14. 

15.

16.

17.

18.

23

24

24

24

25

Targeting gun 

traffickers

Implementing 

“gun buyback” 

programs

Teaching 

conflict 

resolution skills

Restricting 

entry to 

high-risk 

neighborhoods

Impounding 

cars that are 

not properly 

registered

Assumes 

offenders 

procure guns 

from organized 

dealers

Assumes 

reducing gun 

ownership will 

lead to decreases 

in gun violence

Assumes skills 

learned in a 

classroom setting 

will transfer 

to situations 

with high 

emotional states 

and bystander 

encouragement 

Controls access 

to high-risk 

places

Removes one of 

the tools needed 

to conduct 

a drive-by 

shooting

Does not focus 

on the sources of 

guns most likely to 

be used in drive-by 

shootings

Those willing to 

relinquish weapons 

are not the people 

likely to commit 

drive-by shootings; 

does not focus 

on the guns most 

likely to be used in 

drive-by shootings

Classroom-based 

skill development 

does not mimic the 

actual conditions 

under which the 

skills will need to 

be applied

Likely to incur 

very strong 

opposition 

from residents 

and business 

owners; raises 

serious Fourth 

Amendment 

concerns

Likely to capture 

people who are 

not at risk of 

conducting a driveby shooting; low 

weapons yield 

makes it difficult 

to justify the 

expenditure of 

resources

Response 

No.

Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Drive-By Shootings 31

Endnotes 1

 Wilson and Riley (2004).

2

 Sanders (1994).

3

 Milkovits (2003). 

4

 Sherman et al. (1989).

5

 Davis (1995); Lasley (1998); El Paso Police Department 

(2002); Sanders (1994); Sampson and Scott (2000).

6

 Milkovits (2003). 

7

 Huff (1998); Huff (2001).

8

 Maxson (1999); Sanders (1994).

9

 Bjerregaard and Lizotte (1995).

10 Block and Block (1993); Davis (1995); Huff (1998); 

Huff (2001).

11 Block and Block (1993); Sanders (1994); Wilkinson and 

Fagan (1996).

12 Davis (1995).

13 Jacobs and Wright (2006); Jacobs (2004).

14 Jacobs and Wright (2006).

15 Mizell, Joint, and Connell (1997).

16 Hemenway, Vriniotis, and Miller (2006).

17 Lizotte et al. (1997).

18 Ruddell and Mays (2003); Wilkinson and Fagan (2001).

19 Wintemute, Romero, and Wright (2004); Ash et al. 

(1996).

20 Ruddell and Mays (2003).

21 Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan (1995).

22 Wilkinson and Fagan (1996).

23 Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts (1994).

24 Sanders (1994).

25 Lasley (1998). 

26 Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts (1994); Hutson, Anglin, and 

Eckstein (1996).

27 Weisel and Steadman (1998); Lasley (1998). 

28 Klein (1998); Dunworth (2000).

Endnotes 33
29 Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor (1999).

30 Davis (1995); Block and Block (1993); Jones (2002); 

Katz and Webb (2003); Braga (2005); McGloin (2005).

31 McGarrell et al. (2001); McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss 

(2002); Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan (1995); MacDonald, 

Wilson, and Tita (2005).

32 McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss (2002).

33 Crawford (1998); Decker and Rosenfeld (2004).

34 McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss (2002).

35 MacDonald, Wilson, and Tita (2005).

36 Wilson and Riley (2004)

37 Rosenfeld and Decker (1996); Rosenfeld and Decker 

(1998); Decker and Rosenfeld (2004).

38 Decker and Rosenfeld (2004).

39 Katz and Webb (2003).

40 Braga (2005); McGloin (2005).

41 Klein (1998); Dunworth (2000); Maxson et al. (2004).

42 Lasley (1998).

43 Clarke (2004); Zavoski et al. (1999); Lasley (1998).

44 Dunworth (2000).

45 Dedel (2006); Wilson and Riley (2004).

46 Braga et al. (2001); McGarrell and Chermak (2003); 

Braga, Kennedy, and Tita (2002); Tita and Abrahamse 

(2004); Tita et al. (2005); Wakeling (2003).

47 Ash et al. (1996).

48 Sherman (2001); Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996).

49 Wilkinson and Fagan (1996).

50 White et al. (2003).

34 Drive-By Shootings
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About the Author

Kelly Dedel

Kelly Dedel is the director of One in 37 Research Inc., a criminal 

justice consulting firm based in Portland, Ore. As a consultant to 

federal, state, and local agencies, she contributes to research on 

the juvenile and criminal justice systems by 1) developing written 

tools to enhance practice or inform public policy; 2) investigating 

confinement conditions in juvenile correctional facilities; and 3) 

rigorously evaluating various juvenile and criminal justice programs to 

assess their effectiveness. She has provided evaluation-related technical 

assistance to more than 60 jurisdictions nationwide for the Bureau of 

Justice Assistance. In this capacity, she has worked with a broad range 

of criminal justice programs implemented by police, prosecutors, 

public defenders, juvenile detention and confinement facilities, local 

jails, community corrections, and prisons. She consults with the Justice 

Department as a monitor/investigator of civil rights violations in 

juvenile correctional facilities, most often in the areas of education 

and protection from harm. Among her other research interests are 

prisoner reentry, risk assessment and offender classification, and 

juveniles in adult correctional facilities. Before working as a consultant, 

she was a founder and senior research scientist at The Institute on 

Crime, Justice, and Corrections at The George Washington University, 

and a senior research associate at the National Council on Crime and 

Delinquency. Dedel received bachelor’s degrees in psychology and 

criminal justice from the University of Richmond, and a doctorate 

in clinical psychology from the Center for Psychological Studies, in 

Berkeley (California).

About the Author 45

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An 

Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers,

by John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide 

is a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. 

It provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 

problem-oriented policing efforts.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.

Recommended Readings 47
• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 

1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This 

document produced by the National Institute of Justice 

in collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A 

similar publication is available for the award winners from 

subsequent years. The documents are also available at 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective 

or ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory 

for Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 

Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 

1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 

theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory 

have practical implications for the police in their efforts to 

prevent crime.

• Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 

Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 

analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 

can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 

policing practices.

48 Drive-By Shootings
• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 

how a police agency can implement the concept.

• Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 

by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). 

Provides a thorough review of significant policing research 

about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat 

victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings 

to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police 

departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by 

improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and 

securing productive partnerships.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 

First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 

Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 

Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 

(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 

rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 

problem-solving process, and provides examples of 

effective problem-solving in one agency.

Recommended Readings 49
• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 

Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 

Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 

Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 1998) (also available at www.cops.usdoj.

gov). Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, 

basic information on the SARA model and detailed 

suggestions about the problem-solving process.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 

Studies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 

methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 

20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 

Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson 

and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 

for Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 

police to analyzing problems within the context of 

problem-oriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 

many of the basics of research as it applies to police 

management and problem-solving.

50 Drive-By Shootings
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 

2001. ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

2. Street Prostitution, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-02-9

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 

Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7

5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-05-3

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-07-X

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 

Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-14-2

16. Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs, 2nd Edition. Michael S. 

Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-15-0

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-16-9

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 

2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-18-5

20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly.

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 51
21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-30-4

23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 

Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

24. Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004.

ISBN: 1-932582-33-9

25. Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-35-3

26. Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and Kenneth J. Peak. 

2004. ISBN: 1-932582-36-3

27. Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-39-8

28. Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-42-8

29. Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-43-6

30. Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

31. Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos and Mike 

Hough. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-45-2

32. Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-46-0

33. Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-47-9

34. Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-50-9

35. School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-9325802-51-7

36. Drunk Driving. Michael S. Scott, Nina J. Emerson, Louis B. 

Antonacci, and Joel B. Plant. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-57-6

37. Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1932582-56-8

38. The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. Newman. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-59-2

39. Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. Eck. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-60-6

40. People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-63-0

52 Drive-By Shootings
41. Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley 

and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-65-7

42. Witness Intimidation. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-67-3

43. Burglary at Single-Family House Construction 

Sites. Rachel Boba and Roberto Santos. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

44. Disorder at Day Laborer Sites. Rob Guerette. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-72-X

45. Domestic Violence. Rana Sampson. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-74-6

46. Thefts of and from Cars on Residential 

Streets and Driveways. Todd Keister. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-76-2

47. Drive-By Shootings. Kelly Dedel. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

Response Guides series:

• The Benefits and Consequences of Police 

Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

• Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should 

You Go Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

• Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns.

Emmanuel Barthe. 2006 ISBN: 1-932582-66-5

• Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 

Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 

2005. ISBN: 1-932582-55-X

• Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 

2006 ISBN: 1-932582-58-4

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 53
Problem-Solving Tools series: 

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory 

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

• Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. 

Schultz. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7

• Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem 

Solving. Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5

• Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm 

Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1

Understanding Risky Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke 

and John E. Eck. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Abandoned Vehicles

Bank Robbery

Bicycle Theft

Crowd Control at Stadiums and Other Entertainment Venues

Child Abuse

Crime and Disorder in Parks

Pedestrian Injuries and Fatalities

Robbery of Convenience Stores

Traffic Congestion Around Schools

Transient Encampments

•

54 Drive-By Shootings
Problem-Solving Tools

Designing a Problem Analysis System

Displacement

Implementing Responses to Problems

Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in 

Problem Solving

Partnering with Community Developers to Address Public 

Safety Problems

Response Guides

Enhancing Lighting

Sting Operations

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 

Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit 

COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 55


For More Information:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below.

e02072864 March 2007

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0 

www.cops.usdoj.gov