10.

11.

REFERENCES

Hasbrook, A.H.; Garner, J.D.; and Snow, C.C. “Evacuation
Pattern Analysis of a Survivable Commercial Aircraft Crash."
Office of Aviation Report No. 62-9, May 1962.

Snow, C.C.; Carroll, J.J.; and Allgood, M.A. “Survival in
Emergency Escape from Passenger Aircraft." Office of
Aviation Medicine Report No. AM-70-16.

McFadden, E.B.; Reynolds, H.J.; and Funkhouser, G.E. "A
Protective Passenger Smoke Hood." Office of Aviation
Medicine Report No. AM~67-4, April 1967.

McFadden, E.B. and Smith, R.C. "Protective Smoke Hood
Studies." Office of Aviation Medicine Report No. AM-70-20,
December 1970.

Aerospace Industries Association Crashworthiness Development
Program - 2. "Evaluation of Smoke Hoods and Masks for Fire
Suppression." July 1968.

Aerospace Industries Association Crashworthiness Development
Program - 3, “Lighting and Exit Awareness." July 1968.

Wullenwaber, G.E. and Herndon, D.F. "Smoke Hood Evaluation
Program." Flight Standards Technical Division Special
Project Report No. 01271. March 1968.

deSteiguer, D.; Pinski, M.S.; Bannister, J.R.; and McFadden,
E.B. “Aircrew and Passenger Protective Breathing Equipment
Studies." Office of Aviation Medicine Report No. FAA-AM-78-
4, pp. 34-43. January 1978.

deSteiguer, D.; and Saldivar, J.T. “An Analysis of
Potential Protective Breathing Devices Intended for Use by
Aircraft Passengers." Office of Aviation Medicine Report
No. FAA-AM~83-10. May 1983.

Higgins, E.A.; Saldivar, J.T.; Lyne, P.J.; and Funkhouser,
G.E. “Evaluation of a Passenger Mask Modified with a
Rebreather Bag for Protection from Smoke and Fumes." Office
of Aviation Medicine Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-85-10. October
1985.

Higgins, E.A.; Saldivar, J.T.; Lyne, P.J.; and Funkhouser,
G.E. "A Study of Passenger Workload as Related to
Protective Breathing Requirements." Office of Aviation
Medicine Report DOT/FAA/AM-87/2. March 1987.

12


bent

time, the FAA had testified at the U.S. House of Representatives’
Brooks Committee (Government Operations Subcommittee) Hearings
(April 26-27, 1966) on the potential of the hoods as an air
safety measure.

In July 1967, evacuation tests were conducted to determine the
reactions of a naive group of subjects to the use of the
protective smoke hoods in the presence of smoke. A total of 124
subjects were tested in the CAMI evacuation facility. Test
results indicated that the presence of smoke was the primary
variable influencing speed of evacuation, since evacuations with
smoke were much slower than those undertaken without smoke. The
use of the hoods alone did not seem to have a significant effect
on evacuation rate (4, Chapter 6).

Amendment 25-15 to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) was
adopted September 15, 1967. This amendment dealt with evacuation
standards, exits, exit conspicuousness, emergency lighting,
protection from smoke and fumes, and other crashworthiness
components. As a result of these amendments on crashworthiness
and passenger evacuation standards, the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) established a Crashworthiness Research
Committee. Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed aircraft manufacturing
companies participated in the research work, most of which was
carried out at Boeing facilities in Seattle, Washington. In
AIA's study, eight different types of PPBE's were tested. An
evaluation of the reports (5,6) indicated that the most
pronounced difficulty with all the masks and hoods was the lack
of adequate seal against smoke and fumes. Either the neck seals
were not properly tightened or (on the Boeing mask) the
mouthpieces were not properly used. Lack of sufficient
visibility was also a deterrent in some prototypes. Many
subjects were observed lifting their hoods to provide better
vision in the darkness. In a crash fire situation, evacuating
passengers might be expected to do the same when loss of
visibility resulted from smoke. If hoods are lifted, the air
inside the hoods becomes contaminated by the external
environment. The report emphasized that simplicity of the hoods
motivated more of the subjects to use them. The AIA report
concluded that the masks and hoods evaluated in their study were
shown to be unsatisfactory. Use of these prototype devices in
low illumination decreased visibility and slowed evacuation. The
report also concluded that further development was required to
produce a device that would be simple to use, effective in
providing protection, and not increase evacuation time.



acceptable levels and subjects were protected from inward
leakage. It appeared it might be feasible to bypass the
altitude-controlled regulator to achieve those flows; however,
reliability and maintenance would have, in all probability, been
a major problem.

In June 1980, the Federal Air Surgeon approved a request from the
FAA Technical Center for a Research, Engineering, and Development
(RE&D) effort to examine cabin fire PPBE's for passengers. The
request read: "Survival and escape of passengers in a transport
cabin fire may be impaired or prevented by smoke and toxic gases.
Advancements in protective breathing devices and limited progress
in the minimization of cabin fire hazards prompted the SAFER
Technical Group on Compartment Interior Materials to recommend a
reassessment of protective breathing devices for usage by
passengers aboard Part 25 aircraft. The study should include the
following: (1) reassessment of smoke hood concept, including
review of objectionable conments to FAA NPRM; (2) testing of
presently available hood devices; (3) testing of concepts as
developed by industry and/or CAMI; (4) testing or modified TSO-
C64-approved passenger oxygen masks; and (5) testing of other
applicable devices. Items (2) though (5) should consider: (a) a
dual-purpose device for use during decompression and for
smoke/fume atmospheres; (b) use during in-flight fires; and (c)
fume protection during emergency evacuations.”

From July to September 1981, eight different devices were tested
(9). Of those, CAMI researchers felt that a passenger oxygen
mask modified to incorporate a controlled-use rebreather
reservoir in addition to, but separate from the oxygen reservoir,
offered the best approach to achieve the desired objectives.
This device required a flow of approximately 5 L/min of
sustaining oxygen for 15 minutes. Most of the current in-use,
passenger-activated oxygen systems, either compressed gas or
chemical generators, deliver approximately 3.1 to 6.0 L/min.
Some of the lower flows, therefore, would have required an
increase to meet the 5 L/min needed flow rate. During the
subsequent 2 years, work in PPBE at CAMI was reduced to meet
increased commitments to studies of crew protective breathing
equipment and water survival.

Following the Air Canada DC-9 accident at Cincinnati, Ohio, on
June 2, 1983, interest in PPBE again increased.



—

ese

In May 1968, tests were conducted at CAMI to determine the
effects of the smoke hood on the vision of human observers (4,
Chapter 3). Two types of smoke hood materials were used: one
without aluminization (Type S$); and an aluminized hood with a
clear band (Type D). It was determined that Type S hoods have
optical transmissions of approximately 75-80 percent. There was
an approximate five percent difference between the uncoated
samples and the clear areas from aluminized samples, probably due
to the coating used to protect the aluminized surface. Vision in
emergency illumination was so reduced with aluminized hoods (Type
D) as to make them unusable. Visual capacity was reduced
significantly by wearing clear hoods under emergency
illumination, but a 20-25 percent increase in the level of
emergency illumination would compensate for the transmission loss
through the non-aluminized hoods.

In June 1968, tests were conducted at CAMI to determine the
extent to which the smoke hood acts as a barrier to the
transmission of sound (4, Chapter 4). ‘The tests showed that the
hoods do not interfere with the transmission of sound waves. At
most, the threshold shift is three dB at 5,000 Hz, an amount that
is barely detectable.

On June 19, 1968, a second joint memorandum from AFS-1 and AAM-1
to AAC-1 requested further information on smoke hoods. A reply
was sent July 8, 1968. A final report from the Aeronautical
Center was issued October 22, 1968, which contained a compilation
of several of the individual studies cited elsewhere in this
report.

In September and October 1968, CAMI conducted tests to evaluate
leakage in protective smoke hoods in a hydrocarbon environment.
Ten subjects participated--five males and five females. They
were tested at rest and exercising in normal room temperature
(25.5 to 27 °C) and at high temperatures (56.5 to 60 °C). It
was concluded that the wearer of a Type S hood with an elastic
polyurethane neck seal (original neck seal was of a drawstring
type) was given excellent fume protection (4, Chapter 1).

On December 6, 1968, a project report, "Project 2355 - Smoke
Hoods," was issued by the FAA Flight Standards Technical Division
(AFS-40) which recommended the drafting of a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) to require smoke hoods on operations conducted
under Part 121 and 123 of the FAR in accordance with
recommendations made within the report.



On December 14, 1967, AAM-1, at the request of AFS-1, asked the
Director of the FAA's Aeronautical Center (AAC-1) in Oklahoma
City to conduct a full scale evacuation test on a typical airline
jet in which smoke hoods were incorporated. The AFS-1 request
stated: "These tests are necessary in order that the operational
aspects associated with utilizing the hoods are properly
formulated with respect to agency emergency escape procedures."

The emergency evacuation tests were conducted at the Aeronautical
Center on February 17-18, 1968, using an FAA B=-720 which was
equipped with interior seating similar to that used on Braniff's
B=-720,. Sufficient seats were leased from Braniff to provide a
seating capacity of 124 passengers. Four Braniff stewardesses
served as flight attendants. Six emergency evacuation tests were
run; and tests were conducted both with and without smoke hoods.

A report of the results of the emergency evacuation tests was
forwarded to AFS in March 1968. The primary conclusion in that
report was: "There are indications that the use of smoke hoods
during an emergency evacuation of a typical air carrier jet
aircraft causes a small increase (approximately 8%) in the
overall time required for naive passengers to evacuate." (7) The
recommendation of the report states: "It is recommended that
further study of the data of these tests and AIA data be made to
determine whether or not an unequivocal conclusion can be reached
regarding the effect of using smoke hoods on evacuation time."

After observing the smoke hood tests on February 27-28, 1968, Mr.
Dougherty (AFS-301) prepared a memorandum for AFS-1 signature
which was sent to AAC-1 on March 4, 1968, requesting
clarification on several aspects of the smoke hood evacuation
program. On March 19, 1968, AAC-1 replied to this memorandum
after coordinating with CAMI, whose input addressed optical
transmission, neck seal leaks, duration of wearing hood, noise
production by crackling plastic hood, and claustrophobia.

On May 8, 1968, a joint memorandum from AFS-1 and AAM-1 to AAC-1
requested further study of the Schjeldahl smoke hood, including
neck seal fit; tests in a noxious environment; more definitive
studies of visibility characteristics; the effectiveness of
passenger briefings; the feasibility of providing supplemental
air supply; effects on communications; evaluation of the AIA
data; and passenger acceptance. On May 31, 1968, the
Aeronautical Center replied, but emphasized that only non-toxic
smoke should be used.



4, Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. - 30%
increase in evacuation time, insufficient oxygen, and
insufficient testing.

5. Flight Safety Foundation - suffocation.

6. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association-
increase in evacuation time and limited useful time
without air supply.

7. Air Line Dispatchers Association - could lead to
disorientation.

8. Scott Aviation - hood should be equipped with source of
compressed air.

On August 11, 1970, NPRM 69-2 was withdrawn by the FAA citing the
principal reason that the hood might cause a delay in evacuation.
After the withdrawal of the NPRM, interest in PPBE's declined.
This decline, combined with commitments to other research

requirements, greatly reduced the research effort in this area at
CAMI.

In late 1971, a comprehensive report relative to smoke hoods was
reviewed by several members of the National Research Council
(NRC). They rejected the viewpoint that the carbon dioxide
accumulation in the hood and the accompanying hyperventilation
would produce sufficient discomfort to cause removal of the hood.
They suggested absorption of the carbon dioxide and addition of a
source of oxygen to the hood in order to provide extended usage.
The feasibility of using a small chemical oxygen source was then
investigated.

It appeared that any form of protective equipment acceptable to
the airlines must include a life support system (oxygen or
breathable air). Systems using the polyimide smoke hood
developed at CAMI, comparable to the Westinghouse mine-rescue
unit and developed under contract to the Bureau of Mines,
appeared to be too bulky, expensive, complex, and in providing 1-
hour continuous use, far exceeded the requirements for escape
from post~crash fires.

In 1974, tests were conducted at CAMI to evaluate the use of a
Passenger oxygen mask in combination with a smoke hood (8).
Tests were conducted at ground level; 8,000 ft; and 14,000 ft
with flow rates of 4.2 L/min and 5.5 L/min.

After emptying the oxygen reservoir of the continuous-flow
passenger mask, the air drawn in was from the uncontaminated,
oxygen-enriched air in the hood. Carbon dioxide remained at



Technical Report Documentation Page

1.” Report No. 2. Government Accession No.

DOT/FAA/AM-87/5

3. Res

jent’s Catalog No.

4. Title and Subtitle

Summary Report of the History and Events Pertinent
to the Civil Aeromedical Institute's Evaluation of
Providing Smoke/Fume Protective Breathing Equipment
for Airline Passenger Use

5. Report Date

Jiune_1987

6. Performing Organization Code

18. Performing Organization Report No.

7. Author!s)
E. Arnold Higgins

9. Performing Organization Name and Address
FAA Civil Aeromedical. Institute
P. O. Box 25082

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
Office of Aviation Medicine
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

OAM

15. Supplementary Notes

Preparation of this report was performed under task AM-B-87-PRS-81.D.

16. Abstract

This report presents a Summary of the history and events pertinent to the Civil
Aeromedical Institute's evaluation of the feasibility of providing smoke/fume

protective breathing equipment for passenger use, including research undertaken,
reports produced, and responses to requests for information.

a period of November 1965 to February 1987.

The report covers

17. Key Words 18. Dis

Smoke/Fume Environment

wtion Statement
. . . Document is available to the public
Passenger Protective Breathing Equipment,| through the National Technical Information

Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161

19. Security Classif. (of this report) 2. Security Classif. (of this page)

Unclassified Unclassified

21. No. of Pages
12

22, Price

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)

Reproduction of completed page authorized



Evaluation of Passenger Protective Breathing Devices." The
Conclusion stated: "The position taken by FAA in the September
27, 1983, letter to Chairman Levitas is sound. The improvements
resulting from FAA regulatory actions obviate the need to mandate
passenger protective breathing devices. The use of fire-hard
panel construction for walls, ceilings, partitions, and cabinets,
and fire blocking for seat cushions, greatly reduces, and in many
cases, eliminates the inflight fire potential of the vast
majority of materials used in the cabin. Smoke detectors provide
early warning in the more vulnerable areas. Improved Halon 1211
hand fire extinguishers and crew protective breathing equipment
provide a far more effective fire suppression capability and
protection for those fires which might occur."

In September 1984, AWS-100 issued a staff study which included
material from the Passenger Protective Breathing Assessment
Committee and reiterated the material in the AWS-100 position
paper. The study indicated that an effective, practical
breathing device suitable for use in commercial airliner cabins
to protect passengers had not been identified and that the above-
mentioned cabin fire hardening proposals would reduce the need to
further develop PPBE for passengers. The study recommended FAA
evaluation for any devices developed by industry that appeared
promising. If evaluation by FAA proved positive, the results
could be used to develop criteria for Technical Standard Order
(TSO) approval. In addition, it was recommended that FAA should
continue to evaluate the need for PPBE and participate in
industry-sponsored meetings (such as Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) S-9 and SAE A-10 committees) to discuss
protective breathing. issues.

In September 1984, Scott Aviation requested that CAMI evaluate a
new design of the passenger mask with rebreather bag.
Accordingly, testing was conducted with the redesigned device.
The device provided protection for those individuals who had
tidal volumes of 1.5 L or less. However, it did not function
properly for those whose tidal volumes exceeded 1.5 L, in that
either the carbon dioxide levels were too great or the rebreather
bag collapsed (10).

On January 22, 1985, the FAA Administrator replied to the NTSB
concerning their recommendation (A-83-76 cited above) and
reiterated the findings of the staff study cited above, again
indicating that if industry developed suitable devices that
showed promise, the FAA would evaluate them and develop criteria
for their approval.

10


The NTSB Safety Recommendation A-83-76 issued October 31, 1983,
recommended that research be expedited at CAMI to develop the
technology, equipment standards, and procedures to provide
passengers with respiratory protection from toxic atmospheres
during in-flight emergencies aboard transport-category airplanes.

The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Aviation for the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearings on cabin air
quality during November 1983 included discussions related to fire
safety and breathing devices for emergency use by passengers.
The FAA was urged by Subcommittee Chairman Elliott Levitas to
take measures to provide additional passenger protection. In
response, the FAA Administrator pledged to re-evaluate occupant
protection against smoke and toxic fumes and stated that the FAA
planned to take action in many areas to improve survivability in
the cabin. During these hearings, testimony indicated that
segments of the aviation industry were also interested in and
already promoting the development of PPBE.

The FAA's Office of Airworthiness established a Passenger
Protective Breathing Assessment Committee composed of
representatives from the Office of Aviation Medicine (OAM), the
Technical Analysis Branch of the Office of Airworthiness (AWS),
the Technical Analysis Branch of the Office of Flight Standards
(APS), the Systems and Equipment Branch of the Northwest Mountain
Region (ANM), and CAMI. The first committee meeting was held
January 26, 1984, to discuss current problems and possible
solutions. On April 2, 1984, CAMI was requested by the Director,
AWS, and the Federal Air Surgeon to initiate a priority program
to evaluate the performance of a passenger mask with the
following requirements: {1) modification by addition of a
rebreather bag; (2) testing at flight altitudes typical of
airline operation (8,000 ft); and (3) with information on total

oxygen requirements when used at this altitude. The FAA
Administrator set September 30, 1984, as the deadline for a
definitive report from the committee. In August 1984, a

preliminary report of the CAMI study was forwarded to AWS for
incorporation into the committee report. The results indicated
that the device functioned well when respiratory minute volume
was low (resting), but did not function for eight of 10 subjects
when minute volume was high (with exercise).

On August 29, 1984, the Aircraft Engineering Division of AWS
issued a position paper, "Cabin Fire Hazard Analysis for



In December 1968, additional tests were conducted at CAMI to
study the effects of variations in safety briefings upon use of
protective smoke hoods (4, Chapter 5). Results indicated that
changes in briefing procedures to give passengers first-hand
experience with safety devices should be considered,

On January 11, 1969, NPRM 69-2, "Protective Smoke Hoods for
Emergency Use by Passengers and Crewmembers," was published in
the Federal Register.

Responses to the docket for NPRM 69-2 are summarized below:
Neutral:

1. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
2. Experimental Aircraft Association.

3. Ms. Prioleau (requested that protection be provided for
the whole body).

Supported the NPRM:

1, Sprague Electric Company - support with reservations.

2. Schjeldahl - support with some recommended changes.

3. Flight Engineers International Association.

4, Air Line Pilots Association - support for passengers
only. Requested more sophisticated protection for

crewmembers,
5. Arthur C. Smith.
6. Donald E. Hackett - supported concept, but felt it

should be combined with passenger oxygen mask.
7. Ralph H. Dawson, Jr.
8. Ralph L. Creel.
9. Simpson Drag Chutes/Safety Equipment.
10. Mrs. Julia Loscalzo.

Opposed the NPRM:

1. Jesse L. Wallace - concerned about suffocation and that
briefing demonstrations would cause children to put
plastic bags over their heads.

2. British Aircraft Corporation (Operating) Limited-
increase in evacuation time.

3. Air Transport Association - negative safety benefit due
to increased evacuation time and insufficient oxygen
resulting in suffocation.



thicknesses of gold, silver, and aluminum) were applied to
polyimide film. These samples were evaluated for heat
transmission, reflectance, and optical transmission.

Ten experimental hoods were constructed using a silver coating
which would provide maximum infrared reflectance and, at the same
time, permit maximum visual acuity. Eleven subjects instrumented
with thermocouples were exposed to high intensity infrared
radiation for a period of 8 minutes while wearing non-metalized
and metalized smoke hoods. Facial skin temperatures of 114-115
OF were recorded from subjects wearing the non-metalized smoke
hoods. Under identical conditions, skin temperatures of the same
subjects wearing the metalized hoods did not exceed 99 °F. These
and other evaluations of the capability of the hoods to provide
short-term and extended protection from smoke and flame
inhalation in a fire environment are discussed in an Office of
Aviation Medicine (OAM) Report (3).

Evolution and Growth of PPBE Program at CAMI

On April 12, 1967, the FAA Office of Flight Standards (AFS-700)
was directed to secure smoke hoods for installation on FAA-owned
aircraft. Installation was completed on the FAA aircraft N-1 and
N-3, on which the hoods were available and appropriate briefings
on their use provided prior to each flight.

On April 13, 1967, by memorandum, the Director of the Office of
Flight Standards (AFS-1) requested the Federal Air Surgeon (AAM-
1) to forward all information available on development and
testing of smoke hoods.

On August 2, 1967, AAM-1. forwarded a report to AFS-1 which
contained the results of tests which CAMI had performed in June
and July of 1967. The report also contained an analysis of the
smoke hood research and development program, performance
standards for a smoke hood, and the cost and availability of the
devices tested.

During the summer of 1967, U.S. Representative Dingell became
interested in our smoke hood studies, and in a letter to the FAA
Administrator dated October 11, 1967, inquired about FAA plans
for use of smoke hoods. On November 9, 1967, the FAA
Administrator informed Mr. Dingell that more tests and
evaluations of the hoods should be conducted. Prior to that



SUMMARY REPORT OF THE HISTORY AND EVENTS
PERTINENT TO THE CIVIL AEROMEDICAL INSTITUTE'S
EVALUATION OF PROVIDING SMOKE/FUME PROTECTIVE BREATHING
EQUIPMENT FOR AIRLINE PASSENGER USE

Introduction

As a result of several accidents involving turbojet airplanes
(1), particularly the accident involving a B-727 at Salt Lake
City in November 1965 (2), the attention of the aviation industry
focused upon smoke and toxic gases as causal factors of passenger
incapacitation and failure to evacuate an aircraft before fire
and heat rendered the environment uninhabitable. Under these
conditions, providing passengers with a short-duration supply of
breathable air sufficient to accomplish evacuation would enhance
chances of survival.

Initial Development and Testing of Passenger Protective Breathing

Equipment (PPBE)

The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Civil Aeromedical
Institute (CAMI) instituted work on this accident hazard in
November 1965, when Mr. E.B. McFadden, the Supervisor of CAMI's
Survival Research Unit at that time, fabricated the first two
prototypes of a passenger smoke hood.

Subsequently, prototypes of a simple, light-weight, protective,
bag-shaped hood incorporating a neck seal were fabricated under
contract by the G.T. Schjeldahl (now spelled Sheldahl) Company
using special techniques and high temperature adhesives. They
were made of DuPont Kapton--a thin, pliable, high temperature-
resistant, transparent, polyimide, plastic film. Prototype
designs incorporated: (1) rebreathing; or (2) ventilation
provided by a controlled flow from small disposable compressed
gas cylinders. The polyimide film used had no melting point, but
exhibited a tendency to char when a temperature of 1500 F was
attained. A simple rebreather-type hood was tested by human
subjects with a natural gas flame enveloping the facial portion
of the hood for short durations. Attempts were made to
standardize and evaluate this type of test. Rebreather
prototypes were also evaluated for carbon dioxide accumulation
during rest and maximal work conditions.

To reduce the heat transmission and increase infrared
reflectivity of the hood, 21 types of metalized coatings (various



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

INITIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF PASSENGER
PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT (PPBE)

TABLE. OF CONTENTS

EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF PPBE PROGRAM AT CAMI.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CAMI PPBE PROGRAM

SUMMARY . .

REFERENCES,

il

11

12


International Involvement in CAMI PPBE Program

Interest was again stimulated by the British Airtours B-737
accident at Manchester, United Kingdom, on August 22, 1985. At
the request of Mr. E.J. Trimble of the Accidents Investigation
Branch, Department of Transport, United Kingdom Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA), a conference convened at CAMI on March 17-18,
1986, to discuss PPBE.

A joint effort by CAMI and the CAA to evaluate the potential for
PPBE was initiated by the CAA, with participation by the FAA,
Transport Canada, and the French Direction Generale de L'Aviation
Civile (DGAC). The first meeting was held in England from
September 28 - October 2, 1986. A second meeting was held in
Ottawa, Canada, in mid-November 1986.

As part of this cooperative effort, CAMI undertook a study to
evaluate workloads, oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide
production, and respiratory exchange rates for passengers during
an evacuation in an effort to define possible qualification
standards for a protective breathing device. The results of this
study (11) were presented to the Passenger Protective Breathing
Equipment Workshop held at CAMI February 3-5, 1987. During this
workshop the need for an historical record of these facts was
established and resulted in this summary report.

Summary

This report presents a history of events pertinent to CAMI's
evaluation of the feasibility of providing smoke/fume PPBE for
passenger use, including research conducted, reports produced,
and responses to requests for information. The report includes
the period November 1965 to February 1987.

il