GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Readiness and Management Support,

Committee on Armed Services, U.S.

Senate

July 2000 CONTINGENCY

OPERATIONS

Providing Critical

Capabilities Poses

Challenges

GAO/NSIAD-00-164

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II: Assets Identified by the Joint Staff as

Problem Areas 25

Appendix III: Deployment Schedules of Army Divisions

to the Balkans 26

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 27

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 32

Tables Table 1: Assets Identified by the Joint Staff as Problem Areas 25

Abbreviations

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

DOD Department of Defense
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285257 Letr

July 6, 2000

The Honorable James Inhofe

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military

Readiness and Management Support

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, U.S. Armed Forces have been

involved in more than 50 contingency operations abroad.1 The two major

operations currently under way are in the Balkans and in Southwest Asia.

In the Balkans, U.S. forces are in their 5th year of peace enforcement in

Bosnia and in their 2nd year of a long-term peace enforcement effort in

Kosovo. In Southwest Asia, U.S. forces are in their 9th year of no-fly zone

enforcement and related activities involving Iraq. Although the services

have been able to provide the forces and assets necessary for contingency

operations, some unique capabilities have been in high demand. To fulfill

these missions, military personnel deploy on a rotational basis from their

assigned home station. This has resulted in some personnel exceeding the

services’ deployment goals for the maximum number of days an individual

should deploy in a 1-year period. Long deployments can adversely affect

morale and retention.

Because of your concerns about the services’ ability to continuously meet

these operational needs, as agreed with your office, we examined six

military assets that have been heavily used in contingency operations in a

series of case studies. Each case study (1) describes the reasons the

services are having difficulty in meeting requirements for contingency

operations and staying within deployment goals and (2) assesses ongoing

efforts to relieve these difficulties. We selected the case studies to provide

a cross section of the military services and different types of assets. The

1 The term contingency operations in this report refers to peacekeeping and peace

enforcement operations such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo and all other operations other

than war, including those enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq.
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assets we selected were (1) Army divisions;2 (2) Army civil affairs units;3

(3) EA-6B aircraft, which are used to suppress enemy air defenses and have

the only available U.S. military capability to electronically jam enemy

antiaircraft radar; (4) Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

aircraft, which provide airspace surveillance and battlefield management

of all aircraft flying in an assigned area; (5) U-2 aircraft, which gather

intelligence and provide surveillance; and (6) specialized F-16 aircraft, the

CJ model, which are used to suppress enemy air defenses primarily by

targeting air defense radar with sophisticated missiles. Except for Army

divisions, these forces and assets exist in small numbers and comprise a

small portion of overall U.S. military forces. Appendix I describes our

scope and methodology in examining these assets and forces.

Results in Brief The military assets we examined in the case studies continue to be in high

demand relative to their numbers. This has resulted in deployments in

excess of deployment goals. To ease the strain on these assets, the

Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services are taking a

number of actions, which are described below along with our assessment

of them.

• Four of the Army’s 10 active divisions and 1 of its 8 National Guard

divisions were being affected by operations in the Balkans as of January

2000. The Army has begun to use National Guard divisions to relieve the

strain on active divisions and allow them to focus on their primary

mission of being prepared for major war. However, preparing the first

Guard division that deployed to Bosnia required considerable effort,

including the conversion of substantial numbers of Guard personnel to

full-time status; extensive assistance from the active-duty Army; the

borrowing of personnel from other National Guard divisions; and extra

funding obtained from the National Guard Bureau, the Texas National

Guard, and the Army. In addition to deploying other Guard units to

Bosnia, the Army is considering the possibility of using Guard divisions

in Kosovo beginning in mid-2001, but no decision had been made as of

2 A division is a major Army war-fighting organizational unit. The Army has 10 active-duty

divisions and 8 National Guard divisions (an Army division comprises about 10,000-15,000

soldiers).

3 Civil affairs forces interact with civilians and provide the infrastructure needed to bring

government services to the civilian population. The Army has 1 active-duty civil affairs unit

with 208 personnel, and the U.S. Army Reserve has 36 units totaling about 4,900 personnel.
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May 2000. The extent of preparations needed to prepare the Guard

division now in Bosnia suggests that this will not be easy.

• The Army does not have enough active-duty civil affairs capability to

meet current requirements with its one 208-person active-duty unit, and

until recently, there were concerns about having enough reserve civil

affairs personnel to meet requirements in the Balkans. However, smaller

and more flexible force requirements in the Balkans, coupled with Army

plans to increase its supply of civil affairs personnel, should ease the

strain on these forces by fiscal year 2003.

• The Navy and the Marine Corps each have four land-based EA-6B

squadrons; however, these squadrons together are unable to meet all

requirements without exceeding their deployment goal of having twice

as much time at home station as the amount of time deployed. Plans to

create an additional squadron from existing aircraft by fiscal year 2003

will help reduce the time crews must be deployed. Some additional

requirements for EA-6B squadrons could be filled if the Navy relaxed its

policy of limiting the use of carrier-based EA-6B squadrons whose

carriers are undergoing extended maintenance.

• The Air Force could meet current requirements for AWACS aircraft and

crews without exceeding its 120-day annual deployment goal if all 40 of

its staffed crews were fully trained and available for worldwide

deployments. However, only 27 of its 40 crews are fully trained, and

increasing this supply is problematic because of inadequate simulator

training capabilities; a reduction in high-quality training events; and the

loss of experienced crewmembers due to voluntary separation

incentives and reductions in force in recent years. Moreover, six of the

fully trained AWACS crews are based in the Pacific and, except for one

instance in 1999, have been unavailable for worldwide deployments

because the regional theater commander requires that they remain in

the region in case of emergencies on the Korean peninsula. However,

the Air Force could meet worldwide requirements for AWACS better if it

used its Pacific-based crews selectively to augment the forces currently

stressed in meeting worldwide missions outside the Pacific theater.

• The Air Force has only 40 of its 54 authorized U-2 pilots fully trained.

This shortage of fully trained pilots has led to historically high

deployment rates. The Air Force has relaxed certain requirements to

attract and keep its U-2 pilots; however, challenges remain and

continued careful management of the use of these aircraft will be

needed.

• F-16CJ squadrons, particularly those stationed in the United States, have

been one of the most utilized fighter squadrons for the past few years.

The Air Force has nine active-duty F-16CJ squadrons and plans to field a
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10th active squadron in fiscal year 2007 to keep deployments within its

goal of 120 days in 1 year. In the interim, the Air Force has modified two

squadrons of older, less capable aircraft and plans to augment current

forces with a reserve component squadron. However, due to its

part-time nature, this latter unit will be able to cover only about 30 days

of the rotation.

We are recommending that the Army assess its experiences in readying the

49th National Guard Division for its current deployment to Bosnia before

making a decision on using Guard divisions in Kosovo; that the Navy

examine the feasibility of meeting land-based requirements by expanding

the use of carrier-based EA-6B squadrons whose carriers are undergoing

extended maintenance; and that DOD further examine employing Pacificbased AWACS crews in worldwide deployments.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that on balance,

our report was a fair and accurate assessment of critical military

capabilities that will continue to demand close management. DOD

generally agreed with our recommendations concerning the use of Guard

divisions in Kosovo and the use of Pacific-based AWACS crews in

worldwide deployments. DOD did not agree with our recommendation

concerning the use of EA-6B squadrons to meet land-based requirements,

stating that using carrier-based squadrons routinely to supplement

land-based squadrons would adversely affect the Navy’s capacity to surge

the carrier squadrons in response to unanticipated contingencies. A more

detailed discussion on its comments and our evaluation is contained in the

body of this report.

Background The United States has been providing forces to Bosnia since 1995 and to

Kosovo since 1999. The Army provides almost all U.S. ground forces

deployed in the Balkans. As of May 2000, the United States had about 4,300

military personnel in Bosnia and 5,500 in Kosovo. Although the Army’s

divisions each have over 10,000 troops that could theoretically be used to
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meet these requirements, not all divisions are available for these missions.4

Moreover, although the number of troops deployed may appear small in

relationship to the divisions’ size, their readiness to deploy for their

wartime mission is disrupted by even these small deployments. In addition,

we reported in May 1999 that participation in the Bosnia operation

adversely affected the combat capability of units deployed there.5 For

example, soldiers deployed in contingency operations do more guard and

policing actions than tasks associated with operating their M-1 tanks and

Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

The major contingencies that the Air Force and, to a lesser extent, the Navy

are supporting are enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq and providing air

support over the Balkans. Some key aircraft used in these operations

include the EA-6B, AWACS, U-2, and F-16CJ. The Navy and the Marine

Corps each have four land-based EA-6B squadrons, each with either four or

five aircraft, and the Navy has a reserve squadron. The Air Force has 40 full

25-member AWACS crews, but only 27 crews were fully trained in January

2000. Trained pilots are the limiting factor with respect to the U-2. The

aircraft has only one crew member: the pilot. As of January 2000, the Air

Force had 44 of 54 authorized U-2 pilots, 40 of whom were fully trained.

The Air Force has 9 active-duty F-16CJ squadrons, each with either 18 or 24

aircraft and 1 National Guard squadron with 15 aircraft.

We have previously reported that in some instances, there is a higher

demand for some military capabilities during peacetime than the military

services can meet without degrading readiness, losing training

opportunities, and reducing the quality of life for personnel in the affected

units. Some of these assets are managed under the Global Military Force

Policy that the Joint Staff established in July 1996. This peacetime

prioritization process allocates these capabilities among theater

war-fighting commanders for use in crises, contingencies, and long-term

joint task force operations. The military services identify assets to be

included under the policy and determine the rate that these assets can be

4 As of April 2000, the Army had not used the two divisions based in the Pacific region to

support contingencies outside of their region because of the divisions’ strategic importance.

One division, based in Hawaii, is assigned to the Pacific region and for this report is not

considered as U.S.-based. The two U.S.-based divisions whose usage is currently not

planned for the Balkans include one that is held in strategic reserve and one that is

undergoing modernization, which makes it currently undesirable for deployments.

5 Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies

(GAO/NSIAD-99-69, May 24, 1999).
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deployed without adversely affecting readiness and quality of life. The

policy’s goal is to ensure that, while meeting the theater commanders’

requirements, these service-specified assets are maintained at the highest

possible level of readiness and are available to respond to crises.

The Joint Staff administers the policy, coordinating with the war-fighting

commanders and services to (1) determine mission priorities, (2) establish

or validate the capabilities’ requirements, (3) assess their availability, and

(4) develop allocation options for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary

of Defense. Following the Kosovo air campaign, the Joint Staff determined

that 10 of the 32 assets managed under the policy were exceeding service

usage level recommendations. Appendix II contains the 10 assets on this

list. Four of our case studies—the Army civil affairs units and the EA-6B,

AWACS, and U-2 aircraft—were chosen from this list. We chose the other

two case study assets—Army divisions and F16CJ aircraft—on the basis of

their frequent deployments in support of ongoing contingency operations.

Balkan Operations Are

Significantly Affecting

Army Divisions

Because so many of the Army’s active divisions are being affected by their

participation in the contingency operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the

Army has turned to its National Guard divisions to shoulder some of the

deployment burden. While this action will ease the frequency with which

active divisions will be called upon, it is likely to pose substantial

challenges to the National Guard’s divisions.

Multiple Army Divisions Are

Affected by Current

Operations

Concerns about the Army’s preparedness for war are based on the fact that

so many active divisions required in the Army’s war plans are affected by

the current number and size of contingency operations. Units not only

spend time deployed in operations but must also spend time preparing for

their deployment, as well as “recovering” after the deployment by

retraining to regain certain war-fighting skills (such as gunnery) and

performing maintenance to bring equipment up to standards. We previously

reported that depending on the type of unit, the recovery period could last

from 4 months to more than 1 year. Because parts of two divisions are

being deployed at any one time6 (one to Bosnia and the other to Kosovo),

parts of six of the Army’s divisions could be affected simultaneously by

6 Deployments include command staff personnel and a brigade-size combat unit. Active

division participation varies, but close to 3,000 division personnel are usually deployed at

one time.
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operations in the Balkans: two deployed, two preparing to deploy, and two

recovering from their deployments.

In January 2000, for example, four active divisions and one Guard division

were affected by these operations. Among the active divisions, the 1st

Cavalry Division was recovering from a 1-year deployment in Bosnia, the

10th Mountain Division was deployed there, and elements of the Guard’s

49th Armored Division were preparing to deploy there. At the same time,

the European-based 1st Infantry Division was deployed to Kosovo, and the

1st Armored Division was preparing to deploy there.7 Although none of

these divisions deployed in its entirety, deployment of key components—

especially headquarters—makes these divisions unavailable for

deployment elsewhere in case of a major war without a significant infusion

of personnel and equipment.

The Army’s Chief of Staff testified in February 2000 that although the

Army’s active divisions were ready for war, continuing to use them for

peacekeeping operations will increase the risk and raise the price of

meeting U.S. major theater war goals. Our analysis of 1999 readiness data

from the Army division that deployed forces to Kosovo determined that the

number of times that units reported high readiness levels during the second

6 months of the deployment declined 15 percentage points from the

previous 6 months of the deployment. In May 1999, we reported that the

readiness of divisions participating in contingency operations was being

adversely affected. Our analysis showed that in fiscal years 1995-98, the

period when European-based divisions were initially deployed to Bosnia,

European-based division units reported high readiness levels 87 percent of

the time in fiscal year 1995, but only 72 percent of the time in fiscal year

1998.8 During that same period, division units outside of Europe that were

not being used in these contingency operations were experiencing

increases in the number of times they reported high readiness rates—from

80 percent in 1995 to 91 percent in 1998.

7 Because the 1st Infantry Division was the first division deployed to the peacekeeping

operation in Kosovo, there was no recovering division.

8 This analysis was from DOD’s Global Status of Resources and Training System, which is

one measure DOD uses in assessing unit readiness. We considered units that reported C-1

or C-2 levels as having a high readiness level because they are considered able to undertake

most or all of their wartime missions.
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Using National Guard

Divisions Will Reduce

Frequency of Active-Duty

Deployments but Will Also

Pose Challenges

In an attempt to reduce the time active divisions spend in contingency

operations, the Army has scheduled three of its eight National Guard

divisions to provide the headquarters and other forces, such as signal and

intelligence troops, for the Bosnia rotation between March 2000 and April

2003. Guard and active units will generally alternate in 6-month rotations in

which they will command both active-duty and National Guard troops.

Using these three National Guard divisions will almost double the supply of

available divisions for Balkan operations and should relieve U.S.-based

active divisions of a total of 18 months of Bosnia deployments between

March 2000 and April 2003. Appendix III shows the schedule for these

deployments. The Army also plans to use combat units from the National

Guard enhanced brigades in the Balkans beginning in October 2000.

The Army is also considering using National Guard divisions to provide

forces for the Kosovo mission after mid-2001 to ease the burden on the

Army’s European-based divisions.9 However, the extent of preparations

needed to ready the first deploying unit—the Texas National Guard’s 49th

Armored Division, which is currently in Bosnia—suggests that this will not

be easy. For example, in our ongoing related work on the integration of

Army active and reserve forces, Army officials stated that the 49th Armored

Division needed 108 training days over an 18-month period to prepare for

its deployment. Preparations included conversion of substantial numbers

of Guard personnel to full-time status; extensive training assistance from

its active-duty partner division (the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood,

Texas); borrowing of personnel from other National Guard divisions; loans

of specialized equipment from other active-duty units; and extra funding

from the National Guard Bureau, the Texas National Guard, and the Army.

The same intensive preparation is expected to prepare subsequent National

Guard divisions for deployment.

It is difficult to say whether using additional Guard divisions in Kosovo is

viable. As was the case with the 49th Armored Division, other National

Guard divisions have lower priority status for personnel and equipment

than their active-duty counterparts. National Guard personnel and

equipment levels and types also differ from those of their active

counterparts. For example, the 49th Armored Division, like other National

Guard divisions, did not have staff for some military intelligence

occupational specialties positions that were needed for the mission and

9 Army plans as of April 2000 do not identify which divisions will deploy to Kosovo after

June 2001—that decision is pending.
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had to borrow these personnel from other active and reserve units. Also,

because the division did not have some specific equipment, such as

intelligence workstations and communications equipment, it had to borrow

these from the active Army. Moreover, since reserve personnel can only be

used for up to 270 days for an operational mission, succeeding units may

have difficulty borrowing such personnel with the necessary skills because

the pool of eligible personnel will diminish as reserve personnel complete

rotations and meet the 270-day limit.10

Reduced Requirements

and Army Actions

Should Ease the Strain

on Army Civil Affairs

Personnel

The Army does not have enough active-duty civil affairs capability to meet

current requirements. (Civil affairs forces interact with civilians and

provide the infrastructure needed to bring government services to the

civilian population.) However, with the planned increase in the size of the

Army’s only active civil affairs unit,11 there should be enough active civil

affairs capability to meet the need for early deploying forces. Reduced

personnel requirements for operations in the Balkans should relieve the

burden on reserve civil affairs personnel, who have been responsible for

sustaining operations over the long term.

Army Is Increasing the Size

of Its Sole Active Civil

Affairs Unit

Active-duty units are used to meet initial civil affairs requirements in new

operations because it can take a month or more to mobilize and train

reserve units. Nearly all theater commanders believe that they do not have

enough active civil affairs forces to meet contingency requirements. A

single active component unit of 208 people is currently meeting these

needs. In a recently completed study of its civil affairs forces, the U.S.

Special Operations Command, which is responsible for employing such

forces, determined that it needs 48 teams, or 18 more than it currently can

create with existing forces. As a result of this study, the Army has decided

to increase the active civil affairs unit by 84 people, primarily to create the

18 teams. U.S. Special Operations Command officials stated that the

increase is scheduled for fiscal year 2003 and that the Army has committed

10 10 U.S.C. 12304.

11 The Army’s sole active civil affairs unit provides an immediate response capability at the

onset of a contingency or crisis. Its personnel have deployed frequently--an average of

138 days a year. About 97 percent of the Army’s civil affairs personnel are in the reserves;

however, their role has been limited to sustaining operations because the time needed to

mobilize these forces precludes their immediate use in contingency operations. The

reserves have been the predominant source of civil affairs personnel in the Balkans.
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to provide at least $4.4 million per year in funding for these additional

personnel. Army officials project that these additional personnel will be

reallocated from other parts of the Army, although the specific units from

which these personnel will be drawn have not been identified. The action

that the Army is taking to increase civil affairs personnel, when completed,

should reduce the impact of deployments on the active battalion.

Reserves Are Meeting

Sustainment Needs

Reserve civil affairs units have been used heavily in the Balkans, but U.S.

Special Operations Command officials believe that they have enough

reserve civil affairs forces to meet current mission requirements. Although

Command officials were initially concerned about having enough reserve

civil affairs personnel to meet requirements in the Balkans, the numbers

required were reduced from 468 in the early Bosnia deployments to 133 for

both Bosnia and Kosovo as of April 2000. Also, as the requirements have

become more flexible in terms of rank and skills needed, the Army should

be able to provide enough reserve civil affairs personnel to meet the

reduced requirements.

Theater Commanders’

Peacetime

Requirements Exceed

EA-6B Assets

The Navy and the Marine Corps combined do not have enough land-based

EA-6B squadrons, which are used to suppress enemy air defenses and

electronically jam enemy antiaircraft radar, to cover all contingency

operations, and the Navy has chosen to use its carrier-based EA-6B aircraft

for these operations only by exception for various reasons. As a result,

some squadrons from the Navy and the Marine Corps have been exceeding

their goals for the maximum number of days personnel should be deployed

each year. Plans to create an additional squadron from existing aircraft and

recruit the associated crews will help reduce the time crews must be

deployed to contingency operations, but this squadron will not be in place

until 2003. Even after the additional squadron is in place, the number of

squadrons will be insufficient to provide aircraft to all required sites

without exceeding deployment goals.

EA-6B Squadrons Have

Been Deployed Repeatedly

EA-6Bs have been used in support of operations over northern and

southern Iraq since the early 1990s as well as at other locations. The Navy

and the Marine Corps each have four land-based squadrons; however, these

squadrons together are not enough to cover all peacetime requirements

without exceeding the Navy and the Marine Corps’ goals on the maximum

number of days personnel should be deployed each year. The deployment
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goal is to have twice the time at home station as time deployed. For

example, based on current land-based deployments, which are typically

90 days for Navy squadrons, the goal is to have 180 days at home station

after a 90-day deployment. According to a DOD readiness report, in the

1-year period ending November 1999, about 25 percent of land-based

squadrons—or two of the eight squadrons—exceeded this goal. In contrast,

a January 2000 DOD report stated that less than 2 percent of all Navy

deployable units exceeded this goal in fiscal year 1999.

Planned Actions Will Not

Completely Eliminate Stress

on EA-6B Squadrons

To increase the supply of available land-based EA-6B aircraft squadrons,

the Navy will create an additional land-based squadron from existing

aircraft and plans to have it operational in 2003. This additional squadron

will allow more operational sites to be covered within deployment goals.

However, even after creating the ninth squadron, the Navy/Marine Corps

still will not have enough squadrons to provide coverage to all operational

sites while remaining within deployment goals. (The specific number of

sites and the number of squadrons when associated with the number of

sites are classified.)

The Joint Staff also limited the number of sites to which land-based EA-6B

squadrons would deploy between December 1999 and December 2000.12 To

mitigate the risk of not having EA-6Bs at some sites where commanders

have requested aircraft, the Joint Staff has temporarily placed some

squadrons in an on-call status.13 These squadrons conduct their normal

home station training but must be prepared to go to a designated

operational site within several days. While there are some acknowledged

risks associated with not having the aircraft on-site, DOD believes

accepting these risks is prudent when balanced against the negative effects

that further deployments would cause on personnel and equipment.

Through April 2000, no squadrons had to deploy while on call.

For the longer term, DOD is considering a replacement aircraft for the

EA-6B. On the basis of a congressional directive, the services will begin

analyzing the alternatives for a suitable replacement. The study is expected

12 The number of sites covered are reviewed on an annual basis or as warranted by world

events.

13 The specific sites that are covered by on-call assets are classified.
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to take about 2 years, and according to a DOD report, any new aircraft will

not likely be available before 2010.

Limited Use of CarrierBased Aircraft Might Help

Ease Burden

The heavy use of EA-6B squadrons is not likely to subside unless the

current level of contingency operations subsides. However, the Navy could

reduce the burden slightly if it were to change its policy with respect to the

use of carrier-based aircraft for land missions.

Although the Navy has 10 carrier-based EA-6B squadrons in addition to the

land-based squadrons, it has been willing to use them to supplement landbased squadrons only by exception. For example, two carrier-based and

one reserve squadron have been used to reduce deployment levels of landbased squadrons for deployments expected to last less than the usual

90 days. One squadron was used for this purpose in 1998, another in 1999,

and a third (a naval reserve squadron) in 2000.14 Navy officials told us that

in the future, they would rather try to limit the use of the EA-6Bs to stay

within deployment goals rather than permit carrier-based aircraft to share

the burden. They said that using carrier-based squadrons to cover full

90-day land-based missions would detract from carrier training and

undermine the effectiveness and integrity of the entire carrier air wing.

Nevertheless, the Navy has approved the use of a carrier-based squadron to

cover one such mission in the summer of 2000. Squadron officials from this

unit said that they supported this deployment because it will ensure a

higher priority for resources and keep the squadron at a higher readiness

level, since the squadron would not deploy for 24 months—almost twice

the normal period between deployments—because its carrier is to be

undergoing extended maintenance. Moreover, squadron officials believe

the squadron will still have sufficient time to retrain for its carrier mission.

14 The Navy does not count deployment periods of less than 56 days as deployments.

Therefore, these deployments are not counted when assessing unit deployment goals.

However, one squadron deployment lasted 70 days to facilitate recovery from the Kosovo air

campaign. The reserve squadron participated for 45 days.
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Shortage of Trained

Crews Affects Ability

to Meet Theater

Commanders’ AWACS

Requirements

The Air Force could meet current needs for AWACS aircraft and crews in

contingency operations and other peacetime missions such as drug

interdiction without exceeding its 120-day annual deployment goal if all 40

of its staffed crews were fully trained and available for worldwide

deployments.15 AWACS aircraft provide airspace surveillance and

battlefield management of all aircraft flying in an assigned area. For a

variety of reasons, the Air Force currently has only 27 fully trained crews,

and 6 of those crews are based in the Pacific and do not routinely deploy

outside that region because the regional theater commander requires that

they remain in the region and be available in case of emergencies on the

Korean peninsula. This places the burden of worldwide deployments on the

21 fully trained crews outside the Pacific. There are many challenges to

increasing the supply of trained crews. Without using crews based in the

Pacific region, it will likely be difficult for the Air Force to meet

deployment goals, even if it increases the number of fully trained crews.

Shortage of Fully Trained

Crews Increases Time Away

From Home

As a result of the shortfall of fully trained crews, some AWACS squadron

personnel have consistently exceeded the Air Force’s goal of no more than

120 total days away from home station during the previous year. According

to Air Force officials, the high deployment rate—between 20 and

25 percent of all AWACS personnel typically exceeded the Air Force

deployment goal for most of 1997-99—has contributed to retention

problems in the AWACS community, in turn exacerbating the stress on the

remaining AWACS crews.16 As noted above, the Air Force has about half the

trained crews it needs to provide coverage for contingency operations and

other peacetime missions while remaining within its deployment goals. A

number of factors have contributed to the other crews not being fully

trained. These include inadequate simulator training capabilities; a

reduction in high quality training events in exercises involving various

types of aircraft operating together as well as aircraft that act as an

opposing force; and the loss of experienced crewmembers due to voluntary

separation incentives and reductions in force in recent years.

15 An AWACS crew consists of 25 officer and enlisted personnel in different specialties. The

number of trained crews fluctuates.

16 The Air Force considers a system or job category stressed when greater than 20 percent of

its population exceeds the 120-day per year threshold.
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The Air Force is taking a number of steps to increase the number of trained

AWACS crews available for contingencies and has sought to reduce usage

of these assets. It has plans to increase the number of trainees in critical

positions—airborne battle managers, air weapons officers, and pilots—and

to bring new simulator capabilities online that should make simulator

training more valuable. However, these plans will not produce immediate

improvements. An air staff official told us that it takes about 18 months to

produce an AWACS crew capable of operating independently, and the

anticipated simulators will not be in place until about 2002. As is the case

with EA-6B aircraft, the Joint Staff is limiting the frequency with which

AWACS aircraft deploy. It has denied some theater commanders’ requests

for AWACS aircraft for missions the staff considered lower priority, but in

early 2000, it approved an additional AWACS deployment to a classified

location. The Joint Staff also allowed, on an exception basis, some Pacificbased AWACS crews to deploy to Southwest Asia for the first time in 1999.

According to a Pacific Air Forces’ AWACS official, the key factor in the use

of Pacific-based AWACS aircraft and crews outside that theater is a longstanding reluctance on the part of the commander of Pacific forces to allow

Pacific-based AWACS to deploy outside the theater because of a concern

that they will not be available quickly in the event of a crisis on the Korean

peninsula.

If the Air Force can overcome the challenges it faces in increasing the

number of trained AWACS crews, it can reduce the strain on the AWACS

community. Our analysis shows that if its 40 staffed crews were fully

trained and available, the Air Force could meet theater commanders’

routine requirements without exceeding its 120-day annual deployment

goal. However, given the factors affecting crew training, we believe that it

is too early to determine whether the Air Force will be successful in

achieving the goal of training all of its crews. Furthermore, unless the Air

Force is able to use the 6 crews based in the Pacific region for deployments

elsewhere, we believe that it will be difficult to meet deployment goals

even if it fully trains all of its 40 staffed crews.

Shortage of U-2 Pilots

Presents Challenges in

Meeting Theater

Commanders’ Needs

The high demand for U-2 pilots relative to the number of pilots has

contributed to historically high deployment rates for its pilots—175 days on

average in 1999. The U-2 is used to gather intelligence and provide

surveillance. The Air Force faces unique challenges in attracting and

keeping U-2 pilots and has relaxed certain requirements to deal with this

problem. However, the Air Force acknowledges that it faces challenges in
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overcoming historical pilot shortages, and continued careful management

of the use of these aircraft will be needed.

Success of Air Force and

Joint Staff Actions to

Relieve Strain on U-2 Pilots

Is Uncertain

U-2 pilots have had some of the highest deployment rates in the Air Force.

Deployment rates for its pilots were 175 days on average in 1999 or about

50 percent higher than the Air Force’s overall 120-day deployment goal.

Moreover, between 32 and 69 percent of U-2 personnel exceeded the

deployment goal in the periods we reviewed from 1997 through January

2000. Air Force officials attribute the high rates to too few trained pilots

and to the high demand for these pilots. The Air Force had only 40 of its 54

authorized pilots fully trained as of January 2000. The shortage of trained

pilots reflects a drop in applicants to fly the U-2 and higher than expected

attrition. The shortage has been further exacerbated over the last few years

by the need to use some pilots from the operational squadron as

instructors. As a result, U-2 representatives told us that the burden of

contingency deployments falls disproportionately on the trained crews in

the operational squadron. Air Force officials believe that high deployment

rates have contributed to retention problems. Our analysis of DOD’s 1999

survey of active-duty members found that satisfaction with military life

decreased markedly among those who reported being away from home

more than 5 months during the past year. We also found that retention and

satisfaction with military life are closely linked.17

As is the case with EA-6B and AWACS aircraft, the Joint Staff has reduced

the number of U-2 crews that deploy for contingencies. In the case of the

U-2 and other similar intelligence and reconnaissance assets, the Joint Staff

has initiated an additional process to manage these assets. This process

first identifies theater commanders’ requirements, then prioritizes them

according to importance to military operations, regional interests, existing

coalitions and alliances, and the value of the intelligence to be gained. This

process requires commanders to describe what needs to be done over what

period rather than just specifying a specific asset. Theater commanders can

still request a specific asset, but the Joint Staff may substitute a different

asset if the latter is deemed to provide the needed capability or if the one

requested is not available. Requirements are filled according to established

priorities. Joint Staff officials stated that in the future, the lowest priority

requests will not be met if filling them would exceed the usage limits

17 Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD’s 1999 Survey of Active Duty Members

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-110, Mar. 8, 2000).
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agreed upon by the services and the Joint Staff unless there is a compelling

need. This process will allow the Joint Staff not only to limit the use of

capabilities in high demand, but also to identify any unmet requirements

and the level of risk associated with not meeting these requirements.

The Air Force has taken several steps to increase the number of U-2 pilots.

For example, it has reduced the commitment period for U-2 pilots from 5 to

3 years because officials believe a shorter period will attract more

candidates to the program. It also plans to increase the capacity of its pilot

school. The Air Force expects to increase the number of pilots it can train

from 14 to 24 a year—an increase of about 70 percent. The Air Force

believes that if these initiatives are successful, and if U-2 use is constrained,

the U-2 could reach its authorized pilot goal within 2 years.

The Air Force faces unique challenges in attracting and keeping U-2 pilots.

It has not met its historical average for recruiting new candidates into the

program in recent years and projects a net loss in pilots by the end of fiscal

year 2000. Unlike other aircraft communities, qualified pilots are drawn

from other aircraft such as B-52 bombers and C-130 transporters. These

pilots volunteer to be trained to fly the U-2 for a specified period. Because

of the high altitude at which the U-2 flies, U-2 pilots must pass extensive

flight physicals to allow them to operate at altitudes that can exceed

70,000 feet. They are also required to wear full pressure suits much like

those that astronauts wear, and the aircraft can be difficult to fly. Air Force

officials said these conditions, along with high deployment rates, have

contributed to a decline in the number of applicants. Moreover, the number

of applicants accepted has declined in recent years below the 50-percent

historical average because it is difficult to find pilots with the aptitude

required to master the difficult handling characteristics of the U-2.

F-16 Suppression

Squadron Needs for

Ongoing Operations

Are Being Met With

Existing Aircraft

The deployment strain on the Air Force’s specialized suppression aircraft—

the F-16CJ—experienced between 1997 and 1999 should be reduced by

using all F-16CJ capability throughout the Air Force. The F-16CJ is used to

suppress enemy air defenses primarily by targeting air defense radars with

sophisticated missiles. Plans call for fielding a 10th active squadron in

fiscal year 2007. In the interim, the Air Force has added capability by

modifying two squadrons of an earlier version F-16 and plans to

supplement current forces with a reserve component squadron. However,

due to its part-time nature this latter unit will be able to cover only about

30 days of the rotation.
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Past Strain Has Been

Eliminated

F-16CJ squadrons, particularly those stationed in the United States, have

been among the most utilized fighter squadrons for the past few years.

Between 15 and 20 percent of personnel assigned to these aircraft

exceeded the Air Force’s 120-day deployment goal between May 1997 and

May 1999. In October 1999, the Air Force began using a new scheduling

process for most of its forces. For F-16CJ squadrons, this means that

squadrons based in the Pacific and Europe are now scheduled equally with

U.S.-based squadrons and that the reserve component F-16CJ squadron will

also be used. However, that squadron will only be able to cover about

30 days of the rotation due to its part-time nature. The Air Force also

modified two squadrons of an earlier version F-16 to give them a limited

capability to perform the suppression mission. The more equitable

scheduling of all F-16CJ squadrons should eliminate the stress experienced

in the past.

The Air Force believes that it needs an additional active F-16CJ squadron to

reduce usage of existing active squadrons. There are currently nine activeduty F-16CJ squadrons. The Secretary of Defense reported in his 1999

Annual Report to the Congress that operating nine such squadrons to meet

deployment commitments would have kept them above desired

deployment levels. The Air Force plans to purchase 30 F-16CJ aircraft,

most of which will be used to field a 10th active F-16CJ suppression

squadron. The Air Force has budgeted $262 million for 10 aircraft in fiscal

year 2000 and another $567 million has been budgeted for 20 additional

aircraft in fiscal years 2003-05. If the funding is approved as requested, the

Air Force plans to field the 10th active squadron in fiscal year 2007.

Conclusions DOD’s planned actions to address the stress on the six assets we examined

should reduce the level of stress being placed on these critical assets, but

many of these actions will not be completed for at least 2 to 7 years. There

are also additional actions DOD could take to further reduce the stresses.

The Army’s move to integrate National Guard divisions into the Bosnia

rotation is a bold step that should positively affect the readiness of active

divisions by allowing them to spend more time training for their wartime

mission. However, using the National Guard divisions could also create

some stress on them and will pose challenges for the Army. Until the

experiences in preparing the 49th Armored Division for its rotation are

assessed, and it is clearer as to how the substantial support provided to the
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49th can also be provided to another Guard unit, it may be premature to

decide to use Guard forces to cover both the Bosnia and Kosovo rotations.

Despite plans to add an additional land-based EA-6B squadron, meeting

existing EA-6B requirements without exceeding deployment goals will

require the continued use of some non-deployed squadrons in an on-call

status. The Navy could fill more commanders’ requests for EA-6B units if it

were to relax its policy against the use of non-deployed carrier-based

EA-6B aircraft for land-based missions. Using carrier-based squadrons

whose carriers are undergoing extended maintenance would appear to be

feasible in selected instances. The Navy’s current practice of allowing

carrier-based squadrons to fill the need for shorter-term land-based

deployments has also proven to be a workable solution. The Navy would

need to carefully weigh the risks associated with using carrier-based

aircraft for land missions and the impact that this would have on the time

affected personnel would have at home.

The Air Force cannot eliminate the strain on its AWACS crews until all

crews are fully trained and can participate in worldwide deployments. In

both the long term and the interim, this will require using the fully trained

crews in the Pacific in scheduling worldwide deployments. These crews

currently account for over one-fifth of all fully trained AWACS crews, and

deploying them worldwide could have a noticeable impact on the level of

AWACS deployments. There has, however, been a long-standing reluctance

on the part of the commander of Pacific forces to allow Pacific-based

AWACS to deploy outside the theater because of a concern that they will

not be available quickly in the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Any decision to expand the use of Pacific-based AWACS crews will require

careful study of both the benefits of reducing the level of deployments on

AWACS crews based outside the Pacific and the risks of having Pacificbased AWACS crews deployed outside the theater should a crisis occur in

Korea.

Recommendations To alleviate some of the strain on the military forces and assets used in

contingency operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense

direct the following:

• The Secretary of the Army to carefully scrutinize the actions taken to

ready the 49th Armored Division to deploy to Bosnia before deciding

whether to expand the use of National Guard forces to cover the

mission in Kosovo. In making this assessment, the Secretary should
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consider the transfer of specialized personnel, equipment, training, and

other resources that were necessary and whether the same level of

support can be provided to cover both the Bosnia and Kosovo missions.

• The Secretary of the Navy to reexamine the Navy’s policy of limiting the

use of non-deployed carrier-based EA-6B aircraft to less than 90-day

land missions in contingencies. Specifically, the Navy should consider

the feasibility of expanding the use of squadrons for full 90-day land

missions when their associated carriers are undergoing extended

maintenance.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense reexamine using

AWACS crews from the Pacific to cover worldwide missions within the

context of the Global Military Force Policy.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that on balance,

the report is a fair and accurate assessment of critical military capabilities

that continue to demand close attention and management by DOD.

DOD generally agreed with our recommendation to assess the experience

of the 49th Armored Division in Bosnia before deciding whether to expand

the use of these forces in Kosovo. It said that it intends to incorporate the

lessons learned from the 49th Armored Division’s rotation to Bosnia in

assisting other Army National Guard units, as well as active units preparing

to deploy to Bosnia. However, DOD disagreed that an assessment of the

experience of the current National Guard unit in Bosnia should be used to

determine whether and how other National Guard units deploy to Kosovo.

We did not intend to imply that the performance of the 49th in Bosnia

should be assessed to decide whether the Guard should participate in

Kosovo. Rather, we are suggesting that the Army examine closely what

actions had to be taken to prepare the 49th for the mission and whether it

would be possible to provide the same level of support to two separate

missions. We have clarified the language of our recommendation to make

our intent clearer.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Navy

reassess the policy of not using non-deployed carrier-based EA-6B aircraft

to supplement land-based aircraft for land missions whenever possible. It

stated that if the Navy were to use carrier-based squadrons routinely to

supplement a steady-state level of use of land-based squadrons, such action

would reduce and possibly eliminate the surge capacity the carrier

squadrons can provide to unanticipated contingencies. DOD also restated
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our point that the Navy supplements land-based EA-6B squadrons with

carrier-based squadrons when carrier schedules permit and routinely uses

the reserve squadron. The intent of our recommendation is not that the

Navy establish a fixed schedule for carrier-based squadrons to participate

in land deployments but rather that the Navy consider whether it could

expand the use of carrier-based squadrons for 90-day land deployments

whenever possible—primarily when its carrier is scheduled for extended

maintenance. Such use would not appear to disrupt surge capacity for

contingencies, since the carrier could not be deployed while under

maintenance. We have revised our conclusion and recommendation to

clarify our intentions.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of

Defense direct that AWACS crews from the Pacific be employed to cover

some missions. DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense manages the

regional allocation of AWACS aircraft and crews through the Global

Military Force Policy and that as a matter of policy, it has the flexibility to

shift Pacific-based AWACS crews to other regions. It further stated that

although the impact of basing AWACS crews in the Pacific may warrant

further study, it would seem prudent to continue making AWACS basing

and allocation decisions within the construct of the Global Military Force

Policy, leaving the Department the flexibility to shift Pacific-based AWACS

crews to other regions as a matter of policy. Our report recognizes that the

use of Pacific-based AWACS crews to meet ongoing contingency

requirements must be made in the context of balancing needs in the Pacific

with those outside that region. In particular, we recognize that any decision

to expand the use of Pacific-based AWACS crews must balance the risks of

having such crews deployed outside the theater should a crisis occur in

Korea with the benefits of reducing the level of deployments on AWACS

crews based outside the Pacific. We also report that Pacific-based crews

have been used occasionally to support operations outside the region.

However, in view of the heavy day-to-day use of AWACS crews based

outside the Pacific region, absent a reduction in requirements that would

ease the deployment burden on non-Pacific AWACS crews, a decision to

exclude Pacific-based AWACS crews from deployments would result in

crews outside the Pacific region continuing to exceed deployment goals.

We have modified our recommendation to suggest that the Secretary of

Defense reexamine the use of Pacific-based AWACS crews outside the

Pacific region within the context of the Global Military Force Policy, in light

of DOD’s recognition in its comments that this subject may warrant further

study.
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Appendix IV contains the full text of DOD’s comments.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until

15 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the

Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable

Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make

copies available to appropriate congressional committees and to other

interested parties on request. If you or your staff have any questions about

this report, please call me at (202) 512-5140. An alternate contact and major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Carol R. Schuster

Associate Director

National Security Preparedness Issues
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To detail the difficulties faced by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in

providing capabilities that are in limited supply in support of future

contingency operations, we obtained briefings, reviewed documents, and

interviewed personnel at Army, Navy, and Air Force locations, at the Office

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at unified command headquarters within

the United States and Europe. To gain the perspectives of Air Force

officials on the use of Pacific-based Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) aircraft crews for worldwide deployments we discussed the

benefits and risks of using those crews with Air Force Air Combat

Command and Pacific Air Force AWACS officials. Our efforts were

primarily focused on current operations in the Balkans and Southwest

Asia.

To document the services’ proposals to address problems with these

capabilities, we reviewed and discussed studies produced by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency, the U.S. Special

Operations Command, and the National Guard Bureau. We also met with

weapon systems representatives to discuss the initiatives already

implemented and their expected impacts. Furthermore, we obtained the

Army’s plans to provide forces in the Balkans and Southwest Asia and

discussed these plans with cognizant officials at Army Headquarters and

various Army Commands and units in the United States and Europe.

To evaluate service and Department of Defense (DOD) proposals, we

discussed completed and ongoing studies related to low-density/

high-demand capabilities with the appropriate service and DOD offices;

compared the projected impact of proposals with the actual past

performance of the services in areas such as personnel staffing,

recruitment and retention, and demand management of low-density/

high-demand capabilities; and used service and DOD data to assess the

improvement offered by different proposals. We analyzed the Army’s plans

to determine how the Army was meeting its deployment requirements in

the Balkans and Southwest Asia and whether those plans adequately

mitigated the impacts of peacekeeping operations.
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Appendix II

Assets Identified by the Joint Staff as Problem

Areas ApendxiI

In the summer of 1999, the Joint Staff conducted a Joint War-fighting

Capabilities study to determine which of the 32 assets being managed

under the Global Military Force Policy were problematic. This review

considered a number of factors, including recent usage levels, relative

importance to theater commanders, and impacts of deployments on

readiness. From this review, the following 10 assets were deemed

problematic, and actions were taken to improve conditions. Six of the

assets received fiscal year 1999 supplemental funds to improve their

condition.

Table 1: Assets Identified by the Joint Staff as Problem Areas

U.S. Army U.S. Navy U.S. Air Force Navy/Marine Corps

Civil Affairs (classified) Airborne Warning and Control

System

Airborne Command Control

and Communications

HC-130 (aerial refueling)

HH-60 (search and rescue)

Predator Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle

RC-135 (electronic

intelligence)

U-2 (intelligence and

surveillance)

EA-6B (air defense

suppression)
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Appendix III

Deployment Schedules of Army Divisions to

the Balkans ApendxiI
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiIV

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the end

of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Now on pp. 20 to 21.

Now on p. 21.
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Now on p. 21.
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated June 21, 2000.

GAO’s Comments 1. We recognize the importance of time to allow divisions engaged in the

Balkans to refit, retrain, and prepare for deployment to major theater

war following disengagement from the Balkans. Our point is that with

the large number of Army divisions affected by operations in the

Balkans at any one time—four active and one National Guard division

in June 2000—this disruption to wartime training and availability was a

key reason the Army chose to involve National Guard divisions in the

rotations.

2. DOD concurs with the report’s treatment of the status of active and

reserve component units. Its comments provide further detail

highlighting the differences between active and reserve civil affairs

units.
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-164 Contingency Operations

Appendix V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiV

GAO Contacts Steve Sternlieb (202) 512-4534

Acknowledgments In addition to the name above, Rodell Anderson, Tony DeFrank,

Leo Sullivan, and Frank Smith made key contributions to this report.

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