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IRAQ: IS RECONSTRUCTION FAILING?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 22, 2007

Serial No. 110–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., J.D., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Construction ......................... 9

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., J.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 14

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 53

(1)

IRAQ: IS RECONSTRUCTION FAILING? 

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Lantos (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman LANTOS. The committee will come to order. 

Just 1 year ago, United States contractors and army engineers 

put the finishing touches on a highly touted renovation to the maternity hospital in Erbil, northern Iraq. The $6.8 million project 

promised to convert the dilapidated hospital into a modern stateof-the-art medical facility. 

Today, the backed up drainage system spews disgusting water 

through many of the hospital’s floor drains, water contaminated by 

used syringes, drug vials and bandages, an incinerator for medical 

waste disposal lies idle because the workers initially trained to operate it are no longer employed by the hospital. The new water purification system is broken. Hospital workers use dangerous and 

unstable, old oxygen tanks rather than the approved system installed by U.S. contractors simply because they do not feel adequately trained on the new high-tech system. 

This is just one of scores of projects among the many so-called 

‘‘completed’’ reconstruction projects in Iraq that are now literally 

crumbling. These are the projects we handed off with so much fanfare. It is simply outrageous that we are mired in the same mud 

of incompetence that we got stuck in last year and the year before 

that. But knowing the administration’s abysmal track record on 

Iraq reconstruction planning, this is no surprise. 

One of the early bungles in planning for reconstruction involved 

financing. If we had started on a path that offered the Iraqis real 

incentives in rebuilding their country, today’s pitiful state of affairs 

might be different. 

In the fall of 2003, just as the reconstruction effort was beginning, the distinguished chairman of our Appropriations Committee, 

David Obey, and I co-sponsored an amendment to provide half of 

the reconstruction funding as loans, and the other half as grants. 

The loans would have ensured that the Iraqis had a real stake in 

the success of infrastructure projects, and would have encouraged 

them to fulfill their obligations quickly. Iraqis would have been motivated to take ownership over the rebuilding of their own country. 

But the administration and the Republican-led Congress stonewalled the loan plan, which, incidentally, would have preserved 
2

some of the reconstruction monies for the U.S. taxpayers who have 

been paying through the nose every day. There is no accountability. 

The Iraqis who secured these contracts can essentially take the 

money and run. 

Many of them have done just that, as described again and again 

in the reports of our distinguished witness, Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. And some U.S. contractors who have lined their pockets with taxpayer dollars are not 

accountable to anyone, either. This stunning mismanagement 

seems to be why many of the endeavors are executed so shoddily. 

The revelation in Mr. Bowen’s latest quarterly report that new 

facilities are crumbling is equally as troubling as the data on incomplete projects. Some of the supposedly completed ventures are 

actually houses of cards ready to collapse. In a sampling of eight 

projects across different sectors, Mr. Bowen’s office found that 

seven were no longer operating as originally designed. 

The culprits on the ground apparently include plumbing and 

electrical failures, lack of proper maintenance, outright looting, and 

expensive equipment lying idle. But the real blame lies at the feet 

of the administration. 

The President did not follow the sage rule of his former Secretary 

of State, ‘‘If you break it, you own it.’’ The administration instead 

applied some weak glue and then hoped against hope it would not 

fall to pieces. This situation is beyond unacceptable. It is serious 

misconduct. But we must be forward-looking now. And the only 

way to plan adequately for the future is to ascertain the most accurate state of the present. That is why it is so crucial that the Office 

of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction bring an 

unvarnished, independent, and enormously useful viewpoint on the 

rebuilding of Iraq. Let me just review a few of the startling facts 

Mr. Bowen has uncovered in his latest report. I do this not as an 

academic exercise or to erect a fruitless scoreboard, but to underscore the vast improvement we need to make in so many aspects 

of Iraq’s reconstruction. 

Iraq loses perhaps $5 billion a year to the waste created by corruption. Only eight primary health centers have been opened, nowhere near the original goal of 150. The country has the capacity 

to produce just 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. Our original goal 

and promise 4 years ago was over 3 million. Water projects have 

made drinkable water available to only 5.5 million of the 8.5 million people who had been expected to receive it. 

With these kinds of gaps, there are clearly massive failures 

throughout the construction, implementation and managements of 

projects in all of these sectors. It is plainly apparent that the Iraqis 

are not getting the basic services they need, and are not being 

trained to obtain them. 

An axiom of development aid says that if you give a man a fish, 

he will eat for a day, but if you teach him how to fish, he will eat 

for the rest of his life. When it comes to reconstruction, we have 

not even stocked the pond, let alone taught the Iraqis how to fish. 

We must make sure that future plans include training the Iraqis 

to maintain their society, not just fill it with fly-by-night facilities 

that soon deteriorate or become obsolete. 
3

It is now my pleasure to turn to my distinguished colleague, the 

committee’s ranking member and my good friend, Ileana RosLehtinen, to make any comments she may wish to make. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this 

important and timely hearing. Serious errors have been made and 

continue to be made in the reconstruction process. We must learn 

from these, and achieve long-term reconstruction goals which are 

directly intertwined with long-term security and stability objectives. We must work to increase the ability of the Iraqi Government to provide adequate jobs, water, fuel, and electricity. Other 

issues that must be considered as part of any assessment concerning the future direction of reconstruction efforts are the root 

causes of the high rates of absenteeism within the security forces, 

poor Interior Ministry reporting, inadequate vetting mechanisms to 

prevent sectarian and militia influences from infiltrating Iraqi security forces, inadequate systems to account for personnel, and inexperienced staff with limited budgeting and technology skills. 

Both security ministries have difficulties acquiring, distributing, 

and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. 

I have met with Mr. Bowen in the past, and I have great respect 

and admiration for the work that he has done. I hope that in his 

remarks this morning he can comment on the performance of the 

Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi Army, National Police, and 

Iraqi Police. Based on your observation from your most recent trip 

to Iraq, how are the security assistance programs adapting to this 

new environment as a result of the Baghdad security plans? 

Iraq will also continue to require United States and international 

support, including political and economic incentives to strengthen 

its government institutions, to eliminate corruption, to stimulate 

employment, and deliver essential services. I hope that Mr. Bowen 

will elaborate on the recommendations that he made in the March 

2007 report regarding the development of multi-year programs and 

financing strategies that accommodate both short-term and longterm programs. 

If we are to achieve the desired result, we must approach our reconstruction efforts in an integrated manner, and I know that you 

are going to be talking to us about the recommendations to better 

integrate these relevant U.S. agencies, and one of the items that 

was discussed was a Goldwater-Nichols-type approach to reform. 

In assessing the lessons learned from our experience in post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, we must improve our programs to ensure a stable, secure, free Iraq that will be a partner for the United 

States in fighting Islamic militants in the region and beyond. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our witness for appearing before us. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

I am pleased to recognize my friend from New York, Chairman 

Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Two months ago Mr. Bowen appeared before a joint hearing of 

the Middle East and South Asia and International Organizations, 

Human Rights, and Oversight Subcommittees, and told us that he 

was cautiously optimistic regarding reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 
4

Two months later I am not sure that I share Mr. Bowen’s optimism. 

Two months ago the Iraqi Government was still not producing either oil or electricity at rates that matched pre-war performance, 

nor were they able to spend a significant amount of the money they 

had budgeted to improve either situation. 

Two months later the same can still be said. 

Last week the Government Accountability Office reported that 

over the last 4 years between 100,000 and 300,000 barrels of oil a 

day went unaccounted for. I used to have a car like that. [Laughter.] 

It is just gone. GAO figures at an average price of $50 per barrel that amounts to somewhere between $5 million and $15 million a 

day that may have been stolen, siphoned, or more likely, not even 

produced. What the GAO has uncovered here is that neither the 

Iraqis nor we know precisely how much oil is being produced. After having spent more than $2 billion of the American taxpayers’ money on rebuilding Iraq’s oil infrastructure, you would 

think that we would at least know how much oil was being produced. 

Since oil revenue makes up 95 percent of Iraq’s income and since 

oil production is one of the milestones we are using to measure reconstruction progress, it seems to me that precision in this regard 

would be something of a priority. On the up side I suppose it is 

possible that Iraq is actually producing much more oil than we 

thought, more than they reported, but somehow I doubt it. So for 

the past 4 years Iraq has actually been missing its oil production 

targets by a lot more than we had previously thought. 

A similar situation exists in the electricity sector, but at least 

there the Iraqis seem to be able to measure how much electricity 

is being produced. The only problem is that it is simply nowhere 

near enough. Three billion dollars later and Baghdad still has less 

electricity than before the war. The Iraqis have had the same target for producing electricity since it was established by the CPA in 

2004, and have fallen consistently short. 

There are lots of reasons for both these situations as well as the 

other areas where reconstruction has fallen short, like the lack of 

enough clean drinking water or the many hospitals and clinics that 

have been refurbished but lack enough doctors to provide care. The 

total absence of anything like a passive security environment has 

to be at the top of anyone’s list as the chief culprit for reconstruction failing, and while Mr. Bowen makes a valid point about other 

projects having been successfully completed until the big things get 

done, and done right, the little things don’t count for enough. 

So Mr. Bowen’s cautious optimism notwithstanding 4 years into 

our ill-conceived effort to reconstruction Iraq, this social studies 

teacher would give it an F. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

appreciate both your words and those of Ranking Member Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen. There is much wisdom in both of them. 

I think that if there is any blame that we can have about things 

we haven’t done totally right in this committee in the past, I think 
5

the criticism in the past that we have not had as much of an emphasis on this type of oversight, I think would be justified criticism, 

and so I am very pleased that the chairman now is taking steps 

to make sure that we are a player in making the decisions to make 

sure that our money is not being wasted. 

Mr. Bowen, I know who you are, and we have spoken. I respect 

you, and I thank you for the serious job that you are doing and the 

responsible job that you are doing. 

Dealing with corruption and incompetence is not an easy job in 

the middle of a conflict, and I will just say, Mr. Chairman, I have 

seen this firsthand in various conflicts that I have been involved 

with one way or the other, and people on your side who are trying 

to create a better world against an evil enemy, perhaps many of 

them sometimes turn out to be corrupt, and you don’t know what 

to do about it, and other times they are incompetent, and you don’t 

know what to do about it because you are fighting an evil enemy 

and you don’t know how to make it work even though the goal is 

noble. 

I think that may be what is going on in Iraq today, and I appreciate this hearing to make sure we can delve into that and have 

a deeper understanding, and perhaps some of it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome 

Mr. Bowen back from Iraq. Glad to see you are back safely. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Ms. WATSON. And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. From the start we have sought to solve a political 

challenge without any thoughtful comprehensive political strategy, 

and the result is this situation we find ourselves in today. All of 

us who would like to see Iraq become a democracy unfortunately, 

Mr. Chairman, our own actions have hobbled this effort. 

The foundations of democracy are transparency and accountability, yet in Iraq we have only shown the Iraqis how not to build 

these foundations. Our contracts and reconstruction plans for Iraq 

are opaque old egg with no bid and cost-plus contracts being the 

norm. The CPA under Paul Bremer managed to misplace $9 billion—that is right, ‘‘billion’’ with a ‘‘b’’—and the U.S. Government 

officials in charge of these failures have still not been held accountable by this administration. 

Mr. Chairman, these are terrible examples for the fledgling Iraqi 

Government, and to people who are looking toward us as to how 

to do a democracy the right way. These are the bitter fruits of the 

arrogance and the willfully ignorant approach to this war from the 

beginning. 

I applaud you, Mr. Bowen, for your efforts to root out fraud, 

waste, and abuse in our reconstruction efforts, but despite your talents we cannot find what is the most sorely needed thing in Iraq, 

and what it is is an effective political strategy for disengaging our 

forces and re-engaging our partners. Until we can build up their 

democracy so it is functional, we should not invest our own taxpayers’ dollars. 
6

So thank you, Mr. Bowen, for going there and gathering the 

facts, and bringing them back to us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will waive my opening statement and look forward to the testimony. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the 

hearing, and the ranking member as well. I appreciate the oversight role that this committee has taken in the 110th Congress. 

Mr. Bowen made mention of the fact that he spent a number of 

years or did times in Texas, and for that I appreciate him even 

more, and I know, frankly, that he understands how to make 

things work. 

This hearing will probably exhibit a lot of peaking frustration. 

Having gone to Iraq for the first time under the jurisdiction or the 

administration of Paul Bremer and hearing a lot of glorious accolades as to what was going to happen, and now seeing that the 

mountain top really truly was not that. One of the big mistakes, 

of course, was—I call the word ‘‘hoarding,’’ meaning that as we had 

some glimmer of hope in the early stages right after the war when 

Paul Bremer was there, many of us argued vigorously that we embrace the help that was offered by the neighbors, our surrounding 

Mid East neighbors to help Arabic speakers, in fact, the help that 

the European Union was trying to offer, so that not only could 

there be an expanded spread of the amount of resources necessary, 

but there could be added stakeholders. 

And why is that relevant to this whole issue of reconstruction? 

Because, frankly, as you make your presentation the world sees 

that the failure of Iraq in its non-reconstruction falls heavily on the 

shoulders of the United States, and our heavy emphasis on the 

Iraqi National Police and national forces, $15.5 billion, their failure 

to adequately be seemingly able to rise to the occasion, all is emphasized, if you will, on us. 

So my concern as you make your presentation is whether or not 

there is a future, whether or not there is hope in terms of what 

you have been able to find. 

I thank the chairman for this. My frustration is peaking. I think 

it has been a complete failure, and I think the administration is 

on the wrong track. I hope, however, for the people of Iraq we will 

find a way to provide them with a better quality of life. 

I yield back. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. I will pass on an opening statement. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Barrett. 

Mr. BARRETT. No opening statement. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
7

We shouldn’t be in Iraq in the first place. We have destroyed a 

sovereign nation, their economy and their infrastructure. We continue to stay and embolden the insurgents who have continued the 

destruction. What we should be doing is bringing our troops home 

safely, investing only in their safe return home, and then investing 

in helping Iraq rebuild its nation, but not militarily; helping them 

through non-military means. 

That, as far as I am concerned, is the only way we will get corruption out of the system. We need to give the Iraqis the pride in 

their own nation. We need to support them in their rebuilding, and 

we need, in turn, to add to their economy. We have to stop the 

drain of U.S. dollars going to corrupt U.S. contractors, and it is just 

a shame that we are there in the first place. 

But we can do this, but we can’t do it by—and I will say this 

later in my remarks—by having legislation that has benchmarks 

on the Iraqi Government that will then in turn punish them by 

taking away any of their reconstruction dollars when we are the 

ones that are there destroying their country along with their insurgents, but we are embolding the whole process. 

It is a closed circle. We have to stop this. I thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to hear from Mr. Bowen today, and I also appreciate the testimony that you have provided and you are going to talk about in 

terms of this really critical issue, which is Iraqi reconstruction. 

We have spent about $35 billion, the United States, on reconstruction efforts so far in Iraq, and of course, we have lost over 

3,000 soldiers with about 25,000 other soldiers being wounded. 

When our forces went into Iraq, we went in swiftly and decisively, 

and of course, we removed Saddam Hussein, but, unfortunately, 

since that time we have seen the civilian leadership in Iraq has 

failed to win the peace and helped to really build a secure, stable 

environment in order to help with the reconstruction efforts. 

Just consider the news stories from the last 48 hours, at least 

25 people were killed and 60 wounded when a car bomb exploded 

near a popular market in the Amil district in southwestern Baghdad. At least four college students were killed in the last 48 hours 

and 25 wounded in a mortar attack at a college in northern Baghdad, and then two bodies of airport workers in the Arbil were shot 

and found tortured in the town of Ramadi. 

When I look at the provincial reconstruction efforts that are taking place in Afghanistan compared to the efforts that are taking 

place in Iraq, I think we can learn some real lessons. Unfortunately, we have not been able to really engage with the Iraqi culture, the Iraqi people to the same degree that we have a cultural 

understanding and a better relationship with the Afghanis. 

In my home district in Arizona, I have Fort Huachuca, which is 

an army intelligence center, which precisely trains on this issue—

cultural understanding, language understanding, awareness. So I 

am hoping to hear from Mr. Bowen what additional steps we can 

take to better understand the culture, to have a better sense of the 

dollars that we are spending, why they are not working in comparison to Afghanistan. 
8

When I had a chance, in February, to go visit Iraq, although 

briefly, I heard from General Petraeus, General Phil, General Wolf, 

General Odierno. They said, ‘‘We will know if this surge is working 

in . . .’’ they said, ‘‘not days, not weeks, not years, but months,’’ 

and of course that was 5 months ago, and with all of the violence 

we have seen now just in the—well, it never ends. 

You know, I would really like to have a candid discussion from 

you in terms of where are we going here, and is there really a light 

at the end of the tunnel, because it seems to me that the plans that 

have been put in place by the President and the administration 

simply aren’t working. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

hearing so provocatively titled, with such a distinguished and well 

known for his candor witness for this panel. 

Mr. Bowen, I appreciate your service. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. PENCE. And your efforts to safeguard taxpayer dollars in 

particular and highlight areas where we need to improve our efforts. Reform transparency and best practices are good medicine for 

any government, whether it is 1 year old, in the case of Iraq, or 

231 years old. 

Mr. Bowen’s 16 trips to Iraq have shed enormous light on the 

challenges there and how we can improve our delivery of aid, and 

I commend you for that. 

I share probably everyone in this body’s concern about the fact 

that the Government of Iraq has not expended such a large percentage of its capital budget. Your findings put it at about 18 percent of their budget expended, but, of course, 100 percent of salaries have been distributed. Clearly this must improve and Iraq’s 

leaders must show progress in this area. 

I additionally am concerned about the corruption highlighted in 

the oil industry. Your testimony estimates that about one-seventh 

of the oil expert may be lost because of smuggling and fraud. That 

is an astonishing figure, and one that I hope we hear more about 

in the context of your testimony. 

But that being said, we shouldn’t lose sight of the forest for the 

trees. I appreciate Mr. Bowen’s direct answer to the question posed 

in our hearing today, is reconstruction failing, he says, and I quote: 

‘‘The short answer is no.’’ We are not failing and we will not fail 

if we, as the old book says, faint not, in my judgment. 

Mr. Bowen’s testimony makes clear that the sticking point for 

much of our efforts and the Iraq Government’s efforts is the security situation. Without basic security, reconstruction efforts face 

long odds. 

I am personally optimistic about the direction our efforts have 

taken under the new leadership of General Petraeus, and the 

surge. I believe it is critical that this Congress give him the tools 

he needs to succeed. Where reconstruction and security meet is in 

the commander’s emergency response program which allows local 

projects at the discretion of small unit leaders. I wholeheartedly 

support this effort. 
9

I had occasion to be briefed in the preliminary progress being 

made by our troops in Ramadi, and to create a congressional delegation there last month, see RP projects are critical tools in their 

efforts to stabilize the country. 

Mr. Chairman, I also appreciate Mr. Bowen’s efforts to give credit where credit is due. His testimony makes it clear that various 

entities, notably the multinational force in Iraq, improved their 

product in consultation with his efforts, and I appreciate that. 

Despite the fact that there are setbacks, challenges, and shortfalls, I believe and trust we will hear some today, that there is good 

news in Iraq. I thank our witness for his efforts in improving and 

reforming our efforts in that country, and I thank you again, Mr. 

Chairman, for the vision of calling this hearing. 

I yield back. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

We are fortunate to have with us today the person with the 

greatest expertise on Iraq reconstruction. Mr. Stuart Bowen is the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. In that role, 

since October 2004, Mr. Bowen has uncovered enormous waste, 

fraud, and corruption, and abuse in the Iraq reconstruction process. 

He serves an essential oversight function because only with full 

and open disclosure of what has gone wrong can we hope to improve our rebuilding efforts. 

Mr. Bowen has a long and distinguished legal and republican political career, and he previously served as Inspector General for the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. He has just returned from another 

trip to Iraq and we are very interested to hear his observations. 

Mr. Bowen, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR., J.D., SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, OFFICE OF 

THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ CONSTRUCTION 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Chairman Lantos. 

I would like to introduce the lady who just filled my glass—my 

mother, who is with us this morning. So thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Chairman LANTOS. May I interrupt you for a moment? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Bowen, it is a pleasure meeting you, and 

we commend you for having done a very good job in bringing up 

a great public servant. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those kind words. 

Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of 

the committee, thank you for this opportunity to return to you on 

the continuing work of the Office of Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction. 

The title of this hearing poses the question, as Mr. Pence just 

noted, ‘‘Is reconstruction failing?’’ The short answer is ‘‘No,’’ but it 

must be put in context as every report I issue puts in context, and 

as our ‘‘lessons learned’’ put it in context. That is, that the reconstruction program in Iraq has been fraught with challenge, a mixture of success and failure, shortfalls and successful projects 

achieved. 
10

Much has been accomplished with the $21 billion that comprise 

the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the very generous grant 

program that this Congress approved 31⁄2 years ago. Countless facilities have been built, and the Iraqis have been receiving these 

facilities over the past year, but that process itself has been 

fraught with challenges, as our audits, and our recent inspections 

that you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, reveal. 

Permit me also to begin by paying tribute to the many dedicated 

Americans, Iraqis and other coalition partners who have strived 

and continue to strive in incomparably dangerous conditions to advance Iraq’s economic and political recovery, and the challenges are 

enormous, as everyone here knows. 

There have been notable accomplishments with the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund, but the challenges I just alluded to are 

numerous. Foremost among them: Trying to execute a reconstruction program in an unstable security environment. This is not the 

Marshall Plan. This is a reconstruction program conducted virtually under fire, and that means every project has cost more than 

expected, and has taken longer to complete, and a lot of projects 

have not been finished. 

The primary reason is the security situation. There is no gainsaying that reality. But there are other problems, as we pointed 

out. Poor agency planning and coordination, especially in the effort’s early stages, must be rectified over time. Ranking Member 

Ros-Lehtinen alluded to the important reforms that needed to be 

addressed. As we identified in our most recent lessons learned report on program and project management—‘‘beyond GoldwaterNichols reform’’ is what I have called it—what that means is promoting integration among the agencies that are tasked with protecting U.S. interest abroad: the Department of State, USAID, the 

Department of Defense. These are the agencies that have the lead 

in post-conflict contingency relief and reconstruction management, 

and the story of Iraq reconstruction, if it says anything, is that the 

integration of that process needs work. 

Inconsistent and poorly managed contracting practices have also 

been a challenge. Our contracting lessons learned report details 

that. 

It is also a story of gradual improvement. Again, multiple agencies operating with multiple contracting regulations and employing 

varying databases presented a huge challenge for me when I first 

arrived in Iraq 3 years ago and tried to begin to take account of 

what contracting was going on. Our first few audits identified that 

what was going on was poorly staffed and the systems were poorly 

put together, and it has been a gradual recovery from that difficult 

start. It is much better today under the Joint Contracting Command/Iraq. 

Weak program and project oversight, especially with respect to 

quality assurance and quality control programs. Quality assurance 

is the government’s job, to make sure that there is somebody there 

overseeing the contractor who is enforcing quality control at a 

project site. Both areas have had weaknesses. Our most recent lessons learned report details some of those, but, frankly, so do our 

90 inspections and our 86 audits. That is an area of reform that 

is necessary. 
11

Finally, insufficient systems for effective human capital management. That was in our first lessons learned report issued almost 2 

years ago now. We simply identified the need to develop a civilian 

reserve corps in parallel with our military reserve corps, a team 

that is trained and ready to go to exercise leadership in post-conflict relief and reconstruction programs. 

Our second recommendation in our latest lessons learned report 

echoes one that I have made to this Congress and in previous reports, and that is the funding of S/CRS, the entity created by 

NSPD 44, to manage this process. The entity needs authority and 

appropriations before it can robustly address this important matter. 

I just returned from my sixteenth trip to Iraq, spent 10 days 

there, and it was a palpably dangerous environment. There is no 

doubt about that. I met with the key leadership in the Iraq reconstruction program, and addressed our latest findings in our quarterly reports, which was issued 3 weeks ago. 

The United States program, as that report points out, is moving 

beyond the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. That is an important message to continue to articulate for this reason. 

The United States no longer bears the preponderant burden for 

financing the recovery of Iraq. That burden rests squarely on the 

shoulders of the Iraq Government, and it is why the budget execution matter that Mr. Pence raised is so critical. 

Last year the Iraq Government simply did not execute its capital 

budget program effectively, most notably, in the Ministry of Oil, arguably the most critical economic ministry. Oil generates 94 percent of Iraq’s budget, 75 percent of its GDP, and it spent a tiny 

fraction of its capital budget last year. Nine percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was invested in that oil sector because it was assumed that Iraq would be able to begin funding 

itself, but it hasn’t 4 years on, and that gap must be closed. 

The budget execution initiative is ongoing. Ambassador Carney 

is pushing it. There are consequences that are being put in place 

over there, but they must be applied. Iraq must spend its capital 

budget. 

The United States effort now, as it moves beyond the IRRF, will 

increasingly focus on targeted support to specific programs aimed 

at furthering capacity development within the Iraq system. Most 

notable among these programs is the Provincial Reconstruction 

Team Initiative which began just over a year ago and has significantly expanded this year. 

SIGIR issued an audit of that initial plan last October and found 

some problems in resources, staffing, and security. The security 

issue is still there, but resources and staffing of the original 10 

PRTs have made progress. The 10 new embedded PRTs, which are 

just standing up and are embedded with military brigades and 

under direction of the brigade commander, are a novel evolution of 

this program. The whole program is designed to build governance 

out at the provincial level, and especially in Baghdad, four of these 

new PRTs is in Baghdad. They are a bit of a misnomer calling 

them Provincial Reconstruction Teams, since their focus really is 

on governance capacity building, which includes reconstruction as 

just a component. 
12

We will provide a review of our past audit of the PRT program 

in the next quarterly report, and the following report will provide 

a detailed audit of the embedded PRTs. 

SIGIR, as Chairman Lantos pointed out, issues a series of inspection reports in this latest quarterly that raise concerns, and rightfully so. The asset transfer process is something that we have audited before. There was a process put in place within Iraq, worked 

out between the mission and the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 

Planning, but it has not been followed. 

We are in the midst of doing another audit of that process, and 

that will be out in our next quarterly report, updating the reality 

on the ground in Iraq with respect to asset transfer. 

But sustainability of what the United States has constructed and 

turned over to Iraq is really what I was trying to get at when I 

sent my inspectors out across Iraq to look at projects that had been 

done at least 6 months by the time they visited the site, and, frankly, there were some troubling things turned up. You identified the 

Erbil maternity hospital as one, Mr. Chairman, but at the Baghdad 

International Airport, the 10 generators provided to provide the 18 

megawatts of power that airport needs to operate effectively 

weren’t working and haven’t worked. The two GE generators that 

are the top of the line simply have not worked since it has been 

installed. The responsible agencies are addressing that on the 

ground now, but that raises concerns. 

The two key programs, I think, for targeted support moving forward are the PRT program, as we have talked about, and the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. That provides funding to 

maneuver commanders on the ground in Iraq to execute quick 

turnaround projects that will help resolve immediate needs for 

Iraqis in Baghdad and beyond. 

We did our third audit of the CERP program this last quarter, 

and found that it continues to improve. There are still some documentation issues that need to be addressed, but for the most part 

this is a program that, based on our reviews, is generally working. 

The issues we uncovered reflect the multinational, core concerns 

Iraq has agreed to address, and they are already addressing. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, my underlying philosophy is to ensure that the findings that we make are addressed before our audits reach publication. 

Given the current phase of Iraq’s recovery, as I said, the Iraq 

Government must shoulder the burden of financing its recovery, 

and that means that the Ministry of Electricity has to spend more 

than a third of its capital budget that it spent last year, and Water 

has to spend more than just under half of their budget they spent 

last year. 

You also asked for recommendations from me about how funding 

might be targeted moving forward. This is a policy question best 

directed to the responsible agencies, specifically the Department of 

State, but continuing to support these programs, as I have identified, the PRT and the CERP, as well as ministry capacity development are essential. 

SIGIR’s work to date has identified many issues, make numerous 

recommendations. The agencies have been responsive generally, 

but we need to continue to follow up on our recommendations, 
13

which we are doing, and continue to push for improved project 

oversight in Iraq. 

We continue to monitor Iraq’s anti-corruption efforts, and frankly, I was very concerned based on my visits this trip with the Commission on Public Integrity, and the reality is that he has lost 

much of his enforcement power through political means. He cannot 

prosecute, as he told me just last week, ministers or former ministers by direction of the Prime Minister’s Office. 

The legislation that was designed to create and empower the CPI 

has been pulled back from the Council of Representatives, and is 

being revised in the Prime Minister’s Office, endangers the independence of the CPI, and finally, there is a provision in the Iraq 

Criminal Code, Article 134(b), that permits any minister, by fiat, 

to exempt any employee from prosecution. 

So there is a bulwark, essentially, existing within the political 

system that fundamentally undermines the capacity of the Commission on Public Integrity, which is their FBI, to enforce and fight 

corruption. As we have reported, Mr. Chairman, I know over and 

over again, corruption is the second insurgency, I have called it, in 

Iraq. It undermines much progress that we are trying to achieve, 

and continues to be a frustration. 

We continue to push a wide range of audits forward. We are 

moving into focused financial reviews. We will have an audit of 

Bechtel, the Bechtel contract. We are also auditing DynCorp and 

Blackwater and Parsons over the next quarter, and we are comparing how the Gulf Region Division of Corps of Engineers is doing 

versus the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, the two 

key contracting entities in Iraq. We are going to have a review in 

the next quarter of the support to the anti-corruption effort in Iraq. 

We are looking at a comparison of design/build contracting 

versus direct contacting, another lessons learned from the Iraq experience, and we are doing, as I said, assessments of the PRT program and we will continue to look at the CERP program. 

Our CERP review, though, will move from an audit perspective 

to an inspection perspective. Not this quarter but the following 

quarter, I have directed my inspection staff to go look at only 

CERP projects, so you get some input about how those projects 

have done. 

This next quarter from inspections you will get eight more reports about sustainment, so it will flesh out a little bit more that 

issue. Most notably, we are visiting the Al Dura Power Plant, 

which has been the subject of some concern, I know, in this committee. 

Our investigations team continues to make progress. I met with 

every member of my staff when I was over there—all of the auditors, inspectors and investigators. I have to tell you, while I can’t 

go into detail with respect to the investigations, I am very impressed with the progress that we are making in a very coordinated 

interagency effort that is yielding fruit. That will become evident 

over time. 

As I have been talking about, our lessons learned reports, I 

think, are perhaps the most important components of our work in 

the long run because they help address the challenges that have 

burdened the program, and explain how the Congress and the 
14

agencies can address them and improve government systems so 

that we are better postured to engage in post-conflict contingency 

relief and reconstruction management. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, in preparation for our move into the new 

Embassy compound in the fall, we are reducing our personnel footprint in Baghdad from 55 to 30 staff. I remain proud of all my staff 

who are operating, as I said, in a palpably dangerous environment 

in Baghdad, carrying out the important mission that you have assigned to us with integrity, dedication, and courage. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR., J.D., SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

FOR IRAQ CONSTRUCTION

Introduction 

Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report to you on the continuing work of 

the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

This hearing poses the question, ‘‘Is Reconstruction Failing?’’ The short answer is 

‘‘no.’’ Much has been accomplished in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of countless facilities throughout Iraq, and in assisting Iraqis at all levels to take charge, 

whether in neighborhood or provincial councils or in the national ministries in 

Baghdad. Permit me to pay tribute to the dedicated Americans, Iraqis, and other 

Coalition partners who have strived in incomparably dangerous conditions to advance Iraq’s economic and political recovery. 

Although there have been notable accomplishments achieved through the use of 

the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, there have also been significant shortfalls 

within the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq. Identifying those challenges is the first 

step toward applying the lessons learned from Iraq so that the applicable U.S. governmental systems can be effectively reformed and structurally improved. 

The challenges to the relief and reconstruction program, documented in SIGIR’s 

86 audits, 90 inspections and 13 quarterly reports, stemmed from:

• executing a reconstruction program in an unstable security environment;

• poor interagency planning and coordination, especially in the effort’s early 

stages;

• inconsistent and poorly managed contracting practices;

• weak program and project oversight, especially with respect to quality assurance and quality control programs; and

• insufficient systems for human capital management.

These factors have challenged all that the U.S. program has sought to accomplish 

on the reconstruction front in Iraq. Over the past three years, SIGIR has reported 

on these challenges, and, through real time auditing and consultative advice, we 

have sought to advance remedies on the ground in Iraq. Additionally, SIGIR’s work 

has resulted in extensive case studies of the challenges in human capital management, contracting and procurement, and program and project management. We have 

documented these challenges in three lessons learned reports and provided a series 

of recommendations for improvement. These recommendations have generated reform measures within the Congress that have begun to remedy some of the systemic 

problems SIGIR has identified. 

On-The-Ground Update 

I have just returned from my 16th trip to Iraq, where I spent ten days meeting 

with the current leadership of the reconstruction program. I also focused my efforts 

during my visit on furthering the next phase of SIGIR’s oversight mission. 

As we execute our oversight regime, SIGIR continues to work closely with all 

United States Government agencies in Iraq. While in Iraq, I met with the U.S. Chief 

of Mission, Ambassador Crocker, the Multi-National Forces—Iraq (MNF–I) Commanding General, General Petraeus, and other officers of the Departments of State 

and Defense and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 

I also met with the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 

Division, and the USAID Mission Director for Iraq. I had the opportunity to see the 
15

head of the Economic Transition Office, Ambassador Tim Carney, who outlined important developments in the budget execution initiative which is of great importance 

to the recovery of Iraq, and about which I testified before a subcommittee of this 

Committee in March. 

SIGIR’s latest quarterly report, issued three weeks ago and covering the first 

three months of 2007—the beginning of the ‘‘surge’’—highlighted a number of important aspects of the reconstruction program. First, the U.S. program has moved beyond the large-scale reconstruction programs that were funded by the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Over 85% of the IRRF is now spent and most 

projects funded by it are complete. 

The Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division continues to manage the relatively small number of remaining IRRF construction projects, valued at $4 billion, most 

of which are in the electrical sector. GRD expects to complete virtually all of them 

over the next year. The last of the IRRF money is being deobligated and reobligated 

by the Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan to facilitate completion of selected projects. 

As the U.S. program moves beyond the IRRF, the US effort will increasingly focus 

on targeted support to specific programs aimed at furthering capacity development 

within the Iraqi system. Most notable among these programs is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative, which began just over a year ago. The PRTs’ primary mission is to build governance capacity at the local level. In January, it was 

announced that the number of PRTs would be doubled in conjunction with the military ‘‘surge’’ in Baghdad. The PRTs are designed to assist local governments in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. SIGIR’s October review of the PRT program, 

which found problems in the areas of resources, staffing, and security, helped engender focused attention on these important issues that has helped enhance their operating capability. 

SIGIR will update its October PRT report this quarter, and next quarter, will provide a detailed review of the expanded PRT program, including an assessment of 

the 10 new ‘‘embedded’’ PRTs (EPRTs). These EPRTs are mobile units with a core 

civilian staff and embedded within military brigades, which gives them organic security, reduces costs, and allows them to operate in difficult environments. The Congress approved $1.48 billion for the Economic Support Fund as part of 

the FY2006 Supplemental. The appropriation was allocated along three tracks: security ($923 million), economic ($345 million), and political ($208 million). The PRT 

and Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee programs received $470 million from the security track—or about a third of the ESF appropriation—for program and project support. Additionally, $277 million was allocated for infrastructure 

security support. One example of a project funded in this area is the strengthening 

of the Al Latifya Oil Storage Facility in Baghdad. USAID received $155 million for 

its Local Governance Program and $135 million for its Community Stabilization 

Program in Strategic Cities (Kirkuk, Mosul/Telafar, Fallujah, and Basra), both from 

the security track. State allocated $105 million for further ministry capacity development. SIGIR will provide reporting on the FY2006 ESF funds in subsequent reports. 

Our recent Quarterly Report underscored the current challenge in ensuring the 

sustainment—that is, the ongoing operation and maintenance—of IRRF projects 

that have already been transferred to the Iraqis. SIGIR’s latest series of inspection 

reports points to the continuing need to improve the asset transfer process so that 

Iraqi officials are prepared to sustain projects funded with billions of U.S. dollars. 

While the original IRRF contracts included a basic sustainment requirement, usually for 90 days, reconstruction managers soon realized that the Iraqis would need 

more assistance in this regard and thus reprogrammed funds to help ensure successful sustainment. SIGIR has assessed the asset-transfer process before, and our 

next quarterly report will contain an audit updating the progress within and continuing issues confronting the asset-transfer program. 

Section Two of our latest Report contains updated reviews of the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Economic Support Fund (ESF), both 

of which are important funding streams for continuing U.S. support to Iraq. Last 

year, the Congress expanded SIGIR’s mandate to include reporting on relief and reconstruction funds appropriated for FY2006, which include CERP and ESF allocations. 

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) initiated CERP in the summer of 2003 

primarily using seized assets; some Development Fund for Iraq money (Iraqi funds 

under CPA management) was also used. The Congress first appropriated funds for 

CERP in 2004 and, over time, has provided a total of $2.1 billion to the program. 

SIGIR’s April report included an audit of FY2006 CERP activity. The Congress 

appropriated $923 million for FY2006 CERP—of which $510 million was allocated 
16

to Iraq. Virtually all of the CERP funds appropriated to date have been obligated, 

mostly to Iraqi firms, and 83% of the projects have been completed. FY2006 funds 

have provided concrete benefits to the Iraqi people, including electrical generation 

equipment for a children’s hospital, improvements to Baghdad’s electrical grid, the 

construction of schools, and the construction of health care facilities. 

SIGIR’s audit of these CERP funds found that the Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

(MNC–I), which is responsible for CERP oversight, had improved controls over the 

CERP fund since SIGIR’s FY2005 CERP review. Moreover, SIGIR confirmed that 

CERP funds were being used for the purposes authorized by the MNC–I Commander. But there were some concerns uncovered during the audit regarding file 

management and project coordination. The MNC–I concurred with SIGIR’s recommendations and is implementing changes to address them. 

Although substantial U.S. investment supporting Iraq’s recovery continues, the 

phase wherein the U.S. bears the burden for financing Iraq’s reconstruction has 

passed. The Iraqi government now must take responsibility for financing Iraq’s national recovery. This means that the Government of Iraq (GOI) needs to execute 

more effectively its capital budget, which it failed to do in 2006, including effecting 

measures to ensure the proper operation and maintenance of the new infrastructure 

improvements provided through the U.S. reconstruction program. 

Capital budget execution is a serious problem within the GOI. Of the $34 billion 

2006 budget, the U.S. Treasury Attache ́ reports that the GOI spent about $22.8 billion or 67%. Moreover, only 22% of the 2006 capital budget was spent. The Ministry 

of Oil, a key ministry for revenue production, reportedly spent just $90 million of 

its $3.5 billion 2006 capital budget. We are told by Treasury that the best performer 

was the Ministry of Education, which spent its entire, though admittedly small, capital budget of $15 million. The Ministry of Electricity spent a third of its capital 

budget in 2006, and the Ministry of Water spent just under half its allocation. By 

contrast, the GOI performed the simpler task of executing its budgets for salaries 

at a government-wide rate of 99%. 

Best Use of Future Funding 

In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you asked that I make recommendations for the 

best use of future funding. First, as a practical matter, this is a policy question that 

is better directed to the agencies managing this policy. But I believe that it is essential to provide more support for improving the operating capacity of Iraq’s institutions and on improving Iraq’s ability to execute its capital budget. I also believe that 

continuing support to the efforts to build local government capacity through the 

PRT program is vital. 

SIGIR’s work to date has identified numerous issues of concern and we have provided recommendations for improvement with which implementing agencies have 

generally concurred. Many of the recommendations have already been implemented 

resulting in improvements within the reconstruction program. As our lessons 

learned studies have elicited, agencies involved in future post-conflict relief and reconstruction endeavors should ensure that they have developed and coordinated sufficient execution and oversight capacity to ensure that quality projects result. 

Contracting is one of those areas that must be systemically addressed. SIGIR audits criticized contract management within the reconstruction program, particularly 

in its early stages; but contract management improved during the course of the program through the consolidation and streamlining processes for contract monitoring 

implemented by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan. As noted in our 

lessons learned report, recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of trained contracting officers is essential to the success of a contingency relief and reconstruction 

program. 

SIGIR’s reporting similarly has revealed that program and project oversight has 

been a challenge in Iraq. The Baghdad Police College, which SIGIR has visited numerous times, suffered from poor project oversight and thus shoddy construction occurred. But SIGIR’s overall inspections regime reveal that egregious shortfalls such 

as the Baghdad Police College are the exception rather than the rule. Of the projects 

SIGIR has inspected, 70% have generally met contract standards. The SIGIR inspections program validates a self-evident formula: good quality assurance programs (by 

the government) together with good quality control programs (by the contractor) 

should produce good projects. 

Sustainment of U.S. funded reconstruction projects and programs is a significant 

challenge for the Iraqis. The original design-build contracts provided only modest allocations for operations and maintenance training and for spare parts. There has 

been inadequate planning to ensure that the Iraqis would budget for the 

sustainment of these projects. The sustainment issue has garnered increasing atten-
17

tion and additional U.S. funding over the past two years, yielding improvements in 

the sustainment effort. 

Awards fees are better managed today as a result of a SIGIR review in July 2005 

that required managers to put in place tighter controls and properly implement a 

system that appropriately rewarded only good performance. SIGIR’s October 2006 

review of contractor overhead costs also prompted more careful scrutiny of administrative task orders. SIGIR’s serial reviews of contracting in Iraq and the CERP program have produced improvements in the management practices in both of these 

important areas. 

SIGIR continues to monitor U.S. efforts to bolster Iraq’s anti-corruption institutions and will issue another audit on this issue in our next quarterly report. During 

my recent trip to Iraq, I received reports about the weakened capacity and alleged 

politicization of Iraq’s three anti-corruption entities—the Board of Supreme Audit, 

the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), and the Iraqi Inspectors Generals (IG). 

The independence of these three entities is threatened (most particularly, the CPI), 

their staffs lack sufficient training (most notably, the IGs), and they have thus far 

been unable sufficiently to coordinate their overlapping mandates. One encouraging 

note for the committee, however, is the May 16th signing of the Joint Anti-Corruption Council charter. This body will include the heads of each anti-corruption entity 

and the Iraqi Higher Juridical Council. It is hoped that the body will bolster coordination and advancement of anti-corruption and Rule of Law efforts which continue 

to be a critical precursor to success in Iraq. 

Overview of upcoming audits, inspections, investigations. 

I visited with each of SIGIR’s auditors in Iraq during my recent visit and am 

pleased with the progress they are making on a wide variety of significant issues. 

I also worked with the Assistant Inspector General for Audits to update our audit 

plan for the remainder of SIGIR’s existence. Over the next 15 months, SIGIR will 

execute a series of focused financial reviews aimed at achieving a reasonable financial accounting of how the IRRF was spent and what was achieved with it. 

SIGIR currently has 20 auditors in Iraq who are engaged in the following audits; 

we expect to publish up to 12 of them over the next quarter:

• A review of LOGCAP Task Order 130 (looking at the performance of KBR’s 

provision of life-support services (dining, fuel, housing, etc.) to the Department of State)

• The Status of Transferring IRRF Projects and Assets to the Government of 

Iraq

• A Review of Cost-to-Complete Reporting for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

U.S.-Funded Programs and Projects

• A Review of USG Support to Iraqi Anti-Corruption Efforts

• A Fact Sheet on the USG Reconstruction Agencies’ Roles & Responsibilities

• An IRRF Financial Review of Unliquidated Obligations

• A Review of Spending of U.S. Government Funds under USAID’s Bechtel 

Contract

• A Review of Close-Out Procedures for IRRF Contracts

• A Review Contracting in Iraq Reconstruction that Compares Design Build vs. 

Direct Contracting

• A Review of U.S. Sources & Uses of FY 2006 Funding for Iraq Relief and Reconstructions

• A Survey of the Department of State’s IRRF Projects in Programs managed 

by DoS/INL

• A Review of the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Contracts to Enable Budgeting and Financial Management Capabilities within Iraqi Ministries

• A Review of Spending of U.S. Government Funds under Parsons Corporation 

Iraq Reconstruction Contracts

• A Survey of a DynCorp Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support and Equipment

• A Review of the Use of Sector Project and Contracting Office Contractors 

(SPCOCs) in Managing Relief and Reconstruction Projects

• A Review of Blackwater Contracts in Iraq Related to Support of Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction

• An Assessment of the Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq
18

• A Comparative Analysis of the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence 

and Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Contracting 

for and Management and Administration of Projects and Programs in Iraq

SIGIR has nine inspectors on the ground in Iraq who travel the country visiting 

and reporting on projects. In our April report, SIGIR produced its first series of 

sustainment inspections. These assessments reviewed projects that were transferred 

to Iraqi control at least six months before the SIGIR site visit. Although most of 

the sites we visited were operational, the reports raised concerns about the capacity 

of the Iraqis to effectively operate and maintain transferred projects. 

We expect to complete up to seven more sustainment inspections this quarter. 

Our work plan for the following quarter anticipates a series of CERP project inspections. We are also visiting projects associated with one or more Provincial Reconstruction Teams. SIGIR expects to publish the following inspection reports this 

quarter:

• Project Phoenix—Restore Qudas Gas Turbine

• Iraqi Ministry of Defense Building

• Iraqi C–130 Base, BIAP Airport

• Al Rasheed Brigade Set

• Al Qana’at Water Pump Station, Sadr City

• Zegaton Pipeline/Canal Crossing mis-matched pipe connections

• Al Daura Power Plant

Some of these inspections will be co-inspections with personnel from the Office of 

the Inspector General in Iraq’s Ministry of Defense. This will promote the capacity 

of this nascent IG office. 

SIGIR has seven investigators on the ground in Iraq, and, during my recent trip, 

I received a detailed briefing from each of them on their respective cases as well 

as their collaborative efforts with other U.S. investigative agencies operating in 

Iraq. While I cannot discuss the specifics of those cases, I can assure you that we 

are making steady and significant progress on a variety of cases involving fraud, 

kickbacks, bribery, and other crimes. 

Lessons Learned 

In keeping with its mandate to provide recommendations to the Congress for improving the reconstruction program, SIGIR has produced three Lessons Learned reports and is working on a lessons-learned capping report, which will be issued at 

the end of the year. Our Lessons Learned reports have addressed Human Capital 

Management, Contracting and Procurement, and Program and Project Management. 

Recommendations from each include: 

Human Capital 

• Develop a ‘‘civilian reserve corps’’ that would serve as reconstruction and 

stabilization first responders and would include a quick-reaction human 

resources team that pre-identifies human resources requirements for potential relief and reconstruction contingency operations.

• Charge OMB with managing the development and implementation of a 

uniform set of human resources rules that would apply to all federal personnel deployed for contingency operations. 

Contracting and Procurement 

• Explore the creation of an enhanced Contingency Federal Acquisition 

Regulation.

• Pre-compete and pre-qualify a diverse pool of contractors with expertise 

in specialized reconstruction areas 

Program & Project Management 

• Consider a ‘‘Goldwater-Nichols’’—like reform measure to promote better 

coordination and integration among Defense, USAID and State, particularly with respect to contingency operations.

• Ensure that program managers integrate local populations and practices 

at every level of the planning and execution process.

Full copies of the lesson learned reports and their 19 cumulative recommendations are available at www.sigir.mil. 

The lessons learned capping report will draw upon these and other SIGIR reports, 

as well as accounts by various program managers, contractors, and sector advisors 
19

in its account of how the reconstruction funds were spent and how the evolving security and policy environment affected the outcome. 

This committee has asked what SIGIR would recommend on the best use of future 

funding. In addition to implementation of recommendations from our various audits 

and inspections, implementing recommendations from our Lessons Learned reports 

could help promote improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the continuing 

Iraq program. 

Conclusion 

In preparation for our anticipated move into the new Embassy compound this fall, 

SIGIR is reducing its staff footprint in Baghdad from 55 to 30. SIGIR, which is a 

temporary agency, will conclude its mission at the end of next year. We continue 

to manage our work plan—and in particular our investigative work—in anticipation 

of eventually transferring the remaining mission to the appropriate departmental 

inspectors general. 

Before the expiration of our mandate, SIGIR expects to issue a number of audit 

and inspection reports that focus on tracking IRRF funds and review key programs 

under ongoing funding streams such as ESF and CERP. We expect to issue five 

more quarterly reports, a capping lessons learned report, and a concluding letter report. SIGIR expects that our investigative work will yield significant results over 

the course of this year. 

In closing, permit me to say that I remain proud of the courageous SIGIR auditors, inspectors, and investigators who continue to carry out our mission in Iraq 

with great dedication, notwithstanding the many challenges to our important work.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen. Before I 

get to my questions, I was watching your lovely mother and her 

face reflects the same pride that my wife’s face reflects when our 

youngest granddaughter wins another tennis match. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. Let me join you, Mr. Bowen, in paying tribute 

to all of our troops and to all of your people who are undertaking 

such an incredibly dangerous mission. In this connection, may I 

begin the questioning by asking you to comment on this past weekend’s New York Times story which says that so far 917 private contractors have lost their lives, over 12,000 were wounded in battle 

or injured on the job? And I am wondering if you can comment on 

the extent to which these private contractors, 12,000 wounded, almost 1,000 killed, could be given more security as they undertake 

their difficult mission? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, there is no doubt that the dangerous environment that pervades Baghdad exposes everyone there to lethal attack, and that includes the contractors, and that includes journalists as well. We report on this in our quarterly right at the front 

because I think that is an important fact to get out. Nine journalists were killed this last quarter, and over 100 have been killed in 

the last 4 years. 

The challenge in Iraq, as I said, is this is not the Marshall Plan. 

This is a reconstruction program carried out under fire, and the 

lesson learned from that, as I alluded to in my statement, is that 

stabilization is an essential prerequisite to an effective relief and 

reconstruction program. 

To conduct a conflict and a reconstruction program simultaneously yields the tragic results that you alluded to in the contracting community and also, as I just mentioned, those who are 

covering and reporting on what is going on over there. 

You asked how it can be improved. That is a process that is an 

every day occurrence in Iraq. There are systems that I can’t talk 

about, but that coordinate data and intelligence and distribute it 

so that contractors understand the threat that day. Enhancing that 
20

system or preparing it more effectively in advance might be one 

way to reduce that death toll. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Bowen, earlier this month an international compact for Iraq was endorsed by some 60 countries, the 

European Union, and the United Nations. What do we expect as 

a result of this compact? 

Mr. BOWEN. The compact is especially important because its appendix carries with it a series of benchmarks. Benchmarks are a 

significant current topic, I suspect, to aid to Iraq, and I think it is 

worthwhile to review those benchmarks, and specifically some of 

them include requirements of improving the security environment, 

actually the operational capacity of the Iraqi security forces, passing the hydrocarbon law, moving forward on political reconciliation 

reforms, and economic initiatives. 

So I think that first and foremost the compact is useful as a further guide to providing funding to Iraq. I think it is also critical 

because it brings the Gulf States into the mix. That is, that they 

now through the compact will have a more focused and well-defined role to play in trying to achieve economic progress in Iraq. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Bowen, in October 2004, there was a donor’s conference in Madrid. At that conference, apart from United 

States contributions, $13.5 billion was pledged by various countries 

to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq. How much of that 

money has been delivered, put to good use, and I very much hope 

you are able publicly to identify the countries which have not kept 

their pledges? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, we have a detailed report on that in your 

quarterly, and so I would refer you to that because it is a long list, 

but the $14 billion, roughly, that was pledged at Madrid about $3.5 

billion has been forthcoming. 

But also I have to point out that the data on that is difficult to 

acquire at this point because it is within the sovereignty of Government of Iraq now to manage those bilateral and multilateral loan 

relationships. 

Chairman LANTOS. But the Government of Iraq makes the figures available to you? 

Mr. BOWEN. In a very limited way. We get them through the mission, and it is difficult. This is the challenge of obtaining data on 

any front in Iraq, and it afflicts this particular issue as well. 

Chairman LANTOS. Well, which of the major donors has failed to 

fulfill their obligations? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would rather——

Chairman LANTOS. No, I want you to name them publicly now. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, let me name the ones who have come forward: 

Japan and the United Kingdom are the two that have most effectively supported. They comprise virtually all of the $3.5 billion that 

I just alluded to. Other than those two, based on the data we have, 

there has been limited forthcoming. There have been contributions 

to the World Bank, IRRF fund, which is being managed by a number of nations, but again I would be happy to give you a follow up 

for the record as well. 

Chairman LANTOS. No. I want you to talk about it now. Which 

country has made major commitments at the October 2004 meeting 

and has not fulfilled them? 
21

Mr. BOWEN. Well, again, the only ones that really have fulfilled 

them are——

Chairman LANTOS. I understand the ones who have fulfilled 

them. Which ones? Take a look; I will give you all the time you 

need. We are not afraid to embarrass countries which made commitments at a public donor’s conference and failed to fulfill them. 

Just go down the list, Mr. Bowen. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, the European Commission made substantial 

promise. 

Chairman LANTOS. What was the commitment of the European 

Union? 

Mr. BOWEN. It has committed approximately $779 million. 

Chairman LANTOS. And how much of that, to the best of your 

knowledge, has been delivered? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, we don’t have a percentage but they have fallen short. 

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to give you a detailed response. 

Chairman LANTOS. No. I will not take your answer later. I will 

take it now. 

Mr. BOWEN. Okay. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. BOWEN. Okay, the European Commission comprised 33 percent of the amount pledged. 

Chairman LANTOS. How much is that? 

Mr. BOWEN. 33 percent that the European Commission pledged. 

Chairman LANTOS. What is that in dollar figures, approximately? 

Mr. BOWEN. That would amount to approximately—of the total European Commission amount, approximately $4 billion. 

Chairman LANTOS. $4 billion. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Chairman LANTOS. And how much of that was delivered? 

Mr. BOWEN. A small percentage of it was delivered. 

Chairman LANTOS. Less than 10 percent? 

Mr. BOWEN. Actually delivered on the ground in Iraq, yes, I 

would say in that region. 

Chairman LANTOS. So 90 percent of what the European Commission has pledged in October 2004 has not been delivered? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is my estimate. 

Chairman LANTOS. That is your estimate. I will accept it as an 

estimate. 

How about Saudi Arabia? How much did the Saudis pledge? 

Mr. BOWEN. Saudi Arabia, I know, has not come forward. 

Chairman LANTOS. How much did they pledge? 

Mr. BOWEN. Let me see if we have that in here. Saudi Arabia, 

yes. 

Chairman LANTOS. Yes. 

Mr. BOWEN. $500 million. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I know that Ambassador 

Robin Raphel is behind the Inspector General. I am wondering 

if——

Chairman LANTOS. I am delighted to have her assist. 

Mr. BOWEN. $500 million was pledged by Saudi Arabia. 

Chairman LANTOS. Saudi Arabia pledged $500 million. 
22

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Chairman LANTOS. How much of that was delivered? 

Mr. BOWEN. We do not have a figure reported on delivery, but 

very little I know from other reporting. 

Chairman LANTOS. Would you say probably also less than 10 percent, if any? 

Mr. BOWEN. That would be my rough estimate. 

Chairman LANTOS. How about Kuwait? 

Mr. BOWEN. Kuwait did not have a pledge—no, excuse me, $500 

million. 

Chairman LANTOS. How much of that was delivered? 

Mr. BOWEN. Again, we don’t have the final figures on that but 

a relatively small portion of it. 

Chairman LANTOS. Would you say probably less than 10 percent? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is my rough estimate, yes. 

Chairman LANTOS. How about the United Arab Emirates? 

Mr. BOWEN. $215 million. 

Chairman LANTOS. And how much of that was delivered? 

Mr. BOWEN. The same answer. 

Chairman LANTOS. Less than 10 percent? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is my rough estimate, but I will have to research it. Again, the access to the data since last fall has been very 

limited because that is now within the Iraq Government’s sovereignty. 

Chairman LANTOS. Well, let me just say this is a disgraceful performance and I am appalled by it. 

I also would like to ask you, Mr. Bowen, to comment, and I realize this is speculative in nature, on Chairman Obey and my proposal 4 years ago that half of our aid should be given in the form 

of a loan which would make the Iraqis feel more invested in the 

reconstruction projects because it would be half their money, which 

eventually they would have to repay. 

Do you agree in retrospect that it would have been wiser to have 

half of our reconstruction money take the form of a loan rather 

than have all of it be given as a grant? 

Mr. BOWEN. I agree that conditionality should be a part of foreign aid packages, and the one thing that has really worked in Iraq 

over the last 2 years is the IMF standby agreement wherein a certain amount of money was offered in loans and grants to Iraq if 

they met certain benchmarks like fuel subsidy reform. 

Before this standby agreement was initiated, gasoline was 6 

cents a gallon in Iraq. That is now up to over 30 cents. Progress 

has been made and as a result debt relief occurred. So conditionality can work in Iraq. The IMF standby agreement is the example 

of that. 

So in practice and in theory, conditionality of the kind you are 

describing, I think, is an essential element to this kind of foreign 

aid package. 

Chairman LANTOS. The final question I want to raise, Mr. 

Bowen, you are free not to answer, but I hope you will. As you 

know, I have been highly laudatory of your performance——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Chairman LANTOS [continuing]. During your entire tenure, publicly and privately, and I feel very strongly that you are among the 
23

most effective public servants appointed by this administration. 

Lately you have come under some attack by some members of your 

staff. I have no knowledge positively or negatively of the accuracy 

of those attacks, but I would not be surprised to find that you have 

come under attack because you are performing your job without political favor and without partisanship as a public servant. Would 

you care to comment on the attacks on you personally in recent 

weeks? 

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Chairman, I will only say that this is an administrative investigation that arose as a result of a complaint filed 17 

months ago by disgruntled former employees. It is virtually over, 

and I don’t have any concerns about it. 

Chairman LANTOS. Well, let me say to you without knowing any 

of the facts but speaking for myself you have the full confidence of 

the chairman of this committee. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for your excellent questions. 

I think that Americans at my district for sure, and I am not 

going to speak for other districts, are hungry for success. We want 

to be successful, be victorious in our fight against Islamic extremists that want to destroy our way of life. When we read about the 

waste, the fraud, the abuse that is going on in the Iraqi reconstruction efforts their hopes are dimmed because they don’t want their 

tax dollars to be going to lining the pockets of greedy contractors 

who are not doing their job in helping the Iraqi people secure basic 

services like water and electricity. They want us to be successful. 

So I congratulate you for the work that you are doing because 

someone like you whose job it is to look for problems, your job is 

to say how can we improve this, how can we make this work, how 

can we help the Iraqis——

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Build a better society. And it is 

good for our constituents to know that we are not out there saying 

that everything is great. We are looking for problems and we are 

looking for solutions to those problems. So your role is an important one because we want to win, and we want to have faith that 

our tax dollars are being wisely used. So the more that you do, the 

more reports that you issue, I think the more comforted we are 

that those lessons are learned and that those mistakes are not 

going to be repeated, and I think some of the statements that you 

made are so true. 

When you say this is not a Marshall Plan, this is a reconstruction effort under fire. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As the IEDs are going off, we are trying to 

get electrical plants going, and water generators going, and electricity flowing, and we are doing adequate, sub-adequate, or pretty 

bad, but I don’t think people would say that we are doing a very 

good job yet of reconstruction. It is very difficult, as you say, to do 

this under fire every day. 
24

Another statement that you made that I think is very interesting 

and very telling about the nature of the problem is that you say 

that corruption is the second insurgency. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I wanted to ask you about the issue of 

corruption. You talked about in your testimony weakened capacity, 

and the politicizing the anti-corruption entities in Iraq. 

Are we moving in a more positive direction or are we going backward? 

You had mentioned that in the structure there is the equivalent 

of our FBI over there. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And it has a clause saying that they can exempt anyone from these anti-corruption programs. Do you feel that 

we are moving in a positive way to root out this systemic corruption that has been ingrained in this despotic regime for so long? 

Secondly, in your lessons learned reports, we have had three reports, have any of the recommendations from the first report still 

appear on the second and third so that we haven’t rooted out the 

problem? We have identified the problem, but we haven’t been successful in eliminating that problem. 

Is the third report substantially different in terms of the problems you have identified, meaning they have become more of a 

problem of governance or is it still the problems of the programs 

that we have got going over there, making sure that our tax dollars 

are being spent in the best way possible? I will leave you to answer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

As to your second question, there is a recommendation from our 

earlier lessons learned report that again appears in our most recent one, and that is the need to authorize and fund S/CRS, the 

entity within the State Department created by NSPD 44, whose job 

it is to plan and coordinate among departments for post-conflict 

contingency relief and reconstruction operations. I know there is 

legislation pending to do that, and so our latest recommendation 

simply affirms the importance of that legislation. 

But our lessons learned reports obviously address three different 

areas—human capital management, contracting, and programming 

project management. So the recommendations other than that particular one diverge among those reports. 

As to corruption, there is some good news to report on how, I 

think, the Iraqi Government is beginning to address it, and that is 

the Joint Anti-Corruption Council was officially formed this week. 

The order was signed. And it brings together the anti-corruption 

entities within the Prime Minister’s office, so there is some question about how it is going to operate, but the Inspectors General—

there is 29 of them, created by the CPA—are a mixed bag. I mean, 

there is mixed success within those offices. The Commission on 

Public Integrity, I have already talked about, and the Board of Supreme Audit, which is the analogue in Iraq to the Government Accountability Office, and has been around for many decades. So it 

has a more robust infrastructure, and Dr. Abdul Basit, who I meet 

with regularly, and he is one of the people I have found I can trust 
25

over there, and he is sincerely trying to push forward an audit program. He wants investigative powers as well. So there is overlap 

among those three entities. 

And I think the Joint Anti-Corruption Council is trying to resolve 

some of that overlap, but there is no doubt that the legal bulwark 

that prevents prosecution of corruption that I described earlier is 

simply an incentive to commit corruption. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. BOWEN. And I don’t think that you can really advance in 

that area without prosecution, successful prosecutions because that 

is what serves as the deterrent. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Mr. Chairman, if I may, I realize that 

the three reports deal with different aspects of it. I was just wondering if there is a common theme——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. That you see that is in all three 

reports. But I wanted to ask you about the Goldwater-Nichols reform that you have put forth in this report to integrate the agencies like USAID, Department of Defense, et cetera. If you could just 

briefly elaborate on that. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I think there are a number of things that can 

be achieved through that kind of reform. One, and there is another 

thread that goes through each report, and that is staffing, human 

capital management. There was a problem, for instance, in the contracting area of not having overlap among contracting officers. 

One contracting officer would leave, a contract would go unattended for, and then the next one would arrive later, and it is simply a lack of coordination of staffing, and that led to neglect of 

oversight on some contracts. 

Beyond the Goldwater-Nichols idea is simply to begin a process 

based on what we have learned in Iraq to promote better integration among those departments whose mission is to protect United 

States interests overseas, DoD, State, and USAID, and as our lessons learned reports spell out, the planning phase, pre-war and 

subsequent thereto, was somewhat Balkanized. There was a lack of 

effective coordination. There was a difficulty getting agencies to get 

people over to Iraq to participate. 

All of those problems—that kind of problem can be remedied 

through better cross-pollination, if you will, through better integration, through training, and in my underlying proposals to form a 

commission that would make recommendations to the Congress 

about how that could be done and that commission should be comprised of persons with expertise in the area. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you for your 

service, Mr. Bowen. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Bowen, is it Ninevah Plain. 

Mr. BOWEN. I am sorry? 

Ms. WATSON. Ninevah Plain, the plains in Iraq. 

Mr. BOWEN. No. 

Ms. WATSON. Anyway. 

Mr. BOWEN. No, Ninevah. Ninevah? 
26

Ms. WATSON. Ninevah. Thank you for the pronunciation. And the 

surrounding areas are the historic homelands of the Christian Syrians. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Ms. WATSON. Yes. And as such, this area is the largest attraction 

point for Christians, and this is where people would come to see 

this attraction, to be in that area, and expend monies and so on. 

It is my understanding that since the late 2005, no notable reconstruction or redevelopment project has been undertaken in these 

plains, and it has been ignored probably developmentally in a manner that can only be compared to apartheid like de-development of 

an ethnic community. 

As a result, no aid reaching this area and relative to other areas, 

and these IDPs are choosing to flee the country entirely. So the 

Christians, they are de-Christianizing this area in Iraq. I think it 

is a concern that we ought to look at not only because of the injustices being done to the minority groups in Iraq, but because if there 

is any hope that Iraq is going to function as a multi-ethnic democracy, the government must protect all Iraqis, not just the Sunnis 

the Shi’as, the Kurds, et cetera. 

So my questions is, have you had, or your department had a 

mandate to ensure that United States’ funds in Iraq are being used 

strategically but also in an equitable way? Is there not an understanding on the part of our leaders in Iraq that when clear-cut discrimination by the United States takes place, it undermines our efforts to create a multi-ethnic Iraq that includes all Iraqis, the 

Arabs, the Kurds, the Syrians, the Turks, and others as well? 

And is there any thought about our policies that are pushing 

Christians and other minorities out of Iraq where they have lived 

for centuries? 

So my concern is what are we doing for these small ethnic units 

that are not really—I know you spend a lot of time in Baghdad and 

their surroundings, but what are we doing to be sure that we use 

our funds as we go through reconstruction to ensure that all various ethnic groups can enjoy the benefits of this new democracy? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it is funny you should ask. Yesterday I had a 

phone call from a representative of the Syrian Christians, Ken Joseph, here, and he actually was optimistic about progress he was 

making in talks with Prime Minister Malaki about creating an Assyrian entity in Ninevah Province. 

As to the other issues you raise with respect to how they are 

treated, that is a policy question about the Department of State. 

But with respect to the reconstruction component, I need to get 

back to you. I don’t think it is correct that no projects have been 

performed in Ninevah. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, if you could——

Mr. BOWEN. So I will give you a breakdown of how many projects 

have been done up there because I did review that with the commander of the Corps of Engineers. 

Ms. WATSON. Yes. We are aware the people are moving over the 

border lines of Iraq into other areas. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Ms. WATSON. And we are losing a lot of our Christians, the Syrians. 
27

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Ms. WATSON. So if you could report back to us as you—I see your 

think binder there, and I know you can’t cover everything, but this 

is an area that I would be particularly interested in. 

Mr. BOWEN. Correct. 

Ms. WATSON. And if you could provide us information because I 

want to be sure that we don’t reinforce discrimination and only 

focus on those three major tribes. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. 

Ms. WATSON. If we want to build a true democracy, we have to 

be sure. 

Mr. BOWEN. I will get you a list of projects that have been conducted in Ninevah. 

Ms. WATSON. In that area. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOWEN. You are welcome. 

Ms. WATSON. Appreciate it. 

Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let 

me again express my appreciation to you for your leadership during 

this entire session, and this, again, exemplifies the type of responsible leadership you are providing this committee. We need to learn 

the lessons of Iraq just like we needed to learn the lessons of Vietnam and the lessons of every conflict that we have been in. 

Let me just note that we have had such problems in every conflict that I have studied. George Washington’s army was—it was 

impossible for them to get their supplies at Valley Forge due to incompetence and corruption, and inability of our Government—

fledgingly government of our founding fathers to do their job. It 

doesn’t mean it was justified or excused, but that is what the reality was, but it didn’t take away the nobility of the American Revolution. 

Tainted meat was sold to the military during the Spanish American War, killed more of our troops than did the Spanish. Didn’t 

mean that the liberation of Cuba was not something that was a—

we should have done and should have been involved in. Ileana can 

certainly testify to that. Ileana says let us do it again. 

The fact is during World War II our Sherman tanks when they 

came ashore at Normandy were facing German tanks that were superior technologically, and many Americans lost their lives due to 

that incompetence on the part of long-range planners. It did not 

take away from the nobility of American’s effort to liberate the 

mainland of Europe from the Nazis, and Mr. Lantos can stand his 

testimony to that. 

The fact is that we must do these things and try to meet the 

challenges of corruption in every conflict. I appreciate that you are 

in the front lines, you, yourself, are in the front lines of that effort, 

and again, Mr. Lantos’ accolades toward you speak for the whole 

committee here, and our trust for you, and your mother has every 

reason to be proud of the great job you are doing for America. We 

are proud of you, too. 

Now, with that said, the lessons that we have, you know, that 

we need to do, not just military lessons, not just political lessons, 
28

but the economic lessons that you are talking about right now need 

to be put to good use. You mentioned a civilian reserve corps——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. As a possible idea that in the future we might be able to put together that would help us move forward with rebuilding projects under fire——

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. When we meet these challenges. 

You might go into that idea a little bit, and that might be something under Mr. Lantos’ leadership we could work together on. 

What was that? What did you have in mind? 

Mr. BOWEN. It was initially envisioned in NSPD, National Security Presidential Directive 44 that created S/CRS, and one of the 

missions of S/CRS is to develop that. It has been burdened by not 

having authorization or appropriation to carry this forward. I think 

their funding last year was $2 million, and they operate almost exclusively with detailees. So progress on this front has been limited 

to date. 

I think the concept of having a cadre, a trained shell organization, if you will, ready to manage post-conflict contingency operations, and then a network of individuals who have a different day 

job, but who are ready to step forward when the country calls 

makes sense. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As our reserves are in the military. 

Mr. BOWEN. Exactly right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It sounds like a good idea to me, and I would 

be happy to work with you on that project, and maybe we can 

make that real so that when we get ourselves in a situation in the 

future we will have something else to draw upon to meet the challenge. 

Let me just note that Mr. Lantos talked about the decision early 

on to base our rebuilding efforts on grants rather than loans. I remember I was one of the few Republicans, I am sorry to say, that 

voted for that particular position, realizing that the wisdom of 

making sure that the Iraqi people through their future oil revenues 

would actually have to pay for some of the efforts made to rebuild 

their country under the President’s guidance and leadership. Unfortunately, the Republicans made the wrong decision, and I believe that decision was made, the White House made that decision 

in order to protect German and French banks that are afraid that 

their loans to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would not be honored. 

I think that is a disgrace and this administration needs to be 

held accountable for that decision at that time. 

Again, Mr. Lantos has indicated that our allies have not stepped 

forward, and although he put you on the spot, I think we needed 

to do that. The American people need to pay attention to those mistakes and make sure we don’t make them again, and I appreciate 

you enlightening us today. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much. 

So you found our weak spot and found your mother. [Laughter.] 

You have completely de-fanged the attack dogs on our side. 

[Laughter.] 
29

And I know that the only reason that you were reluctant to out 

those people who didn’t meet their commitment is because you 

mother once told you if you have nothing nice to say about somebody, don’t say anything. [Laughter.] 

So I brought this car into the shop today, see, and I says to the 

guy, I says, ‘‘I just need five things done. I need the air in the tires, 

I need you to fill the tank, I need you to wash the windshield, and 

I need a new engine.’’ He says, ‘‘It will be $5,000. It will take 2 weeks.’’

I give him $5,000. I come back in 2 weeks later. I say, ‘‘How are 

we doing?’’

He says, ‘‘Seventy percent through.’’ [Laughter.] 

I think that is what the man seems to be indicating that you are 

saying. Your summary answer at the beginning was, ‘‘yes, we are 

successful.’’ When you take a look at it, you know, we did the windshield and we filled the tank, we checked the tires and all that 

stuff, but the big projects we haven’t done; that we have met our 

targets, our goals or have been successful in 70 percent of the 

projects. Those are the real small things. But if 95 percent of the 

economy of the entire country is based on petroleum and we have 

failed there, I think the target was something like 3 million barrels 

a day and we are doing 1.6, 1.6. I would give it a 52 percent, which 

is not—you know, it is half but it is not a passing grade. 

So if in the big ticket item of the engine, we are making no 

progress or negative progress, I don’t think the overall score can be 

that we are being successful. Maybe you could respond to that. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, clearly, as I said in my answer, the story of 

Iraq reconstruction is a mixed one. A lot has been achieved with 

the $21 billion the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, but we 

have spent the better part of this hearing talking about the challenges that have confronted the overall program, beginning with 

security, which meant that virtually every project ended up costing 

more and taking longer than it did, and that meant, as we have 

pointed out in our previous reports, a reconstruction gap evolved 

which means that we achieved less than we intended because of 

the higher costs. 

The challenges of weak planning, particularly for sustainment, 

which we have talked about in our quarterly reports——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think the point is if we are not successful in 

the petroleum sector, we are not successful. Is that fair? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, you make an excellent point, and that is the 

economic engine that drives Iraq is the petroleum sector. There 

were assumptions early on, and the IRRF allocations reflect that 

assumption, that the petroleum sector would begin to provide a lot 

of funding for the recovery of Iraq rapidly. That did not happen as 

planned. 

Nine percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was invested in the petroleum sector as opposed to 34 percent in security, 

23 percent in electricity, 12 percent in water, 12 percent in transportation, 9 percent in oil and gas, and so that raises the question 

why not a greater emphasis on the engine. That is why the Ministry of Oil must execute its capital budget, because that engine is 

still not working. For Iraq to move forward economically, that sector must improve. 
30

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me say, and I think this should have been 

said at the outset, that any failure in Iraq is not your failure or 

the failure of your people and your staff. It is the failure of the policy. You are there for us to grade it. You are there to tell us it is 

working, it is not working, and you know, it is like you ask the guy, 

‘‘Is my signal light working?’’ He goes back there and says, ‘‘It is 

working, it is not working, it is working, it is not working, it is 

working.’’ It depends on when you are looking at it and what you 

are looking at to see if it is working or it is not. 

And if we are looking at the 70 percent that makes up 5 percent, 

and that is working, it really is not working. So I guess it depends 

on what we are looking at, and what we are grading. But I think 

it is important not to look at this like the teachers who philosophically believe in social promotion, which is a big issue in the field 

of education, you know. The kid is 23 years old and he is in the 

fourth grade. Do you promote him or do you leave him back again? 

And the answer, you know, a lot of teachers say it doesn’t pay to 

leave him back, let us just give him a passing grade and move him 

on. 

To say that the system is working when it really isn’t by any real 

measurement standard as to what is important to move it forward, 

I think is not helpful. If nothing is working, maybe the people who 

say we should be getting out of there and seeing if they can fend 

for themselves and take their own responsibility, you know, have 

an argument there. That is not the purpose of today’s hearing, but 

today’s, as I understand it, is to figure out whether it is working 

or not. 

You can respond if you would like. Otherwise, we will move on. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I think you are alluding to our inspections regime which we visited 94 sites all over Iraq. About 70 percent of 

those are operational, and it fits within the larger point I made, 

which is $21 billion accomplished a lot. 

Now, admittedly some of the projects, as our first look this last 

quarter reveals, are not working as well as they should be, and second, because of the increased cost, 34 percent of the IRRF was 

spent on security, much higher. There were four reprogrammings 

that moved lots of money out of bricks and mortar into security, 

which meant that the infrastructure didn’t get the level of attention that was expected. I mean, that is a shortfall, that is a failure 

of sorts. The start that the United States intended to provide Iraq 

on its recovery was not as robust as initially planned because of 

the security situation primarily. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Last question for me. I used to be a teacher. 

Under the No Child Left Behind Act, if schools are non-performing 

and the kids aren’t learning any better based on testing measurements, then administration’s point of view is you take the money 

away. We reduce the funding for those school districts that aren’t 

meeting the standards. 

Why do we not apply that here, or should we? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, as I said, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund is largely spent, and the posture of the United States in supporting Iraq economically has changed to targeted aid rather than 

a large-scale reconstruction program. That targeted aid in the ESF 

is substantially going to the PRT programs and to USAID’s local 
31

governance programs across the country. On the DoD side, it is 

going to CERP, and I think those are two places where that money 

is going because they have worked reasonably well and fit the current climate, frankly, which is no longer Reconstruction, capital 

‘‘R.’’ It is a relief and development program. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Maybe if we have time, we will come back to 

that. 

Mr. Bilirakis. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Absolutely. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Put in my 2 cents worth. 

Also as a former educator, No Child Left Behind in no way takes 

away funds from low performing districts. In fact, the impetus, the 

rationale behind No Child Left Behind is to further provide incentives for those schools that aren’t performing well, and make sure 

that we do away with what the President calls the soft bigotry of 

low expectations. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, that was a different President that used all 

those fancy words actually, but nonetheless, we could argue that, 

but I think if you spoke to somebody in your school districts they 

would tell you what the problems are there, but that is for the committee down the hall. 

Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for testifying before us, Mr. Bowen, today, and I 

would also like to express my dismay for our allies not fulfilling 

their commitment. I am very disappointed in that. 

My first question is—it is disturbing that the Iraq construction 

projects resulted in the misuse of billions of dollars that should 

have been used to restore Iraq’s economy and civil society. The key 

to making government effective, of course, is holding it accountable. 

You told the Senate Judiciary Committee in March that it is difficult to find evidence, such as documents or eye witnesses that are 

needed to prosecute cases of waste or mismanagement. 

The Iraq Commission on Public Integrity has estimated that 

there are $5 billion that were lost annually due to corruption. It 

particularly notes that Iraqi Government officials are hampering 

efforts to curb corruption under a 1971 law that was reinstated by 

the Prime Minister Malaki. He also ordered the commission not to 

refer cases to an investigative court involving ministers or former 

ministers without his consent. It has been reported that more than 

48 investigations have been stalled under this law. 

The Iraqi Government is clearly misguided in some of its priorities. The bottom line, however, is that these are our taxpayer dollars, and they are not always used effectively. What can be done 

by Congress, in your view, to increase the prosecution of those who 

wasted or mismanaged these funds? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, as I said in my opening statement, we are 

making a lot of progress on a number of significant cases. The investigative process takes time, as I have learned, but we have 28 

of our 78 cases right now at the Department of Justice under prosecution, and my discussions with my investigators make me optimistic that over the course of this year we will see real results from 

those prosecutions. 
32

I do think that strengthening the fraud-fighting effort in Iraq 

would be helpful, and a lot of that work can be done now here in 

the United States as well in trying to track the corruption trail. 

But finally let me say that I think partly because of the forwardleaning, deterrent presence that SIGIR has exerted over the last 3 

years—and has eventually teamed and partnered with Army 

Criminal Investigative Division and the FBI over the last 2 years—

that deterrence has been effective. 

We have not found that fraud within the U.S. program has been 

a significant component. By distinction, as you alluded to, corruption, fraud within the Iraqi system is rampant, and the power of 

the fraud-fighting entities to push it back is weak. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

What do you see happening in the next quarter for Iraqi construction, particularly with the implementation of the Baghdad security plan? I know you touched on it. Maybe you can elaborate a 

little bit. 

Mr. BOWEN. We are going to look at projects that are being constructed as part of the Baghdad security plan. My inspectors have 

my charge over the next quarter to begin visiting those. There is 

no preliminary information I have to report though on progress of 

reconstruction within that plan yet, but in our next report we 

should have some information for you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Last question. When should we expect the 

327,000 Iraqi troops to be fully functioning and officially protecting 

and securing major infrastructure such as roads, electrical grids, 

and oil production, in your opinion? 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. In your estimation. 

Mr. BOWEN. As a policy matter, that is a question for the Pentagon, of course, but we have looked at the use of Iraq security 

forces in several instances, specifically the weapons review that we 

conducted pursuant to Senator Warner’s directive, and also our 

audit of logistic support, and found weaknesses in both areas. 

The weapons tracking system was not working properly, but that 

has been remedied. The logistical capacity of the Iraqi Ministry of 

Defense to support its forces in the field remains a challenge. I met 

with General Dempsey, who is the commander, the Multinational 

Security Transition Command-Iraq again this last trip, and he says 

there has been some progress, and they are able to manage their 

own food and starting to manage their own fuel, which was a big 

obstacle when we did our review last October, but medical care, 

and simply movement, continue to be a challenge. 

The other issue to address, of course, is staffing levels within 

those units, and I know the Government Accountability Office is in 

the midst of a review on that front and is having some challenges 

in getting information on it. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

funny. You add something to our morning. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Can you thank me for being smart? 
33

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, you are funny and smart. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thanks. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. We are all smart, but not very many of us are 

funny. 

You know, we do so much in Iraq from the United States that 

we are forcing upon the Iraqis, and thank you, Mr. Bowen. You 

have been great. You have stayed calm under pressure. This is not 

an easy thing for you to be doing. It just seems that I have to ask 

you, are there enough Iraqi people capable of doing these reconstruction jobs themselves? 

I mean, why aren’t we letting them be the contractors for their 

own country? 

Mr. BOWEN. You have raised several issues there. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I know. I have a hundred issues. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, no, they are good issues. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Yes. 

Mr. BOWEN. The first one is the capacity of Iraqi subcontractors, 

which the United States is using more often than not. The reality 

is the design/build contracts or cost-plus contracts that result in 

subcontracting in-country and most of the subcontractors are 

Iraqis, and that has proven, as our inspections and our audits 

show, to be a mixed bag. Plumbing is an issue. The Baghdad Police 

College is the most notable example of a lack of capacity to carry 

out basic construction. 

The other issue you raise is why aren’t the Iraqis executing their 

own capital budgets, hiring their own contractors, engaging in their 

own recovery, and the answer to that is they must moving forward 

because the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund is spent, and the 

United States is no longer doing Reconstruction, capital ‘‘R.’’ It is 

doing targeted aid, and that is why for Iraq to make progress, it 

must address the oil sector issue we talked about, and it must develop a plan that it implements effectively nationwide to continue 

to restore its infrastructure. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Do we have any data that tells us if it is less safe 

for American contractors that the Iraq contractors? Is there some 

sense of pride when it is built at home by locals versus the U.S. 

stamp on it or an international stamp on it? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, that is what I am told. For example, an Iraqi 

subcontractor gets the award from an American contractor; they 

will ask that Americans not visit the site because by visiting the 

site it raises the danger at the site. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. That should be a lesson to us, shouldn’t it? That 

is political. You don’t have to answer that one. 

Do we have a separate process for monitoring and auditing what 

the Iraqis are doing with international funding, mostly United 

States funding, but international funding versus what our own contractors? I mean, do we separate that? Do we know what 

Haliburton is doing versus what an Iraqi contractor is doing, or 

through their local governments? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, our oversight is—my oversight is of taxpayer 

dollars, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund in fiscal year 2006 

money appropriated for relief and reconstruction. So that is all that 

I have information about. 
34

You know, whether there is similar oversight of how the Iraqis 

themselves are spending their money and managing it, I don’t have 

any information on that. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So I am going to ask a question that is kind of 

a political answer, so you might not want to answer it, but in asking it everybody will know what I think. Well, no, I am not going 

to ask it yet. 

So by the way, would you be able to tell us what you think we 

should be doing in the short term in Iraq or what we should be 

doing in the long term on reconstruction, reconstruction? 

Mr. BOWEN. As I said, ‘‘Reconstruction,’’ capital ‘‘R,’’ is concluded. 

There are still some large projects, especially in the electricity sector, that the Gulf Region Division of the Corps of Engineers is 

managing, about $2 billion left to spend but relative to the overall 

investment what remains is relatively small. 

The targets for the next phase of support to protect our interests 

in Iraq are appropriate. One, the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

effort, it is the most important national capacity to building program in Iraq, and it is about trying to get the provincial councils 

to manage their provinces. 

There are 18 provinces, 18 provincial councils. You know, politics 

is local, democracy is a local event, and those councils are largely 

new. And the other thing that needs to happen, of course, is there 

need to be new provincial elections because the elections of 2005 

were boycotted by the Sunnis. This created an imbalance in representation in a number of provinces, and new elections will fix 

that imbalance. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. I am going to ask my question. Like the 

Iraqis saying, United States stay away from our projects because 

it is safer if you are not there, would the international community 

weigh in if they didn’t think it was all controlled by the United 

States? Would they weigh in to a greater degree if the Iraqis were 

controlling their budgets? 

Mr. BOWEN. You know, that is not an area I can really comment 

on. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. I appreciate that. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. And I think they would. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. I have a few questions. I am way over here on the end. 

Mr. BOWEN. Good to see you, Judge. 

Mr. POE. Every war has its war profiteers. I think it has always 

been that way. When the smoke clears, there are always suddenly 

new millionaires. And when the smoke clears on this war, who do 

you think the new millionaires are going to be? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it is a good question. I will just give you a little anecdotal insight from my travels through Amman. The Jordanians are not happy because of the number of Iraqis who have 

immigrated into Jordan with large sums of money which has 

caused the real estate prices in Amman to triple in the last year, 

according to my Jordanian friend. 

Mr. POE. A couple other questions on the corruption and fraud. 

Where is the money going? I mean, I know it is lining the pockets 
35

of some people who are just corrupt, but is any of the money being 

traced to our enemies, like al-Qaeda? 

Mr. BOWEN. The belief of the Commission on Public Integrity is 

that, yes, some of that money is going there but that is just the 

belief. There is no mechanism that I am aware of for tracking that, 

and if there is a mechanism out there, I am sure it is highly classified. 

Mr. POE. So if there is a belief, what would the percentage of 

that belief be? 

Mr. BOWEN. He didn’t offer up a guesstimate, but it is not implausible. 

Mr. POE. One more question. If you could compare the American 

companies that are doing business in Iraq on reconstruction versus 

the Iraqi home grown corruption, could you put a percentage on 

that for me? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, as I said, within the U.S. program, based on 

our work over the last 3 years that we have reported publicly, 

there has not been a significant fraud problem within the U.S. reconstruction program. As I said, we have 28 cases pending at the 

Department of Justice, and over time that story will be told more 

fully. 

Mr. POE. All right. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SIRES. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would just like to ask Mr. Bowen just to further one of his answers that was anecdotal about the Jordanian 

saying the price of real estate in Amman has tripled. 

The question I believe Mr. Poe asked about—who would the new 

millionaires be?—I think was trying to elicit who is making money 

off of the deal, and the answer, I am not sure how to interpret it. 

The real estate values in Amman are presumably going triple or 

much higher not because of wealthy refugees coming in and buying 

it up, but because all of these poor refugees are making huge demands on the housing market. Is that——

Mr. BOWEN. He didn’t spell out his complaint any further than 

what I have just recited, so I don’t know the actual underlying economics there. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. See if you can get back to him. 

Mr. BOWEN. Okay. I will be going back in August so I will see 

him again. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bowen, when you meet the wrong person in the wrong place 

with all the cost of all the corruption that is going on in Iraq, but 

you had said before that as much as 34 percent is security cost 

overruns on some of these projects? 

Mr. BOWEN. No. What I said was the 34 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was spent on the security sector. 

Mr. SIRES. And how much do think is as percent of corruption? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, as I said, within the U.S. program corruption 

has been a very small component. On the Iraqi side——

Mr. SIRES. 20 percent? 
36

Mr. BOWEN [continuing]. Has been a significant problem. 

Mr. SIRES. Would you say it is 20 percent? 

Mr. BOWEN. No, I wouldn’t. 

Mr. SIRES. What I am trying to get at is for every American dollar we invest in this reconstruction of Iraq, how much of it goes to 

corruption, how much of it goes to security? I mean, what do we 

get for our dollar? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, that is a fair question, and it is one that——

Mr. SIRES. What do I get for my dollar? Let me put it that way. 

Mr. BOWEN. It is one that my office is endeavoring to answer 

over the next year and a half, and we are doing it through focused 

financial audits of contractors and sectors. The Iraq Reconstruction 

Accountability Act of 2006, which extended my office’s jurisdiction 

to cover fiscal 2006 money, also asked that we conduct a forensic 

audit. 

A forensic audit, as I have learned, means lots of different 

things, but what it essentially asks is get down to the details of 

what happened to the taxpayer dollars invested in Iraq, and that 

is what you are asking, and that is why we are issuing our first 

focused financial audit of Bechtel in the next quarter. We have Parsons, Blackwater, DynCorp, and other contractors and sectors on 

our program of audits, and at the end of this regime I expect to 

be able to give you a detailed answer. 

Mr. SIRES. How much money is Iraq putting into all this reconstruction, the country of Iraq? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, that is the capital budget execution problem 

that we have been talking about, and the answer is not enough. 

About a quarter of their capital budget was executed last year. The 

Ministry of Oil was the most egregious failure; $3.5 billion is the 

capital budget and $90 million spent, and that simply is unacceptable. 

Mr. SIRES. How much of that went to corruption? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, as I said——

Mr. SIRES. Somebody has got to feed the families. 

Mr. BOWEN. Judge, the Commission on Public Integrity reports that he estimates $5 billion lost annually to corruption in Iraq. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, I listen to these things and I am like dumfounded. I just can’t fathom that so much money gets lost and we 

don’t get any bang for our money. I mean, I read an article the 

other day where we put up a street light, and then the next day 

it is gone. Does that happen? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I don’t know about that, but that alludes to 

the security problem. Security impedes progress on every front, has 

made every project cost more, and delayed every project. 

Mr. SIRES. So why are we spending all this money in Iraq? I 

mean, what progress are we making when the President says we 

are making progress, Condoleezza Rice says we are making 

progress? Look, I know you are in the hot seat. When history gets 

done with this program, it is going to be the most wasteful program 

this country has ever gotten itself involved in. So what progress are 

we making if all this is happening? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, as I said in my opening statement, and as our 

reports indicate, a lot has been built with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, but the phase wherein the United States bears 
37

the burden of the reconstruction of Iraq is past. Reconstruction, 

capital ‘‘R,’’ is over. Targeted support is what characterizes the continuing foreign aid to Iraq. 

Mr. SIRES. What can we do to make Iraq participate in this program? 

Mr. BOWEN. There is a budget execution initiative that is ongoing in Iraq that has benchmarks, if you will, that is going to compel, we hope, the Iraqi ministries to execute their budgets. Indeed, 

there is a rule that has been implemented by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Planning that requires every ministry to 

execute at least half its annual budget by mid-year or to forfeit the 

balance. 

Mr. SIRES. Can I ask a personal question? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. SIRES. How can you stay so calm when these people are ripping us off like they are? This is the American dollar. I mean, I 

compliment you on your steady, your calm. I am angry just thinking about this, that the American dollar is being wasted so much. 

How can you stay so calm? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well——

Mr. SIRES. You don’t have to answer. Hope you take your mother 

out to lunch, too. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are you going to the other side? I see my colleague from Indiana, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Oh, thank you very much. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I always want to defer to Mr. Burton if I have 

that opportunity. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have noticed this thing going on. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BURTON. I love you man. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I love you too. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BURTON. One of the things that troubles me, and I am not 

sure you can answer this question, but the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi 

Arabia, they haven’t done much of anything. 

Mr. BOWEN. You are right. 

Mr. BURTON. And as I heard you answering questions awhile 

ago, the Saudis have pledged $500 million? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. BURTON. UAE pledged $500 million? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. BURTON. Kuwait, I don’t think it pledged any of it. 

Mr. BOWEN. 250. 

Mr. BURTON. 250. And you said that they are all below 10 percent of their commitment? 

Mr. BOWEN. That was my estimate. Chairman Lantos was pushing me on it, and I will get back to you with details on that. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, even if it is 20 percent, but here is my question. Who is putting pressure on those countries that made a commitment and aren’t living up to it? 

I mean, we are pouring our money into there, and our life blood 

into there, and we are protecting their fannies over there, and they 
38

are not living up to their commitment. I would just like to know 

who is policing that. 

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Burton, you are exactly right because our commitment was the IRRF, and we have provided 100 percent of it, 

$21 billion as opposed to $500 million or $250 million, and our Madrid commitment was the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, unconditional grant program. That does not characterize these other 

pledges from the Gulf States. 

The answer to your question is no one has been pushing to hold 

them accountable, but there is a new process called the Compact 

for Iraq. I know you are aware of it. It just got approved finally 

after much delay at Sharmel Sheik 2 months ago, and in that those 

countries have transferred forward their Madrid pledges to the 

compact process. 

But again, as I mentioned earlier also, there is an appendix with 

benchmarks. So whether that money is coming forward from them 

will be dependent upon certain events happening in Iraq. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I think Chairman Lantos and Ms. RosLehtinen ought to ask somebody from the State Department to 

come up here and find out why they are making this kind of a commitment and they are not living up to. 

I mean, Saudi Arabia gets billions and billions of dollars from the 

United States in oil revenues. We have, as I said before, protected 

them in the past. Kuwait, we saved their bacon in the first Iraq 

War, and the United Arab Emirates, I just can’t understand why 

we are putting all that money in there, and they made a commitment, and they are not living up to it. 

The State Department, if you say nobody is policing that, then 

that is the responsibility of our State Department, and Mr. Ackerman, I hope that you will contact Mr. Lantos and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen 

and let us get somebody from the State Department up here and 

say why in the dickens—I would like to use stronger language—

but why in the heck aren’t you policing that and holding their feet 

to the fire and making sure that they are making good on their 

commitments. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. And actually, that probably should have been 

my answer. Ask the question to the State Department because that 

is their mission. I understand that they do push them, but obviously there hasn’t been any progress on those pushes. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I can’t understand why if we are pushing 

them, we are not succeeding. I mean, every one of those countries 

are at risk if we aren’t successful, every one of them. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. BURTON. And they have got a bigger stake in that than we 

do in all probability in the Middle East, and I just cannot fathom 

why we are not beating the heck out of them, saying you cough up 

your money or else you are going to reap the whirlwind. So I would 

just like to suggest that. 

I don’t have any other questions, Mr. Chairman, and Ms. RosLehtinen, ranking member, but I wish we would call the State Department, get them up here and say what is going on. With that, 

I want to thank you very much for your service. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt. 
39

Mr. DELAHUNT [presiding]. I would just note for the record, directing this to my friend from Indiana, that Chairman Ackerman 

and myself had a hearing that addressed these very concerns that 

you have articulated. It was entitled ‘‘The Coalition of the Willing.’’ 

The point being that we are here alone when it comes to providing 

funding, and I think Mr. Bowen just observed that the $21 billion 

was a grant. It wasn’t a loan. And I think with the exception of 

Japan, and possibly Korea, all of the other pledges that have been 

made but still have not been fully delivered upon are in the form 

of loans. 

I yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. If you had a hearing on this, can you tell me 

who testified? Was it the State Department and others? I would 

like to know what their answer was. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. My memory was it was Mr. Bowen. 

Mr. BURTON. So we haven’t had anybody from the State Department, to your knowledge then? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, that is right. David Satterfield appeared. 

We will be happy to provide the transcript to you. 

Mr. BURTON. I would like to hear it directly from somebody at 

State that is responsible for this to find out what is going on. 

Thank you very much for yielding. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Bowen, I again welcome you, and would note 

for the record that you are one of the few bright lights in the saga 

of Iraq. Thank you for the fine work that you have done. 

Recently I noted that the administration has nominated or appointed a war czar. I think if you had been there at the beginning 

and had accepted the title ‘‘reconstruction czar,’’ that maybe we 

wouldn’t be having this hearing today. It would have proceeded 

with a different result. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But in any event, my memory is that you have 

testified elsewhere and have talked about the need to generate revenue, obviously, with an almost exclusive reliance on the oil sector. 

I think it is about 90 percent? 

Mr. BOWEN. 94 percent. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. 94 percent. What is the status of the hydrocarbon law? And members have expressed concerns to me not just 

simply about its passage, but its support within Iraq because there 

are issues there, at least in the opinion of some Iraqis, that it 

would provide opportunities to foreign investors, and foreign private oil companies that would divert resources. Now, maybe that 

is incorrect. I don’t know. 

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t know either. I don’t know those particular 

details, but first of all, in our latest quarterly report we identified 

passage of the hydrocarbon law as an essential transition benchmark along with the International Compact, which was approved 

2 weeks ago at Shar mel-Sheik, and also the re-energizing of a 

workable asset transfer system, which is broken right now. 

But to put the hydrocarbon law question in context, remember 

that last September its passage was deemed imminent, and then 

in November, and then it appeared to be certain to be passed in 

December, and then it passed out of the Council of Ministers in 

February. There is four pieces to it as I understand. 
40

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. 

Mr. BOWEN. And on its way to the Council of Representatives 

with the four pieces anticipated to be passed, at least I was told 

during my February visit, by May, and we are——

Mr. DELAHUNT. We are in May. 

Mr. BOWEN. We are in May, and so I guess predicting anything 

about the hydrocarbon law, I think, is probably unwise given that 

particular track record. It doesn’t change the fact that it is an important transition benchmark because the rules for investment 

have to be written and the rules for distribution have to be written 

for economic progress to occur. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, this is a quote, and again I can’t 

vouch for its accuracy, but let me read it: ‘‘Iraq will have this very 

complicated institution called The Federal Oil and Gas Council.’’

Is that a creation of the draft hydrocarbon law? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is what I understand. It is a large-scale reform 

of management of oil and gas production and export in Iraq, and 

there are 15 independent operating entities right now that comprise the oil sector, the public oil sector in Iraq, Northern Oil Company, Southern Oil Company, or SOMO, the export entity, are the 

most notable ones. That is going to all change with the creation of 

this centralized sort of contract approval council. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, what I find interesting, and again let me 

just proceed to the end of the quote, and it says, ‘‘We will have representatives from the foreign oil companies on its board.’’

Is that accurate? 

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t know anything about that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because if that is true, one can envision, you 

know, representatives of Exxon, Mobile, Shell, all of the major oil 

companies serving on this council, this Federal Oil and Gas Council. 

Now, if that is the case, what I am concerned about, given the 

attitudes that we see from the polling data about the United 

States, one that was particularly disturbing was that 62 percent of 

the Iraqi people indicating their—well, at least not their disapproval, but that it was okay to assault and kill American military personnel. 

If the Iraqi people I dare say start to become aware, if in fact 

this is accurate, I really want to underscore that, I don’t know this, 

but that we have representatives of major oil companies serving on 

a national oil and gas council that is executing contracts, we open 

ourselves, or we will be open to—not that we are doing this—but 

we will be open to ‘‘they came in because of the oil’’ kind of accusations. 

But again, you don’t know anything about this? 

Mr. BOWEN. No, sir. I don’t know anything about it. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t know anything about it, but it is something that at least should be questioned by ourselves here in this 

Congress, and if anyone sitting in the back there has any information on it, I know that I would appreciate it. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it even works better 

without the clip on the top. 

Mr. Bowen, thank you for your service——
41

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. In the position of Inspector General. In 

our agencies, it is just crucial for accountability, for integrity, and 

I appreciate your service. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Additionally, this morning was so sorry to learn, 

and I share the chagrin of Chairman Lantos, of Congressman Burton from Indiana, our allies, particularly our allies in the region, 

need to be participating because the negative consequences of failure in Iraq will most affect them, and I am just really disappointed. 

You had indicated, I was going to ask, but you had indicted that 

you will be providing——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. Us a list of the different contributions, 

the pledges and contributions, and indeed we want to thank the 

people of Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom, and I never cease to 

be disappointed in the European Union, because they will be catastrophically affected if we are not successful. 

I also have the perspective, I visited Iraq six times. I will be 

going back in the next month. I was so startled on my visits to see 

the infrastructure, the lack of infrastructure, the electrical grids 

that were antiquated, the lack of health care, the lack of school. 

Now are schools for 6 million children. 

My oldest son served for a year in Iraq, so I know from the 

ground the efforts of our forces, and I have never been prouder of 

the American military. They have worked really hard on infrastructure, working to help build schools, to deliver over 1 million book 

bags to the children of Iraq, the efforts to renovate health clinics 

and open health clinics. My son told me one of the greatest experiences he had was to provide water tanks for villages which had 

never had water tanks before, with a contract by Iraqi contractors 

to maintain the water for the people in the villages that they were 

serving. 

So there are so many positive stories out there, but I know that 

your role is to bring up both. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. WILSON. And so another side is to see the progress on Provincial Reconstruction Teams that you have referenced, and I have 

seen it personally in Afghanistan, United States/Korean troops 

working together with local government officials. 

Can you tell us again what the circumstances in Iraq with the 

PRTs? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. There are 10—I call them standard PRTs—part 

of the program that began over a year ago. We did an audit of 

them in October, and there were challenges with respect to 

resourcing them, staffing, and security. Security is simply a problem that will show up in the analysis of any issue in Iraq. 

Some of the PRTs are doing well. The one up in Mosul is doing 

well. There are several that have a hard time getting out and are 

concentrated down at Hila. The one in al Anbar is now operating, 

and it was seriously compromised because of security back during 

my last visit. The Baghdad PRT is making a lot of progress. 
42

So the first tranche of PRTs are a mixed story, as with everything in Iraq, but they are generally accomplishing the mission and 

carrying out the important task of building capacity in the provincial councils. That is their job. 

The second tranche, the EPRTs, the ‘‘E’’ stands for ‘‘embedded,’’ 

there are 10 of those, and they are going to be part of brigades, 

under brigade commanders’ guidance, and have a more mobile capacity, but also similar purpose. There are four of them, or I think 

five of them in Baghdad, so there is going to be a more focused outreach to support the Baghdad security plan, the build portion of it. 

Those EPRTs will carry out that mission. But they are also in a 

start-up phase. They have their core capacity at four individuals, 

I think, on average, but eventually will be up to 20 by the summer. 

That is the plan. 

Mr. WILSON. And as I conclude, again I am so proud of what our 

troops are doing, the representatives from civilian agencies of the 

United States. In my visits there, I have seen the development of 

the satellite dishes that were illegal under Saddam Hussein. Now 

every house has one, sometimes it appears two, from zero of cell 

phones, now there are 6 million, which is——

Mr. BOWEN. 8 million, actually. 

Mr. WILSON. See, I am understating. Thank you for your numbers. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. WILSON. But there is hope. It is not perfect, but I want to 

thank you for your service. I want to thank our troops. I want to 

thank the American civilian agencies. I want to thank the contractors for making a difference for the people of Iraq. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Congressman Inglis. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bowen, just as a recap here because I think I am the last 

one. I wonder what the—well, we have got more. I wonder if you 

could just summarize for me the total that we are spending in Iraq 

or we expect to spend in Iraq on reconstruction again is how much? 

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t know how much eventually we will, but the 

amount that we have under oversight, and I include in relief and 

reconstruction security support, so that includes the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund, about $38 billion. Iraq Security Forces Fund total—

well, security spending, counting the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and the Security Forces Fund is about $16 billion, so 

that gives you some sense. Almost, well 40 percent or higher is security, and then there is $2.1 billion in the Commanders’ Emergency Response in appropriated funds and another billion, $21 billion in the IRRF, and several billion in the Economic Support Fund 

that comprises that $38 billion. 

Mr. INGLIS. So it totals up to $38 billion. And of that, how much 

have we spent? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, almost 90 percent is spent. It varies among the other tranches because they have come in in various supplementals and also in fiscal 

year budgets. But of the Iraq Security Forces Fund, I believe that 

about 80 percent of that is spent. 
43

Mr. INGLIS. Okay. Do you have any sense about if our goal was 

to accomplish certain objectives, we have spent 90 percent of the 

money maybe, but I wonder if we have any sense of the objectives 

as opposed to the amount of monies spent. I mean, are we 90 percent complete on the objectives or are we short of that because of 

the security issues involved? 

Mr. BOWEN. The latter. We are short of that. As we pointed out 

in a number of quarterly reports, something that we named 2 years 

ago the Reconstruction Gap, that simply is an outflow of four 

reprogrammings that moved, almost $6 billion of the IRRF among 

sectors, primarily into the security sector, almost $4 billion into the 

security sector, and that money had to come out of other sectors, 

namely, the water sector was cut by half. The electricity sector was 

cut. Oil and gas a little bit. Economic development was cut, and all 

of it went into training Iraqi forces. 

Mr. INGLIS. Yes. The $38 billion is the American effort. Order of 

magnitude of other partners’ efforts in terms of pledges, what 

would that be? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, that is what we have been talking about here 

this morning, the Madrid pledges, and the failure of a lot of that 

to come forward. 

I am told the EU has put in about $700 million in grants, but 

we are going to have to give you the details on pledges and actual 

money coming forward, but the Japanese have put in $1.5 billion 

in grants, and $3.5 billion loans. The United Kingdom has put in 

about $1 billion in a mix of loan and grant, and Korea and Australia have also stepped up with money, and also actually the Koreans are operating one of the PRTs. 

Mr. INGLIS. So the order of magnitude is maybe $5 billion, that 

is what it sounds like. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. INGLIS. Somewhere in that area. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. INGLIS. So compared to the American effort, $38 billion, our 

partners might be at $5 billion in terms of expenditures. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. INGLIS. And the reason I say $38 billion because 90 percent of it is spent, so therefore we are getting close to the $38 billion, 

right? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, 90 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, which is $20 billion, and about 80 percent of the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund, which is $10.8 billion. 

Mr. INGLIS. Right. When you say that the estimate of $5 billion 

being lost annually to corruption in Iraq, that is not our 38 plus 

the five. 

Mr. BOWEN. No, it is not. 

Mr. INGLIS. It is all of Iraqi——

Mr. BOWEN. It is all Iraq money. 

Mr. INGLIS. So some of that would be ours, some of it would be 

Iraq money? 

Mr. BOWEN. No, it is all Iraqi money. 

Mr. INGLIS. All Iraqi money——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. INGLIS [continuing]. Is the $5 billion estimate. 
44

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. INGLIS. Okay. And that is an order of magnitude of their expenditures? I mean, of expenditures, I mean of——

Mr. BOWEN. Their total budget is $41 billion this year. 

Mr. INGLIS. So the thought is out of the $41 billion perhaps $5 

billion goes off to corruption? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. That is the estimate from the Commission on Public Integrity. 

Mr. INGLIS. And of course it is important for us to keep in mind 

that is not our money, that is their money. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. INGLIS. And of course I guess some part of the $38 billion 

has not been spent as well as we might have hoped. 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. INGLIS. But the order of magnitude of that waste is far lower 

than say the percentage of $5 billion over $41 billion. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. That is correct. 

Mr. INGLIS. Well, helpful. Thank you. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. You are welcome. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson 

Lee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Again, Mr. Bowen, thank you so very much 

for your presence here and your service. 

Mr. BOWEN. You are welcome. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And if my questions are rapid, I want your 

mother to know that I still appreciate very much the leadership 

that you have given to this cause. I was detained in another hearing on the Gulf Coast recovery, so you can imagine the focus we 

have had today. 

I am just going to start. I noticed there are some questions that 

will tie into the one that I will make. For example, it looks as if 

in the Donas Conference, I think you just answered that question, 

of the $13.5 billion, there may be only about a quarter, or $3.5 billion has been received, and certainly that concerns me, and the corruption concerns me as well because that seems to be an ongoing 

story. 

I indicate to you that I was there and have been there since, but 

I was there with Ambassador Berman, and really thank him for 

the good intentions, but I think there were a lot of misdirections. 

One, of course, with the Ba’athists who, as I understand it, were 

just shear civil servants, and we lost them. 

Can you just—first question—say that some of the failure that 

we have now is because of the shear lack of leadership in the 

Malaki government with respect to being able to run, retain good 

civil servants, the disagreement, if you will, of bringing back the 

Ba’athists, and just simply not taking the leadership or statesmanship position to make hard decisions? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I think the issue that we have focused on 

within the Government of Iraq that is a significant problem, if not 

the most significant problem, is the budget execution issue. As I 

have said, the United States is no longer funding the recovery of 

Iraq, the reconstruction of Iraq. The $21 billion is largely spent. 

The burden of funding, a continuing recovery of that country rests 

squarely on the shoulders of the Government of Iraq. 
45

Last year they spent about 22 percent of their capital budget. 

That is not going to remedy the very real problems within their infrastructure that currently exists, and cause low output of oil, that 

cause low limited generation of power on the grid, and also——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But if I may, does that tie back to then a 

failed government system and with the leader who has been told, 

as I understand it, made aware of these fractures in his government? Is it not a question of leadership that we have now in Iraq? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think that moves into political and policy questions 

that are better directed at the State Department. My focus is on 

the economics, and the economic reality in Iraq is that funding is 

compellingly needed, urgently needed across the board to bolster a 

very weak infrastructure—that is continually attacked, by the way, 

by insurgents. 

I mean, you may have seen today in the paper the Baghdad grid 

was hit again. It is something we reported on repeatedly. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I have been there, and forgive me, I am 

going to go on to my next question. 

Mr. BOWEN. Okay. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will take that as a qualified yes, and I do 

respect the fact that you deal with the logistics. Let me just ask 

these series of questions, and then I will yield back to you for the 

answers. 

How much involved are the majors of our country in this whole 

question of the oil production and nonproduction? Frankly, that has 

given the Iraq War a bad name, that this was done only because 

of the majors, many of them that I represent, and I know the 

needs, that they were casting the die on this. Are they involved? 

Have they been training people, and what would be the reason for 

the resources not being moved as quickly as they should be? That 

is the oil resources. 

I wonder whether small and medium-sized businesses of the 

United States, have you seen any opportunities through the 

logistical process for them to really get their foothold? Would they 

be helpful? Would they be helpful for joint ventures? Have you seen 

any work along those lines? 

My next question is dealing with the utilities, electricity. That is 

one of the places—you just spoke about the grid. But again, would 

any help from our neighbors, Jordan and otherwise since they are 

close by, be effective in sort of getting electricity on more than 2 

hours a day beyond the violence? And you might speak to what we 

can do policy-wise to encourage the Ba’athists to be able to come 

back safely as civil servants maybe to help the logistical problems 

that you have just edified. 

Mr. BOWEN. Okay. With respect to the Ba’athists issue, again 

that is a question of policy for the State Department. I focus on economics. 

The electricity issue, 23 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was spent on electricity, and it is an area of continued emphasis, continued new work. It is the area of the largest 

amount of work that is left to be done in Iraq by the Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction Fund. 

The issue that SIGIR has focused on for a year is infrastructure 

insecurity, and that is the very grim reality that the 400 kv line, 
46

for example, from Beji to Baghdad is down more than it is up, that 

the Baghdad grid gets hit continuously, and as a result of that concerted effort the hours of power to Baghdad for the last 9 months 

have stayed between 4 and 6 hours. While it has been higher in 

other parts of the country, Baghdad, city of 7 million, survives 

largely on generators. There is a market that has grown across the 

city in the sale of generators. 

When I fly out of Baghdad at night in a Blackhawk, it looks like 

there is plenty of electricity, but it is not as much driven by the 

grid as by these generators. 

As to small and medium-sized businesses, I will need to get back 

to you with details, but I know that there was an effort within CPA 

contracting, and subsequently within Joint Contracting Command/

Iraq to address set asides and small business interests. The success 

of that, I will have to query the Joint Contracting Command/Iraq 

to get that, and I don’t have any information about major oil and 

gas company involvement in the oil sector. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. If by unanimous consent agreement if my good 

friend from Illinois would allow the gentleman from New Jersey to 

proceed for several minutes, it would be greatly appreciated. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Is that more than 5 minutes? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Go ahead. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank my friend for yielding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a meeting with a Muslim leader at 12:30, so I have 

just a few minutes. 

Let me just ask a couple of questions if I could. Thank you for 

your testimony. I am sorry to have missed some of it, like many 

members were out doing other things. I held a hearing last year 

on General George Casey’s statement or his rule dealing with the 

issue of foreign workers and trafficking, and as you recall, as a 

matter of fact one of the people we had testify was Colonel Robert 

Boyles from the Air Force who I think elaborated very well on what 

they planned to do to try to mitigate abuses of foreign workers. 

His order, frankly, called to ensure that all contracts include a 

termination without penalty, the return of passports issue was important because very often, as you know, they would take the passport. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. And that made that person pretty much stateless in 

terms of his or her ability to move around. It required prime and 

subcontracts to provide employees with a signed copy of their employment contract that defines the terms of their employment. It 

would also provide for sufficient and adequate living space as you 

recall. I am wondering how well or poorly that order is being carried out. 

And let me just say, parenthetically, that it is really a pleasure 

and an honor to see Hillel Weinberg who served with great distinction on this committee for decades, and all of us who knew him 

greatly respected him, so it is good to see you back, Hillel. 

Mr. BOWEN. I am fortunate to have him on my staff. 

Mr. SMITH. I know. I know. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 
47

Mr. SMITH. That is our loss, your gain. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. But please, if you could. 

Mr. BOWEN. It is a good question. It is one I ran into right away 

in 2004, when I got on the ground and really addressed it in the 

summer of 2004 with the Defense Contract Management Agency 

about the practices of a company called Tamani. I don’t know if you 

have run into that company. But it is a Kuwaiti company that was 

subcontracting with Kellogg Brown Root, and was doing exactly 

what you just described, and it was a challenging issue. There were 

some contentious matters, but I think we made progress then. Obviously we didn’t solve it because, as you have heard and just recited, that practice continues elsewhere. 

I don’t know about this particular order. I will need to follow up 

and do some research. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could because it is all about implementation. 

Mr. BOWEN. It is. 

Mr. SMITH. And it seems to me that from a force protection point 

of view, from the exploitation of the labor force point of view. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. I mean, it is a lose/lose everywhere if we don’t pay 

careful attention to this. The order was a fine order. It covered all 

the bases. It is just a matter of whether or not it is implemented. 

Mr. BOWEN. What was the date of that order? 

Mr. SMITH. April 2006; we also had a hearing on it, and frankly, 

the answers that were given, while they were well meaning, were 

not availing in terms of how this was going to be rolled out. The 

35,000 foreign workers is no small number of people, and the recruiters, the brokers in Jordan and elsewhere were doing a job of 

tricking, deceiving, lying, and sometimes coercing, but especially 

defrauding individuals into thinking that this is what it would be 

like once they got to Baghdad or some other point in Iraq. Only to 

find that the pay was nowhere near what they were promised, and 

they were working pretty much in involuntary servitude and slavelike conditions in some cases. 

So the order is right. Whether or not it is being implemented remains the issue. 

Mr. BOWEN. And who signed that order? 

Mr. SMITH. Casey. 

Mr. BOWEN. Casey. 

Mr. SMITH. And Colonel Boyles was one of those who implemented it or began implementing it. 

And I have asked some questions before. Still haven’t gotten the 

answers, and it seems to me the money should——

Mr. BOWEN. We will follow up. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

And if we could make that part of the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. I appreciate your perseverance. I 

don’t know why you do it except you love America with a deep and 

intense passion to help people. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. That is why. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I read through your testimony. I am sorry that 

I wasn’t here. The Congressional Research Service did a memo-
48

randum on the money, and there are so many programs going on 

you wonder, are the bureaucrats sucking up all the money? Then 

they have to file reports as to where the money is going, and you 

wonder how much gets down to the individuals. 

But let me recall, I was at a recent meeting, and an administration official whose name escapes me was very excited. He said 

Americans can look forward to buying Iraqi-made manufacturing 

items, and he said that—I mean, he was really excited. He doesn’t 

represent Winnebago County, Illinois, which has lost 14,000 manufacturing jobs, and has the highest percentage of manufacturing 

jobs per capita for any county in excess of 250,000, with the exception of Wayne County, which is Detroit. 

I spend most of my time on manufacturing issues. I had heard 

from General Petraeus some time before the surge began that the 

United States was going to spend resources trying to restart Iraq’s 

manufacturing sector. I noticed nothing mentioned manufacturing 

in the CRS report, nothing in particular in your testimony. What 

can you tell me about that? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it is a multi-front effort to try and get the private sector manufacturing—and state-owned enterprises, frankly—

restarted, and it has been a 4-year challenge. There is a new initiative, relatively new, that has been ongoing out of the Pentagon 

under Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul Brinkley’s leadership to try and engage the start up of Iraqi factories wherein the 

Department of Defense purchase some of the output of it, and also 

trying to connect up United States businesses to be partnerships. 

Mr. MANZULLO. To import? 

Mr. BOWEN. He told me in his last trip, I saw him last week, that 

there are four factories that he has gotten going and he has 

planned to bring 20 more on line. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Who is it that you are talking about? 

Mr. BOWEN. This is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. MANZULLO. And who is that? 

Mr. BOWEN. Paul Brinkley, for business transformation. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I would very much like to know, and the American people would like to know and my manufacturers and factory 

workers would like to know——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. MANZULLO [continuing]. If the United States is rebuilding 

factories in Iraq, training people to work in those factories to manufacture items in order to sell them back to the people of the 

United States. I think that is outrageous. If that is the goal, this 

is an outrage because there are enough people in Iraq to buy their 

own products, and enough countries out there that should be helping us out to buy those products. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right now he is facilitating the process, not, I am 

told, spending U.S. dollars to do it. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Well, he is spending his time on it. 

Mr. BOWEN. No, I think——

Mr. MANZULLO. And he has a staff——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. MANZULLO [continuing]. And his energy. I would like to meet 

with him. Do you work with him as part of your job? 

Mr. BOWEN. I meet with him. I don’t work directly with him. 
49

Mr. MANZULLO. Is there anybody here from the State Department that works with Mr. Brinkley? 

Mr. BOWEN. He is from the Department of Defense. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Department of Defense. 

Mr. BOWEN. But I can provide you his contact information. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I would very much like to talk to him. 

Mr. BOWEN. Okay. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I would like you to furnish me, if possible, any 

documentation involving the restart of manufacturing in Iraq. I 

don’t recall that before the war we imported that much from Iraq, 

but I think it is absolutely stupid to think that the way to reconstruct manufacturing in Iraq is to provide markets for Iraqi-made 

goods here. Doesn’t that sound strange when there are enough 

countries in the world that are next door, that you don’t have to 

worry about transportation, and enough people in Iraq to buy the 

products themselves? 

I want to know what these products are. I want to know the competition with stuff made in America. Those are valid questions, 

don’t you think? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Don’t you think it would be outrageous for American to build Iraqi factories that we perhaps bombed, and then to 

turn around and create more competition, and then to have the 

prices somehow finessed so that Americans could be buying cheaper stuff in order to rebuild capacity in Iraq, and for how long would 

that go on? 

How could a manufacturing sector be reconstituted if it depends 

upon exports? 

Mr. BOWEN. I will provide you his contact information. I am sure 

he will be glad to come give you a briefing on what he is doing. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Could you do that? And who is from DoD here? 

Anybody here from DoD? 

Okay. Well, I asked some good questions, didn’t I, Mr. Chairman? Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you have anymore questions, Mr. Manzullo? 

Mr. MANZULLO. No. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. We will give you all the time you want. 

Mr. MANZULLO. You know, I live all my life in factories and trying to keep manufacturing here. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. No, but I would just note that I think we did rebuild some factories in Europe after the war. I understand your 

point, and I think you know that I am an advocate for——

Mr. MANZULLO. Right. Little bit different situation. Why would 

administrative officials say Americans will look forward to buying 

goods made in Iraq? Why didn’t he talk about the other countries 

of the world buying Iraqi products? Just a thought. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, we will take your thought and reflect on it. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Jim Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

It is indeed timely that we have this briefing this morning, or 

now into the afternoon with regards to how taxpayers’ dollars in 

our country have been spent on Iraq, and obviously there is a lot 

of concern. 
50

By your own report that I have here, as you noted Congress ap- propriated $21 billion in the Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and 

as you state today, more than 98 percent of those taxpayers’ dollars 

have been obligated, more than 84 percent have been expended. 

Much has been discussed this morning about corruption and the 

challenges with corruption and these dollars, these hard-earned 

American taxpayer dollars that have been allocated for the reconstruction purpose. 

Last night I was in an interesting meeting with the Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, and we had a wide-ranging discussion, 

but one of the questions I put to him was how much progress we 

could expect in the next 6 months, in the next 12 months in terms 

of this Iraqi Government gaining not only further stability but 

making good on its promises to not to spend on the militias, but 

to get reconstruction going, getting the economy going when, in my 

opinion based upon my visits and everything that I have read, corruption continues to be, if not endemic, a way of life. 

And he responded and got animated, and I don’t want to put 

words in his mouth, but that corruption was perhaps, in his opinion, the greatest, if not the, one of the greatest problems that they 

were dealing with, and he went on to further explain that it wasn’t 

just corruption within their own segments of the economy and 

within the government, but corruption within American contractors 

as well, and how contracts were issued. 

I would like to ask, as the Inspector General, whether you have 

been able to place any handle. I mean, we are now being asked to 

put another $3.5 billion with this supplemental if we get it approved, and I hope we do even though I have certain issues, but 

I still think we have to fund our troops, nonetheless what percentage of corruption have you been able to discern out of the $21 billion of taxpayers’ dollars that we have appropriated, and any other 

monies that have been expended either by our allies or by the Iraqi 

Government revenues itself? Do you have any handle on this? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. We are focused on that issue, and we have 78 

ongoing cases and 28 of them are at the Department of Justice 

under prosecution now. 

The fact is there is a distinction between levels of corruption that 

is very substantial. 

Mr. COSTA. Of course. 

Mr. BOWEN. On the Iraqi side——

Mr. COSTA. There is little corruption, mid-sized corruption, big 

corruption. 

Mr. BOWEN. I am talking about the difference between corruption 

on the Iraqi side and the United States side. 

Mr. COSTA. And corruption on our side. Okay. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. On the Iraqi side, it is endemic, as you said, 

and it is upwards of $5 billion annually, and something that the 

anti-corruption entities in Iraq are having a very difficult time 

making any progress on. 

On the U.S. side, based on our work to date corruption has not 

been a significant component—fraud I am talking about—of the 

United States/Iraq reconstruction experience. As I said earlier, over 

the course of this year we expect to see more cases coming forward 

so that picture will become——
51

Mr. COSTA. But these 27 cases you made reference to, they are 

looking at corruption? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. COSTA. And these are American contracts? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTA. And so we don’t as of this point then yet clearly 

know—I mean, we know what those companies did, how much 

their contract was allocate for, I suspect, in dollars. 

Mr. BOWEN. Right. We have a whole variety of allegations, some 

large, some small. But as I said, to date based on what we have 

accomplished, what has been done, the U.S. component of corruption, the component within the U.S. program is relatively small. 

Mr. COSTA. Do you include—I don’t want to say cost overruns, 

but their way of padding, padding costs. 

Mr. BOWEN. That falls under waste, I think, but we do have 

cases that verge from waste into fraud, and we are looking at 

those, but at the same time our audits and our inspections more 

demonstrably note that waste has been a problem. 

Mr. COSTA. And when can you delineate for the committee a better handle in terms of the actual numbers, both as it relates to 

fraud and waste both Iraqi and United States? 

Mr. BOWEN. Our investigations are ripening, and I think through 

the course of this year we will have information we can provide 

publicly to you about progress on those. 

On the waste front, we are engaging, pursuant to our extended 

mandate in the 2006 Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act, to 

pursue a forensic audit-like review of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and we are doing that by doing audits of major 

contractors and sectors. Our first report will be out in the next 

quarter on Bechtel. We have ongoing reviews of Blackwater, Parsons, DynCorp, and we have others in the queue. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired but this is something that 

I believe that the committee needs to continue to follow on and to 

get a timely report so that we can get a better handle on the level 

of corruption and waste that is taking place both on the Iraqi side 

and within United States companies as well. Clearly, we have 

enough challenges in Iraq as it is today without adding to the problems that waste and fraud create as we are trying to make things 

right there. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman, and I would defer to the 

ranking member if she has any additional questions or comments. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Delahunt. As you 

pointed out, you have already delved on this issue in your subcommittee and done a good job of that, and we commend again a 

wonderful Inspector General for the great work that he has done. 

Thank you, Mr. Bowen. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And just let me echo those sentiments. As I have 

stated on multiple occasions, Mr. Bowen, you have been terrific. 

You have done terrific service for your country. With the addition 

of Mr. Weinberg, you enhance the professionalism of your staff, and 

let me make a final request. 
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I intend to ask Mr. Ackerman, who chairs the Middle East Subcommittee, to examine, to conduct a hearing in conjunction with 

my subcommittee into the hydrocarbon act as it is currently constituted, and since oil revenue, as you indicate, amounts to 94 percent of the revenue source for the Iraqi Government to operate and 

reconstruct, we would like to know as much about the hydrocarbon 

act as we can so that at some point in time in the future we can 

speak about it, and discuss it among ourselves or obviously in a 

public forum as well so that we are not blind-sided by possible suggestions or accusations that this is all about oil, big oil, and that 

was the motivation to go into Iraq. 

I don’t know if that is within your purview, but if you could provide the committee with appropriate names and contact information that representatives of the administrative who might have 

those answers could give us, I think we would welcome that. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir, I will do that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. And with that we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this important hearing. May I also 

thank the Ranking Member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and welcome our distinguished witness, Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. I look forward to your testimony, which I hope will provide us with important insights into 

the status of reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, in 2003 the Bush administration chose to invade Iraq without laying out a clear and realistic plan for reconstructing the nation after the conflict. 

This administration incorrectly predicted that the reconstruction of post-Saddam 

Hussein Iraq would be quick, easy, and financed by Iraq’s own resources. Instead, 

the rebuilding of Iraq’s infrastructure, devastated by years of war, sanctions, 

Saddam’s depredations, and the looting and chaos that followed his overthrow has 

proven difficult and costly. 

Even before the invasion, many Democratic members of the Republican-controlled 

Congress warned of the likelihood of a bleak post-war landscape in Iraq. We stood 

on the floor of the House and warned of the enormous destruction and the potential 

astronomical costs to reconstruction, and advocated a clear rebuilding plan be outlined if armed conflict was deemed necessary. 

Now that ill-conceived invasion has occurred, and Iraq’s political and economic infrastructure is mortally wounded, we have a responsibility to not leave Iraq in 

ruins. To date, we have appropriated over $35 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq 

as part of a large-scale assistance program. Initial estimates of the total cost of reconstruction, placed at $55 billion, failed to take into account the significant costs 

of instability and security needs that have arisen in the years following 2003; these 

estimates are likely to fall well short of the eventual total. 

Actual assistance has been focused primarily on three sectors. Approximately 44% 

of reconstruction funds have gone to security assistance, largely used to train and 

equip Iraqi security forces. About 33% has been used to build infrastructure, for 

projects including roads, sanitation, electric power, and oil production. The remaining 23% has been used to fund a range of programs to offer expert advice to the 

Iraqi government, establish business centers, and to provide school books and vaccinations. 

Since FY2003, U.S. foreign aid appropriations for Iraq have mostly come through 

annual emergency supplemental bills. Iraq has not yet proven itself capable of paying for its own reconstruction, though Iraqi funds, largely derived from oil export 

profits, have been employed to cover the ‘‘normal’’ operating costs of the Iraqi government, and, when sufficient amounts are available, have been used to address reconstruction needs. Other nations have also contributed to the stabilization effort, 

with pledges from foreign donors amounting to around $15.2 billion in grants and 

loans, of which about $3.8 billion had been disbursed as of August 2006. 

There have been a number of problems with the distribution of this aid. Because 

of the involvement of multiple authorities and agencies, the assistance program has 

been plagued with problems of coordination. This Congress has attempted to address these concerns, and both versions of the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations have called for appointment of a Coordinator for Iraq Assistance. I 

firmly believe we must continue to work to rectify this serious concern. 

Perhaps the biggest ongoing challenge to reconstruction efforts is the dismal security situation in Iraq. Instability and violence severely slow the pace of construction, 

and are responsible for the destruction of already completed projects such as pipelines and power lines. Major project costs have been increased by 8% to 17% to cover 

security needs, causing a significantly higher burden to American taxpayers. The 

former chairman of the International Reconstruction Fund recently lamented the 

current state of violence, stating ‘‘I have no real expectation that Iraq can be reconstituted as a viable entity. . . . How could reconstruction efforts succeed embedded 

in chaos?’’

Unfortunately, security concerns are not the only thing hampering reconstruction 

efforts. Another key issue is that of corruption, which is pervasive in the Iraqi government and continues to hinder Iraq’s ability to pay for its own future reconstruction. According to a draft study from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 

between 100,000 and 300,000 barrels of oil per day over the past four years are unaccounted for and are likely being diverted by corrupt officials or insurgents. In an 

effort to combat this serious problem, the U.S. Embassy recently established an Office of Accountability and Transparency to coordinate multiple anticorruption efforts. 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is an important 

component to the reconstruction of Iraq. The SIGIR has been instrumental in pro-
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viding information on the successes and failures of our rebuilding projects, and has 

revealed unsatisfactory performance by various contractors employed in the reconstruction effort. I urge my colleagues in this Congress to work to clarify the status 

of the SIGIR over FY2007 appropriations. 

Mr. Chairman, over four years have past since the invasion of Iraq. We owe it 

to our troops, who continue to fight tirelessly on behalf of the American people, to 

offer a workable solution to this question of reconstruction. They won the war that 

they were sent to fight. Now it is time for us to decide how the reconstruction efforts 

will be administered as well as how we are going to pay for them. Our troops have 

earned the right to return home and be reunited with their families and loved ones. 

I urge my colleagues to join me in doing everything we can to ensure that the Iraq 

we leave is secure and stable. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

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