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NASA’S SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 8, 2004 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Breaux ................................................................................. 28

Statement of Senator Brownback ........................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 26

Statement of Senator Lott ...................................................................................... 24

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 2

WITNESSES

O’Keefe, Hon. Sean, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Stafford, Lieutenant General Thomas P., U.S. Air Force (Retired), Co-Chairman, Return to Flight Task Group; accompanied by Joseph W. Cuzzupoli, 

Member, Return to Flight Task Group .............................................................. 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16

APPENDIX

McCain, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from Arizona, prepared statement ................ 41

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to: 

Hon. Sean O’Keefe ............................................................................................ 41

Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford ......................................................... 47

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NASA’S SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback,

presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,

U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good morning. I call the hearing to order. 

I want to thank the Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Committee Chairman for holding this hearing on NASA’s Space 

Shuttle Program. Chairman McCain will be in, I think, in about a 

half an hour or 45 minutes to chair the hearing. Until that time, 

I’ll be chairing it. 

Before I begin, I understand that the recent hurricanes in Florida did significant damage to our space facilities there. I saw an 

article in this morning’s paper, and I want you to know that I 

share the concerns for NASA’s people and programs in Florida, and 

I offer my full support in our efforts to recover from the damage, 

Mr. Administrator, on that, and to all Floridians. I think we all 

watched that storm come in, the storm the size of Texas over Florida, and were just amazed at the power and the destructive capacity, and we’ll want to hear about what that has as its impact. But 

our first and foremost concern is for the people, and we hope and 

pray that they’re safe and sound and will be able to recover, as well 

as for all Floridians. And we’ll hear from Senator Nelson here in 

a minute who can give us more personalized details of what’s been 

taking place. 

The Space Shuttle is a magnificent machine, and it’s clear that 

the dedicated and talented people at NASA are doing their best to 

return it to flight. I am concerned, though, to be sure, about the 

schedule and the cost of this return, and that’s what I want to particularly focus on in this hearing this morning. I’m confident that, 

with enough money and time, we will succeed, but the more we 

spend on this legacy system, the more we mortgage our future. 

I believe in the Administration’s space exploration program. I believe space offers enormous opportunity for our people. I’m concerned that our economic and military competitors around the 

world are breathing down our neck in space. This is one competition we can’t afford to lose. Every dollar spent on space exploration 

must be spent extremely wisely. 

2

As the Space Shuttle Return to Flight costs mount and schedules 

become less certain, the time has come to find alternatives, I believe, to the Shuttle. As I’ve said before, we are never going to realize the benefits of space without full mobilization of all the assets 

that we have available to us as a country, including the private 

sector. A number of private concerns, including some of the Nation’s largest aerospace firms, have told me they have affordable, 

near-term options to offload some, and perhaps all, of the Space 

Shuttle’s launch requirements. 

In previous testimony, NASA said it hasn’t considered alternatives to the Space Shuttle for completing and maintaining the 

Space Station. Yet recent external studies, such as one done by the 

Planetary Society, suggests that as few as 10 to 12 Shuttle flights, 

and not 30, as the plan now stands, could suffice to complete the 

Space Station if alternative means of access are also used. 

For these reasons, I’ve asked, in concert with my House colleagues, for a GAO analysis of these issues. I helped commission 

the Congressional Budget Office to study the issue of space exploration costs. They tell me that the President’s Space Exploration 

Program is affordable within the money we’ve budgeted, provided 

we come to grips with an affordable launch system. Meanwhile, 

every day we focus our resources to maintain the current Shuttle 

infrastructure is a day we delay our people’s exploration and expansion into the solar system. 

This is an important issue. I look forward to hearing NASA’s information today about the program, because we do want to see 

what it is it’s costing us and what the time-frame is going to be 

on Return to Flight on the Space Shuttle, and is there a way for 

us to be able to go to fewer flights and then move those resources 

into Moon, Mars, and beyond in the manned space program. 

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to turn the program over to the—

podium over to Senator Bill Nelson. And, again, our condolences to 

all of Florida and all Floridians for Hurricane Frances and, as I understand, maybe another one coming through. 

Senator Nelson? 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, if I’m a little blunt, you will please understand 

that I have been dealing with hurricanes for the last four and a 

half weeks, and, as reflective of Floridians, our patience is wearing 

thin. Even though there has been a magnificent response and lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew, where one level of government was not talking to the other level of government, those lessons were learned, and the response has been very good, but some 

of the damage that was done is illustrative of mistakes that have 

been made. 

And I specifically want to take this opportunity, while we have 

the Administrator here, with regard to the damage at the Kennedy 

Space Center. As, no doubt, you will share with this Committee, at 

least a thousand panels were lost from the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). These are large panels, panels usually 10x4 feet, in one 

other section, a major section was lost. Why? It’s simply because 

3

NASA has been robbing Peter to pay Paul, because NASA has not 

had the increases that it has needed to do an ambitious space program, and you can’t do spaceflight on the cheap. And so NASA, in 

order to try to do everything it wants to do, takes away from 

where? Maintenance of facilities. And in the corrosive salt air of an 

ocean launch site, you’re going to have degradation of facilities. 

And I think we’re beginning to see that. And the VAB is an example. 

And fortunately, no hardware, per the briefing that I had from 

Jim Kennedy, who is the director of the Kennedy Space Center—

no hardware was harmed, but you’ve basically got a thousand panels off, which means you’ve got a thousand windows open if this 

next hurricane were to come. And what kind of damage would that 

do to the VAB and our ability to stack the spacecraft vertically, 

which is where that’s done—in the VAB? But there were more 

problems. 

Now, fortunately, in the three Orbiter Processing Facilities, there 

was no damage. But the fact is that power went out. And in Discovery that’s being prepared in OPF number three, power went out. 

Why? Why was there not the generator capacity there that would 

kick in when the power went out? And although it does not appear 

that there was any damage to the spacecraft or Discovery’s preparation, is this, again, another example of robbing Peter to pay Paul 

over the last decade that does not give us the maintenance? 

Now, what we’re talking about is nothing new. We’ve been talking about this for years. But it’s an allocation of resources, and I 

think it’s finally coming home that Florida is a place that is threatened by windstorms, and we’d better get it right. 

And then there was the question of the building that housed 

major computers as a computer center, that did sustain significant 

damage on the roof. And, again, why is a computer nerve center 

housed in a building that is not constructed to withstand hurricane-force winds? 

Now, eerily, the track of Ivan is forecasted to come right over 

Western Cuba. Does that sound similar to a hurricane three and 

a half weeks ago named Charley? And if it takes a jog to the right, 

like Charley did, in Southwest Florida, coming right across the 

State of Florida—and Lord help us that this does not occur—but 

it would be headed straight for the Kennedy Space Center. 

In the last one, the winds—Charley—only brushed the north end 

of the Space Center, since it exited at Daytona Beach. But, even 

so, KSC suffered $750,000 worth of damage. So in this $2 billion 

that we passed last night that’s just for FEMA, that’s nothing for 

NASA. And in the $2.5 billion dollars additional that I have requested of the President to request for Department of Agriculture 

and FEMA and Department of Defense and Department of Commerce, is any of that going to go to NASA? I think we’d better 

make our requests known and get serious about our budget for 

NASA in the future. The space program is too important to every 

American that it be successful, and we’ve got to stop robbing Peter 

to pay Paul. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. As I said at the outset, our 

thoughts and prayers go out for the Floridians. 

4

We have two people on the panel, the Honorable Sean O’Keefe, 

Administrator of NASA, and Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford, U.S. Air Force (Retired), Co-Chairman of the Return to Flight 

Task Force. Gentlemen, we look forward to both your testimony. 

Administrator O’Keefe, let’s take your comments and your testimony first. Thank you for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN O’KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Senator Nelson, Senator Lott, pleasure to see you, as well. 

And I’ve got a statement for the record I’ll submit and just briefly summarize it——

Senator BROWNBACK. And it’ll be put in the record. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Appreciate the opportunity to appear before the 

Committee, along with General Tom Stafford, to discuss our efforts 

to return the Shuttle to flight and raise the bar on all of our mission operations. 

Right after the Columbia accident, I certainly had the opportunity, in a joint session of this Committee and the House Science 

Committee, to pledge that we would find the cause of the Columbia

accident, correct the problems we find, and return the Shuttles to 

flight. And we’re doing just that. 

I’m pleased to report today about the tangible progress we’re 

making toward achieving those milestone-driven Return to Flight 

goals, and we are accomplishing those as we move along here. 

It is—all the members of the NASA family, I think, have been 

constantly diligent, which is the minimum price of admission for 

conducting research and exploration on behalf of the American 

public. Throughout NASA, we have had many examples of diligence 

and deliberate action we’ve taken to improve the conditions of all 

three Shuttle orbiters and to minimize the risk associated with 

flight. 

We’ve conditionally closed five of the 15 recommendations of the 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board; and the Return to Flight 

Task Group, co-chaired by General Stafford, and his Co-Chair, as 

well, Dick Covey, who was the pilot on the Return to Flight effort 

after Challenger, have concurred in those five of 15 recommendations at this point. 

The Stafford-Covey Task Group are all external experts, they are 

dedicated professionals, and we are incredibly grateful to them for 

all the time and effort they’ve put into assuring that we remain 

diligent in this particular task. They, probably more than any other 

collection of folks, are looking forward to Return to Flight so they 

can return to their day jobs on a regular basis, but they are dedicating a tremendous amount of time right now to assure that we 

have looked at every option and that we’re selecting the best options as we move forward in order to meet the recommendations 

of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. 

We’re making progress on the remaining ten Return to Flight 

recommendations, and hope to close them out by year’s end. But, 

again, we’ll look at how we track on that and what the response 

is from the Stafford-Covey Task Group. 

5

Throughout the agency, we’re striving to transform the culture 

and the organization so that all employees are empowered to speak 

up on issues impacting mission safety, as well as our approach to 

how we return to flight. In an agency-wide initiative, the outstanding engineers serving in our 1-year-old NASA Engineering 

and Safety Center, located at the Langley Research Center, are 

also providing us many good approaches to improving decisionmaking and risk-management process and looking at the trend 

analysis that, I think, was so carefully articulated by the Accident 

Investigation Board, as well. 

We’re vetting options now to establish the independent technical 

authority to oversee the technical standards and requirements. And 

the board recommended that we develop a plan. Our intent is to 

develop that plan and implement it before Return to Flight. And, 

again, our colleagues on the Stafford-Covey Task Group are being 

very diligent about assuring we pick the very best option to proceed 

with that. But we’re really being more ambitious than even what 

the Board had recommended at that time in order to assure that 

we get this right. 

We’ve begun restructuring our engineering functions, with a 

focus on providing rigorous independent oversight of the technical 

work performed by all of our programs. And specifically for the 

Shuttle program, we’ve expanded the responsibility and the authority of the Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and Integration Office to improve the internal communications and coordination of all 

the technical issues resolved. 

The Space Shuttle program has added the NASA Engineering 

and Safety Center and plans to add the independent technical authority to formal boards and the Shuttle Mission Management 

Team to assure broader independent evaluation of critical decisions 

as they’re rendered. These are just a few examples of the numerous 

changes that are ongoing throughout the Shuttle program, and the 

agency overall, to strengthen the culture, improve how we’re organized, to enhance our ability to perform the mission while focusing 

on the imperative that we do it as safely as we can. 

Throughout this process, we’ve regularly informed Congress 

about the Return to Flight activities. There have been six revisions 

to the implementation plan that we first initiated back after the 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board report was issued on the 

26th of August of last year. And since that time, each iteration and 

update we’ve released includes not only the updated analysis, but 

also an estimated Return to Flight cost. 

The current cost estimates provided to the Committee in late 

July take into account all currently known potential costs and, certainly at this particular juncture, that’s what our best estimate is 

of what it’s going to take to move ahead. The prepared statement 

goes through that in detail. And, Mr. Chairman, as you’ve alluded, 

we’ll get into that, I think, in much greater detail in our discussion 

here. 

It’s possible that this estimate will change. It certainly will as we 

continue to move forward and address new challenges as they arise 

after the first two flights. The estimated cost right now of Return 

to Flight activities for this coming fiscal year is $643 million for 

6

2005. Currently, we’re projecting $465 million for the current fiscal 

year as we close out here in the next 3 weeks ahead. 

These estimates reflect factors—let me just quickly move 

through. As a result of our efforts to meet the recommendations of 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board we’ve continued to 

identify safety-related issues that require additional work, and 

each of those have been identified in turn. We’re undertaking 

major modification on all three of the Shuttle orbiters simultaneously. Typically, we do that one at a time and heel-toe that process over the course of several years. We’re doing all three now. 

Since they are all down and will remain in a no-fly status until 

such time as the Accident Investigation Board recommendations 

are met, we’re using that time now in order to assure that we’ve 

torn down every one of the orbiters and reconstructed it to the 

standards we believe are necessary to meet those recommendations. 

We’re addressing a number of technical requirements up front, 

resulting in the front-loading of many activities in many instances, 

yet demonstrating, again, the diligence based on the experience, as 

well as, again, the constant expert advice we’re receiving from the 

Stafford-Covey Task Group. 

Because of the diligence, we’re introducing a higher level of engineering and technical rigor in all the safety and engineering processes and practices, and many potential flight risks have been reevaluated and, in some cases, mitigated. We will never eliminate 

the risk of spaceflight. Never. Our intent here is to try to do much 

better than what we’ve seen in the past and to eliminate as many 

of the known obstacles toward those safety objectives as we can do. 

Across the board, our flight hardware is now subject to a greater 

level of test, tear-down, inspection, repair, and certification for 

flight, and not all of them are going to be met for those particular 

cases. We’re doing the best we can in order to assure that we’ve 

gone through all the major modifications for all three of the orbiters simultaneously to assure the best condition we can. And all the 

elements—of reassessing the adequacy of industrial processes, safety controls, integrated hazard analyses, and flight hardware test 

protocols—all those are being met. 

Along the way, I think, as Senator Nelson referred to, we’ve also 

had to wrestle with the challenges of acts of nature. And, as a consequence, this particular latest example of this with Hurricane 

Frances has been a really challenging problem. I think, as the Senator referred to, there are a number of cases in which the damage, 

particularly on the Vehicle Assembly Building, or the VAB, has lost 

the better part of a thousand panels. And, you’re exactly right on 

the estimates of what’s involved there, in terms of how extensive 

that damage is. That is—been a rather extended effort that will be 

required in order to replace that in the time ahead, and we’re just 

now in the process of evaluating what will be required there. 

We’ve also lost the Tile Repair Facility and the—for the thermal 

blankets and so forth that are constructed in those particular 

shops. The roofs have caved in, in a couple of those cases. And so, 

as a result, that’s going to require some readjustment of that workload either at Houston or back at Palmdale, one or the other. We’ll 

7

figure that out here in the very short time ahead. And this is the—

what’s remaining of the Tile Repair Facility itself. 

That said, as bad as the damage was—I think Senator Nelson 

got it exactly right—all three of the orbiters—Atlantis, Discovery, and Endeavor—went through this particular hurricane unscathed. 

No water damage. The facilities were battened down all the way 

through, as well as all the hardware for the International Space 

Station. That has been preserved, as well. So there are a number 

of different cases that came out of this about as well as could be 

expected, given the ferocity of the hurricane-force winds that came 

through, as well as the water damage that was encountered. 

So all things considered, Jim Kennedy and the Kennedy Space 

Center Team did an absolutely splendid job, in my estimation, of 

preparing for the worst, anticipating the worst, and riding through 

what was really a hellacious event that, fortunately, we came 

through it with all the orbiters preserved. 

What this will mean in terms of our current schedule, I don’t 

know. We’re still assessing that right now, and it’s been no more 

than 48 hours past the initial assessment, and we’ll determine that 

in very short order. And we’re working with our friends within the 

Administration to determine exactly what the impact of that will 

be, and what the consequences should be, for the upcoming efforts. 

That’s underway immediately. So we’re doing the best we can, 

given the 48-hour time span that has already elapsed. 

Let me just summarize a couple of quick points, as well. We’ve 

provided, again, the six different versions of the Implementation 

Plan for the Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond. Each of 

those are updates of the previous position, just to make sure that 

everybody is aware of exactly where we are. And the latest one was 

issued not more than 10 days ago. 

The words for the title of the plan, Implementation Plan for 

Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, were carefully chosen. 

With the new Vision for Space Exploration announced by the President in January, the Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle and the 

completion of the International Space Station are the first major 

steps in order to accomplish that Vision objective. It’s a compelling 

plan for exploration. It will take our pioneers and robotic explorers 

back to the Moon and on with Mars and beyond, and the value that 

we will gain by completion of the International Space Station will 

contribute to that particular effort. It is the first step in what the 

President directed us to do. 

In pursuing the Vision on behalf of the American public, NASA 

will explore answers to fundamental questions of importance to 

science and society, develop revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future, while doing our best to maintain our stewardship along the way. I think the American people are inspired 

by the current exploration activities, which go to the heart of what 

the Vision is all about. The President got it right. The Columbia

Accident Investigation Board called for a spirit of debate. We got 

one. The President released that on January 14th, and the budget 

to support that has been submitted to the Congress, and we await 

the action on the part of the Congress to support it, as well. 

This very day, NASA is attempting and helping to carry out that 

torch of exploration forward through missions taking place in orbit 

8

around Saturn, on the surface of Mars, in Earth’s orbit aboard the 

International Space Station with Expedition 9. And in about 2 

hours over the skies of Utah, when we will conduct a daring helicopter capture of the Genesis mission capsule containing the first 

solar-wind particles to be returned to Earth for study. Hopefully, 

we will get a report on that before hearing’s end. 

In summary, we’re now focused throughout the agency on the 

painstaking work that it will take in order to return the Shuttle 

to flight operations. We’re moving forward with a great sense of responsibility and determination. And due to all the steps we’ve 

taken, we’re optimistic that we’re on track for returning the Space 

Shuttle to flight next spring. The STS–114 mission, which is commanded by Air Force Colonel Eileen Collins, her second command 

and her fifth flight, will be our next step, following continued construction of the International Space Station. And, of course, we’ll 

fly only when we’re absolutely certain we’ve taken the necessary 

steps to assure that we’ve met all the recommendations, again, to 

our satisfaction, which should be the highest bar that will be established. 

And, again, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I 

thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Keefe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN O’KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

appear today to discuss the status of NASA’s Space Shuttle Return to Flight (RTF) 

effort. When the President visited NASA Headquarters on January 14, 2004, and 

announced the Vision for Space Exploration, he presented a bold and forward thinking vision that is affordable and achievable. He stated that the first order of business is to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practicable, so that 

we can complete assembly of the International Space Station (ISS), focus Station research on supporting exploration goals, and fulfill the commitments to our International Partners. These are the first steps on the journey to fulfill the Vision for 

Space Exploration. 

As the loss of Columbia and her crew reminded us, working in space is inherently 

risky. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, ably led by Admiral Harold 

Gehman, recognized the risks associated with operating the Space Shuttle and made 

its recommendations consistent with an overriding safety objective. NASA recognizes these risks and is working to mitigate them, while moving forward to accomplish our missions. 

Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to focus on the two key elements in our 

progress to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight: (1) our cultural and organizational changes, and (2) our technical solutions. The Gehman Report indicated that 

systemic cultural and organizational shortcomings contributed as much to the Columbia accident as any technical failure. NASA brought in outside experts to conduct an in-depth assessment and to identify areas where we can change our culture 

and organization to improve decision-making, risk management, and communications. Recommended changes have been progressively implemented, and we are 

pleased with the progress achieved through the efforts of the NASA Team. We understand that addressing these elements, along with fixing the technical issues that 

led to the Columbia accident are critical to improving our standards and performance. 

Our decision-making and risk management processes have been enhanced 

through the establishment of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) at 

Langley Research Center. The NESC’s purpose is to provide independent technical 

expertise for engineering, safety, and mission assurance to augment the capabilities 

inherent in NASA’s programs. In addition, NASA began restructuring its engineering functions with particular focus on providing independent oversight of the technical work performed by the programs and improving technical standards. We are 

working through options to implement an Independent Technical Authority (ITA) for 

9

approval of waivers to technical standards and requirements. The Board recommendations urged that we develop a plan for ITA—we are seeking to implement 

the plan before Return to Flight. Within the Space Shuttle Program Office, NASA 

expanded the responsibility and authority of the Space Shuttle Systems Engineering 

and Integration Office to improve internal communications and coordination of technical issue resolution. The Space Shuttle program has added the NESC to formal 

boards and the Mission Management Team to assure a broader, independent evaluation of critical decisions. These are just a few examples of the numerous changes 

that are ongoing throughout the Space Shuttle program and the agency to strengthen our culture, improve how we are organized, and enhance our ability to perform 

our mission while focusing on safety first. 

When we began developing our RTF plan, we understood the technical solutions 

to the challenges we faced would evolve over time. There were no predetermined answers coming out of the Board’s recommendations, little prior experience to guide 

us, and no easy fixes. We put our best engineers on the job and our best managers 

in key positions to ensure that the Shuttle would be as safe as reasonably possible 

when it flew again. We have pursued multiple paths for some of the solutions in 

order to maintain our forward momentum. We have rescheduled the launch window 

several times to reflect achievement of milestones rather than have the schedule 

drive our planning. We have not allowed the budget to dictate the answer to any 

of the safety issues we faced. We have gone beyond the scope of the Board’s recommendations to make changes and improvements to ensure out best efforts. All of 

this has cost more than the original estimate because at that time we could not 

identify the technical solutions needed. 

Shortly after the Board issued its report, we issued NASA’s Implementation Plan 

for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, in September 2003. We announced 

that we would update the plan regularly to reflect on-going development. On August 

30, 2004, we issued the latest update, the sixth revision of the Plan. Throughout 

the past year these revisions report up-to-date status. This plan details the current 

tasks and cost estimates for RTF activities to safely return the Space Shuttle to 

flight. In addition to providing updates on NASA’s progress toward RTF, the implementation plan recognizes the importance of RTF as the first step toward the longterm goals of exploration outlined in the Vision for Space Exploration. The updated 

implementation plan shows that NASA continues to make progress in all efforts to 

make the Shuttle safer. The revised schedule for implementing the Board’s recommendations demonstrates that NASA has a deliberate approach for achieving all 

necessary milestones required to close each action item. 

We have pursued our RTF plans in a purposeful manner, our progress has been 

steady, and we are optimistic that the launch of Discovery will occur during the 

window of opportunity in March through April next year. However, our RTF plans 

continue to be based on accomplishing milestones and are not driven by meeting a 

specific launch window. Consistent with this approach, NASA will comply with all 

fifteen RTF recommendations from the Board prior to launch. The RTF Task Group, 

chaired by former astronauts Richard Covey and Thomas Stafford, is charged with 

assessing the implementation of these recommendations. The Task Group, as of July 

22, 2004, has conditionally closed five RTF recommendations. Our current plan is 

to close the remaining ten RTF recommendations by the end of 2004. The five recommendations that have been conditionally closed are: 

Recommendation 3.3–1—Develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan 

to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system 

components. This inspection plan should take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology. To close this recommendation, NASA has cycled all Orbiter RCC Wing Leading Edge panels and nose cones through the vendor for inspection and confirmation of structural integrity. 

Recommendation 4.2–3—Require that at least two employees attend all final 

closeouts and intertank area hand-spraying procedures. To close this recommendation, NASA’s procedures have been changed to require a minimum of two technicians be present for all final vehicle closeout operations, even with completion of 

critical closeout procedures during manufacturing and assembly. 

Recommendation 4.2–5—Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance and United 

Space Alliance must return to the straightforward, industry-standard definition of 

‘‘Foreign Object Debris,’’ and eliminate any alternate or statistically deceptive definitions like ‘‘processing debris.’’ To close this recommendation, NASA has ceased 

using the term ‘‘processing debris’’ and has changed all work procedures to treat all 

debris at the same high level. 

Recommendation 6.3–2—Modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency [now the National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA)] to make the imaging of each Shuttle flight while on orbit a standard 

10

requirement. To close this recommendation, NASA has agreements with NGA and 

other government agencies to receive support using appropriate national assets. 

Recommendation 10.3–1—Develop an interim program of closeout photographs for 

all critical sub-systems that differ from engineering drawings. Digitize the closeout 

photograph system so that images are immediately available for on-orbit troubleshooting. NASA has revised the vehicle processing procedures to mandate that 

closeout photography be performed and has implemented enhancements to the Still 

Image Management System to allow more efficient distribution of closeout photographs to support on-orbit troubleshooting. 

NASA has embraced the Gehman report and is committed to complying with all 

the Board’s recommendations, as well as self-initiated ‘‘raise the bar’’ actions to improve safety that go above and beyond the content of the Board’s recommendations. 

In addition to the Board’s recommendations, the Space Shuttle program is working 

fifteen self-imposed actions and directives. Of these ‘‘raise the bar’’ initiatives, the 

RTF Task Group has elected to review Space Shuttle Program Action 3, Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS). The CSCS capability could, in an emergency, 

sustain a Shuttle crew onboard the ISS for a limited time to enable a repair to the 

orbiter or allow the crew to be returned to Earth via a rescue mission. The Space 

Shuttle and ISS programs have made progress in defining and planning for a CSCS 

capability. The two programs have completed analyses that indicate that, for our 

first two flights at a minimum, it is possible to launch a rescue mission during the 

time that the Shuttle crew can be safely sustained on the ISS. Other ‘‘raise the bar’’ 

initiatives include review of processes, hardware and activities or analyses that we 

believe will make the Shuttle safer. These include analysis and testing to determine 

critical debris sources, improvements to the flight readiness review process, removal 

and refurbishment of the orbiter rudders speed brake actuators, radar coverage capabilities and requirements, and hardware processing and operations. 

We continue to make significant progress in understanding the debris environment and the material characteristics of the orbiter and External Tank Thermal 

Protection System (TPS). As a result, we are able to better target critical areas for 

hardening prior to RTF. Even more critical to our ability to return safely to flight, 

we have made significant progress in reducing the foam debris that is shed from 

the External Tank during ascent. Work to develop viable repair techniques and materials for the orbiter TPS is under way, and progress has been made on repairing 

acreage tiles and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon cracks. 

As our efforts to return the Space Shuttle to safe flight have matured and the 

required work has been identified, NASA has gained a better understanding of the 

costs associated with this challenging endeavor. Along with the tasks required for 

RTF, we have reinvigorated our safety and engineering practices. As a result, we 

have continued to identify safety-related issues that require additional work. Earlier 

cost estimates presented in previous revisions of the Implementation Plan could not 

have included all RTF elements now under consideration. Nor did they address additional requirements that might be derived from our continuing evaluation of the 

Board’s recommendations, or costs incurred by other agency activities in support of 

RTF. The current cost estimate, submitted to the Committee on July 30, takes into 

account all currently known potential costs, except a budget reserve. This estimate 

will also change to address new challenges that may arise after the first two flights 

in 2005. 

NASA’s updated estimates for RTF activities are as follows:

FY 2003—$42 million 

FY 2004—$465 million 

FY 2005—$643 million (includes $309 million remaining ‘‘under review’’)

NASA’s updated RTF estimates through FY 2005 are reflected in Enclosure 1. 

The updated FY 2003 estimate of $42 million reflects actual expenditures and the 

migration of planned work from FY 2003 into FY 2004. The updated FY 2004 estimate of $465 million reflects the continuing refinement of our RTF plan, better technical definition of the work to be accomplished, and better cost estimates for the 

work. Our estimates for the remaining years are based on our experience to date, 

which is still evolving. Through the early part of 2004, the pace of NASA’s RTF 

technical efforts accelerated rapidly. We moved from planning to execution very 

quickly, and began to close on some of the multiple paths we initiated in late 2003. 

But there is still a great deal of work ahead, and we are still refining our technical 

solutions and our cost estimates. As we do and the content is better defined and 

understood, the budget projections will likely change again. They will also change 

in 2005 as we launch the Space Shuttle and assess the information gained by actual 

flight experience. 

11

The Columbia experience has moved us to reassess the Space Shuttle program in 

total. As a result, we are introducing a higher level of engineering and technical 

rigor into all of our safety and engineering processes and practices. Many potential 

flight risks have been reevaluated and mitigated, resulting in what we believe is 

a safer Shuttle system overall. Across the board, flight hardware is now subjected 

to greater levels of test, tear-down, inspection, repair, and recertification for flight, 

and all elements of the program are reassessing the adequacy of industrial processes, safety controls, integrated hazard analyses, and flight hardware test protocols. 

When we return to flight, we believe the Space Shuttle will be safer, but we will 

never eliminate the risk. We are confident in our ability to maintain a renewed level 

of safety standard throughout the life of the Space Shuttle program. We have the 

best and brightest in NASA and industry working diligently to overcome the challenges of returning the Shuttle safely to flight. Although there will most likely be 

additional challenges before Discovery takes flight, the NASA and contractor team 

are confident that the Space Shuttle program can safely accomplish its role in the 

Vision for Space Exploration to complete International Space Station assembly. As 

John Kennedy so eloquently said more than forty years ago, ‘‘We choose to go to 

the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but 

because they are hard.’’ We are committed to the safe return to flight—the first step 

toward the renewed NASA mission to explore the universe. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to any questions that you may have.


908s1.eps
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14

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, and I look forward 

to some of our discussion. 

General Stafford, thank you very much for joining us. The floor 

is yours. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS P.

STAFFORD, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), CO–CHAIRMAN,

RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP; ACCOMPANIED BY

JOSEPH W. CUZZUPOLI, MEMBER, RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK 

GROUP 

General STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Get one of those microphones a little closer 

to you, if you would. 

General STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman——

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

General STAFFORD.—and members of the Committee, thank you 

for the opportunity today to appear before you to discuss the status 

of the Return to Flight Task Group’s assessment. 

I have a written statement that I’d like to submit, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, at this time. 

Senator BROWNBACK. It will be accepted in the record. 

General STAFFORD. Thank you. 

In July 2003, the NASA Administrator, Mr. O’Keefe, chartered a 

group under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to perform an 

independent assessment of the agency’s actions to implement the 

recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigating Board, 


908s6.eps
15

the CAIB, as they relate to the safety and to the operational readiness of STS–114. The Task Group today consists of 26 members 

from industry, from academia and government. Some key members 

also serve on the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on the International Space Station for Operational Readiness, which I chair. 

Also, two serve on the NASA Advisory Aerospace Safety Panel. All 

members bring with them recognized knowledge and expertise in 

a variety of the relevant fields for this task. 

I have with me today, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, the leaders of the Task Group, three panels. Dr. Dan 

Crippen, who heads our management panel. He has a strong reputation for objective and insightful analysis. A lot of you know him. 

Mr. Joe Cuzzupoli, who leads the technical panel. Mr. Cuzzupoli 

has had more than 40 years of aerospace experience and management experience. Colonel Jim Adamson, who is the leader of the 

operations panel. Colonel Adamson is a former astronaut. He has 

an extensive background in aerodynamics, operations, and business 

management. These gentlemen’s impressive background is submitted with the record. And they are deeply involved in the Task 

Group’s activities on a daily basis, and they will be available to answer the specific details of your questions. 

And since August of 2003, the Task Group has conducted extensive fact-finding activities at all levels within the NASA agency and 

at the contractor team. The members have visited NASA and the 

contractor facilities, participated in their teleconferences. We’ve reviewed documents, conducted interviews, received briefings, observed test simulations and program reviews. And also, Mr. Chairman, when appropriate, members of the Task Group have interviewed and talked with former CAIB members. 

The Task Group, to date, has conducted four open public meetings in which they reviewed NASA’s progress. We have issued two 

interim reports. And the next interim report now is scheduled for 

October. 

The Task Group is encouraged by NASA’s progress. We’ve observed the people of NASA are engaged and dedicated to correcting 

the deficiencies that led to the Columbia accident. We believe that 

NASA has made substantial progress in many, many areas. At the 

same time, we believe the agency faces significant challenges ahead 

and has considerable work ahead of it in some areas before it will 

be ready to fly again. 

To date, the Task Group has formally assessed and conditionally 

closed five of the 15 recommendations from the CAIB. I want to assure this Committee that the Task Group will continue to monitor 

NASA’s progress and the implementation of these recommendations as we work to fully close each one. 

Now, looking at some of the challenges, the Task Group believes 

NASA’s most important work is efforts to eliminate the critical 

asset debris—i.e., the shedding of debris from that external tank. 

The agency has made considerable progress in this area. If it could 

be ensured that no critical debris would come from the external 

tank, the immediate cause of the loss of Columbia would certainly 

be rectified. While analytical and testing techniques will allow a 

level of comfort before launch—and advances in the non-destructive 

inspection techniques may add some confidence to this—it’ll still be 

16

impossible to guarantee no critical debris would be shed. Additionally, it may not be possible to obtain statistically significant data 

verifying external tank conditions even by the end of the Shuttle 

program. 

Therefore, on-orbit inspection and repair capability remain necessary to reduce the risk to future flights. And since our last report, it’s become apparent that NASA continues to face some technical challenges in developing these capabilities. 

Now, I might report, Mr. Chairman, that even in the last 2 

weeks, there has been significant progress made in the sensors to 

inspect in-flight onboard the Shuttle. 

Should one or both of these capabilities not be sufficiently developed by the Shuttle’s Return to Flight, the potential for a crew to 

await a rescue mission at the International Space Station becomes 

the logical consideration for the next launch. Therefore, the Task 

Group is starting to assess this safe-haven capability. 

A universal concern of the Task Group is the personnel requirements to meet the CAIB recommendations for Return to Flight. 

The new engineering and safety organizations that are being established at NASA all require talented individuals. And right now 

they’re largely drawn from the current NASA and contractor pool. 

In summary, the Task Group believes that although significant 

work lays ahead, NASA has made substantial progress toward 

meeting the CAIB’s recommendations. And I want to assure the 

Committee that the Task Group remains engaged, they’ll be aggressive in their fact-finding, and will continue to thoroughly assess and publicly report on NASA’s progress toward meeting the intent of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. 

And I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the work of the Return to Flight Group with you this morning. Colonel Adamson, Mr. 

Cuzzupoli, Dr. Crippen, and myself now look forward to responding 

to your questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. 

[The prepared statement of General Stafford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS P. STAFFORD, U.S. AIR

FORCE (RETIRED), CO-CHAIRMAN, RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP; ACCOMPANIED

BY JOSEPH W. CUZZPOLI, MEMBER, RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today to discuss the status of the Return to Flight Task Group’s 

assessment activities. 

In July 2003, the NASA Administrator chartered the group, under the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act, to perform an independent assessment of the agency’s actions to implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board (CAIB) as they relate to the safety and operational readiness of STS–114. 

The Task Group consists of 26 members from industry, academia, and government. Some key members also serve on the NASA Advisory Council’s International 

Space Station Operations Readiness Task Force, which I chair. And two serve on 

the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. All of our members bring with them recognized knowledge and expertise in a variety of relevant fields. 

The Task Group is organized for fact-finding into three panels—Management, 

Technical, and Operations. I have with me here today the leaders of these three 

panels. 

No stranger to many of you, Dr. Dan Crippen, who leads our Management Panel, 

has a strong reputation for objective and insightful analysis. He is the former Director of the Congressional Budget Office, has served as Chief Counsel and Economic 

Policy Adviser to the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and Domestic Policy Advisor and 

17

Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Dr. Crippen is also a member of the 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. 

Mr. Joseph Cuzzupoli, leader of our Technical Panel, brings to the Task Group 

more than 40 years of aerospace engineering and managerial experience. Presently 

Vice President and K–1 Program Manager for Kistler Aerospace Corporation, he 

was Vice President and Program Manager for the Space Shuttle Orbiter Project for 

Rockwell International during its design, development, and initial operations, and 

was an Assistant Program Manager on Apollo. He is a current member of the ISS 

Operational Readiness Task Force. 

Colonel James Adamson, the Task Group’s Operations Panel leader, has an extensive background in aerodynamics and operations as well as business management. 

He is a former astronaut with two Space Shuttle missions to his credit. He has 

served as President of Allied Signal Systems Technical Services, a government services company which later became Honeywell, and was one of the founders and the 

first Chief Operating Officer for United Space Alliance. He is currently CEO of his 

own consulting firm, Monarch Precision, and a member of the ISS Operational 

Readiness Task Force. 

These three gentlemen have been deeply involved in the Task Group’s activities 

and will be available to answer the details of your questions. 

Since August of 2003, the Task Group has conducted extensive fact-finding activities at all levels within the agency and its contractor team. 

Task Group members have visited NASA and contractor facilities, participated in 

teleconferences, reviewed documents, conducted interviews, received formal and informal briefings, and have observed tests, simulations, and program reviews. 

In all, to date, the Task Group has conducted approximately 100 formal fact-finding activities and has issued more than 90 formal requests for information to the 

Space Shuttle Program Office. 

Throughout the process the Task Group has, when appropriate, consulted with 

former members of the CAIB to ensure our members fully understand the intent 

of their recommendations. 

The Task Group has conducted four public meetings at which it reviewed NASA’s 

progress in meeting the intent of CAIB and the group has issued two interim reports. The next public meeting will take place in Houston next week and another 

interim report is planned for October. 

Based on these extensive activities, I can report to you today that the Task Group 

is encouraged by NASA’s progress, and as we said in our last report, we have observed that throughout the organization the people of NASA are engaged and dedicated to correcting the deficiencies that led to the Columbia accident. 

We believe that NASA has made significant progress in many areas. At the same 

time, we believe that the agency continues to face significant challenges and has 

considerable work ahead of it in some areas before it will be ready to return the 

Shuttle to flight. 

Over the last several months, the Task Group has formally assessed and conditionally closed 5 of the CAIB’s 15 Return to Flight recommendations. This means 

that based on its independent fact-finding and deliberations, the Task Group believes that, contingent on the agency meeting some specific additional conditions, 

NASA will have met the intent of these 5 CAIB recommendations. 

I would like to briefly address each of these recommendations. 

The Task Group believes that NASA has conditionally met the intent of CAIB 

Recommendation 3.3–1 in its development and implementation of a comprehensive 

inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components. And that the inspection plan takes advantage of advanced Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) technology. 

In satisfying CAIB Recommendation 3.3–1, NASA has:

• Requested the manufacturer to rebaseline all RCC system components.

• Undertaken development of new NDI methods for RCC inspection: 

thermography, X-ray, and eddy current techniques.

• Begun incorporating new methods of NDI into existing field processes.

Prior to fully closing this recommendation, the Task Group wants to see completion of requirements documentation and directives, and the results of some additional testing. 

We believe that the agency has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 4.2–3 to require that at least two employees attend all final closeouts 

and intertank area hand-spraying procedures. In fact this commitment has been expanded to include all flight hardware closeouts. 

In satisfying CAIB Recommendation 4.2–3, NASA has:

18

• Amended all manufacturing processes and procedures to ensure that at least 

two employees are present at all manufacturing steps.

• Incorporated more stringent quality assurance requirements through additional 

employee training, certification, and procedures for inspections and imagery.

Before fully closing this item, the Task Group is awaiting completion of requirements documentation and directives, and the results of a program-wide audit. 

The Task Group believes that NASA has conditionally met the intent of CAIB 

Recommendation 6.3–2 to modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National 

Imagery and Mapping Agency—now the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency—

to make the imaging of each Shuttle flight while on orbit a standard requirement. 

In satisfying the intent of CAIB Recommendation 6.3–2, NASA has:

• Modified Memorandum of Agreement with the National Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency to request all available data that may assist NASA in the resolution of 

investigations.

• Implemented an Interagency Operating Agreement.

• Obtained necessary security clearances for appropriate positions.

• Developed plans to demonstrate new capabilities in simulations.

Prior to fully closing this recommendation, the Task Group is awaiting the assessment of simulation results. 

We believe that NASA has conditionally met the intent of CAIB Recommendation 

4.2–5 by returning to a straightforward, industry-standard definition of ‘‘Foreign 

Object Debris’’ (FOD) and eliminating any alternate or statistically deceptive definitions like ‘‘processing debris’’ by the Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance and 

United Space Alliance. 

In satisfying CAIB Recommendation 4.2–5, NASA has:

• Adopted FOD definition derived by National Aerospace FOD Prevention, Inc.

• Eliminated the term ‘‘processing debris.’’

• Conducted benchmarking to determine industry and government best practices 

and analysis on FOD handling.

• Completed workforce training on new definition and procedures.

Before fully closing this item, the Task Group is awaiting NASA’s completion of 

FOD process audits and interviews. 

And, the Task Group believes that the agency has conditionally met the intent 

of CAIB Recommendation 10.3–1 by developing an interim program of closeout photographs for all critical sub-systems that differ from engineering drawings and by 

digitizing the closeout photograph system so that images are immediately available 

for on-orbit troubleshooting. 

NASA’s actions to satisfy CAIB Recommendation 10.3–1 include:

• Established a more precise definition of ‘‘closeout photography’’ and strengthen 

general closeout requirements.

• Mandated that all digitized closeout photography be entered into a common 

closeout database system.

• Implemented enhancements to the closeout database system.

• Implemented photography steps in work procedures.

• Upgraded digital photography equipment and developed user training and photography certification.

Prior to closing this recommendation, the Task Group is awaiting the results of 

simulations to demonstrate that the database can be accessed in a timely manner 

by appropriate personnel, the completion of photographer training, and development 

of a database system familiarization course and computer-based training. 

I want to assure this Committee that the Task Group will continue to monitor 

NASA’s implementation of these recommendations and that we expect the agency 

to advise the Task Group if there is any material change in the status of any recommendation. 

Looking ahead, at our public meeting next week the Task Group plans to consider 

NASA’s request for closure of a sixth recommendation, 7.5–3, which calls for NASA 

to reorganize the Space Shuttle Integration Office to make it capable of integrating 

all elements of the Space Shuttle program, including the orbiter. 

Our fact-finding activities indicate that NASA continues to make progress with 

the other recommendations as well and we anticipate several of them will be 

brought to us for formal assessment by the Task Group in the next month or two. 

19

In April 2004, the Space Shuttle Program Office Safety and Mission Assurance 

Manager described for the Task Group a framework for reducing the risk from thermal protection system debris. The primary hazard control in the framework is the 

elimination of critical debris shedding. Should the primary control not be completely 

satisfied, the capability to detect impacts during ascent and to detect impact damage on-orbit provides warning devices. The ability to make on-orbit repairs to tile 

and RCC, and—as a last resort—crew rescue, provides special mitigating procedures. 

The Task Group indicated in its last report that it is satisfied with this ‘‘topdown’’ approach as it is applied to this hazard reduction program. We have said that 

we believe that this same ‘‘top-down’’ approach needs to be implemented across 

NASA as a whole and specifically to all NASA Implementation Plan items. 

Now, looking at some of the challenges, the Task Group believes—as stated in its 

last report—that NASA’s most important work is its efforts to eliminate critical ascent debris and the agency has made considerable progress in this area. If it could 

be guaranteed that no critical debris would come from the External Tank, the immediate cause of the loss of Columbia would be rectified. Analytical and testing techniques will allow a level of comfort before launch. Advances in NDI techniques may 

add confidence. Still, to guarantee that no critical debris will be shed is impossible 

short of extensive testing in flight. However, it may not be possible to obtain statistically significant data verifying External Tank debris conditions even by the end 

of the Shuttle program. Therefore, on-orbit inspection and repair capabilities remain 

necessary to reduce the risk to future flights. Since our last report, it has become 

apparent that NASA continues to face some technical challenges in fully developing 

these capabilities. Should one or both of these capabilities not be sufficiently developed by the anticipated date of Return to Flight, the ability for the crew to await 

a rescue mission at the ISS will become an important consideration for the next 

launch. Therefore, the Task Group is assessing this ‘‘safe haven’’ capability. 

A universal concern of the Task Group is the personnel requirements to meet the 

CAIB recommendations and return to flight. The various new organizations, from 

the NASA Engineering and Safety Center to the Independent Technical Authority 

to the Space Shuttle System Engineering and Integration Office, all require talented 

staff drawn largely from the current NASA and contractor pool. 

In summary, the Task Group believes that although significant work lies ahead, 

NASA has made substantial progress toward meeting the intent of the CAIB’s Return to Flight recommendations. On Aug. 26, 2003, following the release of the 

CAIB report, we stated publicly that, ‘‘the Return to Flight Task Group is committed to doing its part to help ensure the Shuttle returns safely to space by making 

a careful, thorough, and independent assessment of NASA’s Return to Flight plans.’’ 

I want to assure this Committee that the Task Group remains engaged and aggressive in its fact-finding and we will continue to carefully and thoroughly assess—and 

publicly report on—NASA’s progress toward meeting the intent of the CAIB. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the work of the Return to Flight Task Group 

with you. Colonel Adamson, Mr. Cuzzupoli, Dr. Crippen, and I now look forward to 

responding to your questions.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, General. 

And we’ll proceed to a round of questions of 5 minutes each, and 

go by order of arrival. 

General, I want to make sure I understand what you’re saying 

here, then. You’re saying that we are not going to be able to remove the falling of debris from the takeoff, which is what—when 

we held these original hearings, Mr. O’Keefe, people said, ‘‘This is 

going to be really tough to stop.’’ You’re saying we’re not going to 

be able to stop the falling of debris, so we’re going to go to reducing 

debris, and second, then, either an in-flight repair option or a rescue option in space. Is that correct? 

General STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, NASA has made considerable 

progress in eliminating large areas that could be shed, and we’re 

doing—continuing testing on analytical areas, and this is an ongoing process. But there can be no guarantee that—or certification—

that a critical piece will not come off, even though we’re certifying 

certain parts of the vehicle, there would be a minimum piece for 

20

certain areas, certain angles. And Mr. Cuzzupoli has followed this 

on a day-to-day basis, and he can give you up-to-date information 

on that. And most of it occurs in the first parts of the launch phase, 

when you have maximum aerodynamic pressure and heating there 

on the spacecraft. And if you want any sub-details, Mr. Cuzzupoli 

can certainly give you that. 

Now, also, as we said, we are continuing on for the inspection 

and repair. There are certain areas that it looks like we could repair either cracks or holes up to a certain criteria. Also, the inspection capability is increasing every week. We don’t know that we 

can have a complete, 100 percent—again, Mr. Cuzzupoli is up to 

the day-to-day technical details on that. And we’re starting to assess the safe haven of the International Space Station for a rescue 

mission, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, if I could just quickly add to that, 

I think exactly as General Stafford has described, the objective 

here is to eliminate the critical debris that could cause a catastrophic loss of the orbiter. And so, as a consequence, that has been 

isolated to determine exactly what would constitute that kind of a 

condition. What’s been the case since the very first flight, and all 

the way up to the last, is a flaking effect that occurs with insulation. It’s much like you’d see on any other kind of, you know, insulated case where there is a foam kind of exterior or something. 

Given the circumstances and the intensity of the heat and so forth, 

the objective is to eliminate the critical items of departure from the 

external tank itself, and that’s what we’re trying to work our way 

through. And I think we’ve developed a design that eliminates that 

prospect. 

That said, what we’ve done is tested every one of those scenarios. 

I mean, not just put it through a computer model; we’ve literally 

gone through the effort of looking at varying kind of scenarios and 

shooting the foam at leading edges to determine exactly what the 

consequence will be. So this is not something we’re speculating on 

or just running through some model; it’s actually being conducted 

as a test to determine, what can the orbiter withstand? 

I’m reminded of a comment that Admiral Gehman offered during 

the course of the investigation on several occasions, which is, ‘‘This 

is one tough piece of machinery.’’ And the issue is to determine exactly what point, at what stage, does that tough piece of machinery 

take a catastrophic hit? And that’s exactly what I think the Task 

Group has helped us to sort through and make sure we isolate as 

a condition. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, that leads to my next question on 

this. According to our staff report on this, Return to Flight, to 

date—well, in July of this year we had projected it was going to 

cost $1.1 billion; that’s now been upped to $2.2 billion in the July 

2004 report of NASA to this Committee and to others, double the 

cost to Return to Flight. You’ve done five of the 15 items that are 

required, so you’ve got ten more yet to go and to check through. 

What’s this going to cost? Are we anywhere close to really knowing 

what this is actually going to cost to get the Shuttle to return to 

flight? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. This is—you know, again, the primary consequence 

of the changes that have occurred here in the overall projections—

21

and this is over a span of time; just not concentrated in Fiscal Year 

2005 exclusively—is a combination of two events. The first one is, 

again, there are going to be sustaining engineering expenses necessary. What the Accident Investigation Board pointed out and observed and made as part of their recommendations is, you’ve got 

to have a more robust capacity, organizationally, to deal with 

this——

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes, I don’t mean to cut you off, but my time’s really short. Are we confident that the $2.2 billion will be 

the ultimate cost of Return to Flight? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Getting a lot closer, that’s for sure. And I think the 

primary components of what contributed to these particular cost 

projections are, again, the induction of all three orbiters into a orbiter modification program right now, the effort to put on a series 

of sensors on every single one of the orbiters. There’s a whole range 

of things we did not contemplate a year ago that we’re doing now. 

So I don’t see any new unknowns coming down the road. Whether 

or not this adjusts by some fraction or amount is almost a certainty, given the dynamics of this. But I don’t see this as being a 

large increase differential in the time ahead, because the changes 

are primarily contributed to the options we picked. 

Senator BROWNBACK. And the date? Do you still believe we will 

return to flight in spring of 2005? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Looking promising. I certainly wouldn’t want to 

put a date-time group on it, by any means. We’re going to make 

sure that when we’ve met these milestones, that’s when we’re fit 

to fly, and that’s the occasion on which it’ll occur. And it looks like 

it’s tracking toward a spring opportunity. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, now, I agree with that. We don’t 

want to go to flight until it’s ready and safe. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWNBACK. General, you had a——

General STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I say that in our interface 

with NASA, the Return to Flight Task Group has observed that, 

really, NASA is milestone-driven and not schedule-driven. Certainly, you have to have a schedule out there for a planning factor, 

but we’re anticipating that most of our task will be finished by December. Again, it has to be a milestone to complete that. 

Senator BROWNBACK. I agree with that. 

Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Administrator, what do you think will be the cost of repair 

at the Kennedy Space Center? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Don’t know, sir. We just did get an assessment 

team on the ground here at about 5 o’clock on Labor Day, so here 

roughly—you know, less than 48 hours ago, we really got into the 

intensity of looking at what the assessments are. But we’re anxiously working that through right now. 

Senator NELSON. Well, here’s the timing on that. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. We just passed $2 billion last night. That’s not 

even going to cover it for Charley. I’m expecting at least an additional $21⁄2 billion that the Majority Leader has said he is willing 

to come forward with next week. Now, whether or not that’s going 

22

to be a part of the homeland security bill or whether or not we 

have to strip it off depends on whether or not homeland security 

gets mired down in a whole bunch of other questions. 

The fact is that, as of today, FEMA is running out of money, so 

that’s why they had to have the action that occurred last night. 

Now, if you go back to the experience that we had with Andrew, 

there was almost a billion dollars that was appropriated to the Department of Defense because of the destruction to Homestead Air 

Force Base. So what I’m saying is, strike while the iron is hot. Instead of you having to take this out of your budget, this is an opportunity to get money, because you’ve obviously sustained some 

serious damage. And so we need an estimate so that we can roll 

it into all of these other requests that we’re getting from the Department of Agriculture and so forth and so on. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. This is a tragedy, and we are assessing 

what the scope of that tragedy is. We’re working with our colleagues in the Administration to make a determination of that, and 

we’ll be back promptly. 

Senator NELSON. Now, could you comment, when we see a photograph, like that, of the TPS facility, and winds of only 120 miles 

an hour, gusts, hit the Cape, and it does that kind of damage to 

a facility that the entire space program is dependent upon the production of these thermal protective system tiles, you can imagine 

what 145 miles an hour would have done when you look at what 

120 miles per hour did to that facility. In your calculation on repair, it seems to me that there were mistakes made in designing 

the strength of these buildings to withstand the wind and, in the 

repair and renovation, that we’ve got to move to that higher standard, that it’s too important for the future of the space program. 

Would you calculate that in your request for repair money? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. We’ll take a look at all the different variations of what’s involved here. Again, I think, given the strength 

and ferocity of this hurricane, the fact that the Kennedy Space 

Center rode this through in the manner in which it did—all three 

orbiters are in great condition, the Space Station hardware was not 

affected, the satellites that are there, due for launch, were protected—this was really quite a story. I think Jim Kennedy and the 

team at the Kennedy Space Center did a spectacular job of really, 

really preparing for the worst circumstance. 

There was going to be damage. And, again, I—you know far better than I do, in terms of firsthand evidence of exactly what the 

consequences across the state have been. The fact that the Kennedy Space Center withstood this kind of damage, this kind of intensity, and rode it out in a manner that was the least problematic 

is really a testimonial to the professionalism of the team down 

there. They did a spectacular job. 

Senator NELSON. Do you have an answer as to why there were 

not backup generators in the three OPFs? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. You know, I heard you mention that at the opening 

statement, and I’ve been inquiring here. We had all three of the 

Orbiter Processing Facilities, the orbiters were powered down before the hurricane struck. The objective was to minimize that damage. We did lose power in OPF—the Orbiter Processing Facility 

number three, which is where Discovery was under repair. Why 

23

that generator didn’t kick in, as it did with the other two, is something we’ll have to run to ground. I don’t know the answer to the 

question, but I’ll find out. 

[The information referred to follows:]

During preparations For Hurricane Frances last week (Thursday, September 2, 

2004), there was a prediction that Frances could become a Category 5 hurricane. 

When conditions reach such severe levels, KSC’s Hurricane Plan calls for the rideout crew to evacuate the Center and gather at a safe location in Titusville. As the 

ride-out crew leaves the Center in this case, they are instructed to remove facility 

power (i.e., throw the breakers), which would have left the facilities on back-up generators and uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). Because of concerns with potential storm surge with a predicted Category 5 hurricane, the decision was made to 

leave the power applied to the Orbiter Processing Facilities (OPF) but to shut down 

the back-up generators and UPSs so that if power was lost, they would not come 

on unattended. Normally, the ride-out crews would be in the Center and would have 

been able to monitor power and purge, dealing with any anomaly. When the rideout crew left, all three OPFs had power and purges applied. 

Upon return of the ride-out crew, the following was found:

• OPF #1—Atlantis power was down, along with the purge capability; the rideout crew restored power and purges with no problems noted.

• OPF #2—Endeavour power was up and running and the purge capability was 

maintained throughout.

• OPF #3—Discovery power was up, but the purge was down (circuit breaker 

tripped). When the ride-out crew attempted to restart the purge capability to 

Discovery, cooling was not achieved and a hardware failure with the compressor 

was identified. It took the better part of a day to repair the compressor in OPF 

#3 and restore the purge to Discovery. It is not clear whether the purge breaker 

tripped due to a power problem or due to the compressor hardware failure. Had 

the ride-out crew been present, they might have been able to take action when 

power was lost in OPF #1 and the purge lost in OPF #3.

Senator NELSON. All right. If Ivan were to come to the Cape, 

what is the plan, given that photograph sitting on the floor, where 

you’ve got a thousand open windows into the VAB? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. We’re assessing that right now. We’re hopeful that 

that will not be of the same intensity, but certainly it’s going to be 

a more difficult circumstance if we were to be struck exactly the 

same again. I don’t know what the assessment will be at this point, 

but let me find out. 

[The information referred to follows:]

NASA’s primary responsibility in the event of a hurricane is, first, to ensure to 

the greatest extent possible the safety of NASA civil servant and contractor personnel and, second, to take all practical measures to safeguard NASA equipment 

and facilities, many of which are unique and indispensable to the Nation’s space 

program. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC), in conjunction with the Air Force’s 45th 

Space Wing, has developed Hurricane Preparation and Recovery procedures that address NASA’s obligation to balance safety-of-life concerns with the need to secure 

valuable assets during severe storms. However, safety is paramount. Lives will not 

be endangered to secure or service flight hardware, provide fire protection, security, 

repair, or fuel generators during severe storms. 

KSC damage and recovery teams were on-site immediately after Hurricane 

Francis and had begun preliminary repairs to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) 

in preparation for Hurricanes Ivan and Jeanne before Jeanne hit. The VAB lost 820 

panels and a 5x12 foot roof panel during Hurricane Francis and a further 30 panels 

during Hurricane Jeanne. Preliminary repairs to the VAB have been completed; 

analysis indicates that these repairs should be sufficient to withstand sustained 

winds of up to 60 miles per hour. If a hurricane were to hit KSC with wind loads 

higher than 60 MPH then it is possible that the panels could have come off again. 

Crews will begin permanent repairs starting in November and will have them completed before the start of the 2005 hurricane season. Flight processing hardware inside the VAB suffered only minimal damage, and KSC personnel are confident that 

the facility will be ready to support Space Shuttle Return to Flight activities while 

the permanent repairs are being affected.

24

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

Senator Lott? 

STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Administrator. And, General, thank you for 

your service, and to your task force that you have with you. 

Boy, it seems like one problem after another, and now you’ve got 

the hurricane to deal with. I do think it’s a real good point, if that 

much damage was done with a 120-mile-an-hour wind, what if it 

had been 200 miles-per-hour, which we’ve seen hit certain parts of 

the Gulf Coast in the past? But I know you’ll assess that damage 

as quickly as you can, and so that would be a part of the request 

the Administration will send. 

You know, I am worried about safety, of course, but I also am 

worried about, you know, morale and direction within NASA. I 

mean, until we return to flight, you know, the thing that you really 

are meant to do is going to be on hold, and I’m worried about that. 

I also am worried about—and I’ve discussed this with you—about 

some of the gaps between the launch systems, the one you have 

now and what you plan for the future, what that’s going to do to 

the workforce. How are you going to deal with this? Are you going 

to expedite the decisions? Are you going to extend the time that we 

use the current launch systems? We’ve got a potential problem in 

the next few years. 

In that connection, also, I think you’ve got a real problem with 

having more and more demands placed on you, and having to basically move money around. I understand, for instance, the Hubble 

Space Telescope supporters are pushing back, wanting more 

money. You’re either going to have to ask for more money or you’re 

going to have to move it from somewhere else, and you’re starving 

a lot of other good programs. 

So I really am concerned about NASA and our plan for the future, beyond just Return to Flight. What is our plan? I know that 

there is space exploration and going to Mars and all that, but 

there’s a long way between where we are and getting there, and 

I’m worried about how we’re going to pull that off. 

I guess I asked a whole collage of questions there, but rather 

than giving you—asking you one after the other, why don’t you just 

speak to the general propositions that I’ve laid out? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, I appreciate the sentiment, and I’ll do 

my best to respond. 

First and foremost, the President, on January 14th, issued what 

is the strategy, articulated that, submitted the budget 3 weeks 

later. So the first major step in that process has been accomplished. 

The second step is for Congress to endorse that and to appropriate the funding that he’s requested. That’s our fondest expectation and hope, that the Congress can see their way clear to do that 

in this appropriations process, and we’re confident that we can find 

our way clear to do that, which would accomplish much of what 

you’ve already referred to. It covers the Return to Flight challenges. There certainly are costs that we need to accommodate 

25

within that, but I think we can accomplish that. We’ve certainly 

worked through a number of options and alternatives for that. And 

moving forward, we think what we’ve done here is prioritized the 

approach necessary in the President’s budget request that was 

made in February to emphasize the priorities that he’s directed in 

this strategy that was articulated. 

So that’s the process we are moving down the road on. There is 

nothing I see that’s insurmountable. Certainly, the events of a hurricane and other things are constant new challenges that you’ve got 

to go wrestle with, but this is, you know, part of life, and there’s 

no doubt about it, we’re going to continue to wrestle with that. But 

there is nothing I see at this juncture that would make or compromise our capacity to accomplish the goals that he’s laid out in 

those objectives. 

And as it pertains to your first question, I believe, which was, 

what do we do in the longer term, in terms of retirement of Shuttle 

and then the beginning of the Crew Exploration Vehicle through 

Project Constellation, that occurs at the end of the decade. The immediacy of the challenges we face right now, the first one is Return 

to Flight in order to complete the International Space Station. We 

think we’re on track to do that. New obstacles have mounted, but 

even those are surmountable, in terms of the kinds of challenges 

we’re facing. And how we address the end of the decade is something we’re going to continue to iterate. But in the meantime, nothing precipitous will be made in order to preclude any of the options 

necessary to assure a transition between those two programs. 

Finally, I would just observe that the morale of the agency, from 

my assessment, has improved drastically by our focus on a mission 

objective. What the President delivered on January 14th is a focus, 

a set of priorities, a clear enunciation of what we do in this agency, 

and that’s done more to improve the focus, attention, and morale 

of all of our colleagues than any other singular act. We’re focused 

on the mission objectives. We’re gonna get there. 

Senator LOTT. One other concern that I have had for years—and 

I’ve pressed the point, I’ve discussed it with you, your predecessors—a vision for the agency is important for the workers, but 

to have the support of the American people, it’s got to be more than 

that. They’ve got to see some tangible results. I’ve always argued, 

we get scientific, medical, technological, all kinds of benefits from 

our space program. The idea of just going to Mars doesn’t, frankly, 

excite a lot of people in my state. They don’t really care whether 

there’s water up there or not. They’d rather have asphalt on their 

roads. But if you can show, or we can have a process of—or programs to get what you learn from that, the benefits, into the private sector, then you’ve got a deal. Don’t forget that. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator LOTT. You know, just some esoteric visionary—

spaceflight is not enough. And if NASA doesn’t continue to focus 

on that sort of transfer and programs like the Earth sciences area, 

you’re going to pay a price, because you’re going to lose the support 

of the American people; and when you lose their support, then you 

lose our support. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

26

Senator LOTT. And we need you to help us have the information 

and the ammunition and the technology and science transfers that 

show the people we’re getting a great benefit. Do you want to respond to that? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Absolutely, Senator, I could not agree with you 

more. Every single dollar we spend on exploration is spent right 

here on this planet and, as a consequence, it has tangible benefits 

that go well beyond the scope of simply achieving those exploration 

goals. The technology we’ve developed just in recent years contributed to the development of cataract detection, heart pumps, all the 

different things that we see in day-in and day-out life that were a 

consequence motivated by the technology we developed. 

We anticipate that as a consequence of pursuit of this strategy, 

we’re going to see at least that and a whole lot more, because it’s 

a motivation in order to develop those technologies for greater, 

broader applications. And we’ve certainly focused on that approach 

of how to categorize all those different consequences that are there. 

It is really quite astounding, and it’s something—again, contributes 

to a much broader understanding of our technology development 

and economic improvements in this country, all by itself, in terms 

of where we progress, in terms of economic development efforts. 

That’s had a tremendous consequence, and one we will continue to 

focus on as a preeminent priority in this particular effort. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Hutchison? 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think most of us up here are cosponsors of the reauthorization 

of NASA, along with the President’s Vision to try to go forward. 

However, we’re also—I, at least, am concerned about the potential 

gap in the CEV being ready and not having Shuttles for a year or 

so if we don’t have a certified Shuttle. I was ready to offer an 

amendment to the bill, but was told that you didn’t want the Shuttle to be re-certified in case there might be a gap. So I want to 

work with you, but I want to make sure that we’re not going to 

have a gap that can’t be overcome or that would stop the progress 

that we’re making on the Station and the experiments that would 

be going. So how would you address that? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Absolutely. No, I thank you, Senator. We are delighted to work with you to accomplish that goal. 

Our objective right now—again, as you’ve just alluded—is to 

complete the International Space Station. That is some 25 to 30 

flights. We’re continuing to work through the calculus of that. 

We’ve met with all the international partners and lined up all 

those modules. Whether that occurs, on what date, and what exactly will be the effect of that is going to be a consequence of time. 

How rapidly do we get back to Return to Flight?—and what the sequence of events could be. Any number of different things could 

alter that schedule. 

At present, we’re looking at something that will accomplish that 

task by the end of this decade. Our partners have signed off on 

27

that. They’re all in agreement that that does meet the objectives 

of each of us in the International Space Station partnership. 

Along the way, too, we’re concurrently developing, under Project 

Constellation, the Crew Exploration Vehicle. The response we’ve 

received in the broad agency announcement that was put out here 

just a few months ago has been overwhelming. We’ve gotten better 

than 1,200 different respondents, and have nicked that down now 

to about seven or eight major teams that are now moving forward. 

And what we’re looking to is, by 2008, the development of the first 

spiral of Project Constellation, which will be an unmanned vehicle 

to be accomplished by that time. And it looks like we can accomplish this task. 

There has been a remarkable interest from, not only the traditional aerospace interests and, kind of, industrial prowess that we 

see across this country, but a whole bunch of different companies 

and organizations and efforts that have gone into looking at this 

very differently. And achieving that by the end of this decade appears now to be within range of something people are excited 

about, they’re ready to pursue. And all that stands in the way of 

achieving that task is the endorsement by the Congress of the 

President’s budget request for this coming fiscal year. If we get 

that, we’re on our way toward that task, and I think we can close 

that gap in the time ahead. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, let me just say that I certainly understand that you don’t want to take any money away from the future 

by having that continuation on the certification. However, we also 

have to look down the road at all of the things that happen that 

we don’t expect to happen, and I want to make sure that we don’t 

have a gap that really is unacceptable from a scientific standpoint. 

So let’s work on something that doesn’t take away from the CEV 

or our long-term goal, but also recognizes that, in the next decade, 

a lot of things could happen——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure. 

Senator HUTCHISON.—from a hurricane to some other delaying—

something doesn’t—a part doesn’t come in or doesn’t fit or you don’t 

have the progress you think you’re going to have. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, you bet, absolutely, and I couldn’t agree more, 

Senator, and we will work with you. 

The one issue I would caution—and I’d invite General Stafford 

to comment on this, as well—is, you know, the issue of certification 

is something I really want to steer off of as a general proposition, 

because it implies that somehow we have eliminated all of the risks 

that would be involved in something. We’re never going to do that. 

This is always going to be a risky proposition. We will never eliminate that. 

And what we’re doing right that is short of that term is, again, 

tearing down every single one of the three orbiters to assure that 

we’ve done this in a very, very extensive, major-modification effort 

to bring it up to an industrial standard we think gives us the best 

shot at flying those vehicles for the balance of time that it has 

available to complete the International Space Station, to do what 

we’ve committed to do, to yield the science return that we’d always 

hoped for. And I think we’re within range of that. 

28

Just on the efforts we see today on Expedition 9, the returns 

we’re getting off the science is really compelling. And so the opportunities to do that, I think, are ahead of us and in order to do this 

within the achievable is what our objective is, and to do it in a way 

that guarantees we do it to the best of our ability. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Before my time is up, because I understand 

that issue, but the last thing I wanted to bring up is the issue of 

Russia, which also ties into this. They’ve—apparently, their patience is wearing thin on borrowing their Shuttles. So what is the 

situation with Russia? Are we going to have something with them 

that would be ongoing after 2006 when the contract is up? And is 

it going to be something that helps us get through this period and 

then we will be able to carry our load again? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Uh-huh, no, thank you, Senator. The Russian performance as a member of the International Space Station partnership has been exemplary. I mean, they have done an amazing job. 

And they are as professional and as focused to the task, to accomplishing these efforts, as we ever could have imagined. Any doubts 

about that have been absolutely eliminated. They have done a fantastic job. 

We are in the middle of negotiation now with the completion of 

what’s referred to as the Balance Agreements, which is for the remainder of the time between now and Fiscal Year 2006. We’re also 

laying the groundwork in that baseline for the agreements that 

would follow after that, in terms of continuing, kind of, efforts as 

all of us as partners to support the International Space Station. 

That’s continuing well. And along the way, there has been no diminution whatsoever in their support. Absolutely. All of us have got 

challenges that we’re wrestling with, and they do as well as our 

other partners do. But they have not diminished in any way. 

Last Monday, the Expedition 10 crew was announced. That’s due 

for launch in October. And our Expedition 9 crew will be returning. 

I plan to be there to assure that that gets observed, and we continue to work with our partners to accomplish this. 

But there is nothing but the highest professionalism I’ve seen 

there. The new Director General of the Russian Space Agency, 

Anatoly Perminov, has really done an astounding job of getting 

started right away, and into the saddle immediately, and we 

haven’t missed a beat with the partnership. So they’ve done an exemplary job, and we continue—we expect that there will be a continuation of that performance. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Breaux? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,

U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you. Thank you for your presentations. 

I’d like to just touch on, I think, what Senator Lott might have 

been referring to, and others, in the sense that it seems to me that 

we’ve got two challenges, among others; and one is to pay for the 

past, and also prepare to pay for the future. The past being: How 

do we fix the existing Shuttle? How do we make sure the Space 

Station is working? And, at the same time, with a limited amount 

of money, embark on new missions to Mars and new missions to 

the Moon, and a new vehicle. And it seems like we’ve postponed 

29

fixing the past to pay for the future; at the same time we’re shortchanging the future because of the costs of the past. Now, I don’t 

think this all adds up. I mean, we’ve still got problems in the past 

and that you’re being challenged to go out with new launch vehicles and new missions to Mars and to the Moon, and there’s no 

extra money being requested for all of this. It just doesn’t add up, 

from where I sit, that you’re not going to be able to—while we’re 

losing tiles in Cape Canaveral, well, we’re also still losing tiles on 

the Shuttle. And that ain’t fixed. I mean, you can’t do it with the 

money you’ve got. Now, you tell me how you can. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, sir, I think the budget request the President 

made in February of this year covers the costs we believe are necessary in order to return the Space Shuttle to flight. We’ve got additional costs that we’ve identified as part of this latest implementation plan. We can handle that. This is not a show-stopper by any 

means. There are methods and different options we’re looking at 

now to accomplish that. 

But the first major step is, the Congress would support the President’s budget request. We are on our way. There is every indication 

that that may be problematic. The House Appropriations position 

a month ago—2 months—I’m sorry, a month and a half ago—would 

significantly diminish that capacity. It would make what you just 

said an absolute fact: We can’t do this at the levels that they have 

contemplated. So, as a consequence, this really is, in concert with 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report, in which they 

said the President has to establish a vision, has to establish a 

strategy, has to ask for the money necessary. Well, we did those 

three things. The next step that the Accident Investigation Board 

argued is that Congress has to support that. We’re looking for that 

last step. And we appreciate your indulgence in getting there, but 

that’s going to be the major effort in order to achieve this. 

At that point, we’re talking about at the margin. Under the 

present conditions, if the House Appropriations position goes forward, you’re right, we cannot do this. 

Senator BREAUX. If the amount that the House has appropriated 

is the final amount appropriated to the agency, what would you 

have to slow down, cut back, or eliminate? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Whoo, boy. I think it significantly compromises the 

opportunity for the exploration agenda. The Crew Exploration Vehicle is something that—you know, the whole Constellation effort 

gets put in abeyance. The effort that we’ve really labored in the 

last couple of years to see a breakthrough in in-space propulsion, 

through Project Prometheus, is something I don’t see any option, 

in terms of proceeding with that. Our first primary objective is 

going to be to get the Space Shuttle back flying to complete the 

International Space Station. That’s agenda item number one. And 

Return to Flight, anything else beyond that, that’s what we’ve got 

to focus on in order to achieve any of this under any combination 

of events. So it makes all those other efforts very, very much compromised. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, I mean, I think, Mr. Chairman and our 

colleagues, I mean, that really is the question. We can outline some 

very ambitious concepts about what we need to be doing—fixing 

the Shuttle, fixing the Space Station, going back to the Moon, and 

30

then ultimately to Mars—but if we don’t fund it, we can’t do it. 

And we have a disconnect here between what we’re giving them as 

a mission to do, which is very laudatory in public pronouncements, 

but if we don’t support it, it’s not going to be able to get done. I 

think you’ve heard the Administrator say that there would have to 

be substantial changes in all of these missions if we don’t do any 

more with the funding than what the House has contemplated. I 

mean, you just can’t——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BREAUX.—you can’t accomplish it with the tools that 

we’re giving you, in terms of appropriations. And we’re going to 

have a make a decision. What are our priorities? Is this one? And 

if it is, we’re going to have to step up to the plate with the necessary funding to do it or we’re going to have to drastically change 

the mission. 

So thank you all for the good job you’re doing. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate the illumination on the issue, because it really is that imperative. And, 

again, if the House position prevails, the clear position from the 

Administration that’s been articulated is the President’s senior advisors will recommend that he veto the bill, period. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Administrator, I feel like now we’re 

getting somewhere, OK, on the discussion. Because this is—what 

I’ve looked at, as well, for some period of time, and have been very 

strongly supportive of the President’s exploration vision. I think 

that it’s time, on the manned space programs, for us to really look 

beyond where we are right now. I think on the unmanned programs, you guys are doing a fabulous job. It seems like good vision, 

well established, it’s being accomplished, things are moving very 

well. So you, kind of, set that portfolio aside and say, ‘‘Great job,’’ 

from a policy point of view. 

The policy point of view on the manned space program, though, 

you look at that, and you—I think we’re stuck too much paying for 

the legacy of the past and not projecting on into the future here. 

I mentioned, at the outset here, about looking at the Shuttle. One 

outside group has said, ‘‘Do we need 30 more missions with the 

Shuttle?’’ Now, this is over the life expectancy of the Shuttle; that’s 

not this next budget year, which you’re focused on, and I understand that. But if you look at what they are saying, they’re saying 

you can do this in 10 to 15 flights, not 30, if you offload a series 

of things. I know you’ve been looking at this internally, as well. 

Looking on down the road, isn’t it time we had that type of policy 

discussion of saying that the legacy cost of this is just too much, 

we have some other options, and we really need these funds to go 

into the next phase for human spaceflight, and try to really have 

that level of policy discussion, if we’re going to whittle these down 

to half the number, so that we can get that money flowing toward 

the exploration vision the President articulated in the middle of 

January? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. I take your point. And please be assured 

that the approach that we’ve used in trying to come up with what 

is the longer-term objective and completion of International Space 

Station has been driven by the general mantra of: every single 

flight has to fight its way into the manifest, has to justify the reaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:40 Aug 08, 2007 Jkt 036172 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\36172.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
31

son why we’re going to fly it. And what it really comes down to is, 

we’ve done a terrific job over the years of designing every one of 

these components and modules to fit precisely into the Space Shuttle cargo bay. It is ‘‘the’’ asset that gets it all there. It’s lined up 

impressively. It’s one of the facilities that rode out this hurricane 

with great skill—is all those modules are lined up perfectly and 

going through testing——

Senator BROWNBACK. I understand. We——

Mr. O’KEEFE.—at the Kennedy Space Center. That’s the only 

way to get them there. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Yet the Planetary Society and, as I understand it, some of the internal discussions are saying you could offload a number of these missions and get it down to 10 to 15. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Tactical——

Senator BROWNBACK. Have you looked at either their studies or 

at your own internal ones that would say we could cut the number 

of Shuttle missions in half? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. With all due respect to the Planetary Society, we 

are desperately trying to accomplish the task of getting the modules we know are there through the means that is feasible to do, 

that’s known. And anything we can offload, in terms of logistics requirements, whatever else, we are actively exploring those alternatives now to see what kind of commercial servicing options may 

be pursued. We will put out a request for information on that. The 

industry is out examining that now. But I don’t see a real significant diminution of the flight rate, because it’s just the sheer volume of hardware that fits exactly within the Shuttle, and there are 

no other means, lift, in order to accomplish that task that we know 

of. 

We’ll continue to look at that, constantly. This is an ever-moving 

effort. And our friends in the International Space Station partnership, their only interest is—not, how does it get there—that it does 

get there. They are agnostic to the question of exactly how it’s accomplished. And so the means by which we achieve that goal is the 

objective, and we’re constantly looking for new ways to do that. 

Senator BROWNBACK. We will continue that discussion. 

General Stafford, I want to ask you something on heavy-lift capacity, because this is something else that we’ve wrestled with here 

for some period of time. And I don’t mean to put another issue on 

the agenda, but, as we do budget these things on out, you chaired 

a study—gosh, that’s over a decade ago—and thank you for your 

continuous service to this government and your repository of 

knowledge that you continue to provide to us. But you said then 

that we were—experience has shown that large liquid hydrogen 

and oxygen engines have been expensive to develop and operate. 

Oxygen and hydrogen propellant is not an attractive option for the 

first stage of heavy-lift launch vehicle because of the large tank volume and safety concerns of using hydrogen below an altitude of 

100,000 feet. I don’t mean to drag you back to a decade-old report. 

General STAFFORD. Oh, I sponsored——

Senator BROWNBACK. You probably know this well, but aren’t we 

at a stage now where we really need to be focusing on different or 

better options for heavy-lift capacity, as well, as we look forward 

into the future? 

32

General STAFFORD. Well, we were looking at the time-set that I 

chaired the Synthesis Group, sir, to look forward. And one of the 

key efforts for exploration is large mass to low-Earth orbit. And 

from that, it takes a heavy lift. And we were looking at the lessons 

learned from Apollo. We were looking at lessons—had inputs from 

academia, from industry, all over. And, at the time, they said for 

the first stage for volumetric efficiency, was probably still the locks 

or something like that, with kerosene. And the upper stages would 

certainly be a very high efficiency, with hydrogen and oxygen. Now, 

things have progressed since then. You can use booster stages on 

the side. But the main criteria is a large mass to low-Earth orbit, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BROWNBACK. And have we accomplished that? Are we 

getting the heavy-lift capacity now that we need? 

General STAFFORD. Well, the only heavy-lift capacity that exists 

in the United States today is the elements from the Space Shuttle. 

And if—there have been, you know, certain ideas put forth, like the 

Shuttle C, at one time—that was back in the 1990s—and that 

would put about 140,000 to 170,000 pounds, if I’m correct, into lowEarth orbit. The Saturn V, at the peak, put about 300,000 pounds 

when the third stage shut off; and then to escape velocity, it was 

approximately 120,000 pounds. 

Senator BROWNBACK. I’m concerned we’ve not addressed this adequately. And this is a big, big issue, as well——

General STAFFORD. Yes, sir. I’m——

Senator BROWNBACK.—exploration. And this is one, as an issue, 

that’s been around for some period of time. 

General STAFFORD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. And I agree, 

we have to have a heavy lift for a large mass to low-Earth orbit. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Which brings us back to the policy question, 

Mr. Chairman, that Senator Hutchison had raised. If your only capability of heavy lift is what we have now, and if we know that history tells us, in the development of new technologies, that it doesn’t 

come in on time, so that the Crew Exploration Vehicle likely would 

be delayed, instead of there being a hiatus of 4 years under the 

present plan of the policy, as articulated, which—you stop the 

Shuttle in 2010 and the CEV isn’t ready until 2014, with the slips 

that are likely, you’re talking about 5, 6, 7 years that we would not 

have a man-rated capability of getting up. 

Senator Hutchison said that in her own words. I’m saying that 

in my own words. And I think that that is a dangerous position for 

the United States to be in, that we would be down, without the capability of launching humans, over a 5-, 6-, 7-year period. Would 

you comment on that, Mr. Administrator? 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, again, I think there are two mitigating factors here, Senator. And I don’t disagree with your assessment of 

what could be the worst-case scenario. That said, we’re going to 

know this sooner than later. 

I mean, the approach that the exploration systems folks have 

come up with on these broad agency announcements is to look at 

the first spiral, first increment necessary, for an unmanned, admittedly, piece of Project Constellation. And that’s due for 2008. That’s 

what everybody’s targeting on, that’s what everybody’s focused to. 

33

And exactly how that will evolve beyond 2008 is a point that we’ll 

know a whole lot better long before that first flight occurs. That’s 

before the retirement of the Space Shuttle program. And so, as a 

consequence, you’re going to see some overlap here, and we’re going 

to make some, you know, much better judgments as we get closer 

to the event, rather than speculating on what could be, best-case/

worst-scenario. 

And we’ve often been accused at NASA of being way too optimistic. This is one where we’ve covered all the imperatives here, 

where you’re going to see a demonstrated capacity of that first spiral before there’s ever an intent to complete the Shuttle program. 

And we’ll see what the determination is that time. But everything’s 

tracking exactly right, and the enthusiasm out there for meeting 

this objective is great. 

The last point that I’d raise is, one of the things that we can’t 

understate or diminish is the extraordinary learning we’ve gotten 

from the International Space Station assembly process. This is an 

engineering marvel. I mean, we’ve learned how to assemble pieces 

on orbit in a way that, frankly, 10, 15 years ago, the debate was, 

‘‘Can’t be done. Can’t be done.’’ Great confidence exerted by lots of 

folks who knew what they were talking about, obviously, who said, 

‘‘Cannot be done.’’ Well, we’ve got a couple of folks living there 

right now in this can’t-be-done machine, and it’s half done. 

We are tracking right now. Every component is in line at the 

Kennedy Space Center now, ready for launch as soon as we can get 

back to flying. And that’s an accomplishment that, really, we’ve 

learned an awful lot about how to do on-orbit assembly that, frankly, 10, 12 years ago, was viewed as impossible. 

So all that considered, rather than be wildly optimistic or be forecasting wildly pessimistic, what we’re going to see is a series of 

events and dates coming up here toward the end of this decade in 

which we’re either going to meet that first spiral, or we don’t, and 

the proof will be in that particular demonstrated event. And if it 

is, we’re going to make some determination of where we go. There’s 

time. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Administrator, what you need is Congressional oversight, and that is something that has been sorely lacking 

here. With Congress not being able to pass an authorization bill for 

NASA—you’ve heard that in other arenas, such as intelligence activities, which is one of the things that we’re dealing with right 

now in Congressional oversight—and the Congressional oversight 

that I’m giving you, as expressed by a Republican and a Democrat 

in a nonpartisan space program, is that it’s not in the interest of 

the United States that you have a 5- to 7-year hiatus in which the 

United States does not have the capability of launching humans. 

And that’s what I would purely offer to you. 

General Stafford, you’re known for your straight talk. I want to 

ask you three questions. Has your Task Group witnessed any barriers or impediments or areas of concern for Shuttle safety that 

were not previously addressed by the CAIB? 

General STAFFORD. Senator Nelson, at this time, to my knowledge, we have not, you know, identified any barriers—or not—and 

I’ll check with my three panel leads back here. 

34

Senator NELSON. OK, second question. Have you witnessed, General, any Return to Flight launch-schedule pressures affecting 

NASA’s decisionmaking? 

General STAFFORD. In my observation, Senator Nelson, no. As I 

pointed out to the Chairman and the rest of the Committee, what 

we observed are milestones, that NASA will achieve a milestone 

before we go ahead and close out those items. 

Senator NELSON. The third question is, what is your assessment 

of the workforce morale and the skill levels to meet the Return to 

Flight goals? 

General STAFFORD. Well, as I pointed out in my statement, Senator Nelson, the Return to Flight Task Group is concerned about 

the personnel to support the whole effort, and this was written up 

in our last report—you know, the quality of people—because we’re 

expanding the safety organizations, and all this is coming out of 

other NASA personnel and the contractor pool that is available. 

As far as the morale, now, again, my three panel leads have had 

daily interface with those people, and I’ll look to them to check 

on—as far as morale. 

All of them have said basically the morale is high in their daily 

meetings. And from what I’ve observed—and, again, in a macro 

sense, sir—it’s high. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. 

General STAFFORD. One thing—I would like to respond again to 

the Chairman about the heavy lift that just came to mind. Again, 

when we completed that study, Mr. Chairman, 13 years ago, we 

outlined, you know, the heavy-lift capability. But, again, technology 

has progressed in these 13 years, so 160,000 pounds to low–Earth 

orbit today will do more than what it did back when I conducted 

that study, sir. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good. I just—I pointed it out because you 

did that for Moon-Mars mission review at that time, and talked 

about the need for heavy-lift capacity to be——

General STAFFORD. Right. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—able to do that. Now, maybe it’s a different ball game now, and hopefully it is. It’s just as an issue—as 

I look—saying, OK, we want to get to this new vision for manned 

space exploration—I want us to invest our dollars there, and it 

seems like we’ve depreciated out the old machinery here, and it’s 

time to move on forward. It’s got a heavy expense in repair if we’re 

going to use it, and, you know, we’re at $2.2 billion on Return to 

Flight now. We don’t know if that’s the exact number it’s going to 

finish with. You’ve got 5 of 15 items accomplished, but you’ve got 

ten more to do. We don’t—we’ve got to either have a system where 

you can repair, in-flight, or rescue. That seems like, to me, you’re 

going to—you’re talking about some serious dollars being able to do 

either of those types—or probably you’ll want a system where you 

can do both of those if we’re going to use the Shuttle. And I just—

I’m looking at this thing, and this thing has got a lot of cost associated——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I could, the one point I 

would caution is that this is not an additive or exponential equation here, where you take five recommendations and it costs this 

35

much to get there, and another ten to go, and so you take the exponent and you just escalate it. This is basically what the cost is. 

Last summer, when we, you know, estimated the cost of what we 

were doing here, we were really, you know, doing a forecast that 

was well within a swag, because the Accident Investigation Board 

recommendations were just codified on August 26th of last year. 

We formulated our best bet in putting this together for part of the 

budget. And what we’ve now encountered is a whole series of 

things that we’ve done that I think, in the end, is not so much an 

increase in cost as much as it’s just a front-loading of cost. What 

we’re doing—again, all three orbiters in major modification. That 

would normally happen over a span of 5 or 6 years. The fact that 

it’s intensively happening all in a span of about 18 months is 

what’s front-loading these costs. It means you save cost from the 

out-years of not having to do that. 

The second thing we’re doing is a lot of sustaining engineering 

effort. One of the observations in the recommendation in the Accident Investigation Board report was the requirement for inspections and a whole range of different, kind of, capabilities, organically, within the agency, to do this. That’s going to cost, over time, 

organizationally, the effort necessary, and that’s what I think Tom 

Stafford has observed, is that we’re really tapping some of the best 

folks out there, but that’s kind of getting to be a diminished number, because we’re recruiting them all in to be part of the Engineering and Safety Center, to be part of the Independent Technical Authority, to be part of the sustaining engineering effort at Johnson, 

at Marshall, at Kennedy, in order to assure we’ve got a robust engineering capacity in those places. That’s going to cost, and it’s going 

to be cost over time, in terms of those organizational changes. And 

it isn’t directly related exclusively to Shuttle itself. 

So part of this is an adjustment of cost up front, rather than an 

increase or an additive cost over time. And, indeed, we’d much 

rather see that happen now, during this time when all the orbiters 

are down, so we can do the kind of repairs necessary to make the 

upgrades necessary for sensors and the booms and everything else, 

to do that right. 

Senator BROWNBACK. And that’s agreed. It’s just—I don’t think 

we know that the $2.2 billion is a hard figure, either. I mean, it 

ought to be, and it looks like, to me, it’s probably more than a swag 

off of this one, but, still, you just don’t know what these things are 

going to consume, budgetarily, on you. I mean, I hope this is the 

end of it for—as far as, OK, yes, we can do it, and we’re not driven 

by dollars or time-frames; we’re driven by milestones so that nothing happens until this thing is certified that we’re——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—we’re clear and we’re good to go on it. 

But, you know, that’s——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, for what it’s worth, I mean, you’re absolutely 

right. I don’t want to mislead you in any way that we’ve got a firm, 

fixed handle on these numbers. No doubt about, this is always 

going to be something that’s going to come up here. I mean, it 

seems like it’s a daily event, you know, between acts of God and 

everything else that occurs. 

36

That said, the number we’re looking at today, the cost we’re looking at, the efforts we’re engaged in, what we’re doing to, you know, 

kind of work through each of these recommendations by the end of 

this year, is a whole lot better understood than where it was on 

this very date one year ago. And at that time, it was, you know, 

a forecast, at best. Today, we can bind this within a parameter. 

General STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, say we have conditionally 

closed out 5 of the 15 recommendations. We’re also way down the 

road on many of the other 10, Mr. Chairman. And hopefully, in the 

next 2 to 3 months we can close out another 4 or 5. Our planning 

factor is the end of December, but we’re not going to stop until everyone has, you know, met those milestones. But we’re way down 

the road on considerably more than just those 5 that have been 

conditionally closed, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BROWNBACK. So you believe, as you independently review this, by somewhere near the end of this year, that you should 

be able to close out all 15? 

General STAFFORD. If the conditions are met by NASA. That is 

our planning factor. If they’re not, we’ll go right on over into the 

next year. 

Senator BROWNBACK. No, I understand the planning factor. But 

I’m just saying, as you observe, from outside NASA——

General STAFFORD. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—and what it is doing, you believe they are 

on track to hit all 15 milestones by the end of this year? 

General STAFFORD. It may be difficult on several of them, sir. 

And particularly, as I outlined, the biggest challenge is the external tank and the outlining on the critical debris. So the technical 

part is really the critical part, and Mr. Cuzzupoli could enlighten 

me if there are any further sub-details that you would need. 

Senator BROWNBACK. But you believe the technical ability is 

there, even on the external tanks, to be able to accomplish this limitation of debris? 

General STAFFORD. We know that a lot of the areas have been 

accomplished. And right now, the milestone looks like that they 

should ship the tank there in November. But, again, they won’t 

ship the tank until the criteria have been closed. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Cuzzupoli, do you want to comment on 

this? Do you mind? I hate to extend this, but this really goes to 

the core of what we’re trying to get at, at the hearing. 

Mr. CUZZUPOLI. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Are we going to be able to technologically 

address the issues on the external tank? 

Mr. CUZZUPOLI. Yes, we will. And from an independent viewpoint, NASA has done one great job of identifying their fixes on the 

external tank, and they’ve got a real good path to getting there. 

The issue, again, is to make sure that none of the foam comes off 

the critical debris area, and that’s a tough job. 

The CAIB has put some very strong recommendations, very high 

recommendations. And NASA, again, has lifted the bar over that 

recommendation, and it’s going to be a difficult work going forward, 

but I believe what the General said, that—by the end of the year—

right now, the recommendations look like we can maybe conditionally close all of them. Some of them will have to stay open 

37

based on verification. But they’re on the—on a milestone schedule, 

to complete everything by the end of the year, as far as recommendations. 

Senator BROWNBACK. So no technological hurdle that’s insurmountable on the foam issue and the external tank. 

Mr. CUZZUPOLI. We, on the independent parties, have seen none 

that can stop them from going forward. 

Senator BROWNBACK. And you, as an external reviewer, believe 

that they are on track to be able to close this out, at least conditionally, by the end of this year. 

Mr. CUZZUPOLI. Yes, Senator. 

Senator BROWNBACK. OK, good. 

All right. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Administrator, I might add—throw one final thought in. As 

we’re putting the appropriations together for this year, it seems 

like we really—it may be time, given the Administration’s view on 

this and a veto threat—or recommendation of a veto by key advisors to the President, more accurately—you know, it may be time 

to try to get some of the chief sponsors of this together to try to 

discuss that—while we may talk about an out-year issue, you’ve got 

a near-term, this-year issue that we need to resolve. We’ve got 

budget caps. We’re trying to get back into a balanced budget. Everybody understands that; you more than anybody, having worked 

in this process before, and you understand where you are in the appropriations process. But it might be wise to try to get some of the 

key, chief people together in the House, Senate, and the Administration to try to resolve this issue here pretty near-term so we 

could maybe come up with a number that not anybody is completely satisfied with, but that’s workable on this year, and on a 

this-year appropriation. And it seems like it may be a wise thing 

to do here pretty near-term. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, I appreciate that, Senator. And this is certainly a clear understanding on our part, how challenging this is. 

This is a really tough budget year. There’s no doubt about that. 

That said, I think you put your finger right to it. A lot of the debate and discussion about what we do in the out-years and what’s 

the right permutation and when’s the gap and—that’s academic if 

we can’t get through this first stage. And we understand that to 

be two critical factors. The first one is, we have to demonstrate a 

proficiency—technical and professional proficiency—of Return to 

Flight. That’s our fundamental objective right now to do that. And 

number two is—and equally important—is, the Congress of the 

United States, if it would simply support what the President’s 

budget request has done, that will get us toward that objective. 

So how we debate what these out-year permutations are, are 

really important, they’re significant, they’re imperative for accomplishing this strategy, but we can’t even get out of the starting gate 

unless we can accomplish this, in this coming year, on those two 

variables. And that’s where, you know, the issue resides right now. 

Mr. Chairman, if you would permit me one last point. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me finish this thought, though——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—because what it seems like I’m observing 

is that you’ve got a pretty strong group supporting the Space ShutVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:40 Aug 08, 2007 Jkt 036172 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\36172.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
38

tle, you’ve got a strong group supporting the exploration mission, 

and then you’ve got a strong group that doesn’t want to concentrate 

resources in fewer areas, which you’re going to need to do to be 

able to get these done. And what I would hope we could do is, in 

the near term, the first year, let’s try to agree on a number, that 

we can hit those as we continue to negotiate that set of three policy 

issues that are out in front of you, which I think is all doable, but 

you are going to—it is going to have to take somebody kind of pulling the pot together and getting it made so we can get that done. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. Fair enough. I agree with you wholeheartedly. 

If you’d permit me one last comment, sir. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Please. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. There was—at the point in which there were a couple of discussions of what the morale and what the condition of it 

is across the agency, let me just offer, rather, my opinion—as anecdotal evidence, I admit—a missive that was sent out a couple of 

weeks ago by the deputy program manager of the Space Shuttle 

program, Wayne Hale, that he sent around to all the Shuttle team 

members and all the colleagues we have that are working this 

issue. It really is uplifting. It is a piece that speaks more, in my 

judgment, to what the morale of the people who really matter, that 

are really turning the crank and doing this job and are dedicated 

to this task, have summarized. And this is something I consult just 

about every day now, because it is an important reminder of what 

this is all about and why people care about it. It’s a really great 

piece. And if you’d permit me, sir, to insert that for the record, I’d 

appreciate it very much. 

Senator BROWNBACK. It’ll be in the record, without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Subject: Back to School (August 25, 2004) by Wayne Hale, Jr., Deputy Program Manager, Space Shuttle Program 

The new year doesn’t start on January first; it really begins when school opens. 

The whole family has to get back into the familiar routine, up in the morning, 

breakfast, school bus, homework at night, school activities. There is electricity in the 

air with the excitement of new opportunities. No matter how busy the summer has 

been, the rhythm of life speeds to new heights with the start of school. And even 

though we have our calendars marked in advance, the start of the school year always seems to come as a surprise. 

For the Space Shuttle Program, it’s back to school time, too. 

Almost unexpectedly, we are back into routine: flight design is into the production 

template, the crew training is on schedule, and all of those old standard preparation 

work items are on the agenda. Stacking has started on the flight boosters. Discovery

is powered up, the schedule says ‘‘up mission processing.’’ There is a full court press 

underway in the OPF for both Discovery and Atlantis; parts are no longer being removed, but installed and checked out for flight. Flex hose and wiring inspections—

while never finished—are no longer the focus of our attention nor are they the pacing items. At Michoud, foam is going back onto ET–120 for flight—certified!—after 

a long period of removals, dissections, tests, and discussion. Everywhere we look; 

we see flight preparation routine at last. Even hurricane season seems to be part 

of the routine and will not slow us down. 

A promotion in grade school leads to more difficult courses. Long division is tough 

but the answers are more precise than short division. Algebra is not just a harder 

form of arithmetic, it requires a whole new way of thinking. The homework takes 

longer than it did the previous year. So it is with the Shuttle program. We also have 

a new way of thinking and a new standard of precision to meet. Problems require 

more work, more analysis, more tests than they did ‘‘last year.’’ Our homework is 

going to be tougher, and take longer. But the answers will be worth it: we will know 

rather than guess, hope, or ignore, and we will fly more safely. 

39

When I was in college, after just the first day of classes I always felt I was 3 

weeks behind on reading and homework assignments. So now with the Space Shuttle program; a huge amount of work is ahead. Even though the challenge seems formidable, we know that somehow we will get it all done. 

The juggernaut of testing, analysis, review, and certification must be completed, 

even while working through the template to flight. Yes, this year is going to be 

tougher than before. 

At the end of the spring semester there is always a big final exam that tests everything covered during the year. Even before the first day of class every student 

knows that the final exam will come. It is the same with us; next spring we will 

have a big Final Exam that will test everything we are doing. Every decision will 

play into that test grade. Every test, analysis, redesign, certification, and installation will be tested. Our final exam will be pass/fail. As surely as if we were in school 

we must make the full use of every day to make sure we pass. 

But just as the new school year brings the bright promise of new beginnings and 

excitement, there is a new excitement is in our lives even as the pace of work grows 

faster. The new beginning for us is irrevocably tied up in the ‘‘new culture’’ of 

NASA. This ‘‘new culture’’ is really the old original NASA culture. Our cultural 

change is to go back to the basics. Solid engineering must back up technical and 

management decisionmaking. No risk decisions based on the hopeful optimism of 

press releases or the forced ignorance of cost constraints. Rather, solid decisions 

made on the basis of hard facts proven by test and thorough analysis. Every one 

of us must summon up the courage to deliver the information that—perhaps alone—

we know. We must have the integrity to deliver the facts whether or not they will 

be received well or with disappointment. From this point on, we will look each problem in the face and we will solve each one the old fashioned way: by hard work. 

That is what made our predecessors in this agency successful; that is the lesson that 

ensures our success; that is the lesson that we have had to relearn at a bitter price. 

Some ask, ‘‘can we afford to deal with problems in the new (old) way? ’’ Wrong 

question. Rather ask, ‘‘can we afford to deal with problems as we did before? ’’ No, 

good as that process was, fast as it was, there was too much slipping through the 

cracks, leaving too many opportunities for Murphy to deal us a losing hand. Precision and thoroughness have always been required in space flight. Our Apollo predecessors knew that. Now, we must take dedication, thoroughness, and hard work to 

a new level, reach deeper, pull harder. 

Most school teams have their cheerleaders to encourage them. The whole nation 

is pulling for us. Every chance encounter with the public confirms that the virtually 

everyone in our country wants us to succeed, wants us to fly again. The International Space Station team is counting on us, holding the fort day by day until 

we arrive. It cannot be possible that we could let them all down. 

We have the best and the brightest on our team. If this team is not dedicated 

enough to our goal of safe and successful human space flight, I don’t know who ever 

was. If this highly trained, well educated, and thoroughly experienced team is not 

sufficient to make Shuttle flights safe, who is? If this agency cannot fly in space, 

who from our Nation in our generation will be able to? We made a promise that 

we would carry the torch on, that we would never make the mistake of overconfidence again. This year, I am confident we will pass with flying colors. 

School is now in session.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you’re very kind. Appreciate that. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Gentlemen, thank you all very much. And 

I want to congratulate you, Administrator O’Keefe, General Stafford, really for the work that you guys are doing. And while the 

questions may be, you know, back and forth and seem pretty aggressive at times, it’s our role to try to do some oversight where 

we try to dig into the issues of the day, and we’re wrestling with 

a big set of policy issues, as you are, and we want to review your 

policy decisions. 

Mr. O’KEEFE. We’d be disappointed otherwise, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, we wouldn’t want to disappoint you. 

But I don’t want that thought to diminish the thought, as well, 

that we really want to commend you for the work that you’re 

doing——

40

Mr. O’KEEFE. Appreciate that. 

Senator BROWNBACK.—because I see a lot of very positive things 

that are very uplifting for the country. And there are going to be 

struggles, and this is a cutting-edge area that you’re in, and so 

there are just—there are going to be difficulties with that. And 

sometimes it’s hard to explain to the American public, too, when 

they’d rather have the pothole fixed in the street, that, you know, 

this is important. It is important, and we need to be always out 

there talking about that, but we also need to make sure that the 

policy directions are one that the vast majority of the United States 

public supports. It’s not a partisan issue. It doesn’t cross—it doesn’t 

cut Republican or Democrat. This is about Americans leading on 

forward, and I think you’re both doing a very commendable work 

in that, and I want to thank you for doing that. 

Thank you all for coming. The hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Good morning. Just over 1 year ago, NASA’s Administrator Sean O’Keefe was 

joined by Admiral Harold Gehman in testifying before this Committee about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)’s findings into the causes of the tragic 

Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Today, we welcome back Administrator O’Keefe 

to update us on the progress NASA is making to implement the CAIB’s recommendations and return the Space Shuttle program to flight. In addition, we welcome Lt. General Thomas Stafford, a distinguished Naval Academy graduate and 

astronaut, to discuss the Return to Flight Task Group’s role in providing an independent assessment of the agency’s actions in implementing the CAIB recommendations. 

The CAIB report was one of the most comprehensive accident investigation reports in U.S. history. The report laid out a number of hard decisions that both 

NASA and the Nation would have to make to ensure a safe Shuttle program. I congratulate Administrator O’Keefe for embracing these recommendations, and working 

to implement them. As we examine NASA’s activities, we must acknowledge that 

the return to flight of the Space Shuttle is the first goal of the President’s ambitious 

new initiative to return Americans to the Moon and explore Mars. 

As we will hear today, NASA still has a lot of work to do before the Shuttle can 

fly again. So far, only five of the CAIB’s 15 ‘‘Return to Flight’’ recommendations 

have been conditionally approved by the Return to Flight Task Group. This Committee remains extremely interested in NASA’s efforts to implement the remaining 

10 recommendations, especially the status of the in-flight emergency repair of the 

Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panels on the leading edge of the Shuttle wings, and the 

program to eliminate the shedding of debris from the External Tank. 

I hope that Administrator O’Keefe and General Stafford also will address the status of in-flight tile repair; the establishment of a truly independent Technical Engineering Authority; NASA’s plans to use the International Space Station as a ‘‘safe 

harbor’’ in case the Space Shuttle is damaged; and the recent damage caused by 

Hurricane Frances at the Kennedy Space Center. As the Administrator knows. I 

have included statutory language in S. 2541, my legislation to reauthorize NASA, 

to ensure that the CAIB’s recommendations are implemented. 

One issue of great concern to me is that NASA’s old problems regarding cost overruns have reappeared. According to briefings that NASA has given the Committee, 

NASA expects $114 million in cost overruns for Shuttle operations and sustaining 

engineering activities in Fiscal Year 2004, and $357 million for Fiscal Year 2005. 

I look forward to hearing Administrator O’Keefe’s explanation for these overruns, 

and what programs NASA may cut to pay for them. In addition, I look forward to 

hearing his explanation of an additional $405 million in projected cost overruns in 

FY 2005 for Return to Flight activities. I also hope that he will inform the Committee at this hearing if NASA intends to submit a revised budget request for FY 

2005, and describe to us what it will look like. If NASA wants to reform its credibility and build support for the President’s new space exploration initiative, it will 

have to get its budgeting house in order. 

Space travel is inherently risky, and we will never be able to make it 100 percent 

safe. However, we should work to enact the recommendations of the CAIB to ensure 

that the problems that caused the Columbia accident do not return. I commend both 

Administrator O’Keefe and General Stafford for their efforts, and look forward to 

hearing their testimony. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

HON. SEAN O’KEEFE

Question 1. Will the damage to the Kennedy Space Center due to Hurricane 

Frances cause further delay in returning the Space Shuttle to flight? 

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Answer. It is too early to make an accurate assessment. The combined effects of 

the three hurricanes, Charley, Frances, and Ivan, will be determined over the next 

several weeks. It is known that our Shuttle Processing workforce has lost many 

days of productive activity due to the safe closure of the Kennedy Space Center 

(KSC) in response to the hurricanes. The impact to orbiter processing milestones 

and any other impacts will be assessed and presented to the Space Flight Leadership Council. The results of NASA’s assessment and decisions on Return to Flight 

will be shared with the Congress when the results are available. Like all milestones 

toward Return to Flight, if the milestone cannot be met, NASA will slip the launch 

to the next available launch window and adjust milestone completion dates accordingly.

Question 2. In a July 30, 2004 letter to me, NASA indicated that in addition to the ‘‘Return to Flight’’ costs there are increases of $100 million and $300 million 

for FY 2004 and FY 2005, respectively, for the Shuttle program for program operations and sustaining engineering. In briefing material presented to the Committee 

in July, it was indicated that most of these increases are influenced by Columbia

Accident Investigation Board recommendations and that the actual amounts were 

$114 million and $357 million for FY 2004 and FY 2005, respectively. Can you 

elaborate on these program operations and sustaining engineering cost increases 

and how NASA plans to address them? 

Answer. As a result of the Columbia experience, flight hardware is now subjected 

to greater levels of test, analysis, performance monitoring, inspection, repair, and 

recertification for flight. The program’s safety controls are being reassessed, as are 

its industrial processes, to ensure nothing is overlooked that might lead to a safety 

of flight issue later on. In the short term, this has led to more intensive investigations into flight hardware anomalies not related to Return to Flight (RTF), such as 

the flow liner and flex hoses. In the long term, additional resources will be required 

to sustain the levels of analysis, investigation, and integrated risk assessment that 

were found lacking by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), but not 

addressed specifically in every Space Shuttle project. NASA will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of these changes to ensure that only what is absolutely needed 

for safe flight is retained for the remainder of the Shuttle’s service life. As promised, 

revised estimates for both RTF and Shuttle operations and sustaining activities will 

be provided in the fall. However, the full impact of RTF on Shuttle costs will not 

be known until after the first few Shuttle missions are completed. The $114 million 

increase for program operations and sustaining engineering will be addressed within 

the Space Operations budget. More detail will be provided in the next Operating 

Plan update. NASA will continue to assess requirements and identify strategies to 

incrementally address the FY 2005 shortfalls. NASA may have to reallocate funds 

from lower priority activities, corporate accounts, or other program reserves.

Question 3. Why is it necessary to identify these costs as separate from ‘‘Return 

to Flight’’ costs? 

Answer. It is essential to separate RTF costs from operations and sustaining costs 

for three reasons. First, is to ensure that there is no duplication of effort leading 

to unnecessary expenditures. Second, NASA made a commitment to separately track 

the RTF costs so that they might be accurately assessed and budgeted. Third, the 

technical basis for the increases in operations and sustaining activities, while they 

may be in part a result of the Columbia experience, may also be influenced by other 

factors that must be assessed for their long-term contribution to Shuttle safety and 

performance.

Question 4. Why did NASA not address these cost increases in their written statement or oral remarks during the hearing? 

Answer. Administrator O’Keefe’s written statement and oral remarks to the Committee were focused on NASA’s efforts to implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Program operations and sustaining engineering costs have not been considered in calculating and describing Return to 

Flight costs for the reasons provided in the answer above. 

However, while program operations and sustaining engineering cost estimates 

were not specifically enumerated, Administrator O’Keefe’s testimony did acknowledge their significance. The Administrator’s written testimony indicated that the 

current cost estimate, provided to the Committee on July 30, 2004, included costs 

incurred by other agency activities in support of Return to Flight efforts. A majority 

of these costs is associated with program operations and sustaining engineering. In 

addition, the written testimony made reference to the reassessment of the Shuttle 

program and described program activities that are associated with program operations and sustaining engineering. Finally, Administrator O’Keefe discussed the 

issue of NASA’s sustaining engineering efforts in response to a question on Return 

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to Flight costs from Senator Brownback. Although the hearing was primarily focused on NASA’s RTF efforts, the issue of sustaining engineering and operations 

was addressed. NASA recognizes the importance of these costs, has provided information on these costs to the Committee, and is taking steps to try to control them 

while ensuring that our ability to safely return to flight is not compromised.

Question 5. Cost increases of $450 million to $760 million over the FY 2005 budget request of $4.3 billion for the Shuttle program have been reported by NASA. This 

would amount to a total of $4.8 billion to $5.1 billion for FY 2005 alone. There are 

many who are questioning whether the Shuttle will fly next year and who say that 

the $5 billion would be wasted. How do you respond to these charges? 

Answer. Our current plans have the Space Shuttle flying three missions in FY 

2005. There are currently no technical issues that would prevent NASA from accomplishing this plan, which was confirmed by Gen. Stafford during the hearing. Returning to flight is the first step in implementing the Vision for Space Exploration, 

which uses a stepping-stone approach. It is critical for completing assembly of the 

International Space Station, which is preparing us for future human exploration.

Question 6. When can we expect to see NASA’s amendment to the budget request 

and how NASA will pay for these cost increases? 

Answer. At this juncture, NASA does not plan to submit an FY 2005 budget 

amendment. NASA intends to pay for the Space Shuttle cost increases within the 

President’s FY 2005 budget request. First, the program will seek to reduce the 

shortfalls as technical options are closed and cost estimates can be refined. Operations and sustaining increases are being reassessed to ensure that only essential 

activities continue beyond RTF. The agency will incrementally evaluate progress to 

reduce the shortfalls, and take action to reallocate its resources to support RTF as 

required. NASA is re-evaluating the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 

to determine which activities can be canceled or deleted based on the program’s revised service life. NASA may have to reallocate funds from lower priority activities, 

corporate accounts, or other program reserves.

Question 7. Do you foresee any technical challenges that would prevent NASA 

from meeting the ‘‘Return to Flight’’ recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report? 

Answer. NASA currently sees no insurmountable challenges to safely return the 

Space Shuttle fleet to flight. There is a significant amount of testing to verify analyses and certification processes to complete; however, planning for these activities 

is in place. Unanticipated results from testing and launch preparation may impact 

milestones leading to the Return to Flight launch and, if necessary, we will revise 

the milestone date to assure a safe mission.

Question 8. One issue of critical importance to the Return to Flight program is 

on-orbit repair of the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panels on the leading edge of the 

Shuttle wing and the tiles on the orbiter. As you know, it was a hole in a Reinforced 

Carbon-Carbon panel that caused the destruction of Columbia. What is the status 

of NASA’s efforts to develop on-orbit inspection and repair capabilities? 

Answer. Taken together, Thermal Protection System (TPS) inspection and repair, 

including those processes associated with Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels, 

represent one of the most challenging and extensive Return to Flight tasks. NASA’s 

near-term TPS risk mitigation plan calls for:

• Space Shuttle vehicle modifications to eliminate the liberation of critical debris.

• Fielding improved ground and vehicle-based cameras.

• Developing ship-based radar and airborne sensors for ascent debris tracking.

• Adding wing leading edge (WLE) impact sensors for debris detection and damage assessment.

• On-orbit TPS surveys using the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) 

and Space Station.

• Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) cameras.

• International Space Station (ISS) crew observations during Shuttle approach 

and docking.

Techniques for repairing RCC panels using an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) 

(space walk) are under development. The combination of these capabilities will help 

to ensure a low probability that critical damage will be sustained, while increasing 

the probability any damage that does occur can be detected and the consequences 

mitigated in flight. NASA’s long-term TPS risk mitigation steps will refine and improve all elements of the near-term plan, ensuring an effective inspection and repair 

capability. 

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The first step in structuring effective inspections is to establish baseline criteria 

for resolving critical damage. NASA has defined preliminary critical damage inspection criteria that form the basis for TPS inspection and repair development work. 

The detailed criteria are evolving based on ongoing tests and analyses. Our goal is 

to define damage thresholds for all TPS zones, below which no repair is required 

before entry. These criteria are a function of the damage surface dimensions, depth, 

and entry heating at each location on the vehicle. 

A combination of Shuttle and ISS assets will be capable of imaging TPS damage 

in all areas. The Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) project is currently developing a sensor system that will be flown on the first flight and used to inspect the 

RCC on the WLE and nose cap. The OBSS comprises sensors on the end of a boom 

system that is launched and installed on the orbiter’s starboard sill. The boom will 

be used in conjunction with the SRMS to inspect WLE RCC and the nose cap prior 

to docking with ISS. After docking, the OBSS will be used to further inspect any 

suspect areas on the orbiter. Additionally, the boom will have the capability to support an EVA crewmember, if needed, to support inspection activities. Current plans 

call for the OBSS to carry a Laser Dynamic Range Imager (LDRI) sensor to detect 

damage to the RCC. A second sensor system, called the Laser Camera System 

(LCS), which has a higher capability compared to the LDRI, will also be flown as 

part of the OBSS if development can be completed to support Return to Flight. Critical damage to the RCC will be detectable on-orbit with the OBSS. 

The main challenges to repairing RCC are maintaining a bond to the RCC coating 

during entry heating and meeting very small edge step requirements. The RCC repair project is pursuing two complementary repair concepts that together will enable 

repair of RCC damage of a wide range: Plug Repair and Crack Repair. Plug Repair 

consists of an insert intended to repair holes in the WLE with sizes from 0.5 inches 

to 4 inches in diameter. Crack Repair uses a material application intended to fill 

cracks and small holes in the WLE. Both concepts are expected to have limitations 

in terms of damage characteristics, damage location, and testing/analysis. Schedules 

for design, development, testing, evaluation, and production of these concepts are in 

work. 

NASA is continuing research and development on a long-term, more flexible RCC 

repair technique for holes over 4 inches in diameter. This effort is still in the concept definition phase and is much less mature than the tile repair material study. 

NASA is evaluating concepts across 6 NASA centers, 11 contractors, and the United 

States Air Force Research Laboratory. Initial NASA development of a third RCC repair technique, rigid overwrap, encountered significant technical challenges. As a result, the Space Shuttle program (SSP) recommended that the rigid overwrap be deferred in favor of an expanded research and development project to develop alternative repair techniques for large holes. On June 9, 2004, the Space Flight Leadership Council approved the SSP recommendation and directed the SSP to develop 

plug and crack repair to the greatest extent practicable for the March 2005 launch 

of STS–114.

Question 9. A recent Congressional Budget Office report entitled, ‘‘A Budgetary 

Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration’’ dated Sept. 2, 2004, indicates 

that the human lunar mission could slip by as much as 1 year for each year that 

the Shuttle’s operations are extended. Do you agree with that assessment? 

Answer. Yes. Since the majority of Exploration Systems development costs will 

come from funds freed up by the retirement of the Space Shuttle program, it is correct to assume that any delay in the Shuttle retirement would affect the human 

lunar mission.

Question 10. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that using 

the Shuttle beyond 2010 would require re-certification of the orbiters. It now appears even more challenging for NASA to complete assembly of the International 

Space Station before that time. What are your plans for re-certification? 

Answer. NASA fully plans to meet the Vision for Space Exploration’s plan for retiring the Space Shuttle, by the end of this decade, following the completion of its 

role in assembling the ISS. To prepare for the contingency that the Shuttle may 

need to operate beyond 2010, NASA is reassessing the need to recertify Space Shuttle systems, subsystems, or components in line with the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Question 11. Are you developing any cost estimates of what it would take to recertify the orbiters? 

Answer. NASA fully plans to meet the Vision for Space Exploration’s plan for retiring the Space Shuttle, by the end of this decade, following the completion of its 

role in assembling the ISS. NASA has not yet developed cost estimates for recertification.

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Question 12. General Stafford states in his written statement that a universal 

concern for the Return to Flight Task Group is the personnel requirements to meet 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations. Can you comment on 

NASA’s use of the NASA Flexibility Act to aid the agency in addressing its personnel problems? 

Answer. NASA civil servant staffing in support of Return to Flight was essentially 

completed by the time the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 became available for the 

agency’s use. However, the new flexibilities provided by this Act will benefit the Program’s ability to manage human capital issues in the future. For example, NASA 

plans to use the new retention and recruitment tools to ensure that critical skills 

and expertise of the current workforce are not lost.

Question 13. Several years ago, a number of management reports identified 

NASA’s cost estimating capabilities to be lacking. What has NASA done to improve 

upon this critical skill? 

Answer. GAO recently completed a review of NASA’s cost estimating capabilities. 

NASA is in the process of responding to and implementing recommendations from 

this report. They include:

1. Developing an integrated plan that, at a minimum, includes: specific actions 

for ensuring that guidance is established on re-baselining, and that re-baselining is consistently applied to provide accountability among programs; true 

earned value management is used as an organizational management tool to 

bring cost to the forefront in NASA’s management decision-making process; acquisition and earned value management policies and procedures are enforced; 

and, staff and support for cost-estimating and earned value analyses are effectively used.

2. Establishing a NASA Cost Estimating Review Board (CERB) similar to the 

Department of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) to ensure 

a disciplined cost estimating review process for future NASA acquisitions. On 

July 7, 2004, the NASA Headquarters Cost Analysis Division received the goahead from the Agency Program Management Council (PMC) for full implementation of its Continuous Cost-Risk Management (CCRM) initiative that integrates cost estimating and earned value with risk management and feedback. 

This will provide project managers with the highest quality cost management 

information to ensure successful project cost management.

3. Establishing a standard framework for developing life-cycle cost estimates. 

The framework will require each program or project to base its cost estimates 

on a full life-cycle for the program—including all direct and indirect costs for 

operations and maintenance and disposal as well as planning and procurement—and on a work breakdown structure that encompass both in-house and 

contractor efforts; development of the Cost Analysis Data Requirement (CADRe) 

that includes not only an equivalent to the Department of Defense’s CADR but 

also requires the NASA project manager to additionally provide an annually updated set of key cost-driving technical parameters that can be used to produce 

a Life-Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) along with the requirement for an annual 

LCCE; prepare an independent government estimate at each milestone of the 

program; and, conduct a cost-risk assessment that identifies the level of uncertainty inherent in the estimate.

Question 14. The projected cost increases of $450 to $760 million over the FY 2005 

budget are related specifically to Return to Flight activities and implementation of 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations, and do not include the 

costs associated with Shuttle mission execution and transition activities that will 

begin in the next few years. 

Answer. As a point of clarification, the $450 to $760 million estimated cost increase for FY 2005 does include the estimated $357 million increase associated with 

program operations and sustaining engineering.

Question 15. What uncertainties—both within and outside of NASA’s control—

must be resolved before the agency can provide Congress with an accurate cost estimate of Shuttle program activities through its retirement, including RTF, CAIB, 

and mission execution and transition activities and workforce needs? When does 

NASA anticipate including costs of Shuttle mission execution, transition activities, 

and associated workforce needs in a budget request? 

Answer. While NASA is moving rapidly to close on the technical responses to the 

CAIB recommendations, the total impact of Columbia on the agency cannot be fully 

assessed until after the first few Space Shuttle missions are flown. Only then can 

NASA assess the effectiveness of its technical solutions and determine the level of 

effort needed in all areas to assure safe flight through the end of the program. In 

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addition, until the Space Station final configuration and assembly sequence is 

agreed upon, the number of Shuttle flights required will not be known. In practical 

terms, the soonest NASA might be able to submit a definitive budget through the 

program’s retirement would be in its FY 2007 budget request, since the FY 2006 

request will be submitted before the first RTF mission.

Question 16. Given the uncertainties surrounding Shuttle activities and NASA’s 

issues related to cost estimating in the past, what assurance can NASA provide 

Congress that the out-year cost estimates related to the program are well founded? 

Answer. Over the last 2 years, NASA has greatly enhanced its cost estimating capabilities. The issue with the current Shuttle cost estimates is not a lack of resources or estimating acumen, but the maturity of the technical solutions to the 

RTF challenges. It is only in the last part of FY 2004 that NASA started to close 

on its RTF solutions and to begin incorporating them into flight hardware production, operations procedures, and revised, integrated mission risk assessments. As 

will always be the case, sound cost estimates must follow sound technical content. 

Accordingly, as NASA completes the work delineated in its RTF plan and once actual flight experience is gained, the estimates for all years will be reassessed and 

revised.

Question 17. What activities would you characterize as high risk for the Shuttle 

program in that, they could have a significant impact on Shuttle costs in the future? 

Answer. As NASA closes on its technical solutions to the CAIB recommendations; 

the issues that have the greatest impact on cost in the next year are thermal protection system inspection and repair, and the effectiveness of the debris mitigation actions on the external tank. For the long term, workforce increases to support program-wide integrated engineering and mission assurance efforts are projected to require greater resources than in the years prior to Columbia and are the focus of 

ongoing evaluation as the agency approaches its first RTF missions.

Question 18. According to documents provided to the Congress, NASA anticipates 

using funds originally intended for the Shuttle Life Extension Program (SLEP) to 

offset a portion of the budget shortfall in FY 2005. Has NASA performed a risk assessment to determine the impact of not implementing or postponing needed upgrades to the Shuttle? If not, why not? 

Answer. Decisions to continue with a long-term complex vehicle modification in 

the limited available time for Space Shuttle operations must be viewed in the context of relative risk. Major modification of a developmental vehicle late in its mission life requires additional attention after the lessons learned from the CAIB report. Decision packages related to the two remaining primary vehicle upgrade modifications (Cockpit Avionics Upgrade and Advanced Health Monitoring Phase II) are 

currently in coordination. These packages are based on the diligent evaluation of a 

wide range of technical issues and include inputs from diverse program perspectives. They specifically address the relative risk of continuing the project against the 

remaining potential for benefits.

Question 19. What approved SLEP upgrades does this transfer of funds affect and 

how did NASA make the determination that these upgrades could be delayed or 

abandoned? 

Answer. The SLEP funding profile is based on a ‘‘needs’’ evaluation of what is necessary to safely sustain Shuttle operations through ISS assembly complete. Decisions on the status of future upgrades are based on the processes defined above.

Question 20. Was a sensitivity analysis performed on how risks might rise (from 

such delay or abandonment of specific SLEP upgrades) if the Shuttle was retired 

later than the expected 2010–2011 time-frame? 

Answer. NASA fully plans to meet the Vision for Space Exploration’s plan for retiring the Space Shuttle, by the end of this decade, following the completion of its 

role in assembling the ISS. Because upgrades are primarily implemented during orbiter major modification periods, a delayed Space Shuttle retirement date due to 

manifest changes would essentially delay the implementation of the upgrades as 

well, resulting in very little difference in risk.

Question 21. Based on NASA’s proposed strategy, it appears that NASA is funding 

near-term RTF activities at the expense of long-term safety and operations of the 

Shuttle. Is this the case? 

Answer. No. The decisions on vehicle modification were made based on the relative risk of continuing the upgrade in terms of integrated program and technical 

risk against implementation late in the Shuttle’s mission life. Resource constraints, 

while not a decision driver, were an area of consideration.

Question 22. RTF activities have resulted in a rapid increase in activity, including 

the need for an increase in the Shuttle workforce to support such activities. Once 

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RTF has been accomplished, will this level of workforce be maintained to ensure 

that the critical skills necessary to support mission execution and transitioning activities are available? If the workforce is reduced following successful RTF, how will 

NASA ensure that critical skills will be available until the Shuttle fleet is retired? 

Has NASA examined the long-term impacts of this increase and then possible decrease in workforce numbers in light of the planned retirement of the Shuttle at the 

end of the decade? 

Answer. NASA is assessing the post-RTF workforce requirements to determine 

long-term (not just RTF) impacts to operations in complying with CAIB recommendations while balancing the transition activities associated with Space Shuttle retirement. Maintaining the critical skills related to executing the mission and 

providing the appropriate workforce to support transition activities is a key part of 

this effort. NASA has benchmarked similar programs for transition that have dealt 

with a retirement of assets. The lessons learned from these reviews are being incorporated into the implementation plan being developed by the Space Shuttle program. NASA has also engaged the National Academy of Public Administration 

(NAPA) to assess the adequacy of this implementation plan as it relates to the 

transitioning of the workforce. Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) was requested by Senators McCain and Hollings to review NASA’s plans for 

the workforce with the pending Shuttle retirement. NASA believes the efforts of the 

Program to develop a post-RTF mission execution and transition plan, combined 

with the assessment by NAPA and review by GAO, will ensure adequate critical 

skills retention through the end of mission execution and transition activities. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS P. STAFFORD

Question 1. Do you believe NASA will be able to return the Shuttle to flight next 

spring? What analysis have you done to support your position? 

Answer. NASA has laid out a milestone-driven schedule, that if met, will lead to 

a launch in the March/April time-frame. As I indicated in my written testimony, the 

Task Group’s Management, Technical, and Operations Panels have conducted extensive fact-finding activities at all levels within the agency and its contractor team. 

This has included participating in teleconferences, reviewing documents, conducting 

interviews, receiving formal and informal briefings, and observing tests, simulations, and program reviews. Based on assessment of their fact-finding activities, 

task group believes that NASA continues to make significant progress in meeting 

its milestones. However, challenging work lies ahead for NASA, the impacts of Hurricanes Francis and Ivan are not yet known, and there is little time available in 

the schedule for additional unplanned work. Therefore, while it is still possible that 

NASA could be in a position to launch this spring, I would judge the agency’s plan 

to launch in the current March/April planning window as optimistic and there is a 

likelihood that some adjustment may be necessary.

Question 2. Your written statement indicates that the Task group has conditionally approved 5 of the 15 ‘‘Return To Flight’’ recommendations. You have also 

identified in your written statement the actions that are necessary to completely 

close out these items. Do you consider these remaining action items for the conditionally approved recommendations to be of a concern for the Return to Flight date? 

Answer. NASA has planned or is in the process of taking the actions identified 

as conditions for closure of the five ‘‘conditionally closed’’ recommendations. The 

Task Group has no technical concerns in this area and does not expect implementation of these conditions to impact the Return to Flight date.

Question 2a. Is it accurate to say that none of the 15 ‘‘Return To Flight’’ recommendations have been completely closed out more than 1 year after the final report from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board? 

Answer. NASA has made significant progress toward meeting the intent of the 

CAIB in all 15 recommendations: five have been conditionally closed. However, none 

have been fully closed to date.

Question 3. Have you reviewed the cost estimates for the Return to Flight activities in FY 2005 and do you agree with them? What analysis have you done to support your position? 

Answer. Although the Task Group is charged with assessing the consistency of 

NASA’s flight schedule with available resources, an evaluation of the cost estimates 

for Return to Flight is outside the scope of the charter for the Return to Flight Task 

Group.

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Question 4. Can you further discuss NASA’s technical challenges for providing onorbit inspection and repair capabilities for the Shuttle? Is the ‘‘safe haven’’ approach 

you discussed in your written statement a viable alternative? 

Answer. The Task Group is not aware of any technical challenges to on-orbit inspection based on the current requirements. There is significant forward work to deliver and validate this inspection capability. Several technical challenges remain for 

both RCC and tile repair techniques, materials and overall capabilities. NASA is 

working very hard to address these concerns. 

Safe haven is an emergency contingency that will only be considered after all 

other alternatives have been exhausted. As such, NASA has identified the systems 

and consumables required on ISS to provide an engineering estimate that provides 

expected capability at the time of Shuttle launch. This analysis is updated continuously to reflect current system status and changes to consumables that might affect 

duration. In addition, the necessary crew rescue vehicle mission has been established.

Question 5. You noted in your written statement that personnel requirements of 

the Return to Flight program is a universal concern for the Task Group. Do the required staff talents exist within the agency and its contractors? How much of a hindrance is this toward successfully returning the Shuttle to flight? 

Answer. In responding to the recommendations of the CAIB, NASA is establishing 

various new organizations including the NASA Engineering and Safety Center, the 

Independent Technical Authority, and the Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and 

Integration Office, and strengthening others. The Task Group’s expressed concern 

was that these organizations will require personnel with special qualifications and 

experience; that these personnel would of necessity be drawn largely from a limited 

pool within NASA and its contractor team; and that this could put a strain on resources available to perform other important Space Shuttle Return to Flight activities. NASA is still in the process of establishing and staffing some of these new organizations. The Task Group has not identified any deficiencies that will impact Return to Flight. The Task Group will need to continue to monitor this concern.

Question 6. In its January report, the Return-To-Flight Task Group expressed 

concern that NASA ‘‘has not been timely in some of their responses to Task Group 

requests for information.’’ Have these concerns been addressed, and is the Return 

To Flight Task Group getting the information in a timely manner? 

Answer. NASA has worked closely with the Task Group to refine its process for 

and increase its focus on responding to the Task Group’s requests for information. 

Overall, the new process has resulted in a more timely response to the Task Groups 

requests.

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