FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-3926

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MARINE MAX, INC., and

SEABRIGHT INSURANCE 

COMPANY, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

CHARLES BLAIR,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.

Diane B. Beck, Judge.

Date of Accident: October 22, 2010. 

March 7, 2019

WINSOR, J.

This case requires us to consider what happens when a 

workers’ compensation claimant seeks care from a doctor who—as 

a condition of continued treatment—demands compensation above 

and beyond the statutory limits. Marine Max, Inc., and its workers’ 

compensation insurer (collectively, “Marine Max”), appeal an order 

directing them to “authorize and pay” a doctor who not only 

demanded compensation beyond limits the Legislature imposed 

but also demanded those payments in advance. We affirm in part 

and reverse in part.
2

Charles Blair was injured when he fell off a ladder in 2010. 

Marine Max treated the accident as compensable, and it 

authorized Dr. Jonathan Yunis to provide treatment. Yunis 

operated on Blair several times between 2010 and 2014, when 

Yunis practiced with an outfit called Vascular Associates. Some of 

Yunis’s services during this time were billed at statutory rates, 

and some were billed at higher rates. There were apparently no 

payment disputes.

In 2015, Yunis left Vascular Associates to start his own

practice, the “Center for Hernia Repair.” Later, in 2017, Blair 

sought additional treatment, still relating to the original accident. 

He filed a new petition for benefits, asking to return to Yunis for a 

new round of treatment. Unaware of Yunis’s departure from 

Vascular Associates, the insurance adjuster told Blair he was 

authorizing follow-up treatment with Yunis. The adjuster then 

contacted Vascular Associates to set up an appointment. That is 

when the adjuster learned that Yunis no longer worked there. And 

when the adjuster contacted Yunis’s new practice—still trying to 

make an appointment for Blair—he learned that the new practice 

required payments beyond the statutory rates. He also learned 

that the new practice required those above-statutory-rate amounts 

paid in advance.

Marine Max found the new terms unacceptable. There is no 

indication that Marine Max tried to negotiate with Yunis’s new 

practice or that negotiations could have been successful.1 Instead, 

Marine Max sought a doctor willing to work on acceptable payment 

terms. In its formal response to Blair’s petition, Marine Max stated 

that because Yunis would not accept statutory rates, it was 

authorizing treatment with another physician. The adjuster then 

scheduled an appointment for Blair to see that other physician, but 

on counsel’s advice, Blair refused to go.

 1 Yunis did at one point testify that he would treat Blair for 

free “[i]f he was now abandoned on the street with no insurance 

and nobody to pay for anything,” but Blair’s situation never came 

to that. Yunis did not treat Blair (for free or otherwise), which is 

why this litigation continues.
3

The matter then went before the judge of compensation 

claims. Blair argued that he had an existing patient-physician 

relationship with Yunis and that Marine Max could not interfere 

with that relationship by “deauthorizing” Yunis without statutory 

authority. See generally City of Bartow v. Brewer, 896 So. 2d 931, 

933 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). And according to Blair, the statute 

permits deauthorization only if the claimant is not making 

appropriate progress in recuperation, see § 440.13(2)(d), Fla. Stat., 

or if the provider was engaged in a pattern or practice of 

overutilization, see § 440.13(8)(b)2. A provider’s outright refusal to

accept the fee schedule, Blair continues, does not justify 

deauthorization.

Marine Max responded that payments beyond statutory rates 

are allowed only if the employer agrees to pay the higher amount 

and the provider “specifically agrees in writing to follow identified 

procedures aimed at providing quality medical care to injured 

workers at reasonable costs.” See § 440.13(13)(b), Fla. Stat. 

According to Marine Max, because it had no agreement with Yunis, 

it was left with only one real option: to provide medically necessary 

care—as section 440.13(2)(a) required—by authorizing someone 

else. Cf. Leon v. CSB Services, Inc., 219 So. 3d 166, 167 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2017) (holding that authorization of new doctor is required 

when previous doctor “is no longer a viable option”). 

The JCC agreed with Blair and held that Marine Max’s 

actions were “tantamount to a unilateral deauthorization.” See 

generally Brewer, 896 So. 2d at 933. It noted that “[a]ny dispute as 

to the applicability of the charges is within the exclusive preview 

of [the Department of Financial Services]” and that Marine Max 

“may still dispute the charges even if prepayment is required and 

made.” The JCC then ordered Marine Max to “continue to 

authorize and pay Dr. Yunis.” That led to this appeal.

First, Marine Max correctly argues that the JCC had no 

authority to order it to pay Yunis. Blair acknowledges as much; his 

counsel noted at oral argument that “the judge probably made a 

minor mistake” by including “the portion of the order that says 

‘pay.’” See also Ans. Br. at 12 (“[T]he JCC does not have the 

statutory authority to force the E/C to pay for medical services in 

excess of fee schedule.”). Reimbursement is handled under section 
4

440.13(7), Florida Statutes, and all reimbursement disputes fall 

under the exclusive jurisdiction of DFS. See § 440.13(11)(c), Fla. 

Stat. (stating that DFS “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide any 

matters concerning reimbursement”); see also Cook v. Palm Beach 

Cty. Sch. Bd., 51 So. 3d 619, 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding JCCs

lack jurisdiction over payment disputes); Orange County v. Willis, 

996 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding claimant “did not 

have standing to enforce payment of the doctor’s bill”). Moreover, 

even if the JCC could resolve payment disputes, it could not compel 

prepayment, which chapter 440 does not contemplate for medical 

treatment. The relevant statutes and rules use the term 

“reimbursement,” see, e.g., § 440.13, Fla. Stat. (using the words 

“reimburse” and “reimbursement” forty-seven times); Fla. Admin. 

Code R. 69L-7.020 (“A carrier will reimburse a health care provider 

either the [statutory fee schedule] or a mutually agreed upon 

contract price.”), which is distinct from advance payment.2

Although the dissent would affirm the order in its entirety

(including the prepayment requirement), we struggle to identify 

any basis on which we could do so. We must reverse the order on 

appeal to the extent it compels payment.

We still must determine, though, whether the JCC was correct 

to order Yunis’s continued authorization. We conclude that it was. 

The only basis Marine Max offered to justify its doctor substitution 

was Yunis’s insistence on particular financial terms. But a JCC’s 

award of medically necessary care “is to be made without regard to 

 2 The JCC was also wrong in assuming Marine Max could 

prepay the demanded amounts and later seek relief through 

administrative channels. The administrative dispute process

begins with an employer’s refusing to pay a provider’s bill (or 

refusing to pay it in full), called “disallowance” (or “adjustment”). 

See § 440.13(6), (8), Fla. Stat. But if Marine Max paid in advance 

as a condition of service, Yunis would have no occasion to submit 

a bill afterward. Moreover, section 440.13(7)(a)—which previously 

allowed both employers and providers to initiate reimbursement 

disputes at DFS—changed in 2016. It now allows only health care 

providers to initiate those proceedings. Ch. 16-56, § 4, at 496, Laws 

of Fla. So there is no entry point for an employer that prepaid too 

much.
5

the possibility that a payment dispute might arise between the 

employer and the provider.” Tiznado v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare 

Sys., 773 So. 2d 584, 585-86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The JCC was 

therefore required to determine whether Yunis’s continued 

authorization was “reasonable” and “medically necessary,” see

§ 440.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat., without considering the possibility (or 

even probability) that Yunis and Marine Max would never reach 

agreement on terms. The JCC found that Blair had established a 

satisfactory patient-physician relationship with Yunis, and that 

Marine Max had “not established a valid reason for 

deauthorization of Dr. Yunis under these circumstances.” These

conclusions were supported by competent substantial evidence. We 

therefore must affirm the order to the extent it requires Yunis’s 

continued authorization.

Marine Max contends it is illogical to require continued 

authorization of a doctor unwilling to treat the claimant on 

statutory terms. That point is not without force, but the law limits 

the bases on which an employer may officially deauthorize a 

previously authorized physician. Ordinarily a claimant unable to 

receive care from the authorized physician (because of payment 

disputes or otherwise) might seek a new authorized physician, cf.,

e.g., Leon, 219 So. 3d at 167 (noting that claimant appealed denial 

of new authorized treater after old authorized treater was 

“henceforth unwilling to treat” claimant), but Blair has resisted 

that approach, and it is not up to us to weigh the usefulness of his 

demand for Yunis’s continued authorization. 

Nevertheless, it may well turn out that the continued 

authorization does not help Blair, assuming Yunis remains 

unwilling to provide treatment within the statutory compensation 

limits and Marine Max remains unwilling to pay beyond the 

statutory compensation limits (or to pay in advance).

Authorization cannot help a claimant who remains untreated, and 

it should go without saying that neither Marine Max nor any judge 

of compensation claims can force Yunis to provide treatment he 

does not wish to provide. Marine Max can (and must, for now) 

continue to “authorize” Yunis, but all authorization does is allow 

Yunis to demand compensation if he chooses to treat Blair. See

§ 440.13(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (“As a condition to eligibility for payment 

under this chapter, a health care provider who renders services 
6

must receive authorization from the carrier before providing 

treatment.”). If Yunis elects to provide treatment, his 

authorization will permit him to seek compensation under Chapter 

440. See id. § 440.13(13)(a) (noting that authorized providers “have 

recourse against the employer or carrier for payment for services 

rendered in accordance with this chapter”). If he and Marine Max 

reach a different agreement, he can operate under that agreement. 

See id. § 440.13(13)(b). But if he remains unwilling to proceed 

under the system the Legislature created (with its attendant 

limitations on compensation, see, e.g., id.), no employer can force 

him to do otherwise. On the other hand, if Blair concludes that any 

ongoing refusal to treat means Yunis “is no longer a viable option,” 

Blair can seek authorization of a replacement physician, see Leon, 

219 So. 3d 167—a remedy Marine Max has already pursued for 

Blair. Cf. also Lewis v. Town & Country Auto Body Shop, 447 So. 

2d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (“[I]f the authorized physician 

declines to see him further, claimant is entitled to have another 

physician authorized to provide such medical care.”).

We have not, of course, overlooked this court’s cases

recognizing the importance of the physician-claimant relationship. 

See, e.g., Stuckey v. Eagle Pest Control Co., Inc., 531 So. 2d 350, 

351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Cal Kovens Constr. v. Lott, 473 So. 2d 249 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1985). But none of those cases holds that an 

employer must prepay above-schedule rates to avoid a potential 

disruption of that relationship. Although the dissent never 

explicitly says so, its contrary rule must be that employers have no 

choice but to prepay above-scheduled rates providers demand, at 

least until a judge thinks the providers’ demands have gone too 

far.3 But the Legislature—not DCA judges—decides the 

 3 To the extent the dissent’s conclusion relies on some estoppel 

concept, we note that estoppel is an affirmative defense that must 

be asserted below, see, e.g., Teco Energy, Inc. v. Williams, 234 So. 

3d 816, 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (noting that estoppel is an 

affirmative defense that “must be plead carefully or forever 

waived”), reh’g denied (Feb. 5, 2018)—and that Blair did not plead 

estoppel below, made no estoppel argument below, and does not 

argue estoppel here. Indeed, as Blair acknowledges in his brief, 
7

permissible range of rates. And the Legislature has said that 

“[f]ees charged for remedial treatment, care, and attendance, . . . 

may not exceed the applicable fee schedules adopted under this 

chapter and department rule.” § 440.13(13)(b), Fla. Stat. We 

therefore must reverse the order to the extent it commands Marine 

Max to pay fees that do “exceed the applicable fee schedule.” Id.

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. 

JAY, J., concurs; WOLF, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with 

opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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“[t]he requirements of estoppel are not relevant to the outcome of 

this case.” Ans. Br. at 32.
8

WOLF, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the portion of the majority opinion that requires 

continued authorization for Dr. Yunis to treat the Claimant 

because the Employer/Carrier (E/C) failed to prove a valid reason 

for not continuing to provide treatment with the authorized doctor. 

I dissent from the portion of the opinion that determines even

though Dr. Yunis is authorized, the Carrier is not necessarily 

required to provide the treatment and the E/C may yet again 

designate an alternative physician.

The majority essentially frames the issue in this case as, 

“what happens when a workers’ compensation claimant demands 

that an employer ‘authorize’ a doctor who is unwilling to provide 

treatment for rates within statutory limits.” The issue in this case, 

however, is whether an E/C should be required to continue

medically necessary treatment with an authorized physician when 

the carrier has failed to prove any change of circumstance that 

would justify a de facto deauthorization of the treating physician.

The majority’s statement of the issue switches the focus of the 

inquiry to an issue that we should not address in this case.

The change in focus leads the majority to reach the 

remarkable conclusion that the Claimant won the right to have a 

designation of “authorized” placed by Dr. Yunis’s name, even 

though the Claimant still cannot receive treatment from the 

physician because the JCC cannot require the Carrier to pay the 

physician. This renders the opinion meaningless. Under the facts 

of this case, I would hold that the Carrier is required to continue 

to provide treatment with Dr. Yunis, regardless of Dr. Yunis’ 

willingness to provide treatment for rates within the statutory 

limits because that issue is not properly before us.

Facts

In addition to the facts stated in the majority opinion, I believe 

the following facts are significant and dispositive of this case:

1. The Carrier initially authorized Dr. Yunis in 2010.

2. Claimant received treatment from Dr. Yunis from 2010 

through 2014.
9

3. The fee agreement between the E/C and Dr. Yunis was 

introduced into evidence and indicated that the E/C 

agreed to pay Dr. Yunis in excess of the fee schedule for 

services including non-operative regular visits.

4. Dr. Yunis testified that he has never accepted the fee 

schedule.4

5. No evidence was introduced concerning what fees Dr. 

Yunis was presently seeking. Thus, there is no proof that 

Dr. Yunis was seeking fees that were any higher than 

what the E/C previously paid.

6. In fact, Dr. Yunis’s office manager indicated that she 

offered to provide the doctor’s fee schedule for the E/C’s 

review, but there is no indication that her offer was 

accepted.

7. In addition, when Dr. Yunis asked the Carrier during 

his deposition if it wanted him to accept the Carrier’s fee 

schedule, the Carrier said all we want to know is whether 

you take the fee schedule or not.

8. Between 2014 and 2017, a new servicing agent began 

representing the E/C.

9. The JCC found there has been no negotiation by the 

Carrier regarding the fees, and “[t]he only reason for not 

deviating from the fee schedule at this point is because 

there is a new third party administrator and owner of Sea 

Bright, and they don’t want to anymore.” (emphasis 

added). This finding is supported by the evidence adduced 

in this case.

 4 While the adjuster testified that the E/C had previously paid 

Dr. Yunis for some services in accordance with the fee schedule, 

the specific services were not identified and this testimony was 

obviously not accepted by the fact finder, the JCC. In addition, 

there is no evidence that Dr. Yunis would not provide these 

services for the same fee that he previously had been charging.
10

10. The E/C’s only asserted defense to deauthorization 

was, “Dr. Yunis is no longer accepting workers’ 

compensation fee schedule,” a defense that is belied by 

the uncontradicted evidence that Dr. Yunis has never 

taken the fee schedule.

11. The E/C did not raise the issue of prepayment as a 

defense, and the statute does not specifically prohibit it.

12. There is no indication in the record that the Carrier 

ever attempted to negotiate with the doctor.

13. Claimant made a request for medically necessary 

treatment at the beginning of 2017 and has not to this 

date received treatment with his authorized doctor. The

only doctor authorized by the Carrier was over an hour 

and a half drive away from Claimant’s home and work.

Import of Existing Statutory Law and Case Law

The majority opinion fails to recognize the significance of over 

30 years of continuous decisions from this court recognizing the 

importance of providing a continued course of treatment once a 

satisfactory patient-physician relationship is established.

As early as 1985, in Cal Kovens Construction v. Lott, 473 So. 

2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), this court recognized the importance 

of the physician-claimant relationship and emphasized the burden 

was on the carrier to show good cause sufficient to require a change 

in ongoing medical treatment.

In Stuckey v. Eagle Pest Control Co., Inc., 531 So. 2d 350, 351 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1988), we stated, “[O]nce an injured employee 

establishes a satisfactory physician-patient relationship with an 

authorized physician, the E/C may not deauthorize that physician 

without the employee’s prior agreement or without approval of a 

[JCC] . . . . In this situation the focus should be on the question of 

why an authorized physician should no longer provide care, 

thereby severing an established physician-patient relationship.” 

Stuckey specifically stated that “the E/C must then show good 

cause for such action.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the E/C bears 

the burden of demonstrating good cause to sever an existing 

patient relationship. The opinion fails to recognize that under 
11

statutory law and case law, the E/C has a significant burden to 

demonstrate a change of facts that provide a legal reason for 

severing the physician-patient relationship.

While section 440.13, Florida Statutes, has been amended so 

that it no longer requires prior approval from the JCC to 

deauthorize a doctor, the underlying premise that the E/C cannot 

deauthorize a physician without proving that doing so is in the best 

interest of the claimant is still controlling. Terners of Miami Corp. 

v. Busot, 764 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also State Attorney 

v. Johnson, 770 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (recognizing statute 

did not change the substantive test for deauthorization). In fact, 

we recently recognized the failure to continue to provide treatment 

to the claimant with a previously authorized doctor constituted a 

de facto “deauthorization,” and the failure of the carrier to prove a 

statutory reason for deauthorization meant the E/C was required 

to continue to provide the sought-after treatment. See Hernandez 

v. Hialeah Solid Waste Dep’t, 238 So. 3d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); 

see also Williams v. Triple J Enters., 650 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1995).

The present statutory framework also recognizes the 

importance of the physician-patient relationship by only allowing 

the employer “to transfer the care of an injured employee from the 

attending health care provider if an independent medical 

examination determines that the employee is not making 

appropriate progress in recuperation.” § 440.13(2)(d), Fla. Stat. 

This statutory burden was unmet by the carrier in Hernandez, and 

it was unmet by the E/C here.

Sufficiency of the Evidence and Issue to be Decided

While the majority indicates that a doctor’s failure to accept 

the fee schedule may be considered a refusal to treat, thus 

justifying deauthorization, it is unnecessary for us to reach that 

specific issue in this case. Here, the E/C failed to prove any change 

of circumstance, including any increased fee requirement, that 

might justify a de facto deauthorization of the doctor.

The written agreement for treatment in this case establishes 

that the previous third party administrator had been paying Dr. 

Yunis in excess of the fee schedule. There was not one shred of 
12

evidence presented that his present fee schedule was one penny 

more than what had previously been paid. In fact, the evidence 

demonstrates that the Carrier did not accept a copy of the doctor’s 

fee schedule when the doctor offered it and made no effort to 

negotiate with the doctor to preserve the physician-claimant 

relationship. The JCC specifically found the only reason for the 

E/C’s deauthorization was that the new third party administrator 

no longer wished to deviate from the fee schedule. This is not a 

valid reason for de facto deauthorization. Thus, it is unnecessary 

for us to reach the issue as it is framed by the majority.5

What is the Guidance on Remand?

As previously stated, the majority opinion finds that the 

doctor is authorized but the Carrier does not have to pay him.

Based on the majority’s decision, the JCC, the Claimant, and 

the E/C are left guessing at what the next step is in this case. No 

practical relief has been granted to the Claimant.

If the Claimant wishes to treat with Dr. Yunis, his authorized 

physician, and the E/C refuses to set up an appointment with the 

authorized doctor, the Claimant is back to square one. He cannot 

see his treating physician because the E/C will not set up an 

appointment. The E/C is left guessing whether they need to set up 

an appointment with Dr. Yunis or whether they can continue to 

deny treatment (because they are not required to pay) and 

potentially subject themselves to a new petition for benefits with 

associated penalties and fees.

In addition, the majority implies that the E/C is free to take 

the same action it previously took, refusing to authorize a new 

doctor, because Dr. Yunis failed to take the fee schedule. The E/C 

has already lost on this issue. The doctrines of law of the case and 

res judicata apply to workers’ compensation cases. Boynton 

Landscape v. Dickinson, 752 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); S. 

 5 It is up to a later panel of this court or the Legislature to 

address situations where there is an initial refusal to treat within 

the fee schedule or where there is evidence that a doctor has raised 

his or her fees over and above the amount previously agreed to 

between the E/C and the doctor. That is not the case here.
13

Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Blackstock, 419 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1982). Absent new evidence that could not have been discovered 

prior to the last hearing, the E/C should not be allowed to take the 

same actions that the JCC already found to be unjustified.

The Claimant should not be forced to accept the E/C’s refusal 

to pay Dr. Yunis where a JCC heard all the evidence and found 

there was no valid reason for de facto deauthorization and that 

such action was not in the best interest of the Claimant. The JCC 

specifically stated:

24. The only reason for [the E/C] not deviating from the 

fee schedule at this point is because there is a new third 

party administrator . . . , and they don’t want to anymore. 

The JCC additionally found that it was in the best interest of the 

Claimant to continue to see Dr. Yunis. In Factual Finding #3, the 

JCC found:

3. Claimant testified that he was authorized to treat with 

Dr. Yunis for his hernia condition and Dr. Yunis has 

performed three surgeries for his condition. Claimant 

tried to get a follow up appointment in the past year with 

Dr. Yunis and could not. He is concerned about his 

condition. Claimant understands that E/C has offered a 

doctor in St. Petersburg, Florida but he does not agree 

with a transfer to that doctor. He was told not to attend 

that appointment. Claimant said he does not receive pay 

when he takes off work and he lives in Sarasota, Florida 

where Dr. Yunis’ office is located. He is comfortable with 

Dr. Yunis and does not want a new doctor.

The Claimant should be free to enforce the JCC’s 

determination that Dr. Yunis is still authorized. Any assertion in 

the majority opinion indicating otherwise is mere dicta. 

Necessary Medical Care Should be Provided 

Notwithstanding Potential Disputes Regarding Cost of 

Treatment

The JCC and the majority each address the potential remedies 

for the E/C if they still have a problem with Dr. Yunis’s fee 

schedule. They reach opposite conclusions: the JCC found that the 
14

E/C may pursue administrative remedies, and the majority 

indicated that the statute does not contemplate a remedy for the 

E/C under these circumstances. This question of a fee dispute is 

not properly before us, and any discussion concerning potential 

outcomes in a future dispute should not have been included in 

either the JCC’s order or the majority opinion.6 As previously 

stated, this case is only about the ability to get continued 

treatment with the authorized doctor. The E/C-physician dispute 

is an inappropriate consideration in determining whether the 

Claimant is entitled to continued medical treatment. If there is a 

lack of remedy for the E/C, that should be addressed by the 

Legislature, not this court.

In Tiznado v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System, 773 So. 2d 

584, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), we specifically determined that 

where the care is medically necessary, “medical care should have 

been awarded” notwithstanding a potential payment dispute that 

might arise.

In this case, the JCC was simply requiring the E/C to pay for 

the care that the Claimant was entitled to receive. Such a decision 

is consistent with our case law. See Williams, 650 So. 2d 1114 

(requiring payment to Claimant for necessary medications 

notwithstanding potential utilization review).

The E/C’s order to pay for the treatment did nothing more 

than require provision of treatment. The JCC did not order a 

specific amount be paid. In addition, we are not looking at 

reimbursement or overutilization. The JCC simply addressed the 

 6 The majority appears to be concerned that the E/C has no 

remedy. While I am unsure whether I agree with this analysis, if 

there is a statutory gap that fails to provide the E/C a proper 

remedy, that is for the Legislature to fix and not a valid reason for 

this court to disrupt the existing physician-claimant relationship. 

In addition, in light of the findings concerning the Carrier’s failure 

to negotiate, it is unclear to me that any claim by the E/C was not 

waived or is indeed premature.
15

issue in this case, continued treatment with an authorized 

physician.7 I would affirm this order in its totality.

_____________________________

Robert B. Griffis of Jones, Hurley, and Hand, P.A., Orlando, for 

Appellants.

Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Ft. Lauderdale, and Eric 

M. Christiansen of Lancaster & Eure, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.

 7 If Dr. Yunis attempts to raise his fees in the future to an 

amount greater than the fees he is presently willing to accept, this 

would constitute new circumstances that may allow the E/C to 

properly raise the issue as framed by the majority. As previously 

stated, it is the failure of proof by the E/C that precludes us from 

addressing the issue in this case.