DOT/FAA/AM-99/19

Office ofAviation Medicine

Washington, D.C. 20591

Follow-up Assessment of

The Federal Aviation

Administrations Logistics

Center Safety Climate

Lydia D. Behn

Richard C. Thompson

Thomas F. Hilton

Federal Aviation Administration

Civil Aeromedical Institute

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125

June 1999

Final Report

ITCTC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19990714 022

This document is available to the public

through the National Technical Information

Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

©

U.S. Department

of Transportation

Federal Aviation

Administration
NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of

the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of

information exchange. The United States Government

assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.
Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No.

DOT/FAA/AM-99/19

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.

4. Title and Subtitle

Follow-Up Assessment ofthe Federal Aviation Administration's Logistics

Center Safety Climate

5. Report Date

June, 1999

6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)

Behn, L.D., Thompson, R.C., and Hilton, T.F.

8. Performing Organization Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute

P.O. Box 25082

Oklahoma City, OK 73125

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Agency name and Address

Office ofAviation Medicine

Federal Aviation Administration

800 Independence Avenue, S. W.

Washington, DC 20591

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplemental Notes

16. Abstract

This report details FAA Logistics Center employee safety perceptions following the implementation of a safety awareness

program. Safety perceptions were baselined in 1992 and a follow-up assessment was conducted in 1995. The purpose of

the follow-up survey was to (1) assess differences in perceptions ofsafety that may have resulted from changes made in

the safety program since the 1992 assessment; and (2) determine the managerial and organizational factors that may have

impacted those safety perceptions. The present survey was administered to 329 employees (supervisors and nonsupervisors) during a mandatory monthly safety meeting. The results show that specific actions intended to demonstrate

the importance ofsafety can lead to higher levels ofperceived management and supervisory support for safety. Such

practices can also lead to higher levels ofperceived safety in the workplace. These practices, however, do not appear to

influence perceptions of organizational politics, supervisory fairness, or coworker support for safety.

17. Keywords

Organizational Safety Climate, Employee Perceptions,

Logistics Center

18. Distribution Statement

Document is available to the public through

the National Technical Information Service,

Springfield, VA 22161

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

UNCLASSIFIED

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

UNCLASSIFIED

21. No. of Pages

25

22. Price

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S

LOGISTICS CENTER SAFETY CLIMATE

Employee safety is an issue for every organization.

Safety regulations influence many aspects of organizational operations. For example, all federal agencies

must provide safety training to employees, postinformation regarding the storage and handling ofhazardous materials, and provide equipment to minimize

the effects ofaccidents (i.e., eyewash stations, goggles,

etc.). Federal regulations also require the dissemination of information to employees concerning possible workplace hazards. While regulations require

organizations to meet certain minimum safety standards, ensuring workforce safety beyond the minimum

federal requirements is an organizational decision.

Organizations may choose to exceed federal minimums because investing resources in enhanced safety

can reduce potential future costs associated with the

results ofa hazardous work environment. In 1992 for

example, approximately 3.3 million disabling injury

accidents attributed to workplace hazards or unsafe

conditions were reported (National Safety Council,

1993). Moreover, workplace accidents cost employers approximately 65 million days in lost work time

and can drive up the costs of mandated workers'

compensation insurance.

Workplace safety hazards derive from characteristics of people, hardware (including all aspects of the

physical environment, workplace substances, machinery, and other equipment), and the interaction

ofthe two (Dejoy, 1994). Three main strategies have

been utilized to reduce accidents: remove the source

of the hazard; protect employees against the consequences of an accidental injury; or reengineer processes and procedures to reduce the probability ofan

accident. Many organizations have introduced various environmental changes to improve safety, such as

posting warning signs, adding or replacing safety

equipment, and expanding instruction about safe

work behaviors. Organizational programs that are

intended to improve safety generally focus on changing individuals' behaviors and modifying equipment

(such as installing protective shields and providing

donnable protective devices). Neither ofthese types

of interventions, implemented separately, will produce the desired effect.

Organizations that focus on equipment modifications without regard to other facets of safety may

never reach the goal ofbeing as "safe" an organization

as possible. For environmental changes to have a

lasting effect upon safety, employees must use the

equipment correctly and follow procedures consistently. Likewise, only emphasizing employee safety

behavior may leave safety goals unattained. To achieve

a safe workplace, an organization must have an understanding ofthe relationship between behavior and

safety and the effects the organization may have on

that relationship. Without this understanding, the

lack of safe behaviors exhibited by employees may

leave an organization unable to determine what additions to safety programs are necessary for behavior

improvement. Therefore, to more fully understand

employee behavior, an organization should take a

more comprehensive approach to evaluating safety.

The goal of an effective safety program is to produce a safety-oriented culture in which commonly

held values, beliefs, and business practices emphasize

and reinforce safety. Before that can happen, a climate ofsupport forsafetymust be established (Zohar,

1980). However, little research has focused on organizational changes thattarget an organization'ssafety

climate. Previous safety climate research has generally focused on the number and type of organizational climate dimensions that distinguish "safe" and

"unsafe" organizations (Brown & Holmes, 1986;

Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Dedobbeleer &

Beland, 1991; Zohar, 1980). Hence, prior research

has notlooked at interventions that may enhance the

safety climate of an organization.

An organization's climate is reflected in the

employee's perceptions of the workplace (James &

Jones, 1974). Climate reflects organizational priorities to employees (Schneider & Rentsch, 1988). Safety

climate, then, involves the perceived importance of
safety within an organization. The present study

examines the utility of efforts to affect workforce

behavior by assessing changes in the organization's

climate for safety.

Zohar (1980) was one of the first researchers to

focus on safety climate research. He identified eight

organizational dimensions believed to encompass

safety climate. Zohar's dimensions included: 1) perceived importance of safety training programs; 2)

perceived management attitudes toward safety; 3)

perceived effects of safe conduct on promotion; 4)

perceived level ofrisk at the work place; 5) perceived

effects ofrequired work pace on safety; 6) perceived

status of the designated safety officer; 7) perceived

effects of safe conduct on social status; and 8) perceived status ofthe safety committee. The use offour

of the eight dimensions (perceived importance of

safety training programs, perceived effects of required work pace on safety, perceived status ofsafety

committee, and perceived status of the designated

safety officer) was found to be sufficient in discriminating between "safe" and "unsafe" organizations as

defined by the number of accidents. In addition to

those dimensions, Zohar (1980) found that the degree to which employees perceived that safety was

relevant to job behavior, and that management held

a positive attitude toward safety discriminated between safe and unsafe organizations. Zohar concluded that perceived management attitudes toward

safety were the foundation of an organization's positive safety climate due to its relationship to, and influences

upon, the workers' set ofideas about safety.

The importance ofmanagementsupport for safety

has been found in several other assessments ofsafety

climate (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Dedobbeleer &

Beland, 1991; Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995).

This research suggests that actions taken by management and supervisors to increase perceived support

for safety should, in turn, enhance the safety climate

ofan organization. Such changes should be reflected

in increased perceptions of manager and supervisor

support forsafety, and increased perceptions ofsafety

conditions within the organization. Thus, it is hypothesized that management actionsspecifically taken

to elevate the importance ofsafety and increase the

consistency between stated safety importance and the

behaviors of management and supervisors should

lead the workforce to perceive greater support for

safety in the workplace.

Peers provide another means ofjudging the importance ofsafe behavior at work (Bradley, 1995; Cox &

Cox, 1991; Zohar, 1980). Most workgroups develop

norms for those behaviors that are expected from

members of the work group. As such, safety-related

behavior may also be influenced by coworkers

(Hofmann, Jacobs, & Landy; 1995). Therefore, if a

safety program is effective at changing workforce

attitudes about safety at work, it is expected that

perceptions ofcoworkersupport forsafetywould also

increase. The degree to which coworkers support

safety in the workplace should also be positively

related to an individual's support for safety. Stronger

workplace safety norms are likely to be indicated by

larger correlations among reported personal support

for safety and perceived coworker support for safety.

Given the influence of work group members on

safety perceptions, it is possible that any effect of

safety change effort is not the same for all groups of

employees. Within any organization, there are varying levels ofrisk for employees in different parts of a

facility or facilities (Goldberg, Dar-El, & Rubin,

1991). Employees who work in the office area of a

facility may be at less risk for serious injury, compared with those actively working on a factory floor.

Given these differences in perceived and actual risk

and the differential effectiveness ofchange programs

in general, it is reasonable to predict that management efforts to improve safety will have greater influence on employees in areas where there are greater

risks, compared with employees in areas of less risk

such as an office environment.

Any organizational change relies on communication from management and supervisors to explain the

intended goals and consequences of the effort. In

addition, both parties must behave in a manner

consistent with the change message ifthe change is to

be effective. One potential problem for any organizational change effort, however, is that management

communication is not always taken at face value.

Perceived inconsistency between safety communication and safety actions can lead to employees focusing more on actions than on words. Specific safety

messages are interpreted by employees in light ofthe

larger organizational context and employees' cognitive dispositions (i.e., attitudes, beliefs, and values).

Just because management repeatedly states thatsafety

is important, employees do not necessarily believe

that management is highly concerned about safety.
This is especially true in cases where employees are

materially rewarded for production, and safety is

assumed to be its own reward (Kerr, 1975; Janssens,

Brett, & Smith, 1995). Therefore, behaviors that

may taint the interpretation of management actions

in general, such as political behavior and unfair

treatment of employees, may adversely affect the

interpretations ofsome actions directed atimproving

an organization's safety climate. Thus, it is hypothesized that if employees perceive an increase in management and supervisory support for safety due to

actions to increase the status of the organization's

safety efforts, there will be a corresponding decrease

in perceptions of organizational politics and an increase in perceptions ofsupervisory fairness.

Perceptual measures ofsafety conditions are commonly assessed in safety research and correlated with

the rates and/orseverity ofinjuries, accidents, and/or

incidents. "While it is scientifically sound to link

attitudes and perceptions to behavioral events, it is

seldom practical from the standpoint of improving

the safety climate. Such impracticality arises partly

because accident/incident data are often unreliably

reported and/or recorded; and therefore, correlations

between employee perceptions/attitudes and recorded

safety incident data may be attenuated. Correlations

between safety perceptions and behavioral events can

also be minimized because accidents are rare events

(Hulin & Rousseau, 1980). When examining rare

events, ittakeslongerto accumulate sufficientsamples,

thereby delaying the provision of useful feedback.

Given the problems associated with correlations

between organizational climate measures and infrequently occurring accident data, the present study

examined the relationship between organization climate perceptions and self-report safety perceptions.

First, regardless of changes in climate perceptions

following the implementation ofa safety program, it

is hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between perceptions of manager, supervisor,

coworker, and personal support for safety and how

positively employees perceive the safety oftheir environment. Finally, itis expected thatthere is a negative

relationship between perceptions of organizational

politics and safety climate, and a positive relationship

between supervisor fairness and safety climate.

METHOD

Study Overview

The study was conducted at the FAA Logistics

Center located in Oklahoma City. The FAA Logistics

Center provides new and replacement parts and equipment for the entire United States air traffic control

infrastructure. Logistics Center services include a

large warehouse and freight transfer facility; a large

repair and fabrication facility with shops that upgrade, repair, or fabricate site-unique mechanical,

electrical, and electronic equipment no longer in

production; and a large office complex that writes

contracts, executes purchase orders, and oversees

receiving and shipping in the shops and warehouse.

An earlier baseline climate assessment focused on

the factors mentioned previously and included surveys from four organizational levels: employee, supervisory, branch management, and division

management. Feedback from the baseline survey was

provided to employees and management, and changes

in the safety program were initiated. A follow-up

survey was conducted three years after the baseline survey

to assess changes in climate and safety perceptions.

Safety Program History

The 1992 baseline assessment revealed both

strengths and weaknesses in the safety program.

Management support for safety was found to be the

dimension most related to perceived safety climate.

In 1992, less than half (46%) of the respondents

indicated that safety was a top organizational priority

or that management put safety first, revealing a need

for improvement in perceived importance ofsafety.

Less than 40% ofrespondents indicated that management supported the maintenance of Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. Perceived supervisor support for safety indicated communication weaknesses between employees

and upper management. On the other hand, most

employees (68%) perceived their supervisors to be

fair in dealing with them. Organizational politics was

problematic with 61% ofrespondents reporting that

most employees knew not to "rock the boat," and

43% indicating that it may be "safer to say you agree

with management." The results also indicated
moderately strong safety norms, with over half(61 %)

of the respondents reporting that their coworkers

were safety conscious and supportive of safety

practices.

To enhance the safety climate, feedback from the

baseline survey was provided to Logistics Center

employees and management. Action plans were developed based on that feedback. The action plans

included: a) activities to improve management and

supervisor support for safety, b) new emphasis on

making safety training more relevant, and c) effective

appointment of a safety officer with the responsibility of promoting safety throughout the Logistics

Center. In addition, the existing safety committee

was restructured to ensure representation for all three

work environments (offices, shops, and warehouse).

Safety representatives, who now reported directly to

the safety officer, coordinated safety training and other

safety activities in the various areas ofthe center.

Respondents

The baseline survey was administered in 1992 and

was completed by 351 ofthe 507 (69%) FAA Logistics Center employees. The follow-up survey was

administered in 1995 during a mandatory monthly

safetymeeting. Three hundred and twenty-nine (49%)

ofthe 662 employees voluntarily completed the follow-up survey. Table 1 summarizes the sample demographics for the baseline and follow-up surveys. The

table presents the respondent's gender and age, as

well as tenure and work area in the Logistics Center.

For both surveys, those who worked in an office

environment were located either within the warehouse or in a separate building comprised entirely of

office space.

The demographics of the samples reported in

Table 1 did not significantly differ between the

baseline and the follow-up survey, with the exception

of years of service in the Logistics Center, c

2

(5) =

30.84, p_ < .0001. The significant difference was due

to an increase in the number of 1995 respondents

working less than one year on the job. The lifting of

a hiring freeze that resulted in the addition of approximately 100 new employees after the baseline

survey caused a significant difference in the "less than

one year ofservice" category.

Measures

The organizational and safety climate dimensions

and safety issues assessed in the 1995 follow-up

survey were taken from the 1992 baseline survey,

with some modification in content and format as

requested by Logistics Center management. The baseline survey independently assessed the safety perceptions ofmanagers, supervisors, and employees using

different surveys. The follow-up survey was shortened to focus on climate changes and to reduce the

time and complexity ofsurvey administration. As a

result, for the follow-up assessment all personnel

were administered the same survey. The follow-up

survey assessed nine dimensions: management support for safety, supervisor support for safety, coworkersupport forsafety, personalsupport for safety,

organizational politics, supervisor fairness, safety

conditions, safety knowledge confidence, and safety

training adequacy. Of the nine dimensions assessed

on the follow-up survey, six are directly comparable

to the baseline, due to minimal changes in format and

content. The remaining three can only be assessed for

the follow-up survey, due to significant changes in

format or content. The items that make up each

dimension can be found in Appendix A, along with

item level results.

Management Supportfor Safety. This measure was

comprised of four items developed for the baseline

assessment. Management support measured perceptions of managerial support for safety using items

concerning management's openness to suggestions

from employees (e.g., "Management is open to new

ideas on safety issues"), taking an active personal role

in safety, and making safety a priority.

Supervisor Supportfor Safety. This measure was

comprised of four items developed for the baseline

assessment. Much like management support, supervisorsupport measured the employees' perceptions of

his/her immediate supervisor taking an active role in

ensuring safety in the workplace (e.g., "My section

supervisor tries to make my job as safe as possible").

Coworker Supportfor Safety. The three items measuring this dimension were developed for the baseline

assessment. Coworker support for safety contained

three items measuring the extent to which coworkers

were perceived to take safety seriously and coworkers'

reactions to the safety precautions taken by others.
Table 1. Sample Demographics for Baseline and Follow-up Surveys

1992 1995

Gender

Male 66% 68%

Female 34% 32%

Age in Years

20 to 29 10% 11%

30 to 39 26% 29%

40 to 49 40% 40%

50 or more 24% 20%

Logistics Center Tenure in Years

Less than 1 <1% 9%

1 to 3 27% 20%

4 to 10 37% 43%

11 to 15 13% 11%

16 to 20 10% 7%

More than 20 13% 10%

Work Area

Warehouse 24% 25%

Shops 36% 36%

Office 40% 39%

PersonalSupport forSafety. Seven items were developed for the baseline assessment of this dimension:

items measuring the extent to which an individual

took the initiative to acquire safety knowledge, the

extent to which the employee informed others on

safety matters, and the extent to which an active role

was undertaken to ensure a safer work environment

were included.

Organizational Politics. Perceptions of organizational politics were measured with four items adapted

from the "going along to get ahead" subscale of

Kacmar and Ferris (1991). Organizational politics is

generally reported to be a negative organizational

attribute; therefore, this scale was scored with higher

perceptions of organizational politics resulting in

lower scale scores (Gandz & Murray, 1980). The

dimension included questions about employees' communications with managers, how open the lines of

communication were with regard to negative feedback from employees, and management's response to

such views.

Supervisor Fairness. Supervisor fairness was measured using four items adapted from Moorman (1991).

This dimension addressed issues concerning

perceptions of overall organizational fairness including: fairness in work assignments; employee involvement in the decision-making process; and the level of

perceived objectivity of supervisors when dealing

with employees.

Safety Conditions. The safety conditions dimension assessed perceptions of the physical conditions

of the work environment using eleven items developed for the baseline survey. Topics addressed the

perceived presence ofsafety hazards or unsafe conditions (e.g., "Aisles/passageways and working areas are

free oftripping hazards"), and the proper dissemination and posting ofsafety-related information.

Safety Knowledge Confidence. The safety knowledge confidence section differed in format from the

previous survey. The baseline survey format included

open-ended questions that required the respondents

to give an essay-type answer to determine if, for

instance, they actually knew where to find an eye

wash station in their immediate work area. The

current survey assessed respondent confidence in his/

her knowledge regarding five health and safety issues.

Most ofthe questions concerned knowledge usually

required for a more industrial environment. However,
knowledge ofindustrial safety is needed by all Logistic Center employees due to the close proximity of

office employees' work spaces to the more industrial

environment ofthe Logistics Center and the presence

of office employees in the warehouse and shops.

Safety Training Adequacy. This dimension was

assessed with a single item that asked respondents to

rate the adequacy ofsafety training they had received

in the previous 12 months.

RESULTS

The means and standard deviations for all of the

study measures are summarized in Table 2. Descriptive statistics for both survey administrations, as well

as internal consistency reliability estimates for each

ofthe study measures, are included in the table.

To examine the set ofhypotheses regarding changes

in climate perceptions following the implementation

of changes to the Logistics Center Safety Program, a

Multivariate Analyses ofVariance (MANOVA) was

conducted. Due to confidentiality concerns pairwise

or matched case comparisons were not possible.

Samples were, therefore, treated as independent. Six

dimensions that were measured on both surveys were

compared. The results of the MANOVA indicated

significant differences between survey administrations for at least one of the six climate dimensions,

.F(6,617) = 23.26,/». < .001. Therefore, follow-up one

way Analyses ofVariance (ANOVA) were conducted

for each ofthe six climate dimensions.

The results of these analyses are summarized in

Table 2. As can be seen in the table, the predicted

improvementin perceptions ofmanager and supervisor support for safety was found, F(l, 622) = 82.91 p

< .001, and/^l, 622) = 11.02^ < .001, respectively.

As such, it appears that the actions taken to improve

the safety program of the Logistics Center led to

respondents perceiving greater support for safety.

The next hypothesis, the expected change in perceptions of coworker support for safety, was not supported. The means for the two surveys, shown in

Table 2, indicate there was no change in perceptions

for this dimension.

Given the finding ofimprovement in perceptions

ofmanager and supervisorsupport forsafety, the next

analyses focused on changes in perceptions oforganizational politics and supervisory fairness perceptions.

The results for these analyses, also summarized in

Table 2, show there were no changes in perceptions of

these dimensions. Thus, it is concluded that improvements in safety behavior do not seem to influence these broader organizational climate dimensions.

The final overall baseline/follow-up comparison,

and perhaps the most important for the present

study, is the change in perceptions of safety conditions following the change program. Table 2 shows

that there was a significant increase in the level of

perceived safety conditions in the Logistics Center,

F(l, 622) = 8.22 p < .001. However, this improvement was small (n2

= .01).

Table 2 Dimension Descriptive Statistics

1992 1995

(n = 351) (n = 325)

Reliability Reliability FMean SD Estimate Mean SD Estimate values

Management Support for Safety 3.18 0.75 .81 3.67 0.66 .74 82.909*

Supervisor Support for Safety 3.62 0.82 .79 3.81 0.70 .85 11.022*

Coworker Support for Safety 3.67 0.77 .56 3.60 0.77 .76 1.386

Personal Support for Safety NA NA NA 3.33 0.62 NA NA

Organizational Politics 3.13 0.96 .87 3.04 0.94 .90 2.554

Supervisory Fairness 3.58 1.07 .72 3.71 0.96 .82 2.560

Safety Conditions 3.35 0.68 .83 3.47 0.53 .82 8.219*

Safety Knowledge Confidence NA NA NA 3.60 1.16 NA NA

Safety Training Adequacy NA NA NA 3.68 0.89 NA NA

*p<.001
To test the relational hypotheses, Pearson Product

Moment correlations were computed separately for

the measures from both surveys. These correlations

are summarized in Table 3. The first correlational

hypothesis tested the assumption thatthere would be

a significant correlation among coworker and personal support for safety. This hypothesis was not

supported, r(319) =. 17,p< .001. Although there was

a significant relationship between these dimensions,

it is a small to medium correlation (Cohen, 1992).

This result suggests that, while the relationship is

statistically significant, there is only a weak relationship between coworker and personal support for safety.

The next set of correlational hypotheses proposed

relationships between organizational climate perceptions and self-report indicators of workplace safety.

Correlations for all available measures are summarized in Table 3. The table shows that on the baseline

survey there were sizable correlations between perceptions of safety conditions and management, supervisor, and coworker support for safety. Similarly,

for the follow-up survey, there were similar correlations, although slightly smaller. These results supportthe contention thatthere is a relationship between

perceptions of safety conditions and organizational

climate perceptions. The correlations of climate dimensions with safety knowledge confidence are either nonsignificant (management, supervisor, and

coworker support for safety) or small. The largest

correlation for safety knowledge confidence occurs

with personal support for safety, suggesting that

those respondents who are more safety oriented likewise have more confidence in their safety knowledge.

On the other hand, adequacy of safety training is

unrelated to personal support for safety, but is moderately correlated with the other support measures

and safety conditions. On the whole, these results

suggest that personal support for safety is independent of many organizational influences.

Another set of correlational hypotheses dealt with

relationships between safety conditions and organizational politics and supervisory fairness. Table 3

shows that organizational politics is negatively related to safety conditions for both survey administrations. Further, the results indicate that supervisory

fairness perceptions are positively related to safety

conditions for both administrations.

In addition, Table 3 shows that on the follow-up

survey there was a moderate correlation among ratings ofsafely conditions and safety knowledge confidence (r = .43). This result suggests that respondents

who perceive greater safety in the workplace are more

confident in their safety knowledge. There was no

relationship, however, among safety conditions and

safety training adequacy. Likewise, there was no

relationship between confidence in safety knowledge

and safety training adequacy.

The final set of analyses (Table 4) examined the

differential effect of the safety program changes on

the various work areas of the logistics center. There

were no a priori hypotheses for these analyses, and

therefore, they should be treated as exploratory. Here,

Table 3. Dimension Intercorrelations

Correlations

Dimensions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Management Support for Safety -- .65** .40** .11 -.53** .51** .52** .09 .28**

2. Supervisor Support for Safety .68** - .42** .11 -.44** .64** .46** .09 .21**

3. Coworker Support for Safety .43** .46** ~ .17** -.24** .35** .57** .08 .27**

4. Personal Support for Safety NA NA NA — -.13* .13* .02 .28** .01

5. Organizational Politics -.65** -.54** -.33** NA ~ -.48** -.34** -.14* -.19**

6. Supervisory Fairness .54** .69** .39** NA -.52** - .40** .17** .28**

7. Safety Conditions .68** .68** .53** NA -.51** .54** - .04 .43**

8. Safety Knowledge Confidence NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ~ .07

9. Safety Training Adequacy NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ~

1995 correlations above diagonal, 1992 correlations below diagonal.

'Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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a 2 (year: first and second survey administration) by

3 (work area: Office, Shops, Warehouse) MANOVA

was calculated. This test showed there were significant main effects ofsurvey administration, .F(6,569)

= 23M,p < .001; work area, F(12,1140) = 5.05,p<

.001;andtheinteraction,.F(12,ll40) = 1.94,/><:.03.

These omnibus tests indicate that follow-up analyses

for each dependent variable were appropriate. These

follow-up analyses are summarized in Table 4.

An examination of Table 4 shows that the only

dependent variable with a significant main effect that

was not tempered by a significant interaction was for

supervisor support for safety, ^(1,575) = 9.94, p <

.002. An examination of the means shows that, for

each ofthe three work areas, perceptions ofsupervisor support for safety increased.

Perceptions of organizational politics decreased,

as expected, in the warehouse and the office, but

increased in the shops, which led to a significant

interaction for this dimension, F(2,574) = 3.69, p <

.03. It is likely that the nature ofthese changes, with

decreases in two areas and an increase in another,

contributed to the lack of a main effect for survey

administration. Post hoc analyses, collapsing across

survey administrations, show thatthe level ofpolitics

was lower overall in the shops area, compared with

the warehouse and the office. This initial low score

for politics makes it more difficult to reduce, due to

a "floor" effect.

Perceptions of management support for safety

improved over the initial survey results, as indicated

by the significant main effect. In addition, there was

a main effect for work area, with the shops being

significantly higher, compared with the warehouse,

and no difference for the offices. These main effects,

however, are tempered by a significant time by work

area interaction. An examination ofthe means indicates that the improvement in the warehouse area

outpaces the other two, which yields the interaction.

Finally, there was a safety condition main effect for

both survey administration and for work area. The

means in Table 3 indicate that perceptions of safety

conditions improved over that ofthe initial survey and

that the shops and office were significantly different in

terms ofthe reported level ofsafety conditions.

DISCUSSION

Before discussing the implications of the present

research, it is necessary to discuss several caveats.

First, although the data were collected on two separate occasions, all the data were collected using paper

and pencil surveys. This reliance on surveys can lead

to relationships among variables that are influenced

by mono-method bias. In addition, the statistical

comparisons based on survey administrations were

conducted as analyses ofindependent groups instead

ofsome form ofrepeated measures. Such analyses can

underestimate the degree of difference between the

groups because, instead of controlling some variance

due to individual variability this variance is in the

error term, which makes it less likely a statistically

significant difference will be found.

Nonetheless, the results from this study suggest

that, when an organization's managers and supervisors take actions (based on research evidence) that are

intended to improve the safety climate ofthe organization, there are positive results. Specifically, by

improving the coordination of the safety program

and elevating the status of the safety officer, as suggested by Zohar (1980) and others, the FAA's Logistics Center was able to improve employee perceptions

ofmanagement and supervisor support for safety, as

well as perceptions of safety conditions within the

Center. These results provide evidence that a concentrated effort for improvement can be effective.

These actions did not, however, improve the Logistics Center employees' perceptions of organizational politics, supervisory fairness, or coworker

support for safety. Itis possible thatimprovements in

safety related perceptions were unable to improve the

broader organizational climate perceptions for the

Center as a whole. Past research has demonstrated

that the broader organizational perceptions indirectly influence safety climate perceptions (Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998).

The results also suggest that personal support for

safety is largely independent ofmanagement, supervisor, and coworker support for safety. Similarly,

these perceptions are independent ofperceived safety

conditions of the workplace and the adequacy of
safety training. On the other hand, there is a sizeable

correlation between personal support for safety and

confidence in training knowledge. This finding suggests that persons who are more interested in safety

take the effort to know safety precautions, and hence

are more confident about the safety-related components oftheir job. Ofcourse, the correlational nature

of these results preclude a causal assessment of this

hypothesis, so it should be addressed in future research. Related to this finding, individual ratings of

their confidence in safety knowledge also appear to be

independent ofperceptions ofsafety conditions and

adequacy of safety training. Future research should

examine this relationship, as well as methods of

increasing an individual's concern and support for

his/her personal safety.

REFERENCES

Bradley, G. L. (1995). Group influences upon preferences for personal protection: A simulation study.

Journal ofSafety Research, 26, 99-105.

Brown, R. L., and Holmes, H. (1986). The use of a

factor analytic procedure for assessing the validity

of an employee safety climate model. Accident

Analysis & Prevention, 18, 445-70.

Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-9.

Cox, S., and Cox, T. (1991). The structure ofemployee

attitudes towards safety: A European example.

Work &Stress, 1, 93-106.

Coyle, I. R, Sleeman, S. D., and Adams, N. (1995).

Safety climate. JournalofSafety Research, 26,247-54.

Dedobbeleer, N., and Beland, F. (1991). A safety climate measure for construction sites. Journal of

Safety Research, 22, 97-103.

Dejoy, D. M. (1994). Managing safety in the workplace: An attribution theory analysis and model.

Journal ofSafety Research, 25., 3-17.

Gandz,J., and Murray, V. V. (1980). The experience of

workplace politics. Academy ofManagement Review, 23., 237-51.

Goldberg, A. I., Dar-El, E., and Rubin, R E. (1991).

Threat perception and the readiness to participate

in safety programs. Journal ofOrganizational Behavior, 12, 109-22.

Hofmann, D. A, Jacobs, R., and Landy, F. (1995).

High reliability process industries: Individual,

micro, and macro organizational influences on

safety performance. Journal ofSafety Research, 26,

131-49.

Hulin, C. L., and Rousseau, D. M. (1980). Analyzing

infrequent events: Once you find them, your

troubles begin. In K. Roberts and L. Bursteain

(Eds.), Issues in aggregation (pp. 65-75). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

James, L. R, and Jones, A. P. (1974). Organizational

climate: A review oftheory and research. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 1096-1112.

Janssens, M., Brett, J. M., and Smith, F. (1995). Confirmatory cross-cultural research: Testing the viability of a corporation-wide safety policy. Academy of ManagementJournal, 3J£, 364-82.

Kacmar, K. M., and Ferris, G. R. (1991). Perceptions

oforganizational politics scale (POPS): Development and construct validation. Educational and

PsychologicalMeasurement, 5_L 193-205.

Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while

hoping for B. Academy ofManagement Review,

18, 769-83.

Moorman, R. H. (1991). Relationship between organizationaljustice and organizational citizenship behaviors: Do fairness perceptions influence employee citizenship? Journal of Applied Psychology,

26, 845-55.

National Safety Council (1993). Accidentfacts. Itasca,

IL: Author.

Schneider, B., and Rentsch, J. (1988). Managing climates and cultures: A futures perspective. In J.

Hage (Ed.). Futures of organizations: Innovating to

adaptstrategy andhuman resources to rapid technological change (pp. 181-200). Lexington, MA:

Lexington Books.

Thompson. R. C, Hilton, T. F., and Witt, L. A.

(1998). Where the safety rubber meets the shop

floor: A confirmatory model of management influence on safety. Journal ofSafety Research, 29.

15-24.

Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65., 96-102.

10
Appendix A:

Item Analysis for the 1995 Safety Survey

Management Support for Safety1

Item

Management is open to new ideas on safety

issues.

Mean StdDev Response Distribution

3.79 .79 55%

Management only pays "lip service" to OSHA 3.46

regulations.

.95 50% i

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

41%

33%

12% 12%

16%

* ^M

1 2 3

Management takes action to correct safety

problems when brought to their attention.

3.80 .83

Management puts the j ob before the safety of 3.65

its employees.

.95

1 Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 ;

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

Al
Supervisor Support for Safet\ -

My section supervisor tries to make my job

as safe as possible.

3.95 .76 64%

My supervisor seldom tells management

about unsafe situations.

3.69 .82 50%-I 46%

40%- 33%

30%-

20% 15%

10% 6%

1%

0%-

My supervisor shows personal concern about 3.91

employee safety.

.85

58%

My supervisor places worker safety as a top

priority.

3.69 .96 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

48%

9%

22%

18%

3%

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 :

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A2
Coworker Support of Safety3

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Most of my coworkers take safety very

seriously.

3.58 .95 55%

Most of my coworkers are quick to point out

unsafe conditions.

3.51 .93 53%

2 3 4 5

Some of my coworkers will make fun of me if 3.69

I use safety protection.

.94 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

15%

55%

"* 12%

1

2%

12 3 4

3 Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 :

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A3
Personal Support of Safety4

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Within the last six months, I have notified a

member of management, a member of the

safety committee, or a union representative

that OSHA regulations have been violated.

2.17 .95

56%

Within the last six months, I have cleared

away tripping hazards.

3.53 1.01 62%

Within the last six month I have informed a

member of management, a member of the

safety committee, or a union representative

about an unsafe condition.

2.71 1.20

Within the last six months, I have talked

about safety issues with coworkers.

3.59 1.04

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 ;

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A4
Personal Support of Safety5

(continued)

Item

Within the last six months, I have helped

others to maintain safe work practices.

Mean StdDev Response Distribution

3.56 1.01

56%

Within the last six months, I have made

myself familiar with safety related

information.

3.74 .89 65%

78%

Within the last six months, I have personally

maintained safe work practices.

4.01 .60

5

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 :

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A5
Organizational Politics*

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Some employees may hesitate to speak up for 3.37

fear of retaliation.

1.18

It is generally safer to "say you agree" with

management than to say what you think is

right.

3.14 1.19

We are encouraged to express our concerns

openly.

3.60 0.97 57%

Management officially encourages open

communication, but, in reality, most people

know not to "upset the apple cart: or "rock the

boat."

3.25 1.26 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

T

37%

26%

10% 11%

16%

12 3 4 5

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 :

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A6
Supervisor Fairness7

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

When dealing with me, my supervisor has

been able to suppress his/her biases and has

almost always treated me fairly.

3.80 1.11 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

53%

22%

. 4%

11% 10%

My supervisor has been fair in making my job 3.79

assignments.

1.04

2 3 4 5

My supervisor considers my viewpoint when

making decisions that affect me.

3.60 1.10

In making decisions that affect my pay and

promotability, my supervisor has been fair.

3.61 1.18 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

43%

23%

16%

8% 11%

12 3 4 5

7 Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 ;

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A7
Safety Conditions8

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

First aid and safety equipment are maintained 3.68

in good working order.

0.84

57%

Most of the people in my workgroup believe it

is essential that all employees use safety

equipment on the job (i.e., glasses, gloves,

shoes, etc.).

3.56 0.87 54%

Aisles/passageways and working areas are

free of tripping hazards.

3.24 1.03

Information mandated by OSHA is posted and

updated regularly.

3.25 0.87

8

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A8
Safety Conditions9

(continued)

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Hazardous materials and stations are clearly

marked.

3.65 0.73

Some ofthe workers in my section regularly

behave in an unsafe manner.

2.50 0.95

Warning signs are posted in visible and

relevant locations.

3.75 0.70

69%

Ventilation in my section is excellent. 2.83 1.21

9

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3:

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A9
Safety Conditions10 (continued)

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

There is enough light in my section to do the 3.45

job well.

1.09

Workers here are very careful to maintain safe 3.57

practices.

0.82

Overall, my section is a very safe place to

work.

3.75 0.80 63%

10 Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 :

Unsure, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.

A10
Confidence in Safety Knowledge11

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Confidence in your knowledge of the subject 3.31 1.47

matter:

lockout/tagout

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

21% 21% 23%

28%

1

8%

Confidence in your knowledge of the subject 3.98

matter:

back injury avoidance

1.07 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

• 33%

39%

.

20%

4% 5%

Confidence in your knowledge of the subject

matter:

fire extinguisher training

3.28 1.37 50%

40%

30%

20% ] 15% 14%

10%

0%

22% 24%

16%

Confidence in your knowledge of the subject 4.31

matter:

AIDS Awareness

0.91

11 Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Low, and 5 = Hi.

All
Confidence in Safety Knowledge12 (continued)

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Confidence in your knowledge of the subject 3.59

matter:

job hazard training

1.16

Perceptions of Training Adequacy13

Item Mean StdDev Response Distribution

Over the past 12 months, the safety training I 3.68

have received has been:

.89

60%

12 Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Low and 5 = Hi.

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding; response options are: 1 = Very inadequate, 2 = Inadequate, 3

= Unsure, 4 = Adequate, and 5 = Very adequate.

Al 2