GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2000 FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Is Integrating 

Active and Reserve 

Combat Forces, but 

Challenges Remain

GAO/NSIAD-00-162

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Other Army Integration Initiatives 38

Appendix II: Major Units Involved in Integration Initiatives We

Reviewed 40

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 42

Appendix IV: Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia Task

Forces Through 2003 45

Appendix V: Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited

Conversions 46

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense 48

Figures Figure 1: Composition of Army Combat Force (Fiscal Year 1999) 7

Figure 2: Locations of the Integrated Division Headquarters

and Enhanced Separate Brigades 9

Figure 3: Locations of the Army’s Four Divisional Teams 11

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285228 Letr

July 18, 2000

Congressional Committees

For nearly three decades, the Department of Defense has had a “total 

force” policy in place aimed at maintaining the smallest possible active 

duty force and complementing it with reserve forces. As the military 

downsized in the 1990s, it increased its emphasis on the total force concept 

and sought new ways to use both active and reserve components 

effectively. The Department of Defense has emphasized the importance of 

integration as one way to do this, but without clearly defining integration.1

In its broadest sense, integration could be considered as any arrangement 

or event that brings members from two or more components together for a 

common purpose. It can include formal arrangements to share information 

or joint participation in training exercises and overseas deployments.

The majority of the Army’s forces reside in the Army National Guard and 

the U.S. Army Reserve,2

 and the Army depends heavily on these reserve 

forces as it plans for missions ranging from peacekeeping to two major 

theater wars.3

 In 1999, the Army Chief of Staff said that completing the full 

integration of the active and reserve components was one of his six main 

objectives. However, like the Department of Defense, the Army has yet to 

define what it means by full integration.

The Army recently began to focus on efforts to integrate active and reserve 

combat units. Previously, most reservists who deployed with active forces 

came from support units, not combat units. This changed in March 2000, 

1

For example, in 1997 the Secretary of Defense issued a two-page memorandum that called 

for “a seamless total force” and the elimination of all residual barriers to effective 

integration. While the memorandum included four basic principles of integration, such as 

“leadership by senior commanders—Active, Guard, and Reserve—to ensure the readiness of 

the total force,” it did not contain measurable results-oriented goals to evaluate the services’ 

integration progress.

2

Throughout this report, we use the terms National Guard and Guard to refer to the Army 

National Guard. We use the terms Army Reserve and Reserve to refer to the U.S. Army 

Reserve and the term reserves (lower case) to refer to the Army National Guard and the U.S. 

Army Reserve together.

3

The national military strategy calls for the Army to be able to respond to any contingency 

up to and including two major wars that occur nearly simultaneously in separate theaters.
B-285228

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

when an Army National Guard combat division assumed headquarters 

responsibilities in Bosnia for the first time. This headquarters is 

commanding U.S. Army active and reserve troops, as well as multinational 

forces. The integration of this combat task force in Bosnia is one of the 

Army’s key integration efforts. It also has a number of other integration 

initiatives underway.

As agreed with your offices, this report focuses on four of the Army’s 

largest ongoing initiatives integrating active and reserve combat units: 

(1) integrated divisions, (2) Force XXI heavy division redesign, (3) teaming, 

and (4) the integrated task force in Bosnia. Specifically, we assessed the 

effects of these efforts on the Army’s total costs, force structure,4

 personnel 

tempo,5

 and risk in carrying out the national military strategy. This is the 

fourth in a series of reports issued in response to the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, which requires us to review the 

adequacy of the Army’s forces in carrying out the national military 

strategy.6

Results in Brief The Army’s ongoing efforts are increasing the integration of active and 

reserve combat forces. However, because the Army has not clearly defined 

its goal of fully integrating its active and reserve forces, it cannot precisely 

measure and fully evaluate the effects of these efforts. Nonetheless, we 

found that integration generally affects the Army in the following ways:

• It adds to the Army’s total costs. Due to their part-time status, reserve 

forces are less costly to maintain than their active counterparts, but 

integration raises the Army’s total personnel costs when reservists 

deploy to peacekeeping missions and are paid for more than 39 days of 

4

The numbers and types of units that comprise the force, their size, and their composition 

(i.e., divisions and brigades). 

5

In general, personnel tempo is the time spent away from home. Sometimes the term is 

narrowly defined to mean only the time spent deployed overseas. In this report, we use the 

broadest definition, to include overseas deployments, training and exercises away from 

home stations, and increased work requirements at home stations. 

6

The other three reports were Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict 

Strategy With Some Risks (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997); Force Structure: Army’s 

Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results 

(GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998); and Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to 

Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-99-47, Mar. 15, 1999).
B-285228

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

service (the norm for reservists that do not deploy). Integration also 

increases transportation costs, as active or reserve forces travel to 

participate in integrated training. Since the Army is implementing 

integration in a piecemeal fashion, it has not collected comprehensive 

figures to measure the cost of integration, has not established cost 

goals, and has not determined what cost increases would be acceptable 

to achieve a totally integrated force. Further, many aspects of the 

integration initiatives are unfunded—as a result, resources are being 

taken away from other reserve requirements, and in some cases, 

soldiers are shouldering higher transportation costs. 

• It creates new force structure requirements, as new units are 

established and the numbers of positions within existing units increase. 

To date, these new requirements have been small, and the Army has 

reduced requirements in other areas to compensate for these new 

requirements. However, as integration and the roles of the reserves 

increase, new requirements could grow significantly, and the Army 

would have to make major force structure adjustments to maintain its 

authorized force structure level. The Army’s current approach of 

pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative basis, without an 

overarching plan to guide its efforts, may make it difficult to evaluate 

the merits of these initiatives. None of the Army’s integration plans 

discuss the current operational environment, in which the Army is short 

on the forces it needs to conduct two major theater wars, while its 

personnel level remains constant. Nor do these plans set forth 

evaluation strategies that would enable the Army to assess whether 

reserve forces are properly structured to carry out new roles.

• It generally increases the time personnel must spend away from home. 

As deployment requirements shift, some active forces spend less time 

away from home, while reservists spend more time deployed away from 

home. Although integration just shifts deployment requirements from 

active to reserve forces, it generally increases training times for both 

active and reserve forces. The Army has yet to assess fully the effects of 

integration on the time personnel spend away from home or on 

retention. 

• It could reduce the Army’s risk in executing the national military 

strategy in the long term by increasing the training and readiness levels 

of both active and reserve forces, as the Army expects. However, Guard 

wartime support to active forces may not be as strong as expected. 

Mobilization times may limit Guard support to early-deploying active 

forces. Geographic separations of more than 1,000 miles between some 

Guard units and their active partners, as well as Guard equipment that is 

older and incompatible with active equipment, may also limit the 
B-285228

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Guard’s support to active units. Without clearly established goals for its 

overall integration efforts, the Army will have difficulty measuring 

progress toward its objective of a fully integrated force. Integration 

initiatives may even run counter to other major Army objectives such as 

ensuring that first-to-fight combat divisions are filled with qualified 

personnel (such as medics).

We are recommending that the Secretary of the Army develop an 

overarching plan to guide the Army’s integration efforts and examine 

whether the forces, equipment, and training priorities assigned to the 

National Guard are consistent with its increased roles. We are also 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense review current conditions, in 

which reservists incur increased transportation costs, to determine 

whether changes should be initiated so that reservists could be reimbursed 

for their transportation costs. In written comments on a draft of this report, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with our recommendations 

concerning the need to review priorities assigned to the National Guard 

and the need to examine transportation costs incurred by reservists but did 

not agree with the need for an overarching integration plan. It stated that 

integration guidance and principles can be found in several Army and DOD 

documents and that a variety of organizations are available to oversee the 

integration effort. We retained our recommendation calling for an 

overarching integration plan because none of the documents DOD cited 

contain measurable goals or the firm criteria necessary to guide and 

evaluate integration efforts. Also, none of the existing oversight bodies has 

provided a clear integration strategy for the Army to follow.

Background The Army has a number of efforts7

 underway to integrate its active and 

reserve forces. We focused on four division-level8

 integration efforts that 

could affect a large portion of the Army’s combat forces: (1) integrated 

7

Appendix I contains information about some of the Army’s other integration initiatives. 

Appendix II lists the units that were involved as of April, 2000 in the major integration 

initiatives that we reviewed. The units that we visited are listed in our objectives, scope, and 

methodology section in appendix III.

8

A division is usually made up of three combat brigades, and a brigade is usually made up of 

two or more battalions. Combat divisions are largely self-sustaining organizations that are 

capable of independent operations. They can vary significantly in size, depending on their 

purpose, but typically contain more than 10,000 soldiers. The Army’s 10 active and 8 

National Guard combat divisions are classified as armored, mechanized, medium, light 

infantry, airborne, or air assault, depending on the type and mix of units and equipment. 
B-285228

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

divisions, (2) Force XXI heavy division redesign, (3) teaming, and (4) 

integrated task forces for Bosnia. The methods of integration vary among 

and even within the four integration efforts. Some involve integration of all 

three components (Active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve), while 

others involve only forces from the Active and Guard components. The 

Army Reserve contains over one-fourth of the Army’s total support forces, 

but its combat units are limited to one infantry battalion and two Apache 

helicopter battalions. All of the Army’s combat brigades and combat 

divisions reside in the active Army or the National Guard. (See fig.1.)

Figure 1: Composition of Army Combat Force (Fiscal Year 1999)

Source: Army National Guard Bureau.

Two of the major initiatives that we reviewed (the integrated divisions and 

teaming) currently integrate only National Guard and active Army units but 

may involve Army Reserve forces in the future. The Force XXI heavy 

division redesign, and to a limited extent the Bosnia task forces, integrate 

forces from all three components, but Reserve involvement is limited 

mainly to the integration of individuals rather than units. Below are brief 

descriptions of the four initiatives.
B-285228

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Integrated divisions. In October 1999, the Army created two integrated 

divisions, one heavy9

 (the 24th Infantry) and one light (the 7th Infantry). 

Each division was formed by joining a newly created, small, active division 

headquarters10 and three existing National Guard enhanced brigades.11

During this initiative’s 2-year evaluation period, the active headquarters are 

expected to provide guidance and oversight to improve the training and 

readiness of the enhanced brigades. When viewed as composite units, these 

divisions are integrated. However, active and Guard soldiers within each 

division are separated both organizationally and geographically. The 

division headquarters are staffed with active Army soldiers,12 while the 

enhanced brigades are staffed with National Guard soldiers. The active 

headquarters are located in Colorado and Kansas, while their enhanced 

brigades are located in Oregon, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Georgia, and North 

and South Carolina. (See fig. 2.)

9

Heavy divisions are larger and are built around a nucleus of armored vehicles; light 

divisions are smaller, contain less heavy equipment, and can deploy more rapidly.

10Each headquarters contains less than 150 positions, almost half of which came from other 

active units that train reserve forces.

11There are 15 National Guard enhanced brigades. They are included in the Army’s war 

plans, and each contains over 350 more positions than a standard brigade. Enhanced 

brigades have approximately 4,100 to 5,000 positions, depending on whether they are 

infantry, armor, or mechanized infantry. 

12A small number of full-time National Guard soldiers serve as liaison officers in the 

headquarters.
B-285228

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Figure 2: Locations of the Integrated Division Headquarters and Enhanced Separate Brigades

Source: Army.

Currently, the integrated divisions are not intended or able to deploy.13

However, in October 2001, after examining the training and readiness levels 

of the enhanced brigades, the Army will decide whether to (1) expand the 

41st Enhanced Separate Brigade

Portland, Oregon

7th Infantry Division

Fort Carson, Colorado

39th Enhanced Separate Brigade

Little Rock, Arkansas

24th Infantry Division

Fort Riley, Kansas

30th Enhanced Separate Brigade

Clinton, North Carolina

24th Infantry Division Forward Element

Fort Jackson, South Carolina

218th Enhanced Separate Brigade

Newberry, South Carolina

48th Enhanced Separate Brigade

Macon, Georgia

45th Enhanced Separate Brigade

Edmond, Oklahoma

Division Headquarters (Active Army)

Enhanced Separate Brigades (National Guard)

Forward Element of 24th Infantry Headquarters

7th Infantry Division elements

24th Infantry Division elements

13A substantial increase in personnel and equipment (such as an aviation brigade, division 

artillery, and a division support command) would be needed to make the divisions 

deployable.
B-285228

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

integrated divisions into deployable war-fighting divisions, (2) maintain 

them as a means of enhancing training and readiness, or (3) disband them. 

Teaming. This initiative is the most flexible, least clearly defined 

integration effort that we reviewed. It began in October 1998 with two 

teams (each made up of one active and one Guard division) and was later 

expanded to include two additional teams.14 According to the Army, 

teaming should increase its ability to respond across the full spectrum of 

military operations by establishing or strengthening the training and 

operational relationships of the teamed divisions. Teaming activities 

include joint training at the National Training Center, as well as support 

during deployment training and preparation. The initiative is being 

implemented differently by each team, and the teams have wide discretion 

to adopt whatever approach they think is best, as long as the teaming 

relationship is mutually beneficial. The headquarters usually coordinate 

teaming exercises and activities, but actual integration generally occurs at 

lower organizational levels—at the company and even individual level.15

Although geographic proximity was one of the factors the Army considered 

when it established the teams, only one Guard division is located near its 

active division partner. The other three Guard divisions are located 

between 530 and 1,550 miles away from their active teaming partners.

(See fig. 3.)

14The Army also has plans to team combat and support forces from all three components 

over the next few years. 

15Battalions are made up of companies, which are divided into platoons, which are divided 

into squads made up of individual soldiers.
B-285228

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Figure 3: Locations of the Army’s Four Divisional Teams

Source: Army.

 4th Infantry Division (Active)

 Fort Hood, Texas

 40th Infantry Division (Guard)

 Los Alamitos, California

 1st Cavalry Division (Active)

 Fort Hood, Texas

 49th Armored Division (Guard)

 Austin, Texas

 10th Mountain Division (Active)

 Fort Drum, New York

 29th Infantry Division (Guard)

 Fort Belvoir, Virginia

 3rd Infantry Division (Active)

 Fort Stewart, Georgia

 28th Infantry Division (Guard)

 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
B-285228

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Force XXI heavy division redesign. Under this initiative, the Army is 

conducting a series of war-fighting experiments to create a more 

deployable force that uses emerging technology to increase its capabilities. 

By using digital information to quickly identify and transmit the locations 

of friendly and enemy forces,16 the Army found it could reduce the size of 

its heavy divisions while also increasing the area covered by those 

divisions. Also, by integrating reserve forces into the new design, the Army 

found it could reduce the number of required active personnel. The Force 

XXI heavy division redesign is the Army’s most complex integration 

initiative because it (1) involves all three components, (2) integrates 

personnel at all levels throughout the division, and (3) entails changes in 

equipment, force structure, and number of personnel in the division. 

Furthermore, the test division for the redesign (the 4th Infantry Division, 

Fort Hood, Texas) is also involved in the Army’s teaming initiative.17

Although the Guard was required to fill 257 positions and the Reserve 258 

positions in the 4th Infantry Division, the two reserve components 

approached integration differently. The Guard provided some large units 

(such as a multiple-launch rocket system battery), while the Reserve 

assigned individuals (primarily junior soldiers with little or no prior service 

experience). About one-quarter of the Army Reserve positions were 

designated for soldiers who agreed to serve full-time for 2 years with the 

division. The Army planned to use the 4th Infantry Division’s integration as 

a model for the Force XXI redesign of its other heavy forces. 

Bosnia Task Force. The Army Chief of Staff considers the Bosnia task 

force one of the service’s top integration efforts. Reservists have 

participated in Bosnia task forces since operations began in 1995. However, 

in 1998, the Army altered its staffing philosophy when it tasked the 49th 

Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, to be the division 

headquarters for the seventh Bosnia stabilization force rotation. During 

that rotation, which will last through October 2000, the 49th will command 

active Army and multinational forces, as well as other Guard forces. 

Appendix IV shows the other Guard and active units scheduled to lead and 

participate in future integrated Bosnia task forces through April 2003. 

16The Army refers to this as situational awareness.

17The Army planned to field its first digitized division (the 4th Infantry) in fiscal year 2000 

and its first digitized corps (III Corps) in fiscal year 2004. Full fielding of the 4th Infantry 

Division is now expected to be delayed. 
B-285228

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Integration Has 

Increased Costs, but 

Funding Priorities Are 

Unchanged

Integration is not free, but the Army has not precisely quantified its cost. It 

is difficult to determine the cost of individual integration efforts because 

expenses are tracked at different levels in separate Guard and active 

accounts. It is even more difficult to determine the Army’s total integration 

costs because the Army is pursuing integration in a piecemeal fashion and 

has not collected or consolidated the costs of individual integration efforts. 

As a result, the Army has not fully assessed the cost impacts of integration 

on each component. Despite data limitations, there is evidence that 

integration leads to higher costs for the Army as a whole, primarily through 

increased reserve personnel costs. It is also evident that funding priorities 

have not been fully updated to reflect the increased use of Guard and 

Reserve forces in training and operations. While the Army has provided 

some funding for integration efforts such as the integrated Bosnia task 

force, it has left other efforts largely unfunded. This means that some costs 

of integration are being absorbed by Guard and Reserve units themselves 

or even by individual soldiers.

Historically, Reserve Forces 

Are Less Costly Than Active 

Forces

The Army’s total force policy, which is designed to maintain a small active 

force that can be augmented by reserve forces in a war, helps the Army 

minimize its costs because reserve units generally cost less than 

comparable active units. Pay and allowances are generally much lower for 

reservists (who are usually paid for only 38 or 39 days per year)18 than for 

full-time active soldiers. Operation and maintenance funding is also 

generally much lower for the reserves because they train less. For example, 

operation and maintenance funding for the California Army National 

Guard’s 40th Infantry Division was based on 112 miles per tank in fiscal 

year 2000, compared with the 800 tank miles that are normally allocated to 

active heavy divisions. 

18Both Guard and Reserve soldiers usually participate in 24 drilling days—typically 48 4-hour 

training periods—each year, performed during one weekend per month. In addition, Guard 

and Reserve soldiers usually participate in 14 and 15 days of annual training, respectively, 

each year. 
B-285228

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

The Army currently allocates resources on the basis of a unit’s placement in 

the war plans, and reserve combat units are generally not among the

“first-to-fight” units that receive the highest resources. For example, the 

Guard’s combat divisions have historically been in the bottom tier of the 

Army’s four-tier resourcing model because they are not apportioned to 

either the first or second major theater war.19

Use of Reservists Increases 

the Costs of Integrated 

Peacekeeping Missions

The integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia 

significantly increases the cost of those missions, challenging the premise 

that Guard and Reserve units are a low-cost option for the Army. Active 

Army soldiers receive the same basic rate of pay, whether they deploy to 

peacekeeping missions or remain at their home bases. Therefore, deploying 

active soldiers to peacekeeping missions has little effect on the Army’s total 

pay and allowance costs.20 However, disbursements from Guard or active 

Army pay and allowance accounts increase any time reservists train or 

deploy for more than 39 days in a year.21

Had the Texas National Guard not been given the mission to lead the 

integrated Bosnia task force in 2000, it is likely that Guard soldiers in the 

49th Armored Division would have received 39 days of pay in fiscal

years 1999, 2000, and 2001, for a total of 117 days. The 49th Armored 

Division estimates that its deployed soldiers will average 378 days of pay 

over that period.22 Therefore, total Army pay and allowances will rise by 

261 days for each of the more than 500 soldiers from the 49th Armored 

Division deployed to Bosnia.

19Units in the first tier deploy earliest and receive the highest priority for equipment and 

people. Lower tiers receive increasingly less priority for such resources.

20Although pay does not increase, some allowances do increase.

21The fact that pay for training comes from Guard accounts, while pay for mobilized Guard 

soldiers comes from active Army accounts, or the fact that peacekeeping missions are 

financed through supplemental appropriations does not change the fact that total Army 

costs increase any time Guard soldiers exceed their allotted 39 days of pay in 1 year. 

Regardless of which account pays, increased Guard participation increases total Army costs 

because all the Army’s active soldiers are still being paid, and Guard soldiers are being paid 

more.

22By the end of the mission, the average soldier in the 49th Armored Division will have been 

paid for 108 days of mission-related training (fiscal years 1999 and 2000) and 270 days of 

mobilization (fiscal years 2000 and 2001).
B-285228

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

The integrated Bosnia task force commanded by the 49th also includes 143 

soldiers from the 111th Engineer Battalion of the Texas Army National 

Guard, 105 soldiers from the Maryland National Guard, and other smaller 

groups of Guard and Reserve soldiers, all of whom were mobilized for 270 

days. In total, the cost increase from the Guard’s participation in this 

integrated task force exceeds 190,000 man-days of pay and allowances.

The use of reserve forces for peacekeeping missions can also lead to higher 

equipment costs. Procurement costs can increase if the Army upgrades 

reserve equipment to make it compatible with that of deploying active 

units. Operation and maintenance costs can also increase when reserve 

equipment is used for more than the normal 39 days per year or when 

equipment is transferred from one unit to another. For example, the 

Guard’s 49th Armored Division incurred additional equipment costs when it 

borrowed more than 20 intelligence analyst workstations from the 

intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to prepare for deployment 

to Bosnia. The borrowed equipment did not add to procurement costs, but 

it added to total equipment costs because it cost approximately $400,000 to 

install the workstations and load the required software.23 After the 49th 

Division deployed, the workstations had to be disassembled and shipped 

back to Fort Huachuca because the 49th, like all Guard divisions, is in the 

bottom tier of the Army’s resourcing system. The Army is likely to incur 

additional equipment costs as the Guard’s 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions 

prepare to deploy to Bosnia. 

Integration Increases Costs 

in the Force XXI Heavy 

Division, but Reserve 

Soldiers Bear Some Cost 

Increases

The integration of reserve soldiers into a previously all active division 

increases total Army costs. Declines in active positions within the division 

did not result in cost savings because active personnel levels throughout 

the Army remained the same.24 However, increases in reserve positions 

increased costs because the Army Reserve recruited some soldiers 

specifically for 2-year full-time positions in the active 4th Infantry Division. 

In addition, transferred reservists traveled further to Fort Hood (the 4th 

Infantry Division location) than they traveled to their previous reserve 

units, thus increasing their out-of-pocket expenses. 

23The 49th did not take these workstations to Bosnia because workstations were already in 

place there.

24While costs do not decline, the Army may gain efficiencies if personnel are moved to more 

critical positions.
B-285228

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Officials at the 4th Infantry Division and III Corps cited travel costs as one 

of their main Force XXI resource concerns. According to 4th Infantry 

Division records, 89 percent of reserve soldiers in the division list their 

homes of record as being more than 100 miles from Fort Hood. However, 

reservists traveling to Fort Hood must fund all transportation costs 

themselves because Joint Federal Travel Regulations prohibit the Army 

from reimbursing soldiers for expenses incurred traveling to and from their 

normal monthly training sites.25 Officials at both the 4th Infantry Division 

and the III Corps said they expect reserve retention rates to drop if soldiers 

are not compensated for their travel. They requested relief from the travel 

regulations, citing the DOD instruction that defines 50 miles as a 

reasonable commuting distance.26 The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Personnel recommended pursuing other options, and the Army is now 

considering paying soldiers an extra allowance to offset some travel costs. 

However, this allowance would go to all reservists in the division, 

regardless of the distance they travel, so while the allowance may help 

some reservists, it is not an equitable solution to the problem.27 The same 

challenge will face other heavy combat divisions and brigades as they 

attempt to implement the Force XXI redesign because less than 5 percent 

of the National Guard’s armories are located within 50 miles of the Army’s 

active heavy forces.28

Teaming Increases Costs 

and Takes Resources From 

Other Requirements

The teaming initiative, which is not scheduled for funding until 2002, is 

being supported at the expense of other requirements in some Guard units. 

The U.S. Army Forces Command has funded some costs for teaming 

exercises and activities, but reserve pay and allowances for training must 

25Joint Federal Travel Regulations part G, U7150C.

26DOD Instruction 1215.18 defines a reasonable commuting distance as the maximum 

distance service members may be required to travel involuntarily between their residence 

and their inactive duty sites for training. The normal distance is 50 miles each way, but the 

distance can be expanded to 100 miles if the reservists are provided meals and lodging.

27The designation of the 4th Infantry Division as a high-priority unit allows the Army to pay 

each soldier $10 per drill period (there are usually four drill periods per weekend). Based on 

a mileage rate of 32.5 cents per mile, the $40 weekend drill allowance would fully 

compensate soldiers whose round trip travel to Fort Hood is 123 miles. Soldiers traveling 

further would be undercompensated, and soldiers traveling less would be 

overcompensated.

28The Army’s heavy forces in the United States are located at Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort 

Riley, Kansas; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia.
B-285228

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

be paid from reserve accounts. The National Guard Bureau has provided 

extra pay and allowances to Guard divisions that participate in teaming 

rotations to the National Training Center, but the divisions themselves must 

fund the extra training necessary to prepare for the rotations. This affects 

other division requirements. For example, the California National Guard’s 

40th Infantry Division reported that it cost over $2 million to support the 

teaming initiative in 1999, with nearly $700,000 coming from the division 

itself. Division officials told us that in the absence of teaming, the $700,000 

could have been used for other needed training such as crew certification. 

In January 2000, the 40th Infantry Division had less than one-fourth of its 

required number of certified M1 tank crews.

Other Guard and active divisions have also reported increased costs to 

support the teaming initiative. For example, the Texas Army National 

Guard’s 49th Armored Division reported that between November 1998 and 

May 2000, it cost more than $1.1 million to support its teaming partner, the 

1st Cavalry Division.29 Reserve pay and allowances accounted for most of 

the cost increases, but transportation costs also increased. Cost increases 

for active divisions have been smaller than those for Guard divisions 

because active personnel are already paid for full-time service. The active 

4th Infantry Division reported spending only about $15,000 for teaming in 

fiscal year 1999 and expected to spend about $50,000 in fiscal year 2000. 

The active 1st Cavalry Division reported that it spends approximately 

$20,000 on teaming events each year.

29The National Guard Bureau and the 1st Cavalry Division spent an additional $664,000 to 

support teaming events that involved the 49th Armored Division and the 1st Cavalry 

Division during this period.
B-285228

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Army Plans Have Not Dealt 

With Cost and Funding 

Issues 

Integration is increasing the costs of maintaining Guard and Reserve forces 

because the Army is asking these forces to do more. This trend is likely to 

continue, as indicated by plans such as the Reserve Component 

Employment Study 2005, which is studying ways to enhance the role of the 

reserve components in the full range of military operations. While current 

Army integration plans are consistent with DOD’s goal of making greater 

use of Guard and Reserve forces, they have not altered basic resource 

allocations or even identified the level of funding necessary to achieve this 

goal. For example, the four Guard divisions involved in the Army’s teaming 

initiative have remained in the fourth funding tier,30 with the same basic 

resource allocation level as the other four Guard divisions that are not 

teamed.

The same is true for the six Guard enhanced brigades in the integrated 

divisions. They have remained at the same resourcing level as the other 

nine enhanced brigades that are not involved with the integrated divisions. 

Because of this situation, some Guard officials have questioned whether 

the Army is fully committed to integration. The commanding officer of one 

Guard unit, for example, said that lack of integration funding could 

seriously jeopardize the success of his unit’s integration initiative. He said 

the initiative was unfunded under his predecessor and is scheduled to 

remain unfunded during his entire time in command, and that by the time 

the program is finally funded in 2002, it may be too late for successful 

implementation.

Because the Army has not estimated the costs of its integration efforts and 

does not collect comprehensive figures to measure their costs, it is difficult 

for the Army to assess accurately the funding needs of affected units. 

Without a better understanding of integration’s costs, it is also difficult for 

the Army to weigh effectively the merits of funding integration instead of 

other priorities.31 If it continues to view integration from a piecemeal 

perspective, rather than in the context of a broad overarching integration 

strategy, the Army may also find it difficult to assess the validity of funding 

requirements for integration. For example, directing the Guard’s 49th 

Armored Division to return the intelligence workstations borrowed from 

30Tier 4 units such as Guard divisions had only 36 percent of their full-time active guard 

positions funded in fiscal year 2000.

31Other priorities include shifting from heavy and light to medium brigades and reducing the 

shortfall in support forces.
B-285228

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Fort Huachuca may be reasonable if the division’s deployment to Bosnia is 

a one-time event. However, if the 49th is expected to assist in future 

peacekeeping operations, or if DOD’s Reserve Component Employment 

Study 2005 determines that Guard divisions should be apportioned to war 

plans, then it may be more cost-effective for the 49th to have its own work 

stations so it can sustain future training.

Integration Could Alter 

Force Structure 

Significantly

Integration has led to new force structure requirements, as the Army has 

created new units and increased the size of some existing units. The Army 

has limited these new requirements by (1) shifting positions from one 

component to another, (2) assigning units more than one role (known as 

dual-missioning), and (3) assigning individuals responsibilities for more 

than one job (dual-hatting). Since force structure levels are remaining 

constant, the Army is adjusting other requirements to compensate for the 

small increases currently associated with integration. Over the long term, 

however, Army integration could lead to larger increases in new 

requirements, which would require more significant force structure 

adjustments. Such adjustments could be problematic for Army leaders 

because the Army is already experiencing shortfalls in the forces needed to 

conduct two major wars. Any force structure increases that result from 

integration would have to be offset by decreases elsewhere throughout the 

force, because Army end strength is not increasing. To date, Army plans 

have not addressed this issue.

Force XXI Redesign Adds 

Reserve Positions to 

Formerly All-Active 

Divisions 

Under Force XXI, the Army is reducing the size of its heavy divisions and 

integrating them by setting aside positions for all three components. The 

design was modified several times during planning and testing, and reserve 

positions peaked at 515 in 1999. Later, however, the 4th Infantry Division 

recognized that active forces were better suited for some of these positions 

and requested, and received authorization, to convert 40 reserve positions 

back to active positions. Although the original plan was to replicate the 

division’s design in other active heavy divisions, the next division 

scheduled to convert to the Force XXI design—the 1st Cavalry Division—

will adopt a modified design based on the experiences of the 4th Infantry 

Division.

Most of the 515 reserve positions in the 4th Infantry’s test design did not 

add to the division’s force structure because they were not new positions 

but simply replacements for former active positions. One dual-mission unit 

(a multiple-launch rocket system battery from the Guard’s 49th Armored 
B-285228

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Division) accounts for about one-fifth of all reserve positions in the 4th 

Infantry Division. This unit replaced one of the 4th Infantry Division’s 

active artillery units and at the same time maintained its 49th Armored 

Division responsibilities. Guard and Reserve positions also replaced active 

medical, aviation support, and staff positions without adding to the 

division’s force structure. However, the dual-mission general support 

aviation battalion from the Guard’s 49th Armored Division did add 65 

positions to the 4th Infantry Division’s force structure because it added 

capability rather than replacing an active unit. Increasing ambulance crews 

from two to three people by adding one Reserve soldier to each crew also 

added to the division’s force structure.

Force Structure Increase in 

Integrated Divisions Is 

Small but Could Increase 

Substantially

Although integration has created few additional positions so far, if the 

Army decides to transform the two integrated divisions into deployable 

war-fighting units in 2001, these could have a much greater impact on force 

structure. The Army used 285 new active positions to create the 

headquarters for the two integrated divisions. However, 86 of these new 

positions were filled by dual-hatted personnel with responsibilities both in 

the integrated divisions and on the active bases where they serve. For 

example, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division is responsible for 

overseeing the training and readiness of the division’s three enhanced 

brigades in Oregon, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, but he is also base 

commander at Fort Carson, Colorado. As such, he is responsible for 

supporting active forces at Fort Carson, Colorado, including the 3rd 

Armored Cavalry Regiment that deployed to Bosnia in the integrated task 

force led by the Guard’s 49th Armored Division.

In some cases, the new active positions were created at the expense of 

other units. For example, the Army transferred 140 active duty positions 

into the new divisions from units that were supporting reserve training 

under the Title XI program.32 As a result, the integrated divisions’ enhanced 

brigades will receive more support from the active Army, but other reserve 

32Section 414 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 

(P.L. 102-190, Dec. 5, 1991, as amended by P.L. 102-484, Oct. 23, 1992, section 1132, title XI) 

provides for a pilot program for active component support of the reserves and requires the 

Secretary of the Army to provide at least 2,000 officers and 3,000 warrant officers and 

enlisted members to serve as full-time duty advisers to reserve units for organizing, 

administering, instructing, or training such units. This is sometimes referred to as the 

Title XI program.
B-285228

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

forces will lose some of the assistance they were receiving under the 

program. 

Although force structure growth in the integrated divisions has been small, 

this initiative could have the greatest force structure growth of any 

integration initiative, depending on the Army’s decision at the end of the 

2-year evaluation period. If the Army transforms either or both of the test 

divisions into deployable war-fighting divisions, training and logistics 

requirements will increase, and the active headquarters positions may 

require full-time rather than dual-hatted personnel. In addition, missing 

divisional structure such as an aviation brigade, division artillery, and 

division support command would need to be added.33 To pursue this 

alternative, the Army would need approval from the Secretary of Defense 

to add to its current 18-division structure (10 active and 8 National Guard). 

However, if the Army maintains these divisions as a means of improving the 

training and readiness of the enhanced brigades, the current small 

headquarters and dual-hatting arrangement might continue with no further 

force structure changes. If the Army decides to disband the integrated 

divisions, the active Army would regain the positions from the two small 

headquarters units. 

Guard Deployments Could 

Be Helped by Proposal to 

Increase Divisional 

Intelligence Forces

To date, the participation of Guard divisions in peacekeeping missions has 

not required increases in reserve positions. However, the 49th Armored 

Division’s assignment as headquarters to the Bosnia mission highlighted 

shortages within its intelligence force structure, and the Guard has 

proposed adding about 900 new positions to its divisional intelligence 

forces. Although the proposal is designed to better position the Guard to 

respond to the full spectrum of operations, not just peacekeeping, an 

increase in divisional intelligence forces would make it easier to staff 

future Guard deployments to Bosnia. If the Army accepts the Guard 

proposal, it would increase the size of three National Guard division 

military intelligence battalions from their current cadre status to the 

full-strength levels characteristic of their active counterparts by adding 

about 300 positions to each battalion.34

33A portion of this additional structure could possibly come from the enhanced brigades, 

which would be part of a division rather than separate units that deploy independently.

34Guard officials told us that other units will draw down to balance the increase in divisional 

military intelligence.
B-285228

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

As it prepared for its rotation in Bosnia, the 49thArmored Division found 

that its military intelligence battalion was not properly structured for the 

mission. Because of the mission’s large force protection and human 

intelligence requirements, the division had to draw people from several 

different units. It took some intelligence personnel from its own small 

cadre military intelligence battalion, some from the 3rd Armored Cavalry 

Regiment—the major active Army unit involved in the mission—and the 

bulk from the Guard’s 629th military intelligence battalion, part of the 

Guard’s 29th Infantry Division. The 629th is the only Guard division military 

intelligence battalion with the same force structure level as active military 

intelligence battalions.

The next Guard division scheduled to command the integrated Bosnia task 

force (in October 2001) is the 29th Infantry Division. However, the 29th will 

not be able to use its own 629th Military Intelligence Battalion because 

Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority35 is limited to 270 days per 

operational mission, and the 629th already mobilized for 270 days for its 

current deployment to Bosnia with the 49th Armored Division. Therefore, 

like the 49th Armored Division, the 29th Infantry Division will have to draw 

its intelligence resources from several other units. The current Guard 

proposal to add about 900 soldiers to Guard division military intelligence 

battalions could reduce the number of units involved in future 

peacekeeping rotations and could help the Guard deploy its intelligence 

battalions with their parent divisions in the future. However, it is unlikely to 

eliminate the need to draw some personnel from other units because 

intelligence battalions are structured for war-fighting, not peacekeeping. 

Even fully structured active units do not have all the human intelligence 

and force protection personnel needed for peacekeeping.

Current Approach to 

Integration May Hamper 

Future Force Structure 

Decisions

The Army’s current method of pursuing integration on an initiative-byinitiative basis, without an overarching plan to guide its efforts, hampers its 

ability to evaluate force structure proposals within the context of overall 

force structure needs. For example, if the Army continues to look at the 

integrated divisions separately from other integration initiatives and from 

the Army’s other major objectives, it could decide to increase the size of the 

3510 U.S.C. Section 12304. The authority limits reserve participation in operational missions 

to 270 days. Thus, the 629th Military Intelligence Battalion cannot be mobilized for the 

Bosnia Stabilization Force mission again after it returns from Bosnia in the fall of 2000 

because it will have already served its maximum 270 days under the Presidential Selective 

Reserve Call-up authority.
B-285228

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

integrated divisions to that of full war-fighting divisions without adequately 

addressing the effect this would have on Army units that would lose 

personnel. Individual integration plans do not currently specify how 

integration will help move the Army toward its goal of maintaining the 

smallest possible active force while maximizing the effectiveness of its 

reserve forces.

Integration Provides 

Deployment Relief for 

Some Active Forces 

but Increases Reserve 

Personnel Tempo

Integration provides relief to some active forces by decreasing their 

deployment times, but reserve deployments must increase to offset this 

decline in active deployments. In addition, integration has increased 

training requirements for both components. Current shifts and increases in 

personnel tempo could affect both active and reserve retention for years to 

come. Yet the Army cannot precisely quantify the effects of integration on 

retention, and current plans do not specify what retention effects the Army 

would consider acceptable as it pursues its overall integration goal. 

Integration Increases 

Personnel Tempo at Home 

Bases and Training Sites

Because active soldiers usually work on weekdays and reserves on 

weekends, both have had to make some adjustments to support 

integration. Integrated training often adds to a unit’s normal training 

requirements, thus requiring personnel to spend additional time away from 

home. Furthermore, even when active and reserve forces are able to satisfy 

their normal training requirements by training together, the requirement to 

train at a common site may cause either or both to spend additional time 

away from home. One officer summed up the situation thus: “Integration 

means active soldiers must work more weekends, and reserve soldiers 

must put their civilian careers and education on hold more often.”
B-285228

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Two categories—dual-hatted active soldiers in the integrated divisions and 

Guard soldiers in the teamed divisions—illustrate this point. Dual-hatted 

active soldiers at Fort Carson are required to work some weekends to 

support reservists in the division’s enhanced brigades. This sometimes 

involves travel to the enhanced brigades in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and 

Oregon. However, this does not change requirements that these dual-hatted 

soldiers support active units at Fort Carson, such as the 3rd Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, during the week. Guard soldiers in teamed divisions 

often participate in major training exercises, particularly National Training 

Center rotations, in support of their active division partners. Whenever 

these exercises last more than 15 days (the usual annual training period), 

personnel tempo increases, requiring support from families and employers. 

Reserve personnel tempo may also increase because many of these major 

exercises have training requirements that must be met before the exercises 

themselves begin. Although these personnel tempo increases are not 

particularly large, some Guard officials believe they could affect retention 

because the Guard is being asked more frequently to participate in active 

unit National Training Center rotations throughout the year, with relatively 

short notice.36

Reserves in Integrated Task 

Forces Provide Deployment 

Relief to Some Active 

Forces but Not to Others

Guard forces deployed in Bosnia provide relief to some active forces. 

However, some heavily used forces, especially those in short supply, do not 

see much relief. The Bosnia task forces have focused attention on Guard 

forces and the relief they provide to active forces, which as a result need to 

deploy less frequently. In particular, the Guard’s 49th Armored Division is 

relieving strain on the active division headquarters that commanded 

previous Bosnia deployments. However, some heavily used occupational 

specialties are in short supply in both the active and reserve components, 

or they tend to be concentrated in one component or the other. These 

include military police and specialists in fire support, petroleum supply, 

ammunition, intelligence, and medicine. As a result, personnel that need 

the most relief from frequent deployments are the least likely to be helped 

by integration.

36Guard units usually conduct National Training Center rotations in the summer and plan for 

them years in advance. Active units sometimes have only a few months’ notice before their 

rotations, and Guard units that are called to participate in them must adjust their schedules 

accordingly.
B-285228

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Additionally, those active troops that deploy with Guard units may actually 

spend more time away from home than before. For example, the leaders of 

the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment trained for their Bosnia deployment 

during the week with their active soldiers at Fort Carson, Colorado, then 

sometimes flew to Texas on Fridays for weekend training with the Guard’s 

49th Armored Division. 

Increased Deployments May 

Affect Reserve Retention 

Rates 

One of the primary reasons for creating the integrated Bosnia task forces 

was to reduce deployments of active forces and thus hopefully increase 

their retention rates. However, the Army has not quantified the expected 

effects of integration on retention rates among active forces, and 

integration’s possible negative effects on retention among reserve forces 

could offset any positive effect that may be achieved. 

On the basis of a DOD survey of 66,000 active duty military personnel, we 

noted in March 2000 that satisfaction dropped significantly among 

personnel who were deployed for more than 5 months in 1 year.37 We also 

showed that satisfaction and intent to stay in the military are strongly 

linked. While the results of the survey are not projectable to reserve 

soldiers, some Guard officials told us they believe peacekeeping rotations 

will have a negative effect on employer and family support, leading to 

decreased retention rates. Guard officials in South Carolina told us that 

their upcoming 3-week rotation at the National Training Center had 

adversely affected retention for more than a year prior to this scheduled 

rotation. They expected retention to drop further if their units were 

assigned Bosnia or Kosovo missions.38 Several Guard officials said their 

soldiers were ready and willing to fight in a major war, if needed. However, 

they also said that their soldiers would have joined the active Army, had 

they wanted to spend most of the year on active duty participating in 

peacekeeping missions.

Concerned about the potential effects of long deployments on retention, 

the Army and Joint Staff set a goal in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance 

Plan to have no Army units deploy for more than 120 days (4 months) a 

37Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD’s 1999 Survey of Active Duty Members

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-110, Mar. 8, 2000).

38Shortly after the interviews, the 218th enhanced separate brigade in South Carolina was 

notified that it would be tasked to provide a portion of its forces for the Bosnia mission 

beginning in October 2002.
B-285228

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

year. The 49th Armored Division’s current 9-month deployment far exceeds 

the goal, but in March 2000, the Army announced that it would limit future 

overseas deployments to 179 days (6 months).39 Although these future 

deployments are planned to be much shorter than the 49th’s deployment, 

they will still exceed the goal by 59 days. 

Army Lacks Retention 

Information but Plans to 

Increase Integration 

The Army is moving ahead with plans to deploy Guard combat units to all 

Bosnia deployments in the next 3 years, despite a lack of hard data on the 

effects of long peacekeeping deployments on reserve retention rates.40

Some Army officials believe that spreading out deployments over a larger 

portion of active and reserve forces will increase overall retention. 

However, until the 49th Armored Division returns from Bosnia, this theory 

will remain untested. Because the cost of replacing soldiers has almost 

doubled since 1986,41 it is important that the Army understand the effects of 

its policy decisions on retention. Likewise, the Army has not evaluated the 

effects of its other integration initiatives, or of integration as a whole, on its 

ability to retain soldiers. These effects are important because “manning the 

force” is another of the Army’s six major objectives. 

Integration Has Mixed 

Effects on the Army’s 

Level of Risk in 

Carrying Out the 

National Military 

Strategy 

In the long term, the Army expects integration to reduce its risk in carrying 

out the national military strategy because it expects forces to be better 

trained and more ready. In the short term, however, personnel shortages 

and the inappropriate use of reservists to fill certain positions under the 

Force XXI redesign have increased the Army’s level of risk.42 This higher 

short-term risk may be offset by other aspects of the Force XXI redesign 

and by the integrated Bosnia task forces. However, these integration efforts 

are still in their early stages and do not have established trend data. 

Therefore, it is difficult to measure any risk reductions that may have 

already occurred. As for teaming, it may reduce risk less than expected.

39This does not include the time reservists spend at their mobilization station, in transit, 

transitioning between units, on leave, or at their demobilization station. 

40DOD is currently surveying Guard and Reserve soldiers, but survey results are not yet 

available.

41In 1986 it cost about $5,300 to recruit each soldier. Today the cost is about $10,000.

42Risk in executing the national military strategy increases when force capability is removed 

and declines when capability is expanded.
B-285228

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Force XXI Redesign 

Increased Short-Term Risk 

at the 4th Infantry Division, 

but Modifications Limit Risk 

at the 1st Cavalry Division

Reserve components have not been able to fill all their assigned positions 

in the 4th Infantry Division as it implements the Force XXI redesign. Should 

the division need to deploy, these shortages could increase the Army’s risk 

in executing the national military strategy. The Army Chief of Staff has 

made filling active combat divisions one of his top priorities. In January 

2000, officials at both the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division 

told us that they were staffed above 100 percent of their active 

authorizations, although not by grade and military occupational specialty. 

However, at that time, the reserve components had filled only 68 percent of 

their allocated positions in the 4th Infantry Division.43 Both reserve 

components had shortages, but the Army Reserve was responsible for most 

of the shortages. 

Officials at the 4th Infantry Division said that risk increased not only 

because of unfilled reserve positions but also because of the inappropriate 

replacement of some active positions with reserve positions. The division 

requested that 40 of its reserve positions, mostly for combat medics and 

petroleum supply specialists, be converted back to active positions. 

Division surgeons at both the 4th Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions and 

other medical officers said that placing reservists in independent medic 

positions increased risk for a number of reasons. First, reserve medics are 

generally not available to train with active units on weekdays, and thus the 

Army cannot follow its basic principle to train as it fights. Second, no one is 

available to replace the reservists during weekday exercises, increasing 

risk for soldiers injured during these exercises. Third, the medic positions 

in question are junior positions44 that tend to be filled by reservists with no 

prior service experience who do not generally have civilian jobs in the 

medical field. The medical officers contended that these reservists 

generally have not had the breadth of experience necessary for 

independent duty. As for petroleum specialists (who provide aviation 

support), 4th Infantry Division officers said that daily requirements in the 

aviation support battalion were so high that reservists could not possibly 

meet mission needs.

43The reserve components were scheduled to fill those positions by October 1999.

44Most of the positions are for soldiers at the E-4 pay grade. There are nine enlisted pay 

grades, E-1 through E-9. 
B-285228

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Although the Army originally planned to replicate the 4th Infantry 

Division’s integration in its other heavy forces, the next Force XXI division 

(the 1st Cavalry) will be less integrated than the 4th Infantry Division. In 

March 2000, the Army dramatically reduced its integration plans for the 1st 

Cavalry Division, after division and III Corps officials raised concerns 

about the reserve components’ ability to support a second division in the 

same geographic area as the 4th Infantry Division.45 Guard positions in the 

1st Cavalry Division were cut from 257 to 233, but Army Reserve positions 

were cut from 258 to 3. As of May 2000, the Army had not yet determined 

whether the right mix of Army reservists and guardsmen would be 

available in the regions surrounding its other active heavy forces in order to 

integrate those units. However, there are no National Guard armories near 

the Army’s heavy forces overseas, and less than 5 percent of the Guard’s 

armories are within 50 miles of active heavy forces in the United States.46

New Positions in Force XXI 

Redesign and Integrated 

Peacekeeping Task Forces 

Decrease Short-Term Risk 

Integration added some new capabilities to the Force XXI heavy division 

and should thus reduce the Army’s short-term risk in carrying out the 

national military strategy. For example, the dual-mission general support 

aviation battalion from the Guard’s 49th Armored Division added 8 UH-60 

Black Hawk helicopters, crews, and support personnel to the 4th Infantry’s 

24 Black Hawks. A third (reserve) medic was also added to some 

ambulance crews that previously had only two active Army soldiers.

The deployment of Guard divisions for peacekeeping missions also helps 

reduce risk because it increases the readiness of Guard divisions, which 

must be certified in war-fighting as well as peacekeeping tasks before they 

deploy. It also frees active divisions to train for their primary war-fighting 

tasks. This second benefit may be strictly short term because Guard units 

can only deploy for 270 days per operational mission under the Presidential 

Selective Reserve Call-up authority.47

45Both divisions are headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas, but the 4th Infantry Division has 

only two maneuver brigades there compared with three in the 1st Cavalry Division, thus 

making it even more difficult for the Army to integrate the 1st Cavalry Division with 

reservists from that geographic area.

46Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Carson, Colorado; and Fort Hood, Texas.

4710 U.S.C. Section 12304.
B-285228

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Integrated Divisions May 

Offer Some Benefits, but 

Long-Term Risk Reductions 

Are Difficult to Measure and 

May Be Less Than Expected

Army officials expect the active headquarters of the integrated divisions to 

improve training in the divisions’ National Guard enhanced brigades, thus 

allowing the brigades to deploy more quickly and reducing the Army’s risk 

in carrying out the national military strategy. Officials at the enhanced 

brigades we visited said that although the headquarters are small, they still 

provide significant benefits in preparing the brigades for deployment, 

especially in training battalion and brigade staffs. The active headquarters 

also helped spotlight Guard equipment modernization and compatibility 

issues that previously had been raised only by the National Guard chain of 

command. One brigade attributed the accelerated fielding of new radios,48

at least in part, to the influence exerted by its active headquarters. 

Several factors have made it difficult for the Army to evaluate the 

effectiveness of its integrated division headquarters in improving the 

training and readiness of their enhanced brigades.49 First, measures of 

effectiveness to gauge improvements were adopted only in March 2000. 

Second, the commander of one division has questioned the reliability of his 

enhanced brigades’ baseline readiness data, saying the brigades were not 

as ready as their baseline data indicated. Third, the three enhanced 

brigades in the heavy integrated division are undergoing Force XXI “limited 

conversions.” These conversions reduce the brigades’ capabilities by 

removing a full company of equipment and personnel from each of the 

maneuver battalions within the brigades. These reductions were originally 

scheduled to coincide with the arrival of new, more capable, digital 

equipment. However, under the limited conversions, the maneuver 

battalions must give up a company before they receive their digitized 

equipment. Appendix V contains a table showing the dates that units are 

scheduled to undergo limited and full Force XXI conversions.

Teaming May Not Reduce 

Risk as Much as Expected

Officials expect teaming to help the Army reduce its level of risk in carrying 

out the national military strategy by improving the readiness of teamed 

divisions. Army officials said that teamed divisions can provide three types 

of support to their deploying partner divisions. First, they can “push out” 

the deploying divisions by providing transportation for equipment, 

48Single channel ground and airborne radio system radios are arguably the most important 

piece of communication equipment in the Army. They can automatically change frequencies 

and provide secure communications not available with older radios.

49The 2-year test period for the divisions is scheduled to end in October 2001.
B-285228

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

administrative support for deploying soldiers, and replacement personnel 

to meet home station responsibilities. Second, soldiers from the partner 

divisions can be “plugged in” the deploying divisions to fill personnel 

shortages. Finally, partner divisions can “plus up” deploying divisions by 

providing units that add to the deploying divisions’ capabilities. 

The Army describes teaming as a mutually beneficial relationship, and our 

discussions with both active and reserve partners have confirmed that both 

sides have achieved benefits. However, most of the benefits have centered 

on training and pre-deployment events, rather than on actual operations. In 

the event of a major theater war, support would flow primarily from Guard 

divisions to their active division partners. Any support the Guard divisions 

could provide to their active counterparts would certainly reduce the 

Army’s risk in carrying out the national military strategy, but several factors 

are likely to limit this support:

Time constraints. Guard forces need time to mobilize, making it difficult 

for them to support early deploying active forces on very short notice. 

These difficulties are greatest when active teamed divisions deploy as part 

of a division alert force. A division alert force is maintained at an enhanced 

level of readiness, whereby it can deploy an initial-ready company in 

18 hours and a division-ready brigade in 72 hours.50 When an active teamed 

division is assigned division alert force responsibility, the amount of 

push-out support that its partner Guard division can supply is severely 

limited. Active divisions that deploy later in a conflict are likely to receive 

much more support from their Guard division partners, which will have 

time to mobilize.

Geographic constraints. Geographic separation affects the amount of 

support that Guard divisions can provide to their active teaming partners, 

particularly the amount of “push out” support. The 49th Armored and 

1st Cavalry Divisions are located close to each other and both train at Fort 

Hood. Because the 49th is headquartered within commuting distance of 

Fort Hood, it could easily provide Fort Hood with replacement personnel 

to meet home station responsibilities when 1st Cavalry Division soldiers 

deploy. It could also provide transportation assets and other push-out 

support on relatively short notice due to its geographic proximity to the 

1st Cavalry Division. The other Guard divisions are all located at least 

50The details of this deployment sequence are found in the Army’s Armored and Mechanized 

Infantry Brigade Field Manual 71-3, appendix G.
B-285228

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

500 miles from their active division teaming partners and would have to 

overcome transportation challenges before they could push out their 

partnered active divisions. 

Equipment compatibility problems. Equipment and weapons used by 

reserve and active forces are often different or incompatible. This can 

create problems as the components train together, and where equipment 

differences are very large it could delay or even prevent Guard units from 

filling or augmenting their active partner divisions. Officials at the 40th 

Infantry Division (California Army National Guard) told us that none of 

their major equipment was compatible with that of their teaming partner, 

the 4th Infantry Division. They estimated that they were about 10 to 15 

years behind the 4th Infantry Division in modernization. They still had 

M1IP tanks with 105-millimeter guns, compared with their partner’s 

state-of-the-art M1A2 digital tanks with 120-millimeter guns.51 These 

disparities prevent 40th Infantry Division tank crews from plugging into 4th 

Infantry Division tank crews and make it unlikely that tank crews from the 

40th would even fill a plus-up role for the 4th Infantry Division. One officer 

from the Guard’s 40th Infantry Division summed up the situation saying 

that during a visit to the 4th Infantry Division’s museum he saw museum 

equipment that was more modern than the equipment his soldiers are 

currently operating. However, Guard divisions, including the 40th Infantry 

Division, are receiving upgraded equipment from active forces and Guard 

enhanced brigades that are downsizing under Force XXI limited 

conversions.

Conclusions Although the Army’s integration efforts have increased interaction between 

the active and reserve components, the current state of integration is 

unclear. DOD and Army officials have both articulated the need for a fully 

integrated force, and they have increased the Guard’s participation in 

military activities, from training at home stations to peacekeeping abroad. 

Despite this increased participation and the Army Chief of Staff’s emphasis 

on “the full integration of the active and reserve components” as one of his 

six major objectives, the Army has not clearly defined what constitutes full 

integration. It also has not determined the level of resources available for 

integration or assessed the effects of integration on other important 

51The 40th Infantry Division had begun fielding M1A1 tanks with 120 millimeter guns at the 

time of our visit. However, only 15 of the 91 tanks it had received were operational, and 

none of them had single channel ground and airborne radio system radios. 
B-285228

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

objectives such as time members spend away from home or retention. 

Without an overarching integration plan to define roles, set measurable and 

results-oriented goals, and clearly articulate a framework for a fully 

integrated force, the Army will continue to have difficulty measuring the 

progress or effectiveness of its integration efforts.

Because integration currently involves a series of individual efforts that are 

being implemented on a piecemeal basis, the Army has not fully considered 

integration’s impacts on its costs, force structure, personnel tempo, or 

ability to carry out the national military strategy. As a result, integration has 

led to unintended effects: reservists have had larger out-of-pocket 

expenses when participating in training, medical support for the 4th 

Infantry Division has declined, and personnel tempo has increased for 

some active forces. In addition, reserve combat units have faced significant 

personnel and equipment challenges as they have attempted to increase 

integrated training and deployment times while remaining at the same lowpriority funding levels under the Army’s tiered resourcing system. Finally, a 

piecemeal approach to integration has prevented integration objectives 

from being coordinated with the Army’s other major objectives, such as 

manning combat divisions at 100 percent of their authorization levels. This 

lack of coordination has caused one active heavy division to be staffed 

below its authorization level and—should this division need to deploy—

would increase the Army’s risk in carrying out the national military 

strategy.

Recommendations Given the Army’s current emphasis on active and reserve integration as a 

means of maximizing the effectiveness of its total force, and given the 

inherent limitations of pursuing integration on a piecemeal basis, we 

recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop an overarching plan to 

guide the Army’s integration efforts. This plan should establish the Army’s 

strategy, goals, policies, and resources for achieving full integration and 

should include milestones and performance measures for gauging 

progress. Further, it should fully consider how the integration of active and 

reserve forces can be achieved consistent with the Army’s other primary 

objectives, including the full staffing of its combat forces. 

In light of the Army National Guard’s increased responsibility in 

peacekeeping operations and the Army’s desire to reduce deployment 

burdens on active forces by substituting reservists, we recommend that the 

Secretary of the Army examine whether the forces, equipment, and training 

priorities assigned to the National Guard are commensurate with its 
B-285228

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

increased role and make whatever adjustments are needed, considering the 

overall needs of the Army.

Because some reservists are incurring significant increases in their 

transportation costs as they integrate with active forces located farther 

from their homes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine 

whether the benefits of Army active/reserve component integration 

warrant a change in current travel regulations that prohibit travel 

reimbursement related to inactive duty training. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

agreed with our recommendation concerning the need to review priorities 

assigned to the National Guard. It stated that “the equipping issue will 

remain problematic” because resources are not available to fully modernize 

all units simultaneously, and said that units with the most current 

equipment will continue to transfer the equipment to other units with an 

immediate need. DOD also agreed with our recommendation concerning 

the need to examine transportation costs incurred by reservists, and stated 

that it will conduct a comprehensive study of reserve component duty and 

compensation, including transportation costs. DOD’s comments are 

reprinted in appendix VI.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need for an 

overarching integration plan. It stated that the September 4, 1997, 

memorandum from the Secretary of Defense defined integration and 

contained DOD’s integration goal and specific sub-goals, which provide an 

excellent framework for measuring integration progress and results. In 

addition, DOD believes that the Army’s white paper, America’s Army—One 

Team, One Fight, One Future, along with the Army’s Transformation 

Campaign Plan and the declaration by the Army’s current Chief of Staff are 

guiding active and reserve component integration. DOD also said that the 

Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, the Reserve Component 

Coordination Council, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs oversee integration efforts. 

Finally, DOD stated that precise measurable effects will become more 

apparent as integration initiatives mature, and the current Bosnia mission 

shows that integration efforts are on target. 

We do not agree that DOD has a framework for measuring integration 

progress and results. This report acknowledges that the Secretary of 

Defense’s memorandum is a starting point for looking at integration. 
B-285228

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

However, the Secretary’s statement defines integration in terms of 

conditions of trust and leadership confidence, rather than defining it in 

measurable terms. In addition, DOD’s “seamless total force” goal, and 

sub-goals such as “leadership by senior commanders,” are not specific or 

measurable and require subjective evaluations. Therefore, they are not the 

types of measurable, results-oriented goals that should be used to measure 

progress toward important organizational objectives. Further, with respect 

to the activities of the cited oversight bodies, each body provides some 

oversight of the Army’s integration efforts, but none has comprehensively 

assessed Army integration in terms of the Secretary of Defense’s overall 

integration goal and sub-goals. During the course of our review, we met 

with representatives and former members of these bodies and reviewed the 

minutes of their meetings. On the basis of these discussions and reviews, 

we believe that these organizations have been primarily reactive, by dealing 

with issues and problems as they arise, rather than proactive and providing 

a clear integration strategy for the Army to follow. This report clearly 

acknowledges the groundbreaking efforts of the 49th Armored Division’s 

integrated Bosnia task force, and we believe that these efforts present the 

Army with an opportunity to examine how it can best set clear, measurable 

goals. For example, because one major objective of the task force was to 

reduce active component personnel tempo, and thus increase retention, the 

Army could set measurable retention goals for units or military 

occupational specialties affected by integrated task force deployments. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the 

Army. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
B-285228

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Please contact me at (202) 512- 5140 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Gwendolyn 

R. Jaffe, Michael J. Ferren, and Irene A. Robertson.

Carol R. Schuster

Associate Director

National Security Preparedness Issues
B-285228

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson

Chairman

The Honorable Max Cleland

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Stephen E. Buyer

Chairman

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives
Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure
Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Appendix I

Other Army Integration Initiatives ApendxiI

Multi-component units. This initiative involves units that are authorized 

to include personnel from more than one component (Active Army, Army 

National Guard, or U.S. Army Reserve) on a single authorization document. 

The Army lists the objectives of multi-component units as improving 

readiness and resource allocations, optimizing component-unique 

capabilities, improving documentation, and enhancing the total integration 

of active and reserve forces. Multi-component units go to war as a single 

integrated entity. Since they are included on a single authorization 

document, all portions of the unit (both active and reserve) have the same 

priority with respect to equipment fielding and modernization.

Integrated light infantry battalions. This initiative was designed to 

make more effective use of reserve forces by involving them in a 2-year test 

of the Army’s old round-out and round-up concepts1

 beginning in October 

1999. The round-out portion of the test was to be conducted with an Army 

National Guard light infantry company replacing an active company in a 

battalion of the 1st brigade of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, 

New York. The round-up portion of the test was to involve one company 

that was added to the 1st brigade of the 25th Infantry Division at Fort 

Lewis, Washington. The test was not carried out and the Army decided to 

reject the round-out concept and pursue the round-up concept. As a result, 

one National Guard anti-tank battalion will be added to the 10th, 25th, 

82nd, and 29th division.

Training support XXI. This initiative created training support divisions 

under the operational control of both the U.S. Army Reserve Command and 

the Continental U.S. Armies. The initiative was designed to increase 

reserve component readiness levels by providing “synchronized, 

integrated, and effective training support to priority and other reserve 

component units,” thus helping units achieve pre-mobilization training 

goals and reducing post-mobilization training requirements.

Active component associate unit mentor relationships. This initiative 

centers on the sharing of professional experience and coaching. Senior 

active component commanders assist in reserve component training. 

Senior mentors (corps- or division-level active component commanders) 

1

 The round-out concept replaces an active unit with a similar reserve unit (company for 

company, battalion for battalion, etc.) thus maintaining capability. The round-up concept 

increases capability by adding an additional reserve unit to a standard active configuration. 

For example, it would add a company to a battalion or a brigade to a division.
Appendix I

Other Army Integration Initiatives

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

provide reserve commanders with leadership and advice on training 

matters. Peer mentors (unit commanders of like-sized active components) 

share experience and information on implementation of training 

requirements with reserve component commanders.

Active/reserve component battalion command exchange program. 

This initiative involves the exchange of active and reserve (Army National 

Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) battalion commanders. Active component 

commands will fill key command and senior staff positions within the Army 

National Guard, while the Guard and Reserve will fill key command and 

senior staff positions within the active component. The initial tours are for 

battalion commanders, brigade and battalion executive officers, and 

operations officers. In accordance with a memorandum of agreement 

between the components, the positions are considered career enhancing, 

and reserve commands carry the same weight as active commands. 
Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Appendix II

Major Units Involved in Integration Initiatives 

We Reviewed ApendxiI

Integrated Divisions 7th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

39th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Little Rock, Arkansas (National Guard)

41st Enhanced Separate Brigade, Portland, Oregon (National Guard)

45th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Edmond, Oklahoma (National Guard)

24th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Riley, Kansas (active)

24th Infantry Division Headquarters Forward Element, Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina (active)

30th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Clinton, North Carolina (National Guard)

48th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Macon, Georgia (National Guard)

218th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Newberry, South Carolina (National 

Guard)

Teaming 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California (National Guard)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia (active)

28th Infantry Division, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (National Guard)

10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York (active)

29th Infantry Division, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (National Guard)
Appendix II

Major Units Involved in Integration 

Initiatives We Reviewed

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Force XXI Heavy 

Division Redesign

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (implementing)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (planning stage)

See appendix V for a schedule of units involved in limited conversions.

Integrated Bosnia Task 

Force

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

629th Military Intelligence Battalion, Maryland (National Guard)

111th Engineer Battalion, Texas (National Guard)
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxiI

This report is the fourth in a series of reports issued in response to the 1996 

National Defense Authorization Act, which requires us to review the 

adequacy of the Army’s forces in carrying out the national military strategy. 

This review focuses on the Army’s efforts to integrate its active and reserve 

combat forces. Specifically, we assessed the effects of these efforts on the 

Army’s (1) total costs, (2) force structure, (3) personnel tempo, and (4) risk 

in carrying out the national military strategy.

We met with representatives from each of the three components to obtain 

an overview and the current status of the Army’s active and reserve 

components’ integration efforts. Specifically, we met with officials from the 

Army National Guard Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia; the U.S. Army 

Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and the Department of the 

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Force Development. These 

meetings provided us with general information about the Army’s many 

ongoing integration efforts and helped us focus our efforts on the Army’s 

most significant integration efforts. Specifically, we focused on the Bosnia 

task force integration, teaming, the integrated divisions, and the Force XXI 

heavy division redesign because they all involved large numbers of people 

and were being implemented at the division level. Army officials confirmed 

that by reviewing these efforts, we would cover virtually all the important 

issues related to active and reserve component integration.

To determine integration’s effects on the Army’s total costs, force structure, 

personnel tempo, and ability to execute the national military strategy, we 

reviewed integration plans and discussed integration impacts with officials 

from both headquarters and operational units. At the headquarters level, 

we met with officials from the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Offices. 

At the Pentagon, we also met with representatives of the Army Reserve 

Forces Policy Committee and the Reserve Component Coordination 

Council. The respective groups are responsible for reporting to the 

Secretary of the Army on policy issues and to the Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army on action issues related to reserve components and the “total Army.” 

However, most of the detailed data contained in this report came from the 

operational units listed below that are implementing the Army’s ongoing 

integration efforts. Our review of integration plans and discussions with 

officials focused on identifying (1) what additional costs and personnel, if 

any, were needed to implement the initiatives; (2) how the initiatives 

affected the time reserve personnel would spend away from their home 

stations; and (3) the impact these initiatives are likely to have on the Army’s 

risk in carrying out the national military strategy. We did not independently 
Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

verify the cost figures in the report but relied on financial officials, 

primarily at the U.S. Property and Fiscal Office in Texas and at the divisions 

we visited.

While the bulk of our effort was directed toward the units that were 

actually involved in the integration initiatives, we also met with officials at 

the U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, and III Corps, 

Fort Hood, Texas. Both these organizations have oversight and resourcing 

responsibilities for the major integration efforts we reviewed. Following 

are the divisional units that we visited under each integration heading:

Integrated Divisions 7th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

45th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Edmond, Oklahoma (National Guard)

24th Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas (active)

24th Infantry Division Forward Element, Fort Jackson, South Carolina 

(active)

218th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Newberry, South Carolina (National 

Guard)

Teaming 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California (National Guard)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

Force XXI Heavy Division 

Redesign

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

Integrated Bosnia Task 

Force

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)
Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

In addition, we also met with several retired senior Army generals at the 

Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia, 

to obtain a historical perspective on Army active and reserve component 

integration.

We conducted our review from May 1999 through May 2000 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Appendix IV

Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia 

Task Forces Through 2003 ApendxiIV

Bosnia Stabilization Force rotation 

numbers and dates Headquarters Other units with significant participation

#7 March-October 2000 49th Armored Division (Texas National 

Guard)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (active) and 

629th Military Intelligence Battalion 

(Maryland National Guard)

#8 October-March 2001 3rd Infantry Division (active) Companies from the 3rd and 25th Infantry 

Division (active) and the 30th and 45th 

Enhanced Separate Brigade (North Carolina 

and Oklahoma National Guard) 

#9 March-October 2001 3rd Infantry Division (active) Companies from 3rd and 25th Infantry 

Division (active) and the 48th Enhanced 

Separate Brigade (Georgia National Guard)

#10 October-April 2002 29th Infantry Division (Virginia National 

Guard)

Companies from the 10th Mountain Division 

(active), the 29th Infantry Division (Virginia 

National Guard), and the 155th Enhanced 

Separate Brigade (Mississippi National 

Guard) 

#11 April-October 2002 101st Airborne Division (active) Companies from the 101st Airborne Division 

(active) and the 116th and 76th Enhanced 

Separate Brigade (Idaho and Indiana 

National Guard)

#12 October-April 2003 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania National 

Guard)

Companies from the 3rd and 25th Infantry 

Division (active) and the 218th Enhanced 

Separate Brigade (South Carolina National 

Guard)
Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Appendix V

Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited 

Conversions ApendxiV

The following chart shows when the Army’s active and reserve heavy 

forces are scheduled to undergo Force XXI redesign. Units are scheduled 

to make the full conversion in conjunction with the arrival of new digital 

equipment. The limited conversions involve force structure changes that 

will precede the arrival of the new equipment. The home state of each 

National Guard unit is in parentheses.

Unit Limited conversion Full conversion 

4th Infantry Division,1st Brigade Not applicable January 1999 

4th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Not applicable September 1999

4th Infantry Division Headquarters Not applicable October 1999

1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade Not applicable Fiscal year 2001

1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade Not applicable Fiscal year 2002

1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade Not applicable Fiscal year 2003

4th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade June 2000 Fiscal year 2004

1st infantry Division, 2nd and 3rd Brigade January 1999

116th Armored Brigade (Indiana) October 1999

30th Infantry Brigade (North Carolina) October 1999

155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi) October 1999

48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia) October 1999

81st Armored Brigade (Washington) October 1999

218th Infantry Brigade (South Carolina) October 1999

256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana) October 1999

31st Armored Brigade (Alabama) October 1999

49th Armored Division (Texas) October 1999

1st Armored Division, 2nd Brigade February 2000 

1st Armored Division, 1st Brigade April 2000

1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade June 2000 

3rd Infantry Division June 2000

1st Infantry Division, 1st Brigade June 2000

40th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade (California) September 2000

28th Infantry Division, 55th Brigade (Pennsylvania) September 2000

2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade June 2001

40th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade (California) September 2001

28th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade (Pennsylvania) September 2001

34th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade (Minnesota) September 2001
Appendix V

Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited 

Conversions

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

28th Infantry Division, 56th Brigade (Pennsylvania) September 2002

34th Infantry Division, 32nd Brigade (Minnesota) September 2002

35th Infantry Divisions, 149th Brigade (Kansas) September 2002

38th Infantry Division, 37th Brigade (Indiana) September 2002

38th Infantry Division, 46th Brigade (Indiana) September 2002

42nd Infantry Division, 32nd Brigade (New York) September 2002

(Continued From Previous Page)

Unit Limited conversion Full conversion 
Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the 

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 54.

Now on p. 3.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

See comment 2.

Now on p. 54.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 54.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 54.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

See comment 5.

Now on p. 54.

See comment 6.

Now on pp. 54-55.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 54.

Now on p. 22.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Now on p. 32.

Now on pp. 32-33.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

Now on p. 33.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

The following are GAO’s responses to DOD’s comments dated June 22, 

2000. 

GAO Comments 1. We revised the title of our report to better reflect the scope of our 

review—Army combat force integration. 

2. This report deals with integration only in the Army’s combat forces. The 

numbers DOD cited included not only the Army’s combat support and 

combat service support personnel mobilized and deployed for the 

Persian Gulf War, but also reservists from other services who were 

mobilized and deployed. The initial call-up for Operation Desert Shield 

did not contain any Army combat forces. While later call-ups did 

include combat forces, the armored brigade and two mechanized 

infantry brigades that were mobilized never deployed to Southwest 

Asia. Only two field artillery brigades deployed.

3. We agree that peacekeeping missions add to the Army’s total costs, 

whether the missions are staffed with active or reserve personnel. 

However, the key point made in the report is that base pay for active 

forces is a fixed cost that does not change, whether active forces 

deploy or not. This is not the case for reservists. If reservists are not 

training or on active duty, they do not get paid. Therefore, integrated 

task forces that deploy reservists for more than their budgeted 39 days 

per year increase the Army’s total personnel costs. Some reserve 

mobilizations for peacekeeping missions last up to 270 days. 

4. We agree that when they are not deployed, part-time reserve forces are 

substantially less costly to maintain than full-time active forces. We 

have modified our report to acknowledge this fact but have retained 

our discussion of how integration activities result in added costs.

5. We did not mean to imply that the Army would need an increase in its 

personnel end-strength to implement integration initiatives. We have 

clarified our report language to state more clearly that, because specific 

integration efforts create new force structure requirements, 

adjustments will be necessary, assuming end-strength levels remain 

stable. As the roles of reserve forces increase, the magnitude of these 

adjustments will also need to increase.

6. Because the 49th Armored Division’s Bosnia deployment is the largest 

deployment of a reserve combat unit in years, DOD and the Army 
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure

cannot predict the effect of this 270-day deployment on Guard retention 

with any degree of certainty. However, as noted in our report, DOD’s 

data shows that retention suffers when active forces deploy for more 

than five months.

7. Documentation from the 4th Infantry Division showed that the Army 

denied the request. The report has been changed to explain more 

accurately the Army’s response to the request. The Army Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Personnel recommended pursuing other options rather than 

endorsing and forwarding the request. 

(702000) Letr
Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of 

reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to 

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit 

cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are 

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders by phone:

(202) 512-6000

fax: (202) 512-6061

TDD (202) 512-2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and 

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list 

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone 

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain 

these lists.

Orders by Internet:

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, 

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at: 

http://www.gao.gov

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, or Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact one:

• Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

• e-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

• 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00