1

06- 1590- cv S e a l e d P l a i n t i ff

v . S e a l e d De f

e n da n t #1
UN ITED STA

TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m, 200 7 (S ub mi tt ed: J un e 27 , 20 08 Dec id ed: Aug us t 1 2, 2 008 ) Do cket No . 06 -1 590 -c v S EA L ED P LAI N TI FF ,

Pl aint iff -A ppella nt , v. S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #1, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #2, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #3, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #4, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #5, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #6, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #7, S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #8, and S EA L ED D EFE N D AN T #9,

Defenda nts-App ellees
. B ef or e: M I NER , M C L

A U G H L IN , and C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ges . App eal f r om a ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e No r th er n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( No r manA. M or du e, Judge

), di s mi s s in g sua sponte

pl a in ti ff’ s pro se com pl ain t f or failu r e t o f

ile an amende d complaint in he r actual na me rather than a pseudonym a nd for other perceive d pleadi ng de fic ie nc ie s. We c onclude tha t the Distr ict Court’s denial of plai ntiff’s request to f ile under a ps eud onym w as er r on eou s , as was it s di s mi s s al o f the c om pl ain t. Vacat ed an d Rem and ed. Seal ed P lai nt if f, pro se . La w Of fi ce o f S eale d D ef

end ant #1, for defendan ts-app ellees.Thi s ac t i on h as bee n s eal ed by t he D i s t r i ct C our t an d by our C our t . W e uns eal por t i ons of t he r ecor d onl y f

or 1 t he l i m i t ed pu rpo ses of t his op i nion an d on l y insofar a s t he rec ord i s refere nc ed i n this op i nion
. T he u nd erlyi ng rec ord i n t hi s ac t i on— bot h i n t hi s C our t an d i n t hi s D i s t r i ct C our t

— r em ai ns under s eal unt i l s uch t i m e a s t he a ppl i cab l e s eal i ng or der i s v a ca t ed. 2 J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : Seal ed Plaintiff appea ls fr om a judgment of the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the Northern Di s tr ict of New Yor k ( No r manA. M or du e, Judge

), di s mi s s in g sua sponte

pl a in ti ff’ s pro se complaint for failu r e t o f

ile an am end ed c om pl ain t i n h er actual nam e r ath er

th an a p s eud onym a ndfo r other pe rc ei ve d p le a di ng

de fic ie nc ie s. T hi s app eal p r es ent s qu es ti on s of fi r s t i mp r es s io n f

or ou r Cou r t: (1 ) Under what ci rcumst ance s may a pla intiff f ile a complaint using a pseudony m? and (2) What standard go ve rns o ur re vi ewof a di stri ctco urt ’s d ec isi on to p er mi t orde ny a re qu estto f

il e u nd era pse ud on ym ? As des cr ib ed i n gr eat er

det ail bel ow, we h ol d that

di s tr ict cou r ts mu s t b alan ce a p lai nt if f’ s in te r es t i n anonymity a gainst both (a) the public interest in disclosur e and (b) the potential prejudice to defenda nts when de termining whether to permit a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym. Bec ause this balanci ng
nece ss arily enta ils an exercise of discretion, we revie w such determinations for abus e of discretion. In th e in s tan t c as e, we con clu de that th e Di s tr ict Cou r t, op er ati ng w

itho ut th e be nef it of th e guid ance we provide in herein, e rred by denying pla intiff’s applic ation to litigate under a pseudonym without first bal anci ng the r elev ant

in te r es ts . We f

ur th er con clu de that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t didno t c on s true p lai nt if f’ s pleadi ngs in a manner consistent with the liberality a ffor ded pro se litigants. Acc ordingly, the judgme nt of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t i s vacat ed, andth e cau s e is r ema nd ed f or fu r th er pr oce edi ngs con s is te nt

with thi s opinion. BAC KGROUND 1 Se a le d Pl ain ti ff c om me nc ed thi s pro se act io n ag ain s t s tat e andmu ni cip al go vernm ent ent it ies andof fi cer s onOct ob er

5, 2 005 un der

a “J ane D oe” ps eud onym. Her com pl ain t alleg ed, int

er ali a ,P l a i n t i ff h a d r e f e r e n c e d t h i s s t a t u t e a s a b a s i s f o r f i l i n g u n d e r a p s e u d o n y m. 2 3 physical a nd sexual assault in viola tion of her civil and c onstitut ional rights, and she moved for a preliminary injunc tion and an order granting discovery for the purpose of identifying certain “John Doe” defenda nts. T he District Court denied these motions in an Order dated October 24, 20 05 and in s truct ed p lai nt

if f, sua sponte , to file an a mended compla int that used her real name rather than a “Jane Do e” p s eud onym. Se e S eal ed P lai nti ff v . S eal ed D ef en dant #1 , N o. 05- CV- 126 6, d kt . n o. 4 ( “O r der ”) , at 10- 11 ( N. D. N. Y. O ct . 24 , 20 05) (the “ Oct ob er 24 O r der ”)
. T he gr ou nd s fo r th e Cou r t’ s dec is io n that plaintiff could not press her claims under a pseudonym we re (1) “[t]he Rape Shield Lawin New Y ork does not provide for

the use of ps eudonyms,” (2) Rule 10(a ) of the Federal Rule s of Civil Procedure 2 requires that “all the parties” be na med in the title of the compla int, and (3) Rule 17(a) requires that the “r eal p ar ty

inin te r es t” pr os ecu te th e act io n. Id
. at 3 . T he D is tr

ict Cou r t al s o o r der ed that , t o s ur viv e sua sponte di s mi s s al, pl ain ti ff ’s ame nd ed c om pl ain t m us t ( 1) all ege the p er s on al i nv ol vem ent of tw o defendants; (2) identify two “John Doe” defenda nts; (3) state a cla im aga inst the municipal defenda nt; (4) plead conspiracy

with a grea ter level of detai l; and (5) comply with releva nt for matting rules (for
exam pl e, the n um ber

in g of par agr aph s ). Id

. at 3 -8 . T he Co ur t o r der ed that pl ain ti ff mu s t s tat e in
nu mb er ed p ar agr aph s : (i) the alleg ed ac t of mis conduct; (ii) the date on which such misconduct occ urred; (iii) the names of each a nd every individual w ho participated i n such misconduct; (iv) where app r op r iat e, the l ocat

io n wh er e the alleg ed mis con du ct occ ur r ed; and(v

) the n exu s bet

ween suc h m isc on du cta nd Pla in ti ff’ s ci vi l a nd /o r c on sti tutio na l ri gh ts. Id
. a t 8 . Fa il ure to f

il e a n a me nd ed co mp la in t th a t c om plie d wit h th ese spe ci fic a ti on s wi thi n th irty d a ys, th e Cou r t w ar ned , wo ul d r es ul t i n the dis mi s s al o f the ac ti on . Id
. at 1 1. I n a l et te r r ecei vedby the D is tr

ict Cou r t o n N ov emb er

9, 2 005 —t

wo w eeks af

te r th e Oc to ber 24 Order—plaintiff described her attempts to comply with the C ourt’s instructions to identify the4

“J oh n D oe” def

end ant s andr equ es te d the as s is tan ce o f the Co ur t i n co nn ect io n wi thth es e ef

fo r ts . See Seale d Pl aint iff , d kt . n o. 5 ( “D ocu men t Re ject io n O r der ”) (N ov emb er

22, 200 5) . M agis tr ate J ud ge Gu s tav e J . D i B ian co, to who m the m att er hadbee n r ef

er r ed, r es po nd ed thi r te en d ays lat er ina let te r tha t “ re je ct ed ” p la in ti ff’ s pro se submis sion because (1) insofar as it cons tituted a motion for reconsideration, the submiss ion (a) failed to comply with Local R ules 7.1(a), requiring that a memorandum of law a nd suppor ting affidavit ac company all motions, and (b) was untimely in a ny event; a nd (2) it failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 11 tha t pro se lit igan ts s ignth eir
s ub mi s s io ns to th e Cou r t. Id
. Within two w eeks, plai ntiff made a further s ubmiss ion to the Distr ict Court, whic h is not formally part of the record in this case bec ause it was “rejec ted and returned” by Magi str ate Judge Di B ian co r ath er

th an d ock et ed an d f

ile d wi thth e Cou r t. Seale d Pl aint iff , dkt. No. 6 (“Document R ejec tion Order”), at 1 (November 30, 2005). In his or der, the Magistrate Judge explai ned that this submiss ion
was r ejec te d b ecau s e it

“f ail [ed ] t o co mp ly wi thth e [O ct ob er 24] Or der ” di r ect

in g pl ain ti ff

th at i n o r der “to avoid dismissal of this action, [she] must file an Amende d Compla int in which [she] state[s] [her] real nam e and

not a pseud

onym .” Id
. M agis tr ate J ud ge D i B ian co gr ant ed p lai nt if f f or ty -f ive days “t o f

ile an Ame nd ed Co mp lai nt

th at f ully co mp lie [d

] wi thRul es 8 an d 1 0 o f the F ede r al Rules of Civil P r oce du r e, andth e t er ms of

th e Oc to ber

24, 200 5 O r der .” Id

. T hr ee m on th s pas s ed, andpl ain ti ff hadno t y et

filedan am end ed c om pl ain t. OnM ar ch 9 , 20 06, the Distr ict Court dismiss ed the ac tion without prejudice be cause of “[p]laintiff’s failure to comply with th e pr io r Or der s of

this Cou r t an d f

or her failu r e t o f

ile a vi abl e pl eadi ng i n thi s act io n. ” Seale d Pl

aint iff , dkt. no. 7 (“Decision and Order”), at 2. Judgment wa s entered on March 10, 2006, a nd plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on March 27, 2006. A t the same time, she also filed an a pplica tion in the Distr ict Court for a subpoena in an a pparent effort t o identify ce rtain defendants, expla ining that “the5

[d]efendants will not comply with identification in this case unle ss ordered to do s o by court order, and have i n[]fact retaliated a gainst the [p]laintiff for seeking out the name [s] of her assailants as the court has wis hed .” Seale d Pl

aint iff , dkt. no. 10 (“Letter fromSeal ed Plaintiff”), at 1 (March 27, 2006). In addit io n, s he r equ es te d a r es tr ainin g or der pr ot ect in g he r fr om def end ant s ’ alleg ed “ te r r or

cam paign [

in
r et ali ati on ] f or s peak in g ou t an d f

ili ng acom pl ain t. ” Seale d Pl aint iff , dkt. no. 11 (“Notice/R equest”), at 1 (M ar ch 2 7, 2 006 ). T he D is tr ict Cou r t d eni ed thes e mo ti on s fo r lack of ju r is di ct io n i n l igh t o f the n ot

ice of app eal. DISCUSSI ON T hi s app eal r ais es qu es ti on s of fi r s t i mp r es s io n f

or ou r Cou r t: (1 ) U nd er

what cir cum s tan ces may a plaintiff file a compla int using a pseudonym? and (2) What standard governs our r eviewof a Di stri ctC ou rt’ s de ci sio n to pe rmi t orde ny a re qu estto f

il e u nd era pse ud on ym ? Thi s a pp ea l a lso pr es ent s an o ccas io n t o em ph as ize the s tan dar ds we h ave e s tab lis hedfo r han dl in g pro se lit igat io n— s tan dar ds whi ch ap pear to hav e be en o ver

lo ok ed b y the D is tr

ict Cou r t i n thi s cas e. I. Plaint iff’s Use of a Pseudonym Pursu a nt t o R ul e 1 0( a

) of the Fe de ra l R ul es o f C iv

ilProc ed ure , “ [t] he ti tl e o f [a ] c om pl ain t mu st
name a ll the parties.” This r equirement, though seemingly pedestrian, serves the vital purpos e of fa cil it ati ng p ub lic s crut

in y of ju di cial pr oce edi ngs andth er ef

or e can no t b e s et

as id e light

ly. Cer tai nly, “[ i] den ti fy in g the p ar ti es to th e pr oce edi ng i s an i mp or tan t dim ens io n o f p ub lic nes s . T he p eop le h ave a
r igh t t o kno w wh o i s us in g thei r cou r ts .” Doe v

. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Un ited , 112 F.3d 869, 87 2 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J .). Courts have neve rtheless “ca rved out a limited number of exce ptions to the gen er al r equ

ir eme nt of di s clo s ur e [o f the n ame s of par ti es ], whi ch p er mi t p lai nt if fs to pr oce ed
ano nym ou s ly. ” Roe v. Aware Woman C tr. for Choice, Inc. , 25 3 F .3d678 , 68 5 ( 11th Ci r . 20 01) . I nd eed , we hav e app r ov ed o f l

it igat in g un der a ps eud onym i n ce r tai n ci r cum s tan ces , see, e.g . , Smi th v . Edw ard s, 17 56

F.3d 99, 99 n.1 (2d C ir. 1999) (“For the sake of the privac y of plaintiff’s child, pseudonyms for plaintiff and his family a re employed throughout this opinion.”), but we hav e not yet set forth the standard for permi tt in g a p lai nt

if f t o d o s o, see, e.g

. , Doe v . Menefee , 391 F.3d 147, 14 9 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We de cline
to add r es s th e co mp lexqu es ti onof th e app lic abl e s tan dar ds fo r lit igat in g un der a ps eud onym u nd er th es e cir cum s tan ces .”) . O th er Cir cui ts hav e es tab lis heds ucha s tan dar d, ands ever al dis tr ict cou r ts in this Circuit have rece ntly grappled with this is sue. Drawing on both the rules adopted by other Ci rcuits

a nd the ex pe rie nc e o f th e d ist ric t c ou rts o f ou r C irc ui t, we no w se t fo rth the sta nd a rd g ov er ni ng the use of ps eud onyms inciv

il l it igat io n i n o ur Cir cui t. The co urt s tha t have co nsi de re d th is i ssue ha ve fra me d th e r el ev a nt i nq ui ry a s aba la nc in g t est that weig hs the plaintiff’s need for anonymity a gainst countervailing interests in full disclosur e. In Aware Woma n Cen ter

, the Ele venth Circuit e xplaine d that the “ultimate test for permit ting a pla intiff to proceed a nonymously is whether the plaintiff has a subst antial priva cy right whic h outweighs the
cus to mar y andcon s ti tu ti on ally- emb edd ed p r es um pt io n o f o pen nes s inju di cial pr oce edi ngs .” 2 53 F .3d at 6 85 ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks omit te d) . L ikewis e, the T enth Ci r cui t “ weig h[ s ] the p lai nt

if f’ s clai med
r igh t t o p r iva cy again s t the c ou nt er

vailing pu bl

ic i nt er es t i n [op en p r oce edi ngs], ” M. M. v. Zav aras, 13 9 F. 3d798 , 80 3 ( 10th Ci r . 19 98) , as do es th e F if thCir cui t, se e D o e v

. S te ga ll , 653 F.2d 180, 18 6 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (discuss ing “the ba lance pitting privacy c oncerns against the presumption of op enn es s of

ju di cial pr oce edi ngs ”) . Si milar

ly, th e Ni nth Ci r cui t h as hel d that “a p ar ty may pr es er ve his or her anonymity in judic ial procee dings in special c ircumstances when the party’s need for anonymity

ou tw eig hs [1 ] p r eju di ce t o the o pp os in g pa r ty and[2] the p ub lic ’s in te r es t i n kno wing the p ar ty ’s id ent it y.” Do es I T hr u XX II I v . A dv anc ed T ex ti le Co rp. , 214 F.3d 1058, 1 068 (9th Cir. 2000). V ariations of th e Ni nth Ci r cui t’ s fo r mulat io n h ave b eenado pt ed p r evi ou s ly b y di s tr ict cou r ts inou r

Cir cui t. See, e.g. , Do e v . Del Rio , 24 1 F .R.D . 15 4, 1 57 (S.D .N .Y. 200 6) ; EW v. N.Y. Bloo d C tr. , 21 3 F .R.D . 10 8, 1 107

(E.D.N.Y. 2 003). We agree tha t the interests of both the public and the opposing party should be
con s id er ed whendet er mi ni ng whether to gr ant an ap pl icat io n t o p r oce ed u nd er

a ps eud onym. Acc ordingly, we endorse the Ninth Circuit’s formulation and hold tha t when determining w hether a plaintiff may be a llowed to ma intain an a ction under a pseudonym, the pla intiff’s interest in anonymity must be balance d aga inst both the public i nterest in dis closure and any prejudice to the de fendant. T hi s bal anci ng o f i nt er es ts ent ail s th e co ns id er ati onof s ever al f act or s th at h ave b eenid ent if ied by our sis ter Circuits and the distr ict courts in this Circuit. W e note with a pproval the following factors, with the caution that this list is non-exhaustive and district courts should take into acc ount other fa ct or s r elev ant

to th e par ti cul ar

cas e un der

con s id er ati on : ( 1) whe th er th e li tigat io n i nv ol ves mat te r s th at a r e “high ly s ens it ive and[o f a

] p er s on al n atu r e,” Zav

aras, 13 9 F .3dat 8 03; see also James v. Jacobson , 6 F .3d233 , 23 8 (4th Ci r . 19 93) ; Do e v . F ran k , 95 1 F .2d320 , 32 3 ( 11th Ci r . 19 92) ; ( 2) “wh ether id ent if icat io n p os es a r

is k o f r et ali ato ry phys ical

or men tal harm t o the . . . p ar ty

[s eeki ng t o p r oce ed
ano nym ou s ly] or

evenmo r e cr

it ically, to in no cen t n on -p ar ti es ,” Jacobson , 6 F .3dat 2 38; se e al so Zav aras, 139 F. 3dat 8 03; Do e v

. Shak ur , 164 F.R.D. 3 59, 361 (S.D.N.Y . 1996); (3) whether identifica tion presents
other har ms andth e li kely s ever it y of th os e harms , se e A dv

anc ed T ex ti le Co rp. , 214 F.3d at 1068 , including whe th er “the i nj ur y li tigat ed ag ain s t w ouldbe i ncu r r ed as a r es ul t o f the dis clo s ur e of th e pl ain ti ff

’s id ent it y,” Zav aras, 13 9 F .3dat 8 03; (4

) whether th e pl ain ti ff

is par ti cul arly vul ner abl e t o the p os s ib le har ms of di s clo s ur e, se e A dv

anc ed T ex ti le Co rp. , 21 4 F .3d

at 1 068 , p ar ti cul arly i n l

igh t o f his age, see Jacobson , 6 F .3dat 2 38; se e al so Del Rio , 241 F.R.D. a t 157; (5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of th e go vernm ent

or th at o f p r iva te par ti es , see J

acobson , 6 F .3dat 2 38; Fr

ank , 95 1 F .2dat 3 23; (6 ) whe th er th e de fe nd ant

is pr eju di cedby allo wing the p lai nt if f t o p r es s hi s clai ms ano nym ou s ly, whe th er the nature of that prejudice (if any ) differs at any

particular stage of the litiga tion, and whe ther any pr eju di ce canbe mit

igat ed b y the dis tr

ict cou r t, se e A dv

anc ed T ex ti le Co rp. , 21 4 F .3dat 1 068 ; ( 7) whe th erThe D i s t r i ct C our t al s o r el i ed on t he r equi r em ent of R ul e 17 ( a) t hat t he “ r eal pa r t y i n i nt er es t ” pr os ecut e t he 3 a c tio n . It is u n c le a r h o w th e u se o f a p se u d o n y m c o n flic ts w ith th is r e q u ire m e n t. S ee D oe v . D el R io , 241 F. R
. D
. 154, 156 ( S. D
. N
. Y. 2006 ) ( “The .
. . r ef er ence [i n Ru l e 17 ( a) ] t o t he ‘ nam e’ of t he r eal pa r t y i n i nt er es t does not con cer n t he f or m al r equi r em ent s of

ca pt i oni ng , whi ch a r e g over ned by R ul e 10 ( a) , but r at her ens ure s t hat t he s ui ng pa r t y po s s es s t he s ubs t ant i ve r i gh t bei ng as s er t ed, t hus pr ot ect i ng def endant s ag ai ns t i ndi s cr i m i nat e l i t i ga t i on b y t hos e l ack i ng a r eal in te r e st.” (c itin g 6 A W r ig h t, M ille r & K a n e , F e d e r a l P r a c tic e a n d P r o c e d u r e , § 1 5 4 1 a t 3 2 1 -2 2 (2 d e d . 1 9 9 0 ))). 8 th e pl ain ti ff

’s id ent it y has th us fa r

bee n k ept

con fi den ti al, se e D el

Rio , 241 F.R.D. a t 157; (8) whether the pu bl ic’ s in te r es t i n the l

it igat io n i s fu r th er ed b y r equ

ir in g the p lai nt

if f t o dis clo s e hi s id ent

it y, see Adv anc ed T ex ti le Co rp. , 21 4 F .3dat 1 068 ; ( 9) “wh ether , b ecau s e of th e pu r ely l egal

natur e of th e is s ues pr es ent ed o r

other wis e, ther e is an at

ypi cally weak

pu bl ic i nt er es t i n kno wing the l it igan ts ’ id ent

it ies ,” Del Rio , 241 F.R.D. a t 157; and (10) whe ther there are any a lternative mec hanisms f or prot ecting the
con fi den ti ali ty

of th e pl ain ti ff

, cf
. Aware Woma n Ctr. , 253 F. 3dat 6 87. B ecau s e thi s fa ct or -d r

ive n b alan cing in quir

y r equ ir es a di s tr ict cou r t t o ex er cis e it s di s cr et io n i n th e co ur s e of

weig hi ng c om pet

in g in te r es ts , see, e.g

. , Jacobson , 6 F.3d at 239 (“[T]he judicia l recognition of
s uchfa ct or s [s er

ves ] as [a] gui de[

] t o [ th e] p r op er

exer cis e of

di s cr et io n. ”) , o ur

r evi ew o f adi s tr

ict court’s decision to grant or deny a n applic ation to litigate under a pseudonym is for abus e of discretion. See Aware Woman C

tr. , 253 F.3d at 684 (revie wing a motion to proceed anonymously for abuse of di s cr et io n) ; Zav aras, 13 9 F .3dat 8 02; Fr

ank , 95 1 F .2dat 3 23. A di s tr ict cou r t ab us es it s di s cr et

io n wh en “( 1) it s dec is io n r es ts onan err or of law ( s uchas app lic ati onof th e wr on g le gal p r

in cip le) or a cle arly erroneous f

actua l finding, or (2) its decision—though not nece ss arily the product of a leg al error or a clea rly err on eou s fa ctual

fi ndin g—c ann ot

be l ocat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of

permi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” Zervos v. Ver izon N.Y., Inc. , 25 2 F .3d

163 , 16 9 (

2dCir . 20 01) (f

oo tn ot es om it te d)
. In this case, the District Court’s decision res ts on jus t such an error of law. The District Court appea rs to have be lieve d itself s trictly bound by the requirement of Rule 10(a) that the title of a
com pl ain t i ncl ud e the n ame s of “all th e par ti es ,” see

Oct ob er 24 O r der at 3 , anddi d n ot

bal ance 3 plaintiff’s interes t in proceeding a nonymously aga inst the interes ts of defendants and the public . InO f cour s e, a di s t r i ct cour t i s not r equi r ed t o l i s t ea ch o f t he f act or s or us e a ny p ar t i cul ar f or m ul at i on a s l ong as 4 i t i s cl ear t hat t he c our t ba l anc ed t he i nt er es t s at s t ake i n r eac hi ng i t s con cl us i on. 9 other words , it did not apply the c orrect legal standard to determine whe ther plaintiff’s application to pr oce ed u nd er

a ps eud onym s ho ul d b e gr ant ed o r denied
. T he d ecis io n o f the D is tr ict Cou r t w as 4 th er ef or e the p r od uct

of legal err or . See Ze vro s, 25 2 F .3dat 1 69. Acco r di ngl y, we vacat e the O ct ob er

24 Order ins ofar as it denied plaintiff’s applica tion to pros ecute he r claims under a pseudonym. II. Constructi on of P ro Se P leadings On occa sions too numerous to count, we ha ve reminded district courts that “when [a ] plaintiff pro ce ed s pro se , . . . a co ur t i s ob lig ed t o co ns true his pl eadi ngs lib er ally.” Mc Eac hin v . M cG uinn is , 35 7 F. 3d197 , 20 0 (

2dCir . 20 04) (c it

in g Wei ns tein v . A lbr ig ht , 26 1 F .3d127 , 13 2 (

2dCir . 20 01) ). T hi s obligation e ntails, at the very le ast, a permiss ive a pplica tion of the rules governing the for m of pl eadi ngs . As th e Su pr eme Cou r t h as r ecen tly ob s er ved , “a pro se

complaint, how ever inartfully plea ded,
mu s t b e he ldto les s s tr

in gen t s tan dar ds th an f

or mal pl eadi ngs dr af

te d b y law yer s .” Er ic kso n v. P ard us ,

__ U.S . _ _, 127 S. Ct . 21 97, 220 0 (

200 7) (p er cur iam ) ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) . T hi s is par ti cul arly s o wh en the pro se pl ain ti ff all eges th at h er

civ il r igh ts hav e be en v

io lat ed. See Mc

Eac hin , 35 7 F. 3dat 2 00. Acco r di ngl

y, the “ di s mi s s al o f a pro se clai m as in s uf

fi cien tly pl eade d i s app r op r iat e only i n th e mo s t u ns us tai nab le o f c as es .” Boykin v. Key corp , 521 F.3d 202, 21 6 (2d Cir. 2008). The Di stri ctC ou rt, in it s ev a lu a ti on of p la in ti ff’ s pro se co mp la in t, fa il ed to a pp ly the se di r ect ive s . As des cr

ib ed ab ov e, the D is tr

ict Cou r t i ns truct ed p lai nt

if f t o f ile an am end ed c om pl ain t that (1 ) al leg ed the p er s on al i nv ol

vem ent of tw o d ef end ant s ; ( 2) id ent if iedtw o “J oh n D oe” def

end ant s ; ( 3)
s tat ed a c lai m ag ain s t the m unici pal def end ant ; (4) pl eade d co ns pi r acy wi thth e r equ is it e lev el o f d et ail ; and(5 ) c om pl

iedwith the r elev ant

fo r mat ti ng rul es . See October 24 Order at 4-8. Failure to do so, t he Di s tr ict Cou r t w ar ned , wo ul d r es ul t i n the sua sponte di s mi s s al o f the ac ti on . Se e i d. at 1 1. We bel

iev e it10

was inappropriate for the Distr ict Court to threaten dismiss al of all of pla intiff’s clai ms against all of the def end ant s bas ed o n p leadin g de fi cien cies r elat in g only t o s om e of

th e de fe nd ant s andth e co mp lai nt ’s devia tion fromthe releva nt for matting rules. In light of the nature of plaintiff’s claims—including physical a nd sexual assault—the Distr ict Court should have a ffor ded plai ntiff wider latitude in press ing he r c la im s. Likewise, it wa s err or for

the Distr ict Court to iss ue specific instructions mandating the content andfo r mat

of th e pu tat ive ame nd ed c om pl ain t. As des cr ib ed ab ov e, the D is tr

ict Cou r t o r der ed pl ain ti ff to file a c om pl ain t that

s tat ed i n n um ber ed p ar agr aph s : (i) the alleg ed ac t of mis conduct; (ii) the date on which such misconduct occ urred; (iii) the names of each a nd every individual w ho participated i n such misconduct; (iv) where app r op r iat e, the l ocat

io n wh er e the alleg ed mis con du ct occ ur r ed; and(v

) the n exu s bet

ween suc h m isc on du cta nd Pla in ti ff' s ci vi l a nd /o r c on sti tutio na l ri gh ts. Oc tob er24 Ord era t 8 . W e se e n oth in g w ron g wit h th e su gg estio n th a t, a s ama tte r of “ be st pr a ctic es”
or gen er al gu

id ance of fe r ed t o all pro se litigants, plaintiffs s hould be asked to organiz e their complai nts along these line s. Rega rdless of the best intentions of the District Court to or ganiz e a c ourt f

ile to facilita te prompt and effective reviewof plaintiff’s claims, a threat to dismis s the action for failure to comply with these requirements is another matter altogether. Neithe r our rules nor our precedents authorize a distr

ict court to take such a step. As the Supreme Court has observed, “Federal R ule of Civil P r oce du r e 8(a)(

2) r equ ir es only a s ho r t an d p lai n s tat eme nt of th e claim s ho wing that

th e pl eade r is ent it ledto r eli ef

. Sp ecif ic f act s ar e no t n eces s ary; the s tat eme nt nee d o nly gi

ve the d ef end ant fair
no ti ce o f what

th e claim is andth e gr ou nd s up onwhi ch i t r es ts .” Erickson , 12 7 S. Ct. at 2 200 (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks andalt er ati onom it te d) . Acc or di ngl y, a c om pl ain t n eedno t c on tai n d et ail ed f actual all egat io ns —s uchas th e dat es of mi s con du ct

andth e nam es of

“eachandever

y in di vid ual ” in vo lve d i n the misconduct that the Distr ict Court required plaintiff to provide in the amende d complaint. There
wa s no ba sis fo r th e i mp osi ti on of su ch ma nd a tory g ui de li ne s.11

Equal ly ina ppropriate, in our view, wa s the Magistr ate Judge’s deci sion to “reject and return” pl ain ti ff ’s tw o s ub mi s s io ns of

No vem ber

200 5. I t i s clea r

fr om th e f

ir s t s ub mi s s io n, a cop y of

whi ch i s part of the record, that plaintiff s ought assis tance with identifying the “John Doe” de fendants, as she was required to do by the District Court’s October 24 Order. Construed liberal ly, this submis sion constituted a request for

a discovery order or, at the very lea st, a conference of the parties to facilitate th e id ent if icat io n o f c er tai n d ef

end ant s . See, e.g. , Sand

ers v . Doe , No. 05 Ci v. 7005 (R

JS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LE XI S 40 515 , at

*2 ( S.D .N .Y. M ay 8, 200 8) (I n a pro se action, the di str

ict court ordered the “plaintiff to provide the NYPD with information to facilitate the ide ntification of the John Doe Defendants” and “r equ ir ed that def ens e co un s el m ake i ts bes t e ff or ts to id ent

if y the J oh n D oe D ef

end ant s inthis cas e.” (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ). T he M agis tr ate J ud ge’ s r ejec ti onof th e s ub mi s s io n as an u nt

im ely motion for

reconsideration is inconsis tent with the requirement that pro se pl eadi ngs be r ead l

ib er ally. Tur ning to plaintiff’s s econd submiss ion, we ha ve no abi lity to discern its contents beca use a copy of the plea ding wa s not made part of the r ecord in this case. Henc e an a dditional flawof the “reject and return” policy adopted by

the Magistrate Judge is that a reviewing court has no ability to determine what r eli ef th e pro se lit igan t s ought

fr om th e di s tr

ict cou r t an d ther ef

or e is un abl e t o d et er mi ne whether the matter was resolved properly. The better cours e is for pro se s ub mi s s io ns to be d ock et ed an d f ile d
s o that th ey ap pear

inth e r eco r d o f the c as e. See, e.g. , Lomb ardo v. Holanchock , No. 07 Ci v. 8674 (DLC), 200 8 U. S. D is t. LE XI S 48 753 , at *2 n .1 (S.D .N .Y. J un e 25 , 20 08) . I f the s ub mi s s io ns ar e de fi cien t, th at matter can be a ddress ed through an order or letter of the distr ict court or the magistr ate judge . In light of the incomplete record here, w e have no basis to determine whether the actions of the Magistr ate Judge—intended, no doubt, to assist plaintiff in the formulation of her claims and to facilitate the pr ogr es s of

this act io n— wer e war r ant ed.I n l i gh t of t he v aca t ur of

t hat por t i on o f

t he O r der denyi ng pl ai nt i ff’ s ap pl i cat i on t o f i l e under a ps eudonym 5 ( s ee Par t I ) , t he O r der of O ct ober 24, 2005 i s va cat ed i n i t s ent i r et y. 12 For these reasons, we vac ate the District Court’s O ctober 24 Order insof ar as it held plaintiff to a plea ding standard inconsistent with that applica ble to pro se lit igan ts . Li kewi s e, we vacat e the D is tr ict 5 Cou r t’ s Or der

dat ed M ar ch 9 , 20 06 a ndth e ju dgm ent ent er ed o n M ar ch 1 0, 2 006 , dis mi s s in g pl ain ti ff ’s
com pl ain t f

or failu r e t o co mp ly wi thth e Oc to ber 24 O r der
. CONCLUSI ON B ecau s e the D is tr

ict Cou r t, lack

in g the b ene fi t o f the g

ui dan ce s et

fo r thher ein , ( 1) denied pl ain ti ff ’s r equ es t t o l

it igat e thi s act

io n u nd er a ps eud onym w

itho ut fi r s t b alan cing pl ain ti ff

’s in te r es t i n
ano nymit y agai ns t the p ub lic in te r es t i n dis clo s ur e andpr eju di ce t o d ef end ant s , an d (

2) s ub ject ed plaintiff’s pleadings to a standard far stricter than that applica ble to pro se litigants, we V

ACA TE the Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s Or der

of Oct ob er 24, 200 5. We als o VA CAT E th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s Or der

of M ar ch 9 , 2006 and the judgment entered on March 10, 2 006, dismiss ing plai ntiff’s complaint sua sponte for f ailure
to com ply with the O ct ob er 24, 200 5 O r der . We REM AND th e cau s e f

or fu r th er pr oce edi ngs
con s is te nt with thi s op inio n. I n l

igh t o f the s er

io us nat ur e of th e claim s pr es s ed i n thi s act io n, we encourage the distr

ict court to consider whether the appointment of pro bo no cou ns el p ur s uan t t o 2 8 U.S .C. § 191 5( e) (1 ) i s war r ant ed. T he m and ate s hall is s ue f or th with, andju r

is di ct io n s hall b e r eturned to this Court , pursuant to United Sta tes v. J acobson , 1 5 F. 3d 19 , 2 1-2 2 (2d C ir. 19 94 ), up on a le tte r re qu est fr om any p ar ty . Up ons ucha r es to r ati onof ju r is di ct io n, th e ma tt er

is to be r ef

er r ed t o thi s pan el.