United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Efforts to Improve 

Distribution and 

Supply Support for 

Joint Military 

Operations Could 

Benefit from a 

Coordinated 

Management 

Approach 

June 2007 

 

GAO-07-807 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2007

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Efforts to Improve Distribution and 

Supply Support for Joint Military 

Operations Could Benefit from a 

Coordinated Management Approach 

Highlights of GAO-07-807, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

the Army and the Marine Corps 

experienced problems with the 

delivery of supplies to the

warfighter. Such problems

highlight long-standing weaknesses

in the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) supply chain management. 

DOD has identified joint theater 

logistics as a key effort aimed at

improving distribution and supply 

support. GAO was asked to

examine DOD’s efforts to develop

and implement joint theater 

logistics. GAO assessed (1) the 

extent to which DOD’s approach to

managing joint theater logistics 

departmentwide encompasses 

sound management principles and 

(2) the progress DOD has made in

implementing joint theater logistics 

initiatives. GAO reviewed DOD 

documents and interviewed

officials from the Joint Staff,

services, agencies, and geographic

combatant commands. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DOD develop 

and implement a coordinated and 

comprehensive management

approach to guide and oversee

efforts across the department to 

improve distribution and supply 

support to U.S. forces in a joint 

theater. GAO also recommends 

that DLA assess opportunities to 

consolidate storage and shipping 

activities within all geographic

combatant commands. DOD

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management 

approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics 

across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater 

logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components 

due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for 

achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures—key 

principles of sound management. Further complicating DOD’s ability to 

adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint 

theater logistics are the diffused organization of DOD’s logistics operations, 

including separate funding and management of resources and systems, and 

changes in DOD’s overall logistics transformation strategy. DOD is currently 

testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is considering a 

realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics strategy, which could 

affect the future of joint theater logistics. Without a more coordinated and 

comprehensive approach to managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks 

assurance that it is on the right path toward achieving this capability and 

that individual initiatives will collectively address gaps in logistics 

capabilities. Further, DOD will have difficulty achieving improvements in 

theater distribution and asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics.

DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint 

theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply support, 

but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to realize the full

benefits of these efforts. For example, 

 

• While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been 

established in each geographic combatant command to help manage 

supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in 

Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a lack 

of interoperability among information technology systems. 

• Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of surface 

transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues of 

command and control, the availability of information technology tools, 

and potential duplication of responsibilities with other organizations. 

Unless DOD successfully addresses these and other challenges GAO 

identified, the initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the ability of a 

joint force commander to effectively and efficiently direct logistics 

functions, including distribution and supply support activities, across the 

theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without 

addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some of

the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that have 

occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive 

Management Approach to Joint Theater Logistics 9 

DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but 

Faces Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the 

Benefits of These Efforts 19 

Conclusions 51

Recommendations for Executive Action 52 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 53 

Scope and Methodology 54 

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 57 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59 

Table 

Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD’s Ability to Fully Implement 

Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives 19 

Figures 

Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD 

Logistics 15

Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006) 27 

Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General 

Support Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006) 42 

Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA 

Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006) 43 

Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options 

Included in the Joint Experimental Deployment and 

Support Initiative 47 

Page i GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
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Page ii GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 29, 2007 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

 Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

 Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics 

support and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq 

that impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to shortages 

of items critical to the warfighter.1

 These problems—which affected both

Army and Marine Corps ground forces—included an insufficient capability 

to provide support to combat forces during the early stages of the conflict, 

difficulties in distributing supplies within the theater of operations, and 

limitations in asset visibility.2

 Such problems also occurred during 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the 1990s, following 

the end of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat environment 

that U.S. military forces could face and identified logistics capabilities that 

would be needed to support future military operations. One of these 

identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at improving the 

ability of a joint force commander to direct various logistics functions, 

including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater of 

operations to accomplish an assigned mission. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics 

support and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq 

that impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to shortages 

of items critical to the warfighter.1

 These problems—which affected both

Army and Marine Corps ground forces—included an insufficient capability 

to provide support to combat forces during the early stages of the conflict, 

difficulties in distributing supplies within the theater of operations, and 

limitations in asset visibility.2

 Such problems also occurred during 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the 1990s, following 

the end of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat environment 

that U.S. military forces could face and identified logistics capabilities that 

would be needed to support future military operations. One of these 

identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at improving the 

ability of a joint force commander to direct various logistics functions, 

including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater of 

operations to accomplish an assigned mission. 

Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint 

force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects of 

Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint 

force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects of 

 1

DOD defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and 

maintenance of forces. Logistics includes six broad functional areas: supply, maintenance,

transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services. Supply chain 

management consists of processes and activities to purchase, produce, and deliver 

materiel—including ammunition, spare parts, fuel, food, water, clothing, personal 

equipment, and other items—to a force that is highly dispersed and mobile.

2

DOD describes asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and accurate information on 

the location, quantity, condition, movement, and status of equipment and supplies. 

Page 1 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
logistics necessary to support the mission.3

 However, the joint force 

commander relies on various DOD components, including the military 

services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and U.S. Transportation 

Command, to provide the logistics resources and systems needed to 

support U.S. forces. Various provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code establish 

responsibilities and authorities for supplying and equipping the armed 

forces.4

 These and other Title 10 functions are promulgated by DOD 

through directives.5

 Implementing joint theater logistics involves

harnessing these diffuse resources and systems, which are not integrated

but rather separately funded and managed across DOD’s components. 

The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate is DOD’s lead proponent for joint 

theater logistics, and this effort involves developing and implementing a 

number of initiatives across the department. DOD believes joint theater 

logistics will improve the distribution and visibility of assets in a theater of 

operations. For this reason, DOD has listed joint theater logistics as one of

several key initiatives in its supply chain management improvement plan. 

Because of long-standing systemic weaknesses that have been identified in 

our previous reports, we have designated DOD’s supply chain management 

as a high-risk area. In 2005, DOD developed the supply chain management 

improvement plan to place it on a path toward removing supply chain

management from our high-risk list. 

At your request, we have examined DOD’s efforts to develop and 

implement joint theater logistics as part of its plans for improving logistics 

support and supply chain management. Specifically, this report assesses 

(1) the extent to which DOD’s approach to managing joint theater logistics 

departmentwide encompasses sound management principles and (2) the 

progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives 

in the areas of distribution and supply support. 

 3

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint 

Operations (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3. (Hereafter cited as JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. XX). 

4

See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.

5

DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components (Aug. 1, 2002) states that the military services are responsible for providing

logistic support for service forces. DOD Directive 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (May 

17, 2006), directs DLA, among other responsibilities and functions, to provide materiel 

commodities and supply chain management for items of supply and services. DOD

Directive 5158.4, United States Transportation Command (Jan. 8, 1993), states that the

command shall have combatant command over all transportation assets of the military 

departments, except for service-unique or theater-assigned assets. 

Page 2 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
To assess DOD’s approach to managing joint theater logistics, we 

identified sound management principles based on prior work on 

organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the 

Government Performance and Results Act.6

 We reviewed doctrine, 

regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and other 

documents related to the development of joint theater logistics, logistics 

strategic planning, and supply chain management, to include reports by 

various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed DOD’s 

logistics operations. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense who are involved with joint theater 

logistics and logistics transformation. To assess DOD’s progress in 

implementing joint theater logistics initiatives, we visited the five 

geographic combatant commands, the subordinate unified command in 

Korea, military service component commands in three theaters, and 

operational units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. We met with military 

service officials at headquarters offices, as well as at selected commands 

and reserve components. We also visited U.S. Transportation Command, 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, and DLA to obtain information on specific 

initiatives. In addition, we attended the out-brief for an Army conference 

on theater opening, reviewed after-action reports from exercises testing 

the initiatives, and analyzed lessons learned reports from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. We determined that the data we used were sufficiently reliable 

for our purposes. Additional information on our scope and methodology is 

provided at the end of this letter. We conducted our review from July 2006 

to April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. 

DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management 

approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics 

across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater 

logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD 

components due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, 

accountability for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance 

measures—key principles of sound management. While DOD has broadly 

defined joint theater logistics as an adaptive ability to anticipate and 

respond to emerging theater logistics and support requirements, it has not 

developed specific goals and strategies linked to this vision. In addition, 

DOD has not assigned accountability for achieving results under joint 

Results in Brief 

 6

Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Page 3 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
theater logistics and has not developed outcome-oriented performance 

measures that would enable the department to know whether its efforts 

are fully and effectively achieving a joint theater logistics capability. 

Furthermore, the diffused organization of DOD’s logistics operations, 

including separate funding and management of resources and systems, 

complicates DOD’s ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach to developing and implementing joint theater 

logistics capabilities. A number of studies that have assessed DOD’s 

logistics operations have recommended changes to DOD’s organizational 

structure and control of resources for providing joint logistics support to 

military operations. Moreover, changes in DOD’s overall logistics 

transformation strategy have hampered its ability to adopt a coordinated 

and comprehensive management approach to joint theater logistics. Over 

the years, DOD has made a number of attempts to articulate a long-term 

strategy to guide logistics transformation, including joint theater logistics, 

but progress on these efforts has been hindered by differing visions within 

the department. DOD is currently testing a new approach to managing 

joint capabilities and is considering a realignment of capabilities in its 

long-term logistics strategy—efforts that could affect the future of joint 

theater logistics. Under this realignment, joint theater logistics may cease 

to exist as a stand-alone capability area; however, the tenets of joint 

theater logistics would be retained, and the functional areas associated 

with joint theater logistics would be integrated within the broader joint 

logistics portfolio. Without a coordinated and comprehensive approach to

managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right 

path toward achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will 

collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will have 

difficulty achieving the desired improvements in distribution and asset 

visibility associated with joint theater logistics as portrayed in the supply 

chain management improvement plan. We are recommending that DOD 

develop a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide

and oversee efforts across the department to improve distribution and 

supply support in a joint theater. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

DOD concurred with our recommendation. 

Although a coordinated and comprehensive management approach does 

not exist, DOD components have made progress developing and 

implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution 

and supply support; however, the department faces a number of 

challenges that hinder its ability to fully realize the benefits of these 

efforts. A notable improvement has been the establishment of Joint 

Deployment Distribution Operations Centers that can help joint force 

commanders synchronize the arrival of supplies into a theater and assist in 

Page 4 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
other aspects of distribution and supply support. However, officials we 

interviewed said these operations centers alone will not resolve 

distribution and supply support problems. Other initiatives are at various 

stages of development and implementation as DOD experiments with new 

organizational arrangements, writes new concepts of operations, and 

revises doctrine. Despite this progress, DOD faces a number of challenges 

in fully developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in 

the areas of distribution and supply support. Some of the challenges are as 

follows: 

• DOD has established an expeditionary organization to manage the arrival 

of supplies moving into a theater during the early stages of a military 

operation, but Army officials have raised questions about the need for this

new organization and the resources devoted to it, as well as about the 

command and control over this organization. 

• While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been 

established in each geographic combatant command to help manage 

supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in 

Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a lack of 

interoperability among information technology systems. We also found 

continuing problems with container management, although improvements 

have been made. 

• Initiatives to improve the coordination of surface transportation assets 

theaterwide also face challenges with issues of command and control, the 

availability of information technology tools, and potential duplication of 

responsibilities with other organizations. 

• Efforts to consolidate multiple storage and shipping activities in a theater 

have been implemented on a limited scale and additional consolidation 

opportunities may exist. During our site visits to Kuwait, we found that 

DLA and the Army were operating separate facilities that have the 

potential for consolidation, which could result in more efficient use of 

resources. Since our fieldwork was completed, DLA assessed ways to 

improve theater distribution and made recommendations to consolidate 

and relocate existing operations. Because this study was focused on the 

U.S. Central Command area of operations, we are recommending DLA 

undertake similar assessments within all the geographic combatant 

commands. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with 

this recommendation. 

• Finally, various options have emerged for improving the ability of a joint

force commander to exercise command and control over joint theater 

Page 5 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
logistics functions. However, the military services have raised concerns 

about how their own roles and responsibilities for providing logistics 

support might be affected and have opposed expansion of the most robust 

command and control option that has emerged. 

Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the initiatives are not 

likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force commander to 

harness the diffuse logistics resources and systems that exist within the 

department and effectively and efficiently direct logistics functions, 

including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater of 

operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without 

addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some 

of the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that 

occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

We have identified weaknesses in DOD’s supply and distribution support 

in prior reports.7

 These weaknesses have affected the department’s ability 

to meet its goal of delivering the “right items to the right place at the right

time” to support the deployment and sustainment of military forces. One 

problem with logistics support has been an insufficient capability to 

support combat forces during the early stages of a conflict. In Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, for example, DOD’s priority was to move combat forces 

into the theater first, with logistics personnel arriving later in the 

deployment. Because of the shortage of support personnel in theater, the 

forces experienced delays in receiving, storing, and distributing supplies. 

For example, early in Operation Iraqi Freedom, inefficient packaging and 

palletizing of air shipments created supply backlogs in Kuwait that delayed 

the delivery of supplies shipped by air to units in Iraq. Once in theater, 

mixed shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, and re-palletized at 

theater distribution points, causing additional delays in getting repair parts 

to their end users. Another problem has been limited visibility of assets 

within the distribution system. Incomplete radio frequency identification 

tags required logistics personnel to spend time opening and sorting the 

Background 

 7

GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics 

Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 

2003); Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005); and

Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but 

Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts, GAO-05-775 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.

11, 2005). 

Page 6 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
shipments, significantly increasing processing time. Additionally, logistics 

systems used to order, track, and account for supplies were not well 

integrated and could not provide the essential information to effectively 

manage theater distribution. Thus, we have indicated that materiel 

distribution and asset visibility are two key focus areas critical to resolving 

these supply and distribution problems. 

Joint theater logistics is one of seven future logistics capabilities that DOD 

has grouped under the term “focused logistics.” DOD has broadly defined 

joint theater logistics as an adaptive ability to anticipate and respond to 

emerging theater logistics and support requirements. In addition to joint 

theater logistics, focused logistics capabilities include joint 

deployment/rapid distribution, agile sustainment, operational engineering,

force health protection, multinational logistics, and logistics information 

fusion. Together, these capabilities are intended to support an overall joint

logistics capability, which DOD defines as “the capability to build 

effective, responsive, and efficient capacity into the deployment and 

sustainment pipeline; exercise control over the pipeline from end to end; 

and provide certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces, 

equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on 

time.” According to DOD, focused logistics can be achieved by 

transforming logistics capabilities. To succeed, these focused logistics 

capabilities must be fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, 

decentralized, adaptable, and capable of decision superiority. Further, 

they must support future joint operations that are continuous and 

distributed across the full range of military operations. 

Since the 1990s, DOD has developed various strategic planning

documents, such as Joint Vision 2010, which included focused logistics as

a needed capability. In 2000, DOD incorporated joint theater logistics and

other focused logistics capabilities in joint warfighting doctrine. In 2003,

the department approved the joint functional concept for focused 

logistics.8

 In 2005, DOD issued its Focused Logistics Roadmap, presenting

an “as is” compendium of programs and initiatives associated with the 

fiscal year 2006 President’s Budget and aligned under the focused logistics 

capabilities. The “as is” roadmap was intended to complement previously 

published logistics strategies and to represent the portfolio of programs 

and initiatives for which the Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities 

 8

Joint functional concepts describe, and are used as a basis to shape, joint capabilities 

across the department. 

Page 7 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Board9

 and Joint Staff Logistics Directorate have primary oversight 

responsibility. In 2006, DOD approved the Joint Logistics (Distribution) 

Joint Integrating Concept,10 which complements the joint functional 

concept and calls for a joint deployment and distribution enterprise that is 

capable of providing joint force commanders with the ability to rapidly 

and effectively move and sustain forces in support of major combat 

operations or other joint operations. This document describes the 

enterprise as an integrated system of assets, materiel, personnel, leaders, 

organizations, procedures, tools, training, facilities, and doctrine that is 

expected to enable the joint force commander to minimize seams in the 

distribution pipeline. The joint deployment and distribution enterprise is 

expected to complement and augment service or joint force commanderunique distribution responsibilities and capabilities. 

Distribution is part of the process and activities for managing the supply 

chain. According to joint doctrine, distribution is the process of

synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the “right 

things” to the “right place” at the “right time.” DOD’s distribution system 

has two segments: strategic-national and theater. The strategic segment of

this pipeline involves the movement of supplies from points outside a 

theater of military operations into the theater. The theater segment 

consists of distribution that occurs within a theater of military operations. 

The military services have the responsibility to organize, train, equip, and 

provide logistics support to their respective forces.11 The military services 

and DLA manage supplies and provide for asset visibility. U.S. 

Transportation Command is responsible for providing transportation 

support, primarily strategic airlift and sealift, as well as in-transit asset 

visibility.12 The geographic combatant commands are responsible for 

 9

DOD has eight Functional Capabilities Boards that support the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council and lead the capabilities assessment process. 

10Whereas a joint functional concept is a broad description of joint force functions, a joint 

integrating concept is a description of narrowly focused operations or functions and is 

used to identify, describe, and apply specific capabilities.

11See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062. 

12DOD defines in-transit visibility as the near-real-time capability to track logistic resources 

and transportation assets while they are mobile and underway. 

Page 8 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
logistics in their theaters, to include managing and directing the theater 

distribution system.13

In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense assigned new organizational 

responsibilities in the logistics area, including designating the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) as the 

Defense Logistics Executive, and the Commander, U.S. Transportation 

Command, as the Distribution Process Owner. The Defense Logistics 

Executive has authority to address logistics and supply issues. The role of

the Distribution Process Owner is to improve the efficiency and 

interoperability of the end-to-end distribution system. Prior to these new 

organizational designations, the Secretary of Defense designated U.S. Joint 

Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, responsible for 

improving joint deployment and redeployment processes. The 

commanders of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Transportation 

Command—recognizing that many deployment and distribution processes 

are common and that both commands serve a common customer: the 

supported joint force commander—signed a joint vision statement in 

September 2006 to help guide their partnership as they work together to 

improve DOD’s joint deployment and distribution. 

DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management 

approach for guiding and overseeing the implementation of joint theater 

logistics across the department. While DOD intends joint theater logistics 

to improve the distribution and visibility of assets in theater, its current 

approach is not consistent with sound management principles that have 

been shown to be effective in accomplishing organizational 

transformation, and has led to fragmented efforts across components. In 

addition, changes in DOD’s overall logistics transformation strategy have 

hampered DOD’s ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach to joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated 

and comprehensive approach, DOD will continue to face difficulties 

achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset visibility, which 

impair its ability to improve overall supply chain management. 

DOD Has Not 

Developed a 

Coordinated and 

Comprehensive 

Management 

Approach to Joint 

Theater Logistics 

 13Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Joint Theater Distribution (Aug. 22, 2000), p. II-6. 

Page 9 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Our review of DOD’s efforts to develop joint theater logistics showed that 

the department has taken a piecemeal approach rather than a coordinated 

and comprehensive approach that is consistent with sound management 

principles. DOD’s current approach has led to fragmented efforts among 

components to develop and implement initiatives. Sound management 

principles, such as those used by leading organizations to transform their 

culture and embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act, 

include (1) specific goals and strategies, (2) accountability for achieving

results, and (3) outcome-oriented performance measures. We have 

previously reported that organizations that have progressed toward the 

results-oriented framework of the Government Performance and Results 

Act have established performance goals for which they will be held 

accountable, determined strategies and resources to effectively 

accomplish the goals, and measured progress towards those goals. A focus 

on results, as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act, 

implies that collaboration is important to ensure that consistent and 

complementary goals and strategies for achieving results are developed 

and implemented across the enterprise. Performance metrics are critical 

for demonstrating progress toward achieving results and providing 

information on which to base organizational and management decisions. 

Further, outcome-focused performance metrics show results or outcomes 

related to an initiative or program in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, 

or impact. When combined with effective leadership, these principles 

provide a framework to guide program efforts in a coordinated and 

comprehensive fashion and allow leadership to determine if these efforts 

are achieving the desired results. In contrast, an insufficient articulation of 

program goals and inadequate information on performance may be 

impediments to improving program efficiency and effectiveness. 

DOD’s approach to joint theater logistics is not consistent with these 

principles of sound management. First, while DOD has a broad definition 

of joint theater logistics, it has not articulated specific goals and strategies

linked to this vision. For example, DOD’s Focused Logistics Roadmap, 

supply chain management improvement plan, and other documents we 

reviewed do not contain specific goals and strategies for achieving joint 

theater logistics. DOD also has yet to identify the resources and time 

frames for fully implementing joint theater logistics. Moreover, DOD’s 

description of joint theater logistics has not been consistent over time, 

which may affect its ability to develop specific goals and strategies. This 

issue is discussed later in this report. 

Second, DOD has not assigned accountability for achieving results under 

joint theater logistics. Although the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate has 

DOD’s Approach to Joint 

Theater Logistics Is Not 

Consistent With Sound 

Management Principles 

and Has Led to 

Fragmented Efforts 

Page 10 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
been designated the lead proponent for joint theater logistics, no one 

entity within DOD has responsibility for coordinating and overseeing 

programs and initiatives related to joint theater logistics. In addition, while 

DOD has designated executive agents and process owners aimed at 

addressing logistics challenges that cut across the department, the roles 

and responsibilities among DOD components have not always been clearly 

delineated and may overlap. We have previously reported on problems 

DOD has experienced in defining accountability and authority for 

addressing supply distribution problems.14 For example, although the 

Secretary of Defense in 2003 designated the Commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command, as DOD’s Distribution Process Owner—with 

responsibilities for overseeing the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and 

alignment of DOD-wide distribution activities—DOD has yet to issue a 

directive defining the process owner’s authority, accountability, resources,

and responsibility.15 Additionally, during our current review, service and

combatant command officials had concerns with U.S. Transportation 

Command expanding beyond its traditional roles and responsibilities for 

strategic distribution, believing that there should be a hand-off of 

responsibilities once assets arrive in theater. 

Furthermore, the diffused organization of DOD’s logistics operations, 

including separate funding and management of resources and systems, 

complicates DOD’s ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach to developing and implementing joint theater 

logistics capabilities. Since 2003, a number of studies that have assessed 

DOD’s logistics organization have recommended changes to DOD’s 

organizational structure for providing joint logistics and supply support to 

military operations.16 Some of these organizations have noted that control 

over resources is a critical issue to be addressed. For example, the 

Defense Science Board recommended creation of a Joint Logistics 

Command that would combine the missions of U.S. Transportation 

 14GAO-05-775. 

15In May 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense redesignated the Commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command as DOD’s Distribution Process Owner. Under this redesignation, 

the mission of the Distribution Process Owner is to oversee the overall effectiveness, 

efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution activities and to establish concepts and 

operational frameworks relating to the planning and execution of DOD transportation

operations.

16For more information on these recommendations, see GAO, DOD’s High-Risk Areas: 

Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain Management Recommendations, but Full

Extent of Improvement Unknown, GAO-07-234 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2007). 

Page 11 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Command, DLA, and service logistics commands. The Center for Strategic 

and International Studies also suggested the creation of a departmentwide 

logistics command responsible for end-to-end supply chain operations. 

Regarding resource allocation, it further stated that resources should be 

organized, managed, and budgeted largely along military service lines, but

in those instances where joint capability needs are not being met with 

service-centric processes, the Secretary must turn to joint processes and 

entities for their realization. The Lexington Institute, which also 

recommended creation of a U.S. Logistics Command at the four-star level,

concluded that Title 10 can be used to prevent joint logistics 

transformation and interoperability and may need to be amended in order

to create a Logistics Command. The Lexington Institute also concluded 

that existing funding mechanisms act as disincentives for joint logistics 

transformation and interoperability. The Defense Business Practice 

Implementation Board, while not agreeing with the idea of combining U.S. 

Transportation Command and DLA, recommended that DOD elevate 

leadership for supply chain integration by designating a new Under 

Secretary of Defense who would have authority to direct integration 

activities, including control over budget decisions affecting these two 

components and the military services. While we noted that 

transformational changes such as those proposed by these organizations 

may not be possible without amending existing laws, the scope of our 

review did not include an assessment of these proposals or what changes,

if any, would require congressional action. 

On the basis of our prior work on DOD’s approach to business 

transformation,17 we have stated that DOD needs to establish a chief 

management official at an appropriate level with the authority to be 

responsible and accountable for enterprisewide business transformation, 

including business operations related to supply chain management. Also, 

in our report on 21st century challenges confronting the federal 

government,18 we stated that DOD faces significant challenges in 

accomplishing its transformation goals and making improvements in key 

business areas such as supply chain management. We also suggested in 

that report that decision makers may need to reexamine fundamental 

 17GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated Efforts, and 

Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure Success, GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 16, 2006). 

18GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
aspects of DOD’s programs by considering issues such as whether current 

organizations are aligned and empowered to meet the demands of the new 

security environment as efficiently as possible and what kinds of 

economies of scale and improvements in delivery of support services 

would result from combining, realigning, or otherwise changing selected 

support functions, including logistics. 

Third, DOD has not developed outcome-oriented performance measures 

for either joint theater logistics in general or for its specific initiatives. The 

supply chain management improvement plan lists potential metrics for 

joint theater logistics, but these have not been made into quantifiable, 

outcome-oriented measures. For example, the plan names visibility of 

logistics capabilities, logistics footprint,19 and joint logistics and 

distribution planning improvement as three potential metrics that could be

developed to track results and show the impact of joint theater logistics 

implementation. Other documents we reviewed, including a joint theater 

logistics implementation plan that was drafted in 2006 but not finalized, 

recognize a need to identify metrics for the specific tasks required to 

achieve the joint processes supporting joint theater logistics. However, 

these metrics have not been identified as yet. 

Because DOD has lacked a coordinated and comprehensive approach to 

managing joint theater logistics, efforts to advance joint theater logistics 

across the department have been fragmented. While DOD has developed a 

series of initiatives to improve joint theater logistics, leadership on 

individual initiatives is dispersed among various DOD components. Many 

of these initiatives have been introduced by individual services, combatant 

commanders, and other DOD components without an overarching 

management approach for coordinating efforts. For example, of the four 

initiatives identified in the Focused Logistics Roadmap as supporting joint

theater logistics, two have been submitted by U.S. Transportation 

Command, one has been developed by the Army, and another has been 

created by U.S. Joint Forces Command. During our field visits, DOD 

officials identified a number of other initiatives they had under way which 

they regarded as joint theater logistics. Specific examples of DOD’s 

fragmented efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics 

initiatives are discussed later in this report. This fragmented approach 

could lead to duplication of effort as well as capability gaps, diminishing 

 19Logistics footprint is the amount of personnel, spare parts, resources, and capabilities 

physically present and occupying space at a deployed location. 

Page 13 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
the potential benefits of joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated and 

comprehensive approach that embodies sound management principles, 

DOD may be unable to fully implement initiatives and achieve this 

capability. As a result, DOD will have difficulty improving supply chain 

management in the areas of distribution and asset visibility associated 

with joint theater logistics. 

Changes in DOD’s overall logistics strategy have hampered the 

department’s ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach to joint theater logistics. These changes indicate 

that DOD has lacked a consistent vision and strategy regarding its efforts 

to transform logistics. Over the course of the last 10 years, DOD has made 

multiple alterations to its overall logistics strategy that have reflected 

differing visions about the future of the department’s logistics system. 

Figure 1 shows several of the strategic planning documents, including 

vision statements, doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps, that have 

addressed the future of DOD’s logistics systems.

Changes in DOD’s Overall 

Logistics Strategy Hinder 

Development of Joint 

Theater Logistics 

Page 14 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Page 15 GAO-07-807

Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics 

Defense Logistics
Many of the strategic planning documents shown in figure 1 have 

addressed joint theater logistics, but the description of this concept has 

varied over time. For example, a strategic planning document derived 

from Joint Vision 2010 refers to “joint theater logistics command and 

control,” describing this focused logistics capability primarily as a concept

to clarify lines of authority through a single entity responsible for logistics 

support in a joint warfighting environment. However, the Focused 

Logistics Joint Functional Concept appeared to change the focus of joint 

theater logistics from command and control to management. This 

document identified joint theater logistics as a capability aimed at 

developing tools to allow the joint force commander to effectively oversee 

management of logistics through the range of military operations and did 

not focus on clarifying lines of authority through a single logistics 

command and control organization. As part of this continuing evolution of 

DOD logistics strategies, the most recent efforts include (1) the “to be” 

roadmap, (2) the revision of the Focused Logistics Joint Functional 

Concept, and (3) the capabilities portfolio management test for joint 

logistics. 

• “To Be” Roadmap. As a follow-on to the 2005 “as is” Focused Logistics 

Roadmap, DOD is developing a “to be” roadmap. Because the “as is” 

roadmap indicated that key focused logistics capabilities would not be 

achieved by 2015, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) directed the department to prepare a more 

rigorous “to be” roadmap that would identify the scope of logistics 

problems and capability gaps to be addressed, including joint theater 

logistics. According to DOD officials, the roadmap is intended to portray 

where the department is headed in the logistics area and how it will get 

there, monitor progress toward achieving its objectives, and

institutionalize a continuous assessment process that links ongoing 

capability development, program reviews, and budgeting. The first edition 

of the “to be” roadmap was scheduled for completion in February 2007, in

conjunction with the submission of the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 

2008. However, DOD put the roadmap on hold pending the completion of 

other strategic initiatives. As of March 2007, DOD estimated it would 

complete the roadmap by March of 2008, after completion of its 

capabilities portfolio management test. Capabilities portfolio management 

is discussed below. 

• Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept. DOD is revising the Focused 

Logistics Joint Functional Concept, which could affect the future of joint 

theater logistics. In August 2006, Joint Staff officials told us that they no

longer believe that the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept 

approved in 2003 accurately captures the capabilities needed by the 

Page 16 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
warfighter, as they found it difficult to delineate the relationships among 

the seven focused logistics capabilities, including joint theater logistics. 

Consequently, the Joint Staff is currently rewriting the Focused Logistics

Joint Functional Concept, which they expect to be finalized in the fall of

2007. According to Joint Staff officials, the revision will likely realign

focused logistics capabilities, reducing the number of capabilities 

supporting joint logistics from seven to five. They have stated that joint 

theater logistics may cease to exist as a stand-alone capability area under

the proposed realignment. However, they have said that the tenets of joint 

theater logistics would be retained in the remaining capability areas 

addressing the supply chain, and the functional areas associated with joint 

theater logistics would be integrated within the broader joint logistics 

portfolio. Once the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept paper is 

rewritten, DOD intends to complete the “to be” roadmap in alignment with 

the new joint logistics capability areas. Additionally, DOD’s key joint 

doctrine document for joint logistics operations, Joint Publication 4-0, is 

being rewritten to reflect these changes. 

Prior to these changes, the Joint Staff’s Joint Theater Logistics working 

group had begun developing an implementation plan for joint theater 

logistics. As part of this plan, the working group identified 13 capability 

areas in support of joint theater logistics.20 For each capability, the 

working group planned to evaluate different processes used by the 

services and merge the common parts of these individual processes into a

joint process to meet the commander’s requirements. The working group 

finished identifying the joint processes for 3 of these potential capability 

areas that were considered most readily joint—ammunition, fuels, and 

mortuary affairs— and began drafting the joint tasks and metrics 

associated with each. Drafts of these documents were completed prior to

the summer of 2006, and the goal was to have the tasks identified for the 3

capability areas by July 2006. All the services have agreed to these three 

joint processes, and officials said that the next step is to complete task 

identification for all 13 capabilities. However, these efforts have been 

placed on hold pending DOD’s realignment of the joint capability areas. 

 20The 13 joint theater logistics capabilities areas identified in this process were: 

engineering; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; joint 

expeditionary theater opening; joint contracting; joint deployment and distribution 

management; joint petroleum management; joint service support; joint financial 

management visibility; joint repair and maintenance; joint subsistence, food service 

support, and water management; mortuary affairs; joint theater conventional munitions 

management; and health service support. 

Page 17 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
• Capabilities Portfolio Management. In a separate but related effort, the 

department has begun testing a new approach to managing the 

development of joint capabilities DOD-wide. This new approach is known 

as joint capabilities portfolio management. In September 2006, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense selected joint logistics as one of four capability areas 

for testing capabilities portfolio management.21 These experiments were 

initiated in response to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that 

emphasized DOD’s need to build on capabilities-based planning and 

management. According to DOD officials, the purpose of this test is to 

determine if DOD can make better leadership decisions by managing a 

portfolio of capabilities instead of managing systems and capabilities 

individually. Thus, this portfolio test is intended to enable senior leaders to

consider trade-offs across previously stovepiped areas and to better 

understand the implications of investment decisions across competing 

priorities. The Joint Staff Director for Logistics is the test director for the 

joint logistics test case, which will include all capabilities required to 

project and sustain joint force operations, including supply chain 

operations. DOD will examine the capabilities and their initiatives in order 

to identify gaps or redundancies or determine where initiatives 

complement one another. According to Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) and Joint Staff officials, the initial results of the joint logistics 

capability portfolio management test were expected to be available in late

spring 2007. The officials told us that these results will then be used to 

write the revision to the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, 

which they said will enable them to complete the “to be” roadmap. Joint 

Staff officials are also awaiting the completion of the test prior to updating 

their joint theater logistics implementation plan. 

As DOD continues its attempt to articulate an overall strategy to guide 

logistic transformation, the development of the “to be” roadmap and other 

activities related to implementing joint theater logistics have been delayed 

due to these changes. In addition, the initiation of the capabilities portfolio 

management experiment has the potential to fundamentally alter the 

management of joint logistics. Until DOD decides on its vision and aligns 

its strategic direction, it will be unable to develop a coordinated and 

comprehensive approach to joint theater logistics. Moreover, it will be 

unable to ensure that it is achieving its desired improvements in theater 

distribution and asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics. 

 21The other three test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint Network Operations, 

and Battlespace Awareness. 

Page 18 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
DOD components have several initiatives under way that are aimed at 

developing a joint theater logistics capability in the area of distribution 

and supply support. Our analysis showed that the current initiatives 

generally address five areas of distribution and supply support to a joint 

force commander. Some of the initiatives have been specifically 

designated by DOD as supporting joint theater logistics, and other 

initiatives supporting this capability were identified during our field visits 

with DOD components. Although progress has been made on some 

initiatives, DOD faces challenges in fully developing and implementing 

these initiatives. Table 1 summarizes the five areas of distribution and 

supply support, the related joint theater logistics initiatives, and the 

challenges we identified during our review. 

DOD Has Made 

Progress on Joint 

Theater Logistics 

Initiatives but Faces 

Challenges That 

Hinder Its Ability to 

Fully Realize the 

Benefits of These 

Efforts

Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD’s Ability to Fully Implement Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives 

Area of distribution and supply 

support 

Related joint theater logistics 

initiatives Challenges hindering full implementation 

Receiving and processing a large influx of 

supplies at the beginning of a military 

operation 

Joint Task Force-Port Opening • Potential redundancy of efforts 

• Sourcing and use of personnel

• Command and control issues

Management of supplies moving across 

the distribution system 

Joint Deployment Distribution Operations 

Center 

• Noninteroperable information technology 

systems 

• Container management 

Theaterwide coordination of surface 

transportation assets 

Theater and Expeditionary Sustainment 

Commands, Director of Mobility ForcesSurface 

• Fragmented theater logistics operations 

• Lack of information technology tools 

• Insufficient numbers of skilled personnel 

• Unclear position in command structure 

• Command and control issues

• Potential duplication of efforts 

Consolidation of supply storage and 

shipping activities 

Node Management and Deployable 

Depot, Joint Regional Inventory and 

Material Management, Theater 

Consolidation and Shipping Point 

• Funding of inventories 

• Security concerns 

Exercise of command and control over 

joint logistics functions 

Joint Experimental Deployment and 

Support 

• Statutory requirements for logistics 

support 

• Exercising directive authority for logistics 

• Operational and financial considerations 

Source: GAO analysis.

Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the initiatives are not 

likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force commander to 

Page 19 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
harness the diffuse logistics resources and systems that exist within the 

department and effectively and efficiently direct logistics functions, 

including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater of 

operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without 

addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some 

of the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that have 

occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

New Port Opening 

Capability Faces 

Implementation 

Challenges 

DOD has developed an initiative to improve its port opening capability but 

faces implementation challenges because of concerns with potential 

redundancy of efforts, staffing, and command and control issues. The 

capability to rapidly open a new port in a theater to receive and process a 

large influx of equipment and supplies is critical during the initial stages of

a military operation, ranging from humanitarian missions to major combat 

operations. A rapid port opening capability provides the joint force 

commander with an expeditionary force to conduct an airfield or 

distribution assessment, establish initial command and control, set up 

critical in-transit visibility and communications systems, and establish 

movement control over distribution operations. However, in the early 

stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces did not deploy a sufficient 

port opening capability that was needed in Kuwait to successfully 

establish initial supply and distribution operations. For example, we have 

previously reported that because DOD’s priority was for combat forces to

move into the theater first, logistics support forces to establish an initial 

theater distribution system were either deleted from the deployment plan

or shifted back in the deployment timeline.22 As a result, logistics 

personnel could not effectively support the increasing numbers of combat 

troops moving into theater, and the shortage of logistics support resulted 

in delays in the processing of supplies as well as backlogs. According to 

Army officials, these early decisions regarding port opening capabilities 

led to problems in sustaining a large influx and flow of materiel during 

early operations. The Army’s deployed port opening capability could not

support more than a brigade-sized element, which resulted in a number of 

theater distribution problems. 

To improve DOD’s rapid port-opening capability, U.S. Transportation 

Command began developing the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative

in 2005, and the Secretary of Defense approved a standing Execution 

DOD Has Established a New 

Port Opening Unit 

 22GAO-04-305R and GAO-05-775. 

Page 20 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Order for the initiative in May 2006. As the Distribution Process Owner, 

U.S. Transportation Command wanted a capability to rapidly extend the 

distribution network into a theater and facilitate theater distribution. The 

mission of the joint task force is to rapidly open a port and manage initial 

distribution operations. Joint Task Force-Port Opening is comprised of air 

and surface elements that train and work together, are deployable in 12 

hours, and are to be deployed for approximately 45-60 days before being 

replaced by follow-on forces. According to U.S. Transportation Command, 

Joint Task Force-Port Opening is designed to rapidly establish and initially 

operate a port, facilitating more effective movement of materiel within the 

theater by arranging cargo just off the airfield in a logical pattern and 

creating a forward distribution point, or node,23 within 10 kilometers. The 

capability was initially validated for an aerial port of debarkation, and 

development of a similar capability for a seaport of debarkation has 

begun.24 Joint Task Force-Port Opening bypassed the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System process initially but is now going 

through an accelerated review.25 U.S. Transportation Command’s goal is to

have three Joint Task Force-Port Opening units, each comprised of an air

and a surface element, which would facilitate a cycle allowing for an 

active, a training, and a reconstituting unit at any given time. Currently, 

there is one surface element at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that is staffed by 

individuals from multiple Army Reserve units and filled through a request 

for forces that was originally set to expire in June 2007. The air element is

provided by the Air Force’s existing Contingency Response Groups, and 

the current group is located at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, near 

the surface element at Fort Dix. 

 23A distribution node exists wherever materiel arrives in the distribution system via 

transportation assets such as air, surface, or ground transport. 

24According to U.S. Transportation Command, the Joint Task Force-Port Opening seaport

of debarkation team is in the final stages of staffing its concept of operations for U.S. 

Transportation Command components, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and 

the services. The concept has also been briefed to the geographic combatant commanders’ 

staffs. U.S. Transportation Command officials stated that planning and development of the 

seaport of debarkation training concept and force sourcing activities began in April 2007,

with a goal of having forces to train by late summer of 2007. 

25DOD uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System as an analytical 

process to identify, assess, and prioritize joint military requirements in support of the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council and its Functional Capabilities Boards. The purpose of the

analysis process is to identify capability gaps and redundancies, determine the attributes of

a capability or combination of capabilities that would resolve the gaps, identify approaches

for implementation, and assess the cost and operational effectiveness of the joint force for 

each of the identified approaches. 

Page 21 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
During our field visits with combatant commands and the military 

services, we found that while there was agreement on the need for an 

effective port-opening capability, DOD components had differing views on 

how to address the shortfall in this capability that became apparent during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. In particular, senior Army officials we 

interviewed—to include officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Logistics, Army Reserve, and Army Combined Arms Support 

Command—expressed concerns regarding (1) the potential redundancy 

between the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative and their own 

service-led efforts, (2) the personnel resources devoted to the task force,

and (3) command and control issues. Until the challenges associated with 

implementing this initiative are resolved, DOD will continue to struggle to 

develop and implement an effective and integrated port opening 

capability. 

Army Officials Have Raised 

Concerns About the Port 

Opening Unit 

Army officials questioned the need for Joint Task Force-Port Opening in 

view of existing and emerging capabilities within the Army. Some Army 

officials we interviewed asserted that the Army already has an adequate 

port opening capability but it was not deployed properly during the initial 

stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.26 These officials consider Joint Task 

Force-Port Opening to be redundant of existing capabilities. Other Army 

officials stated that while DOD’s port opening capability has been 

deficient, the Army’s ongoing efforts to enhance its expeditionary theater 

opening capability will address this shortfall. Military officials have said

that the Army’s expeditionary theater opening capability extends beyond 

the early entry capability of Joint Task Force-Port Opening, and includes a 

range of key capabilities critical to larger theater opening efforts. In the 

view of Army officials, port opening is a subset of this larger effort, and 

consequently Joint Task Force-Port Opening will ultimately fall short of 

the capability they believe is required and will need to be integrated into a 

larger theater opening framework. Army officials also had some concerns

about the effectiveness of Joint Task Force-Port Opening across the range 

of military operations. Some officials noted that Joint Task Force-Port 

Opening could become quickly overwhelmed by a large operation and that 

additional Army logistics personnel would have to be deployed to 

supplement the task force’s operations. 

 26Marine Corps officials noted that their service has its own port opening capability through 

its special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. 

Page 22 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
A second area of concern to Army officials is the personnel requirements 

to staff the Joint Task Force-Port Opening surface element. Army officials 

told us they were unable to use active duty personnel to fill the surface 

element due to commitments to other operations, so they turned to the 

reserve component to fill these positions. However, Army Reserve officials 

have questioned the sustainability of the task force using reservists. These 

officials noted that placing Army Reserve personnel on standby for 

potential Joint Task Force-Port Opening deployment uses up the 

mobilization time of these reservists without actually deploying the force.

The Secretary of Defense recently extended the provisional status of Joint 

Task Force-Port Opening due to competing priorities for funding and 

personnel. As a result, the Army Reserve will continue the interim 

manning arrangement of the task force until the summer of 2008 rather 

than the summer of 2007 as initially planned. 

A final area of concern that emerged from our discussions with Army 

officials was command and control over Joint Task Force-Port Opening. 

Army officials raised questions about who would have the authority to 

deploy the task force and who would direct its operations once it deploys.

According to Army officials, such command and control issues must be 

resolved before Joint Task Force-Port Opening can be effectively 

integrated into military operations. A theater opening exercise conducted 

by the Army in November 2006 revealed that these issues had not been 

resolved. U.S. Transportation Command officials, however, do not identify

command and control as an issue regarding the task force. They have 

stated that the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, would have 

the authority to direct the Joint Task Force-Port Opening into the theater 

and that the joint force commander may exert command and control while 

the unit is deployed. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to 

Improve Supply 

Distribution, but Asset 

Visibility and Container 

Management Challenges 

Remain 

DOD has taken steps to improve the management of supplies moving 

across the distribution system, particularly through the creation of Joint 

Deployment Distribution Operations Centers, but challenges remain in 

achieving asset visibility across the theater and in managing containers. 

We have previously reported that the defense logistics systems used by 

various components to order, track, and account for supplies are not well

integrated and do not provide the information needed to effectively

manage theater distribution and provide asset visibility.27 Limitations in 

 27GAO-05-775. 

Page 23 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
these capabilities have led to difficulties in the logistics planning process 

and the creation of potential double orders for the same supply part, and

could impact readiness of forces. 

To address deficiencies in the management of theater supply distribution, 

DOD has created Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers within 

the geographic combatant commands. The mission of the operations 

centers is to improve intertheater and intratheater supply distribution by 

integrating the flow of military forces and supplies and materiel to sustain 

U.S. forces. The operations centers are designed to incorporate 

representatives from DOD components, such as U.S. Transportation 

Command, DLA, and the military services, who can provide a 

knowledgeable connection to logistics supply centers in the United States 

and facilitate the distribution of supplies to the theater. According to DOD 

officials, the Joint Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command are currently 

working to incorporate the operations centers into joint doctrine, which 

will result in updating numerous existing DOD publications. 

DOD Has Established Joint 

Operations Centers in the 

Geographic Combatant 

Commands 

Initiated by U.S. Transportation Command, the first Joint Deployment 

Distribution Operations Center was established in Kuwait under U.S. 

Central Command. In addition to managing the coordination between 

services and logistics agencies and improving asset visibility as supplies 

enter the theater, operations center personnel also analyze distribution 

problems, identify causes, and propose solutions. DOD officials have 

stated that the operations center was successful at improving the 

management of supplies moving across the distribution system and 

achieving cost savings. For example, U.S. Transportation Command 

officials said the operations center was responsible for shifting from the 

use of airlift to sealift to transport supplies, which reduces costly airlift 

requirements and frees up airlift capacity; coordinating the movement of 

personnel from their point of origin to final destination rather than 

through intermediate locations with time-consuming layovers (a concept

referred to as “single ticket”); and improving distribution management by

facilitating the use of pure-packed pallets and containers,28 developing a 

container management plan, and improving the return of Army materiel 

from the theater. According to data provided by U.S. Transportation 

Command, the activities of the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations 

Center have resulted in total cost avoidance and savings of $343 million 

between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. 

 28Pure-packing is the consolidation of cargo for shipment to a single user. 

Page 24 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
On the basis of the successes attributed to the Joint Deployment 

Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait, DOD established new 

operations centers in the other geographic combatant commands. The 

size, structure, and organizational placement of these operations centers 

vary across the combatant commands. For example, the U.S. Central and 

European Commands have the largest operations centers, with 

approximately 60 and 55 personnel, respectively. The other centers are 

considerably smaller with a core staff ranging from 7 to 12 personnel. 

However, the operations centers are considered “scaleable”—that is, they 

can be increased in size as needed to support a military exercise or 

operation. 

Senior military commanders in Kuwait told us that despite the benefits 

obtained from the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center, 

effective management of supply distribution across the theater has been 

hindered by ongoing challenges in achieving asset visibility. They 

attributed these challenges to a lack of interoperability among information 

technology systems, making it difficult to obtain timely and accurate 

information on assets in the theater. Interoperability refers to the ability of

different systems to communicate effectively, including sharing 

information. Interoperable systems providing effective asset visibility can 

enable commanders and logisticians to have a common operating picture 

concerning the location, status, and identity of equipment and supplies 

across a theater. According to DOD doctrine, asset visibility across the 

supply chain and a common operating picture are both key enablers for 

joint theater logistics. In our previous reports, we stated that DOD lacks 

the systems integration necessary to provide total asset visibility because 

of the duplicative and stovepiped nature of DOD’s systems environment.29

Lack of System Interoperability 

Has Impeded Asset Visibility 

During our field visit to Kuwait, officials from the 377th Theater Support 

Command and 143rd Transportation Command said they must use manual 

workarounds to overcome the problems caused by noninteroperable 

information systems. These officials estimate that their staff spends half 

their time pulling data from information systems, e-mailing it around for 

validation or coordination, consolidating it on a spreadsheet, and 

analyzing it to make management decisions. In January 2007, a joint 

assessment conducted by several DOD components at Camp Arifjan, 

 29GAO, Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Implementation of Its LongTerm Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of Its Inventory, GAO-05-15 (Washington, D.C.:

Dec. 6, 2004) and GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested

without Adequate Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).

Page 25 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Kuwait, found that information technology capabilities need to be 

improved to achieve visibility of materiel in transit and of transportation 

resources required to optimize distribution. The assessment reported that 

separate movement control battalions in Kuwait and Iraq use both 

automated and handwritten transportation movement requests to track air 

and ground movements. Consequently, to capture the total theater 

movement picture, both movement control battalions must consolidate 

manual and automated data into spreadsheets. Neither movement 

battalion has total visibility over what is occurring in both Kuwait and Iraq. 

Nor do they have total visibility of the surface transportation resources 

necessary to optimize the distribution of resources. The movement control 

battalions use e-mail on a daily basis to coordinate each other’s projected

movement requests and planned commitment of transportation assets. 

DOD also has challenges with container management that hinder asset 

visibility and impede its ability to effectively manage logistics operations 

and costs. These challenges include (1) the application of radio frequency

identification technology on containers in the supply chain, (2) 

compliance with container management processes, and (3) the return of 

commercial containers to maritime carriers. We discussed some of these 

same problems in a prior report.30

Problems With Container 

Management Have Continued 

Most supply items shipped by surface ships, excluding large end items 

such as vehicles, are consolidated and packed into 20- or 40-foot sea-land 

containers (such as those shown in fig. 2) that are owned by the 

government or commercial maritime carriers. 

 30GAO-04-305R. 

Page 26 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006) 

In 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) directed the use of active radio frequency identification 

technology31 on all consolidated shipments moving to, from, or between 

overseas locations. These shipments are to be tagged in order to provide 

global in-transit visibility. U.S. Central Command has emphasized the need 

to use radio frequency technology to improve asset visibility in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In January 2005, the Commander, Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, directed that all containers moving to, from, and 

within the theater have active radio frequency tags written with complete

contents detail. However, more than a year later, inadequately tagged 

containers continued to move throughout the theater. Consequently, the 

 31Radio frequency identification technology is a data input system that consists of (1) a

transponder, generally referred to as a tag; (2) a tag reader, also known as an interrogator,

that reads the tag using a radio signal; (3) centralized data processing equipment; and (4) a

method of communication between the reader and the computer. The interrogator sends a

signal to the tag, prompting the tag to respond. The battery-powered tag sends a signal to

the interrogator with information about the container, pallet, or item to which it is 

attached. The information is forwarded to the central data processing equipment where it 

is stored and can be used to provide visibility over inventory items as they move 

throughout the supply chain.

Page 27 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Commander issued an updated radio frequency tag policy in October 2006, 

instituting a phased-in approach for compliance according to the following

timeline: 50 percent compliance by November 1, 2006; 75 percent by 

December 1, 2006; and 100 percent by January 1, 2007. However, despite 

this updated policy, inadequate radio frequency tagging of containers 

continues to be a problem. 

U.S Central Command officials, including general officers, identified a 

number of reasons why DOD continues to struggle with the application of 

radio frequency identification technology in the theater supply chain.

Some problems include shipping containers without radio frequency tags 

or with tags that are broken, tags with incorrect information, or tags that 

are rewritten but not cross-referenced to the original shipping information. 

Based on tracking charts from the Container Management Element,32 from 

the period of August 15, 2006, to April 9, 2007, 15 percent of the containers 

that passed northbound through the NAVISTAR33 distribution point had no

radio frequency tag. Another 20 percent of the containers had broken tags

or tags that did not match the container contents.

34 In addition, a radio 

frequency tag must be created to have the container’s shipping information 

and contents entered into an inventory software system that then uploads

the information to the DOD in-transit visibility server. When a container 

moves between transportation nodes—the airport, seaport, Army general 

support warehouse, Consolidation Receiving and Shipping Point, Defense 

Distribution Depot, Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, NAVISTAR, 

or forward-located nodes in Iraq—it might require creating a new tag to 

upload new information to the in-transit visibility server. A container may 

require a new tag if its current tag is broken or found to contain inaccurate

data or when a container is opened and repacked. The problem arises 

when the new radio frequency tag, with its newly generated number that is 

assigned by the local inventory software system, does not reference back 

to the original tag number. As a result, the requesting customer might look 

up the original tracking number in the in-transit visibility server and no 

longer have visibility of the shipment. 

 32This element is under the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center. 

33NAVISTAR is the point of crossing from Kuwait into Iraq. 

34These averages exclude a gap from November 13 through November 30, 2006, for which 

no data are available. 

Page 28 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Noncompliance with container management processes established by U.S. 

Central Command can limit asset visibility of supplies. Officials in U.S. 

Central Command’s Container Management Element use an Army Webbased central database to track container ownership, location, condition,

and use, and to provide visibility of all containers in theater. For the 

system to effectively track containers, the containers must be properly “ingated”—recorded entering a transportation node—and “out-gated”—

recorded leaving a transportation node. In a process similar to the 

commercial shipper tracking systems used by United Parcel Service or 

Federal Express, a container is in-gated when it first arrives at a location 

to document that it has been received, according to Container 

Management Element officials. Upon departure from that location, the 

container is out-gated to indicate that it has been shipped. Container 

Management Element officials stated that the failure of transportation 

nodes to properly in-gate and out-gate containers as they pass through 

distribution channels is a significant problem hampering asset visibility in

theater because tagged containers can become “lost” in theater, with no 

one able to track the location of the container or its contents. In addition, 

if the container is commercially owned and not returned to the carrier 

within a specified time period, detention charges begin accumulating. 

In the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial containers 

were flowing into the theater but were not always tracked once in Iraq, 

and many of the commercial containers moving into Iraq were not quickly 

returned to maritime carriers.35 In July 2005, the Army Audit Agency 

reported that container detention charges were continuing to accrue at 

about $15 million per month. 36 To improve management and 

accountability over containers and to address the growing detention 

charges, U.S. Transportation Command and the Military Surface 

Deployment and Distribution Command developed a theater container 

management process and established the Container Management 

Element—a unit responsible for tracking and providing management 

oversight of containers in the theater. In addition, the Army decided to

purchase (“buy out”) commercial containers to reduce monthly detention 

 35Containers were not returned for a number of reasons, primarily because the military’s

resources were dedicated to tactical operations and because soldiers resourcefully made 

use of empty containers for such purposes as storage, perimeter barriers, and housing.

36U.S. Army Audit Agency: Asset Visibility and Container Management—Operation Iraqi

Freedom, Audit Report: A-2005-0197-ALE (Alexandria, Va.: July 5, 2005). As of May 2004, 

only 6 of the 37 transportation nodes in Iraq could read radio frequency tags.

Page 29 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
charges. According to information provided by the Military Surface 

Deployment and Distribution Command, the Army had purchased 

approximately 28,832 containers at a total cost of approximately 

$203 million, as of December 2006. Container Management Element 

officials told us that through a combination of container buyouts and 

increased oversight, detention charges decreased from approximately 

$10.7 million per month in December 2005 to $3.7 million per month in 

October 2006. 

Although DOD has been able to reduce monthly detention charges on 

commercial containers, it is still experiencing problems with retaining 

visibility over containers. As of April 30, 2007, the central container 

database showed that 54,390 containers—or more than one-third of all 

containers in the U.S. Central Command theater—were considered to be

lost. Furthermore, according to container management officials, DOD’s 

problem with commercial container detention charges is shifting from Iraq 

to Afghanistan. Efforts to curtail the movement of commercial containers 

into Iraq have been largely successful, according to information provided 

by container management officials. For example, of the 13,440 containers 

sent to Iraq from June 6, 2006, to October 17, 2006, only 19 were 

commercially owned. However, 4,901 (85 percent) of the 5,752 containers 

sent into Afghanistan during the same period were commercial containers. 

Container buyout data for December 2006—the most recent data 

available—show that 4,748 (67 percent) of the 7,038 containers purchased 

were in Afghanistan. According to container management officials, this 

problem stems from a general shortage of government-owned containers

in the theater and the lack of a container transloading operation for 

materiel shipped into Afghanistan that would be similar to the one at the 

port of Kuwait for materiel going to Iraq.37 Items being shipped by sea to 

Afghanistan enter through the port of Karachi in Pakistan since 

Afghanistan is landlocked. According to container management officials, 

establishing a transloading operation in Pakistan would be difficult 

because of restrictions placed on U.S. military personnel in Pakistan. 

These officials said that commercial containers en route to Afghanistan 

begin to accumulate detention charges prior to reaching their final 

destination because of the time required for trucks to cover the difficult 

inland route.

 37Transloading is the unloading of a commercially owned container and repacking its

contents into a government-owned container. 

Page 30 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
DOD components have initiatives underway to better coordinate the 

surface transportation of supply items that are distributed across a 

military theater of operations, but these efforts face challenges to their 

implementation and may duplicate some functions. During the initial 

phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD faced problems with prioritizing 

and managing its transportation assets across the theater. According to a 

2005 RAND study,38 U.S. forces suffered from both a shortage of 

transportation assets—primarily trucks—and the fragmented control and 

management of these assets across the different echelons of theater 

command. While RAND reported that exact data on the total truck 

shortage were not available, the estimated ratio of Army personnel to 

medium truck equivalents was 194 to 1 at the beginning of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom compared to approximately 73 to 1 in Operation Desert Storm. In 

addition, the distances from logistics operating bases to support combat 

operations were greater—344 miles to Baghdad, versus 210 miles to the 

farthest incursion during Operation Desert Storm. The Army Division 

Support Command, Corps Support Command, Area Support Group, and 

Theater Support Command each controlled a portion of the truck assets 

within the theater. Consequently, there was no single distribution 

organization to advocate for truck assets during the force planning 

process, which may account for the shortage of trucks, and no single 

organization deployed in theater with the authority to rebalance 

transportation assets across the theater and integrate and synchronize the 

surface deployment and distribution movements in support of the 

commander’s priorities. 

The Army and U.S. Transportation Command have separate initiatives 

aimed at addressing these surface transportation problems. As part of its 

modular transformation, the Army is creating new organizations—Theater 

Sustainment Commands and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands—that 

are aimed in part at centralizing control over Army surface transportation 

assets within a theater of operations. Under the Army’s emerging 

sustainment doctrine, the objective of the Theater Sustainment Command 

is to provide the Army with a single headquarters responsible for 

operational command and control of logistics operations throughout the 

theater. Its functions include theater opening, materiel management, and 

distribution. This command would typically operate in a rear area away 

Separate Organizations 

Are Being Established to 

Coordinate Surface 

Transportation 

Sustainment Commands and 

Surface Mobility Directorate 

Are Aimed at Coordinating 

Surface Transportation

 38RAND Corporation, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations, Contract No. DASW01-C-0003 (Santa

Monica, Calif.: 2005). 

Page 31 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
from frontline military operations. Theater Sustainment Commands 

replace the Army’s existing Theater Support Commands and are designed 

to plan, prepare, rapidly deploy, and execute operational logistics within 

the theater of operations.39 Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, a 

forward extension of the Theater Sustainment Commands, have a primary 

role of managing regional logistics operations in support of the joint task 

force commander. According to U.S. Central Command officials, the 1st 

Theater Sustainment Command and the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command are scheduled to deploy to Kuwait and Iraq, respectively, in the 

summer of 2007. In addition, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command has 

been established in U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii, and the 19th 

Expeditionary Sustainment Command is operational in Korea. 

In a separate initiative, U.S. Transportation Command created a new 

organization, the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, to integrate surface 

deployment and distribution priorities set by the joint force commander. 

According to U.S. Transportation Command, this initiative will enable 

DOD to better synchronize and direct the movement and coordination of 

surface transportation resources to ensure uninterrupted distribution of 

materiel from air and sea ports of debarkation to destinations within the 

theater. In addition, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe that 

theater surface distribution will benefit from establishing an organization 

that has a capability similar to that provided by the Director of Mobility 

Forces-Air for theater air distribution.40 The proposed responsibilities of 

the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface include coordinating, prioritizing, 

and executing surface transportation movement requests. In Kuwait, U.S. 

Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command established a pilot

Director of Mobility Forces-Surface in August 2006 and completed an 

initial assessment of the pilot in February 2007. In addition, this initiative 

has been tested during exercises in Korea, most recently in March 2007.

 39Certain subordinate command elements under the replaced Theater Support Command

also will be eliminated, such as the Transportation Command, Transportation Command 

Element, and Transportation Group. The Division Support Command, Corps Support

Command, and Area Support Group have also been eliminated from the Army force

structure. 

40According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, after Operation Desert

Shield/Desert Storm the Air Force realized that it did not have the right mix of skills and 

capabilities to integrate the air mobility mission into the combined air operations center of 

the combined joint forces air component command. In response, the Air Force developed

the air mobility division and its command structure, including the Director of Mobility 

Forces-Air, to provide this strategic-to-theater integration of distribution. 

Page 32 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
The Army and U.S. Transportation Command face a number of challenges

in the implementation of their initiatives. While the Army’s Theater and

Expeditionary Sustainment Commands were designed to be the single 

headquarters responsible for operational command and control of logistics 

operations throughout the theater, the fragmentation of logistics 

operations in theater may hinder it from achieving this objective. More 

specifically, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the 1st Theater 

Sustainment Command will be placed under the Commander, Coalition 

Forces Land Component, in Kuwait. As the forward extension to Theater 

Sustainment Commands, Expeditionary Sustainment Commands are 

designed to operate under the command and support of the Theater 

Sustainment Command in order to provide a single command for logistics 

theaterwide. However, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the 

deployment order for the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command has 

placed it under the operational control of the Commander, Multi-National

Forces-Iraq. While still attached to the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, 

the placement of the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command under 

Multi-National Forces-Iraq will likely continue the fragmentation of 

logistics operations like surface distribution that the new command 

structure was designed to eliminate. The Commander, Coalition Forces 

Land Component, is a (Three Star) Lieutenant General, and the 

Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, is a (Four Star) General and the 

highest ranking officer in the theater, responsible for U.S. operations in 

Iraq. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command will likely be 

responsible for logistics operations in Kuwait and the rest of the theater, 

while the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command will be responsible 

for logistics operations in Iraq. In addition, the 19th Expeditionary 

Sustainment Command in Daegu, South Korea, is under the operational 

control of the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, rather than the 8th Theater 

Sustainment Command in U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii. The deployment

of these new Army logistics support units under command and control 

structures that differ from their original design raises questions about the 

efficacy of the emerging Army sustainment command doctrine and its 

general applicability to joint military operations conducted within a 

combatant command theater. 

Initiatives Face Implementation 

Challenges 

Army officials also raised concerns about whether the sustainment 

commands would have the information technology tools and personnel 

necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out their mission. They said 

these commands were designed to be smaller than their predecessors 

based on an assumption that certain information technology tools would 

be available to enable the commands to operate with fewer personnel. 

However, some of these information technology tools have experienced 

Page 33 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
problems during their development that have limited their capability or 

have delayed their fielding. For example: 

• The next generation Mobile Tracking System is a satellite tracking system 

for trucks that in its most advanced configuration is also able to read and 

relay information from radio frequency identification tags attached to

containers and pallets traveling in a supply convoy. This technology could 

provide near real-time visibility and location data on supplies moving 

through the theater by surface transportation. However, the technology is

expensive and few trucks are equipped with this latest configuration. 

• Battle Command Sustainment Support System processes a large amount of 

logistics data and can facilitate decision making by providing a means for 

commanders to determine the sustainability of current and planned 

operations. The system provides a capability for tracking supply convoys 

moving through an area of operation. However, it lacks the integration to 

produce and send a cargo manifest that can be linked to an in-transit 

visibility device for tracking. 

• TransLog Web was designed to serve as the single point of entry for 

transportation movement requests. This Web-based program could serve 

as a transportation planning and movement tracking tool to assist 

movement managers in coordinating supplies and transportation assets. 

However, the system (1) is not used by all movement control teams, 

(2) does not provide visibility of the cargo’s description beyond the supply 

class, and (3) does not feed information to the Global Transportation 

Network.41

• Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movements 

System II is expected to enhance and improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of support planning needed to deploy and redeploy forces 

and equipment; improve the visibility of assets; and enhance cargo and 

passenger receiving, controlling, and shipping. However, the system is not 

scheduled to be fully operational until around 2010, and while the Army 

justified the system based on its joint service application, two services (the

 41The Global Transportation Network is DOD’s designated in-transit visibility system that 

collects, integrates, and distributes transportation information to combatant commanders, 

the military services, and other DOD customers and provides U.S. Transportation 

Command with the ability to perform command and control operations, planning and

analysis, and business operations in tailoring customer requirements throughout the 

requirements process. 

Page 34 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Air Force and the Marine Corps) have stated that they do not intend to use

it.42

According to Army officials, the shortcomings in available information 

tools have resulted in the need for additional staff in the sustainment 

commands. They explained that problems with data and a lack of system 

interoperability have required the commands to use manual, ad hoc 

techniques to validate, coordinate, and analyze data for decision making, 

and these efforts are cumbersome and manpower intensive. In Kuwait, the 

377th Theater Support Command, including subordinate commands such 

as the 143rd Transportation Command, controlled an organization of 

several thousand personnel. By comparison, the Theater Sustainment 

Command that will replace it was designed to be staffed with several 

hundred people. According to Army officials, if the Army had all the 

information technology tools in place that have been promised and 

factored into the design of the new sustainment commands, it might be 

possible to accomplish its mission with the smaller staff. To meet the 

additional personnel requirements of the sustainment commands, U.S. 

Central Command issued a request for additional forces, which increased 

Theater Sustainment Command staffing from 155 to 461 personnel and 

Expeditionary Sustainment Command staffing from 254 to 378 personnel. 

Furthermore, Army officials noted that the leaner staffing of the new 

commands places a premium on obtaining personnel with the right 

expertise and skills. For example, assigned staff will need to be fully 

networked with the national inventory control points, able to quickly 

develop support relationships, and determine the best method of meeting 

requirements. They must be proficient in tapping into the Army’s standard 

supply system, prepositioned stocks, host nation support, and contracting.

The officials expressed some concern about the probability of getting 

personnel with those skills and expertise on a recurring rotational basis. 

The Director of Mobility Forces-Surface has also faced implementation 

challenges. During exercises in Korea, the new organization has had 

difficulty establishing its position within the U. S. Forces Korea and 

Combined Forces Command structure. In each exercise, the directorate 

has been placed under a different organization. For example, it has been 

tested under the operational control of the Joint Force Support 

 42GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Uncertain Joint Use and Marginal Expected Value 

of Military Asset Deployment System Warrant Reassessment of Planned Investment, 

GAO-06-171 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). 

Page 35 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Component Command and in the Joint Operations Fusion Center. U.S. 

Forces Korea officials said that finding the proper niche for Director of 

Mobility Forces-Surface is further complicated because the South Korean

military is responsible for surface mobility of the Combined Forces on the 

Korean peninsula. During the 2007 exercise, the directorate was placed in

the Combined Transportation Movement Center, which is co-chaired by 

the South Korean military. 

Moreover, the initial assessment of the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface 

pilot in Kuwait by U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central 

Command indicated that the initiative faces a number of challenges related 

to (1) command and control, (2) availability of information technology 

tools, (3) securing personnel with the expertise and knowledge to use the 

information technology tools that are available, and (4) potential 

duplication of responsibilities with other Army organizations. More 

specifically, the assessment found that while the pilot had made progress, 

the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface: 

• was assigned to the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, 

whose authority is currently restricted to the Kuwait Joint Operations 

Area, which impedes a U.S. Central Command-wide focus on surface 

distribution; 

• lacked adequate information technology tools to ensure the visibility of 

materiel in transit and availability of surface transportation assets required 

to optimize surface distribution across the theater; 

• lacked personnel with the right skill sets or training to take advantage of 

the technology tools that were available; and 

• provided functions that could overlap with those of the Army’s 1st 

Theater Sustainment Command. 

Regarding this last point, an Army analysis also showed a potential for 

duplication of efforts. Specifically, the Army reviewed 123 proposed 

responsibilities of the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface and found that 

most of the responsibilities are covered by the Army’s sustainment 

commands and service component commands. The Army’s analysis 

showed that most other proposed Director of Mobility Forces-Surface 

responsibilities were covered by the geographic combatant command. 

The U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command’s 

assessment also noted that “unity of effort” with regard to the Director of 

Page 36 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Mobility Forces-Surface was lacking and that some key senior leaders had 

not yet embraced the initiative’s capabilities. In response to the 

assessment, U.S. Central Command discontinued the pilot in May 2007, 

until some of these issues are resolved. 

DOD components have begun several initiatives to consolidate storage and 

shipping sites located in a joint theater, but these efforts have been 

implemented on a limited scale and we found potential opportunities for 

further consolidation during our fieldwork in Kuwait. DOD currently uses 

multiple storage and shipping sites within a theater to supply items to its 

customers. In some cases, these sites may carry the same supply items and 

ship to the same customers. Operating multiple sites requires additional 

facilities, personnel, contract services, and inventories and also results in 

extra movements of stock, inefficient use of surface and air distribution 

assets, increased opportunities for information processing errors, and the 

loss of asset visibility. Consolidating storage and shipping arrangements 

can help address these supply chain problems while at the same time 

reducing DOD’s logistics footprint. 

DOD has developed initiatives to consolidate and improve storage and

shipping of materiel, including Node Management and Deployable Depot, 

Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management, and Theater 

Consolidation and Shipping Point. Node Management and Deployable 

Depot is a DLA initiative to develop a small-scale, rapidly deployable 

distribution center that has the capability to provide consolidated 

shipping, receiving, cross-docking, storage, communication, and order 

processing. The initiative, which is in the early stages of development and 

testing, is aimed at improving the flow of logistics information along the 

supply chain and also providing efficient physical management of materiel 

in the theater of operations. To deploy this capability to a theater, DLA 

would send trained personnel, information technology systems, portable 

structures, and materiel handling equipment. DLA is collaborating with 

U.S. Transportation Command to establish a close association between 

Node Management and Deployable Depot and Joint Task Force-Port 

Opening. Supply items off-loaded by the port opening unit could be moved 

to the DLA depot located within 10 kilometers away. The two 

organizations plan to write this relationship into the concepts of 

operations for both initiatives. U.S. Pacific Command is the operational 

manager for Node Management and Deployable Depot, providing the 

location for upcoming exercises to prepare for operations that would be 

carried out in an austere location. The initiative is currently undergoing 

Consolidated Storage and 

Shipping Arrangements 

Have Been Implemented 

on a Limited Scale 

Consolidated Storage and 

Shipping Initiatives 

Page 37 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
tests of both its information technology and materiel management 

capabilities. 

A second consolidation initiative is Joint Regional Inventory and Material 

Management, which is aimed at streamlining the storage and distribution 

of common items for multiple military service locations in a region from a 

DLA hub. The objectives of Joint Regional Inventory and Material 

Management include eliminating duplicate materiel handling and inventory 

layers. The pilot program for the Joint Regional Inventory and Material 

Management initiative in Hawaii has been completed and shows promise 

to improve joint theater logistics, but some funding and metrics issues are 

still being addressed. DOD has met key milestones in this initiative, and 

officials in U.S. Pacific Command reported that they had reduced 

redundant service-managed inventories, the number of times they handle 

parts, and customer wait times over the course of the pilot. When the 

services stock fewer items, they also have more efficiency in storage, and 

U.S. Pacific Command officials estimated that the services had reduced 

their inventory levels by more than $10 million.43 A related activity 

included in the initiative is the development of a Web site for hazardous 

materials that would allow the services to share and view data on available 

hazardous inventories, enabling them to make arrangements with the 

other services to reuse items and save on waste disposal costs. Another 

related activity is an ongoing effort to establish a joint shipment manager

to provide expedited and scheduled deliveries to move items from the DLA 

hub to the requesting units. U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that 

they plan to roll out Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management to

other DLA depots in the command’s area of operations, and they plan to 

establish this arrangement next in Okinawa and Guam. U.S. Pacific 

Command has established a working group that is addressing some issues 

such as tracking demand histories for multiple requests and deployed

units and determining appropriate metrics to ensure that DLA has the 

assets available when the services require them. Officials we spoke with 

believe Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management has the 

potential to improve joint theater logistics by having common assets 

available close to where they are needed and under the control of DLA, 

freeing military service personnel to focus on service-specific assets and 

their warfighting missions. 

 43Stockage levels for Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management are based on the

number of demands placed on a part per year, and a minimum of four demands was

required for an item to be included in the pilot.

Page 38 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
A third consolidation initiative we found during our review is the 

establishment of Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points. DLA, in 

coordination with the Army, has opened Theater Consolidation and 

Shipping Points within the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central 

Command geographic regions. The goal for these consolidated facilities is

to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of materiel 

consolidation and shipping activities. The Theater Consolidation and 

Shipping Points operate under memoranda of agreement between DLA 

and each of these combatant commands. DLA is validating its template for 

the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, which is the first step in 

creating a doctrinal organization, according to DLA officials.

The Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point in the U.S. European 

Command opened in October 2006, and is collocated at DLA’s Defense 

Distribution Depot-Europe in Germersheim, Germany. The creation of this 

consolidated activity was part of the Army’s plan for managing a reduction 

in personnel in Europe, which included divesting itself of noncore 

activities and focusing on its warfighting functions. The DLA organization 

took over distribution functions that had been performed by the Theater 

Distribution Center, which was operated by the Army’s 21st Theater 

Support Command at Panzer Kaserne, Germany. These functions include 

breaking bulk materiel for multiple customers, consolidating materiel for 

shipment to individual units, marking pallets and containers with radio 

frequency identification tags, and preparing them for onward shipment to 

customers. The Army agreed to fund the realignment of the Theater 

Distribution Center’s functions to DLA by transferring $1.6 million each 

fiscal year for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and then realigning funding 

directly to DLA beginning in fiscal year 2009. According to the Commander 

of the Defense Distribution Depot-Europe, the Theater Consolidation and 

Shipping Point will serve as the primary conduit for theater sustainment 

distribution from multiple sources, including materiel entering the theater

at Ramstein Air Base and the Germersheim Rhine River terminal. He said 

collocating the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point with the DLA 

Defense Distribution Depot will improve the overall efficiency of theater 

distribution activities by making better use of DLA’s existing distribution 

infrastructure, including its information technology systems, and will 

capitalize on DLA’s core competencies of receiving, storing, and shipping

materiel. According to the Commander, specific benefits have included 

estimated annual cost savings of approximately $700,000 and a reduction 

in full-time equivalent employees from 56 to 19. At the time of our visit, the 

activity had been operating for less than a week; consequently, our review

was limited to briefings and a tour of the operations and processes at the 

Page 39 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
facilities in Germersheim, Germany. Therefore, we did not validate the 

claimed benefits. 

In U.S. Central Command, the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point 

was established in February 2006 when DLA took over theater distribution 

functions from an Army-operated Theater Distribution Center in Kuwait. 

The Theater Distribution Center had previously been relocated to Camp 

Arifjan from just outside Camp Doha when Camp Doha closed in 2005. 

According to DLA officials, the Army and DLA agreed to transfer 

operations to DLA in December 2005, and DLA began operations in 

February 2006. The facility is contractor-operated at an annual cost of 

approximately $7.9 million. The transfer of operations to DLA was aimed 

at capitalizing on the agency’s materiel consolidation and shipping 

expertise, streamlining the distribution process by linking the distribution 

depot and the consolidation and shipping operations under DLA 

management, and improving asset visibility by installing DLA’s standard 

distribution information system at the consolidation and shipping point. 

During our fieldwork in Kuwait, we found that additional opportunities 

may exist for consolidating storage and shipping activities. Unlike the 

consolidation and shipping point in Europe, the Kuwait activity is not 

collocated with the DLA Defense Distribution Depot and therefore lacks 

the efficiencies from combining operations available at the European 

activity. Moreover, the Army continues to operate a general support 

warehouse at Camp Arifjan that is separate from the DLA Theater 

Consolidation and Shipping Point. Based on our visits to these facilities 

and discussions with officials, we believe there are potential opportunities 

to improve joint theater distribution processes and sustainment operations 

through further consolidation, relocation, and streamlining of distribution 

operations and processes. Some potential improvements that might be 

achieved are:

Additional Opportunities for 

Consolidating Shipping and 

Storage 

• reducing contract and contract administration costs; 

• maximizing use of pure pallets, thereby making more efficient use of airlift 

capability and reducing customer wait time; 

• eliminating redundant warehouse functions and substandard warehouse 

facilities; 

• freeing up government-owned containers for use in repacking materiel 

intended for units in Iraq; and 

Page 40 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
• consolidating materiel processing points, thereby reducing the potential 

for errors in information technology and the loss of asset visibility. 

The DLA Defense Distribution Depot is a contractor-owned and operated 

facility located in the Mina Abdullah Complex, a private industrial park 

located approximately 14 kilometers outside Camp Arifjan. The current 

annual contract cost for the distribution depot is approximately $37.1 

million. The distribution depot carries out similar receiving, storage, 

packing, and shipping functions as the Theater Consolidation and Shipping

Point, and these facilities serve the same customer base. For example, 

each facility pure packs air pallets to be flown out of Ali Al Salem Air Base 

to units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. According to the 

distribution depot director, the depot is having difficulty packing pure 

pallets to capacity and consequently is not maximizing use of airlift 

capability. The depot’s goal is to hold air pallets for up to 24 hours in 

hopes of packing a pure pallet. However, if the pallet is not completely 

pure packed within the 24-hour hold period, it must be airlifted anyway in

order to meet customer wait time standards. DLA officials told us that by 

collocating the consolidation and shipping point with the distribution 

depot, they could more quickly build fewer and larger air pallets, which 

would maximize the use of airlift capacity and reduce customer wait time. 

The Army’s general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan also performs 

materiel receiving, storage, and shipping functions. The Army warehouse 

is in poor condition, is poorly lighted, and has little climate-controlled 

space. It operates at capacity and has some of its inventory stored outside 

in government-owned containers or on the bare ground and exposed to the 

elements (see fig. 3). The DLA Defense Distribution Depot, in contrast, 

appears to be a modern warehouse with approximately a million square 

feet of covered warehouse space, much of which is climate controlled, and

another million square feet of hard surface (asphalt) outside storage space 

for containers (see fig. 4). 

Page 41 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General Support 

Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006) 

Page 42 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006) 

Page 43 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
According to DLA officials, the distribution depot has sufficient capacity 

to absorb the Army general support warehouse workload and already 

manages 920 Army-specific items. Consolidating the Army warehouse 

inventory at the DLA distribution depot would likely produce efficiencies 

through economies of scale, reducing the overall cost of receiving, storage, 

and shipping, and also eliminate the need to upgrade the substandard 

Army warehouse on Camp Arifjan. Consolidating the Army general 

support inventory at the DLA depot would also free up government-owned 

containers currently used for general warehouse storage. Governmentowned containers are needed to support seaport operations for repacking 

materiel to send to Iraq from commercial containers, and they are in short 

supply in Kuwait. 

U.S. Central Command has directed that only government-owned 

containers be sent into Iraq to prevent the accumulation of detention 

charges on commercial containers. According to 831st Transportation 

Battalion officials responsible for port operations, government-owned 

containers sent to Camp Arifjan are seldom returned to the port to support 

container cross-loading operations. Army general support warehouse 

officials told us that when they are directed to give up government-owned 

containers to support port operations, they often have no place to put the 

materiel stored inside the container, which forces them to store some 

inventory on the bare ground. Having adequate space to store inventory at

the DLA distribution depot would reduce the need to use governmentowned containers as storage space, thereby supporting container crossloading operations at the port, and would reduce the need to place 

inventory on the ground and exposed to the elements. 

The Army general support warehouse, DLA Theater Consolidation and 

Shipping Point, and DLA Defense Distribution Depot, Kuwait all exist to 

support essentially the same units in Iraq with regard to receiving, storing, 

and shipping sustainment materiel. According to DLA officials, 

consolidating these operations at the DLA Defense Distribution Depot 

would help to improve asset visibility by reducing the number of materiel 

processing points, and thereby the potential for errors in inputting data 

into information technology systems. Under such a consolidation, only one 

organization would be applying radio frequency identification tags to 

containers and entering data into the joint in-transit visibility systems, 

which are tasks that DLA officials consider to be among the agency’s core 

competencies. 

In discussing our observations with Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command officials, they generally agreed about the potential for 

Page 44 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
consolidating storage and shipping arrangements and stated that the 

conditions needed to be thoroughly assessed and workable 

recommendations developed. These officials noted two obstacles that 

would have to be overcome. First, the Army had already purchased its 

general support inventory and wanted to be reimbursed for inventory 

transferred back to DLA. Second, the Directorate of Security Plans and 

Operations, within the Army’s Area Support Group in Kuwait, had 

assessed the Mina Abdullah Complex as too great a security risk for 

relocating the operations from Camp Arifjan. In January 2007, subsequent 

to our visit to Kuwait, the directorate completed a new force protection 

assessment of the Mina Abdullah Complex. According to DLA officials, 

this new assessment leaves open the possibility of moving the Theater 

Consolidation and Shipping Point and the Army general support 

warehouse to the distribution depot if certain deficiencies are adequately 

addressed. In March 2007, the DLA Defense Distribution Center directed a 

study team to conduct an analysis of major theater receipt, storage, and 

distribution nodes and processes in U.S. Central Command. In April 2007,

the study team briefed the Distribution Process Owner Executive Board 

on the results of its assessment, which included recommendations to 

terminate the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point contract and 

assume these functions at the defense distribution depot and to draw 

down inventory and operations at the Army general support warehouse at 

Camp Arifjan. 

Command and Control 

Over Joint Logistics 

Functions Remains 

Unresolved 

Command and control over joint logistics functions has been a concern 

due to past challenges with directing and coordinating logistics resources 

and systems within a theater of operations. In past combat operations, 

joint forces dispersed over a large area of operations placed significant 

demands on the ability of the joint force commander to provide, manage, 

and prioritize logistics support. For example, although the combatant 

commander has directive authority for logistics, existing capabilities and 

processes limit the ability to exercise this authority. In 1997, DOD 

identified command and control as a key focus area of joint theater 

logistics in order to prioritize and allocate scarce resources, determine 

how services can share existing assets and capabilities in theater, and 

eliminate redundancies and excess capabilities. Additionally, officials at 

U.S. Pacific Command explained that senior military leaders have 

indicated that they want a single point of contact for all logistics 

information in theater. Officials at U.S. Central Command stated that clear 

lines of command and control, in addition to improved asset visibility, are 

currently needed to advance joint theater logistics.

Page 45 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
The joint theater logistics initiatives we reviewed all include organizational 

structures intended to provide command and control over all or part of 

logistics functions under the combatant commander’s control. In addition 

to the initiatives discussed earlier in this report, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command is coordinating the Joint Experimental Deployment and 

Support initiative.44 The objective of this initiative is to experiment with a 

range of command and control options that can provide logistics 

coordination, integration, and synchronization to meet the combatant 

commander’s priorities. The initiative builds upon DOD’s Joint 

Deployment Distribution Operations Center concept and progresses along 

a continuum to include more robust organizational options. According to

U.S. Joint Forces Command, the different options in the continuum would 

allow a combatant commander to select a flexible capability and tailor it 

to suit the size and complexity of a mission. The options along this 

continuum are displayed in figure 5. 

Several Command and Control 

Options Have Emerged 

 44U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive agent for joint warfighting 

experimentation, making it responsible for conducting joint experimentation on new 

warfighting concepts and disseminating the results of these activities to the joint concept

community. 

Page 46 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included in the

Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative

Note: Scalability refers to the breadth, depth, numbers of nations, and size of the joint operations

areas. Complexity is determined by the geography of the theater, number of distribution nodes, and 

rapid deployment, among other factors. 

The Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus, which is on 

the lower end of the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support 

continuum, is being tested in U.S. European Command. The command’s 

Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center currently has day-to-day 

responsibilities that it handles with a staff of 55. For a contingency 

operation, this organization could be upgraded to the Joint Deployment 

Distribution Operations Center Plus, with additional staff augmentation 

from the command’s logistics directorate, military services, and other 

DOD components. U.S. European Command is drafting standard operating 

procedures for the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus. 

According to command officials, the Joint Deployment Distribution 

Operations Center Plus may be included in DOD’s updated template for 

the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center, which is due in 

August 2007.

Page 47 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
The Enabled/Enhanced J4,

45 which is being tested and developed in U.S. 

Pacific Command, is the next organizational option on the Joint 

Experimental Deployment and Support continuum. According to 

command officials, the Enhanced J4 is activated during contingencies and 

includes U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Deployment Distribution 

Operations Center and a fusion cell, which is a 4-person group that pulls 

together and filters information for the J4. While U.S. Pacific Command’s 

Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center is run by a staff of 5 for 

day-to-day operations, during a contingency the organization would be 

augmented to support the Enhanced J4 with a staff of up to 64. U.S. Pacific 

Command is currently developing standard operating procedures and joint

mission-essential tasks for this new capability. 

The Joint Force Support Component Command is the most robust 

continuum option being evaluated. This organization is designed to 

provide a single theater logistics command with enhanced joint 

capabilities to identify theater logistics shortfalls, prioritize shortfalls, and 

direct theater logistics resources. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, has 

stated that the Joint Force Support Component Command will be the 

logistics command and control structure for any future contingency

operations in Korea. The Army’s 19th Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command in Korea serves as the headquarters for the Joint Force Support 

Component Command, which will be augmented by integrating staff from 

other components in Korea, the Pacific Command’s Joint Deployment 

Distribution Operations Center-Korea, DLA, and the Director of Mobility 

Forces-Surface. The Joint Force Support Component Command has been 

tested in two exercises—Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and 

Integration and Ulchi Focus Lens—and U.S. Forces Korea officials are 

currently involved in the Senior Leader Seminar as part of the high-level 

process to discuss the next iteration and iron out the roles and 

responsibilities of the Joint Force Support Component Command. U.S. 

military officials in Korea explained that the future goal is to merge the 

Joint Force Support Component Command into a joint logistics command. 

The Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum shows two 

other command and control options that could support more complex 

operations. These options are the Combined Logistics Coordination Center 

 45J4 designates the logistics directorate or section of a joint staff. U.S. Joint Forces 

Command refers to this option as the Enabled J4, and U.S. Pacific Command calls it the 

Enhanced J4. 

Page 48 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
and the Combined/Coalition Joint Force Support Component Command. 

However, DOD has not defined, developed, or tested these options. 

Despite the development of these new organizations designed to offer 

robust logistics command and control capabilities, our discussions with 

officials from the combatant commands and the military services revealed 

unresolved issues related to exercising joint command and control over 

logistics functions in a theater of operations. For example, some military 

services have indicated that they would not support the establishment of a 

Joint Force Support Component Command in other geographic combatant 

commands, leaving the future of this initiative in question. A number of 

officials had concerns about how organizations such as the Joint Force 

Support Component Command would be staffed and what roles and 

authorities it would have. Specifically, they mentioned (1) statutory 

requirements for logistics support, (2) directive authority for logistics, and

(3) operational and financial considerations. 

Command and Control Issues 

Have Not Been Resolved 

Although the Joint Force Support Component Command is still in an 

experimentation phase, there has been resistance from the services to its 

future implementation. The Air Force, for example, has stated that, while 

the Joint Force Support Component Command might work for the size and 

scale of operations in the Korean theater, DOD should be cautious about 

adopting it as a model across all combatant commands. The services have 

expressed concerns about mandating that they provide staff to the Joint 

Force Support Component Command, while also fulfilling their Title 10 

responsibilities to man, train, and equip their forces.46 The Marine Corps 

said this would hinder its ability to provide logistics support to its own 

tasked missions and to deploy in a “lean” condition. Officials from military 

service components in the geographic combatant commands also raised 

the issue of having a service component take direction from a separate 

component command at the same level, rather than from a higher level 

command, and they were resistant to losing personnel to such an 

organization because the service component commands still have tactical 

logistics responsibilities to fulfill. While the Navy has not provided an 

official position on the Joint Force Support Component Command, Navy 

officials told us they did have some concerns with the initiative and that 

one disadvantage of a single logistics command is that it separates 

logistics from operations instead of keeping both functions under the 

same operational commander they are designed to support. 

 46See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, and 8013. 

Page 49 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Some military service officials we interviewed raised questions about the 

effectiveness of a Joint Force Support Component Command that lacked 

an ability to exercise directive authority for logistics. Directive authority 

for logistics gives the combatant commander the ability to shift logistics 

resources within the theater in order to accomplish a mission.47 While DOD 

doctrine states that directive authority for logistics may be delegated to a 

subordinate commander, such as a joint force commander or service 

component commander,48 officials we interviewed did not believe directive 

authority for logistics could be delegated below that level of command to 

an entity such as the Joint Force Support Component Command. Without 

this authority, some military service officials question how the Joint Force 

Support Component Command differs from other logistics command and 

control organizations if the organization can make recommendations to 

the joint force commander but not actually direct the transfer of assets 

across the service components, known as cross-leveling. For example, 

officials in U.S. Pacific Command stated that the Joint Force Support 

Component Command faced challenges when trying to release joint 

logistics tasking orders during the exercises because it could not resolve 

issues with the service components. They believed that the role of the 

organization should be to coordinate with the services to deconflict and 

prioritize support to the next campaign rather than address problems at 

the tactical level. Since directive authority for logistics still resides with 

the joint force commander, the Joint Force Support Component Command 

does not provide any additional authorities; therefore, some officials 

argued that its functions could be accomplished with an organization such 

as U.S. Pacific Command’s Enhanced J4. 

There are also readiness and financial considerations related to exercising

directive authority for logistics. In this process, the component

commanders provide input as to what they can support. There are military 

operational risks and trade-offs associated with cross-leveling, because 

assets diverted from one unit to support another unit may affect the giving

organization’s ability to conduct a future operation. Officials raised 

concerns that logisticians in a separate logistics command may not fully 

 47Under 10 U.S.C. §164, unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of 

Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command

with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include giving 

authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out 

missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations, joint training, and logistics. 

48JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3. 

Page 50 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
understand the impact of cross-leveling on the next military mission. 

Additionally, because the services obtain funding for their own assets, 

several officials told us that some form of financial reconciliation must be 

considered when exercising directive authority for logistics. Thus, any 

assets provided from one service to another must be accounted for and 

later replaced or reimbursed. Because of these financial considerations, 

some military service component officials believed that joint funding is 

necessary to support joint operations.

Issues related to joint command and control over logistics in theater are 

not limited to the Joint Force Support Component Command organization.

For example, another joint theater logistics initiative, the Theater 

Sustainment Command, also faces some logistics command and control 

challenges. As discussed earlier in this report, the Theater Sustainment 

Command is an Army logistics command and control organization that is 

being developed to streamline logistics support as part of Army 

modularity. The Theater Sustainment Command, however, is also being 

developed as a “joint-capable” headquarters that becomes a joint 

organization in a theater of operations with the addition of augmentees 

from the military services and other DOD agencies. Its joint-capable 

designation raises the same issues as the Joint Force Support Component 

Command regarding staffing, roles, and authorities. In addition to the 

current uncertainty over who exercises control over the Theater and 

Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, there would be added the question 

of where these organizations would fit into the theater. Further, some 

military service component officials questioned whether using these Army 

organizations in their joint command and control capacities would lessen 

their ability to perform Army-specific tasks. Until lines of command and 

control are clearly defined for these new organizations, joint force 

commanders will continue to face challenges in directing and coordinating 

logistics resources within a theater of operations.

Joint theater logistics has the potential to address long-standing issues 

associated with visibility and distribution of assets within a theater of 

operations, which is a critical step toward overall improvements in supply 

chain management and support to the warfighter. While several initiatives 

developed by different DOD components show promise in improving the 

joint force commander’s ability to see emerging logistics requirements and 

rapidly respond to them, these initiatives have been fragmented across the 

department due to the lack of a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach. Moreover, the diffused organization of DOD’s 

logistics operations, including separate funding and management of 

Conclusions 

Page 51 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
resources and systems, complicates DOD’s ability to adopt such an 

approach to developing and implementing joint theater logistics 

capabilities. Transformational changes in DOD’s organization—such as 

those proposed by a number of organizations that believe DOD should

move toward a more integrated logistics system and change how it 

controls and allocates logistics funding—could potentially require changes 

to existing laws, such as Title 10. Another factor that has hindered 

adoption of a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to joint 

theater logistics has been changes with respect to DOD’s overall logistics 

transformation strategy. Without a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach, DOD may have difficulty addressing the challenges 

discussed in this report, including determining roles and responsibilities 

for DOD’s port opening capability, addressing asset visibility issues caused 

by noninteroperable information technology systems, resolving 

disagreements on roles for coordinating surface transportation, making 

more use of opportunities to consolidate storage and shipping activities in 

Kuwait, and clarifying command and control over theater logistics 

functions. Moreover, without a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach, DOD is not in a position to effectively coordinate 

the initiatives across the department, guard against potential duplication 

of effort, and prioritize initiatives to make decisions on how best to target 

its resources. 

To improve logistics and supply chain operations, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics), in his capacity as the Defense Logistics 

Executive, to develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive 

management approach to guide and oversee efforts across the department

to improve distribution and supply support for U.S. forces in a joint 

theater. This approach should encompass sound management principles, 

including developing specific strategies and goals, assigning accountability 

for achieving results, and using outcome-oriented performance measures, 

and should be aligned with the results of the ongoing joint capabilities 

portfolio management test, the proposed realignment of focused logistics 

capabilities, and the development of a “to be” roadmap. In considering 

options for implementing this recommendation, the Under Secretary 

should determine whether any changes should be made to DOD’s 

organizational structure and control of resources for joint logistics support 

and identify the steps needed to make these changes, including changes to

existing laws, such as Title 10. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 52 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
To make more economical and efficient use of shipping and storage 

facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, 

DLA, to evaluate existing storage and shipping arrangements within the 

geographic combatant commands and identify opportunities for 

consolidation. 

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both 

of our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that we 

incorporated as appropriate. The department’s response is reprinted in 

appendix I. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In response to our recommendation for developing and implementing a 

coordinated and comprehensive management approach to improving 

distribution and supply support in a joint theater, DOD stated that the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense is leading initiatives in portfolio management, 

the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) is focusing on Joint Logistics 

portfolio management, Joint Staff (J4) is updating the Joint Logistics Joint 

Functional Concept, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics 

and Materiel Readiness) is developing the logistics strategy and roadmap, 

which are to be completed by summer 2008. While we acknowledge these 

steps that DOD is taking to improve distribution and supply support for 

U.S. forces in a joint theater as a good start, we continue to believe that as

DOD develops and implements a comprehensive management approach 

that is coordinated across the department, DOD needs to incorporate the 

sound management principles we describe in this report. Again, in 

considering options for implementing this recommendation, the Under 

Secretary should determine whether any changes should be made to 

DOD’s organizational structure and control of joint logistical support, and 

identify steps needed to make these changes, including changes to existing 

laws, such as Title 10. We are reemphasizing these two matters because 

DOD did not specifically address them in its comments to our 

recommendations. 

Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Director, Defense Logistics Agency, to evaluate existing storage and 

shipping arrangements within the geographic combatant commands and 

identify opportunities for consolidation, DOD stated that it plans to 

complete such an evaluation by the summer of 2008. We believe this 

action, if implemented, will be responsive to our recommendation. 

Page 53 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
To assess DOD’s approach to managing joint theater logistics, we 

identified sound management principles based on prior work on 

organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the 

Government Performance and Results Act.49 We also reviewed doctrine, 

regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and other 

documents related to the development of joint theater logistics, logistics 

strategic planning, and supply chain management. This review included 

reports by various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed 

DOD’s logistics organization. While we examined the recommendations 

proposed by these organizations, the scope of our review did not include 

an assessment of these proposals or what changes, if any, would require 

congressional action. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) and the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate who are involved in

joint theater logistics and logistics transformation. Over the course of 

these visits and interviews, we obtained pertinent information on the 

status of DOD’s efforts in support of joint theater logistics, such as the “as 

is” Focused Logistics Roadmap, the “to be” roadmap, and the supply chain 

management improvement plan. We reviewed the draft joint theater 

logistics white paper, implementation plan, and capability process 

analyses. We also examined DOD’s overall efforts to institute a long-term 

logistics strategy, reviewing strategic planning documents such as vision 

statements, joint doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps that have

addressed DOD’s future logistics systems. We discussed the capabilities 

portfolio management test case with OSD and Joint Staff personnel. 

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. 

Transportation Command, combatant commands, DLA, the military 

services, and selected reserve components to get their perspectives on 

joint theater logistics. 

Scope and 

Methodology 

To obtain information on DOD’s progress in implementing joint theater 

logistics initiatives, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military service 

guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status reports, and other 

pertinent documentation related to the development of these initiatives. 

To identify the status of initiatives DOD is working on to address joint 

theater logistics, we focused on the four initiatives highlighted in the “as 

is” roadmap in support of joint theater logistics: Joint Deployment 

 49See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003), and GAO,

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 54 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Distribution Operations Center, Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, Joint

Experimental Deployment and Support, and Theater Sustainment 

Commands. We conducted interviews and obtained information on these 

initiatives from U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, and the Army’s G-4 logistics directorate. In addition, we also 

looked at four other initiatives related to providing support to the joint 

force commander: Joint Task Force-Port Opening, Node Management and 

Deployable Depot, Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points, and Joint 

Regional Inventory and Material Management. Because these initiatives 

have been recently implemented or are still in the testing stages, in some 

cases we were able to obtain only limited data on their effectiveness, and 

we did not independently validate these data. To obtain information on 

specific initiatives, we interviewed officials from U.S. Transportation 

Command and two of its components, Air Mobility Command and the 

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; U.S. Joint Forces 

Command; DLA; U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command; the 

military services; and selected reserve components. Additionally, we 

visited and interviewed officials in the five geographic combatant 

commands: U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. 

We also met with military service component commands in U.S. Central 

Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command and with

operational units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. Because several of the

newly developed initiatives are being tested in the Korean theater of 

operations, we visited the subordinate unified command in Korea to 

discuss their experiences and challenges in implementing joint theater 

logistics. We attended the out-brief for an Army conference on theater 

opening, reviewed after-action reports from exercises that tested the 

initiatives, and analyzed lessons learned reports from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. To assess the reliability of the container management system 

data, we interviewed Container Management Element officials at Camp 

Arifjan, Kuwait, about the internal controls and reliability of the system. 

We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We conducted our review from July 2006 to April 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, DLA; the Director, 

Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. This 

report will also be available at no charge at our Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Page 55 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Key contributors to this 

report are listed in appendix II. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 56 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Appendix I: Comments from the Department Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 57 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 58 GAO-07-807 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 59 GAO-07-807

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Karyn Angulo, Alissa Czyz, Maria Gomez, Thomas Gosling, Brian 

Howell, and Larry Junek.

Defense Logistics

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350907) 
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