UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ J. G., a minor, through her father and Conservator, Mark Grimes, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. KIM BIMESTEFER, in her official capacity as Executiv e Director of the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing; CHRISTINE NIERENZ, in her official capacity as Administrative Law Judge II for the Colorado Office of Appeals of the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, Defendants - Appellees.

------------------------------ COLORADO CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY, INC.; COLORADO LEGAL SERVICES; JUSTICE IN AGING; NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE; NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, Amici Curiae. No. 21-1194 (D.C. No. 1:19-CV -02674-WJM-STV) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 27, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 12 Before PHILLIPS , MORITZ , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Appellant J.G., through her father and c onservator, Mark Grimes, appeals the district court orders dismis sing her claims, denying her motion for reconsideration, and denying her motion to amend her co mplaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background 1
J.G. was born in December 2005. In January 2007, she su ffered an adverse reaction to a measles-mumps-rubella-varicella vaccine. That unfortuna tely led to serious health consequences. Through her mother and then -conservator, J.G. petitione d for compensation in the Court of Federal Claims under the Nationa l Childhood Vaccine In jury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 et seq. 2 While her petition was pending, J.G. applied for and was

1 The contents of this sec tion are taken from J.G.’s co mplaint. We disregard all legal conclusions and i rrelevant allegations. Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018). But we accept as true all relevant, well-pleaded facts and view them in the light most fa vorable to the plaintiff. Id.

2 The Vaccine Act “establishes a no -fault compensation program” that compensates individuals w ho are injured by vaccines. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC , 562 U.S. 223, 228 (2011) . Under the program: A person injured by a vaccine, or his legal guardian, may file a petition for compensation in the United States Court of Federal Claims, naming the Secretary of Health and Human Se rvices as the respondent. A special master then makes an informal adjudi cation of the petition . . . . The Court of Federal Claims must re view objections to the special master's decision and enter final judgment . . . . At th at point, a claimant has two options: Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 23 approved to receive benefits under Colorado’s Medicaid pr ogram. That included Home and Community Based Children’s Extensive Su pport Waiver services, which are offered to children with developmental delays or disabilities. In Colo rado, Medicaid is administered by the Colorado Departme nt of Health Care Policy & Financing (“Department”). In 2011, while J.G. was receiving Medicaid benefits, a special master in the Court of Federal Claims approved a se ttlement between J.G. and th e Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). The settlement incl uded compensation for several categories of damages, including (1) a lump-sum paym ent into a reversionary trust that DHHS created, Regions Bank managed as trustee, and J.G. could access for only therapy expenses, and (2) a lump-sum payment to pu rchase an annuity, pr oviding J.G. annual payments during her life. A Colorado state court also approved the settlement terms. For roughly five years, the Department expressed no concerns with J.G.’s settlement. That changed in April 2016, when the Depart ment began questioning the settlement’s terms. J.G.’s representatives trie d addressing the Depart ment’s concerns but to no avail. In 2017, J.G. was notified that her Medicaid benefits were being terminated. The notice stated that the reversionary trus t was a countable resource that placed J.G.

to accept the court’s judgment and fo rgo a traditional tort suit for damages, or to reject the judgment a nd seek tort relief from the vaccine manufacturer. Id. Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 34 above the allowable-resource lim it to qualify for Medicaid assi stance. It also said that money received under the annu ity contract put J.G. over the allowable income limit. J.G. appealed that decisi on to the Office for Administ rative Courts. The appeal was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Ta nya Light. During those proceedings, the parties agreed that the case could be deci ded on summary-judgment briefing, without a hearing. So they submitted their briefs a nd supporting exhibits, some of which were stipulated. After considering the arguments, ALJ Light issued an “Initial Decision” that reversed the Department’s ineligibility ruling, concluding that neither the reversionary trust nor the annuity were countable assets for determining J.G.’s Medicaid eligibility. The Department objected to the Initial Deci sion, and J.G. filed a response to those objections. The matter was reviewed by Appe llee Christine Nieren z, an ALJ in the Department’s Office of Appeals. In July 2019, she issued a Final Agency Decision (“Final Decision”) that reversed the Initial Decision. ALJ Nierenz concluded that the reversionary trust and the annuity were countable assets after all, making J.G. ineligible for Medicaid assistance.
II. Procedural Background The Final Decision stated that J.G. could seek judicial review of the decision by suing in the appropriate state district court w ithin 35 days. But J.G. didn’t pursue that option; she instead turned to federal court and filed a complaint in the District of Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 45 Colorado. She asserted five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against ALJ Nierenz and Kim Bimestefer in their official capacities as members of the Office of Appeals. 3 In Count I, J.G. alleges that ALJ Nierenz violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V)–(VI) by not evaluating her Medicaideligibility “in accordance with the regulations and law as set fort h in the [Supplemental Security Income] program.” 4 R. Vol. 1 at 109. According to J.G. , had ALJ Nierenz correctly relied on the Supplemental Security Income eligibility standards, she would have c oncluded that neither the reversionary trust nor the annuity was countabl e income to J.G. In Count II, J.G. alleges that the reversionary trust isn’t a countable asset under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) or an av ailable asset to her under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). She alleges that by interpreting the reversionary trust otherwise, the Department violated § 1396p(h)(1). She asks the district court to declare the trust a non-countable and unavailable asset to her, “as more fully set fo rth in the opinion of [] ALJ [Light] in the Initial Decision.” R. Vol. 1 at 118. In Count III, J.G. alleges that the Departme nt erred in concluding that the annuity was a countable resource under 42 U.S.C. § 13 96p. She says that because her annuity is

3 Bimestefer is the Depart ment’s Executive Director.

4 Supplemental Security Inco me is a federal program th at is “designed to help aged, blind, and disabled people[] who ha ve little or no income” by providing them money for basic needs. Supplemental Security Income Home Page — 2014 Edition , U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http ://www.ssa.gov/ssi/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 56 assigned to a disability trust, it’s neither a countable resource nor her personal income. She asks the district court to declare the same. Count IV alleges a claim for “Equitabl e Estoppel and Waiver,” but J.G. has abandoned that claim, and it is not at issue on appeal. In Count V, J.G. alleges that the Depart ment violated 42 U.S. C. § 1396a(r)(2)(A) by “counting income and resources for [her] in a manner that is more restrictive than the [Supplemental Security In come] program.” R. Vol. 1 at 124. J.G. says that “[t]he decision of [] ALJ [Light] in this case is correct unde r federal law,” while “[t]he decision of [ALJ] Nierenz is incorrect under federal law.” Id. at 125. ALJ Nierenz and Director Bimestefer m oved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that J.G.’s claims were barred by issue and cl aim preclusion. They also argued that J.G. lacked any enforceable federal rights under the Medicaid statutes. The district court granted their motion on claim-preclusion grou nds, concluding that the Final Decision was entitled to preclusive effect and that each of J.G .’s claims either had been raised or could have been raised during the administrative pr oceedings. The court then entered a final judgment. J.G. later moved for reconsideration and to amend her compla int. Both motions were denied. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss We review de novo the gr ant of a motion to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds. Johnson v. Spencer , 950 F.3d 680, 70 4 (10th Cir. 2020). Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 67 a. Whether the Final Decision Can Have Preclusive Effect We must first decide whether the Final Decision can have preclusive effect. We conclude that it can. Federal courts must give full faith and cr edit to state-court j udgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. This principle can also extend to state administrative actions. When an agency (1) acts in a judicial capacity, (2) re solves disputed issues of fact before it, and (3) the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate issues, the agen cy’s decision has the same preclusive effect it woul d have in state court. Salguero v. City of Clovis , 366 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004). An agency acts in a judicial capa city “[w]hen the decision is likely to affect the rights and duties of specific individuals and is reached through the application of preexisting legal standards or po licy considerations to present or past facts developed at a hearing.” Chellsen v. Pena , 857 P.2d 472, 475 (Colo. App. 1992). The above elements ar e satisfied here. First, both AL Js Light and Nierenz acted in a judicial capacity. They relied on Colorado and Tenth Circuit caselaw in evaluating J.G.’s Medicaid eligibility. It doesn’t matter that no hearing occurre d, because “[t]he parties agreed that the case could be decide d on summary judgment, and requested [that] the Court vacate the scheduled hearing and set a briefing sche dule.” R. Vol. 1 at 43. Second, the administrative proceedings resolved disputed issues of fact. The parties filed exhibits in support of their summary-judgment briefs, which formed the basis of many of ALJ Light’s extensive factual findings. In fa shioning her Final Decision, ALJ Nierenz was bound by those findings unless they were “contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 65. Third, J.G. had a full and ade quate opportunity to litigate whether the Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 78 reversionary trust and the an nuity rendered her ineligible for Medicaid—indeed, her arguments persuaded AL J Light to reverse the Department ’s initial termination decision. We thus conclude that the Final Decision can have preclusive effect in this case.
b. Whether the Final Decision P recludes J.G.’s Federal Lawsuit Having determined that the Final Decision can have preclusive effect, we must now determine whether it does preclude J.G.’s lawsuit here. We conclude that it does. We noted above that “[f]ederal courts give state agency determinations the same preclusive effect that the foru m state’s courts would afford them.” Guttman v. Khalsa , 669 F.3d 1101, 1109 (10th Cir. 2012). He re, the parties agree that if claim preclusion applies, we should as sess it under Colorado law. Claim preclusion bars re-lit igation of matters that we re decided or could have been raised in a prior proceeding. Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. , 109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo. 2005). The doctrine saves parties from multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and promotes relian ce on the judicial system by preventing inconsistent decisions. See id. In Colorado, claim preclusion applies when: “(1) the judgment in the prior pro ceeding was final; (2) the prior and current proceedings involved identical subject matt er; (3) the prior and current proceedings involved identical claims fo r relief; and (4) the partie s to the proceedings were identical or in privity with one another.” Gale v. City and Cnty. of Denver , 500 P.3d 351, 354 (Colo. 2020) (citation omitted). J.G. doesn’t contest whether the firs t, second, and fourth elements are satisfied. She doesn’t meaningfully discus s them in her briefing, and during oral Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 89 argument, she confirmed that she was ch allenging only the third element—namely, the identity-of-claims element. 5 So we limit our analys is to that element. “Identity of claims exists when ‘the cl aim at issue in the second proceeding is the same claim that was (or could have been) brought in the first proceeding.’” Gale v. City and Cnty. of Denver , 923 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10t h Cir. 2019) (quoting Foster v. Plock , 394 P.3d 1119, 1127 (Colo. 2017)). One prin ciple is critical here: “the inquiry does not focus on the sp ecific claim asserted or the name given to the claim .” Argus , 109 P.3d at 608–09 (emphasis added). Rather , the “same claim or cause of action requirement is bounded by the injury for which relief is demanded , and not by the legal theory on which the pers on asserting the claim relies.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Gale , 923 F.3d at 1256 (“Colorado ‘disregard[s] the form of the action and instead look[s] at the ac tual injury underlying the first proceeding’ using a transactional analysis to determ ine whether the claims ‘seek redress for essentially the same basic wrong, and rest on the same or a substantially similar factual basis.’”) (alterati ons in original) (quoting Foster , 394 P.3d at 1127). We evaluate each of J.G.’s claims with these principles in mind.

5 In a footnote, J.G. argues that the pr ivity-of-parties elemen t isn’t met because her lawsuit must involve Re gions Bank as a witness. See Op. Br. at 26 n.7. She notes that if the reversionary trust is deemed a co untable asset, then any use of the trust is subject to Regions Bank’s consent. But sh e abandoned this position at oral argument when clarifying that she only challenges th e identity-of-claims elem ent. And even if she didn’t mean to abandon the argument, she cites no authority illustrating that we should consider witnesses when evaluating whether the parties are either identical or in privity. Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 910 i. Count I In Count I, J.G. alleges that ALJ Ni erenz failed to evaluate her Medicaid eligibility using the Supple mental Security Income el igibility standards, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (V)–(VI). She alleges that ALJ Light correctly recognized that a resource is not “countable” under the Supplemental Security Income standards unless a person can liquidate and use it. Thus, neither the reversionary trust nor the annuity is countable . So J.G. asks the court to: (1) enforce § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V)–(VI) and (2) declare that the Children’s Extensive Support Waiver program must be administered using Supplemental Security Income regulations. The injury that J.G. seeks to remedy in Count I is the denial of her Medicaid benefits. That’s the same in jury that she sought to re medy during her administrative proceedings. And during those proceedings, sh e raised many of the same points that are now alleged in Count I. For example, in her brief before ALJ Light, J.G. said that “[t]he Department is only permitted to consider income and resources as are available to the individual and when such income and resources can be liquida ted.” R. Vol. 2 at 151. She then stated that “[ a] trust cannot be c ounted as a resource if the individual does not have the right to use the assets as well as the au thority to dispose of that right.” Id. She also said that when determ ining her Medicaid eligibility, “[t]he Department is required to use the same methodology as th at used by [the Supplemental Security Income program].” Id. at 152. Based on these arguments, she Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1011 reasoned that the reversiona ry trust and annuity should be declared non-countable

resources. Given those similarities, it’s clear that the substance of Count I was considered during the administrative proceedings. Telli ngly, J.G. herself reduces Count I to one question: “Is [] ALJ [Light] correct or is [ALJ] Nierenz correct under federal law?” R. Vol. 1 at 112; see also id. at 113 (“Essentially, this Court would determine who is right under the federal law, [] ALJ [Light] or [ALJ] Nierenz.”). That framing further proves that Count I was already addresse d during the administ rative proceedings— J.G. simply disagrees with the outcome. We conclude that the iden tity-of-claims element is sati sfied as to Count I.
ii. Count II In Count II, J.G. alle ges that the reversionary trust is neither an “asset of the individual” under 42 U.S. C. § 1396p(h)(1), nor an “ava ilable” asset to her under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), “as more fully set fort h in the opinion of [] ALJ [Light] in the Initial Decision.” R. Vol. 1 at 114, 118. J. G. alleges that in reversing ALJ Light, “[ALJ] Nierenz misunderstood the legal re quirements of a proceeding brought under the National Vaccination Act” and misconstrued the nature of the reversionary trust. Id. at 115. J.G. alleges th at the trust “was never intended by anyone in the [Vaccination Act] proceeding to be an ‘asset of the individual’” because “DHHS is the grantor of the trust[, a nd] J.G. can only access [the tr ust’s] funds for a limited purpose, i.e., ABA therapy.” Id. at 116. So J.G. alleges that ALJ Nierenz violated § 1396p(h)(1) and asks the dist rict court to enforce the stat ute. She also asks the court Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1112 to declare that the trust is neither an “asset of the indivi dual” nor an “available” asset under the applicable statutes. Again, the injury that J. G. seeks to remedy is th e denial of her Medicaid benefits in the Final Deci sion. She sought to address the same injury during her administrative proceedings and raised many of the same points now raised in Count II. Before ALJ Light, J.G. argued that the trust wasn’t an “asset of the individual” because it was created and funded by DHHS, not herself. R. Vol. 2 at 150. She said that the trust was not an available asset under § 1396p(h)(1) because it was “conferred on [her] under very strict guidelines,” and she had “no right or power to direct or control” it. Id. at 150–51. She argued that “c ounting [the Reversionary Trust] as available would vi olate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17 )(B) and (C) . . . . [because] the federal government itself placed rest riction on the distributions from the Reversionary Trust and Colo rado Medicaid officials have no authority to alter the federal government’s authority and power to determine how funds . . . must be utilized.” Id. at 153. She made similar arguments to ALJ Nierenz. Thus, in Count II, J.G. “seek[s] redre ss for essentially the same basic wrong” at issue in her administ rative proceedings and on th e same factual basis. Gale , 923 F.3d at 1256. That she asks the distri ct court to interp ret § 1396p(h)(1) and § 1396a(a)(17) the same way that ALJ Li ght did shows that Count II was already addressed during the admi nistrative proceedings. We therefore conclude that the identity -of-claims element is satisfied as to
Count II. Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1213 iii. Count III In Count III, J.G. allege s that ALJ Nierenz violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) by declaring the annuity payments “countable income,” which rendered her ineligible for Medicaid. She says that ALJ Nierenz “ignored the fact that the annuity is assigned to [a] disability trust which al ready names the Department as remainder beneficiary.” R. Vol. 1 at 121. J.G. ar gues that under § 1396p, an asset that’s assigned to a disability trus t is not countable income for purposes of her Medicaid eligibility. So she asks the district court to find that the annuity payments are not countable income. As with Counts I and II, the injury that underlies Co unt III is the termination of J.G.’s Medicaid benefits. J.G. tried curing that injury through the administrative proceedings and relied on the same points th at are now alleged in Count III. In her brief to ALJ Light, she stated that “[t]he original pleadings establishing the J.G. Disability Trust specifically authorize the guardian/cons ervator to transfer the annuity payments to the Disability Trust which was done without exception.” R. Vol. 2 at 155. She then argued that “[t]he annu ity payments cannot be counted as income to J.G. because they are not available to he r nor can the payments be accessed or used for J.G.’s support.” R. Vol. 2 at 156. She raised similar arguments in her brief to ALJ Nierenz. Through Count III, then, J. G. asks the court to review a matter that was already addressed during the administrative proceedings. This is also proven by her allegation that ALJs Nierenz and Light incorrectly characte rized the annuity. See R. Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1314 Vol. 1 at 120 (“[N]either the Initial Decisi on nor the Final Agency Decision is correct under federal law.”). Though J. G. is dissatisfied with how the matter was decided, claim preclusion bars our review here. We find that the identity-of-claims el ement is satisfied as to Count III.
iv. Count V In Count V, J.G. alleges that ALJ Nierenz violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r)(2)(A) by “counting income and resources for [her Me dicaid eligibility] in a manner that is more restrictive than the [S upplemental Security Income] program.” R. Vol. 1 at 124. Once again, the injury underl ying J.G.’s Count V is the loss of her Medicaid benefits. During the administrative proceed ings, she sought re dress for the same injury and raised the same argument. In her brief to ALJ Light, J.G. also cited § 1396a(r)(2)(A) to argue that “[t]he Depa rtment is required to use the same methodology as that used by [the Supplemental Security Income program].” R. Vol. 2 at 152. Further, we’ve already noted th at during the administrative proceedings, many of J.G.’s arguments c oncerned why the reversiona ry trust and the annuity weren’t countable resources or income. See supra Sections I.b.ii–iii. J.G. even alleges that “[t] he decision of [] ALJ [Light ] in this case is correct under federal law,” while “[t]he decision of [ALJ] Nierenz is incorrect.” R. Vol. 1 at 125. She’s thus candid that through Count V, she merely seeks review of a matter already raised and decided. Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1415 The identity-of-claims element is satisfied as to Count V. And in sum, we hold that the district court didn’t err in c oncluding that Colorado’s four-part claimpreclusion test was satisfied as to each of J.G.’s claims.

c. J.G.’s Section 1983 Arguments Before moving on, we briefly address tw o of J.G.’s arguments related to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, she ar gues that claim preclusion doe s not apply to “unreviewed administrative proceedings where Section 198 3 was not raised nor could it be raised.” Op. Br. at 19. Second, she says that she wasn’t required to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing a federal complaint containing § 1983 claims. Id. at 13. Neither argument is persuasive. To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that she was deprived of a federally protected right. Crown Point I, LLC v. Inte rmountain Rural Elec. Ass’n , 319 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). Merely a lleging a violation of federal law is not enough. Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. R. v. Owens , 464 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 2006). And merely labeling claims as “Sec tion 1983 claims” is not enough, because Colorado’s claim-preclusion analysis does not focus on how claims are styled. Argus , 109 P.3d at 608–09. We must look at the substance of each claim. Id. Nowhere in J.G.’s complaint does sh e allege that she was deprived of a federally protected right. Nowhere in her briefing does she say which rights were Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1516 violated. 6 Nor does she ever allege that any applicable statutes , regulations, or policies are invalid or unconstitutional. 7 J.G.’s claims are in stead based on alleged violations of federal la w. That, alone, does not make them § 1983 claims. Mandy R. , 464 F.3d at 1146. We acknowledge that during her admini strative proceedings, J.G. could not have raised constitutional claims unde r § 1983. Had she challenged the constitutionality of a Department regulati on, for example, ALJs Light and Nierenz would have been powerless under Colo rado law to declare it unconstitutional. See 10 Colo. Regs. 2505-10, § 8.057.8.E. Separately, J.G. is correct that a plaintiff needn’t exhaust state administrative proceedings be fore filing a federal complaint containing § 1983 claims. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 519 (10th Cir. 1998). But these principles do not help her. They are relevant when a party asserts true § 1983 claims—that is, claims involving alleged violati ons of federally protected rights. J.G.’s claims do not contain those allegations, so they are not § 1983 claims. Despite that conclusion, we are not deci ding whether J.G. ha s private rights of action under the statutes that she alleges were violated. I ndeed, multiple circuits have

6 J.G. does say that ALJ Nierenz’s Fina l Decision “is specifically violative of federal rights because it allegedly ignored federal rights-creating language,” yet she doesn’t specify which rights we re violated. Op. Br. at 25.

7 The district court made a similar obs ervation in its order denying J.G.’s motion for reconsideration. See R. Vol. 3 at 241 (“Tellingly, Plaintiff does not cite any specific paragraphs from her Amended Complaint where she asserted a facial challenge to Department regulations or polic ies, nor did the Court discern any in its review of the Amended Complaint.”). Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1617 held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a( 10), on which Count I is based, creates a private right of action through § 1983. See, e.g. , Watson v. Weeks , 436 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 18 3 (3d Cir. 2004); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2004). But the Ninth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), on wh ich Count II is partially based, does not create a private right of action. Watson , 436 F.3d at 1162. As for the remaining statutes that J.G. cites, neither our circuit nor others have decided whether they create private rights of action. And we don’t confront those ques tions here, for the parties haven’t discussed them in their briefs. United States v. Chee , 514 F.3d 1106, 1112 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). Regardless, this appeal’s outcome doesn’t turn on whether the relevant statutes create private rights of action through § 1983. Even if they do, it remains true that the injury underlying J.G.’s clai ms is her loss of Medicaid benefits. As we’ve noted repeatedly, that is the sa me injury that J.G. s ought to remedy during her administrative proceedings. And under Colo rado claim-preclusion law, the identityof-claims element is satisfied when a part y seeks redress for th e same injury as before. Gale , 923 F.3d at 1256. J.G. canno t avoid that conclusion.
II. Order Denying Motion for Recons ideration and Motion to Amend After granting ALJ Nierenz and Director Bimestefer’s motion to dismiss, the district court entered a final judgment th at dismissed Claims I, II, III, and V with prejudice. One month later, J.G. moved for re consideration under Federal Rule of Civil Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1718 Procedure 59(e) and to amend her complaint. The district court denied both motions, and J.G. argues that the court erred by doing so. We review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Ketchum v.
Cruz , 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992). Gene rally, leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But once a judgment is entered, that presumption is reversed, and “the filing of an amended complaint is not permissible until judgment is set aside or vacated pursua nt to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b).” The Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp. , 419 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “To hold otherwise wo uld enable the liberal amendm ent policy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation.” Id. (citation omitted). J.G. acknowledges the above precedent but says that allowing amendment is appropriate if we conclude th at her motion for reconsiderati on should have been granted. We review the denial of a motion for re consideration for a buse of discretion. Wright ex rel. Tr. Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc. , 259 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 2001). A motion for reconsideration may be granted when “the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law.” Nelson v. City of Albuquerque , 921 F.3d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). J.G. hasn’t identified a misapprehension of any facts, arguments, or law that warrants granting her reconsid eration motion. Throughout her briefing on appeal, she presents arguments and issues that she c ould have raised—and did raise—during the administrative proceedings and before the dist rict court. Those matters are inappropriate Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 1819 for a reconsideration motion. See Servants of the Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (motions for reconsideration are inappropriate for “revisit[ing] issues already addressed or advanc[ing] arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing”). Thus, we see no error in the dist rict court’s denial of J.G.’s motion for reconsideration. And because the district court correctly denied the motion for reconsideration, it also correctly denied J.G.’s motion to amend. See Tool Box , 419 F.3d
at 1087. Moreover, “[c]ourts have refused to a llow a postjudgment amendment when . . . the moving party had an opportunity to seek the amendment before entry of judgment but waited until after judgment before requesting leave.” Id. at 1088. If J.G. truly meant to allege violations of federally protected ri ghts under § 1983, she co uld have amended her complaint to add those claims before the di strict court entered judgment. She offers no reason for us to think otherwise. We conclude that the district court didn’ t abuse its discretion in denying J.G.’s motion for reconsiderati on and motion to amend.
CONCLUSION The district court’s orders are affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 21-1194 Document: 010110716748 Date Filed: 07/27/2022 Page: 19