Combating

Proliferation of

Weapons of

Mass Destruction

Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization

of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Pursuant to Public Law 293, 104th Congress

In accordance with the Intelligence Author

(P.L. 104-283) and the Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277), we h

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Fed

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Commission was established in 

assessment and report to Congress on specific adm

changes it believes would improve U.S. performan

It has been an honor to serve.

Respectfully 

P.O. Box 18205

Washington, D.C. 20036-8205

(202) 331-4060

Fax (202) 296-5545

Chairman

John M. Deutch

Vice Chairman

Arlen Specter

Commissioners

Anthony C. Beilenson

Stephen A. Cambone*

M.D.B. Carlisle

Henry F. Cooper

J. James Exon

Robert L. Gallucci**

Dave McCurdy

Janne Nolan

Daniel Poneman

William Schneider, Jr.

Henry D. Sokolski

Executive Director

Suzanne E. Spaulding

* nominated

** resigned

John M. Deutch

Chairman

Anthony C. Beilenson Stephen A. Cambon

Janne NolanDaniel Poneman 

Henry D. Sokolosk

Enclosure

Henry F. Cooper J. James Exon 

The Honorable Trent Lott

Majority Leader

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:
In accordance with the Intelligence Author

(P.L. 104-283) and the Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277), we h

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Fed

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Commission was established in 

assessment and report to Congress on specific adm

changes it believes would improve U.S. performan

It has been an honor to serve.

Respectfully 

P.O. Box 18205

Washington, D.C. 20036-8205

(202) 331-4060

Fax (202) 296-5545

Chairman

John M. Deutch

Vice Chairman

Arlen Specter

Commissioners

Anthony C. Beilenson

Stephen A. Cambone*

M.D.B. Carlisle

Henry F. Cooper

J. James Exon

Robert L. Gallucci**

Dave McCurdy

Janne Nolan

Daniel Poneman

William Schneider, Jr.

Henry D. Sokolski

Executive Director

Suzanne E. Spaulding

* nominated

** resigned

John M. Deutch

Chairman

Anthony C. Beilenson Stephen A. Cambon

Janne NolanDaniel Poneman 

Henry D. Sokolosk

Enclosure

Henry F. Cooper J. James Exon 

The Honorable Tom Daschel

Minority Leader

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:
In accordance with the Intelligence Author

(P.L. 104-283) and the Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277), we h

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Fed

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Commission was established in 

assessment and report to Congress on specific adm

changes it believes would improve U.S. performan

It has been an honor to serve.

Respectfully 

P.O. Box 18205

Washington, D.C. 20036-8205

(202) 331-4060

Fax (202) 296-5545

Chairman

John M. Deutch

Vice Chairman

Arlen Specter

Commissioners

Anthony C. Beilenson

Stephen A. Cambone*

M.D.B. Carlisle

Henry F. Cooper

J. James Exon

Robert L. Gallucci**

Dave McCurdy

Janne Nolan

Daniel Poneman

William Schneider, Jr.

Henry D. Sokolski

Executive Director

Suzanne E. Spaulding

* nominated

** resigned

John M. Deutch

Chairman

Anthony C. Beilenson Stephen A. Cambon

Janne NolanDaniel Poneman 

Henry D. Sokolosk

Enclosure

Henry F. Cooper J. James Exon 

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the Intelligence Author

(P.L. 104-283) and the Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277), we h

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Fed

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Commission was established in 

assessment and report to Congress on specific adm

changes it believes would improve U.S. performan

It has been an honor to serve.

Respectfully 

P.O. Box 18205

Washington, D.C. 20036-8205

(202) 331-4060

Fax (202) 296-5545

Chairman

John M. Deutch

Vice Chairman

Arlen Specter

Commissioners

Anthony C. Beilenson

Stephen A. Cambone*

M.D.B. Carlisle

Henry F. Cooper

J. James Exon

Robert L. Gallucci**

Dave McCurdy

Janne Nolan

Daniel Poneman

William Schneider, Jr.

Henry D. Sokolski

Executive Director

Suzanne E. Spaulding

* nominated

** resigned

John M. Deutch

Chairman

Anthony C. Beilenson Stephen A. Cambon

Janne NolanDaniel Poneman 

Henry D. Sokolosk

Enclosure

Henry F. Cooper J. James Exon 

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt

Minority Leader

United States House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Leader:
Executive Summary 

Introduction Commission Charges and Procedures 

Chapter 1. A Grave Threat to the United States 

Chapter 2. Combating Proliferation: What the Federal Governmen

Should Do 

Chapter 3. Managing the Interagency Process 

Resources and Program Evaluation 

Technology Acquisition 

International Cooperative Efforts 

Chapter 4. Export Controls 

Chapter 5. Findings and Recommendations for Executive Branch

Agencies 

Common Agency Issues 

Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Intelligence Community 

Department of Commerce 

Other Agencies 

Department of the Treasury 

Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Departments of Health and Human Service

Agriculture 

Appendices

A: Commission History and Charter Legislation 

B: Commission Members and Staff 

C: Individuals Interviewed by the Commission 
iv

D: Baseline Survey of Proliferation-related 

E: Proliferation-related Interagency Coord

F: Proliferation-related Reporting Requirem

G: Resource Allocation—Budget Sub-func

H: Technology Acquisition 

Additional Views

Of J. James Exon 

Of M.D.B. Carlisle, Stephen Cambone*, Hen

William Schneider, Jr., and Henry Soko

Annex:

Organizational Overviews

Executive Office of the President 

Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Intelligence Community 

Department of Commerce 

Department of the Treasury 

* nominated
Every American should understand that weapons of mass destruction (WM

biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery—pose a grav

United States and to our military forces and our vital interests abroad. The m

threats are:

• Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United Stat

• Possession of, and the manufacturing infrastructure for, WMD by Iran, Ira

or other unfriendly states;

• Diversion of WMD-related weapons, technology, materials, and experti

• Transfer of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, delivery mean

technology by China; and

• Destabilizing consequences of WMD programs in the Middle East, Sout

Asia.

These threats define a chilling new reality for our country. Their magnitud

require a new strategy focused not just on prevention, but also on combat

of proliferation, to include impeding the spread of capability, responding 

as it occurs, strengthening our capacity to defend against such weapons, a

respond if these weapons are used against us at home or abroad.

Congress established this Commission to assess the organization of the Fede

with regard to WMD proliferation and to make recommendations for improve

is formidable. Proliferation is related to catastrophic terrorism, infrastructure 

espionage. Many separate government agencies that have overlapping juris

involved. Combating proliferation requires actions both at home and abroad

and with other nations and international organizations. The Commission find

Government is not effectively organized to combat proliferation.

This report makes many recommendations, including particular ones for e

involved. Together, the recommendations aim to bring about four major ch

• Presidential leadership is essential to ensure that a strategy for com

proliferation is formulated, understood, and implemented by the many a

involved. The President should consider assigning the Vice President a 

the National Security Council to ensure that adequate attention and res

devoted to WMD proliferation.

• Central direction and coordination. A new post of National Directo

Combating Proliferation should be established. The National Directo

within the National Security Council structure and would chair a new C

Proliferation Council. The Council, composed of senior-level officials 

each agency, would formulate policy, reach timely decisions, and harm

interagency process of program execution and resource allocation in a

an integrated national plan.
vi

• Improved execution of policies and programs by res

agency must adjust its internal organization, programs, 

reinforce an integrated government-wide effort to comba

Commission’s specific recommendations primarily addre

In the case of the Department of Defense, we recommend 

relationships. We endorse changes proposed for the De

• Integrated planning and budgeting of resources. The

resource expenditures for combating proliferation. Doing 

interagency effort. The Commission recommends the cr

function for this purpose. The National Director should b

government-wide plans, especially for technology develo

combat proliferation. These plans should be designed to e

and Congress to measure progress and assure that reso

and flexibly to explicit program objectives and schedules

We believe the adoption of the Commission report will reduce 

people from WMD proliferation. The Commission’s recomme

• A national strategy that will more effectively employ a br

instruments in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, fr

assistance;

• Greater efficiency, accountability, and capability for defen

weapons of mass destruction, from biological agent dete

leakage from the Russian nuclear stockpile;

• Better intelligence about the intentions and capabilities o

• Enhanced capability to take timely and effective operatio

or prevent the use of WMD; and

• A more transparent process for tracking the application o

purposes, coordinating agency efforts, and evaluating p

clear program objectives.

The Commission does not assert that these changes, even if fu

the proliferation problem. We live in a dangerous world where 

exploit WMD to their advantage and to threaten us, especially 

arise with little or no warning. It is precisely because WMD po

that the threat must be addressed with grit and determination

effective and efficient organization this country can muster.
A cardinal truth of government is that policy without proper organization is 

policy at all. If the Federal Government’s policy is to combat the threat pose

of weapons of mass destruction, then the government must be organized 

so. The large number of agencies involved in this particular effort makes o

especially critical. Recognizing the need, Congress established this Comm

assess the current structure and organization of the government, as well 

cooperative efforts with foreign governments, and to make recommendati

improvements.1

The Commission began by assessing the operation of proliferation-related 

responsible federal agencies. The examination was timely, since many of 

were undergoing substantial reorganization. For example, the Arms Cont

Disarmament Agency was being integrated into the Department of State, 

Department of Defense was consolidating several activities into a single a

to counter-proliferation, cooperative threat reduction, and on-site arms con

Similarly, the Intelligence Community was taking steps to strengthen com

proliferation-related collection and analysis in response to recent recomm

Congress, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the Un

Rumsfeld Commission), the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of 

States Intelligence Community (the Aspin/Brown Commission), the Presid

Intelligence Advisory Board, and the reports issued by Admiral David Jerem

wake of the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and another following 

espionage at the nuclear weapons complex.

Between January 1998 and June 1999, the Commission held approximate

with Cabinet-level and other senior officials, former senior officials, and non

specialists. Appendix C provides a list of individuals whom the Commissio

The Commission also sent a “Baseline Survey of Proliferation-Related Ac

(Appendix D) to all Federal agencies that deal with the spread of weapon

destruction. Some of the information contained in their responses is include

as are specific recommendations to improve the agencies’ effectiveness w

their efforts to combat proliferation.

In addition to reviewing the efforts of the individual agencies, the Commis

the mechanisms by which the interagency process develops policy altern

reaches decisions on government-wide policies and programs to combat p

management of resource allocation received particular scrutiny.

Effective export control policy is vital to our efforts to impede the spread o

technology. Accordingly, the Commission examined this area and present

recommendations for improvements.

1 See Appendix A for the Commission’s history and its legislative mandate. See A

list of Commission members and staff.
viii

Similarly, the Commission assessed particular agency and in

technologies that could advance our efforts to combat prolifer

procedures for deciding which technologies are pursued, in w

resources. For example, development of biological-agent det

since the Gulf War, but the fielding of these systems remains 

considered whether the work under way sufficiently addresse

potential users, users such as state and local officials, internat

intelligence collectors, those responsible for protecting Ameri

embassies, and deployed military forces.

Finally, the Commission sought to determine the effectivenes

proliferation-related cooperation with foreign governments and 

The range of international cooperative activities spans diploma

enforcement, and intelligence, in both bilateral and multilatera

proliferation concerns are global and are so interconnected w

security challenges, such as terrorism, infrastructure vulnera

management and response, an appropriate policy response c

with international partners.

The Commission’s deliberations took place within the context 

proliferation threat, including the potential for WMD use within 

the legislation establishing the Commission prohibited us from 

domestic response preparedness and capabilities. The Com

effective capability to respond to the use of nuclear, chem

weapons by states or sub-national groups, whether at hom

only in the event of an attack, but also for its deterrent ef

believes these issues should be integrated.

This report presents the findings and recommendations of th
Weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to U.S. citizens and mi

our allies, and to our vital national interests in many regions of the world. 

proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery is a paramount n

need for the United States.2

Consider the following hypothetical scenarios:

These events have not taken place. But they could.

Now consider these developments that actually have occurred or are now 

Terrorist acquisition or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological w

At least a dozen terrorist groups have expressed an interest in or have ac

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons capabilities.3 On March 20, 1995

cult group, Aum Shinrikyo, released the nerve agent sarin into the Tokyo s

killing 12 people and injuring more than 5,000. A successful nuclear, chem

biological attack against the United States would be devastating. Even a c

such an attack could dramatically undermine America’s sense of security, 

ability to support allies abroad, and cause major disruptions.

Possession of, and the manufacturing capability for, nuclear, chemical

weapons and the means to deliver them by Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or o

unfriendly states:

North Korea is believed to have enough nuclear material for one or perhaps 

weapons, and it may be continuing to develop its nuclear program. Moreover, 

2 “Proliferation” refers to the actions of a country or sub-national entity to transfer

acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the means of their delivery.

• A disgruntled Russian scientist at Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65) acqu

kilograms of highly enriched uranium and sells it to the governme

• Anthrax is released in a Boston subway station during rush hour, 

6,000 people to hospital emergency rooms.

• Analysts estimate that North Korean scientists have assembled t

weapons, and intelligence officials receive reports that Pyongyang 

to sell at least two of these devices.

• Saddam Hussein launches Scud missiles armed with a nerve ag

forward-deployed U.S. forces in Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

3 Statement by John A. Lauder, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelli

Nonproliferation, at Commission Hearing, 29 April 1999, p. 6.
2

role as a supplier of ballistic missiles to aquire WMD materials 

for nuclear weapons. Iran has manufactured and stockpiled che

blister, blood, and choking agents, as well as the bombs and ar

deliver them. In fact, most of the seven state sponsors of t

Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) either have or are 

destruction. More than a dozen states have offensive che

weapons programs. And despite seven years of intrusive on-

Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International A

have not been able to certify that Iraq’s WMD programs have b

Nuclear weapons can be delivered in the back of a truck or cover

ship, chemical weapons dispersed from a paper bag, and biolo

crop duster. These “low-tech” delivery methods are likely to be 

threats, however, include the use of WMD loaded on cruise or ba

risk is growing. In August 1998, North Korea unexpectedly laun

Dong-1 ballistic missile over Japanese territory. This followed a 

flight of North Korea’s No Dong ballistic missile over Japanese 

Korea’s missile-related exports to Iran helped Tehran “save yea

Shahab-3 missile, tested in 1998.4

Diversion of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons

or expertise from Russia:

We know of seven instances since 1992 in which weapons-u

stolen from Russian facilities. The continuing economic meltd

heightened the risk of both further material leakage and the “

expertise. Russia has no reliable inventory of its fissile materi

to an “insider” threat is increased by power outages at Russian 

need for unpaid guards and technicians to forage for food, an

by and against personnel from the Ministries of Defense and 

dangerous state and sub-national actors would like to exploit 

acquire nuclear weapons or small quantities of weapons-usa

China’s role as a significant proliferator of ballistic m

mass destruction, and enabling technologies:

China has carried out extensive transfers to Iran’s solid-fuel ba

programs. It has supplied Pakistan with a design for a nuclear w

weapons ballistic missile assistance. It has transferred complet

Saudi Arabia (the 3,100-kilometer range CSS-2) and Pakistan 

4 Id. at 4.
M-11). China is both a source and transfer agent for passing knowledge, te

systems and entire systems to dangerous state and sub-national actors.5

Destabilizing consequences of nuclear, chemical, biological, and mis

in South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East:

In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Neither country 

surveillance capability; reliable command, control and communications; o

systems. This vulnerability could lead to a “launch-on-warning” posture, fu

aggravating the subcontinent’s already serious instability. Moreover, this r

the possibility of Chinese and Russian involvement and more explicit miss

assistance. Similar efforts by countries in East Asia and the Middle East to a

chemical, or biological weapons, and the means to deliver them, may mot

those regions to enhance their own relative security in ways that reduce U.S

fuel regional arms competitions. The proliferation of WMD and delivery sy

manufacturing capabilities may further stimulate the diffusion of these dan

destablizing technologies.

These examples demonstrate that the danger to U.S. national security fro

weapons of mass destruction is real and urgent. We should harbor no illu

pace, magnitude, or complexity of the problem. Proliferation is not a single 

The most obvious proliferation threat comes from the planned efforts of st

national groups to acquire a WMD capability. We have seen such efforts in 

Korea, and earlier in Pakistan and India. But nations can also take actions 

themselves appear innocent, and that permit plausible deniability of intent t

capability, but that effectively provide them with elements required to achi

delivery missile capability.

Understanding and combating proliferation is further complicated by the fac

of mass destruction” do not present a single, undifferentiated threat. Nucl

and biological weapons each present unique challenges in terms of contro

response.

The strategic context for proliferation has changed substantially during the 

years. Until the 1980s, the concern was focused on the spread of weapon

destruction to states that previously lacked them—nuclear weapons to Ira

and our attention was focused on preventing proliferation. Since then, cert

made efforts to improve and modernize their arsenals, e.g. upgrading of N

ballistic missile forces. Several countries have acquired WMD capability. Se

countries have this as a strategic objective, and the necessary technologi

are progressively more available. It has become necessary for the US Go

devise and implement strategies which capitalize on America’s enduring m

5 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United S
4

economic, political, and diplomatic strengths to respond to pro

target the weaknesses of specific proliferators. A policy that f

unlikely to succeed.

Today, however, both diplomatic and military efforts to comba

confine the range of tools they employ and the goals they see

Department-led efforts, there is a natural focus on military ins

potential threats of weapons of mass destruction. State Depa

contrast, naturally focus on formal diplomatic tools, such as t

understandings, that seek pledges of compliance with interna

expansion of multilateral agreements to limit the transfer of te

related to weapons of mass destruction.

A set of effective strategies reflecting today’s proliferation chal

than this. Strategies are needed to actively orchestrate the en

allied strengths in trade, finance, military force, intelligence, te

leverage against proliferators’ clear vulnerabilities in one or m

intelligence to identify and analyze these vulnerabilities would 

operations to achieve a more comprehensive set of objective

effectively dissuading nations from proliferating by targeting a

groups or power centers within these nations to recognize the 

encouraging the most hostile proliferating regimes towards in

would either reduce their proliferation activities or lead to new r

up; (3) keeping our friends secure enough to defend themsel

proliferating neighbors so they do not resort to acquiring such 

(4) strengthening the global consensus for proliferation-relate

and the specific strategies which they support, moreover, mu

anticipate changes in proliferating countries and calibrate ins

What we worry about most:

• Terrorist acquisition or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons

• Possession of, and the manufacturing capability for, nuclear, chemical, or bio

Iraq, North Korea, or other unfriendly states

• Diversion of WMD-related weapons, technology, materials, and expertise f

• China’s role as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of ma

enabling technologies:

• Destabilizing consequences of WMD programs in the Middle East, South A

Combating these threats—and preventing the potential crises described a

government that is organized to develop and carry out a coherent, coordin

response, using all available tools and an appropriate level of resources.
Successfully combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

leadership. It requires organization. It requires coordination.

It requires policies, plans, programs, and operations that will (1) deter, imp

and defend against the development, acquisition, transfer, and use of thes

their means of delivery, (2) either roll back or effectively address the cons

existing WMD programs, and (3) if these efforts fail, respond to the use of 

chemical, or biological weapons against Americans at home or abroad.

We do not have a comprehensive approach to combating the prolife

weapons of mass destruction.

It is not difficult to identify the key elements of an effective governmental r

First, Presidential leadership is essential in combating proliferation. No o

structure can overcome a lack of commitment at the top.

Second, we need policy guidance that sets clear priorities and reflects a 

our national objectives. This policy must be integrated with other objectives 

States has in a region or country and with related national security objective

control, combating terrorism, and protecting critical infrastructure.

Third, our intelligence system must provide early warning of threats, while 

diplomatic, preemptive, or retaliatory responses to either threats of prolife

actual use of weapons of mass destruction. Resources should be allocate

current policy priorities.

Fourth, we need an effective interagency process to develop coordinated 

government-wide strategies to address these threats, including country-spe

plans to reduce the demand for these weapons, as well as strategies for te

and for mitigating the consequences of proliferation that has already occurr

to occur in the future.

Fifth, there must be a clear delineation of responsibility to executive branc

and agencies to develop coordinated and systematic programs, operation

technology development and acquisition plans to implement these strateg

resources commensurate to the scale of the problem.6

6 We need particular emphasis on preventing further leakage or transfer of weap

and know-how about WMD from Russia and the New Independent States (NIS). 

activities such as:

• purchasing highly enriched uranium from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Georgia;

• helping Russia and the NIS improve protection, control, and accounting of fis

• preventing Russian technology from falling into the hands of unfriendly nation

groups.
6

Sixth, we must prepare for the threat or use of nuclear, chem

This will require a broad effort at all levels, involving federal a

governments. It will require new working relationships among 

law-enforcement, and public health communities, including in

state, and local authorities; active duty and reserve military fo

and police, fire, and medical officials.

Seventh, we need to marshal resources for the fight against p

budgets for combating proliferation more efficiently.

Eighth, we must engage our allies—and potential proliferators

curtailing countries’ desires for nuclear, chemical, or biological 

acquisition of critical WMD-related technology; and preparing t

weapons of mass destruction.

The Role of Congress

None of these efforts will succeed without the energetic a

of Congress. The legislative and executive branches must ach

addressing this grave national security threat. A lack of consen

undermined the consistency of U.S. proliferation policy through 

administrations and Congresses.

Over the last several years, regardless of which party controlle

Congress, there has been a tension at both ends of Pennsylva

with proliferation. Congress has tended to perceive the executi

committed to combating proliferation because it seemed to sub

goals to other bilateral or multilateral objectives. The executive b

complained that Congress insists on using blunt instruments to 

generally relies too heavily on punitive measures, downplaying 

The Commission defines the scope of combating pro

plans, programs, and operations that:

• Prevent or impede the acquisition or use of wea

destruction and their means of delivery

• Roll back or effectively address proliferation wh

• Respond if weapons of mass destruction are thr

against us at home or abroad
relations in achieving our proliferation-related goals. An organizational struc

executive branch that raises the proliferation profile and establishes a cleare

between our proliferation-related objectives, policies, strategies, and program

pave the way for a more cooperative relationship.

Congressional-executive interaction is complicated by the number of cong

committees that now have oversight and budgetary authority over prolifera

programs. Oversight from at least twenty committees heightens the need 

continuous consultation between the branches.

Organizing to Combat Proliferation

While organization will not by itself determine the overall success or failur

to combat proliferation, it is a critical component. Organization governs the 

of priorities, the assignment of tasks, and the allocation of resources. It infl

of information and analysis. It affects how the work of government is done 

accountable for the results.

Many offices and agencies have a role in countering the proliferation thre

include several White House offices; traditional national security elements 

Intelligence Community and at the Departments of State, Defense, and En

the national laboratories); as well as the Departments of Justice, Comme

Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. The chart on the next page s

players involved.

Ensuring that these diverse elements work effectively during both cr

crisis times requires more than coordination. It requires strong and ti

to establish policy, set program priorities, and allocate resources. It 

delineation of responsibilities. It requires specific mechanisms to plan and 

operational responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destructio

diplomatic initiative, foreign assistance, security assurances, covert action

retaliation. Once responsibility and authority are established, there must b

for performance against specified objectives.

How we organize the Federal Government to combat proliferation 

profound impact on our prospects for success.
8

2A (45p x 55p)
Many present and past officials have indicated that the coordination of prol

programs has often failed to meet these standards. The Commission has id

areas in which interagency activities are deficient. These have common fe

• overlapping responsibility and resource requirements: When a n

involves identifying available resources or the development of a coordi

from several agencies, the process is cumbersome and slow, and is fu

by a lack of resource flexibility. Disputes that should be resolved prom

working level must often be resolved instead at meetings of deputy s

Cabinet-level officials.

• no end-to-end interagency plan for addressing proliferation: The

proliferation-related architecture—an end-to-end plan for policy deve

program planning, and budget formulation—nor does any person or 

power or responsibility to develop one.

• absence of a cross-cutting budget for program elements related 

proliferation: Neither the President, Congress, nor any executive br

knows how much the various agencies have spent on these efforts or 

plan to spend in the future. The private sector has an apt expression

measure it, you can’t manage it.” Without an explicit financial plan tie

programmatic objectives, individual agencies and the corresponding s

on Capitol Hill make their program and resource decisions independ

overall plan or objective. The result is not only inefficiency and duplic

potentially catastrophic delay.

The President’s National Security Advisor has the broadest perspective o

proliferation threat, but with all of his other responsibilities he cannot be e

manage the government’s proliferation-related programs on a daily basis. 

specifically in charge of all proliferation-related efforts, no one is ultimately 

the President and to Congress. Thus, the present system lets agencies p

perceived institutional interests rather than fully contributing to an overall pl

broader objectives. Blame can be deflected and diffusedother participants 

interagency process. Such diffuse responsibility invites inefficiency and in

and avoids accountability.

Assessing the Need for Change

A coordinated, consistent, and coherent response to proliferation-related t

concerted changes in all three elements of the current system: the interag

the individual departments and agencies, and Congress.

The nation lacks a comprehensive policy and plan to meet the th

by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
10

An improved mechanism for White House-led interagency dire

first step.7 Improved proliferation-related direction and manag

also needed. Finally, the executive and legislative branches n

than—as is so common—at cross purposes.

The Commission considered a number of options for improvi

During the course of our work, we consulted many current and 

including Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security 

Presidents. All agreed that stronger central direction is neces

how to achieve better coordination.

Here are the options the Commission considered:

1. Assign responsibility for interagency coordination o

matters to the Secretary of State. This is based prima

for the conduct of foreign affairs. The recent Presidentia

Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Se

interagency working group on non-proliferation is a step 

officials noted, however, that State has few resources an

manage proliferation-related programs now executed by 

2. Assign responsibility to the Secretary of Defense. Ad

Department of Defense (DoD) resources devoted to cou

and the Department’s capacity to manage large program

concerns about the ability of one agency to direct other

all proliferation-related management within DoD fails to 

non-proliferation into our overall foreign policy.

3. Assign execution responsibility to a single individu

an Assistant Secretary in the Departments of Defen

This proposal for a “triple-hatted” Assistant Secretary fo

the key roles that these three agencies play in proliferat

Advocates note the close link between directive authori

emphasizing the difficulty of vesting such control outside 

they cite the Director of the Naval Propulsion Program, w

Secretary in both the Departments of Defense and Ene

official could wind up without support in any of the agen

the chain of command.

7 Appendix E contains an illustrative list of the many interagency gro

to coordinate U.S. proliferation-related activities. The complexity of 

participating groups add weight to the view that an improved mecha

direction and integration to the existing process.
4. Assign responsibility for interagency coordination of counter-p

matters to the Secretary of Defense and of non-proliferation po

Secretary of State. This reflects the view that formulation of policy 

implementation of programs are fundamentally different types of activ

be coordinated and managed in different ways. It recognizes the prim

proliferation-related policy formulation and the core capabilities and 

dominance of Defense with regard to specific programs. Critics poin

agencies have significant roles in each of these areas, and that this 

not address the difficulty inherent in one agency trying to assert dire

over others. Moreover, it may undermine the critical importance of ens

is no disconnect between policies and programs.

5. Create a new agency to combat proliferation. In the past, conside

was given to transforming the Arms Control and Disarmament Agen

agency devoted to emerging threats. An alternative is to create a su

charged with providing an architecture for combating proliferation an

the resulting programs. This latter idea is similar to the Strategic Def

Organization created in the Reagan Administration to address ballis

defense. The primary disadvantage of this model is that it again fails 

what the Commission views as a fundamental tenet: combating prol

be integrated into our overall security and foreign policy. Establishing 

and staff outside the National Security Council (NSC) pulls the proc

opposite direction.

6. Create a new office in the White House for combating proliferati

advocate this point to the role of the Director of the Office of Nationa

Policy (ONDCP) and its staff of about 150. The Director (also known 

czar”) has significant legislative authority to direct all drug programs 

backed up by budgetary powers previously exercised only by the Of

Management and Budget (OMB). The principal concern with this mo

as that with the “new agency” model, i.e., that our efforts to combat pr

be coordinated from within the NSC in order to ensure that those effor

of our overall security and foreign policy. This concern is mitigated in 

ONDCP because its efforts are focused primarily on domestic issues 

abuse, although the drug issue does have some foreign policy aspe

disadvantages of pulling ONDCP out of the NSC structure are thus n

as they would be in the case of proliferation-related activities.

7. Assign responsibility for proliferation to the Vice President. Adv

model believe that only the President or Vice President has the auth

agencies conform to a central coordinating authority. They point out th

President does not have time to lead these efforts on a day-to-day b

President has both the clout and the time. They cite the testimony o

speaking to the Commission who noted that Cabinet secretaries are 

to disagree in front of the Vice President. Thus, interagency issues pu

for meetings chaired by the Vice President tend to get Cabinet-level a
12

resolved before the meetings occur. Supporters of this o

that have benefited from Vice Presidential authority, suc

(since the time of Vice President Johnson) and the Reinv

of Vice President Gore. Others point out that Vice Presi

reasons having nothing to do with their interest in or qua

national security effort. Moreover, there is a danger in bu

the Vice President that is separate from the NSC.

8. Assign responsibility for proliferation to a National 

Proliferation within the National Security Council, w

Assistant to the President. This model establishes a s

national security apparatus with the authority and respo

development and implementation of interagency policie

proliferation-related threats. It embeds this effort within t

integration with our overall security and foreign policy a

NSC’s traditional role of bringing relevant agencies toge

working level up to the Principals. It elevates the stature 

efforts in the NSC and assigns a correspondingly enhan

differences between agencies, setting priorities for agen

resources within existing congressional authorities. Exe

remain with agencies.

Critics of this model express doubt that a member of the 

rank of Deputy Assistant to the President, can direct Ca

disputes between Cabinet secretaries. Moreover, they p

authority without control over budget resources is tenuo

not be involved in executing budgets. In addition, such d

likely require that the official be appointed by the Presid

consent of the senate.

9. Work to improve the present system and organizatio

Commission was mindful of the first rule of any effort to 

systems: do no harm. Some felt the disadvantages inhe

considered by the Commission argued in favor of leavin

place, on the theory that individuals of good will can wo

framework through both formal and ad hoc interagency 

suggested that the interagency process works well and 

with the emerging threats of proliferation, terrorism, and 

Finally, advocates of this view note that there are other 

across several agencies and require coordination, and th

solve each such cross-cutting issue with a new interage
A New Approach to Combating Proliferation

The Commission recognizes that the right people—with the right skills an

dedication—can often overcome poor organizational structure, and that e

organizational structures need dedicated individuals to succeed. Howeve

Commission concludes that the shortcomings of the existing system 

addressed. We cannot afford “business as usual” in the face of this grow

Therefore, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

In order to sustain this senior-level leadership, the President should consi

a special role for the Vice President in the National Security Council, desi

that adequate attention and resources are devoted to countering this threa

the President could direct the Vice President to coordinate an annual repo

Principals Committee, through the Vice President to the President and Con

the nature of the threat and evaluating our progress in responding to that th

this evaluation process, the Vice President could chair meetings of the re

secretaries to provide a mechanism for ensuring senior-level attention.

The National Director would have two distinct responsibilities: to advise the 

Vice President, through the National Security Advisor, on proliferation-relat

to lead an interagency group, the Combating Proliferation Council, in deve

to combat proliferation, coordinating the development and implementation 

programs by the agencies, and ensuring the efficient allocation of resourc

Recommendation 2.1: The President must lead efforts to combat pro

and direct immediate steps to make those efforts more coherent, cons

and effective.

Recommendation 2.2: The President should appoint a National Dire

Combating Proliferation, with the rank of Deputy Assistant to the Pres

sufficient staff resources to carry out his or her charter.
14

In advising the President and Vice

President on proliferation-related

matters, the National Director would:

• ensure that the President and Vice

President are fully informed about

proliferation-related issues, activities,

and events here and abroad;

• prepare and coordinate presidential

reviews, directives, and decision

papers on matters relating to

proliferation policy;

• organize the President’s or Vice

President’s meetings of Cabinet

secretaries on proliferation;

• provide all necessary support for the

annual report to the President

evaluating our proliferation efforts; and

• participate in presidential meetings, including meetings 

as presidential-level communications, where proliferation

In fulfilling these responsibilities, the National Director would 

Security Advisor to ensure coordination with overall national 

In leading the Combating Proliferation Council in the deve

proliferation-related policies and programs, the National Direc

• lead the interagency policy development process with re

export controls;

• act as the administration’s principal spokesperson on pr

which includes the responsibility to coordinate demarche

that articulate and define the administration’s policy in th

• lead the development of a detailed plan to address the f

related issues and activities including, for example, integ

technology development and acquisition, resource alloc

from the former Soviet Union, intelligence collection and 

response (responsibility for execution of programs would 

2B (1
• work with the Director of OMB and the relevant agencies to construc

agency proliferation budget and oversee proliferation-related transfer

reprogrammings;8

• consult with Congress to explain the overall plan and how individual 

activities fit into that plan, and work toward a more cooperative relati

• ensure that the requisite legal authorities are in place to act against t

The National Director would be a member of the NSC Deputies Committe

request of the National Security Advisor, would chair Deputies Committee 

dealing with proliferation issues. The National Director should be invited t

Principals Committee meetings as appropriate, and should be included in 

NSC country or regional interagency working groups to ensure that prolifera

reflects and is reflected in country and regional strategies. While the Natio

would manage the policy process within the NSC to the Deputies level and 

interagency disputes, agency heads would retain the right to appeal to the 

if necessary, to the Vice President and President.

The duties of the

National Director

should be spelled

out in a Presidential

Decision Directive

(PDD).9 If this

position is created

by statute rather

than by PDD, the

Commission

recommends that

the position expire

after five years

unless Congress

reauthorizes it.

Additional staff that the National Director needs to carry out these duties 

included within the NSC, either as direct hires or as detailees from particip

The chart above illustrates one option for organizing such a staff.

8 See Chapter 3 for additional recommendations on agency reprogramming auth

9 This PDD should also clarify the relationship between the National Director and 

currently perform coordinating functions for particular aspects of the proliferation is

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism

Secretary of State for International Security and Arms Control.

2C (27p x 15p)
16

The CPC would exist to improve coordination within individua

coordination and consultation between the National Director 

Commission recommends that its membership consist of sen

officials designated by the head of each major agency with re

related matters. (The National Director could include addition

specific issues.) The designated officials would represent the

level that is sufficiently senior to make decisions and resolve 

or their designees should also attend meetings of the country 

working groups. The existing interagency working group on n

controls would be subsumed by the CPC.

An important task for the

National Director will be to

establish a relationship with

members of the CPC that is

mutually reinforcing. The

National Director should

ensure that he or she is

able to help the designated

agency officials accomplish

their missions within their

agencies, as well as

contributing to a more

effective and efficient

interagency process.

Recommendation 2.3: The President should establish a 

Council (CPC) headed by the National Director and made 

Senate-confirmed officials from each agency with respon

Recommendation 2.4: The urgent nature of the threat m

Congress, as well as the executive branch, take immedia

should examine its organization with the goal of streamlin

proliferation-related matters.

2D (24p x 

18

Streamlining executive branch authority and focusing respon

to produce a new approach to combating proliferation. Congr

in order.

The number of congressional committees with oversight and 

proliferation-related programs complicates efforts to manage 

In the House of Representatives, at least ten committees sha

authorization of funds and oversight of proliferation-related pr

and agencies, while an even greater number of sub-committe

appropriating funds for these programs. A similar problem ex

responsibility so widely dispersed, it is difficult if not impossib

proliferation in a consistent and coordinated fashion.

The Commission urges Congress to examine its programmat

organization in order to improve its processes for considering 

Commission commends the Senate Armed Services Committ

its consideration of these matters in an Emerging Threats su

Congress should consolidate the WMD-related reporting requ

the executive branch. Currently, the executive branch must su

Congress. Although many of these are triggered by specific ev

waive sanctions—nearly two dozen are required at some reg

year. (See Appendix F for a list of these reports.) The Comm

streamline these requirements so that the President would be 

comprehensive annual report providing Congress with all of th

has requested through the current reporting requirements—a

Congress feels that some data should be updated more often

less comprehensive, report to be due at some appropriate int

Recommendation 2.5: Congress should consolidate the 

proliferation required from the executive branch.
The National Director for Combating Proliferation, in leading the Federal G

efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, should 

particularly on three critical aspects of interagency activity: (1) identifying 

money we are spending on combating proliferation and determining whet

having any success, (2) determining what technologies we need to acquir

proliferation and the most efficient and timely way to acquire them, and (3

sound policies and strategies for improving cooperation with foreign gove

international organizations. (See chart below.)

In each of these areas, the National Director should ensure that every agen

in its proliferation-related mission with clear policy guidance, adequate res

efficient leveraging of the capabilities of other agencies. The National Dire

provide guidance and direction to top officials in each agency, to ensure tha

efforts support the government’s overall proliferation-related policies. He o

accountable ultimately for the effective integration and implementation of 

proliferation-related policy objectives.

Resources and Program Evaluation

No one in the Federal Government knows how much money we are spen

proliferation. The success of any campaign depends on the resources avai

and on the ways in which those resources are brought to bear. Currently, h

decides what level of resources should be devoted to proliferation-related 

no overall plan for how those resources should be allocated and no consis

of the effectiveness of these expenditures.

3AA (27X 17)
20

Proliferation-related Budget Sub-function

The Commission determined that the most effective way to id

proliferation-related activities would be to create a separate b

National Defense function (050) for these programs.

Budget sub-functions are usually established to identify a coh

while scattered among different agencies, should for policy p

whole. For example, there is a budget sub-function for the def

Department of Energy (sub-function 053).

Creation of a proliferation sub-function will identify the funds 

this threat and is an essential first step in coordinating our pr

and activities. It would not alter existing congressional author

responsibilities for proliferation-related programs, although la

Commission makes a recommendation for improving congres

these issues.

The Commission recognizes that determining which activities 

some instances, be difficult. Nevertheless, it is well worth doi

for managing this critical area of activities. (Appendix G illust

government officials might construct a useful 05x proliferation 

Building the Proliferation-related Budget

The National Director and the Combating Proliferation Counc

between administration policy and program aims and the var

activities, using the budgetary cross-cut undertaken in the es

account as a baseline. The National Director should provide 

policy guidance early in the budget process, so that the agenc

the framework of overall priorities. This means, of course, tha

Recommendation 3.1: The Director of the Office of Man

(OMB) should create a separate National Defense budge

proliferation-related programs and activities in the Preside

Recommendation 3.2: The National Director and the Dir

jointly direct an annual proliferation-related budget-buildin

with the departments and agencies.
the CPC will need to set program recommendations before agency plannin

spring or summer. As agencies build their budgets, the National Director sh

in the OMB fall budget reviews.

The agencies make their budget submissions to OMB in the early fall. OM

do a cross-cutting budget review of all proliferation-related agency budget

hearings with each agency. The National Director or his or her representat

part in this review and reach an agreement with the OMB Director on reco

budget changes. Once the review is complete, OMB should pass the reco

changes, endorsed by the National Director, back to each agency, in orde

the final agency submissions conform to the National Director’s guidance

ensure both that priority programs get adequate funding and that the age

coordinated across budgets to eliminate redundancies.

Agencies appeal budgetary pass-backs to the OMB Director. In this case

should be copied to the National Director, who should discuss the appeal

Director. Ultimately, as the President hears budgetary appeals, there shou

pre-meeting on proliferation-related resource priorities before final budget 

made. The Vice President, jointly with the National Director and the OMB 

pre-screen appeals to the President, to prepare the presidential agenda. 

would help ensure that priority presidential attention is given to resource l

allocation decisions in this area.

3A (36p x 22p)
22

Program Execution and Evaluation

Effective oversight requires transparency. The National Direc

made fully aware of the ways in which programs and activitie

responsible are executed. This is needed to make sure that r

put to the purposes intended and not siphoned off for other a

creation of a clear, cross-agency database on budget execut

develop such a database, the National Director and OMB sho

participating in the CPC an initial annual report on the execut

programs within its budget. These reports would provide a bas

leading to more frequent reporting.

Programs in this area should also be carefully evaluated on a

Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), all agenc

Intelligence Community—are required to design strategic pla

evaluating program performance. In this case, an evaluation m

across agencies.

Working with OMB, which has general responsibility for GPRA 

experienced staff, the National Director should develop an ev

proposal should be discussed with the Vice President and th

goals of each proliferation-related program made clear and g

evaluation set. Determination of goals and standards should 

discussion of program priorities.

The National Director and OMB should then work with each a

into specific performance measurements and to set forth ann

for each agency. The President should consider tasking the V

annual reports with the National Director and the OMB Direct

assessment for the President. This assessment should have tw

extent to which the agency programs are meeting their assig

the allocated budgetary resources are being used.

Recommendation 3.3: The National Director and the Dir

jointly create a government-wide database on budget exe

related programs, and develop goals and standards to eva
Agency Budget Processes

The Commission believes that White House coordination and decision ma

fully effective unless the participating agencies themselves give priority to 

related programs and to the internal transparency needed for proper reso

No agency currently gives these programs special attention. This must ch

In Chapter 2, the Commission recommended that each agency with prolif

responsibilities designate a single senior-level, presidentially-appointed offi

those responsibilities. Each agency should also make one senior resourc

responsible for proliferation-related budgets. This official would work with 

Director and the Director of OMB in the resource planning process.

Congressional Budget Process

In the end, Congress appropriates. But just as proliferation-related progra

distributed widely among the departments and agencies, so too is congre

responsibility for funding these programs widely dispersed among authori

committees and appropriations sub-committees. This means that even if t

were to send Congress a cross-agency proliferation-related budget, as th

recommends, Congress would not be able to consider it as a whole. Instea

to be cut into agency- or department-specific programs and budgets, with e

independently in a separate jurisdiction.

In Chapter 2, the Commission urged that Congress examine its organizatio

of streamlining consideration of proliferation-related matters. Nowhere is t

important than on budget issues.

The Commission urges Congress to find a forum for reviewing the Presiden

related budget as a whole—perhaps through joint hearings in the Armed 

committees, the Foreign/International Relations committees or the Gover

Operations/ Affairs committees. It would also help if each Appropriations c

Recommendation 3.4: Each Cabinet secretary or agency head with p

related responsibilities should designate a senior proliferation budget 

Recommendation 3.5: Congress should develop a means to review t

President’s proliferation-related budget as a whole, rather than dividin

several authorization committees and appropriations sub-committees
24

assigned a senior staff member responsibility for cross-appro

proliferation-related programs. This would facilitate the execu

Reprogramming and Transfers

Internal agency reprogramming is common in the Defense D

place to some extent in other agencies. For those agencies w

responsibilities, below-threshold reprogramming rules need t

sufficient flexibility within the proliferation budget to respond t

budgets are written and appropriations passed. Above these 

committees normally must be notified of reprogramming.

Transfers across agencies (as distinct from reprogrammings, 

agency budget) are substantially more difficult to accomplish

agency (e.g., State) to request that another agency (e.g., Def

good up to a certain amount, out of spending authority provid

down (e.g., military equipment to a country State wishes to s

transfers allow one agency to provide a good or service to ano

the statutory authority to do so.

The Commission believes that the President should authorize 

together with the OMB Director, to concur in agency proposa

reprogrammings from lower-priority to higher-priority program

propose above-threshold reprogrammings, which would ultim

concurrence of the congressional authorizing and appropriatin

National Director should also have authority to propose trans

agencies under existing draw-down authorities and the Econ

Technology Acquisition

In the age of technology, one need is self-evident: coping with 

technology requires the vigorous acquisition of new and effec

technologies.

Recommendation 3.6: The President should authorize t

jointly with the Director of OMB, to concur in departmenta

reprogramming or transferring funds from lower priority to 

and to propose funds transfers between departments and 

draw-down authorities.
The Persian Gulf War gave vivid warning of our technology weakness aga

mass destruction. There was no equipment to detect biological weapons, a

sensors were plagued by false alarms and thus virtually useless; our forc

were essentially blind to biological and chemical attack. We found that ou

lacked adequate protective measures and procedures, including sufficien

clothing, vaccinations, and other critical items. We found the threats to civi

were even worse, as nations neighboring the Gulf ran out of gas masks a

discovered they had no civil defenses effective against biological and che

Yet nearly nine years after this wake-up call, and after billions of dollars of 

technology expenditures, we see that there has been relatively little progre

of the areas vital to combating WMD proliferation.

The Department of Defense’s own technology estimates indicate how ser

shortfalls still are. Here are some examples:

• Loudspeaker announcements and shouting (called “voice alerts”) rem

principal means of alert against biological and chemical attacks.

• We still can detect only a handful of the thousands of possible chemica

threats, and those few that can be detected require the use of many se

limited range.

• Security guards remain at great risk; their only threat detectors have 

high false alarm rates, require long inspection times, lack portability, a

• Nine years after the Gulf War, only an “interim” biological detection sys

to our military forces in the field.

• Even as the Department places greater reliance on commercial tech

enhancing force capabilities, there has been an erosion of policy guid

expertise, and programmatic implementation to assure such technol

operate through a nuclear environment.

• Our national ballistic, theater, and cruise missile defenses are little b

Patriot missile that we used in the Gulf War, and the missile threat—

proliferation—is growing faster than our defense improvement progra

• Deeply buried WMD facilities still cannot be effectively detected, cha

defeated, which may affect the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. W

know-how needed to contain the spread of threat agents that are rel

destroying above ground facilities.
26

• Even our basic understanding of the threat, as contained 

and vulnerability, has major gaps and unsolved problem

The Department of Defense predicts that, given current techn

resources, only incremental improvements to these deficienc

1-3 years.

To be sure, acquiring modern technology is not easy. It involve

development, and acquisition activities, including testing, dep

technologies put into the field. Furthermore, it is an expensiv

pressure on our limited federal budgets. It requires building and 

workforce with the best facilities and equipment. It requires v

expert management, and careful oversight.

But while the rewards for successful technology acquisition a

consequences of failure. We cannot afford to duplicate acquis

the federal enterprise. We cannot afford to develop technolog

We cannot leave unused technology capabilities already avail

We cannot wait decades for technology support. Yet we are d

Problems with Current Practice

WMD technology acquisition efforts in the Federal Governme

departments and agencies and are not well integrated. The De

the Department of Energy, and the Intelligence Community e

WMD-related technology acquisition efforts under the 1994 N

Authorization Act. Of these technology producers, DoD is by 

greatest budget investment, facilities, and expertise for comb

Other agencies, such as the departments of Health and Huma

also fund technology programs of direct importance to the WM

organizations have not traditionally classified their activity as b

they formally report or coordinate their efforts with the Intellig

departments of Defense and Energy.

Despite the existence of numerous “coordination mechanism

in the DoD section of Chapter 5), the Commission finds that e

the diverse WMD technology acquisition efforts fall far short o

articulated above, and result in poor integration and substantia

the entire federal technology investment used for combating W

Examples abound of poor coordination, redundancy, and neg

technology.
One example of poor coordination is the profusion of biological sensor pro

various departments. While the need for better biosensors is clear, each t

producer has separate efforts to build its biosensors based upon the definit

of its own internal organization, and lacks effective mechanisms to levera

efforts, avoid unnecessary duplication, fill evident gaps, or measure progres

most of these biosensor efforts have identified no end-user willing to field t

placing the value of these efforts in doubt.

Examples of redundant technology acquisition efforts include the numero

develop software tools used for improving the quality of intelligence analy

to WMD. These efforts exist in virtually every affected department or agen

responding independently to the same functional need. Not surprisingly, a

have strong similarities in their technology (such as achieving integration, q

databases with different information content, and development of automa

retrieval techniques). Such tools are certainly useful and needed, but how 

do we need?

Omission of private sector technology may be seen throughout the area o

threats. For example, the food industry years ago fielded technology prov

effective in protecting food from biological contamination—a technology o

value for protecting key U.S. facilities from biological attack. Yet these sim

solutions remain largely unknown and unused in the federal effort. Furthe

government is not discriminating well between work it should perform and w

left to the private sector. For example, should DoD remain in the vaccine 

vaccine development and production in the United States has been, and c

successfully performed by the nation’s universities and pharmaceutical in

Finally, the entire acquisition cycle takes far too long. The average time re

new technology system, from its earliest stages to completion, is well ove

growing. We cannot afford to wait decades for meaningful technology solu

What’s Missing: A Coordinated Government-wide Plan

Of the many problems with technology acquisition, perhaps the most seri

that the Federal Government lacks a government-wide WMD technology a

What plans there are reside within the confines of each department or ag

interagency investment strategy or effective guidance from above. Techno

are not well connected to technology consumers, either within individual d

or between them. Consequently, our existing expenditures are frequently 

ineffective.

Even within the individual departments, WMD technology acquisition lack

leadership and advocacy. A consequence of this lack of leadership is the te
28

Department’s WMD technology efforts to lose their focus ove

traditional priorities resident within each organization. For exa

what DoD reports as WMD technology investment for fiscal y

defense, a traditional warfighting requirement that would exist 

A similar tendency toward traditional roles and missions can 

of Energy’s reported WMD technology program.

This plan, the first of its kind, must clearly articulate an acquis

and executed by all relevant federal departments and agencie

private-sector technology. To succeed, the plan must have the 

of the President, and should be integrated into the proliferatio

budgets submitted to Congress. The Commission recognizes 

a plan will necessarily involve decisions about what is to be in

excluded. The National Director must also develop or posses

integrated budget, that can facilitate management oversight o

organization and accounting systems used by the executing d

(Another potential management tool is illustrated by the taxon

H.) Without such tools, managing the federal technology effo

Recommendation 3.7: The President should direct the N

Combating Proliferation to oversee the creation of a gove

acquisition plan.

3B (27p x 20p)
The lengthy time required for technology acquisition is also a serious prob

urgent resolution. The Commission notes that this problem is not new and 

our entire national security posture, not just WMD threats. The problem is s

and long-standing enough, that the traditional approaches to correct it sim

Personal involvement at the secretarial level is absolutely vital to success

personal and sustaining commitment of agency heads, our large governme

will be unable to reverse their course toward longer and longer acquisition 

involvement by the Secretary of Defense is perhaps most critical of all, be

weakness in DoD technology acquisition is a weakness throughout the na

combat weapons of mass destruction.

The Commission also realizes that the department secretaries will need e

organizational incentives to overcome the chronic technology acquisition p

by the separation of technology producers and consumers, and by non-re

acquisition regulations, within the government.

Funding for further technology development, except in discretionary case

be made conditional upon user validation of those programs. This recomme

a discipline upon the technology producer community similar to that empl

private sector, which emphasizes the connection of corporate technology 

its business units. In the Federal Government’s case, the user community 

business unit.

Recommendation 3.8: The head of each department or agency invo

development of technology used to combat WMD, particularly the Sec

Defense, should personally reinvigorate the use of private-sector techn

or her department, while simultaneously increasing the speed by which 

transitions to fielded systems.

Recommendation 3.9: The National Director should measure the suc

WMD technology program by using performance measurements prov

technology users.

Recommendation 3.10: The National Director should direct developm

implementation of a plan to harmonize the communications and comp

infrastructure used by the departments and agencies in combating pro
30

An investment in modern database management is badly nee

would not only be more efficient but also would make for mor

applications of policy. This new system should be optimized f

exchange of information for all federal agencies involved in co

weapons of mass destruction, with other international organiz

missions, and for improved communications among the policy

enforcement communities.

This would consolidate activities currently assigned to the Co

Review Committee (CPRC) and the Nonproliferation and Arm

Working Group (NPAC-TWG), both of which would be elimina

recommendation. Each department or agency involved in WM

would send its individual technology needs and requests to th

consumers of the technology base are fully and appropriately 

The Commission notes that the National Director cannot do i

the best advice possible, especially in the complex area of te

International Cooperative Efforts

The third key area requiring greater interagency coordination 

international cooperative efforts aimed at combating prolifera

essential. The United States cannot do the job alone. We mu

nations if we are to reduce the threat that weapons of mass de

and to our allies and friends.

International cooperative efforts take many forms, including:

• employing diplomatic contacts with allies, friends, and o

acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by th

organizations;

Recommendation 3.11: To ensure better connectivity bet

users and technology producers, the Combating Prolifera

should coordinate interagency requirements across the fe

Recommendation 3.12: The President should establish 

experts to provide advice to the National Director and the 

Council on technology acquisition in the Federal Governm
• facilitating other countries’ removal and destruction of nuclear and che

and ballistic missiles;

• helping other nations to protect, control, and account for critical mate

technologies; implement export controls; maintain border security an

enforcement; and restrict the flow of scientists and technicians or tran

knowledge to states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction

• engaging in security cooperation, including military training and joint 

• providing funding, information, and expertise to international organiza

and enforce compliance with multilateral agreements; and

• negotiating, implementing, and verifying arms control treaties and ex

regimes to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 

their delivery;

The Commission examined four aspects of international cooperative effor

proliferation: (1) cooperation with foreign governments through diplomacy 

programs, (2) cooperation with international organizations, (3) intelligence 

foreign governments and international organizations, and (4) cooperative 

efforts.

The Commission found that while our diplomatic efforts with foreign gove

extensive and coordinated, our programmatic response—particularly U.S

programs in the former Soviet Union and with allies threatened by WMD a

of delivery—has often fallen short. The Commission concluded that the N

for Combating Proliferation, working through the Combating Proliferation C

play a leading role in coordinating these efforts. The Commission also con

Director of Central Intelligence should exercise more leadership in coordin

intelligence agencies’ cooperation with foreign governments and internati

organizations.

Cooperation with Foreign Governments to Combat Proliferatio

The United States has aggressively sought foreign governments’ coopera

combating proliferation. These diplomatic activities include efforts to:

• Stem the flow of sensitive materials and technology to Iran and Iraq,

• Denuclearize in the former Soviet Union,

• Freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,
32

• Extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 

• Dissuade China from transferring WMD technology and 

nations.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, and continuing 

economic crises in Russia and the successor states also cre

programmatic response to proliferation threats. The Commiss

weapons and weapons-related materials, technologies, and e

threshold states and terrorist organizations as a grave threat 

result, the Commission paid careful attention to our programs 

alleviate this danger.

For the past seven years, we have conceived, funded, and im

cooperation with Russia and the New Independent States (N

• enhance safety, security, control, accounting, and centra

and nuclear materials;

• assist in the elimination, and prevent the proliferation, of 

chemical weapons and biological capabilities;

• assist Russia in accelerating its implementation of arms 

• train and develop an infrastructure for customs and bord

• help build export control institutions, infrastructure and le

• employ former NIS weapons scientists and engineers to 

proliferating states; and

• safeguard fissile material disposition.

Distinct from our diplomatic efforts at combating proliferation, 

involve departments and agencies across the US Governmen

Enhancing the Efficacy of U.S. Assistance to Russia 

Independent States

Every agency assessed by the Commission is engaged in pro

some of the NIS in combating proliferation. The bilateral prog

various U.S. departments require thorough coordination. The 

Assistance to Russia and the NIS is responsible for ensuring 
efficiently among the departments, but the Coordinator is not equipped to 

management of these programs. Consequently, the assistance programs 

each department conducts its activities according to its own understandin

best contribute to overall U.S. foreign policy goals. Strategic planning is w

do not appear to work closely with each other. Funding is unpredictable a

delivered in a timely manner. Program effectiveness is not regularly evalu

For example, several agencies manage programs to assist Russia and th

Independent States in detecting and deterring trafficking in WMD materia

as well as dual-use commodities and technologies useful in developing WM

Department of Commerce has a program to establish a legal and regulator

export control and licensing. The NIS Coordinator’s office administers fun

Commerce’s export control assistance programs because Commerce rec

funding for this program. Commerce has great difficulty in planning its pro

delays of up to 11 months in receiving funding from State.

A lack of Russian government cooperation has also contributed to ineffici

example, problems with the Russian customs and tax services have plagu

projects. Russia taxes U.S. assistance funds intended to pay former weap

participating in the Department of Energy Initiatives for Proliferation Preve

thus reducing the availability of funds to engage Russian scientists in non-

In other cases, the Russian customs service charges customs duties on U

provided to Russia in order to deter and detect smuggling of critical mate

siphoning off of funds from these important programs reduces their effect

A recent General Accounting Office investigation highlighted other proble

intended to move former Russian weapons scientists into commercial tec

development activities.10 Evidence suggests that the Department of Energ

experience in this field, may be an inappropriate partner for Russia in brin

technology projects to commercial success. Moreover, the current econom

Russia may preclude success under even the best of circumstances.

Ensuring Priority of Proliferation Issues on the President’s Bila

The Commission notes that the National Director will have a key role in dipl

with foreign governments. As a Presidential advisor and senior member o

House staff, the National Director will have an opportunity to ensure that p

related issues are included on the agenda for the President’s and Vice Pr

meetings with foreign leaders. The National Director will also have a princ

10 General Accounting Office. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE’s Effo

Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists. GAO/RCED-99-54. F
34

preparing the President’s and Vice President’s remarks for su

sculpting their public statements and speeches.

While proliferation-related diplomacy is primarily the respons

Department, the National Director will also be a valuable reso

use in meetings below the Presidential level, whether in Was

visitors who may not see the President or Vice President reco

senior White House official, such as the National Director, con

emphasis. Likewise, when U.S. officials meet with foreign cou

the inclusion of the National Director on some occasions can g

to the proliferation message.

Improving the Effectiveness of International Organiz

The United States cooperates on proliferation-related matters 

international organizations, including the United Nations; milit

arms control treaty review and compliance organizations such 

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); export control reg

organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Committee, Zan

Australia Group; and special proliferation-related activities su

Energy Development Organization.

The Commission applauds the efforts of the United States to s

international organizations. Generally, the Commission found 

expertise, and funding energizes and drives the work of these 

pushing the WMD Initiative at the 1999 NATO Summit, provid

Nations Special Commission on Iraq, or encouraging China to 

Control Regime, the United States is at the forefront of the ef

related international organizations more effective.

Intelligence Sharing with Foreign Governments and 

Organizations

The Commission noted that intelligence sharing is a valuable 

U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, but one that carries seriou

need to balance the advantages to be gained from informing 

Recommendation 3.13: The Director of Central Intellige

disciplined procedure for approaching key allies and intern

the purpose of expanding intelligence cooperation.
organizations about proliferation threats or supporting enforcement operat

need to maintain the security of U.S. intelligence sources and methods. M

present intelligence sharing generally takes place at the individual agency 

is no coordinated effort by the government to identify the highest priority o

cooperation, or to determine a unified Intelligence Community approach e

governments and their intelligence services or to international organizatio

Commission endorses carefully planned and securely executed intelligen

activities to strengthen multilateral support for our proliferation policy.

3C (36p x 16p)

The most effective measures to combat proliferation are those that persuad

not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. To the extent such restraint is 

controls can reinforce other measures aimed at combating proliferation.

Profound and fundamental changes in the sources of technology for milita

application have occurred. To an increasing degree, enabling technology 

military capabilities is drawn from the commercial sector. The defense ind

is no longer the leading developer in areas crucial to military performance 

telecommunications, computation, microelectronics, etc. Moreover, these 

are available from suppliers throughout the world. This worldwide commer

technology is helping to sustain U.S. economic growth and the technology 

is critical to our military strength. But it is also intensifying the problem of 

The export control system needs to adapt to these changes if it is to cont

combating proliferation effectively. This can be accomplished by refocusin

control system from broad-based, technology-driven controls to limiting or 

to proliferation-enabling technologies by potential proliferators. Reinforced 

coordinated employment of other policy instruments available to the US G

ranging from diplomacy to arms transfers, export controls can provide lev

initiatives to achieve U.S. goals in combating proliferation.

Export controls have made—and continue to make—significant contributio

proliferation. This is done in three ways. First, the very process of develop

controls within a nation, or negotiating export controls multilaterally, educa

officials and individual companies about technologies, materials, and equip

be diverted for proliferation-related purposes. Doing so facilitates the broa

voluntary compliance by exporters without which no system could functio

Second, export controls, and the enforcement apparatus that supports the

dangerous goods from reaching their intended destinations. In this conne

Commission acknowledges the determination and creativity in enforcing ex

U.S. officials.

Third, export controls provide a legal basis for punishing violators. For those 

fail to comply, violation of export controls may result in fines, denial of expo

in extreme cases, prison sentences.

Export controls properly administered will continue to be one of the princi

combating proliferation.
38

The Proper Role of Export Controls in Combating Pr

An effective export control system requires a national consen

objectives. What technologies are we trying to deny to a pote

how long?

Protecting U.S. national interests requires (1) a clear policy b

consensus on the proper role of export controls in the contex

availability of proliferation-related technology and today’s diffi

The United States now lacks both. The lack of a clear policy 

consensus both within and between Congress and the Admin

controls. Indeed, this issue has become more polarized in the 

Congress has reversed executive branch decisions in such are

the process for reviewing commercial communications satelli

range of views is broad, from those who favor unilateral contr

prepared to support export controls with broad multilateral su

The Commission believes that the recommendations outlined 

effectiveness of export controls in combating proliferation:

For export controls to keep proliferation-sensitive materials, eq

of the wrong hands, assessments of the likely end user shou

whether to approve or deny an export license. This is increas

experience in Iraq. Proliferators will revert to using “low” techn

access to high technology and their WMD aspirations require 

Moreover, many dual-use items have such broad civilian app

control system is sufficiently focused on end-users of real pro

controls could needlessly constrain many innocent exports w

proliferators the capacity to develop or produce weapons of m

and more items fall into the “dual-use” area, it will be increasi

controls on end-users that present a credible risk of diversion 

end-use.

Automation can help meet this objective. For example, if the S

already required by law were collected electronically, they wo

that would include vital information both for assessing prolifer

and for determining when a proposed export should be denie

participation in the Automated Export System would also sav

Recommendation 4.1: Target U.S. export controls and e

end-users of concern.
inputting the data from 500,000 declarations each month. This would be g

security and economic interests, as it would facilitate government identific

interdiction of—dangerous shipments, while sparing industry a cumbersom

paper process. Such expanded use of the information reported on export 

could also demonstrate global procurement patterns of proliferators, and 

new diplomatic effort to win greater multilateral support for effective expor

Additional steps to improve our ability to target end-users include:

• Increase resources devoted to research of open primary source info

Dunn & Bradstreet’s, Web sites) to help identify, for example, front co

procurement networks used by entities attempting to acquire weapon

destruction.

• Develop mechanisms to increase information sharing between indus

government and within the government on end-users of concern.

• Improve our ability to conduct post-shipment verification by granting 

discretion in how resources for verifications can be used or by provid

resources.

Since proliferators are not constrained by “Buy American” legislation, any 

policy that does not embrace all major sources of supply is doomed to fai

two challenges. First, our allies have made it abundantly clear that they w

their exports to a potential U.S. veto, as in the days of the Coordinating C

Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), through which Western countries re

export of strategic materials and technology to Communist nations. Instea

multilateral export controls—including the new Wassenaar regime, which 

CoCom—are now implemented at the “national discretion” of each govern

inevitably tempts many to relax their enforcement when there is money to b

exports. Many governments license exports that the United States would 

they disagree over which countries— e.g., China, India, Iran—should be t

these controls. This loss of consensus is another victim of the end of the 

with it, the easy East versus West labeling of friend and foe.

11 The U.S. Customs Service has developed and implemented a pilot program, th

Targeting System—Anti-Terrorism, which builds on the efficiencies of AES to iden

goods which may be in violation of U.S. law. The ATS-AT is a useful tool for law e

identify and interdict such shipments in a timely fashion as well as providing a dat

which could be the basis for analysis.

Recommendation 4.2: Strengthen multilateral coordination and enfo

export controls.
40

Second, many of the countries that were traditionally targets o

have now become sufficiently developed to constitute signific

with Russia and China being only the most notable examples

system that excludes these key players can ultimately succee

The United States should therefore pursue vigorous diplomat

multilateral support for the U.S. approach to export controls. 

commercial interests coincide. Weaker export controls in fore

promote trade in weapons-related articles in those countries, 

exporters adhering to higher standards of control by siphonin

less-constrained foreign competitors.

It is not enough, however, to agree with other governments o

countries. Effective international enforcement is essential to 

objectives. Effectiveness, in turn, turns on equivalent enforce

members, in terms of degree of scrutiny, processing times, an

an export should be approved or denied. Absence of equal enf

commercial advantages on one member state over another a

Intelligence-sharing offers a unique contribution to effective e

licensing and enforcement authorities to dangerous exports i

multilateral regime. Other measures to enhance effective enf

post-shipment end-user checks, training for foreign export co

and financial and in-kind support to resource-poor export con

The complexity of the U.S. export control system has also blu

principles of good government that should discipline the adm

system:

• Transparency. Any agency should have the right to revi

the corresponding duty to express a view on that license 

as consent. Agencies should also be allowed to review w

classification or jurisdiction determinations that have bee

• Deadlines. Agencies should be given clear deadlines fo

license, with silence deemed consent, except in those c

sensitive arms sales) in which such deadlines are inapp

• Default to Decision. The system should provide for cle

procedures—up to the President—to assure that the rev

decision rather than to gridlock. Critical to this principle is 

Recommendation 4.3: Enhance discipline in the U.S. ex
be made accountable for ensuring that the interagency review proce

decision within an allotted period, or for referring the matter to more 

interagency review with the issues framed for decision by that higher 

To be sure, there will be cases involving difficult foreign policy issues—su

the sale of advanced military capability to areas where regional security a

dominate—in which it makes no sense to straitjacket the interagency revie

artificial deadlines. For the vast majority of cases, however, these principle

of license applications provide a useful discipline to a system that too ofte

into delay and inaction.

The end of the Cold War brought about the elimination of parallel export c

in most nations. The side-by-side existence of separate export control sys

use and munitions-related exports was needed to support multilateral con

CoCom as well as national controls on munitions list exports. Typically, th

ministries managed dual-use export controls or economic ministries in all

while the foreign ministry operated the munitions export control system. Th

the 1994 dissolution of CoCom to develop an international consensus on 

constraints on dual-use exports to combat proliferation meant that most o

CoCom partners substantially limited dual-use controls and refused to allo

a continued veto over exports to destinations of proliferation concern.

The United States has continued to maintain a robust system of dual-use 

controls. Export controls on dual-use products aim to block proliferation-re

technology from end-users of proliferation concern. Export controls on mun

are maintained to permit arms transfers to be employed as an instrument o

Both systems share common functions. Cases must be reviewed and enf

Department of Commerce issues approximately 11,000 dual-use export l

year, while the Department of State issues approximately 45,000 munition

year. There is considerable unevenness in the distribution of resources fo

licensing and enforcement systems, as well as different procedures for inte

The Department of Commerce applies 300 employees to its export licens

enforcement functions while the Department of State applies less than fift

processing. As a result, there are significant differences in processing tim

administrative procedures between the two systems.

There is scope for increasing the efficiency of the export control process i

States by a measure of rationalization of some common functions. The en

Recommendation 4.4: Rationalize common export control functions 

advances American interests.
42

function is shared as a statutory requirement by both system

in implementation. End-user checks, for example, are require

systems. Enforcement investigations, and associated enforce

from rationalization as well.

In the first instance, the current dual-use and munitions expor

fully automated, either through a government-wide computer 

that are fully compatible, and use of the automated system by 

mandatory. Automation of cases that interface effectively betw

practical and desirable. As commercial technology assumes 

munitions list equipment, there can be considerable benefit to 

processing system that is mutually reinforcing of the separate 

above, Shipper’s Export Declarations (SEDs)—already requi

collected and processed electronically to provide an abundan

contribute to assessing proliferator procurement patterns.

Beyond these administrative improvements, the Commission 

system may bring several advantages. It could enhance com

confusing red tape could make it easier for exporters to follow 

enforce it. Since proliferators purchase both dual-use goods a

system would allow licensing officers to communicate more r

concern, reducing the stovepiping of information that could p

worrisome acquisition patterns.

In rationalizing these two systems, we must preserve our abi

standards of approval for dual-use and munitions items. Each 

statutes and regulations, forms and nomenclatures, rules and 

bureaucracies. Security and commercial implications will of c

across the spectrum of controlled exports, from ball bearings 

fighter aircraft. These differences require varying standards o

penalties. For munitions, it is essential that the United States 

or deny export licenses based on foreign policy consideration

considerations as foreign availability.

Once these steps have been implemented and operated, the A

the results to evaluate the progress toward more efficient adm

If this review supports pursuing further reform, we recommend 

(1) to implementation of “one-stop shopping,” where an expo

application into either the State or Commerce “mailbox,” confi

agency will see that it is referred to all relevant agencies and 

appropriate statutory framework, and (2) to unification of dual

under a single management structure. The Commission sugg

conducted at the outset of the Presidential administration beg
Executive Branch Agencies

Common Agency Problems

This chapter presents the Commission’s findings and recommendations f

branch agencies that have a WMD-related mission. Most of the recomme

directed at a specific department or agency—reflecting the fact that each ag

and programs are different—but some apply to most or all of the agencies. 

recommendations are discussed at the outset of this chapter and are direc

departments and agencies that have a role in combating proliferation.

Cabinet-Level Attention and Similar Portfolios

As noted in Chapter 2, one of the Commission’s principal findings is that t

Government’s efforts to combat WMD proliferation would benefit from grea

and senior-level attention. The Commission recommended that the Presid

Combating Proliferation Council (CPC) to improve coordination among ag

ensure close consultation between the agencies and the National Directo

Proliferation. The Commission also recommended that the head of each ag

a senior-level, Senate-confirmed official to be responsible for proliferation

These officials will constitute the membership of the CPC and will ensure t

proliferation receives sustained high-level attention in each agency. Such 

increases the chances that proliferation-related problems will be noticed e

officials to address them quickly and thus avert serious crises.

Each agency’s designated official should be charged with developing a co

carrying out that agency’s WMD-related mission and effective programs to 

plan. The designated officials will resolve, in consultation with the heads o

(and where appropriate with the National Director), WMD-related disputes 

agencies. They will be accountable to their agency heads and to the Natio

the results of their agencies’ strategies and the successes and failures of 

operations.

Each agency’s lead official for proliferation-related matters should have a 

consistent with the portfolio of the National Director and with their counter

agencies. In addition, each agency should make one senior resource offic

for proliferation-related budgets. This person would work with the Nationa

resource planning process.

Personnel

One of the most important common agency problems is recruiting, retaini

developing personnel with the skills required for combating proliferation. E
44

coherent and effective non-proliferation policies will not succe

them are understaffed, or if the personnel in those offices are 

the required skills and abilities. The scientific nature of weapo

issues mandates expertise (acquired through extensive trainin

and biological sciences. Such expertise is in relatively short s

Government must compete with the private sector to attract an

The problem is more acute in some areas than others. Know

with nuclear weapons, for example, is greater than with biolog

This is not surprising: the United States invested large amou

money in the nuclear field during the Cold War, while biologic

received less sustained attention. In addition, whereas the U

nuclear systems, we gave up our offensive chemical and biolo

ago. The Commission does not recommend that those offensi

must recognize, however, and, to the extent possible, address 

the intellectual infrastructure for biological and chemical threa

nuclear threats.”12

Other skills are also needed. Government officials must have 

business dealings, in order to understand (and be able to trac

networks and other financial transactions that accompany pro

languages and familiarity with other countries’ histories, cultur

similarly vital to our efforts to stop proliferation.

The first problem that personnel officials face is hiring individ

existence of a large gap between what individuals can earn w

Government and what they can earn in the private sector is n

WMD-related positions. Although the government cannot nor

compensation packages, government officials could in certai

incentives, such as “signing bonuses” for individuals with unu

officials must also do a better job of “selling” the government 

demonstrating to individuals that working for the government 

experience, one that can provide an opportunity to do excitin

edge work unlike anything found in the private sector. Such a 

long way toward compensating for a wage gap.

Because not enough qualified individuals will decide to pursu

Government, government officials must make more extensive 

organizations in the private sector (including academia) who 

12 Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, Remarks to the DSW

Conference on Controlling Arms, June 11, 1998. Hamre added that “

on chemical weapons because we really started working very hard 

protections back in the mid ‘80s.”
for the government on a temporary basis. By hiring individuals for specific 

limited duration, government officials can tap into the private sector’s talen

advantage of the latest developments made there. This type of short-term c

gives people in the private sector an opportunity to experience governmen

them may decide after their experience to pursue a full-time government c

Ultimately, we will never replicate for biological or chemical issues the kind 

infrastructure and expertise we created over 50 years in the nuclear field—

The greatest expertise in these sciences resides outside government, in u

industry. We must be more creative in finding ways to leverage that exper

bringing individuals into government service.

Retention of individuals currently in government is a second important issu

spend a few years in government and then find the allure of the private se

Such turnover drains the government of its most valuable workers, who are 

the most attractive offers elsewhere. Retention is an especially serious pro

that have a relatively high cost of living. Many of the same techniques tha

attract individuals in the first place can also be used to retain them. Officia

consider “signing bonuses,” for example—in this case “re-signing bonuses

valuable (in terms of experience and skills) individuals.

A third important personnel issue involves education and training. Educat

government employees is vital: attracting the most capable individuals wil

effort if inadequate education and training prevents them from doing their 

This is particularly important in the WMD-related arena. Whether the indiv

intelligence analyst poring over satellite photos of a suspected biological w

an Energy Department scientist directing the removal of weapons-grade p

Russia, or a U.S. Customs inspector trying to decide which packages are 

enough to warrant a search before they leave the country, sufficient educat

is indispensable.

Unfortunately, this is often one of the first areas to be cut in a period of bu

retrenchment, even though such an approach is almost always counterpr

A well-trained worker can do more to advance U.S. interests than several 

workers, as a well-trained worker will avoid pitfalls and head off nascent p

preventing them from becoming full-blown crises that require higher-level 

expensive solutions.

Another problem with education and training is that it is time-consuming. B

agencies often fail to educate and train their most valuable workers becaus

feel that they cannot function well without those workers, even for a short tim

should seriously consider their workers’ requests for training, in order to a

to the agency’s mission. Officials at each agency’s headquarters should ide
46

and training opportunities that will enhance workers’ WMD ex

of the agency’s offices are aware of them.

Education and training are, of course, not independent of hiri

education and training can be an excellent incentive for individ

and also for them to remain in government service. Governm

the use of an ROTC-type program whereby the government w

assistance to individuals pursuing undergraduate and graduat

commitment to work in the government after graduation.

Education and training can similarly be used to help retain va

people who would otherwise leave government service might 

were guaranteed the opportunity to further build their skills ba

capital. Such offers might be particularly attractive in the comi

worked in the government during the Cold War seek to acqui

were of minimal value during the Cold War but that are in hig

War era.
Department of State

The Department of State (State) has preeminent responsibility and autho

conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, State should be assigned the princip

for communicating to foreign governments U.S. policy on proliferation of we

destruction, and should play a central role in defining and coordinating U.

A Reorganized Department of State: Long-term Challenges and

Opportunities

The integration of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the 

Department in April 1999 resulted in the consolidation under the Departm

a number of new international security affairs and arms control functions. 

ACDA was responsible for formulating, advocating, and negotiating arms c

proliferation agreements. During this time, ACDA worked to establish and 

an arms control verification process that was used (1) to focus Intelligenc

collection, analysis, and dissemination and (2) to provide procedures by w

compliant behavior could be brought to the attention of other agencies an

the interagency process. Important proliferation-related agreements, such 

Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Wea

Convention, and the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, have all be

ACDA negotiation and advocacy. Implementation was left to other agencie

When ACDA existed as a separate agency, activity within the Department 

proliferation-related policy was divided between regional (e.g., European 

Affairs) and functional (e.g., Political-Military Affairs) bureaus. Moreover, c

authority was divided between the Under Secretaries responsible for bilat

(Under Secretary for Political Affairs) and arms control (Under Secretary fo

and International Security Affairs). These circumstances often led to a wid

bilateral policy considerations dominating functional policy concerns, inclu

proliferation-related policy objectives. Thus, despite the primacy of prolife

goals in U.S. declaratory policy, the imperatives of day-to-day bilateral pol

undercut our proliferation goals vis-a-vis certain governments.

Arms control and non-proliferation are now under the day-to-day jurisdicti

organization headed by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and Interna

Affairs. The Department has reorganized its political-military affairs burea

replacing the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs with three new bureaus de

accommodate new missions, as well as the substantial increase in person

from the absorption of ACDA.
48

The Commission believes this reorganization has the potenti

Department’s ability to address the long-term challenges it fa

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Maintaining the Proper Balance Between WMD Prior

Priorities

Centralizing responsibility for proliferation-related issues withi

the Department’s historical institutional preference for bilatera

expense of global policy objectives, such as WMD proliferation

“functional” and “regional” organization viewpoints within the 

fundamentally different ways of organizing and approaching f

overall organizational framework could pose a continuing cha

management. Advocacy for “functional” issues, such as WMD 

and counter-narcotics, is likely to continue to clash with the S

“regional” philosophy and structure. Instead, the Department 

integrate its regional and functional expertise to bring both app

of country- and region-specific strategies for combating prolif

The Commission also believes that the appointment of a Nat

Combating Proliferation, as recommended in Chapter 2, will h

about maintaining strong interagency advocacy for proliferatio

foreign policy community.

Recommendation 5.1: The Department of State should ta

organizational structure to create country-specific strategi

and functional perspectives concerning WMD proliferation

Mission should reflect these strategies.
5A (45p x 33p)
50

Responding to Proliferation that Has Already Occur

State and ACDA historically emphasized efforts to prevent pr

capabilities to other countries rather than to marshal instrume

proliferation that had already occurred. Thus, the Departmen

to react to the rapidly changing proliferation problem, for exam

Korea. This must change. ACDA’s leadership in establishing 

processes used by the US Government for treaty formulation

verification, enforcement, and evidence collection may now h

address these issues, but it is not clear that the reorganizatio

emphasis on addressing existing proliferation deemed neces

The review should address all the multilateral and bilateral 

available to the United States to deal with the foreign polic

both to prevent or deter proliferation and to deal with it once i

Pakistan, North Korea, and, potentially, Iraq and Iran are cent

assessing the results of this review, the National Director shou

all efforts to combat proliferation, these potential sources of le

effective if they are exercised unilaterally than if we can gain m

range of instruments that should be examined includes, but is 

• Foreign assistance

• Security assistance

• Arms transfers

• Security guarantees

• Cooperative WMD programs of all agencies

• Trade and economic assistance

• Regulation of access to global markets, including:

Recommendation 5.2: The National Director, working wit

State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, 

organizational and resource review to identify the change

to take advantage of opportunities to prevent proliferation 

consequences of proliferation that has already occurred.
• Civil aviation access to ports of entry

• Trade access to industrial, agricultural, and service markets

• Support for nations abroad through international financial in

• Military training and related services

• The sale of surplus defense commodities

• Official travel visas

• Access to financial markets

• Access to advanced technology

• Government-sponsored export credit and insurance

Obtaining and Efficiently Using Funding for Combating Proliferation

The Commission believes that both the foreign and security assistance pr

currently too constrained by limitations on the reallocation of funds under 

direction to be used effectively as policy instruments for proliferation conti

Foreign Assistance program, in particular, has accumulated nearly forty ye

and extra-statutory obligation restrictions. It is surrounded by a powerful se

recipient constituencies that severely constrain the ability of the Departme

fast-breaking policy objectives in a timely way. An illustration of a program 

resource allocation provisions is State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmamen

$15 million per year), which can be used aggressively to address prolifera

they arise. This model could be applied with appropriate modifications to 

in the foreign assistance program. Under the Commission’s proposal outl

3, the National Director should require a full accounting of how NDF funds 

each year as part of the resource allocation review and evaluation.

Recommendation 5.3: The National Director, the Secretary of State, 

Congress should consider ways to enhance the use of the Foreign Ass

Security Assistance programs to achieve proliferation-related objective

reducing existing constraints on how the funds can be used, as well as 

the flexibility provided by the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (

aggressively, and expand the precedent established by the NDF autho

broadly in international affairs accounts.
52

The Commission was briefed on the problems involved with t

support diplomatic demarches aimed at combating proliferati

difficulty arises from the tension between protecting sources 

intelligence information to achieve a desirable policy end.

Recommendation 5.4: The National Director, in consulta

Central Intelligence, should establish a decision-making p

of intelligence in a demarche that ensures timely decisions 

of the policy benefits and the risks to sources and method
Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DoD) has the most resources applied to the w

programs for combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 

delivery. DoD combats proliferation by (1) the application of military power t

States forces and interests, (2) intelligence collection and analysis, and (3

diplomacy, arms control, and export controls. It is the only agency involve

of responding to the WMD threat, including prevention, deterrence, defen

the damage in case of use. It must be organized to support not only its own 

the government-wide efforts described in Chapter 2.

Impact of the Defense Reform Initiative on Proliferation Policy

The Secretary of Defense’s November 1997 Defense Reform Initiative (D

several organizational changes intended to raise the priority of DoD prolif

activities and to improve the Department’s overall performance in this are

• The position of Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy h

abolished and its functions, including proliferation policy, transferred 

Secretary for Strategy and Resources (renamed Assistant Secretary f

Threat Reduction).

• A new Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has brought toget

single Director several agencies dealing with emerging threats: the D

Weapons Agency (formerly, the Defense Nuclear Agency), On-Site I

Agency, Defense Technology Security Administration, Center for Ver

Research and elements responsible for implementing the Cooperativ

Reduction program.

• Congress stopped the Secretary of Defense from abolishing the pos

the Secretary for Atomic Energy (later for Nuclear, Chemical and Biol

–previously a key advisor on these programs—although the position r

In spite of these developments, responsibility for proliferation-related issu

remains so diffused as to make it impossible to determine who—below th

Secretary—has the authority and the responsibility to integrate plans, polic

and programs. No one seems to be “in charge” of combating proliferation 

organization as large and complex as DoD, that is a serious problem.

Responsibilities for combating proliferation are too diffuse. Below the 

Deputy Secretary, there is no institutional means of integrating the mu

separate activities.
54

5B (45p x 28p)
The Commission is concerned that the DRI, in its zeal to reduce the size 

Secretary of Defense, has damaged the Department’s ability to develop a

proliferation plans, policy and programs. The Commission believes that th

should reconsider the results of the DRI and reorganize proliferation relat

technology acquisition activities.

Making Proliferation Policy. The Under Secretary for Policy is responsib

Secretary of Defense for proliferation policy. Implementation of DRI recomm

not only produced a downsizing of the Under Secretary’s staff, but also a c

diverse policy areas, including proliferation, under a single ASD for Strate

Reduction. The quite considerable abilities of this individual notwithstandi

Commission believes that the proliferation policy responsibility should not 

other policy and strategy issues. Instead, this demanding portfolio should b

province of an Assistant Secretary for Combating Proliferation.

Acquiring Technologies to Combat Proliferation. While the effort to br

proliferation-related acquisition programs together in the new Defense Th

Agency (DTRA) is laudable, the Director of the new agency lacks the auth

priorities among research and development programs of the military depa

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. This weakness has both o

and “cultural” origins. Our experience in developing the capability to prote

against chemical and biological weapons illustrates the problem.

The Urgency of Chemical and Biological Defense

Despite the expenditure of several billion dollars since the threat em

previously identified vulnerabilities against chemical and biological 

remain, and our commanders have found even more weaknesses. M

appears likely that only incremental progress will be achieved in the 

years. Why? The Commission’s pessimistic outlook is based on fou

• First, our system for acquiring technology is broken. The Commission 

problem and proposed steps toward a solution in Chapter 3. Our rec

include an integrated, government-wide technology acquisition plan 

requirements and determine how and by whom they can best be sat

The 1990-91 Gulf War heightened our awareness to the threats posed 

spread of chemical and biological weapons. Today, the warfighting co

in-chief continue to rank chemical and biological defense as their num

counter-proliferation priority.
56

• Second, DoD elements are still learning how to define th

process. Understanding what we are seeking to defend 

and under what circumstances is essential, but so, too, is 

important factors in a complex organization with numero

finite resources.

• Third, one of the competitive challenges to chemical and 

comes from another, more traditional threat to our milita

intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles. Substan

expended on missile defenses than on the number-one 

biological defense, although the regional warfighting com

threats—the traditional and the new—demand immediat

• Finally, DoD lacks both the organizational leadership and 

new requirements, like chemical and biological defense, 

For chemical and biological defense acquisition programs, the 

inter-linked sets of committees in a management chain unde

Defense for Acquisition and Technology: the Office of the Sec

Biological and Chemical Steering Committee; the Joint Nucle

Defense Board; the Joint Service Integration Group; the Joint 

a series of six “commodity area” groups led by program manag

services. But even this list is not all-inclusive. The ASD for Sp

Intensity Conflict has primary oversight of force protection ac

connection to this chemical and biological defense committee 

why force protection assessments lack sufficient integration w

programs for chemical and biological weapon defense.

Well-intentioned as it is, the DTRA solution, as presently struc

technology acquisition problem. As the chemical and biologic

illustrates, nowhere in this process is there a senior official w

resources to command the development and implementation 

Department-wide architecture to combat the proliferation of w

Halting the Erosion of U.S. Nuclear Programs

The proliferation of nuclear weapons will remain a primary se

foreseeable future. The safety, security, reliability, and adequa

deterrent will also be continuing DoD concerns, and sustainin
needs to be a top national priority.13 But, DoD faces challenges similar to 

Department of Energy in maintaining the cadre of skilled nuclear weapon

needs, together with the underlying infrastructure to support their work. T

technical analysis they provide is also critical to our understanding of other 

capabilities.

The Commission is concerned that placing responsibility for the custody a

acquisition oversight of nuclear forces under the Defense Threat Reductio

recommended by the Defense Reform Initiative, created two potential pro

• First, responsibility for maintaining effectiveness of U.S. nuclear wea

assigned to an agency whose principal mission is keeping others from 

weapons. Such a dual focus is inherently conflicted.

• Second, the Defense Reform Initiative relegated nuclear weapons an

programs to a much lower level of attention, with a significant degrad

nuclear career field among the military services.14

The downgrading of nuclear program oversight has been occurring for so

Defense Nuclear Agency was once headed by a three-star general office

responsibility to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the D

leadership. Today, nuclear operations are headed by a one-star general wh

as head of a Defense Threat Reduction Agency directorate and deputy di

nuclear weapons office in the Department of Energy (DOE). The position 

the Secretary of Defense (ATSD) for Atomic Energy, recently renamed AT

for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense, was proposed for eliminat

Defense Reform Initiative, but Congress, concerned with DoD oversight o

programs, has in effect prevented this action.

The Commission believes the President’s description of the role of nuclea

deterring our adversaries from employing weapons of mass destruction as 

13 Increased attention to chemical and biological defense should not come at the 

attention to the challenges posed by nuclear issues. Indeed, chemical and biolog

often joined into the larger category of “NBC defense,” but this term is often unre

significant nuclear component and these are not synonymous: nuclear defensive 

distinct category that wants for more balanced attention from senior defense lead

acquisition program managers.

14 The Commission shares the concern of the March 1, 1999, Chiles Commission 

DoD 1998 Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Nuclear Deterrence that 

and related programs are not receiving sufficient management attention. In partic

Commission endorses the Chiles Commission’s conclusion that “the Administratio

through actions and words, should make a concerted and continuing effort to conv

weapons community that their mission is vital to the security of the nation and wil

beyond the planning horizons normally associated with programmatic decisions. 

should be unequivocal, clear, and periodically reinforced.”
58

remains valid, and his recognition of the need to ensure the v

infrastructure is equally compelling. The Commission notes th

have identified shortcomings in this area and proposed remed

urges that the Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of En

place a high priority on addressing their recommendations.

Reorganizing DoD Proliferation-related Policy and T

(1) Establish the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (A

Proliferation/Policy to be the focal point for policy on combatin

mass destruction and related emerging threats, and align his 

those of the National Director for Combating Proliferation:

• Developing the DoD strategy for implementing policy on 

including prevention, protection, and mitigation of the co

in countries of concern, regionally and globally.

• Overseeing the execution of DoD’s Cooperative Threat R

assuring it is consistent with overall U.S. policy;

• Overseeing DoD consequence management (transferred 

Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Confl

• Managing export control and sanctions policies, with sup

Technology Security Administration (transferred from the 

Agency).

(2) Realign the responsibilities of the ASD for Strategy and R

functional areas:

• Defense guidance and plans;

• Nuclear force structure and employment planning;

• Ballistic missile defense; and

• Arms control.

Recommendation 5.5: The Secretary of Defense should 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, establishing a 

proliferation-related issues.
(3) Maintain the regional responsibility focus of the ASD for International S

(It may be advisable to include the Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian region 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program under the ASD for Proliferation Th

Planning Proliferation-related Military Operations

Preparing plans for military operations is the job of the Director for Operat

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Planning operations to combat p

complex, specialized, and sensitive. The Commission believes that the Jo

establish a small cadre of specialists—a Joint Proliferation Operations Pla

conduct planning for operations to:

• Deny acquisition of weapons-useable nuclear, biological and chemic

equipment, and technology by countries and sub-national groups of 

• Disrupt delivery of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery 

• Identify and inhibit sub-national terrorist groups and nations that are 

acquire or enhance weapons of mass destruction capability.

This Joint Proliferation Operations Plans Group would necessarily work c

National Director for Combating Proliferation, receiving requirements and 

the National Director as well as keeping him or her fully informed of planning 

group would also work closely with the headquarters of U.S. warfighting co

Central Intelligence Agency, and, where appropriate, the Federal Bureau o

The Commission believes that coordination could best be accomplished b

intelligence and law enforcement specialists to work with the Group. This 

could, over time, become an important force in crystallizing consideration 

action that advances our efforts against proliferation. Eventually, these plan

covert or military action that would require review by Principals, approval b

and notification of relevant congressional committees. Others would involv

Recommendation 5.6: The President should direct the Secretary of 

establish a Joint Proliferation Operations Plans Group, under the Assi

Secretary of Defense for Combating Proliferation/Policy, to conduct pl

support for operations to combat proliferation.
60

diplomacy and various forms of cooperation including, but no

cooperation.

Reporting to the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technol

of Defense for Combating Proliferation/Acquisition would be d

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and responsible for:

• Developing a comprehensive architecture for technology 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their d

out this responsibility, the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Acquisition would make use of the analytic strength of th

Agency’s Advanced Systems Concept Office;

• Ensuring the DoD plans and programs are consistent w

complement government-wide technology acquisition pl

National Director for Combating Proliferation and the Co

Council;

• Providing guidance and direction to a senior scientific dep

a coordinated research and development (R&D) program 

including Advanced Technology Demonstrations and Adv

Demonstrations, and related R&D conducted by the Serv

Research Projects Agency, and the Defense Threat Red

• Overseeing an office, led by a two-star general, to assure 

United States nuclear forces. This office should have res

radiological defense acquisition programs, including tech

personnel with a knowledge of nuclear weapons, and th

weapons; and

• Replacing much of the Army-led chemical-biological def

with an office, led by a two-star general, responsible for 

programming resources. This office would take principa

oversight of all chemical and biological development and 

Recommendation 5.7: The Secretary of Defense should 

Secretary of Defense for Combating Proliferation/Acquisit

technology acquisition programs bearing on combating p
5C (45p x 33p)
62

Department of Energy

The Department of Energy (DOE) plays a key role in combat

its expertise in nuclear weapons and nuclear power, DOE has 

other agency in dealing with matters of nuclear proliferation. 

laboratories, including the three national weapons laboratorie

Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sa

and the manufacturing complex for nuclear weapons. These 

technological capabilities that, if properly harnessed, can con

aspects of combating proliferation.

The Commission’s review of DOE’s proliferation-related activ

period when major counterintelligence and security problems w

time, there have been several independent reviews and recom

changes in the management of the weapons programs and o

closely associated with nuclear weapons. In general, the Com

the views of the recent report of the President’s Foreign Intel

(PFIAB). Along those lines, the recommendations that the Co

focus DOE more closely on nuclear proliferation-related activ

unique experience. The Commission endorses the PFIAB’s re

Office of Nonproliferation and National Security under a new 

if such an office is created.

DOE and its predecessor agencies, the Atomic Energy Comm

Research & Development Administration (ERDA), have a lon

proliferation matters. In the 1950s and 1960s, the AEC was t

implementing “Atoms for Peace,” a policy aimed at providing 

assistance to nations willing to forswear the acquisition of nuc

period and until India’s nuclear explosion in 1974, the AEC, a

supported policies today considered proliferation risks, such 

explosions and export of commercial enrichment and reproces

its creation in 1977, DOE has been committed to advancing U

objectives. Over time, several programs have emerged in DO

objectives. The most important relate to nuclear matters in the 

include developing Materials Protection, Control, and Accoun

disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials (notably the p

uranium from Russia), participating in the Cooperative Threat 

convert Russia’s three plutonium production reactors to fuel th

grade plutonium, and the Nuclear Cities Initiative.

DOE’s strength is also its weakness. The Department and its 

creating new high-performance technology, although the cost 

is high, and the laboratories do not have experience in procuri

the commercial world. The expertise of the laboratory system i
and related areas (such as instrumentation), and the government is under

single developer and supplier of nuclear weapons. However, in the areas o

biology, DOE has peers in universities and the private sector.

DOE is good at sponsoring work in the laboratory system that supports its 

less adept at competing work between the laboratories and industry or un

Commission stressed in Chapter 3 that the US Government program mus

consideration of the entire life cycle of technology, from research and develo

procurement, testing, and field deployment. For chemical and biological a

weapons detection, protection, and treatment, the problem of procuremen

deployment is as demanding and more costly than developing new techno

Commission believes it is important that DOE’s development program not 

isolation from a government-wide acquisition plan that involves other agenc

for addressing the procurement and acquisition issue. Without such integr

danger that DOE (or other agencies) may develop new technology that is n

sponsor similar projects in several different laboratories, as has happened 

Commission found examples of chemical and biological agent detection p

computer software systems designed to serve a possible proliferation end 

proceeding in parallel. The result is that significant resources are devoted 

development with greater duplication than desirable, and with little or no a

fielding new capabilities.

DOE assistance to Russia on MPC&A provides an important example of sh

occur when there is an exclusive focus on technology. DOE has been succe

MINATOM, the Russian nuclear agency, obtain MPC&A systems. However

program does not include any support, either financial or technical, for de

operation, and maintenance of these systems. The result is that, in some 

installed systems are neither used nor maintained, thus vitiating the purpos

Cooperative Threat Reduction effort.

The Commission believes that DOE should focus its policy and program e

combating nuclear proliferation, and should shift its focus on chemical and 

proliferation to one of supporting the requirements of other agencies and 

access to its laboratories. Our recommendations are intended to accomp

Recommendation 5.8: Responsibility for combating nuclear prolifera

be consolidated under one Assistant Secretary of Energy (ASE).
64

All relevant DOE programs should be placed under this officia

relevant should be moved to other offices. This ASE should be 

designated as a member of the Combating Proliferation Coun

• All activities related to foreign nuclear materials disposit

Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN) sh

this ASE. This includes, for example, the North Korean s

Activities related to U.S. materials disposition currently h

Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) arguably should be inc

of the international impact of such actions. Alternatively, 

disposition activities could be moved to ASE/Defense Pr

Environmental Management (EM).

• The Office of Emergency Management in ASE/Nonprol

Security should be consolidated with the Office of Emer

Defense Programs. The Commission notes that Energy 

has independently taken action to transfer the NN Office 

and the DP Office of Emergency Response to the newly 

and Emergency Operations. However, these two offices 

organizationally.

• Activities of the Office of International Nuclear Safety an

reactor safety and are not directly concerned with prolife

either to the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety within t

Safety and Health, or transferred to the Nuclear Regulat

DOE’s role in the export control process should be limited to 

nuclear technology and products, broadly defined.

Over time, the DOE intelligence program should be focused on 

including analysis of both technical and country/regional issu

laboratories have unique capabilities. In addition, this technic

matters should be made more accessible to the rest of the In

particularly those elements whose mission is primarily prolife

process could involve the assignment of personnel from DOE

the national laboratories to the DCI Nonproliferation Center (N

is in line with one made by the President’s Foreign Intelligenc

1999 report on security problems at the Department of Energy

expertise into the NPC would benefit the NPC and the Intellige

Recommendation 5.9: DOE activities in the interagency p

focused on nuclear matters, in which the agency has uniq
R&D programs should be structured as part of an overall strategy that lea

deployment, whether for force protection or for domestic response.

The DOE R&D effort should be coordinated with other agencies, especially 

and biological areas, to avoid duplication.

Much of the work on technology related to combating biological and chem

currently funded in the DOE budget should be funded instead by the agen

requirements for the technology, such as the Department of Health and H

the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community. This work ca

at the DOE laboratories as “work for others.” This will strengthen the conn

the user and the developer, and hopefully shorten the time required to fie

capabilities.

Recommendation 5.10: DOE’s proliferation-related research and dev

(R&D) efforts should conform to a government-wide technology acqui

put together by the National Director for Combating Proliferation and t

Combating Proliferation Council, and existing regulatory and other ba

make it difficult for the DOE laboratories to perform work for other agen

be removed.
66

Intelligence Community

National intelligence collection and analysis has been import

related policies since the 1950s. Significant steps to strengthe

intensified after India surprised the world with its 1974 nuclea

Desert. During the Bush Administration, Directors of Central 

Webster and Robert Gates established the DCI Nonproliferat

proliferation-related intelligence collection and analysis. In ad

Intelligence Community (IC)—including the CIA, the National 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of Energ

Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)—ha

their proliferation-related intelligence capability.

5D (27p x 31p)
While there has been considerable progress in U.S. intelligence capability

to be done to meet policy needs. There are no better reminders of the ne

improvement than the unexpected Indian nuclear test in May 1998 and No

of a three-stage ballistic missile in August 1998. Similarly, the importance 

for warning about potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction wa

the revelation that environmental samples and other intelligence indicated 

Ladin’s terrorist organization was interested in acquiring chemical weapon

to the presence of a VX nerve agent precursor in Sudan. And surely our le

a detailed appraisal of how well Russia is controlling its nuclear stockpile, 

strategic nuclear and other WMD-related materials, its technology, and th

personnel who work, or have worked, on its nuclear, chemical, and biolog

Our objectives for proliferation-related intelligence should include the follo

• The earliest possible warning of imminent and emerging WMD threats

significant testing milestones, and technological surprises;

• Accurate information and assessments about the WMD programs an

practices of nations and sub-national groups, including associated d

and related technology, along with identification of vulnerabilities;

• Greater understanding of the particular strategic, regional, and intern

motivate a country or sub-national group to acquire, or use, WMD cap

as key points of leverage for influencing such decisions;

• Identification of critical links and nodes in the web of selling, buying, 

WMD technology and materials, as well as vulnerabilities in those pr

networks; and

• Resource allocation in the IC should reflect the high priority accorde

proliferation.

Considerable collection and analytic resources are required to accomplish 

objectives. Both collection and analysis must be better planned, managed, 

along both functional lines that stress the weapons and their means of del

regional lines, so that the political and security contexts that lead to dema

weapons are better understood.

It is also important to address the relationship between intelligence and it

both Congress and the executive branch, and the ways in which this relatio

the quality of the intelligence. Good intelligence is fundamental to combati

Most efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are shrouded in secr

and denial; the Intelligence Community must pierce that shroud. In only the 

as in Iraq immediately after the Gulf War—can we quickly uncover vast qu
68

incontrovertible evidence of these weapons programs. But ev

scrutiny supported by the most intrusive non-proliferation insp

still believe Saddam Hussein has been able to conceal some 

much of his WMD development infrastructure.

Discovering the secrets of unfriendly states and terrorist grou

and in confidence. In this work, sources are fragile and any p

likely to make the source dry up or, worse, jeopardize the sou

objectivity is the Intelligence Community’s greatest asset. Atte

inevitably threaten to bias it. Biased intelligence courts policy 

For these reasons, good intelligence and the rough-and-tumb

process do not always mix. Yet U.S. intelligence depends on 

people’s elected representatives, support that requires close c

between the Intelligence Community and Congress. In additio

relationship between the Intelligence Community and the gov

crucial importance. To be agile and well-informed, policy need

To be relevant, intelligence efforts must address policy conce

In much intelligence work, clear, mission-specific standards o

example, the consequences of a missed warning can be muc

consequences of a false alarm. Therefore, in providing warni

Community should err on the side of over-reporting by using 

of proof. In providing estimates and analytical reports, on the 

Community should apply its best assessment, taking all its da

and judgment into account. In analyzing whether a specific tra

context of a sanctions determination or other action that coul

consequences for American interests, the Intelligence Comm

standard of proof. Once promulgated, these standards would g

analysis by the Intelligence Community and its evaluation by 

Recommendation 5.11: The Director of Central Intellige

intelligence is responsive to the needs of policy makers a

conferences between policy agencies and the Intelligence 

with a sharpened focus on presenting usable intelligence

Recommendation 5.12: The National Director should wo

Central Intelligence to promulgate guidance to ensure tha

evidence are applied to current intelligence and warning a

longer term analyses and estimates, and that these stand

throughout the Intelligence Community, to relevant policy 

relevant committees of Congress.
The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for determining the arch

proliferation-related intelligence efforts and the successful execution of th

An effective architecture requires a single integrated proliferation intellige

(and accompanying budget) that includes all activities within the National 

Intelligence programs in the Departments of State, Justice, and Energy. A

a single integrated plan covering collection, analysis, and production of pr

related intelligence does not exist.

Intelligence collection is most successful when collectors and analysts fro

disciplines—imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), h

intelligence (HUMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MA

together to define a collection plan. While the individual agencies will exe

collection, the scope and strategy for collection require a community-wide p

should not go forward without the Director’s approval. The Director of Cen

has taken steps toward a more coordinated collection plan across the ent

Community by appointing an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 

(ADCI/Collection).

The Commission believes that the Nonproliferation Center (NPC) should w

ADCI/Collection to assemble integrated proliferation-related collection pla

them to the Director for approval. Assigning this responsibility to the NPC 

evolution of its scope and is necessary for it to carry out its mission succe

Recommendation 5.13: The President should direct the Director of C

Intelligence to create a single proliferation-related intelligence program 

pursuant to policy guidance and priorities established by the National 

Combating Proliferation and the Combating Proliferation Council, for a

the President and review by the appropriate congressional committee

Recommendation 5.14: The Director of Central Intelligence should e

there is integrated collection planning against priority proliferation targ
70

Two recent reports by outside experts15 suggest that our abili

political and military analysis must be strengthened. Without 

objective analysis, the targeting of collection will be poor and t

not be translated into useful intelligence for policy makers. Th

both on technical aspects of the development and production 

weapons of mass destruction and on the regional and domes

concerns that lead nations to acquire them. Such analysis mu

and classified sources.

Accordingly, the Director of Central Intelligence, through the A

and with the help of outside experts, should assess the capabi

national laboratories of DOE, to carry out proliferation-related 

assessment should identify shortfalls and areas of unnecess

consider ways to: (1) ensure the development and retention o

with specialized knowledge of technical proliferation issues (e

analyst” positions and a career track for such specialists), (2) 

training and support tools, (3) provide outside review of intellig

programs, particularly for intelligence analysts, (4) encourage 

and provide appropriate channels for getting those views to t

minimize the risk of inadequate analysis prompted by pressu

(6) ensure that analysts have access to all relevant intelligenc

compartmentalized unless justified by security needs, (7) pro

analysis without sacrificing the resources needed for longer-t

make better use of open-source information relevant to prolife

analysts have access to it, and (9) ensure maintenance of da

and estimation.

Recommendation 5.15: The Director of Central Intellige

proliferation-related analytical capabilities throughout the 

assign lead responsibility for proliferation analysis, and pr

where needed.

15 Admiral David Jeremiah’s report to the DCI on the Intelligence Co

Indian preparations for the nuclear weapons tests conducted in Ma

Commission chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfe

ballistic missile threat to the United States.
Each type of weapon of mass destruction has a different cycle of developm

and storage, along with corresponding signatures that can be detected by 

intelligence collection. The technical intelligence associated with nuclear 

activities is unique and considerable capability exists within the Intelligence 

large part in DoD and the DOE laboratories) to detect nuclear signatures. 

capability to detect signatures of chemical and biological agents. There is 

to improve this capability, especially for environmental sampling and analy

chemical- and biological-weapons activity. The capability that presently ex

fragmented among the CIA, the Army, and DOE laboratories.

During the Cold War, intelligence was primarily focused on Soviet military 

capabilities in preparation for a war that never came. In contrast, prolifera

intelligence is used every day in an ongoing battle to stop the spread of we

destruction. Intelligence is used as the basis for denying an export license

sanctions, demarching a foreign government, influencing members of inte

organizations, or undertaking law-enforcement activities. Each of these a

some risk to the sources or methods used to acquire the information. At t

intelligence is of no value if it cannot be used. Balancing the benefits of the

of intelligence against the risk that such use may frustrate future intelligen

efforts must often be done on a case-by-case basis. Clear policy objectives 

understanding of the potential risks should inform these determinations. A

is no established process for ensuring consistent consideration of these fa

Recommendation 5.16: The Director of Central Intelligence should ta

Nonproliferation Center, working with the ADCI/Collection, to prepare 

plan to enhance the technical capability for proliferation-related intellig

collection and to develop new technology for sampling and analysis th

provide faster and more accurate information on activities at suspect f

Recommendation 5.17: The National Director for Combating Prolifera

Director of Central Intelligence should develop a process for resolving 

regarding the use of proliferation-related intelligence.
72

Department of Commerce

The Department of Commerce manages and enforces expor

technology, including goods and technology that have a direc

development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruc

delivery. The current organization of Commerce to implemen

1985, when Congress—out of concern for the inherent confli

promotion activities of Commerce and the administration of e

export controls from the International Trade Administration an

Export Administration (BXA).

The original statutory basis for these dual-use controls was e

Administration Act (EAA), though since 1994—the last time th

have been implemented pursuant to Presidential emergency a

have been established pursuant to our role as party to the Nuc

and the Chemical Weapons Convention and our membership 

Group, Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regim

Arrangements. Under the “catch-all” authority established un

through the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, BXA con

and technologies if destined for an end-user engaged in the de

or the proliferation of WMD projects to other nations.

A New EAA with Enhanced Penalties

BXA establishes and maintains the Commerce Control List, w

commodities requiring export licenses for export to specified 

reviews and decides export license applications for items on 

In fiscal year 1998, BXA received about 11,000 export licens

Defense Authorization Act of 1998 imposed a new ten-day no

of high performance computers to Tier 3 destinations which re

increase in applications received in the first year.

Effective administration of export controls is enhanced by cle

reflecting clear export control policy. As noted in Chapter 4, w

consensus on export control policy. We also do not have clea

Congress and the Administration have failed for a decade to 

update of the Export Administration Act that reflects the post-

Committee on Strategic Trade) world. Year after year, the Unit

its export control system pursuant to emergency Presidential 

regular statute—the Export Administration Act. We have unde

assist emerging nations in the establishment of export control 

first step in these efforts is to convince these nations to establis
own export control system. This effort could be assisted by U.S. passage o

law.

Since the expiration of the Export Administration Act on September 30, 19

two short periods when the EAA was extended), the Export Administratio

have been continued in force by a series of executive orders under the au

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The lack of an E

Administration Act hampers BXA in its compliance and enforcement efforts

Export Administration Regulations under IEEPA limits the criminal fines for 

amount much less than the penalties of the last EAA, and less still than th

penalties that any new EAA would surely contain. In some cases, an export 

could view the risk and burden of penalty for a violation as low enough to be 

of doing business,” to be balanced against the revenue received from an ille

There is also a significant difference in the standard for violations betwee

IEEPA.

Post-shipment Verifications

An aggressive enforcement effort discourages would-be violators, and po

verifications are an important tool for monitoring exports from the United S

export licenses are approved with conditions, such as limiting access to th

prohibiting resale or re-export, and prohibiting use in a proliferation end-u

BXA’s compliance efforts, post-shipment verifications are conducted to en

goods are received by the declared end-user and to ensure the goods are 

accordance with any conditions that BXA imposed on the export. When fo

know that Commerce personnel may visit to verify that the goods are bein

compliance with the conditions of the export, their incentives to ensure full c

U.S. export controls are enhanced.

The NDAA of 1998 mandated that BXA conduct postshipment verification 

performance computers exported to Tier 3 destinations, numbering about 

year. BXA has had to devote significant resources to conduct these on-sit

devoting four of its international safeguards teams solely to verifications o

performance computers. Commerce therefore has fewer resources to con

checks for other technologies which may contribute more directly to the dev

indigenous WMD capability.

Recommendation 5.18: Congress should enact and the President sh

new Export Administration Act, reflecting the post-CoCom export cont

and containing substantially greater penalties than now apply to expo

violations.
74

Informing Congress

The Commission believes it is important that Congress have 

information. The Export Administration Act provided for such 

committees in Congress, along with confidentiality provisions 

Commerce Department should fully comply with any and all r

accordance with that section. By keeping such information fro

branch insulates itself from healthy engagement with Congre

BXA should report this export licensing information annually 

oversight of the administration’s implementation of dual-use e

Effective Enforcement of Export Controls

Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) has about 

offices nationwide whose sole responsibility is enforcing the E

Regulations. The Export Administration Act authorized the la

Commerce’s special agents. However, since the EAA expired

be deputized annually by the U.S. Marshal’s Service in order 

enforce U.S. export control laws.

OEE agents are closely linked to the export licensing process 

license applications. The special agents can flag companies 

technologies, parties under investigation or parties they or the 

have identified as front companies for would-be proliferators. 

has provided information to licensing officials that caused the

and in other cases, licensing officials have alerted OEE to pos

export license application.

Recommendation 5.19: The Bureau of Export Administr

post-shipment verifications to encompass technologies o

and Congress should ensure that the Bureau has the reso

it needs to implement an effective and aggressive post-sh

program.

Recommendation 5.20: Congress and the executive bra

mechanism for ensuring that Congress has greater acces

information.
For a variety of reasons, however, there is not adequate sharing of inform

enforcement agents and the Intelligence Community. Moreover, agents are 

ability to tap into information outside BXA on end-users. Because of BXA’s 

exporting community and the outreach efforts of the agents, many exporte

when they are concerned about an end-user. BXA officials can query only 

own database in response to these calls, and there is no way for them to 

Government sources of information about end-users, classified and uncla

essential that BXA be fully integrated into the information-sharing process 

swift action to prevent illegal export.

Specifically, BXA should be connected to the IC network in order to facilita

classified sources regarding end-users.

Training of Personnel

Export license application processing requires the assessment of the poten

and strategic uses of an item, vetting the end-user through the Intelligenc

and consulting with other agencies who review these applications, includi

Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, and the Nonproliferation Cen

analysis of an export license application is done by BXA’s licensing office

licensing officers need technical expertise in the technologies for which the

applications. These officers are not the sole source of expertise, as some 

analysis is contributed from other agencies during the interagency review 

The ideal solution would be to recruit specialists in the technologies of W

is not possible, training of existing personnel should be a priority, and BXA 

advantage of the expertise among the various agencies, including the IC, 

training for licensing personnel.

Recommendation 5.21: The National Director for Combating Prolifera

work with the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration 

information sharing between the Bureau of Export Administration and 

Intelligence Community, and should develop mechanisms by which spe

in the field can request and receive end-user information from US Gov

sources.

Recommendation 5.22: The Bureau of Export Administration should t

increase the expertise of its licensing officers.
76

Other Agencies

The agencies discussed below have important contributions 

proliferation effort. Each of these departments should design

confirmed official to act as the point of contact for the Nationa

Proliferation and to ensure adequate coordination of proliferat

department.

Department of the Treasury

The Department of the Treasury includes several offices and 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the U

Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Secret Service, an

Investment. Specific recommendations for some of these offi

which fall under the purview of the Under Secretary (Enforce

United States Customs Service

The mission of the U.S. Customs Service is to ensure that all 

and leaving the United States do so in accordance with U.S. 

Customs inspectors administer the Service’s interdiction prog

conduct warrantless searches of any items entering or leaving 

therefore plays a key role in ensuring that weapons of mass d

components) do not enter or leave the United States illegally.

Preventing the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction m

Service’s top priorities. However, Customs is also charged wi

of other items, notably illegal drugs. Since interdiction of wea

vital to the security of the United States, Customs must have 

employees who focus solely on that task.

The staff of this office should be specially trained in WMD de

techniques, and responsible for ensuring that Customs inspe

airports around the country are similarly trained. Congress an

ensure that it has the resources it needs to guard America’s b

WMD smuggling.

Recommendation 5.23: The Customs Service should cr

to the detection and interdiction of weapons of mass dest
In theory, all goods leaving or entering the customs jurisdiction of the Unit

be inspected. In reality, the volume of U.S. foreign commerce makes this 

Successful interdiction is based on advance intelligence or on irregularitie

suspicions of a Customs inspector on the spot. Because intelligence is one 

Service’s most powerful interdiction tools, Customs and the Intelligence C

must ensure that Customs continues to receive as much useful intelligenc

consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

Customs also participates in several interagency programs that train forei

services to deal with the smuggling of WMD-related materials. Because it 

intercept such material as far from U.S. territory as possible, these internat

a critical part of U.S. interdiction efforts. Congress must ensure that they re

funding.

Automated Export System

The Customs Service tracks items that leave the country in part by requir

report on their shipments. Under current law, however, a Shipper’s Export 

(SED) does not have to be submitted to government officials until after the 

left the country. Because of this (and for other reasons), data from the SED 

used for enforcement purposes, but only to amass trade statistics. Custom

trying to encourage exporters to file their SEDs electronically using its Au

System (AES). Use of the AES is voluntary, however, and participation rat

low.

Economic Leverage

Although the Commission was prohibited in its charter legislation, as ame

evaluating the adequacy or usefulness of sanctions laws, it is clear from ou

that the United States is not making optimal use of its economic leverage 

proliferation. Trade sanctions are only one of the economic tools at our dis

to U.S. capital markets, access to U.S. technologies, financial assistance, a

international financial organizations are among the wide range of econom

Recommendation 5.24: Congress should require all exporters to file 

Shipper’s Export Declarations electronically via the Automated Export 

This requirement should be phased in over a period of several years, 

creating the mandate Congress should seek to address, to the extent p

concerns of the trade industry regarding the costs it will impose, partic

small businesses.
78

could be used as carrots or sticks as part of an overall strateg

Given the increasing tendency to turn to economic sanctions 

response to proliferation activity, it is essential that we begin 

warfare” with the same level of sophistication and planning w

For example, just as good intelligence is essential to success

good intelligence on key points of leverage in the governmen

essential for tailoring economic tools to achieve maximum infl

In addition, we should ensure that we have in place the legal 

exercise this leverage. For example, the Commission is conce

may be raising funds in U.S. capital markets. The Cox Comm

report found that “the [People’s Republic of China] is using ca

source of central government funding for military and comme

means of cloaking U.S. technology acquisition efforts by its fr

of regularity and respectability.”16 Because there is currently n

review of entities seeking to gain access to our capital marke

know that they may be assisting in the proliferation of weapon

providing funds to known proliferators. Aside from the moral i

potential financial consequences of proliferation activity—suc

of trade and financial sanctions—which could negatively impa

As part of this assessment, the National Director should, in c

appropriate agencies and experts from the private sector, ass

proliferators access to U.S. capital markets. Options consider

enhance transparency, such as requiring more detailed repor

companies seeking access or disclosure of proliferation-relat

mechanisms to bar entry of such entities into the U.S. capital 

possible costs and benefits of various options, this review sho

effectiveness of unilateral actions and the impact of those op

viability of the global capital market in general and U.S. capita

16 Report of the Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/C

People’s Republic of China, Volume 1, Chapter 1, page 57.

Recommendation 5.25: The Secretary of the Treasury, i

National Director for Combating Proliferation, should lead 

current mechanisms for exercising financial or economic 

proliferation, and develop recommendations for improving 

leverage, including any legal changes that might be requi

focus on positive as well as negative incentives.
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

The Secretary of the Treasury chairs the interagency Committee on Foreig

the United States (CFIUS). The Office of International Investment, under 

Secretary for International Affairs, handles CFIUS-related matters on a da

By delegation from the President, CFIUS administers the Exon-Florio pro

authorizes the President to bar foreign acquisition of an American firm if t

“threatens to impair the national security” and if other laws cannot protect 

security. The law does not define “national security,” but its language indic

proliferation could be considered within CFIUS’s jurisdiction. However, the 

also be interpreted to mean that CFIUS, in deciding whether or not to bar 

should not consider either the potential for the transfer of dual-use material 

for the transfer of actual WMD by means other than direct sales. Such an 

might lead CFIUS to permit acquisitions or mergers that could damage U

security.

Recommendation 5.26: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the 

States should continue to take steps to prevent foreign individuals and 

engage in or assist in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

acquiring U.S. firms. In doing so, CFIUS should view its mandate broa

as appropriate on the expertise of interested agencies to aid CFIUS in 

both the potential for transfers of WMD by means other than direct sa

possible transfer of dual-use material.
80

Department of Justice

Combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is es

issue, but one in which law-enforcement tools can be particu

deterrence, blocking certain proliferation activities, and organ

use. In its response to the Commission’s baseline survey, the 

stated that it does not have a specific proliferation-related mis

believes, however, that the Attorney General’s role as the nat

officer and principal law-enforcement advisor to the Presiden

unique position to help ensure that appropriate enforcement 

this threat.

Legal Authorities for Combating Catastrophic Terror

Protecting citizens in a democracy necessarily involves strikin

between the risks to public safety presented by the threat and 

liberties posed by the means of protection. In the context of t

chemical, or biological weapons (sometimes referred to as “c

analyses of this balance and its implications do not appear to 

thoroughly made. Certain logistics of domestic response hav

has been no sustained public debate on the nature of the cata

the measures that, as a nation, we are willing to accept to pre

In the case of either a known imminent threat or an actual us

destruction, whether overseas or at home, enormous pressur

the President and Congress to move quickly and decisively. T

public safety needs and (2) the legal options available for mee

undertaken now, not in the wake of a credible threat or devas

Consultations with Congress on executive branch planning sh

This should include a thorough assessment of the appropriat

present threat environment, between investigative tools and a

civil liberties. It should also determine whether we have the au

to a heightened threat environment, such as receipt of a cred

of a biological weapon or an actual attack. Such a situation c

public support for greater federal authorities, but it also carrie

is important to consider carefully, in advance, what measures 

Recommendation 5.27: The National Director should wo

General to determine the legal authorities needed to dea

catastrophic terrorism.
context. The results of this assessment should be provided to the Nationa

discussed with Congress.

Impact on National Security

The Department of Justice oversees prosecutions of criminal violations of la

of, or trafficking in, weapons of mass destruction. Justice’s Office of Intellig

Review plays an important role in the review and approval of surveillance 

under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In such reviews, the Depa

up information that can affect either overall national security or particular 

national security policy.

Law Enforcement and Intelligence

The potential catastrophic consequences of an attack involving chemical, 

nuclear weapons require concerted action to detect the actions of those, 

or sub-state actors, who seek to attain such weapons and those who alre

them and who have the means and motive to use them. These potential so

of course, need to be identified and continually monitored by the Intelligen

(IC), including the FBI. In case of a successful terrorist attack with such w

United States, the emphasis would shift to law enforcement –catching tho

bringing them to justice.

However, in combating proliferation the line between intelligence and law 

not always clear. Though they operate under different authorities, the two c

no longer make clear distinctions on such criteria as “foreign versus domes

activity versus national security threat.” Over the years, Congress has ena

establishing extraterritorial jurisdictions and criminalizing activity with nati

implications, such as nuclear smuggling. This blurring of jurisdictions incr

for effective coordination.

Working together, the national security and law enforcement communities 

who seek to acquire or deploy weapons of mass destruction with a tough o

progress has been made toward ensuring coordination and cooperation b

two communities, but more needs to be done. There needs to be a recog

Recommendation 5.28: In conjunction with the National Director, the 

of Justice should assess the national security implications of informatio

in its investigations, and identify appropriate ways to communicate the

executive branch agencies while preserving the integrity of its investig
82

sides bring discrete skills and abilities to the table and each c

legal framework to improve coordination and information shar

threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Toward this end, the Department of Justice and the CIA estab

Community-Law Enforcement Task Force (JICLE), which rec

policies for appropriate coordination between the two entities

lack of coordination regarding the use of intelligence crime re

provided to law enforcement by the Intelligence Community. T

law enforcement community that the IC is not forthcoming wit

without risk to sources and methods. In addition, there are co

cultural and legal, with sharing of law enforcement informatio

Community. While some of these problems transcend prolifera

proliferation and, worse, use of weapons of mass destruction 

must be identified, implemented and maintained.

First, the national security agencies and domestic law enforc

brought together in a dialog to identify all resources within the 

enforcement communities that can be brought to bear on the 

the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction. Next, 

established identifying what information, intelligence and inve

under what circumstances, rather than only specifying what c

processes should be put in place for the appropriate exchang

operational units of each community and for monitoring the ef

Lastly, a joint Intelligence Community/law enforcement report 

Attorney General and to the Director of Central Intelligence, o

establish information sharing procedures, and detailing exam

relates to combating proliferation.

The Department of Justice is the initial law enforcement and 

with the IC, and thus should be an important part of the asses

establish specific procedures by which the sharing of informa

enforcement can be monitored, and should regularly commu

the results of the information sharing.

DoJ should actively encourage such sharing by providing adv

community as to when and what information can and should 

Recommendation 5.29: The National Director should co

improve the relationship of the Intelligence Community an

their respective efforts to detect, disrupt, prevent, and pro

to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction.
when grand jury secrecy no longer applies. There has been improvement 

understanding of ways to minimize the threat to intelligence sources and 

However, it may be more effective to begin such efforts earlier in the invest

and additional efforts should be made to encourage interaction with respe

enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction of offenses involving the acqu

weapons of mass destruction.

Coordinating Law enforcement Community Efforts

The Attorney General must also ensure that all law enforcement elements 

in combating proliferation have the legal authorities they need to fulfill the

that they are coordinating their efforts within the law enforcement commu

currently exists a number of laws prohibiting proliferation activities. Some 

international trafficking in the weapons themselves; others prohibit the ac

technologies directly related to production capability or destined for prolife

users. Still other laws criminalize the use of these weapons within the Un

against U.S. interests abroad. There are agency overlaps in enforcement 

in some cases, there is concurrent jurisdiction by two or more agencies. S

enforcement authorities are unique, e.g., the border search authority gran

U.S. Customs Service. Some agencies bring specific expertise to enforce

the Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement. On the oth

Federal Bureau of Investigation brings its store of resources, including larg

personnel and technical abilities. While the law enforcement agencies usu

together, overlaps in jurisdiction can result in investigations proceeding do

tracks, risking a collision of interests along the way. Proper coordination an

DoJ could minimize such collisions and ensure that our best combined ef

put forth to combat proliferation of WMD.
84

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI’s role in countering espionage by foreign powers now 

efforts directed by or sponsored by nations, sub-national grou

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons capability, or to dep

U.S. interests at home and abroad. In addition, in recent year

investigate and prosecute violations of law prohibiting the use 

destruction has been expanded by several statutes:

• Title 18 USC §831, which makes possession of and traffi

crime;

• Title 18 USC §175 et seq., which prohibits the developm

trafficking of biological toxins for use as a weapon; and

• Title 18 USC §2332 et seq., which prohibits the threat o

mass destruction against U.S. persons and property.

In enacting these laws, Congress granted significant extrater

when such attacks are perpetrated against U.S. citizens and p

in some cases, when committed by U.S. citizens anywhere in 

a new direction for the FBI. Integrating these responsibilities 

Intelligence Community and with diplomatic or military efforts 

overseas can be problematic. Protecting a crime scene so th

investigators is essential to a successful prosecution, but doin

be difficult. Diplomatic or military relationships with a host gove

in gaining their cooperation. The investigative methods traditi

enforcement to preserve prospects for a prosecution may be s

about the perpetrators or possible future attacks than intellige

a foreign country. These factors should be considered and de

maximize our options for response.

Organization of the FBI to Combat Proliferation

The FBI fulfills its role in combating proliferation through its a

Intelligence Surveillance Act and the enforcement of criminal 

trafficking laws and counter-terrorism laws. The FBI must be 

appropriately when foreign powers target US Government faci

weapons of mass destruction or related technologies. Recen

of foreign nationals working in or visiting the national laborato

importance of counterintelligence activities—as led by the FB
The FBI’s National Security Division has added proliferation to its National 

List and in January 1999 established a unit to address the acquisition of U

for the development of weapons of mass destruction by foreign countries. 

contracted with the Department of Energy to utilize the expertise of the na

laboratories to identify technologies and industry sectors which might be ta

and sub-state actors bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and

production capability. In conjunction with the laboratories, the FBI has wo

an initial assessment of the scope and breadth of proliferation activities and 

other agencies in an effort to thwart the acquisition of WMD-related materi

information, or technology from the United States.

Several attempts to acquire actual chemical, biological, or nuclear devices 

countries have been identified. However, the predominant number of case

acquisition of U.S. dual-use technology designed to give a nation the infra

indigenous weapons program. The FBI works closely with the Intelligence C

and utilizes the expertise of agents from the Department of Commerce an

Customs Service in these cases.

The Criminal Division is responsible for pursuing the investigation and pros

who violate U.S. laws relating to the trafficking in and/or use of weapons o

destruction against U.S. persons. The Criminal Division is supported by th

Counterterrorism Center (CTC) within the National Security Division at FB

The CTC brings together representatives of twenty different law-enforcem

agencies, and provides intelligence and threat analysis information about t

of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups to the appropriate law

units.

These various FBI units report up distinct chains of command, and they d

together until well up the chain. This is especially true of investigations an

units within the FBI. While the legal authorities and constitutional requirem

different for each, this separation within the FBI leads to stovepiping of inf

inefficient information sharing regarding WMD activities of foreign entities 

States.

Recommendation 5.30: The FBI should designate a single program 

coordinate the efforts of all units within the FBI with responsibility for co

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manager should be 

enough to the actual operation to identify priorities, coordinate activitie

ensure information sharing.
86

Personnel Requirements of the FBI

The FBI has proposed the establishment of the National Dome

assist state and local emergency response agencies by provid

efforts. This office will provide training for a broad base of state 

be supported by a network of coordinators located in FBI field 

The FBI’s new Strategic Information and Operations Center al

incidents and enhances communications capabilities between 

operations. The FBI has undertaken an ambitious initiative to 

consequences of a WMD attack are managed in a coordinate

law enforcement and public safety officials. The Commission

contained in its charter legislation, did not address the effecti

The Commission did consider, however, whether the FBI age

prepared to prevent the illegal acquisition or use of WMD in t

that the FBI lacks the technical expertise among its agents a

challenge. FBI agents do not have adequate training in how t

where such weapons may be present.

The FBI has increased the number of agents to meet new mi

experience or technical expertise to deal with proliferation-rel

Bureau’s intelligence analysts are not well-prepared in this ar

quality analysis in pursuing their detection and prevention effo

acquire weapons of mass destruction. More analysts with ap

to support these efforts.

While the FBI has historically focused on the investigation and 

law, its responsibilities in detecting and preventing the use of w

within the United States require a more proactive approach. I

counterintelligence division, human source reporting on non-

kept pace with the demands of the new threat environment a

declined. Human source reporting is essential to discovering 

networks before an incident involving weapons of mass destru

technologies of emerging threats, as well as regional specialis

prevent the acquisition and/or use of weapons of mass destru

the United States of those working on behalf of foreign powe

must be monitored by the FBI, and the FBI’s foreign language 

those countries and foreign groups in order to make the best 
Commission notes that the FBI has identified areas for improvement in its 

and supports the FBI’s initiatives to address the threat of proliferation.

Based on analysis of the foreign threat in the United States, the FBI should 

the quality of analysis and human source reporting through personnel tra

recruitment of new personnel with technical and language expertise requir

threats. New expertise should encompass both the geopolitical and techn

required to combat foreign proliferation within the U.S. effectively. FBI age

trained and prepared to respond to crime scenes that may involve the use 

biological, or nuclear devices.

Information Management

As noted above, effective information sharing between the IC and the law

community is important to countering the WMD threat. Even within the FBI, 

intelligence and investigative information exists only on paper, and is often 

in local files. Thus the information may not be distributed, searched, or re

electronically for cross-office or cross-mission use. This system causes sig

distribution to the appropriate units, and does not ensure that all units rece

pertaining to their mission. It is vital to detect a threat before it becomes a 

Timely dissemination of information to all appropriate units is essential to 

effort to meet the threat. In addition, many attempts to acquire weapons o

destruction span the globe. A system in which information is maintained la

form and retained primarily on a local basis is not adequate to meet this c

Such a system will enhance the FBI’s ability to detect proliferation-related a

as allow the Bureau to provide such information to others promptly so actio

to detect and prevent such activities. The system could also be used to tr

Recommendation 5.31: The FBI should initiate training programs to ra

of technical expertise of its agents and analysts in detecting, counteri

investigating proliferation and uses of weapons of mass destruction.

Recommendation 5.32: The FBI should develop and implement an a

information management system that allows for electronic distribution, 

retrieval of intelligence and investigative information, as well as trackin

intelligence information received by its own National Security Division 

parts of the Intelligence Community.
88

of intelligence and investigative information in support of the 

activities to the Attorney General and the Director of Central 

Coordination with Intelligence Agencies

The FBI is not well connected to the IC network. Inability to p

information-sharing among the other IC agencies has put the 

because they have to rely on personal contact and relationsh

The FBI perceives that other intelligence organizations do no

recognize the Bureau’s role in combating proliferation. The Int

feels the information it provides to law enforcement disappea

exchange of senior people between the FBI and the CIA has 

more effective relationship, but there is still much room for im

Improved coordination will facilitate management of the compe

and law enforcement, particularly in the event of an attack inv

destruction. In addition, participating fully in an automated en

Intelligence Community would provide a comprehensive asse

proliferation activities known to the United States.

Recommendation 5.33: The FBI should continue to impro

the Intelligence Community and establish mechanisms to 

created by overlapping jurisdiction and conflicting interest
Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture

In 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment reported that a single airpl

100 kilograms of anthrax spores by aerosol on a clear, calm night over the 

D.C., area could kill between one million and three million people.17 Two ke

efforts to meet the challenges presented by the threat of biological weapo

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department o

These departments’ proliferation-related resources mainly involve respon

against the U.S. civilian population or economy, a subject beyond the sco

Commission’s charter.18 However, these departments perform substantial 

bear directly on WMD issues relevant to the Commission’s inquiry. Furthe

taken by these departments (such as efforts to establish better communic

traditional national security community) underscore the significance of the

work to the Commission’s charter.

Department of Health and Human Services

HHS’s unique resources include the National Institutes of Health (NIH), th

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Public Health Service, and the 

Administration (FDA). HHS’s fiscal year 1999 budget for bioterrorism prepa

million, with a proposed increase in the President’s fiscal 2000 budget to $2

organizes its bioterrorism efforts into five areas:

• Disease surveillance and public health network

• Medical consequence management

• National pharmaceutical stockpile

• Research and development (R&D)

• Deterrence

17 Richard K. Betts. “The New Threat of Mass Destruction.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77

February 1998, page 26.

18 Because Congress prohibited the Commission from studying domestic respon

such issues as developing a national communications network, upgrading medica

response capabilities, conducting threat/risk/benefit assessments for stockpiling 

medicines, development of interim measures until such stockpiles are in place, a

necessary to mitigate “culture clash” between the various cooperating agencies w

These issues need to be addressed in order to develop an overall coherent, com

combating proliferation.
90

Of these areas, research and development is of most interes

basic research on infectious diseases, immunology, and micr

to address the biological weapons (BW) and chemical weapo

expansion is useful to military efforts to combat WMD. HHS h

Medicine (IOM), in collaboration with the Commission on Life 

research, development, and technology on detecting chemica

well as on protecting and treating casualties and health care 

results of this review, IOM recommended and prioritized rese

needed to address shortfalls in addressing the BW and CW t

placing major emphasis on generating genetic information ab

agents, especially organisms that cause anthrax, tularemia, a

U.S. military forces abroad. Also, both the Department of Def

working on the anthrax and smallpox vaccination problems. R

significance of much of its research and development, NIH ha

Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USA

elements, and the Department of Energy.

HHS regulates shipments of certain hazardous biological org

1997, the CDC has regulated transfer of particular biological a

of laboratories handling such materials, and ensured complia

governing shipment of these materials.21 Finally, HHS is involv

Defense Departments to convert biological warfare facilities i

(FSU) to legitimate pharmaceutical factories.

HHS has significant resources available to combat the prolife

sample list of funding for specific HHS activities includes:

• Smallpox and anthrax vaccination R&D ($30 million in fi

• Vaccines, antibiotic/antiviral basic research ($22.1 millio

• An FDA-expedited review that can help speed procurem

treatments for military personnel ($12.4 million in fiscal y

• A public health service information technology network t

military’s battlefield situation awareness capability ($40 

19 “Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Research and Development 

Response,” Committee on R&D Needs for Improving Civilian Medic

Biological Terrorism Incidents, Health Science Policy Program, Inst

Environmental Studies and Toxicology, Commission on Life Science

National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 1999, pre-publication c

www.nap.edu

20 USAMRIID is roughly the military counterpart to the CDC and the 

21 42 C.F.R. 72.6
Department of Agriculture

The Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) involvement in combating biolog

was spurred by the discovery of the extent of investment by the former So

creating anti-plant and anti-animal agents designed to destroy U.S. crops 

According to Ken Alibek, former first deputy chief of research and productio

BW program, the Russian offensive biological research complex had emp

10,000 of its 30,000 scientists and technicians on agriculturally related iss

Consequently, USDA’s traditional mission of protecting U.S. livestock and 

diseases and its extensive research and development facilities have been 

include national security matters. The Agricultural Research Service (ARS

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Food Safety and Inspection 

and Office of Inspector General (OIG) have important capabilities. USDA’

bioterrorism related initiatives was $11 million in fiscal year 1999; the Pre

for fiscal year 2000 requests $10.6 million. However, a significant increase 

fiscal year 2000 is being considered.22

USDA has established contacts with the Intelligence Community and is pro

level technical support to the Defense Intelligence Agency in analyzing da

international sources on crop disease projects. USDA has state-of-the-art 

molecular biology capabilities. It plans to recruit staff with expertise and b

biological warfare issues.

Like HHS, USDA is actively involved in efforts to convert BW facilities in th

Union to legitimate uses. USDA’s most important contribution against WM

will be in aiding the development of a robust veterinary science and pharm

industry in Russia.

Specific initiatives being considered include:

• Law Enforcement and Investigative Activities ($45 million in fiscal 20

FSIS, and OIG for operational purposes that include safeguarding re

collection of, and information on dangerous biological materials; stre

interception capacity at foreign locations and U.S. ports of entry; and s

training, facilities, and equipment.)

• Antiterrorism R&D ($186.5 million in fiscal 2000—in ARS to develop 

technologies and avoid technological surprise).

22 “U.S. Agriculture: The Threat of Terrorism, Biological Weapons And Weapons 

Destruction,” Committee on Emerging Threat Diseases, October 23, 1998.
92

Issues

Control of biological materials and biotechnology that are we

important issue. The National Academy of Sciences believes 

control dissemination of these materials and biotechnology w

transparency at all facilities, medical and otherwise, involved 

counter-proliferation, emergency response, and medical treat

infectious diseases. Issues such as accountability, security, a

activities, together with a system of transparency in which the 

involved, must be addressed. A key sub-set is restrictions on 

development should never be pursued by choice because of 

contagion dangers coupled with high-risk containment factors

considerations apply if the Biological Weapons Convention is 

site inspection of private sector facilities. Appropriate controls

inspections that avoid compromising intellectual property mu

HHS and USDA in initiating private sector involvement, includ

community, in addressing this issue need to be identified.

USDA and HHS must also work to increase their understand

environment and to enhance their ability to operate within tha

the proper handling of classified information. The Secretaries 

should review their security procedures with the Director of C

To meet the demanding schedules imposed by the severity o

taken to mitigate what could be a severe culture clash among 

enforcement, public health, and other communities all working 

in some respects closely, and maybe for the first time. For ex

medical community has not engaged with the national securi

the battlefield mission area. The need for trained personnel w

the appropriate clearances must be addressed. Links between 

and the Intelligence Community must be established to ensu

detection of a BW or CW threat event both on the domestic a

Since analyzing small outbreaks is important, although d

conducting surveillance and response processes must b

these threats. We need to think creatively about mechan

better understanding of the threat and build trust in gove

with the threat. Courses in graduate school, conferences

as USAMRIID’s training of medical personnel by telecon

the recent Journal of the American Medical Association on 

23 Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, Au
As discussed in Chapter 3, collaborative research with the private sector 

encouraged, particularly in the area of vaccine development and possibly 

against viruses. Challenges in doing this include protection of intellectual 

indemnification, and the public relations aspects of being involved in defens

New legislation may be required on procedures for approving new means 

protection and treatment to reduce industry risks, with the caveat that care

in place and reasonable steps are taken.

Strong interagency coordination mechanisms to better integrate research 

development activities of HHS and USDA with other major technology prod

the Departments of Defense and Energy, particularly in the areas of deve

fielding biosensors, need to be established. In Chapter 3, the Commission 

the creation of a government-wide technology acquisition plan. Both HHS a

participate in the development of this plan.

Finally, owing to significant technical challenges, management must creat

environment that sustains enthusiasm for finding solutions regardless how 

Recommendation 5.34: The National Director should ensure that the H

includes resources for the Director of the National Institutes of Health 

a comprehensive program in vaccine development and other means o

and treatment that makes use of the huge private sector store of know

technology.

Recommendation 5.35: USDA and HHS should continue to work clo

USAMRIID and others in the national security community to ensure th

cooperative efforts with the former Soviet Union do not inadvertently e

sustain any offensive biological or chemical weapons capability.

Commission History

The legislation that created the Commission was the Intelligence Authoriz

fiscal year 1997 (P.L. 104-293), which was enacted in October 1996. It ca

appointment of eight commissioners, four to be selected by the President a

Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate majority lea

Senate minority leader. The Commission was charged with issuing a fina

eighteen months of the legislation’s enactment.

The eight appointments were not made until December 1997, however, a

Commission did not begin its work until January 1998. The Commission so

P.L. 104-283 to reflect its delayed start, and to extend the report’s due dat

from the initial January 1998 meeting. This amendment passed the Sena

but failed to reach the floor of the House before the earlier deadline for th

Commission had passed. The Commission ceased operation in June 199

The Commission’s deadline was subsequently extended to July 18, 1999, 

Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal 

105-277), and in November 1998 the Commission re-convened. This legisl

the number of commissioners to twelve, with two new appointees each fro

of the House of Representatives and the Senate Majority Leader. It also i

prohibitions on the Commission’s ability to review, evaluate, or report on b

domestic response capabilities for WMD-related contingencies and the ad

usefulness of U.S. laws that provide for the imposition of sanctions on cou

engage in WMD proliferation.

Charter Legislation

P.L. 104-293 (FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act)

TITLE VII—COMBATTING PROLIFERATION

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Ma

Act of 1996”.

Subtitle A—Assessment of Organization and Structure of Government for 

Proliferation
96

SEC. 711. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

(a) Establishment.—There is established a commission to be 

to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Co

Weapons of Mass Destruction (in this subtitle referred to as t

(b) Membership.—The Commission shall be composed of eig

(1) four shall be appointed by the President;

(2) one shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the S

(3) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Se

(4) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 

(5) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Ho

(c) Qualifications of Members.—

(1) To the maximum extent practicable, the individuals app

Commission shall be individuals who are nationally reco

regarding—

(A) the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destructio

(B) the efficient and effective implementation of Unite

policy; or

(C) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the na

United States.

(2) An official who appoints members of the Commission m

as a member if, in the judgment of the official, the individ

or financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties 

(d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.—Members shall be ap

Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect 

in the same manner as the original appointment.

(e) Initial Meeting.—Not later than 30 days after the date on w

Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall hol
(f) Quorum.—A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitut

a lesser number of members may hold hearings.

(g) Chairman and Vice Chairman.—The Commission shall select a Chair

Chairman from among its members.

(h) Meetings.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman.

SEC. 712. DUTIES OF COMMISSION.

(a) Study.—

(1) In general.—The Commission shall carry out a thorough study of the 

the Federal Government, including the elements of the intelligence c

respect to combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass destructi

(2) Specific requirements.—In carrying out the study, the Commission s

(A) assess the current structure and organization of the departmen

of the Federal Government having responsibilities for combatti

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and

(B) assess the effectiveness of United States cooperation with fore

governments with respect to nonproliferation activities, includin

(i) between elements of the intelligence community and elem

intelligence-gathering services of foreign governments;

(ii) between other departments and agencies of the Federal G

the counterparts to such departments and agencies in fo

governments; and

(iii) between the Federal Government and international organ

(3) Assessments.—In making the assessments under paragraph (2), th

should address—

(A) the organization of the export control activities (including licens

enforcement activities) of the Federal Government relating to t

of weapons of mass destruction;

(B) arrangements for coordinating the funding of United States no

activities;
98

(C) existing arrangements governing the flow of inform

and agencies of the Federal Government respons

activities;

(D) the effectiveness of the organization and function 

ensuring implementation of United States treaty ob

with respect to nonproliferation;

(E) the administration of sanctions for purposes of no

measures taken by departments and agencies of 

implement, assess, and enhance the effectiveness 

(F) the organization, management, and oversight of U

counterproliferation activities;

(G) the recruitment, training, morale, expertise, retent

Federal Government personnel responsible for the 

the Federal Government, including any problems i

(H) the role in United States nonproliferation activities 

Council, the Office of Management and Budget, th

Technology Policy, and other offices in the Executi

having responsibilities for such activities;

(I) the organization of the activities of the Federal Gov

government-to-government assurances and comm

nonproliferation, including assurances regarding th

exported from the United States; and

(J) the costs and benefits to the United States of incre

decreased centralization in the administration of th

of the Federal Government.

(b) Recommendations.—In conducting the study, the Commi

recommendations on means of improving the effectiveness o

departments and agencies of the Federal Government in me

interests of the United States with respect to the proliferation 

destruction. Such recommendations shall include specific rec

duplications of effort, and other inefficiencies, in and among s

agencies.
(c) Report.—

(1) Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, t

shall submit to Congress a report containing a detailed statement of t

conclusions of the Commission, together with its recommendations 

legislation and administrative actions as it considers appropriate.

(2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 

annex.

SEC. 713. POWERS OF COMMISSION.

(a) Hearings.—The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at su

places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commissio

advisable to carry out the purposes of this subtitle.

(b) Information from Federal Agencies.—

(1) In general.—The Commission may secure directly from any Federa

agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to 

provisions of this subtitle. Upon request of the Chairman of the Com

head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to 

Commission.

(2) Classified information.—A department or agency may furnish the C

classified information under this subsection. The Commission shall ta

actions to safeguard classified information furnished to the Commiss

paragraph.

(c) Postal Services.—The Commission may use the United States mails i

manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencie

Government.

(d) Gifts.—The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donat

or property.

SEC. 714. COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTERS.

(a) Compensation of Members.—Each member of the Commission who i

or employee of the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate eq

equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Exec

under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including tra

which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the C

members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United 
100

serve without compensation in addition to that received for th

employees of the United States.

(b) Travel Expenses.—The members of the Commission shall 

including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized 

under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Cod

homes or regular places of business in the performance of se

(c) Staff.—

(1) In general.—The Chairman of the Commission may, wi

service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an 

other additional personnel as may be necessary to ena

perform its duties. The employment of an executive dire

confirmation by the Commission.

(2) Compensation.—The Chairman of the Commission may 

executive director and other personnel without regard to 

and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States 

classification of positions and General Schedule pay rate

for the executive director and other personnel may not e

level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 o

(d) Detail of Government Employees.—Any Federal Governm

detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such 

interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(e) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services.—Th

Commission may procure temporary and intermittent service

title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals which do no

of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Ex

section 5316 of such title.

SEC. 715. TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.

The Commission shall terminate 60 days after the date on wh

its report under section 712(c).

SEC. 716. DEFINITION.

For purposes of this subtitle, the term “intelligence communit

given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act o
SEC. 717. PAYMENT OF COMMISSION EXPENSES.

The compensation, travel expenses, per diem allowances of members an

the Commission, and other expenses of the Commission shall be paid ou

available to the Director of Central Intelligence for the payment of compen

allowances, and per diem allowances, respectively, of employees of the C

Intelligence Agency.

Excerpt from Senate Report Accompanying Charter Legislatio

In the view of the Committee, the US Government at present is not well org

the threat to U.S. national security posed by the worldwide proliferation of 

biological or nuclear weapons or devices, and their delivery systems. Mor

departments, agencies and other organizations, including the Departmen

State, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services and Justice, as w

National Security Council and the intelligence community, have responsib

combating proliferation. Yet no one individual or organization is responsib

coordinating the political, military, diplomatic, economic and intelligence res

required to prevent or roll back proliferation.

Moreover, the Committee believes that there is unnecessary duplication of 

inefficiencies among the departments and agencies that have responsibilit

and that streamlining is required.

Organizational inefficiencies and a lack of central focus and direction have 

efforts to combat proliferation ad hoc, reactive and less effective than they 

the extraordinary challenge to U.S. national security posed by the proliferat

of mass destruction (and the means to deliver them), and the current lack 

the Federal Government, the Committee believes that a thorough assessm

of the institutional architecture of the Federal Government is required.

The Committee’s authorization bill includes legislation to create a commis

such an assessment, and to report to Congress on specific administrative

other changes it believes are required to improve U.S. performance.

“Re-authorizing” Legislation

P.L. 105-277 (FY 1999 Omnibus Appropriations bill)

SEC. 708.

24 Report 104-258 to accompany S.1718, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Ye

Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and The Central Intelligen

Retirement and Disability System and for other purposes.
102

(a) Extension of Deadline for Submission of Report by Comm

Organization of the Federal Government To Combat the Prolif

Destruction.—Section 712(c)(1) of the Combating Proliferatio

Destruction Act of 1996 (subtitle A of title VII of Public Law 104

out “the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting in lieu 

(b) Membership of Commission.—Section 711 of that Act is a

(1) in the matter preceding subsection (b)(1), by striking ou

inserting in lieu thereof “twelve members, none of whom 

their service on the Commission, be an officer or emplo

agency, or other establishment of the executive branch (o

and”;

(2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking out “one” and inserting 

(3) in subsection (b)(4), by striking out “one” and inserting 

(4) in subsection (e), by striking out “the date on which all m

have been appointed” and inserting in lieu thereof “the d

making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, He

and Education, and related agencies, for the fiscal year e

regardless of whether all the members of the Commissi

of that date,”.

(c) Restrictions on Activities of Commission.—Section 712(a) 

adding at the end the following:

(5) Restrictions.—In carrying out the study under paragrap

assessments under paragraph (2), and addressing the 

paragraph (3), the Commission shall not review, evaluat

(A) “United States domestic response capabilities with 

destruction; or

(B) “the adequacy or usefulness of United States laws 

imposition of sanctions on countries or entities tha

of weapons of mass destruction.”

(d) Limitation on Commission Expenditures.—Section 717 of 

striking out “shall be paid” and inserting in lieu thereof “shall 

shall be paid”
Commissioners

John M. Deutch, Chairman of the Commission, is an Institute Professor 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as Director of Central In

May 1995 to December 1996. He previously served as Deputy Secretary 

(1994-95) and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technolog

From 1979 to 1980 he served as Under Secretary of the Department of E

Senator Arlen Specter, Vice Chairman of the Commission, is the author o

that created the Commission. As Pennsylvania’s senior Senator, he chairs 

Veterans Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Subcommittee on Lab

Human Services, and Education. He is also a member of the Judiciary and 

Affairs Committees. In the 104th Congress, he chaired the Senate Select 

Intelligence.

Anthony C. Beilenson of California served twenty years in the U.S. Hous

Representatives. He chaired the House Permanent Select Committee on 

two years and promoted bipartisan cooperation on that committee. He wa

influential member of the House Rules Committee for nearly twenty years

budget, intelligence, and House floor issues.

Stephen A. Cambone25 is Director of Research at the Institute for Nation

Studies of the National Defense University. He recently served as staff dir

Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Fro

he was Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strateg

International Studies. He was previously Director of Strategic Defense Pol

of the Secretary of Defense (1990-93).

M.D.B. Carlisle was Chief of Staff to Senator Thad Cochran from 1991 to 

previously served as Vice President for Government Relations at The Herit

(1989-90) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (1986

Henry F. Cooper is Chairman of Applied Research Associates, Inc., Cha

Frontier, and a private consultant. He previously served as Director of the 

Defense Initiative Organization, chief negotiator at the Geneva Defense a

with the Soviet Union, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarma

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, and Scientific Advisor to the 

Weapons Laboratory.

J. James Exon of Nebraska retired from the U.S. Senate in 1997 after serv

He was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and an influ

Congress on matters regarding the military, particularly strategic issues. H

25 Nominated
104

on the Senate Budget and Commerce, Science and Transpo

Governor of Nebraska from 1970 to 1978.

Robert L. Gallucci26 is currently Dean of the School of Forei

University. He was previously a career civil servant in the Dep

as Ambassador at Large during his tenure as Assistant Secre

Military Affairs.

Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma was a Member of the U.S. Hous

years (1981-1995). During his tenure, he served in several lea

Chairman of the Military Installations and Facilities Sub-comm

Services Committee and Chairman of the Transportation Avia

committee of the Science and Space Committee. He was the 

to chair a congressional committee, the House Permanent Se

Intelligence. He is currently the President of the Electronic In

Janne E. Nolan is a professor of national security studies at 

director of the Ethics and National Security Project at the Cen

served in several senior positions in both the private sector a

Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, senior consultant t

Senate Armed Services Committee, and an official at the Arm

Agency.

Daniel B. Poneman is attorney at the law firm of Hogan & H

He served on the National Security Council staff for six years

administrations, as Director in the Office of Defense Policy an

and as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Directo

Export Controls (1993-96).

William Schneider, Jr. is President of International Planning 

Washington-based international trade and finance advisory fir

of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology from 

as a Member of the recent Commission to Assess the Ballistic 

States.

Henry Sokolski is Executive Director of the Nonproliferation 

Washington-based non-profit organization founded in 1994 to 

understanding of strategic weapons issues for academics, po

He also teaches graduate-level courses on proliferation issue

Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. From 1989 to 19

Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defen

26 Resigned
Staff

Consultants

Suzanne E. Spaulding, Executive Director

Margaret A. Glatz, Executive Officer

Bonnie D. Jenkins, General Counsel

Dorothy C. Donnelly Robert A. Kehlet

Jason D. Ellis Maureen E. Lenihan*

Goldie R. Flowers Marcel J. Lettre II

Barbara M. Gregory Terence M. Lynch*

John A. Hartford, Jr.* Mary E. O’Brien

John W. Ivicic Kevin A. Stroh*

Joseph F. Jakub III* Daniel S. Volchok

* until July 1, 1998

Gordon Adams Neil Joeck

Burrus M. Carnahan Richard A. Johnson

John P. Carrico William M. Wise

Portia Clark
106
The following is a list of individuals whom Commission members or staff i

or who submitted written comments to the Commission, between January 

June 1999:

A

Madeline K. Albright

Secretary of State

Kenneth Alibek

Program Manager

Battelle Memorial Institute

Gene Aloise

Assistant Director

Resources, Community and Economic Division

General Accounting Office

Desaix Anderson

Executive Director

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

Brian D. Andresen

Leader, Forensic Science Center

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Steven Aoki

Director

Office of Regional Nonproliferation Policy

Department of State

B

John Barker

Department of State

James Barone

Special Agent-in-Charge, New York Office

U.S. Customs Service
108

Richard K. Betts

Council on Foreign Relations

Kent L. Biringer

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories

Hans Blix

Former Director General

International Atomic Energy Agency

John Boright

National Academy of Sciences

Harold Brown

Former Secretary of Defense

John Brougher

International Trade Administration Office

Department of Commerce

George Bunn

IIS Consulting Professor

Center for International Security and Cooperation

Stanford University

Walter Busby

Major General, USA (Ret.)

Former Deputy Assistant to The Secretary of Defense (Coun

and Biological Defense)

George Bush

Former President of the United States

Ambassador Richard Butler

Executive Chairman

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)

C

Ashton Carter

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Jimmy Carter

Former President of the United States

John F. Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

Seth Carus

Senior Research Professor

Center for Counterproliferation Research

National Defense University

Hugh Casey

Center for International Security Affairs

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Marvin E. Casterline

Assistant Director

National Security and International Affairs Division

General Accounting Office

Maritza Castro

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs Service

Ferdinand Cirillo

DCI Nonproliferation Center

Joseph Cirincione

Senior Associate and Director

Non-Proliferation Project

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Richard A. Clarke

National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism

Donald J. Cobb

Associate Laboratory Director for Threat Reduction

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Thomas B. Cochran

Senior Scientist

National Resources Defense Council
110

William Cohen

Secretary of Defense

Congressman Christopher Cox (R-California)

David Crane

Office of the Inspector General

Department of Defense

Richard T. Cupitt

Associate Director

Center for International Trade and Security

Charles B. Curtis

Partner, Hogan & Hartson

Former Under Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy

D

Richard Davis

General Accounting Office

Steven Day

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Nuclear, Chemical and Biological)

Department of Defense

Jonathan Dean

Union of Concerned Scientists

Robert M. DeBell

Chief Scientist,

The Jefferson Project

Battelle Memorial Institute

F. Amanda DeBusk

Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement

Department of Commerce

Trisha Dedik

Director

Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division

Department of Energy
William Desmond

Director

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

Department of Energy

Paula DeSutter

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Randy Devalk

Legislative Aide

Senator Thomas Daschle

Jayantha Dhanapala

Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs

United Nations

Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-New Mexico)

Mildred Donlon

Program Manager, Biological Warfare Defense

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

James C. Doyle, Jr.

Energy and Environmental Analysis Group

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Melvin Dubee

Former head of Legislative Affairs

Office of National Drug Control Policy

Charles Duelfer

Deputy Executive Director

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)

Liesel Duhon

Director, Special American Business Internship Training Program

International Trade Administration

Department of Commerce

William H. Dunlop

Program Leader

Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control Program

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
112

E

William Eckert

Department of State

R. P. Eddy

Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Intelligen

Department of Energy

Douglas Elliott

Staff Member

Senator Michael B. Enzi

Gerald L. Epstein

Senior Policy Analyst

National Security and International Affairs Division

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Scott Everett

Office of Enforcement Policy

Department of the Treasury

F

Edward T. Fei

Acting Director

International Policy and Analysis Division

Department of Energy

Mark Flohr

Plans and Programs Office

Counterproliferation and Operations Directorate

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Josephine Fontana-Moran

Special Agent-in Charge

Office of Export Enforcement, New York Field Office

Department of Commerce

Leon Fuerth

National Security Advisor to the Vice President
Torrey Froscher

Chief of Analysis

DCI Nonproliferation Center

G

Peter Gagliardi

Special Agent-in-Charge, New York Office

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Neil J. Gallagher

Assistant Director (National Security Division)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Linda Gallini

Deputy Director

Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs

Bureau of Nonproliferation

Department of State

William V. Garner

International Consultant

Pyramid Limited

Bruce J. Gebhardt

Special Agent-in-Charge, San Francisco Field Office

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Victor Gilinsky

Former Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

James Goodby

Guest Scholar

The Brookings Institution

Lisa Gordon-Hagerty

Director

Office of Emergency Management

Department of Energy

Rose Gottemoeller

Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security

Department of Energy
114

Thomas Graham

Second Choice Foundation

Thomas Graham, Jr.

President

Lawyers Alliance for World Security

H

Benedikt Haller

Political Counselor

German Embassy

Morton Halperin

Director, Policy Planning Staff

Department of State

Margaret Hamburg

Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation

Department of Health and Human Services

John Hamre

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Robert Harmon

Global Technology Partners

Anne Harrington

Department of State

Elisa Harris

National Security Council

Ronald Hauber

Director

Division of Nonproliferation, Exports, and Multilateral Relation

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Robert J. Hermann

Connecticut Technology Associates
Laura Holgate

Director

Office of Fissile Materials Disposition

Department of Energy

John Holum

Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Department of State

Tom Hopkins

Colonel, USAF

Director

Counterproliferation and Operations Support Directorate

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Floyd P. Horn

Administrator

Agricultural Research Service

Department of Agriculture

Sally K. Horn

Director

Non-proliferation Policy

Office of the Secretary of Defense/International Security Policy

Daniel Hurley

Nonproliferation and Export Control Coordination

Department of Commerce

I

David Ivry

Director

Israeli National Security Council

J

James E. Johnson

Under Secretary (Enforcement)

Department of the Treasury
116

Robert Joseph

Director for Counterproliferation Research

National Defense University

Shaun B. Jones

Commander, USN

Defense Sciences Office

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

K

Arnold Kanter

The RAND Corporation

David A. Kay

Corporate Vice President

Science Applications International Corporation

Spurgeon Keeney

President and Executive Director

The Arms Control Association

Donald M. Kerr

Assistant Director (Laboratory Division)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Robert F. Knouss

Rear Admiral, USN

Director

Office of Emergency Preparedness

U.S. Public Health Service

Susan Koch

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Mitch Kugler

Staff Director

Sub-committee for International Security, Proliferation and Fe

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
L

Anthony Lake

Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Terry R. Lash

Director

Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

Department of Energy

John A. Lauder

Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for Nonproli

Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center

Peter Lavoy

Director, Counter-proliferation Policy

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threa

Joshua Lederberg

Sackler Foundation Scholar

The Rockefeller University

Janice Dunn Lee

Director

Office of International Programs

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Ronald F. Lehman II

Director

Center for Global Security Research

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories

Milton Leitenberg

Senior Fellow

Center for International and Security Studies

University of Maryland

James F. Leonard

Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and

Former Assistant Director

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
118

Jacob L. Lew

Director

Office of Management and Budget

Allen W. Locke

Director

Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issu

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Department of State

Senator Richard G. Lugar (R - Indiana)

Kenneth N. Luongo

Executive Director

Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council

M

Bruce W. MacDonald

Assistant Director for National Security

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Douglas MacEachin

Former Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Central Intelligence Agency

R. Roger Majak

Assistant Secretary for Enforcement Administration

Department of Commerce

John Martuge

Area Director

John F. Kennedy Airport

U.S. Customs Service

Jessica Mathews

President

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Edward G. McGinnis

Senior Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Energy 

National Security

Department of Energy
Maureen I. McCarthy

Science Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation 

Security

Department of Energy

Kathryn McGuire

Legislative Director

Senator Michael B. Enzi

Thomas G. McInerney

Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)

President and CEO

Business Executives for National Security

Holly McMahon

Standing Committee on National Security

American Bar Association

Robert Meekins

Chief Inspector

John F. Kennedy Airport

U.S. Customs Service

Robert Mikulak

Director

Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention

Bureau of Arms Control

Department of State

Gary Milhollin

Director

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Jami Miscik

Director

Office of Transnational Issues

Central Intelligence Agency

Elizabeth A. Moler

Under Secretary of Energy

Ernest J. Moniz

Under Secretary of Energy
120

Michael Moodie

President

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute

Stephen S. Morse

Program Manager

Defense Science Office

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Sarah Mullen

Director

Office of Technology and Analysis

Department of State

N

Michael Nacht

Dean

Goldman School of Public Policy

University of California, Berkeley

R. Richard Newcomb

Director

Office of Foreign Assets Control

Department of the Treasury

O

Michael O’Neill

Politico-Military Affairs

British Embassy

Gordon Oehler

Corporate Vice President for Corporate Development

Science Applications International Corporation

Vayl Oxford

Deputy Director

Counterproliferation and Operations Support Directorate

Defense Threat Reduction Agency
P

John Parachini

Senior Associate

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Sang-Hoon Park

First Secretary

Embassy of the Republic of Korea

Gerald W. Parker

Colonel, USA

Director

United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases

Christopher Payne

National Resources Defense Council

Federico Peña

Secretary of Energy

Donald Prosnitz

Chief Scientist

Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

R

William Reinsch

Under Secretary for Export Administration

Department of Commerce

Alice M. Rigdon

Port Director, San Francisco

U.S. Customs Service

John Rheingruber

OSD(P) RT&A

Brad Roberts

Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division

Institute for Defense Analyses
122

Paul Robinson

President and Laboratories Director

Sandia National Laboratories

Roger W. Robinson

RWR, Inc.

Michael Rosenthal

Office Director

Multilateral Nuclear Affairs

Department of State

Randy J. Rydell

Senior Political Affairs Officer

Office of the Under Secretary General

Department for Disarmament Affairs

United Nations

S

Richard Sadleir

First Secretary (Political)

Embassy of Australia

Scott Sagan

Co-Director

Center for International Security and Cooperation

Stanford University

Gary C. Salzman

Lead Project Leader

Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Gary Samore

Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for

Non-Proliferation and Export Controls

National Security Council

Kenneth E. Sanders

Director

International Safeguards Division

Department of Energy
Amy Sands

Associate Director

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Larry Sanchez

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Energy and Director

Office of Intelligence

Department of Energy

Kim Savit

Office of the NIS Assistance Coordinator

Department of State

Jon Sears

Captain, USN

Chief, Deterrence and Counterproliferation Branch

Joint Staff, J5

The Department of Defense

Lawrence Scheinman

Director

Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Washington D.C. Office)

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Lewis Schiliro

Acting Director

New York Field Office

Federal Bureau of Investigation

James Schlesinger

Former Director of Central Intelligence

Former Secretary of Defense

Former Secretary of Energy

Brent Scowcroft

Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)

Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

David Shapiro

Chief

Criminal Division

U.S. Attorney’s Office

San Francisco
124

Owen J. Sheaks

Special Advisor

Verification and Compliance

Department of State

Kenneth B. Sheely

Deputy Director

Russia/NIS Nuclear Materials Security Task Force

Wayne J. Shotts

Associate Director

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and International Security

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

George P. Shultz

Former Secretary of State

Randall S. Sike

Special Agent-in-Charge

Office of Export Enforcement San Jose Field Office

Department of Commerce

Charles Simonsen

Special Agent-in-Charge, San Francisco

U.S. Customs Service

Julianne Slifco

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Amy E. Smithson

Senior Associate

The Henry L. Stimson Center

John F. Sopko

Chief Counsel for Special Matters

Department of Commerce

Leonard S. Spector

Director

Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Department of Energy
Carmen Spencer

Director, Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Daniel J. Spohn

Deputy Director for Policy Support

Defense Intelligence Agency

Richard Stratford

Director

Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs

Department of State

James C. Swingle

Z Division Leader

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

T

C. Bruce Tarter

Director

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

William B. Taylor

Special Advisor to the President and to the Secretary of State on Assistan

Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and Coordinator of N

Department of State

Jonathan H. Temple

Environment and Energy

British Embassy

George J. Tenet

Director of Central Intelligence

Roszel C. Thomsen II, Esq.

Thomsen & Burke, LLP

Ralph B. Tildon

DCI Nonproliferation Center
126

Bonni G. Tischler

Assistant Commissioner

Office of Investigations

U.S. Customs Service

Simon Tower

First Secretary (Trade Policy)

British Embassy

Michael D. Turner

Director

Strategic Investigation

U.S. Customs Service

U

Marc Umeno

Captain, USA

Health Physicist

U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

V

Vann Van Diepen

Director

Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Affairs

Department of State

Laura A. Vanderberg

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Yevgeny Velikhov

President

Nuclear Energy Institute—Kurchatov Institute

Blaine Villwock

Automated Export System

U.S. Customs Service
W

John Wade

Colonel, USA

Acting Deputy Assistant for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological 

Department of Defense

Robert E. Waldron

Director

Office of Research and Development

Headquarters, Department of Energy

Michael Walls

Senior Counsel

Chemical Manufacturers Association

Robert D. Walpole

National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs

Central Intelligence Agency

Edward L. Warner

Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Threat Reduction

Department of Defense

Dale Watson

Inspector Deputy Assistant Director of the National Security Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

George M. Whitesides

Mallinckrodt Professor of Chemistry

Harvard University

Rhys M. Williams

Director

Nuclear Nonproliferation Division

Office of Intelligence

Department of Energy

Frank G. Wisner

Vice Chairman, External Affairs

American International Group, Inc.

Former U.S. Ambassador to India
128

Gillian Woollett

Associate VP for Biologics and Biotechnology

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America

R. James Woolsey

Partner

Shea & Gardner

Former Director of Central Intelligence

Z

Dov S. Zakheim

Corporate Vice President

Systems Planning Corporation (SPC)
Mission

1. Describe your department’s/agency’s overall proliferation-related m

survey, proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear, biological, and c

weapons, their means of delivery, and related technologies and exp

2. List and briefly describe all laws, directives, and guidance statemen

Congressional, departmental) that directly and specifically inform yo

department’s/agency’s proliferation-related mission, as well as any 

legislation currently being proposed or sought by the Administration 

Organizational Structure

3. Describe the organization of your department’s/agency’s proliferatio

efforts, including the specific function of each element and key man

personnel and their positions. Include a description of how these el

with each other.

4. What do you envision your proliferation-related mission and organiza

to be in one year? Five years? If you have recently undergone or ar

significant reorganization of this structure, please provide a descrip

previous organizational framework, the changes made or anticipate

reasons for the reorganization. How has your organization evolved o

years on proliferation matters? Show the evolution of organizationa

proliferation, including each reorganization, in this time frame.

5. List and briefly describe department/agency directives that set forth 

responsibilities for managing department/agency efforts to combat 

Resource Allocation

6. Provide data on the amount and source of funds obligated for prolif

activities in fiscal years 1990-1997, budgeted for fiscal year 1998, a

fiscal years 1999-2001. Provide a breakdown of allocated resource

(including but not limited to: operational activities; research and dev

related technologies; acquisition activities; education, training, and 

development for related personnel including rotatees; information ma

by proliferation subject area—nuclear, chemical, biological, means 

related technologies and expertise).
130

7. List and describe the authorities and responsibilities of t

the department/agency making overall resource decisi

resource decisions, or influencing the resource decisio

8. Describe how your department/agency integrates decis

proliferation into its strategic planning and resource pla

budgeting process. How do you prioritize activities and a

to achieve your proliferation-related mission? What is t

resources for current activities with mid/long term inves

9. What is the process and criteria for evaluating your suc

to achieve your proliferation-related mission?

Personnel

10. Provide a breakdown of the number of personnel workin

by the following categories: full-time, part-time employe

rotational employees in and out of your organization, a

contractor employees. Also include in your breakdown 

number of employees at each pay grade, their total yea

and the total years of proliferation-related service. Inclu

breakdown by organization (e.g., offices, groups, task f

11. Compare the size and capabilities of your proliferation-

covering these issues for you ten years ago using the f

• Number of staff with specialized non-technical deg

responsibility was the assessment of proliferation 

gathering of information on these programs or form

related policies.27 (For example, the number of po

conducted proliferation-related policy on a country 

• Number of staff with technical degrees whose prim

was the assessment of proliferation programs, col

information on these programs, or formulation of p

(For example, the number of chemists/chemical en

of assessing the technical status of a foreign chem

27 When counting those assigned to work proliferation program ass

officers with primary account responsibility for formulation of overal

or political analysis regarding the proliferation problem, internationa

exports and controls related to proliferation.
• Number of staff, not captured by the above categories, whose p

responsibility was the assessment of proliferation programs, co

information on these programs, or formulation of proliferation-r

• A breakdown of the staff devoted to information collection or g

general categories of collector, report preparation and evaluat

officers or other categories as you deem appropriate.

• Number of staff officers and support contractors with foreign la

capabilities relevant to countries of proliferation concern.

12. Do you rely significantly on contractors, consultants, or other outsid

fulfill your proliferation-related mission? If so, describe the rationale 

and provide a breakdown for each contract, including type of work c

length and cost of contract. What are the comparative advantages a

disadvantages to using these personnel?

13. As they pertain specifically to proliferation-related personnel, descr

processes and policies for recruitment, retention, maintenance of m

advancement of personnel. What opportunities for training, acquisit

expertise, and career development are made available to proliferati

personnel in your agency?

Interagency and Other Interactions

14. List all inter-agency proliferation-related efforts in which your depar

participates, including task forces, working groups, and other perma

forums. Describe your role in inter-agency proliferation-related effor

precise mechanisms in place to plan, coordinate, and implement th

15. Describe the interface between your department’s/agency’s prolifer

efforts and the National Security Council, including any formal mech

for day-to-day interaction, as well as any additional framework estab

management. Include details regarding the level at which the interact

at the NSC and at your department/agency, as well as the names a

the individuals responsible for this interaction. Describe any related i

other offices in the Executive Office of the President, such as the O

Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technolog

16. Describe your interaction with entities of the federal government tha

provide intelligence in support of your proliferation-related activities

deficiencies and strengths do you see with intelligence on this topic

make recommendations for change?
132

17. What deficiencies and strengths do you see with the U

proliferation? What recommendations would you make 

process on proliferation matters?

18. Describe how specific elements within your departmen

proliferation-related issues with foreign governments a

multilateral organizations. Include formal arrangements 

practices for ad hoc interaction. Provide a description o

or ongoing cooperative efforts with foreign government

significant factors hampering more effective cooperatio

as well as the factors that most ensure or enhance the 

cooperation. How have these relationships evolved ove

US Government been effective in its interactions with fo

proliferation issues?

19. Describe your department’s/agency’s role in achieving, 

bilateral and multilateral treaties, agreements, or comm

proliferation, including assurances regarding the future u

from the U.S.

20. Describe any significant relationships with non-federal-

state and local governments, academic institutions and 

groups and associations) that support proliferation-rela

Evaluation/Accountability

21. Describe the department’s/agency’s evaluation process

determine success in achieving national and/or organiz

efforts.

22. Please provide copies of any formal evaluations or aud

three years of any of the offices or elements involved in 

efforts described above. Include any customer surveys

GAO reports, or other internal or external reports that a

your proliferation-related efforts.

23. Describe the most significant successes and failures of 

proliferation-related efforts over the last 8 years. What 

contributed to these successes/failures?

24. What does your agency see as the key proliferation-rel

future? In your view, is the US Government prepared to 
This representative but by no means exhaustive list of interagency groups 

scope of WMD proliferation issues, the number of agencies involved, and—

of groups listed—the continuing need for coordination. One task of the Na

would be to insure the best integration possible of the functions and activiti

other WMD-related groups.

Groups Chaired by the National Security Council (NSC)

NSC Coordination Group - Nuclear Smuggling

Purpose: to set policy and oversee activity related to nuclear smuggling is

WMD Preparedness Interagency Working Group (WMDP)

Purpose: to coordinate policies and programs related to WMD preparedn

consequence management, in response to the requirements of President

Directive 62.

Nonproliferation and Export Control Interagency Working Group

Purpose: to set policy and oversee activity related to nonproliferation and 

issues.

Interagency Working Group on Plutonium Disposition

Chairs: NSC, OSTP

Purpose: to set policy and oversee activity related to the disposition of U.

surplus weapons plutonium.

Enrichment Oversight Committee (EOC)

Purpose: established by the President in 1998 to monitor and coordinate U

respect to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC). A sub-group oversee

from the U.S.-Russian HEU Agreement.

Export Control Groups

Nuclear Export Violations Working Group (NEVWG)

Chair: State/NP/NE

Reviews procurement-related activities by countries of proliferation conce

when and how to approach supplier governments about these activities.
134

Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC)

Chair: State/NP/NE

Established in 1977 and mandated by the Nuclear Nonprolifer

interagency forum for discussion of significant/difficult (dual-us

issues.

Operating Committee (OC) of the Advisory Committee on 

Chair: Commerce/BXA/EA

The Chairman of the OC is authorized to approve or deny ap

referred to it. Any voting agency disagreeing with the decision 

Agencies are represented at the A/S level. ACEP decisions m

Cabinet level Export Administration Review Board (EARB

very rare.

Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NS

Chair: State/NP/NE

Working-level coordinating groups for issues before those two 

Technology Transfer Working Group (TTWG)

Chair: State/NP/ECNP

Identifies and attempts to frustrate efforts to circumvent expo

Wassenaar Arrangement and conventional arms.

Missile Technology Export Control Group (MTEC)

Chair: State/NP/CBM

Working-level group that reviews proposed U.S. exports of go

controlled for missile proliferation concerns. Agency disagreem

Office of Defense Trade Controls for final decision.

Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG)

Chair: State/NP/CBM

Reviews intelligence for missile-related transactions that shou

action to be taken, monitors progress. Also reviews intelligence 

potentially sanctionable under U.S. law; initiates sanctions-rev

Statements of Fact.

Missile Annex Review Committee (MARC)

Chair: State/NP/CBM
Evaluates U.S. and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partner p

changes to the MTCR Annex; determines U.S. interpretation of Annex.

Missile Nonproliferation Working Group

Chair: State/NP/CBM

Office director-level group that guides the working level policy process, es

relates to U.S. participation in the MTCR.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Working Group (SHIELD)

Chair: State/NP/CBM

Chemical and biological weapons policy/export review group. Two SHIEL

Licensing and Interdiction, review proposed U.S. exports and examine ch

biological weapons (CBW)-related transactions respectively.

Australia Group Working Group and Delegation

Chair: State/NP/CBM

Oversees U.S. policy with regard to and participation in the Australia Grou

proliferation regime.

Proliferation-related Groups Addressing Physical Security Issu

Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP)

Chair: DTRA/OSIA

Established to provide assistance to DoD and other agencies in preparing 

for inspections under international treaties/agreements. The original focus 

CTBT and START is expanding.

Technical Equipment Inspection (TEI) Program

DoD-funded and managed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTR

Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). Chartered to inspect all equipment prior t

inspections of U.S. facilities.

Overseas Security Policy Board (USPB)

Chair: State/DSS

A forum to review and evaluate issues and make recommendations involvi

technical security measures for federal facilities and personnel security. A

integration between agencies.
136

Groups Addressing WMD Accident, Emergency, Sm

Illicit Tracking Notification System

State/NP/RNP

Incidents of nuclear smuggling come to the attention of State 

the G-8 system or U.S. Embassy contacts. PM coordinates th

preparation of a USG response.

National Response Team

Chair: EPA; Vice-Chair: U.S. Coast Guard

A legislatively mandated group responsible for preparedness 

national oil and other hazardous spills, including those that m

material. It also coordinates regional planning and provides p

to regional response teams.

Nuclear Accident/Incident Program (NAIP)

Chair: State

Coordinates an interagency nuclear accident/incident training 

country teams overseas.

Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Commi

Chair: FEMA

Coordinates federal planning and training for any radiological 

sabotage and terrorism.

Groups Addressing Nonproliferation/Arms Control T

Requirements

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working 

Chairs: State/DoD/DOE/NN

Established by PDD 27 (1994) to coordinate all federally funde

control technology R&D programs, and to identify and elimina

and technology gaps. Has 13 focus groups and one subcomm

the relevant NSC IWGs and to the National Science and Techn

on National Security (CNS).
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC)

Chair: DepSecDefense; Vice Chair: DepSec Energy; members: DCI, CJC

Established by the Defense Authorization Act of 1994. Reviews activities 

related to countering proliferation. Makes/implements recommendations o

interdepartmental activities/programs to address shortfalls in existing and 

capabilities to counter WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, and 

paramilitary and terrorist WMD threats.

Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)

Chairs: State, Energy, and Defense

The group addresses R&D efforts to meet the threat posed by domestic a

terrorism. It includes a working group on Chemical, Biological, Radiologic

Countermeasures.

Interagency National Security Technology Exchange

Host: DOE/NN-20

Annual forum to discuss current security projects/accomplishments using 

U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) Program Manag

Group

Chair: DoD/Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center and Air Force Spa

Meets biannually to coordinate the USNDS programs, which place and op

explosion monitoring sensors aboard GPS and DSP satellites.

Satellite Systems Review Panel

Chair: DOE/SNL

Meets biannually to review the AFTAC R&D program for atmospheric and 

explosions monitoring from satellites. Also assesses recent anomalous ev

Other Interagency Groups

NPT Working/Backstopping Group

Chair: State/NP/IAEA

Coordinates U.S. policy on NPT-related issues and participation in NPT c
138

IAEA Steering Committee

Chair: State/NP

Office Director-level group to formulate U.S. policy toward the 

implementation. The Committee directs and coordinates the 

subcommittees (where much of the continuing work is accom

congressional relations with regard to the IAEA, and coordina

Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT)

Chair: CI/CB

An interagency umbrella organization composed of over 45 e

defense, intelligence and law enforcement communities invol

activities. It functions as a forum for exchange of counter-terr

products. It is not a policy body. It has seven subcommittees, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Subcommittee (CBRN)
The following table shows the proliferation-related reports that the executi

Congress. Each entry includes a description of the report, the legislation 

person in the executive branch who is responsible for providing the report

made.28

28 This Information was compiled by the Congressional Research Service

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) F

1. Determination and Identification of a Country or Person that Has Violated

Nuclear Safeguards (Export-Import Bank Act (EIBA))

S

S

(S

2. Determination to Impose Sanctions on a Country or Person Who Violates

Nuclear Safeguards (EIBA)

S

3. Status of Consultations Before Imposing Sanctions (EIBA) S

4. Determination to Grant Approval for Extension of Credit to Governments

(EIBA)

P

5. Termination Prohibition Against Governments Who Have Taken Corrective

Actions Against Persons (EIBA)

S

6. Terminating Prohibition Against Persons (EIBA) P

7. Nuclear Export License Applications (Atomic Energy Act (AEA)) S

8. Nuclear Export Licenses (AEA) P

9. Notice of Export Authorization not Meeting Safeguards Criterion (AEA) P

10. Continuation of Nuclear Cooperation Despite Violations (AEA) P

11. Reasons for Proposed Subsequent Arrangement for Retransfer or

Reprocessing of Special Nuclear Material (AEA)

S

E

(S

12. Foreign Spent Fuel Storage in the United States (AEA) P

S

13. Possession of Nuclear Explosive Device by Pakistan (Foreign Assistance

Act (FAA))

P

14. Waiver of Sanctions Imposed on U.S. Persons Who Transfer Missile

Equipment or Technology (Arms Export Control Act (AECA))

P

15. Exports to Space Launch Vehicle Programs (AECA) S

16. Notification of Admittance of Missile Technology Control Regime Annex

(MTCR) Adherents (AECA)

P
140

17. Waiver of Sanctions Against a Foreign Person Who May Violate Missile

Equipment Transfers (AECA)

President 

18. Determination Against Imposing Sanctions (AECA) President 

19. Status of Consultations with and Actions by Foreign Government (AECA) President 

20. Determination to Terminate Sanctions (AECA) President 

21. Determination to Exercise Waiver Authority on Sanctions (AECA) President 

22. Funds for Nuclear Equipment Transfers (AECA) President 

23. Certification for Prohibited Assistance to Countries Involved in the

Transfer of Nuclear Reprocessing Equipment (ACEA)

President 

24. Imposing Sanctions Against Countries Who Transfer or Use Nuclear

Explosive Devices (AECA)

President 

25. Justification for Delaying Imposition of Sanctions (AECA) President 

26. Waiving Sanctions to Achieve Nonproliferation Objectives (AECA) President 

27. Notification to Waive Sanctions on Countries that Transfer Nuclear

Explosive Devices (AECA)

President 

28. Determination Not to Impose Sanctions (Export Administration Act

(EAA))

President 

29. Determination to Terminate Sanctions (EAA) President 

30. Notification of Waiver of Application of Sanctions (EAA) President 

31. Certification on China’s Non-Proliferation Policy (Joint Resolution

Approving Nuclear Agreement with China (JRANA))

President 

32. Report on China’s Non-Proliferation Policy (JRANA) President 

33. Certification Required to Impose Additional Sanctions if Certain

Conditions Are not met (Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and

Warfare Elimination Act (CBWA))

President 

34. Determination to Waive Sanctions (CBWA) President 

35. Determination that a Foreign Government Has Used Chemical or

Biological Weapons (CBWA)

President 

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) From Whom 
36. Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons by a Foreign Government

(CBWA)

P

37. Certification for Assistance to Destroy Soviet Nuclear Weapons

(Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act)

P

38. Determination to Provide Assistance for the International Nonproliferation

Initiative (Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (WMDCA))

S

D

(S

39. Determination to Impose Sanctions on Persons Engaging in Export

Activities that Contribute to Proliferation (Nuclear Proliferation Prevention

Act (NPPA))

P

40. Status of Consultations with Foreign Governments (NPPA) P

41. Certification to Terminate Sanction (NPPA) P

42. Determination to Waive Application of Sanction (NPPA) P

43. Consultations with Foreign Government Regarding Imposition of

Sanctions (NPPA)

P

44. Coordination with Activities of Foreign Governments (NPPA) P

45. Report on Status of Consultations (NPPA) P

46. Sanctions on Persons Who Engage in a Prohibited Activity (NPPA) P

47. Determination to Waive Continued Application of Sanctions (NPPA) P

48. Theater Missile Defense System Under ABM Treaty (National Defense

Authorization Act (NDAA))

S

49. Military and Civil Defense Preparedness Plans (NDAA) S

S

D

50. Limitation on Assistance to Nuclear Weapons Scientists of Former Soviet

Union (NDAA)

S

51. Limitation on Funds for Offensive Biological Warfare Program in Russia

(NDAA)

P

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) F
142

52. Consultations with Foreign Governments to Delay Sanctions (Iran and

Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA))

President 

53. Status Report on Consultations (ILSA) President 

54. Weapons Proliferation and Policies of the People’s Republic of China

(NDAA)

President 

55. Review of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19 (NDAA) DCI 

56. Report of the Commission (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile

Threat to the United States) (NDAA)

Commission 

57. Response to Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (DAWMD))

President 

58. Cooperative Program for Elimination of Plutonium Production (DAWMD) SecDef 

59. Comprehensive Preparedness Program (DAWMD) President 

60. Reliability and Safety of Nuclear Arsenal (NDAA) President 

61 Policies and Practices Relating to Protection of Armed Forces Personnel

Abroad from Terrorist Attack (NDAA)

SecDef 

62. Use of Funds for Planning a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

(NDAA)

SecDef 

63. Obligation of Funds for Storage Facility for Russian Fissile

Material (NDAA)

SecDef 

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) From Whom 
64. Funds for Weapons Storage Security (NDAA) S

65. Chemical Warfare Defense (NDAA) S

66. Obligation of Funds in Excess of Individual Amounts for Cooperative

Threat Reduction Funds (NDAA)

S

67. Limitation on Use of Funds for Chemical Weapons Destruction Activities

(NDAA)

P

68. Limitation on Use of Funds for Biological Weapons Proliferation

Prevention Activities in Russia (NDAA)

S

69. Assistance for Cooperative Counter Proliferation Program (NDAA) S

70. Waiver of Notification for Assistance to Country of Former Soviet Union

(NDAA)

S

71. Biological Weapons Programs in Russia (NDAA) S

72. Individuals with Expertise in Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

(NDAA)

S

S

ap

of

73. Response to Threats of Domestic Terrorism (DAWMD) P

74. Requirement to Develop Methodologies for Assessing the Threat and

Risk of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (NDAA)

A

G

ap

Fe

an

ag

75. Funds for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

(Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA))

P

76. Regional Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy in South Asia (Foreign

Assistance Act (FAA))

S

ot

77. Status of United States Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament

Policy (Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA))

P

78. Compensating for Violations of U.S. Nonproliferation Commitments

(ACDA)

P

79. Foreign Military Sales and Commercial Sales Case Listings (AECA) P

80. Grant Excess Defense Articles (Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments) P

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) F
144

81. Determination to Impose Sanctions Against Certain Foreign Persons

(EAA)

President 

82. Annual Determination to Permit Continued U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with

EURATOM (NNPA)

President 

83. US Government Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation (NNPA) President 

84. Nonproliferation Policy and Actions (NNPA) DOE/NRC 

85. Activities to Carry Out the Purposes and Policies of Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA)State, DOE,

NRC, DoD

86. Nuclear Programs and Related Activities of Certain Countries

(International Security and Development Cooperation Act (ISDCA))

President 

87. Nuclear Facilities and ESF Funds (ISDCA) President 

88. Report on Foreign Government’s Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons

(CBWA)

President 

89. Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (NDAA)

President 

90. Nuclear Weapons Reduction (NDAA) President 

91. Assistance to Support International Nonproliferation Activities (WMDCA) SecDef 

92. Determination to Waive Sanctions Against Iran and Iraq (Iran-Iraq NonProliferation Act (IINPA))President 

93. Activities in Support of Counterproliferation Programs (NDAA) SecDef 

94. Assessment of the Counterproliferation Policy (NDAA) Joint

Committee fo

Review of

Counterproli

ation Progra

95. Individual Transfer of Arms (IINPA) President 

96. Report on Transfers to Subject to Sanctions to Iran or Iraq (IINPA) President 

97. Counterproliferation Activities and Programs (NDAA) SecDef 

98. Limitation on Use of Funds for a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

(NDAA)

President 

99. Multilateral Sanctions Regime Against Iran (Iran and Libya Sanctions Act) President 

100. National Defense Panel’s Review of Force Structures of the Armed

Forces (Military Force Structure Review Act)

SecDef and

Chairman, J

101. Early Deactivation of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems (NDAA) President 

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) From Whom 
102. Recommendations to Make Nonproliferation Laws More Effective

(NDAA)

P

103. Policy Functions/Operational Roles of Federal Agencies in Countering

the Domestic Chemical/Biological Threat (DAWMD)

P

104. International Border Security Assistance to States of the Former Soviet

Union (DAWMD)

P

105. Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to

Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Combating

Proliferation of WMD (CWMD)

C

106. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology and Conventional Munitions

(CWMD)

D

107. Threat to the United States by WMD (NDAA) S

108. Budget for Carrying out Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism Activities

(NDAA)

P

109. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of Advisory Panel

(NDAA)

A

to 

D

R

C

Te

In

110. Notification of Nuclear Export License (NDAA) P

111. Report on Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (FOAA) S

112. Iraqi Development of WMD (FOAA) P

Title (Legislation that Contains Reporting Requirement) F

Establishing the specific composition of the 05x account will be difficult. Fo

of specific considerations to help determine what should be included in the 

The following categories should be included:

• Threat reduction

• Nonproliferation

• Counter-proliferation

When WMD may be included:

• Anti-/counter-terrorism

• Infrastructure protection

• Emergency response/management capabilities

• Domestic preparedness activities

• Export control efforts

• Epidemiological activities (e.g., bio-surveillance/early warning)

The cross-cut should include the following areas:

• State

• Defense

• Public health

• Intelligence

• Law enforcement

• Trade/Commerce

• Interagency (e.g., Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Wo

[NPAC TWG], Counterproliferation Program Review Committee [CPR

Technical Support Working Group [TSWG])

And overall budget categories:

• Operations and maintenance

• RDT&E

• Administrative (e.g., personnel, security, training, and overhead)

• Procurement/acquisition

29 A list of abbreviations used in this appendix appears at the end of it.
148

Illustrative 05x Sub-function

As a starting point, this sub-function should include current pr

well as WMD-related counter-terrorism and domestic prepare

also include, as possible, particular arms control (e.g., the Nuc

or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), epidemiological (e.g

commercial (e.g., export control), and other specific activities 

control (e.g., land mines), counter-terrorism , and infrastructur

not be included.

WMD-related programs are currently run by at least eight diff

departments—Defense, Energy, Commerce, State, Justice, T

Services, and Agriculture—along with the Intelligence Comm

such interagency technology development groups as the CPR

While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmenta

Department of Transportation, and other non-designated fede

counter-terrorism, most, if not all, of their respective activities 

05x account.

As an illustration, the following activities from the various fede

agencies that should become part of the newly-created 05x a

below (anything not explicitly mentioned should stay as it is):

Department of Defense

• Cooperative Threat Reduction program

• Passive measures, such as chem-bio defense progr

• Active measures, such as counterforce capabilities (

hardened, deeply-buried targets)

• DoD-Customs and DoD-FBI counter-proliferation pro

• Select force protection efforts and special operations 

• Intelligence support activities (i.e., specific WMD-rel

• Domestic preparedness program

• Most currently-specified CPRC, TSWG, and NPAC T

• Diplomatic support activities carried out by the Office 

Policy and others, such as DTRA’s On-Site Inspectio

• Select planning capabilities (including personnel) in 

and elsewhere [as appropriate, TBD]
Department of State

• NDF

• NIS export control efforts

• NIS science centers

• IAEA assessments

• OPCW assessments

• CTBT prep-com assessments

• KEDO funding

• UNSCOM support

• Some portion of proliferation-related arms control activities [e.g. M

etc.; also percentage of strategic arms control treaties/negotiatio

• Select administrative costs [Bureau of Nonproliferation, some Bur

Control admin.]

• NPAC TWG overhead

Department of Energy

• IPP

• NCI

• MPC&A

• RERTR

• Reactor safety (NIS)

• North Korea spent fuel packaging

• Export control activities

• Plutonium disposition [IAEA voluntary, trilateral; NIS aid]

• Emergency response [NEST, etc.]

• All relevant CPRC, NPAC TWG, and TSWG technology developm

• Some portion of proliferation-related arms control activities [e.g. 

etc.; also, percentage of strategic arms control treaties/negotiatio

• Elements of stockpile stewardship

• Select administrative costs in DOE HQ [e.g., Office of Emergency 

IN, elements of NN] and for the national labs
150

Department of Commerce

• Bureau of Export Administration (select administrativ

• Export control activities

• Support to international regimes

• Enforcement activities

• NIS export control assistance (with State)

• SABIT program

Department of Justice

• Select administrative/overhead costs for technology 

investigations, operations

• WMD operations unit and counter-proliferation unit

• Elements of the FBI critical incident response group

• National Domestic Preparedness Office

• Some FBI counterintelligence

• Select cooperative international law enforcement act

• Portions of AG’s Office of Intelligence and Policy Rev

• Critical infrastructure protection

Department of Treasury

• Portions/percentage of OFAC’s work/overhead

• CFIUS

• Secret Service’s CBRN program

• Customs: Strategic Investigations Division

• Customs: Georgian border security efforts

• Customs: WMD detection equipment (U.S. border se
Department of Agriculture

• Select ARS R&D activities

• Select law enforcement and investigative activities

• PDD-62/63 activities

Department of Health and Human Services

• Select R&D activities (CDC, NIH, FDA)

• Select emergency/medical response/consequence management

• CDC: Public health surveillance and diagnostics

• CDC: Epidemiological capability

• CDC: Laboratory activities

• Pharmaceutical stockpile

Intelligence Community

• CPRC technology development activities

• Relevant portions of NFIP, JMIP

• Specific offices: personnel and admin. costs for relevant collecto

administrators, analysts, and researchers (e.g., NPC, CPD)

• Select field operations
152

Specific Action Items:

1. Broker agreement on which categories of effort should 

of each (e.g., include threat reduction? Arms control?).

2. Similarly, specify which particular actors within the Fede

included, and to what extent (e.g., include all of CDC o

much of the foreign counterintelligence activities of the 

3. Determine which discrete budget categories (e.g., O&M

be included in the proposed 05x account.

4. Further specify (i.e., revise above estimates with specifi

relevant programs and activities of each federal actor (a

costs, as appropriate).

5. Compile composite matrix of estimated government-wid

programs and related activities.

6. Draft a cross-cutting interagency resource allocation se

matrix as a specific template.

Other Federal agencies or offices

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission (export control acti

• Admin. or overhead costs for specific White House o

thereof): OMB, NSC, OSTP

• Department of Transportation (elements of: aviation 

protection, detection and interdiction efforts, collabora

or other)

• National Information Protection Center

• FEMA
Abbreviations

AG Attorney General

ARS Agricultural Research Service

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

CPD Counterproliferation Division

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CPRC Counterproliferation Program Review Committee

CW Chemical Warfare or Chemical Weapons

DOE Department of Energy

DoD Department of Defense

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FSU Former Soviet Union

GDIP General Defense Intelligence Plan

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IN Office of Intelligence

IPP Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

MPC&A Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NCI Nuclear Cities Initiative

NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program

NIH National Institutes of Health

NIS Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union

NN Office of Nonproliferation and National Security

NPAC TWG Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Gr
154

NPC DCI Nonproliferation Center

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NSC National Security Council

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

O&M Operations and Maintenance

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical W

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

R&D Research and Development

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

RERTR Reduced Enrichment for Research and

Test Reactors Program

SABIT Special American Business Internship Program

TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

TSWG Technology Support Working Group

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
A key finding of the Commission concerns the lack of tools appropriate fo

diverse proliferation-related technology acquisition efforts of the federal go

order to illustrate one such tool, consider the following taxonomy, intended 

information parameters and conceptual organization necessary for effecti

technology management and oversight. The specific items provided in the 

intended to be illustrative rather than a comprehensive list.30

The many federal departments involved with WMD technology acquisition 

and often inconsistent, accounting systems. Indeed, the Department of De

one time had over 100 different accounting systems. The goal of this man

taxonomy is not to overrule or replace a given accounting system in any f

department or agency. Rather, the goal is to outline a coherent means to 

functional elements common to all these accounting systems to achieve t

management comparisons. The following management taxonomy is inher

independent of any existing accounting system, even though it is more lik

accounting systems than others.

Much work is needed to translate existing systems into any overarching m

taxonomy, no matter how well conceived that taxonomy is, and diligence i

each individual department to maintain coherence with it.

Stating the National Goals

Building the management taxonomy begins with a clear statement of the na

combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Many differen

articulate these national goals may be found in various statements, public

strategy documents produced by the federal government. These stateme

integrated. For illustration, all U.S. government responses to the WMD pro

can be classified according to one or more of the following four national g

Proliferation Prevention/Denial

This class of responses includes all efforts designed either to prevent stat

actor from starting development of a WMD operational capability or to inh

development, by means other than military force, once it has begun. Prev

tools may include diplomacy, treaties, international and domestic law-enfo

and export controls.

30 A list of abbreviations used in this appendix appears at the end of it.
156

WMD Deterrence (Short of Military Action)

Deterrence of WMD use is the next line of defense, assuming 

may lead to the rolling back of an existing WMD capability by 

political isolation, development of alliances, or the threat of ov

response to a WMD attack.

WMD Military Action (Including Active Defenses and/or R

This class of response includes all efforts to physically destro

operational capability or weapon delivery threat, and involves 

imminent threat identification, perpetrator identification, and i

in the United States and abroad. This class of responses ofte

infrastructure elements of the threat organization, and, in the 

substantial role for active defenses.

WMD Consequence Management

This class of response includes all efforts designed to reduce 

successfully fired WMD weapon. These efforts include active 

personnel protection, mitigation of effects, emergency respon

Obviously, these four response classifications have overlaps. 

in facility protection (WMD consequence management) may a

by forcing the threat organization to resort to so-called “asym

on our known vulnerabilities) or may reduce their willingness to 

because of its relative ineffectiveness. Similarly, individual U.

combat proliferation may contribute to multiple goals (such as 

research and development efforts).

Next: Link Technology Programs to National Goals

The overall process should be designed to link specific WMD 

efforts with one or more of the four national goals. It could co

hierarchical order, (1) the operational capabilities needed to a

enabling technologies designed to help create or improve a req

(3) specific technology programs, organized to provide the id

technologies, and (4) program milestones and funding.

The examples below use actual technology programs as repo

Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report to Co
to change; up-to-date data should be obtained from the originating agenc

assignments are by Commission staff only.

National Goal: WMD Prevention and Denial

Proliferation occurs with the acquisition of an operational WMD capability, 

component therein, not currently possessed by state or sub-state actor, th

more of the following means:

• Indigenous development,

• Unlawful acquisition (without consent from an existing source), or

• Direct acquisition (with consent from an existing source).

A WMD “source” consists of any state or sub-state actor that currently po

operational WMD capability or a key component therein. At present, all kn

operational sources are states, but some key components may exist in pr

such as medical research laboratories.

Required Operational Capabilities (Sample):

• Continuous knowledge and forewarning of:

• Sources of WMD technology proliferation

• Indigenous WMD efforts (by states or sub-state actors)

• Unlawful WMD acquisition efforts

• Direct (WMD source-supported) acquisition efforts

• WMD capability assessments (of states or sub-state actors)

• WMD key technology identification

• Interdiction capabilities (for export control support)

Enabling Technologies (Sample):

• WMD source surveillance and intelligence-related technologies

• WMD technology and equipment identification and detection technol

support to customs and export control efforts and inspection teams)

• Treaty verification technologies

• Hazardous material handling and removal technologies
158

Technology Programs (Sample):

DoD Program

• PE 603711BR: Various Nuclear, Chemical, Biological an

Verification Technology Programs. RDT&E of technolog

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) implementation

verification. Provide enhanced nuclear safeguards. Impl

monitoring, and inspection of chemical and biological we

agreements. RDT&E of technologies to enable verificatio

follow-on nuclear weapons treaties.

Department of Energy (DOE) Programs

• Detecting and Characterizing Worldwide Production of N

Weapons: Continuing development of both remote and o

to detect and characterize foreign nuclear materials produ

Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation 

program, development of a hyperspectral infrared imagin

effluents associated with nuclear materials production p

weapons clandestine production detection efforts focuse

small satellite demonstration system employing multispe

techniques.

• Monitoring Worldwide Nuclear Testing: Continued devel

U.S. capabilities for monitoring the Limited Test Ban Trea

Test Ban Treaty. DOE has a long standing partnership wit

designing and producing nuclear detonation detection s

deployment on DoD GPS and Defense Support Program 

based technical methods associated with the CTBT, and 

International Monitoring System.

• Preventing and Detecting the Diversion and Smuggling o

program focuses on detecting and preventing nuclear sm

material at its source, detecting stolen material in transit

and actual events, and determining the origin of intercept

efforts are focused on protecting domestic nuclear mate

smuggling by securing potential sources of material in the 

the “Second Line of Defense” program, aimed at improvi

capabilities and preventing nuclear materials, high explo

substances from exiting the country, was begun. In addi

laboratory personnel lead an international technical work

the sources of smuggled nuclear material.

• Securing Nuclear Materials, Technology, and Expertise 

Former Soviet Union, and the Baltics: Two DOE program
this activity: the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&

the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP). The MPC&A program 

related to nuclear materials security and nonproliferation, while the go

to engage scientists and engineers from the weapons institutes of th

Union in peaceful technology applications in order to help stabilize p

resources that represent a potential risk of “expertise proliferation.”

• Reducing Inventories of Surplus Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials W

Safe, Secure, Transparent, and Irreversible Manner: Efforts focus on 

the disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium and plutonium and 

technical support to attain reciprocal actions for the disposition of su

plutonium. Multinational cooperation is under way to minimize the fut

highly enriched uranium in civilian programs through the developmen

low-enriched uranium fuels for research reactors.

• Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: DOE will lead a

task force on warhead and fissile material to create START III option

elimination and fissile material disposition. DOE will continue to supp

UNSCOM by providing equipment, technologies, and expertise to per

and intrusive inspections in North Korea and Iraq.

Sample Program Milestones (Summarized at the PE/Project Level)

PE 603711BR: Nuclear Arms Control/CTBT Technology Support Prog

Objectives: This consolidated RDT&E program develops capabilities and 

under the oversight of the Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs, to support t

implementation, compliance, and verification of the CTBT. Work under thi

Element also includes the Chemical Biological Arms Control Technology P

Strategic Arms Control Technology Program.

Milestones:

Fiscal year (FY) 1999: All U.S. IMS monitoring stations operational.

Deliver IDC to CTBT international organization.

Complete BW history document

Demonstrate new tagging technologies

FY 2000: IMS and IDC operational

FY 2002: Develop nuclear weapon identification detectors.

Funding ($ in millions):

PE Project FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY0

603711BR N/A 55.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
160

National Goal: WMD Deterrence (Short of Military Ac

This class of responses includes all efforts designed to convi

a WMD operational capability already obtained by state or su

physically destroying the capability. Deterrence may include p

development of alliances, or the plausible threat of overwhelm

WMD attack. The Commission includes technologies necess

plausible (noting that many will be repeated in other categorie

Required Operational Capabilities (Sample):

• Substantially reduced vulnerability to WMD attack (facilit

• Rapid force projection to remote areas

• Political support from international treaties or alliances

Enabling Technologies (Sample):

• Target hardening and personnel protection technologies 

from a WMD attack)

• Advanced logistics technologies (for rapid force deploym

• Conventional force projection technologies (e.g. cruise m

Technology Programs (Samples):

• PE 603228D: Joint Physical Security Equipment: Conso

facility and nuclear and other high-value weapons protec

• PE 604384BP: Collective Protection/Contamination Avoi

NBC collective protection shelter development, NBC det

EMD, EMD for individual protection. Expanded manufac

testing of vaccines and medical products.

Sample Milestones (Summarized at the PE/Project level)

Sample data not identified by the Commission.
National Goal: Military Action (Including Retaliation)

The use of military force is always targeted against a specific threat organ

organizations may be independent (such as organized crime or fanatical p

organizations), state-sponsored (including quasi-independent terrorist org

actual states. No matter its size, a threat organization will have the followi

elements subject to military attack:

• threat organizational structure (including a command hierarchy, perso

communication capabilities, and so on);

• threat infrastructure facilities and resources (including financial resou

device production facilities, key materials, headquarters and supply f

logistics, and so on);

• delivery systems (including transportation) for their WMD devices; an

• intended physical targets (in the United States or abroad) consistent 

and motivations of the organization.

Required Operational Capabilities (Sample):

The ability to physically destroy, while minimizing collateral damage, the:

• threat organizational structure,

• threat infrastructure facilities and resources, and

• threat delivery systems.

Enabling Technologies (Sample):

• Threat target identification and intelligence technologies (as in preve

• Force projection technologies (as in deterrence)

• Technologies to make hardened targets vulnerable

• Technologies that reduce collateral WMD damage after physical des

• Technologies that help ascribe organizational responsibility for a WM

retaliation)

• Active defenses

Technology Programs (Samples):

• PE 603750D: Tactical FLIR Pod Modification: Improved battle damage 

NBC/M and underground facilities.
162

• PE 603160BR: UAV-Based Collateral Effects Assessme

Aerial Vehicle-based detection, identification, and trackin

collateral effects.

• PE 603160BR: Multiple Projects: Continuous surveillanc

and battle damage assessment of NBC/M and undergro

Effects Phenomenology Assessment. Source term char

prediction, phenomenology experiments, and assessme

Enhanced penetrating munitions for hard and undergrou

Target Planning and Response/Vulnerability Assessmen

analytical analyses of target response/vulnerability and a

NBC/M facilities.

• PE 603160BR: Counter-proliferation ACTD’s: Integrated 

support early deployment of new counterforce capabilitie

underground targets.

• PE 603750D: Tactical Multi-Sensor Data Fusion. Suppo

target characterization and battle damage assessment.

• PE 603884BP: JBREWS ACTD. Accelerate fielding of w

remote detection, identification, characterization, and ea

weapons (BW) attacks. Includes demonstration and rap

portable and UAV-integrated BW detectors for remote de

of BW agents.

• PE 603884BP: Eye Safe LR-BSDS for Biological Warfar

deployment of airborne eye-safe IR LIDARS for standoff 

detection and tracking.

• PE 603160BR: Specialized Special Operations Forces T

devices. Technologies to detect, disable, render safe, and 

from NBC devices in a non-permissive and time-sensitiv

• PE 604327N: Navy Hard Target Munitions Program. Coo

development of a conventional earth penetrating variant o

System.

• PE 602601F: LIDAR Remote Optical Sensing Technolog

technologies used for standoff detection and battle dama

of NBC/M production, storage, and use.

• PE 604327F: Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Ca

evaluation and development of hard and deeply buried t

• PE 604222F: Agent Defeat Weapon Program. Develop c

neutralize, immobilize, or deny an adversary access to BW

collateral damage.
• PE 602715BR: Hard Target Defeat Program. End-to-end evaluation an

of improved tactics and technologies for hard-target characterization 

evaluation of conventional weapon lethality, and effects and collatera

assessment. Maintain core competency in nuclear weapons effects. 

simulation technology to validate weapon system survivability, force 

assessments against nuclear weapons effects based upon test resu

• PE 603122D: Counter-terror Technical Support Program. Develop te

capabilities and prototype systems and concepts to detect, render sa

against paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats.

• PE 603122D: SO/LIC Analytical Support. Research/analysis of techni

and policy issues relating to special operations, counter-terrorism, an

unconventional warfare.

Sample Milestones (Summarized at the PE/Project Level)

PE 602715BR, Projects AB, AC and AI. (Hard Target Defeat)

Objectives: Deliver to the warfighter an end-to-end deliberate planning c

defeat of tunnel facilities. This capability will include the ability to characte

through the fusion of multi-sensor data and reverse engineering to identify 

functional nodes and potential vulnerabilities; identify functional disruption

reconstitute when complete destruction of the facility is impossible or unde

numerous attack strategies in an automated fashion; assess bomb damag

maximum lethality potential of conventional weapons beyond which other m

nuclear weapons) will be necessary. The lethality of several advanced we

resulting from the hard and deeply buried target defeat capability acquisitio

related service efforts will also be evaluated as part of this program.

Milestones:

FY 1999: Complete tunnel test-bed facility (simulated missile operations fa

Test Site; develop signature database.

FY 2000: Demonstrate a capability to deny and disrupt operational (missi

facilities for a minimum of 48 hours using current conventional weapons; d

incorporate target reconstitution models. Begin construction on tunnel tes

production/storage).

FY2001: Complete MEA Tunnel Module Version 2.0 (Missile Ops Tunnels)

plans for tunnel test-bed #2. Demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear wea

in defeating deep structures using precise, low-yield attacks by HE simula
164

FY 2002: Demonstrate a capability to deny and disrupt WMD 

facilities located in tunnels for at least 7 days with current and 

weapons. Encompass data into MEA Tunnel Module Version 

FY 2003: Construct test-bed #3, a simulated C2 facility.

Funding ($ in millions):

National Goal: WMD Consequence Management

This class of responses includes all efforts designed to reduc

successfully fired WMD weapon. These efforts include facility 

protection, mitigation of effects, emergency response proced

Consequence management may also support the goals of W

deterrence by substantially reducing the potential “reward” fro

maintaining the associated risks.

Required Operational Capabilities (Sample):

• Substantially reduced vulnerability of facilities and perso

• Hazardous material handling and decontamination proc

• Rapid alert and effective response procedures to WMD 

• Properly trained and equipped personnel

• Casualty treatment tools and techniques

Enabling Technologies (Sample):

• Facility hardening against WMD attack (especially chem

• Personnel protection technology (masks, clothing)

• Chem/bio detection and identification technology

• Risk assessment technology and modeling

• Medical treatment technology

PE Project FY99 FY00 FY01 F

602715BR AB 6.9 6.4 6.1 

602715BR AC 4.3 4.4 4.6 

602715BR AI 9.3 10.0 10.0 

Total 20.5 20.8 20.7 
• Active defenses

Technology Programs (Samples):

DoD Programs

• PE 603160BR: First Responder Support. Accelerated development o

and technologies to enhance interagency response to CW/BW threa

• PE 601384BP: Medical Chemical Defense. Basic research on medic

measures to CW agents and development of drugs and vaccines for 

• PE 602384BP: Chemical Biological Defense. Development of treatm

agent casualties, applied research on drugs and vaccine candidates f

CW/BW detection and warning, individual and collective protection, de

and modeling support.

• PE 603384BP: Chemical/Biological Defense Systems. Non-clinical te

evaluation of BW vaccine candidates and drugs, advanced technolog

for new medical countermeasures for CW agents, technology demon

BW agent detection/identification, decontamination, and individual/co

protection.

• PE 604384BP: Collective Protection/Contamination Avoidance/Individ

NBC collective protection shelter development, NBC detection and w

EMD, EMD for individual protection. Expanded manufacture and Pha

testing of vaccines and medical products.

• PE 60365N: Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Systems Pr

EOD equipment to locate, access, and render safe explosive devices

devices, for all services.

• PE 602383E: BW Defense Sensors Program. Research, developme

demonstration of technologies that will minimize impact of BW agent

military operations. Develop new medical countermeasures, diagnos

consequence management tools.

• PE 603709D: Joint Robotics Program. Consolidates Service/DoD RD

demonstrate mature robotics technologies for Explosive Ordnance D

other activities.

DOE Programs

• Detecting Chemical and Biological Agents. Responding to congressi

and a CPRC recommendation, DOE, DoD and U.S. intelligence esta
166

R&D initiative in chemical and biological defense. DOE b

detection R&D program in FY 1997. The program is focu

experience in traditional DOE missions and its Human G

of four thrust areas: fundamental biology (including geno

pathogens), prediction (including urban terrain models), d

technologies), and mitigation (including CW/BW deconta

• Nuclear Emergency and Terrorism Response. DOE mai

response assets postured to respond to events that may 

prevention efforts fail. This includes the Nuclear Emergen

primary responsibility for responding to acts of nuclear t

involving nuclear weapons or devices.

Sample Milestones (Summarized at the PE/Project Level)

PE 603160BR: Project CB2 (CB Protective Clothing)

Objectives: Develop and demonstrate materials for a new ge

chemical/biological (CB) protective clothing ensembles based 

membrane technology that will eliminate or reduce the use of 

resulting advanced material system will be 20 percent lighter 

dress overgarment material system, allow selective permeati

preventing the passage of common vesicant agents, provide 

penetration by toxic agents in aerosolized form, and provide a

protection against toxic vapors and liquids. The ultimate objec

protective garment that replaces the standard duty uniform.

Milestones:

FY 1999: Demonstrate material durability. Integrate advanced 

shell fabrics and novel closure systems into a lightweight CB 

CB duty uniform will be launderable, 30 percent lighter in wei

JSLIST duty uniform/overgarment system, with equivalent du

burden and lower cost.

FY 2000: Fabricate and demonstrate a lightweight CB duty u

lighter with the same or better protection.

Funding ($ in millions):

PE 603384BP: Chemical/Biological Defense System, Proj

Objectives: Part of an integrated biodetection ATD designed 

technologies: one that provides a pre-exposure warning for a b

PE Project FY99 FY00 FY01 F

602384BP CB2 0.5 0.6 0 0 
that provides an order-of-magnitude increased sensitivity to agents while 

time virus identification capability with significantly reduced logistics. Thes

improvements include automated operation, fivefold reduction in size and w

storage requirements, and reduced consumables.

Milestones:

FY 1999: Products will be demonstrated separately and as an integrated f

suite in future battlelab warfighting experiments.

Funding (in $ Millions):

PE Project FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY

603384BP CB3 6.1 0 0 0 0 
168

Abbreviations

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

ATD Advanced Technology Demonstration

BW Biological Warfare or Biological Weapons

CALIOPE Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of P

CB Chemical/Biological

CPRC Counterproliferation Program Review Committ

CW Chemical Warfare or Chemical Weapons

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DOE Department of Energy

DoD Department of Defense

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development

FLIR Forward Looking Infra Red

FSU Former Soviet Union

GPS Global Positioning System

HE High Explosive

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IDC International Data Center

IMS International Monitoring System

JBREWS Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System

JSLIST Joint Staff List

LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging

LR-BSDS Long Range Biological Stand-off Detection Sy

MEA Munitions Effectiveness Assessment

MPC&A Material Protection, Control, and Accounting p

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

NBC/M Nuclear, Biological, Chemical/Materials

R&D Research and Development

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

SO/LIC Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (on Iraq)

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Additional Views of Senator J. James Exon

I generally endorse and applaud the findings and recommendations of the 

all sections of the report with the exception of portions of the Executive S

Chapter 2 regarding line authority and reporting requirements of the Natio

Combating Proliferation.

I dissent to those sections and urge the President and the Vice President 

somewhat different and more comprehensive course of action to solve the 

problems. I suggest the assigning of a more direct involvement and respo

Cabinet-level officials, granting more authority to the National Director, an

sunset provision. My “Task Force” approach is briefly outlined below.

After finding that “weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a grave threat 

and military forces, to our allies and to our vital national interests in many 

world” the Commission has, in my opinion, settled on an executive solution 

the necessary.

In essence the Commission has recommended heavy new responsibilitie

President, named a National Director for Combating Proliferation, and pro

official chair a Combating Proliferation Council consisting of what I consid

secretaries from each of the agencies of government involved. The Nation

assigned the duty of supporting the President and Vice President and wou

of Deputy Assistant to the President. However, the National Director woul

President and Vice President through the National Security Advisor!

What has been crafted, in my opinion, is another lower-level “working group

assistant to the National Security Advisor with an impressive title but who 

council consisting of officials from the many agencies involved. My conce

establishment will tend to give a “wink and nod” to such a council and con

quo.

If the problem is as critical and serious as the Commission has defined it 

demands the immediate priority attention of the top most officials at every 

government. At this juncture time is of every essence. Relegating the solu

where it principally now resides, in the National Security Council, is at best 

Inserting the National Director under the National Security Advisor is no b

demanded by the threat.

In my view the National Director must be an individual of national standing

respected by Cabinet secretaries, visible previously in this area, and with 

reputation for getting things accomplished. This individual should be prep

his or her full-time talents, at the request of the President, for a period of at 

to jump start this vital task. The President would not likely attract someon
170

qualifications I have suggested if that person would be requir

existing agency of government and/or not serve directly unde

President and Vice President.

The Commission has assigned significant new time-consumin

to the Vice President. I question whether the Commission ha

such assignments are realistic given the existing circumstanc

commission member, the next eighteen months are absolute

correcting our course in this area! We received testimony from 

cautioning against any significant new responsibilities for the 

already over-burdened important assignments. If one takes in

President will also be running for President for the next eighte

person might believe we may be expecting too much of the V

circumstances. If this is accurate then the Commission’s pen

Vice President be the “key” in carrying out our recommendatio

our efforts fail because of a fettered key official of our own ma

During our deliberations I have been impressed with the unde

by all the Cabinet secretaries and the key individuals and gro

direction. While we have always had the tendency to blame t

failures, I do not believe that to be the case with the less-than

weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the talent and strength 

obvious in this area. In this instance the bureaucracy represe

solve the problems. This does not mean that they are current

concentrated, marshaled, directed, or coordinated.

My impressions are that of all the WMD threats, we are bette

concert more with the nuclear threat. This is likely the case be

for half a century. The public and Congress are well aware of 

chemical and biological threat, with the latter apparently the g

for a catastrophic event by most experts to whom the question 

needed is better direction, coordination, and furtherance of a 

the chemical and biological areas.

I feel that the Commission’s recommendations tend to protec

Cabinet secretaries unnecessarily, thereby protecting the ind

thwarting cooperation, and complicating the best chance for a 

must given the seriousness of this threat. Our recommendati

authority of the National Director. It goes without saying that 

have the right to appeal any decision to the President. That is 

out in our report invites a weakened National Director wherea

need the most strength.
The following is a brief outline of my suggested “Task Force” alternative:

The members of the Task Force would consist of the following:

1. An Executive Board consisting of the President, the Vice President, an

Director, appointed by the President, who would devote exclusive full-time 

position and oversee all activities of the federal government in this area. T

Director would report directly to the President and Vice President.

2. The following “Principals” who would report directly to the Executive Di

matters affecting this nation’s defenses against weapons of mass destruc

a. The National Security Advisor

b. The Secretary of Defense

c. The Secretary of State

d. The Secretary of Energy

e. The Attorney General

f. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget

g. The Director of Central Intelligence

The seven “Principals” would be involved, under the guidance of the Direc

the mission. These “Principals” could appoint a high-level person in their d

work directly in their stead with the Director on a daily basis, but official po

individual “Principals” would be formally presented to the National Directo

Principals.

The Director would be required to hold at least monthly meetings with the E

and formalized meetings for planning, discussion and decision making at 

months with the full Task Force. These meetings of the entire Task Force w

by the President or the Vice President and require the attendance of the “

or their designees.

The Director would be authorized to employ not more than fifty employees 

out the duties of this office, but could accept additional temporary personn

governmental agencies.
172

Sunset Provision

The Task Force would be activated with the naming of the Ta

President, and would terminate 36 months thereafter unless 

Presidential order. After 36 months the Task Force could be e

additional months at a time by order of the President.
Additional Views of Margo D. B. Carlisle, Steven Cambone,31 Hen

William Schneider, Jr., and Henry Sokolski

The Commission's work has addressed a crucial issue of public policy an

security—the organization of the Federal government to combat the prolif

weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The threat pose

States by proliferation has intensified dramatically in recent years. A rece

review of the proliferation threat led by former Secretary of Defense Dona

observed that the threat has matured so rapidly, that the United States cou

to WMD attack in the near future “with little or no warning.”32 It is not surpr

so. The Commission has concluded that the efforts of the US governmen

proliferation today are neither effective nor command an appropriately hig

in the Executive branch of government.

The Commission's recommendations engage two broad areas of governm

organization. The first is the organization of government departments and 

perform their respective functions in combating proliferation. The perform

government agencies in the implementation of their mission to combat pr

uneven. The effectiveness of some agencies such as the Department of St

signs of improvement, while other agencies such as the Department of E

suffered a vertiginous decline. In the case of the Department of Energy, fu

changes in management of nuclear proliferation-related functions in the D

needed. We agree with the PFIAB's recommendation that an as an autono

formed either within the Department similar to the DOD's Advanced Rese

Agency, or as an independent non-cabinet agency similar to the former A

Commission. We prefer either of these suggestions to the Commission's 

reorganization under an assistant secretary. We agree that the performan

government departments and agencies is crucial to a successful governm

to combat proliferation. From a programmatic perspective, the ability of the 

combat proliferation will not necessarily be improved simply by applying a

resources to existing programs. However, we believe that the Commission's 

recommendations will enable departments and agencies to better employ 

resources, and effectively use additional resources if they become availab

to combat proliferation. Future administrations will benefit from the implem

these recommendations.

The second dimension of the Commission's recommendations concerns th

and leadership of the interagency process. The Commission's recommen

new position within the National Security Council staff to manage the inte

apparatus to combat proliferation. The official would be empowered with e

31 Nominated 32 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States: Execut

(Washington: GPO, 1998).
174

coordination authority to bring about an effective government

proliferation threat. The Commission recommends that a sub-c

parallels the cabinet-level policy management structure estab

Security Act of 1947. The Commission's proposal responds t

circumstances that have adversely affected the responsivenes

over several administrations to the proliferation threat—the dif

Presidential involvement, the growing urgency of the prolifera

increasing complexity for policy and programs of the prolifera

circumstances motivated the Commission to find a new solut

We endorse the Commission's proposed solution that can be 

Executive Order under the existing authority of the National S

administration should be free to organize as it sees fit, especia

danger posed by proliferation. For this reason we view the pr

this and succeeding administrations should consider seriousl

particular details of the proposed solution are the principles o

include the need for presidential leadership in establishing prio

cabinet officers, the identification of NSC-level responsibility, 

departmental organization with presidential priorities, and the 

government-wide effort to respond to the proliferation threat. 

Commission's observation that “Presidential leadership is ess

proliferation. No organization structure can overcome a lack 

The apparatus created a half century ago in the National Secu

extraordinarily effective, flexible, and robust instrument for ad

interest when committed leadership “at the top” is present.
Annex:

Organizational Overviews

Executive Office of the President

Introduction

This paper describes the role of the Executive Office of the President in U.S. proliferationrelated activities. It discusses the National Security Council (NSC), the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, the NSC staff, the NSC interagency committee

system, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, and the

Office of Science and Technology Policy.

National Security Council

The NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as part of a general post-war

reorganization of the U.S. national security apparatus. The function of the NSC, as outlined

in the National Security Act, is to advise the President on “the integration of domestic,

foreign and military policies relating to national security” so as to facilitate interagency

cooperation. At the President’s direction, the NSC may also “assess and appraise the

objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and

potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making

recommendations to the President.” It is intended to be, as President Clinton said in

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC-2, “the principal forum for consideration of

national security issues requiring presidential determination.” The National Security Act

and the PDD also make clear that the NSC and its subordinate committees perform a

strictly advisory function. Decision making on national security matters remains exclusively

with the President, as specified in the Constitution.

The statutory NSC members are the President, designated by law as chairman; the Vice

President; the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff is by law the principal military advisor to the NSC, and may, at the discretion

of the President, attend and participate in NSC meetings. A similar provision of the act

applies to the Director of Central Intelligence. In PDD/NSC-2, President Clinton invited the

Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to

the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic

Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President to attend all meetings of the NSC. The

Attorney General and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy attend

meetings pertaining to their jurisdiction.

PDD/NSC-1, signed by President Clinton on January 20, 1993, revised the framework

governing the flow of NSC work. It established a Presidential Review Directive (PRD)

series to direct that the departments and agencies undertake specific policy analyses. A
2

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) series was created to promulgate presidentia

decisions on national security matters. PRDs and PDDs are usually, though not alw

classified.

Notwithstanding the policy-making framework established by the National Security A

1947, as amended, contemporary presidents, including President Clinton, have pref

less formal means for receiving advice. The NSC rarely, if ever, meets as a corporate 

Instead, President Clinton consults his “foreign policy team,” an informal group who

membership varies according to the issues under discussion, but which generally pa

the NSC. The President began this practice several years ago, after receiving critici

the press and in Congress for lack of attention to national security affairs. For some 

the President met with his “foreign policy team” every two weeks. It is unclear with w

regularity the practice continues. This illustrates, however, one of the great strengths 

National Security Act, from a President’s perspective: it allows him to manage natio

security affairs according to his decision-making style, while providing a broad lega

framework for the process of policy development and implementation.

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Contrary to popular perception, the National Security Act of 1947 did not create the

position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. President Eisenh

established the position in 1953 with the appointment of Robert Cutler. Although the

precise title of the incumbent has varied, the position has come to be known as the

President’s National Security Advisor. Under Eisenhower, Cutler (and each of his th

successors) served as the principal executive officer of the NSC, setting the agenda

briefing the President, and supervising the staff. Based in part on the military staff sy

the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs facilitated the dec

making process, but had no substantive role and did not function as a policy advoca

The role of the National Security Advisor, like the NSC, has evolved considerably in 

ensuing years. To a great extent, it has been a function of the operating style of the

President, as well as the personality of the incumbent National Security Advisor. (S

Report of the President’s Special Review Board, February 26, 1987, p. II-2 and 3

discussion of the functions of the National Security Advisor.)

In the Clinton Administration, the National Security Advisor’s involvement in prolifera

related matters is similar to his role in other substantive areas. He is the “honest bro

for the NSC process, assuring that issues and options developed by the NSC Princ

Committee are clearly presented to the President and that all relevant views are accu

conveyed. He is a confidential and independent advisor to the President. He monito

implementation of the President’s national security policies. He develops policy initia

He keeps the President informed about foreign developments and activities both in

Congress and in the departments and agencies that affect the President’s national se
policies through a briefing scheduled, though not held, daily. (The Vice President also

attends these briefings when he is available.) He is frequently a spokesman for the

President on national security policy, including proliferation-related policy, as was the case

in Sandy Berger’s recent speech to the Carnegie International Conference on NonProliferation. Working through his two deputies and the NSC Executive Director, the

National Security Advisor also manages the NSC staff.

To exercise his responsibilities to the President, the National Security Advisor seeks to

maintain close working relations with the other members of the President’s national

security team. He meets regularly with the Secretaries of State and Defense in so-called

“ABC” (“Albright-Berger-Cohen”) breakfasts, and with the Director of Central Intelligence.

Issues related to proliferation, because they are an Administration priority, can be assumed

to be on the agenda of many of these meetings.

The National Security Advisor also plays an active role in meeting and communicating on

behalf of the President with his counterparts in foreign governments.

In short, the President’s National Security Advisor is deeply involved in the substance of

national security affairs. In a time when proliferation-related issues hold center stage, and

in an Administration in which proliferation-related policies are a high priority, the National

Security Advisor is directly and deeply engaged. At the same time, proliferation is but one

of many priority concerns that occupy him.

NSC Staff

The National Security Act of 1947 gave the NSC “a staff to be headed by a civilian

executive secretary” appointed by the President. The intent of Congress appears to have

been for the NSC staff to support the Council as a corporate body in its task of coordinating

national security issues. In practice, the NSC staff has come to serve and represent the

President, who instructs it through the National Security Advisor.

The NSC staff under President Clinton is composed of regional, functional, and support

directorates that are, in most cases, headed by a “Senior Director” who also holds the

protocol rank of “Special Assistant to the President.” Responsibility for proliferation-related

issues is shared, on the functional side, among the Senior Director for Non-Proliferation

and Export Controls, the Counselor (formerly Senior Director) for Defense Policy and Arms

Control, and several regional directors. The main regional directorates with proliferationrelated policy interests are Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia; Near East and South Asia; and

Asia.

The degree to which the Senior Directors affect policy depends on several factors:

• the salience of their issues for the President and the National Security

Advisor;
4

• the confidence that others in the White House appear to have in their

abilities;

• the degree to which they are perceived as “expert” or “activist,” or bot

• their skill in bureaucratic maneuver and negotiations; and

• their personal qualities, particularly in trust and discretion.

Although the National Security Advisor does project to the departments and agenci

sense of the extent to which White House direction may be imposed, the performan

individual NSC staff members often determines how successful the White House w

This is particularly true for cross-cutting issues such as proliferation because they

invariably involve a range of actors in both the White House and the departments a

agencies.

Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls. The Senior Director 

Non-Proliferation and Export Controls heads a staff of three professionals and two su

personnel.

• The current Senior Director, a career State Department official, serves 

non-reimbursable detail. Primarily because of his extensive backgrou

regional proliferation-related matters, he personally manages Middle 

South Asia, and Northeast Asia issues, as well as supervising his sta

three directors.

• One director, an agency detailee, oversees Russia and the New

Independent States, proliferation-related aspects of the Cooperative T

Reduction program, and security of fissile materials, technologies, an

expertise.

• A second director, the only NSC employee of the four professionals,

oversees chemical and biological weapons and missile issues, includin

Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons and Toxin

Convention, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australi

Group.

• The third director, a career employee detailed from the Department o

Commerce, follows conventional arms proliferation and export contro

including the nuclear regimes (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, t

Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Fissile Material Control Treaty, the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zon

treaties).
The current Senior Director, as with his predecessor, was promoted from within, having

served as a director in the office prior to the departure of his predecessor. The President’s

National Security Advisor makes the final determination on hiring Senior Directors.

The process for selecting directors is informal. The Senior Director “announces” a vacancy

to his proliferation colleagues in the departments and agencies. They, in turn, suggest

potential candidates to the Senior Director. The Senior Director interviews the candidates

and makes a recommendation to the Deputy National Security Advisor. The Deputy

interviews the Senior Director’s choice and, if he concurs, approves the recommendation.

NSC budget limitations require that directors be reimbursable detailees, so the Senior

Director recruits them from among career federal military and civilian professionals. This

has some advantages, as the positions require a detailed knowledge of the issues,

agencies, and persons involved in proliferation-related policy, and the pace of work does

not allow time for on-the-job training. Hence, career professionals tend to make the best fit.

The current Senior Director would like to have one additional director, preferably a Foreign

Service Officer with diplomatic negotiations experience, to handle regional proliferation

matters. He believes the addition of another director would free the Senior Director to

manage his staff more efficiently and assist more readily in crisis or urgent situations.

The Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls chairs the Interagency

Working Group in his functional area. However, this responsibility will soon be transferred

to the office of the new Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International

Security/Special Advisor to the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament. The transfer is a product of the internal Administration negotiations

concerning integration of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the

State Department. (See below.)

The Senior Director, who also chairs the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Oversight

Committee, responsible for implementation of the U.S.-Russia HEU Agreement, expects

to continue to chair a biweekly meeting of Intelligence Community proliferation analysts,

and department and agency proliferation specialists held via a secure video

teleconferencing system.

Counselor for Defense Policy and Arms Control. In the Bush Administration,

proliferation-related issues and export controls, plus defense policy and arms control, were

the province of a single senior director, who had one staff member to oversee proliferationrelated and export controls issues. The latter functional area was assigned to a separate

senior director in the Clinton Administration, reflecting the higher priority accorded

proliferation-related matters by the President. Some related issues, however, remained

with the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, recently renamed

“Counselor.” These include Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations, U.S. nuclear

posture, START treaty negotiations, ballistic missile defense policy, National and Theater
6

Missile Defense programs, and that portion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction pro

involving destruction of ballistic missiles. The Counselor shares with the Senior Dire

for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls responsibility for policy relating to nuclear

weapons free zones and the Conference on Disarmament.

The Counselor is also responsible for assembling the President’s annual report on 

National Security Strategy, required by an amendment to the National Security Act. 

report is the primary official statement of U.S. national security strategy and contain

significant section on proliferation. Typically, the proliferation section is drafted in the

Department of State, edited by the Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export

Controls, and coordinated widely throughout the executive branch.

Regional Senior Directors. As noted above, three regional Senior Directors—Rus

Ukraine, and Eurasia; the Near East and South Asia; and Asia—have major prolifer

and export control issues in their portfolios. Physical proximity of offices in the Old

Executive Office Building, secure telephone and e-mail connections, and frequent

participation in meetings on issues of common concern facilitate cooperation with th

Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls and with other interested 

staff members.

The Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia has, since the outset of the C

Administration, had a very close relationship with the Senior Director for Non-Prolife

and Export Controls. Indeed, negotiations concerning proliferation issues and expo

controls have been central to the U.S.-Russian relationship. The two senior director

their staffs are in constant contact on these issues and cooperate extensively. Toge

they also work closely with the Vice President’s national security affairs staff to ensur

the Vice President is well-prepared for meetings and conversations with Russian le

Proliferation concerns in Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan also require close coordinat

between the Senior Director for Near East and South Asia and the proliferation direct

After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, for example, the Senior Director for No

Proliferation and Export Controls took the lead on sanctions implementation and ex

control issues, while the regional Senior Director worked with the Deputy Secretary 

State on diplomatic responses.

Proliferation issues have been an important element of U.S.-China relations and at 

center of U.S.-North Korea relations, requiring that the Senior Director for Asia work

closely with the Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls. He estim

that they are in contact with each other at least three or four times each day. The Asia 

has a military officer on reimbursable detail who focuses closely on North Korea an

fact, has been a member of the State Department-led team negotiating with the No

Koreans. The Senior Director, a well-known expert on China, oversees Chinese iss
Although responsibility for proliferation-related matters is diffused among several

directorates, it appears to be only on the rarest occasions that the NSC regional

directorates do not coordinate relevant cables, meeting papers, correspondence, and

other memoranda with the Non-Proliferation and Export Controls staff. In general, the

evidence suggests the NSC staff works well as a team on proliferation-related issues.

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and CounterTerrorism. Originally the Senior Director for Global Affairs, with responsibility for diverse

issues ranging from the United Nations to international crime and counter-terrorism, this

office acquired responsibility for protection of critical infrastructure as a result of the

recommendations of the President’s Commission to study that subject. The National

Coordinator reports to the President through the National Security Advisor. The National

Coordinator’s role is detailed in PDD-63, an unclassified synopsis of which describes him

as overseeing preparation of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan involving

assessment of the vulnerability of infrastructure in critical sectors of the economy and

remedial planning. Among the threats to be considered is covert employment of weapons

of mass destruction against the United States.

National Coordinator on Nonproliferation Matters. In the National Defense

Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, Congress directed the President to designate a

“National Coordinator on Nonproliferation Matters” to serve under the direction of the NSC

and advise the President on “non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including

issues related to terrorism, arms control, and international organized crime.” The National

Coordinator was to chair a high-level, interagency NSC Committee on Proliferation with

broad responsibilities, including development of a comprehensive WMD preparedness

program (see below). The National Coordinator was also to ensure emphasis on,

coordination of, and cooperation in U.S. Government-funded proliferation-related research

efforts. Congress authorized $2,000,000 for this purpose, but did not appropriate the

funds.

There is no information in the public domain to indicate that the President complied with

this statute by naming a National Coordinator on Nonproliferation Matters. The National

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism does, however,

have some of the responsibilities identified for the Nonproliferation Coordinator, including

preventing acquisition and use of WMD or related materials or technologies by terrorist

and organized crime organizations, and WMD consequence management.

The Interagency Committee System

NSC Principals Committee. The NSC Principals Committee was established by

President Bush and continued with some modification by President Clinton in PDD/NSC2 as the senior interagency forum for the consideration of policy issues affecting national

security. The function of the Principals is to review, coordinate, and monitor the
8

development and implementation of national security policy. It is intended to be a fle

instrument, “a forum available to Cabinet-level officials to meet to discuss and resol

issues not requiring the President’s participation.”

The National Security Advisor chairs the Principals Committee. Its members include

• the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair)

• the Secretary of State (or Deputy Secretary)

• the Secretary of Defense (or Deputy Secretary)

• the U.S. Representative to the United Nations

• the Director of Central Intelligence

• the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

• the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy

• the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (adde

January 1997)

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and other heads of department

agencies are invited as needed. The Secretaries of Energy and Commerce, or their

Deputies, are routinely invited to Principals Committee meetings involving proliferat

related issues. As a result of the internal Administration negotiations concerning

reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, PDD/NSC-65 provides that the Unde

Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security/Senior Advisor to the

President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament is invited to attend

meetings concerning matters pertaining to arms control, proliferation, and disarmam

Other members of the White House staff, including the President’s Chief of Staff, th

Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Deputy Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, may also attend, depending on the agenda.

NSC Deputies Committee. The Deputies Committee, also established by PDD/NS

is the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affect

national security. The function of the Committee, according to PDD/NSC-2, is to rev

and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process and to focus attention on pol

implementation.

Members of the Deputies Committee include:

• the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (ch
• the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

• the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

• the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

• the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

• the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

• the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy

The chair of the Committee, in consultation with the State and Defense representatives,

may invite others to attend Deputies Committee meetings. In fact, the OMB Associate

Director for National Security and International Affairs and the Under Secretary of the

Treasury for International Affairs are invited to most Deputies Committee meetings.

Representatives of the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Commerce are routinely

invited to meetings involving proliferation-related matters. As in the case of the Principals

Committee, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security/

Senior Advisor to the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament is

invited to attend all Deputies Committee meetings concerning proliferation-related

matters.

The Deputies meet frequently, often two or three times per week, to address current

concerns. The President’s Deputy National Security Advisor calls Deputies Committee

meetings, determines the agenda, and ensures that papers are prepared and distributed.

Papers are normally drafted by the State Department in a format that lays out a range of

views and options. The NSC Senior Director with regional or functional responsibility for

the issue under consideration writes a separate paper for the chair. This paper provides

additional information to the chair concerning the positions of various departments and

agencies, suggests a sequence for orderly consideration of the issues, and identifies

preferred outcomes. When proliferation-related issues are taken up in the broader context

of regional or country-specific policy, the drafting task falls to the NSC regional office

involved. If the issue is exclusively proliferation-related, a rare instance, the Senior Director

for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls prepares the paper. In either case, the respective

senior directors coordinate closely.

Deputies Committee meetings produce a variety of results ranging from agreement on

policy options to send to the Principals, to agreement that issues do not rise to the level of

the Principals, to agreement to send issues to an interagency group for further work. By its

nature, the Deputies Committee focuses on immediate problems. While the Deputies have

occasionally met to consider long-term policy matters, such sessions are unusual. They

have frequently addressed proliferation-related issues, but there is little information in the

public domain concerning Deputies dealing with proliferation in a long term context.
10

NSC Interagency Working Groups. PDD/NSC-2 authorizes the Deputies to estab

system of Interagency Working Groups (IWGs), some permanent and others ad ho

While the PDD empowers the Deputies to determine the chairs of the IWGs, other f

intervened in the case of the NSC IWG on Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, th

principal interagency group for proliferation-related issues. As originally written, PD

NSC-2 stated that “[i]n general, foreign policy and defense issues should be chaired 

Assistant Secretary level by the Departments of State and Defense, respectively...a

intelligence, non-proliferation, arms control and crisis management by the NSC.”

(Emphasis added.) Thus, for the first six years of the Clinton Administration, the IWG 

been chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls.

As a result of the State Department reorganization that Congress mandated in the Fo

Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, however, the State Department will s

assume the chair of the non-proliferation IWG. PDD/NSC-65 changed the basic PD

provide that “[i]n general, foreign policy and non-proliferation issues should be chai

the Assistant Secretary level by the Department of State.” (Emphasis added.) Presum

the Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, a position established under the Unde

Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, will replace the NSC S

Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls as chair of the IWG, though the S

Director will remain an important member.

The change to the PDD regarding who chairs the Non-Proliferation and Arms Contro

resulted from lengthy negotiations over the integration of the independent foreign af

agencies—ACDA, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the U.S.

Information Agency (USIA)—into the State Department. (See “Reorganization Plan 

Report,” submitted by President Clinton to Congress on December 30, 1998, pursu

Section 1601 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as contain

P.L. 105-277.) In fact, possibly as a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding

reorganization, the IWG has been meeting less frequently and more informally than 

past. Nonetheless, the IWG maintains a structure of interagency sub-groups devote

specific issues, including plutonium disposition, chemical weapons, biological weap

and export controls. Presumably, the new IWG chair will appoint sub-group chairs, a

neither the reorganization plan nor the internal Administration negotiations appear to 

specified which agency will chair each sub-group.

PDD/NSC-13, which is classified, established and directed implementation of U.S. p

on proliferation and export controls, and it assigned responsibility for implementation 

President’s policy agenda to the IWG on Non-Proliferation and Export Controls.

A second NSC interagency group that deals with proliferation-related concerns is the 

on Defense Policy and Arms Control. This IWG, chaired by the NSC Counselor for De

Policy and Arms Control (a new title for the Senior Director), assists the Deputies o

matters relating to the defense budget, programs, and policy, nuclear arms control, 

conventional arms control. The IWG’s purview includes the Comprehensive Test Ba
Treaty negotiations, U.S. nuclear posture, START implementation, and ballistic missile

defense policy. Who would chair this IWG was also an issue in the negotiations

surrounding the integration of ACDA into the State Department. The NSC strongly

objected to handing the chair of the Defense Policy and Arms Control IWG to State

because of the clear interagency nature of the IWG, and the President decided to maintain

the status quo. As in the case of the IWG on Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, the

membership, functions, and activities of this IWG are delineated in a classified PDD.

A third interagency group of consequence for proliferation-related interests is the Critical

Infrastructure Coordination Group (CIGC), under the chair of the National Coordinator for

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. PDD-63 requires that

departments and agencies appoint to the CIGC a representative at the Assistant Secretary

level. Reporting to the Deputies, the Group is responsible for coordinating the

implementation of PDD-63 to protect the critical infrastructure of the United States from

intentional attack, including attack by weapons of mass destruction. NSC directors serve

on CIGC sub-groups working on the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threat

posed by non-state actors. The Office of Science and Technology Policy’s Associate

Director for National Security and International Affairs chairs the Research and

Development Sub-group.

In addition to these functional interagency groups, various regional interagency groups

focus on proliferation in the broader context of U.S. foreign relations. These groups

sometimes report directly to the Principals Committee, as in the case of the Policy Support

Group (PSG) on Russia and the NIS and the Interagency Working Group on South Asia,

both chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State. The Deputy Secretary formed and chaired

the former group when he was Coordinator of Russia/NIS programs in the State

Department and continued to chair the PSG when he moved on to become Deputy

Secretary. In the case of the South Asia IWG, the Deputy Secretary took the chair following

the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The informal group on North Korea,

chaired by the State Department Counselor, manages issues relating to that country,

including proliferation. The NSC Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls

and NSC Senior Directors for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia; Near East and South Asia

(NESA); and Asia, respectively, are represented on these groups. Additionally, the NSC

Senior Director for NESA and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs cochair an IWG on Iraq that meets almost daily via the secure video teleconferencing system

and weekly on a face-to-face basis.

Each of these regional interagency groups considers critical proliferation-related issues as

they are embedded in U.S. policy toward and relations with various regions and countries.

NSC Committee on Transnational Threats. The National Security Act was amended in

1996 (P.L. 104-293) to establish within the NSC a “Committee on Transnational Threats,”

chaired by the President’s National Security Advisor, and composed of the Director of

Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
12

General, and such other members as the President may designate. The function of 

Committee is to coordinate and direct the activities of the government to combat

“transnational threats,” which the statute defines as “any transnational activity (inclu

international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) 

threatens the national security.” (emphasis added) or any individual engaged in suc

activities.

In carrying out its function, the Committee is directed to:

• identify transnational threats, develop strategies to enable the United S

to respond to these threats, and monitor their implementation;

• assist in the resolution of operational and policy differences between

agencies in their responses to transnational threats;

• develop policies and procedures to ensure the effective sharing of

information about transnational threats among the departments and

agencies, including the Intelligence Community and law-enforcement

agencies; and

• develop guidelines to improve coordination between the Intelligence

Community and federal law-enforcement agencies outside the United

States with respect to these threats.

There is no information in the public domain to suggest that the Committee on

Transnational Threats has organized or met. The Committee’s function and membe

however, appear to parallel the broad authority given to the NSC Principals Commit

under PDD/NSC-2.

NSC Committee on Proliferation. The same Congress that established the NSC

Committee on Transnational Threats also established, but by different legislation (P.L

201), the NSC Committee on Proliferation. The Proliferation Committee has a simila

though more detailed, mandate with regard to proliferation matters, but there are so

differences between the two committees. The “National Coordinator for Nonprolifera

Matters,” established by the same legislation, chairs the Proliferation Committee, whi

President’s National Security Advisor chairs the Transnational Threats Committee. T

Proliferation Committee has a wider membership than the Transnational Threats

Committee (adding the Secretaries of the Treasury, Energy, and Commerce and the

Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency), and a sunset provisi

September 30, 1999. The NSC Proliferation Committee was to review and coordina

federal programs, policies, and directives relating to proliferation, “including matters

relating to terrorism and international organized crime,” and to recommend to the

President through the NSC:
• integrated national policies for countering WMD threats;

• options for integrating federal agency budgets for countering such threats;

• means to ensure that all levels of government have adequate capabilities to

manage crises involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or related

materials and technologies, and to manage the consequences of use of

these weapons or technologies, and that use of those response capabilities

is coordinated; and

• coordination of smuggling prevention, domestic law enforcement, antiorganized crime efforts, materials and technologies safeguarding,

intelligence and law- enforcement activities, and export controls regarding

proliferation.

The President, acting through the NSC Committee on Proliferation, was directed to

develop a comprehensive preparedness program, including plans for:

• countering proliferation of WMD and related materials and technologies;

• training and equipping federal, state, and local officials to manage a crisis

involving a use or threatened use of WMD, including consequence

management;

• providing regular sharing of information among intelligence,

law-enforcement, and customs agencies;

• training and equipping law-enforcement units, customs services, and border

security personnel to counter smuggling of WMD and related materials and

technologies;

• establishing export controls relating to WMD;

• encouraging and assisting foreign governments to implement and enforce

anti-WMD smuggling laws;

• developing confidence building measures with Russia concerning controls

over nuclear weapons and fissile materials, including verification of

dismantlement of nuclear weapons;

• reducing the U.S. and Russian stockpiles of excess plutonium; and

• studying the establishment of a global network to detect and respond to

terrorist or other criminal use of biological agents.
14

Finally, the law required the President to report to Congress in his fiscal year (FY) 1

budget on his specific plans for the comprehensive preparedness program, with bud

estimates by department and agency for FY 1998 and the following five years.

As with the NSC Transnational Threats Committee, there is no information in the pu

domain to suggest that the NSC formed the Proliferation Committee, but it could be a

that the NSC Principals Committee performs the same function.

Office of the Vice President

The Vice President’s responsibility in U.S. proliferation-related activities is rooted in 

statutory membership on the National Security Council, but his role derives from the

solicitation of his advice by the President and the specific tasking on national secur

matters given him by the President. The Vice President’s facility as an advisor on na

security affairs, including combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destructio

obviously depends on his personal chemistry with the President, as well as his own

background, diplomatic skills, and experience in these matters. From the outset of t

Clinton Administration, the President expressed confidence in the Vice President’s fo

policy knowledge and abilities, relied on him regularly for advice on key issues, and

assigned him broad responsibilities and specific tasks, which included proliferation-re

problems.

The Vice President’s national security affairs staff is composed of a National Secur

Advisor, who is appointed by the Vice President and occupies a White House perso

position; a Deputy National Security Advisor, also appointed by the Vice President a

detailed from a department or agency; six substantive specialists; and six support

personnel, also detailed from departments and agencies. Each substantive special

manages a portfolio of regional and functional issues, roughly paralleling the NSC s

director structure. Thus, the substantive specialist responsible for proliferation and e

control issues may also cover other functional areas, such as Defense Policy and A

Control, and possibly a region as well. Given its extremely small size and the breadth 

responsibilities, the Vice President’s national security affairs staff must work very cl

with the NSC staff.

The Vice President and his national security affairs staff become involved in U.S.

proliferation-related activities through (1) the Vice President’s function of advising th

President on national security issues, either informally or as a member of the Presid

foreign policy team, and his participation in the President’s White House meetings w

visiting foreign leaders, (2) the Vice President’s own meetings and conversations w

senior foreign government officials, both in Washington and on official travel abroad

the binational commissions authorized by the President and co-chaired by the Vice
President with the Prime Minister of Russia, the President of Ukraine, the President of

Kazakhstan, and the Deputy President of South Africa, and (4) the National Security

Advisor’s membership on both the NSC Principals Committee and Deputies Committee.

Advising the President. The Vice President directly advises the President on national

security affairs by several means. From the beginning of the Clinton Administration, the

Vice President has scheduled a private lunch with the President each week. The Vice

President’s agenda for this lunch is developed by his Chief of Staff, with inputs from the

senior staff, and may include matters related to proliferation if the National Security Advisor

determines that such matters are timely and important. As indicated above, the Vice

President attends the President’s daily intelligence and national security briefings in the

Oval Office. He also attends the President’s irregular meetings with his foreign policy team,

at which proliferation-related issues are often discussed. The Vice President also

participates in the President’s meetings with foreign leaders in the White House, where,

depending on the relevance to the particular visitor, proliferation-related matters are

sometimes on the agenda. The Vice President reviews all Principals Committee and other

decision memoranda on national security matters, and his views are incorporated and

specified in the recommendations to the President. Additionally, the Vice President sees

in advance, and often comments on, most presidential speeches and statements relating

to national security affairs, including those in which proliferation is an issue.

Meeting with Foreign Officials. Vice President Al Gore has maintained an exceptionally

active calendar of meetings with senior foreign officials, both in Washington and on official

visits to foreign capitals. As a consequence of his interest and experience, he has been

asked by the President through his National Security Advisor to raise proliferation-related

issues with a diverse group of foreign government officials, political leaders, and heads of

state and government. He has developed close, personal relationships with several foreign

leaders with whom he remains in contact via cables, telephone calls, and personal

meetings.

A prominent, and public, example of the Vice President’s role in proliferation-related

matters was his acceptance of the task of addressing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) Extension Conference in New York in May 1995. As a result of his personal relations

with some of the key foreign officials involved in the NPT conference, the Vice President

played an important part in developing and implementing the U.S. strategy that produced

a successful outcome.

Working through Binational Commissions. During their first summit in Vancouver in

April 1993, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin discussed a variety of

economic and security issues, including proliferation matters. Among the agreements

reached at Vancouver was a plan to set up working groups involving high-level officials of

both governments with broad authority in the areas of economic and scientific and

technical cooperation. As part of this effort to stimulate close consultations between their

respective governments, the two presidents agreed to establish a binational commission
16

to enhance cooperation in the areas of energy and space, and to designate Vice Pres

Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as co-chairs. Over the ensuin

years, the Gore-Chernomyrdin [now the Gore-Stepashin] Commission, officially the 

Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, broadene

perspective and became the principal means for conducting U.S.-Russian relations b

the presidential level.

The binational commission represented a new model for the conduct of foreign rela

bringing the Vice President and other Cabinet members into direct, regular contact 

their foreign counterparts on matters of significant substance. As the Gore-Chernom

Commission matured, its success led President Clinton to recommend this approac

South African President Nelson Mandela as a means to focus U.S. efforts to assist 

transition of South Africa from apartheid to democracy. Mandela agreed, and Vice

President Gore worked with South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki to establis

U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission.

Subsequently, the presidents of both Kazakstan and Ukraine sought binational

commissions co-chaired by the Vice President and themselves to assist in their nat

transitions. With slight modifications to the original model, these commissions are a

operating. Demonstrating the breadth of proliferation-related concerns within the

international community, the Vice President has discussed particular proliferation-re

issues with each of the governments with which the United States has established a

binational commission.

Gore-Chernomyrdin [now Stepashin] Commission. While each of the binationa

commissions represents a forum for the discussion and implementation of proliferat

related policy, the Gore-Chernomyrdin [now Stepashin] Commission has presented 

best and most frequent opportunity. The Commission is composed of eight committ

each co-chaired by U.S. and Russian Cabinet members or, in the case of Defense

Conversion, their deputies (committees having interest in proliferation-related matte

italics):

Committees Working Groups

Agribusiness Capital Markets Forum

Business Development Environmental Working Group

Defense Conversion

Energy Policy

Environment

Health

Science and Technology

Space
A small secretariat guides the day-to-day work of the commission and serves as a

communications channel for the Vice President and the Prime Minister. The three U.S.

members of the secretariat are the Vice President’s National Security Advisor; the NSC

Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs; and the Special Advisor to the

Secretary of State for the New Independent States. The Commission functions as a

coordinating body to establish a framework for cooperation, and the instruments of that

cooperation are the bilateral committees.

Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin held the first commission meeting

with the respective committee chairs in Washington in September 1993. The Vice

President and the Prime Minister made several decisions with significance both for the

durability of the commission and for the ability of the principals to take up sensitive security

issues such as proliferation.

• They determined that the committees making up the commission should be

interagency in nature, meet regularly at the call of their co-chairs, and set

their own work plans. (The role of the U.S. committee co-chair was

enhanced by his or her authority over funding specific programs with

moneys appropriated to his or her department.)

• They agreed to meet in plenary session, that is, with all the committee chairs

in attendance, twice each year, alternating between Washington and

Moscow. This established the principle that the work of the committees

would be subject to regular and intensive review by the Vice President and

the Prime Minister.

• They agreed that the two leaders would meet together privately, with one

note-taker on each side, on the eve of each semi-annual commission

session to resolve any outstanding issues related to the commission’s work

and to discuss sensitive issues not appropriate to the commission setting.

(This practice became known as the one-on-one meeting, for which a

separate agenda, called the off-line agenda, was developed.) The one-onone meetings facilitated discussion of the most sensitive matters in U.S.-

Russian relations.

• Finally, they agreed that they would meet with the president of the host

country at the conclusion of each commission session to report on their

accomplishments and discuss other matters that their respective presidents

might wish to raise. By regularizing joint meetings with the president of the

country hosting each commission meeting, they became a key

communications link between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.
18

As has been true from the beginning, Congress appropriates no funds to the Comm

itself. The committees pursue their agendas and develop programs with funds

appropriated to the U.S. departments and agencies for the specific purposes of ass

Russia and conducting international activities.

On the U.S. side, the evolution of the Commission strongly reinforced the importanc

sustaining interagency representation on the various committees. As the U.S. side

demonstrated the benefits of interagency consultation and cooperation, the U.S.

committee chairs noted a growing interest among the highly “stovepiped” Russian

ministries to work together. Still, the general reluctance of one Russian ministry to a

the participation of another in its area of responsibility remained a problem for the

Commission, and was clearly evident in discussion of some matters related to prolife

The one-on-one meeting has also evolved in several ways.

• First, and most important, the success of the Vice President and the P

Minister in developing an effective working relationship led Presidents

Clinton and Yeltsin to add new and increasingly difficult issues to the 

Chernomyrdin agenda. By resolving the question of the Russian sale 

missile technology to India at their first one-on-one meeting in Septem

1993, for example, the Vice President and the Prime Minister demonst

that they could take on and solve thorny problems related to prolifera

But they also found it necessary to devote more time to one-on-one

meetings, with the unintended consequence of appearing to diminish 

importance of the committees’ work.

• Second, as the complexity of the issues given to Gore and Chernomy

grew, they decided on occasion to add selected experts to their priva

discussions, thus sometimes altering their one-on-one character but

expanding the degree of expertise brought to bear on a given problem

has happened most frequently for the discussion of macroeconomic

questions, but sometimes occurs for discussions of security matters

involving highly technical details.

• Third, the two presidents, recognizing the effectiveness of the GoreChernomyrdin process, soon began tasking the Vice President and th

Prime Minister to prepare the agenda for Clinton-Yeltsin summit mee

On several occasions this required Gore and Chernomyrdin to meet ou

the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission setting in order to coordinate th

discussions with the timing of presidential summits. It also focused the 

President and the Prime Minister ever more closely on security issues

as Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran.
U.S.-Russia Proliferation Issues in the Gore-Chernomyrdin [now Stepashin]

Commission. Proliferation issues have played a central role in U.S.-Russian relations

from the outset of the Clinton Administration and, consequently, in the evolution of the

Gore-Chernomyrdin [now Stepashin] Commission. In fact, the dispute over proposed

Russian transfer of missile technology to India in June 1993 caused the postponement of

Chernomyrdin’s initial visit to Washington to launch the new commission. The subsequent

resolution of this problem through granting Russian access to the U.S. satellite launch

market and participation in the international space station demonstrated both the

interrelationship of proliferation concerns with other bilateral issues and the value of the

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission as a conduit for high-level negotiations on sensitive

matters. As a result, proliferation issues became a staple of the Gore-Chernomyrdin

agenda for the next five years.

Both the Defense Conversion and the Energy Policy Committees have dealt with

proliferation issues.

• Initially focused on the conversion of Russian military industries to civilian

purposes, the Defense Conversion Committee became involved in

numerous issues related to proliferation through the Department of

Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which seeks to achieve

the accelerated and safe reduction of nuclear materials and chemical and

nuclear weapons, and to enhance the safety and security of remaining

nuclear weapons and materials. Defense Conversion Committee activities

have included the transparency project at the Mayak Fissile Material

Storage Facility (for the storage of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear

weapons) and the core conversion project related to weapons-grade

plutonium-producing reactors.

• Virtually from its inception, the Energy Policy Committee zeroed in on the

control, accountability, and protection of nuclear materials in Russia as a

priority issue. This work covered a significant number of Russian facilities.

As indicated above, proliferation issues have figured prominently in the one-on-one

meetings. In each case the Vice President has pursued discussions with his Russian

counterpart intended to implement policy decisions taken by the President. The NSC

Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, as well as colleagues at State,

Defense, Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), participate actively in the

development of the Vice President’s background papers and talking points, and participate

in briefing the Vice President on proliferation issues prior to the one-on-one meetings.

Most of these discussions remain classified, in keeping with the private character of the

meetings. The Vice President, however, has frequently alluded to his discussion of

proliferation matters with the Prime Minister at press conferences following commission

meetings. At the press conference following the 10th Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission
20

meeting in March 1998, for example, the Vice President acknowledged that they had t

about Russian transfer of missile equipment, technology, and expertise to Iran. Gene

no bilateral issue concerning proliferation escaped the attention of the two principals

several of the most daunting issues owe their resolution in whole or in part to the five

dialogue between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. The exte

which the Vice President and Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin can make further pro

on proliferation-related matters remains to be seen.

Participating in NSC Principals and Deputies Committees. In PDD/NSC-2 Pres

Clinton extended membership on the NSC Deputies Committee to the Vice Preside

National Security Advisor. Although he also attended the Principals Committee mee

as an observer, the Vice President’s National Security Advisor did not become a me

of that body until the beginning of the second term in January 1997. (The Vice Presid

Deputy National Security Advisor attends Principals and Deputies Committee meetin

the absence of the National Security Advisor.)

By virtue of his membership on both NSC committees, the National Security Advisor 

an active role in all policy deliberations concerning the proliferation of weapons of m

destruction and missile delivery systems. As indicated above, these issues compris

significant and important part of the Administration’s national security agenda.

Consequently, the National Security Advisor has been involved in regional proliferat

problems in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, 

Iraq, as well as broader issues such as extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation T

the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons and Toxin Conven

Unlike other members of these committees, however, the Vice President’s National

Security Advisor has no departmental or agency interest to represent. This has allo

him, on occasion, to play a neutral, considered role in the discussions and, as a resu

President’s National Security Advisor sometimes utilizes his vice presidential counte

to forge consensus.

Membership on the NSC Principals and Deputies Committees also assured that the 

President’s National Security Advisor would be thoroughly familiar with key issues a

thus better able to ensure that U.S. participation in the binational commissions wou

based on implementing rather than making policy.

By practice, the National Security Advisor briefs the Vice President on key issues b

discussed by the Principals and the Deputies.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

OMB’s primary mission is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of th

federal budget and to supervise its administration in executive branch agencies. OM

responsible to the President for evaluating the effectiveness of agency programs, po
and procedures; assessing competing funding demands among agencies; and setting

funding priorities. In national security matters this is normally a consultative process

involving the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and the National Security

Council staff. OMB also ensures that agency reports, rules, testimony, and proposed

legislation are consistent with the President’s budget and with Administration policies by

acting as a clearinghouse for review of these items within the Executive Office of the

President.

Proliferation-related budget issues are primarily the domain of the Principal Associate

Director (PAD) for National Security and International Affairs. The PAD’s staff of

approximately 55 is divided into two divisions: National Security and International Affairs.

The Deputy Associate Director (DAD) for National Security manages the Department of

Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community budgets through three branches: Command,

Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I); Force Structure and

Investment; and Operations and Maintenance. The DAD for International Affairs has two

branches: Economic Affairs and State-USIA.

OMB Program Examiners review proliferation-related programs and budget submissions

in the broader context of departmental and agency programs and budgets. This facilitates

cross-cutting analysis, that is, analysis of issues that cross departmental and agency lines,

in the proliferation area.

For example, the Intelligence Community budget is mission-based, with proliferation being

one “bucket.” The contents of the proliferation bucket are culled from National Foreign

Intelligence Program elements and projects and subjected to some analysis through the

program review process. The C4I branch analyst responsible for the CIA and General

Defense Intelligence Program accounts also has functional responsibility for overseeing

Intelligence Community proliferation programs. OMB seeks to influence decisions on

Intelligence Community proliferation programs through direct participation in Intelligence

Program Review Group budget reviews and its own budget hearings. The objective of

OMB’s analysis is to array resources, focus attention on programs, eliminate unnecessary

duplication, and establish priorities. It is, however, necessarily limited by the small size of

the OMB staff and the nature of the review process. OMB is most effective in performing

diagnostics, focusing attention on issues in existing programs, and encouraging others to

examine problems more closely.

OMB has significantly less influence on DoD proliferation programs. OMB staff is invited to

the DoD Program Review Group, but is not represented at the table. The OMB staff is not

confident that DoD considers proliferation to be a core mission area.

While OMB has made strides in focusing at the PAD level on proliferation as a cross-cutting

issue, the Director of OMB had not typically reviewed proliferation in that format. Last year,

however, in a departure from OMB’s traditional agency focus, the Director’s Review—a

formal presentation of program issues requiring the OMB Director’s attention—included
22

two cross-cutting issue sets in the National Security and International Affairs area. T

first, Counter-narcotics, had been presented to the Director in previous years, but th

second, Transnational Issues, including proliferation, terrorism, continuity of govern

protection of critical infrastructure, and international crime, was presented in the Dire

Review for the first time.

Participation in the Interagency Policy Process. The OMB leadership participate

the national security policy-making process through membership on key NSC commi

The Director of OMB is a member of the NSC Principals Committee and the Deputy

Director sits on the Deputies Committee (although in the Clinton Administration the D

Director is usually represented by the PAD for National Security and International Af

The PAD or his designee is a member of the Interagency Working Group on NonProliferation and Export Controls, and OMB representatives often attend IWG sub-g

meetings. The PAD is sometimes invited to informal White House discussions on

proliferation issues.

The PAD formerly chaired an informal group, unofficially termed the EXOP (for Exec

Office of the President), made up of representatives of White House offices and cha

with making recommendations on the Function 150 (Foreign Operations) account. T

account contains all U.S. bilateral and multilateral foreign economic and military

assistance, including funding the U.S. contribution to the Korean Peninsula Econom

Development Organization (KEDO), which is a critical element in the Administration’s 

to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program. This matter is of such importan

however, that it is almost certainly managed in the Deputies Committee.

Many program functions in the proliferation area are dispersed as, for example, the

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in Russia which involves the Departm

of State, Defense, and Energy. OMB participates in the informal Office of the Vice

President-led interagency review of resources for CTR to ensure that the emergent

strategy is within budget constraints. Other proliferation issues, like the problem of K

funding, reflect disagreements within the Administration over the source of funds fo

specific programs.

While OMB plays a significant role in the overall process of balancing competing inte

Director Jack Lew emphasized that his relationship with policy makers is personal, 

institutional. He noted that OMB does not have sufficient staff depth to engage on

substantive issues.

Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

The mission of OSTP is to provide expert, timely advice to the President in all areas 

science and technology and to coordinate federal science and technology investmen

Office is headed by a Director who is appointed by the President and confirmed by 
Senate, and who is also dual-hatted as the President’s Science Advisor. The extent of

OSTP’s engagement in proliferation matters depends in large measure on the interest and

commitment of the individual in this position.

OSTP’s proliferation-related activities are conducted in the National Security and

International Affairs (NSIA) Division. The Division is headed by an Associate Director who

is subject to Senate confirmation and is dual-hatted as Senior Director for Science and

Technology (S&T) on the National Security Council staff. The NSIA Division develops and

supports science and technology policy in national security, the commerce-security nexus,

and international affairs. The Division’s National Security staff consists of four persons, all

of whom hold advanced degrees in science or technology. The previous Associate

Director, herself a Ph.D. in biochemistry and biophysics, estimated that 25 percent of that

group’s work was devoted to proliferation-related issues.

Participation in the Interagency Policy Process. As a consequence of its policy focus

and significant scientific and technical expertise, yet small staff, OSTP’s involvement in

proliferation matters occurs primarily through participation in interagency activities.

The Associate Director is a member of the IWG on Non-Proliferation and Export Controls,

through which OSTP has been involved in Administration efforts to arrange the disposition

of Russian excess weapons-grade plutonium, to facilitate a domestic consensus and the

implementation of a strategy for the disposition of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium, and to

monitor implementation of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) purchase agreement and

the blend down of U.S. HEU. The Associate Director formerly co-chaired, with an NSC

Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, the IWG’s sub-group on Plutonium

Disposition. OSTP remains an active member of this group. (OSTP also co-chairs with the

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition

Joint Steering Committee to oversee R&D cooperation in this area.) OSTP participates in

other sub-groups of the IWG on Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, including the SubGroup on Biological Weapons and the Sub-Group on Chemical Weapons.

The Associate Director, in her role as NSC Senior Director for S&T, chairs the Research

and Development (R&D) Sub-Group of the WMD Protection, Consequence Management

and Preparedness Panel established under PDD-62. This group examines how best to

deploy U.S. scientific and technical capabilities to prevent, detect, mitigate against,

respond to, and/or recover from terrorist attack, with special attention to possible terrorist

use of chemical and biological weapons.

In the area of ballistic missile proliferation, OSTP is working with CIA experts to understand

the major technological hurdles to the development of ICBMs and, in particular, the added

difficulty of developing ICBMs, as compared to shorter range missiles. Also, in the wake of

the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon tests, OSTP is leading an interagency effort to

evaluate and recommend policy with respect to on-going collaborations with these

countries.
24

OSTP acts as the Executive Secretariat for the National Science and Technology Co

(NSTC) established by President Clinton by Executive Order 12882 on November 2

1993, to coordinate R&D policies and activities across federal agencies. The Presid

chairs the NSTC, and its 25 members include the Vice President, the President’s Sc

Advisor, the President’s National Security Advisor, the Director of OMB, the Directo

Central Intelligence, Cabinet secretaries, and agency heads. The NSTC Committee 

National Security is responsible for efforts to increase the overall effectiveness and

productivity of federal national security R&D efforts. This Committee has an IWG on 

Proliferation and Arms Control technology, but there is little evidence of any signific

activity. An Ad Hoc Working Group of the NSTC Emerging Infectious Diseases Task F

chaired by OSTP, is assessing the costs and benefits of a domestic and internation

system of surveillance for terrorist or other criminal use of biological weapons, as

mandated by the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997.

President Clinton also established the President’s Committee of Advisors on Scienc

Technology (PCAST) by Executive Order 12882 in November 1993 to advise him “o

issues involving science and technology and their roles in achieving national goals an

assist the...NSTC in securing private sector participation its activities.” The Presiden

appoints the 19 PCAST members who, with the exception of the President’s Scienc

Advisor, come from outside government. The Science Advisor co-chairs the commi

with a private sector member selected by the President. PCAST is intended to bring 

private sector perspective to the S&T policy making process.

PCAST established a panel on U.S.-Russian Cooperation to Protect, Control, and Ac

for Weapons-Useable Nuclear Materials, which reported to the President, the Vice

President, and President’s National Security Advisor on May 1, 1995. The panel’s

recommendations formed the basis for subsequent work on fissile materials cooper

for President Clinton’s summit meeting with President Yeltsin.

On issues with a high degree of focus on science and technology, OSTP takes the

initiative. But proliferation matters do not often center exclusively on science and

technology concerns, and OSTP personnel do not sense that their participation is

automatic in proliferation-related policy events. The NSIA Division depends heavily 

being invited to attend policy-related meetings convened by others and being asked 

review papers on proliferation-related policy issues. The extent to which the invitation

forthcoming seems to be a function of the NSIA staff’s skill in learning what issues t

NSC, State, Defense, and Energy are pursuing. The Associate Director’s dual-hatte

status makes possible attendance at the National Security Advisor’s twice-weekly N

staff meetings, a valuable means of staying abreast of NSC activities. OSTP, howev

often finds itself “playing catch up” to remain involved on proliferation-related issues
Department of State

The Non-proliferation Mission

The primary contribution of the Department of State (State) to combating proliferation is its

participation in diplomatic activities as well as in interagency, congressional, public

education, and other processes. As illustrated below, State acts on a broad range of fronts

to constrain the nations that already possess weapons of mass destruction and prevent

other states or groups from acquiring them.

State Organization on Proliferation-related Activities

The Department of State’s organizational structure with respect to proliferation has

undergone change as a result of the integration of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency (ACDA) into the Department of State on April 1, 1999. Integration of ACDA and

State was mandated by the Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998,

Subdivision A, Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as contained in

Division G of Public Law 105-277. ACDA’s mission was to strengthen national security by

formulating, advocating, negotiating, implementing, and verifying effective arms control,

non-proliferation, and disarmament policies, strategies, and agreements. ACDA’s four

bureaus focusing on issues of arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament were:

intelligence, verification, and information management; multilateral affairs; nonproliferation and regional arms control; and strategic and Eurasian affairs. The ACDA

Director functioned as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor,

and the Secretary of State on arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament matters.

All of the authorities ACDA had in the area of proliferation were transferred to the State

Department in accordance with the legislation mandating the reorganization.

The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs provides

policy oversight of and coordinates arms control, proliferation, and security assistance

policy for State. Prior to the merging of ACDA and State, the Bureau of Political-Military

Affairs (PM) was responsible for formulating and implementing policies on national security

issues such as the proliferation of WMD and missile technology, nuclear and conventional

arms control, arms export controls, and regional security assistance programs and

initiatives. PM also was State’s primary liaison with the Department of Defense on security

assistance issues and on the implications of U.S. foreign policy.

Upon the merging of ACDA and State, the five previous bureaus of ACDA and State (four

in ACDA plus PM) were reduced to three, all under the policy oversight of the Under

Secretary. In addition, an office reporting directly to the Under Secretary advises on

verification and compliance issues.
26

A new Bureau of Nonproliferation (NP) has been created from the ACDA/State mer

This bureau is now responsible for many of the duties previously carried out by PM

bureau has two Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DAS). The DAS for Regional

Nonproliferation is supported by the Office of Policy Coordination, Office of Regiona

Affairs, Office of Nonproliferation Threat Reduction, and the Senior Coordinator for Nu

Safety. The DAS for Nonproliferation Controls is supported by the Office of Nuclear E

Affairs, Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation, and Office of Ex

Controls and Conventional Arms Nonproliferation Policy. Also within this Bureau is t

Office for the Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund, as well as the Office of IAEA/NP

Affairs that reports directly to a special representative for nuclear non-proliferation.

The Nonproliferation Bureau is responsible for nuclear non-proliferation, e.g., suppo

the International Atomic Energy Agency, implementing the Nuclear Non-Proliferatio

Treaty, securing nuclear materials, advancing civil nuclear cooperation under safe a

sound conditions, and promoting effective protection, control, and accounting of nuc

material worldwide. It presses for non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapon

missiles, and promotes restraint in transfers of conventional arms. The Bureau also

pursues regional and bilateral initiatives designed to reduce proliferation pressures 

destabilizing arms acquisitions.

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund (NDF), also part of the Nonproliferation

Bureau, supplements U.S. diplomatic efforts to halt the spread of WMD; limit the spre

weapons, their delivery systems and related technology; and enable the dismantling 

existing weapons and their means of delivery. The fund was established pursuant to

section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act, which was enacted on October 24, 1992

fund currently has projects underway in over 30 countries. Projects have included

procurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU), destruction of missiles, procuremen

nuclear safeguards and detection equipment, support for UNSCOM, and the develop

of automated export control systems for foreign governments. NDF has received $8

million in funding since its inception in 1994. It has been funded at a level of $15 milli

fiscal year 1997, fiscal year 1998, and fiscal year 1999. The Under Secretary for Ar

Control and International Security gives final approval to all proposed NDF projects

The second bureau under the policy oversight of the Under Secretary is the Bureau 

Arms Control. This bureau leads efforts to negotiate new agreements, primarily the 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) and other future strategic arms contro

agreements, and negotiating efforts in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) such 

cutoff of fissile material production and anti-personnel land mines. It has an importan

of implementing a large number of existing agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic M

(ABM) Treaty, the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and S

II), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons and To

Convention (BWC), and of preparing to implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Tre
(CTBT). The Verification and Compliance Staff within the Bureau contributes primarily to

ongoing negotiation, technology policy coordination, policy analysis, arms control efforts

relative to critical infrastructure protection, and interagency implementation efforts.

The third bureau under the policy oversight of the Under Secretary is the Bureau of

Political-Military Affairs. This bureau supports the Secretary and the Under Secretary in

playing a large role in security and defense policy. It provides analytic support for the

Secretary and the Under Secretary on defense-related foreign policy issues, contributes

to the coordination of peacekeeping and other military operations, is responsible for a

cluster of issues involving arms transfers, defense trade controls, and political-military and

defense cooperation in critical infrastructure protection, and also supports the Under

Secretary in coordinating security assistance.

A scientific and policy Advisory Board on arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament

reports to the Secretary of State through the Under Secretary, who maintains an

operational authority over the Board, including designation of members and staff. In

addition, special representatives and envoys that previously reported to the ACDA Director

are now supported by their relevant DAS and report to that DAS and the Under Secretary.

Finally, the new Bureau of East European and Eurasian Affairs manages U.S. relations

with countries that became independent after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The

Bureau ensures the effective utilization of public diplomacy, assistance, and conflict

resolution efforts in pursuit of U.S. policy, and works to ensure effective coordination with

the new arms control and proliferation-related entities.

New Role for the Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security.

Presidential Decision Directive 65, dated June 23, 1998, amends Presidential Decision

Directive/NSC-2, dated January 20, 1993, specifying that the Under Secretary of State for

Arms Control and International Security Affairs/Senior Advisor to the President and the

Secretary of State for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament shall, at the

discretion of the President, (1) be invited to attend all NSC meetings concerning matters

pertaining to arms control, proliferation, or disarmament and (2) be invited to attend all

NSC/PC and DC meeting concerning the same issues. It also provides that foreign policy

and proliferation-related issues should be chaired at the Assistant Secretary level by the

Department of State.

The Under Secretary serves as a Senior Advisor to the President and Secretary of State

on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. The Under Secretary is authorized to

communicate to the President through the Secretary of State and participate, at the

direction of the President, in meetings of the National Security Council and its subordinate

groups.
28

The Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States of th

Former Soviet Union.

Within the Department of State structure is the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the 

Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. This position has been establ

in accordance with Section 102 of the FREEDOM Support Act. The mandate of the

Coordinator is to “assure maximum coordination of efforts within the executive bran

promote reform and policies in the NIS. The Coordinator presides over the allocatio

U.S. assistance resources, directs and coordinates the interagency process on

development, funding and implementation of all bilateral assistance, trade, and inves

programs related to the NIS. These programs include: trade and investment, busines

economic development, training and exchange, criminal justice, energy and

environmental, social sector and humanitarian, and security. The Coordinator is the

chairman of the interagency NIS Assistance Coordination Group and is also a mem

the Policy Steering Group for the NIS to ensure that U.S. assistance and related act

are consistent with and support broader foreign policy objectives. The Coordinator 

mandated to work with U.S. Ambassadors to the NIS to strengthen coordination

mechanisms in the field and increase the effectiveness of our assistance and expor

investment programs on the ground. The Coordinator reports to the Secretary of St

The Role of the Department of State in International Proliferation-relate

Efforts

The Department of State is the lead for the conduct of diplomacy and representation 

U.S. overseas, and the advocate of U.S. policies for foreign governments and interna

institutions. As such, State interacts extensively with foreign governments and multil

organizations on non-proliferation issues. These efforts include, but are not limited t

leading U.S. delegations in numerous multilateral bodies and negotiations, including

international proliferation-related treaty negotiations, export control regimes such as 

Australia Group and the Nuclear Supplier Group, and in many G-8 and NATO prolife

related discussions.

The Department holds regular bilateral proliferation-related talks, in Washington an

capitals, with the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia and the European Union, during w

the full range of proliferation-related concerns are discussed and joint courses of actio

identified. State often writes instructions to U.S embassies to deliver messages to h

governments that may address such issues as halting an export to a country of con

or seeking coordination of public reaction to the South Asian nuclear tests. In the U

Nations Security Council, State coordinates efforts to consult both in New York and 

capitals on issues of proliferation concern.
The Science Centers are established under multilateral agreements, funded by various

governments, and have a number of mechanisms for coordination between governments.

The main goal of the Science Centers is to provide peaceful research opportunities to

qualified NIS scientists and engineers who are experts in WMD and their delivery systems.

The Science Centers process direct, tax-free payments of grants to participating NIS

scientists and have access to project facilities for international auditing and technical

monitoring. Both Science Centers are run by Governing Boards, with representatives from

each of the governments that signed the original agreements.

State has the lead for negotiating and implementing proliferation-related treaties, including

the NPT and several treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapons-free zones. State also

has leadership responsibilities in ongoing U.S. efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards

and BWC verification and the development of verification for the future Fissile Material

Control Treaty.
30

U.S. International Cooperative Efforts1

Department of Defense (DoD) Efforts

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR)

CTR was initiated in FY 92 to reduce the threat posed to the United States by weapo

mass destruction remaining on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Weapons Destruction and Dismantlement

These programs are helping destroy vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons an

weapons-systems components. Key projects include:

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

Provision to Russia of equipment, training, services and logistic support to 

in expediting the elimination of strategic offensive arms pursuant to STAR

Treaties.

Chemical Weapons Destruction

Efforts to Russia to help it destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and an

associated infrastructure.

Chain of Custody

These programs help prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials, increase th

security of nuclear weapons while in transit or in storage, and ensure that fissi

materials from dismantled warheads are stored in safe, centralized and

environmentally sound locations. Key projects include:

Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak

Construction on a facility for the storage of fissile material derived from

dismantled Russian weapons at Mayak.

Weapons Protection Control and Accounting (WPC&A)

The project focuses on improving the security of nuclear weapons during

transportation and interim storage.

Material Protection, Control and Accountability2

MPC&A projects enhance the security of the fissile materials at NIS facilitie

institutions, and improve capabilities to prevent, detect and deter theft, dive

or other unauthorized use of nuclear materials.

1 This list is illustrative only.

2 The Department of Energy began managing and funding MPC&A programs in fiscal year 1996 (see th

section below).
Enhancing Export Controls3

This assistance is provided to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to help

establish effective and sustainable national export control systems.

Demilitarization

These programs facilitate the demilitarization and transition of the NIS countries to

democratic institutions and market economies.

Defense Conversion

Ongoing projects to assist in the transformation of the former Soviet defense

complex into peaceful and productive civilian commercial activities.

Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF)4

Provides loans and grants and makes equity investments in joint defense

conversion projects involving U.S. companies and former Soviet enterprises

formally involved in WMD production.

Science Centers5

Provides former Soviet weapons scientists opportunities to work on peaceful

civilian research activities so they would not be tempted to sell their expertise to

countries of proliferation concern.

U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF)

This is a non-governmental, non-profit foundation that helps sustain highly

competent scientists and engineers in the NIS, including those from the former

Soviet defense sector, and support the development of a market economy in the

NIS.

Collaborative Biotechnical Programs

Funds collaborative biotechnical research with former biological weapons

scientists to increase access to Russian scientists, to enhance the transparency

of their work, and to address pressing public health needs in the area of

infectious diseases.

3 In fiscal year 1996, funding responsibility for NIS export control assistance shifted to the Department of State. 4 In fiscal year 1996, funding responsibility for the DEF was transferred to the Department of State under the

FREEDOM Support Act (See DoS section below).

5 Beginning in fiscal year 1996, direct program funding responsibility shifted to the Department of State under

the FREEDOM Support Act (see DoS section below).
32

Defense and Military Contacts

This program funds defense and military contact events in the NIS, includ

military exercises, high-level exchanges, and unit exercises.

CTR Country Efforts

Belarus

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

SOAE programs seek to facilitate the expeditious, safe and environmenta

sound elimination of WMD delivery systems.

Continuous Communications Link (CCL)

This program provides Belarus with its own capabilities to fulfill its reporting

requirements under the INF and START Treaties. No funds are available for th

project at this time.

Emergency Response Equipment and Training

This assistance provides equipment and training to respond to an acciden

incident involving a nuclear weapon or fissile material.

Export Control

Material Control & Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection6

Defense Conversion

Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF)

International Science and Technology Center (STCU)7

Environmental Restoration

This assistance will provide Belarus with the capability to conduct the

environmental restoration of former Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) bases

Audits and Examinations (A&Es)

Audits and examinations have been done on export controls, industrial

partnerships programs, environmental restoration, SOAE liquid-fuel

incineration, and emergency and training.

6 This program has been administered by the Department of Energy since fiscal year 1996.

7 Funding responsibility transferred to DoS in fiscal year 1996.
Kazakhstan

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

Government-to-Government Communications (GGCL)

This assistance will provide Kazakhstan with its own capability to fulfill its

reporting requirements under the INF and START Treaties, which it previously

did through Russia.

Emergency Response Equipment Training

Export Control

Material Control & Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection8

Expanded Defense and Military Contacts

Industrial Partnerships (e.g., Byelocorp Scientific, Inc., Allen & Associates

International, Kazakhstan’s National Nuclear Center, Lucent Technologies)

This assistance will convert former military enterprises to the production of

civilian goods.

Defense Enterprise Fund

International Science and Technology Center9

Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination

This assistance is geared to eliminate facilities or infrastructure that supported

WMD.

Audits and Examinations (A&Es)

Russia

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)

Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security

DoD and the Russian MOD are working to enhance the security of nuclear

weapons during transport in connection with their destruction.

Armored Blankets

This assistance provides ballistic protection by wrapping warheads or

containers with armored blankets.

Rail Car Security Enhancements

This assistance provides training and equipment to modify cargo and guard

rail cars for transport of nuclear weapons destined for dismantlement.

8 The Department of Energy has provided funding for this program beginning fiscal year (FY) 1997.

9 Administered and funded by DoS since FY1996.
34

Supercontainers

Supercontainers enhance nuclear weapons security and safety durin

transport.

Emergency Support Equipment

This assistance provides equipment, training and technical manuals 

enhance the MOD’s capability to respond to accidents involving nucl

weapons in transit to dismantlement activities.

Nuclear Weapons Storage Security

This assistance establishes cooperation between DoD and the Russian M

enhancing the security of nuclear weapons storage in connection with the

destruction, and the prevention of nuclear weapons theft or diversion.

Security Assessment and Training (SATC)

This Center will test and evaluate new security alarm and access de

equipment.

Nuclear Weapons Automated Inventory Control and Management System

(AICMS)

This program provides computer equipment for establishing an AICM

prototype.

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

This program provides equipment and training for upgrading Russia’s 

(drug and alcohol testing equipment and related training)

Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMCSF)

This program is to help the Russian government provide safe and secure

storage for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons.

Fissile Material Containers FMCs/Post-Dismantlement Processing

This assistance program is to provide MinAtom with containers for the tran

and storage of fissile material from dismantled weapons.

Core Conversion

This program will modify the cores of Russia’s three remaining plutonium

producing reactors so as to halt the production of weapons- grade plutoniu

December 31, 2000.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance

Biological Weapons (BW) Proliferation Prevention
This assistance is to prevent the proliferation of BW technology and expertise by

joint research at former Soviet BW institutes on biodefense.

Defense Conversion

Industrial Partnerships

Housing

This assistance program is to convert and privatize defense facilities and

establish housing-assembly and component-manufacturing capabilities for

the production of prefabricated housing for demobilized Russian officers

and the Russian housing market.

Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF)

International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)10

Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF)

Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection (MC&A and PP)11

Export Control

Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment

This assessment is to investigate and analyze nuclear waste disposal in the

Arctic regions

Audits and Examinations

Ukraine

Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE)

This assistance helps facilitate START implementation and helps eliminate all

strategic nuclear weapons systems in Ukraine.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE)

Export Control

Material Control & Accountability and Physical Protection (MC&A and PP)12

Civilian Cooperative Nuclear Reactor Safety Upgrade

This assistance is to provide a nuclear reactor simulator for training of reactor

operators and engineers to enhance safe operation of nuclear power plants.

10 Administered and funded by DoS since FY 1996. 11 Administered and funded by DOE since FY 1996. 12 Administered and funded by DOE since FY 1996.
36

Government-to-Government Communications Link (GGCL)

Emergency Response Equipment and Training

Science and Technology Center - Ukraine (STCU)13

U.S. - Ukraine Industrial Partnerships

These joint industrial partnerships between U.S. and Ukraine firms is to co

former Soviet military production capability to peaceful, civilian uses.

Audits and Examinations (A&E’s)

Defense and Military Contacts

Non-CTR DoD International Cooperative Efforts

Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation

This program supports joint activities with Norway and Russian Ministers 

Defense to ensure the safe handling and storage of radioactive materials

proper disposal of hazardous toxic materials.

Counterproliferation Programs

DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program

This program is focused on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons-re

law enforcement training to prevent smuggling and trafficking.

DoD/U.S. Customs Service Counterproliferation Program

This program focuses heavily on equipment in its initial implementation an

focused on border security.

Military—Technical Cooperative Efforts

These efforts are expanded opportunities to increase the level of militarytechnical cooperation with the NIS.

DoD/DoS Warsaw Initiative

This initiative aims to help America’s new democratic partners work with t

United States to advance the goals of the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

This program is designed to foster greater respect for understanding the

principle of civilian control of the military, to contribute to responsible defe

13 Administered and funded by DoS since FY 1996.
resource management, and to improve military justice systems and procedures

in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

Department of State Efforts

Department of State/U.S. Customs Service—Georgia Border Security and Law

Enforcement Program

This program is designed to help the Georgian Border Guards and Customs

Service gain and maintain control over Georgia’s borders as Russian border

guards pull out.

Science Centers (ISTC, STCU)

Partners Program

This program allows private industry, foundations, academic and scientific

institutions and other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations in

Science Center activities.

New Biotechnology Initiatives

This program is designed to counter the threat of Soviet biological weapons

facilities that could contribute, directly or indirectly, to bio-terrorism or attempts

to build biological weapons.

International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)

This program funds projects employing scientists and engineers at hundreds of

NIS scientific institutes.

Science and Technology Center (STCU)

This is a similar project located in Ukraine

Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF)

Science Collaboration/Redirection of Biotechnical Activities (USDA/HHS)

This project is aimed at redirecting scientists in former Soviet biological weapons

related facilities to civilian, commercial, agricultural and public health activities.

USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS)—Biotechnical Science

Collaboration

This program draws on the expertise in USDA in animal and plant

pathogens and its network of Agricultural Research Service (ARS)

laboratories and related facilities to establish agricultural research

collaboration with Russian institutes.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—Biotechnical Science

Collaboration
38

Through this program, HHS will work with Russian and other NIS

biotechnology scientists to better understand and control infectious

diseases.

Export Control Assistance

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) provides resources to sup

bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation disarmament efforts to prevent, 

or detect potential proliferation of WMD, WMD components, and WMD de

systems. It is a contingency fund for unanticipated requirements or opportu

in support of our non-proliferation objectives.

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Activities (NADR)

This fund focuses on helping the NIS and countries along potential t

routes from the smuggling of WMD and related material to potential

proliferators, and to develop effective control regimes.

Department of Energy Efforts

Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)14

Railway Transportation Security Projects

This project performs rapid security upgrades on railcars that transport nu

materials not in weapons form.

Truck Transportation Security Project

DOE upgraded truck sets utilized in the intra-site and inter-site transport o

special nuclear materials by modifying the vehicles to prevent unauthorize

access to special nuclear material.

MPC&A Training

DOE Cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)

This is designed to enhance the effectiveness of physical protection of nu

material storage at MPC&A locations in Russia by training MVD troops in 

operation of modern physical protection systems.

Expanded DOE Cooperation with Serial Production Enterprises

This will expand the cooperation with the four serial production enterprise

Russia.

Expanded Cooperative Work with the Russian Navy

14 MPC&A include emergency measures (winter uniforms, space heaters, and systems performance

contracts).
This expansion will cover the security upgrades for all the Russian Navy fresh

fuel by the year 2000.

Expanded Cooperative at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical

Physics (VNITF)

This provides more cooperative work at the site, which was formerly known as

Chelyabinsk-70.

Export Controls

Cooperation with GosAtomNadzor (GAN)

DOE continues its cooperation with GAN, the Russian Nuclear Regulatory

Agency, to develop MPC&A program procedures in accordance with Russian

federal and GAN-level rules and regulations, and licensing and inspection

practices.

DOE-MinAtom MPC&A Agreement

DOE has been negotiating with MinAtom to upgrade and replace the DoDMinAtom MPC&A Agreement that expired in September 1998.

Fissile Material Disposition Program

Fabrication of MOX Fuel for Thermal Reactors

This program assists and encourages Russia to develop a MOX fuel fabrication

process that is compatible with surplus weapons-grade plutonium, test the

resulting fuel, and qualify it for use in a VVER-1000 water reactor.

Validating the Performance of MOX-Fuel Nuclear Reactors

Considerable work is required to make sure VVER-1000 water reactors can be

fueled with mixed plutonium oxide and uranium oxide fuel.

Converting the Russian Fast Neutron Reactor to a Plutonium Burner

DOE is helping Russia assess the feasibility of converting Russia’s BN-6000

reactor, fast-neutron reactor, into a net burner of plutonium.

Plutonium Conversion Technology and Plutonium Disposition

This work is to design and build a facility for converting weapons-origin

plutonium metal into an oxide form suitable for use in MOX fuel and for

international inspection.

Plutonium Immobilization

This research and development is to implement immobilization as part of its

hybrid plutonium disposition strategy.
40

U.S. - Russian—Canadian Project to Burn Oxide (MOX) Fuel in a Canadian Nu

Reactor

This program will examine the technical feasibility of burning MOX fuel ma

from surplus U.S. and Russian weapons plutonium in existing Canadian

Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors.

Gas Reactor Technology Development

This will provide for joint U.S. - Russian development of gas reactor techn

to dispose of excess weapons-derived plutonium.

Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)

This joint U.S. - Russian program will further reduce the international comm

in highly enriched uranium through the conversion of Soviet-designed res

and test reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium fuel.

Export Control Assistance/Second Line of Defense

This involves multilateral cooperation among donor states to optimize limi

funding and take advantage of activities in a multilateral setting.

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

This program identifies and develops non-military applications for defense

technologies and creates long-term jobs for NIS weapons scientists and

engineers in the high-technology commercial marketplace.

Nuclear Cities Initiative

This program will enhance global security by promoting economic opportu

and social support for displaced scientists, engineers, and technicians in 

Russian nuclear weapons complex.

U.S. - China Lab to Lab Technical Exchange Program15

This program promotes scientific interactions with China in support of U.S. 

control and non-proliferation policy.

Department of Commerce Efforts

Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT)

This program places scientists from the NIS with American companies fo

period of three to six months. Such scientists can apply their skills to pea

15 This includes verification technologies, MPC&A, nuclear export control, remote monitoring, and ener

environment programs.
research and development in areas such as defense conversion, energy,

pharmaceuticals, and the environment.

Non-proliferation and Export Control Cooperation

This program is designed to help NIS countries develop effective export control

systems of their own. In each country, the program is designed to establish

political interest and commitment at senior government levels, establish and

automate licensing procedures, support enforcement and encourage

cooperation between industry and government. In 1998, there were 41

exchanges with the NIS.

U.S. Multilateral Export Control Regimes

Australia Group

Zangger Committee

Nuclear Suppliers Group

Missile Technology Control Regime

International Organizations Engaged in Proliferation-related Activities

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory

Commission16

The Group of Eight Industrial Countries (G-8)

The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)

Science and Technology Center (STCU)

16 This body has not yet achieved the status of an international organization.
42

Department of Defense

Introduction

Of all U.S. Government agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD) has the larges

most comprehensive effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruct

with a reported WMD-related investment in fiscal year 1999 of about $5.9 billion. Th

Department of Defense approaches the challenge of weapons of mass destruction

through both non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts. Non-proliferation ref

the use of political, economic, informational, and military tools to prevent proliferatio

reverse it diplomatically, or protect U.S. interests against the use of WMD. Counterproliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defense to combat prolifera

including (1) the application of military power to protect U.S. forces and interests, (2

intelligence collection and analysis, and (3) support to diplomacy, arms control, and e

controls. The Department of Defense is the only agency involved in all areas of resp

to the threat, including prevention, deterrence, defense, and limiting the damage in 

of their use.

This appendix covers four main areas for the Department of Defense. It:

• Identifies the existing guidance and sources used for formal weapons 

mass destruction planning,

• Describes the current organizational structure for combating prolifera

• Partially describes the intra- and interagency coordination process, a

• Provides supporting documentation for the issues discussed in the

Department of Defense section of Chapter 5.

The intra- and interagency coordination section is not intended to be an inclusive,

encyclopedia-like reference. Rather, it is intended to illustrate the numerous commit

associated with combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both to

establish requirements and to develop program execution plans to address those

requirements. Nowhere within the Department of Defense is there a single, integrat

priority list and accompanying program execution plan for combating the proliferatio

weapons of mass destruction.

Guidance and Sources for Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning

Three documents, the National Security Strategy, Presidential Decision Directive 13

the Counter-proliferation Policy Guidance of the Secretary of Defense, provide the

framework for counter-proliferation planning within Department of Defense. Formal 
warfighting plans are developed in DoD by the Commanders-in-Chief. Three documents

provide the prerequisites for beginning the Commanders’-in-Chief formal WMD planning

process: the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Missions and Functions Study, the

Counter-proliferation Charter, and the Counter-proliferation CONPLAN 0400.

The Department of Defense’s WMD effort is also influenced by a number of major

organizational initiatives and studies within the department. This includes the Quadrennial

Defense Review, issued in May 1997, and the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), announced

in November 1997 with the goal of achieving major reform in the way DoD does business.

The Quadrennial Defense Review identified threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear,

biological, chemical/missiles and associated capabilities, and stressed the need for the

Department of Defense to:

• Institutionalize counter-proliferation as an organizing principle in every facet

of military activity, and

• Internationalize counter-proliferation efforts to encourage participation by

our allies in addressing the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat (i.e., to

train, equip, and prepare forces).

Organizational Structure

The implementation of the Defense Reform Initiative is having a significant impact on the

weapons of mass destruction effort. Based on the analysis in the Quadrennial Defense

Review, the Department of Defense designed a comprehensive defense strategy with

three central elements:

• Shaping the international security environment,

• Responding to the full spectrum of crises that threaten U.S. interests, and

• Preparing now for an uncertain future.

As a result, there has been a personnel reduction and associated reorganization of the

Department of Defense to include re-engineering the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

the Defense Agencies, the Department of Defense Field Activities, the Defense Support

Activities, and the Joint Staff. This has had an impact on these organizations combating

proliferation, including a reorganization of the Policy Secretariat and a consolidation of

several of DoD’s WMD-related organizations into a new Defense Threat Reduction

Agency, which came into existence in October 1998. The Defense Threat Reduction

Agency was formed by consolidating the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Special

Weapons Agency, and the Defense Technology Security Administration. In addition,
44

functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff associated with managing re

programs were moved into the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. This included: pro

management staff from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and subordinate

positions under the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and

Biological Defense, including the Deputy for Counter-proliferation and Chemical/Biolo

Defense. The Defense Reform Initiative also called for the elimination of the Assista

the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense position, wh

serves as the Executive Secretary of the Counter-proliferation Program Review Cou

and Chairman of the Counter-proliferation Program Review Council Standing Comm

However, the 1999 Defense Authorization Bill required that the Office of the Secreta

Defense retain oversight of this office.

As identified in the DRI, the Department of Defense structure for combating prolifer

involves elements from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secret

Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the Services through the Joint Staff.

Policy: The Defense Reform Initiative called for a three-Assistant Secretary of Defe

structure as shown below.

The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs cont

to formulate and coordinate international security strategy and policy, including polit

military policy on issues that relate to foreign regions and nations.
The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction is

responsible for national security strategy, including reducing and countering nuclear,

biological, chemical, and missile threats to the United States and its forces and allies; arms

control negotiations, implementation, and verification policy; denuclearization, threat

reduction, and nuclear safety, security, and dismantlement in the former Soviet Union;

counter-proliferation; policy and strategy for U.S. nuclear weapons and selected advanced

conventional weapons; technology transfer; and relations with Russia, Ukraine, and other

New Independent States.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Humanitarian Assistance

(continued as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict) is responsible for the overall supervision of special operations and low intensity

conflict activities as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance affairs.

Acquisition and Technology: The Defense Reform Initiative called for the elimination of

the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense and

the creation of a new Defense Threat Reduction and Treaty Compliance Agency under the

Director of Defense Research & Engineering. However, the 1999 Defense Appropriation

Authorization required a modification to this plan, as Congress effectively blocked the

elimination of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological

Defense (ATSD(NCB)). As implemented, the organizations for combating weapons of

mass destruction within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology are shown below.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) exercises oversight and

overall coordination and integration of all Department of Defense science and technology

research and development. The DDR&E oversees the preparation of three key documents

detailing these efforts including the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan; the

Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Basic Research Plan. (These documents are

below.)

 There are two organizations with combating-proliferation responsibilities under the

Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

• The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter-proliferation

& Chemical and Biological Defense has oversight and overall coordination

and integration of all Department of Defense chemical and biological

defense research, development, and acquisition efforts. Additionally, this

office provides the guidance for planning, programming, budgeting, and

executing of the chemical and biological defense program.

• The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is charged with seeking

breakthrough concepts and technologies. The Defense Sciences Office

within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency manages its

biological warfare defense program, which is intended to support the
46

Department of Defense’s chemical and biological defense program. T

primary investments are in early, technology development phases wit

rapidly decreasing involvement in the succeeding stages that lead to sy

development.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a new organization established to reduce 

threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventi

and other special weapons, through the execution of technology security activities,

cooperative threat reduction programs, arms control treaty monitoring and on-site

inspection, force protection, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, and counter

proliferation; to support the United States nuclear deterrent; and to provide technica

support on weapons of mass destruction matters to the DoD components.17

The Ballistic Missile Defense Office supports U.S defense and counter-proliferation

objectives for deterrence and active defense. As an example, effective boost phase

defense serves as a deterrent against the use of nuclear biological and chemical mi

because of the potential for nuclear, biological or chemical contaminant debris to fal

on the aggressor’s own territory.18 This office was established by Department of De

17 Department of Defense Directive 5105.62, dated September 30, 1998.

X11, 27x24
Directive 5134.9, and is responsible for managing, directing, and executing the Ballistic

Missile Defense Program. This program's objective is to: first, develop and deploy

increasingly capable Theater Missile Defenses to meet the existing missile threat to

deployed U.S. and allied forces; second, as a hedge against the emergence of long-range

ballistic missile threats, develop options to deploy a National Missile Defense for the United

States; and third, continue to support research on more advanced ballistic missile defense

technologies to keep pace with the threat and improve the performance of theater and

national missile defense systems.

The Services through the Joint Staff: The Defense Reform Initiative does not alter the

existing structure of the Joint Staff and its relationships to the Commanders-in-Chief and

Services. The two primary Joint Staff organizations that have combating-proliferation

responsibilities are shown below.

The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment working group on Combating Terrorism

assesses antiterrorism and force protection requirements, which include policy,

operations, intelligence, information, training, technology, and resources.

The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment working group on Deterring and

Countering Proliferation of WMD assesses warfighting capabilities and requirements to

address the range of DoD efforts to deter and defend against potential adversaries’

decision to acquire, threaten the use of, or employ WMD to achieve political or military

goals.

Additionally, the Army has been assigned executive agent responsibilities for two areas

that relate to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

18 Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, Counter-proliferation

Program Review Committee, May 1998.
48

• The United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency is responsible 

the publication of the doctrine on employment of nuclear weapons fou

the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication 3-12 series and for the integrated

specific military requirements list for nuclear research activities that is

revalidated and published annually. However, there is no intraagency

coordination of this priority list with the Joint Warfighting Capabilities

Assessment priority list process.

• The Soldier Biological and Chemical Defense Command receives its

responsibilities for the execution of DoD’s chemical and biological def

program initiatives from Public Law 103-160. Intraagency coordinatio

accomplished through the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Nucle

Biological and Chemical Steering Committee/Sub-organization struct

described below.

Intra- and Interagency Activities for Combating WMD Proliferation

As there are many committees and sub-groups that participate in preparing requirem

for and executing the DoD programs to combat proliferation, the Commission believe

those identified below only constitute a partial list. Nowhere in this process does the

appear to be anyone “in charge” with the charter and necessary resources to devel

overall architecture to assure that DoD can accomplish its primary mission in the fa

the proliferation threat. This has implications for the larger architectural issues that co

the Federal Government, including its responsibilities to the states and local “first

responders” (e.g., via the National Guard and Reserves) that would be critically impo

in a crisis event involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Furthermore, th

defocused process is not well-framed as a means of stimulating change in an often

resistant bureaucracy responsible for formulating policy, requirements, plans, and

programs.

• The Counter-proliferation Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretar

Defense, provides senior-level oversight of Department of Defense-w

efforts to train, exercise, and equip U.S. forces for the counter-prolifer

mission. The Council also oversees Department of Defense counterproliferation activities in interagency and international forums. The eff

with the international community focus on the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization’s (NATO) Joint Committee on Proliferation; and concent

on: improved intelligence/information sharing, coordination of threat

reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union, improving defense and

deterrence programs, and response to chemical and biological warfa

attacks against civilian populations.
• The Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) is a

congressionally mandated committee that was created to identify, review,

and foster interagency program integration with several proliferation-related

purposes including the specific charter to include efforts to stem the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One of the major products of

the Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee is the Areas for

Capabilities Enhancements with priorities from the Department of Defense,

Department of Energy (DoE) and Intelligence Community (IC). Should the

Commission’s recommendation for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Combating Proliferation be adopted, the legislative requirements for the

CPRC should be re-examined. For 1999, the Areas for Capabilities

Enhancements are shown in the table below.

ACE Priorities Areas For Capability Enhancements for 1999

Department

of Defense

DoE IC

1 -- Individual and Collective Protection Against NBC Agents to Enable

Sustained Operations on the NBC Battlefield

2 -- Medical Protection Against NBC Agents, to Include Vaccine Stockpile

Availability

3 32 Detection, Identification, Characterization, and Warning of CW/BW Agents

4 -8 Ballistic Missile Active Defense

5 -- Provide Decontamination Capabilities on the Battlefield and in the Joint

Rear Area

6 25 Support for Special Operations Forces and Defense Against Paramilitary,

Covert Delivery and Terrorist NBC Threats

7 - 12 Cruise Missile Defense

8 71 Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence to

Counter Proliferation

9 14 Detection, Tracking, and Protection of NBC/M and NBC/M-Related Materials and Components

10 - 6 Target Planning for NBC/M Targets

11 - 7 Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground Facilities with Minimal Collateral Effects

12 6 3 Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of NBC/M Facilities with Minimal

Collateral Effects

13 - 11 Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat

14 4 - Provide Consequence Management for Terrorist Use of NBC Weapons

(Including Support to Domestic Consequence Management)

15 8 10 Support Export Control Activities of the U.S. Government

16 5 9 Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Arms Control Agreements

and Regimes
50

The annual report to Congress indicates that where there is an Area for Capability

Enhancement that has no priority for the Department of Energy or for the Intelligenc

Community, then that organization does not have any effort for that Area of Capabil

Enhancement. The Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee has two subcommittees:

* The Counter-proliferation Capabilities Working Group co-chaired by the Joint Staf

and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter-proliferation and

Chemical and Biological Defense (DASTD(CP/CBD)), which develops and coordina

Department of Defense policy, operational concepts/requirements, and related Prog

Operating Memorandum efforts; and

* The Counter-proliferation Intelligence Integration Support Initiative (CPI2SP) to esta

critical linkages with the Intelligence Community.

• The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Gro

(NPAC TWG), established by Presidential Decision Directive 27, adv

the Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee on investment

priorities, reviews Research and Development programs and provide

forum for information exchange.

• The Joint Staff’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

assesses and prioritizes Military requirements into the Planning,

Programming and Budgeting System cycle; and includes a Joint Warfig

Capabilities Assessment working group on deterrence and counterproliferation. In 1996, the Commanders-in-Chief endorsed a list of 16

counter-proliferation “required capabilities”, which they considered

necessary to conduct the counter-proliferation mission from a warfigh

perspective. This list currently contains 19 required capabilities and is 

periodic formal review within the Department. The Joint Requirement

Oversight Council addresses weapons of mass destruction issues th

requirements and acquisition and Joint Warfighting Capabilities

Assessment processes. These processes serve to incorporate

Commanders-in-Chief requirements, integrate needs into the Program

Operating Memorandum and planning cycle, and establish advocacy 

counter-proliferation products. For 1999, the Commanders-in Chief co

proliferation requirements are shown in the table below.

Priority Commanders-in-Chief Counter-proliferation Requirements for 1999

1 Provide Individual Protection to Forces and Assist Allies/Coalition Partners with Relief fro

Effects of NBC

2 Intercept the Conventional Delivery of WMD and Control Collateral Effects

3 Provide Collective Protection to Forces and Assist Allies/Coalition Partners with relief from 

Effects of NBC
It is of particular note that with this year's cycle, this Joint Warfighting Capabilities

Assessment's prioritized requirements list was also used by some of the other relevant

committees as a part of their requirements-generation process. The Commission

commends the Joint Staff's Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment working group on

deterrence and counter-proliferation as a positive step in the development of an end-toend planning process. The extensive effort to collect the Department of Defense

requirements, combine them into an overall priority list, and then integrate the results into

specific operational plans is exemplary. Indeed, this results in a de facto intra-Department

of Defense coordination mechanism of potentially high value, although it is not yet

effectively replicated throughout the department's broad efforts to combat weapons of

mass destruction proliferation.

• The United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) is a

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command organization responsible for

maintaining the United States doctrine for the employment of nuclear

weapons and for personnel risk and casualty criteria to nuclear weapons

effects. While it is not directly a counter-proliferation organization, much of

its integrated research priorities are directly related to the deterrence,

defense and consequence mitigation categories of combating weapons of

mass destruction proliferation. The Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

hosts an annual review and validation of nuclear research priorities inviting

nuclear community experts and users across the Department of Defense

and the Department of Energy to attend. The nuclear weapons effects

research is categorized into a number of topical chapters and then into

4 Mitigate the Effects of WMD Use

5 Detect/Monitor Development, Production, Deployment, Employment of WMD

6 Communicate the Ability/Will to Employ Interdiction/Response Capabilities

7 Determine Vulnerabilities in WMD Development, Production, Transfer, Deployment, and Employment

8 Conduct Off-site Attack to Destroy, Disable, and Deny WMD Targets

9 Establish and Maintain Relations with Allies, and Potential Adversaries to Discourage

Development, Production and Use of WMD

10 Seize, Destroy, Disable, and Deny Transport of WMD

11 Communicate the Ability/Will to Employ Defensive Capabilities

12 Determine Vulnerabilities in Decision-Making Processes Related to WMD

13 Conduct Information Warfare to Destroy, Disable and Deny WMD

14 Support Treaties, Export Controls, And Political/Diplomatic Efforts

15 Provide Alternatives to the Pursuit of WMD

16 Provide Intelligence Collection Capabilities in Support of USG NP Efforts

17 Conduct On-Site Attack to Seize, Destroy, Disable, Deny WMD Targets

18 Provide Personnel, Training, Materiel, Equipment, to Support Security Assistance

19 Destroy, Disable, and Deny Actor’s Non-WMD Resources and Capabilities
52

sections. Requirements are then sub-categorized for each section. O

ranked in importance for each section, the overall list is rank-ordered 

create a numerical priority for use by research and development

organizations that develop products in response to the identified need

While the list has over one hundred requirements, only the top twenty

ranked specific military requirements for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 a

shown in the table below.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) has

three interlocking processes for identification and prioritization of research, development,

and acquisition of science and technology for combating the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction:

• The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Defense Steering Committee, presumably chaired by the acting Assistant to

the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense. It

provides oversight of the chemical and biological defense program and sets

overall guidance to the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense

Board. It is composed of the Director for Defense Research and

Engineering, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Chemical and

Biological Defense Directorate from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

U.S. Army Top Ranked Specific Military Requirements (SMRs) for Nuclear Weapons Effects

Research Fiscal Years 1999/2000

Pri SMR Topic Description

1 2.3.1a Incorporate nuclear weapons effects information into simulation and distributed

interactive simulation systems

2 4.3.2a Develop procedures and equipment for low-level radiation doses

3 3.2.2b Create commanders dose-level guidance for operations in low-level radiation

environments

4 3.5.3a Identify or develop low-cost, individual-issue physical dosimetry and field

biodosimetry to measure radiation levels

5 4.5.2a Develop procedures to predict system responses to electromagnetic environments

6 4.1.2a Investigate the non-ideal air blast phenomenon

7 4.3.4a Add capabilities for current system protection factor prediction codes

8 2.1.2a Expand and maintain a database of equipment performance and automate targeting data

9 3.3.2a Estimate combined effects of ionizing radiation and other stressors

10 4.5.2I Exercise new validation procedures to assess Army digitized battlefield acquisitions

11 3.2.2a Decrease the long-term health effects of radiation, using drugs

12 3.4.2a Develop data and models to predict performance degradation from effects of lasers

13 4.3.4b Estimate initial-and residual-radiation protection factors for military shelters and

equipment

14 4.3.2c Evaluate the accuracy of aerial survey

15 3.8.1a Develop treatment protocols and a field screening kit for depleted uranium in urine

16 4.5.2h Develop electromagnetic test validation procedure(s)/simulator(s) to replace current techniques

17 4.3.2b Enhance and maintain radiation transport codes

18 3.6.3a Provide integrated medical assessment tools

19 4.1.6a Test and analyze composites for response to thermal-blast synergistic effects

20 2.2.1a Develop methodology and analytic tools for nuclear survivability analyses
54

and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation/Chemical and Biological Defense. The chemical and biolo

defense program is divided into the following topical areas: contamina

avoidance, individual protection, collective protection, decontaminatio

medical chemical defense, medical biological defense and modeling 

simulation. It is of note that there are few nuclear or radiological defen

elements in spite of the committee’s name. For 1999, the capabilities

supported by the chemical and biological defense program are shown 

table below

• The Joint NBC Defense Board, which works the Program Operating

Memorandum and provides overall management, is co-chaired by the 

Vice Chief of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Researc

Development; It has two sub-elements, one for requirements and one 

execution management:

*The Joint Service Integration Group—led by the Army—which works o

Service/SOF requirements, and reviews doctrine, training, plans and

Service Program Operating Memoranda. It includes a medical program 

panel chaired by the Senior Clinical Consultant for the Army Medical

Department Center and School and serves to identify chemical and

biological defense-based medical programs identified by the Departm

Defense’s medical community, and

*The Joint Service Management Group—led by the Army—which coordi

research and development planning, provides technical oversight, dev

Program Operating Memoranda strategy, and reviews research,

development, and acquisition and technology base programs.

There are a series of “commodity areas” led by program managers from the various

services: the Army leads contamination avoidance and medical issues; the Air Force 

decontamination; the Marines lead in individual protection; and the Navy leads in coll

protection (in ships, aircraft, building complexes, etc.) and modeling and simulation

modeling and simulation commodity area reports to the Joint Service Integration G

presumably to help establish requirements; all others report in to the Joint Service Ma

Group;

Capabilities Supported by the Chemical and Biological Defense Program for 1999

Cross-referenced to the Commander-in-Chief’s Counter-proliferation Capabilities Priority List

Pri Description

1 Provide individual protection to forces and assist allies/coalition partners

3 Provide collective protection to forces and assist allies/coalition partners

4 Mitigate the effects of WMD use

5 Detect employment of WMD
• The Director, Defense Research and Engineering’s Defense Science and

Technology Advisory Group Steering Committee develops plans to provide

programming guidance for the Department of Defense Science and

Technology community, including NBC defense research. The three plans

are the:

*Basic Research Plan (BRP), which presents the Department of Defense

objectives and investment strategy for the Department-sponsored Basic

Research (6.1) performed by universities, industry, and service laboratories.

In addition, it presents the planned investment in each of ten technical

disciplines. They include Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Computer

Sciences, Electronics, Materials Science, Mechanics, Ocean and Terrestrial

Sciences, Atmospheric and Space Sciences, Biological Sciences, and

Cognitive and Neural Science;

*Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP), a joint perspective

horizontally across the Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced Technology

Development (6.3) plans of the services and defense to ensure that the

Science and Technology program supports priority future joint warfighting

capabilities. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has endorsed the

Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan planning process and

methodology and the Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives used in the

development of the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan; and

*Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP), which presents the Department of

Defense objectives and the Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced

Technology Development (6.3) investment strategy for technologies critical

to Department of Defense acquisition plans, service warfighter capabilities,

and the JWSTP. It also takes a horizontal perspective across the service and

defense agency efforts, thereby charting the total Department of Defense

investment for a given technology. The Defense Technology Area Plan

documents the focus, content, and principal objectives of the overall

Department of Defense science and technology efforts. This plan provides

a sound basis for acquisition decisions and is structured to respond to the

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology’s emphasis

on rapid transition of technology to the operational forces.

It is reported in the 1999 Department of Defense’s Annual report to Congress on Nuclear

Biological and Chemical Defense that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Chemical

and Biological Defense Directorate prepares relevant portions of the these three

documents by March of each year. This implies that as a member of the Office of the

Secretary of Defense’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense Steering Committee,

the activities of the chemical and biological defense program are reflected in the

development process for the defense technology objectives (shown below). However, the

correlation of the investment strategies of the Defense Technology Area Plan with those
56

of the chemical and biological defense program is not apparent.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology does not bear the

responsibility for all acquisition programs pertinent to counter-proliferation activities

example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intens

Conflict—which has no apparent connection to the chemical and biological defense

committee process under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

1999 Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs)—

Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTO Topic Description

I.02 Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System Advanced Concepts Technology

Demonstration

I.03 Airbase/Port Biological Detection Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration

I.04 Integrated Biodetection Advanced Technology Demonstration

I.05 Chemical Add-On to Airbase/Port Biological Detection Advanced Concepts

Technology Demonstration

J.03 Counter-proliferation I Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration

J.04 Counter-proliferation II Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration

CB.02 Joint Warning and Reporting Network

CB.06 Advanced Lightweight Chemical Protection

CB.07 Laser Standoff Chemical Detection Technology

CB.08 Advanced Adsorbents for Protection Applications

CB.09 Enzymatic Decontamination

CB.19 Chemical Imaging Sensor

CB.20 Biological Sample Preparation System for Biological Identification

CB.21 Chemical Agent Prophylaxes

CB.22 Medical Countermeasures for Vesicant Agents

CB.23 Medical Countermeasures for Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B

CB.24 Medical Countermeasures for Encephalitis Viruses

CB.25 Multiagent Vaccines for Biological Threat Agents

CB.26 Common Diagnostic Systems for Biological Threats and Endemic Infectious Disease

L.07 Terrorist Chemical/Biological Countermeasures

NT.01 Nuclear Operability and Survivability Testing technologies

NT.02 Electronic System Radiation Hardening

NT.03 Hard-Target Defeat

NT.04 Prediction and Mitigation of Collateral Hazards

NT.05 Balanced Electromagnetic Hardening Technology

NT.06 Survivability Assessments Technology

NT.07 Integrated Comprehensive Weaponeering Capability

NT.08 Nuclear Weapon Safety and Reliability

NT.09 Nuclear Phenomenology
Technology—has primary oversight of force-protection activities, even though the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency and the Joint Staff (J-34) are both supporting and executing

agents. This partly explains why ongoing force-protection assessments lack sufficient

integration with technology development programs for chemical and biological weapon

defense.

The Technical Support Working Group

Jointly chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of State,

the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) addresses research and development

efforts to meet the threat posed by domestic and international terrorism, and includes a

working group on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures.

Technical Support Working Group: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Countermeasures Subgroup

Pri Description of Prioritized Fiscal Year 2000 Requirements

1 Non-Intrusive Detection, Stand-off Chemical/Biological/Explosive Detector

2 Non-Intrusive Detection of Chemical and Biological Agents

3 Validation of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Mass Decontamination Process

4 Improved Communications System for the Individual Protective Mask

5 Micro Fluidic Biodetector

6 Chemical Warfare Agent/Toxic Industrial Chemical Mask Filter Cannister

7 SOF Chemical Agent Detector

8 Rapid Screening Test for Multiple Biological Agents in a Variety of Matrices

9 Lossless Image Compression x100

10 Contamination Mapping and Detection Tool for Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents

11 Chemical and Biological Protective Gloves with Dexterity

12 Urban Dispersion Modeling

13 Lightweight Level A Cooling System

14 Expedient Hazard Reduction System

15 Urban Chemical and Biological Countermeasures

16 Field-Deployable Decontamination System

17 Nuclear Material Classification System

18 First Responder Individual Protective Mask

19 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Counter-Terrorism Training Support

20 Anti-crop/animal Biological Agent Characterization and Database

21 Urban Chemical Relation Test Bed

22 Chemical and Biological Agent Forensic Protocols

23 Non-Hazardous Decontamination – Peptides and Proteins

24 Improved Techniques for Rapid Biological Warfare Agent Identification

25 Sensitive Equipment Decontamination

26 Chemical and Biological IED Containment

27 Parametric Modeling of Chemical and Biological Incidents
58

The Department of Defense’s Baseline Survey Response

As of this printing, the Commission has not yet received the official unclassifed copy 

Department of Defense’s Baseline Survey Response. However, three comments ca

made about their classified response. First, the response was not integrated. The ans

were made by the individual agencies within the Department of Defense and seque

attached to the respective questions. The absence of an integrated Department of

Defense answer reflects the lack of a single integrating office within the Departmen

Defense for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, not 

the agencies with counter-proliferation activities provided answers in the Departme

Defense’s baseline survey response. Notably absent were the Defense Advanced

Research and Projects Agency and the Ballistic Missile Defense Office. And third, t

response highlighted three pertinent issues the for the impact of the Defense Refor

Initiative on policy:

• the waning role/atrophy of the Office of Nonproliferation Policy;

• the reliance on contractors/external groups for policy planning/resear

and

• the specified challenge of matching adequate resources (human and

financial) to expanding needs.

Arguably, defense policy planning should not be the sole purview of Defense Scienc

Board, National Defense University, Commission, and contractor/FFRDC studies. R

OSD should harness its current capabilities and, rather than always contract-out, be

capable to perform work in-house. Clearly, the current Department of Defense struc

could be strengthened to meet the needs of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of

Defense with respect to combating proliferation.

Erosion of Nuclear Expertise

Many of the recommendations from the Commission on Maintaining United States Nu

Weapons Expertise (the Chiles Commission) are applicable to the Department of Def

The most notable recommendations that could be considered by the proposed nucl

office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating Proliferation

(Recommendation 5.2) are:

28 Interface between Individual Protective Mask and NVG
• Recommendation 1 to reinforce the national commitment and fortify the

sense of mission: “The Administration and Congress, through actions and

words, could make a concerted and continuing effort to convey to the

nuclear weapons community that their mission is vital to the security of the

nation and will remain vital well beyond the planning horizons normally

associated with programmatic decisions. This message should be

unequivocal, clear, and periodically reinforced”;

• Recommendation 3 on Strengthening the Department of Energy (DOE)-

Department of Defense (Department of Defense) Relationship: “Create a

true partnership that forges both a shared commitment to meet national

security needs for nuclear weapons”;

• Recommendation 7 on establishing and implementing plans on a priority

basis for replenishing essential technical workforce needs in critical skills:

“Large numbers of the nuclear weapons workforce are reaching retirement

and a new generation of essential scientific, engineering and technical

workers must be hired and trained in order to preserve essential skills”;

• Recommendation 9 on expanding training and career planning programs

which are adapted to the dramatically changed workforce environment;

• Recommendation 10 on expanding the use of former nuclear weapons

program employees: “Institute a small, select Nuclear Weapons Workers

Reserve from those with key skills to maintain the ability to increase

experienced staff rapidly, when and if required”;

• Recommendation 11 on creating a permanent Defense Programs Advisory

Committee: “formed of senior, experienced personnel capable of assessing

stockpile integration and priorities.”; and

• Recommendation 12 on enhancing congressional oversight: “Provide

positive explicit reinforcement of the public service character of the mission

to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.”

In sum, the lack of a single focus for weapons of mass destruction with sufficient seniority

and necessary resources has resulted in “pockets” of programs within the Department of

Defense (like the chemical and biological defense program) that tend to operate

independently of each other and cannot be traced to a single integrated Department-wide

program plan. There is an urgent need for a single policy and a single acquisition authority

for programs to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction within the

Department of Defense
60

Department of Energy

Historical Background

The history of the Department of Energy (DOE) is intimately linked to the developm

U.S. nuclear proliferation-related policy. Even before the first detonation of an atomi

bomb, the scientists of the Manhattan Project warned the War Department about th

potential dangers of proliferation. In 1945, the War Department’s Interim Committee 

post-war nuclear policy debated the alternative virtues of international cooperation v

strict control over information about nuclear technology.

As part of the reorganization of defense activities after the end of World War II, the 

Government decided that production of nuclear weapons should be the responsibilit

civilian agency rather than of the military establishment. The Atomic Energy Act of 

established a five-member civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to take over t

assets and responsibilities of the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947.

The 1946 Act also sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by establi

strict controls over fissionable material. Ownership of all fissionable material was ves

the AEC, and its possession was forbidden to persons outside the jurisdiction and c

of the United States. The Act also prohibited the direct or indirect production of fissio

material outside the United States. These provisions made it very difficult for the AE

authorize peaceful nuclear cooperation with other nations.

A major policy change was announced in President Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for P

speech to the United Nations. Recognizing that the United States no longer had a

monopoly on nuclear technology, the President proposed to share nuclear materials 

technology with other nations, provided that they undertook an obligation not to dev

nuclear weapons. As originally proposed, this cooperation was to be carried out und

control of an international organization that eventually became the International Ato

Energy Agency (IAEA).

In 1954, Congress enacted amendments to the Atomic Energy Act to permit

implementation of the Atoms for Peace program. Beginning in the late 1950s, a netw

peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements was negotiated, setting a pattern later foll

by other nuclear supplier states. Initially, these agreements provided for safeguards

inspections to be conducted by the United States to verify that nuclear material of U

origin was not being diverted to military purposes. To carry out this responsibility, th

Atomic Energy Commission developed the material accounting and control concept

inspections techniques that underlie international safeguards to this day. In the late 1

and early 1960s, the AEC worked closely with the IAEA to help the latter develop its 

safeguards capability. This assistance to IAEA safeguards has been maintained by 
AEC’s successor agencies, the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. By the end of the 1960s, the United States had transferred all safeguards

responsibilities under its peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements to the IAEA.

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic Energy Commission,

transferring its regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its military,

proliferation-related, and other responsibilities were allocated to the new Energy Research

and Development Administration. This agency was itself abolished only three years later

when Congress transferred its functions to the newly created Department of Energy

(DOE). The Department officially came into existence on October 1, 1977.

Since 1977, three additional pieces of legislation have had major importance for the

Department’s proliferation-related programs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

placed stringent new restrictions on nuclear trade and peaceful nuclear cooperation with

other nations. Responsibility for implementing many of these fell on the Department of

Energy. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 privatized the Department’s civil uranium

enrichment capability by transferring it to the newly created U.S. Enrichment Corporation.

Finally, under the Nunn-Lugar Act, the Department has played a major role in cooperative

threat reduction with the former Soviet Union.

Organization

The Department of Energy’s role in proliferation derives from its experience in developing

and maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. These weapons, designed, built and

tested by DOE and its predecessor agencies, have formed the deterrent that has been the

cornerstone of American national security for the past 50 years. Stewardship of the nuclear

weapons complex continues to be one of DOE’s core missions. However, as the post-Cold

War global environment has presented new challenges, DOE’s security role has

broadened to include a range of arms control and non-proliferation activities focused on

reducing the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile

materials.

To meet these challenges, most of the Department’s arms control and proliferation-related

work, including research and development, has been consolidated into one organization,

the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN). Other proliferation-related

activities are carried out by the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition and the Office of

Intelligence.19
62

The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security is the focal point of the Departm

proliferation-related efforts. The director of NN, an assistant secretary, reports direc

the Secretary of Energy and represents DOE at all senior-level arms control and

proliferation-related forums within the United States. Key program offices of NN includ

following: the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NN-40), the Office of

International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation (NN-30), and the Office of Research 

Development (NN-20). 20 Also reporting directly to the assistant secretary is the Ru

NIS Nuclear Materials Security Task Force, which oversees the Material Protection

Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, whose goal is to enhance the safety an

security of nuclear weapons materials in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and to imp

the ability of FSU authorities to account for quantities of nuclear materials stored at a

and former Ministry of Atomic Power and Ministry of Defense facilities. The Office o

Nonproliferation and National Security’s fiscal year 2000 budget request is $747.3 mis

representing an 11 percent increase over its fiscal year 1999 appropriation.

The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NN-40) oversees a wide range of

international proliferation-related activities in support of U.S. Government policy. So

these activities include assisting former Soviet republics in establishing and strength

nuclear material export control systems, providing technical support to and improvin

effectiveness of IAEA nuclear safeguards, promoting research and development of

technologies relevant to proliferation-related treaty verification and monitoring, and

building constituencies for regional arms control and non-proliferation in areas of inst

and tension.

19 On May 11, 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced a sweeping reorganization of DO

security programs. The reorganization calls for the creation of a new Office of Security and Emergenc

Operations, which will be responsible for “all safeguards and security, cyber-security and emergency

operations functions throughout the DOE complex” and will “oversee all security-related functions whi

previously were handled by different DOE program offices.” As part of this plan, three components of the 

of Nonproliferation and National Security that are responsible for various security and emergency manag

activities, will be transferred to the new Office of Security and Emergency Operations. These compon

include the following: the Office of Security Affairs (NN-50), which is responsible for directing Departmen

safeguards and security, and classification/declassification programs; the Office of Emergency Manag

(NN-60), which is the Department’s focal point for all emergency management activities; and the Uncla

Foreign Visits and Assignments Program, within the Office of Resource Management (NN-10), which 

policy for, and management of, vital information on foreign visitors and assignees to DOE and DOE con

facilities (the rest of NN-10 will remain intact). In addition, the Commission was informed that responsib

tracking U.S. nuclear material inventories and transactions is expected to be transferred from the Intern

Safeguards Division (NN-44) of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security and consolidated 

newly created Office of Plutonium, Uranium and Special Material Inventory within the Office of Securit

Emergency Operations. The Office of Emergency Response (DP-23), within the Office of Defense Pro

(DP), will also be transferred to the newly created Office of Security and Emergency Operations. DP is

responsible for the operation of the nuclear weapons complex, including design, manufacture, testing, st

stewardship, and disposition, as required. Its role in combating proliferation consists primarily in provid

technical capability, through DP-23, to respond to nuclear and radiological accidents and other emerge

DP-23, which works closely with NN’s Office of Emergency Management, sponsors the Nuclear Emer

Search Team and related assets to deal with the possibility of terrorist use of a weapon of mass destr

20 NN also includes the Office of Resource Management (NN-10), which is responsible for cross-cutti

budget, personnel, resource, and financial management issues, and procurement and contracting issu

affecting NN--activities it coordinates with appropriate departmental offices, the national laboratories, 

USG agencies, and Congress.
Components of NN-40 include the International Policy and Analysis Division (NN-42), the

Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division (NN-43), and the International Safeguards

Division (NN-44). In addition, NN-40 administers two separate, but complementary,

programs concerned with reducing the nuclear threat from the FSU: Initiatives for

Proliferation Prevention, which seeks to engage FSU weapons scientists in the

development of non-military, commercial applications for defense technologies, and the

Nuclear Cities Initiative, which seeks to create job opportunities for displaced weapons

scientists and engineers in Russia’s ten closed nuclear cities, and, over the longer term, to

provide assistance to the Russian Federation as it downsizes its nuclear weapons

complex.

The International Policy and Analysis Division (NN-42) develops, coordinates, and

implements DOE positions, policies, and plans relating to a broad range of international

arms control and nuclear proliferation-related security matters. In fulfillment of this mission,

it performs the following functions:

• coordinates DOE treaty implementation, compliance, and verification

activities;

• represents DOE in international arms control and proliferation-related

negotiations and consultations, and provides technical support to such

delegations;

• supports U.S. and international regional proliferation-related and

confidence- and security-building efforts, a program it manages for the

Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories;

• serves as DOE point of contact for other U.S. Government agencies on

technical matters related to arms control and proliferation-related policy;

• manages efforts to limit the use of weapons-usable fissile materials

worldwide, including the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test

Reactors (RERTR) program, which seeks to convert foreign research

reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to advanced lowenriched uranium (LEU) fuels;

• manages proliferation-related support for DOE’s policy to accept foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the

United States;

• processes subsequent arrangements governing the transfer of nuclear

materials subject to U.S. consent rights under our agreements for peaceful

nuclear cooperation;
64

The Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division (NN-43) develops, coordinates, a

implements policies, regulations, and procedures governing the transfer or export o

nuclear and nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technologies in accordance 

national security and nuclear proliferation-related objectives and international treaty

obligations. In fulfillment of its mission, it performs the following functions:

• administers U.S. transfers of nuclear technology and technical assistan

foreign nuclear programs,

• serves as Secretariat of the interagency Sub-group on Nuclear Expo

Coordination,

• provides technical analysis and export policy formulation for proposed 

nuclear-related commodity exports for DOE,

• represents DOE in the negotiation and administration of multilateral su

arrangements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangge

Committee,

• conducts training and informational seminars in the United States an

abroad on nuclear proliferation, technical assistance, and supplier iss

• represents DOE in bilateral and multilateral meetings on nuclear sup

issues,

• provides assistance to U.S. efforts to prevent illegal trafficking in nucl

technology and materials,

• provides a computerized information sharing system to provide techn

assistance to members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and

• maintains a comprehensive computer network to share proliferation-re

data products for use by staff in license reviews and for proliferation-re

analysis to support policy.

The International Safeguards Division (NN-44) supports the development and

implementation of U.S. nuclear proliferation-related policies, particularly with respec

nuclear safeguards implementation, treaty verification, and materials protection, co

and accounting. Through its programs, NN-44:

• formulates and implements U.S. safeguards policy, develops technolo

to verify excess fissile material, and negotiates verification regimes to
ensure excess fissile material no longer needed for defense programs is

removed irreversibly from nuclear weapon use;

• leads DOE interactions with the IAEA and supports U.S. policy and technical

cooperation consistent with U.S. obligations under the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT);

• manages technology research and development programs to strengthen

IAEA safeguards and improve nuclear material security worldwide;

• helps ensure physical protection of U.S. and non-U.S. origin nuclear

material against theft and sabotage through technical and training support

in physical protection and MPC&A to foreign countries and international

organizations, notably the IAEA;

• tracks and analyzes domestic and foreign nuclear material inventories and

transactions, and

• cooperates with global partners to share safeguards technology.

Another component of NN, the Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

(NN-30) provides technical leadership, expertise, and program management for

cooperative international programs to promote nuclear safety and nuclear technology

development. These include cooperative programs to reduce the threat posed by the

operation of aging civilian nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Central

and Eastern Europe. NN-30 also represents DOE in international forums, such as the

IAEA, on matters concerning nuclear safety, the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, and

the development of advanced nuclear technologies. Additional safety-related activities

include its management of DOE’s efforts in support of implementation of the G-7

Memorandum of Understanding with the Ukraine to secure the closure of the Chernobyl

nuclear power plant. These activities include technical management of the Chernobyl

sarcophagus and decontamination and decommissioning work.

NN-30 also leads the Department’s program to shut down Russia’s three remaining

plutonium production reactors in Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 and to convert them to a

non-plutonium producing mode by 2001. It also manages activities to implement the HEU

Transparency Program, which monitors the down-blending of Russian HEU into LEU and

assures that Russian HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons is converted to LEU and

delivered to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation. These transparency monitoring activities

are scheduled to continue through 2013.

The Office of Research and Development (NN-20) is responsible for a full-spectrum

systems and technology program for reducing the threats to U.S. national security posed

by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation and illicit materials trafficking.

The program addresses technologies in four principal thrust areas: (1) nuclear treaty

monitoring, (2) early detection of proliferation activities, (3) detection/deterrence of the
66

diversion of weapons of mass destruction and constituent materials, and (4) counterin

potential use of chemical and biological weapons. The program develops applicable

technologies, demonstrates and validates fieldable prototypes, and, in the treaty

monitoring area, provides actual operational hardware and software. Most of the

technologies developed within the program are intended to support the operational n

of other USG agencies. The program also provides the science and technology bas

enables other DOE Nonproliferation and National Security organizations to accomp

their missions.

The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) was created in October 1994 to ove

DOE’s activities to dispose of inventories of U.S. weapons-usable plutonium and hig

enriched uranium declared excess to national defense needs and to provide technic

support for Administration efforts to obtain Russia’s agreement to reciprocal actions f

disposition of its surplus plutonium. The Office is headed by a director who reports to 

the Under and Deputy Secretaries of Energy. Key programs administered by MD inv

transferring surplus HEU to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation for downblending and u

commercial reactor fuel, designing a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion facilit

a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, reducing the number of sites where surplus pluto

is stored, and conducting small-scale tests and demonstrations of plutonium dispos

technologies with Russia. Through these activities, MD plays an important role in he

to reduce the nuclear danger associated with increases in stockpiles of surplus wea

materials resulting from downsizing of the nuclear weapons complex and weapons

dismantling. The fiscal year 2000 budget request for these activities is $200 million, 

increase of $32.5 million over the fiscal year 1999 comparable amount. This increas

primarily to allow the program to begin design of a key U.S. plutonium disposition fac

immobilize surplus non-pit plutonium, to procure lead test assembly equipment req

for mixed oxide fuel irradiation tests, and to hire the field staff necessary to oversee

plutonium disposition facility design activities at the selected DOE site.

The Office of Intelligence (IN) provides technical nuclear weapons expertise, nuclea

proliferation-related analysis, and intelligence collection support to the intelligence a

policy communities, as well as operational support to defense and civilian operation

teams. In addition to its headquarters team, it draws upon the resource base of the na

laboratories to provide technical analysis of all aspects of foreign nuclear programs

to solve especially difficult and intractable intelligence questions. Two units within IN 

primary responsibility for non-proliferation issues: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Divis

(NND) and the Special Technologies Program (STP), which seeks to develop and fi

quick-turnaround, specialized technology applications to meet the needs of the

intelligence, special operations and law-enforcement communities. The director of t

reports directly to the Secretary of Energy.

Executive Order 12333 identifies DOE as a member of the Intelligence Community 

expressly charges the Secretary of Energy to:
• participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information with

respect to foreign energy matters,

• produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the Secretary’s

responsibilities,

• participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements

where the special capability of the Department can contribute, and

• provide expert technical, analytical, and research capability to other

agencies within the Intelligence Community.

The Office of Intelligence implements the Department’s intelligence responsibilities

through a variety of activities:

• producing and coordinating intelligence analyses,

• tasking in-depth technical analyses and preliminary technology

development to DOE’s field organizations,

• managing Intelligence Work for Others at these organizations,

X07, 18x24
68

• working with intelligence collectors to ensure that DOE requirements 

met,

• providing technical training and other support for the greater intelligen

and policy communities,

• managing departmental intelligence policy, and

• serving as interlocutor between the Intelligence Community and the

resources and requirements of DOE and its national laboratories.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Background

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established by the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, which abolished the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

The fundamental premise of the Act was that the AEC faced an inherent conflict of interest

since it both promoted civil nuclear energy programs and regulated them in the interest of

public safety. In broad terms, then, the NRC inherited the Atomic Energy Commission’s

regulatory functions, while its other functions were passed to the Energy Research and

Development Administration, and later to the Department of Energy.

The five NRC Commissioners are appointed for set terms of office, and cannot be removed

except for cause. Appointments are made by the President with Senate confirmation. The

Chairman of the Commission is designated by the President, and serves as its principal

executive officer. As an independent regulatory commission, the NRC does not report to

the President and is not (with one exception noted below) subject to direction from the

executive branch of government. The general NRC budget does not come from

appropriated funds, but from license fees. (Some proliferation-related activity, such as

assistance to civil nuclear activities in the former Soviet Union, is paid for through

appropriated funds.)

Congress modeled the NRC on other federal regulatory commissions, such as the

Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, or the

Federal Trade Commission. Many such commissions were created in the Progressive and

New Deal eras, with broad powers to regulate specific sectors of the economy. The theory

was that the subject matter dealt with by each commission required the application of

expert judgment that could only be developed over time. The public interest, it was

believed, also required that this expert judgment be exercised free of political influence or

conflicts of interest. Former NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky, testifying before the

Commission, pointed to this independence of judgment as the primary strength of the

NRC. He noted, for example, that as early as 1981, the NRC was able to raise questions

about the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, at a time when such questions were virtually

taboo elsewhere in the federal bureaucracy.

Historically, independent regulatory commissions gave much of their attention to rate-fixing

and other economic regulation. Over the last 20 years, however, economic regulation has

passed out of favor and free-market pricing has been extended to formerly regulated

economic sectors. The work of some independent commissions has been cut back, while

others, including the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board,

have been abolished.
70

Had nuclear power expanded to the extent many experts predicted in the 1960s, the 

might have had a major role in its economic regulation. This development never occu

however, and the bulk of the regulatory work done by NRC focuses on safety, physi

security and environmental protection.

The NRC staff consists of approximately 3,000 employees in the headquarters and 

regional offices in the United States. The headquarters staff is divided into 11 princ

offices. Five of these formally report to the Commission as a whole, including the Offi

International Programs. Six offices report directly to the Chairman, including the Exec

Director for Operations. The four NRC regional offices report to the Chairman throug

Executive Director for Operations.

NRC Proliferation-related Activities

The proliferation-related role of the NRC is concentrated in two headquarters offices

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, under the Executive Director for

Operations, and the Office of International Programs.

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. The United States has a long

history of assisting and supporting IAEA safeguards. Many of the fundamental safeg

concepts used by the IAEA were first developed by the AEC in the 1950s and 1960s

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards is a principal heir to this expertise

participates in the interagency formulation and an international implementation of U

policy on safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear material.

As a nuclear weapon state, the United States is not routinely subject to internationa

safeguards at all its peaceful nuclear facilities. Within the United States, NRC funds 

enforces a nuclear material management safeguards system to ensure that U.S. civ

nuclear material is not diverted. On those rare occasions when the IAEA does appl

safeguards to NRC-licensed facilities in the United States, the NRC assists the IAEA 

during the blending down of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan in 1997-98).

At the international level, personnel from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards participate in advisory committees to strengthen IAEA safeguards. They 

also played a major role in supporting cooperative threat reduction activities in the fo

Soviet Union. These have included the development of nuclear material protection, co

and accounting (MPC&A) regulations in Kazakhstan, assisting the development of a

MPC&A inspection program in Russia, and developing physical protection regulatio

the Ukraine.
Office of International Programs. The Office of International Programs is the NRC focal

point for export controls. This Office has both a policy-making role and a role in deciding

on certain specific export licenses. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC, after

coordination with the executive branch, licenses exports of the following commodities:

• Nuclear reactors,

• Fuel cycle facilities,

• Components of the above,

• Reactor-grade graphite,

• Uranium,

• Plutonium, and

• “Byproduct material” from reactor operations (e.g., tritium; radioactive

waste).

In general, the NRC licenses exports of materials and commodities that are “specially

designed and prepared” for nuclear use, as that term is used in Article III of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty. NRC export regulations therefore closely follow the Zangger

Committee trigger list, intended to implement Article III.

Once these commodities and materials leave the United States, NRC loses jurisdiction

over them, even though the U.S. Government retains certain rights over them. For

example, nuclear fuel exported from the United States, or any fuel used in a U.S.-origin

reactor, may not be reprocessed without the consent of the United States. Similarly, a

reactor or fuel exported from the United States under NRC license may not be transferred

to a third state without U.S. consent. Such “consent rights” are not processed as NRC

licenses, but rather by the “subsequent arrangement” process administered by the

Department of Energy.

By law the NRC cannot license an export if the executive branch, through the State

Department, objects. The reverse is not true; in theory, the NRC could refuse to license an

export even though the executive branch strongly supported the exporter’s application. No

witness appearing before this Commission or its staff could recall an instance when that

had occurred. Should it ever happen, the Atomic Energy Act gives the President the power

to authorize the export over the NRC’s objection. (This is the one instance, mentioned

above, in which the NRC is subject to executive branch control.)

The NRC must be consulted on the following export-related programs administered by

other agencies:
72

• Proposed agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, concluded b

Department of State under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act;

• “Subsequent arrangements” by the Department of Energy under sect

131 of the Atomic Energy Act;

• Transfers of technology authorized by the Secretary of Energy under se

57b of the Atomic Energy Act; and

• Commerce Department regulations controlling dual-use exports with

potential nuclear applications, under section 309c of the Nuclear Non

Proliferation Act.

Export controls are not a major priority for the NRC, and few resources are allocated t

function. Less than one percent of the NRC staff deals with export issues, and the

workload of NRC licenses is expected to remain constant at only 75 to 100 applicat

per year. For technical expertise, the Office of International Programs primarily relie

the Department of Energy and its national laboratories. (On safeguards issues, it al

relies on the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.)

X04, 27 x 22
The Intelligence Community

The Intelligence Community (IC) consists of the 13 executive branch organizations that

conduct the range of intelligence activities constituting the total U.S. national intelligence

effort. The IC is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence, who simultaneously serves

as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In addition to the CIA, the IC includes

the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy

Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, the National Imagery and

Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the

Department of State.

One component of the IC worthy of special mention is the DCI Nonproliferation Center,

which is responsible for managing and coordinating U.S. intelligence support to

proliferation-related policy.

DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC): Background

Originally established on September 17, 1991, within the Directorate of Intelligence and

administratively subordinated to the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR),

the Nonproliferation Center’s mission was to track the worldwide development and

acquisition of production technology, designs, components, or complete military systems

in the areas of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weaponry. On

behalf of the DCI, the NPC provided IC-coordinated assessments to U.S. policy agencies

responsible for these issues and support to proliferation-related monitoring and

compliance activities, such as UN inspection teams. The Center was also tasked with

developing requirements, strategies, and data bases for IC support to U.S. policy and

enforcement agencies.

In April 1992, then-DCI Robert Gates raised NPC’s stature by making it a DCI Center and

removing it from OSWR’s administrative control. The Director of the NPC, Gordon Oehler,

became the senior IC spokesperson on proliferation-related issues. At the time, the NPC

was directed to plan and execute a proliferation-related strategic plan that actively involved

all elements of the IC. On March 25, 1993, DCI R. James Woolsey designated the Director

of the NPC as his Special Assistant for Nonproliferation. The DCI also broadened the

NPC’s mission, assigning it principal responsibility for ensuring the coordination of IC

proliferation-related analysis and support to the policy, export licensing, law-enforcement,

military, and operations communities. Specific areas were identified so that the NPC could

improve the planning, coordination, management, and effectiveness of IC proliferationrelated activities.
74

NPC: Current Authorities and Responsibilities

The NPC’s current structure was established by DCI George Tenet in October 1997

latest reorganization added to the Center five analytic elements involved in the analy

transfer networks and foreign missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

programs. Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 7/2, effective May 7, 1999

forth the role of the Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation and the mission 

NPC as follows:

The Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation shall:

• Be the DCI’s principal advisor, senior spokesperson, substantive leade

focal point on proliferation, and interrelated WMD issues both inside a

outside the Intelligence Community;

• Serve as the Non-proliferation and Counter-proliferation Issue Manag

the Intelligence Community;

• Serve as the Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center;

• Represent the DCI on interagency and international policy formulatio

implementation bodies concerned with combating proliferation;

• Establish and maintain regular and close contact with consumers to

understand their needs and how intelligence can support them, priori

consumer needs for intelligence collection, analysis, R&D, and other

support, identify intelligence shortfalls, and develop comprehensive

response strategies;

• Establish and maintain regular and close contact with collection, opera

R&D, exploitation, and analytical organizations in the Intelligence

Community to understand their capabilities and limitations, to develop

comprehensive strategies, and to represent their interests, as approp

in the planning, programming, and budget cycle;

• Advise the DCI, the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Di

of DIA), and other senior intelligence managers on the value and

effectiveness of current and future program activities and investments

related to supporting U.S. objectives for combating proliferation; and

• Serve as Chairman of the Community Nonproliferation Committee,

established under DCI Directive 3/13, and such other committees as 

be established to facilitate collaboration among the intelligence, policy

enforcement, public health, and related communities.
The DCI Nonproliferation Center, under the guidance of the DCI, shall:

• Oversee the critical role of the Intelligence Community in supporting the

formulation and implementation of U.S. policies for combating proliferation;

• Conduct timely and succinct all-source analysis on proliferation and

interrelated WMD issues;

• As directed by the DCI, and in consultation with other components as

appropriate, oversee the development and facilitate the implementation of

an Intelligence Community strategy for supporting U.S. efforts to combat

proliferation, including support to counter-proliferation activities;

• Coordinate IC support to counter-proliferation efforts, including support to

law enforcement, counterintelligence, and military operations;

• Coordinate the development of Community-wide analytic and collection

strategies, provide guidance, and establish priorities for the Intelligence

Community, based on consumer needs to increase knowledge and

understanding of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their

delivery means;

• Evaluate Intelligence Community performance, as required by the DCI and

Congress, in supporting U.S. policy objectives to combat proliferation and in

meeting consumer needs, and, in consultation with the Community

Management Staff, recommend investment changes or develop options to

optimize Intelligence Community performance;

• Oversee the identification of shortfalls and the development of strategies,

and provide guidance and priorities to the Intelligence Community’s

research and development efforts to improve intelligence capabilities for

combating proliferation;

• In coordination with the Intelligence Community, provide Congress, as

appropriate, with intelligence assessments on all aspects of proliferation

and proliferation-related Intelligence Community capabilities;

• Maintain effective relationships on issues of common concern with other

Intelligence Community Issue Managers and organizations; and
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• Develop and implement plans for facilitating the scientific and technic

relationships between Intelligence Community components and

organizations outside the IC, including private industry, academia, the

national laboratories, and the public health community, on all aspects 

combating proliferation.

As a high priority responsibility, the NPC will facilitate the Intelligence Community’s

collection, analysis, operations, and R&D efforts against foreign offensive biologica

warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) activities. It also will work with the Commun

develop plans, priorities, and guidance to significantly enhance and expand U.S.

capabilities to anticipate, assess, and counter BW and CW activities. In particular, the 

will undertake critically needed all-source analysis on the development, acquisition, 

spread of BW and CW capabilities by foreign state and non-state entities and will stim

collaborative and supplementary efforts within the Intelligence Community.
Findings of the Aspin-Brown and Jeremiah Commissions

The Aspin-Brown Commission (formally the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of

the United States Intelligence Community), chartered in 1994 to review American

intelligence, made a number of points that bear on this Commission’s findings. Although

the Intelligence Community makes a vital contribution to U.S. national security through its

mission of countering WMD proliferation, the Aspin-Brown report argued that:

• intelligence agencies need better direction from the policy level regarding

the roles they perform and what they collect and analyze;

• intelligence must be integrated with other functions of the government, such

as law enforcement, to achieve shared objectives;

• present organizational arrangements do not provide sufficiently strong

central direction, as authority is dispersed and administrative barriers

impede cooperation; and
78

• greater use must be made of experts from outside the government.

The Jeremiah Commission, chartered to evaluate the actions taken by the IC leadin

to India’s nuclear test in May 1998, provided additional perspectives and suggestion

this Commission feels still need to be addressed. The Jeremiah Commission recog

that the Indian tests posed a difficult collection and analysis problem, that India took

measures to avoid detection, and that only a handful of Indian leaders was aware o

plans. Despite those impediments, several critical issues were raised (some of whic

already been addressed by the Aspin-Brown Commission):

• an underlying mindset that India and other proliferators would behave 

would marked intelligence thinking prior to the tests and must be avoid

the future;

• outside substantive expertise must be systematically tapped, especia

during times of transition, or when new challenges emerge;

• analysts need to consider more than their own “stovepipe” of informa

• comprehensive coverage of unfriendly states must not push out analy

high-priority issues in other countries;

• because technical collection outstrips analytical resources, better too

need to exploit the data;

• senior-level attention must be paid to intelligence requirements; and

• the IC needs to improve the clarity of its structure, fix responsibilities, 

provide appropriate tools for analysts.
Department of Commerce

The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), within the Department of Commerce,

establishes, manages, and enforces export controls on dual-use goods and technologies.

These export controls are established and implemented for reasons of national security

and foreign policy, including combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, these export controls are established pursuant to our role as signatory to

proliferation-related treaties (the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical

Weapons Convention) and membership in various proliferation-related regimes (e.g., the

Nuclear Supplier’s Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime).

The underlying statutory authority stems from the Export Administration Act of 1979, as

amended (50 U.S.C app. §2401-2420). In an effort to separate the export control function

from the trade promotion function, the EAA was amended in July 1985 to designate the

position of Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration to carry out all

functions of the Secretary of Commerce as set forth in the EAA. This change gave an

independent voice to Commerce’s export control agency and elevated the agency to the

bureau level.

The EAA expired on September 30, 1990, and except for two short periods when the EAA

was extended (3/27/93-6/30/94 and 7/5/94-8/20/94), the Export Administration

Regulations (effective 3/25/96, 15 CFR §§734-774) have been continued in force by a

series of executive orders issued by Presidents Bush and Clinton under the authority

invested in them by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

The Bureau of Export Administration, with the exception of the Critical Infrastructure

Assurance Office and the Office of Antiboycott Compliance, is almost exclusively devoted

to non-proliferation efforts. There are approximately 320 employees of BXA who

administer and enforce the U.S government’s dual-use export control regime. BXA’s

funding for non-proliferation activities is approximately $43.7 million for fiscal year 1999,

with a request for approximately $51.1 million for fiscal year 2000.

BXA is divided into two major organizations, Export Administration and Export

Enforcement. In addition, within the Office of the Under Secretary for Export

Administration, there is the Non-proliferation and Export Control Cooperation Office

(NEC).

Export Administration

The Export Administration Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish and

maintain a list of goods and technologies which require an export license for export from

the United States. Export Administration (EA) is responsible for formulating a list of
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controlled items, the Commerce Control List, in consultation with other U.S. Govern

agencies, and formulating and implementing export license policy. EA promulgates 

Export Administration Regulations (EAR) which implement this policy.

Since 1991, EA has worked to refine the Commerce Control List to reflect the shift f

East-West controls to controls based on the non-proliferation efforts of the U.S. Man

commodities were decontrolled based on advances of technology and there was a

realignment of remaining controls along the proliferation-related regimes. In 1994, E

underwent a major reorganization to reflect the state of export controls in the post-C

War period. This reorganization reflected changing U.S. national security, foreign po

non-proliferation and economic security objectives. In 1991, EA undertook a major 

to implement these new objectives and rewrote the Export Administration Regulatio

entirely to streamline the export licensing process.

Export Administration is now divided into five offices, four of which are devoted larg

exclusively to activities related to combating proliferation:21

• Office of Exporter Services

• Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls

• Office of Nuclear and Missile Technology

• Office of Chemical and Biological Controls and Treaty Compliance

There are approximately 140 employees in these four offices.

EA receives, reviews, and decides export license applications for items on the Comm

Control List. EA received about 11,000 export license applications in fiscal year 199

Processing requires assessing the potential proliferation and strategic uses of an ite

verifying the end-use and end-user, and consulting with other agencies who review 

applications, including the Departments of State, Defense (DoD), Energy (DOE), an

DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) (as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation f

encryption and foreign national technology transfer cases).

In 1998, to comply with the provisions of the NDAA regarding the export of highperformance computers, EA revised the EAR to reflect the new ten-day notification

requirement prior to the export of HPCs to Tier 3 countries, which include most cou

of proliferation concern. This change resulted in about a ten percent increase in the

number of applications received by EA.

21 The Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Analysis is tangentially related to proliferation by w

to assure the competitiveness of U.S. defense industries.
Office of Exporter Services. In addition to staff at Commerce headquarters, the Office of

Exporter Services (OExS) maintains a Western Regional Office in Irvine, CA, and has one

employee resident in the Silicon Valley. These offices provide advice and consultation to

the exporting community on compliance with the EAR. OExS develops Export

Management System Guidelines that companies use to ensure compliance with the EAR

and conducts export licensing workshops in the U.S. and internationally. These seminars

provide training to U.S. exporters, freight forwarders, foreign distributors and foreign resellers of U.S. origin technology. This office also chairs the Operating Committee Informed,

the interagency process by which U.S. exporters are informed of special licensing

requirements for foreign entities of proliferation concern (the Entity List, Supp. 4 to Part

744).

Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls, Office of Nuclear and Missile

Technology, Office of Chemical and Biological Controls and Treaty Compliance.

These offices relate directly to combating proliferation and are organized according to the

multilateral proliferation-related regimes. These offices are responsible for the

development, implementation, and modification of proliferation-related export controls, as

well as controls related to sanctions and regional stability. Personnel from these offices

represent Commerce in interagency export control policy deliberations, international

multilateral export control deliberations (Wassenaar, AG, NSG and MTCR), and

international treaty deliberations (CWC and BWC).

The Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls administers national security

export controls, which include items also controlled proliferation reasons, e.g., high

performance computers. OSTFP also includes the encryption licensing division. Export

controls on encryption are not considered to be proliferation-related.

The Office of Chemical and Biological Controls and Treaty Compliance will be responsible

for industry compliance under the CWC, including receiving data declarations from U.S.

companies and facilitating domestic visits of international inspection teams. New staff,

hardware and software have been acquired to meet these new responsibilities.

These three offices are responsible for responding to classification requests from the

exporting community and processing applications for export licenses. The licensing

officers (LO’s) include technical personnel and analysts. Many of those with technical skills

were hired during the Cold War era and reflect that era’s focus on strategic technologies.

Licensing officers who have special technical expertise or are supervisors are GS-14s and

GS-15s, while others are GS-13s. BXA is recruiting personnel with technical expertise

related to proliferation technologies and some of these positions will be higher grades, but

it is still difficult to match salaries such individuals can command in the private sector.

These licensing officers are responsible for the processing of export license applications

for dual-use commodities and technologies. They do initial review of export license

applications, ensuring the proper classification of the items on the application, assessing
82

the appropriateness of the items on the application to the stated end use, and determ

potential proliferation or strategic uses of the items. The LOs develop a Commerce po

on the approval or denial of the application, along with any conditions for approval w

might be required. They then electronically refer the applications, along with Comme

recommendation, to State, DoD, DOE, FBI and NPC for review and monitor these ref

for completion within the required time frames. In fiscal year 1998, Commerce forwa

85 percent of all applications for interagency review. Those applications not referred 

other agencies included applications which contained errors and were returned to t

applicant, as well as applications for commodities which the reviewing agencies had 

delegated review authority to Commerce.

The NPC is responsible for providing intelligence information about the involvement 

parties to the application in any proliferation activities. License applications are rece

electronically by the NPC and reporting, classified up to the secret level, is returned

electronically (information classified above secret is communicated in hard copy for

Licensing Officers generally have secret-level security clearances. When informatio

received from NPC is classified above the secret level, it must be referred to and revi

by an official at BXA with the appropriate clearance.

The other agencies review the license applications referred to them for strategic or

proliferation concerns. Each agency electronically communicates its position on the

approval or denial of the application back to BXA. The reviewing agencies are requi

respond within 30 days; if no position is received from an agency within that time fra

is assumed their position is one of approval. The LOs communicate with the export

obtain any additional information required by the reviewing agencies to support the

application. If, after review of the intelligence information and the positions of the revie

agencies, there is a dispute among the agencies as to approval or denial, the applic

for export license is raised to the Operating Committee.

The Operating Committee. The Operating Committee, positioned within the Office 

Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, is a sub-committee of the Advisory

Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) and is the first step in the interagency disputeresolution process. The OC is comprised of the agencies with review authority (NPC

participates as an observer) and is chaired by BXA. The Chair decides whether to ap

or deny an application for export license which has been escalated to the OC. The O

a staff of four and anticipates handling about 2000 applications in fiscal year1999.

The OC conducts weekly meetings where the disputed applications are discussed a

the representatives of the agencies. Licensing officers from the appropriate BXA lice

office also participate in the discussions. The agencies express their concerns abou

specific export license applications and discuss how and whether such concerns ca

adequately addressed by obtaining additional information or imposing conditions on 

export. Decisions focus on two major proliferation issues: the utility of the item in

proliferation projects and the proliferation activity of the end user.
The OC weighs the intelligence information provided by the NPC and the other agencies,

e.g., DoD intelligence concerning national security matters and DoE intelligence

concerning nuclear end-uses and end-users. The reviewing agencies expressed that NPC

intelligence information provided to the OC is somewhat less useful in the interagency

review process. Older information may not take into account conversion of former defense

facilities to peaceful activities or may miss more recent activities of proliferation programs

of concern. Some intelligence community units do not include NPC in the distribution of

their reports and this raises the possibility that a licensing decision will be made in

ignorance of current, relevant intelligence.

The OC chair has said more information about end users is often necessary to supplement

the intelligence information. In addition, the exclusive use of intelligence information may

limit its usefulness in taking final export control actions because of the necessity to protect

sources and methods. The wealth of information now available from open sources would

greatly assist the OC in vetting end users in escalated cases. When open source research

yields adequate information, export license decisions can be made without harm to

intelligence sources and methods. However, neither the OC nor the NPC has adequate

staff to conduct extensive open source research. The NPC currently examines

approximately 10,000 export licenses, and has recently been given additional

responsibilities regarding the export of commercial satellite. The NPC has advised BXA

they cannot review all export licenses, and that they cannot review high-performance

computer exports due to resource constraints. The Operating Committee, with a staff of

four to process 2000 escalated applications, has extremely limited resources.

After discussion, the chair polls the agencies for their positions and then renders a

decision, which ranges from tabling the application while additional information is obtained

to approval or denial. If any agency dissents from the OC’s decision, they may escalate the

application to the full ACEP.

Export Enforcement

Export Enforcement (EE) is charged with preventing and investigating dual-use export

control violations. As part of this mission, EE works to ensure that controls on dual-use

items useful in the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile

delivery systems are enforced.

Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, senior analysts work

with the State Department on a regular basis on foreign export control developments.

Enforcement also participates in a number of interagency working groups chaired by State,

including the Technology Transfer Working Group, the Missile Trade Analysis Group,

SHIELD and the Nuclear Export Violations Working Group.
84

Export Enforcement is comprised of three offices: The Office of Export Enforcemen

Office of Enforcement Analysis, and the Office of Antiboycott Compliance. The Offic

Antiboycott Compliance has no duties related to combating proliferation. Export

Enforcement has about 150 employees who have direct responsibility for non-prolife

activities; 107 are special agents with full police powers whose sole responsibility is 

enforcement of the Export Administration Regulations. The Office of Enforcement An

is located in headquarters. The Office of Export Enforcement headquarters include

Intelligence and Field Support Division. This division is comprised of special agents 

analysts and interfaces on a daily basis with EA and with other government agencie

including the Intelligence Community. One special agent from OEE headquarters is

detailed to the NPC. The Office of Export Enforcement has eight field offices staffed 

special agents and located near major ports and technology centers.

Office of Export Enforcement

There has been a change in the nature and direction of EE’s work over the past ten 

with the end of CoCom, the deregulation of many dual-use items and the globalizat

trade. Within the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE), non-proliferation efforts are ca

out on a regular basis. The Office of Export Enforcement has developed proliferatio

related cases by focusing on end users and end uses of items subject to the EAA an

EAR.

OEE’s efforts are primarily focused on investigating and interdicting illegal transactio

well as prosecutions for violations. OEE’s special agents receive information about

potential or past violations from a variety of sources, including the intelligence comm

other law enforcement agencies and to a significant degree, the exporting commun

OEE’s special agents have full police powers granted by the Export Administration A

upon expiration of the Act however, OEE special agents have had to be deputized b

U.S. Marshal's Service in order to continue their law enforcement powers. OEE's sp

agents conduct and participate in criminal investigations using all investigative resou

including undercover operations, detention and seizure of illicit exports, execution o

search warrants, arrest, and criminal prosecution. In fiscal year 1998, OEE had 40

detentions, executed 11 search warrants, arrested 5 individuals, indicted 7 individual

5 companies, and convicted 13 individuals and 4 companies. So far in fiscal year 19

OEE has executed 8 search warrants and arrested 7. Criminal penalties totaled

$11,473,00 in fiscal year 1998. While many investigations are successfully conclud

OEE alone, some investigations are worked jointly with the U.S. Customs Service w

shares jurisdiction of the EAA with OEE. Some investigations are joint cases with th

when transactions fall under the jurisdictions of both the FBI and OEE.

OEE special agents also investigate and refer for administrative sanctions violations 

EAR which do not meet the level of a criminal prosecution. In fiscal year 1998, Comm

levied $2,549,000 in administrative penalties. Denial of export privileges is a very
important weapon in BXA’s arsenal. Prohibiting a company from engaging in or benefiting

from any U.S. export transaction is a penalty too high for many companies. In fiscal year

1998, 29 individuals and companies were denied export privileges.

Because Export Enforcement can interface with Export Administration regarding export

license applications, EE is able to detect, prevent and interdict illegal exports of WMDrelated goods and technology. EA’s export licensing database is also a source of

information about potential illicit transactions. All OEE personnel have the ability to review,

and make a recommendation on, any application for export license. Special agents can

flag companies who produce targeted technologies, parties who are under investigation,

or parties who have been identified either by the IC or through investigation as front

companies for entities of concern. Once notified an application has been filed, special

agents can request a pre-license check be conducted to determine the bona fides of the

purchaser. If the legitimacy of the transaction cannot be established, OEE special agents

can recommend rejection of the application. In fiscal year 1998, OEE reviewed 5,500

applications for export licenses, conducted 275 pre-license checks and recommended

rejection or return without action of 164 applications, thirty of which were based on

unfavorable pre-license checks.

OEE also requests and performs post-shipment verifications for commodities exported

from the U.S. to verify the goods were received by the declared end-user and are being

used in accordance with the conditions of the license. As part of OEE’s safeguards

program, pairs of special agents visited various countries identified as being of concern

because they are either countries of proliferation concern or potential diversion locations.

The special agents conduct in-person site visits in those countries to inspect commodities

received from the U.S. During 12 visits to 21 countries in fiscal year 1998, OEE conducted

289 post-shipment verifications. An additional 111 post-shipment verifications were

performed by personnel at American embassies at the request of OEE or other units within

BXA. Six post-shipment verifications resulted in information that required further

enforcement action.

The NDAA of 1998 mandated that BXA conduct post-shipment verification of all highperformance computers exported to Tier 3 destinations. OEE established a five-person

unit to coordinate and supervise all enforcement responsibilities under the NDAA,

including receiving the post-shipment reporting for these exports. Due to the large number

of required high-performance computer post-shipment verifications, OEE has had to

devote significant resources to conduct those checks. Four of the twelve Export

Enforcement safeguards visits were devoted primarily to NDAA-mandated post-shipment

verifications of high performance computers. Thus fewer resources and less flexibility are

available to conduct post-shipment verifications on commodities and technologies that

might have a more direct impact on proliferation projects.
86

Because OEE has a larger national field presence than EA, special agents conduct

outreach activities to educate the exporting community about its responsibility to co

with U.S. export laws. Special agents not only participate in the export control semi

conducted by EA but also visit exporters and freight forwarders on a regular basis. 

year, OEE conducts Business Executive Enforcement Team meetings in several loca

around the country. This visibility within the exporting community provides exporters 

a face and a name to contact when they have concerns and OEE special agents re

a large number of tips and leads regarding suspicious transactions from industry sou

OEE special agents conducted over 1,200 outreach contacts in fiscal year 1998.

Office of Enforcement Analysis. The Office of Enforcement Analysis (OEA) is sta

with analysts who conduct data analysis from a variety of sources to stem the prolife

of goods and technology which would contribute to WMD projects. Two major initiative

the Shipper’s Export Declaration (SED) Review program and the Visa Review progr

The Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations (15 CFR Part 30) and the Export Administ

Regulations require the filing of a Shipper’s Export Declaration for almost all exports 

the U.S. These declarations identify the exporter; the consignee; the Schedule B

identifying code, which generally describes the commodity being exported; the licen

designation or license exception; and the country of destination. Currently SEDs ar

received by the U.S. Government primarily on a post shipment basis and largely in p

form. The current system is very limited as an interdiction tool and would benefit hu

from mandatory participation in an automated export clearance process. (See below

While EE’s special agents conduct periodic reviews of SEDs at freight forwarders a

the ports, OEA conducts SED reviews on a post-shipment basis. OEA receives a

computerized index of select SED information from the Census Bureau which collect

retains the information from the SEDs. The index allows a search based on targeted fi

With the search results, analysts can examine transactions for further review, focusi

certain license exception shipments, shipments of commodities of proliferation conc

and shipments bound for certain destinations. When SEDs indicate a possible viola

OEA analysts refer the matter to special agents in the field. In fiscal year 1998, OEA

analysts referred 363 SED review cases to the field.

Enforcement initiated the Visa Review Program in 1990, which examines applicatio

visas from an export control and technology transfer perspective. In fiscal year 1998

Enforcement restructured the program developing new criteria and thresholds again

which incoming visa applications are evaluated. The focus is narrower and concent

on specific technologies targeted for use in WMD projects. When a specific visa

application raises concerns, OEA analysts can request special agents in the field co

additional investigation into the proposed visit. Based on OEA and OEE information 

recommendations, the State Department has in the past declined to issue visas due 

risk of transfer of sensitive technology and in a few cases, analysts have uncovered 

fraud which was referred to State’s Fraud Unit for further investigation.
Non-proliferation and Export Control Cooperation. The Non-proliferation and Export

Control Cooperation (NEC) unit, within the Under Secretary’s office, develops and

strengthens foreign national export control systems to prevent terrorists and unfriendly

states acquiring nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; missile delivery systems; and

other sensitive materials. Currently, the NEC effort engages the governments of 23

countries in the Baltics, Central Europe and the New Independent States (NIS). The goal

of BXA’s export control cooperation mission is to foster high-level political commitment;

sound legal, regulatory, and organizational infrastructures; and a cadre of capable, welltrained government officials to administer effective national export control systems in the

NIS. The NEC strategy is to work cooperatively with foreign governments and assist them

in strengthening and implementing their own export control systems.

In fiscal year 1998, NEC conducted 41 technical exchanges in 23 countries. The central

theme for these technical exchange programs was to familiarize the countries with the

elements that constitute an effective export control system and assist them in developing

their own export control systems. Toward this goal, licensing procedures and processes

were shared, preventive enforcement techniques were explained, and case studies were

presented. The need for government and industry cooperation on export control matters

was emphasized and demonstrated. NEC also presented automation program techniques

to simplify a country’s export control system.

The NEC has a dedicated staff of nine individuals and draws on the skills and talents from

other units in BXA when needed, e.g., enforcement personnel for exchanges with foreign

enforcement personnel. Funds for NEC’s activities are currently derived from the State

Department’s Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, De-Mining and Related Activities account.

However, these funds are not used to justify positions or pay government salaries. Thus

BXA directly funds a small staff without a direct appropriation for this purpose. Attempts to

obtain direct funding in the last two years have failed. In addition, only recently has State

changed its policy to allow up to 4 percent of the funds to be used to cover travel by U.S.

Government employees.

When funds are approved by State for BXA/NEC’s activities, the timing of receipt of the

funds complicates NEC’s efforts to work with these countries. In fiscal year 1999, NEC has

established a goal of 45 technical exchanges, including several industry-government

programs. However, such industry-government programs require the development and

preparation of written internal compliance programs reflecting the host country’s laws,

regulations and processes and must be translated into the country’s language. Such

projects require a six-month lead time. However, as of April 1999, BXA had not received

funding for fiscal year 1999 projects. Such a delay makes it very difficult to plan a full year’s

activities.
88

Department of the Treasury

United States Customs Service

The United States Customs Service was established in 1789 by the first Congress o

United States. Customs became part of the Treasury Department in 1875. The

Commissioner of the Customs Service reports to the Under Secretary of the Treasu

(Enforcement).

The Customs Service ensures that all imports and exports comply with U.S. laws a

regulations. Customs conducts investigations into possible violations of laws and

regulations relating to imports and exports. It is also responsible for the interdiction 

seizing of contraband, including WMD-related material. Customs currently has abo

7,400 inspectors working at 300 ports of entry and exit, along with 2,800 special ag

who investigate possible violations of law. The inspectors are housed in Customs’s O

of Field Operations, while the special agents are located in the Office of Investigatio

These two offices, each of which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner, handle th

of Customs’s WMD-related activities.

To ensure that Customs can fulfill its responsibilities, Congress has granted Custom

officers broad border-search authority. Customs agents can conduct warrantless sea

of any person or package that is entering or leaving the United States. They can als

detain merchandise to ensure compliance with U.S. laws and regulations.

X08, 18 x 18
The Customs Service’s response to the Commission’s baseline survey stated that

Customs currently has “few programs exclusively devoted to non-proliferation.”

Unsurprisingly, no Customs officials are dedicated to WMD detection and interdiction. The

baseline survey response also states that “Customs accounting system does not allow for

direct identification of non-proliferation activities.”

Although awareness of the WMD threat has grown in recent years, most people continue

to regard the detection and interdiction of narcotics as Customs’s primary duty. This can

lead to situations in which WMD issues do not receive the attention (and the resources)

they require and in which WMD-related skills and expertise are not as highly valued as they

ought to be. The Commission’s recommendation that Customs create an office devoted to

WMD detection and interdiction is intended to prevent such situations.

Automated Export System

The Automated Export System (AES) is a voluntary program designed both to facilitate the

clearance of goods being exported from the United States and to provide better, more

timely reporting to the U.S. Government. AES allows for the electronic completion and

submission of information that must otherwise be submitted on a shipper’s export

declaration (SED). There over 1 million exports from the United States each month, yet

only about 3 percent of all exports are cleared through AES. The remainder are split

between manual filing and reporting through the Automated Export Reporting Program

(AERP), the Commerce Department’s monthly electronic SED filing program.

The information that exporters must report, whether on a paper SED or through AES,

includes the identities of foreign and domestic parties to the transaction, a description

(including number, weight, and value) of the commodities to be exported, license authority

for the export, the port of export, the carrier, and the port of unloading. In contrast to the

current paper-based system, which allows exporters to submit export data up to four days

after departure, AES is designed to clear shipments on a pre-departure basis.

The information required by AES would be useful in the identification and interdiction of

illicit WMD-related exports. Customs has a companion system to AES, known as the

Automated Targeting System—Anti-Terrorism (ATS-AT), which was initially designed to

screen air shipments for possible threats to aviation safety.22 The ATS-AT, however, has

certain rules and validations programmed in against which AES will match incoming AES

records. There are now approximately 1,500 rules that include such factors as the Denied

Parties List, the Entities List, State Department Registrants, and chemical precursors for

22 There is currently a pilot program at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, with plans to expand it to 14 other

ports in the next year.
90

narcotics. When AES matches shipments against these rules, the shipments are ass

a score based on weight associated with the rules. Inspectors can search through

shipments and see the scores automatically assigned by ATS-AT.

In addition, ATS-AT allows inspectors and other law-enforcement officials to enter s

criteria that can be matched to outbound shipments. For example, an agent could inp

name of a foreign party that investigative or intelligence information has identified as a 

company for a proliferation end user. The agent could also enter the likely port of ex

and the value, weight and description of a shipment, if known. If shipments address

that foreign party were filed through the AES, the shipments would be flagged. Law

enforcement would then have the opportunity to hold and examine the flagged shipm

thus facilitating interdiction.

The information collected by AES would be particularly useful in analyzing the acqu

methods and networks of proliferators. If officials noted the export of a combination 

WMD-related items to a particular country of concern, that knowledge would be use

supporting either counter-proliferation efforts or diplomatic efforts with that country. 

information would also provide information about the degree of development of a cou

WMD programs.

Customs does not require exporters to use AES, and participation levels remain extre

low. With the significant technological advances that have been made since 1995, i

appropriate now to begin phasing in mandatory participation in AES. There is an initia

to businesses to develop or obtain AES software or to contract with a service to file 

AES. If there is concern about the burden mandatory participation would have on s

business, however, it might be more appropriate to create an exemption for such

businesses than to define the entire process around their concerns. In addition, som

resistance to participation in AES is based on a long-standing situation in which expo

have been allowed to file on a post-departure basis, either on a de facto basis beca

carriers can file up to four days after departure, or through the AERP, the Commerc

Department’s monthly electronic SED filing program, which is set to expire on Dece

31, 1999. Therefore, there is currently little or no incentive to participate in AES.

Only about 30,000 exports per month are processed through AES and the program 

basically funded for the current level of participation. Beginning in fiscal year 1999, 

Customs Service has a separate line-item appropriation for AES. Customs is expec

many of the participants in the Department of Commerce’s electronic filing program 

convert to AES when the Commerce program expires. Significantly higher participa

rates will tax the AES system, which suffers from occasional hardware problems ev

its current low level of participation. However, as participation in AES increases, the

be a corresponding decrease in the data entry burden for the Bureau of Census, wh

now manually enters information from 500,000 paper SEDs into the Foreign Trade

Statistics database each month in addition to electronic filings.
An additional benefit to the Bureau of Census will be a significant reduction in errors on

the SEDs. Several reviews of SEDs have revealed that one of every two SEDs contains

some type of error. Due to the built-in validation functions of the AES, shipments cleared

through AES have an error rate of about 7 percent.

Customs International Programs

The U.S. Customs Service runs a number of programs with the customs services of other

countries. These usually involve the provision of training, equipment, or both to members

of foreign customs agencies

Under Project Amber, which first received funding in 1994, the Customs Service offers

basic and advanced training courses to customs officials in Eastern Europe and the Baltic

states. These courses stress identification, detection, interdiction, and investigations. The

courses include both classroom work and exercises in the field, and they are tailored to

take into account the specific problems of the target country. The State Department’s NonProliferation and Disarmament Fund, established by the Freedom Support Act, provides

funding for the program. In 1996, Congress authorized the purchase of specialized x-ray

vans with nuclear detection capabilities. The United States provides these vans to customs

agencies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The countries that have received training under Project Amber include the Czech Republic,

Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. X-ray van training has been

completed in all of those countries as well as in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Malta,

Romania, and Slovenia.

Project Amber is scheduled to terminate at the end of fiscal year 2000, although there are

some efforts underway to extend it.

The Department of Defense/U.S. Customs Service Counterproliferation Training Program

was authorized by the fiscal year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. Its basic

training course builds on Project Amber, stressing border interdiction methods and the

proper use of interdiction equipment.

The program also includes a course at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, where

the Department of Energy’s Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response

Training Center is located. Officials from six former Soviet republics and four Eastern

European countries have taken the course, which is called the RADACAD International

Border Security Training. These officials have returned to their countries equipped to pass

on their training to their colleagues.
92

The Counterproliferation program also assigns U.S. Customs officials, when request

another country, to serve as advisors to that country’s law-enforcement agencies. Adv

are drawn from the Customs Service’s senior ranks, and serve for up to five months

Bulgaria and Romania are among the countries that have participated in this part o

program.

The Georgian Border Security Program began in 1998. It seeks to enhance the qua

border controls in a country that both contains an important oil pipeline and is a ma

transit corridor for smugglers who move material from Russia to Europe and to the M

East. In addition to the standard detection and interdiction training, the program inc

“integrity classes” that seek to minimize corruption among Georgian customs agent

border guards. It also involves the provision of equipment, including (among other th

32 vehicles for the Georgian Border Guard, seven vehicles for the Georgian Custom

Department, bulletproof vests, radiation detector pagers, and uniforms.

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an interagen

group that was created in 1975. The Secretary of the Treasury chairs the eleven-me

body. The other members are the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce; th

Attorney General; the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Di

of the Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Nationa

Security Affairs; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Assistant to the President for

Economic Policy, and the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers.

In 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade and

Competitiveness Act of 1988. Section 5021 of the Act, which is known as the Exon-

provision, amends Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. As amended

Section 721 authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit any foreign acquisition 

merger with, a U.S. corporation if he finds “credible evidence that the foreign entity

exercising control might take action that threatens [U.S.] national security.”

Since 1988, CFIUS has administered the Exon-Florio provision. Once CFIUS is notifi

a proposed purchase or merger, it has 30 days to conduct a preliminary review. If C

concludes from that the proposed purchase or merger could have implications for na

security, it has 45 days in which to conduct a thorough investigation. At the conclus

an investigation CFIUS must provide a report and recommendation to the President

President then has 15 days to make a final decision on whether to permit the propo

purchase or merger to go forward. The President must communicate these decision

Congress.
The Exon-Florio provision does not define “national security,” but the conference report

that accompanied it noted that the term was to be interpreted broadly. Exon-Florio does

provide that the government may consider, among other factors, the “potential effects of

the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology

to any country” identified by the Secretary of State as a “country of concern regarding

missile proliferation,” or “the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons” or the sale

of military goods, equipment, or technology to a country on the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Special Country List.” This indicates that WMD proliferation should be considered within

CFIUS’s jurisdiction. However, the reference to sales of “military goods, equipment, or

technology” could be interpreted to mean that dual-use equipment and technology is not

within the Committee’s purview. Moreover, the use of the term “sales” is troubling, since

most countries that pursue WMD programs attempt to develop an indigenous capability to

produce such weapons, rather than seeking to buy WMD outright. The “sales” reference

also overlooks the possibility that countries or groups will acquire WMD technology

through espionage rather than commercial channels.