The Terrorist Threat to 

the US Homeland

 

 July 2007 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community 

(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and 

acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the 

Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters. 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with: 

• Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are 

no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security; 

• Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and 

• Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as 

present results. 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a bridge 

between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on 

critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence Community 

collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished, 

and unbiased information. Its primary functions are to: 

• Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and 

other senior policymakers. 

• Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence 

Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security 

concerns. 

• Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to 

task the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions. 

• Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector—and use 

alternative analyses and new analytic tools—to broaden and deepen the Intelligence 

Community's perspective. 

NIEs are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security 

issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding 

the likely course of future events. 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND THE NIE PROCESS

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most 

authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US 

civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests. 

NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily 

“estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and 

identify the implications for US policy. 

The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers, 

Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). 

Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant National Intelligence Officer is responsible for 

producing a concept paper, or terms of reference (TOR), and circulates it throughout the 

Intelligence Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions, 

determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or 

more IC analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to 

critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the 

relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE. 

Working with their Agencies, representatives also assign the level of confidence they have 

in key judgments. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the 

National Clandestine Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any 

that have been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned. 

All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is 

composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are 

briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs 

normally takes at least several months. 

The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI. 

These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence 

Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last two years the IC has: 

• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and 

technical judgments. The Director of CIA, as the National HUMINT Manager, as 

well as the Directors of NSA, NGA, and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now 

required to submit formal assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and 

overall credibility of their sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE. 

• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that 

explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the difference 

between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted 

effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for 

such differences and to display them prominently in the Key Judgments. 
THE US HOMELAND THREAT ESTIMATE: HOW IT WAS PRODUCED

The Estimate, Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland, followed the standard process for 

producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), including a thorough review of 

sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, the use of alternative analysis, and review by 

outside experts. Starting in October 2006, the NIC organized a series of roundtables with 

IC experts to scope out terms of reference (TOR) for the Estimate. Drafters from 

throughout the Community contributed to the draft. In May, a draft was submitted to IC 

officers in advance of a series of coordination meetings that spanned several days. The 

National Clandestine Service, FBI, and other IC collection officers reviewed the text for 

the reliability and proper use of the sourcing. As part of the normal coordination process, 

analysts had the opportunity--and were encouraged--to register “dissents” and provide 

alternative analysis. Reactions by the two outside experts who read the final product were 

highlighted in the text. The National Intelligence Board, composed of the heads of the 16 

IC agencies and chaired by the ODNI, reviewed and approved the Estimate on 21 June. As 

with other NIEs, it is being distributed to senior Administration officials and Members of 

Congress. 

 
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language 

When we use words such as “we judge” or “we assess”—terms we use synonymously—

as well as “we estimate,” “likely” or “indicate,” we are trying to convey an analytical 

assessment or judgment. These assessments, which are based on incomplete or at times 

fragmentary information are not a fact, proof, or knowledge. Some analytical judgments 

are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which 

serve as building blocks. In either type of judgment, we do not have “evidence” that 

shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues. 

Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community’s 

sense of the probability of a development or event. Assigning precise numerical ratings 

to such judgments would imply more rigor than we intend. The chart below provides a 

rough idea of the relationship of terms to each other. 

We do not intend the term “unlikely” to imply an event will not happen. We use 

“probably” and “likely” to indicate there is a greater than even chance. We use words 

such as “we cannot dismiss,” “we cannot rule out,” and “we cannot discount” to reflect 

an unlikely—or even remote—event whose consequences are such it warrants 

mentioning. Words such as “may be” and “suggest” are used to reflect situations in 

which we are unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is 

nonexistent, sketchy, or fragmented. 

In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood, we also 

ascribe “high,” “moderate,” or “low” confidence levels based on the scope and quality of 

information supporting our judgments. 

• “High confidence” generally indicates our judgments are based on high-quality 

information and/or the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid 

judgment. 

• “Moderate confidence” generally means the information is interpreted in various 

ways, we have alternative views, or the information is credible and plausible but not 

corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. 

• “Low confidence” generally means the information is scant, questionable, or very 

fragmented and it is difficult to make solid analytic inferences, or we have significant 

concerns or problems with the sources. 
Key Judgments 

We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next 

three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially alQa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by 

these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities. 

We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years 

have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led 

terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These 

measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11. 

• We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as 

9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge. 

Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central 

leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni 

communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has 

protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a 

safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational 

lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of 

individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge 

that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here. 

• As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat 

environment.

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland 

through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida 

will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its 

most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack 

the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to 

energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and 

indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks. 

We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent 

political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, 

visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US 

population. The group is proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive 

devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and overcoming security obstacles. 

• We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use 

them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability. 
We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks outside the United 

States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three 

years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran. 

We assess that the spread of radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites, increasingly 

aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating 

cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim 

population is expanding, including in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US 

law enforcement of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States—

who are becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the 

global extremist movement—points to the possibility that others may become sufficiently 

radicalized that they will view the use of violence here as legitimate. We assess that this 

internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however. 

We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often referred to as “single-issue” groups 

by the FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent 

histories, but we assess this violence is likely to be on a small scale. 

We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable 

even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify and 

intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized 

terrorist organization, training camp, or leader. 

• The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment 

will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt 

plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local 

level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of 

terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.