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36–063PDF 2007

DEAL OR NO DEAL: THE STATE OF THE

TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 14, 2007

Serial No. 110–77

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

AMANDA SLOAT, Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Chairman, International Committee 

on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims ................................................................... 7

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Illinois: Prepared statement ................................................................. 39

(1)

DEAL OR NO DEAL: THE STATE OF THE 

TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP 

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos 

(chairman of the committee) Presiding. 

Chairman LANTOS. The committee will come to order. 

For decades during the Cold War, the United States and Europe 

had a steadfast alliance with a palpable purpose. We stood shoulder to shoulder to stave off the menace of the Soviet Union. The 

relationship was seemingly unbreakable because communism represented an existential threat to the very foundations of human 

freedom. But now, without that unifying force, the trans-atlantic 

alliance has become tattered like a flag that has weathered one too 

many hurricanes. 

The United States is partly to blame with our my-way-or-thehighway approach. But the Europeans are also at fault because 

often they leave us doing the heavy lifting. Young men and women 

from New York and San Francisco and Ames, Iowa, are daily giving their lives in defense of freedom while their counterparts in 

Bonn and Paris stroll the avenues admiring Europe’s great prosperity. 

The wealth and security enjoyed by Europe today is a direct result of the American security umbrella granted Europe after World 

War II. But instead of doing their part to keep this umbrella upright, Europe continues to rely on our shelter. 

The military spending of all of its countries combined is dwarfed 

by U.S. military spending. And so the trans-atlantic relationship 

has gone off course, adrift in competing priorities and missed opportunities. 

A case in point: Last week, at the close of the G–8 summit, leaders of the world’s most powerful countries strolled confidently 

across a sprawling bucolic lawn in Germany to hold a press conference only to deliver the contents of a hollow script. 

The G–8’s tentative commitment to global warming had been watered down because the United States refused reasonable pollution 

targets offered by the Europeans. The G–8’s commitment to renew 

our efforts to save Afghanistan did not bind European nations to 

any specific goals. The commitment to stop the horrendous regime 

in Iran from developing nuclear weapons was diluted beyond rec-
2

ognition, and there simply was no commitment to meaningful action to end the persecution and slaughter in Darfur. 

All of these missed opportunities represent more than just items 

on a list. Between the risk to the environment and the risk to the 

freedom and security of people across the globe, the very health of 

the planet is at stake. The Europeans and the United States could 

not face a more dire and morally fraught agenda. 

Americans and Europeans, working together, need to seize the 

opportunity to revitalize NATO, a revitalization process that begins 

in Afghanistan. A NATO victory there would be a lifeline for the 

future of the alliance, proof of NATO’s continued relevance in the 

post-Cold War world. 

Our friends in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have 

bravely let their troops be placed in harm’s way for the sake of 

NATO’s all-important mission in Afghanistan. But some other European nations must live up to their convictions by following suit 

rather than ducking the front lines. 

If French and German soldiers aren’t willing to serve on the 

front lines, Afghanistan could devolve once again into a state sponsored launching pad for terror. And so it symbolizes another opportunity for the trans-atlantic alliance to lead in wiping out the 

scourge of global terrorism. 

Since the September 11th attacks, the United States and the European Union have embarked on a massive effort to crack down on 

terror groups. But if the collaboration is going to work, it is imperative that the EU and the U.S. solve our significant differences on 

extradition, information sharing, visa waivers and other things. 

If we are serious about cracking down on rogue regimes, the Europeans need to do much more on Iran. Ahmadinejad’s abhorrent 

reign represents the most destabilizing existential security threat 

on the globe today. The European Union and the United States 

must jointly enact powerful sanctions that prevent anyone from 

doing business with Iran’s energy sector. But many individual European nations have clearly decided it is more important to make 

money by doing business with Iran than to recognize its threat to 

our society. Shame on them. 

Our joint world leadership with the Europeans should not end 

with the battle against authoritarian state sponsors of terror. It 

must extend to regions where freedom itself is suppressed. That is 

why the EU must exert its influence on Russia not to block a U.N. 

Security Council resolution putting Kosova on a path to independence. The people of that war-torn region have lived a nightmare, 

and they deserve their freedom. 

Freedoms are being suppressed to an alarming extent in the 

former Soviet domain under Russian President Putin. I am deeply 

concerned by Putin’s pattern of abuse and suppression of dissidents, independent journalists and, in fact, anyone who opposes 

him. 

Europe cannot shrink from this issue. They and we must seize 

the opportunity to confront Putin head on by condemning his more 

barbaric practices while working with him on issues like North 

Korea and Iran. It is in this spirit that, next week, our committee 

will meet with its counterparts in the Russian Duma in a first-ever 

open session, a groundbreaking opportunity to discuss the most 
3

weighty matters of mutual interest in full view of the public, the 

issues that divide us and the areas of common ground. 

Two days ago, I gave a speech at the dedication of a memorial 

just a few blocks from here to remember victims of communism and 

the role played in bringing the Cold War to an end. We can no 

more let a society such as Russia slip back into that repressive 

nightmare than permit others to force on the world their own 

brand of totalitarianism through terror. 

In the last century, we bravely wiped out Nazism and communism. The challenges today are no less daunting. This is the 

time to right the ship of trans-atlantic relations and to give it new 

direction. All the opportunities we have missed in recent years 

yield new challenges in the years ahead. 

In this century we must renew the great trans-atlantic alliance 

and more purposefully turn its efforts toward fighting terrorism, 

opposing oppression and halting global warming. We cannot afford 

to miss any more opportunities. 

It is now my pleasure to turn to my colleague, the distinguished 

ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to make any opening remarks she wishes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As always, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing and I am also pleased to 

join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our distinguished panelist, 

former Secretary of State Eagleburger, to our committee this morning. 

Since the end of the Cold War 15 years ago, and the removal of 

the threat of Soviet invasion that has bound us so closely together, 

we have been waiting and watching to see how the relationship between the United States and Europe might change. We can see 

that the European countries are undergoing significant changes. 

That is going to have a very significant and important impact on 

our relationship with the individual countries. 

Right now, of course, we have a change in leadership taking 

place in France, with the election of the new President, and in Britain, where Tony Blair will soon be stepping down and be succeeded 

as prime minister by Gordon Brown. And this follows the rise of 

Angela Merkel to the office of chancellor in Germany as well as the 

change in leadership post in Italy. Also, in Poland, there have been 

changes in the foreign and domestic posts and the people who head 

those, the famous brothers in Poland. 

These leadership changes in some of the most important states 

of Europe are taking place against the backdrop of more fundamental political economic and demographic changes. The rapid expansion of the European Union over the past decade has apparently led to a sort of ‘‘Euro fatigue’’ among many Western Europeans, as demonstrated by the refusal of the French and Dutch voters to approve the proposed Constitution for the EU. 

And within the EU, there has long been a sense of concern 

among its many member states over the leading roles that France 

and Germany have played within that organization. The relationship of France and Germany within the EU is also undergoing 

change with Germany entering a new foreign policy phase, now 

more willing to take the political lead within Europe that it has 

long ceded to France. 
4

As Germany now seeks to revive the drive to adopt an EU Constitution of some sort, critical questions for EU members remain. 

How much more of their sovereignty are they willing to cede to the 

EU? What greater role will the EU have in formulating foreign policy on behalf of all of its members? And in much of the EU, large 

minority communities have taken root and present Europe with a 

challenge of assimilation that it has not yet mastered. 

And, finally, many of the leading European states are saddled 

with expensive social welfare programs that weigh down economic 

growth, despite the influence in Europe of some of the world’s most 

advanced industries. With this and much more taking place within 

Europe, and with somewhat unpredictable political trends further 

to the east in Ukraine and perhaps Russia, with the question of the 

status of Kosova still unresolved and with the feeling of authoritarian movement alive and well in Belarus and Russia, the United 

States must find a way to maintain the strength of our trans-atlantic relationship in order to ensure European cooperation on issues 

that concern us mutually: Global security, stability and the future 

of democracy. 

We continue, of course, to seek to underline a new mission for 

the NATO alliance that goes beyond Europe to support collective 

security in places like Afghanistan and perhaps in strife-torn African regions, but we are also searching for ways to ensure that the 

leading states of Europe see the necessity to vigorously stand up 

to specific challenges that now confront us. We have an Iran that 

is clearly seeking nuclear weapons. With such weapons, it might 

well achieve its goal of regional domination and drive other states 

to acquire their own nuclear capabilities to offset this aggression. 

The United States is moving forward with a program of defense 

against missiles that might be launched by rogue regimes such as 

Iran, but it is not yet clear where some of the leading European 

states stand on such efforts. 

We have a peace process in the Middle East that can either move 

in a constructive way or end up supporting terrorist elements. And 

the U.S. and the EU need to work in coordination with each other 

to support those who are committed to peaceful coexistence, to security and to freedom. 

These are but a few of the many issues that comprise the everevolving trans-atlantic relationship. Mr. Chairman, I look forward 

to hearing from our esteemed witness, a good friend of our committee, on this and other issues that comprise this ever-evolving relationship with our friends across the Atlantic. 

Thank you, as always, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Congressman Sheila Jackson Lee, would you like to make an 

opening statement? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I first want to thank the witness 

for his presence and certainly for his service, to acknowledge my 

chairman and ranking member for being kindly responsive to the 

ever-moving and ever-changing dynamics of the full world order. 

This question, I believe, is a prime and important question because 

the United States has always counted its alliance with Europe and 

the European, if you will, diplomatic entities, whether it is NATO, 
5

it is the European Parliament or other bilateral organizations, as 

a strong component of her foreign policy. 

I am reminded of a visit that a number of us as Members of Congress made in the 1990s to then Chancellor Kohl. We walked into 

the room and expected a greeting in the beginning of some long discussions, and he asked as we walked in without a moment to sit 

down, ‘‘Where have you been?’’ Meaning, where has the United 

States been in its attention to Europe? 

So I believe the questions of Afghanistan, the Iraq war, the attitudes that have plagued us, as it relates to Europe, do we listen 

to them, are key to us moving forward. And if we are to have alliances that will be helpful, not only to us, Europe and the United 

States, but to the world, I think we have to understand whether 

we have a frayed relationship or whether or not we have one that 

is a little bit ill but can be repaired, and I think now is the time 

to address that question. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller? 

Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Eagleburger, certainly welcome to the committee. I 

would be very interested in—before I say that, however, I want to 

give you a compliment because I watch you often on the news 

shows, and you bring a rather interesting and very thoughtful perspective. And I certainly enjoy your appearances. 

I would be very interested in your observations and thoughts on 

just what the Russians are up to, especially in terms of Iran. Giving an example, no sooner than we sent our ships off the shores 

of Iran, somewhat saber rattling by the Bush administration, an 

interesting thing happened in Russia. They consummated a deal 

with $750 million for air defense mechanisms for Iran. I would like 

to get your thoughts on that. 

Also I would like to get your thoughts on the situation and the 

downward pressures being placed on NATO as a result of some of 

our NATO friends being concerned in their countries and wanting 

to pull out their participation in Afghanistan because of the United 

States’ involvement in Iraq, and specifically Italy. 

Back in February, if you remember, the Italian Government basically collapsed, and the reason they collapsed were two things involving the Americans. One, they opposed the extension of a military base up in northern Italy; and secondly, because they were 

concerned about getting their troops out of Afghanistan as a way 

of protesting against the United States’ involvement in Iraq. I 

would be very interested in your comments on those situations. 

And, finally, the situation in Eastern Europe along the Russian 

border, particularly countries like Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia, 

these countries basically are living in a blackmail atmosphere with 

Russia pulling off their gas, pulling off their electricity or whatever. 

I would like to get your thoughts on that. And the situation in 

Belarus and the fear that especially in Lithuania they have because there are constrictions on how much military Lithuanians 

can have but not on what Belarus can have. I would be very interested in your comments on those. 
6

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Chairman, let me just note that much of my own consciousness about what we should expect from our European friends 

has come from some of the statements that you have made and 

some of the indications when we have had meetings with our 

friends from Europe, some of the points that you have made to 

them and their response to those points. 

Very quickly, there are reasons to, you know, be happy that people in Europe are our friends, and certainly there are some people, 

like the Poles and others in what was known as Eastern Europe 

who are now pulling their own weight. But generally, it is upsetting to me, and I think upsetting to the American people, that Europeans who criticize us so frequently are not pulling their own 

weight and making the contributions that would be commensurate 

with the amount of criticism they are willing to give us. 

And I understand especially, again from questions that you have 

brought up in these hearings, that even the commitments that they 

have made, for example in rebuilding, much less trying to put their 

people in harm’s way and using their military, they haven’t even 

met their rebuilding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Well, I would hope that our European friends get the message. 

And maybe they have. The people of France seem to have elected 

someone now who is not virulently anti-American, and maybe that 

is a good sign. And I would hope that that friendship that we have 

would be a true partnership instead of just a partnership where 

they get to criticize but not pull their own weight. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Tancredo? 

Mr. TANCREDO. No comments. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Very briefly, I, too, am concerned about the fact that the Europeans seem to be, in many cases, very self-righteous about their 

condemnation of the United States across the board in many areas, 

yet they don’t provide answers to the problems. Iran is one of 

those; Darfur is another one of those. And hopefully we can find 

some common ground where the United States, being the superpower, constantly gets the criticism from the Europeans, but if we 

were to bail out of these issues, what would they do, if anything? 

And I think the time has come for Europeans, as my colleague Mr. 

Rohrabacher has said, to pull their own weight on world issues besides being the constant cynical critic of the United States and our 

foreign policy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. 

Mr. Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. No opening statement, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Boozman? 

Mr. BOOZMAN. No, thank you. 

Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Woolsey? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. No thank you. 
7

Chairman LANTOS. I am particularly delighted to welcome today 

one of our most preeminent statesmen, diplomats and security experts, my good friend, Secretary Eagleburger. 

Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger served the United States with 

great distinction as Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of 

State. He began his distinguished public service career almost five 

decades ago. He served in some of the most important diplomatic 

positions of our country. He shaped policy at some of the most crucial moments of the Cold War. He invariably presented his case 

with a degree of urbanity and wit and colorful language that has 

made him certainly my favorite witness and the favorite witness of 

many Members of Congress. 

I have used your example, Secretary Eagleburger, every time we 

have a new Cabinet level officer appearing, and I told them that 

they have one of two options: Give us bureaucratese or testify the 

way Larry Eagleburger testifies. Because if we get bureaucratese, 

there won’t be any audience. But if it is a Larry Eagleburger-type 

testimony, we will all be here with great attention. 

I am grateful for your appearance. The floor is yours, and we are 

anxious to listen. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON HOLOCAUST ERA INSURANCE CLAIMS 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am not sure I need to say much because I have heard enough 

just listening to all of you to say that most of what you said I agree 

with completely, and maybe I can just repeat some of it, and then 

we can all go home. 

But, seriously, there is very little that I have heard here today 

that I disagree with, and I am not even sure there is anything 

much I disagree with. 

But, Mr. Chairman, there is an apocryphal story about Machiavelli when he was dying. 

Chairman LANTOS. I remember well that episode. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am one upped again. 

But anyway, he was dying, and they got a priest of the church 

to come and give him the last rites. And the priest stood over the 

deathbed and said, ‘‘My son, my son, do you repent of your sins and 

renounce the devil?’’ And there was no answer. So he asked three 

or four more times. No answer. Finally, in great frustration, he 

said, ‘‘I ask you for the last time, do you repent of your sins and 

renounce the devil?’’ And Machiavelli looked up and said: ‘‘This is 

no time to make new enemies.’’

My point is, I hope I will not make any new enemies today, but 

I am going to say some things that I suspect will not go over well 

with everybody. 

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, we, the United States, are in a 

mess internationally. A mess that is to some degree at least of our 

own making. And it obviously relates at least to some degree to 

Iraq. I don’t intend to spend a great deal of time talking about 

Iraq, but rather, the way in which we got there and what has happened since has, I think legitimately to some degree, at least given 

our European allies reason to be unhappy with us. 
8

Now, that is not to say—and I agree with everything that was 

said here—this is not to say that the Europeans have done their 

duties. They have not. But we walked into Iraq in ways that could 

have used a good bit more in the way of consultation before we did 

it. 

I don’t recall any time in most of my sentient life that I think 

we have been in more trouble than we are now, not in a wartime 

sense of it but in terms of, if you think about it, Korea was difficult; Vietnam was difficult. In both cases, we came out of it after 

having gone into, in both cases, gone in without understanding 

what it was that we were doing or all of the permutations of what 

we were going to be facing when we went there. But that is frankly, I think that is in spades as far as Iraq is concerned. 

I do not believe—I don’t believe that we had any serious contingency planning in case what we attempted to do did not work. And 

I think we have found ourselves in a situation in Iraq that need 

not have happened quite the way it has, at a minimum. 

And I spent some time on the Iraq Study Group recently, so I 

think I learned from things there that in fact upset me a good bit 

as I saw them revealed. 

Now having said that, we now, I think, to a great degree find 

ourselves unable to do what clearly is going to be necessary for the 

United States in the course of the next few years with the instabilities that we see and the instabilities that are going to increase. 

One of the things that we clearly are going to need is an ability 

to bring our allies to face with us some of the most serious problems we face. And I am not sure we are in a position to do that 

now. 

For example, and the one that I find most disturbing constantly 

and yet I find very little in the way of serious discussion about it, 

and that is the future of nuclear weapons. Okay, we all talk about 

it. We and our allies have concerted on it in many cases. And I 

think only the United States has really represented to anybody 

how serious we think that problem is, but we are not getting much 

support. But I would suggest to you that if we don’t get this as a 

serious issue on our agenda soon, a generation from now at a minimum—maximum is going to look at us or at our history one of 

these days, and they are going to say, where the hell were you 

when this was all developing the way it has been, and when it is 

no longer containable at all because too many people, both countries and terrorist groups, will probably have possession of some of 

these weapons. 

This is, as far as I am concerned, at least probably the most serious threat that faces us and the civilized world in the course of the 

next decade or two, and I do not find us doing much about it. 

Now there are a number of people in the United States, including 

Secretary Schultz and others, who have spent a great deal of time 

talking about it and arguing about the need to eliminate all nuclear weapons. I respect him for this. It is not going to work. We 

are not going to be able to convince nuclear powers or nonnuclear 

powers that are aspiring to those weapons; we are not going to be 

able to convince them to give this up. The only way I think at least 

that this as an issue is going to be able to be contained is if the 

United States in the lead is able over time to convince the nuclear 
9

states, including—I almost said the Soviet Union—including Russia 

and others, that there has to be an international consortium of 

these states to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons 

and to be able to face nuclear—potential nuclear states, such as 

Iran and North Korea, with the threat of the use of force if necessary. But it will have to be by concert. It will have to be a clear 

consensus on the part of all of those who want to prevent this from 

becoming the real danger that it is in the process of becoming. And 

that can only come about if the United States is in the lead in trying to convince other nations of the dangers of this. But we have 

to be in a position when we try to get others to agree with us to 

recognize that we are at the moment not terribly popular around 

the world, and part of it at least is our own making, not all of it 

by any means, and certainly the Europeans have not done their 

duty. 

And by the way, I have to compliment you on your comments 

about the Germans and the French. If the Germans want to complain about you being uncivilized about all of this, you might suggest that they take a look at what their previous chancellor said 

about President Bush and about the United States. And I would 

not be upset about their being unhappy about what you said, because what you said was correct. 

And it is about time that countries—I think, by the way, that the 

French elections are a real breath of fresh air. I think for the very 

first time in a long time, we are probably seeing a man as the 

President of the French Republic who will in fact be far more reasonable and far more balanced than Mr. Chirac was and will not 

be on the take as Mr. Chirac was, if I may say so. And I think he 

is going to be a breath of fresh air. 

One of the good things we are seeing in Western Europe right 

now, the changes in leadership are moving in the right direction. 

Merkel in Germany; I think Brown will be a repeat more or less 

of Tony Blair. So I think, in those three countries at least, in Western Europe, we are seeing either a continuation of good support to 

us, as in the British case, or in the German and French cases, 

hopefully we are going to see a reversal of some of the less-thanfriendly relationships developed with those two countries over the 

course of the last few years. 

Chairman LANTOS. It has not escaped your attention, Mr. Secretary, that the new French President is of Hungarian origin. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I was going to comment on that, but 

then I decided I would leave it to you. And he is also handsome 

by the way. He is a very good-looking fellow. 

One of the things that most impresses me out of the mess—and 

I think it is a mess that we are now in—is the degree to which we 

seem to fail too often to understand the culture of the countries we 

are dealing with. I am going to name two now because I lived in 

one of them, namely Yugoslavia. And you will notice that, in both 

cases, when Tito fell and when Saddam fell, the countries came 

apart. And I am not excusing either one; although the Tito dictatorship was a far more benign one in his last years than Saddam ever 

was. But the fact of the matter is, one of the things we have been, 

as we proceed in the course of trying to deal with some of these 

human rights issues, for example, is that while they have to be 
10

dealt with, we have to be careful how we do it so that we don’t create a greater instability in the process of trying to correct the problems that are there. 

And I can only tell you that, in both cases, and the Yugoslav one 

is very close to me, that I thought I understood their culture. I did 

not ever expect the murderous events that took place. I am not saying it is easy to do, to understand these people. But on the other 

hand, it seems to me we should have been able to recognize that 

the Sunnis and the Shia do have some problems with each other 

and have had them for some centuries. And under those circumstances, I would have expected that we would not have been 

quite so off put, if I may say it, by trying now to sort out the relationship between those two sects. 

That leads me, by the way, to another concern I have, and again, 

everything I am trying to talk about here this morning is in the 

context of issues that cannot be settled unilaterally. Every single 

one of them is going to require, in most cases, the leadership of the 

United States but in concert with our traditional European allies 

who have flunked the test over the course of the last few years. 

But what does that require on our part? It requires more than 

anything else a little—a lot more patience and a lot more effort to 

consult with them and convince them of our beliefs and the things 

that are facing all of us. And certainly, for example the nuclear 

issues, they are not an issue that is only a threat to the United 

States. That ought to be able to be seen in Western Europe, and 

they talk about it, but I don’t think they are prepared to do much. 

I think that this country and this President are in fact prepared 

to do more. But the fact of the matter is, he is talking to a bunch 

of allies who, for a number of reasons, have become relatively deaf. 

And some of those reasons are our cause, not their own. 

There are some other issues, and some of these were raised. For 

example, where are we with the Russians? And what do we face 

with the Russians? Here, again, there is a need for concerted action 

on the part of a number of the countries of the West if we are going 

to succeed in dealing with what I think is potentially a serious increase in the evidence of Putin’s desire to increasingly not only pursue a more independent course but a course that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States. We are coming back into that situation again. And his attempt to deal with us on the question of the 

missile defense issues, for example, in Eastern Europe, his suggestions, although they sound reasonable, every single one of them 

means that if we follow them, the missile defense program in Eastern Europe is useless. We can argue whether we should have a program in Eastern Europe or not; I think we should. But at the same 

time, we need to understand what Mr. Putin is doing when he tries 

to roadblock it. 

And I should say, in that regard, I think, by the way—and I don’t 

think everybody here is going to agree with me—but given the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, I personally believe 

that the United States has a great interest in pursuing the question of a missile defense for itself. I don’t think we can sit back and 

watch the development of these nuclear weapons on the part of others, North Korea and Iran certainly in the future, and not expect 

that one of the ways in which we can defend ourselves against 
11

those developments is by building our own missile defense. I know 

there is a lot of argument about whether it can ever work or not. 

I think, from what I read at least, with some effort and with the 

expenditure of some money, yes, we can make it work. 

I think there are just several I will briefly touch on, and then I 

will be happy to try to answer questions. But I think we have to 

face the fact, and I know nobody likes to talk about this, but I 

think we are in the process of seeing the development of an Islamic 

terrorist movement that is going to expand, that is going to build 

on the religion. That is not to say that I believe that every Muslim 

is a terrorist, but it is to say that they are becoming increasingly 

organized. They almost certainly are getting support in broad 

measure from Iran. And indeed, I am afraid that we are going to 

see, to some degree, increasing support on the part of the Russians 

for at least some of those terrorist groups. 

And it seems to me relatively evident that this is another issue 

that cannot be dealt with unilaterally. We have an obligation, to 

put it mildly, to do what we can to reverse the trends of the last 

few years in which we were increasingly not listened to by our allies, and increasingly, we were, to some degree at least, at fault for 

that. That is again not to excuse the Europeans, but it is to say 

that it is not solely their fault. 

I could go on with a long list. Every single one of these issues 

can only be dealt with multilaterally. The Middle East, Israel, 

Hamas, Hezbollah, any place you want to talk to about in the Middle East itself, China; they all are going to require, at least to some 

degree, concerted action if we are going to be prepared to maintain 

the kinds of security that has been the case in the past. But now 

in a far more immature, far more unstable world, it is going to be 

absolutely essential. And if we can’t get if through our heads that 

we are going to spend the next several decades in a world that is 

increasingly unstable no matter what we do, we are going to miss 

the most—single most important historic fact that we face today 

and it cannot be dealt with unilaterally. And I will stop there, I 

guess. 

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your 

very perceptive and very important comments. 

We begin with Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for sharing your insights with us. As 

we know, when you were talking about the missile defense system, 

the President of Russia has put out a proposal to remove his opposition to our putting——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It is a phony. It is a phony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, I wanted to catch your impression, and 

I think you are giving it. Please continue. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I think the whole proposal, if you take 

a look at it, it essentially moves the defense system away from 

where it now is, and when you look through, it may defend 

Kamchatka, but it will not defend much else. It is a totally phony 

approach. 

I think there is a legitimate argument over whether we should 

build a missile defense to defend Western Europe or not. I personally think that we should. But I can see a legitimate argument 
12

whether that is something that we should do. But for Mr. Putin to 

play this game and make it sound like he is being reasonable, he 

is not being reasonable at all. And I think everybody is going to 

see through it; I hope anyway. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

You talked this morning about the rise of radical Islam. Do you 

think that Europe is waking up to the realization that it is right 

within its borders that this movement being susceptible to radical 

propaganda and the Wahhabi school of radical thought, and 

preaching is slowly taking roots everywhere? Do you think that Europe is dealing with this issue? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, Ma’am, I don’t. I think they are 

slowly waking up. That I will accept. When the—in the French case 

here 6 months or so ago, they were burning automobiles in the 

streets and so forth; you can’t help but wake up a little bit to it. 

But what I have not seen in any case is any commitment to try 

to do anything about it. 

And by the way, again, one of the failures in the European case, 

and the French are a classic case; they haven’t given these younger 

Muslim men and women—particularly men—jobs. They haven’t 

done anything to try to bring them into the society. Not that they 

often want to come into the society, but the French have largely 

tried to ignore the problem and put them off in a ghetto somewhere. That is, in fact, the case to some degree in the United Kingdom as well. So it breeds on itself. And I am afraid they have not 

yet really awakened to the threat that is increasingly going to be 

theirs. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, just one last 

question about Russia with its threatening behavior, with it trying 

to monopolize the gas supplies, the attempt to cut off the gas supplies to Ukraine, the intimidating tactic that it has used in Estonia 

and in Georgia, et cetera. What do you think that the response 

should be from the trans-atlantic community, from the U.S., from 

the EU? Should we work together in trying to mitigate this threat? 

And the refusal of Russian troops, for example, to leave Moldova, 

there is such a long list of the kind of aggressive in-your-face tactics of the President of Russia. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Of course, the answer is, we ought to 

try to work together to mitigate it. But the question then becomes, 

what does that mean? And more important—more important I 

think is, we need to understand something that I think we have 

kind of lost sight of. I at least am convinced that when the Soviet 

Union collapsed, there were a number of people sitting in what was 

the politburo and now is something else who from the very beginning saw the need—they thought—to begin to bring the fallen 

away republics back into what was the Soviet Union, into Russia 

proper. 

Now I don’t think that is or was an across-the-board idea, but I 

do think that there are still some in Moscow who have something 

of this view left. I think in fact, frankly, that Mr. Putin may. But 

under any circumstances, what he is demonstrating now is a classic Russian approach to dealing with people who don’t agree with 

you. And what he is doing is using the economic levers he has to 

pressure the Baltic States and now Ukraine, the whole range, pres-
13

sure them to behave themselves, I guess, is the proper way to put 

it. The only way I could see to deal with that in any meaningful 

way is to make it clear through relationships we have with—for example, when the President went to Bulgaria or even to Albania 

where I think the whole population came out to cheer him because 

they had never seen a President before, but anyway by doing what 

we can to keep the relationship with the Eastern Europeans—

which by the way, by and large, have a much better attitude toward the United States right now than do their Western European 

neighbors, and why? Because they know perfectly well who it is 

that brought the Iron Curtain down. And it seems to me that the 

way you deal with the Putin kind of blackmail, if you will, is, one, 

you maintain as close a relationship with these countries economically, by the way, not just politically, economically, as you can. And 

over time, it becomes obvious that he is not going to succeed. 

But if we don’t pay attention to the economic pressures he can 

put on and try where we can to ameliorate those pressures over 

time, he is going to succeed. So these Eastern European countries 

have to understand that we are ready to help them when we can. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Brad Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary. You spoke in your opening remarks about what you saw as the need for a European missile defense system. That system appears to be—or our research appears 

to produce unreliable results at a very, very expensive cost. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You are talking about the missile? 

Mr. MILLER. The missile defense system. I am the chair of the 

Investigative Oversight Subcommittee of the Committee on Science 

and Technology. And the Bush administration was preparing to 

close a laboratory that did radiation testing that had—the total 

cost was $7 million or $10 million a year. It already had the technology, not widely deployed, but already had the technology that 

could spot a dirty bomb in a truck and was developing technology 

to detect a nuclear weapon in the hull of a ship. And yet the Bush 

administration was prepared to close the laboratory. When I think 

of the likely threats against the United States, the likelihood of a 

missile launched from the soil of another nation seems unlikely. 

And in relationship to the likely cost of trying to develop anything 

remotely reliable and how far in the future that is versus the priority of trying to detect a dirty bomb or a nuclear weapon in the 

hull of a ship, how do you balance those priorities? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, and you have made some good 

points. And I did caution that this is assuming you can make the 

system work to begin with. And I know it will cost a lot of money 

if you can do that. 

My point and it all focuses on back on this question of what happens over the course of the next decade or two on the development 

of nuclear weapons. And what concerns me is, unless you believe 

that the danger is going to be because somebody puts a nuclear 

weapon in the hull of a ship and sails it into New York harbor, 

which by the way is a possibility, but if you believe that there is 

at least a potential serious question of whether somebody may be 

able, over a period of time, to launch these weapons, and Korea 
14

would be one example of someone who might—it is not going to 

take care of the terrorists either, by the way; I understand that. 

But unless you think that is not a very serious danger, I think it 

is worth investing the money. 

Now the question then becomes, is there any way to prevent—

back it up—I am not now talking about the danger of a terrorist 

group that gets a weapon somewhere and one way or another get 

its into the country. Missile systems certainly won’t do any good 

there. But if you believe, as I do, that if we don’t get serious about 

stopping the proliferation, that now we have walked away from 

North Korea—they clearly are going to do it. They have done it. 

They have lied to us for a decade over it at least. I have no doubt 

whatsoever that the Iranians are going to try to do the same thing 

and will probably succeed. My point is, I worry a lot about—ignoring is too strong a term—I worry a lot about putting this question 

of what happens to the development of nuclear weapons in countries sort of on the back burner and not doing everything we can 

do to prevent it. And under those circumstances, I think, since I 

am worried that a number of these countries are going to, over 

time, develop these weapons, then I think that the missile system, 

assuming it can be made to work—and I am not at all sure I care 

too much about how much it costs if it can be made to work—under 

those circumstances, then I think it would be a good idea. 

I am cautious about how I put this forward, other than to say, 

it seems to me that the issue of the missile defense and the issue 

of the future of nuclear weapons development and how the world 

deals with that issue are in fact to some degree linked. And I don’t 

argue with you at all. It will cost a lot of money. And the most serious beginning question is: Can it be made to work at all? And I 

think I suspect you and I have a different view. I think, over time, 

they can be. But I am not the expert on it. I am only parroting 

what I have heard from others. 

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Secretary, nice to see you again. 

Let me just note that I do have a disagreement with my colleague, who is my friend and colleague and my chairman of the 

oversight subcommittee there in Science. I just say that the fact 

that you have maniacs in charge of Iran and you have got nut 

cases in charge of North Korea, and there may be—you can never 

rule out that such radical folks will not come to power in Pakistan, 

it is very prudent for us to be developing a system that might be 

able to shoot down a missile that might be shot from one of those 

countries at either us or a country that would be friendly to us. 

That only seems to be a prudent course of action. Not to say that 

that has to eliminate the development of technology for chips that 

can determine if there is a dirty bomb in a ship or not. But that 

seems very prudent to me. 

However, let me disagree with you, Mr. Secretary, about analyzing Mr. Putin’s position. Let me just say that I disagree with 

many of my colleagues about the nature of Mr. Putin. I think that 

Putin is doing what he should be doing, and that is championing 

the interests of the people of Russia. We should not expect him to 

do anything else. I mean, that is what his job is; and I think that 
15

he has done—frankly, I think he has done a good job in bringing 

some order to Russia, ending the looting that was going on, foreign 

looting of his company. 

And Americans were involved in the looting of his country at a 

time when we had basically pushed them into the collapse of communism, which was the right thing to do, of course. But then I believe that we did not follow a moral course in preventing our own 

people from coming in there and exploiting the chaos that followed 

the fall of communism in a way that was very detrimental to the 

Russians. 

Should we blame Putin for using his economic leverage in order 

to promote the interests of Russia? We do that. Countries around 

the world do that. They use their economic leverages for what they 

think is in the interest of their country. 

And if he shuts off—if he says, we are going to shut off gas to 

you unless you are doing it, I do not understand the great upheaval, uproar about a leader of his country doing that. He is not 

a tyrant in the sense that—yes, there has been some retrogression, 

but nowhere near what has been going on in China and some of 

these other countries of the world in which we don’t seem to have 

this same outrage. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. If I may, in the first place, you are absolutely correct that if he is doing what he thinks is best for Russia 

that is what he is paid to do. That doesn’t mean, however, that we 

don’t have a right and an obligation to point out where these activities of his threaten our interests and take steps to try to prevent 

them from threatening our interests; and I don’t think you would 

argue with that either. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. He is, in fact, and has done a number 

of good things as far as Russia is concerned, particularly in the earlier years. I think he did, in fact, correct much of the—collapse is 

the wrong term—but the instabilities that came in the latter period 

of Yeltsin. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Chaos. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Absolutely, and very dangerous therefore. So, in fact, he deserves a good bit of credit for that. But, at 

the same time, I am afraid I think that what we have seen over 

the course of the last year or 2 is the beginnings of a more 

confrontational approach to the U.S. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me, Mr. Secretary, just note this. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Number one, first of all, Putin’s position on 

missile defense may well be putting forward a negotiating position 

rather than a final position, which would just suggest that Russia 

wants to be included in missile defense rather than excluded, 

which is, by the way, what Ronald Reagan proposed originally. I 

was there in the White House. I remember talking to Ronald 

Reagan about it personally, and that was Ronald Reagan’s idea. 

You know, we should have no fear of missile defense. Putin, by 

making his demand, wants to be included rather than excluded. 

Plus what you are suggesting right now about maybe some retrenching going, maybe he is moving in the wrong direction, and 

I think we should hold his feet to the fire in terms of human rights. 
16

But can we blame Mr. Putin and the Russian leadership for that 

when we haven’t even granted most favored nation status to Russia? 

After giving up its empire, after giving up communism, we 

haven’t granted most favored nation status to Russia, but yet in 

China, who has all of these evils in terms of the way they are involved with—number one, external threats, there is threats from 

China externally, but their human rights abuses. They are the biggest human rights abuser on the planet. They are the ones who 

have an expansionary policy, or at least a threatening policy to 

their neighbors. We grant them most favored nation status, and we 

don’t do it to Russia after they have gone through all of this reform 

and given up their empire. Can you blame Putin then for trying to 

get tough? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Congressman, I have clearly been away 

from Washington for too long, because I never thought I would 

hear you say anything nice about Russia. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I know it. And I remember from an earlier time when you were—I wouldn’t have heard those same words 

out of your mouth. 

But, by the way, I have to believe that fundamentally you are 

correct. Certainly you can’t blame him for it. You can’t blame, you 

know—hell, you can’t blame anybody that runs his country well, 

even if it is antagonistic to us. Blame is the wrong term. 

But certainly you have to keep track of what it is they are doing. 

And if in their excellence, if you will, they also are threatening our 

security one way or another, or the security of the people we hope 

are going to be our allies again someday, then you have to at least 

be prepared to take steps about it. 

And I don’t think the people I heard here today were blaming 

him for it. They were in fact I suspect, if you would parse their 

thinking on it, they would also have been saying, yes, he has been 

too good. He has been too capable. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We need Russia on our side, and China is a 

greater threat today than Russia was even back then. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I would like both of them on our side. 

It may take a while, but we will get there. 

Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Eagleburger, thank you so much for being here. Okay. 

Let us say you are the Secretary of State again. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That will never happen again. Don’t 

worry about it. I saw everybody’s faces turn white here. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. No, they didn’t. 

In your opinion, what does the United States need to do to earn 

international respect to be the leaders that we ought to be? I mean, 

not just—I mean, yes, indeed we have to be multilateral and reach 

out. What examples should we be setting on nuclear nonproliferation, et cetera, and what is our role in this world as the most powerful nation in trying to find a way for peaceful solutions instead 

of having to have solutions that relate to guns and bombs? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. The first thing we have to do—and you 

just said it. The first thing we have do is understand that just be-
17

cause we are the most powerful nation in the world doesn’t necessarily mean much any more. Because our power, at least in the 

military sense, is not particularly useful against people who are 

hiding in the mountains and so forth. 

So let us not be in fact, one—and I admit to being one of those 

who fell for it. I was convinced, to put it bluntly, that we would 

go into Iraq, and we would be through with it in about 2 months, 

and that would be the end of it. And if we had been fighting a normal war—well, we did. We got them out, got Saddam out of there 

in a hurry; and you may have noticed we are still there. 

That is the whole point here is it is a different world, and power 

and U.S. power is now a different sort of a thing. At least it needs 

to be. And one of the things it needs to be, again, is an example 

to the rest of the world not only that we are powerful but that we 

listen to others. 

And I am sorry, ladies and gentlemen, I know when I say this—

and I have said it all myself—I get so frustrated with the Europeans particularly, because they don’t snap to anymore, for one 

thing. Remember, in the old days when they had the Soviet Union 

sitting on their doorstep that tended to focus their minds a bit 

more than it does now. 

But my point here again is the United States needs to understand—and I am sorry to say this, I can’t tell you how sorry I am 

to say it—we have lost the respect not just of some of the leadership in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe, but 

amongst the people. All you have to do is travel there and watch 

it and see it sometimes. 

And we made some mistakes. That is not to absolve others of 

having made mistakes. But we became too unilateral, if you will. 

And there are some—I am going to say this and I shouldn’t I guess, 

but there are some very senior members of this administration who 

consciously didn’t care. And I have to tell you if I voted Democrat 

my hand would wither. So I am not saying something that I pleasantly want to say, but it is true. And it is going to take us a long 

time, if we are not careful, at least, to reverse that trend. And I 

could go on. 

But if there is any single thing this country needs to do, it is to 

show the rest of the world that—two things—that we respect their 

views, even if we don’t agree with them; and, secondly, if we have 

to, after having examined their views, if we then have to act unilaterally in our own security interests, we will do it. And that is 

where it gets tougher. 

For example, as I say, I was on the Iraq Study Group, so I am 

one of those who suggested some moderation of things. But, at the 

same time, I think we all have to understand that when and if we 

leave Iraq——

Ms. WOOLSEY. If? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. On less than satisfactory 

terms, the consequences for our position in the world, more this 

time than Vietnam by a long shot, the consequences are something 

we are going to have to think about and face. 

I am not trying to argue with anybody here, except if you don’t 

agree with me that if we leave Iraq under difficult or wrong circumstances—‘‘wrong’’ is the wrong word, but you know what I 
18

mean. If we leave clearly having been defeated from beginning to 

end, if we leave Iraq under those circumstances we will not make 

up for that in terms of the views of the world and in terms of the 

threats in that part of the world for some period of time. 

What am I trying to say? That we have to be far more concerned 

about the views of others; and we also have to recognize that, because we are the most powerful country in the world, there may 

come a time when we have to use that power, whether anyone else 

agrees with us or not. But I do not happen to believe we are even 

close to that right now. And I am not sure any of that answers your 

question, but it is the best I can do. 

Mr. MILLER [presiding]. Secretary Eagleburger, I think you 

meant if I vote Democratic my hand would wither. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am sorry. You are being too sensitive, 

Congressman. 

Mr. MILLER. That is all right. 

Mr. Tancredo. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It was not deliberate, believe me. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Secretary, I just returned from a NATO PA 

meeting in Portugal, and we were talking—we talked a lot about, 

of course, NATO’s commitment or lack thereof—over here, sir. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you. I was looking all over. 

Mr. TANCREDO. That is all right. 

We talked a lot about the fact that the NATO countries were not 

living up to their commitments in terms of building their own 

forces and the commitments that should be made to NATO and 

how much individual countries were spending on defense, as opposed to what they need to be spending on defense. 

But one of the things that was peculiar that came out in this 

meeting was this drive for a European military of some sort, a military that would be under the direction of the European Parliament. 

This is I think a peculiar development, is—I guess what I would 

say in terms of here we are, on one hand, we can’t get them to commit to a defense budget that would be satisfactory for the purpose 

of making their commitment to NATO; and, on the other hand, 

here they are talking about a European military that would certainly take away from resources available for NATO. 

How serious do you think that is? And what do you think is the 

outcome of this European Parliament, the EU’s attempts—I know 

that, of course, the Constitution failed. Germany is trying to get it 

started again, but we don’t know how much—it doesn’t look like 

they have got a lot of momentum behind it. But what do you think 

are the implications of the movement of European Union—the kind 

of evolution of a European Union from a purely economic organization to one that now has this political and maybe even military dimension in the European Parliament? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It is not new, Congressman, in the 

sense that for many years, even during the worst days of the Cold 

War, and when I was involved in NATO, for example, there were 

certain Europeans who were always arguing that they ought to 

have a separate European military force committed to NATO, but 

separate. It never got anywhere for a number of reasons, not least 

of which was at that time they recognized the costs, and they also 

recognized that they got a much freer ride——
19

Mr. TANCREDO. On our coattails, yes. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. In the old system. 

I think it is still there, and I think it is much more prevalent 

now in part because of the general feeling of dislike of the way we 

have gone of late. 

But there is another much more fundamental thing, too, I think; 

and that is deep in their guts they have always resented to some 

degree or another—and when I say ‘‘they’’ that is much too broad 

a statement—some countries more than others, for example—but 

many have always regretted the fact that this upstart, the United 

States, is able to, because we are so powerful and they are not and 

because the Russians, the Soviets are such a threat that they have 

to toe the line and come along with us. 

That certainly is the view in France, certainly going way back to 

de Gaulle and de Gaulle’s view that he was going to take them out 

of the military side of NATO, if for no other reason because of 

French glory. It was an emotional thing as well as maybe thought 

out. 

The whole point is this is not new. It is much more prevalent 

today than I think it was. And, yes, it is contradictory, but they—

once the Soviet Union collapsed, all sorts of things over time we 

should have expected, not least of which is increasingly the Russians, the Europeans, European side of NATO was going to want 

and has wanted more independence, less dependence on the United 

States until it gets tough. Then, believe me, it will change. 

I mean, I happen to have the same view. We worry about the dollar because, you know, it is so overstrained and so forth and so on. 

I can assure you that the first time there is a serious threat to the 

economies of the West we will find all of those dollars coming back 

here. And that is because we are—even today, we are viewed as 

that safe house and—but they don’t like it, a lot of them don’t. And 

the more that the Soviet Union has drifted into the past, the more 

this view of a more independent Europe has become prevalent and 

given, as I have said, what I think we have done to our own reputation in Europe over the course of the last some years, is worse. 

Now, will it ever take place? I don’t think so. Because it would 

be—I shouldn’t say ‘‘ever’’ take place, but not while I am around 

certainly. It is going to be a long time, because it would cost more, 

and because they don’t think the threat is there anymore. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary, thank you very much for being here. I really enjoy 

your comments, especially the levity of it. 

I have a question about Kosova. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SIRES. I have people in my office that this is not the right 

time for them to declare their independence. I have people in my 

office that this is the right time to do it. I am getting all sorts of 

visitors. Is there a right time or do you think it is going to make 

the situation worse in that part of Europe? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am going to give you two answers. 
20

I think it is a lousy time, because I don’t think—on the one hand, 

I don’t think we or any other country or any international organization has a right to carve somebody else’s country up. 

Now, having said that, yes, they should do it. I mean, if you 

think about this in terms of the precedent it sets, you want the 

U.N. Running around deciding that someday they are going to take 

Xinjiang out of the People’s Republic of China? I mean, it is unheard of in a sense. 

But, at the same time, this has now—and I have spent 7 years 

in Yugoslavia, including I was there when Tito died. So I think I 

know the area. And there is no way it can be contained. It will be 

a bloody mess if they don’t make it independent. And it is a terrible 

thing to do, but there is no choice. I am sorry. I think as a matter 

of principal it is the wrong thing to do. Someday someone is going 

to come and say—is there anybody here from the State of Maine? 

I think I can safely say somebody comes up and says we are going 

to take Maine away from you. Come on. It is not the sort of thing 

that countries do to each other except for after a war. But I see 

no way to do anything else with it because the Kosovars have beaten the Serbs badly already, and they will do it again. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I also have a question regarding the recent G–8 Summit. It 

seems like the Chancellor of Germany has taken on the global 

greenhouse gas emissions issue and she wants to reduce it by 50 

percent by the year 2050. I just wonder how we can work with the 

Europeans to come up with something regarding the greenhouse 

emissions, because the administration seems so against it. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. This administration. 

Mr. SIRES. This administration. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me—part of the problem I think is 

that—I am going to get in trouble again. But some of the greens 

in Europe are really totally unrealistic. 

If you take a look at the Kyoto Protocol, which was 98 to 2 or 

98 to nothing, I think it was, in the Senate, it was: Don’t ever bring 

it here because we won’t approve it. And the point is, because the 

demands were unrealistic and it would have cost—I once knew all 

these facts and figures. But the number of jobs it would lose in the 

United States was horrendous. 

Now the point is, having said that, there is no question I think 

the administration—although I gather the administration is beginning to move. But there is no question that I think they have delayed longer than they should and that they are standing against 

any basic movement in this regard. 

And I am going to get myself in trouble with somebody here either one way or the other, but my view is that the administration 

has not moved. But when the President declared that the Kyoto 

Protocol was dead and every European country and government 

had a snit fit, the fact of the matter is they had all known for years 

that the United States wasn’t going to ratify it, nor should we 

have, I think. So it became a political football by the Europeans to 

be able to prove one more time that George Bush was a ‘‘you know 

what.’’ The fact of the matter is he had no choice, if he had wanted 

to have, because the Senate had already made it clear. 
21

Now, having said that, I think there is no question this administration or the future one is going to have to do more than we have 

been doing; and I think the pressures coming from Europe now are 

working in that direction. But it is going to take some time, I 

think, before the administration is ready to do anywhere near as 

much as the Europeans would like us to do. 

Mr. SIRES. You don’t want to clarify that ‘‘you know what’’ part, 

do you? I am only kidding. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, that is diplomatic talk. You understand, 30 years as a diplomat I know how to use those terms, and 

then you never know what I said. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Where are we now? 

Mr. POE. We are over here. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh. 

Mr. POE. I am going to follow up on your comments about Kosova 

and self-determination. And just so you know, I am from Texas, 

and there are probably a lot of folks here that would like to kick 

us out of the United States. You don’t have to comment yet. I saw 

you say amen. 

What is the national policy of the United States regarding that 

very issue you just talked about with my friend from New York 

about self-determination of peoples of different countries? I mean, 

we may face that in Iraq in the north with the Kurds and the south 

as well. What is our policy? What is our national policy? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I have to guess, from what the President has said, he would like to do it yesterday. So I guess his—

I guess the national policy, to the degree the President sets it, is 

that we should do it. 

Mr. POE. How will that play with other countries when the same 

situation may arise in Africa or the Middle East or with the Russian—former Russian countries? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Again, right now, the Europeans will 

have the same view we do, which is Kosova needs to be separate. 

And, look, to me—well, I think I have said it. The point is, I think, 

as a precedent it is awful. I really do. If you think about it for a 

while, if a bunch of countries or the U.N. Can gang up on a country 

and take a piece of it away, we ought to think about what that may 

do down the road somewhere. 

But, having said that, there is no question that if we don’t agree 

to have Kosova separated they are going to do it anyway. And the 

bloodshed is going to be awful. And it isn’t as if the Serbs didn’t 

ask for it a long time ago when they treated the Albanian nationality in Kosova as they did. 

But, at the same time, and this is long history that I won’t bore 

you with more than to say Kosova is the heart of old Serbia. It was 

once where the—the Serbs are the only people I know who celebrated defeat. They were defeated in the Battle of Kosova in 1300 

something, and it is where the Serbs really started. And it is a 

thing for them, and I understand it. But they have now been 

swamped by the Albanian population, and there is no ending unto 
22

it. Partly because the Serbs treated the Albanian minority, who are 

now a majority, so badly for so long. 

But how can I answer other than to say someday it could jump 

up and bite somebody, you know, where—just simply because they 

haven’t thought through the implications of this. 

Mr. POE. One other question regarding homegrown terrorism in 

Europe, second generation young Muslims who have been 

radicalized, and the whole concept of visa waiver program with the 

United States. I have been recently in some of the Scandinavian 

countries. Every country seems to approach it a lot differently. How 

do you see us dealing with that issue of folks born in Europe and 

then working their way to the United States? How are we dealing 

with that, if anything? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Now you are getting me into the whole 

question of immigration, where I also am an unreconstructed rightwing nut, I guess. The answer basically, sir, has to be that you—

unless we want to simply put up a wall and say these kinds of people can’t come in, you have to do it the way we always do it, and 

that is you take a look at their background and let them in if they 

meet the standards. And I think it would be a terrible thing for us 

to all of a sudden decide we weren’t going to let people in because 

they were Muslim. 

So I think there is no easy answer to that one either. 

Mr. POE. Do you think the Europeans and the Americans are 

working together well enough to, of course, filter out threats to either country? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. I am not ‘‘Mr. Chairman.’’ Sorry. I forgot 

that. I will accept it. 

Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of 

the committee. 

I think this morning’s hearing has been insightful; and, Mr. Secretary, we do appreciate your comments I think collectively. I have 

several questions. 

Reading through your statement, Deal or No Deal, and the transatlantic relationships that exist presently and what we can look 

forward to in the near term, and we talk about the trio that is 

emerging with the new leadership both in France and as well as 

in England and, of course, Merkel’s new chancellorship—you know, 

it is easy to be critical, but I think on the whole, when you look 

at the last 40-plus years, there has been a tremendous amount of 

achievement of the EU. Who would think they would have a functioning Parliament that has achieved already a common currency 

and a level to assert itself or come together in ways that——

I mean, if we imagined it for a moment, to have 27 different 

countries today, the whole emergence of Eastern Europe to become 

part of the EU is really, I think, a level of success that would be 

hard to imagine 20 years ago. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is right. Excuse me, go ahead. 

Mr. COSTA. So when you talk about this deal or no deal, could 

you rank where you think the opportunities are in the next 5 years 

to really make progress together as partners, realizing that we are 
23

at the end of this President’s term of office, we are near the end 

of it, and we will have a new President in 18 months or so, and 

where the opportunities might lie with a new administration with 

this partnership? 

How would you prioritize, if you were going to be advising? Because you already told us you have no interest in going back to the 

Secretary of Stateship, but if you were advising the new administration, regardless of what party, where they would prioritize the 

next 5 years with this new trio? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. This is going to sound like a typical 

diplomatic answer, but you know what I would tell him to do first? 

Him or her—I thought I better get that in fast. I think the President-Elect or the President ought to get on an airplane and go to 

Europe and spend a couple of weeks going around making it very 

clear that this is a new regime here now—and I don’t—the party 

isn’t important. But make it clear that the past is past, it is prologue, and now we have a President who is going to work hard to 

try to develop a different kind of a relationship with our closest allies. 

Mr. COSTA. A new partnership. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes. And let me say—this is probably 

not going to be a very good example, but at the end of the Lyndon 

Johnson administration there had been a really fairly unpleasant 

relationship with a number of European countries, particularly including the French, where de Gaulle had kicked us out of NATO—

or kicked NATO out of France. Richard Nixon, first thing he did 

when he became President was get on an airplane with some of his 

advisors, and off he went to Europe. And he visited Germany and 

France—he visited France last, because it was deliberate that he 

was going to go to see de Gaulle. And particularly the relationship 

with the French and with de Gaulle was really very acerbic. And 

he made this trip, and it turned an awful lot of things around. 

Now I recognize talking about Nixon is not necessarily the greatest thing in the world, but it worked. 

Mr. COSTA. So before establishing priorities you think we need 

to reframe the partnership. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is the first priority right there. 

Mr. COSTA. Is to reframe frame the partnership. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTA. Let me move on here, because time is limited. 

You spoke a moment ago about the situation of Iraq and your 

own epiphany of sorts—that is my words, not yours—but the fact 

is that if we do, and I hope not, leave under less than satisfactory 

terms, as you described—I know your involvement in the BakerHamilton Commission. 

I was in Egypt with a congressional group 2 months ago; and 

Mubarak made the comment, I told your President not to go in 

there, not to go in there. I know those Iraqis. I know all the problems, blah, blah, blah, blah. 

Then he concluded by saying, now that you are here you can’t 

leave. Which I think is, unfortunately, the reaction of a lot of the 

folks in the Middle East. Give me a worst-case scenario if we leave 

under less than satisfactory circumstances. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Easy to describe. 
24

Mr. COSTA. Because I think we are on a powder keg right now; 

and there are so many of those countries on a tripwire with Lebanon, Iran, not only Iraq, and, of course, the Palestinian-Israeli 

question. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You want a worst-case scenario? 

Mr. COSTA. Yes. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. First of all, Iran moves into Iraq. Secondly, Iran and Syria take on Israel one way or another. 

And is that enough to start with? Because I think—and maybe 

I am exaggerating. I don’t think so. I don’t think it is going to take 

place within 15 minutes of this collapse on our part. But I would 

say to you I think the chances of a—well, certainly the chances of 

Iran throwing off the limits is almost inevitable. 

Now, how far that goes, I think almost certainly if they don’t 

move into Iraq they have a—they put in a sympathetic government 

in place very soon. And, secondly, I don’t think it is necessary—I 

don’t think it is wise to take statements about Israel that have 

been made by the man who is President—and I can never pronounce his name——

Mr. COSTA. The Iranian President? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Ahmadinejad, or whatever it is, excuse 

me. And the fact of the matter is—and, in fact, Congressman——

Mr. COSTA. Rohrabacher. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Somebody recently said, you know, 

these crazy people in Korea and Iran——

Mr. COSTA. That was Rohrabacher. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. They are not crazy. You 

better get that through our heads. They don’t think the way we do, 

but they are not crazy. 

I sometimes think the little fellow in Korea comes close, but, believe me, they know what—they have a good idea what it is—certainly in Iran he does. And we make a mistake if we think they 

are crazy. They have a deliberate sense of what it is they are going 

to do; and when he says he is going to wipe Israel off the face of 

the map, he means it. 

Mr. COSTA. You think we ought to take him seriously. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. He means it. Just like when Adolf Hitler wrote Mein Kampf and nobody took it seriously, well, they realized later they should have. And I think you are facing that. 

Mr. MILLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Royce. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. ROYCE. Secretary Eagleburger, I appreciate the opportunity 

to ask you—Mein Kampf, part of the difficulty is that Mein Kampf 

among German works is probably the best-known book being reprinted right now in the Middle East and has quite a following in 

Europe——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I know. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. As well. And it is particularly that concern expressed by Europeans parliamentarians. 

One I have talked to is Ayaan Hirsi Ali from the Netherlands. 

She was a Muslim woman serving, you know, in the Netherlands 

Parliament; and her problem was twofold. 
25

One, for many of the younger generation of Muslims who subscribe to the more radical new version of the Wahhabist creed, not 

the old Wahhabi thinking, but there is a new variant that the Muslim Brotherhood has also had a hand in helping to shape, and part 

of the thesis is, to participate in democracy itself is an insult to 

God. Because either God makes the laws or a bunch of us around 

the table makes the laws. And if we are making the laws, then—

and I have had Muslims in my district who subscribe to this explain this to me. What they want is, therefore, a separate canton 

or a separate area for their faith in which you do not impose European concepts, secular concepts on them. 

Now, her other problem was, in speaking out against the system 

of marrying off the daughter to the uncle and having honor killings 

if the girl picked her own beau, this then kind of marked her for 

death in that society; and she finally left because of the concerns 

she had that Europeans were saying to her, look, you are stirring 

up a problem. 

Now Der Stern magazine, other magazines in Europe have figured out the demographics; and before the end of this century a 

majority of continental Europe will be Islamic. And I guess the 

question for me is, unless—given the birth rate and the migration 

rate into Europe, when this occurs in Belgium and in France and 

in Germany and such, unless younger Muslims are buying into the 

concepts of the French Enlightenment or European Enlightenment, 

unless they subscribe to that, if instead they subscribe to the more 

radical new version that 85 percent of the mosques now are disseminating, then we have got a very different relationship with Europe in the future. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Right. 

Mr. ROYCE. And I was going to ask you for some of your thoughts 

on that. 

Also, many professional Muslims in Europe have told me they 

don’t feel they are getting any support. They are being encouraged 

just to be quiet. The BBC and nobody else wants to print or carry 

their message as they are trying to get into these communities and 

saying, look, we have a right to participate in the political process. 

Let’s be moderates. That is not part of the equation for young Muslims or for professionals who are getting this enormous pressure 

within the society. And I would like your thoughts on that. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Well, I don’t like to predict that sort of 

outcome, and I think we have to be careful about talking about it 

that way. But there is no question I think if you look at the demographics, and if it continues, there will be a major change in the 

cultural life of the Dutch community or whomever. And the issue 

really becomes one of whether the demographics really change that 

way in the course of the next 60 or so years or not. I can’t answer 

that question. 

But I do think it is at least a legitimate question to ask whether 

this process of increasing immigration into Western Europe does 

what you have described. And I guess I would have to say if it continues as it does it may well. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. And I don’t know what you do about 

that. 
26

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Eagleburger. 

Mr. MILLER. Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Ambassador Eagleburger, for being here. 

One of the things that our chairperson, Tom Lantos, has done is 

to encourage all of us to travel. And we travel often, and I think 

that is a good thing. I have lived in France, I have lived in the Far 

East, and one thing I noticed about the French, they are the most 

nationalistic country you could ever be in. You know, the honor and 

glory of France. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yep. 

Ms. WATSON. And I find in America we are kind of isolated. You 

know, English only. Well, in the European countries people speak 

the languages of their neighbors, and so they understand how they 

are thinking. You are absolutely right when you say don’t call them 

crazy. Because they are outsmarting us at every turn. 

I have got a couple of places I want to go with this, and I am 

going to do them in a hurry. 

One of the things that I noticed, that the visa waiver program 

is a big issue. It seems like there is a feeling among the 27 nations 

in the European Union that we are dragging our feet; and I want 

to know, is the United States really running out of time with, you 

know, trying to improve our relations around the visa issue? 

And the other thing I would like you to comment on at this time 

is you said that, you know, we can’t leave Iraq or Iran will move 

in. Are we to commit our personnel and our dollars for as long as 

it takes? What do you see as a benchmark? Can you respond? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, on the first question, ma’am, I am 

sorry, but I don’t know enough about the visa program. I have been 

away from that for so long, and I don’t know enough about it to 

give you an answer. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, what is happening is that, you know, it requires a visa to go here or there. We have a common currency, but 

you still need a visa. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Right. 

Ms. WATSON. And so some of the analysts suggest that certain 

EU member states may ultimately press for retaliation against the 

United States, against their citizens if there is no program in 

Washington extending the visa waiver so their people can travel 

here. 

So it is all right if you can’t respond to that. It is an issue that 

we have been dealing with, and particularly myself since I have all 

of Koreatown. I represent Los Angeles, and it is an issue all the 

time. We are trying to get waivers. 

But the other issue that I wanted to raise was about——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is one, ma’am, that—you know, 

that question is the center of debate in the Congress I know. And 

I can tell you my view of it, but that and $0.25 will get you a cup 

of coffee. 

Ms. WATSON. Let’s just hear it. It is another voice. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. My strong view is that, and on the Iraq 

Study Group, what we ended up saying was at a minimum give the 

administration time to withdraw over a period of time and give the 

Iraqi Government some period of time to get its house in order. So 
27

the only answer I can give you is that the realities of the situation 

I know indicate that there is going to have to be a withdrawal at 

some point. If I had my druthers, which I don’t, I would say to you 

if we leave under adverse circumstances we will deeply regret it 

sometime in the future. 

But I am not—that is my personal view, and it is not—not only 

is it not popular, but it is perhaps not even true. I think leaving 

immediately is a serious mistake. Give it some time, and hopefully 

it can be done in a way that doesn’t bring the roof down around 

our ears. 

Ms. WATSON. Noticing that two very sacred mosques were destroyed in the last 24, 48 hours, and that indicates that there still 

is that clash between the various ethnic groups, and I think that 

goes on whether we are there or not. I don’t know how we deal 

with that. Because, you know, you can go back 6,000, 7,000 years. 

I don’t think we understand their culture and their beliefs and 

their principles well enough to deal with that. I just see us as putting our people in harm’s way, too. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I can understand that. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. And if I may just say, you know, I indicated to you I was in Yugoslavia for 7 years of my career, not all 

at once, but I got to know them pretty well, and I spoke the language. Again, it is the same thing that happened; and you have to 

ask yourself, coming from what we come from, how in the name of 

you know what could two people who had lived together or next to 

each other for 50 years and not shot each other up, the minute 

this—the minute Tito leaves, basically, they end up killing other as 

fast as they can? And I can’t explain it. I can’t explain it in the 

Iraqi case. 

I guess what I have to say is that the one point I tried to make 

ahead of time is if we are going to get our troops involved in places 

like this we better understand the culture before we do it. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Secretary Eagleburger has been very gracious and patient to 

take as many of our questions and be part of this discussion with 

us. I want to be respectful of the Secretary’s time, and I know that 

there have been many members who have been waiting patiently 

to have the opportunity to ask questions. What I would propose is 

that if any member uses less than their full 5 minutes, I am sure 

that Secretary Eagleburger, the chair pro tempore, and Mr. Lantos 

would view you as a patriotic American. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I—sir, having been corrected in my use 

of the language earlier, I am prepared to stay as long as it takes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very creative uses of you-know-whats. 

Mr. MILLER. Secretary Eagleburger, you are forgiven that mild 

transgression——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. And if anyone else arrives, I would propose that we 

can cut off the questioning with those members who are here now. 

Mr. Boozman? 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You mentioned in your testimony that our descendants would 

look back and say, basically, you know, what were you people 
28

thinking as far as the nuclear proliferation. I remember with 

Jimmy Carter, you know, one of the really famous incidents during 

his campaign was that, you know, he was having breakfast with 

his daughter Amy and said, you know, that they discussed that 

that was the most——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. And I know later on during—prior to the Super 

Bowl, Roger Staubach, you know, a great quarterback, said he was 

having breakfast with his daughter that morning, and she said to 

watch out for the bomb, you know, in discussing what was going 

to happen. So this has been going on——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You mean this kind? 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Yes, that kind, a deep—but this thing I guess, you 

know, that was 30 years ago; and, you know, a generation has almost lapsed in that time period. So I guess what I would like to 

know from you is how do you get that done? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I don’t know. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. What mechanism, you know, would you propose? 

Or do we need an Iraq—do we need a Bomb Study Commission 

that is equivalent to the Iraq Study? I think it would be difficult 

to get that done through the U.N. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I think it is almost impossible to do it. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Do you have any ideas at all as to how you go 

about—I mean, right now, we can’t even get economic sanctions 

against Iran. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Well, but my view of it is you can’t—

you are not going to be able to get any kind of sanctions against 

any individual builder of the bomb. You know, we let it happen 

with North Korea after having—the President having said several 

times that it was unacceptable. 

My only view, and I think—this as an issue, if it ever can be successfully dealt with prior to somebody popping one off in Berlin or 

New York or wherever, it is going to be extremely difficult. My only 

sense of it is that the only way that maybe it can be handled is 

that if the United States—the President of the United States starts 

speaking about it every chance he gets and says—calls some sort 

of a conference of like-minded states and begins the process of talking about putting together some form of international organization—I don’t mean the U.N. Or something like that, but like-minded countries who believe that it is dangerous as can be to let countries continue to build these weapons. If you can get enough people 

over a period of time to come to that conclusion and are prepared 

to commit troops if necessary to make sure that they don’t do it 

anymore, that they don’t build these things, that to me is the only 

solution. 

And if you ask me is it likely to happen, no, I don’t think so. Because, again, until one is blown up somewhere again, it is not going 

to—everybody worries about nuclear weapons, but since we haven’t 

seen one take place since August 1945, why should we worry about 

it now? But I tell you there is going to come a time when somebody 

is going to blow one up, and God help us all when that begins to 

happen. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 
29

Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

First, let me again thank you for your patience, and I know not 

only your patience but your discomfort as well. You are a great soldier on this battlefield this morning. 

I would like to ask you about Iran. First of all, under what circumstances, and do you see those circumstances now, that we 

should go to war with Iran? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Now? 

Mr. SCOTT. Or what would those circumstances be? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh. 

Mr. SCOTT. But if you feel now, we would like to know that as 

well. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No. Number one, you know, even to 

contemplate that now is—number one, I don’t believe anybody 

should go to war when the people of the country don’t believe it is 

the thing to do; and I have to believe that nobody is going to think 

it is the thing to do. So we are already one war too many right now 

is the problem. I certainly couldn’t argue for another one. 

I will say this, though. I don’t know how many years there are 

still before they have it in the armory, but it would be nice—and 

that is all I can say—if there were enough countries ready to commit forces to go to war with Iran to stop them from building one. 

But it is not going to happen. 

So, no, I don’t want to go to war with them now. But I will say 

to you that that is why, as one clear example, that is why this 

issue is so monstrous, because nobody wants to take it on. 

But, as I tried to say, if someday Iran or somebody else blows 

one up somewhere and kills a hundred thousand people, which is 

what we—130,000 is what we killed in Hiroshima, and they are a 

lot more powerful now. At that point, somebody is going to say, 

why did you let this go on for as long as you did? And 150,000 people or whatever be slaughtered in one explosion? 

I guess what I am saying is the first time that happens, and I 

think it may at some point in the future, it is going to be too late. 

But that is what the question will be. And, therefore, in the abstract, yes, I would go to war to prevent anybody from building one. 

But you and I both know that is not sustainable in the body politic 

in this country, much less anywhere else. 

Mr. SCOTT. Very good response. 

May I follow up on that for a moment? I certainly concur with 

you we are in one war too many. Hopefully, we hurry up and get 

out of Iraq in a meaningful way. 

But going back to Iran, we have got a situation here where the 

head of the government in Iran has said two important things. 

First of all, that Israel should be wiped away from the face of the 

earth——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yep. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. And then, secondly, they are aggressively going after a nuclear weapon. So my question is: Do you feel 

that in the back of their minds that their number one priority for 

getting this nuclear weapon is in fact to do just that, wipe Israel 

off the face of the earth? 
30

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I would suspect that it is probably 

broader than that, but this is a part of their list of things to do 

with this thing if they get it. 

I suspect that the basic reason they want it is because it puts 

them in a totally different position in the region and in the world. 

And it is a—what it becomes is a radical Muslim bomb. Iran is not 

just a Muslim state, it is a radical Muslim state, and I think that 

is what they want. A part of that is because I do believe they mean 

it when they say they want to wipe Israel off the face of the map. 

And maybe they are just saying it. But we have too many times—

too often we have pooh-poohed what some vicious person who runs 

a country has to say, saying he doesn’t really mean it; and, oh, all 

of a sudden, we find out he does. And I don’t know how you can 

judge the Iranian situation any other way. 

But, having said that, I am also saying to you we are not in a 

position to do anything about it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, it is great to have you here today. I wanted to, 

because it has been raised a couple times, talk to you about the 

Iraq Study Group report. You remember—I thank you for your 

service on that—I was privileged to be one of the consultants; and 

the recommendations that came out in my view provided some very 

good advice, solutions potentially. It did recommend a military 

surge, but it also focused on a diplomatic surge and solution to the 

problem. 

You as a diplomat, I know, were very involved with that. Some 

in the Congress seem to think that this will not be solved by diplomacy, we are wasting our time. I tend to disagree with that. But 

I want you to, if you wouldn’t mind, just give you an opportunity 

to comment on these recommendations that I don’t believe were—

initially were not received as well as we had hoped by the administration. I think they are coming around to these recommendations. 

If you could comment on that and what more needs to be done to 

carry out these recommendations. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. First of all, I wasn’t surprised that they 

weren’t accepted right away. I think some of the others were. It 

didn’t bother me that they weren’t accepted right away, if in fact—

because most of them I think the sooner the better. But, at the 

same time, there is some time that can run before it is too late. 

And the issue of—and I was one of those that had to be convinced when I was on the panel about whether we should talk to 

Iran and Syria, for example, which were two of the suggestions. 

Basically, my view has always been on that kind of a question that 

unless the simple talking to somebody gives them a leg up in some 

significant way, we ought not worry about it. If we were to decide 

now we were going to go talk to Hamas—or better, say, to 

Hezbollah and not talk to Hamas, we would be doing something 

dumb I think, because we would be giving one group an advantage, 

at least in public terms. But in the case of Iran and Syria, I am 

not at all sure it would accomplish anything. 

But I see no argument for not talking if you are confident that 

whoever you have going over there to talk to them isn’t going to 
31

give the shop away. And I don’t really think that we would do that. 

But I don’t see anything wrong with talking in circumstances like 

that. 

I would be very surprised if it would make any difference in Iran. 

I think it might have an ability to succeed in Syria, because I have 

some sense that perhaps they can be pulled away from being so 

tightly bound to Iran, and it would at least be interesting to try. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I know we talked—and I am just as skeptical of 

Iran. I am very hawkish when it comes to Iran. But there are the 

other key stakeholders in the region that I believe a diplomatic 

surge would be very beneficial. I believe they need to step up to the 

plate more. I think it is in their best interests. They are the neighbors, the surrounding neighbors. And I just want to get your 

thoughts on that as well in terms of these recommendations and 

what more needs to be done. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. By the way, one thing you said that I 

really think is important. I have spent some time in the last few 

weeks talking to some of the diplomats from some of the smaller 

gulf states, and they won’t say it this way, but they are scared to 

death. Because if this goes badly in Iraq, they have——

In fact, when you asked the question about what would be the 

bad outcome, the fact of the matter is not only would we I think 

see Iran making threats against Israel, and perhaps carrying them 

out, but I think certainly the gulf states would be handy targets, 

and an unconstrained Iran would have very little reason not to do 

it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Anyway——

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Other than that, I think the thing that 

I guess impressed me most of all was—because I came into it late. 

I replaced Bob Gates when he went off to be Secretary of Defense. 

One of the least intelligent things I have seen him do in a long 

time, by the way. 

But, anyway, the point is one of the things that impressed me 

very much was the degree to which the people on that Commission 

were really trying to find common ground. And it wasn’t easy for 

them on both sides, but it pretty well worked. That is why I am 

convinced that this is not an insoluble problem, but it is close to 

it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here this long. I also have 

back problems, so I feel for you, literally. I don’t know if standing 

up or any other—if that would make you more comfortable, but 

anything——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is all right. This is fun. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We will try to be fun. 

As to Mr. Scott’s comments, I would think that before we went 

to war with Iran we would consider putting some real sanctions on 

them. And this is an administration that is unwilling to turn to 

epicureans and say that they would have to live without southern 

Caspian caviar imports. This is an administration that acquiesces 
32

in World Bank loans to Iran. This is an administration that has 

told me in no uncertain terms that we wouldn’t even talk to the 

Russians about changing our policies toward Moldova in order to 

get Russia on our side with regard to Iran. So with such a pitiful 

prioritization of the effort to prevent Iran from having nuclear 

weapons, it would be hard to tell our men and women in uniform 

to go die for a cause that epicureans cannot be asked to sacrifice 

for. 

You had the Commission on Holocaust Asset Insurance, and that 

is where I want to direct my questions. Do you have any guess as 

to the total face value, perhaps adjusted for inflation, of the insurance policies sold in Europe prior to World War II, presumably to 

adults who would be 90 years old and 100 and 110 that have not 

been paid off? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. This is my brain, so will you give me—

we don’t have that figure. I don’t know how much there is in total. 

I do know—at least I think I know—that we found—I am looking 

for my piece of paper here. I was prepared for some questions, but 

not that one. But I think we do know that we—let me just give you 

the figures I have. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That will help a little bit. We put out over $306 million offered to more than 48,000 sur- vivors and their heirs. Of this $306 million, more than half was for 

policies that did not originally identify any particular company or 

did not identify the company that ultimately ended up paying the—

making the offer. 

ICHEIC, that is this commission that I was on, our research efforts and/or the research and matching work done by the companies involved on individuals and claimants on unnamed policies 

were matched to specific insurance companies, outstanding policies, 

and offers were made. What am I trying to say? We managed, from 

amongst other things, we did our own archive. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you were able to collect over $300 million, but 

we don’t really have an indication of how much remains——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Unpaid. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Uncollected. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me put forward a few ideas first, that we also 

need to be concerned about World War I era insurance. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh, God, my friend. If you don’t know 

the agony that I spent over 8 years finding it for this one. Excuse 

me a second. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, let me——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I understand. But the Web site I don’t 

have here with me. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me put forward a proposal and get your——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. What are you trying to ask? That is my 

point. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What if we required that any insurance company 

doing business in the United States could not do business in the 

United States unless they and all of their affiliated insurance companies worldwide were to post on the Web the name of anyone insured who the company had not been in contact with since 1945? 
33

And then families could search that Web page and figure out 

whether a lost uncle or cousin was listed and they would know 

which company had sold them the insurance. 

I view this as a consumer protection issue. I sit on the Insurance 

Subcommittee. I know Ms. Ros-Lehtinen has a bill on this, and I 

look forward to not only supporting her bill, but working with her 

on this, because I sit on the Insurance Subcommittee of the Financial Services Committee. 

To me, this is a consumer protection issue. I don’t want anybody 

in my district to rely on an insurance company that would hide behind the Holocaust as a way to enhance its profits, that would say 

to an Armenian family we can’t pay the policy on that person who 

is now is 183 years old because you can’t give us a death certificate. Those insurance companies that are part of affiliated groups 

of insurance companies that won’t pay because there is no death 

certificate from a genocide or the Holocaust, would we want our 

constituents to rely on such companies? 

So perhaps the Secretary could comment on whether we should 

insist as a condition of doing business in the United States that if 

a company was receiving premiums before 1945 and has lost contact after 1945, has never paid on the policy, that they would at 

least list those on a Web site. 

Mr. MILLER. I think, Secretary Eagleburger, you can answer that 

now or for the record later. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, I would like to answer it now, because it is such nonsense, with all respect. 

First of all, I have no idea why you think—first of all, I guess 

I have to back up. I don’t understand how—I thought imperialism 

was gone in this country, but, of course, I think it is not gone when 

the Congress of the United States would suggest that an insurance 

company doing business in this country has to go through this 

record of yours that you have insisted on when we did it for 8 years 

in ICHEIC, and we went through more lists and more names than 

you are ever going to find anywhere else, and we paid 300-andsome million dollars over the course of that time. And now all——

And, by the way, where do you get this nonsense now that because they won’t give a death certificate they won’t get paid? There 

was a time when they did that. They haven’t done it anytime that 

we did anything in ICHEIC. We wouldn’t have tolerated an answer 

like that. 

And, as a matter of fact, with everything that we accomplished——

Mr. SHERMAN. So you think you have done such——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Can I finish? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. When you referred to 

my comments as nonsense, I do want to respond to it at some 

point. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You can respond, but can I finish first? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Please proceed. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I knew that this was going to happen. 

And the fact of the matter—if we got this at all—and the fact of 

the matter is I have seldom seen anything that distorts the record 

quite like what you have just tried to do and with all respect the 
34

legislation does. We have paid more money to more claimants, potential claimants than you would ever find anywhere else. 

Why is it you think that if you were to force the companies to 

open up their books now some way or another, which they would 

never do, nor do they have an obligation, nor should they have an 

obligation to do in the way which you demand it, what makes you 

think that you are going to find anything we didn’t already find? 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you are here to tell us that every insurance 

company doing business——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Of course not. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You haven’t found everything, but you are not 

convinced that anybody can find everything that you have not 

found? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. For heaven’s sake. I am not going to 

say that we have found every possible insurance——

Mr. SHERMAN. Why should we stop looking? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You shouldn’t stop looking, but that is 

not the way to look. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Why shouldn’t we ask the insurance companies to 

give us a list of those policies that they have not paid? 

Mr. MILLER [presiding]. Secretary Eagleburger, if you can answer 

that——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I will send you a letter. 

Mr. MILLER. That is fine. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Because I am very upset by this distortion of 8 years of work on our part. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Sir, I am——

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am not finished. I am not finished. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I can’t distort the facts if I don’t know the facts. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is exactly what you are telling me, 

that we screwed up some way or another, and that we did not do 

something over the course of 8 years, a job that cannot possibly be 

done in the way in which you and this legislation argue that it 

could be done. And amongst everything else, since when—since 

when is it the obligation of the Congress of the United States to 

be as imperialist as this would be? When we did it with the insurance companies, we did it through voluntary efforts on their part. 

They had to be squeezed into it, but once they got started, they behaved themselves, and they gave us the information that we needed. 

And what drives me bats on this subject is 8 years—8 years and 

300-and-some million dollars, and does anybody say that was wonderful work, and that was $300 million that they would never have 

gotten otherwise? Of course not. All we get is complaint because, 

in fact, we may have missed somebody. 

I’m sorry, I give up. I will send you a letter. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I will look forward to doing something for the 

Armenian victims as well. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. It is great to see you again, Mr. Secretary. I remember working with you for so many years. I appreciated the hard work you poured into your job, especially during 

the very difficult time of the Balkan War. So I do want to welcome 

you and thank you for your many years of leadership. 
35

Let me ask two brief questions. Late last week Congressman Eric 

Cantor led the delegation, and I was the co-chair, to an OSCE 

meeting on intolerance with a particular emphasis on anti-Semitism. Parenthetically the idea of the OSCE conferences on antiSemitism was mine. Senator Voinovich and I had a meeting back 

in 2002. We recommended as much to the Bush administration 

after receiving significant evidence of a rising tide of anti-Semitic 

abuse from the diaspora, coming from the Middle East, bringing 

hate, with the left-wing and the right-wing also contributing to 

that. 

Now after the fourth conference—the first one was in Vienna, the 

second in Berlin, the third in Cordoba, and this last one in Bucharest—a number of very important best practices have been worked 

out, including Holocaust remembrance, education; the prosecution 

of ethnically based hate crimes; training the trainers. And I was 

wondering, it seems to me that there are still—despite the fact that 

foreign ministers have participated, Presidents have participated—

there are those who would like to marginalize the issue, and I wonder if you might have some thoughts on how to continue confronting this rising tide that can persist nevertheless, how to best 

confront it. 

And secondly, if I could, Mr. Eagleburger, talking about trans-atlantic relationships, one area where there is a huge gulf between 

ourselves and our European friends is in the area of China. We 

have not had a stellar stand against the PRC’s systematic abuse 

of human rights, and, as you know, human rights abuses in China 

are lethal, massive in scope, cold-hearted, calculated to accomplish 

the regime’s designs, and show no signs whatsoever of abating, and 

the impunity is being exported to places like Darfur. And we wanted to lift the arms embargo. Thankfully they turned from that foolhardy path. 

Any recommendations that you might have? We have come to understand the depths of the depravity of Beijing’s abuse of human 

rights, religious freedom, one-child-per-couple policy, its work 

against the Dalai Lama. You are very aware of them, but it is not 

getting better, and it seems like we have human rights fatigue 

when it comes to China, and they get a pass. Anything you would 

recommend on that? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me start with the first one, because 

I absolutely agree with you. Anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. 

There is no question in my mind about that at all. I saw it with 

this commission, and I have seen it reflected in comments by people who have come back from Europe. So there is no question it is 

coming back, and it is there. And I think the only thing—well, I 

learned one thing out of this benighted commission, and that is you 

can’t stop talking about it. That is the first lesson. You can’t stop 

talking about it. 

And one of the things we did with some of the money that the 

commission had was we—for example, we began a program in the 

University of Miami that brought students from the university into 

contact with Holocaust survivors. There are a lot in and around 

Miami. And they were given credit for this program. But they went 

and talked to, worked with, helped out the survivors and then 

wrote reports on it afterward. And what they did was they got a 
36

sense that they had never had before of what the Holocaust was 

all about. And interestingly enough, these were not all Jewish kids. 

They started out Jewish kids, but a number of Gentile students 

also came into this. We did it also in a couple of universities up 

north. 

My point is, don’t stop talking about it. Don’t stop people who 

should know better what it was all about, and these kids had no 

idea what it was. 

We also did another program where we set up what we called 

summer camps in the former Soviet Union and brought in Jewish 

families and—the children and the parents from a people who had 

never been permitted to learn about their own religion in the past, 

and we went through that with them, and again, the reaction was 

fantastic from these people. 

And it cost money, and all I am saying about this is this is one 

way you do it. And the more that money can be put into finding 

ways to keep reminding people what was the Holocaust was all 

about—and it is amazing how many younger people, including Jewish kids who don’t know about it. In Miami they were mostly Jewish kids in the beginning. And I can’t give you any better way to 

deal with it than that, and that is the only way I know of to deal 

with it, because they have got—people have to understand what 

the Holocaust was. And when they understand what the Holocaust 

is or was, there is no way on God’s green Earth that they can support it or that they can think it was simply some historic event. 

Now, on the question of China, I don’t know the answer to that, 

because the Chinese, as you know, they march to their own tune, 

and part of my problem from when I first started going to the PRC 

to later years, I haven’t gone back for some time now, but the fact 

of the matter is that there is a fair amount of improvement. That 

is not to say it is satisfactory by any means. And what I am not 

sure of is whether the normal kinds of sanctions and so forth are 

going to make any difference to them. I just don’t know the answer 

to it in that case. 

Again, you can’t avoid talking about it with them. You have to 

do that. The question becomes one of how much you are prepared 

to punish if they don’t behave themselves? 

Are we almost done? 

Mr. MILLER. We are almost done. 

Ms. Jackson Lee is the last member to ask questions. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It is just I have a back that is beginning to feel like it was yesterday. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Secretary, if I had the ability to grant the 

Honor of Congress Medal, you have it, and I will try to be respectful of the rising back pain that all of us experience. So I know with 

your years of service—let me just quickly try to thank you for your 

service and throw three hot points out at you. 

One, is Putin bluffing? Is Putin bluffing? One question. 

Number two, have we expended the capital that I thought we 

gained in the whole Bosnia, Kosova and Albania when the United 

States stepped in? I think we did a pretty good job, and we were 

so out in front of NATO and others. 

And finally, number three, what do we do to repair and encourage relationships, particularly focused on Afghanistan? I think I 
37

am going to leave Iraq out. You might want to throw it in. I think 

we wasted our capital there. But the point is can we get Europeans 

to rally around us as to their own self-benefit as to Afghanistan? 

Thank you so very much for your indulgence. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me take the last one first because 

it is the one that I remember. Afghanistan and Iraq are two different issues. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, absolutely. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I thoroughly agree with that. And the 

tragedy of Afghanistan is that we were so successful, and it is beginning to slip away. And to the degree that the allies—to the degree that our friends and allies, I suppose, can be brought into the 

game, it is important. And how much more they are going to be 

willing to do, I am not sure. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Should we gather the new leaders like Brown 

and Merkel? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And get with them separate from the E8? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Anything we can do to bring them into 

this one. And you may have to indicate to them that you are not 

asking them about Iraq right now. But I think Afghanistan is a 

separate issue. It is also difficult to isolate it as a country. And 

that is part of the problem, because these people slip in and out. 

But we really pretty well destroyed the Taliban infrastructure in 

Afghanistan, and I think, one, we have to stay there, we have to 

keep it going. And I think we can, if we work hard at it, get the 

allies to put in some more money. That is not Iraq. 

Now, is Putin bluffing? No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I talked over you. Is Putin bluffing? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, not really. Depends what you mean 

by bluffing. He is not—he is not just shaking his fist or puffing his 

chest. He is serious. He is serious. Now, he is smart, and he has 

not taken on the world, but he is not bluffing. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So he is not bluffing about missile defense? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, no. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can we stand down, or should we engage in 

diplomacy on this issue? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You know, this is one I have to tell you 

if I had had my way, I am not sure I ever would have suggested 

it. But now that we have got it started, we can’t, I think, let him 

get away with them. And more important than that, it would send 

all the wrong signals to the Poles, the Bulgarians and so forth in 

Eastern Europe if we walked away from it now. 

You have to understand Putin a bit on this one. I mean, if they 

were to build one along the Mexican border, I don’t think we would 

like it a lot. But anyway, the point is he is not bluffing. 

But the point is he is never going to turn around and be a Stalin. 

That just is impossible in that country anymore. He can be and he 

has slowly, I think, come to capture a lot of the political power, but 

it is never going to be anything like it was under the Communists. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can we do anything to boost our numbers, 

and did we get any credit for Bosnia and Kosova and Albania to 

improve our numbers, to get back on track? 
38

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am not sure I understand the question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Our numbers are low among the populations 

in Europe. Did we gain any capital when we leaned on Bosnia and 

Kosova and Albania, and does that help us gain any traction? 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh, I see. Not much. This goes way 

back when I was still involved in government. I used to yell my 

head off at the allies because this was—it is an interesting case 

that we run into a lot, not so much now. But that was still in an 

era when ‘‘Let Uncle Sam do it.’’ And by the way, it got us in a 

vicious circle because if we did not do it, it did not get done. And 

if we did do it, it was another example of something the Europeans 

did not have to do. 

So I think more than anything else this was a case of just we 

ended up doing it because the others wouldn’t. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you so very much, and thank you for 

your service, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. MILLER. Secretary Eagleburger, you are done. You may 

stand or do whatever it is that brings you relief. 

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. And I have to apologize for blowing my 

stack. 

Mr. MILLER. You showed better humor than I would have had I 

been in physical discomfort. Thank you very much for your testimony and for your patience. And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
(39)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing to discuss our relationship with Europe. I look forward to hearing from former Secretary of State, 

Lawrence Eagleburger about the status of the transatlantic relationship. 

Mr. Chairman, America’s relationship with the countries of Europe is as old as 

the founding of our nation. This bond was reaffirmed on the battlefields of World 

War I and then World War II when America’s sons fought side by side with our 

European allies against the Axis armies of Germany and Japan. 

Today, our diplomatic and trade relationship with Europe are strong. So, despite 

the media’s intense focus on the negative side of the transatlantic relationship, I remind my colleagues, as a frequent participant in the U.S.–E.U. Inter-parliamentary 

Exchange, that our relationship with Europe remains strong. There is more that 

unites us than divides us. We have the largest economic relationship in the world. 

The United States exported over $232 billion of goods and services to Europe in 

2006. Illinois is the fourth largest exporting state to Europe, at $10.5 billion, with 

machinery—the staple of the Congressional district I am proud to represent—as the 

state’s top export. 

Europe is also the largest source of foreign direct investment in Illinois—more 

than $22 billion or 54 percent of total investment in Illinois. For example, Germany’s Eisenmann Corporation has a subsidiary located in Crystal Lake that makes 

quality products for the automotive sector and supports good manufacturing jobs. 

Taken together, European trade and investment supports nearly 162,000 jobs in Illinois, mostly in highly skilled and well-paid sectors. We need to continue to work 

together to further the trade liberalization agenda. Hopefully the recent optimistic 

predictions of World Trade Organization Director-General Pascal Lamy come true 

and we reach an agreement with the G–4 nations on June 19 in Potsdam, Germany 

to cut barriers to trade in agricultural and industrial products to jumpstart the 

WTO talks. 

America needs to continue working closely with Europe to tackle all the pressing 

issues of the day. We share a commitment to fighting terrorism. The United States 

commiserates with the residents of London and Madrid who suffered their own 

version of 9/11. We deeply appreciate the close cooperation between our intelligence 

and law enforcement agencies in stopping terrorist attacks. 

I also believe we have an opportunity to work with our European friends to reduce 

environmental damage and improve access to clean air and water. Rather than arguing over whether climate change exists, let’s press forward on the issue of combating all forms of pollution, which respects no borders and affects us all. That’s 

why I was pleased with the President’s recent announcement on climate change and 

the progress that he made at the recent G–8 Summit on environmental issues. 

Finally, I am heartened by the European Union’s eastward expansion to include 

countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. By including the 

transitioning democracies of Europe within the European Union, Europe stands only 

to benefit by encouraging the further development of democratic institutions in its 

new members. We need to get these nations into our visa waiver program. 

Mr. Chairman, today’s Europe consists of 27 nations and consists of 490 million 

people. It is hard to believe all this progress in the span of six decades and that 

we no longer have to fear another ‘‘Great War’’ in Europe. We should be extremely 

grateful to the architects of the post-World War II era in both the United States 

and Europe who had the wisdom and insight to establish the policies carried 
40

through by 10 successive U.S. Administrations of both political parties that created 

and sustained a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

Æ