UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-5168

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GARFIELD REDD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Williams D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:07-cr-00470-WDQ-1)

Submitted: March 4, 2010 Decided: March 30, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, George 

J. Hazel, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Garfield Redd pled guilty to possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2006). Redd was sentenced under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006), to 240 months‟ 

imprisonment. Redd appeals, arguing that the district court 

erred in finding that he had the requisite number of qualifying 

predicate convictions under the ACCA. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

In considering whether the district court properly 

designated Redd as an armed career criminal, this court reviews 

the district court‟s legal determinations de novo and its 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Wardrick, 

350 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2003). A defendant is an armed 

career criminal, subject to a minimum fifteen-year sentence, 

when he violates § 922(g)(1) and has three prior convictions for 

violent felonies or serious drug offenses that were committed on 

different occasions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4(a) (2007). A “violent felony” is 

defined by the ACCA as any crime punishable by imprisonment for 

a term exceeding one year that “has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). To determine 

whether an offense under state law falls within the definition 
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of a violent felony, this Court uses a categorical approach, 

which “takes into account only the definition of the offense and 

the fact of conviction.” United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 

286 (4th Cir. 2002). The particular label or categorization 

under state law is not controlling. Taylor v. United States, 

495 U.S. 575, 590-91 (1990). We find the district court 

properly determined that Redd had the three necessary qualifying 

predicate convictions to warrant the armed career criminal 

designation.

Redd first argues on appeal his prior conviction for 

distribution of cocaine could not be considered a predicate 

offense because he was only sixteen years old at the time of the 

offense and seventeen years old at the time of conviction. The 

statutory definition of a “serious drug offense” includes “an 

offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, 

or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a 

controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the 

Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum 

term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). In the presentence report, the 

probation officer noted that Redd pled guilty to and was 

convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in 

Maryland state court in March 1988. He was sentenced to ten 

years‟ imprisonment. Redd‟s conviction was for a serious drug 
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offense and constitutes the first predicate offense for armed 

career criminal status. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600 (noting 

that, to determine whether a prior conviction may be counted 

under the ACCA, the court looks to the statutory definition of 

the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying 

that conviction); United States v. Wright, ___ F.3d __, 2010 WL 

376549, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2010) (finding no error in 

district court‟s reliance on prior juvenile convictions to 

enhance sentence under ACCA). 

The district court also properly found that Redd‟s two 

Maryland convictions for first-degree assault qualified as 

predicate offenses under the ACCA. Under Maryland law, a person 

is guilty of first-degree assault if he “intentionally cause[s]

or attempt[s] to cause serious physical injury to another.” Md. 

Code Ann. Crim., Law § 3-202 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). Because 

the elements of first-degree assault under Maryland law 

encompass the use or attempted use of physical force, these two 

offenses categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. See

Johnson v. United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2010 WL 693687, at *6 

(U.S. Mar. 2, 2010) (“We think it clear that in the context of a 

statutory definition of „violent felony,‟ the phrase “physical 

force” means violent force-that is, force capable of causing 

physical pain or injury to another person.”); but see United 

States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding 
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Maryland common law assault is not per se violent felony within 

the meaning of ACCA); United States v. Kirksey, 138 F.3d 120, 

125 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing common law assault in Maryland to 

include, inter alia, “any unlawful force used against a person 

of another, no matter how slight”). 

Because all three prior convictions qualify as 

categorical predicate offenses under the ACCA, Redd‟s reliance 

on Taylor and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)

(holding that a court‟s inquiry as to disputed facts in 

connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of 

the charging document, a plea agreement, a transcript of the 

plea colloquy, or a comparable judicial record), is misplaced. 

While a sentencing court is not permitted to resolve disputed 

facts about a prior conviction that are not evident from “the 

conclusive significance of a prior judicial record,” Shepard, 

544 U.S. at 25, a determination that a defendant is eligible for 

sentencing under the ACCA may be based on a judge‟s 

determination that the predicate convictions are for violent 

felonies or drug trafficking crimes if the qualifying facts are 

inherent in the predicate convictions and the court is not 

required to perform additional fact finding. See United 

States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2005).

In his reply brief, Redd argues that, even if these 

prior convictions are categorically considered predicate 
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offenses under the ACCA, the Government failed to carry its 

burden of establishing the fact of these convictions and was not 

entitled to rely solely on the presentence report. Contrary to 

Redd‟s argument, we have held that a sentencing court is 

entitled to rely on “the conclusive significance” of the record, 

see Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, as set out in the presentence 

report. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285 (sentencing court entitled to 

rely on the presentence report because it “bears the earmarks of 

derivation from Shepard-approved sources”); see generally United 

States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 606 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 

United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990)) (“A 

mere objection to the finding in the presentence report is not 

sufficient. . . . Without an affirmative showing the information 

is inaccurate, the court is „free to adopt the findings of the 

[presentence report] without more specific inquiry or 

explanation.‟”). 

We therefore find that the district court did not err 

in determining that Redd had the requisite number of qualifying 

predicate convictions to warrant the armed career criminal 

designation.* Accordingly, we affirm Redd‟s sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

 

* Because Redd has three prior convictions that qualify as 

predicate offenses under the ACCA, we need not address his

arguments as to the fourth prior conviction for assault.
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED