alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 332.18 Effective date; transition rule. ( a ) *Effective date.* This part is effective November 13, 2000. In order to provide sufficient time for you to establish policies and systems to comply with the requirements of this part, the FDIC has extended the time for compliance with this part until July 1, 2001.
( b ) ( 1 ) *Notice requirement for consumers who are your customers on the compliance date.* By July 1, 2001, you must have provided an initial notice, as required by § 332.4, to consumers who are your customers on July 1, 2001.
( 2 ) *Example.* You provide an initial notice to consumers who are your customers on July 1, 2001, if, by that date, you have established a system for providing an initial notice to all new customers and have mailed the initial notice to all your existing customers.
( c ) *Two-year grandfathering of service agreements.* Until July 1, 2002, a contract that you have entered into with a nonaffiliated third party to perform services for you or functions on your behalf satisfies the provisions of § 332.13(a)(1)(ii) of this part, even if the contract does not include a requirement that the third party maintain the confidentiality of nonpublic personal information, as long as you entered into the contract on or before July 1, 2000.
§ 618.8000 Definitions. For the purposes of this subpart, the following definitions shall apply: ( a ) *Program* means the method or procedures used to deliver a related service. This distinguishes the particulars of how a related service will be provided from the type of activity or concept.
( b ) *Related service* means any service or type of activity provided by a System bank or association that is appropriate to the recipient's operations, including control of related financial matters. The term “related service” includes, but is not limited to, technical assistance, financial assistance, financially related services and insurance, but does not include lending or leasing activities.
( c ) *System banks and associations* means Farm Credit Banks, agricultural credit banks, banks for cooperatives, agricultural credit associations, production credit associations, Federal land bank associations, Federal land credit associations, and service corporations formed pursuant to section 4.25 of the Act.
[60 FR 34099, June 30, 1995, as amended at 69 FR 43514, July 21, 2004]
§ 382.7 Exclusion of certain QFCs. ( a ) *Exclusion of QFCs with FMUs.* Notwithstanding § 382.2 of this part, a covered FSI is not required to conform to the requirements of this part a covered QFC to which: ( 1 ) A CCP is party; or
( 2 ) Each party (other than the covered FSI) is an FMU.
( b ) *Exclusion of certain covered entity and covered bank QFCs.* If a covered QFC is also a covered QFC under part 252 or part 47 of this title that an affiliate of the covered FSI is also required to conform pursuant to part 252 or part 47 and the covered FSI is: ( 1 ) The affiliate credit enhancement provider with respect to the covered QFC, then the covered FSI is required to conform the credit enhancement to the requirements of this part but is not required to conform the direct QFC to the requirements of this part; or
( 2 ) The direct party to which the covered entity or covered bank is the affiliate credit enhancement provider, then the covered FSI is required to conform the direct QFC to the requirements of this part but is not required to conform the credit enhancement to the requirements of this part.
( c ) *Exclusion of certain contracts.* Notwithstanding § 382.2 of this part, a covered FSI is not required to conform the following types of contracts or agreements to the requirements of this part: ( 1 ) An investment advisory contract that: ( i ) Is with a retail customer or counterparty;
( ii ) Does not explicitly restrict the transfer of the contract (or any QFC entered into pursuant thereto or governed thereby, or any interest or obligation in or under, or any property securing, any such QFC or the contract) from the covered FSI except as necessary to comply with section 205(a)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-5(a)(2)); and
( iii ) Does not explicitly provide a default right with respect to the contract or any QFC entered pursuant thereto or governed thereby.
( 2 ) A warrant that: ( i ) Evidences a right to subscribe to or otherwise acquire a security of the covered FSI or an affiliate of the covered FSI; and
( ii ) Was issued prior to January 1, 2018.
( d ) *Exemption by order.* The FDIC may exempt by order one or more covered FSI(s) from conforming one or more contracts or types of contracts to one or more of the requirements of this part after considering: ( 1 ) The potential impact of the exemption on the ability of the covered FSI(s), or affiliates of the covered FSI(s), to be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner in the event of the financial distress or failure of the entity that is required to submit a resolution plan;
( 2 ) The burden the exemption would relieve; and
( 3 ) Any other factor the FDIC deems relevant.
#### Linda Joyce WASHINGTON *v.*STATE of Arkansas

5814

491 S.W. 2d 594

Opinion delivered March 19, 1973

*Omar F. Greene,*for appellant.

*Jim Guy Tucker,*Atty. Gen., by: *Frank B. Newell,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Frank Holt, Justice.

Appellant was fined $50 and sentenced to 30 days imprisonment on a charge of shoplifting (second offense). She contends that the trial court, sitting as a jury, should have directed a verdict of acquittal because the state failed to produce in evidence the coat which “was allegedly involved in the shoplifting.” It appears that the property was released to the local merchant.

*122The state adduced evidence that a saleslady in a local department store observed the appellant wearing a coat which was missing from a sales rack. The appellant was asked if she had decided to buy it. When the sales person’s attention was diverted, apparently by two confederates, the appellant left the store and was apprehended wearing the coat. Appellant testified that the coat was given to her several months previously by her husband and that it was stained or soiled from use. Therefore, appellant asserts the state was required to produce the coat inasmuch as it would be the best evidence as to whether it was a new or used coat. Further, without the coat she could not offer witnesses to identify the coat as being her own.

It is well established that in a criminal case it is permissible for a witness to testify concerning tangible objects which are involved without producing the articles. *Maynard*v. *State,*252 Ark. 657, 480 S.W. 2d 353 (1972), *Swearingin*v. *State,*251 Ark. 700, 474 S.W. 2d 111 (1971), *Scott*v. *State,*251 Ark. 918, 475 S.W. 2d 699 (1972), *Washington*v. *State,*248 Ark. 318, 451 S.W. 2d 449 (1970), and *Meyer*v. *State,*218 Ark. 440, 236 S.W. 2d 996 (1951). In the latter case we observed:

> “ ‘The best evidence rule deals with writings alone, not with objects, and the fact that exhibition of such objects to the jury would more clearly and forcefully explain their nature, appearance or condition, is not a valid objection to oral evidence concerning such matters.’ ”

The trial court correctly refused a directed verdict.

Affirmed.
#### Franklin L. Sheppard et al., Respondents, *v.*Rose Berney, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

Louis A. Jaffer (Abram S. Jaffer, of counsel), for appellant.

Roger Foster, for respondents.

*Per Curiam.*

In support of the appeal it is urged that there is no proof in the testimony of the value of the property alleged to have been converted at the time of the demand; that the verdict of the jury is excessive and against the weight of .evidence. We *797have carefully examined the record and find ample proof of value and in other respects the verdict is supported by the evidence. Judgment and order appealed from affirmed, with costs.

Present: McCarthy and O’Dwyer, JJ.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
EXHIBIT 12.1
  Ratio of
    Earnings to Fixed Charges
    (dollars in thousands, except ratio data)
  Year Ended December 31,2008


2007


2006


2005


2004Fixed Charges:Interest expense on indebtedness (including amortization of debt
    expense and discount)

$
39,483


$
39,341


$
29,492


$
17,849


$
22,868Interest expense on portion of rent expense representative of
    interest


20,018



20,211



19,899



14,614



9,089Total Fixed Charges

$
59,501


$
59,552


$
49,391


$
32,463


$
31,957Earnings (Loss):Net loss before provision for income taxes

$
(244,915
)

$
(262,448
)

$
(251,173
)

$
(239,439
)

$
(242,898
)Fixed Charges per above


59,501



59,552



49,391



32,463



31,957Total Earnings (Loss)

$
(185,414
)

$
(202,896
)

$
(201,782
)

$
(206,976
)

$
(210,941
)Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges


















Coverage
    deficiency(1)(2)(3)

$
(244,915
)

$
(262,448
)

$
(251,173
)

$
(239,439
)

$
(242,898
)     (1)
    
    The Companys Coverage deficiency for 2008 includes a gain
    on the sale of an equity investment of $32,518, partially offset
    by a charge for impaired investments of $6,284.(2)
    
    The Companys Coverage deficiency for 2006 includes charges
    for lease termination and restructuring of $29,510 partially
    offset by a gain on the sale of an equity investment of $14,759.(3)
    
    The Companys Coverage deficiency for 2004 includes net
    charges of $12,975, relating to a $15,408 charge for
    restructuring partially offset by a gain recognized on the
    extinguishment of debt of $2,433.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4790

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus RODNEY TERRELL NEWSOME, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:02-cr-00048-H) Submitted: February 22, 2007 Decided: February 28, 2007 Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Following a hearing at which Rodney T. Newsome was found to have violated conditions of his supervised release, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to twelve months and one day in prison. Newsome appealed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. We review sentences imposed upon the revocation of supervised release to determine whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” See United States v. Crudup , 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006). Newsome’s sentence was nearly nine months below the guidelines sentencing range of 21-24 months, and the court stated a proper basis for its conclusion that Newsome be sentenced to twelve months and one day of imprisonment. The court considered that Newsome was the primary caretaker for his teenage son, however, noted Newsome’s repeated criminal conduct and his failure to notify his probation officer of being arrested. Because Newsome’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable, we find that his sentence is not plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
AD Economic Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2010-1301 Directorate ID: 2010-SW-008-AD

Helicopter Model: MD Helicopters, Inc., Model MD900 Helicopters

Number of Helicopters (U.S. Operators): 39 Helicopters in the US Registry.

Reason: this is a superseding AD prompted by the manufacturer introducing an improved, newlydesigned tube adapter to prevent loss of yaw control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Costs:

Parts per Helicopter $244 (2 tube adapters)

Labor per Helicopter

(6 x $85/work-hour)

$510

Other (Explain)

Total Cost per Helicopter $754 

Total US Fleet Cost $29,406

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No ()

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No ()

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

Yes ( ) No ()

Project Engineer: Eric D. Schrieber
42766.

#### SCARBOROUGH v. MARTHA WHITE MILLS OF GEORGIA, INC. et al.

Jordan, Presiding Judge.

1. The record in this court discloses service of the notice of appeal by counsel for the plaintiff, as appellee, on counsel who represented both the individual and corporate defendants in the proceedings in the lower court. In view of this fact the appeal is deemed to meet in substance the requirements of Sec. 4 of the Appellate Practice Act as amended (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 493, 496; *Code Ann.**738§ 6-802) that all parties to the proceedings in the lower court are parties on appeal and shall be served with a copy of the notice of appeal. The appellant and the corporate appellee, however, have treated the individual appellee as eliminated from the proceedings, apparently because the judgment in the lower court was entered against the corporate defendant only, notwithstanding a jury verdict against both defendants. Thus, in the posture of the case as presented on appeal, based on a judgment binding the corporate appellee only, the issue of any liability on the part of the individual appellee is not before- the' court for decision.

*Deen and Quülian, JJ., concur.*

Argued May 4, 1967

Decided May 17, 1967.

*Roberts •& Thornton, Jack M. Thornton,*for appellant.

*Hatcher, Stubbs, Land & Rothschild, A. J. Land,*for appellees.

2. Counsel for the appellant asserts in his first enumerated error that the trial court permitted opposing counsel to elicit testimony from the appellant that he had received sick leave from his employer and had suffered no monetary loss of earnings because of his absence from work. This contention is not supported by the record. Although the appellant did testify generally on cross examination that he was entitled to sick leave from his employment as a school teacher without deduction from his pay, there is no evidence that he actually received sick pay for his absence on the occasion in issue. On the contrary, he claimed in his petition the loss of $90 in earnings, and his uncontradicted testimony supports this claim, around $15 per day for six days, although he also testified he was not sure of the exact amount. The trial judge instructed the jury to the effect that in the event of a finding for the plaintiff he was entitled to recover for lost earnings as shown by the evidence, but not in excess of the amount claimed. The verdict for $750 far exceeds this claimed loss of earnings and other specific losses. This enumerated error is without merit.

3. The remaining three enumerated errors are directed to instructions on liability and the failure to instruct concerning liability. As the jury resolved the issue of liability favorably to the appellant, any error in this respect would be harmless to the appellant.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### Fannie Hirtenstein, Respondent, *v.*John Farrell, Impleaded, Etc., Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment for $314.57, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant on a verdict rendered by a jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

McCrea, Somerville *&*Taylor (George H. Taylor, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.

Morris Cukor, for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

This action is brought to recover damages *for*personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by the fall of a dumbwaiter.

The appellant claims a reversal of the judgment on the ground that the verdict rendered by the jury is against the weight of evidence.

It is a close case, and the jury having determined in favor of the plaintiff after a fair submission of the question to the jury, we think we are not warranted, under the evidence, to disturb the verdict.

Judgment and order appealed from affirmed, with costs.

Present: McCarthy and S'chttohman, JJ.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3288 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.3288

                       One Hundred Eighth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
           the seventh day of January, two thousand and three

                                 An Act

 
    To amend title XXI of the Social Security Act to make technical 
     corrections with respect to the definition of qualifying State.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF 
              QUALIFYING STATE UNDER TITLE XXI OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
              ACT.

    Effective as if included in the enactment of Public Law 108-74, 
section 2105(g)(2) of the Social Security Act, as added by section 1(b) 
of such Act, is amended--
        (1) by striking ``185'' the first place it appears and 
    inserting ``184'';
        (2) by inserting ``August 1, 1994, or'' before ``July 1, 
    1995''; and
        (3) by inserting before the period at the end the following: 
    ``, or, in the case of a State that had a statewide waiver in 
    effect under section 1115 with respect to title XIX that was first 
    implemented on October 1, 1993, had an income eligibility standard 
    under such waiver for children that was at least 185 percent of the 
    poverty line and on and after July 1, 1998, has an income 
    eligibility standard for children under section 1902(a)(10)(A) or a 
    statewide waiver in effect under section 1115 with respect to title 
    XIX that is at least 185 percent of the poverty line''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000902056
<NAME> SAF T LOK INCORPORATED
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,426,410
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,344
<ALLOWANCES>                                    14,510
<INVENTORY>                                    347,682
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,228,402
<PP&E>                                       1,672,877
<DEPRECIATION>                                 530,748
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,521,871
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,428,346
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        99,870
<OTHER-SE>                                  16,656,116
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,521,871
<SALES>                                         40,594
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                40,594
<CGS>                                           24,668
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,046,543
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 3,704
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (5,264,606)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (5,264,606)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,264,606)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.76)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .46
        

</TABLE>
S

aw

. Ga

v

ADMINISTRATO

Regional AdministratorU.S. Environmental Protection Agency RE’-’Region III (Mail Code: 3RAOO)

1650 Arch Street OCT 27 .3;i Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029 LJJVISIQfl Dire.

Subject: Withdrawal and Re-Submittal ofthe District of Columbia’s Regional Haze

State Implementation Plan

Dear Mr. Garvin:

On September 21, 2010, the District of Columbia submitted the required elements of a State

Implementation Plan (SIP) revision to address Regional Haze, as required by the Clean Air Act.The District is hereby withdrawing the September 21, 2010, SIP revision in its entirety andsubmitting a new SIP revision to address Regional Haze.

Pursuant to the authority set forth in the District of Columbia Air Pollution Control Act of 1984

(“the Act”), Mayor’s Order 98-44, effective April 10, 1998, and Mayor’s Order 2006-6 1,

effective June 14, 2006, the District of Columbia is hereby requesting approval ofits SIP

revision pertaining to Regional Haze.The following are attached:

• Two hard copies of the SIP narrative;• The public hearing notice and affidavit of publication;• The hearing officer’s certification; and• Two CDs containing an electronic version ofthe entire SIP revision, the SIP revision’s

appendices, and public comments received. The electronic version includes an exactduplicate ofthe paper copy of the SIP revision submittal.

The SIP revision submittal includes condition III. a. 2. D. Compliance With Requirements forProtection of Visibility ofthe Title V Operation Permit! Chapter 3 Permit, No. 026-Ri, for thePotomac Power Resources LLC, Benning Road Generating Station. This is the only condition of

permit No. 026-Ri that the District is requesting be considered part ofthis SIP revision to

address the Clean Air Act’s requirements for Regional Haze.This plan is also being submitted for purposes of meeting the District of Columbia’s relevant andapplicable obligations related to visibility pursuant to § iiO(a)(2) ofthe federal Clean Air Act, including but not limited to § § 11 0(a)(2)(D)(i)(II) and ii 0(a)(2)(J), for the District of

DISTRICT greenforward

*4

DEPARTMENT

*

OFTHE *

ENVIRONMENT 1200 First St. NE, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20002 tel: 202.535.2600 web:ddoe.dc.gov
ncere

Director

.G. Tulou

Enclosure

cc: Diana Esher, Director, Air Protection Division, EPA Region 3 Cecily Beau, Associate Director, Air Quality Division, DDOE