97-242

 No. 97-242

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

RICHARD K. EMERY,

 Petitioner and Respondent,

 v.

STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,

 Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Missoula,

 The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 John M. McRae, Special Assistant Attorney General, Department

 of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement

 Division, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Richard A. Reep; Reep, Spoon & Gordon, Missoula, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: September 11, 1997

 Decided: December 23, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (1 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

 Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Richard K. Emery (Emery) petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula

County, for judicial review of an administrative decision and order entered by the 

State

of Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support

Enforcement Division (CSED), authorizing CSED to proceed with an income withholding

action against Emery. The District Court entered an opinion and order denying in 

part

and granting in part Emery's petition. Emery subsequently moved the court to alter 

or

amend its opinion and order on judicial review. The District Court granted Emery's

motion and, thereby, dismissed CSED's income withholding action against Emery. 

CSED appeals from the judgment entered by the District Court on its order granting

Emery's motion to alter or amend its order on judicial review. We reverse and 

remand.

 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in 

granting

Emery's motion to alter or amend and dismissing CSED's income withholding action

against Emery.

 BACKGROUND

 Emery's marriage to Deborah Keep (Keep) was dissolved in 1987. Pursuant to the

dissolution decree, Keep was awarded residential custody of their three children and

Emery was ordered to pay $375 per month to Keep for child support. Subsequent to 

the

entry of the dissolution decree, Keep received public assistance under the Aid to 

Families

with Dependent Children (AFDC) program for eleven months between December of 1987

and May of 1990. When she applied for AFDC benefits, Keep assigned her right to

receive current and future child support payments during the period in which she 

received

AFDC benefits, as well as her right to enforce child support obligations owed to 

her, to

CSED.

 Emery did not pay the full amount of child support ordered in the dissolution

decree and a child support debt accrued. In an effort to collect the past-due child

support, CSED notified Emery on October 21, 1991, that the past-due amount would be

referred to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for collection through interception 

of any

federal tax refund to which Emery might be entitled for that year. This tax 

intercept

notice also informed Emery that, if he disputed the amount determined by CSED to be

past due, he could request an administrative review of that determination. Emery 

timely

requested administrative review, but no hearing was ever held on the matter; nor did 

the

IRS intercept any federal tax refund to which Emery may have been entitled for 1991. 

CSED sent a second federal tax intercept notice to Emery on September 17, 1992. 

There

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (2 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

is no indication in the record that Emery ever directly responded to that notice or

requested an administrative review of the past-due amount claimed therein. The IRS 

did

not intercept any federal tax refund to which Emery might have been entitled in 1992.

 Meanwhile, in June of 1992, Emery and Keep entered into a stipulation modifying

the child custody provisions in the 1987 dissolution decree. Pursuant to the 

stipulation,

Emery became the primary residential custodian of the two younger children and Keep

retained residential custody of the older child. The stipulation also provided 

that, as long

as the stipulated custody arrangement remained in effect, neither party would be 

required

to pay child support to the other and all child support arrearages existing at the 

time of

the stipulation would be waived. The District Court adopted the stipulation by order

dated June 22, 1992. Although CSED had informal notice of the proceedings resulting

in the District Court's adoption of the stipulation, it was never served with 

written notice

and did not appear in the action or consent, in writing or otherwise, to the 

stipulation.

 In December of 1995, CSED again initiated an attempt to collect the past-due 

child

support it claimed against Emery, in the amount of $3,025. It served him with a 

Notice

of Intent to Withhold (NOI) stating that CSED intended to order Emery's employer to

withhold money from Emery's monthly wages to satisfy the amount due. Emery timely

requested a hearing to contest the NOI, asserting that the child support arrearages 

had

been waived under the 1992 stipulation, and a hearing was held on February 14, 1996,

before a CSED administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ subsequently entered a 

decision

and order in which it determined that Emery owed a child support debt in the amount 

of

$3,025; that the stipulation and order entered in June of 1992, which purported to 

waive

all child support arrearages, was void with respect to CSED because CSED did not

participate; that CSED could enforce the child support obligation set in the 

original 1987

dissolution decree for the months in which Keep received AFDC benefits; and that CSED

could proceed with the income withholding action.

 Emery petitioned the District Court for judicial review of the ALJ's decision 

and

order. The District Court denied Emery's petition for judicial review in part, 

concluding

that the ALJ correctly determined that the 1992 stipulation and order "waiving" child

support arrearages was void as to CSED's claim for past-due child support accrued 

during

the periods Keep received AFDC benefits. The court also granted Emery's petition for

judicial review in part, by remanding the case to CSED with instructions to 

redetermine

the past-due amount owed by Emery.

 Emery timely moved to alter or amend the District Court's opinion and order on

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (3 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

judicial review, asserting two bases on which the court should dismiss CSED's income

withholding action. The District Court granted Emery's motion to alter or amend and

dismissed CSED's income withholding action on the basis that the delay between 

Emery's

1991 request for administrative review and the February 14, 1996, hearing before the

ALJ violated his rights to due process of law and the administration of justice 

without

delay under the Montana Constitution. CSED appeals.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 We review a district court's ruling on a motion to alter or amend to determine

whether the court abused its discretion. See Estate of Nielsen v. Pardis (1994), 265

Mont. 470, 478, 878 P.2d 234, 238 (citations omitted). Here, the basis for the 

District

Court's grant of Emery's motion to alter or amend was its conclusion that CSED had

violated Emery's rights to due process of law and the administration of justice 

without

delay. We review this underlying conclusion of law to determine whether the court's

interpretation of the law is correct. Connell v. State, Dept. of Social Services 

(1997),

280 Mont. 491, 494, 930 P.2d 88, 90.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in granting Emery's motion to

 alter or amend and dismissing CSED's income withholding action against

 Emery?

 Emery's motion to alter or amend the District Court's opinion and order on

judicial review was based, in part, on our decision in Connell, which he asserts is

analogous to the facts in this case and compels a conclusion that CSED's income

withholding action should be dismissed. The District Court agreed with Emery's

interpretation of Connell and determined that the delay of over four years between

Emery's initial request for administrative review of the 1991 federal tax intercept 

notice

and the February 14, 1996, hearing on the NOI violated his rights to the 

administration

of justice without delay and due process of law as guaranteed by Article II, 

Sections 16

and 17 of Montana's Constitution. CSED argues that Connell is distinguishable from 

the

present case and, as a result, that the District Court erred in relying on Connell as

authority for dismissing its income withholding action against Emery. We agree.

 In Connell, CSED initiated an income withholding action against Connell for 

pastdue child support by serving him with an NOI in February of 1990. Additionally, in

June of 1990, the State Auditor's office served Connell with notice that his 1990 

state tax

refund would be offset against the amount he owed to CSED. An administrative hearing

was held on both the NOI and the state tax refund offset on February 15, 1991; at the

conclusion of the hearing, a schedule for the submission of proposed findings of 

fact and

conclusions of law was established. Connell, 930 P.2d at 90. Although Connell 

timely

submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, CSED failed to do so,

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (4 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

either timely or at all. Nor did the hearings officer enter a final decision. 

Connell, 930

P.2d at 90.

 Almost four years after the hearing in February of 1991, a new hearings officer

took over the case and ordered the parties to appear via a telephone conference to 

present

arguments and motions regarding the preparation of findings of fact, conclusions of 

law

and an order in the matter. Connell, 930 P.2d at 90. Connell moved for a default

judgment against CSED or, in the alternative, to dismiss the case; the hearings 

officer

denied Connell's motions on July 28, 1995, and ordered a rehearing of the matter. 

Connell petitioned for judicial review, the district court affirmed the order 

setting a

rehearing and Connell appealed. Connell, 930 P.2d at 90.

 We reversed the district court on appeal. We reiterated the long-established

principle that due process requires providing a person the opportunity to be heard 

at a

meaningful time and in a manner which comports with principles of fair play, adding 

that

administrative proceedings must also be conducted in accordance with fundamental

principles of fair play. Connell, 930 P.2d at 91 (citations omitted). We further

determined that Montana's constitutional guarantee of justice without delay was 

implicated

when extraordinary delays occurred in legal proceedings. Connell, 930 P.2d at 91. 

Under the facts before us, we concluded that "failure on the part of CSED's hearings

office to render a decision after a lapse of 44 months constitutes undue delay under

Montana Constitution Article II, Section 16, and violates the due process guarantees

under Montana Constitution Article II, Section 17." Connell, 930 P.2d at 92-93.

 In this case, CSED served its NOI regarding the income withholding action on

Emery in December of 1995. Emery requested a hearing and the hearing was held on

February 14, 1996. The ALJ's decision and order was entered on July 1, 1996, less 

than

five months later. The delay between the hearing and the resulting decision in this 

case

was minimal and did not begin to approach the magnitude of the 44-month delay in

Connell. Thus, Connell is distinguishable from the present case on the facts and, 

as a

result, it is not authority for a determination that CSED violated Emery's 

constitutional

rights to due process and the administration of justice without delay in the period

following the hearing on the NOI.

 The District Court, however, perceived the delay in this case as that occurring

between the time Emery first requested a hearing on the 1991 federal tax intercept 

notice

and the 1996 hearing on the 1995 NOI. It determined that our constitutional 

analysis in

Connell applies to such delays between the request for, and grant of, an 

administrative

hearing and concluded that the delay here was impermissible and unconstitutional 

under

Connell. CSED asserts that the District Court erred in treating CSED's child support

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (5 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

collection efforts as one long administrative action initiated with the 1991 federal 

tax

intercept notice and in implicitly concluding that Emery's right to a hearing on that

federal tax intercept notice continued without abeyance until a hearing was 

eventually

granted. CSED argues that the District Court's application of Connell based on these

erroneous conclusions was incorrect.

 Child support which is due under a dissolution decree and which is unpaid

becomes a judgment debt similar to any other money judgment. In re Marriage of Sabo

(1986), 224 Mont. 252, 254, 730 P.2d 1112, 1113 (citations omitted); In re Marriage 

of

Brown (1994), 263 Mont. 184, 188-89, 867 P.2d 381, 383-84. Thus, Emery's failure

to pay the full amount of child support ordered in the 1987 dissolution decree 

during the

intermittent months Keep received AFDC benefits between December of 1987 and May

of 1990 resulted in a judgment debt against him. Furthermore, when Keep applied for

AFDC benefits, she assigned her right to enforce that judgment debt against Emery to

CSED. Pursuant to statute, CSED had ten years from the date Emery's child support

payments became past due in which to initiate collection proceedings against him on 

the

resulting judgment debt. Section 27-2-201(3), MCA; In re Marriage of (Crittendon)

Hooper (1991), 247 Mont. 322, 327, 806 P.2d 541, 544. 

 CSED is authorized to collect past-due child support amounts through various

administrative remedies. For example, õ 40-5-412, MCA, authorizes CSED to collect

child support arrearages through income withholding, a remedy which CSED initiated in

this case via its NOI in December of 1995. Other administrative remedies include 

license

suspension under õ 40-5-703, MCA, state debt offsets under õ 17-4-105, MCA, and

warrants for distraint under õ 40-5-247, MCA. CSED also is authorized, by 42 U.S.C.

õ 664, to collect past-due child support via federal tax refund intercepts such as it

initiated against Emery in 1991. Each of these administrative remedies is a separate

collection remedy, with separate statutory procedural requirements, which CSED may

pursue individually or simultaneously at any time within the ten-year statute of 

limitations

period. CSED's election to pursue one remedy does not preclude pursuit of other

remedies at the same, or a later, time. See, e.g., õõ 40-5-404(1) and 40-5-247(9), 

MCA. 

Thus, contrary to the District Court's perception, CSED's attempts to collect child

support arrearages are not one continuous collection action, but rather a series of

independent and, occasionally, cumulative actions. 

 Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution provides that "[n]o person 

shall

be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Procedural 

due

process concerns, and the concomitant right to notice and a hearing, do not arise 

unless

there is an actual or threatened deprivation of a person's life, liberty or 

property. See,

e.g., State ex rel. Dept. of Health v. Reese (1993), 260 Mont. 24, 27, 858 P.2d 357,

359. When CSED initiates a collection action there is a threatened deprivation of a 

child

support debtor's property, usually the debtor's money, and the right to a due process

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (6 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

hearing arises. The statutes authorizing CSED's various administrative collection 

actions

recognize this due process right by providing corresponding rights to notice of the

proposed action and the opportunity to request and receive a hearing. See, e.g., õ 

40-5-

413, MCA (notice of intent to withhold income); õ 40-5-414, MCA (hearing on proposed

income withholding action); õ 40-5-702, MCA (notice of intent to suspend license for

nonpayment of child support); õ 40-5-703, MCA (hearing on action to suspend 

license). 

While each individual hearing may include a review of whether the amount of child

support CSED has determined to be past due is correct, the hearing itself is 

specifically

tied to the particular administrative remedy initiated by CSED.

 As discussed above, there was little delay involved in the proceedings and 

decision

regarding CSED's NOI in December of 1995. The administrative remedy and

corresponding right to a hearing at issue here is the 1991 federal tax refund 

intercept

action. Upon receiving CSED's notice of the federal tax intercept action Emery 

timely

requested a hearing, asserting that he did not owe the amount determined by CSED to 

be

past due. A hearing was scheduled, but later was continued indefinitely. In the 

interim,

the IRS did not intercept any federal tax refund money to which Emery was entitled in

1991 and, when no tax refund money was intercepted by the IRS, CSED discontinued

action on the 1991 federal tax intercept collection attempt. Nevertheless, in 

October and

November of 1993, Emery repeated his request for a hearing on the amount of past-due

child support claimed by CSED; CSED did not grant his request. Eventually, in his

motion to alter or amend the District Court's opinion and order on judicial review, 

Emery

contended that CSED's failure to grant his request for a hearing on the 1991 federal 

tax

intercept collection attempt violated his right to due process.

 As stated above, the initiation of a CSED administrative collection remedy 

raises

the threat of a deprivation of property which, in turn, raises procedural due process

concerns. However, when that particular administrative collection remedy is

discontinued, the threat of a property deprivation is withdrawn and the necessity 

for a due

process hearing evaporates. Thus, when the IRS did not intercept any federal tax 

refund

monies to which Emery was entitled in 1991 and CSED discontinued action on that

collection effort, the threatened deprivation of Emery's property no longer existed. 

Concomitantly, the requirement of a due process hearing on the 1991 federal tax 

intercept

notice also no longer existed. Emery's requests for a hearing in the fall of 1993 

were not

sufficient to require a hearing because the requests were not attached to any 

specific

action or proposed action by CSED which threatened to deprive Emery of his property.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (7 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

 Moreover, State agencies may act only as authorized by the statutes enacted by 

the

legislature. See Bick v. State, Dept. of Justice (1986), 224 Mont. 455, 457, 730 

P.2d

418, 420. We know of no statute, or administrative rule promulgated thereunder, 

which

authorizes CSED to grant a hearing to a child support debtor absent a proposed or

pending administrative collection action by CSED, and the due process provision of 

the

Montana Constitution, in itself, does not require CSED to grant Emery a hearing 

absent

a threatened or actual deprivation of his life, liberty or property. See Art. II, 

Sec. 17,

Mont. Const. There simply is no right to a hearing unless and until there is an 

agency

action pending on which a hearing could be held. 

 Neither is the constitutional guarantee of administration of justice without 

delay,

as provided in Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution, implicated in 

this case. 

In Connell, Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution was addressed, in

conjunction with the Article II, Section 17 due process of law provision, as being a

constitutional guarantee of "prompt disposition of administrative actions . . . ." 

Connell,

930 P.2d at 91. However, each administrative action initiated by CSED against Emery

was disposed of promptly. Both the 1991 and 1992 federal tax intercept actions were

discontinued after the IRS did not intercept any refund money to which Emery was

entitled in those years. The NOI served on Emery in December of 1995 was disposed

of at the administrative level less than eight months later when the ALJ's decision 

and

order was entered on July 1, 1996. Thus, in each of these administrative actions 

against

Emery, the Article II, Section 16 requirement of "prompt disposition" was met by 

CSED.

 Finally, we agree with CSED's assertion that there is no requirement in Article 

II,

Section 16 of the Montana Constitution that a judgment creditor--in this case, CSED--

must "speedily and without delay" apply for any particular remedy within any 

particular

time. As discussed above, the period within which CSED may initiate collection 

actions

against a child support debtor is ten years from the date the child support 

obligation

becomes past due. Section 27-2-201(3), MCA; Marriage of Hooper, 806 P.2d at 544. 

CSED may initiate one, or several, collection actions at any point within that tenyear

period. Once such a collection action is initiated, Article II, Section 16 requires 

that it

be resolved without undue delay--that is, "disposed of promptly"--but there is no

requirement in this constitutional provision that CSED take steps to begin a 

collection

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (8 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM
97-242

action at any particular time after the child support debt accrues. The practical 

effect of

a determination that Article II, Section 16 of Montana's Constitution requires CSED 

to

initiate attempts to collect child support debts promptly, without undue delay and 

prior

to the expiration of the ten-year statute of limitations would be to eliminate that

limitations period.

 We conclude that the District Court erred in determining that CSED violated

Emery's constitutional rights to due process of law and the administration of justice

without delay by not granting his request for an administrative hearing in the period

between the termination of the 1991 federal tax refund intercept action and service 

of the

1995 NOI. We hold, therefore, that the District Court abused its discretion in 

granting

Emery's motion to alter or amend and in dismissing CSED's income withholding action

against Emery.

 Reversed and remanded with instructions that the District Court reinstate its

original opinion and order on judicial review.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-242%20Opinion.htm (9 of 9)4/17/2007 4:24:21 PM