Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 16A01-1506-JT-766| December 22, 2015 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of F.W., Minor Child, and

C.W., Mother,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 22, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

16A01-1506-JT-766

Appeal from the Decatur Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Timothy B. Day, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

16C01-1408-JT-236
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Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] C.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights 

over her minor child F.W. (“Child”). Mother raises a single issue for our 

review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the 

termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[1] Mother gave birth to Child on March 21, 2013.1 On July 24, an interested party 

contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to report that 

Mother: was using illegal substances; was “homeless and leaving [F.W.] with 

random people”; and had not seen F.W. for two weeks. Appellant’s App. at 

22. Amanda Payne, a DCS family case manager, made contact with Mother, 

who stated that she was living with her boyfriend’s parents. Payne was unable 

to confirm the veracity of that information. At that time, Mother, who has 

three other children, was “currently under [a] court’s order in a separate DCS 

case requiring her to give drug screens to DCS,” but Mother refused Payne’s 

request that she submit to a drug screen. Id. at 13. In addition, Mother was 

“becoming less cooperative with attending her supervised visits with her 3 other 

children and with meeting with service providers.” Id. Accordingly, DCS filed 

 

1

 Child’s father has not been identified and has not registered with the putative father registry.
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a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). DCS 

removed Child from Mother’s care on July 26. 

[2] On July 30, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS. Then, following a 

dispositional hearing in August, the trial court ordered Mother to: maintain 

contact with her family case manager weekly; maintain appropriate housing; 

not use controlled substances without a valid prescription; submit to random 

drug screens; complete a psychological evaluation; participate in home-based 

counseling; and participate in visitation. Mother’s participation in those 

ordered services was grossly inconsistent. For example, following a 

psychological evaluation in January 2014, a therapist recommended that 

Mother attend weekly or bi-monthly therapy sessions. Mother attended one 

therapy session in January; two in June; and one in August. Due to Mother’s 

noncompliance, her therapy was terminated. Mother also failed to stay in 

regular contact with her family case manager, and she refused all but three 

random drug screens. Mother failed two out of the three drug screens.

[3] On August 15, 2014, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. Following an evidentiary hearing on the 

petition on January 29, April 17, and June 4, 2015, the trial court entered the 

following relevant findings and conclusions in support of terminating Mother’s 

parental rights:

2. There is a reasonable probability that:
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a. The conditions which resulted in Child’s removal 

and continued placement outside the home will not 

be remedied by parents as shown by:

i. Mother’s instability for the past two 

years and longer;

ii. Mother’s housing instability, 

including times where she is homeless 

and times where she has lived in a tent;

iii. Mother’s mental health has not 

improved despite being provided 

opportunities by DCS to address her 

needs and has chosen not to do so;

iv. No father has come forward 

throughout the case or upon the 

termination of parental rights being 

published.

b. That continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to Child’s wellbeing as shown by:

i. Since there has been no improvement 

in mother’s mental health, she is a 

danger to the child in her current state 

as there is evidence in testimony and in 

the court hearings in this cause of action 

as well as the CHINS action of anger 

outbursts by mother, irrational 

behaviors, choosing inappropriate 

caregivers for her children and 

inconsistency in visits.

3. Termination of parental rights is in Child’s best interests:
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a. In addition to the above, the Court notes that no 

father has ever been involved in the child’s life either 

during the CHINS case or in the above cause.

b. The child’s CASA testified that termination is in 

the child’s best interest.

c. Further, mother has been provided several 

opportunities to appear for these proceedings and 

despite good notice, has not appeared on either the 

April 17 or June 4 hearings to present her case.

4. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

Child, that being adoption;

a. The Court acknowledges that the child’s aunt, 

[J.K.], who is the child’s current placement and 

presumed adoptive parent may have some financial 

difficulties; however, it appears that the child’s needs 

are sufficiently met and further that [J.K.] has always 

been there for the child.

* * *

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED: That DCS’ petition for termination of parental 

rights is granted; and that the parent-child relationship between 

the child [F.W.] and her Mother, [C.W.] and to her father, any 

unknown alleged father, is hereby terminated.

Id. at 231-32. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional 

right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the 
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Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe 

Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), 

trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the 

parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a 

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re K.S.), 750 

N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child 

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be 

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental 

rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or 

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[5] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

* * *

(C) [and] that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). That statute provides that DCS need establish only 

one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may 

terminate parental rights. DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental 

rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-

14-2).

[6] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of 

Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s 

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). trans. denied.

[7] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 

2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, 

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. 
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“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[8] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s 

findings underlying its conclusions that Mother will not remedy the conditions 

that resulted in Child’s removal; that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child; and that termination is in 

the best interest of Child. Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is 

written in the disjunctive, we only address the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the trial court’s conclusions that continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being and that termination is in 

Child’s best interest. And we address each of those contentions in turn.

Continuation of the Parent-Child Relationship

[9] In support of this conclusion, the trial court stated as follows:

Since there has been no improvement in mother’s mental health, 

she is a danger to the child in her current state as there is 

evidence in testimony and in the court hearings in this cause of 

action as well as the CHINS action of anger outbursts by mother, 

irrational behaviors, choosing inappropriate caregivers for her 

children and inconsistency in visits.
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Appellant’s App. at 232. Mother contends that the court’s findings on this issue 

are “not supported by the evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. In particular, 

Mother asserts that

DCS presented no evidence to show Mother ever endangered 

F.W. Though caseworker Miller saw Mother angry at visits, but 

[sic] she never directed her anger towards her daughter. And 

Miller never stated Mother acted violently, rather she yelled at 

her kids.

* * *

Another of the court’s findings hinges on Mother leaving the 

child with inappropriate caregivers. Obviously this did not 

happen after F.W.’s removal. Before DCS took custody of the 

child, Mother often left her with Aunt [J.], the woman who now 

wishes to adopt the child. If Aunt [J.] had been an 

“inappropriate” caregiver, the court would not have approved of 

the plan to allow her to adopt F.W.

Much of DCS’s case hinged in the fact Mother had not worked 

aggressively with service providers to change her circumstances. 

But before one judges Mother too harshly, it is necessary to 

understand the difficulties which impact Mother. Mother 

presented to the court as a woman with reduced mental capacity. 

When she was a child, Mother went into foster care and suffered 

after being subjected to emotional, physical and sexual abuse. 

Given her history, Mother entered the case distrustful of the same 

agency she felt had never supported her as a child.

Unable to initially grasp why DCS kept removing her children, 

Mother lashed out at those trying to help her. That Mother did 

not avail herself [of] services offered to her can be explained by 

Mother’s limited functioning and her general distrust of the 

system which she felt failed her.
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Appellant’s Br. at 16-17 (citations omitted).

[10] First, while the evidence does not show that Mother had expressed anger 

towards Child during supervised visits, there is evidence that Mother had angry 

outbursts and had, on one occasion, expressed anger toward her children. In 

particular, the evidence shows that: during supervised visits with Child, Mother 

“would cross some boundaries as far as . . . becoming very upset” and behaving 

in an “inappropriate” manner in front of Child; Mother “had her moments of 

getting pretty hostile” with the family case worker; and she “expressed a lot of 

anger with her DCS case workers as well.” Tr. at 58, 68, 73. DCS also 

presented evidence that, during a June 2014 therapy session, Mother threatened 

to “take anybody’s breath if they took hers,” which the therapist took to mean 

to refer to Mother’s children, and Mother stated that “her invisible knife would 

turn into a real one.” Id. at 47. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings

that Mother had angry outbursts and engaged in irrational behavior.

[11] Second, as to the trial court’s finding that Mother left Child with inappropriate 

caregivers, while the evidence shows that Mother sometimes let J.K. babysit 

Child, the undisputed evidence also shows that, at the time of Child’s removal, 

Mother was “homeless and moving from place to place with [Child] and 

dropping [Child] off [with] random babysitters for extended periods of time.” 

Appellant’s App. at 30. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding on this 

issue.
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[12] Third, to the extent Mother asks that we excuse her behavior in light of her bad 

experiences with the foster care system as a child and her “limited functioning,” 

Mother does not explain her refusal to attend all but a few therapy sessions. 

Mother’s therapist, Linda Brown, testified that she had hoped to “continue to 

evaluate the need for . . . substance abuse treatment” in light of Mother’s 

marijuana use. Tr. at 44. Brown also testified that she had referred Mother to 

an adult case management service, which would have helped Mother learn life 

skills, such as maintaining stable housing, but Mother did not pursue that 

service.

[13] A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient 

lifestyle such that his physical, mental, and social growth is permanently 

impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Shupperd v. Miami 

Cnty. Div. of Family & Children (In re E.S.), 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002). When the evidence shows that the emotional and physical development 

of a child in need of services is threatened, termination of the parent-child 

relationship is appropriate. Id. 

[14] The undisputed evidence shows that Child was removed from Mother’s care 

only a few months after Child’s birth. During the CHINS proceedings, Mother 

barely maintained contact with her family case manager; she has not 

maintained suitable or stable housing; she has not consistently visited with 

Child; she did not follow through on recommended individual therapy, 

including additional substance abuse evaluation; she refused all but three drug 

screens; and she failed two out of the three drug screens. In short, Mother has 
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been more non-compliant with the court’s orders than compliant. Finally, 

when asked to describe how Mother did in her supervised visits with Child, 

Scott Miller, the case manager who supervised those visits, testified that “there 

was always a lack of stability there and concerns with how she would actually 

do if she had to care for her full time.” Tr. at 56. And Miller testified that 

Mother had lost her bond with Child due to her failure to participate in 

consistent and frequent visits with Child. Mother’s contentions on appeal 

amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The 

trial court’s findings support the trial court’s conclusion that there is a 

reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to Child’s well-being.

Best Interests

[15] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 

924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent’s historical inability to 

provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current 

inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the 

parent-child relationship is in the child’s best interests.” Castro v. State Office of 

Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. 

“Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important consideration in 

determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service 

providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.” 

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224.
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[16] Again, Mother’s contention on this issue amounts to a request that we reweigh 

the evidence, which we will not do. Justin Rowland, a family case manager, 

summed up the evidence showing that termination is in Child’s best interests as 

follows:

[Mother]’s not been able to maintain appropriate care of herself. 

She has not been consistent with services. She has not been able 

to work towards any progress on her mental health. She has 

failed drug screens. She . . . has not had housing stability 

throughout the life of the case. And I do not feel that [Child] 

would be safe in an environment with [Mother] as the caregiver.

Tr. at 85. Finally, Pam Meyer, the Court Appointed Special Advocate, testified 

that she “believe[d] very strongly that it’s in [Child]’s best interest” that 

Mother’s parental rights be terminated. Id. at 104. We hold that the totality of 

the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in Child’s 

best interest. The trial court did not err when it terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to Child.

[17] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and May, J., concur.