alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350 ADOPTED  PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The
undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to their knowledge, the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2002 of Naturade, Inc. (the "Company") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in such periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in such report.

Very
truly yours,

|/s/BILL D. STEWART                         |  | 
|------------------------------------------ |  | 
|                                           |  | 
|Bill D. Stewart
Chief Executive Officer    |  | 
|                                           |  | 
|                                           |  | 
|                                           |  | 
|/s/LAWRENCE J. BATINA                      |  | 
|Lawrence J. Batina
Chief Financial Officer |  | 

Dated:
August 14, 2002

---

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-7888

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus DWIGHT LAMONT HUNTER, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CR-94-111-MU; CA-00-71-3-2-MU) Submitted: June 25, 2004 Decided: August 3, 2004 Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Dwight Lamont Hunter, Appellant Pro Se. Robert James Conrad, Jr., United States Attorney, Douglas Scott Broyles, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Dwight Lamont Hunter appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the district court’s prior judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion to vacate his sentence. An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit judge or justice issues a certificate of appealability. See Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 370 (4th Cir. 2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(2000). This court will not issue a certificate of appealability as to claims denied by a district court on procedural grounds unless the movant can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). We have reviewed the record and determine that Hunter has not made the requisite showing. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3163

To amend section 526 of the National Housing Act to provide that any 

certification of a property for meeting energy efficiency requirements 

for mortgage insurance under such Act shall be conducted by an individual certified by an accredited home energy rating system provider. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2003

Mr. ANDREWS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL

To amend section 526 of the National Housing Act to provide that any certification of a property for meeting 

energy efficiency requirements for mortgage insurance 

under such Act shall be conducted by an individual certified by an accredited home energy rating system provider.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FHA Energy Effi5 ciency Act’’. 
2

•HR 3163 IH 

1 SEC. 2. ENERGY EFFICIENCY CERTIFICATIONS. 

2 Section 526(a) of the National Housing Act (12 

3 U.S.C. 1735f–4(a)) is amended—

4 (1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(a)’’; and 

5 (2) by adding at the end the following new 

6 paragraph: 

7 ‘‘(2) The Secretary shall require, with respect to any 

8 single- or multi-family residential housing subject to a 

9 mortgage insured under this Act, that any approval or cer10 tification of the housing for meeting any energy efficiency 

11 or conservation criteria, standards, or requirements pursu12 ant to this title and any approval or certification required 

13 pursuant to this title with respect to energy conserving 

14 improvements or any solar energy system, shall be con15 ducted only by an individual certified by a home energy 

16 rating system provider who has been accredited to conduct 

17 such ratings by the Home Energy Ratings System Coun18 cil, the Residential Energy Services Network, or such 

19 other appropriate national organization, as the Secretary 

20 may provide.’’.

Æ
§ 602.21 Production of FCA documents. ( a ) An FCA employee may produce documents only as the Chairman allows.
( b ) Before we will release any documents, the requesting party must get an acceptable protective order from the court before which the action is pending that will preserve the confidentiality of the documents to be released.
( c ) On request, we may provide certified or authenticated copies of documents.
§ 324.33 Off-balance sheet exposures. ( a ) *General.* ( 1 ) An FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the exposure amount of an off-balance sheet exposure using the credit conversion factors (CCFs) in paragraph (b) of this section.
( 2 ) Where an FDIC-supervised institution commits to provide a commitment, the FDIC-supervised institution may apply the lower of the two applicable CCFs.
( 3 ) Where an FDIC-supervised institution provides a commitment structured as a syndication or participation, the FDIC-supervised institution is only required to calculate the exposure amount for its pro rata share of the commitment.
( 4 ) Where an FDIC-supervised institution provides a commitment, enters into a repurchase agreement, or provides a credit-enhancing representation and warranty, and such commitment, repurchase agreement, or credit-enhancing representation and warranty is not a securitization exposure, the exposure amount shall be no greater than the maximum contractual amount of the commitment, repurchase agreement, or credit-enhancing representation and warranty, as applicable.
( b ) *Credit conversion factors* — ( 1 ) *Zero percent CCF.* An FDIC-supervised institution must apply a zero percent CCF to the unused portion of a commitment that is unconditionally cancelable by the FDIC-supervised institution.
( 2 ) *20 percent CCF.* An FDIC-supervised institution must apply a 20 percent CCF to the amount of: ( i ) Commitments with an original maturity of one year or less that are not unconditionally cancelable by the FDIC-supervised institution; and
( ii ) Self-liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the movement of goods, with an original maturity of one year or less.
( 3 ) *50 percent CCF.* An FDIC-supervised institution must apply a 50 percent CCF to the amount of: ( i ) Commitments with an original maturity of more than one year that are not unconditionally cancelable by the FDIC-supervised institution; and
( ii ) Transaction-related contingent items, including performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties, and performance standby letters of credit.
( 4 ) *100 percent CCF.* An FDIC-supervised institution must apply a 100 percent CCF to the amount of the following off-balance-sheet items and other similar transactions: ( i ) Guarantees;
( ii ) Repurchase agreements (the off-balance sheet component of which equals the sum of the current fair values of all positions the FDIC-supervised institution has sold subject to repurchase);
( iii ) Credit-enhancing representations and warranties that are not securitization exposures;
( iv ) Off-balance sheet securities lending transactions (the off-balance sheet component of which equals the sum of the current fair values of all positions the FDIC-supervised institution has lent under the transaction);
( v ) Off-balance sheet securities borrowing transactions (the off-balance sheet component of which equals the sum of the current fair values of all non-cash positions the FDIC-supervised institution has posted as collateral under the transaction);
( vi ) Financial standby letters of credit; and
( vii ) Forward agreements.
1... This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2008-CI-15014, styled Alamo Community College District v.

Franchesca O’Neal, in the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Andy Mireles presiding.

However, the challenged order was signed by the Honorable Lori Massey, presiding judge of the 288th Judicial District

Court, Bexar County, Texas.

i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00694-CV

IN RE Franchesca O’NEAL

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. López, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 8, 2008

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED AS MOOT

On September 15, 2008, relator Franchesca O’Neal filed a petition for writ of mandamus,

seeking to compel the trial court to vacate a temporary restraining order. On September 17, 2008,

the temporary restraining order expired and the trial court granted a temporary injunction. The

temporary restraining order is no longer in effect. Therefore, the petition for writ of mandamus is

now moot. 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus and all other relief requested as

moot.

PER CURIAM
§ 3.304 Temporary exclusions from total leverage exposure. ( a ) *In general.* Subject to paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section, and notwithstanding any other requirement in this part, a national bank or Federal savings association, when calculating on-balance sheet assets as of each day of a reporting quarter for purposes of determining the national bank's or Federal savings association's total leverage exposure under § 3.10(d), may exclude the balance sheet carrying value of the following items: ( 1 ) U.S. Treasury securities; and
( 2 ) Funds on deposit at a Federal Reserve Bank.
( b ) *Opt-in period.* Before applying the relief provided in paragraph (a) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings association must first notify the OCC before July 1, 2020.
( c ) *Calculation of relief.* When calculating on-balance sheet assets as of each day of a reporting quarter, the relief provided in paragraph (a) of this section applies from the beginning of the reporting quarter in which the national bank or Federal savings association filed an opt-in notice through the termination date specified in paragraph (d) of this section.
( d ) *Termination of exclusions.* This section shall cease to be effective after the reporting period that ends March 31, 2021.
( e ) *Custody bank.* A custody bank must reduce the amount in § 3.10(c)(2)(x)(A) (to no less than zero) by any amount excluded under paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
( f ) *Disclosure.* Notwithstanding Table 13 to § 3.173, a national bank or Federal savings association that is required to make the disclosures pursuant to § 3.173 must exclude the items excluded pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section from Table 13 to § 3.173.
( g ) *OCC approval for distributions.* During the calendar quarter beginning on July 1, 2020, and until March 31, 2021, no national bank or Federal savings association that has opted in to the relief provided under paragraph (a) of this section may make a distribution, or create an obligation to make such a distribution, without prior OCC approval. When reviewing a request under this paragraph (g), the OCC will consider all relevant factors, including whether the distribution would be contrary to the safety and soundness of the national bank or Federal savings association; the nature, purpose, and extent of the request; and the particular circumstances giving rise to the request.
[85 FR 32988, June 1, 2020, as amended at 86 FR 731, Jan. 6, 2021]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO 

RICO 

DEBTORS 

Civil No. 15-01578 (LTS) 

CAUSE: BANKRUPTCY 

RELIEF UNDER PROMESA 

PUB. LAW 114-187 

(130 STAT. 549) 

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE AND REQUEST FOR SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS 

TO THE HONORABLE COURT: 

 Please take notice that the undersigned attorney hereby files 

his appearance as counsel representing creditors and interest 

party Lauren De Pablo by her, Rolando Martínez by him and as 

inheritor of Ondina Finale, Conjugal Partnership of Rolando 

Martínez and Lauren de Pablo, Deianeira Martínez De Pablo by her, 

Pedro Rolando Martínez Torres by him and as in heritor of Ondina 

Finale, and Olga Martínez Finale as inheritor of Ondina Finale; 

and respectfully request this Honorable Court that every document 

filed in the caption case be notified to the undersigned attorney. 

 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2268 Filed:01/19/18 Entered:01/19/18 14:05:18 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 2
‐ 2 ‐ 

WHEREFORE, the appearing parties very respectfully request 

from the Honorable Court to accept the appearance; and that the 

undersign attorney be notified of every document docketed in this 

case. 

I HEREBY CERTIFY: I hereby certify that on 19 day of January, 

2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the 

Court, using CM/ECF system which will send notification of such 

filing to the attorneys of record. 

 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 19 day of January, 2018. 

 

 JAMES LAW OFFICES 

 Counsel for Plaintiffs 

 PMB 501 

 1353 Rd. 19 

 Guaynabo, P.R. 00966-2700 

 Tel. (787)763-2888 

 s/Glenn Carl James 

 USDC-PR 207706 

 E-mail: 

 glenncarljameslawoffices@gmail.com 

 

 

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2268 Filed:01/19/18 Entered:01/19/18 14:05:18 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-10261 Conference Calendar

JOE ADRIAN DEL CASTILLO, III, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus TOM BAKER, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division, Director, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:99-CV-858-Y

- - - - - - - - - - June 13, 2000 Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Joe Adrian Del Castillo, III, Texas prisoner # 849460, appeals from the dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He contends that he has been denied credit for the time he spent in official detention prior to his sentence and that, as a result, he is being unlawfully detained beyond the maximum term of his sentence. Castillo does not address the basis of the district court’s decision, i.e. , that his claim is not cognizable under Heck v.No. 00-10261 -2- Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Because he fails to identify any factual or legal error in the district court’s opinion, he has failed to brief this issue for appeal adequately. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Even if Castillo had adequately preserved the issue, the claim is not cognizable under Heck , as this court has applied Heck to suits challenging the computation of a prisoner’s sentence. See McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles , 47 F.3d at 158, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Vannoy , 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995). This appeal is without arguable merit and, thus, frivolous.
See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Castillo that both the district court’s and this court’s dismissals count as “strikes” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Once he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTIONS WARNING ISSUED.
§ 4.62 Definitions. ( a ) *Minority- and/or women-owned (small and large) businesses and entities owned by minorities and women (MWOB)* means firms at least 51 percent unconditionally-owned by one or more members of a minority group or by one or more women who are citizens of the United States. In the case of publicly-owned companies, at least 51 percent of each class of voting stock must be unconditionally-owned by one or more members of a minority group or by one or more women who are citizens of the United States. In the case of a partnership, at least 51 percent of the partnership interest must be unconditionally-owned by one or more members of a minority group or by one or more women who are citizens of the United States. Additionally, for the foregoing cases, the management and daily business operations must be controlled by one or more such individuals.
( b ) *Minority* means any African American, Native American (*i.e.,* American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut and Native Hawaiian), Hispanic American, Asian-Pacific American, or Subcontinent-Asian American.
( c ) *Individual with disabilities-owned (small and large) businesses and entities owned by individuals with disabilities (IDOB)* means firms at least 51 percent unconditionally-owned by one or more members who are individuals with disabilities and citizens of the United States. In the case of publicly-owned companies, at least 51 percent of each class of voting stock must be unconditionally-owned by one or more members who are individuals with disabilities and who are citizens of the United States. In the case of a partnership, at least 51 percent of the partnership interest must be unconditionally-owned by one or more members who are individuals with disabilities and citizens of the United States. Additionally, for the foregoing cases, the management and daily business operations must be controlled by one or more such individuals.
( d ) *Individual with disabilities* means any person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. For purposes of this part, it does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs nor an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job as defined by the IDOB.
( e ) *Unconditional ownership* means ownership that is not subject to conditions or similar arrangements which cause the benefits of the Outreach Program to accrue to persons other than the participating MWOB or IDOB.
§ 253.1 Authority, purpose, and scope. ( a ) *Authority.* The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) has issued this part (Regulation ZZ) under the authority of Public Law 117-103, division U (the “Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act”), codified at 12 U.S.C. 5801 *et seq.*
( b ) *Purpose.* The purposes of the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act are to establish a clear and uniform process, on a nationwide basis, for replacing the overnight and one-, three-, six-, and 12-month tenors of U.S. dollar LIBOR in existing contracts that do not provide for the use of a clearly defined or practicable replacement benchmark rate; to preclude litigation related to such existing contracts; to allow existing contracts that reference LIBOR but provide for the use of a clearly defined and practicable replacement rate to operate according to their terms; and to address LIBOR references in Federal law.[148] This part implements the statute by defining terms used in the statute and identifying Board-selected benchmark replacements for LIBOR contracts.
( c ) *Scope.* As described in § 253.3, the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act and this part apply by their terms to existing contracts governed by Federal law or the law of any state that reference the overnight and one-, three-, six-, and 12-month tenors of U.S. dollar LIBOR and do not have fallback provisions providing for the use of a clearly defined and practicable replacement benchmark rate following the LIBOR replacement date, unless the parties to that contract agree in writing that the contract is not subject to the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act. This part does not apply to or affect existing or prospective contracts that do not reference the overnight or one-, three-, six-, or 12-month tenors of U.S. dollar LIBOR, and except as provided in § 253.3(a)(1)(iii) and (c), generally does not apply to or affect LIBOR contracts that have fallback provisions providing for the use of a clearly defined and practicable replacement benchmark for LIBOR (either directly or through selection by a determining person), even if that rate differs from the otherwise applicable Board-selected benchmark replacement. Any determining person's selection of the applicable Board-selected benchmark replacement pursuant to § 253.3(c) is subject to §§ 253.4, 253.5 (including any benchmark replacement conforming changes made by a calculating person), §§ 253.6, and 253.7.
Footnotes -
253.1
[148] The act does not affect the ability of parties to use any appropriate benchmark rate in new contracts.
§ 608.840 Refunds. ( a ) In instances where the FCA is the creditor agency, it shall promptly refund any amounts deducted under the authority of 5 U.S.C. 5514 when: ( 1 ) The debt is waived or otherwise found not to be owed to the United States (unless expressly prohibited by statute or regulations); or
( 2 ) An administrative or judicial order directs the FCA to make a refund.
( b ) Unless required or permitted by law or contract, refunds under this section shall not bear interest.