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34–752 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–102

ENSURING OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE BY

PROMOTING MIDDLE-CLASS PROSPERITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2007

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee

(

(II)

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

[Created pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress]

SENATE

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

JOHN SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Vice Chair

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey,

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania

RON PAUL, Texas

CHAD STONE, Executive Director (Acting)

CHRISTOPHER J. FRENZE, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

OPENING STATEMENT OF MEMBERS

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, U.S. Senator from New York .................. 1

Hon. Jim Saxton, Senator, Ranking Minority, U.S. Representative from New

Jersey .................................................................................................................... 4

WITNESSES

Statement of Robert E. Rubin, director and chairman of the Executive Committee, Citigroup; former U.S. Treasury Secretary ........................................... 9

Statement of Dr. Lawrence Summers, Charles W. Eliot University professor,

Harvard University; former U.S. Treasury Secretary ....................................... 11

Statement of Dr. Alan Blinder, professor of economics and director of the

Center for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton University; former Vice

Chairman of the Federal Reserve ....................................................................... 15

Statement of Dr. Richard Vedder, distinguished professor of economics, Ohio

University; visiting scholar, American Enterprise Institute ............................ 18

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer, Chairman ......................... 38

Prepared statement of Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Vice Chair ............ 39

Prepared statement of Representative Jim Saxton, Ranking Minority .............. 39

Prepared statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy ........................................... 40

Washington Post editorial series on inequality ............................................. 41

Prepared statement of Robert E. Rubin, director and chairman of the Executive Committee, Citigroup; former U.S. Treasury Secretary ............................ 53

Prepared statement of Dr. Lawrence Summers, Charles W. Eliot University

professor, Harvard University; former U.S. Treasury Secretary ..................... 54

Prepared statement of Dr. Alan Blinder, professor of economics and director

of the Center for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton University; former

Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve ............................................................... 56

Prepared statement of Dr. Richard Vedder, distinguished professor of economics, Ohio University; visiting scholar, American Enterprise Institute; coauthor of the Wal-Mart Revolution .................................................................... 58

(1)

ENSURING OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE BY

PROMOTING MIDDLE-CLASS PROSPERITY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Washington, DC.

The Committee met at 9:40 a.m. in room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Charles E. Schumer (Chairman

of the Committee) presiding.

Senators present: Bennett, Bingaman, Casey, Klobuchar, Schumer, and Webb.

Representatives present. Saxton.

Staff present: Katie Beirne, Daphne Clones Federing, Chris

Frenze, Nan Gibson, Rachel Greszler, Colleen Healy, Brian

Higginbotham, Katie Jones, Bob Keleher, Michael Laskawy, Zach

Luck, Jeff Schlagenhauf, Chad Stone, Annabelle Tamerjan, and

Adam Wilson.

Chairman Schumer. The Committee will come to order. I want

to welcome both my colleagues and or guests. I have an opening

statement. I know Jim Saxton has an opening statement, then we’ll

go right to the remarks.

If either of my colleagues would like to say something at the beginning, they’re welcome to. Senator Kennedy and Vice Chair

Maloney were not able to attend, but have asked to have statements put in the record, so, without objection, they will be.

[The prepared statements of Representative Maloney and Senator Kennedy appear in the Submissions for the Record on pages

39 and 40 respectively.]

Chairman Schumer. Any other statements for the record? No.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER,

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

Chairman Schumer. Well, good morning. I’m very pleased to

open the first hearing of the Joint Economic Committee in the

110th Congress.

I want to welcome Ranking Member Maloney, the Vice Chair,

who couldn’t be here today, and Ranking Member Mr. Saxton. Jim

and I were friends in the House. We’re continuing to work on a variety of legislation when I crossed the Capitol.

We’re going to have a great time and a great relationship. I’m

so glad you’re here, Jim.

I know we’re going to have some disagreements along the way,

but I really do hope we’ll be able to develop a shared view of the

problems the American people will want us to be working on, and

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look forward to working with the Minority closely, and, I dare say,

neighborly, with all of you.

Now, this Committee is a Committee that’s going to ask difficult

questions, challenge our assumptions, and seek to define our Nation’s economic challenges, using the best minds in the Nation as

our witnesses for much of the next 2 years.

Our hearings are going to focus on two things that are related:

One is just the changing nature of the economy. We live in a totally

different world, economically, than we did even 20 years ago.

Technology has revolutionized everything: The way we live; the

way we work; the way we buy; the way we sell. Globalization is

now a word that everyone uses, but it has enormous, enormous effects.

But it’s not just globalization that’s affected our lives. We’re living longer. Technology has made dramatic advances, and, as we

live longer, there are the issues of 30 years of leisure at the end

of a life, getting married later, having kids in different ways; everything is changing before our eyes.

It’s a revolutionary period, in a certain sense—peaceful, but revolutionary, and our hearings are going to focus on that.

There’s going to be a particular emphasis in these 2 years, on the

middle class. That’s because I believe that the middle class is the

engine of the American economy. When they do well, America does

well; when the middle class is anxious, America is anxious.

If we want to expand or reform aid to the poor, we can only do

so, if the middle class feels that they are prosperous, moving

ahead, and secure.

If we want to expand trade, because we believe it grows the economy, we can only do so, if the middle class feels that they will benefit as much from our national growth as those at the very top.

This hearing couldn’t come at a better time, because on all of

those measures, the middle class feels a little bit shaky. They’re

not struggling to get by, but they are struggling to get ahead, and

if you look at the poll results, while people think they’re doing OK

right now—and we’ll hear from our distinguished witnesses about

this—they’re much more worried about the future and their children’s future, than they were, even 2 or 3 years ago.

They are unsure of their footing in an economy and a world that

is about change, technology and even disruption. They feel they are

alone to navigate the contours of change, and that government isn’t

really helping them where they need it.

They see the economic fortunes of different groups in our economy, growing apart, not together. They’re rightfully worried that

this gap will grow into an unbridgeable chasm.

We all know the statistics; we went through the most prolonged

job slump since the 1930s, after the 2001 recession.

Productivity continued the strong trend that began in the mid90s, much of it technology-driven, but real wages stagnated as the

benefit of economic growth showed up in the bottom lines of companies and in executive salaries, but not in the paychecks of most

workers.

But the middle class doesn’t need statistics to tell them that

they’re on shaky ground. American families know they can’t work

any harder than they already do, and that for the last 6 years, they

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have mostly run in place, as new expenses and new troubles hit

them: Paying for the cost of education, particularly college; longer

life; the number of people who help support their parents is greater

and greater and greater.

And so we know that the anxiety of the middle class is not just

perceived, but real. This morning, President Bush will give a State

of the Economy Address in my home State of New York, and he’ll

try to make the case to the American public, that our economy is

strong and everyone is benefiting.

The President will surely point to today’s news that economic

growth picked up in the Fourth Quarter, and a key measure of

wages, showed some real growth, as well.

No one is happier than we are that we had a nice quarter, but

if you spend time out in middle class America, if you descend from

the 30,000-foot level to the communities of Main Street, you know

that all is not well with the middle class.

The basic success and aspirations of middle class life—raising a

family, buying a home, paying for college, saving for retirement,

and health care—are becoming intimidating hurdles for average,

ordinary people.

So the President is right when he says that a future of hope and

prosperity in this country begins with a growing economy, but he

could not be more wrong when he says that all Americans have

benefited from economic growth over the past several years.

The fact is that the middle class has never been so unsure of its

footing, since I came to Congress in 1980. I believe we need a new

direction to promote an economic growth for all Americans in the

21st century.

We need a new map, because technology has changed our world.

How do we address income inequality? How do we address trade?

How do we address longer life? How do we change our health care,

our education systems, to meet the new global challenges that we

face?

We need to throw away the old map that has been favoring those

with influence and wealth and leaving the middle class behind.

Our economic fortunes need to grow together, not apart.

I said that the JEC would seek advice from the best of the best,

and that’s what we have to offer for our first hearing.

Bob Rubin and Larry Summers presided over a period that was

quite different from today. When they were Secretaries of the

Treasury, not only was there growth, but the growth was more

spread out and the middle class had much more confidence than

they do today.

The changes that have occurred since then, are not—I am not

blaming George Bush for all of them, or even most of them. Most

of them are due to the changes in the economy and because of technology. But, when that changes, we have to adapt, and just sticking with the same policies that might have been good in 1980, or

even 1990, probably doesn’t work today.

There are no four better witnesses than the four who are here

today: Bob Rubin, Larry Summers, and Alan Blinder, need no introduction to people who have followed economic policy in this

country over the past decade or more. Their reputations are stellar,

and deservedly so.

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We all wish we could go back to the times of the 1990s, when

everyone was doing so well and everyone thought they were doing

so well, as well.

I’m going to give each a proper introduction before they give

their testimony. I also want to welcome Dr. Vedder. Professor Richard Vedder is the distinguished professor of economics at Ohio University, and he’s going to lend a different perspective than maybe

Dr. Blinder, Mr. Rubin, and Dr. Summers. We welcome hearing

that, as well, because we should always be hearing different points

of view to keep us all on our toes and challenge our assumptions.

With that, let me call on Jim Saxton.

[The prepared statement of Senator Schumer appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 38.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, RANKING

MINORITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

Representative Saxton. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here to be able to congratulate you as you take the gavel

of this very useful and important Joint Economic Committee.

I have had the pleasure on three occasions, to serve as Chairman, and, during the years, since 1995, I have found this to be a

challenging set of issues, that gives us, as Members of the House

and the Senate, and gives those who wish to attend, a view

through technology to observe the great witnesses that we have

had over the years in discussions of economic issues.

As you pointed out very well and accurately in your opening

statement, it’s also a pleasure to join in welcoming the distinguished panel as witnesses before us today, all of whom, I believe,

have appeared here previously.

So, former Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin; former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers; Professor Alan Blinder; and Professor Richard Vedder, thank you for being here with us today.

The hearing today will likely cover a number of topics, including

the performance of the U.S. economy. It is useful to recall that in

2003, a new policy mix of accommodative Federal Reserve policy

and tax incentives for investment, led to a rebound in investment.

The pace of economic growth picked up, and the employment

growth rebounded. Since August of 2003, over 7 million jobs have

been created and the unemployment rate has fallen to 4.5 percent—good news for all Americans.

Economic growth has generally been quite good in 2005. The Fed

referred to the solid performance of the economy and said that it

should continue to perform well through 2006 and 2007.

Some have criticized the U.S. economic performance for producing excessive income inequality. However, according to the Census Bureau, its key measure of income equality has been statistically unchanged since 2001.

Some have also focused on slow wage growth, that many of the

data used understate progress, because they are based on measures

that overstate inflation and exclude fringe benefits from the equation.

Even so, various measures of real wages and earnings growth

have been rising at a faster pace recently. It should be noted that

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* The material referred to was unavailable at press time.

during the 1990s expansion, it also took several years before real

wages and earnings increased at a strong rate.

The continued prosperity of middle-income households, can be facilitated by pro-growth economic policies. It would also be reasonable to examine Federal policies regarding research, personal savings and investment, education, and social safety net programs, to

determine what changes might be helpful.

For example, I have long supported various tax incentives for

personal savings, to provide tax security and a reserve fund for

middle class investors.

However, in Congress today, there is in some quarters, increasing support for a policy response that would be profoundly destructive to middle-income families, in my opinion. That is generally

known as protectionism.

Much has been said about the effect of international trade on our

economy. According to many economists, the quickening pace of

technological change is more responsible for shifting employment

patterns, than is international trade.

The economic policies that promote the flexibility and dynamism

of the U.S. economy are the best course for improving the future

of middle-income Americans.

As Congress examines these issues, it should avoid policies that

would hamper the ability of the economy to adapt to future change.

Mr. Chairman, you and I certainly agree on that point.

Let me take the opportunity, again, to thank you, Mr. Chairman,

for the courtesies extended by you. I look forward to hearing from

our witnesses, as you have said you do, as well. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Representative Saxton appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 39.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Congressman. Would you like

to make a statement, Jeff? Bob?

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. BENNETT,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

Senator Bennett. Normally, Mr. Chairman, I would pass, but

since I have to go to the Banking Committee—and I don’t think

you’ll give me your proxy for that, to hear Secretary Paulson, if I

could, I would like to make a bit of an opening statement, and welcome the witnesses here, people with whom I have worked in the

past.

I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your assignment here. In

anticipation of a different kind of outcome in the election, I had assumed I would be Chairman, and, therefore, prepared some material,* and I would like the material* included in the record.

Chairman Schumer. Without objection, and you would have

been a good Chairman.

Senator Bennett. You’re very kind to say that, and I’m sure you

will be.

Let me just share with you, out of this material, two charts that

I think summarize what we need to understand about the issue of

income inequality. I don’t know if we have them in large form. I

have copies which I will distribute.

6

We often hear of the gap in household income, income distribution, and say that the highest quintile is 10 times—more than 10

times higher than the lowest quintile.

In this chart, Mr. Chairman, see the blue on the chart, that’s the

lowest quintile and that’s the highest quintile. That is the Census

figures on income.

That’s right; it’s more than 10 times, because over there, it’s only

3.5 and over here, it’s 49.6. However, if you include taxes and

transfers in your calculation, because the folks down here don’t pay

very many taxes and the folks up here pay a lot, and down here,

you get the Earned Income Tax Credit, so, transfers, this number

goes up and this number, appropriately, comes down.

Now, in the light tan bars, we have the number of people per

household. Many of the folks in the lowest quintile, are retired, and

there are only two people or one person per household, whereas the

folks here, are younger and have bigger households, so, this goes

up and this comes down, when you adjust there.

Finally, in the green bar, you adjust for hours worked, because,

again, many of these people are not working; they are retired, and

these folks are working, and, therefore, have more income.

So, you see that the difference between the green bars of the lowest and the highest, is 3:1, rather than 10:1. I think we need to

keep that in mind, as we talk about income distribution, instead

of just, as some people do, take the blue bar at the end and say,

gee, it’s 10, 11 times, the top quintile to lower quintile.

The other chart I would share with you is one I share with my

grandchildren and children as an incentive on this whole situation.

This is earnings, income, and wealth by education level.

Earnings is the blue bar; income is the purple bar—pardon me—

yes, income, and then the green is the wealth. These folks have relatively low earnings, but, from a variety of sources, they have a little bit higher income and that’s as much wealth as they are able

to acquire, $68,000 in wealth.

These are the folks with no high school. The next one is high

school, and there’s virtually no difference. It’s $58,874, high school;

$68,530, no high school, in the amount of wealth that they’ve accumulated.

Then, as I say, this I share with my children. They’ve all gone

to college, but with others in the families, this is what happens

when you go to college.

This——

Chairman Schumer. I’d just ask, is it any college, or graduates?

Senator Bennett. The narrative that goes along with this, simply says household heads with a college education, earned 3.7 times

more than those without a high school education, so——

Chairman Schumer. Senator, your staff says it’s graduates.

Senator Bennett. It’s graduates, OK, that’s pretty dramatic,

and as we talk about trying to solve the problem of income gap, we

should help people understand that the best way to solve income

gap—it’s basically a skill gap, and if you don’t go to college, you’re

not getting it.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would ask your permission to move

on to the Banking Committee. I apologized to our witnesses, and

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* The charts referred to were unavailable at press time.

I have a number of other neat charts with wonderful colors that

I’d be happy to submit to the record.*

Chairman Schumer. Well, thank you, Senator, and, as usual,

your thoughtful approach makes us think. I don’t think anybody,

and certainly I would not dispute that education is really probably

the No. 1 key to all of the problems we are facing, or most of them,

anyway.

Senator Klobuchar, would you like to make an opening statement?

Senator Klobuchar. Yes, I would.

Chairman Schumer. Please, and welcome, welcome to the Committee and to the Senate.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Senator Klobuchar. It’s wonderful to be here with these distinguished guests, and thank you for heading this up. I think I heard

someone say yesterday that this is not going to be your daddy’s

Joint Economic Committee anymore, and we’re going to really focus

on these middle class issues and what matters.

I can tell you that in Minnesota, this is what I heard for the last

2 years: It’s about rising healthcare costs—many of our people in

our State have jobs, we have a strong economy, but basically, it’s

getting harder and harder for them to get by with health premiums

up 60 percent in the last 6 years.

Tuition at the University of Minnesota is up 80 percent in 7

years. We had gas prices, as you know, up toward 3 bucks a gallon

this summer, and it was tough for people, for two income families,

barely getting by.

It was getting harder and harder for them to make it. And we

would have these living room forums all across our State, where

people would suddenly stand up and they realized they were blaming themselves. They said, I have a job, but my kid went to college

and now he can’t afford to get a house, or I’m a small business

owner and it’s getting harder and harder for me to afford health

care and I have a pregnant employee and I don’t want to drop the

health care, but I can’t afford it anymore.

Those were the things that we were hearing throughout our

State, in what is really a strong economy.

The other thing that people, surprisingly, were aware of, was the

debt. And they were very focused on what the government was

going to do to try to rein in the spending and also do something

about what they perceived as unfairness in the system.

One in 12 tax dollars, as you know, goes to service the debt. We

pay $900 million a day in interest and we’re also seeing an increase

in the interest rates, as a result of the national debt.

One of the things I’d hear from people a lot, is that they didn’t

understand why, in the past, Congress and Washington were giving tax shelters to wealthy people and multimillionaires, while it

was getting harder and harder for them to make it.

The tax cut gave, by our calculations, $111 to the super wealthy

for every dollar that a middle class family got.

8

They passed healthcare legislation that was written, in part, by

the pharmaceutical companies and an energy policy that was written by the oil companies.

We actually put out a budget plan. I’m not sure it would pass

muster with you two, but we put out a plan of how to basically get

rid of the deficit by rolling back the tax cuts for the top 1 percent,

by closing the tax loopholes for multimillionaires that were shielding money on the Cayman Islands; by closing down the oil royalties, which this Committee has already put a report out on; by

posting capital gains taxes so that people who were not posting

capital gains, people that were not paying them, would be required

to pay them.

And we put all these things together and presented it to the people of our State, including rolling back the tax cuts on the top 1

percent, and they responded very positively to this, because, with

this, came help for them: $10,000 in tax deductibility for college

tuition; help for adults who are helping their elderly parents; trying to look at how you can help first-time home buyers with a

$3,000 tax credit.

And we put those things out and showed the disparity of what

was going on in the government and how it was hurting everyday

people.

When I was a prosecutor, we’d always say, follow the money, and

when you follow the money, you find the bad guys. Well, that’s

what I hope, Senator Schumer, that this Committee does, which is

to follow where some of the money has been going in Washington,

and put it back in the hands of the people who deserve it, and

that’s the people who are driving this economy, which is the middle

class.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar, and welcome in many ways.

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.

Chairman Schumer. We’re now ready to move on to our witnesses. Let me give a brief introduction. None of them need much

of an introduction, because of their reputations, their fine reputations, proceed them.

Robert Rubin is director and chairman of the Executive Committee and member of the Office of the Chairman of Citigroup, Inc.

He has been involved with financial markets and public policy debates all of his professional life.

As Secretary of the Treasury from 1995 to 1999, Mr. Rubin

played a leading role in a host of issues, including: Balancing the

Federal budget; acting to stem financial crises in Mexico, Asia, and

Russia; and guiding sensible reforms at the Internal Revenue Service.

Lawrence Summers is the Charles W. Eliot University professor

at Harvard University. He served as its 27th president from 2001

to 2006. Dr. Summers has taught on the faculty at Harvard and

MIT, and he has served in a series of senior public policy positions,

including succeeding Bob Rubin as Treasury Secretary.

Alan Blinder is the Gordon S. Renchler Memorial professor of economics at Princeton, and director of Princeton Center for Economic Policy Studies, which he founded in 1990.

9

He served as Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System from June 1994 to January 1996, and, before that, he served as a member of President Clinton’s original

Council of Economic Advisors, January 1993 to June 1994.

And Richard Vedder, last but certainly not least, holds the title

of distinguished professor of economics at Ohio University. He is a

Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Dr. Vedder is the author of several books, including: The American Economy in Historical Perspective; Out of Work—Unemployment and Government in 20th Century America; and the Wal-Mart

Revolution—How Big-Box Stores Benefit Consumers, Workers, and

the Economy.

Secretary Rubin, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT RUBIN, DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN

OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, CITIGROUP; FORMER U.S.

SECRETARY

Secretary Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by

saying that I believe that, as you and I have discussed, that you’re

holding this hearing at an exceedingly important time. I think of

this as a critical juncture for the longer-term outlook with respect

to the American economy, and I think that your Committee can

contribute enormously by catalyzing serious public discussion of the

kinds of issues you just illuminated, and by helping develop sound

approaches to the complex and uncertain issues that this country

faces.

The American economy has enormous strengths: A dynamic society, a willingness to take risks, flexible labor markets, and a great

deal else. On the other hand, we face hugely consequential, longerterm challenges, and I’ll touch on those briefly in a moment.

At the same time, the global economy is undergoing change of

historic proportions, including: Technological developments,

globalization, effective productivity regimes in quite a number of

emerging market countries.

And as a consequence of all of this, China and India are emerging not only as large potential markets, but as powerful competitors. I don’t think that there is any question that we can thrive in

this environment, but I believe that in order to do so, it is absolutely imperative that we meet our challenges, and I believe that

failure to meet our challenges, could lead to very serious difficulty.

Currently, in my judgment, we are on the wrong track on almost

every front, independently of how you allocate political responsibility.

This contributes substantially, No. 1, to the unsound fundamentals underlying our economy, despite good GDP growth, which

could auger badly for the future; and, No. 2, to the struggle that

far too many Americans are having economically.

Median real wages and median real compensation have been

roughly stagnant for the last 5 years, and grew at relatively slow

rates for 25 of the last 30 years, the only exception being the last

5 years of the 1990s, while inequality benefiting a very small top

tier, has increased substantially.

Moreover, economic dislocation and economic insecurity have increased substantially.

10

I believe strongly, Mr. Chairman, in markets as the most effective organizing principle for economic activity, but government also

has a critical role in providing the requisites for economic success

that markets, by their very nature, will not optimally provide.

Moreover, I believe that the objectives for economic policy should

be growth, but also, and, absolutely critically, broad participation

in that growth and improved economic security, both as a matter

of values and because these objectives can be mutually reinforcing.

More specifically, sustained growth is the single most effective

way of promoting broad income growth, both because you have a

larger pie to split and because of sustained tight labor markets.

Conversely, broad income increases and increased economic security are critical to economic growth, for two reasons: First, they

provide workers with resources to access education, training, rapid

redeployment into the mainstream economy when dislocated, and

other factors that contribute so importantly to productivity, and,

second, as you said, Mr. Chairman, sound economic policies around

trade and market-based economics, will only have broad public support, if the great preponderance of our people expect to benefit from

those policies.

I think we can most effectively achieve our interrelated economic

objectives by meeting the challenges I mentioned earlier, and I

think of those challenges as falling into four categories:

Number one, our multiple financial imbalances, including the

debt that you mentioned, Senator;

Two, serious shortfalls in education, infrastructure, basic research, energy policy, healthcare policy, inner city programs, and

so much else that are critical with respect to economic success.

Number Three: Cost/benefit imbalances in our regulatory and

litigation regimes, and,

Number Four: International economic policy, including trade, relatively open immigration, and working toward flexible exchange

rates around the world.

These all occur alongside of serious exogenous risks: Terrorism,

oil shock, and so many others that are a serious threat economically.

In my limited time, I will not try to describe the relationship between each of these challenges and the three objectives I set out.

Let me just comment on two of these challenges, and very briefly.

As to financial imbalances, current economic conditions rest on

high levels of borrowing at multiple levels in our society. These include:

Significant projected deficits over the 10-year Federal budget

window, assuming the 01 and 03 tax cuts are extended permanently, as proposed, and assuming AMT reform, and that is instead

of the surpluses we should have had in a time of healthy GDP

growth;

A net national savings rate of something under 2 percent, a projected increase of the major entitlements—Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—as a percentage of GDP of over 50 percent over

the next 15 years;

A current account deficit, that is to say, a trade deficit, plus some

other items of almost 7 percent of GDP, caused partly by our fiscal

11

deficits and heavy over-weighting of dollar-denominated holdings in

many foreign portfolios.

The combination of these factors, in my view, is a deep threat to

American job creation, American standards of living, and our

American economy.

The vast flows of capital from abroad that have sustained us are

exceedingly unlikely, in my view, to continue indefinitely in the

face of these imbalances, though the timing of trouble, whether in

the near term or years out is unpredictable.

I believe that we should establish a fiscal path that systematically reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio, year-by-year, instead of that

ratio increasing, as is going on at the present time, and that leads

to balance, and, at the same time, we must make room for critical

public investments.

As to globalization and trade, the pressures from globalization on

wages and economic security are one of the factors, along with the

even greater effect of technological change, that has led to real economic difficulty that so many Americans are experiencing.

In this context, there is an understandable temptation to erect

trade barriers, but in my view, that would be deeply harmful, leading to higher consumer prices, higher input costs for our producers

versus foreign competitors, loss of the benefits of comparative advantage, loss of the pressure of open markets on business to increase productivity, and, finally, likely retaliation by countries to

which we export, and possible disruptive effects on the dollar.

Moreover, and very importantly, other countries are continuing

to move forward with trade liberalization and trade agreements, so

that the only question is whether we will be in or out of this network of preferential arrangements.

However, and having said all that, trade liberalization, which I

believe, on net, greatly benefits our economy and the great preponderance of our people, must be combined with a powerful domestic

agenda to promote productivity, broad-based income growth, and

greater security along the lines I briefly discussed.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we can have a bright economic future,

but we must address with great seriousness of purpose, many complex and uncertain matters, and this Committee can contribute

greatly to achieving those purposes. Thank you for the opportunity

to be here today, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rubin appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 53.]

Chairman Schumer. Secretary Summers.

STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE SUMMERS, CHARLES W. ELIOT

UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; FORMER

U.S. SECRETARY

Secretary Summers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Not

surprisingly, I find myself in substantial agreement with what Secretary Rubin said, and I too, am grateful to this Committee for undertaking these investigations at what I believe is a critical time

in our economic history.

It is a cliche ́, following elections, to declare that policy is at a

critical juncture and that we are at a unique moment, but in this

case, it is, in very important respects, correct.

12

Without precedent, are:

The magnitude of our current account deficit and looming problems;

The degree of integration between the United States and the

global economy;

The rise of major trading partners, where economic growth in

China is now rising at a level where the size of their economy doubles every 7 years;

The pervasive and changing impact of technology on the way

Americans work and consume, and;

The unprecedented increases in economic inequality and insecurity that have been observed in recent years.

We are, to an important extent, in uncharted territory, and so

this Committee’s discussions and deliberations are of great importance.

I believe the United States faces three main economic policy

challenges at this juncture:

Making, assuring that its finances are on a sustainable basis, because without sustainable finance, one runs the risk of disruption

that will make the achievement of any other goal, impossible.

Assuring an adequate foundation for growth, through a sufficient

rate of investment, and

Assuring that the benefits of growth are widely shared, and so

that we continue to have the strong middle class that has long

been the underpinning of our democracy.

Let me say a few words about each of these challenges: First, the

nation’s finances are not now on a sustainable basis. While projections vary, most observers believe that without a significant policy

change, the debt-to-GDP ratio of the United States will increase

quite rapidly in the next decade and beyond.

In part, this is the reflection of an aging society; in part, it is a

reflection of the fiscal policies of the last 5 years, in which very

large tax cuts have coincided with substantial increases in both defense and domestic spending.

This move toward fiscal unsustainability has been one of the

drivers of the deterioration in the international economic position

of the United States, as our current account deficit has now

reached record levels and is approaching a trillion dollars.

The current account deficit reflects both the very substantial

international borrowing by the United States, due to significant fiscal deficits, as well as the continuing decline in the private savings

rate.

Indeed, for the first time in our history in recent years, we have

observed moments when the net national savings rate of our country approached zero.

The consequences of these adverse and unsustainable developments have been masked by the very substantial investment in

U.S. short-term financial securities made by central banks around

the world, and, in particular, made by the central banks of emerging Asian countries and oil exporting countries.

This has created a unique, and, I believe, unprecedented situation where the world’s greatest power is also the world’s greatest

borrower.

13

In the short run, the United States benefits from the availability

of low-cost capital, however, this low-cost capital has as its counterpart, our very substantial trade deficit. And it also raises profound

questions of how long foreign investors will be prepared to lend us

funds on such generous terms.

Clearly, a policy priority has to be increasing the stability of the

nation’s financial position.

The most important step that Congress can take is to adopt a fiscal policy that puts the government’s finances on a sustainable

footing. There is no silver bullet here. It is important to address

the excesses of recent years, to take on entitlement issues, and perhaps, most critically and immediately, to return to budget discipline with respect to any new initiatives on either the spending

or the tax side.

The second large economic policy challenge is assuring adequate

growth in the years ahead. For reasons that economist do not fully

understand, productivity growth fluctuates substantially.

It was rapid from the end of the Second World War until the

mid-1970s. It slowed radically from the mid-1970s until the mid1990s. After the mid-1990s, it has accelerated substantially again,

although there are some signs that this acceleration may be tailing

off.

There can be no certainty as to the links between public policy

and productivity, but equally, there is no question that public investments are essential. I would highlight three areas of public investment:

First, our investments in research and development, after increasing rapidly during the 1990s, have materially lagged. In a

time when the world stands on the brink of revolutionary progress

in the life sciences, it cannot be rational for the NIH budget to decline as it did this past year for the first time in nearly 40 years.

If one looks at funding levels adjusted for inflation, the decline

in our national commitment to basic research is even more remarkable.

As President of Harvard, I had the opportunity to observe the remarkable potential of research in the life sciences. I’ve also had the

opportunity to observe many extraordinarily talented young scholars abandoning the field, as the average age of funded investigators

rose in the face of budget pressures. Similar trends can be observed

in the physical sciences.

The second key element to public investment in productivity

growth is education funding. Ultimately, nothing is more important

to our prosperity than the quality of the American labor force. It

is essential at the level of preschool, where an increasing body of

evidence suggests very high rates of return on investment in preschool education, particularly for disadvantaged children.

It is essential at the level of the Nation’s public schools, as you

know better than I, and it is crucial in terms of affordability of

higher education.

Of the many disturbing statistics I have encountered in recent

years, one of the most disturbing is the observation that in our

leading universities, only 10 percent of the students come from

families in the lower half of the American income distribution. This

14

is clearly not a matter of ability; it is, importantly, a matter of access.

There are also crucial issues in infrastructure investment, as

well.

The third, and in some ways, most pressing economic challenge,

is that of assuring a strong middle class. This has three related but

distinguishable elements:

Assuring equality of opportunity; assuring long-term economic

security for those who currently have good jobs; and assuring that

prosperity and economic growth are shared widely, rather than

benefiting a small part of the population.

How best to do this is a question that will require all our efforts

in the years ahead, but I think there are at least three crucial

areas that require attention:

First, assuring the fair collection of taxes. There are a number

of ways in which we can improve the effectiveness of the tax system, while at the same time, increasing its fairness.

These include: Making a serious assault on the tax gap resulting

from noncompliance with the Internal Revenue Code. I would note

that the tax gap is greatest for those categories of income that go

disproportionately to the upper ends of the income distribution.

There are also important issues and abuses associated with

transfer pricing and the sheltering of both individual and corporate

income that require Congressional attention. I’m convinced that

substantial revenues can be gained from these sources.

If we are to assure adequate economic security for all of our citizens, we need to recognize that in a world where jobs are going to

be increasingly impermanent, economic security cannot come only

from the employment relationship.

This will require new approaches in the areas of health insurance and retirement security. I believe it is also appropriate that

consideration be given to thinking about methods of wage insurance that would enable increasingly inevitable economic mobility to

take place, without significant and painful dislocation.

A third type of response to economic insecurity involves taking

comprehensive and systematic policy approaches to the issue of the

future of key industries and regions.

I was struck, Mr. Chairman, by the recent report that you and

other leaders from your State released on the steps necessary to

keep New York at the center of the global financial services industry.

I could not help but wonder whether similar comprehensive efforts to devise a strategy and assure the leadership of American

firms and opportunity for American workers in other regions,

would not be availing with respect to many different sectors.

Indeed, reliance on the strength of communities of clusters of

Americans, is, it seems to me, profoundly important for our economic future. Any individual faces the possibility of competition

with the lower-earning and equally skilled individual abroad, but

it is much more difficult to compete with or replicate entire clusters

of economic activity. Indeed, the supremacy of New York City as

the world’s financial capital, illustrates this point.

Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the crucial areas of policy

that we face. I look forward to answering your questions and enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:31 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 034752 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\34752.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
15

gaging in a wide-ranging discussion. Thank you for inviting me to

be here this morning.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Summers appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 54.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Dr. Summers.

Dr. Blinder.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN BLINDER, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR ECONOMIC

POLICY STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY; FORMER VICE

CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

Dr. Blinder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to devote my

time to two big problems that you mentioned in your opening statement that haven’t been mentioned too much by the two distinguished witnesses that preceded me, although both mentioned

them.

One is having to do with income inequality and one having to do

with globalization. I’m not going to mention the word ‘‘deficit’’ in

my 7 minutes, because I anticipated it would be pretty well covered

by the distinguished former Secretaries of the Treasury that preceded me, but suffice it to say that I align myself with their remarks; that’s it.

The first problem, rising income inequality, has been with us so

long now that I feel that this country is becoming inured to it, as

if it’s part of the normal patterns of life.

Statistical measures of poverty and inequality can be and have

been disputed. You already heard some of that this morning from

Mr. Saxton and from Mr. Bennett, and you’ll hear some more, I believe, from the next witness.

That notwithstanding, the basic story is very clear, which is that

inequality in the United States was mostly falling for the 30 or 35

years or so from the end of the Second World War, until the late

1970s, and has been mostly rising since then.

The main factor behind this story has not been vast capital gains

accruing to a tiny minority, nor a massive shift of income from

labor to capital, although both of those have played roles at particular intervals, including right now.

But rather, the basic story is that earnings from work have

grown vastly more unequal over these three decades or so. There

are many ways to measure that change, but here’s one that I find

both dramatic and very easy to understand:

According to IRS data on wages and salaries, in 1979—so that’s

when this process started—the average taxpayer in the upper onetenth of 1 percent of the income distribution, way at the top,

earned about as much as 44 average taxpayers in the lower half—

44.

By 2001, that ratio had risen to about 160, and we’re pretty sure,

from other fragmentary data, it’s gotten worse, not better since

then.

Now, let me be clear. As you yourself said, Mr. Chairman, at the

beginning, the main culprit in this story was not the government,

but the marketplace.

16

While there are a number of competing explanations, some of

which have been alluded to already, the fact is that starting in the

late 1970s, the market turned ferociously against the less skilled.

Now, you could ask yourself, how should the government, in the

abstract, how should a government react to such a development?

Well, one clearly wrong approach would have been to try to stop

the market forces that were generating the rising inequalities.

Such an effort would have produced undesirable side effects and

probably would have failed anyway. A much more reasonable approach would have been—would have included using the tax and

transfer system to cushion the blow, raising the minimum wage,

devoting more resources to compensatory education, making health

insurance, universal, and so on and so forth.

These, by the way, are still useful ideas, because this is not a

problem of the past; this is a problem of the present.

Now, a social Darwinist would have looked at this phenomenon

and rejected palliatives like that and said, let the market rule and

the chips fall where they may.

Now, you might think that that sounds heartless, but the fact of

the matter is, for the most part, over these 30 to 35 years, the U.S.

Government followed a much harsher policy than that.

As the market forces turned ferociously against the middle class

and the poor, the government pile on, by enacting tax cuts for the

rich, while permitting large holes to develop in the social safety

net.

We’re about to have the Superbowl. In football, we call that unnecessary roughness and we penalize it 15 yards. It should have

been penalized, in fact, in national economic policy, as well. It’s a

policy direction that was misguided, always, I believe, and needs to

be changed right now.

The second issue I want to talk about is one whose present importance, ironically, has been greatly exaggerated, but whose future importance appears to be underappreciated, and that’s the offshoring of service jobs from the United States and other wealthy

countries. But I’m going to concentrate on the United States.

Now unfortunately, no comprehensive numbers on the size of this

phenomenon are available. It’s not in the government’s statistical

gathering system, but from fragmentary evidence from a number

of sources, it appears certain that fewer than a million U.S. service

jobs have been off-shored to date.

Now, when I say ‘‘a million,’’ that sounds like a lot, but in a Nation of over 140 million jobs, it’s a drop in the bucket, not even 1

month’s normal turnover of the U.S. workforce.

However—and this is the point, I believe that what we’ve seen

so far is just the tip of what will be a very big iceberg, once it’s

revealed, and here’s why:

Only a minority of American workers, mainly manufacturing

workers, have historically faced job competition from abroad. Now,

while they haven’t liked it over the years, they’ve grown to understand that foreign competition is one of the hazards of industrial

life, like bankruptcies and business cycles. It happens.

But most American workers have never, never had to worry

about foreign competition. Until recently, neither low-skilled work

17

like call centers, or high-skilled work like computer programming,

could easily be move offshore.

Now, both of them can be, and, of course, are being done. And

the share of American jobs, that is, potentially—and I want to underscore the word, ‘‘potentially,’’ because it’s mostly a story of the

rest of the iceberg that we haven’t seen yet—potentially vulnerable

to off-shoring, is certain to rise over time as the technology improves and as countries like India and China modernize and prosper and move up the skill ladder.

These are inevitabilities; we know they’re going to happen. As

this occurs, tens of millions of additional American workers who

have never experienced such competition from abroad before will

start to experience this additional element of job insecurity on top

of the job insecurities they have now, which you’ve already—you

and others have mentioned, and the concomitant downward pressure on wages. This kind of competition does have an effect on

wages.

Problems that have been reserved for manufacturing workers up

till now—and I want to remind the Committee that manufacturing

workers these days constitute about 10 percent of the U.S. workforce. Service workers, depending on how you define it, are 60 to

70 percent of the U.S. workforce.

Now, many people have concluded, falsely, I believe, that offshoring is a particularly acute problem for the less well educated

workers, precisely the people that have been left behind over the

last 25 years.

I’m not so sure that that is right. Indeed, I suspect it’s wrong.

As I see it, the key labor market divide in the information age,

going forward, will not be between the high-skilled and the lowskilled, which has been the right way to look at the problem for the

last 25 years, but rather, between those who provide services that

can be delivered electronically with little loss of quality, and those

who provide services that cannot be so delivered.

And that cuts across the skill spectrum, so think about a few examples. It seems to me most unlikely that the services of either

waiters or brain surgeons will ever be delivered over the Internet.

On the other hand, we know that both typing services, a low-end

skill, and security analysis, a high-end skill, are already being delivered electronically from India at very high quality.

These disparate examples illustrate two important points: First,

the dividing line between jobs that are deliverable electronically

and those that are not does not correspond to the traditional distinctions between high-end work and low-end work that we’ve become so accustomed to thinking about.

Frankly, I don’t have any idea whether the future off-shoring is

going to make the distribution of wages more unequal or less unequal.

Second, the fraction of U.S. jobs that can be moved offshore is

certain to rise as the technology improves, and it only improves; it

never deteriorates.

In some ongoing research that I’m doing right now, I’ve estimated that something between 22 and 29 percent of all current

U.S. jobs might potentially be off-shore-able. That’s a very big numVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:31 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 034752 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\34752.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
18

ber. And I want to emphasize ‘‘potentially.’’ It’s not all going to

happen, of course.

Now, finally, what can or should the government do about all

this? I don’t have a laundry list of concrete proposals to suggest to

you, but I think the appropriate governmental responses fall into

two generic categories which Congress should be thinking about:

First, we need to repair and extend the social safety net for displaced workers. That includes unemployment insurance, trade adjustment assistance, job retraining, the minimum wage, EITC, universal health insurance, pension portability, all of those things—

maybe not the pensions, maybe—all of those things have been mentioned up to now, plus other newer ideas like wage loss insurance.

If we fail to do these things, or, perish the thought, turn back

to social Darwinism, or worse, the piling on, then a large fraction

of the U.S. population is going to experience a great deal of anxiety

and economic distress.

These people, by the way, will constitute a much larger, more

vocal and more politically engaged group than the poor and the

uneducated. You will hear about them in this building.

Second, we must take steps to ensure that our workers and our

businesses supply and demand the types of skills and jobs that will

remain in America, rather than the ones that will move offshore.

So, among other things, that may require substantial changes in

our educational system. After all, the 5-year-old that comes into the

kindergarten system now, 17 years from now, comes out with a college degree to a quite different world.

And it will certainly entail a variety of steps to ensure that the

United States remains the home of innovation and invention; that

we get there first.

Now, notice that I didn’t mention a third possible category of

governmental response, which is trying to impede globalization, in

general, or off-shoring, in particular.

The U.S. Government, powerful as it is, cannot hold back the

tides of history, and it shouldn’t try. Mr. Chairman, you may be

and I am old enough to remember a 1960s musical comedy called

‘‘Stop the World, I Want to Get Off.’’ I understand the sentiment

very well. You hear a lot of it these days.

But the truth is that we can’t stop the world, and we certainly

can’t get off. Instead, we Americans need to prepare ourselves for

the future, whether we like it or not. Thank you for the opportunity

to testify here today.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Blinder appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 56.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you very much, Dr. Blinder, and

now, Dr. Vedder.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD VEDDER, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, OHIO UNIVERSITY; VISITING

SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; Co-AUTHOR

OF THE WAL-MART REVOLUTION

Dr. Vedder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By the way, as an economic historian, I would note that, if memory is correct, this Committee is now beginning its 61st year. It has just completed 60

years in existence, having come into service with the Employment

19

Act of 1946. You’ve done good deeds over the last 60 years, and I

hope it continues, as I’m sure it will in the future.

Chairman Schumer. It was intended as a counterbalance to the

Council of Economic Advisers when it was passed. They were

passed in the same legislation.

Dr. Vedder. Yes, and as a former employee of the Committee,

I appreciate that point.

I anticipated, since two of my predecessors are tenured professors, that they would ignore the 10-minute limit, and speak for 15,

so I will omit part of my prepared statement, but I would like the

whole thing entered into the record.

Chairman Schumer. Without objection.

Dr. Vedder. My distinguished colleagues have painted a somewhat pessimistic and perhaps mildly alarming picture of the American economy. We learn that many Americans have not shared in

our Nation’s rising prosperity.

The income and wage gap between the rich and the poor is growing. We are told that we’re becoming a more economically divided

and bankrupt Nation.

My message is somewhat more optimistic and skeptical of the

analysis that suggests vast portions of the American populous are

languishing economically.

Let me just briefly touch on three points: First, the conventional

measures that are typically cited to denote greater inequality are

fundamentally flawed and grossly overstated, as Senator Bennett

pointed out in his earlier analysis.

And, second, even if you accept the proposition that America has

insufficient equality of economic condition, history tells us that

public policy efforts to deal with the problem often are relatively

ineffective.

Third, some policies that conceivably might lower inequality, as

conventionally measured, would, if adopted, have serious adverse

consequences to the economy as a whole, and on this point, I entirely agree with all of the panelists with respect to most of their

comments with respect to globalization, outsourcing, and the need

not to try to impede market forces.

We might disagree on some other aspects of that, but there is an

inevitability to globalization. Markets need to be encouraged, and

public policy should not try to stop it.

But first, turning to my first major point, looking at the conventional statistics on income distribution, three factors make them

overstate inequality: First, and least important is that statistics

traditionally are based on pre-tax income, and exclude a variety of

in-kind, non-cash payments that primarily benefit lower-income

persons—Medicaid benefits, food stamps, housing subsidies, and so

forth.

Any analysis or comparison of income levels or of income inequality today, with, say, 1960, using published income data, will tend

to overstate the rise in inequality because of the growth of the social safety net.

A second factor that we should be truly interested in is the economic well being of Americans which is best measured by consumption, not by income.

20

Dollar-for-dollar, people derive more joy from what they spend

than from what they earn. As many elementary economics textbooks point out in the first chapter, the ultimate purpose of economic activity is consumption.

And we also know that in any given year, consumer spending is

far more equally distributed than income. If you compare the income distribution statistics derived from the Current Population

Survey with the BLS’s Consumer Expenditure Survey, you get revealing results.

For example, the poorest one-fifth earned only slightly over 7

percent as much income as the richest one-fifth in the year 2002,

but they consumed more than 24 percent as much. Roughly speaking, conventional measures show that consumption inequality is at

least one-third less than for income inequality.

The third point relating to the overstatement of inequality, relates to the remarkable income mobility of the American people.

For example, at the request of this Committee, the Treasury Department in the 1990s, provided data suggesting that the overwhelming majority of persons in the bottom quintile of the income

distribution were in another quintile a decade later, and a large

percent even moved up and down from one year to the next.

Researchers at the Urban Institute and other places have

reached similar conclusions.

Now, while we’re talking about measurement problems, they are

particularly prevalent in our discussion of changes in earnings over

time which have been alluded to in previous testimony.

Go to page 338 of the latest Economic Report of the President—

a new one’s coming out shortly—but go to the last Economic Report

and go to page 338. We learn that average weekly earnings of

workers in private, non-agricultural industries in 2005, were over

8 percent less than they were in 1964, the year Lyndon Johnson

announced his Great Society initiative.

This isn’t a 5-year problem; it’s a 40-year problem, if you believe

page 338. But go to page 340—turn the page—and look at real

compensation per hour in the non-farm business sector in the same

period. We learn it has gone up 75 percent.

Page 338 is consistent with a Marxian, even, or a Malthusian interpretation of our economic history, a tendency for wages to fall

to subsistence, or mass exploitation of the working proletariat by

exploitive capitalists.

Page 340 is consistent with the view that with economic growth,

the earnings of workers have risen sharply, and it’s also consistent

with national income accounting data that shows real per capita

consumption spending has increased about 2 percent a year.

Even the data on page 340 suffers from deficiencies, which gets

to some other things that we mentioned earlier. We learned that

productivity in the non-farm business sector in 2005 was 2.3 times

as great as it was in 1964. Compensation was only 1.8 times as

great, a pretty huge difference inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory and suggesting that owners of capital are indeed deriving extraordinary profits as a result of paying workers less than

what they contribute to output at the margin.

This should have resulted in a significant decline in compensation of workers as a percentage of the national income, but going

21

to page 314 and 315 of the same book, we see a different picture.

Compensation of employees actually rose in this time period. The

share of national income accounted for by corporate profits actually

fell, albeit very slightly, in the same time period.

I’m making two points here. First, the interpretation of economic

data can be exceedingly misleading. Second, the analysis of broader

measures of economic performance suggest that workers as a group

have shared in our national prosperity of the past several generations. You don’t need a Ph.D. in economics to observe that never

has a society had a middle class more used to what once were considered goods and services available only to the uber-rich. Middle

income people today live in larger homes, buy more gadgets like

iPODs and cell phones, live longer, are more if not better educated

and take nicer vacations than either their parents did or do their

counterparts in any other major nation in the world.

I just returned 2 days ago from a trip to the Caribbean on a

cruise traveling less with business executives or even elite Ivy

League professors than with equipment salesmen, butchers and

teachers, ordinary folk. That just simply didn’t happen 30 years

ago.

My second major point relates to public policy dealing with economic inequality. Time certainly doesn’t permit a detailed exegesis

of past efforts. But a reminder of some historical experiences is sobering in this regard. Attempts, for example, to make the tax system more progressive have often had unintended effects. For example, the sharp reductions in marginal tax rates in the 1920s, the

1960s and 1980s, seen by some as favoring the rich, actually led

to sharp increases in the tax burden of the rich relative to the poor.

I worked for this Committee in the 97th Congress, 1981–82, in

a political environment exactly like today: Divided government, Republicans controlling the executive while Congress was more under

Democratic control, yet the two branches seemed to work together

to fashion a more growth-oriented tax policy, with lower marginal

tax rates that contributed mightily to the boon that followed. I

hope the 110th Congress is capable of similar accomplishments.

Taxes have behavioral consequences. The CBO greatly underestimated revenues that would be realized from reducing the top capital gains rate to 15 percent, for example, as falling rates unlocked

billions in unrealized gains that have helped fund our rapidly expanding government. Sharp reductions in the number of estates

subject to death taxation as a result of reform in those laws has

not led to a sharp decline in revenues from that source, as some

may have expected.

I think it would be a tragedy to reverse the positive effects of the

tax reductions of the past few years that, like the Kennedy tax reductions of the sixties, has had a positive impact on economic activity.

On the spending side, history again shows disappointing results

of many initiatives to help the poor and middle classes. The January 20th issue of The Economist shows work training programs of

governments have internationally been largely failures. Spending

initiatives in the area of education, medical care and public assistance usually have brought about disappointing results. Despite

spending far more in real terms per student than a generation ago.

22

American students do not appear to be learning much more and

the education for lower income students is particularly deficient.

A tripling of Federal aid to college students since 1994 has been

accompanied by a decline, not an increase in the proportion of students from the lowest quartile of the income distribution attending

and graduating from our finest universities. Picking up on Secretary Summers’ comment, our universities are increasingly becoming taxpayer-subsidized country clubs for the children of the affluent.

While Medicaid has certainly brought about increases in medical

care for the poor, it has not done so at an enormous cost to society

and the cost pressures of a highly inefficient system are leading

companies to cut back on health care benefits for working middle

class Americans. We can go on and on and I will not do so because

of time limitations.

I agree with everything that’s been said about protectionism or

the implication of the earlier testimony that protectionist policies

would be undesirable for the economy. Almost all economists would

agree with that. And I would hope that what I might call the intelligent wing of the Democratic party prevails in intraparty debates

and that Secretaries Rubin and Summers and Professor Blinder

win that battle with the money bags in the labor unions.

Now at the macro level, I believe the single biggest factor in the

slowdown in growth rates in this decade relative to the eighties

and Nineties has been the sharp increase in government expenditures. I think we agree on that. From fiscal 2001 to fiscal 2006,

total Federal outlays rose 42 percent, $790 billion. Tax revenues

went up 20 percent, about the same percent as GDP, so the problem has not been that our tax burden has been falling, the problem

has been that our expenditures have risen and we need to bring

that under control.

I thank you for listening to me and I’ll be glad to engage in the

discussion that inevitably will follow.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Vedder appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 58.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you. I want to thank all four of our

witnesses for really stimulating testimony in reference to what Mr.

Rubin, Dr. Summers and Dr. Blinder have talked about. You all

paint a far more sobering picture than the President’s view. The

President is speaking on Wall Street today. We don’t know what

he’s going to say, but based on what he said in Peoria yesterday,

I think it’s a very fine and pointed contrast.

I’d also thank Dr. Vedder for his enthusiasm and it’s sort of interesting here, at least on this little panel. Democrats are more emphasizing issues like productivity and production and Republicans

are emphasizing consumption. There’s a little bit of switch here,

which is sort of interesting.

Dr. Vedder. The hearing talked about income and equality as a

focus. I love to talk about productivity, too.

Chairman Schumer. Good. We’ll have that at another hearing.

We’re going to proceed to the questions where each Member will

get 5 minutes.

My first question is to all of the panelists. You’ve given very interesting—particularly Secretary Summers and Rubin and Dr.

23

Blinder, very interesting analyses of the economy which, as I say,

are sobering and a contrast, I think, to what the President is saying. I’d also note that when we look at income and equality I think

these days to do it in just quintiles probably doesn’t tell the whole

story. If you look at the top 1 percent or even the top 0.1 percent,

you’d get a much more pointed picture than a picture in quintiles.

But my two questions are these. Again, if each of you could

elaborate if you believe it to be true, how a slowdown in upward

mobility for the middle class takes its toll on economic growth as

a whole. In other words, just looking at the macro picture is not

enough.

And the second, if you could have one wish for a significant

change in government policy to reverse that, what would you point

to? I’ll just give you something to play off of.

When I talk about globalization, one of the people who couldn’t

come today—we invited him—Chairman Greenspan basically said

that if we were to significantly improve our educational system K

through 12, at college, that would be the greatest, the best thing

we could do to ensure growth and particularly ensure less income

inequality among the classes.

Secretary Rubin.

Secretary Rubin. Mr. Chairman, in brief, on the first question,

I think the Senator said it before. Unless the American people believe that trade liberalization and multinational economics generally are going to benefit them, support for those policies—which

I think are central to a strong economy—will continue to diminish.

I think also having broad based income growth better equips the

average American to access education and so much else that’s critical to productivity.

On your second question, I’m going to take one wish with a semicolon. President Clinton said in 1993 there was a tremendous

amount he wanted to do but that the threshold issue was to get

our country back on a sound fiscal path. Chairman Bernanke said

I think 2 or 3 weeks ago that he thought the long-term fiscal prospects for the United States were a real threat to our economic well

being. There’s much else we need to do in the areas of education,

infrastructure and everything else. I do think the threshold question remains the same then as it did for President Clinton, so that

would be my answer. But I do think we need to combine that with

all these areas of public investment.

Let me just add on inequality, if I may say so, Chairman Greenspan also said some time ago, Mr. Chairman, that growing inequality was a deep threat to what he called democratic capitalism and

I think that is correct.

Chairman Schumer. Secretary Summers.

Secretary Summers. You know, in a long historical perspective,

Mr. Chairman, in the first decade of the last century when industrialization was having profound effects, we instituted a whole set

of public policies: Antitrust laws, the first wave of regulation, that

they in a very important sense saved capitalism and support for

the market economy from itself. Something similar happened when

the market system stopped working in the 1930s and, in historical

terms, what Franklin Roosevelt did was save the market system by

enabling it to work for the vast majority of citizens.

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And ultimately the same thing is at stake in the response to the

middle class concerns right now. So the stakes in this era of

globalization are very large. I would agree completely with Secretary Rubin on the urgency of restoring our finances to a sustainable basis, but I would emphasize that that is in a sense defensive.

If we don’t do it, we are taking an enormous and imprudent risk.

But we’re not going to drive the economy forward merely by putting our finances on a much sounder footing.

And I would emphasize the issue of addressing our health care

system as absolutely central to questions of security, questions of

competitiveness, and questions of everybody feeling like they’re

part of the same country.

Chairman Schumer. Dr. Blinder.

Dr. Blinder. I guess I think that there’s probably more fear of

falling mobility than actual falling mobility. Secretary Rubin made

the point that it gives people a reason and a motive to try to resist

change in general, from whatever source. And, in particular, as an

example of that, it gives people a reason to resist globalization—

which, as I said before, is an inevitable force and will raise productivity in the United States and elsewhere.

To illustrate what I mean, just imagine if the United States had

tried to hunker down in 1958—when we were undisputed kings of

the hill in everything—and say ‘‘we’re going to try to defend this

economy, this industrial structure’’ and so on. That’s a loser’s strategy, from which we have to stay away. We’re vastly different now

than we were in 1958; and 50 years from now we’re going to be

vastly different still.

If I had a wish list, I guess I would put at the top some of the

things I mentioned earlier. It starts with the theme that we have

to do a better job of cushioning the people who fall. I would say,

stronger than that, we want to turn the cushion or the safety net,

as it’s called, into a trampoline that bounces people back into productive employment. These are not easy things to do. But I don’t

think we’ve tried that hard, and we just need to try a lot harder.

Chairman Schumer. Dr. Vedder.

Dr. Vedder. I actually agree largely with Chairman Greenspan

with respect to education, but I think the important thing to keep

in mind, the critical role that education plays in income mobility

as well as in economic growth.

Incidentally, I also would in large part agree with Secretary

Summers on the R&D comments that he made. A colleague of Professor Summers, however, Carolyn Hoxby, once estimated in recent

years that the productivity of K through 12 education in the United

States has fallen by up to 60 to 65 percent in the last 30 to 40

years and we have productivity declines occurring in the education

sector. I think it’s also occurring in higher education. I’ve written

a lot about that and I’ve served on the Spellings Commission recently on that.

So I think we have some inefficiencies, a need to restructure our

educational system to make it able to be more competitive, to make

it less of a Soviet style system and more of a competitive, lean and

mean system. In doing that, we may need to devote more resources

to it. That’s a possibility. But I think an essential prerequisite is

making the system work.

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Chairman Schumer. Thank you.

I’d just like to go back and just ask Secretary Rubin to elaborate

on one thing and Dr. Summers on a second, then my time will expire.

Could you draw out the link a little bit between fiscal responsibility and economic growth? I think many people in the country—

some reject it; I guess the President sort of rejects it or gives it lip

service—but many others think it’s a moral thing to do, but it

doesn’t really get to growth and some other things.

To Dr. Summers, you mentioned health care first and foremost.

I have mentioned education because I believe that without the

growth in education our incomes, our international share of income

but also our relative growth in income will decline and we wouldn’t

have the dollars to do what we need in health care or other things.

Could you answer that?

Secretary Rubin. Mr. Chairman, in brief, to the extent that the

Federal Government through deficits absorbs our savings, we have

less savings available for investment and we’ve had these enormous inflows from abroad, largely to support the dollar and in

order to maintain exports mainly from petrodollar countries for

safe haven. It’s almost inconceivable that that’s going to continue

indefinitely in the face of these imbalances.

I think Dr. Summers said that this—somebody said, I think it

was Dr. Summers—this masked our real problems. So one problem

is crowding out private investment. I’m deeply involved in markets

every day of my life and I’m deeply troubled at the potential that

at some point—and it may be years out, it could be near term,

there’s no way of predicting which—that the global markets will

develop concerns about the combination of our low savings rate, our

high current account deficit, our fiscal prospects, the large increase

in entitlements coming in, and, as a consequence it will have serious disruptions with respect to our markets which will mean much

higher interest rates and all that flows from that, including serious

economic slowdowns. As I say, that could be way off in time. It has

been masked, as I think Dr. Summers said, by these vast inflows.

But that won’t go on indefinitely.

What we discovered in 1993 but did not anticipate, but I think

it was very important, was that once we reestablished sound fiscal

conditions that greatly increased business and consumer confidence

generally. What had happened was that our deficits had become

kind of a symbol for more general concern about our ability to manage economic affairs in this country.

And finally two other items. President Clinton made this observation: If we’re going to have serious public investment, the American people have to have confidence in government. That in turns

requires you to have sound fiscal conditions.

Finally we had the tragedy of 9/11. We also had a recession. The

economic resilience, the budgetary resilience to deal with that came

because we had substantial surpluses. Had we had deficits, we’d

then have to pile additional deficits on top of that. It might have

been deeply harmful to our economy.

Secretary Summers. I would not want to contrast health and

education in any way that would disparage. What I would agree

with you is the overwhelming importance of improving our eduVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:31 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 034752 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\34752.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
26

cational system. There’s much, as I did mention in my testimony,

that can be done at every level.

I would stress that in the education area the investment of resources is essential, but the improvement of performance is also absolutely essential to any success and that there are probably some

limits on how much of that can be done at the Federal level, which

is why I emphasized the health care issue—which it seems to me

is increasingly important to the perception of security or middle

class families, is essential to the competitiveness of very large

numbers of American businesses and to the overall sense that this

society is working well.

Chairman Schumer. I want to thank all of our witnesses. You

have provided a real contrast to what we are hearing from the

White House and I hope we certainly on this Committee are going

to continue to make those points, then take it from there and try

to figure out the kinds of policies that you have discussed, put

them into practical terms so we can address our future with confidence. Thank you, all four of you, for your comments.

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.

Dr. Blinder, you talked about, I think it was in your words, ‘‘unnecessary roughness on people and some of the government policies

that have made it worse.’’ This is apart from your testimony about

the need to fix the safety net. But when you talk about these tax

policies and how they made it worse, could you elaborate on that?

Dr. Blinder. Glad to. I think you yourself were talking about

this in your opening statement. We’ve cut taxes several times in

this decade. If you leave aside incentive effects—which is something that is very relevant and we should argue about, because it

is important—and look at the distributional aspects of these tax

cuts, it’s hard to imagine a less progressive, a more regressive set

of tax cuts. If you had solved the hypothetical problem of giving

away this much revenue in the most regressive way we can, that’s

pretty close to what we got.

The minimum wage—which is in the Congress right now—has

been allowed to dwindle in real terms to its lowest in 50 years. We

haven’t raised the Earned Income Tax Credit since we did it at the

beginning of the Clinton Administration in 1993. That’s the biggest—I don’t want to quite call it an antipoverty program, because

it’s antipoverty and near poverty because lots of people collect

EITC that aren’t below the poverty line. But it’s probably the best

redistributive tool that we have in the arsenal. These are the kinds

of things that I was talking about.

Then if you look on the other side of the ledger, what did we do

to try to cushion the blow for the people who were taking the blow?

The answer is essentially nothing, except for a few things that happened in the 1990s like the EITC liberalization and so on. We had

a little bit of greater trade adjustment assistance put into one of

the tax bills. Was that in the tax bill of 2003? I’m forgetting. People

from the staff behind you will know the answer to that. And there’s

been almost no take-up, there’s been almost no use of enhanced

trade adjustment assistance. That’s another example.

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.

Then the other thing, I was reading this great book last night,

I don’t know if you’ve seen it——

27

[Laughter.]

Senator Klobuchar [continuing]. Called ‘‘Positively American’’

by our Chairman——

Chairman Schumer. The Senator from Minnesota has half an

hour additional.

[Laughter.]

Secretary Rubin. Senator, I plan to wait until it becomes a television series.

Senator Klobuchar. In addition to learning a lot about what

the Chairman likes to eat, like grilled octopus and all these oatmeal cookies, he makes a point of all the things we can do to help

the middle class, including investment in education, which you, Dr.

Summers, had mentioned.

What I’m trying to reconcile here, I guess, is how we do this and

we still manage to bring down the deficit—and I threw out some

ideas that I had—and start working on the debt. Because I think

in the end that’s going to eat away at the middle class that we’re

trying to help.

What exact policy prescriptions do you have where we can start

doing things with this Congress where we’re actually reducing the

debt, bringing down this deficit and at the same time helping the

people that the Chairman talks about?

Secretary Summers. I think in your statement, Senator, you

pointed to a number of areas where I believe that tax changes

would both raise revenue and, in all likelihood, improve the function of the tax system as a contributor to economic health. One is

the tax gap where the volume of taxes that are owed, but not paid,

is large and growing.

It defies belief that in a world where the CitiGroup organization

is able to track people who spend money on their Visa cards at 30

million locations around the world, get them a statement within 30

days and collect what they owe, that we cannot collect as a country

more than 85 percent of the taxes that are owed, and the gaps are

far and away the largest in categories related to profits and various

kinds of capital income that go disproportionately to people who

are very well off.

If you look at the location of U.S. corporate foreign profits, where

are the foreign profits as reported on tax returns greatest for U.S.

companies? You might expect them to be in places like Japan and

Germany and England that have the largest economies where they

would be doing business. They are, in fact, much more in places

like Ireland and various Caribbean locales that provide extraordinarily generous tax treatment. And there is room for improvement in that area as well.

One of the things that we launched—initially raised during Secretary Rubin’s time as treasury secretary that I pushed very hard

during my time was the issue of corporate tax shelters where it’s

very difficult to know, but there appear to be very significant

losses. And I might say that this is an area where I think the technical economic community has some work to do, because our efforts

to address these problems are, I think, held back by the fact that

they are often scored in extremely conservative ways that reflects

a legitimate concern that they’ve sometimes been used as a somewhat phone item in various Congressional budget efforts. So they’re

28

scored in a very, very conservative way which in turn makes it

harder to build the impetus for necessary policy changes.

So I think there is a significant agenda of things that would actually make the tax code more of a level playing field, more efficient in the way it collected income and also raise revenue that

could be coupled with the various initiatives that I think you have

in mind to address key needs of middle income families.

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.

Chairman Schumer. Senator Webb.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony today. This

is a great opportunity for us to hear from some of the great minds

in America about how we can work to solve these problems, and

I appreciate your holding these hearings. I look forward to more of

them and participating.

And, if I may say with the greatest deal of respect, Mr. Chairman, I think you got 10 minutes in your questioning and we’re getting 5. In the spirit of egalitarianism.

Chairman Schumer. Ask our Chief of Staff. I said what’s that

all about, everyone should have the same before you even brought

it up. We don’t want to have time income inequality here.

[Laughter.]

Senator Webb. First of all, Dr. Summers, I appreciate what you

just said in your response to Senator Klobuchar. It goes a long way

toward, I think, what a lot of us are thinking.

Dr. Blinder, your comments about the functional breakdowns

here in terms of globalization among skill sets, electronic transmission and those sorts of things, I think if you look at where the

typical American worker is having to see the challenges, the

squeeze they’re facing come from three directions. That is certainly

one of them.

The other is, looking at the manufacturing base, when we are

having such dramatically different economic systems with which

we are competing, the iPODs and the cell phones that are mentioned are made in China. Even on infrastructure issues, you can’t

export a waiter’s job. But the situation we have right now with respect to immigration is that in many cases the wage levels are

being held down by this vast labor pool that’s kind of under the

water, infrastructure projects in such places as waiters and this

sort of thing. That’s sort of a dilemma when we’re talking about

these issues across the aisle and in other ways, it does often depend on whether you’re focusing on the economy writ large or

whether you’re talking about the opportunity for personal advancement.

I know, Dr. Summers, you mentioned access. This is such a key

of what’s going on right now, all this talk of social Darwinism really neglects the reality of starting points of access of the ability,

quite frankly, of people with wealth and power to manipulate government policies, as well as to take care of their future generations.

And those are the sorts of things that I and other people have been

trying to focus on.

I wanted to ask a specific question. I was really taken by an article in the Economist last summer—I don’t have it in front of me.

29

It was a 19-page special on the impact of globalization. And, as you

would expect, it was very positive about the future of globalization.

One thing that it did point out was that the impact on the American workforce is quite different than the other so-called first world

economies and that it extended beyond the blue collar workforce.

In fact, Dr. Blinder, as you were pointing out, it is now beginning

to dramatically affect white collar America. Some of the conclusions

that they had reached, outsourcing, the impact of outsourcing on

our economy, some of them talked about illegal immigration. And

the other, I think, really focused differential we were talking about

was the way that we traditionally construct our medical programs,

our health care programs—which all of you addressed. Their prediction was basically that if we don’t come to some sort of fair conclusions on these issues, we are going to move toward protectionism in the political system and possibly toward political unrest.

As I’m listening here about the comments about education being

a fix, that’s a very long-term fix. It’s certainly a laudable goal, but

we have to have some other things that we can put into the works.

Health care is possibly a shorter-term fix, but I’m also curious as

to the recommendations that the people on the panel would have—

or even if you agree, particularly in the case of Dr. Vedder.

Dr. Rubin, if you could start.

Secretary Rubin. Thank you, Senator. I don’t think that any of

the three Ph.Ds on the panel would agree with my being called

‘‘Doctor Rubin.’’ But nevertheless, I think you identified a very serious issue and I don’t think it’s a simple one to deal with because

the reality of life is that China and India have very effective productivity regimes and as they become more and more productive—

as I think Dr. Blinder said—it’s going to create serious competitive

pressure with respect to our economy.

I think there are productive things to do and counterproductive

things to do. Too much of the temptation goes in the counterproductive direction. Having said that, I think health care is certainly one.

Another area that we should pursue is trade adjustment assistance. It isn’t just trade adjustment, but assistance for any sort of

dislocation.

There’s a man named Bruce Katz at Brookings who has a project

around local economic development, to approach job creation and

new activity creation not in some national sense directly from

Washington but, rather, around local strengths, building on our

great university systems and building around the strengths of localities. I think there’s a tremendous potential in that.

But I think the answer to this, Senator—such as portable pension funds, there are a lot of specifics you can get together, but I

think trying to interfere with markets or stop markets isn’t going

to work and I think there’s an enormous amount we can do in a

dynamic society to create greater opportunity here, and that’s the

direction in which I, at least, think we ought to go.

If I could just say, by the way, Dr. Vedder, you referred to the

struggle within the Democratic party and hoping we would prevail.

I don’t view it that way at all. I think what you’ve got is a very

serious set of issues which we’ve all been raising—including the

30

Senator right now—and within our party, we’re all working to find

sensible solutions, recognizing the difficulties.

Thank you.

Secretary Summers. A couple points that I would add. First,

I don’t think any of us on this panel have minimized the magnitude

of the challenges that we face. At the same time, I would rather

face our problems than the problems facing any other industrialized country in the world in terms of the tremendous productive

capacity, dynamism and growth potential of the American economy.

That’s why I believe so strongly that it is important to make neither of the two major errors that are so often suggested in the political debate: One is to simply be passive and reliant on the market and assume that all will be well—that’s the mistake we avoided

in the first part of the century, that’s the mistake we avoided in

the 1930s, that’s the mistake we’ve consistently avoided to our very

great benefit.

The other is to take a whole set of measures that would go

against the grain of the market system, which I think would run

the risk of creating the kinds of problems for ourselves that Europe

and Japan face, which have essentially become stagnant societies

in ways that have reduced enormously their potential to take on

whatever challenges they define for themselves. That’s why I think

the challenge.

And if there’s one theme, it would be to take a more collective

approach to prosperity and economic security by having broad systems that assure that health care is available for all, that whatever

happens to you in the market economy, you don’t lose your home,

you don’t lose your capacity to have an adequate retirement, that

the economic success of the area where you live is not just a matter

of the individual economic successes of a set of individual people

there, but is a collective responsibility to formulate a strategy. And

I think it is taking that kind of more collective view of prosperity

and economic security, while at the same time insisting that you

go with the grain rather than against the grain of the basic market

system that has produced all this potential. That’s, I think, the policy challenge.

Dr. Blinder. I very much agree with that. I appreciate the sense

of your question, Senator. Some of the hard truth of this matter is

that, in terms of cures, the short-term plate is kind of bare, but not

empty; I’ll come back to that in 1 second. And the long-term plate

is bountiful; but these are hard things to do, and they take a long

time. When prescribing long-term remedies, it’s very good if you’re

in a position like we on the panel are; you don’t have to run for

election, because they do take a long time.

On the short-term plate, I think the right way to think is just

where Secretary Summers finished. When we teach our students

about the gains from international trade, most of us emphasize

that there are winners and losers. And to make the case intellectually airtight, you need to compensate the losers for their losses.

And there are losers. People lose their jobs. They lose their health

insurance. They lose their pensions. They shouldn’t be losing all of

that stuff.

We in the United States ought to be taking much more seriously

the ideas that the losers should be compensated so that the society

31

can reap gains from trade. Some of this can be done in the short

run, like pension reform and maintenance of health insurance.

There is COBRA, for example we can do more things like that. The

long-term fixes have to do with education.

You mentioned health care.

I believe it was an historic mistake, though made for understandable reasons, that the United States made a long time ago when—

just about uniquely in the world it decided—to attach health insurance to employment. It’s now a huge burden. It wasn’t such a burden in the good old days of the 1950s, but it’s a big burden now.

It’s an anchor that is pulling down real wages.

You know, when you look at total compensation—which most

economists prefer to look at—a large and growing hunk of that is

health insurance.

If the worker is getting more and more compensation to pay for

less and less health insurance, he’s not really better off. It’s an anchor on wages, to some extent, and it’s an anchor pulling down

business competitiveness. You talk about long term? It’s going to

take us a long time to get out from under that system.

Dr. Vedder. Senator, I’ve been sort of mystified in this hearing.

To some extent, I think we’re proceeding from sort of an erroneous

factual basis on some of these things and I think we’re overly concerned. Now I’m not saying that everything is right about our economy, and I’m not a apologist for the Bush administration’s policies,

some of which I would disagree with as strongly as others on this

panel. But it is a fact that in November of last year there were

8,630,000 more jobs than there were 5 years earlier. Maybe

globalization is a problem, but it is a fact that in the year 2006 the

unemployment rate will come in as the fourth lowest in the last 37

years. That is a fact.

It is a fact that our budget deficit this year, while it is a deficit—

I don’t know if it’s a fact, because we’re in the midst of the fiscal

year, but if the numbers run the way they have run in the early

part of the fiscal year, it seems likely that the budget deficit this

year will be less than 2 percent of GDP. That’s a deficit and zero

is better than 2 percent.

But 2 percent relative to modern historical experience, not only

in the United States, but certainly in Europe, Japan, anywhere

else, is actually on the conservative side. It’s relatively modest.

True, maybe it should be zero.

The trade deficit—we ran a trade deficit from 1607 to 1870, nearly every year for 263 years. The Nation somehow muddled through.

And I think with respect to income inequality—Census data show

that in 2005 there’s no statistically significant difference in the

G&E coefficient using the conventional income measures than

there were 5 years ago. We should reach some common ground on

what the problem is before we try to solve it.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Dr. Vedder.

I just want the record to show Mr. Webb has gotten 4 more minutes than he asked.

Senator Webb. I owe you for the next hearing.

Chairman Schumer. Senator Casey.

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Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I don’t

have your book in front of me. I was going to show it if I did. But

Senator Klobuchar is out advertising it, so I’ll do it later.

Chairman Schumer. You can’t do it too often.

Senator Casey. I do want to thank Senator Schumer for focusing the work of this Committee and especially the work we’re doing

here today in this hearing. I think on a very important distinction

which gets lost in the translation which is growth and numbers can

be presented and some of them are positive, but the different between growth and who benefits is the disconnect there and I think

that’s very important. It gets lost in the discussion beyond this

hearing room. It’s not happening today because we’re focused on

that.

I wanted to focus on just maybe two areas to stay within my time

limit. First of all, Secretary Rubin, again I want to thank the entire

panel for your great work here today, your scholarship, and your

contribution to helping us better serve the people we represent.

I was struck—as a Senator from Pennsylvania having just gone

through a long, long campaign, I was struck by much of what was

said here this morning, some of which I missed earlier. But I wanted to focus in particular, Secretary Rubin, on your statement starting at the top of page 4 and continuing from page 3, if I’m reading

it—and I don’t want to simplify this too much. But I break this

down as growth equals income growth plus increased security. That

kind of juxtaposition of growth plus security.

I thought it was interesting and important for the people I represent in Pennsylvania that you said that we must provide workers

with—quote—‘‘the resources to access education, training, rapid deployment into the economic stream’’ and then you go on from there.

I thought it was important that sometimes in Washington when

we’re debating these issues about programs and support for workers we talk about education and training or some people talk about

them as something that we’re giving. It’s kind of a handout, so to

speak. But I appreciate the fact that you identified them as resources for those workers to bring about economic growth. I’d ask

for your comment on that.

Plus, later on that page, where you talk about serious shortfalls

in education, infrastructure, basic research, energy policy, and especially the last two that I’ll cite here, health care policy and innercity programs, as much as you and Dr. Summers and others have

contributed to the Democratic party’s better understanding that

growth is good, that balanced budgets are good, and fiscal discipline is good—and I appreciate that because we don’t focus on it

enough as a party, I speak only for my fellow Democrats here. But

I guess just a general comment on how those supports help our

workers create better economic growth and, in particular, the impact of health care and focus on the inner city. I know that’s broad,

but if you could just elaborate on that.

Secretary Rubin. Let me try to make just a broad general

statement on the inner city piece, but first I’d like to make another

comment. As a general proposition, the point I was trying to make

was that these are exactly what you said, Senator Casey, these are

economic issues and by providing education and health care and effective energy policies and so much else, we’re enabling our workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:31 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 034752 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\34752.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
33

ers to be more productive and more competitive and that, in turns,

fuels economic growth.

I was also trying to make the point that if you have broad-based

income growth and workers are able themselves to better access all

of this through their incomes and so forth, that was the point

there. Both Dr. Summers and Dr. Blinder can speak better to

health care issues than I can on the specifics.

I would like to make one comment, if I may though, because I

believe the inner city issues are every bit as much of an economic

issue as they are a values issue. I don’t think there’s any question

that there are tremendous productivity gains to be had if you can

reduce the social costs to America by having effective programs to

bring people in the inner cities back or into the economic mainstream and there are tremendous productivity gains to be had.

When I have been in China and have met with public and private sector leaders and in India as well—in both, the political leaders, the governmental leaders will say to you that one of the great

economic productivity challenges for them is to equip the poor to

enter the economic mainstream. We should have exactly the same

focus for pure hard-headed economic reasons, and that was the

point of that.

By the way, I might add that all three of us happen to be involved in something called the Hamilton Project, which has been

developing a series of projects relating to all these kinds of issues.

Senator Casey. Thank you.

I wanted to ask one more in my limited time here. Dr. Summers,

as you know from your work and the great work that President

Clinton’s administration did on returning us to fiscal stability and

a path to sustain that, one of the most important things that I

thought that Administration did was make a major commitment on

children’s health insurance. We have an opportunity this year, in

my judgment—if the Congress fails to do a very good job on that

reauthorization, it’s not only a moral failing, I think it’s a big economic failing.

So I ask in light of the fact that we now have a very solid program on children’s health insurance but we also have 8.3 million

kids with no health insurance at all, based upon your earlier statement about the critical impact of health care, if you could elaborate

on them, on what’s ahead of this Congress with regard to children’s

health insurance and health insurance generally.

Secretary Summers. I’m not an expert on these specific issues

regarding children’s health insurance, but let me make three comments that may be relevant. First, it’s a basic policy problem that

we all have difficulty dealing with, which is if you don’t fund somebody’s health insurance, to some extent they don’t get health care

and that’s terrible.

But to a substantial extent, they get health care by going to an

emergency room and getting the care and not paying for it and

then we all pay for it in higher insurance premiums, in higher

costs for government programs. It’s a kind of stealth—the uninsured represent a kind of stealth tax increase.

When we address the problem of non-insurance, we’re reducing

that stealth tax increase, but we don’t have good ways of taking

full account of it and, therefore, we move forward with insufficient

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energy. If we could always recognize that a lot of what we’re doing

is when we’re paying for the uninsured is taking a burden off businesses, off the rest of us who pay premiums, off the taxpayers who

pay for government insurance, I think we would get toward better

outcomes.

Second, there are critical issues here for children for others that

go beyond questions of simply the categories of insured and uninsured. I was exposed to some data not long ago on hypertension,

which is an easily controllable condition with the right medical

care and the right follow-up, but accounts for major gaps in life expectancy, and the particular studies that I was exposed to suggested that less than a quarter of those with hypertension in America were having it adequately and sufficiently controlled.

That’s in part a matter in part of not having health insurance,

in part a matter of the way the health care system functions. And

the costs down the road when it is uncontrolled, in terms of disability, not to mention the moral costs, are enormous. In part,

these are questions of the way in which care is organized to be provided.

The third point that I would make is that I believe—and it’s not

something that can be proven—that the degree of anxiety surrounding questions of health care is crucial to our capacity as a society to accept a whole set of dynamic changes that are necessary

if we’re to move our economy forward. So I could not imagine morally, in terms of its consequences for the premiums and the burdens all people in this society bear in terms of the ultimate impact

on the ability to be educated and to be a productive member of our

society, or in terms of the impact on our sense of economic security

as we take on the challenges of globalization that it would be wise

for the Congress to do anything other than to strongly support the

reauthorization and expansion of the benefits in the child health

care area.

Senator Casey. Thank you. I know we’re over time, but do any

of the other panel members want to follow up on that?

Dr. Blinder. If I could just say very briefly, a lot of Americans,

though not all, believe that universal health care is an imperative—eventually. That we have to get there, and that it’s a disgrace

that we have so many Americans without health insurance. It’s

also economically inefficient and all of that.

But I think it starts with the view that it’s a national disgrace

that we have this many people uninsured. Politically, over the

years, Congress has picked off the low-hanging fruit. We had Medicare; we’ve got a national consensus that senior citizens should not

be without health care. Then we got Medicaid so poor people would

not be out on the streets without health care. And then, in the

nineties, we got coverage for children—but not all of them, as you

pointed out.

I think, in some sense, the next logical step along the road is

children. I started by saying this yellow brick road is leading eventually to universal health care. But we’re doing it categorically. I

think it makes all the sense in the world to not only, of course, continue to reauthorize the program we have, but to extend it to more

children.

Senator Casey. Good point. Thank you.

35

Chairman Schumer. Thank you.

I have a bunch of things. First, to my colleagues who are here,

but particularly our three freshmen who are on the Committee, I

think everyone can see why the rest of us have so much faith in

their coming and really injecting a lot of enthusiasm, a lot of

knowledge, different perspective as we move forward.

Finally, I want to thank our witnesses. I think this was a great

panel. I want to thank you, Dr. Vetter, for a forceful and lively opposition to the three big artillery here. But I want to thank our

three witnesses. I think we accomplished—began to accomplish two

things today. There is—as I mentioned, the President’s giving his

speech and he basically is saying everything is great and you’re focused on some of the anxieties that average folks have in terms of

income and service and everything else, I think shows, the contrast

and shows that all is not well.

But second, we’re attempting here to sort of lay out or begin to

lay out a new vision, where do we go? I think you all put it so well,

each in a different way, that we’re at a real crossroads economically and the new vision we’re trying to grapple with here, if I had

to describe it and maybe describe what you’re saying and I agree

with it—accepts economic forces but acknowledges and deals with

the changes that have occurred within those forces and it’s the latter that the Administration hasn’t done.

Now we have a real problem if we run away from economic

forces. You put it one way, stop the world, I want to get off, Dr.

Blinder. I put it—I wrote this in my book—you can’t have water

flow uphill. But you can have water down one side of the mountain

rather than the other side of the mountain and our job is to make

sure that we acknowledge and accept those economic forces, but

also are able to use them and direct them for the greatest benefit

of the greatest number of our people. And you can’t ignore the

changes that have occurred economically, you just can’t. That’s why

we’re at such a crossroads here. It’s a different economy than it

was 20 years ago or even 10 years ago when all of you served in

the government in the last decade of the 20th century.

So our challenge here, as we try to develop a new vision, is to

understand and accept those forces, but also acknowledge that

changes have occurred and figure out the best way to deal with

those changes for the benefit of our people, and you’ve given us a

terrific first start.

I want to assure all my colleagues, present and not, that this

Committee is going to pursue that vision and that goal, I think,

hopefully not in a partisan way, in a bipartisan way as best we

can. But the future of our country really depends on it.

We’re in interesting times, as the Chinese say. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, please.

Secretary Rubin. Could I just make one brief comment, Mr.

Chairman? You made a comment before, and I’d like to suggest a

slightly different framework. The panel was presenting an overly

sober view of the contrast to the more optimistic view of the Administration. I actually feel—I have a slightly different way of

thinking about that. I think all of us expressed a very robust view

of the potential for the American economy and believe the American economy can do very well. I think what we are saying, though,

36

is in order to do that, we’ve got to recognize the challenges that relate to the economy and also relate to making sure, as you just

said, that the great preponderance of our people benefit from our

economy, and we need to meet our challenges.

Chairman Schumer. I think you put it better than I did. I

think the challenges are sobering. But the economy itself, I like

what Dr. Summers said, if you had to pick a developed country to

be in, there is no question, we’d pick this one with our vigor, with

our open system with immigrants, with everything we have to

offer. It’s simply if we put our head in the sand and ignore the

changes that have occurred, it may not be that way 25 years from

now. And our challenge is to begin to lay out a new vision. There

are moments in history that you need to sort of—where ideas make

a real difference. Then, after that, society carries along. I believe

this is one of those moments and we’re just at the start of it and

all of you have made a real contribution toward moving us forward.

I thank you for taking the time to come and the interest, erudition and concern which you really showed for this great country of

ours. Thanks. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the Committee meeting was adjourned.]

(37)

Submissions for the Record

38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER, CHAIRMAN

Good morning. I am pleased to open the first hearing of the Joint Economic Committee in the 110th Congress. I want to welcome Ranking member, Mr. Saxton, who

was a colleague of mine when I was in the House.

I know we will have some disagreements over solutions along the way, but I hope

that we will be able to develop a shared view of the problems the American people

will want us to be working on. And I look forward to working closely and, dare I

say, neighborly with all of you.

This is a committee that will ask difficult questions, challenge our assumptions,

and seek to define our nation’s economic challenges using the best minds in the Nation as our witnesses.

For much of the next 2 years, our hearings are going to focus on the middle class.

That is because I believe that the middle class is the engine of the American economy.

When they are doing well, America is doing well. When they are anxious, America

is anxious.

If we want to expand or reform aid to the poor, we can only do so if the middle

class feels that they are prospering, moving ahead, and are secure.

If we want to expand trade because we believe it grows the economy, we can only

do so if the middle class feels that they will benefit as much from our national

growth as those at the very top.

This hearing couldn’t come at a better time because on all of those measures, the

middle class feels a bit shaky. They are not struggling to get by, but they are struggling to get ahead. They are unsure of their footing in an economy and world that

is about change, technology, and disruption.

They feel they are alone to navigate the contours of change and that government

isn’t really helping them where they need it.

They see the economic fortunes of different groups in our economy growing

apart—not together. And they are rightfully worried that this gap will widen into

an unbridgeable chasm.

We all know the statistics: we went through the most prolonged jobs slump since

the 1930s after the 2001 recession; productivity continued the strong trend that

began in the mid-1990s, but real wages stagnated as the benefits of economic

growth showed up in the bottom lines of companies and in executive salaries but

not in the paychecks of most workers.

But the middle class doesn’t need statistics to tell them they’re on shaky ground.

American families know they can’t work any harder than they already do, and that

for the last 6 years they have mostly run in place.

This morning, President Bush will give a ‘‘State of the Economy’’ address in my

home state of New York. And he will try to make the case to the American public

that our economy is strong and everyone is benefiting.

The President will surely point to today’s news that economic growth picked up

in the fourth quarter and a key measure of wages showed some real growth as well.

No one is happier than me that we had a nice quarter.

But if you really spend time out in middle class America—if you descend from

the 30,000 foot level to the communities of Main Street America—you know that all

is not well with the middle class.

The basic successes and aspirations of middle-class life—raising a family—buying

a home—paying for college—saving for retirement—are becoming intimidating hurdles for average, ordinary people.

The price of college, for example, the ticket to the middle class for future generations—has increased faster than inflation for 26 consecutive years.

So, the President is right when he says that a future of hope and prosperity in

this country begins with a growing economy. But he could not be more wrong when

he says that all Americans have benefited from economic growth over the past several years. The fact is that the middle class has never been so unsure of its footing

since I came to Congress in 1980.

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I believe that we need a new direction to promote economic growth for all Americans in the 21st century. We need to throw away the old map that has been favoring

those with influence and wealth and leaving the middle class behind. Our economic

fortunes need to grow together, not apart.

I said that the JEC would seek advice from the best of the best and that’s what

we have to offer for our first hearing.

Bob Rubin, Larry Summers, and Alan Blinder really need no introduction to people who have followed economic policy in this country over the past decade or morealthough I will give them a proper introduction before they give their testimony. We

also welcome Professor Richard Vedder, Distinguished Professor of Economics at

Ohio University to lend us a different perspective.

I want to give the Vice Chair, the ranking member, and the senior Senate Republican a chance to make their opening statements, but I hope we can proceed quickly

to our witnesses and get down to business.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JIM SAXTON, RANKING MINORITY

It is a pleasure to join in welcoming the distinguished panel of witnesses before

us today: former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, former Treasury Secretary Larry

Summers, Professor Alan Blinder, and Professor Richard Vedder. I would also like

to congratulate Senator Schumer in joining the Committee and being designated as

the incoming Chairman.

The hearing today will probably cover a number of topics, including the performance of the U.S. economy. It is important to recall that in 2003, a new policy mix

of accommodative Federal Reserve policy and tax incentives for investment led to

a rebound of investment. The pace of economic growth picked up and employment

growth rebounded. Since August of 2003, over 7 million jobs have been created, and

the unemployment rate has fallen to 4.5 percent. Economic growth has generally

been quite good. In 2005, the Fed referred to the ‘‘solid performance’’ of the economy

and said that it ‘‘should continue to perform well in 2006 and 2007.’’

Some have criticized U.S. economic performance for producing excessive income

inequality. However, according to the Census Bureau, its key measure of income inequality has been statistically unchanged since 2001. Some have also focused on

slow wage growth, but many of the data used understate progress because they are

based on measures that overstate inflation and exclude fringe benefits. Even so, various measures of real wages and earnings growth have been rising at a faster pace

recently. It should be noted that during the 1990s expansion it also took several

years before real wages and earnings increased at a strong rate.

The continued prosperity of middle income households can be facilitated by progrowth economic policies. It would also be reasonable to examine Federal policies

regarding research, personal saving and investment, education, and social safety net

programs to determine what changes might be helpful. For example, I have long

supported various tax incentives for personal saving and investment to provide financial security and a reserve fund for middle class investors.

However, in Congress today there is increasing support for a policy response that

would be profoundly destructive to middle income families: protectionism. Protectionism would undermine economic growth, trigger international retaliation, and

raise prices for middle income consumers.

Three of the witnesses before us this morning are associated with the Hamilton

Project of the Brookings Institution, a project that seems designed to head off the

rising tide of protectionism among the Majority in Congress. While I may not agree

with the Hamilton Project recommendations, the project is a well-intended effort to

fend off a very real threat to middle income families. Protectionist policies would

be a very valid reason for middle class anxiety.

According to many economists, a quickening pace of technological change is more

responsible for shifting employment patterns than is international trade. Thus economic policies that promote the flexibility and dynamism of the U.S. economy are

the best course for improving the future of middle income Americans. As Congress

examines these issues, it should avoid policies that will hamper the ability of the

economy to adapt to future challenges.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CAROLYN B. MALONEY, VICE CHAIR

Thank you, Chairman Schumer. I am pleased to be here at the first hearing of

the Joint Economic Committee held under your leadership and I am proud that I

will be the Vice Chair of the Committee. Together, we and the other members of

the Committee have an exciting opportunity to take economic policy in this country

40

in a new direction that helps American families meet the challenge of continuing

to compete and prosper in an increasingly competitive world economy.

I am pleased to welcome our witnesses, three of whom helped President Clinton

preside over the longest economic expansion in our nation’s history—when 22.7 million jobs were created, the unemployment rate came down to 4 percent, and families

up and down the income ladder made real economic progress and had a sense of

confidence in their economic future.

I am proud to have Bob Rubin as a constituent. Americans benefited from his

skillful work as Treasury Secretary and they are continuing to benefit from his wise

counsel about how to address the economic challenges we face. Professor Summers

and Professor Blinder each have combined highly distinguished academic careers

with equally distinguished careers in public service and I am pleased that they are

here so that we can draw on their experience and wisdom. Dr. Vedder, I am sure

that you will be coming at these issues from a different perspective, but I look forward to a serious policy discussion and competition among ideas.

The issues we are discussing today are critically important. The middle class is

the fabric of our nation, but they are feeling a bit frayed at the moment. And they

probably feel frustrated when they hear the President and his surrogates continually heap praise upon this country’s economic performance. Many of them are probably thinking: Is the President talking about the same economy? And: If the economy is doing so well, then why am I left with this empty feeling?

When the President says his policies are working to make the economy strong and

that all Americans are benefiting, he is only looking at the situation from a distance. The bird’s eye may not look so bad, but the facts on the ground tell a different story.

Despite 4 years of economic expansion, job growth has been modest, wages are

barely keeping pace with inflation, real incomes have fallen, household debt is rising, employer-provided health insurance coverage is declining, and private pensions

are in jeopardy. These are the economic barometers that matter most to families.

These are facts and figures that affect their pocketbooks.

The growing divide between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ is also tearing the fabric of our nation. A recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office shows that

the President’s policies have aggravated the widening gap between the rich and everyone else in the last several years. The policies of this Administration simply do

not address the problems of families trying to maintain a middle class way of life

and they certainly do not address the problems of working families trying to make

it into the middle class.

The American people want us to create an economic environment that produces

better jobs with better pay, raises the minimum wage, makes health care and college more affordable, cuts middle-income taxes, guarantees a dignified retirement

for our seniors, moves the Nation toward energy independence, and restores fiscal

responsibility. In the House of Representatives, we have already acted on many of

these issues, but there is much work left to do.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and their thoughts on policies

that can help us fulfill our promise to restore the American Dream to middle-class

families.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

In the decades following World War II, increased overall productivity and economic expansion brought an increased standard of living for Americans across the

economic spectrum. It provided a strong middle class in stark contrast to today’s

economy where the middle class has felt more insecure than at any time since the

Great Depression.

GDP is rising, productivity is up and corporations are earning record profits, but

economic growth is largely leaving working families behind. Middle class wages

have been virtually stagnant, while prices for essentials such as housing, health

care, gas and utilities have skyrocketed. Families are exhausting their savings and

falling into debt. To keep their heads above water, they put in longer hours at work

or accept multiple jobs, sacrificing time with their families and jeopardizing their

children’s well-being.

More and more middle class jobs with decent wages and benefits are disappearing. Millions of jobs are being shipped overseas, and the new jobs being created often come with lower pay, fewer benefits, and less stability.

The American economy is becoming more and more stratified, and that threatens

our democracy. The divide between the haves and have-nots is the largest since the

41

Depression and it’s growing wider every year, putting our economy and our society

at greater risk.

We need to find concrete solutions to these very real challenges that employees

are facing. We need to restore their confidence that the American Dream still exists.

Citizens need to believe again that we can all find a good job with fair wages and

benefits that can support a family.

The Administration touts the productivity and job growth numbers to show how

well the Bush economy is doing. But the vast majority of the American people know

differently. The hard-working men and women of America deserve real solutions to

the economic challenges that they face every day.

I commend my colleague Senator Schumer for holding this hearing on this very

important challenge, and I look forward to the testimony and recommendations from

this distinguished panel.

Mr. Chairman, between March and December last year, The Washington Post

published an excellent series of ten editorials on the issue of inequality. I believe

they will be of interest to all of us concerned about this issue, and I ask that the

series be made part of the record for today’s hearing.

[The editorials referred to follow:]

[From the Washington Post Series on inequality, Sunday, March 12, 2006; B06]

A RISING TIDE?

THIS NATION prefers not to discuss inequality. Lacking a unifying religion, ethnicity or even language, it is held together by an appealing faith: that anyone who

works hard and plays by the rules can attain the American dream, sharing the

fruits of economic progress. But the trends of the past quarter-century compel a reexamination of this creed. When President Kennedy promised that ‘‘a rising tide

lifts all boats,’’ he was correct. Today that claim could be disputed.

A few numbers show why. In the 25 years from 1980 to 2004, a period during

which U.S. gross domestic product per person grew by almost two-thirds, the wages

of the typical worker actually fell slightly after accounting for inflation. So, too, did

wages for the 50 percent of the work force that earned less than the typical, or median, employee. The rising tide helped only workers at the top. Wages for workers

in the 90th percentile—that is, workers who earned more than 90 percent of their

peers—jumped by more than a quarter.

Other measures tell variants on this story. More women are working, so household income, as distinct from individual wages, has risen. The value of health benefits has increased, so counting these plus other non-wage income from investments

also paints a brighter picture. Between 1980 and 2003, total after-tax income for

the bottom fifth of households rose 8 percent, and the second-bottom fifth gained

17 percent; in other words, all boats did rise, albeit by less than 1 percent per year.

But it’s hard to celebrate such modest gains when the top fifth advanced 59 percent

over the 24-year period.

Depending on which statistics you choose, the tide is either not lifting most boats

or lifting many of them modestly. At times over the past quarter-century, commentators have hoped that this disappointing performance was temporary. Perhaps

it was caused by a one-time shock from the arrival of the personal computer, which

made junior clerical workers less valuable? Perhaps it reflected a one-time jump in

competition from foreign workers following the creation of the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement? Or maybe it reflected social

pathologies among the poor that could be changed by welfare reform? All these theories had their day; but after a quarter-century of disappointment, the struggles of

Americans in the bottom half of the income distribution cannot be viewed as temporary.

Many argue that, as long as most households are not retreating, inequality

shouldn’t be a worry. The rich are entitled to the fruits of their labor: These reflect

talent, hard work, risk-taking and innovation, and only an economy that rewards

such things can be dynamic. This is true up to a point. But when big rewards for

high achievers don’t produce an economy that helps ordinary folk, the case for big

rewards loses some of its appeal.

Moreover, Americans have tolerated divisions between rich and poor because they

believed that anyone could get ahead, given enough talent and determination. But

the truth is that rags-to-riches stories have never been the norm: One study of people reaching adulthood between 1968 and 1998 found that 42 percent of those born

into the poorest fifth ended up there also. As the distance between the top and bottom grows wider, it becomes harder to traverse the gulf. Family background has a

42

larger impact on people’s prospects. The talent of people born into poor families goes

wasted.

The idea that everyone should start life with decent opportunities helped to inspire the American Revolution and the civil rights movement; it is an idea that this

nation forsakes at its peril. But there are other reasons to worry about inequality.

Surveys find that if you ask people whether they’d prefer to earn $100,000 in a society in which the average pay is $80,000, or $110,000 in a society in which average

pay is $130,000, respondents pick the lower salary in order to feel rich in relative

terms.

This isn’t just irrational. Riches and poverty are partly relative concepts. The

more unequal a society, the more citizens in the bottom half will experience hardship. When people at the top gain more disposable income, they bid up the prices

of goods in limited supply—homes in top school districts, or places at top colleges.

Tuitions at 4-year colleges have more than doubled since 1980, with the result that

gaps in enrollment by class and race, which declined in the 1960s and 1970s, are

as wide now as 30 years ago. The wealth of people in the top half also bids up the

common understanding of what a middle-class lifestyle entails. People feel obliged

to spend more on birthday gifts, children’s sneakers or a suit for the next job interview. Since 1980, the median size of a newly built house has increased by a third—

even while the household savings rate has fallen to about zero.

So it’s not quite true that the rich can enjoy their riches without harming anyone;

their money changes life for people lower down. This might not matter if inequality

brought compensating gains: if the growth of relative disadvantage were offset by

absolute wage rises or by social mobility. But increases in wages have been small

or negative, and the United States has become less socially mobile than nations

such as Sweden and Germany.

This editorial marks the start of an occasional series about inequality. We do not

believe that reducing it should become the sole priority for economic policy, as the

next installment will explain, and we recognize that trends in the global economy

may make some rise in inequality inevitable. But the quest for a more equal society

should not be smothered by protests of ‘‘class warfare.’’ Yes, some popular remedies

for inequality would backfire, stifling growth or wasting money. But there are promising policies out there, too: policies that would reduce inequality without damaging

growth; in fact, policies that might boost it.

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Wednesday, March 22, 2006; A20]

JOINING THE INEQUALITY DEBATE

THE BUSH administration seems ready to debate inequality, the subject of the

occasional series that we began 10 days ago. In recent conversations with us and

with the Wall Street Journal, Treasury Secretary John W. Snow has described inequality as ‘‘the new sort of battle line in the political arena,’’ suggesting that this

may have something to do with desperation among the administration’s critics. The

way the secretary tells it, economic pessimists used to gripe that the economy was

not growing; then, when the economy accelerated, they grumbled that growth was

not producing jobs; now, with unemployment down at 4.8 percent, they protest that

jobs aren’t paying enough to ordinary folks. Mr. Snow, for his part, is an optimist.

‘‘We may now be at a tipping point for higher real wages going forward,’’ he told

us.

The secretary bases his optimism partly on short-term arguments. He correctly

points out that declines in unemployment are generally followed by increases in

wages; given that joblessness has declined from 6.3 percent to 4.8 percent during

the current recovery, wages may indeed rise over the next year or so. But the question is whether these gains will dent the long-term pattern of stagnation. For the

bottom half of the workforce, wages have actually fallen since 1980 after accounting

for inflation. Although it’s true that households have done better, this is not exactly

comforting. The gain in income for the typical household, about a fifth since 1980,

has been smaller than the increase in the household workload. Since 1980, the number of hours worked by the average husband-and-wife team has increased by a quarter, as more women have entered the labor force.

In his conversation with The Post, Mr. Snow drew attention to an apparent fall

in inequality between 2000 and 2003. In 2000, according to data compiled by the

Congressional Budget Office, the top fifth of households pocketed 51.3 percent of all

post-tax income; in 2003 they pocketed 48.8 percent, allowing the rest of the country

to increase its share of the pie. But this isn’t the basis for optimism that Mr. Snow

supposes. The top fifth lost ground for 2 years after 2000 because they stopped cashVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:31 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 034752 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\34752.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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ing in on the stock market bubble. But between 2002 and 2003 their share of national income rose again, a fact obscured by Mr. Snow’s choice of statistics; the numbers for 2004 and 2005 have not yet been crunched. Besides, Mr. Snow’s focus on

3 years’ worth of data should not distract him from the bigger picture. Between

1980 and 2003, the top fifth of households increased their share of national income

by 6 percentage points.

At other times in the conversation, Mr. Snow accepted that inequality has grown

over the long term but sought to explain it as the natural product of market forces.

It’s true that the ‘‘star system’’ has grown more pronounced in many professions,

from sports to medicine to academia: Globalization has allowed top performers to

attract a global following, driving remuneration up. But if this is a big reason for

inequality, as indeed seems likely, one should expect the gap between the stars and

the majority to grow even more in the future—globalization is not about to go away.

Far from providing a reason to embrace inequality as ‘‘natural’’ and therefore, presumably, acceptable, Mr. Snow’s argument underlines why inequality is a rising social challenge that policymakers must reckon with.

Mr. Snow indicated an open-mindedness on these issues, which is a good thing.

‘‘I want to get deeper into the data because it’s a very important question,’’ he said

of wage disparities. We look forward to the debate.

This is the second editorial in an occasional series on inequality.

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Sunday, April 2, 2006; B06]

THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH

It may not lift all boats as it used to, but it’s still essential.

FOR PERHAPS half a century, the central preoccupation of economic policy has

been to promote growth. Until 1980, the reasons for this were evident: Expanding

national output boosted everybody’s living standards, and advancing living standards were presumed to underwrite that most American of occupations, the pursuit

of happiness. Yet the cult of gross domestic product is now open to question. Because of rising inequality, growth is a less reliable provider of higher living standards to most Americans, as earlier articles in this series have noted. And a new area

of research, blending psychology and economics, challenges the assumed connection

between income and happiness.

Despite headlong growth in rich countries since 1950, there has been no rise in

the share of people who describe themselves as ‘‘happy’’ in opinion surveys. So what,

you might say; how can people accurately report on such a fickle and subjective

mood?

Well, self-reported happiness can be cross-checked by asking friends and colleagues how happy someone is, and neuroscientists have figured out how to measure

the experience of good feelings in the left front of the brain. People who say they

are happy do turn out to be objectively happy. The stature of this new science was

recognized 4 years ago when one of its founders, psychologist Daniel Kahneman, received a Nobel Prize in economics.

The evidence from this new science is unsettling for advocates of growth. It shows

that as nations escape poverty they benefit greatly; progressing from African-style

penury to the condition of South Korea or Portugal entails huge jumps in happiness.

But once nations pass the $10,000-per-person mark, roughly a third of today’s level

in this country, the happiness payoff ceases. Individual Americans can still grow

happier by becoming richer, because it feels good to do better than the neighbors,

but society as a whole can’t raise its income relative to itself. As a national objective, therefore, GDP growth no longer makes such obvious sense.

An impressive range of thinkers, from Benjamin M. Friedman, a former chairman

of Harvard University’s economics department, to British economist Richard Layard,

has accepted this critique of growth. We would not go as far as they do: Even if

a higher national income does not measurably raise human happiness, it will expand opportunities to travel, learn, yak with grandma on her cellphone—surely this

is worth something? Moreover, there remain two other reasons to care about growth.

The first comes from Mr. Friedman: It’s that as Americans get richer relative to

their past, forward momentum makes them optimistic and tolerant: They expect life

to get better, so they act more generously toward racial minorities, immigrants and

the poor. In a recent book on this subject, Mr. Friedman has argued that steady

economic growth promotes enlightened social policies. In the late 19th century, stagnation in the American South created the conditions for the reimposition of segregation. In the 1960s, galloping growth created the conditions for civil rights legislation

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and the Great Society programs. Perhaps if France were growing more robustly, it

would not have experienced the riots and demonstrations of the past few months.

The other argument for growth is a particularly American one: To exercise global

leadership, the United States needs financial clout. In a narrowly economic sense,

it’s great if foreigners catch up to U.S. living standards; this means richer markets

for American products, so everybody gains. But in a political sense, a loss of economic preeminence would be crippling—both for American statecraft and for the enlightened causes that it defends. The world relies on the United States to secure

the world’s sea lanes, lead the push for trade liberalization, fight international diseases, contain terrorism and stabilize failed states. The rise of China, with its vast

population and illiberal values, underscores the importance of U.S. vitality.

In sum, the case for economic growth remains convincing, but policymakers need

to balance its pursuit with a concern for equity. Mr. Friedman’s argument—that

growth can cause a society to feel more optimistic—depends on the sharing of its

benefits. Equally, our sense that higher incomes expand the range of human experience, even if they don’t expand the sum of happiness, carries weight only if the

boost to incomes is broadly shared. The policy challenge, therefore, is to promote

growth while also promoting equity. That is where this series will go next.

This is the third editorial in an occasional series on inequality.

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Sunday, April 23, 2006; B06]

DO NO HARM

Some remedies for inequality would be worse than the disease.

INEQUALITY IN the United States has been growing for a generation. The top

fifth of households enjoyed post-tax incomes worth 6.7 times those of the bottom

fifth a quarter of a century ago; that multiple has since jumped to 9.8, a 46 percent

increase. But this distressing trend hasn’t forced the right policy response, in part

because advocates of equity are often their own enemies. Some of their proposed

remedies would be ineffective, wasteful or harmful to the economy.

One unproductive critique of inequality targets corporations for cutting wages and

benefits. Companies must respect market forces: If they pay workers more than is

necessary to keep them, they will lose out to competitors, as thousands of jobless

car workers can testify. You can debate whether government should force all companies to increase pay or benefits—by raising the minimum wage or by requiring employers to offer health insurance, as Massachusetts has just done. You can talk

about fairer government enforcement of the collective bargaining rights of workers

or opportunities for shareholders to control executive salaries. But to blame corporations for ripping up the social contract is to misunderstand their function. Firms

began offering workers health coverage because government controls capped what

they could offer in wages; now that wage controls are history, the health plans that

companies provide reflect tax rules. So politics and government create the social

contract; it is not managers’ place to do so.

The next sort of blunt critique calls for policies that sound good but don’t work.

Cracking down on immigration, for example, is no solution. Tough enforcement is

expensive, harsh and doomed to be at best partially effective; moreover, the best

economic studies predict that it would lift the pay of unskilled natives imperceptibly

if at all. Equally, economists find no evidence that tax-privileged empowerment

zones in depressed areas boost local wages, though this didn’t stop President Bush

from proposing a ‘‘GO Zone’’ (Gulf Opportunity Zone) as part of his response to Hurricane Katrina. The same applies to tax credits for employers who hire people on

welfare or food stamps; in at least two-thirds of cases, firms that hire such workers

don’t even know they are eligible for the tax break, according to studies by Sarah

Hamersma of the University of Florida. Training programs for jobless youths also

have a disappointing record: They boost future earnings of participants marginally

and may do so at the expense of youths who don’t attend the sessions. Because they

achieve so little, all these interventions set back the fight against inequality by

making it seem wasteful or futile.

The most pervasive and misplaced reaction to inequality is protectionism. Trade

liberalization since 1945 has delivered a vast stimulus to growth, boosting U.S. incomes by $1 trillion a year, according to an extensive survey of the evidence by the

Institute for International Economics. It’s true that these gains are unevenly distributed, but the skewing is subtle. Unionized labor in the heavily traded manufacturing sector has been hit hard. But the poorest and least skilled Americans actually gain from trade, because they tend to work in low-end service jobs that do not

45

face foreign competition. As a result, trade does nothing to depress their pay, but

it does ensure that the goods they buy are cheaper.

Moreover, additional trade liberalization would help the poor, because the nation’s

remaining trade barriers are regressive. Cheap sneakers are subject to a tariff of

48 percent, whereas expensive leather shoes face a border tax of 10 percent. Polyester underwear attracts a tariff of 16 percent, while fancy silk underwear glides

into the country with a tariff of 1 percent. Edward Gresser of the Progressive Policy

Institute calculates that residual trade barriers cost a low-wage working mother 2

percent of her income, four times more than the impact on a high-income family.

So protectionism would have disastrous consequences for growth and would help

limited numbers of exposed workers rather than the majority of poor and middleincome families. But the pressure to close borders, bash corporations and experiment with ineffective social programs will continue until government addresses inequality in a serious way. The next installments in our series will suggest how to

do this.

This is the fourth editorial in an occasional series on inequality. Previous editorials in the series may be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/inequality

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Sunday, May 7, 2006; B06]

THE TOP TAKES OFF

That rhetoric about giveaways for multimillionaires? It’s accurate.

THE QUEST for ways to reduce inequality begins with taxation. Unlike spending

programs, redistribution through taxation is administratively simple; besides, putting money directly into people’s pockets allows them to spend it on whatever they

need most. But the tax tool has been wielded badly. Rather than using it to offset

rising inequality, politicians have contrived to do the opposite.

The Bush administration refuses to acknowledge this extraordinary fact. It argues

that the tax system has grown more progressive because the rich provide a larger

share of government revenue than in the past. But this isn’t because tax rates for

the rich are higher; it’s because the pretax earnings of the rich have taken off. While

the income of the families in the middle fifth of society has grown 12 percent since

1980, the income of the top tenth has grown 67 percent, and the income of the top

1 percent has more than doubled. In short, the rich have grown a whole lot richer:

That’s why they pay a larger share of total tax.

The administration also argues that the Federal income tax is already progressive

enough. Thanks to the earned-income tax credit and Mr. Bush’s refundable child

credit, almost a third of tax filers pay either zero income tax or less than zero—

meaning that they take money out of the system. But it’s nonetheless true that the

income tax is less progressive than it used to be. People still have to pay the regressive payroll tax. And changes to the estate tax must be factored in as well.

Our chart shows the combined effect of the Bush tax cuts. It leaves no doubt that

the tax system has become less progressive, even as the need for progressivity has

grown. Over the past quarter of a century, the tide of the American economy has

failed to lift the bottom half of society, damaging the faith on which capitalism depends. Seven out of ten say the Nation is headed in the wrong direction even though

economic growth is galloping, and many are hostile to trade, immigration and big

business. But rather than crafting a tax policy that responds to those sentiments,

the administration has done the opposite.

The chart makes a second point. The loss of tax progressivity has not occurred

in the middle of society; it’s not as though someone a quarter of the way down the

income scale is doing better at the expense of someone three-quarters of the way

down. Rather, it’s the top tenth who have benefited, and the top within the top has

done fabulously well. According to Thomas Piketty of the E ́ cole Normale Supe ́rieure

in Paris and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California at Berkeley, the top

0.01 percent of households has seen its tax bite fall by 6 percentage points since

2000 and by an astonishing 25 percentage points since 1980.

It’s clear that some of these changes should be rolled back. Yes, raising taxes on

the rich can mean more evasion and duller incentives. Some footloose financiers

might leave the country. Some managers might spare themselves the heartache of

restructuring companies if their performance-linked bonuses were subject to high

taxes; they might prefer to coast along comfortably—as many do in Europe or Japan

and as many did in the United States of 30 years ago. But the risks of raising taxes

have to be weighed against the risks of not raising them. Inequality is not only bad

in itself; it also will intensify pressure for bad policies that threaten growth more

acutely than higher taxes would.

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Economics cannot predict how high taxes can be raised before they reach counterproductive levels. But it would almost certainly be safe to increase taxes on the top

1 percent by 5 percentage points, restoring the level of the mid-1990s—hardly a period of lethargic chief executives. This tax hike would raise $85 billion annually or

perhaps a bit less if it spurred some extra tax evasion; sharing that revenue among

the bottom three-fifths of households would give each family $970 a year. That

would be a big help to families at the bottom, but it would deliver a boost of less

than 3 percent to the median household.

To remedy stagnant middle-class living standards, more radical tax hikes would

be necessary. But given that taxes will have to increase anyway because the budget

deficit is running at around $300 billion, raising more than $85 billion for the purpose of redistribution is possible only if it’s part of a wide-ranging tax reform.

Which brings us to the possibility of closing loopholes in today’s tax system. Closing loopholes that allow people to shelter income does not dull incentives, because

it does not raise tax rates on the additional income people earn by putting in an

extra effort. Meanwhile, closing loopholes does reduce the time Americans devote to

gaming the tax code, freeing their energy for more productive things. Since the rich

make greatest use of loopholes, closing them is good for equality and good for efficiency. The next editorial in this series will explore some of these win-wins.

This is the fifth editorial in an occasional series on inequality. Previous editorials

in the series may be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/inequality.

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Sunday, June 4, 2006; B06]

A PLAN FOR MR. PAULSON

An economic agenda that might bring both parties together.

IN ACCEPTING President Bush’s invitation to serve as Treasury secretary,

Henry M. Paulson Jr. is said to have extracted a promise that he will be more than

just a salesman for policies devised in the White House. So the big question is: How

will Mr. Paulson use his clout? He is not going to reverse the administration’s tax

cuts; unfortunately, neither he nor Mr. Bush has any appetite for that. He is unlikely to tackle entitlements; unfortunately, congressional Democrats showed in last

year’s Social Security fight that they will frustrate any such effort. But if Mr.

Paulson really has authority to push sound policy regardless of any misgivings of

political operatives in the White House, he should focus on tax reform. Done right,

this could be good for economic growth and for social equity. Indeed, it could correct

the central failings in the administration’s economic record: its indifference to longterm budget deficits and to the accumulating evidence that a rising tide no longer

lifts all boats.

The goal of tax reform is to rationalize the deductions that clutter the tax code.

There are tax incentives to encourage saving for retirement and education; to promote home ownership; to buy medical and life insurance; to own municipal and local

bonds; to give to charities. Not all these tax breaks achieve what they are supposed

to: Britain and Australia have no subsidies for home ownership in their tax codes,

yet Britain has the same rate of home ownership as the United States and Australia

has a higher one. But besides being sometimes ineffective, tax incentives are often

scandalously regressive. According to the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, in 2004 more than 55 percent of mortgage-interest subsidies went to taxpayers with an income of $100,000 or more, even though that group represents only

12 percent of tax filers.

Tax incentives to buy health insurance are also egregious. In 2004 the 12 percent

of households in that $100,000-plus group pocketed 27 percent of the tax breaks for

health spending. These subsidies cause people who would buy health insurance anyway to choose overly inclusive Cadillac plans, which in turn fosters indifference to

medical prices; the resulting boost to health inflation puts insurance beyond the

reach of some lower-income workers. According to Treasury estimates, the ranks of

the uninsured could be reduced by 1 million to 2 million if Cadillac plans lost their

privileged status. Capping tax deductions for health insurance at around $11,000,

a level sufficient to purchase an ordinary family plan, would simultaneously prevent

affluent workers from shortchanging the Treasury by overspending on doctors.

Tax incentives to promote retirement savings cry out for reform also. In 2004, 49

percent of subsidies for IRAs, 401(k)s and other defined-contribution pensions flowed

to the richest one-tenth of households, according to analysis done by the nonpartisan

Tax Policy Center; the bottom two-fifths got only 3 percent of the subsidy. This upside-down system, in which savings incentives are directed at the people who least

need them, is economically inefficient as well as socially unfair: Affluent households

47

capture the subsidies by putting money they would have saved anyway into tax-favored accounts, so national savings are unchanged. Meanwhile households that are

not saving don’t get an adequate incentive to do so: A chance to boost national savings is squandered.

Badly designed tax breaks are not a marginal problem. Taken together, incentives in the tax code reduced Federal revenue by a stunning $730 billion in 2004, according to the Government Accountability Office. That’s the equivalent of nearly onethird of Federal spending; it’s more than three times the cost in 2005 of all the Bush

tax cuts and seven times the annual cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Eliminating just a quarter of these subsidies would generate twice as much money

for redistribution as an increase of 5 percentage points in tax rates for the richest

1 percent, a measure we proposed in a previous editorial in this series.

Of course, some tax breaks either cannot or should not be eliminated, but they

should at least be reformed. Many take the form of deductions: Taxpayers subtract

privileged types of spending from their income before calculating what tax they owe.

The value of these deductions depends on your tax bracket: The richer you are, the

higher your bracket and the more valuable the tax subsidy. Converting these deductions into refundable credits that are worth the same to all taxpayers would reduce

inequality sharply. Thus a poor family that pays no income taxes currently gets no

tax subsidy if it puts, say, $2,000 into a retirement plan, whereas a rich family in

the 35 percent tax bracket gets a Federal subsidy of $700. Under a recent proposal that replaces deductions with credits, both families would get $600.

This sort of reform ought to attract support from both parties. Republicans should

favor curbing wasteful subsidies because the alternative is higher tax rates. Democrats should seize the chance to refashion a regressive class of government programs

and thus counter the forces of technology and globalization that are deepening inequality. Judging by the administration’s rhetoric, which includes a number of creative claims about the progressive impact of the tax cuts, it should embrace both

arguments for reform. Opposition will come from special interests that benefit from

tax loopholes—real-estate developers, mortgage lenders, health insurers and so on.

Those special interests have a powerful voice in politics, which is why the Bush

administration has yet to act on last year’s sensible proposals from its own tax-reform commission. But now, at least according to the spin from the administration,

there is a brand-new Treasury secretary with the power to push serious policy ideas.

We look forward to discovering whether that spin has substance.

This is the sixth editorial in an occasional series on inequality. Previous editorials

in the series may be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/inequality.

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Wednesday, October 11, 2006; A18]

GLOBALIZATION AND SCHOOLS

It’s time to recall Martin Luther King’s challenge.

BACK IN 1979, the average worker with a college degree earned 75 percent more

than the average high school graduate. Because of technology and globalization, the

gap has leapt to 130 percent. This rising ‘‘college premium’’ does much to explain

the growth of inequality over the past generation, so any serious response to inequality must make access to college broader and fairer. It should be broader because a higher rate of college attendance would share the fruits of globalization

more widely. It should be fairer because, if the prizes for attending college are growing, it’s essential that everyone begin life with a decent shot at winning them.

Because education boosts economic growth, and because it threatens no powerful

lobby, virtually everyone claims to support it. The question is how it should be improved. Some commentators, pointing to the fact that schools in low-income districts

already spend more per pupil than schools in affluent ones do, argue that failures

at poor schools reflect complacent management rather than a lack of resources. Signaling at least partial acceptance of that theory, the Bush administration has tried

to improve schools by holding them accountable and subjecting them to competition.

Choice and accountability are attractive in principle, but studies of voucher programs in New York City, Milwaukee and Cleveland have found negligible gains

from them. Costlier interventions must also be part of the solution.

The first opportunity for extra investment in education comes when children are

young. That’s when they are most malleable and when poor children start to fall

behind: Even at age 3, researchers find class-based differences in linguistic and

emotional maturity. The Federal Head Start program, bolstered by a variety of state

preschool programs, has succeeded in reaching many poor 3- and 4-year-olds. In

2001, 49 percent of 4-year-olds whose mothers were high school dropouts attended

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some type of preschool program, up from 36 percent a decade earlier. But that participation was still way below the 70 percent rate for children of college graduates.

And the quality of many preschool programs is poor.

Head Start requires that only half of its teachers have 2-year college degrees. In

contrast, a 1960s experiment in Michigan known as the Perry Preschool program

provided a fully qualified teacher for every six or seven students, and teachers visited each child at home weekly. The program raised IQ test scores by eight to 10

times the increase achieved by Head Start. It also reduced the likelihood that a student would require special education (by 43 percent), drop out of high school (by 25

percent) or be arrested (by 50 percent). A range of other studies, including recent

ones in Michigan and Chicago, confirms that high-quality programs have lasting effects on poor children. Upgrading the 900,000 children in Head Start programs to

something like the Perry program might require around $2 billion a year, according

to W. Steven Barnett of Rutgers University. But quality preschools reduce spending

on special education, jails and welfare, saving money for society in the long term.

Early intervention would help schools from kindergarten through 12th grade do

their job properly, since teachers would face fewer students who can’t keep up. But

it also makes sense to invest in K–12 education directly. Although it’s true that lowincome districts already spend more per pupil than do rich ones, this slight advantage is swamped by the challenge of teaching poor children, who on average have

more discipline problems and require more remedial attention—and will continue to

do so even if preschool is improved. Because of the challenge of teaching poor children, the higher cost of special education and other factors, schools in low-income

neighborhoods have less-experienced teachers and worse facilities than do schools

in affluent ones, according to research by Cecilia Rouse of Princeton and Lisa Barrow of the Federal Reserve. These schools might spend more money per pupil, but

they lack more money per pupil, too.

Which K–12 investments would be effective? Smaller classes are a leading candidate: A Tennessee experiment that divided pupils into classes of differing size in

kindergarten and then returned them to regular-size classes in third grade found

benefits from smaller classes that persisted to high school. Improving the quality

of teachers is also likely to boost performance, though teacher quality is not necessarily linked to teacher certification. Publicly funded summer school could make

a difference. The performance gap between privileged and poor children appears to

be linked to the way they spend their summers, with the privileged attending enrichment programs while the poor are underoccupied.

Nearly 30 years ago, Martin Luther King Jr. declared that the challenge for

schools is ‘‘to teach so well that family background is no longer an issue.’’ By increasing the rewards for education, globalization has added urgency to King’s argument, but globalization paradoxically creates a temptation to ignore him, too. By

driving down the cost of tradable goods such as cars and DVD players, it leaves

untradable ones such as education looking expensive. There’s a tendency for policymakers to say that education spending is growing a bit faster than inflation—isn’t

that generous enough? But inflation is low partly because globalization brings us

goods from cheap foreign suppliers. The economic challenge posed by those cheap

foreign suppliers is precisely the reason we should invest more in our children.

[From the Washington Post series on inequality, Wednesday, December 13, 2006; A20]

INEQUALITY AND HEALTH CARE

Two fixes for middle-class insecurity

THE RISE of inequality over the past generation calls for a rethinking of tax and

education policies, as earlier editorials in this series have said. But it also calls for

reform of the health system. Because of a historical accident—wage controls during

World War II drove employers to compensate workers with perks such as medical

insurance—the health system is tied to corporations. This exacerbates inequality.

In most countries, rising medical costs are shouldered by taxpayers. Because tax

systems are progressive, this means that the extra cost is borne by those who can

afford it. But in the United States, where health spending per person has doubled

since 1975 (after adjusting for inflation), the non-poor and non-elderly are expected

to pay their own way. This is most clearly the case for Americans who lack a company health plan and must pay directly out of pocket. It’s increasingly the case for

Americans who have corporate coverage that comes with high deductibles and copayments. But even workers who have generous, all-you-can-eat health plans end

up paying indirectly, since their wages are held down to offset the cost of the plans.

49

This individualistic system goes a long way toward explaining the ‘‘middle-class

squeeze’’ so frequently invoked on the campaign trail. Workers’ total compensation

may be rising, but health benefits gobble up an increasing share of that, so wages

lag. Equally, out-of-pocket medical expenses are believed to cause at least 425,000

bankruptcies annually, and one in six working-age adults carries medical debt.

The U.S. health system distributes risk as unforgivingly as cost. Because health

care comes courtesy of the human-resource policies of big companies, anyone who

gets pushed out of a big company may lose coverage. According to Yale’s Jacob

Hacker, 82 million people, or one in three non-elderly Americans, went without

health insurance at some point during the 2 years beginning in 2003. As more companies drop coverage, the prospect of losing health care will be a growing source of

anxiety for all but the most financially secure Americans. This will reduce people’s

willingness to change jobs or set up their own ventures. The flexibility of the workforce, one of this nation’s traditional economic trump cards, may be compromised.

HOW TO DEAL with the twin problems of insecurity and squeezed pay? The answer starts with a fix for the insurance market that serves individuals and small

firms. As health insurance has grown more expensive, young and healthy individuals, or small firms that employ mainly young and healthy individuals, have chosen

to go without coverage. As low-cost patients leave the insurance pool, health plans

are left with older, sicker people, which forces them to raise premiums further—

which in turn drives more young and healthy workers to exit. Because of this vicious cycle, health insurance for individuals and small firms has become prohibitively expensive. Even among workers earning the median wage or higher, an astonishing 19 percent of 35- to 44-year-olds lack insurance, a near doubling of the percentage in 1979.

The best-known solution to this problem is the Massachusetts health reform, enacted earlier this year. This approach prevents healthy individuals from dropping

out of the insurance pool by mandating that everyone buy coverage; it promotes affordability by subsidizing individuals who are at or below 300 percent of the poverty

line; it ensures that coverage is available by allowing people to buy into the plans

that are currently offered to Medicaid patients. There are other ways to achieve the

same objectives. Rather than mandating individual coverage, taxpayers could cover

part of the cost of insuring sick individuals, thereby driving premiums down and

enticing healthier people to buy insurance. Rather than allowing individuals to buy

into Medicaid, states could invite them to buy into the health plans that are offered

to state employees. Whatever the precise formula, some fix for the insurance market

should be adopted by all states. Or it could be done nationally by allowing people

to buy into Medicare or into the health system for Federal employees.

This reform would make insurance available for everyone. It should be affordable:

The current system, in which 47 million go without insurance, is wasteful as well

as shameful because it obstructs the use of cheap preventive medicine and funnels

people into expensive emergency rooms.

But promoting universal insurance may be easier than reining in the costs that

cause the middle-class pay squeeze. However strange it is that health care should

have grown out of corporate compensation policies, switching to an entirely tax-financed system (euphemistically known as ‘‘single-payer’’) may be politically infeasible at this point. The challenge is to graft cost-cutting reforms onto the public-private jumble that is the U.S. system.

The Bush administration’s approach is to turn patients into cost-conscious consumers by steering them into high-deductible plans. The idea is that when people

pay out of pocket for health care, they will refuse to overpay for it; witness the dramatic fall in the price of procedures that insurance does not cover, such as Lasik

eye surgery. But this approach has a cost—it shifts more risks directly onto individuals—and the benefit is smaller than advertised. Consumers can’t be expected to

start researching which doctors offer good value for the money when they face a

medical emergency, and emergencies account for a large chunk of health spending.

Besides, major medical events are likely to cost more than the deductibles of even

high-deductible policies, so patients would still have little incentive to shop carefully

for surgery and other big-ticket procedures.

SO A SHIFT to out-of-pocket spending can only discipline medical costs up to a

point. A better approach is for insurers to take the lead on price discipline. Back

in the 1990s, this meant health maintenance organizations crudely denying care

and turning themselves into pariahs. But the cost containment of the future could

be smarter and more palatable if government encouraged doctors to maintain electronic records.

Consider one cost in the system: the overuse of diagnostic tests. At present, doctors order these tests because they perceive (maybe wrongly) little medical downside

to doing so; insurers resist them because they are expensive. But if detailed patient

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records allowed researchers to measure the benefits of doing tests on certain types

of patients, this dispute could be resolved intelligently. Data on millions of cases,

stripped of personal information to protect privacy, could show whether patients

with herniated discs gain anything from MRIs, or whether whole-body CAT scans

achieve anything. Equally, the data could show which sorts of patients benefit from

a brand-new anti-inflammation drug and which will do fine on cheap ibuprofen. In

this way the medical system could switch from the indiscriminate use of expensive

new technology to a more targeted approach based on evidence.

The health system is a huge problem in its own right, irrespective of inequality.

The United States spends almost twice as large a share of its economy on health

care as do other rich countries, yet it still has lower life expectancy; it still has 47

million uninsured; and future health costs threaten crippling budget deficits. But

the rise of inequality provides an extra reason to tackle the health challenge. Struggles with medical bills and fears of losing coverage are at the root of middle-class

anxiety, and that anxiety creates pressure for misguided populist policies that would

spread the dysfunction of the health system to the broader economy. So long as a

third of the workforce lives in fear of losing access to doctors, nobody should expect

the Nation to believe that a rising tide is lifting all boats.

This is the eighth editorial in an occasional series on inequality. Previous editorials in the series can be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/inequality.

[From the Washington Post Series on inequality, Friday, December 22, 2006; A32]

JUST CAPITALISM

Not all attacks on business are crazy. Here is the sane version.

THIS SERIES has described ways to address inequality: Increase tax progressivity; invest more in education; reform health care. But there’s pressure to reach

beyond that: to tackle inequality where it apparently originates, meaning the workplace. This pressure can be dangerous. Companies are not instruments of social policy; their first duty is to make money by serving customers, and they can provide

for their workers only so long as they do that. Nevertheless, two sorts of corporate

reform are warranted. It should be easier for labor unions to organize. And it should

be harder for top executives to pay themselves outlandish sums.

Union membership has fallen from 20 percent of the workforce in 1980 to 13 percent in 2005, and part of this decline is inevitable. It reflects attrition in the manufacturing industries that are most easily organized. It reflects the rise of sophisticated human resource departments that provide workers with training, savings

plans and grievance procedures—usurping some of unions’ traditional functions.

And it reflects the deregulation of domestic industries such as trucking and airlines,

plus tougher foreign competition. These forces spur businesses to innovate, but they

also constrain their ability to make wage concessions to unions. In competitive markets, companies will pay workers what it takes to prevent them from being lured

away by rivals—and not more.

Yet the decline of organized labor also reflects a legal climate that is neither inevitable nor desirable. The way labor law is enforced now, employers can block attempts to establish unions by intimidating workers; a supervisor can summon an

employee to daily meetings to discuss the dangers of unions or ban discussion of a

union during work hours. If these tactics are not enough, employers can fire union

organizers; although this is supposed to be illegal, the penalties are too feeble to

serve as a deterrent. Meanwhile, a series of decisions from the National Labor Relations Board has narrowed the definition of workers who are eligible for union membership. Two months ago, for example, the three board members appointed by President Bush outvoted the two appointed by President Bill Clinton in ruling that relatively junior workers can be defined as ‘‘supervisors,’’ thus restricting their right

to join a union.

A fairer legal climate might reduce inequality slightly. According to David Card

of the University of California at Berkeley, de-unionization explains about 15 percent of the increase in wage inequality among men over the past quarter-century.

But the larger gain from reforming labor law would be political. Freedom of association is a core democratic right, and polls suggest that between 30 and 50 percent

of nonunion workers would choose union representation if they had a chance to vote

for it. The suppression of freedom of association is wrong in itself, and it fosters the

suspicion that the rules of the economy are rigged against workers. Setting aside

the debate over how much union membership can improve wages or benefits, the

option of union membership is crucial to the legitimacy of capitalism.

51

The same goes for rules on executive compensation. Since 1970, the pay of chief

executives has jumped from less than 30 times the average wage to almost 300

times that level. This helps explain why the richest 1 percent of Americans pocketed

21.6 percent of all the gains in national income between 1996 and 2001, according

to Ian Dew-Becker of the National Bureau of Economic Research and Robert J. Gordon of Northwestern University. As with the decline of labor unions, some of the

rise in executive compensation reflects market forces and is inevitable. Yet similar

market forces are at work in other advanced nations, where executive pay has

grown more modestly. In 2003, the ratio of U.S. chief executives’ pay to that of manufacturing workers was more than double the norm in 13 other rich countries.

This reflects the way that bosses’ pay is often set in the United States. Chief executives negotiate with a committee of board members whose independence is sometimes suspect, whose personal interests (particularly if they are CEOs of their own

companies) may be served by rising executive-pay scales and who see little upside

in risking a fight with the chief executive. In the absence of real discipline from

compensation committees, CEOs can get away with pointing to the typical pay rate

in their industry and asserting that they deserve a little more. The result is an inflationary spiral in executive compensation, unhinged from CEOs’ real contribution

to firms’ performance.

What proportion of bosses’ pay should be regarded as excessive? In a paper published last year, Harvard’s Lucian Bebchuk and Cornell University’s Yaniv

Grinstein take a careful look at this question. They begin by noting that executive

pay was already raising eyebrows back in 1993 and that it has nonetheless grown

mightily since then. Then they observe that sales and profits of top companies have

risen, which would tend to cause the bosses’ pay to rise in tandem; and that an increasing share of the top companies are new-economy outfits, which tend to pay

more. By analyzing the statistical relationship between executive pay and firms’

size, profits and product mix, Mr. Bebchuk and Mr. Grinstein calculated how much

compensation could have been expected to rise between 1993 and 2003. Their result:

In 2003 the top five executives at the average public company could have been expected to earn a collective $6 million—but they actually received almost twice that. Overall, that means that the 1,500 companies studied ‘‘overpaid’’ a total of $8.7

billion in 2003—and this number is an understatement because it leaves out executive pensions, which are thought to have grown especially dramatically. If corporate

governance reforms reestablished discipline over executive compensation, that excessive pay might shrink a bit. Inequality would decline, though only slightly—the

money would flow to shareholders, and more than three-quarters of all stocks are

owned by the richest 10 percent of the population. But, as with labor law reform,

the chief gain from corporate governance reform would be political. Executive overpayment running into the billions sends a terrible signal about the justice of the

capitalist system.

Most critics of business are misguided. It is wrong to denounce managers who relocate factories to other countries or who fight to control wages; they are responding

to market signals, as indeed they should. But when managers distort market forces

by rigging the legal environment, that is a different matter. An entire industry of

consultants exists to advise companies on how to avoid recognizing a union; a second industry of consultants exists to legitimize super-sized executive pay. Until this

changes, the growing material inequality in the Nation will be compounded by the

corrosive perception that the rules are unequal, too.

This is the ninth editorial in an occasional series on inequality. Previous editorials

in this series can be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/inequality.

[From the Washington Post Series on inequality, Sunday, December 24, 2006; B06]

SEIZE THE CHANCE

The politics of inequality have shifted. Now policy must follow.

THIS SERIES opened with the observation that Americans prefer not to discuss

inequality. Nine months later, the climate has changed. John W. Snow, who served

as Treasury secretary until July, broke ground for this administration by acknowledging that inequality was worth debating—though he never quite conceded it was

a problem. His successor, Henry M. Paulson Jr., forthrightly declared that ‘‘amid

this country’s strong economic expansion, many Americans simply aren’t feeling the

benefits.’’ Meanwhile, Ben S. Bernanke, installed by President Bush as Federal Reserve chairman, has called for the fruits of globalization to be distributed more

evenly. During his 2000 Presidential campaign, Mr. Bush quipped that his base consisted of the ‘‘haves and the have-mores.’’ We doubt he would make this joke now.

52

The question is whether the new climate will lead to a policy breakthrough. Some

of the Democrats who unseated incumbents in the midterm elections—notably

Sens.-elect James Webb in Virginia and Sherrod Brown in Ohio—campaigned on the

issue of inequality and feel that they have a mandate for action. But the action they

emphasize is trade protectionism, which would harm growth without necessarily reducing inequality. Higher tariffs might help workers in struggling manufacturing

companies, but they would push up prices for workers in the service sector, which

includes janitors, fast-food workers and other low-income employees.

The field is therefore open for leaders in both parties to come up with better ideas.

This series has suggested several options and explained their policy merits. But we

also believe that our proposals are politically marketable.

Take our suggested tax increase: A 5-percentage-point increase in the rate paid

by the top 1 percent of households. Members of Congress appear to believe that calling for a tax increase—any tax increase—is political suicide. But can it really be

true that voters are wedded to all of the tax cuts enacted this decade, even though

the richest 1 percent stand to pocket more than a third of the windfall? By definition, the tax increase we suggest would not affect 99 percent of households, and it

would not damage growth either. It would merely restore the top rate that existed

in the 1990s—a period when the U.S. economy performed excellently.

The same goes for tax reform, another policy endorsed in this series. Members of

Congress may think they’ll be skinned alive for messing with mortgage-interest deductions or tax shelters for savings. But what if they explained that half the benefits of these schemes flow to the richest tenth of households? What if they promised

that the majority of voters would keep their tax breaks, and only those with mortgages of $500,000 or more would suffer the indignity of reduced subsidies? If voters

understood that these tax deductions are unfair, inefficient and condemned by policy

experts of all stripes, they would applaud the politician who tamed them.

This series has also proposed a boost to education spending, including an increase

of $2 billion annually to upgrade the quality of the Head Start preschool program.

Of all the policies we offer, this is perhaps the easiest sell. Mr. Bush has demonstrated that it’s possible to generate a bipartisan coalition on education, and this

month a commission headed by former education and labor secretaries from both

parties endorsed the idea of starting school for most children at 3 years old. The

chief obstacle to action is the fear that education reform seldom yields real improvement. But experiments with high-quality preschool have shown dramatic reductions

in later dropout and arrest rates for students, proving that education investments

are effective and save money for society in the long run.

Then there is the dysfunctional health system, which national politicians often

shy away from in the belief that it is impossibly complex. But the pressure for reform is stronger now than it was when President Bill Clinton’s proposal crashed

spectacularly: The nation has suffered another decade of galloping health costs that

eat into take-home wages, damage the bottom lines of companies and leave a

shamefully large number uninsured. Besides, the idea that ambitious health-care

proposals will explode in the face of their sponsors is belied by recent experience.

Gov. Mitt Romney of Massachusetts signed a plan for universal health coverage and

is now running for president. A dozen other states are pushing health-reform experiments; California’s Governor, assembly speaker and Senate president are coming

out with rival ways to expand coverage. This month Sen. Ron Wyden, Democrat of

Oregon, unveiled a voluminous bill that promises to extend coverage to all Americans without costing taxpayers a cent more.

Inequality has increased in most rich countries over the past quarter-century. We

do not claim that eliminating it is possible, nor even desirable: Unequal rewards

help motivate people to work and innovate. But excessively unequal rewards can

backfire. They can allow a successful elite to insulate itself from the rest of society,

actually dulling competition and incentives, which is why economists find no evidence that more unequal societies grow faster—and some evidence of the opposite.

The level of inequality in the United States is bad for the social fabric without being

good for economic dynamism. There are win-win opportunities to reduce inequality

and at the same time boost efficiency. When the new Congress convenes in January,

it should seize them.

This is the 10th and final editorial in a series on inequality. Previous editorials

in this series can be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/inequality.

53

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. RUBIN, DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, CITIGROUP; FORMER U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I believe that you are holding this hearing at an historic juncture with respect to the longer-term outlook of the American economy, and

that your Committee is exceedingly well positioned to catalyze serious public discussion and to develop sound approaches with respect to the issues that face us.

The American economy has enormous strengths: the dynamism of our society, the

willingness to take risk, our flexible labor markets, and much else. On the other

hand we also face hugely consequential longer-term challenges, which I’ll touch on

briefly in a moment. Moreover, the global economy is undergoing change of historic

proportions, including technological developments, globalization, effective productivity policies like education and market-based economics in a number of emerging

market economies, and, as a consequence of all this, the emergence of China and

India as potentially large markets but more immediately as powerful competitors.

We can thrive in this transforming environment, but to do so it is imperative that

we meet our challenges, and failure to meet our challenges could lead to serious difficulty.

Currently, in my judgment, we are far from being where we need to be on almost

every front, independently of how you allocate the political responsibility. This contributes substantially both to the unsound fundamentals underlying our economy

despite good GDP growth, which could augur trouble for the future, and to the

struggle that many if not most Americans are having economically. As to this latter,

median real wages and median real compensation have been roughly stagnant for

the last 5 years, and grew relatively slowly for the last 30 years, except for the last

5 years of the 1990s, while income inequality, focusing on a very small top tier, has

increased substantially. Moreover, economic dislocation and economic insecurity

have increased substantially.

As we address all of these conditions, I believe strongly in markets as the most

effective organizing principal for economic activity; but government has a critical

role in providing the requisites for economic success that markets, by their very nature, will not provide. Moreover, the objectives of policy should be growth, but also

broad participation in that growth and improved economic security, both as a matter

of values and also because these objectives can be mutually reinforcing.

More specifically, sustained growth is the single most effective way of promoting

broad income growth and economic security—through the effect of sustained tight

labor markets. And, broad income growth and increased security are critical to

growth for two reasons. First, they provide workers with the resources to access

education, training, rapid redeployment into the economic stream when dislocated,

and other contributors to productivity, and, second, because sound economic policies

around trade and market based economics will only have broad public support if the

great preponderance of the people expect to benefit from these policies.

I think we can most effectively achieve the three objectives I set out—growth,

broad distribution of that growth, and greater economic security—by meeting the

challenges I mentioned earlier, which I think of as falling into four baskets: (1) our

multiple financial imbalances; (2) serious shortfalls in education, infrastructure,

basic research, energy policy, health care policy, inner-city programs and so much

else that are critical requisites for economic success; (3) the cost/benefit imbalances

in our regulatory and litigation regimes; and (4) international economic policy, including trade, relatively open immigration, and working toward flexible exchange

rates. These all occur alongside of economically significant exogenous risks, including terrorism, oil shock and others.

Addressing our challenges will require a dramatic change in our strategic orientation and commensurate change in our policies. In my limited time, I won’t try to

describe the relationship between each of our challenges and the three objectives I

set out, but just comment briefly on two of those challenges.

As to financial imbalances, current economic conditions rest on high levels of borrowing at multiple levels in our society. These include significant projected fiscal

deficits over the 10–year Federal budget window—assuming the 2001 and 2003 tax

cuts are made permanent as proposed—instead of the surpluses we should have had

in a time of healthy GDP growth; a net national savings rate of about 2 percent

of GDP; a projected increase in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid entitlements

as a percentage of GDP over the next 15 years of 50 percent; a current account deficit of almost 7 percent of GDP, caused partly by our fiscal deficits, and heavy

overweighting of dollar denominated holdings in many foreign portfolios. The combination of these factors is a deep and multi-faceted threat to job creation, to standards of living, and to our economy. The vast capital flows from abroad that have

54

sustained us are exceedingly unlikely to continue indefinitely, though the timing of

trouble—whether in the near term or years out—is unpredictable.

I believe that we should establish a fiscal path that systematically reduces the

debt to GDP ratio year-by-year and leads to balance, and at the same time makes

room for critical public investments. These critical public investments—and other

key domestic policy issues—also will require change that will be very difficult, substantively and politically, but that are imperative.

As to globalization and trade, let me start by saying again that many Americans

are experiencing real difficulty economically, and the pressures from globalization

on wages and economic security are one of the factors—including, far more significantly, technological change—contributing to this.

Thoughtful people on this committee and your colleagues in both chambers are

working to find effective policy responses to these difficulties, a search made more

complicated by the transformative change taking place in the global economy.

There is an understandable temptation to erect trade barriers. However, I believe

that would be deeply harmful: that path would lead to higher consumer prices, higher input costs for our producers vs. foreign competitors, loss of the benefits of comparative advantage, loss of pressure of open markets on business to increase productivity, and finally, likely retaliation of the countries to which we export and possible

disruptive effects on the dollar. Moreover, other countries are continuing to move

forward on trade liberalization; the only question is whether we will be in or out

of the net of preferential arrangements.

However, trade liberalization—which I believe on net still greatly benefits our

economy and the great preponderance of our people—must be combined with a powerful domestic agenda to promote productivity, broad-based income growth, and

greater security, along the lines I already discussed, and drawing on past experience

but also innovative and creative thought.

Mr. Chairman, we can have a bright future, but we have much substantively and

politically difficult work to do, and this committee can contribute greatly to achieving those purposes.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, CHARLES W. ELIOT

UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; FORMER U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I appreciate very much this opportunity to testify before the Joint Economic Committee at what I believe is a critical

juncture for U.S. economic policy. There are a variety of features of the current economic environment that are without precedent. These include:

• the magnitude of our current account deficit and looming fiscal problems;

• the degree of integration in the global economy;

• the spectacular rise of China, India and other emerging markets;

• the pervasive impact of technology; and

• the substantial increases in inequality and economic insecurity that have been

observed in recent years.

We are, to an important extent, in un-chartered territory in setting economic policy and so this Committee is to be commended for taking up these policy challenges

at this crucial juncture.

In this new economic environment, the United States faces three main policy challenges:

• returning its finances to a sustainable basis;

• making necessary investments for the continuation of rapid economic growth;

and

• assuring the benefits of growth are widely shared, and in particular, that we

continue to have the strong middle class that has long been the underpinning of our

democracy.

Let me say a few words about each of these challenges.

First, the nation’s finances are not now on a sustainable basis. While projections

vary, few observers believe that without significant policy changes the debt-to-GDP

ratio of the United States will increase quite rapidly in the next decade and beyond.

In part, this is a reflection of an aging society. In part, it is a reflection of the fiscal

policies of the last 5 years in which very large tax cuts have coincided with substantial increases in both defense and domestic spending.

This move toward fiscal un-sustainability has been one of the drivers of the deterioration in international economic position of the United States, as our current account deficit has now reached record levels and is approaching one trillion dollars.

The current account deficit reflects both the very substantial international borrowing by the United States government due to significant fiscal deficits as well as

55

a continuing decline in the private savings rate. Indeed, in recent years, the United

States has had a net national savings rate that is close to zero.

The consequences of these adverse and unsustainable developments have been

masked in recent years by the very substantial investments in U.S. short-term financial securities made by central banks around the world, and in particular by the

central banks of emerging Asian countries and the oil-exporting countries. This has

created a situation where the world’s greatest power is also the world’s greatest borrower. In the short run, the United States benefits from the availability of low-cost capital. However, this low-cost capital has as its counterpart the very substantial volume of exports to the United States in excess of our own imports and the resulting

significant trade imbalances. There is also the question of how long foreign investors

will be prepared to lend us funds on such generous terms to support deficits of this

magnitude.

Clearly, a policy priority in this regard has to be increasing the stability of the

nation’s financial position. The most important step the Congress can take is to

adopt a fiscal policy that puts the government’s finances on a sustainable footing.

There is no silver bullet here. Undoubtedly, it is important to address the excesses

of recent years, to take on entitlement issues, and, perhaps most critically, to return

to budget discipline with respect to any new initiatives on either the spending or

the tax side.

The second large economic policy challenge is assuring adequate growth in the

years ahead. From the end of the Second World War until the mid nineteen-seventies, Americans benefited from rapid productivity growth. Subsequently, a sharp

slowdown in productivity growth manifested itself and lasted until the mid nineteen-nineties. Since then, productivity growth has been quite rapid, though there

are signs that it may be slowing once again. Economists do not fully understand all

the determinants of these trends.

There can be no certainty as to how best to increase productivity growth going

forward in the United States. But equally, there is no question that public investments are essential. I would highlight three areas of public investment where I believe our national effort has been insufficient in recent years.

First, our investments in research and development, after increasing rapidly since

the nineteen-nineties, have lagged. In a time when the world stands on the brink

of revolutionary progress in the life sciences, it cannot be rational for the NIH budget to decline as it did this past year for the first time in nearly forty years. If one

looks at funding levels adjusted for inflation the decline in our national commitment

to basic research is even more remarkable.

As President of Harvard, I had the opportunity to observe the remarkable potential of research in the life sciences. I also had the opportunity to observe many extraordinarily talented scholars abandoning the life sciences as the average age of

funded investigators rose in the face of budget pressures. Similar trends can be observed in the physical sciences.

The second key element of public investment in productivity growth is education

funding. Ultimately, nothing is more important to our prosperity than the quality

of the American labor force. It is particularly important that investments be made

to ensure that all of our citizens have a chance to fully participate and share in our

prosperity. A growing body of evidence suggests that pre-school education has an

enormous rate of return, particularly for children from disadvantaged background,

and funding these kinds of programs should be a high priority.

There is also a major need for national investment to ensure the affordability of

higher education for all of our citizens. One of the most disturbing statistics I encountered in recent years is the observation that just 10 percent of students attending our leading universities come from the lower half of the American income distribution.

The third crucial area of investment is in infrastructure. Here, there are clearly

areas in which there has been excess national investment in response to political

pressures. But there are also key areas such as transportation and other infrastructure facilities where investment has been grossly inadequate.

The third, and in some ways most pressing, economic challenge is that of assuring

a strong middle class. This has three related but distinguishable elements: assuring

equality of opportunity; assuring long-term economic security for those who currently have good jobs; and assuring that prosperity and economic growth are shared

widely, rather than benefiting a small part of the population. How best to do this

is a question that will require all of our effort in the years ahead, but I think there

are three crucial areas that require attention.

First, assuring the fair collection of taxes. There are a number of areas in which

we can improve the effectiveness of the tax system while at the same time increasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:31 Aug 02, 2007 Jkt 034752 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\34752.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
56

1The unit of observation in tax data is the tax return, not the individual or the family.

2These are my calculations, based on data in Table 7 (p. 104) of Ian Dew-Becker and Robert

Gordon, ‘‘Where did the Productivity Growth Go?,’’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,

2005:2. 2001 is the last year for which comprehensive tax data were available at the time.

ing its fairness. These include making a serious assault on the tax gap resulting

from non-compliance with the Internal Revenue Code, which may represent as much

as fifty billion dollars per year. I would note the tax gap is greatest for those categories of income that go disproportionately to the upper ends of the income distribution. There are also important issues and abuses associated with transfer pricing and the sheltering of both individual and corporate income that require Congressional attention. I am convinced that substantial revenues can be obtained from

these sources.

If we are to assure adequate economic security for all of our citizens, we need to

recognize that in a world where jobs are going to be increasingly impermanent, economic security cannot come only from the employment relationship. This will require new approaches in the areas of health insurance and other benefits. I believe

it is also appropriate that consideration be given to thinking about methods of wage

insurance that would enable increasingly inevitable economic mobility to take place

without significant and painful dislocation.

A third type of response to economic insecurity involves taking comprehensive and

systematic policy approaches to the future of key industries and regions. I was

struck, Mr. Chairman, by the recent report you and other leaders from your state

released on the steps needed to keep New York at the center of the global financial

services industry. I could not help but wonder whether similar comprehensive efforts to devise a strategy and assure the leadership of American firms and other

regions would not be availing in many different sectors. Indeed, reliance on clusters

is, it seems to me, profoundly important for our economic future. Any individual

faces the possibility of competition from a lower earning and equally skilled individual, but it is much more difficult to compete with or replicate entire clusters of

economic activity. Indeed, the supremacy of New York City as the world’s financial

capital illustrates this point.

Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the crucial areas of policy that we face.

I look forward to answering your questions and engaging in a wide-ranging discussion. Thank you again for inviting me to be here this morning.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN S. BLINDER, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVER- SITY; FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to use my brief time

to focus on two broad-brush, long-term issues, one pertaining to income disparities

and one pertaining to globalization. They are, of course, related.

RISING INCOME INEQUALITY: FIRST, DO NO HARM

The first problem has been with us for so long that I fear we may be becoming

inured to it. The plain fact is that America does a very poor job of caring for its

poor, for its weak, and for its downtrodden—as was illustrated, for example, by the

woefully inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina.

Although specific statistical measures of poverty and inequality can be—and have

been—disputed, the basic outlines of the story are clear enough. Inequality in America was basically constant for the 35 years or so from the end of World War II until

the late 1970s, but has been mostly rising since. The one notable exception was the

boom years of the second Clinton administration, when labor markets were extraordinarily tight.

This phenomenon has not been mainly a story of vast capital gains accruing to

a tiny minority, nor of a massive income shift from labor to capital-although both

of these have played roles in certain time periods. Rather, the basic story is that

earnings from work have grown vastly more unequal over the last quarter-century.

There are many ways to measure that change, but here is one that I find both dramatic and easy to understand. According to IRS data, in 1979 the average taxpayer

in the top 1/10th of 1 percent of all wage and salary earners earned about as much

as 44 average taxpayers in the bottom half.1 By 2001, that number had risen to almost 160.2 And we know from other data sources that inequality has gotten worse

since.

What accounts for this alarming trend? Let me be clear: The main culprit has not

been the government but the marketplace. While there are a number of competing

57

3The main exception was the Clinton administration’s huge increase in the Earned Income

Tax Credit in 1993. 4See Alan S. Blinder, ‘‘Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?,’’ Foreign Affairs, March/

April 2006, pp. 113–128.

theoretical explanations, the fact is that, starting sometime in the late 1970s, the

market turned ferociously against the less skilled and the less well educated.

How should the government have reacted to such a development? One clearly

wrong approach would have been to try to stop the market forces that were generating rising inequality. Such an effort would have produced undesirable side effects

and would probably have failed anyway.

A more reasonable approach would have included using the tax-and-transfer system to cushion the blow, raising the minimum wage and the EITC, devoting more

resources to compensatory education, making health insurance universal, etc. These

are still useful ideas, and we should use them.

A Social Darwinist would have rejected palliatives like these in favor of letting

the market rule and the chips fall where they may. (By the way, it strikes me as

ironic that some of these Social Darwinists are not biological Darwinists.)

That may sound heartless. But, with a few notable exceptions, the U.S. Government has followed an even harsher policy course for most of the past quarter century.3 As market forces turned against the middle class and the poor, the Federal

Government piled on by enacting tax cuts for the rich while either permitting or

causing large holes to emerge in the social safety net. In football, that would be

called ‘‘unnecessary roughness’’—and penalized severely. It’s a policy direction that,

in my view, needs to be changed—and fast. The first step is to stop piling on.

OFFSHORING: THE SLEEPING GIANT

Let me now turn to an issue whose present importance has been greatly exaggerated, but whose future importance appears to be underappreciated: offshoring of

service jobs. While no comprehensive numbers are available, scattered studies make

it appear likely that fewer than a million U.S. service jobs have been lost to

offshoring to date. A million may sound like a lot, but in a nation with over 140

million jobs, it is not even 1 month’s normal turnover. No big deal, in other words.

However, I believe we have seen only the tip of a very big iceberg. Here’s why.

Only a minority of American workers—mainly manufacturing workers—have historically faced job competition from abroad. They haven’t welcomed it, of course. But

they have long understood that foreign competition is one of the hazards of industrial life, like bankruptcies and business cycles.

But most American workers, including the vast majority of service workers, have

never had to worry about foreign competition. Until recently, neither low-skilled

work like call centers nor high-skilled work like computer programming could easily

be moved offshore. Now both can be. My point is that the share of American jobs

that is potentially vulnerable to offshoring is certain to rise over time as the technology improves and as countries like India and China modernize and prosper. As

this occurs, tens of millions of additional American workers will start to experience

an element of job insecurity—and downward pressure on real wages—that has heretofore been reserved for manufacturing workers. It is predictable that they will not

like it.

Many people have concluded that offshoring will be a particularly acute problem

for less-skilled and less-well-educated workers—precisely the people who have been

left behind for the last 25 years. I’m not so sure. As I see it, the key labor-market

divide in the Information Age will not be between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, as it has been in the recent past, but rather between services that can be delivered electronically with little loss of quality and those that cannot be.4

Consider a few examples. It seems unlikely that the services of either waiters or

brain surgeons will ever be delivered over long distance. On the other hand, both

typing services and security analysis are already being delivered electronically from

India—albeit on a small scale so far. These disparate examples illustrate two fundamentally important points. First, the dividing line between jobs that are deliverable electronically (and thus are threatened by offshoring) and those that are not

does not correspond to traditional distinctions between high-end and low-end work.

Frankly, I have no idea whether future offshoring will make the distribution of

wages more or less equal. Second, the fraction of U.S. jobs that can be moved offshore is certain to rise inexorably as the technology improves. Despite all the fuss,

it is pretty low now; but it will eventually be quite high. In some ongoing and still

preliminary research, I have estimated that 22–29 percent of all (current) American

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5 Alan S. Blinder, ‘‘Estimating the Potential for Offshoring in the United States,’’ unpublished,

Princeton University, December 2006.

jobs might potentially be offshorable, although only a fraction of those jobs will actually be offshored.5

What can or should the government do about all this? I don’t have a laundry list

of concrete proposals, but I think the appropriate governmental responses fall into

two generic categories.

First, we need to repair and extend the social safety net for displaced workers.

This includes unemployment insurance, trade adjustment assistance, job retraining,

the minimum wage, the EITC, universal health insurance, and pension portability—

plus other, newer ideas like wage loss insurance. If we fail to do these things or,

perish the thought, turn again to Social Darwinism or piling on, a large fraction of

the U.S. population is going to experience a great deal of anxiety and economic distress. These people will constitute a much larger, more vocal, and more politically

engaged group than the poor and uneducated. So it seems unlikely that they will

just sit there passively and take their medicine. Rather, Congress will hear from

them.

Second, we must take steps to ensure that our labor force and our businesses supply and demand the types of skills and jobs that are going to remain in America

rather than move offshore. Among other things, that may require substantial

changes in our educational system—all the way from kindergarten through college.

And it will certainly entail a variety of steps to ensure that the U.S. remains the

home of innovation and invention, for we will never compete on the basis of cheap

labor. Nor do we want to.

Notice that I did not mention a third category of governmental response: trying

to impede globalization in general or offshoring in particular. The U.S. Government

cannot hold back the tides of history, and it should not try. Mr. Chairman, you may

remember a popular 1960s musical comedy called Stop the World, I Want to Get Off.

I understand the sentiment. You hear it a lot these days. But we cannot stop, and

we cannot get off. Instead, we Americans need to prepare ourselves for the future

of globalization, whether we like it or not. There is much to be done.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD VEDDER, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF ECO- NOMICS, OHIO UNIVERSITY; VISITING SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE;

CO-AUTHOR OF THE WAL-MART REVOLUTION

Good morning Senator Schumer and members of the Committee. The JEC has

just completed 60 years of existence, and during those six decades it has assisted

importantly in the making of economic policy, and I am pleased to be part of today’s

proceedings.

My distinguished colleagues on this panel have painted a somewhat pessimistic

and perhaps mildly alarming picture of the American economy. We learn that many

Americans have not shared in our nation’s rising prosperity. The income and wage

gap between the rich and the poor is growing. We are told we are becoming a more

economically divided nation.

My message is somewhat more optimistic and skeptical of the analysis suggesting

that vast portions of the American populace are languishing economically. Let me

very briefly touch on three points. First, the conventional measures that are typically cited to denote greater inequality are fundamentally flawed and grossly overstate inequality in this nation, and the growth in it over time. Second, even if one

accepts the proposition that America has insufficient equality of economic condition,

history tells us that public policy efforts to deal with the problem often are ineffective. Third, some policies that conceivably might lower inequality as conventionally

measured would, if adopted, have serious adverse consequences to the economy as

a whole.

Turning to the first point, looking at conventional statistics on income distribution, three factors lead us to overstate inequality. First, and probably least important, those statistics are traditionally based on money income, excluding a variety

of in-kind, non-cash payments that primarily benefit lower income persons—Medicaid benefits, food stamps, and housing subsidies are three good examples. Any

comparison of income levels or income inequality today with, say what existed in

1960 using published income data will tend to overstate any reported rise in inequality, and understate any estimate of income gains for lower income Americans,

since non-cash payments have become relatively more important in the intervening

time period.

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A second factor is that what we should be truly interested in is the economic wellbeing of Americans, and a far better measure of that economic well-being is consumption spending. Dollar for dollar, people derive more joy from what they spend

than from what they earn. As many elementary economics textbooks point out in

the first chapter, the ultimate purpose of economic activity is consumption.

We know that in any given year consumer spending is far more equally distributed that income. Comparing the income distribution statistics derived from the

Current Population Survey with the BLS’s Consumer Expenditure Survey is revealing. For example, the poorest one-fifth earned only slightly over 7 percent as much

income as the richest one-fifth in 2002, but they consumed more than 24 percent

as much. Using the most recent data for 2005, we see the richest one-fifth of the

population earned 3.47 times as much as the middle quintile, but consumed only

2.31 times as much. Roughly speaking, conventional measures show consumption inequality is at least one-third less than for income inequality.

The third point relating to the overstatement of inequality relates to the remarkable income mobility of the American people. For example, at the request of this

Committee, the Treasury Department in the 1990s provided data suggesting that

the overwhelming majority of persons in the bottom quintile of the income distribution were in another quintile a decade later, and a large percent even moved up or

down the distribution from one year to the next. Researchers at the Urban Institute

and other organizations have made similar observations. This phenomenon helps explain the narrowness of the distribution of consumption spending relative to the distribution of income, as observed decades ago by the late Milton Friedman and in

a different context by Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani. Failure to consider the

income mobility of people contributes to the inadequacies of traditional measures of

income distribution and also leads us to create some inequities and inefficiencies

when devising tax policies based on single year definitions of income.

While we are talking about measurement problems, they are particularly prevalent in our discussions of changes in earnings over time. Go to page 338 of the 2006

Economic Report of the President. We learn that average weekly earnings of workers

in private nonagricultural industries in 2005 were over 8 percent less than they

were in 1964, the year Lyndon Johnson announced his Great Society initiatives. Yet

turn the page, to page 340. Looking at real compensation per hour in the non-farm

business sector for the same time period, we learn it has risen 75 percent. Page 338

is consistent with a Marxian or even Malthusian interpretation of the economy—

a tendency for wages to fall to near subsistence, and evidence of mass exploitation

of the working proletariat by exploitive capitalists. Page 340 is consistent with the

view that with economic growth, the earnings of workers have risen sharply, and

also consistent with national income accounts data that shows per capita real consumption has increased about 2 percent annually.

Yet even the data on page 340 suffer from deficiencies. We learn that productivity

per hour in the non-farm business sector in 2005 was 2.28 times as great as in 1964,

yet compensation rose only 1.75 times, a pretty big difference that is inconsistent

with the neoclassical economic theory of factor prices and suggestive that owners

of capital are indeed deriving extraordinary profits as a result of paying workers

less than what they contribute to output at the margin. This should have resulted

in a significant decline in compensation of workers as a percent of national income.

Yet the national income data taken from pages 314 and 315 of the same source

show a radically different story. Compensation of employees actually rose from 60.75

to 61.51 percent as a percent of the national income. The share of national income

accounted for by corporate profits fell slightly in the same time period.

I am making two points here. First, interpretations of economic data can be exceedingly misleading. Second, the analysis of broader measures of economic performance suggests that workers as a group have shared in our national prosperity of the

past several generations. The original wage data I cited suffer from two enormous

deficiencies. First, they fail to take account non-wage forms of compensation, particularly health care and retirement benefits. These have soared in magnitude over

time. Second, the calculation of changing values in constant dollars is fraught with

peril, and the Consumer Price Index used in these calculations very significantly

overstates inflation in the eyes of virtually every mainstream economist, liberal,

conservative, vegetarian, Presbyterian, what have you. Similarly, analysis of wage

changes by wage or income category suffers not only from these problems, but from

the aforementioned phenomenon of the rapidly changing economic status of individual members of our opportunity society over time.

You don’t need a Ph.D. in economics to observe that never has a society had a

middle class more used to what once were considered goods and services available

only to the uber rich. Middle income Americans live in larger homes, buy more

gadgets like IPODS and cell phones, live longer, are more if not better educated,

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and take nicer vacations than either their parents did or do and their counterparts

in any other major nation. I returned 2 days ago from a 2-week cruise in the Caribbean, traveling less with top business executives or even elite Ivy League professors

than with equipment salesmen, butchers, and teachers -ordinary folk. That simply

did not happen even 30 years ago.

My second major point relates to public policy dealing with economic inequality.

Time does not permit a detailed exegesis of past efforts. But a reminder of some

historical experiences is sobering. Policy can come from the tax, spending or regulatory side. I will ignore regulatory matters in the interest of time, although I would

hasten to commend Senator Schumer for recent statements showing his concerns

about the abusive use of the tort system as a growth-impeding way of redistributing

income. Looking at taxes, attempts to make the system more progressive often have

unintended effects. For example, sharp reductions in top marginal tax rates in the

1920s, 1960s, and 1980s, viewed by some as favoring the rich, actually led to sharp

increases in the tax burden of the rich relative to the poor. I worked for this Committee during the 97th Congress in 1981 and 1982 in a political environment much

like today with divided government, with the Republicans controlling the Executive

while Congress was more under Democratic control, yet the two branches managed

to work together to fashion a more growth oriented tax policy with lower marginal

tax rates that contributed mightily to the boom that has followed. I hope the 110th

Congress is capable of similar accomplishments.

Taxes have behavioral consequences. The CBO greatly underestimated revenues

that would arise from the reducing in the top capital gains rate to 15 percent, for

example. Falling rates unlocked billions in unrealized gains that have helped fund

our rapidly expanding government. Similarly, sharp reductions in the number of estates subject to death taxation as a result of reform in those laws has not led to

a sharp decline in revenues from that source, as some had expected. It would be

a tragedy to reverse the positive effects of the tax reductions of the past few years

that, like the Kennedy tax reductions of the 1960s, have had a positive impact on

economic activity.

On the spending side, history again shows disappointing results of many initiatives to help the poor or middle class. As the January 20 issue of the Economist

notes, government job training programs have internationally been largely failures.

Spending initiatives in the areas of education, medical care, and public assistance

have usually brought about disappointing results. Despite spending far more in real

terms per student than a generation or two ago, American students do not appear

to be learning much more, and the education for lower income students is particularly deficient. A tripling of Federal aid to college students since 1994 has been accompanied by a decline, not an increase, in the proportion of students from the lowest quartile of the income distribution attending and graduating from our finest universities, which are increasingly becoming taxpayer subsidized country clubs for the

children of the affluent. While Medicaid has brought some increase in medical care

for the poor, it has done so at an enormous cost to society, and the cost pressures

of a highly inefficient system are leading companies to cut back on health care benefits for working middle class Americans. As to public assistance, it is far greater

today in real per capita or per poor person terms than in 1973, yet the current poverty rate is higher. The welfare reforms of the 1990s were an important achievement, but the overall picture is, at the very least, mixed.

Speaking of public assistance, I have to make one statement that may sound a

bit callous or insensitive to some, but it is an important but often neglected truism.

Comparing the rich and the poor, it is worth noting that the rich work a lot more.

Of those persons in poverty, only a tiny minority work full-time. We have relatively

few working poor in America. And it is worth noting that employment creation is

greatest in periods when the government allows the incredible job machine generated by the competitive private sector operating in a market environment to work.

The job creation of the 1980s was stimulated by a halt to the growth in government’s share of GDP characterizing earlier decades, and by tax reductions that stimulated the spirit of enterprise. The job creation of the 1990s was stimulated by an

unprecedented decline in government expenditures as a percent of GDP for eight

consecutive years—a reverse crowding out phenomenon that propelled an enormous

outpouring of American creative and entrepreneurial endeavor.

Turning to my final point today, there is a temptation to do things in the interest

of protecting middle and lower income Americans that might have highly undesirable effects on the economy as a whole. In this regard, the rise in protectionist sentiment in Congress is appalling, particularly as is largely centered in a party which

historically has favored free trade, a policy that has brought prosperity to almost

all Americans while at the same time has contributed enormously to eliminating

global disparities in the distribution of income and wealth. I hope the intelligent

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wing of the Democratic Party, represented by able persons such as those who preceded me on this panel, will be able to prevent a return to policies reminiscent of

that old Democratic bete noire, Herbert Hoover. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and rising

taxes were a factor, along with Hoover’s inane wage policies, for the Great Depression of the 1930s. Let us not repeat that today. I hope the Democratic Party will

try to emulate Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton in the area

of trade policy, not Herbert Hoover.

At a macro level, I believe the biggest single factor in the modest slowdown in

growth rates in this decade relative to the 1980s and 1990s is the sharp increase

in government expenditures. From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2006, total Federal

outlays rose by 42.4 percent, or $790.1 billion. By the way, the overwhelming majority of that was for non-defense or national security purposes. This was nearly double

the percent growth in GDP. Receipts rose well over 20 percent or roughly equal to

the growth in GDP, so the burgeoning deficit reflected a spending binge that resulted in some crowding out of private economic initiatives. Dollar for dollar, the

evidence is crystal clear that private spending has more productivity-enhancing effects than public spending because of the discipline that competitive markets impose

on market enterprise. The tax cuts largely corrected for the natural tendency for

taxes to rise relative to national output. Raising taxes again would reduce the deficit, but would have direct unfortunate disincentive effects on human economic behavior and would also reduce the political costs to Congress of incremental spending

initiatives, which almost certainly would have severe economic effects. I hope some

early indications of spending constraint are maintained in the months and years

ahead. While I am not the financial guru that Secretary Rubin is, an analysis that

I have conducted with Lowell Gallaway for this Committee in the past suggests that

the two best determinants of the growth of wealth as measured in equity prices are

the rate of inflation and government spending as a percent of GDP. Rising government spending is associated with falling market values and wealth, with all the adverse consequences that has for pensions. And stable prices are much better than

inflation. The Fed has done a pretty good job on the inflationary front, but the Congress and the Executive are guilty of having shown insufficient constraint with respect to Federal expenditures.

Again, I praise the JEC for providing a needed forum for the analysis of policy

possibilities informed by factual evidence. I hope the next 60 years are as successful

for this Committee as the last 60 have been.

Thank you.

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