IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-47

No. 262A20

Filed 23 April 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: J.E., F.E., D.E.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 4 

March 2020 by Judge Charlie Brown in District Court, Rowan County. This matter 

was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but determined 

on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 

Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Jane R. Thompson for petitioner-appellee Rowan County Department of Social 

Services.

Alston & Bird, LLP, by Caitlin C. Van Hoy, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant father.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent, the father of the minor juveniles J.E. (Jeff)1, F.E. (Fred), and D.E. 

(Dan), appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights.2 Upon 

careful review of the record and arguments, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading. 

2 The order also terminates the parental rights of the children’s mother. However, she 

is not a party to this appeal. 
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¶ 2 On 8 December 2017, the Rowan County Department of Social Services (DSS) 

filed a juvenile petition alleging that Jeff, Fred, and Dan were neglected and 

dependent juveniles and obtained nonsecure custody of the children. The juvenile 

petition also contained allegations concerning the children’s mother’s oldest child, 

D.P. (Doug).3 The petition alleged that DSS received a report on 6 December 2017 

with concerns regarding the welfare and safety of Doug and Fred after the parents 

left them in the care of a neighbor in Rowan County on 5 December 2017 to attend a 

court date in Wilmington. The parents later called the neighbor asking the neighbor 

to care for the children overnight, and the neighbor called law enforcement on 6 

December 2017 reporting that he could not reach the parents and could no longer care 

for the children. It was reported that law enforcement responded and found Doug and 

Fred present at the home where the family had been squatting, which was “in very 

poor condition.” Specifically, the home smelled strongly of feces and rotten food; there 

were dirty diapers, coke bottles containing a yellow bubbly substance, sticky carpet, 

and visible mold throughout the home; drug paraphernalia was in plain sight; and a 

55-gallon drum with fermenting mash was located in the kitchen. It was also reported 

that Doug and Fred smelled strongly of urine, body odor, and filth; Doug’s hair was 

“severely cut short in the front”; and Fred suffered from severe diaper rash requiring 

an antibiotic and had numerous scratches on his neck and torso. 

 

3 Respondent is not Doug’s father, and therefore this appeal does not concern Doug.
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¶ 3 The petition further alleged that the parents returned from Wilmington on 7 

December 2017, dropped Jeff and Dan off with their aunt, and told the aunt that they 

were concerned they would be arrested for child abuse and did not have money to 

make bond; the parents told a social worker that they were both suffering from 

mental health issues, the mother was severely depressed, respondent’s health was 

declining, and they were struggling to care for the four children; the parents had 

acknowledged their house was a “wreck”; the parents indicated they did not plan to 

return to Rowan County until they could afford to make bond; the mother had 

previously been hospitalized for mental health issues and had been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder; respondent is hostile and 

aggressive with authority figures and bullies and threatens people to get what he 

wants; and both parents have drug issues. 

¶ 4 The petition also indicated the parents had a significant history with child 

protective services in Rowan County, Anson County, and Union County and had 

previously faced criminal charges. The petition provided that DSS had received nine 

reports since the family moved to Rowan County in June 2016 with concerns 

including: lack of supervision; failure to take Doug to counseling and to provide him 

with proper schooling; domestic violence between the parents in front of the children; 

safety hazards for the children at the home; the parents driving without licenses; and 

failure to follow up with critical medical appointments for the children. The petition 
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also alleged the parents were charged with misdemeanor child abuse, possession of 

marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia in May 2016; respondent was 

additionally charged with traffic offenses; and respondent was on probation after 

pleading guilty to “several offenses” in July 2017. Lastly, the petition alleged the 

children have been negatively impacted by their unsafe, unhealthy, and unstable 

home environment. 

¶ 5 An Out of Home Family Services Agreement (case plan) was developed for and 

signed by respondent at a Child and Family Team Meeting on 23 February 2018. The 

case plan included requirements for respondent to address his substance abuse and 

mental health issues, complete parenting education, obtain and maintain appropriate 

housing, and demonstrate the ability to care for the children and meet their needs. 

¶ 6 After the hearing on the juvenile petition was continued on 1 March 2018 and 

12 April 2018, the juvenile petition came on for hearing on 17 May 2018. On that 

date, the parents stipulated that the children were neglected and dependent juveniles 

based on the allegations in the juvenile petition. As part of the stipulations, 

respondent again agreed to terms and conditions consistent with his case plan. 

¶ 7 On 3 July 2018, an adjudication and disposition order was entered adjudicating 

the children to be neglected and dependent juveniles based upon the parents’ 

stipulations. In addition to the stipulations, the trial court found that the parents 

were on probation after pleading guilty to child abuse charges in January 2018, and 
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respondent was charged with driving while license revoked on 22 February 2018. The 

trial court’s findings also acknowledged respondent’s entry into the case plan and 

detailed his participation in initial assessments which resulted in recommendations 

for services, but the trial court found that respondent had either refused or had yet 

to follow through with recommended services and DSS could not confirm respondent’s 

participation in services for which respondent reported participation. The trial court 

continued custody of the children with DSS, ordered that the initial permanent plan 

be set at the first permanency planning review hearing, and allowed the parents 

supervised visitation “at a minimum of twice per month for two hours.” Furthermore, 

in accordance with respondent’s case plan, the trial court ordered respondent to abide 

by the conditions of his probation/parole; follow all recommendations from his 

substance abuse, mental health, and any psychiatric or psychological assessments; 

obtain and maintain safe, sanitary, and stable housing and provide proof of such to 

DSS and the guardian ad litem (GAL); make diligent efforts to obtain and/or maintain 

stable employment and provide proof of such to DSS and the GAL; participate in 

medication management services and take medication as prescribed; submit to 

random drug screens; participate in recommended services for the children; enroll in 

and complete a parenting education program approved by DSS; and sign releases of 

information to DSS, the GAL, and the trial court.

¶ 8 The matter came on for the first permanency planning review hearing on 13 
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September 2018. In an order entered on 31 October 2018, the trial court found 

respondent had been arrested on 18 June 2018 for three counts of misdemeanor 

probation violation and was presently incarcerated. DSS retained custody of the 

children, and the trial court set the primary permanent plan for the children as 

reunification with a secondary plan of adoption. Respondent’s visitation was not 

changed. 

¶ 9 After the matter came back on for another permanency planning review 

hearing on 24 January 2019, the trial court entered an order on 21 March 2019 that 

changed the primary permanent plan for the children to adoption with a secondary 

plan of reunification. The trial court found respondent had not made any further 

progress on his case plan and had been absconding or incarcerated for much of the 

case. 

¶ 10 On 2 July 2019, DSS filed a petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights 

to Jeff, Fred, and Dan. DSS alleged that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s

parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and for failure to 

make reasonable progress pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). On 15 August 2019, 

respondent filed a response to the petition opposing the termination of his parental 

rights. 

¶ 11 After continuances on 26 September 2019 and 7 November 2019, the 

termination petition was heard on 2 December 2019 after the trial court denied the 
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parents’ motions to further continue the matter. On 4 March 2020, the trial court 

entered an order terminating respondent’s and the mother’s parental rights. The trial 

court concluded that both grounds alleged in the petition existed to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019), and that it was 

in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

Respondent appeals. 

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Continue

¶ 12 Respondent first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue 

the termination hearing on 2 December 2019 and proceeding in his absence. 

“Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and 

absent a gross abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling is not subject to 

review.” In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. 515, 516–17 (2020) (quoting State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 

1, 24 (1995)). “However, if ‘a motion to continue is based on a constitutional right, 

then the motion presents a question of law which is fully reviewable on appeal.’ ” In 

re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 679 (2020) (quoting State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 530–31 

(1996)).

¶ 13 On appeal, respondent contends the denial of his motion to continue deprived 

him of a fair hearing under the circumstances. Respondent seeks de novo review 

arguing that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair hearing in violation of his right 
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to due process. He emphasizes his participation in the juvenile proceedings up to the 

termination hearing and argues, “[c]onsidering the fact that [he] had consistently 

participated in the proceedings prior to the termination hearing and the likelihood 

that he did not know the hearing was taking place, he had a critical need for 

procedural protection and his attorney’s motion to continue should have been 

granted.” 

¶ 14 However, there is no indication in the record that respondent’s counsel moved 

to continue the termination hearing in order to protect respondent’s constitutional 

rights. There is no mention of the need to continue due to a lack of notice or in order 

to ensure due process. Although the transcript of the proceedings is incomplete, the 

transcript shows that upon inquiry from the trial court respondent’s counsel 

confirmed that his only objection to proceeding with the termination hearing was 

respondent’s absence. A parent’s absence from termination proceedings does not itself 

amount to a violation of due process. See In re C.M.P., 254 N.C. App. 647, 652 (2017) 

(“[T]his court has held that a parent’s due process rights are not violated when 

parental rights are terminated at a hearing at which the parent is not present.”); In 

re Murphy, 105 N.C. App. 651, 656–57 (holding a parent’s due process rights were not 

violated when the termination hearing was conducted in the parent’s absence), aff’d 

per curiam, 332 N.C. 663 (1992). Accordingly, respondent has waived any argument 

that the denial of the motion to continue violated his constitutional rights, and we 
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review solely for an abuse of discretion. In re S.M., 375 N.C. at 679 (citing In re A.L.S., 

374 N.C. at 516–17).

“Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is 

manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it 

could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State 

v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). 

Moreover, “[r]egardless of whether the motion raises a 

constitutional issue or not, a denial of a motion to continue 

is only grounds for a new trial when defendant shows both 

that the denial was erroneous, and that he suffered 

prejudice as a result of the error.” Walls, 342 N.C. at 24–

25, 463 S.E.2d at 748.

In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. at 517.

¶ 15 In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we are guided by the Juvenile Code,

which provides that “[c]ontinuances that extend beyond 90 days after the initial 

petition shall be granted only in extraordinary circumstances when necessary for the 

proper administration of justice.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(d) (2019). “Furthermore, 

‘[c]ontinuances are not favored and the party seeking a continuance has the burden 

of showing sufficient grounds for it. The chief consideration is whether granting or 

denying a continuance will further substantial justice.’ ” In re S.M., 375 N.C. at 680

(alteration in original) (quoting In re D.W., 202 N.C. App. 624, 627 (2010)). 

¶ 16 The termination petition was filed in this case on 2 July 2019, and respondent 

was served with the petition in person in court on 11 July 2019. Prior to the 

termination petition being called for hearing on 2 December 2019, the termination 

hearing had been continued twice upon motions of the parents on 26 September 2019 
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and 7 November 2019 due to the parents’ absences. At the time of the last continuance 

on 7 November 2019, counsel for both parents agreed to the special setting of the 

termination hearing on 2 December 2019. Respondent, who was incarcerated at the 

time, was transported to court for the hearing on 7 November 2019 but was not 

brought into the courtroom because the matter was continued. 

¶ 17 When the termination petition came on for hearing on 2 December 2019, 

exactly five months after the petition was filed, counsel for each parent was present, 

but neither parent was present in court. Based on the trial court’s findings of fact, we 

are satisfied the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining respondent’s 

unexplained absence did not amount to an extraordinary circumstance, as required 

by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(d), to merit continuing the termination hearing further beyond 

the 90-day timeframe set forth in the Juvenile Code. Respondent’s attempt on appeal 

to explain his absence by asserting it was “likely” he did not know the hearing date 

is not convincing. Respondent never affirmatively asserts he did not have notice of 

the hearing. Furthermore, respondent does not contest the trial court’s findings 

regarding efforts by counsel and DSS to contact him, and he offers no explanation for 

his lack of contact with his counsel and DSS despite him knowing that the 

termination hearing was pending. 

¶ 18 Additionally, respondent has failed to argue, let alone establish, how he was 

prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue. Given respondent’s 
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counsel’s advocacy on behalf of respondent at the termination hearing and the 

unchallenged findings of fact supporting the termination of his parental rights

discussed below, we believe it is unlikely that the result of the termination 

proceedings would have been different had the hearing been continued.

¶ 19 Respondent has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to continue and that he was prejudiced thereby. Accordingly, we 

overrule respondent’s argument that the trial court erred in denying any further 

continuance of the termination proceedings. 

B. Grounds to Terminate Parental Rights

¶ 20 Respondent also challenges the trial court’s adjudication of the existence of 

grounds to terminate his parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and 

(2). The Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of parental 

rights: adjudication and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). At the 

adjudication stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence” that one or more grounds for termination exists under N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f). “[A]n adjudication of any single ground in 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.” In re 

E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019).

¶ 21 “We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine 

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
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findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” Id. at 392 (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 

N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed 

supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Moreover, we review 

only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds 

existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407

(2019) (citations omitted). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” 

In re M.C., 374 N.C. 882, 886 (2020). 

¶ 22 A trial court may terminate parental rights for neglect if it concludes the 

parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined as one “whose parent, guardian, 

custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; . . . or 

who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B101(15) (2019). As we have recently explained:

Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory 

ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 

termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 

from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 

showing of a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.

When determining whether such future neglect is likely, 

the district court must consider evidence of changed 

circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect 

and the time of the termination hearing.

In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (cleaned up). 

¶ 23 In this case, the trial court found that the children were previously adjudicated 
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to be neglected and dependent juveniles. It also issued findings that detailed DSS’s 

history of involvement with the family, the circumstances leading to the prior 

adjudication, the requirements of respondent’s case plan that he agreed to and was 

ordered to complete to remedy those conditions, and respondent’s failure to comply 

with the requirements of his case plan and to remain in contact with DSS. The trial 

court ultimately determined “[t]he probability of a repetition of neglect of the 

juveniles if returned to the home or care of [the mother] and [respondent] is very 

high” and concluded grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights for 

neglect. 

¶ 24 Respondent now argues the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to 

terminate his parental rights for neglect was “not supported by competent and 

sufficient findings of fact.” Respondent challenges very few of the trial court’s findings 

and instead argues the findings do not account for his circumstances at the time of 

the termination hearing and do not support the trial court’s determination that there 

was a very high probability of a repetition of neglect. We disagree.

¶ 25 The trial court made the following relevant findings of fact:

10. In his written answer to the TPR petition, [respondent] 

admits that he and [the mother] have significant child 

protective services history in Rowan, Anson, and Union 

counties. He admits that nine reports were made to [DSS]

beginning in June 2016, the month that he and [the 

mother] and the children moved to Rowan County from 

Anson County. He admits that the [nine] reports contained 

concerns including a lack of proper supervision, failure of 
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the parents to provide proper medical attention to the 

children, exposure to domestic violence, untreated 

substance abuse and mental health issues, and an

injurious, unstable, and unsanitary living environment for 

the children. . . . 

. . . .

12. On December 6, 2017, [the parents] left the county to 

attend a court date in Wilmington, NC. They left two of the 

four children with a neighbor. The neighbor called law 

enforcement stating that he could not get in touch with the 

parents, and he could no longer care for the children. [The 

parents’] home was in very poor condition. [Fred] was born 

prematurely and addicted to marijuana. He had multiple 

bruises and scratches and had severe diaper rash. Both 

parents signed a stipulation document at adjudication 

agreeing that the allegations were true. The children were 

adjudicated neglected. 

13. The parents were ordered to complete substance abuse 

treatment and parenting education, to obtain appropriate 

housing, to participate in therapy for the children, to 

complete mental health treatment, and to comply with 

[DSS]. Neither parent has met any of those requirements 

to date. Both parents admitted to [DSS] that they have 

mental health issues . . . . 

. . . .

15. [The parents] plead[ed] guilty to child abuse charges in 

January 2018 and were both placed on probation. [The 

parents’] relationship was on and off during the case. 

[Respondent] was an emotional mess and obsessive about 

[the mother]. . . . [He] often made statements to social 

workers that made [DSS] question his veracity and/or 

lucidity. . . . [He] would write fairy tales to be given to the 

children. . . . [DSS] reviewed the writings and did not find 

them to be appropriate for the children. [Respondent and 

the mother] moved around from place to place and had no 

stable housing. . . . 
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16. By May 2018, neither parent was compliant with [DSS]. 

[Respondent] was living out of his car. . . . [He] had some 

visits with the children [between December 2017 and May

2018]. He would often show up late to visits[,] . . . or he 

would no show to visits. He would sometimes come to visits 

dirty and had to use [DSS’s] restroom to clean himself up. 

[Respondent] was engaged with the children during visits, 

but he would cry and would often be very tearful and 

emotional. 

17. [A new social worker] took over the case in May 2018 

but did not have any communication with the parents until 

July 2018. Several attempts were made to locate [the 

parents]. . . . [Respondent] was arrested in June 2018. . . . 

. . . .

19. Around the time of the January 24, 2019 court hearing, 

[respondent] agreed that he and [the mother] had 

substance abuse and mental health issues. He said he did 

not have a plan to reengage in a relationship with [the 

mother] and wanted to get his life together. [Respondent] 

no showed to a scheduled meeting at [DSS] on April 21, 

2019. In July 2019, [respondent] contacted [the social 

worker] wanting to reengage in services. 

. . . .

21. [A new social worker] took over the case in August 2019 

and has made efforts to contact and locate [the parents] 

with no success. [The social worker] contacted all phone 

numbers listed for the parents and sent out letters to the 

parents’ attorneys. All phone numbers were invalid. [The 

social worker] called [respondent’s] employer on September 

23, 2019 and October 15, 2019. On September 23, 2019, 

[respondent’s] employer stated that [respondent] was still 

technically employed, but he had not spoken with 

[respondent] in two weeks. [The social worker] reached out 

to the Mecklenburg County Police Department and 

received documentation that [respondent] had been 

arrested twice. [The social worker] has been unable to have 
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any contact with either parent.

22. [Respondent] was charged with vehicle theft on August 

30, 2019, and on September 3, 2019, he was arrested for 

larceny of a motor vehicle. [The mother] was with him at 

the time[ ] . . . . [Respondent] posted bail but was arrested 

again on November 3, 2019 for drug paraphernalia 

possession and bonded out on November 14, 2019. Neither 

parent has made any effort to make contact with the 

agency or the foster parents in regards to the well-being of 

their children. 

23. . . . [The parents] are not in a position to care for the 

juveniles due to their lack of responsible decision making, 

incarcerations, mental health issues, substance abuse 

issues, positive drug screens, parenting issues, failure to 

communicate consistently, and lack of overall stability. 

Both parents have expressed their plans and desires on 

multiple occasions to get themselves together, but each has 

failed to follow through with services ordered by the court 

to help them reach their goals. 

24. The barriers to a safe reunification with either parent 

are numerous and include the fact that both parents 

continue to have unaddressed substance abuse and mental 

health issues, they have been frequently incarcerated 

throughout the life of this case, they have not maintained 

stable housing or employment, and they have not visited 

regularly with the children or even checked on the 

children’s well-being. 

These findings are unchallenged by respondent and are binding on appeal. See In re 

T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407.

¶ 26 The above unchallenged findings of fact detail the historical facts of the case 

and demonstrate that, at the time of the termination hearing, respondent had failed 

to complete the requirements of his case plan designed to address the issues that 
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previously resulted in the adjudication of the children as neglected juveniles. The 

findings also make clear that respondent’s incarceration was not the sole evidence of 

neglect, but that his incarceration was considered along with his failure to complete 

his case plan requirements for substance abuse, mental health, and housing, and his 

failure to regularly visit with the children or check on their wellbeing. Moreover, 

respondent was not incarcerated for the entirety of the case, and his incarceration for 

much of the case was the result of his probation violations and criminal activity that 

continued up until the month before the termination hearing, which itself is evidence 

supporting a likelihood of repeated neglect.

¶ 27 Upon review of the termination order, we are satisfied that the unchallenged 

findings which establish a lack of changed circumstances fully support the trial 

court’s determination that there was very high probability of a repetition of neglect if 

the children were returned to respondent’s care. See In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870

(2020) (“A parent’s failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of 

a likelihood of future neglect.”) (quoting In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 637 

(2018)); In re J.M.J.-J., 374 N.C. 553, 566 (2020) (upholding termination based on 

neglect where “the trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that respondent’s 

circumstances had not changed so as to render him fit to care for [the child] at the 

time of the termination hearing”). In turn, the combination of the trial court’s finding 

that the children were previously adjudicated to be neglected juveniles and its 
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determination that there was very high probability of future neglect supports the 

conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the 

children for neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

III. Conclusion

¶ 28 Having held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s 

counsel’s motion to continue the termination hearing and did not err in adjudicating 

grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights, and because respondent does not 

challenge the trial court’s best interests determination at the dispositional stage, we 

affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights to Jeff, Fred, 

and Dan. 

AFFIRMED.