GAO 

------I-_1- 1 Initc4 Stntcts General Account,ing Office 

-’ 

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

--- 

Nt?pt.t!Inlwr 1 !H 1 ARMS CONTROL 

Intermediate-Ran 

Nuclear Forces Treaty 

Implementation 

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i 
GAO United States 

General Accounting Office 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

National Security and 

International Affairs Division 

H-241619 

September 12,1991 

The Honorable John Glenn 

Chairman, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

This is an unclassified version of our classified report that was issued on 

April 10, 1991. Accordingly, some of the matters discussed in that 

report are limited in presentation in this report or they have been 

deleted entirely. We have also updated some of the information. 

In response to your request, we examined U.S. implementation of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a bilateral agreement 

between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty requires 

eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet land-based missile systems 

with ranges between 500 to 5,500 kilometers (about 300 to 3,400 miles). 

The treaty provides for several types of on-site inspections as a means 

to verify compliance. The United States established the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) within the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct 

and coordinate the treaty’s inspection provisions. 

Specifically, you asked that we [ 1) describe OSIA'S role and organizational structure, including what organizations and systems are involved 

in providing OSIA policy and operational guidance and (2) identify the 

costs and personnel associated with treaty implementation. We also 

agreed to provide our observations concerning OSIA'S operations and 

treaty implementation issues that may have implications for other arms 

reduction agreements. . 

Results in Brief The on-site inspection provisions of the treaty are carried out by OSIA, 

with support from numerous federal departments and agencies and several private contractors and foreign governments. Certain non-inspection related INF activities are done by other US. organizations. Available 

data show that identifiable INF implementation costs will be about 

$522 million for fiscal years 1988 through 1991, covering the first 

Page 1 GAO/NSI.AD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
B-241519 

3 treaty years.’ Experiences from implementing the INF treaty have 

raised a number of issues that merit consideration for other arms control agreements. 

Treaty Inspection 

Provisions 

The INF treaty, formally known as the Treaty Between the United States 

and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

and Shorter-Range Missiles, was signed in Washington, D.C., on 

December 8, 198’7.2 The treaty includes a Memorandum of Understanding and periodic updates identifying what sites and items are covered and two Protocols on Inspections and Eliminations explaining how 

these will be done. The agreement also allows the parties to agree on 

measures to improve the effectiveness of the treaty, and several agreements of this type have been made since the treaty entered into force. 

The agreement requires destroying four types of U.S. and six types of 

Soviet missile systems3 and associated equipment and prohibits further 

production, testing, and deployment of these systems as well as future 

ground launched systems that would fall into the range limits. Both parties must eliminate all treaty-limited items within 3 years: the elimination deadline was May 31,199l. The Memorandum of Understanding 

identified over 7,600 treaty-limited items that must be eliminated and 

133 Soviet sites and 31 U.S. sites to be inspected.4 It also identified one 

missile final assembly plant in the Soviet Union where the United States 

has established a monitoring facility, and one missile production plant in 

the United States where the Soviets have established a monitoring 

facility. The treaty also established unprecedented rights for the parties 

to conduct five types of on-site inspections. 

‘The INF treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988. Therefore, the first 3 treaty years cover the L 

period June 1, 1988, through May 31, 1991. However, OSIA was crcdted in *January 1988 and because 

federal agencies budget and account for their costs by fiscal year (Oct. 1 to Sept. 30), we present cost 

and personnel data for 4 fiscal years-1988 through 1991-throughout this report. 

“On May 27, 1988, the IJnited States Senate consented to the agreement and t,he treaty entered into 

force on June 1, 1988. 

“The four 1J.S. systems are the BGM-1OQG Ground Launched Cruise Missile, Pershing II, Pershing IA, 

and Pershing 1B. The six Soviet systems are the 85-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23, and SSC-X-4. 

41n addition to INF facilities in the IJnited States and the Soviet IJnion, the treaty covers facilities in 

other countries where the subject missiles and support equipment arc located. For the IJnitcd States, 

it included Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, the [Jnited Kingdom, and the Fcdcral Republic of Germany (West Germany), For the Soviet IJnion, it included the former German Democratic Republic 

(East Germany) and Czechoslovakia. Despite the unification of East, and West Germany on 

October 3, 1990, the United States retains the right to inspect former Soviet facilities in that part of 

Germany known as East Germany. Throughout this report WC refer to East and West Germany as 

they were known when the treaty was signed. 

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INP Treaty Implementation 
B-241519 

l Baseline, Beginning 30 days after the treaty entered into force, each side 

had 60 days to inspect the other’s declared sites to verify the data in the 

Memorandum of Understanding. 

l Closeout. Within 60 days after the scheduled elimination of a facility, an 

inspection can be conducted to verify that all treaty-limited items have 

been removed from the site and all INF treaty-related activities have 

ceased. 

l Quota or short notice. For 13 years, each side is permitted to conduct 

inspections at designated sites to confirm the expected presence or 

absence of activities and items limited by the treaty. Twenty inspections 

are permitted each year for the first 3 years of the treaty; the number 

decreases over the remaining 10 years. 

l Elimination. When one party destroyed certain treaty-limited items, the 

other party was required to monitor the process to verify the 

destruction. 

l Continuous Portal Monitoring. For up to 13 years, each side is permitted 

to establish a resident inspection team at the exits of an agreed-to missile final assembly plant or former missile production facility. The 

inspectors are allowed to patrol the perimeter and inspect vehicles 

exiting the main gate (portal) to determine whether treaty-limited items 

are in them. 

The treaty also established cooperative measures to enhance the utility 

of reconnaissance systems and a Special Verification Commission as a 

forum for U.S. and Soviet representatives to discuss compliance issues 

and measures to improve the effectiveness of the treaty. While the 

treaty’s inspection regime is limited to 13 years, the treaty itself is 

indefinite in duration. 

Treaty Status As required by the treaty, as of June 1, 1991, all declared U.S. and 6 

Soviet treaty-limited items had been eliminated. Shorter-range missile 

systems were eliminated by November 1989, within the required 

18-month time frame, and all remaining intermediate-range missile systems were eliminated by the May 3 1, 199 1, deadline.” During the first 

“In early 1990, the IJnited States became aware of the existence of Soviet-produced SS-23 shorterrange missiles and launchers-items listed in the INF treaty-in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East 

Germany. In addition, a Soviet document provided to the United Nations cited a number of SS-23s 

produced in excess of those declared by the Soviet IJnion in the INF treaty or claimed by any of the 

East European countries, According to the President’s report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 

Control Agreements dated February 1991, the IJnited States haa information that the Soviets provided approximately 70 SS-23s to these three countries. The United States continues to investigate 

the matter and is preparing a report to the Congress on the INF compliance issue. 

Page 3 GAO/NSLAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
B-241519 

3 treaty years, both parties had also conducted all required and allowed 

inspections. (See table 1.) 

Table 1: INF Inspections During the First 

3 Treaty Years U.S. inspections of 

Soviet facilities 

Soviet inspections of 

U.S. facilities 

Baseline 117a 31 

-_-___---.-- -.-.--. ..- - 

Closeout 114b 23 

.-.-~ ----- ----- 

Quota 60 60 

.-.-..-~.--- -.-..-. -~_ 

Elimination 130 94 

Total 

TIepresents 133 sites 

421 208 

%xludes a 1988 closeout inspection that was determined to be invalid by the Special Verification Corn 

mlsslon and a 1990 re-InspectIon of the same Soviet site. 

Since the beginning of the fourth treaty year, both parties have conducted closeout, quota, and portal monitoring inspections. As of 

July 22, 1991, the Soviet Union had completed all closeout inspections of 

U.S. INF sites and the United States had completed most closeout inspections of Soviet sites. Quota inspections and continuous portal monitoring 

may continue for the next 10 years-through May 2001, 

INF Treaty Guidance The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee provides overall 

policy direction and oversight of treaty implementation. The Committee 

is a high-level interagency group chaired by National Security Council 

staff, with representatives from DOD, the Departments of State and 

Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the 

Director of Central Intelligence. It is supported by several interagency 

subcommittees and working groups, which provide guidance on specific 

INF issues. * 

Treaty interpretation, Soviet compliance determinations, and U.S. policy 

decisions are the responsibility of these agencies and the interagency 

committees. Information obtained from OSIA’S on-site inspections flows 

into the interagency structure, which reviews Soviet compliance. The 

National Security Council is responsible for resolving any interagency 

disputes. The Special Verification Commission and other diplomatic 

channels are used to resolve questions and agree upon measures to 

improve the effectiveness of the treaty. Negotiation results are provided 

to the interagency community, which then formulates policy guidance 

for OSIA. 

Page 4 GAO/NSLAD91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
I5241519 

The Secretary of Defense is primarily responsible for providing OSIA 

operational guidance, as well as transmitting policy guidance formulated 

by the interagency mechanism. The Director of Central Intelligence is 

responsible for ensuring that the inspection process is supported by U.S. 

intelligence resources. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

provides guidance on counterintelligence matters; ACDA provides recommendations on arms control policy issues; and the Department of 

Energy, as well as DOD, provides technical expertise on technologies and 

hardware for on-site inspections. 

See appendix I for more complete discussions of the roles and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies involved with OSIA in 

implementing the INF treaty. 

Organizational 

Structure of OSIA 

OSIA is organized to conduct inspections of Soviet facilities and escort the 

Soviets during inspections of U.S. facilities. OSIA’S Director, currently an 

Air Force major general, is appointed by the Secretary of Defense with 

the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval of the President. He is supported by three deputy directors who are appointed by 

ACDA, State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Inspections and 

escort activities are managed by two directorates that report to the 

Director through the Principal Deputy Director (from ACDA). OSIA also 

has a substantial support directorate. 

Figure 1 illustrates OSIA’S organizational structure during most of the 

first 3 years when its primary mission was to implement the INF treaty’s 

on-site inspection provisions. 

Page 5 GAO/NSLAD-91-262 INP Treaty Implementation 
B-241519 

Flgure 1: On-Site Inspection Agency Organization Chart 

r 

Negotiations 

Plans Off ice 

L 

Director for 

Operations 

Communications 

Current Operations 

Scheduling, Plans, 

1 Director for Portal , Monitoring 1 1 Direct; for Support 

JII 

‘am 

_-. 

c 

Source, On-Site InspectIon Agency, June 1990. 

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
E-241519 

The Portal Monitoring Directorate managed the portal in the Soviet 

Union with up to 30 inspectors, most of whom were contractor personnel. This office also coordinated the Soviet’s reciprocal portal monitoring site near Magna, Utah, with a detachment of OSIA personnel and 

contract escorts and linguists. Both portals have been in operation since 

July 2, 1988. 

The Operations Directorate, responsible for managing all other inspection and escort activities, included the Inspection, Escort, and Operations Management Divisions, three field offices, and two gateways. The 

Inspection Division controlled several inspection teams that normally 

each consisted of 10 inspectors, many of whom were temporary duty 

government personnel, although most team leaders were on OSIA’S permanent staff. 

The Escort Division managed the escort teams. Most of the team leaders 

were on OSIA’S permanent staff, and most team members were detailed 

from other agencies. Escort team members included U.S. military and 

civilian personnel and foreign government personnel (if the facilities 

were located overseas). 

OSIA’S organizational structure has been modified to reflect an expanding 

mission. As of August 1991, OSIA’S responsibilities beyond INF included 

planning for or implementing the on-site inspection provisions of several 

other arms control agreements. This includes the Threshold Test Ban 

Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, the Vienna Document 

1990/Confidence and Security Building Measures, the Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 

Treaty, and both the Chemical Weapons bilateral agreement with the 

Soviets and the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, In 

July 199 1, OSIA was also designated the DOD executive agent for DOD support to the United Nations’ Special Commission on Iraq. OSIA’S current 

organizational structure still consists of three directorates; however, the 

former Portal Monitoring Directorate is a division of the Operations 

Directorate and OSIA’S Field Office, Europe, is a separate directorate. 

Appendixes II and III provide more detailed discussion of US. inspections of Soviet facilities and escorting Soviet inspectors at U.S. facilities, 

respectively. 

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
B-241519 

INF Treaty Costs and The costs of inspections and other treaty implementation activities are 

Personnel Are 

Difficult to Identify 

j difficult to identify. Agencies did not always account for treaty-related 

costs separately or the information could not be provided. Most significantly,salaries are not included for full-time military personnel, some 

full-time civilian personnel, and all civilian and military temporary duty 

personnel. Available data indicate identifiable costs of about $522 million for fiscal years 1988 through 1991. Over $427 million, or about 

82 percent, is DOD’S costs, 34 percent of which is attributable to ASIA. 

OSIA’S costs for the period represent about 28 percent of the identified 

INF implementation costs. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Identifiable Costs of INF Treaty 

Implementation-fiscal Years 1988-91 Dollars in millions 

Fiscal year 

actual prolected Total 

1988 1989 1990 1991 costs 

Department of Defense 

_ --_-.__ 

On-Site Inspection Agency 

Army 

--Air Force 

$24.2 $43.2 $38.9 $40.1 $146.4 

20.6 24.4 36.3 38.6 119.9 

18.1 17.1 6.3 11.0 52.5 

Navy 15.5 0.5 4.5 4.5 25.0 

Other Defense 35.6 9.5 21.9 16.2 83.4 

Department of Energy 7.8 4.7 0.5 0.3 13.3 

Other 30.0 21.5 14.2 15.8 81.5 

Total $152.0 $120.9 $122.6 $126.5 $522.0 

Concerning personnel, most agencies and organizations could not identify the number of personnel assigned to INF-related functions. Available 

data show that full-time positions budgeted for INF ranged from 348 

during fiscal year 1988, when the treaty entered into force, to an estimated 570 for fiscal year 1991. On average, DOD accounted for about 6 

77 percent of these positions, over one-half of which are military personnel. OSIA has about one-half of the DOD budgeted positions. 

See appendix IV for more detailed information on costs and personnel 

associated with INF treaty implementation. 

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
B-241519 

Implications of the Experiences from implementing the INF treaty have raised a number of 

INF Treaty for Other issues that merit consideration in planning and implementing other arms 

control agreements. This is especially important if treaties incorporate 

Agreements on-site inspection and verification activities similar to those permitted 

by the INF treaty. Following is a brief description of the important lessons learned; these and other issues are discussed in more depth in 

appendix V. 

. Fully trained inspectors, escorts, and linguists need to be identified and 

brought on-board 4 to 6 months before a treaty becomes effective to 

improve the United States’ ability to staff and train inspection and 

escort teams. 

. Adequate funding is needed before treaty ratification to begin start-up 

efforts such as planning to conduct inspections, training personnel, and 

purchasing equipment. 

. Prior to any agreement, U.S. contractors affected by treaty provisions 

must be given the opportunity to react to proposals regarding their 

property. 

We conducted our review between January 1989 and December 1990 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As 

agreed with your office, we did not obtain written agency comments on 

this report. However, we discussed the information in the report with 

cognizant agency officials and have incorporated their comments as 

appropriate. A discussion of our scope and methodology is in 

appendix VI. 

As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this 

report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies l 

to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, 

Energy, and State; the National Security Advisor; the Directors of the 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Central Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Management and Budget; 

and other interested parties. 

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
B-241619 

Please contact me at (202) 276-4128 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors are listed in 

appendix VII. 

Sincerely yours, 

Joseph E. Kelley 

Director, Security and International 

Relations Issues 

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Page 11 GAO/NSJAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Contents 

Letter 

Appendix I 

1 

U.S. Organization for Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee 

INF Treaty Department of Defense 

Implementation Director of Central Intelligence 

Department of State 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

U.S. Special Verification Commission Delegation 

Roles and Responsibilities of Other Agencies 

Roles and Responsibilities of Basing Countries 

16 

17 

19 

24 

24 

25 

26 

26 

27 

27 

Appendix II 29 

U.S. Inspections of The Inspection Process 29 

Soviet Facilities Baseline Inspections 31 

Closeout Inspections 32 

Quota/Short Notice Inspections 33 

Elimination Inspections 34 

Portal Monitoring at Votkinsk 35 

Appendix III 39 

Escorting Soviet Baseline Inspections at U.S. Sites 40 

Inspectors at U.S. INF C1oseout inspections 40 

40 Facilities Quota/Short Notice Inspections of U.S. Sites 

Elimination Inspections 40 

Portal Monitoring at Magna 41 

* Appendix IV 43 

Costs and Personnel to First Year Funding Problems 43 

Implement the INF INF Implementation Costs 44 

OSIA’s Costs 46 Treaty Future OSIA Inspection Costs 47 

INF Requires Substantial Personnel Support 48 

Costs and Personnel Not Included in Agencies’ Estimates 50 

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Cmntents 

Appendix V 54 

Implications of the A Better Method for Resolving Treaty Disputes May Be 54 

INF Treaty for Other Necessary 

Agreements 

Inspectors and Linguists Need to Be Identified and 

Readily Available 

54 

Funding Is Needed Before Treaty Ratification 

Portal Monitoring Is Expensive 

Complete Cost Information Is Not Available 

Coordinating Information Collected From Multiple 

Treaties Would Be Useful 

56 

56 

57 

57 

Contractors Affected by Treaty Provisions Need to Be 

Consulted 

58 

Provisions Need to Be Made for Disposing of Excess 

Equipment and Property 

58 

Transportation and Housing Requirements Need to Be 

Considered 

59 

Appendix VI 

Scope and 

Methodology 

Appendix VII 

61 

62 

Major Contributors to 

This Report 

Tables Table 1: INF Inspections During the First 3 Treaty Years 

Table 2: Identifiable Costs of INF Treaty 

Implementation- Fiscal Years 1988-9 1 

Table IV. 1: DOD’s INF Treaty Implementation Costs by 

Category 

4 

8 4 

45 

Table IV.2: Other Agencies’ INF Treaty Implementation 

costs 

46 

Table IV.3: OSIA’s INF Treaty Implementation Costs 

Table IV.4: U.S. Government Civilian and Military 

Authorized Positions Associated With INF Treaty 

Implementation 

47 

49 

Table IV.5: OSIA Contract Personnel at Votkinsk and 

Magna Portals 

50 

Page 13 GAO/NSIAB91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Contents 

Figure Figure 1: On-Site Inspection Agency Organization Chart 6 

Abbreviations 

ACDA 

DC1 

DOD 

INF 

JCS 

MAC 

NRRC 

OSIA 

YVC 

Page 14 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Department of Defense 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Military Airlift Command 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 

On-Site Inspection Agency 

Special Verification Commission 

GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix I 

US. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

The United States created a complex organizational structure involving 

numerous organizations to implement the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty. Overall policy direction and treaty implementation 

oversight are provided to executive branch organizations through an 

interagency mechanism established by the President. The on-site inspection provisions of the treaty are carried out by the On-Site Inspection 

Agency (OSIA), with support from several other Department of Defense 

(DOD) components, federal organizations, private contractors, and five 

European basing country governments1 Implementation of non-inspection related INF treaty activities is shared by numerous other US. 

organizations. 

OSIA was established as a DOD agency by Presidential directive on January 15, 1988, to implement the inspection provisions of the INF treaty.2 

It is responsible for conducting on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, 

the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany),3 and Czechoslovakia; coordinating all activities related to Soviet inspections in the 

United States and five West European basing countries; and reporting on 

U.S. inspections to the interagency policy groups. On May 29, 1990, 

President Bush expanded the charter of OSIA to include planning for the 

implementation of the on-site inspection provisions of the Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe agreement, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, 

and the Chemical Weapons agreement (National Security Directive 41). 

On July 18, 1990, OSIA was tasked by National Security Directive 44 to 

manage inspection and on-site escort activities of the Threshold Test 

Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. On June 20, 1991, 

OSIA became responsible for US. inspections, evaluations, and escorts 

associated with the Vienna Document 1990/Confidence and Security 

Building Measures, which entered into force January 1, 199 1. In addition to responsibilities for arms control agreements, on July 11, 1991, 

the Director, OSIA, was designated as the DOD executive agent for DOD 

support to the United Nations’ Special Commission on Iraq to monitor 

and verify elimination of Iraq’s ballistic missile capability and weapons 

of mass destruction. 

‘Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, and the 1Jnited 

Kingdom. 

“DOD Directive ‘I&5134.2, “United States On-Site Inspection Agency,” describes OSIA’s relationship 

with other agencies. It is based on National Security Decision Directive 296, dated January 15, 1988. 

“The IJnited States retains the right to inspect former Soviet INF facilities in that part of the Federal 

Republic of Germany formerly known as East Germany since the unification of East and West Germany on October 3, 1990. According to the State Department, under a 1990 stationing agreement with 

Germany, Soviet forces will remain at the six INF facilities in former East Germany until 1994. 

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

The Director of OSIA is appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval of the President. 

The Principal Deputy Director of OSIA is appointed by the Director of the 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation appoints a deputy to coordinate counterintelligence support; the Department of State appoints a deputy who supervises OSIA 

support for the U.S. Special Verification Commission (svc) delegation, 

the interagency process, and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. 

OSIA receives policy guidance formulated by the Arms Control Policy 

Coordinating Committee and operational guidance from DOD'S Executive 

Committee. OSIA is represented on the U.S. svc delegation, and the 

Director of OSIA serves as a technical advisor in the Arms Control Policy 

Coordinating Committee’s Subcommittee for INF implementation. 

The administration’s decision to place OSIA within DOD rather than the 

State Department or ACDA is not clearly documented. However, according 

to OSIA, needed assets, experience, manpower, and other resources were 

more readily available in DOD. For example, (1) DOD had access to a large 

pool of specialists with expertise in the affected weapons systems; 

(2) DOD funds were available, through reprogramming, to begin planning; 

and (3) most facilities to be inspected were under DOD. According to OSIA, 

military discipline and familiarity with bases are critical to the inspection process. 

Despite disagreement over which executive branch agency should provide policy direction and operational 1 .ance to OSIA, and what congressional committee would oversee tl 3 agency, the basic organizational 

structure has not changed.4 Operational support remains the responsibility of DOD. DOD also provides OSIA with policy guidance formulated by 

the interagency community under the overall direction of the National 4 

Security Council, 

Arms Control Policy The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee is the principal interCoordinating 

Committee 

agency group responsible for overseeing implementation of the INF 

treaty, providing policy direction, and making the requisite judgment 

with respect to compliance and verification. This high-level committee is 

chaired by National Security Council staff and includes representatives 

4The Arms Control Authorization Act of 1989 clarified the roles of ACDA and DOD. The act specifies 

that ACDA provide recommendations to the interagency community on arms control policy guidance 

for OSIA and that DOD provide OSIA appropriate policy guidance formulated by the interagency 

community. 

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD81-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendlx I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

at the assistant secretary level of the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, 

and State; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Director of ACDA. Two subcommittees and their working 

groups support the committee on INF implementation issues. 

Subcommittee for INF 

Implementation 

The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee’s Subcommittee for 

INF Implementation considers policy issues related to treaty implementation and formulates policy guidance for OSIA and the U.S. svc delegation. 

The subcommittee is chaired by National Security Council staff and 

includes representatives from the agencies represented on the Arms 

Control Policy Coordinating Committee. The U.S. representative to svc 

and the directors of OSIA and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NHHC) 

also participate. The subcommittee is supported by three working 

groups. 

. The svc Support Group, chaired by ACDA, is responsible for formulating 

the work program and guidance for the U.S. svc delegation and preparing and coordinating guidance drawing on this work, such as providing instructions for the I7.S. Embassy in Moscow on INF 

implementation issues that are resolved outside the svc framework, 

l The Equipment and Procedures Working Group, chaired by DOD/Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is responsible for considering the technical characteristics of the equipment and operating procedures related to on-site inspections such as the X-ray imaging equipment 

for portal inspections in Votkinsk. 

. The Basing Country Working Group, chaired by State, is responsible for 

dealing with lJ.S. allies and basing country issues related to Soviet 

inspections of INF facilities located overseas. For example, this group 

will discuss how the United States plans to implement U.S. inspection 

rights at Soviet INF facilities located in former East Germany. * 

Subcommittee for 

Verification and 

Compliance 

The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee’s Subcommittee for 

Verification and Compliance is responsible for policy matters relating to 

Soviet compliance with arms control treaties, including INF. It is supported by a Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Group, 

chaired by ACDA, which provides the technical and analytical expertise 

for the preparation of arms control compliance reports. For example, 

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 

,.: 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

the group prepares the congressionally mandated annual report, Soviet 

Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.” 

Department of 

Defense 

The Director, OSIA, reports to the Secretary of Defense through an Executive Committee, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the 

Chairman, JCS. Other DOD components and the military services provide 

personnel and other support to OSIA. 

Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has primary responsibility for ensuring DOD compliance with the obligations of the INF treaty. 

This office also provided $325,000 to the Department of Energy to 

develop a system to secure data communications between NRRC and OSIA, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the military services. Additionally, the office has established two working groups to support its 

mission. 

l The INF Compliance Review Group is chaired by the Acquisition office 

and includes representatives from Policy, JCS, and General Counsel. 

l The Working Group on Implementation, chaired by Acquisition, includes 

representatives from Policy, .JCS, Air Force, Army, Navy, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, OSIA, Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Counterintelligence, Office of the General Counsel, Office of 

Public Affairs, Office of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Comptroller, 

and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 

Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reports to the Secretary of 

Defense and is primarily responsible for developing and implementing 

DOD policy concerning INF monitoring and verification activities, as well * 

as policy concerning Soviet compliance. The Under Secretary is a 

member of the DOD Executive Committee, is represented on the Arms 

Control Policy Coordinating Committee, and also designates the Secretary of Defense representative to the U.S. svc delegation. This office is 

responsible for transmitting policy guidance formulated by the interagency community to OSIA and other DOD components on matters of INF 

monitoring and verification. 

“This report is mandated by Public Law 99-145, title X, section 1002, and amended by Public Law 

100-456, title IX, 906(b). 

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-91-202 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS advises on the military aspects of implementing INF verification and 

monitoring provisions and provides temporary duty military personnel 

to fill a wide variety of functions within OSIA such as linguists and missile specialists. JCS is represented on the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee and its subcommittees and is a member of the U.S. svc 

delegation. The Chairman is also a member of the DOD Executive 

Committee. 

Defense Intelligence 

Agency 

The Defense Intelligence Agency is the primary DOD agency responsible 

for treaty monitoring and intelligence support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and ACDA. The Agency provides training and intelligence support to OSIA. In addition, the Agency participates in various INF 

interagency policy groups, including the svc Support Group and the 

Equipment and Procedures Working Group, and serves on all of the 

Director of Central Intelligence’s treaty monitoring working groups. 

Defense Investigative 

Service 

The Defense Investigative Service is primarily responsible for providing 

industrial security assistance to the four defense contractors whose 

facilities are subject to Soviet inspections under the INF treaty. As such, 

its industrial security specialists are assigned at the Hercules plant near 

Magna, Utah; the Martin Marietta plant in Middle River, Maryland; the 

General Dynamics facility in San Diego, California; and the Thiokol 

Ammunition Plant in Marshall, Texas, to review each contractor’s classified information protection plans and to ensure that the plans are carried out. These industrial security specialists also serve on OSIA escort 

teams, as needed. 

In addition, the Defense Investigative Service is involved in granting 

clearances for OSIA personnel and contractors working on INF-related l 

contracts. The Hercules plant and the Thiokol facility each are assigned 

one full-time industrial security specialist. At the other two contractor 

facilities, industrial security specialists are assigned on an as-needed 

basis. The Defense Investigative Service has also assigned one full-time 

industrial security specialist to OSIA headquarters and has plans to 

assign four more under proposed future agreements. The Service also 

participates in the intelligence community staff’s Counterintelligence 

and Security Countermeasures Arms Control Working Group. 

Defense Nuclear Agency The Defense Nuclear Agency was tasked to provide administrative support, including civilian personnel management, finance and accounting, 

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
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U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

budget and contracting, and other logistics to OSIA. The Agency provided 

$2.2 million for OSIA’S start-up costs before treaty ratification. The 

Agency also managed DOD’S research, development, and procurement of 

equipment to support OSIA’S inspection activities. Although OSIA has 

assumed responsibility for many of its administrative functions, the 

Defense Nuclear Agency continues to provide support in the areas of 

civilian personnel management, finance and accounting, engineering, 

and computer support. 

U.S. Air Force The US. Air Force is responsible for withdrawing and eliminating 

Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and associated treaty-limited items, 

providing air transportation for on-site inspection teams, and facilitating on-site inspections at its INF facilities. The Air Force also provides 

personnel to 0sIA to serve as linguists, inspectors, escorts, missile specialists, and support personnel. It also notifies the U.S. NRRC on all movement of Air Force treaty-limited items. 

The Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Air Force component of the 

U.S. Transportation Command, provides most of the air transportation 

support for OSIA’S inspection and escort operations. MAC flies U.S. inspection teams to and from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the 

two OSIA forward deployment areas at Rhein Main Air Base, Frankfurt, 

West Germany, and Yokota Air Base near Tokyo, Japan. It also provides 

air transportation for U.S. escorts and Soviet inspection teams in the 

United States to and from the Washington, D.C., and Travis Air Force 

Base, California, points of entry and the inspection sites, as well in Italy 

to and from the Rome point of entry and Sigonella Naval Base on the 

island of Sicily (near the declared U.S. INF facility at Comiso). 

MAC also services Soviet aircraft at certain points of entry and transports INF-related missiles and other treaty-limited items from Europe to 

the United States for destruction at one Air Force and two Army elimination facilities. 

At Air Force sites subject to Soviet inspections, base commanders prepare and carry out site plans to meet, house, monitor, secure, control, 

transport, and support Soviet and OSIA teams. The Air Force also oversees General Dynamics’ program for protecting sensitive programs and 

information during a Soviet inspection at Air Force Plant Number 19 in 

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
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U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

San Diego.‘) The defense contractor’s program plan is evaluated by resident Defense Investigative Service agents at the plant for its adequacy. 

The Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations provides security and 

counterintelligence support. 

U.S. Air Forces, Europe, provides temporary duty linguists and missile 

experts for OSIA escort teams and security and communications support, 

The Air Force Systems Command, Electronic Systems Division, contracted with Hughes Technical Services Corporation to install, operate, 

and maintain the permanent monitoring system used by OSIA at the 

Votkinsk portal. 

U.S. Army The U.S. Army is responsible for withdrawing and eliminating the Pershing missiles and associated treaty-limited items in accordance with the 

INF treaty provisions. Army Pershing missile system items are eliminated at Hausen, West Germany; Pueblo Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado; and Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas. Thiokol 

Corporation, Martin Marietta, and Colsa Corporation assist the Army in 

eliminating treaty-related items. The Army details personnel to OSIA to 

serve as linguists, inspectors, escorts, missile specialists, and support 

personnel, It also notifies NRRC of all actions dealing with Army treatylimited items. 

The Military Traffic Management Command, the Army component of 

the U S. Transportation Command, provides some ground transportation 

to inspection teams in the United States. U.S. Army, Europe, provides 

(1) ground transportation in Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany; (2) temporary duty linguists and missile experts for OSIA escort 

teams; and (3) security support. 

At Army bases subject to Soviet inspection, base commanders prepare 6 

and carry out site plans that provide procedures to meet, house, monitor, secure, control, transport, and support Soviet inspection and OSIA 

escort teams. At these sites, the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command personnel provide security and counterintelligence support. 

U.S. Navy Compared to the Air Force and the Army, the Navy’s role in INF implementation is somewhat limited. Its primary responsibility is to ensure 

‘kh-ierdl Dynamics formerly produced Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and launchers. 

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
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U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

that two contractors are prepared for Soviet inspections at their facilities-Martin Marietta’s Middle River Plant in Maryland and Hercules 

Plant Number 1 near Magna, Utah.’ The contractors are required to 

establish plans to accommodate Soviet inspections and to safeguard sensitive areas and information. The adequacy of information security 

plans is evaluated by resident Defense Investigative Service agents at 

the plants. Construction and service contracts with Hercules Corporation were awarded in April and May 1988 to upgrade the plant’s physical security, provide security training, and establish security teams at 

the plant’s exits and portal. The Navy also signed a contract with Martin 

Marietta for treaty compliance support in April 1988. In addition, the 

Navy provides personnel to OSIA to serve as linguists, inspectors, and 

escorts. U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, provides helicopter transportation 

for OSIA escort and Soviet inspection teams from Sigonella Naval Base to 

the U.S. INF facility at Comiso, on the island of Sicily, Italy. 

U.S. European Command Headquarters, US European Command, is the focal point for all military INF notifications pertaining to Soviet inspections of INF facilities in 

Europe. It oversees (operationally) the various components involved 

and interfaces with the basing countries and U.S. embassies in the European theater. It has overall responsibility for preparing and implementing the European theater INF on-site inspection and withdrawal 

plans and ensuring that its components prepare and implement supporting plans. 

The U.S. European Command Center disseminates all information 

relating to the European theater, including notifying the European 

basing countries’ ministries of defense. The U.S. European Command 

also chairs the theater INF steering group, which was the focal point for 

planning all INF implementation in Europe. In addition, the U.S. Euro- 4 

pean Command forwards after-action reports on Soviet inspections of 

U.S. INF facilities in Europe, prepared by its staff or its components, to 

OSIA and others. 

U.S. Pacific Command The U.S. Pacific Command’s role in INF implementation is to provide 

logistical support to OSIA inspection teams going to and from the eastern 

Soviet Union sites through Yokota Air Force Base (near Tokyo), Japan. 

7Martin Marietta produced the Pershing 1A launcher and Hercules Corporation produced the first 

stage of the Pershing II. 

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 

‘, 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

Yokota Air Base is the OSIA gateway where U.S. teams depart for Ulan 

Ude, the eastern point of entry in the Soviet Union. 

Director of Central 

Intelligence 

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is responsible for INF treaty 

monitoring activities and intelligence support to the interagency policy 

process. DCI directs and coordinates all monitoring activities. This effort 

is staffed with members from various intelligence agencies. DCI is 

responsible for coordinating requirements for collection of intelligence, 

including National Technical Means collection activities, which are 

capable of monitoring both declared and non-declared INF sites to ensure 

that INF receives the highest practical priority and that collection 

resources are used efficiently. DC1 is also responsible for producing Intelligence Community monitoring assessments. 

DCI also interacts with the INF policy groups to keep them informed of all 

monitoring activities and analysis that may relate to the verification of 

the INF treaty. In return, DCI receives policy guidance regarding the propriety and adequacy of the monitoring activities. 

DCI is also a member of the National Security Council’s Arms Control 

Policy Coordinating Committee. Along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies, DC1 participates in reviewing lists of Soviet 

inspectors for US. acceptance. 

Department of State The State Department provides diplomatic channels for contact with the 

Soviet and allied governments and coordinates INF implementation activities with the US. embassies in the five West European basing countries, 

Moscow, Czechoslovakia, and former East Germany. State’s Bureau of 

Politico-Military Affairs has primary responsibility for the Department’s 

role in INF monitoring and verification. The Bureau coordinates State’s 

positions with other units in the Department and keeps basing countries 

informed of developments concerning INF implementation. The head of 

the Bureau also serves as the Director of NRRC. 

, 

NRRC, through which all U.S. INF notifications are sent and received, provides the formal communications link with the Soviet Union on INF 

implementation. It was officially established by National Security Decision Directive 301, dated February ‘23, 1988, in compliance with a U.S.- 

Soviet Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, signed September 15, 1987. The current Director of NRRC, appointed 

by the President, is the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs 

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendlx I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

in the State Department. Although NRRC is responsible for notifications 

on other U.S.-Soviet agreements, its primary work load since it became 

operational in April 1988 has been INF notifications. The Soviets have a 

counterpart center located in its Ministry of Defense. 

State’s Arms Control Implementation Unit at the U.S. Embassy in 

Moscow provides coordination and liaison support to the Votkinsk 

portal and U.S. INF inspectors and air crews coming in and out of the 

Soviet Union, and through the U.S. ambassador, acts as a liaison with 

the Soviets. The unit is staffed with four State Department and four OSIA 

personnel. In addition, one State Department person at the U.S. Embassy 

in Tokyo flies into Ulan Ude, Soviet Union, from Yokota, Japan, with the 

U.S. inspection teams and air crew for inspections conducted in the 

eastern part of the Soviet Union. 

State’s Office of the Legal Advisor is the official U.S. repository for the 

INF treaty and participates in its interpretation. State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research participates in INF monitoring through the intelligence community and acts as a conduit between the intelligence 

community and State policy bureaus. State is also responsible for facilitating Soviet visa applications for U.S. inspectors and air crews and 

issuing U.S. visas to the Soviets. 

State is a member of the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee, 

as well as its subcommittees and working groups, and is represented on 

the US. WC delegation. In addition, State coordinates its functions with 

OSIA through an OSIA Deputy Director, appointed by State. 

Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s primary role in INF treaty implementation is to monitor Soviet inspectors’ presence and conduct counterintelligence operations. As such, the largest INF impact is at the Magna, 

Utah, portal where up to 30 Soviet inspectors are monitoring the 

facility. Magna has the third largest presence of Soviets in the United 

States, behind the diplomatic delegations in Washington, D.C., and the 

United Nations in New York City, New York. To support this operation, 

the Bureau has had to increase staffing for its Utah area office, 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has similar counterintelligence 

responsibilities at the missile destruction sites subject to Soviet inspections and at the designated points of entry where Soviet inspectors pass 

through to the inspection sites. The Bureau participates in screening the 

list of Soviet inspectors and air crews for acceptance by the United 

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

States. Furthermore, the Bureau coordinates its functions with OSIA 

through an OSIA Deputy Director, appointed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has also detailed staff to OSIA. 

Arms Control and ACDA provides advice to OSIA on arms control policy through its particiDisarmament Agency pation in the interagency policy process. In order to maintain close 

liaison between the two agencies, a senior ACDA representative, 

appointed by the ACDA Director, serves as OSIA'S Principal Deputy 

Director. 

In addition, ACDA’S Bureau of Strategic Programs chairs and manages the 

work of the svc Support Group. Its Bureau of Verification and Implementation chairs the Verification and Compliance Analysis Working 

Group. Its General Counsel provides INF treaty interpretation and legal 

advice to the interagency groups through the svc Support Group. ACDA is 

also represented on all INF-related interagency groups and is the central 

repository for the INF negotiating history. 

To facilitate ACDA'S role in the implementation of treaties and agreements in effect, a Treaty Implementation Panel has been established 

within ACDA. The panel is chaired by ACDA'S Director, and its membership 

includes the Assistant Director for Verification and Implementation, 

other ACDA Assistant Directors, the General Counsel, the svc representative, the Principal Deputy to OSIA, and others as appropriate. 

U.S. Special 

Verification 

Commission 

Delegation 

WC was established under article 13 of the INF treaty “to promote the 

objectives and implementation of the provisions of the treaty” between 

the United States and the Soviet Union. svc meets at either party’s 

request to discuss and resolve questions of compliance and to agree on L 

measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty, such 

as procedures or techniques. As of August 22,1991, there had been 

10 svc sessions averaging about 6 weeks each since the treaty entered 

into force. 

The head of the U.S. svc delegation is appointed by the Secretary of 

State, with approval of the President. It is currently headed by an 

ambassador and includes about 20 members and advisors from ACDA, the 

Departments of Energy and State, DOD'S Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, JCS, OSIA, and others. Logistical and administrative support is 

provided by ACDA and the two to four full-time U.S. svc members 

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organization for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

(including the head of the delegation) assigned to ACDA. Policy guidance 

is formulated by and received from the interagency community. 

Roles and 

Responsibilities of 

Other Agencies 

The Department of Energy participates in interagency analysis and 

policy development and, as such, is a member of the Arms Control 

Policy Coordinating Committee, its Subcommittee for INF Implementation, and svc and Equipment and Procedures Working Groups. Energy is 

also a member of the US. svc delegation and uses its laboratories in 

cooperation with DOD to develop technologies and hardware for INF onsite inspections such as the permanent monitoring system used by OSIA 

at the Votkinsk portal and the radiation detection equipment used by 

U.S. inspection teams during quota inspections. Under a contract with 

DOD'S Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Energy’s 

Argonne National Laboratory also supported and developed a system to 

secure data communications between NRRC and OSIA, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and the military services. In addition, Energy is 

responsible for handling the nuclear materials removed from the missiles subject to the treaty. 

Other U.S. agencies that play a role in supporting INF implementation 

include the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs, 

and the Department of Agriculture. These agencies provide all necessary 

assistance to OSIA at the U.S. points of entry in the processing of the 

Soviet inspection teams. 

Roles and 

Responsibilities of 

Basing Countries 

Under a December 1987 INF Basing Countries Agreement with the 

United States, the five European countries with U.S. INF facilities agreed 

to facilitate U.S. treaty implementation on their territories. As such, 

they are responsible for (1) issuing visas and other entry documents; 6 

(2) issuing clearance for flights transporting Soviet inspection teams; 

(3) waiving customs duties on inspection equipment; (4) expediting customs processing; and (5) providing food and lodging for Soviet inspectors and air crews, if requested (costs borne by the United States). 

Basing countries also assist the United States in providing two-way 

voice communications for Soviet inspectors between inspection sites and 

the Soviet embassy in the country. Although not specified in the agreement, these countries routinely facilitate Soviet inspections by providing 

in-country escorts, security personnel, and police escorts and arranging 

social activities; however, they do not provide any financial assistance 

to the U.S. treaty implementation effort. 

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix I 

U.S. Organhtlon for INF 

Treaty Implementation 

Under the agreement, each basing country has the right to change the 

designated point of entry for its territory by giving the United States 

6 months’ notice. In addition, each country has the right to review proposed lists of Soviet inspectors and air crew members, and it may object 

to some on certain grounds. Each country also has the right to designate 

specific routings to the inspection sites. 

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 

., ,A, I .’ 

I . ‘, 
Appendix II, 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) manages and conducts U.S. on-site 

inspections of Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) facilities. 

US. determination of which sites to inspect and the requirements for 

each mission are the responsibility of the interagency community. Using 

this guidance, OSIA assigns a team chief and an inspection team that is 

briefed and prepared to inspect that specific site. Many team members 

are temporary duty personnel from the mihtary services and other 

Department of Defense (DOD) components, as well as from other federal 

agencies. The treaty requires that at least two inspectors on each team 

speak the language of the inspected party, for example, Russian. 

Under the treaty, each party must submit separate lists of proposed 

(1) air crew members, (2) portal inspectors, and (3) all other inspectors. 

Each list, limited to 200 individuals, is subject to review and acceptance 

by the inspected party and the basing country, and is periodically 

updated. Currently, OSIA has access to a pool of over 800 inspectors, 

some of whom also serve as linguists. 

The Inspection Process Once the decision to conduct an inspection is made and a team is 

assigned, OSIA sends a notification message through the U.S. Nuclear 

Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) to the Soviet counterpart agency. NRRC 

also notifies the appropriate U.S. embassies, and OSIA alerts its field 

offices and other DOD components so that appropriate assistance will be 

provided. 

Notifications for inspections must include the point of entry, the estimated arrival time and date, and the names of the inspectors and air 

crew members. For baseline, quota, or closeout inspections, notification 

must be given at least 16 hours in advance of arrival at the point of 

entry and must include the date and time when the inspection site will b 

be specified. For elimination inspections, notification must be made at 

least 72 hours in advance and specify both the site to be inspected and 

whether the team will be (1) observing the process of elimination or 

(2) confirming the elimination of certain treaty items such as training 

missiles or missiles placed on static display, accidentally destroyed, or 

lost. 

In most cases, U.S. inspection teams initially assemble at OSIA headquarters in Washington, D.C., to receive prebriefings from the team chief 

before departing overseas (exceptions include instances when the team 

chief and/or other members are at overseas locations). The team is then 

transported (generally by commercial flights) to one of two OSIA forward 

deployment areas, called “gateways”-Rhein Main Air Base, Frankfurt, 

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

IJ.S. Inspectiona of Soviet Facilities 

West Germany (for sites in Czechoslovakia, the former East Germany, 

and the western Soviet Union), or Yokota Air Base, Japan (for sites in 

the eastern Soviet Union). Once the entire team is assembled at the 

gateway, it receives substantive prebriefings concerning the site and 

mission and makes final preparations such as assembling necessary 

equipment for the inspection. 

The United States, as the inspecting party, provides its own transportation to the designated Soviet point of entry. At least 6 hours before the 

scheduled departure, the inspecting party must provide, through its 

NHRC, a flight plan specifying that it is an inspection aircraft with a 

standing diplomatic clearance number and that it requires priority clearance processing. The U.S. team is flown by the Military Airlift Command 

(MAC) (usually on a C-141 cargo plane, sometimes a C-130) from the U.S. 

gateway to the designated point of entry closest to the inspection site 

(Moscow or Ulan Ude, Soviet Union; Schkeuditz, the former East Germany; or Ruzyne, Czechoslovakia). 

Upon arrival at the point of entry, U.S. inspectors and air crew are met 

by representatives from the U.S. embassy (in the Soviet Union, inspectors are met by U.S. Embassy Arms Control Implementation Unit staff) 

and Soviet in-country escorts. The inspectors and air crew then proceed 

through Customs and Immigration, which takes about an hour, and their 

inspection equipment is secured in an appropriate storage facility until 

needed. As the inspected party, the Soviets provide parking, security 

protection, servicing, and fuel for the U.S. aircraft (the United States, as 

the inspecting party, is responsible for fuel and servicing costs). The air 

crew may remain at the point of entry under escort until the end of the 

inspection period or leave the country and return later. According to 

OSIA, US. air crews rarely stay at the point of entry, whereas Soviet air 

crews almost always remain there until the inspection team departs. 6 

The inspected party provides all in-country transportation, meals, 

lodging, work space, and medical care (some costs borne by the 

inspecting party). For closeout and quota inspections, formal specification of the site to be inspected must occur between 4 and 24 hours after 

the team arrives at the point of entry. For baseline inspections, the 

treaty allows up to 48 hours for site specification. Depending on when 

the site is declared, the inspectors may be transported to the inspection 

site the same day or remain overnight at the point of entry. For baseline, 

closeout, and quota inspections, the Soviets have a maximum of 9 hours 

to transport the U.S. inspectors to the site once it is declared. 

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

Upon arrival at the site, a preinspection briefing is given by the site 

escorts and the U.S. team notifies U.S. Embassy staff that it has arrived. 

The inspection must begin within 1 hour. The treaty allows 24 hours to 

conduct baseline, closeout, and quota inspections; however, this may be 

extended by no more than 8 hours, with the approval of the in-country 

escort. There is a 4-hour post-inspection period in which a formal report 

of inspection must be prepared (in both English and Russian) and signed 

by both parties (the inspection team leader and one member of the incountry escort team) and exchanged. Once this is completed, the inspection is officially over. The United States may then either declare its 

intent to conduct a second inspection at another site (except if the 

inspection was a quota in which case no follow-on inspection is allowed) 

or return to the point of entry (where the team may also declare a 

sequential inspection or depart the country). If a follow-on inspection is 

declared, the team is then transported to the designated site without any 

unjustified delay. The team must depart through the point of entry. 

Upon return to the gateway, the team is debriefed and reports are prepared and forwarded to the policy community. This post-inspection process requires 1 or 2 days. Once this is completed, the team members 

return to their regular work sites and duties. 

Baseline Inspections Baseline inspections were conducted during the 60-day baseline period, 

from July 1 through August 29, 1988, to confirm data in the Memorandum of Understanding such as the number and technical characteristics of declared treaty-limited items. During this period, OSIA teams made 

81 separate trips into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to conduct 

117 baseline inspections at 133 declared Soviet sites. According to OSIA, 

its inspectors observed about 98 percent of the declared inventory, or 

5,366 treaty-limited items. The remaining items were said to be in b 

transit and therefore not confirmed. Inspection teams measured and 

weighed items at specific sites designated for this purpose to confirm 

technical characteristics. 

During baseline inspections, the U.S. teams identified inaccuracies in the 

information presented by the Soviets in the Memorandum of Understanding. For example, some site diagrams were inaccurate and some 

treaty-limited items differed from the type shown in photographs. However, those inaccuracies have now been corrected. Other questions and 

comments raised by the United States included the right to take notes 

(in one instance a Soviet escort took notes out of an inspector’s hands 

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

without his permission) and the availability of adequate telephone service to contact the U.S. embassy. 

Each inspection team consisted of 10 members, with senior military 

officers with previous Soviet-related experience as team chiefs. Other 

members included Soviet area specialists, Russian linguists, missile specialists, and other experts. Of the pool of 200 inspectors, 170 were 

assigned on a temporary duty basis. According to OSIA officials, there 

were many administrative problems associated with managing this large 

pool of temporary personnel. For instance, OSIA had difficulty ensuring 

that required skills were available for particular inspections. 

Closeout Inspections Each party has the right to conduct inspections to verify that all treatylimited items have been removed and all treaty-prohibited activities 

have ceased at declared missile operating bases and missile support 

facilities (other than missile production facilities). Closeout inspections 

are only permitted if conducted within 60 days after the scheduled date 

of the elimination of the facility. 

As of July 22, 1991, the United States had conducted 124 closeout 

inspections of Soviet missile operating bases and missile support facilities and found only one closeout violation. During a 1988 closeout 

inspection of the Saryozek Missile Operating Base in the Soviet Union, 

OSIA inspectors observed two SS-12 missiles and therefore did not consider all INF activities to have ceased. The official inspection report 

included a photograph and a statement on the ambiguity (as allowed by 

the treaty). The issue was raised in the Special Verification Commission 

(svc), and WC determined the inspection was invalid. In the President’s 

December 1988 report Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, the U.S. administration issued a finding that (1) the presence of b 

these treaty-limited items at a facility declared ready for “elimination” 

was in violation of the treaty and (2) the removal of these missiles from 

the boundaries of the Saryozek elimination facility (an adjacent site) 

also constituted a violation of the treaty. 

With respect to the first matter, the report stated that the United States 

would reinspect the missile operating base to establish that it is ready to 

be closed out. For the second matter, the report stated that the United 

States had told the Soviets that they could rectify the situation by 

keeping all shorter-range missiles within the current boundaries of the 

elimination facility or adjusting the boundaries, as permitted by the 

treaty. The Soviets corrected the noncompliance by redefining the 

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

boundary of the adjacent INF elimination facility to include the area 

where these missiles were found. On January 21, 1991, the United 

States reinspected the Saryozek Missile Operating Base and officially 

declared it closed-out. 

Quota/Short Notice 

Inspections 

A specified number of quota inspections of designated sites are allowed 

each treaty year and are to continue for 13 years after the treaty 

entered into force. Twenty such inspections are permitted each year for 

the first 3 years, 15 per year for the following 5 years, and 10 per year 

during the final 5 years. These inspections are restricted to declared or 

formerly declared sites (except missile production and closed out elimination facilities). They were established to help ensure treaty compliance, and they include verifying the accuracy of the number of treatylimited items declared to be at a facility, such as a missile operating base 

or support facility. 

The treaty requires at least 16 hours’ advance notification before arrival 

at the point of entry for a quota inspection. Follow-on inspections are 

not permitted after a quota inspection -the inspectors must return to 

the point of entry and, within 24 hours, leave the country. 

Team members for quota inspections include government specialists in 

the weapon system subject to inspection, as well as specialists from the 

private sector, and teams have included the same team chief who conducted the baseline inspection, Inspectors have the right to inspect the 

entire site, including interiors of structures, containers, and vehicles 

large enough to contain a treaty-limited item. For containers large 

enough to contain a treaty-limited item, external inspection consists of 

visual observation, measurement of dimensions, and use of radiation 

detection devices.’ External visual observation, including measuring, is 

allowed for containers and structures not large enough to contain a 

treaty-limited item. Inspection team members are also permitted to 

patrol the site perimeter and monitor the exits while the site is being 

inspected. The treaty allows 24 hours to conduct a quota inspection, 

which may be extended up to 8 hours if approved by the in-country 

escort. 

The United States conducted its first quota inspection in September 

1988. During the first 3 years of treaty implementation, the United 

‘Radiation detection devices are permitted to be used only at former SS-20 missile bases that have 

been converted to SS-26 missile bases. 

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
-- _.-.-- -.- 

Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

States conducted all allowable quota inspections (20 each year). Since 

the beginning of the fourth year of treaty implementation, the United 

States had conducted 2 of the allowed 15 inspections as of July 22, 1991. 

According to OSIA officials, the United States intends to conduct the 

maximum number of inspections allowed throughout the life of the 

treaty. 

Elimination 

Inspections 

All treaty-limited items were to be eliminated within 3 years-that is, 

no later than May 3 1, 199 1. The treaty also required each party to 

observe the other’s elimination of missiles, launchers, and support 

equipment. In addition, each side had the right to confirm the elimination of training items and items eliminated by being placed on static display, accidentally destroyed, or lost. 

The treaty provided for reductions in phases. For example, all shorter 

range missiles were to be eliminated within 18 months. Also, no later 

than 29 months after the treaty entered into force (by 

November 1, 1990), the number of deployed intermediate range missiles 

for each party could not exceed the number capable of carrying 

180 warheads.” 

The Soviets began eliminations on July 22, 1988, with OSIA inspectors 

present. The Soviets initially established eight elimination sites-three 

of which discontinued activities in late 1988-to destroy treaty-limited 

items. Only one type of missile was destroyed at any particular site. As 

of the end of the first 3 treaty years, OSIA had conducted 130 elimination 

inspections and the Soviets had destroyed their missiles by explosive 

demolition, launching-to-destruct, or cutting. Elimination inspections 

lasted from 2 days to over 4 weeks. Although the treaty permitted up to 

20 inspectors to participate, OSIA generally sent only one lo-person team. 

Occasionally, upon completion of an elimination inspection, the same 

team traveled to another site to conduct a closeout inspection. 

. 

During the first 6-month period of the treaty, up to 100 intermediate 

range missiles could have been eliminated by launching and 72 SS-20s 

were eliminated by this method. As of November 1989, all 957 declared 

21’hc Soviet SS-20 missile is capdblc of carrying three warheads ac opposed to the 1J.S. Pershing II and 

(irolmd I,aunchcd Cruise Missile that have a single warhead. 

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Sovlet Facilities 

Soviet shorter range missiles (718 SS-12s and 239 SS-23s) had been eliminateda3 As of September 1990, the Soviets had eliminated three types of 

its intermediate range missiles-6 SS-5s, 80 SSC-X-4s and 149 SS-4s. 

According to OSIA, the last Soviet INF treaty-limited item was eliminated 

on May 29,199l. 

Portal Monitoring at On July 2, 1988, the United States began continuous portal monitoring 

Votkinsk inspections at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Soviet Union, where 

SS-20s were assembled and where the SS-25 intercontinental ballistic 

missile (not covered by the treaty) currently is assembled. The treaty 

allows continuous monitoring for at least 3 years and up to 13 years, 

unless the Soviets discontinue the final assembly process for 12 consecutive months. 

Up to 30 U.S. inspectors are allowed on-site to carry out the portal monitoring provisions of the treaty. The U.S. inspectors at Votkinsk are on 

duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The facility is managed, on .’ 

average, by 4 to 5 OSIA staff, with the assistance of 18 to 25 contract ’ 

personnel.4 (Prior to March 1990, representatives from the Department 

of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories were also at Votkinsk to assist 

in installing the permanent monitoring system equipment.) The team 

includes contract linguists. U.S. inspectors patrol the facility’s 4.1 kilometer perimeter on foot or on skis in winter (there is no road around the 

plant) and check all exiting vehicles capable of holding treaty-limited 

items (all are rail cars). Inspection procedures include measurements, 

visual checks, and imaging.” Eight times per treaty year, the United 

States has the right to select a canister, require the Soviets to open it, 

and measure the second stage of the missile within the canister. The 

United States was not satisfied with the measuring device tested and, 

therefore, these checks have been only visual. 6 

“A number of Soviet-made SS-23s were discovered in Eastern Europe in March 1990, and the press 

reported in November 1990 that several Soviet-made SS-12s were in Iraq; however, these were not 

included in the data provided by the Soviets in the Memorandum of Iinderstanding. According to the 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, during INF negotiations, the Soviets never stated that they 

had transferred any missiles to their allies. The IJnited States is currently investigating the issue. 

4T~o full-time contractors are also stationed at OSIA’s Frankfurt field office, Rhein Main Air Base, 

West Germany, to facilitate shipments of equipment and supplies to Votkinsk. 

“During SVC meetings, both parties agreed not to exercise the right to weigh items in exchange for 

the right to inspect all vehicles large enough to contain an SS-20 missile or Pershing II first stage, 

regardless of weight. Each party implemented this on a provisional basis until SVC signed the Memorandum of Agreement in December 1989. 

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

The monitoring equipment at Votkinsk is collectively referred to as the 

Votkinsk Portal Monitoring System. This continuous monitoring system 

and its prototype-the Technical On-Site Inspection system-were 

designed by Sandia National Laboratories, Department of Energy, and 

the Electronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command. It 

includes one rail exit at the portal for inspecting vehicles, gates and 

traffic lights to control traffic, video equipment, infrared break-beam 

profilers for dimensional screening, an X-ray imaging device 

(CargoScan” ), a data collection center, a storage warehouse, three 

inspection team buildings, one administration building, and a back-up 

power generator. 

A great deal of time was required to set up full operations in Votkinsk, 

and initially only rudimentary equipment (tape measures, flashlights, 

and cameras) was available for monitoring. In July 1988, when the site 

began operations, only a few OSIA inspectors were assigned. The contracting process for site personnel did not begin in time due to the lack 

of funding prior to treaty ratification. Hughes Technical Services Company contract employees, hired to install, operate, and maintain the continuous monitoring system and to perform most of the routine inspection 

duties, began arriving in mid-August 1988 but were not fully trained for 

inspections until late September 1988. 

Several factors contributed to the delay in establishing the permanent 

monitoring system. Lack of congressional funding prior to treaty ratification prevented OSIA from beginning construction. On-site preparations 

also took more time than anticipated due to apparent disagreements on 

the Soviet side between the Ministry of Defense Industries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and poor weather conditions. In addition to 

funding problems, it took Sandia National Laboratories much longer l 

than initially estimated to develop and field the U.S. monitoring system, 

primarily a non-damaging X-ray device. This system was determined 

necessary by the policy community to verify that the Soviets were not 

illegally shipping SS-20s out of Votkinsk. The Soviet SS-25 and SS-20 

have physically identical first stages, and the Soviets refused to remove 

SS-25s from their canisters to permit the United States to verify second 

stage dimensional differences. According to OSIA, the high technology 

system may be more sophisticated than necessary, and it was developed 

for a high volume plant rather than the situation at Votkinsk where, on 

average, only one missile per week exits the portal. There is also the 

“CargoScan is a registered trademark of the Bechtel Corporation. 

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspections of Soviet Facilities 

potential for equipment reliability problems, especially in the severe 

cold weather. 

Further delays were caused by Soviet opposition to the proposed equipment. Because the technology is so complicated, it was hard to reach 

agreement on the characteristics, procedures for use, and documentation 

for the X-ray imaging system. Also, the United States was not satisfied 

with the Soviet-designed Stage Measuring device tested to measure the 

second stage of the missile inside a canister. The issues were discussed 

at numerous svc sessions. The problems with the X-ray were eventually 

resolved; however, as of August 1991, the Stage Measuring System was 

not in operation. 

In March 1990-nearly 20 months after the treaty entered into forcethe United States began using the CargoScan. (Prior to this, infrared 

break-beam profilers for dimensional screening of vehicles and manual/ 

visual measurement were the only equipment used to image vehicles and 

they often did not work.) However, from March 1 to March 10, 1990, the 

Soviet Union refused to permit the United States to exercise its INF 

treaty rights to use the newly operational CargoScan non-damaging 

image producing equipment to image three Soviet missile canisters 

exiting Votkinsk. 

On April 4, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an 

amendment to the December 1989 Memorandum of Agreement covering 

the general use, manufacture, purchase, examination, repair, storage, 

technical characteristics, and methods of use for the Stage Measuring 

System. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this 

will enable the United States to exercise its last remaining unimplemented INF verification right. The agreement specifies that (1) the Soviet 

Union will manufacture the system for measuring the length and diam- . 

eter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile and (2) the parties will contract for the United States to purchase no fewer than three systems. 

According to OSIA, as of August 7, 1991, the United States was working 

to finalize the terms of an agreement to purchase the system from a 

Soviet firm, and once this is completed the Soviets have 120 days to 

provide the systems. 

As of August 2, 199 1, 210 declared missiles had exited the portal, an 

average of one per week, and 25 canisters had been opened for inspection since operations began. In addition, since the United States began 

operating the CargoScan in March 1990,91 missiles had been imaged as 

of August 2,199l. 

Page 37 GAO/NSIADSl-262 INP Treaty Implementation 
Appendix II 

U.S. Inspectiona of Soviet FaciIIties 

The United States is responsible for paying most costs in connection 

with the portal monitoring activities such as work space, equipment, 

food, furniture, and other supplies. Some costs are borne by the Soviets 

in connection with reciprocal agreements for payment of some Soviet 

operating costs at its portal near Magna, Utah, by the U.S. side. The 

Soviets constructed four buildings, including housing and offices for the 

U.S. team. The United States built the Data Collection Center. 

The Votkinsk operation requires a large amount of logistical support. 

For example, MAC flies into Moscow once every 3 weeks to deliver supplies and transport inspectors going to or from the portal. Nine other 

flights were made into the Soviet Union carrying cargo-primarily 

equipment-for the portal. Four trips were made around September 

1988 and the others were made in 1989. 

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow coordinates with the Soviets for delivery 

of the cargo and maintains direct telephone links with OSIA portal 

inspectors. The Embassy also provides support for two inspectors from 

Votkinsk during their weekly visits to the Embassy. 

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix III 

Escorting Soviet Inspectors at U.S. INF Facilities 

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) provides escort teams and makes 

certain arrangements for Soviet inspections of U.S. Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces (INF) facilities in Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the 

Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

When the Soviet Union intends to conduct an inspection, OSIA is notified 

through the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC). For inspections 

in Europe, NRRC also contacts US. embassy officials in the basing countries who, in turn, notify the respective ministries of foreign affairs. OSIA 

notifies critical Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies 

which, in turn, inform and activate all concerned activities under their 

control. OSIA also notifies its field offices through its operations center. 

The National Military Command Center provides the communications 

link to the U.S. military commands and services, as well as other agencies. OSIA directly contacts its field offices and provides hard copy notification of all Soviet inspection activity to all organizations involved in INF 

implementation. As appropriate, the US. European Command also 

relays messages to the European basing countries’ ministries of defense. 

Notifications must be received at least 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry for baseline, closeout, and 

quota inspections. The United States and the Soviet Union must provide 

each other with a 30-day notice of an intent to conduct eliminations, and 

the Soviets are required to give 72 hours’ notice before arrival in 

country for these inspections. Portal monitoring inspections are continuous at the Hercules Plant Number 1 near Magna, Utah, but inspectors 

rotate about every 4 weeks. 

Once the point of entry is known, preparations begin at U.S. INF facilities 

accessible from that location. Site commanders or contractors are 

responsible for protecting information, material, and activities at their 6 

facilities. Basing countries also provide security personnel and police 

escorts. Each site subject to inspection must also have plans to accommodate the Soviets, such as providing a telephone link to the embassy, 

housing, food, security, and transportation. 

Upon arrival at the point of entry, Soviet inspectors and air crew are 

met by representatives from the Soviet Embassy and in-country escorts. 

The inspectors and air crew then proceed through customs and immigration. Basically, the same procedures discussed in appendix II apply to 

Soviet inspections of U.S. facilities. The status of Soviet inspections of 

U.S. INF facilities and some unique differences are described in the following sections. 

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
1 

Appendix III 

Escorting Soviet Inspectors at U.S. 

INF Facilities 

Baseline Inspections at OSIA escorted 31 Soviet inspection teams at 18 sites in the United States 

U.S. Sites and 13 sites overseas during the July to August 1988 baseline period. 

The Soviet inspection teams accounted for all declared US. treaty-limited items, including 677 intermediate range missiles and 169 shorter 

range missiles. At the overseas locations, OSIA escort teams also included 

personnel from the basing country government. 

Closeout Inspections The Soviets completed 31 closeout inspections of all U.S. INF sites on 

July 23, 1991. Seven inspections were conducted during the first treaty 

year. Five sites were closed before baseline inspections began-four in 

the United States and one in Europe-therefore, the Soviets conducted 

both baseline and closeout inspections at the same time. The Soviets conducted no closeout inspections during the second treaty year. Twentythree closeouts were conducted during the third treaty year and eight 

closeouts were conducted during the fourth treaty year. 

Quota/Short Notice #VT-T ,-b Ikpections 

Sites 

01 U.S. 

The Soviets conducted their first quota inspection in September 1988, at 

a Pershing missile operating base in West Germany. During the first 

3 treaty years, the Soviets conducted the maximum number of quota 

inspections allowed (20 per year). As of the end of July 1991, the 

Soviets had conducted 1 of the 15 quota inspections allowed during the 

fourth treaty year. 

Because only 31 U.S. INF facilities are inspectable, some sites have been 

subject to more than one Soviet quota inspection. Including the 31 baseline inspections and the 61 quota inspections conducted as of July 1991, 

several sites had been inspected four or more times. This is a burden to 

these sites because operations are halted and the sites are essentially 

closed to normal activities while the Soviets are there. 4 

Elimination 

Inspections 

The United States had four elimination sites-three in the United 

States, where most treaty-limited items were destroyed, and one in West 

Germany. All Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and launchers 

were eliminated at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona. The 

remaining three sites eliminated the Army’s Pershing missile system 

treaty-limited items. At the Pueblo Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado, 

Pershing missiles and launchers were destroyed; the Longhorn Army 

Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas, also destroyed missiles; and the 

Equipment Maintenance Center, Hausen, Frankfurt, West Germany, 

destroyed launchers. 

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix III 

Escorting Suviet Inspectors at U.S. 

INF Facilities 

-.- 

The Soviets began observing U.S. eliminations in September 1988 at 

Longhorn, Texas; the first item, a Pershing lx, was destroyed by static 

firing and crushing. Eliminations of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile 

system at Davis-Monthan were conducted around-the-clock for 2 days. 

The missiles and launchers were destroyed by cutting them into pieces. 

However, the length of elimination periods for Pershing eliminations at 

Pueblo depended on the number of missiles to be destroyed and environmental conditions. The longest elimination period, as of October 1990, 

had been 15 days. Pershing missiles were destroyed by explosive demolition or burning, the solid fuel was burned during a static firing, and the 

missile canister was then crushed. Sometimes, however, the firings had 

to be delayed 3 to 4 days because of environmental restrictions. The 

most common delaying factor was wind velocity and direction beyond 

prescribed limits. 

At the end of the 3-year elimination period, OSIA had provided escorts 

for 94 elimination inspections. All 169 U.S. Pershing 1A shorter range 

missiles had been eliminated by November 1989, within the l&month 

deadline. Several U.S. missiles had also been rendered inoperable and 

placed on display. According to OSIA, all U.S. INF treaty items were eliminated by May 6, 1991. The last Pershing II was eliminated at Longhorn 

on May 6, 199 1, and the last Ground Launched Cruise Missile was eliminated at Davis-Monthan on May 1, 1991. 

Portal Monitoring at 

Magna 

The Soviet Union began continuous monitoring operations at the Hercules Corporation Bacchus Works, near Magna, Utah, portal on 

July 2, 1988. Preparing the Magna site required a tremendous amount of 

work by several different agencies. Hercules’ planning and preparation 

began after the treaty was signed in December 1987. Construction 

started in May 1988 and was completed in December 1989. To secure 6 

operations, a fence and a road were built around the perimeter. Permanent housing for the Soviets was built between October 1988 and 

April 1989 (OSIA is providing funds to lease this building). The Navy provided funds and oversight for these contracts; Hercules managed portal 

construction through subcontractors. 

A permanent OSIA detachment is stationed at Magna to coordinate treaty 

implementation activities with Hercules and to provide around-the-clock 

support and assistance to the up to 30 Soviet inspectors monitoring the 

facility. The office is staffed with 16 US. government personnel, and it 

relies on contractor support to cover day-to-day operations. OSIA hired a 

contractor to augment its military linguists with 10 Russian speaking 

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix III 

Escorting Soviet Inspectors at U.S. 

INF Frillties 

linguists. Another contractor provides 34 escorts for the Soviet inspectors. These escorts are the 24-hour a day counterparts to the inspectors 

at the portal and they transport the Soviets for official and leisure 

activity within the designated local travel area. 

Magna has the third largest presence of Soviets in the United States, 

behind the diplomatic delegations in Washington, D.C., and the United 

Nations in New York City, New York. As such, security in the area has 

been increased. For example, OSIA has a contract with the West Jordan 

Public Safety Department to provide security at the Soviet housing complex. Thirteen police officers were added to this city function to provide 

two officers on duty around-the-clock. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has increased staffing in the area to monitor the Soviet inspectors 

and conduct counterintelligence investigations. The communications 

security posture in the Magna area has also been enhanced. 

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Personneto l Iinplement the 

INF Treaty 

In addition to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), numerous other 

Department of Defense (DOD) components, State Department units, federal agencies, interagency groups, and five basing country governments 

play a role in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty implementation. Therefore, OSIA’S costs and its assigned personnel represent 

only part of the total federal resources devoted to INF implementation. 

Other agencies have also incurred significant costs. 

However, not all cost and personnel data directly associated with INF 

implementation were readily available. Principally, this was because 

most agencies did not track the data or separately identify INF-related 

costs in their budgets. For example, the costs of full-time military personnel, some full-time civilian personnel, and all temporary duty personnel associated with implementing the INF treaty were not charged to 

INF implementation. We also identified other costs that could not be 

readily quantified but relate to INF implementation. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency declined to provide us all cost and personnel 

data. 

We identified, to the extent possible, the costs and personnel resources 

expended or budgeted by the principal organizations for INF implementation for fiscal years 1988 through 1991. We also projected some of OSIA’S 

costs for the remaining lo-year life of the treaty (fiscal years 1992 to 

2001) based on OSIA’S estimates of certain costs associated with 

inspections. 

First Year Funding 

Problems 

No funding was provided by the Congress before ratification of the INF 

treaty. As a result, funding for INF implementation either was absorbed 

within the budgets of the implementing DOD components or, for new 

activities, was provided through reprogrammed funds. For example, the 

Defense Nuclear Agency provided OSIA about $2.2 million in operations c 

and maintenance funds for start-up efforts. The Air Force also provided 

OSIA almost $9.9 million in procurement funds and $4.9 million in 

research and development funds for portal monitoring equipment before 

treaty ratification. Subsequently, the Congress approved a DOD Program 

Budget Decision, reprogramming over $82 million in operations and 

maintenance funds for fiscal year 1988 INF implementation-$67 million 

of which was released to OSIA. However, OSIA only used about $20 million, in part, because the treaty was ratified later than initially projected. In fiscal year 1989, $3.8 million in military construction funds 

was provided to OSIA through the Defense Nuclear Agency to construct 

0sIA facilities. 

Page 43 GAO/NSLAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Pemonnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

Start-up funding for some non-DOD agencies was also a problem. For 

example, the Air Force funded certain Central Intelligence Agency and 

Department of Energy activities, and DOD transferred funds to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in fiscal year 1988. 

INF Implementation 

costs 

DOD’s Costs The INP implementation costs identified by DOD agencies for fiscal years 

1988 through 1991 I are estimated to be about $427 million (see 

table IV.1). DOD categorized its costs as inspections, portal monitoring, 

missile eliminations, and other (such as administrative and communications equipment). Inspections and portal costs accounted for about 

44 percent of the total DOD costs, while eliminations and other costs 

accounted for about 30 and 26 percent, respectively. After 

fiscal year 199 1, costs should decrease because baseline and elimination 

inspections will have been completed by June 1, 1991, and only portal 

operations, closeout inspections, and a reduced number of quota inspections may continue under the treaty provisions. During fiscal years 1988 

to 1991, the largest single cost element is estimated to be for the U.S. 

Army Pershing missile eliminations-over 25 percent of the total cost 

for the period. As could be expected, OSIA is estimated to have the 

highest amount of total costs, about $146.4 million, or 34 percent, of 

DOD’s total Cost. 

I The INF treaty entered into force on .June 1, 1988. Therefore, the first 3 treaty years cover 

June 1, 1988, through May 30, 1991. However, OSIA was created in January 1988, and because federal agencies budget and account for their costs by fiscal year (Oct. 1 to Sept. 30), we present cost and 

personnel data for 4 fiscal years-1988 through 1991-throughout this appendix. 

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix N 

Costs and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

Table IV.l: DOD’s INF Treaty 

Implementation Costs by Category Dollars in millions 

Inwections 

Fiscal year 

actual projected 

1988 1989 1990’ 19918 Total 

-__ 

On-Site Inspection Agency $11.6 $20.8 $14.8 $13.6 $60.8 

-Air Force 16.7 12.1 1.3 1.7 31.8 

Army 8.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 13.0 

Navv 7.3 . 4.0 4.0 15.3 

Other Defenseb 

Subtotal 

2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 10.0 

$46.4 $36.6 $24.2 $23.7 $130.9 

Portal 

-___ 

- On-Site Inspection Agency 

Navy 

-~-- -- 

Subtotal 

Eliminations 

- 

Air Force 

__-. 

$5.4 $15.9 $12.3 $13.0 $46.6 

8.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 9.7 

-- 

$13.6 $16.4 $12.8 $13.5 $56.3 

$1.4 $5.0 $5.0 $9.3 $20.7 

Army 

.------- 

Subtotal 

12.0 23.1 34.8 37.0 106.9 

$13.4 $28.1 $39.8 $46.3 $127.6 

Other 

On-Site Inspection Agency 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

..-.---__ 

Other Defense 

--________ 

Subtotal 

$7.2 $6.5 $11.8 $13.5 $39.0 

0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.5 

1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 4.9 

.__- 

31.8 5.5 17.8 11.9 67.0 

$40.8 $13.6 $31.1 $26.9 $112.4 

Total $114.2 $94.7 $107.9 $110.4 $427.2 

aData for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 are based on DOD’s fiscal year 1991 budget, the latest DOD 

budget available at the time of our review. 

blncludes costs for the Defense Investigative Service and the Defense lntellrgence Agency 

Non-DOD Agencies’ Costs Non-DoD agencies’ costs for fiscal years 1988 through 1991 are estimated to be about $95 million and include communications, security, 

monitoring, and other equipment, as well as personnel, travel, and 

administrative expenses (see table IV.2). Equipment costs were the 

major expense. For example, the State Department purchased $1 million 

in communications equipment for the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 

(NRKC). The Department of Energy spent $8.3 million for the equipment 

used by OSIA at the Votkinsk portal monitoring facility. 

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

Table IV2 Other Agencies’ INF Treaty 

Implementation Costs Dollars in millions 

Fiscal year 

actual projected 

1988 1989 1990 1991 Total 

Energy 

Stateb 

$?xP $4.7a $0.5 $0.3 $13.3 

____-_.-- 

1.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 5.1 

Special Verification CommissionC 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.3 

Other 28.0 20.2 12.8 14.1 75.1 

-.- 

Total $37.8 $26.2 $14.7 $16.1 $94.8 

aThe Air Force funded $2.5 million for the handling of nuclear material 

bOnly includes costs for NRRC, the Bureaus of Politico-Military Affairs and European and Canadian 

Affairs, and the Legal Advisor. 

COnly includes costs for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s permanent positions for the U.S 

delegation. 

OSIA’s Costs OSIA'S costs, excluding those for military personnel, are presented in 

table IV.3. OSIA'S start-up costs for the part-year in fiscal year 1988 were 

$24.2 million; its costs averaged about $41 million per year for the next 

3 fiscal years. 0sIA’s major costs (over 58 percent of its total) were for 

travel and per diem, airlift, and portal contracts. 

c 

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendlx IV 

Co&e and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

Table IV.3: OSIA’s INF Treaty 

Implementation Costs Dollars in millions 

Operation andmaintenance 

MAC airlift 

-Portal contracts 

Fiscal year 

actual projected Percent 

1988 1989 1990 1991 Total of total 

-.-.-- --.~ 

$5.1 $10.7 $9.2 $8.9 $33.9 23 

--.--- .~ 

4.3 10.6 7.6 8.0 30.4 21 

Travel 4.5 5.3 5.5 5.0 20.3 14 

Miscellaneous contracts 2.5 2.0 3.4 5.0 13.0 9 

-, Reimbursable to Soviet9 2.5 3.9 2.3 2.3 11.0 8 

.-___ 

Rent and utilities 0.6 1.4 2.5 2.5 7.0 5 

Civilian pay 0.2 1.3 2.4 2.6 6.5 4 

________-. -- 

Field operationsb 0.4 0.8 1.8 1.6 4.6 3 

__---- 

Supply and equipment 1.5 1.2 1 .o 0.8 4.5 3 

-__.-_ --. -.--- ..~~~ 

Linauists 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.5 1 

Maintenance and printing 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.3 1 

._-- 

Training - . . 0.5 0.5 1.0 1 

----- 

Soviet expensesc 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.1 1 

Representational 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 d 

_------. 

Miscellaneouse 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.5 --2.4 2 .__I_ -.- __-. - 

Subtotal $22.9 $38.9 $36.0 $39.1 $138.9 

Military construction $ l $3.8 $ l $ l $3.8 3 

-- ----____ ..-_____ 

Procurement $1.3 $0.5 $0.9 $1 .o $3.7 3 

.-- 

Total $24.2 $43.2 $38.9 $40.1 $146.4 

NOTE. Totals may not add due to rounding. Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundrng. 

alncludes expenses for landing and navigation fees, fuel, and quarters for U.S personnel at the Votkrnsk 

portal that the United States may have to pay for. The United States and the Soviet Union are still 

negotiatrng whether to rermburse each other for these expenses or to offset them in-krnd. 

‘Includes operating expenses for OSIA field offrces at Rhein Main Air Base, Travis Air Base, and Wash 

ington Dukes; the Yokota gateway, and travel expenses for field office personnel 

Clncludes meals, lodging, and local transportation for Soviet inspectors that are paid for by OSIA 

dLess than 0 5 percent 

‘7ncludes the installatron of a local area network and reimbursements to U.S. Arr Forces, Europe, and 

US. Army, Europe. 

Future OSIA 

Inspection Costs 

” 

On the basis of data provided by OSIA, we projected some of OSIA’S costs 

for the remaining 10 years (fiscal years 1992 to 2001) of the INF treaty 

inspection regime. Other agencies were not able to provide cost estimates for implementing the INF treaty beyond fiscal year 199 1 I 

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

According to the INF treaty provisions, after the third treaty year, only 

portal monitoring, quota, and closeout inspections are permitted. For 

10 years, beginning June 1, 1991, each side will be entitled to 15 short 

notice (quota) inspections during the first 5-year period and 10 short 

notice inspections for the second 5-year period. On the basis of OSIA’S 

estimates of its average airlift and travel costs during fiscal year 1989 

for a short notice inspection, we estimate that it will cost $7.5 million in 

constant 1989 dollars to conduct all 125 inspections allowed through 

May 2001. 

OSIA estimated the costs to operate the Votkinsk and Magna portals at 

about $12.4 million annually. Assuming portal operations continue for 

the remaining 10 years, this would be an additional $124 million in constant 1989 dollars for the life of the treaty. 

INF Requires Implementing agencies have not included military and most civilian perSubstantial Personnel sonnel costs in their cost estimates. Thus far, the costs of these personnel have been absorbed by the parent agency of the personnel 

support involved. As shown in table IV.4, a large number of military personnel 

are devoted to INF implementation. While the costs are important, 

enough personnel with the skills required to support the INF treaty must 

be available. This is especially important as the United States reduces its 

military forces. Sufficient numbers of skilled personnel must be retained 

to support agreements such as the Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe and the Strategic Arms Reductions. According to OSIA officials, 

these treaties will require many of the same skills as those needed for 

INF but perhaps 10 times as many personnel. Some skills, such as linguists, may be in short supply. 

From fiscal year 1988, when the treaty was in force only 4 months, 4 

through fiscal year 1991, when eliminations were to be completed, the 

number of government civilian and military authorized positions identified by all agencies ranged from 348 to 570 positions, averaging 484 

annually. These numbers do not include a large number of temporary 

duty and other personnel who spent only a portion of their time on INF 

duties. 

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

Table iV.4: U.S. Government Civiiian and Military Authorized Positions Associated With INF Treaty implementation 

d&ariment oibefense 

Fiscal year 

1988 1989 1990 1991 

actual projected 

military civilian military civilian military civilian military civilian 

On-Site InspectIon Agency 116 16 133 44 152 71 151 68 

-.- 

Air Force 28 l 38 l 62 l 62 l 

Army 11 18 11 18- 11 22 11 22 

Defense Nuclear Aaencv 1 10 4 8 2 19 2 19 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

joint Chiefs-if $iaifT--- 

Nav; 

-- 

beiense lnvestiaatwe Service 

8 5 8 6 8 6 8 6 

- 

3 l 3 l 3 l 3 l 

19 - 10 . . . . . . 

. 3 9 3 . 3 . 4 

Other DOD 2 35 2 48 2 76 2 90 

Departme.nt of Energy 

State DeDartmenP 

-.___- 

. 23 . 12 . 2 . 1 

-_.__ 

1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 

_.. _ .--_l______ -.._ ___- 

SDeclal Venfication Commissionb . 2 l 2 . 3 l 4 

Other . 25 l 104 

Total 189 159 200 257 

. 104 l 104 

241 318 240 330 

Fiscal year totals 348 457 559 570 

aOnly includes posittons in State’s Nuclear Risk Reductton Center which primarily handles INF nottfica 

tions. State was unable to provtde the number of personnel involved in other INF activities. 

bOnly includes the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s (ACDA) permanent posttions for the U S 

SVC delegation ACDA did not Identify all personnel associated with treaty implementation. 

OSIA’S authorized positions include linguists, missile specialists, inspection team chiefs, and other technical experts and administrative support 

for INF implementation. However, these positions do not include about 

30 staff from other DOD components or agencies, who are assigned to 4 

OSIA to perform liaison, counterintelligence, and other functions. They 

also do not include contract personnel. OSIA has numerous service support contracts supporting its mission, Table IV.5 shows some examples 

of OSIA contract personnel used at the Votkinsk and Magna portals. 

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

Table IV.!% OSIA Contract Personnel at 

Votkinsk and Magna Portals Type of service Number of personnel 

Escorts for the Magna portal 34 

~- 

Security guards for the Soviet quarters near Magna 2 

Linguists for the Magna portal 10 

--__~- 

Technicians at the Votkinsk portal 25 

Total 71 

OSIA has difficulty acquiring people with the skills it needs. For instance, 

linguists have been a continual problem. OSIA now has 39 Russian linguists on its staff. Other OSIA staff also qualify as Russian language linguists and serve a dual role on inspection and escort teams. Other 

military temporary duty personnel also serve as linguists. However, 

during the baseline period of the INF treaty, OSIA had difficulties finding 

the number of linguists needed and could not assign as many as it would 

have liked to inspection and escort teams. OSIA has primarily used military linguists on the teams; however, at the Magna portal, 10 civilian 

contract linguists assist OSIA in escorting the Soviets. 

Costs and Personnel Other resources associated with INF treaty implementation have not 

Not Included in been included or recognized in agencies’ estimates. Chief among them is 

the cost for military and most civilian personnel. These costs are signifiAgencies’ Estimates cant and will increase if other treaties are agreed to with on-site inspection provisions. For example, on the basis of DOD’S fiscal year 1991 

e weighted average for military personnel costs, we estimate that 

including military personnel costs for the first 3 treaty years would 

increase total implementation costs by about $20 million, or about 

$6.6 million, annually.” 

Some costs are more difficult to quantify. Certain activities done under 

l 

the INF treaty are part of an organization’s normal duties. As noted previously, INF activities involve many personnel who devote only a portion 

of their time. Quantifying the number of personnel for such activities 

would require extensive record searches for each agency. The following 

are some of these other activities. 

“Rased on the current officer-to-enlisted ratio, DOD estimates that the weighted average cost for a 

military personnel for fiscal year 1991, which includes salary and benefits, would be about $30,400 a 

year. The average number of military positions assigned to INF for the 3 treaty years was 218. Multiplying $30,400 by 218 equals about $6.6 million. 

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costs and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has devoted agents to INF-related 

work at U.S. INF sites in addition to work contributed by authorized INF 

positions, This was primarily for counterintelligence activities when the 

Soviets inspected U.S. INF sites other than Magna, Utah. 

l Overseas, approximately 60 Air Force personnel, each for 2 to 3 days, 

are sent to closed missile bases to prepare for Soviet inspections. 

According to Air Force officials, site preparation support for active 

bases is even higher; for example, about 300 personnel are needed to 

prepare for a Soviet inspection of the Comiso (Italy) missile operating 

base. The personnel costs for site preparation support are not included 

in the Air Force’s estimate of INF costs. Similarly, the Air Force has not 

included personnel costs associated with site preparation at bases in the 

United States. Even less information was available from the Army, but 

Army officials said that they had similar personnel costs for site preparation support. 

. Temporary duty personnel from various agencies augment OSIA inspection and escort teams on an ad hoc basis. OSIA has a pool of about 600 

such personnel. Depending on the type of inspection they are assigned, 

these temporary duty personnel could be on loan to OSIA from 5 days to 

3 weeks, with the lending agencies absorbing the personnel costs. 

. Two subcommittees of the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee 

and various working groups directly support the INF treaty. Personnel 

costs for these interagency groups are absorbed by the executive agencies. Similarly, ACDA and State absorb the costs of the individuals that 

each appoints to serve as an OSIA Deputy Director. ACDA also absorbs its 

costs for supporting the U.S. svc delegation and assigning nonpermanent 

staff to the delegation. 

l Several Department of State bureaus, offices, and embassies provide a 

wide range of services in support of INF. Embassy staff in the basing 

countries coordinate with government officials and have established 

Basing Country Working Groups and other forums to address INF issues. * 

NRRC provides official INF communications between the United States 

and the Soviet Union on a 24-hour basis. The Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research assists in treaty compliance. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 

Arms Control Implementation Unit, provides logistical support for the 

portal and U.S. inspectors and air crews and acts as a liaison with the 

Soviets. State does not track its INF-related costs and personnel separately and Department officials were only able to provide estimated 

costs for some INF activities such as the Arms Control Implementation 

Unit in Moscow, for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and NRRC. 

. Other resources not counted by agencies include personnel at military 

bases who provide transportation and security support during a Soviet 

inspection and file reports at the completion of an inspection, and the 

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix Iv 

CO&E and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

US. svc delegation members who convene in Geneva, Switzerland, as 

needed. As of August 1991, these personnel had met with the Soviets 

ten times for an average of 6 weeks per session. The U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of 

Agriculture process Soviet teams when they arrive in the United States 

at a point of entry. This is part of their normal duties and is not 

reported as an INF cost. In addition, Department of Energy staff have 

made trips to the Soviet Union for baseline measurements using radiation detection equipment and installing and operating the CargoScan; 

these costs are also not included. 

l National Technical Means (such as satellite reconnaissance and remote 

sensing equipment) is used by the United States for various purposes 

and provides the majority of the information needed to determine 

whether the Soviet Union is complying with the terms of the INF treaty. 

Because these activities would exist without INF, estimating the costs 

attributable to INF is difficult, but need to be considered in estimating INF 

treaty costs. 

. Though not a U.S. cost, basing country governments absorb the costs of 

providing in-country escorts, security personnel, and police escorts to 

facilitate Soviet inspections. 

Certain Costs Cannot Be 

Quantified 

INF activities also incur costs that cannot be measured. Closing and 

reopening bases in anticipation of Soviet inspections may negatively 

affect the readiness of U.S. forces. As noted previously, preparing a site 

for a Soviet inspection requires a large amount of resources and takes 

priority. It affects training, exercises, billeting, and transportation and, 

in effect, closes the base for several days. 

The use of strategic cargo planes to ferry U.S. inspection teams back and 

forth to the Soviet Union may affect the Military Airlift Command’s 

ability to respond to other contingencies. For example, for a quota 

inspection of a Soviet facility, the United States has two aircraft ready 

(one backup). When these aircraft, specifically designed for transporting 

military cargo, are diverted to transport inspection teams they are not 

available to perform other missions. 

Finally, a Congressional Research Service study3 stated that it is inevitable that Soviet inspectors, through on-site inspections, will have 

access to sensitive information that the United States would rather not 

“On-site Inspections in Arms Control: Verifying Compliance with INF and START (Oct. 30, 1989). 

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix IV 

Costa and Personnel to Implement the 

INF Treaty 

reveal and that is not covered by the treaty. This can be considered an 

intangible cost to the United States. 

Page 63 GAO/NSlAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix V 

Iinplications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

Although a number of problems were encountered in implementing the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, including the lack of 

resources, these matters were eventually resolved, and implementation 

has generally been a success. A number of lessons were learned that 

should be considered in planning and implementing other arms control 

agreements that incorporate on-site inspection and verification provisions similar to those of the INF treaty. Such provisions are included in 

several arms agreements, including the Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty, the Nuclear 

Testing Treaties, and the Chemical Weapons agreements. 

A Better Method for 

Resolving Treaty 

Disputes May Be 

Necessary 

Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of the Special Verification Commission (svc), which was established under INF as a forum for 

resolving compliance issues and improving the viability and effectiveness of the treaty. Most of svc’s sessions related to establishing inspection procedures and the use of monitoring equipment at the Votkinsk 

portal. The negotiation process was slow. For example, it took over 

18 months-more than half the 3-year elimination period-to complete 

the Memorandum of Agreement, the authoritative document for inspection equipment and procedures and other administrative arrangements 

for all inspections. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), this 

was due to apparent Soviet attempts to limit U.S. treaty rights through 

definition of equipment and procedures. 

An informal agreement by both parties to implement provisions as they 

were agreed on proved to be awkward because no official document was 

prepared detailing what was agreed on and there was no assurance that 

these provisions would be included in the final agreement. U.S. government agencies were reluctant to divulge what had been informally 

agreed on in the negotiations. Further, the U.S. European Command 

wanted quicker feedback from svc’s negotiating process. It was also 

awkward for U.S. inspection teams when the Soviets mentioned the new 

agreements and the inspectors had no document to refer to. 

Inspectors and 

Linguists Need to Be escorts, and linguists who can be used in implementing other agreements. Personnel need to be brought on-board 4 to 6 months before a 

Identified and Readily treaty becomes effective to improve the United States’ ability to staff 

Available and fully train inspection and escort teams. Although more complex 

than previous agreements, execution of the INF inspection provisions is 

relatively simple when compared to requirements under a strategic 

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Implications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

nuclear arms reduction agreement, which will require more inspections 

at more sites-baseline, quota, portal, and elimination-and limit the 

number of systems, instead of eliminating an entire class of missile. Multiple treaties will also require many more personnel. According to DOD, 

early estimates were that up to 10 times more inspectors will be needed 

for a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreement. 

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OEM) has been training additional 

inspectors beyond its INF requirements in response to its expanding mission. As of August 199 1, OSIA’S responsibilities beyond INF included planning for or implementing the on-site inspection provisions of several 

other arms control agreements. This includes the Threshold Test Ban 

Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, the Vienna Document 

1990/Confidence and Security Building Measures, the Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 

Treaty, and both the Chemical Weapons bilateral agreement with the 

Soviets and the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention. In 

July 199 1, OSIA was also designated the DOD executive agent for DOD support to the United Nations’ Special Commission on Iraq. 

In carrying out these additional duties, OSIA’S work force is estimated to 

triple or quadruple, with the remainder being detailed or loaned from 

other departments and agencies. The number of qualified Russian linguists available during the INF baseline period proved barely adequate, 

and because resources are still limited, OSIA has contracted for civilian 

linguists at the Magna portal. Other treaties will require more personnel 

and other languages. Those requiring multiple languages would place a 

great strain on the United States’ ability to provide a sufficient number 

of linguists. 

Section 1014 of the fiscal year 1990 DOD Authorization Act requires OSIA 4 

to establish a database of potential inspectors, both government and 

nongovernment personnel, with necessary technical or linguistic skills 

that may be called upon to support on-site inspections. OSIA has begun to 

establish such a database. Although OSIA prefers to staff its inspection 

teams with military personnel, limiting its search to active and retired 

military may not yield the required number of personnel and may not 

satisfy the intent of the act. Efforts to identify personnel from other 

government agencies and the private sector with the requisite skills 

should help in planning future agreements. 

As of December 5, 1990, OSIA’S database included 1,168 individuals1,058 inspectors, 32 escorts, and 78 linguists. The list of inspectors 

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INP Treaty Implementation 
Appendix V 

Implications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

includes 965 individuals from several federal government agencies’ and 

213 contractors, primarily from the Department of Energy. The lists of 

escorts and linguists are limited to DOD personnel. The escorts are from 

OSIA and the linguists are primarily from the military services. As of 

August 19, 1991, OSIA'S database had been expanded to 2,385 inspectors 

and escorts, of which 174 were qualified as linguists. 

Obtaining personnel with the necessary technical knowledge and skills 

may become more difficult as DOD reduces its troop strength in accordance with future treaties, budgetary constraints, or the current 

emphasis to reduce the U.S. overseas military presence. Over 15,000 military and civilian positions associated with the weapons systems eliminated under the INF treaty were abolished; other treaties may result in 

even greater reductions. In addition, OSIA has had to rely on a large 

number of temporary duty personnel to conduct inspection and escort 

activities. As personnel resources become more limited and inspection 

requirements become more strenuous, OSIA'S ability to obtain temporary 

duty personnel, especially from the services, will be increasingly difficult. Care must be taken to ensure that the resources are available to 

conduct treaty inspections and provide escorts, as necessary. This may 

require stationing personnel in Europe and elsewhere for this specific 

reason to ensure that treaty provisions can be carried out. 

* Funding Is Needed Prior to INF treaty ratification, funding was not available to begin startBefore Treaty 

Ratification 

up efforts such as planning for inspections and purchasing equipment. 

Early funding would have allowed more time to prepare for the large 

number of initial baseline inspections that began shortly after the treaty 

entered into force and that had to be completed within a very short time 

period. Full operation of the portal facility was also delayed because c 

funding was not immediately available. 

Portal Monitoring Is 

Expensive 

Portal monitoring under the INF treaty is the most costly on-site inspection activity. The typical OSIA annual operating cost for one pair of portals under the treaty is about $12.4 million, $9.2 million of which is for 

Votkinsk. Over $32 million has also been spent by the Air Force and the 

Department of Energy on special monitoring equipment at Votkinsk. 

Costs to improve security at Magna have been several million dollars. 

‘Includes the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy; the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the 1J.S. Geological Survey. 

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix V 

Implications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

OSIA spends a large percentage of its budget on contracted technical support services, including inspectors, linguists, and escorts, at Votkinsk 

and Magna. 

More complex and encompassing treaties, such as reducing strategic 

nuclear forces, will include more than one permanent portal monitoring 

facility for each party. A single facility in the Soviet Union under a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks agreement is estimated to cost the United 

States as much as $30 million for initial setup and $12 million to operate 

each year. 

Complete Cost 

Information Is Not 

Available 

A realistic estimate of how much it has actually cost to implement the 

INF treaty is not available. INF has involved numerous organizations 

other than OSIA, which provide both direct and indirect support. Many 

agencies do not track costs specifically for treaty implementation, and 

much of the funding has come from existing budgets, Other treaties will 

involve even more agencies and personnel, and costs will be greater. 

Also, as arms control agreements require more resources, the cognizant 

organizations will be less able to absorb the costs. To identify all 

resources devoted to implementing a treaty, each agency with a role 

would have to track and report its costs, including the number of personnel, for each treaty. 

In an October 1990 memorandum, the Office of Management and Budget 

requested that DOD, the Departments of State and Energy, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency provide and justify estimates for certain arms control implementation-related expenses beginning with their 

budget submissions for fiscal year 1992. Implementation expenses were 

defined as funds budgeted to plan, prepare for, or carry out on-site + 

inspections and other compliance activities required by arms control 

agreements. Except for direct counterintelligence expenses, this requirement does not include costs for intelligence activities. 

Coordinating Currently, the U.S. government does not have a single national database 

Information Collected for information related to the monitoring of Soviet and U.S. inspections. 

OSIA conducts inspections of Soviet facilities and collects information; 

From Multiple Treaties the information is turned over to another agency, which prepares and 

Would Be Useful controls the inspection reports. OSIA also prepares reports on its escort 

activities. Although OSIA officials said they have access to these reports, 

at the time of our review, OSIA did not have them all. OSIA officials told 

Page 57 GAO/NSLAD91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix V 

Implications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

us that it is beneficial for team members to have prior inspection 

reports. In addition, when other treaties that have on-site inspection 

activities are agreed to, comparing reports for the same or similar sites 

will be most useful. Access to information collected from one or more 

inspection teams would enhance the United States’ ability to monitor 

and track movements at inspection sites. 

Contractors Affected 

by Treaty Provisions concerns that warrant consideration. Under the INF treaty, four U.S. contractor facilities are subject to on-site inspections for up to 13 years. 

Need to Be Consulted Two contractor facilities are subject to quota or short notice inspections, 

one is subject to elimination inspections, and another is host to the 

Soviet portal monitoring facility. Overall concerns include (1) protection 

of other contractor operations from Soviet espionage penetration, 

(2) costs of relocating and securing operations outside inspectable areas, 

(3) costs of hosting Soviet and related personnel, and (4) their firms’ 

competitiveness for future U.S. contracts given the Soviet presence. 

Contractors have also expressed their dissatisfaction with the level of 

consultations that took place prior to signing the treaty. At the INF 

portal monitoring facility near Magna, Utah, the contractor was told 

that this facility was not likely to be chosen. Nevertheless, it was, and 

facilities and equipment planned for use on other missile programs were 

within the designated portal area. According to the contractor, this was 

not necessary and could have been avoided if sufficient time were given 

to prepare. To help minimize these problems, the contractors must be 

involved in the decision process and must be given the opportunity to 

react to proposals regarding their plants and property. 

l 

Provisions Need to Be INF treaty implementation raises questions on the follow-on use of INF 

Made for Disposing of bases, facilities, and non-treaty limited equipment. Property and facili- ties ’ must be disposed of or provisions made for reuse. For example, 

Excess Equipment and there are over 200 vehicles for towing the Pershing launcher that do not 

Property have to be destroyed. These were bought specifically for the Pershing 

and, according to Army officials, the total cost was over $47 million. At 

the time of our review, the Army had no plans to use them. 

OSIA spent $3.8 million to build a field office facility at Rhein Main Air 

Base, West Germany, in support of the INF treaty. If and when other 

treaties are ratified, additional facilities will probably be required. 

According to OSIA, it will continue to use Rhein Main as a gateway as 

long as the facilities are available (estimated to be until 1993 or 1994). 

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix V 

Implications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

Alternatives to constructing new facilities for implementing future treaties could include using existing bases and facilities that are now scheduled to be closed for inspection activities, elimination sites, or housing. 

Renting or obtaining space from North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

allies could also be considered. 

Transportation and Using U.S. military cargo planes to transport INF inspection teams and to 

Housing Requirements retrograde missiles to the United States for destruction requires the use 

of the Military Airlift Command’s (MAC) strategic airlift and may not be 

Need to Be Considered cost-effective. Implementing more complex and encompassing treaties, 

particularly multiple agreements, will place an even greater burden on 

its strategic airlift capacity. Currently, MAC provides airlift for US. 

inspection teams traveling to Moscow from Frankfurt on C-141 cargo 

aircraft. Command officials in Europe suggested using smaller, passenger aircraft to economize on costs. Plans must be made to ensure that 

MAC has adequate capacity to support treaty requirements and still meet 

its other military requirements. Other alternatives could be considered 

for future treaty implementation such as using regularly scheduled commercial flights for routine trips to the Soviet Union. The Soviets used 

such flights into Washington, DC., for rotating inspectors during eliminations. In response to MAC'S increased airlift requirements in the Persian Gulf in 1990, OSIA officials stated that it began using commercial 

transportation for trips to the Soviet Union to conduct elimination 

inspections because those could be scheduled in advance. However, OSIA 

still relies on MAC for time-sensitive inspections such as a quota inspection, in order to comply with treaty time requirements. 

Housing personnel in Frankfurt, West Germany, has been a problem. 

Frankfurt is the gateway for U.S. inspectors traveling to and from most 

of the Soviet sites and the point of entry for Soviet inspections in West c 

Germany, where most of the U.S. INF overseas facilities are located. 

Often U.S. inspection team members have to stay off base in housing 

leased by OSIA. When the Soviet inspectors and their air crews arrive, 

they and their escorts are housed in on-base facilities for security reasons. This displaces other U.S. military personnel and their dependents. 

Although OSIA has recently added an on-base housing facility by renovating an old Army battalion building, it will alleviate the problem only 

for the short term. In the longer term, with additional arms control treaties, housing in Frankfurt could still be a problem, especially if OSIA 

decides to allow accompanied tours for its personnel stationed in Frankfurt, Off-base housing is difficult to find in the Frankfurt area, especially during certain times of the year when the city is hosting fairs and 

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix V 

Implications of the INF Treaty for 

Other Agreements 

conventions. Consideration should be given to using another location as 

a gateway and/or point of entry in West Germany or providing funds to 

build additional housing. 

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 

.’ 
Appendix VI 

Scope and Methodology 

Our work was conducted in the United States, West Germany, and the 

United Kingdom. In the United States, we interviewed officials and 

reviewed records at the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of Energy and State, and the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency, including the IJ.S. Special Verification Commission (svc), to determine their role in the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty implementation. We held discussions with 

two defense contractors whose facilities are subject to Soviet inspections 

and a private contractor who provides escorts for the Soviets in Utah to 

obtain their views on treaty implementation issues. 

We visited OSIA field offices at Dulles Airport, Washington, D.C., and 

Travis Air Force Base, California, and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile destruction site at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona. 

We also toured the Soviet portal at Hercules Plant Number 1, near 

Magna, Utah, and a former Pershing launcher production facility at 

Martin Marietta, Middle River, Maryland. 

Our work in Europe was conducted at OSIA’S Frankfurt field office, the 

major U.S. military commands, selected U.S. INF facilities, and U.S. 

Embassies in Bonn, West Germany, and London, England, as well as the 

German and British Ministries of Defense. In Germany, we interviewed 

officials and reviewed records at OSIA; U.S. European Command Headquarters, Stuttgart; U.S. Air Forces, Europe, Ramstein; and U.S. Army, 

Europe, Heidelberg. We also met with base commanders and toured U.S. 

INF facilities at a Pershing missile operating base, a Pershing launcher 

destruction site, and Ground Launched Cruise Missile operating bases in 

West Germany and the United Kingdom. 

We also reviewed selected reports on US. inspections of Soviet facilities 

and US. escort of Soviet inspectors and internal and external reports on 

& 

INY issues. However, certain documents and records were not made 

available to us. We were not provided access to relevant National 

Security Decision Directives, information on the issues being discussed 

in svc, or most of the U.S. inspection reports. We also had limited access 

to intelligence agency officials, who play a key role in carrying out the 

INF treaty. 

Our work was conducted from January 1989 through December 1990. In 

addition, we updated certain information during July and August 1991. 

Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report 

National Security and Albert H. Huntington, III, Assistant Director 

International Affairs 

Mary K. Quinlan, Evaluator-in-Charge 

Steven M. Irwin, Evaluator 

Division, Washington, 

DC. 

izi ~~n~c~~~~~~~Evaluator 

, 

(4f37434) 

(487386) Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-91-262 INF Treaty Implementation 
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