GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2000 DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Air Force Report on

Contractor Support Is

Narrowly Focused

GAO/NSIAD-00-115

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air Force

Materiel Command Systems and Subsystems as of

March 2000 22

Related GAO Products 30

Tables Table 1: GAO Analysis of Systems Using or Planning to Use Various

Types of Support Arrangements as of March 2000 10

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-284930 Letr

April 20, 2000

Congressional Committees

For many years, the Air Force has relied on contractors for most of the

required logistics support for aircraft that are similar to commercially

available aircraft.1 Examples of aircraft using this kind of support include

the C-9 aeromedical evacuation aircraft and the KC-10 tanker/airlift

aircraft. Also, some high-cost, classified systems that are produced in small

quantities, such as the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, use this type of support

arrangement. Using such an arrangement for systems similar to those used

in the private sector can result in savings because it is possible to share

common parts supply and other support structure costs, such as

maintenance facilities and personnel, with other public and private sector

users. Since the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the

services have initiated actions to expand the use of such contractor

logistics support to other military programs. The Air Force is the service

with the most extensive use of this logistics support strategy.

Section 344 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000

required the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to the Congress

by February 1, 2000, identifying all Air Force programs that are currently

using or planning to use a program the Air Force refers to as Total System

Performance Responsibility or similar contractor support programs.2 For

these contractor-supported programs, the report was to include an

evaluation of how the programs support warfighting readiness and how the

programs complement the support provided by the government's logistics

depots and affect core government logistics management skills. The

evaluation was also to address the process and criteria used by the Air

1

Contractor logistics support includes such functions as determining requirements for spare

and repair parts, engineering services, and maintenance and is usually provided on a longterm basis.

2 Though there is not an established definition, the term “Total System Performance

Responsibility “ has generally been used to describe forms of long-term contractor logistics

support under which a contractor, rather than the government, is responsible for the

integration of logistics support functions such as providing engineering support, identifying

requirements for spare and repair parts, and performing maintenance on weapon systems.

Section 344 does not contain either a definition or a description of Total System

Performance Responsibility.
B-284930

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Force to determine whether government employees or the private sector

can perform logistics management functions more cost-effectively.

By a letter dated February 11, 2000, the Air Force submitted the Total

System Performance Responsibility report to the Congress. The report is

3 pages long, with a 2-page attachment providing a definition of Total

System Performance Responsibility and a listing of eight programs—four

current programs, two planned programs and two similar programs. The

body of the report listed the mandated requirements and gave a oneparagraph discussion on two issues and a five-paragraph discussion on the

third issue.

Section 344 also required us to evaluate the Air Force's report and report to

the Congress. Accordingly, this report addresses the extent to which the Air

Force's report provides a comprehensive treatment of issues required by

section 344 and gives a complete picture concerning the Air Force's

reliance on Total System Performance Responsibility and similar programs.

Specifically, we address the extent to which the report (1) identified

programs or systems3 using or planning to use contractor support

arrangements, (2) supported the Air Force's view that the contractor

support provides equal or superior warfighting capabilities; (3) identified

the impact of such support arrangements on the government's logistics

depots and core government logistics management skills; and (4) identified

processes and criteria followed in determining whether government

employees or the private sector can perform logistics management

functions more cost-effectively.

Results in Brief Overall, the Air Force's report, through use of a narrow definition of terms,

does not provide as complete a picture as it might have concerning the Air

Force's reliance on Total System Performance Responsibility and similar

programs. Further, the report provides only limited responses to specific

questions contained in section 344. Specifically:

3 In responding to the section 344 requirement to report on programs, the Air Force was

system specific in its reporting. Accordingly, we also provide information on a system basis.
B-284930

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• Although the Air Force was required to identify all of its programs that

are using or planning to use such support arrangements, the definitions

used resulted in the identification of eight programs or systems as using

or planning to use such support arrangements.4 Given the lack of

definitions for Total System Performance Responsibility and similar

programs in section 344, we do not question the legal propriety of the

definitions the Air Force used in its report. However, a more complete

picture of the Air Force's use of multifunction, long-term contractor

support would include many other systems and subsystems, including

those using interim contractor support arrangements involving multiple

logistics functions that usually extend for long periods of time. The Air

Force could have included at least 75 systems that are using or planning

to use such support arrangements.5

• Although the Air Force was required to report on how these contractor

support arrangements are expected to support readiness and

warfighting capability, it provided a limited analysis for its conclusion.

While the report generally links the use of such support arrangements to

equal or better weapon system availability and readiness, the impact of

such support arrangements on readiness is uncertain because other

factors that affect these areas are not addressed. For example, while the

aircraft systems with such support arrangements have higher mission

capable rates compared to other systems, they also have advantages

that have contributed to this success. Contributing factors are that

aircraft receiving this contractor support are relatively new and have a

small fleet size, which contribute to fewer maintenance problems and a

less complex supply chain.

• While the report was expected to address the impact of these contractor

support arrangements on the government's logistics depots and on core

government logistics management skills, the report provided only

cursory comments on the process the Air Force used to make workload

allocation decisions for depot maintenance. It did not discuss the impact

of contractor support on government depot maintenance capabilities or

address other logistics management skills that may need to be

maintained in-house. Thus, the report did not provide a clear picture of

4 The report also acknowledges that the Air Force currently manages 27 major weapon

systems and many other simulator or equipment items through contractor logistics support

but does not cite them specifically or include them in its analysis.

5 As used in this report, the term “system” refers to systems such as aircraft, missiles, radar,

and ground communications systems and to subsystems such as engines and avionics.
B-284930

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

the impact of contractor support on core government logistics

management skills, including that required for the military depots.

• In responding to the requirement to identify the processes and criteria

followed in determining whether government employees or the private

sector can perform logistics management functions more

cost-effectively, the report states that a business case analysis6 or a cost

comparison is performed to determine the best value solution. However,

our work shows that this process is not always followed. For example,

the Air Force decided on a future support strategy for the Joint

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System without performing a business

case analysis or a cost comparison. Additionally, when a business case

analysis is performed, the analysis is sometimes limited.

Background The Air Force has for many years used the term contractor logistics

support to describe its strategy of using contractors to provide long-term

logistics support in such functional areas as supply management,

engineering, and depot maintenance. The term “interim contractor

support” is used when the support capability is expected to be transitioned

eventually from the contractor to the government. For some programs,

such as missile or electronic systems, warranties have been included in

contracts with equipment manufacturers that, in essence, may result in

long-term contractor support.7 Terms such as flexible sustainment and

Total System Performance Responsibility have been used more recently for

long-term contractor support arrangements that have given contractors

greater responsibilities and control for support of military systems and

equipment. While no formal definition of Total System Performance

Responsibility has been established, Air Force officials state generally that

the difference between Total System Performance Responsibility and

contractor logistics support is that for the former category, the contractor,

rather than the government, is the integrator of all the support functions.

6 A business case analysis is a review or an assessment of business-related issues regarding

a specific action or recommended change. This process involves the identification of time,

resources, management, cost, timing and quantification of savings and other tangible

results.

7 Under a warranty, a contractor provides whatever support activities are necessary to

assure that the system is available whenever needed and the cost of this service is generally

included in the contract price. Some of the more recent warranties were for as much as 10

to 20 years.
B-284930

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Under other forms of contractor logistics support, the government is the

integrator of the support functions.

Regardless of definitions, the extent of contracting for logistics support has

often been a source of concern and debate between DOD and the Congress

and has led to various legislative provisions affecting DOD's ability to

contract with the private sector for logistics support services. One such

provision is 10 U.S.C. 2466, which provides that not more than 50 percent of

the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or a

defense agency for depot-level maintenance and repair can be used to

contract for private sector performance. Another provision is 10 U.S.C.

2464, which provides for core logistics capability that is to be identified by

the Secretary of Defense and to be owned and operated by the

government.8

We have issued reports in recent years addressing the allocation of depot

maintenance work between the public and private sectors. In March 2000,

we provided testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness and

Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, on the

Secretary of the Air Force's waiver of the 50-percent limitation on the use

of contractor maintenance.9 With the percentage of such private sector

support to the Air Force growing closer to the 50-percent ceiling in recent

years, Members of Congress have expressed concern about increased

reliance on contractor support. A list of related products is included at the

end of this letter.

8 Core capability is the equipment, personnel, and services needed to repair or maintain

weapon systems or other military equipment to ensure an effective and timely response to a

mobilization, national defense contingencies or other emergencies.

9 Depot Maintenance: Air Force Faces Challenges in Managing to 50-50 Ceiling

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-112, Mar. 3, 2000).
B-284930

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Report Presents

Limited View of the

Use of Total System

Performance

Responsibility or

Similar Programs

While it was required to identify all Air Force programs that are currently

using or planning to use Total System Performance Responsibility or

similar programs, the Air Force used a narrow definition of terms. Given

the absence of definitions in the legislation, the Air Force has broad

discretion in defining terms for reporting purposes. Nevertheless, our

analysis shows that the Air Force is using or planning to use long-term

multifunction contractor support arrangements for many other systems in

addition to the eight identified in the report.

Air Force Criteria Section 344 mandated that the Air Force report to the Congress, identifying

all programs using or planning to use Total System Performance

Responsibility or similar programs. The report focuses only on eight

weapon system platforms. For purposes of its report, the Air Force defined

Total System Performance Responsibility as “a product support strategy for

major weapon system platforms whereby one or a limited number of

contractors are responsible for system modifications, integration tasks and

sustainment tasks to meet warfighter requirements.10 The government

remains accountable for program execution.” The Air Force defined

“similar programs” as those programs where contractors perform some or

all of the logistics functions in support of major weapon system platforms.

The report identifies four systems that currently use Total System

Performance Responsibility—the B-2 bomber, the F-117 fighter, the C-17

cargo aircraft, and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. The report also

lists two systems planning to use Total System Performance

Responsibility—the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and the Joint Surveillance

and Target Attack System. It also identifies two systems using similar

support programs—the KC-10 tanker/airlift and the E-4 command and

control aircraft. While the report also states there are 27 weapon systems

and many other simulator or equipment items using contractor logistics

support, only 2 of these are major weapon system platforms—the KC-10

tanker aircraft and the E-4 command and control aircraft. Thus, only those

two were reported as similar programs.

Given the lack of definitions for Total System Performance Responsibility

and similar programs in section 344, we do not question the legal propriety

10 While the report does not define the term “platform,” Air Force officials told us that the

term refers to systems that deliver a weapon such as bomber and fighter aircraft.
B-284930

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

of the definitions the Air Force used in its report. However, a more

complete picture of the Air Force's use of multifunction, long-term

contractor support would include many other systems and subsystems,

including those using interim contractor support arrangements involving

multiple logistics functions that usually extend for long periods of time. It

would also include contractor warranties, which involve multiple functions

provided under long-term contracts.11

In discussions with Air Force program managers, we identified 127 systems

and subsystems that managers are currently managing and obtained

information on the type of support arrangements used or being planned.

Using the more complete set of factors noted above, we identified 67

additional systems—for a total of 75 that are using or planning to use

various forms of multifunction, long-term contractor support. Of those

remaining, 39 systems are using other logistics support strategies—10

using government support and 29 using or planning to use a combination of

public and private sector support; the type of support to be used for 13

systems had not yet been determined at the time of our review. These are

summarized in appendix I.

A breakdown of the 127 systems included in our analysis is shown in

table 1.

11 Interim contractor support or warranties for individual components were not part of this

analysis unless they were included in systems that were described as having mixed support

strategies.
B-284930

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Table 1: GAO Analysis of Systems Using or Planning to Use Various Types of

Support Arrangements as of March 2000

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

An example of a system that could have been included in the Air Force's

report is the Space Based Infrared System. This system shows that

programs other than weapon system platforms may be large and costly, and

their inclusion could be important to providing a more complete picture of

planned use of long-term multifunctional contractor support. The system is

a replacement for the Defense Support Program, which provides early

detection and warning of missile and space launches. It has an expected

acquisition cost of $1.5 billion, and it is to be supported under a contractor

support arrangement. The Air Force plans for a contractor to provide most

support activities —including provisioning, spare parts management, and

depot maintenance. This new system is expected to replace the old system

on an incremental basis beginning in fiscal year 2000, and the government

infrastructure that supports the old system will be phased out.

Type program

Type of support

in use

Type of support

planned Total

Multifunctional long-term contractor support

Total System

Performance

Responsibility 4 5

Contractor logistics

support 33 13

Contractor warranty 7 11

Interim contractor

support 0 2

Subtotal 44 31 75

Other

Government

supported 10 0

Mixed public/private 26 3

Not yet determined None 13

Subtotal 36 16 52

Total 80 47 127
B-284930

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Report Provides

Insufficient Evidence

That Contractor

Support Is Equal to or

Better Than Other

Support Arrangements

Although the Air Force was required to report on how Total System

Performance Responsibility and similar contractor support programs are

expected to support readiness and warfighting capability, the Air Force

provided limited support to the conclusion it reached. While the report

generally links the use of this type of contractor support arrangement to

increased weapon system availability and readiness, it does not provide a

sufficient basis for reaching that conclusion.

The report states that in fiscal year 1999 mission capable rates12 were

higher for aircraft systems with Total System Performance Responsibility

support (F-117, KC-10, and C-17) than for other systems not supported by

this type of support strategy. The report also states that, while direct

comparisons are difficult, in general, logistics support provided by

contractors had been equal to or better than support provided by

government sources such as government depots. However, based on the

report, it is not possible to determine whether contractor-provided support

is equal or superior.

Several factors that were not addressed in the report can affect mission

capable rates, leaving unclear to what extent contractor-provided logistics

support was the major source of improved logistics support. For example,

while the aircraft systems with contractor support arrangements have

higher mission capable rates compared to the other systems, they also have

advantages that may have contributed to this success. One key factor is

that aircraft receiving contractor support are relatively new and have

smaller fleet sizes, which can result in fewer maintenance problems and a

less complex supply chain. Conversely, the traditionally supported aircraft

noted by the Air Force (F-15, F-16, KC-135, C-5, and C-141) tend to be older

and have larger fleet size, leading to more maintenance needs and a more

complex supply chain. For example, the average number of deployed

aircraft for the systems identified in the Air Force report as using Total

System Performance Responsibility was 59, while the average size of the

five reported aircraft that were traditionally supported was 586. The

contractor-supported aircraft were deployed during the 1980s and 1990s

compared to deployment dates in the 1960s and 1970s for the traditionally

supported aircraft.

12 Mission capable rates represent the percentage of time that an aircraft is partially or fully

mission capable.
B-284930

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Funding support for readiness is also a critical element that can influence

mission capable rates. For example, the Air Force has to prioritize

requirements and determine at what level various requirements can be

funded. According to Air Force officials at operating commands, funding

that is designated for and restricted by specific programs, such as Total

System Performance Responsibility, becomes obligations that are often

characterized as “must-pay” bills and they have funding priority over other

programs. While this funding commitment helps the programs that have

contractor support, they can create greater funding pressures on other

programs that sometimes have to absorb the impact of unanticipated

requirements that emerge during the year. For example, in November 1999,

Air Force Space Command officials who are responsible for funding certain

requirements for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile total support

contract expressed concerns that contract cost growth was reducing the

Command's operation and support flexibility in other areas.

Implications for

Logistics Depots and

Military Core Logistics

Management Skills Are

Not Fully Discussed

While the Air Force's report was expected to address the impact of Total

System Performance Responsibility and similar programs on logistics

depots and core government logistics management skills,13 the report

provided only cursory comments on the use of their decision process to

make workload allocation decisions for depot maintenance. It does not

discuss the impact of contractor support on government depot

maintenance capabilities, as required by section 344. Additionally, it does

not address other logistics management skills that may need to be

maintained in-house. Thus, the report does not provide a clear picture of

the impact of long-term contractor logistics support on core government

logistics management skills, including the military depots.

Although the report indicates that the Air Force routinely evaluates the

impact on core capabilities prior to a decision to contract out depot

maintenance, this is not always done. Available information indicates that

the Air Force has contracted out workloads in the past without

reevaluating the impact on core. For example:

13 As used in this report, the term “core logistics management skills” includes management

and technical capabilities necessary to fulfill the agencies’ logistics mission responsibilities.

It goes beyond the traditional use of the term “core” which, under 10 U.S.C. 2464, generally

relates to depot maintenance functions.
B-284930

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• In 1996, the Air Force privatized in place aircraft and missile inertial

guidance and navigation systems work previously performed at the

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center in Newark, Ohio. Prior to the

closure of this depot, the workload in this facility had been identified as

100 percent core. About 900,000 hours of depot maintenance workload

was involved.

• In 1997, the Air Force contracted out support for a new radar system

after having earlier determined that this was core work.

• In 1998, the Air Force contracted for total contractor support of the

F100-229 engine, although that work had been previously identified as

core work.

According to key officials at the Air Force Materiel Command, the

maintenance depots are not getting work involving new, advanced

technology weapon systems that they would need to have if they are to

establish and maintain core capabilities in these areas. This view was

discussed in a February 9, 2000, memorandum from the Ogden Air Logistics

Center to Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command that stated:

“Infusion of new technology workloads from new weapon systems is essential to maintain

core. Therefore the future of the [air logistics center] is contingent upon acquiring

workloads in each technical repair center that will continue to provide a viable organic

source of repair for the using commands. If an [air logistics center] is determined core or

best value in a particular technology, then any new weapon system acquired that has the

associated technology should have the respective core allocation from day one of the

sustainment life cycle. The core determination is weighted heavily towards older high surge

workloads. Depots are provided new workloads often only after the original equipment

manufacturer loses interest.”

In addition to concerns about depot maintenance core capabilities, various

logistics center personnel have also raised concerns about the need to

retain in-house technical and management capabilities in related functional

areas. These could include such functions as supply management and

engineering. As responsibilities for integration and support of a system are

consolidated with individual contractors, the government may no longer

have a requirement to perform certain of these functions. However, since

the Air Force does not have a formal process for evaluating core

requirements in this area, it is not clear whether the Air Force has

evaluated these functional areas of logistics to determine how much, if any,

capability or expertise should nonetheless be retained within the

government to assure continued performance. The Air Force is currently

considering contracting out many of these positions.
B-284930

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Reported Process and

Criteria for Making

Contractor Support

Decisions Are Not

Always Being Followed

In responding to the requirement to identify the processes and criteria

followed in making contractor support decisions, the Air Force states that

it bases these decisions on a business case analysis; our work, however,

shows that this process is not always being followed. Additionally, when a

business case analysis is performed, the analysis is often limited.

The Air Force's report indicates that, to determine the best value solution

for the Air Force's logistics support needs, a business case analysis or a

cost comparison is performed, which includes consideration of total

system costs and performance factors. It also indicates that the extent and

timing of the assessments may vary depending on individual program

circumstances and, if applicable, Office of Management and Budget

Circular A-76 cost comparison procedures are used to support portions of

these decisions. However, our prior14 and ongoing reviews of the processes

used by the Air Force Materiel Command to make its determinations

concerning contractor support arrangements showed that they were often

implemented or planned as long-range sole-source relationships with prime

contractors without performing a detailed business case analysis. In some

cases, where such analyses were done, the analysis was limited. Further,

we found that the Air Force had often concluded that A-76 procedures did

not apply.

For example, without a supporting analysis, in November 1999 the Air

Force approved acquisition plans that call for a transfer of the

responsibility for system support for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System from the government to a contractor. The Air Force expects

to reduce support costs and improve system availability by awarding a

multimillion dollar, 5-year, sole-source contract in July 2000. The contractor

is to assume support responsibility that includes the air vehicle, ground

support systems, operational and maintenance trainers, supply chain and

spares management, systems engineering, and technical data. According to

program office officials, an A-76 cost comparison is not applicable to any

part of the initiative because this future support arrangement is viewed as

reengineering the function rather than simply transferring work to

14 Defense Depot Maintenance: Contracting Approaches Should Address Workload

Characteristics (GAO/NSIAD-98-130, June 15, 1998).
B-284930

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

the private sector. They also pointed out that a cost model will be

developed and that source-of-repair assignment decisions15 will be made as

necessary. However, as of March 2000, the program office had not

performed a cost-benefit analysis of this future support arrangement. In

commenting on our draft report, Air Force officials stated that the program

office intends to do a business case analysis when cost data becomes

available from the contractor.

Our ongoing review of contracting out in the Air Force Materiel Command

also shows that in those instances where cost comparisons or business

case analyses were completed or are being planned, the analyses often

were, or are expected to be, limited to (1) a comparison of current and

projected program operating costs using existing strategy to contractors'

cost estimates without consideration of whether the Air Force-managed

program could be improved or (2) only the depot maintenance activity. For

example, in December 1997, the program office awarded a competitive,

15-year contract for support for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

System. The contract provides that the contractor is responsible for system

support integration and for system support, major modifications, and

subcontractor management. A program office analysis reported that the

total support contract would save $1.2 billion over the contract period—the

difference between the estimated costs of the current strategy and the

proposed contractor costs. However, we found that the estimated savings

could be inflated because the program office (1) did not identify whether

internal improvements to current performance were feasible to reduce

program costs in the out years and (2) made the assumption that actual

program funding in future years will be the same as the funding requested

(which generally proves not to be the case).

Agency Comments We requested comments on a draft copy of this report from the Department

of Defense. On April 13, 2000, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense (Maintenance Policy, Programs, and Resources) and the Deputy

Division Chief for Maintenance Management, in the Office of the Deputy

Chief of Staff Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and

representatives from other Air Force Headquarters offices, including

Acquisition and General Counsel, provided oral comments. They generally

15 Source-of-repair analysis is the process the Air Force uses to determine whether a

government activity or a contractor will provide depot maintenance. The process results in

an assignment decision to a government depot or to the private sector.
B-284930

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

agreed with the facts presented but expressed some concerns about our

observations in these areas: (1) the scope of systems included in our

definition of Total System Performance Responsibility and similar

programs, (2) our discussion of core logistics management skills, and (3) a

statement that the depots are not getting new advanced technologies. They

also made several technical comments for clarification. Where appropriate,

the body of the report has been changed to reflect these comments.

Air Force officials stated that our definition of Total Systems Performance

Responsibility and similar programs went broader than they believe the

Congress intended. They also said they believe that warranties and interim

contractor support should not be considered as Total Systems Performance

Responsibility systems because the contractor does not function as the

integrator as it does for Total Systems Performance Responsibility systems.

We do not question the legal propriety of the definitions of Total Systems

Performance Responsibility and similar programs used in the Air Force

report. However, since the Air Force's definition, which limited the report

to eight major weapon system platforms, included systems using

contractor logistics support—a long-term, multifunction contractor

support strategy where the government, rather than the contractor, is the

integrator—we considered it appropriate to reflect other systems that also

use this long-term multifunction contract strategy. Regarding the question

of whether warranty and interim contractor support programs should have

been identified as similar programs, since they also provide long-term,

multifunction contractor support, we also consider it appropriate to

identify systems using these support strategies.

Air Force officials also disagreed with our observation that the Air Force

does not have a process for determining core logistics management skills.

They said it has a process for evaluating depot maintenance core (the

equipment, personnel, and services needed to repair or maintain weapon

systems to ensure an effective and timely response to a mobilization or

other national emergency), and in their view, core logistics management

skills are those skills necessary to manage core depot maintenance

workloads. Our draft report distinguished between core logistics

management skills, which includes various logistics management skills

necessary to fulfill the Department's logistics mission responsibilities, and

those core skills that only represent one logistics function—depot

maintenance. However, we added a definition of core logistics skills to

further clarify the distinction made in our report.
B-284930

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Finally, Air Force officials disagreed with a statement in our report that the

maintenance depots are not getting work that involves incorporating new

advanced technologies on new weapon systems and components—work

that is needed to establish core capability for these systems. They said that

the Air Force considers the technological needs of its depots through the

depot maintenance core assessment methodology, which includes an

analysis of technology requirements for depots. However, according to

information provided us by officials at Air Force logistics centers, the Air

Force's current core assessments are limited to evaluating the

technological needs only for the current year's requirements, not

longer-term requirements to support new system technologies.

Additionally, the core analysis process tends to drive older technology

systems into the depots, rather than newer ones, since the private sector is

often no longer interested in the repair of older technology systems and

components. Thus, the core process would not generally provide for the

infusion of technology capabilities needed to support newer systems. For

example, as the C-141 cargo aircraft is being phased out of the inventory,

the Air Force's core methodology does not provide for acquiring the

capabilities for technologies needed to support the replacement aircraft,

the C-17, as it is phasing into the inventory.

Scope and

Methodology

In analyzing the Air Force's report, we relied heavily upon our prior work

and our ongoing work regarding the Department of Defense's and the

services' contracting out plans. We interviewed officials responsible for

preparing the Air Force's report but did not attempt to verify the data

provided in the Air Force's report.

To address the extent to which the report identified programs or systems

using or planning to use Total System Performance Responsibility and

similar programs, we used information being compiled from an ongoing

assignment concerning contracting out plans for the Air Force Materiel

Command. We visited system program offices at the Aeronautical Systems

Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Air Armament Center,

Elgin Air Force Base, Florida; the Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air

Force Base, Massachusetts; and the Space and Missile Systems Center, Los

Angeles Air Force Base, California. We also visited program offices at the

Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah; the Warner Robins

Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; the Sacramento Air

Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, California; the Oklahoma City

Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and the San

Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.
B-284930

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

At each program office, we examined proposals, acquisition strategy plans,

and related Air Force evaluations to identify the current support strategy or

planned strategy for the systems and subsystems managed by the program

office. We also discussed the use or planned use of Total System

Performance Responsibility and similar contractor support strategies with

officials responsible for program management.

In evaluating whether the Air Force supported its view that contractor

support provides equal or superior warfighting capabilities, we examined

the trend in mission capable rates for the eight systems for the 5-year

period, fiscal years 1995 through 1999. We also obtained from the program

offices information on factors that contributed to high or low rates.

To determine whether the Air Force's report adequately addressed the

impact of contract support arrangements on the government's logistics

depots and core government logistics management skills, we examined the

statutory requirements regarding contracting for depot maintenance and

for the retention of an in-house core logistics capability. We identified prior

examples where the Air Force had determined that workload previously

determined to be core was subsequently contracted out. We also discussed

the impact of contractor logistics support with officials at Air Force air

logistics centers and system program offices.

To determine whether the Air Force report provided a comprehensive

treatment of the process and criteria followed in determining whether

government or the private sector can perform logistics management

functions more cost-effectively, we reviewed applicable Air Force

regulations and instructions regarding the requirements for analyzing

cost-effectiveness of support strategies. We also examined cost analyses

done by the system program offices to identify the factors and elements

that were considered in such analyses. Finally, we discussed

cost-effectiveness of support strategies in use or planned with officials in

the system program offices.

We conducted our review from February through March 2000 in

accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air

Force, and the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director of Office of Management
B-284930

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

and Budget; and to interested congressional committees. We will also make

copies available to others on request.

Please contact me or Julia Denman at (202) 512-8412, if you or your staff

have any questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this

assignment were Bobby Worrell, Bonnie Carter, Fredrick Naas, Kimberly

Seay, and John Brosnan.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues
B-284930

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air Apendxies

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000 ApendxiI

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Missiles, Munitions &

Support Equipment

• (1) Joint Direct Attack

Munition (JDAM)

Contractor warranty Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$4 billion based on fiscal year 1996

President's budget.

• (2) Joint Air-to-Surface

Standoff Attack Munition

(JASSM)

Contractor warranty with total

system performance

responsibility

Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$2.1 billion based on fiscal years 1996-

1999 actual budget authority.

• (3) Joint Standoff

Weapon (JSOW)

Contractor warranty Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$1.7 billion based on fiscal year 1999

President's budget.

• (4) BRU-57 Smart Rack Contractor warranty with total

system performance

responsibility

Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$35.3 million for production

• (5) Sensor Fuzed

Weapon (SFW)

Contractor warranty Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$2 .0 billion based on fiscal year 2000

President's budget.

• (6) Wind Corrected

Munitions Dispenser

(WCMD)

Contractor warranty Estimated acquisition cost for fiscal years

1995-2006 is $652.2 million based on fiscal

year 1999 President's budget.

• (7) Advanced Medium

Range Air to Air Missile

(AMRAAM)

Contractor warranty with total

system performance

responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $760,370.

• (8) Upgrade to Maverick

Air-to-Ground Missile

(AGM-65H/K)

Contractor warranty Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $12,301,840.

• (9) Air-to-Ground

Missile-130 Surface,

Attack Guided Munitions

(AGM-130)

Contractor warranty Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $3,178,434.

• (10) Guided Bomb

(GBU-15)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Included in AGM-130 above.

• (11) Air-to-Ground

Missile (AGM-142)

HAVE NAP

Contractor warranty Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $4,736,092.

• (12) Inter-Continental

Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

Program

Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $314,155,875.

• (13) Advanced Cruise

Missile (AGM-129)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $22,939,730.

• (14) Air Launch Cruise

Missile (AGM-86)

Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $22,069,857.

Continued
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (15) Conventional Cruise

Missile (AGM-86C)

Government/interim contractor

support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $4,782,100.

• (16) HARM Missile

(AGM-88)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $9,051,809.

Aircraft

• (17) F-22 Interim contractor support Estimated acquisition cost is $58.6 billion.

• (18) Joint Strike Fighter Not determined Estimated development cost is $19 billion.

• (19) Joint Primary

Aircraft Training System

(JPATS)

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is $4 billion.

• (20) F-117A (except for

engine)

Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $255,561,338.

• (21) T-38C − Avionics

Upgrade

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is

$855.5 million.

• Commercial Derivative

Aircraft (17 weapon

systems)

(22) C-9 (2 models)

(23) C-12 (4 models)

(24) C-20 (4 models)

(25) C-21

(26) C-22

(27) C-26 (2 models)

(28) C-38

(29) C-137 (2 models)

(30) CT-43

(31) E-4

(32) E-9

(33) EC-18 (2 models)

(34) KC-10

(35) T-3

(36) T-43

(37) TC-18

(38) VC-25

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for the

following systems for fiscal year 1999

totaled:

$35,819,279

$15,944,032

$31,342,243

$443,520,747

$4,806,795

$7,808,059

$3,731,441

$12,140,406

$1,457,662

$105,166,845

$8,265,364

$1,656,309

$317,105,416

$10,998,075

$40,694,128

$9,555,999

$41,271,477

• (39) C/KC-135 (3

models)

(40) PACER CRAG

Government/contractor

logistics support

Warranty

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,328,224,524.

Total estimated program cost is

$479 million.

• (41) B-52 Aircraft (2

models)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $312,392,949.

• (42) C-5 (3 models) Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,029,532,135.

• (43) C-141 (2 models) Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $689,122,516.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (44) F-15

(45) Avionics Upgrade

(46) Low Altitude

Navigation & Targeting for

Night (LANTRIN)

(47) Operational Flight

Program (OFP) Software

Development

(48) APG-63(V)1 Radar

Support

Government/contractor

logistics support

Contractor logistics support

Government/contractor

logistics support

Contractor logistics support

Contractor logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,503,762,717.

• (49) F-229 engine (for

F-15E aircraft and newer

F-16s)

Contractor logistics support Estimated production cost is $1.2 billion.

• (50) F-119 engine (for

F-22 and Joint Strike

Fighter aircraft)

Interim contractor support Contractor logistics support Included in the costs of the F-22.

• (51) C-130 (Four

Models)

(52) C-130 Avionics

Modernization Program

(53) AC-130U (Special

Operations aircraft)

Contractor logistics support

Contractor logistics support

Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,155,542,640.

• (54) C-17 Contractor total system

performance responsibility

(Flexible Sustainment)

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $308,179,789.

• (55) U-2 (2 models) Contractor logistics support Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $20,627,347.

• (56) T-1 Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $83,010,499.

• (57) A-10 Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $469,371,422.

• (58) F-16

(59) Avionics upgrade

Government/contractor

logistics support

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,857,115,600.

Estimated acquisition cost is $1.6 billion.

• (60) B-1B Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $529,283,969.

• (61) B-2 Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $208,164,283.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (62) H-1 Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $58,511,963.

• (63) H-60 Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $116,936,155.

• (64) H-53 Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $736,000.

Aircraft Subsystems

• (65) Common Low

Observables Verification

System (CLOVerS)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $30 million.

• (66) Joint Service

Electronic Combat

Systems Tester

(JSECST)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is

$115.6 million.

• (67) Common

Organizational Level

Aircraft System Tester

(COAST)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $7.82 million.

• (68) Common Munitions

BIT Reprogramming

Equipment (CMBRE)

Contractor warranty Estimated acquisition cost is $37.1 million.

• (69) JOVIAL software

maintenance tools

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance cost for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $878,000.

• (70) Embedded Global

Positioning System

Inertial Navigation

System (EGI)

Contractor warranty Estimated acquisition cost is

$415.0 million.

• (71) Towed Decoy

(An/ALE-50)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance cost for fiscal

year 1999totaled $724,000.

• (72) Joint Helmet

Mounted Cueing System

(JHMCS)

Not determined Estimated development cost is

$89.1 million.

Space and Missile Systems

• (73) Space Based

Infrared System (SBIRS)

Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Estimated acquisition cost is $1.5 billion.

• (74) Evolved

Expendable Launch

Vehicle (EELV) System

Not determined (program

office is buying a new launch

service capability)

Estimate for development and purchase of

launch services is $2.7 billion for fiscal

years 1998-2003 based on fiscal year 1998

President's budget.

• (75) MILSTAR Satellite

Communications

System

Government/contractor

logistics support

Estimated acquisition cost is $9.5 billion

through fiscal year 2005 based on fiscal

year 2001 President's budget.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (76) Global Broadcast

Service (GBS)

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is $1 billion for

fiscal years 1996-2003 based on fiscal year

1998 President's budget.

• (77) Advanced

Extremely High

Frequency Military

Satellite

Communications

System (AEHF)

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is $2.9 billion for

fiscal years 2000-2005 based on fiscal year

2000 President's budget

• (78) Wideband Gapfiller

Satellites (WGS)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $872.2 million

through fiscal year 2005 based on fiscal

year 2001 President's budget.

• (79) Advanced

Wideband System

(AWS)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $292.1 million

through fiscal year 2005 based on fiscal

year 2001 President's budget.

• (80) Ultra High

Frequency Demand

Assigned Multiple

Access Satellite

Communications

Airborne Integrated

Terminal Group (DAMAAITG)

Contractor warranty Estimated acquisition cost is

$244.7 million.

• (81) NAVSTAR Global

Positioning System

(GPS)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $27,422,061.

• (82) Satellite Control

Network (SCN)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $216,060,650.

• (83) Spacelift Range

System

Contractor logistics support Information not available

• (84) Defense Satellite

Communication System

(DSCS)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $3,076,000.

Electronics Systems

• (85) Global Air Traffic

Management (GATM)

System

Contractor warranty Estimated acquisition cost is $2.1 billion for

fiscal years 1999-2005 based on fiscal year

1999 President's budget.

• (86) Precision Landing

Systems Receiver

(PLSR)

Interim contractor support Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$47.8 million based on fiscal year 2002

program objective memorandum.

• (87) Joint Precision

Approach and Landing

System (JPALS)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $116.0 million

for fiscal years 1999-2005 based on fiscal

year 1999 President's budget.

• (88) Mobile Approach

Control System (MACS)

Not determined Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$246.7 million as of October 1999.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (89) Air Force Terminal

Instrument Procedures −

Replacement

(AFTERPS-R)

Not determined Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$17.8 million based on fiscal year 2002

program objective memorandum.

• (90) Region/ Sector Air

Operations Center

(R/SAOC)

Modernization Program

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $86.9 million

for fiscal years 1997-2003.

• (91) Integrated

Broadcast Service (IBS)

Contractor logistics support Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$111.8 million based on fiscal year 2000

President's budget.

• (92) Intelligence Training

Systems (ITS)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Funding information is classified.

• (93) Distributed

Common Ground

System (DCGS)

Contractor logistics support Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$225.6 million based on fiscal year 2000

President's budget.

• (94) Tactical Exploitation

Group (TEG)

Contractor logistics support Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$90.4 million based on fiscal year 2000

President's budget.

• (95) Eagle Vision Contractor logistics support Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$29.7 million based on fiscal year 2000

President's budget.

• (96) Airborne Broadcast

Intelligence (ABI)

Contractor logistics support Life-cycle acquisition cost estimate is

$33.2 million based on fiscal year 2000

President's budget.

• (97) Airborne Warning

And Control System

(AWACS) - E-3 Sentry

Government/interim contractor

support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $202,851,007.

• (98) Cheyenne Mountain

Complex

Contractor logistics support Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $102,190,559.

• (99) High Frequency

(HF) Global

Communications

System

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is $135 million

for fiscal years 1995-2005 based on fiscal

year 2000 program. objective

memorandum

• (100) Teleinfomatics Government support Operation and maintenance funds are

budgeted and managed at the base level

thus there is no source for a cumulative

value.

• (101) Integrated Digital

Telecom-munications

System (IDTS)

Contractor warranty Operation and maintenance funds are

budgeted and managed at the base level

thus there is no source for a cumulative

value.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (102) Command and

Control Switching

System (CCSS)

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance funds are

budgeted and managed at the base level

thus there is no source for a cumulative

value.

• (103) Joint Surveillance

& Target Attack Radar

System (JSTARS)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Contractor total system

performance responsibility

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $62,416,000.

• (104) PACER SPEAK Government/contractor

logistics support

Estimated acquisition cost is $40.7 million.

• (105) Single Channel

Ground & Airborne

Radio System

(SINCGARS)

Contractor warranty Estimated acquisition cost is $38.8 million.

• (106) HAVE QUICK Government/contractor

logistics support

Estimated acquisition cost is $3.1 million.

• (107) Scope Shield (SS) Government/contractor

logistics support

Estimated acquisition cost is $99.5 million.

• (108) Multi-Mission

Advanced Tactical

Terminal (MATT)

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is $56.2 million.

• (109) Joint Tactical

Information Distribution

System (JTIDS)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Estimated production cost is

$322.7 million.

• (110) Litening II

Targeting System

Contractor logistics support Estimated acquisition cost is $301 million.

• (111) Joint Tactical

Radio System (JTRS)

Not determined Estimated acquisition cost is $2.4 million.

• (112) Air Battlefield

Communication and

Control Center Capsules

(ABCCC)

Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $360,000.

• (113)Atmospheric Early

Warning System

(AEWS)

Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,377,000.

• (114) Air Force Mission

Support System

(AFMSS)

Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $14,085,000.

• (115) Counter-Drug

Surveillance & Control

System (CSCS)

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $2,857,000.

• (116) Deliberate & Crisis

Action Planning and

Execution Segments

(DCAPES)

Contractor logistics support No operation and maintenance funding

prior to fiscal year 1999.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix I

Our Analysis of Support Strategies for Air

Force Materiel Command Systems and

Subsystems as of March 2000

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

• (117) Ground Theatre

Air Control System

(GTACS)

Government support No operation and maintenance funding

prior to fiscal year 2000.

• (118) Joint Tactical

Terminal (JTT)

Contractor warranty Included in MATT above.

• (119) SHELTERS Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $178,000.

• (120) Theatre Battle

Management Core

Systems (TBMCS)

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $12,982,000.

• (121) Weather Systems Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $3,300,000.

• (122) Tactical Automated

Security System (TASS)

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $725,000.

• (123) Base and

Installation Security

System (BISS)

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $1,895,000.

• (124) Weapons Storage

Security System (WS3)

Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $81,719.

Training systems

• (125) Training systems

and simulators

Contractor logistics support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $57,609,000.

• (126) Air Combat

Training System (ACTS)⋅

Government/contractor

logistics support

Operation and maintenance funds are

budgeted and managed at the base level

thus there is no source for a cumulative

value.

• (127) Range Threat

Systems

Government support Operation and maintenance costs for fiscal

year 1999 totaled $8,357,000.

System

Type of support

strategy in use Planned support strategy Estimated cost information

Continued from Previous Page
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

Related GAO Products

Depot Maintenance: Air Force Faces Challenges in Managing to 50-50

Ceiling (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-112, Mar. 3, 2000).

Depot Maintenance: Future Year Estimates of Public and Private

Workloads Are Likely to Change (GAO/NSIAD-00-69, Mar.1, 2000).

Depot Maintenance: Workload Allocation Reporting Improved, But

Lingering Problems Remain (GAO/NSIAD-99-154, July 13, 1999).

Navy Ship Maintenance: Allocation of Ship Maintenance Work in the

Norfolk, Virginia Area (GAO/NSIAD-99-54, Feb. 24, 1999).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Public and Private Sector Workload

Distribution Reporting Can Be Further Improved (GAO/NSIAD-98-41,

July 23, 1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New

Weapon Systems to the Private Sector (GAO/NSIAD-98-8, Mar. 31, 1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector

Workload Allocations (GAO/NSIAD-98-41, Jan. 20, 1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in

Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111,

Mar. 18, 1997, and GAO/T-NSIAD-97-112, May 1, 1997).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD's Policy Report Leaves Future Role of

Depot System Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-96-165, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent

Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-96-166, May 21,

1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the PublicPrivate Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996, and GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148,

Apr. 17, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public and

Private Sectors (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161, Apr. 12, 1994.)

(709438, 709482) Letr
Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of

reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit

cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders by phone:

(202) 512-6000

fax: (202) 512-6061

TDD (202) 512-2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain

these lists.

Orders by Internet:

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet,

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at:

http://www.gao.gov

To Report Fraud,

Waste, or Abuse in

Federal Programs

Contact one:

• Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

• e-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

• 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)
Related GAO Products

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-115 Defense Logistics

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00