### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 85 -C V

______________________________ I N THE MATT ER OF TH E MARRI AGE OF ARCHI E MORRI S SAMFORD, J R. AND REB ECC A SA MF ORD A ND I N T HE I NT ERE ST O F A R C H IE M O R R IS S A M F O R D , III , A M IN O R C H ILD
On Appea l from the 123rd Judicial District Court

Panola County , Texas Trial Court No. 2004-D -042

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyIn re Ma rri ag e of S am for d , 173 S.W .3d 887 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied)
. 1 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON The disputes betwe en Rebe cca and Ar chie Morr is Samfor d, J r., re g ardingtheir divorce and
c us tod y of the ir so n h a ve wo rn

an o ft e n- tr od

path t o this Court . T his a

pp e a l by Re be c c a is h e r f ourt h attempt to se ek redr ess from the actions of the trial court. I n this most rec ent appe ara nce, Re becc a appea ls from an orde r of the tr ial court that dire cted he r to pay attorney ' s fee s to he r for mer husband;
s h e a l s o co mp l ai n s b ec au s e s h e w as n o tp er m i t t ed a j u ry t ri al o n t h e l as t v ar i at i o no f t h e p ro ce ed i n g. By way of bac kg round, Rebec ca a nd Arc hie enter ed into a mediated se ttlement ag ree ment in their d iv o r c e an d a d e c r e e o f d iv o r c e w a s e n te r e d Ja n u ar y 2 5 , 2 0 0 5
. D e s p it e th e e n tr y of the divorce in acc ord with t h e m ediated settlement ag ree ment, Rebec ca a ppeale d; the appea l was not
su c c e ssf ul. 1 There afte r, Arc hie later

soug ht modification of the par ent-c hild relati onship. During that proce eding , the cour

t ordere d both pare nts and the child to appe ar f or men t al ex am i n ati ons and dir e c te d th e pa

re nts to sig n c on se nt fo rm s re qu e ste d by the e xami ne r. Al tho ug h Re be c c a re fu se d to sig n th e c on se nt f

or ms o r t o s ub mit

to a me nta l e xami natio n, sh e mov e d the c ourt to o rd e r A rc hie to be examined by

a professional counselor. Arc hie ac quiesce d and submitted to the order ed mental examination. Rebec ca' s continued wilful and bad-f aith ref usal to obey

the orde r for

a mental e x amination and othe r orders issued by the trial cour

t culminated in the trial cour t striking her

pleading s. OnIn re A.S. , 241 S.W .3d 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). 2In re Sa mf

or d , 249 S.W .3d 761 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig . proce eding ). 3 3 appea l, we re verse d that decision, noting that she was entitled to a trial, despite t he st riking of her
answe r. The trial c ourt went for war d with a benc h trial, modified the ri gh t s o f the par ties, and 2
awa rded attorney ' s fee s to Archie. I n the midst of this action, Rebecc a filed a petition se eking mandamus relief from this Court in which she a sked us to or der the trial court to c onduct a jury trial of the pe nding issue. We denied 3 the pet i tion for writ of manda mus, finding that be cause the pleadingdid not seek a c hang e of
conser vatorship (see king only

to alter the r ights of a cce ss to and possession of the child), a jury trial was not re quired. The Current Appeal De te rm ini ng the ob

je c t of Re be c c a ' s ins tant a pp e a l is ini tia lly dif

fi c ult . H e r n oti c e of

a pp e a l, filed on Jul y

16, 2008, specifie s that it is fr om an " order /judgment" signe d on J une 17, 2008, " which implements part of a 'L etter Decision' [si c] of t he Tria l Court dated May 1, 2008, which has not be en
re du c e d to a

F ina l Judg me nt i n to ta l." Th e July 16 do c ume nt i s e nti tled as an o rd e r, and dir e c ts Rebec ca to sign a de ed. I t neither c ontains any lang uag e purpor

ting to implement or incor porate any "l et t er d ec i s i o n , " n o r d o e s an y

s u ch d o cu m en tap p ea r i nt h e r ec o rdb ef o re u s . No n e o f R eb ec ca 's issues on appea l refe r to any thing se t out in the complained-of docume nt. Accor dingly , if we r estrict her appea l to the order from which she states she is a ppealing , the issues of which she c omplains are4

not applicable a

nd she has wholly

failed to a lleg e cla ims of error related to the order at bar. Fur ther, it is not clea

r that this is a ty

pe of or der w hich, standing alone, is s u b j ec t t o ap peal a s it does not dispose of any

number of othe r issues that wer e pendingat that time befor e the tria l court. The g ener al rule is that ther e ca n only be one f inal judgmen t i n a ca s e. T EX . R. C IV . P. 301. We are restric ted by

statute from hear ing only cer tain interlocutory

order s. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 5 1. 01 4 ( Ve rn on

20 08 ). An

or de r t hat do e s n ot d isp os e of

a ll part ie s a

nd a ll i ssu e s in

the c a se must be classified, f

or purpose s of appe al, as a n interlocutory

order
. Ru iz v . R uiz , 946 S.W .2d 123, 124 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no wr i t ). At the time this appeal wa s filed, the re cord w ould not have r efle cted that a

final judg ment had bee n enter ed and it would appea r that this Court would not have ha d jurisdiction to entertain the a ppeal. Howeve r, if we look at the re cord a s it ex isted sever al months later t h an the date that the notice of a

ppeal was filed, we find an order in a suit to modi fy the par ent-c hild relationship which
wa s s i gn edo nS ep t em b er 5 , 2 0 0 8
. T h at o rd er

i s a t y p e t h at i s ap p ea l ab l e, co n t ai n s l an gu age ref lecting the intent of the c ourt that it be final, and c ontains lang uag e aw ardingthe attorne y ' s fee s that are the main bone of

contention in this appeal. I n the intere st of justice, we de em the notice of appea l to be from the a ctual fina l judgment in thi s c a se . We wi ll tr e a t thi s a s a pr e ma tur e ly fi le d no tic e of a pp e a l and de e m it fi led timel y pursuant to Rule 27.1 of

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e. T EX . R. A PP . P. 2 7. 1; see T EX . R. A PP . P. 27.2.5

The Issu es Rebec ca f irst contends that the evidenc e is insuff icient to pr ovide the "g ood cause " that she
argue s is ne c e ssa

ry be fo re the tr ia l c ourt

cou ld awa

rd a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s. Th e g ist

of thi s a rgume nt i s that since Ar chie would ha ve bee n nece ssarily

awa re that Rebecc a wa s "a

cer tain ty pe of pe rson" and that he " knew who she was" befor e the e ntry of their divorc e dec ree about a y ear and a half ea rlier, he should have made c erta in that th e d i v o rc e decr ee guarde d ag ainst her unpr edictable behavior
. Rebec ca f urth er m ai n t ai n s that Arc hie ag ree d to the terms of the divorc e dec ree in spite of being "w ell awa re of Rebec ca' s persona lity ." B eca use, she argues, Archie was a family law attorne y , he should have " dealt with these issues in t h e divorce proc eeding ." F ollowing throug h this li ne of
rea soning, be cause there was no c laim by Arc hie of a

"r ece nt mental impairment" of Rebec ca ( i.e.,
on e that di d n ot e xist at th e tim e of the en tr y of th e di vo rc e de c re e ) t he n th e re wa s a

fa ilure to demonstrate a

chang e in circ umstance w hich justified the chang es in visitation and custody which Ar c hie ha d r e qu e ste d. Re be c c a ' s argume nt ( wh ic h is ess e nti a lly that c le arl y

Ar c hie wa s e nti tle d to
n o at t o rn ey 's fe es b ec au s e h e k n ew wh at R eb ec caw a s l i k e b ef o re t h e d i v o rc e) i s u n av ai l i n g. Although he p re s u m ab l y would have ha d knowledg e bef ore the divorce was g rante d of herthenexis ting pr opensity

for bizarre or contumac iously irrational be havior, that knowle d g e d o e s n o t h in d er his successf

ul effor ts to seek judicial re lief over a year afte r the divorc e wa s g rante d. Th e Te xas F a mil y

Cod e pr ov ide s th a t th e c ourt may order reas o n able attorney ' s fee s and expenses and order the fee s to be paid direc tly to an attorne y . T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 106.002(a)6

(Ve rnon 2008). The lang uag e of this statute is pe rmissive. I t authorizes an awa rd of attorney ' s fee s and it permits the taxing of the a war d as costs, but i t n ei t h er re quires that the tria l court aw ard attorney ' s fee s, nor that attorney ' s fee s be taxed a s costs. In re Z.B.P. , 1 0 9 S. W. 3 d 7 7 2 , 7 8 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 3, no pe t.) ; s e e D r e x e l v

. M c Cu tcheon , 6 0 4 S.W .2d 430, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, no wr it). Rebec ca f ocuses her ar g ument on her de sire for us to visit the question of whe ther ther e wa s "g ood cause " f

ound for the a

war d of attorne y ' s fee s. The empha sis in mi splace d. "G ood cause " lang uag e is neither in the authorizing statute, nor in the applicable case law as a predic ate f

or such
an aw ard. See B runi v. Bruni , 924 S.W .2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1996). Rather, the awa rd of attorney ' s fee s in this t y pe of c ase is a discre tionary deter mination by

the trial cour

t; the question of whether g ood
cause exis ts for t he award of attorney ' s fee s may be a f actor that the cour

t might consider

in making such a r uling, but it is neither a c ritical nor a require d element. Whe re the " g oo d c a

us e " fi nd ingis r e le va

nt i s th e c ir c ums tanc e in w hic h a no n p r e v a i l i n g pa rt y is awar ded attorne y ' s fee s. T EX . R. C IV . P. 131. S e e I n r e M

. A

. N.M ., 2 3 1 S. W. 3 d

5 6 2 , 5 6 5 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2007, no pe t.). The trial court' s discretion is not unlimit ed, and no provision is made, abse n t go o d cause , for a llowing a n unsucce ssful party

rec overy of his attorney ' s fee s. London v. London , 19 2 S.W. 3d 6, 19 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t h Di st. ] 2 00 5, pe t. d e nie d) ; Reame s v. Ream es , 604 S.W .2d 335, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).7

Thus, there was no necessity under the se circ umstances f or the trial c ourt to make a finding that A rc hie ha d s ho wn

g oo d c a us e fo r t he awa rd of a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s. Re be c c a g oe s o n to argue tha

t th e re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e pr e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt to support the amount of the a war d. An awa

rd of attorney ' s fee s must be supported by the evidenc e and if it finds such support, the trial cour t does not abuse its discre tion in making such a n awa rd. Tul l

v . Tu ll , 1 5 9 S
. W
. 3 d 7 5 8 , 7 6 0 (T ex . Ap p . — Da l l as 2 0 0 5 , n o p et
. ). T h e r ea s o n ab l en es s o f a nat t o rn ey 's fee awa rd is a question of fac t a

nd must be supported by competent evidenc e. Id . F or e xamp le , to support an awa

rd, there should be evidenc e of the time spe nt by the attorney on the case , the nature of the pre paration, the complexi ty of the c ase, the experien ce of the attorne y , and the pr evailing hourly rate s. Ha rd

in v . H ar din , 161 S.W .3d 14, 24 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The de termination is not made in a vac uum, however , and " evidenc e on ea ch of the se fa ctors is not
nece ssary to determine the amount of an attorney s' fee awa rd." Sandles v. Howerton , 163 S.W .3d 829, 838 (Tex. A

pp.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). The court may also consider

the entire rec ord and the common knowledg e of the lawy ers a nd judge s. Id
. ; Ke it h v . Ke ith , 2 2 1 S. W. 3 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 9 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). I n this case, there is testimony reg arding the num ber of hours that the attorne y devoted to the
case (145.4), the total f

ee char g ed ($21,810.00), the costs incurre d ($11,014.80), the complexit y of the ca se, and the number of he aring s require d. There was evidenc e about the ne ed for additional fee s
s h o u l d an appe al be take n, and evide nce br ingingto the court' s memory its striki ng of Rebec ca's8

pleading s, the unique issues of lawraised, a nd the r ep etitive hear ings on the psy cholog ical ca re issues. Counsel te stified that althoug h his normal billing rate was $175.00 pe r hour, he had billed
a ta l e s s e r r a t e o f $ 1 5 0
. 0 0 p e r

h o u r f o r t h i s c a s e a s a

p r o f e s s i o n a l c o u rt e s y t o a

f e l l o w a t t o r

n e y. This evidence is sufficient for the trial court, which ha d witnessed this entire c ontentious aff air, to dete rmine within its discr etion that attorney ' s fee s wer e payable, a nd to support the amount
awa rded. The c ontentions of err or ar e over ruled. Rebec ca ne x t contends that the trial court improperly denied her a trial by jury , and asks us to rec onsider our ruling on her ma ndamus petition, a petition that this C ourt has pre viously denied. We held in our ruling on that petition that the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion by striking he r reque st for a ju

r y tr ia l b e c a

u s e th e p le a d in g s n e it

h e r r e qu e s te d a c h an g e in c o n s e r v a to r s h ip , n o r a d e s ig n a ti o nth a t e it

h e r p arty h a s th e e xc lu s iv e r ig h t to d e s ig n a te th e c h il d ' s p r im ar y r e s id e n c e . We thus concluded that no ext ant re quest allowed f or dec ision by

a jury . Rebec ca now

invites
rec onsideration of our

ruling on this iss ue, for

the same r easons a

nd under the same fa cts which we have a lrea dy

discussed and f

ound without merit. W e dec line the invitation.9

We a ff ir m.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J uly 9, 2009 Date D ecide d: J uly 10, 2009