FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARLENA DAWSON,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 19-73124

Agency No.

A072-583-249

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 13, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed May 26, 2021

Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr. and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit 

Judges, and Kathryn H. Vratil,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Vratil;

Dissent by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

* The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
2 DAWSON V. GARLAND

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying Karlena Dawson’s petition for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial 

of deferral of removal under the Convention Against 

Torture, the panel held that the record did not compel a 

finding that it is more likely than not that Dawson would 

suffer future torture if returned to Jamaica.

Dawson sought CAT relief based on the physical abuse 

she suffered at the hands of her former domestic partner. 

The panel agreed with the Board that even assuming Dawson 

suffered past torture, the record did not compel the 

conclusion that she faces a likelihood of future torture if 

returned to Jamaica, given her changed circumstances, 

including a Jamaican court’s issuance of a protection order, 

and her former partner’s departure from her household. The 

panel explained that in assessing the likelihood of future 

torture, the adjudicator must consider all evidence relevant 

to the possibility of future torture, including whether 

circumstances or conditions have changed significantly with 

respect to the particular individual, and not merely 

information about general changes in the country.

The panel also concluded that the record supported a 

finding that Dawson could safely relocate within Jamaica to 

avoid future torture, given that Dawson’s former partner’s 

purported connections to the government did not prevent 

Dawson from obtaining and enforcing the protection order, 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
DAWSON V. GARLAND 3

which allowed her to stay in her former partner’s home; the 

Jamaican police were responsive to reports when her former 

partner violated the protection order, arresting him on one 

occasion; and before returning to the United States, Dawson 

was able to relocate to her friend’s house in another town 

where she had no physical contact with her former partner.

The panel rejected Dawson’s contention that the IJ failed 

to consider or give proper weight to country report evidence 

concerning the treatment of women in Jamaica, which she 

asserted demonstrated a particularized risk of violence to 

herself. The panel explained that circumstances for 

Jamaican women in general did not vitiate the agency’s 

specific findings as to Dawson’s situation, and that while the 

country reports reference generalized domestic violence 

against women, that evidence did not compel a conclusion 

that Dawson would more likely than not be subjected to 

violence from her former partner or his associates.

Dissenting, Judge M. Smith wrote that the record in this 

case compelled the conclusion that Dawson will more likely 

than not be tortured if returned to Jamaica. Judge M. Smith 

noted that Dawson endured severe torture at the hands of her 

former partner, and wrote that in cases of past torture, such 

abuse is the “principal factor” for evaluating the likelihood 

of future torture, yet the majority turned a blind eye to the 

facts in Dawson’s case, considering only what happened 

after she successfully sought a protection order. Judge 

M. Smith observed that the vast majority of this circuit’s 

“changed conditions” case law concerns changes in the 

immigrant’s specific country of origin, and wrote that even 

assuming arguendo that a significant change in personal 

circumstances is sufficient to render past torture irrelevant in 

determining future torture, Dawson’s circumstances did not 

significantly change, where despite a reduction in physical 
4 DAWSON V. GARLAND

violence post-protection order, Dawson’s former partner

remained obsessively fixated on stalking her, hurting her, 

and even killing her.

COUNSEL

Kathryn M. Davis (argued) and Peter R. Afrasiabi, 

Supervising Attorneys; Courtney Lem (argued) and Wei Liu 

(argued), Certified Law Students; University of California at 

Irvine School of Law, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Pasadena, 

California; for Petitioner.

Robert Michael Stalzer (argued), Trial Attorney; Anna 

Juarez, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

VRATIL, District Judge:

Petitioner challenges a final order of removal issued by 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In that decision, 

the BIA affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of 

petitioner’s request for deferral of removal under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT). See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(c)(1). We hold that the record does not compel a 

finding that it is more likely than not that petitioner will 

suffer future torture if returned to Jamaica. We also hold that 

the IJ appropriately considered all of petitioner’s evidence, 

including her country reports and whether she could safely 

relocate if returned to Jamaica. We thus deny the petition for 

deferral of removal.
DAWSON V. GARLAND 5

Standard Of Review

The Court reviews for substantial evidence the factual 

findings which underlie the BIA’s conclusion regarding 

eligibility for CAT protection. Avendano-Hernandez v. 

Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015). Substantial 

evidence means that the findings are “supported by 

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the 

record.” Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th 

Cir. 2003). To reverse a factual finding, the evidence must 

“compel” a conclusion different from the one which the BIA 

reached. Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2011); 

see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). 

In reviewing the decision of the BIA, this Court considers 

only the ground relied upon by the BIA. Singh v. Holder, 

649 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Arrey v. 

Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019) (court cannot 

affirm on grounds on which BIA did not rely).

We may refer to the IJ’s decision when “the BIA’s 

decision . . . accorded significant deference to the IJ’s 

observations.” Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 

2010); see also Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 909 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (where BIA reviews IJ’s decision and 

incorporates portions of it as its own, Court treats 

incorporated portions as decision of BIA). The Court’s 

review is limited to the administrative record before the BIA. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).

Factual And Procedural Background

Karlena Dawson is a native and citizen of Jamaica who, 

starting around 1992, made multiple unlawful entries into 

the United States. In late 2009 or 2010, Dawson was arrested 

for shoplifting and had an outstanding warrant from a 1996 

drug charge. On July 20, 2010, Dawson was sentenced to 
6 DAWSON V. GARLAND

63 months in prison for unlawful importation of a controlled 

substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). On April 24, 

2014, she completed her period of incarceration and was 

removed to Jamaica.

On February 8, 2019, Dawson attempted to reenter the 

United States by claiming to be a United States citizen. After 

immigration inspectors determined that she was not a 

citizen, Dawson expressed a fear of returning to Jamaica and 

was found to possess a credible fear of persecution if

returned. In the ensuing removal proceedings, she sought 

deferral of removal under CAT.1

I. Proceedings Before The Immigration Judge

The basis of Dawson’s CAT claim was physical abuse at 

the hands of her former domestic partner in Jamaica, a man 

named Robert Hinds. Dawson testified and offered 

documentary evidence in support of her application. The 

documentary evidence included her declaration; a temporary 

protection order against Hinds from a magistrate judge in 

Jamaica; and three reports which described existing 

conditions in Jamaica—the 2018 U.S. Department of State 

report on human rights abuses in Jamaica, a 2018 United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Report and a 2016 

United Nations Women’s Health Survey for Jamaica.

1 Because of her controlled substance conviction, Dawson sought 

only deferral of removal under CAT. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c)(1), 

1208.16(d)(2) (applicant who has been convicted of particularly serious 

crime subject to mandatory denial of asylum and withholding of 

removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (applicant subject to mandatory denial 

under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) “shall be granted deferral of removal to 

the country where he or she is more likely than not to be tortured”).
DAWSON V. GARLAND 7

In testimony on May 29, 2019, Dawson explained that 

she met Hinds in 2006 in Phoenix, Arizona. At first, she 

thought that he would protect her, but in early 2007 he began 

to physically abuse her. They dated for about eight months, 

until he was incarcerated and eventually removed to 

Jamaica. In April of 2014, when released from her own 

incarceration, Dawson returned to Jamaica to be with Hinds. 

Hinds sent a police officer to escort Dawson through 

customs so that she would not be stopped for processing. The 

officer delivered her to Hinds, who sequestered her in his 

house. Hinds kept her locked in the house and instructed her 

to not speak to anyone, to not try to leave and to do the 

laundry on certain days. He also started to physically abuse 

her again.

While Dawson lived with Hinds, Hinds forced her to go 

to his farm, where he beat her and threatened to behead her 

if she did not work. She recounted one particular day when 

she refused to go to the farm, and Hinds’ friends forced her 

into a van and burned her hands as punishment. According

to Dawson, she still had burn marks on her hands and scars 

on her knees where Hinds had dragged her. Because of her 

injuries, she could not make a tight fist with either hand.

On multiple occasions starting in 2016, Dawson reported 

Hinds to the police. The first time she reported him, the 

police sent two officers who were friends of Hinds. These 

officers tried to evict her from Hinds’ house, but neighbors 

rallied and yelled at the police officers until they left. 

Dawson then complained at a different police station, which 

only gave her a police report. In July or August of 2016, 

Dawson went to family court and obtained an order of 

protection which allowed her to stay in Hinds’ house. As 

soon as the judge issued the order, Hinds drove to the house 

and tried to break in. A neighbor took a picture of Hinds 
8 DAWSON V. GARLAND

pulling the sliding glass door off the house and sent the 

picture to Dawson. Dawson went to the police station and 

reported Hinds, and police arrested him for violating the 

court order. The police released Hinds later that day, and that 

night he came back to the house with a gun, shot out one of 

the outdoor lights, and then left. After the court issued the 

protection order, Hinds never lived in the house again. In 

2018, the court issued a five-year stay-away protection 

order. After that, Dawson did not know where Hinds lived.

After the initial protection order in 2016, Dawson 

attended court once a month. When she returned home from 

court each month, Hinds waited for her further up the street, 

along with two police friends who would come and harass 

her. The officers would stay for 15 to 20 minutes, tell her to 

“go back to America” and state that she would “end up dead” 

because Hinds needed his house and “has to be paying rent.” 

Neighbors again rallied and told the officers to leave her 

alone. 

After the protection order was issued, Hinds frequently 

drove by the house but only entered it twice. The first time 

he came to pick up his clothes, and when she told him to 

leave, he slapped her and left. The second time, Hinds came 

through the open back door and told Dawson that the house 

belonged to him. When Dawson protested, Hinds pushed 

her. Dawson yelled, and neighbors again rallied and the 

police came. In addition, Hinds’ mother showed up on one 

occasion to try to evict Dawson and change locks, but the 

police came and told Hinds’ mother that because of the 

protection order, Dawson could not be evicted.

In 2017, Dawson began to experience bleeding and pain 

in her stomach, which required her to be hospitalized in two 

hospitals over the course of two months. As a result of the 

bleeding, she received a blood transfusion. In her 
DAWSON V. GARLAND 9

declaration, Dawson explained that the doctors “didn’t really 

know what was wrong with [her]” and asked her, “Who is 

punching you in the stomach?”

In October of 2018, Dawson moved to Spanish Town, 

which was approximately 20 to 30 minutes away from 

Hinds’ house. Until January of 2019, when she returned to 

the United States, she stayed there with a friend. During this 

period, Hinds “came by like around five, six times” and 

threatened her. After she returned to the United States, Hinds 

continued to harass the friend in Spanish Town who had 

helped her leave, and he left a bullet on her friend’s porch.

When asked what she feared if she returned to Jamaica, 

Dawson said that she “will sure be killed.” She explained 

that police officers and Hinds “will have [her] killed” 

because she was suing for the return of money from a 

malpractice settlement that Hinds took from her daughter. 

Dawson suggested that Hinds would be able to find her in 

Jamaica because she would have to go to court for her civil 

suit.

II. The Immigration Judge’s Decision

In June of 2019, the IJ issued a written decision which 

denied Dawson’s application for deferral of removal and 

ordered her removed to Jamaica.2 The IJ found that even 

2 Although Dawson was only seeking deferral of removal, the IJ “out 

of an abundance of caution” analyzed whether Dawson’s drug conviction 

was for a particularly serious crime which would preclude her from 

seeking asylum, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), 

and withholding of removal under the regulations implementing CAT.

The IJ concluded that Dawson’s conviction was for such a particularly 

serious crime. Dawson did not appeal this conclusion to the BIA, nor did

she contest it in her petition for review. Dawson therefore waived this 
10 DAWSON V. GARLAND

though Dawson’s testimony was credible, she had failed to 

demonstrate eligibility for deferral of removal. The IJ 

assumed that Hinds’ past treatment of Dawson constituted 

torture, but that in light of subsequent developments, 

Dawson had not established that it was more likely than not 

that Hinds would torture her in the future. In particular, the 

IJ noted that Hinds did not live with Dawson after she 

obtained the protection order, and police responded on at 

least one occasion to arrest him for violating the order. The 

IJ explained that although Dawson continued to suffer 

harassment from Hinds, “the severe abuse from Hinds 

ended” after she obtained the protection order. As a result, 

the IJ found that during the last two years Dawson lived in 

Jamaica, she did not suffer “a level of harm approaching 

torture.” The IJ therefore concluded that she had not 

demonstrated that she would more likely than not suffer 

torture in the future.

The IJ also assessed whether Dawson had established 

that a public official or other person acting in an official 

capacity would consent or acquiesce to her torture. The IJ 

found that “nothing in the record suggest[ed] [Dawson] will 

be subjected to torture by the Jamaican government or with 

its acquiescence.” The IJ noted that Hinds often brought his 

“police friends” to the home, but noted that Dawson was able 

to file police reports against Hinds and obtain the order of 

protection, which was “viable until 2023.”

The IJ also examined the evidence of conditions within 

Jamaica, including “issues with corruption within the police 

issue. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 

2014) (requiring issue exhaustion before BIA); Christian Legal Soc’y v. 

Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 2010) (issues waived if not raised in 

opening brief).
DAWSON V. GARLAND 11

force and a generalized trend of violence towards women.” 

The IJ concluded that a pattern of violations alone was 

insufficient to establish that Dawson would be personally at 

risk of torture.

Accordingly, because Dawson had not demonstrated 

eligibility for deferral from removal, the IJ ordered her 

removed to Jamaica.

III. The BIA Decision

Dawson filed a timely administrative appeal to the BIA, 

arguing that the IJ had erred in denying her request for 

deferral of removal under CAT. On December 2, 2019, the 

BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Dawson’s 

appeal. The BIA discerned “no clear factual error” in the IJ’s 

finding that Dawson was not more likely than not to be 

tortured by Hinds or his associates if she returned to Jamaica. 

The BIA explained that the IJ had appropriately concluded 

that even if Dawson had suffered past torture from Hinds, it 

significantly diminished after (1) she obtained a protection 

order and (2) Hinds left the domestic household. The BIA 

concluded that after those changes in circumstance, Hinds’ 

conduct “was not so severe as to constitute torture within the 

meaning of the applicable regulation.” See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.18(a)(2).

The BIA also found no clear error in the IJ’s analysis of 

country conditions evidence. The BIA acknowledged 

Dawson’s argument that the IJ had given insufficient weight 

to evidence related to domestic violence, but found no clear 

error “in the manner in which the Immigration Judge 

weighed the evidence of record, or his predictive findings as 

to what is likely to occur if [Dawson] is removed to 

Jamaica.”
12 DAWSON V. GARLAND

In consequence, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and 

dismissed Dawson’s appeal. In a footnote, the BIA explained 

that because it was affirming the IJ’s predictive finding 

about the likelihood of future torture, it need not resolve 

Dawson’s challenge to the IJ’s finding regarding whether a 

public official in Jamaica would acquiesce to such torture. In 

doing so, the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision in part.

Analysis

Petitioner seeks review of the BIA’s decision which 

denied deferral of removal under CAT. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(c)(1). Petitioner argues that (1) by limiting its 

consideration to events which occurred after the protection 

order, the BIA failed to the consider the totality of the 

evidence about the likelihood of future torture; (2) the BIA 

erred by failing to consider evidence that petitioner cannot 

safely relocate if returned to Jamaica; and (3) the IJ failed to 

appropriately consider country reports.3 The Court will 

consider each argument in turn.

I. Likelihood Of Future Torture

The first issue is whether substantial evidence supports 

the BIA’s determination that petitioner did not establish that, 

more likely than not, she would face torture if returned to 

Jamaica. The BIA’s finding that an applicant is not eligible 

for relief under CAT is reviewed for substantial evidence. 

3 Petitioner also argues that the record demonstrates acquiescence of 

a public official. She argues that if the BIA had considered the IJ’s error, 

the BIA would have been compelled to reverse. The BIA expressly stated 

that it was unnecessary to review the IJ’s finding whether the torture 

would occur by or with the acquiescence of a Jamaican government 

official. Because we deny this petition on the issue of likelihood of future 

torture, we need not address this issue.
DAWSON V. GARLAND 13

Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2011); Arteaga 

v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. at 481 n.1.

Dawson argues that in finding that she had not shown a 

probability of future torture, the BIA failed to give 

appropriate weight to evidence of past torture. In rendering 

a decision about the likelihood of future torture, the BIA is 

required to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility 

of future torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3); see Parada, 

902 F.3d at 914–15. Past torture is one such relevant 

consideration, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i), in that 

someone who has been tortured in the past is likely to be 

tortured in the future if returned to the same situation. See 

Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In and of itself, however, a showing of past torture “does not 

give rise to a regulatory presumption of . . . future torture.” 

Lopez-Gonzalez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 726, 728 (9th Cir. 

2018) (citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 802 

(9th Cir. 2005)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The 

inference that future torture is likely to recur breaks down 

where “circumstances or conditions have changed 

significantly, not just in general, but with respect to the 

particular individual.” Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1218; see also 

Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 

2020) (applicant likely to be tortured again if returned to site 

of prior suffering “absent changed circumstances”); Cole, 

659 F.3d at 770, 775 (BIA must “consider the aggregate risk 

that [applicant] would face”).

Here, Dawson argues that the horrific nature and extent 

of past torture at the hands of Hinds, in league with the local 
14 DAWSON V. GARLAND

police, is the appropriate background against which the BIA 

must evaluate the likelihood of future torture. Petitioner 

contends that the protection order and Hinds’ removal from 

the domestic household did not significantly change her 

situation because they did not eliminate the risk of future 

torture and the torture did not stop. To illustrate, she cites the

following post-protection order incidents: (1) Hinds tried to 

break in to the household and was subsequently arrested; 

(2) Hinds appeared on the street once a month after Dawson 

returned from court and yelled at her, with police friends 

who harassed and threatened her; (3) Hinds frequently drove 

past the house, one time wielding a gun and shooting out the 

porch light; (4) Hinds entered the house on two occasions—

once to pick up his clothes, and once to tell Dawson that the 

house belonged to him—and slapped or pushed her before 

leaving; and (5) after Dawson returned to the United States, 

Hinds left a bullet on the doorstep of her friend’s house in 

Spanish Town.

We agree with the BIA that even assuming that petitioner

suffered past torture, the record does not compel the 

conclusion that Dawson faces a likelihood of future torture 

if returned to Jamaica. The dissent describes in detail the 

torture that Dawson suffered at the hands of Hinds when they 

lived in his house together from approximately April of 2014 

to July of 2016, see Dissent at 20–21. The IJ and the BIA 

assumed that “the harm [Dawson] experienced at one time 

from Mr. Hinds amounted to torture,” and we do not 

disagree. Dawson’s circumstances “changed significantly,” 

however, after the Jamaican court issued her a protection 

order and Hinds left the domestic household. See Nuru, 

404 F.3d at 1217–18; see also Xochihua-Jaimes, 962 F.3d 

at 1188. According to Dawson’s testimony, these changes 

had a significant impact on her situation: Dawson went from 

suffering daily physical abuse by Hinds to seeing him drive 
DAWSON V. GARLAND 15

past the house or yell from the street roughly once a month. 

Dawson’s situation changed even more significantly when 

she left Hinds’ house and moved in with her friend in 

Spanish Town, after which Hinds “came by like around five, 

six times” over the course of approximately two months and 

never had physical contact with her. The dissent analogizes 

the past torture that Dawson suffered to the torture that the 

petitioner in Xochihua-Jaimes suffered, see Dissent at 23-

24. But in our case, the conditions in Jamaica for Dawson 

changed after she obtained the protection order; in 

Xochihua-Jaimes, on the other hand, the conditions in 

Mexico for petitioner “remain[ed] the same” as when the 

past torture took place, see Xochihua-Jaimes, 962 F.3d 

at 1188.

As noted, the inference that future torture is likely to 

recur based on past torture breaks down upon consideration 

of the entire record, including the post-protection order 

evidence. From July of 2016 (when Dawson obtained the 

protection order) to January of 2019 (when Dawson left for 

the United States), Hinds slapped or pushed Dawson only 

twice; otherwise, she did not suffer any physical harm. Hinds 

verbally harassed her from the street, and on one occasion, 

his police officer friends told her to go back to America or 

she would “end up dead.” Her neighbors intervened, 

however, and she was not harmed. Hinds left a bullet on her 

friend’s porch, but Dawson no longer lived there. Without 

more, these incidents do not constitute torture or compel a 

finding that future torture is likely. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.18(a)(2) (torture “does not include lesser forms of 

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”); see, e.g., Vitug v. 

Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013) (record did not 

compel finding that petitioner who was beaten several times 

in Philippines would more likely than not be tortured if 

returned); Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029–
16 DAWSON V. GARLAND

30 (9th Cir. 2019) (petitioner did not show more likely than 

not that he would be tortured, even though he received two 

death threats from private actors). In fact, we have often 

found that such incidents do not create a well-founded fear 

of future persecution to support an asylum claim, which has 

a lower burden than the standard for torture under CAT. See 

Singh, 764 F.3d at 1163; see, e.g., Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 

1014, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 2006) (record did not compel 

finding of past persecution when petitioner struck in back of 

head ten times with rod).

The dissent argues that Nuru does not support our 

conclusion because Nuru discusses changed country 

conditions, not changed personal circumstances. Dissent 

at 21. This is a misreading of Nuru, which directs us to 

consider whether “circumstances or conditions have 

changed significantly, not just in general, but with respect to 

the particular individual,” 404 F.3d at 1218 (emphasis 

added), and further holds that the adjudicator must conduct 

“an individualized analysis of how changed conditions will 

affect the specific petitioner’s situation,” not merely an 

analysis of “[i]nformation about general changes in the 

country,” id. at 1218 n.6 (cleaned up). In evaluating a CAT 

claim, we must consider “all evidence relevant to the 

possibility of future torture,” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 

1049, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), including 

changes to the petitioner’s individual circumstances. See 

Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(despite petitioner’s evidence of past torture due to sexual 

orientation, BIA’s denial of CAT relief supported by 

substantial evidence, including evidence that he was no 

longer a homeless child but a “self[-]sufficient homosexual 

adult”).
DAWSON V. GARLAND 17

Because the record in its entirety does not compel a 

contrary result, we must uphold the BIA’s finding that 

petitioner did not show that more likely than not, she will 

face torture if returned to Jamaica.

II. Relocation

The second issue is whether the BIA erred by failing to 

consider evidence that petitioner cannot safely relocate if 

returned to Jamaica. In assessing CAT claims, the BIA must 

consider all evidence, including “[e]vidence that the 

applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal 

where he or she is not likely to be tortured.” See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). A petitioner is not required to prove that 

internal relocation is impossible; rather, relocation is just one 

factor the BIA must consider in assessing the likelihood of 

future torture and is not determinative on its own. See 

Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 

2015) (en banc). The record must contain evidence that a 

general or specific area exists where the petitioner could 

safely relocate within the country of removal. XochihuaJaimes, 962 F.3d at 1186–87.

Dawson argues that the record does not contain evidence 

of a general or specific area where she can safely relocate in 

Jamaica. She contends that the BIA failed to consider her 

testimony regarding how Hinds is well connected in the 

Jamaican government and will be able to track her down and 

prevent her from safely relocating. She also points to country 

reports which show how Jamaica is a relatively small island, 

which makes it easier for people to be tracked down.

Here, the IJ stated that evidence of relocation would be 

considered and subsumed the analysis within the discussion 

of the likelihood of future torture and government 

acquiescence. The IJ noted that Hinds’ purported 
18 DAWSON V. GARLAND

connections to the government did not prevent Dawson from 

obtaining and enforcing the protection order. The protection 

order allowed her to stay in Hinds’ home, and the Jamaican 

police were responsive to reports when Hinds violated the 

protection order, arresting him on one occasion. The BIA 

agreed with the IJ that the protection order significantly 

diminished the level of harm and helped ensure Dawson’s 

safety while living in Jamaica. The BIA also agreed that the 

country reports were insufficient to show that individually, 

Dawson more likely than not would be tortured if removed 

to Jamaica. The record further demonstrates that before 

returning to the United States, Dawson was able to relocate 

to her friend’s house in Spanish Town where she had no 

physical contact with Hinds. In the context of the protection 

order, the record supports a finding that Dawson can safely 

relocate within Jamaica. Because the evidence does not 

compel a different conclusion from the one which the BIA 

reached, we must affirm.

III. Country Reports

The final issue is whether the IJ appropriately considered 

all of petitioner’s evidence, including her country reports. To 

qualify for deferral, petitioner must demonstrate that she, in 

particular, would more likely than not face torture upon 

return to Jamaica. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Zheng, 

644 F.3d at 835–36 (rejecting torture claim where “claims of 

possible torture remain speculative”). For us to reverse the 

BIA with respect to a finding of fact, the evidence must 

compel a different conclusion from the one which it reached. 

See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1.

Petitioner argues that the IJ did not consider or give 

proper weight to the country reports about treatment of 

women in Jamaica, which petitioner asserts demonstrate a 

particularized risk of violence to her. The circumstances of 
DAWSON V. GARLAND 19

Jamaican women in general, however, do not vitiate the 

agency’s specific findings as to petitioner’s situation with 

Hinds. While country conditions include generalized 

domestic violence against women, this does not compel a 

conclusion that petitioner will more likely than not be 

subjected to violence from Hinds or his associates.

Because the record does not compel a contrary result, we 

must uphold the BIA’s finding that the IJ appropriately 

considered all of petitioner’s evidence, including her country 

reports. Therefore, we affirm the BIA and deny the petition 

for review.

PETITION DENIED.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

An applicant is entitled to relief pursuant to CAT if she 

establishes that “it is more likely than not that . . . she would 

be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal,” 

and that a public official would acquiesce in that torture. 

Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 508 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The record in this case compels the conclusion that 

Dawson will more likely than not be tortured if returned to 

Jamaica. When an applicant who has previously been 

tortured seeks relief under CAT, the “principal factor” on 

which we rely for evaluating the likelihood of future torture 

is past torture. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1217–18 

(9th Cir. 2005). Here, the record reflects that Dawson 

endured severe torture at the hands of her ex-partner, Robert 

Hinds.
20 DAWSON V. GARLAND

The majority omits the gory details of Hinds’s abuse of

Dawson, notwithstanding the fact that our case law requires 

that we consider them in determining whether Dawson is 

entitled to relief. Let me supply the details. Dawson met 

Hinds in 2006 while she was living in a domestic violence 

shelter in Arizona. Hinds began abusing her—he sat outside 

her work, watching her all day, threatened to “beat on [her]” 

if he saw her with anyone else, and physically hurt her “quite 

often.” He “threatened to kill [her] if [she] left him.”

Once Dawson and Hinds were deported to Jamaica, the 

abuse escalated to torture. Hinds confined Dawson to his 

home, which had “bars wrapped around [it] . . . like a prison” 

and “blood spattered on the walls.” Dawson learned from 

Hinds’s aunt that his previous girlfriend lived in the house 

prior to Dawson moving in, and the blood was from their 

fights. Hinds supposedly “kicked the baby out of” his 

previous girlfriend when she was six months pregnant.

From that moment on, Hinds “constantly” beat, raped, 

threatened, stole from, and otherwise controlled Dawson.

Hinds either locked Dawson in his house or forced her to 

accompany him everywhere he went, “watching [her] every 

move.” Hinds assured Dawson that “if [she] ever tried to 

escape that he would cut [her] head off and put it in [a ditch 

on his family’s property].” Hinds “kicked [her] and pushed 

[her] directly into [burning] coals,” beat her to the ground 

and “stomped [her] in the stomach,” “hit [her] on the side of 

[her] head with a water bottle,” and “threatened to kill [her]” 

with a machete. Hinds’s friends, most of whom were police 

officers, also threatened Dawson, telling her that they would 

kill her and leave her “body at the side of the road.”

To this day, Dawson has “scars on [her] back, stomach, 

legs, hands, and elbows.” As my colleagues note, Dawson 

was hospitalized for two months for a blood clot that left her 
DAWSON V. GARLAND 21

“throwing up blood.” Her injury was a result of Hinds 

“punching [her] in the stomach.” In Dawson’s own words, 

she was just “lucky to be alive” after a four-pint-blood 

transfusion.

Hinds’s abuse clearly constitute acts of torture under our 

case law. As we held in Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 

800 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015), rape, severe beatings, 

and threats “certainly rise[] to the level of torture for CAT 

purposes.” Similarly, in Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 

1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2020), we concluded that multiple 

instances of rape over the petitioner’s lifetime, along with 

ongoing death threats, amounted to past torture. In both 

cases, we remanded with instructions for the agency to grant 

the petitioners CAT relief because the level of past torture 

sufficiently demonstrated the likelihood of future torture, 

“particularly in the form of sexual abuse.” XochihuaJaimes, 962 F.3d at 1188; see also Avendano-Hernandez, 

800 F.3d at 1079–80, 1082.

My colleagues turn blind eyes to the facts in Dawson’s 

case. They consider only what happened after Dawson 

successfully sought a protection order against Hinds because 

they contend that the protection order changed Dawson’s 

circumstances significantly. Slip Op. at 14–15. In support 

of this conclusion, my colleagues cite Nuru, 404 F.3d 

at 1218. Notably, however, Nuru discusses changed country

conditions, not changed personal circumstances. In Nuru, 

we explained that the “changed conditions” analysis that 

applies “in asylum and withholding of removal cases” also 

“applies in the torture context.” 404 F.3d at 1218 n.6. Our 

primary contention was that “[i]nformation about general 

changes in the country is not sufficient” to establish changed 

conditions. Id.
22 DAWSON V. GARLAND

This makes sense given that the vast majority of our 

“changed conditions” case law in the immigration context 

concern changes in the immigrant’s specific country of 

origin. Our CAT case law only tangentially refers to a 

change in personal circumstances as a relevant changed 

condition. See, e.g., Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1126 

(9th Cir. 2014) (holding the petitioner’s circumstances 

changed because he was no longer a child but “a 

self[-]sufficient homosexual adult”) (quotation marks 

omitted). Instead, the relevant change is usually a coup in 

the petitioner’s country of origin, or that country’s growing 

acceptance of that a certain minority group. See, e.g., Chand 

v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 

2005); see also Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (“[J]ust as changed country conditions can defeat 

an asylum claim, they can also defeat a claim for CAT 

protection.”). How Nuru’s discussion of changed country 

conditions supports my colleagues’ conclusion in Dawson’s 

case remains unclear—it is undisputed that Jamaica’s 

conditions have not changed since Dawson was brutally 

tortured there.

In CAT cases, our case law specifically requires the BIA 

“to consider all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 

torture.” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.2d 901, 914–15 (9th Cir. 

2018) (emphasis added). Obviously, this would include past 

torture, which begs the question of whether it is even proper 

for us to ignore any part of the record—as the majority does 

with Dawson’s pre-protection order abuse—in denying CAT 

relief.

Even assuming arguendo that a significant change in 

personal circumstances is sufficient to render past torture 

irrelevant in determining future torture, Dawson’s 
DAWSON V. GARLAND 23

circumstances did not significantly change. Post issuance of 

the protection order, the physical abuse Dawson suffered 

may have diminished, but Hinds remained obsessively 

fixated on stalking her, hurting her, and even killing her, 

which by themselves constitute torture.

In Dawson’s own words, the protection order “didn’t

stop [Hinds],” “he constantly violated [it].” “[O]nce every 

two days [Hinds] would drive by the house,” “[h]it the glass 

doors,” and harass and intimidate Dawson. See contra Slip 

Op. at 14–15. Hinds entered the home twice. The first time 

was right after the judge issued the protection order. Hinds 

ran to the shared home, pulled a door off its frame, and 

“dragged [Dawson] out of the house.” Hinds returned to the 

home one hour later, armed with a gun, and “shot out one of 

the outdoor lights.” The second time was two years later, 

right after the judge issued a permanent protection order 

against him. This order “of course made [Hinds] very mad

. . . [and he] came up to the house and started yelling at his 

friends to come help him to ‘beat this woman,’ referring to 

[Dawson].” Because the situation with Hinds “was getting 

really, really serious,” Dawson fled to Spanish Town to stay 

with a friend. Yet Hinds found her and continued stalking 

her. Hinds went so far as visiting the friend’s daughter’s 

school—all to threaten Dawson. Hinds’s threats continued 

after Dawson left Jamaica: he left a bullet on the doorstep of 

Dawson’s friend’s home in Spanish Town.

Dawson remains certain that if she is returned to 

Jamaica, Hinds will kill her or have her killed by someone 

on his behalf. The protection order, therefore, did not solve 

the problem—Hinds continued to be a dangerous, 

threatening presence in Dawson’s life. Because Dawson’s 

circumstances did not significantly change after the issuance 

of the protection order, we must consider Hinds’s actions 
24 DAWSON V. GARLAND

within the context of the severe torture Dawson suffered at 

his hands.

When considered in its entirety, Dawson’s case most 

closely resembles Xochihua-Jaimes. In that case, the 

petitioner’s partner severely abused, raped, and threatened 

her. Xochihua-Jaimes, 962 F.3d at 1180. Even after she 

managed to separate from him, he molested her children, 

broke into her home, and directed his friends to harass, 

intimidate, and threaten her. Id. We ultimately concluded 

that the petitioner’s showing of past torture demonstrated a 

likelihood of future torture, even though her ex-partner had 

been arrested and imprisoned. Id. at 1180, 1188. We held 

that the ongoing death threats from those associated with her 

abuser “demonstrate[d] some likelihood that she would 

again suffer severe assault or indeed, . . . death.” Id. 

Dawson’s case compels the same conclusion.

I respectfully dissent.