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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

KEILA GARCÍA COLÓN,

 Plaintiff,

 v

CORPORATION OF THE STATE 

INSURANCE FUND, ET AL,

 Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 21-cv-01211 (RAM)

Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; 

Sexual Harassment, Sex Discrimination 

and Retaliation

TRIAL BY JURY

JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM 

TO THE HON. RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH: 

 COME NOW Plaintiff, Keila García Colón (“García”) and the Corporation of the State 

Insurance Fund (“SIFC”), through their respective undersigned attorneys, very respectfully 

submit the instant Joint Case Management Memorandum as ordered in Docket Nos. 71 and 75. 

I. Factual Versions and Legal Contentions 

 A. Plaintiff

 García alleges sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 

U.S.C. §1981a, and under their Puerto Rico counterparts. 

García complained of sexual harassment to her superiors at the Arecibo Region of the 

Corporation of the State Insurance Fund (“CSIF”) and, after her employer’s failure to address her 

claim, she filed an administrative charge of sex discrimination and retaliation before the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Her opposition to the sexual harassment she 

experienced in her workplace constitutes protected conduct under Title VII and the Puerto Rico 

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legislation under which she seeks relief and constitutes the trigger for defendant’s subsequent 

campaign of retaliation. 

At the time of García’s filing of the Verified Complaint, she was no longer the subject of 

unwanted sexual advances in her workplace. Prof. Wanda Toledo (“Toledo”) from National 

University College (“NUC”) was granted access to the CSIF by virtue of a collaborative 

agreement between NUC and the CSIF. Pursuant to the accord, Toledo was to coordinate the 

extramural training of NUC’s nursing students by pairing them with nursing personnel at the 

CSIF.

Since Toledo was asked to leave and not visit the CSIF on two separate occasions as a 

result of García’s complaints against her, the sexual harassment of García at work, as of this 

filing, has ceased. But the retaliation against her began after she denounced Toledo’s unlawful 

conduct and has turned hostile, physically threatening and psychologically disturbing.

García’s underlying Claim of Sexual Harassment

A plaintiff claiming retaliation under Title VII must have claimed discrimination and 

have a reasonable belief that her allegations were meritorious, though she need not prevail in her 

underlying claim to continue with her cause of action for retaliation. See e.g., Benoit v. Tech. 

Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 175 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). García satisfies this 

requirement because the sexual harassment to which she was subjected by Toledo is a form of 

sex discrimination. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).

When García began to feel uncomfortable about Toledo’s constant visits to her work 

area, she complained to her immediate supervisor, Marilyn Gerena. Among the things she told 

Gerena was that she had heard statements from the nursing students and, at least, from one 

fellow worker that Toledo was making comments about her attraction to García and fondness for 

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her temper (“me gustan así, bravitas”). García’s denunciation of Toledo’s unlawful conduct to 

Gerena had no positive effect on Toledo, as she continued as if nothing had happened. At the 

time of García’s first sexual harassment complaint, Gerena was her supervisor at the CSIF, as 

well as a fellow professor of Toledo at the NUC. Toledo’s advances continued despite García’s 

clear rejections, were more frequent and escalated the tension. García tried to be more 

categorical and direct in her opposition of Toledo’s approaches. It reached a point where the 

harassment on García began to take its toll. García decided to face Toledo and make it very clear 

that she had to stop her unwanted behavior towards her and that she did not want Toledo close to 

her at any time. After García’s clear message, and anticipating that she might report Toledo, she 

prepared a memorandum and gave it to Gerena and Nora Rosario, another of García’s 

supervisors, alleging that García had been disrespectful to her. According to Toledo, García told 

her to refrain from giving her any orders because she was not her supervisor.

Gerena and Rosario met with García to determine whether to refer the matter to the Labor 

Relations Office at the CSIF for an investigation, as required by the CSIF’s sexual harassment 

protocol. When Gerena and Rosario met with García and told her of Toledo’s accusations, 

García spared no details and narrated everything that had been happening since Toledo’s arrival, 

including what she told Gerena the first time, and how the situation was deteriorating. García 

described the disrupting effect it was causing on her emotional stability and in the performance 

of her duties and that she was about to report Toledo’s unlawful conduct to NUC. Gerena and 

Rosario decided not to refer Toledo’s claim against García to the Labor Relations. Instead of 

reporting Toledo to the Labor Relations Office, Gerena pleaded with García for an opportunity to 

solve the situation directly with the Director at NUC.

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García satisfies all elements of her underlying claim of sexual harassment by Toledo: (1) 

García is a female; (2) was subjected by Toledo to unwelcome sexual advances; (3) Toledo’s 

continued disregard for García’s rejections turned her work environment hostile; (4) the 

frequency of the advances and Toledo’s unrestricted expressions to employees and nursing 

students, establish that the harassment was intentional, severe and pervasive; and (5) although 

Toledo was not a CSIF employee, she was authorized by the CSIF to be present as part of the 

collaborative agreement and the CSIF had the obligation to see that she complied with 

employment discrimination laws and regulations when dealing with CSIF employees. The 

CSIF’s failure to act since the first time that García complained to her supervisor constitutes a 

violation of Title VII and makes the CSIF liable to García.

The Merits of the Retaliation Claim

García became the victim of retaliation for having complained of sexual harassment. She 

has been the object of threats to her physical safety and submitted to emotional harassment at 

work by Migdalia Baerga, one of Soto’s right-hands at the CSIF and a childhood friend of 

Toledo in Utuado. García satisfies the elements of her retaliation claims under Title VII because 

the evidence available to her demonstrates that: (1) she engaged in protected activity under the 

statute when she complained tother supervisors of sexual harssment by Toledo, (2) she has been 

the victim of retaliation, and (3) the retaliation is causally connected to García’s exercise of 

protected conduct. Oliveras v. Univisión Puerto Rico, Inc., 2011 WL 4625951, p. 17 (D.P.R. 

2011) (BJM), citing Collazo v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2010); 

Bennett v. Saint–Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.2007). Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.,

342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2003).

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1) García’s Opposition Constitutes Protected Conduct

García’s verbal complaints of sexual harassment by Toledo before her supervisor and the 

filing of her administrative charge before the EEOC constitute protected conduct under Title 

VII’s opposition clause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

2) Retaliation against García is an Adverse Employment Action 

García became the victim of retaliation because as soon as Soto found out about her 

complaint to Gerena, rather than activating the CSIF’s sexual harassment protocol provided in 

Administrative Order No. 19-06 and she began to closely monitor García, frequently visit her

work area, unlike before. DE 1, ¶ 61. Moreover, Gerena did not channel García’s first complaint 

about Toledo’s unlawful conduct as contemplated in the sexual harassment protocol. Thus, 

García was left exposed to Toledo and under the magnifying glass of Soto, Toledo’s friend and 

Regional Director of the CSIF. Furthermore, though Toledo’s sexual harassment of García 

ceased when she was removed from the CSIF, the harassment against her did not and the 

evidence that she will present establishes an unlawful pattern of retaliation against García. There 

was a pattern of retaliation after the first departure by Toledo in late 2019. After Toledo returned 

in early 2020 and was sent back to the NUC because García challenged her presence at the CSIF, 

the retaliatory campaign by Soto, Baerga and others intensified. García’s work environment at 

the Arecibo Regional Office of the CSIF evince a harrowing, traumatic and unacceptable state of 

affairs in clear violation of Title VII and the Puerto Rico anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation 

legislation meant to guarantee García a safe and productive work environment. There can be no 

justification for the lack of effective action to deal with a situation that everyone knows about at 

the Arecibo CSIF and at Headquarters. 

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It is inexplicable that the result of the investigation conducted by the Director of the 

Labor Relations Office, Gladys Meléndez, was resolved with a mere “corrective measures have 

been taken” and that when García decided to exercise her federal rights by filing a charge before 

the EEOC, all Meléndez could do was to question Garcías’s decision to seek redress before the 

EEOC.

3) The Causal Connection

The evidence available to García suffices to establish the causal relationship between the 

exercise of protected conduct and the retaliation against her because: (1) of the temporal 

proximity and (2) by the pattern of antagonism that has been displayed against her. These are 

two of the quintessential means to establish the causal nexus in a retaliation claim in the First 

Circuit. See e.g., Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 342 F.3d 31, 38 (2003).

Moreover, the two (2) investigations conducted by the Labor Relations Office will also will shed 

light on defendant’s retaliatory animus regarding her sexual harassment allegations and the lack 

of evidence to support the accusations lodged against García in an effort to discredit and label 

her as “homophobic.”

As subsequently explained, defendant’s past and present retaliation against García for 

having engaged in protected conduct, when she complained of sexual harassment, and the latent 

threat of bodily harm to which she has been exposed by Baerga and García’s supervisors 

constitute retaliation for having engaged in protected conduct.

As a result of defendant’s unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory actions and omissions 

García has suffered and continues to suffer emotional harm and the deterioration of her physical 

well-being. García’s physical condition has deteriorated to the point that she is currently 

undergoing treatment and testing for the proximate effects of defendant’s conduct and has also 

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had to seek psychological treatment to abate and deal with the pressure that she has encountered 

and continues to suffer at work, notwithstanding the preliminary injunction currently in effect at 

the Arecibo Regional Office of the CSIF. Defendant is liable to García for all damages suffered 

by her as a proximate result of defendant’s unlawful conduct. Additionally, defendant is liable to 

García under 42 U.S.C. §1988 for all costs, litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees 

related to the prosecution of this action. 

B. Defendant

Plaintiff Keila García Colón (“Ms. García” or “Plaintiff”) filed the Verified Complaint 

and Request for Injunctive Relief on May 6, 2021 (“Complaint”). In essence, the Complaint 

alleges that García has been the victim of sexual harassment due to allegedly repeated unwanted 

advances from Wanda Toledo (“Toledo”), a National University College (“NUC”) professor in 

charge of NUC’s Nursing Program who oversaw the students exposed to training in SIFC 

facilities. According to the Complaint, Ms. García allegedly reported these acts to Marilyn 

Gerena Cáceres (“Gerena”), García’s supervisor, and Magalis Soto Pagán (“Soto”), then 

Arecibo Regional Director. Gerena and Soto allegedly failed to put in place the SIFC’s sexual 

harassment policy or escalate Plaintiff’s claim in any way. According to the Complaint, Soto 

recruited fellow employees, among these Migdalia Baerga (“Baerga”), and responded with a 

retaliation campaign. 

On the same day as the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff filed her Request for Preliminary 

Injunctive Relief (“Motion for Preliminary Injunction”). In its Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction, alleging that the 

retaliation campaign against García is wholly ongoing and is putting her life at risk. 

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Plaintiff’s Complaint vaguely and generally alleges that Toledo and Baerga’s behavior 

created a hostile work environment. We will proceed to discuss the merits of Plaintiff’s baseless 

claims individually. 

First, even if plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to show that Toledo’s behavior created 

a hostile work environment, the SIFC would not be liable for his behavior under Title VII. 

The standard under which an employer can be held liable for an employee's sexual harassment 

under Title VII depends on whether the harassment was perpetrated by the victim's supervisor or 

co-worker. See Figueroa García, 490 F.Supp.2d at 206. When the alleged harasser is a coworker, the employer is liable if it knew or should have known about the misconduct and 

failed to take appropriate corrective action. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 401 (1st

Cir.2002). In Toledo’s case, she is not a SIFC employee, rather a National University College 

Professor (“NUC”) who served as coordinator for the NUC’s Nursing Program at the Arecibo 

region of the corporation. See Complaint ¶¶ 19-22. Plaintiff then proceeds to enumerate a series 

of uncorroborated isolated incidents without providing the specific dates of said alleged 

occurrences. See Complaint ¶¶ 25-32 Plaintiff’s vague allegations state that “at some point” she 

approached her supervisors Gerena and Rosario on separate occasions and explained her version 

of Toledo’s so-called inappropriate interactions. See Complaint ¶¶ 34 and 48. The fact is, that 

shortly thereafter, Toledo was removed from Managing the NUC’s nursing program at the SIFC. 

See Complaint ¶¶ 58-59. Therefore, the SIFC took swift corrective action and removed Toledo. 

On February 2020, Toledo returned to the SIFC. See Complaint ¶ 68. On that occasion, 

Plaintiff went and reported the situation to Rosario, since Gerena had retired from the SIFC. See 

Complaint ¶¶ 68-70. Once again, Plaintiff alleges that Toledo incurred in inappropriate 

behavior, however, once again fails to provide the specific dates of said alleged occurrences. A 

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meeting was held by Soto, Rosario, and Dr. Luis Padro (SIFC’s Arecibo Medical Director) with 

Plaintiff to discuss her allegations. See Complaint ¶¶ 86-88. During said meeting, Soto 

reassured her that she would be protected as required by the SIFC’s harassment protocol. See 

Complaint ¶ 95. Soto also stated that the matter would be referred to the Labor Relations Office, 

as required by the sexual harassment protocol. See Complaint ¶ 95. After the meeting, Soto 

drafted the formal referral required by the SIFC’s sexual harassment protocol and sent it to the 

Office of Labor Relations at the SIFC’s headquarters. See Complaint ¶ 99. In early March 2020, 

García was informed by Gladys Gisela Melendez (“Ms. Melendez”), Director of Labor 

Relations, that she would meet with her to discuss the sexual harassment allegations. See

Complaint ¶ 107. Present at the meeting were Garcia and the union steward, María Lebrón. See

Complaint ¶ 108. Ms. Melendez interviewed Plaintiff and obtained a sworn statement from her 

and proceeded to conduct a full investigation on the matter. See Complaint ¶¶ 109-110. 

However, due to the COVD-19 pandemic, the SIFC closed its facilities on March 16, 2020. See, 

Complaint ¶ 112. On June 29, 2020, Plaintiff returned to work at the SIFC. See Complaint ¶ 

112. On October 9, 2020, Ms. Melendez issued her report and recommendation on the matter, 

and concluded that Toledo was not to return to provide services at the SIFC’s Arecibo Region in 

order to guarantee that Plaintiff could work in an environment free of sexual harassment. Said 

determination was notified to Plaintiff on that same date. As Plaintiff admitted in her Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction, Toledo no longer works at the SIFC’s Arecibo Region and she is no 

longer the subject of alleged unwanted sexual advances in the workplace. See Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction ¶ 6. Consequently, the SIFC once again took quick corrective action to 

tend to Plaintiff’s claims. 

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As to her co-worker Baerga, Plaintiff professes that she constantly engages in harassment 

against her for having complained about alleged acts of sexual harassment by Toledo. See 

Complaint ¶ 112. Plaintiff proceeds to provide allegations that mention a series of random and 

uncorroborated events without providing evidence of dates and witnesses to said occurrences. 

See Complaint ¶¶ 67, 128-130, 155- 162. Plaintiff claims that her supervisors were aware of the 

situation but fails to provide evidence of dates and or/written communications to corroborate said 

statements. See Complaint ¶¶ 159, 163, 165. Plaintiff’s most disturbing allegation is that 

Baerga’s harassment is of such nature that it included references to death. Complaint ¶ 175. She 

alleges that on more than one occasion, Baerga ushered comments about having to buy 

“coronas” (funeral floral arrangements). Complaint ¶ 176. Plaintiff goes as far as stating that 

Baerga allegedly threatened ger with the infliction of bodily harm when she whispered, “would 

love to have you alone and stab you”. Complaint ¶ 177. For such a serious allegation, Plaintiff 

is curiously vague with respect to the date in which the alleged threat occurred.

Plaintiff further alleges that she contacted her supervisor Rosario and Dr. Padró, 

however, states that the SIFC has not produced any solution and Baerga is allegedly allowed to 

continue her harassing behavior. See Complaint ¶¶ 178-180. Once again, Plaintiff fails to 

provide evidence to corroborate that her supervisors were indeed notified, the dates they were 

allegedly notified, and proof that the SIFC has done anything to resolve this matter. 

It is important to point out that the allegations in the Complaint against Baerga happened 

as far back as 2019. This means that “at one point” between 2019 and May 6, 2021, Ms. Baerga 

issued the alleged threat. The timeframe given is so vague that it is unreasonable to assume that 

the allegation occurred with any type of temporal proximity to the filing of the Complaint and 

the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On the contrary, “at one point” communicates to anyone 

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with basic reading comprehension skills that the event in question happened so far back in time 

and was treated with so little importance that the person issuing the statement is unsure of the 

exact moment it happened, if it even happened.

Plaintiff’s blatant refusal to provide specificity for the harassment and retaliation-based 

allegations in her Complaint demonstrates the little regard she has for this Honorable Court’s 

time and resources. Even if we assume that the alleged threats did happen and Plaintiff is 

merely omitting the timeframe for the sake of dramatic tension, what was Ms. García’s reaction 

upon hearing her coworker threaten her life? Did Ms. García file a complaint with her union 

representative? That is not alleged. Did Ms. García request that the matter be referred to the 

Office of Labor Relations. That is not alleged. Most importantly, there is nary an allegation 

mentioning how Ms. Garcia filed a complaint with the police, No. That is not alleged. Nor did 

she request a restraining order from the Court in order to be protected from Baerga’s alleged 

threat. Furthermore, at no point in the Complaint does Plaintiff explain her inertia on the matter. 

Let us reiterate that the allegations before this Honorable Court involve an allegation of a threat 

of bodily harm. That is as serious an allegation as can be made, yet Plaintiff apparently did 

nothing about it, except, months afterward, file this suit. In the meantime, she kept going to 

work. 

It is widely known in the context of Title VII that “[t]he Supreme Court has rejected the 

idea that an employer is strictly liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor when 

the employer neither knew nor reasonably could have known of the alleged misconduct.” See

Chaloult v. Interstate Brands Corporation, 540 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing: Meritor Sav. 

Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-72 (1986)). Pursuant to this principle, the Court has 

crafted a doctrine, derived from Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) and 

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Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), and denominated it the “FaragherEllerth” defense. This defense forecloses a Title VII claim against an employer, as 

Plaintiff’s claim against the SIFC clearly is, when (1) the employer’s “own actions to 

prevent and correct harassment were reasonable” and (2) “the employee's actions in 

seeking to avoid harm were not reasonable.” Chaloult, 540 F.3d at 66 (citing: Faragher, 524 

U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765). This test, at the pleading stage, must be looked through 

the lens of the new pleading standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. See Iqbal, 129 

S.Ct. at 1953 (Holding that the Twombly’s pleading standard applies “in all civil actions” under 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.). 

The Faragher-Ellerth defense is applicable to the SIFC in the instant case. The SIFC, in 

accordance with its harassment protocol, has removed Baerga from the Arecibo Region, effective 

June 1st, 2021. The SIFC’s actions do not constitute an acceptance that Plaintiff’s allegations are 

true. Rather, the SIFC’s internal harassment protocols mandate that when an allegation such as 

this one is made, the alleged offender be removed from the work site to another office, while the 

SIFC’s internal investigation begins. Thus, the SIFC was proactive and took corrective action to 

remove Baerga from the Arecibo region. However, Plaintiff’s actions in seeking to avoid harm

simply do not comport with her behavior after receiving the alleged threat. To the contrary, her 

actions indicate that she continued with her daily work routine---which is great for her, the SIFC. 

and the citizens of this territory, but which are fatal for her allegations of fear for her safety. By 

acting in this manner, Plaintiff failed to act with reasonable care to take advantage of the 

employer’s safeguards and otherwise prevent harm that could have been avoided. See Faragher 

524 US at. 805. This is grounded on the notion that “...it requires the employee in normal 

circumstances to make [the effort to put the company on notice] if the employee wants to impose 

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vicarious liability on the employer and collect damages under Title VII.” Id. At 74 (citing: Reed

v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc. 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003). As the First Circuit has noted, 

this requires that a plaintiff takes reasonable steps in reporting the harassment. See: Id. It also 

makes clear that “ordinary fear or embarrassment” is not a justification for lack of diligence in 

not reporting any such incident. Id.

Plaintiff’s inaction at such a serious offense begs the question: Why did she abstain from 

filing a formal complaint and taking the reasonable steps in reporting the harassment when 

Baerga allegedly issued her threat? The answer is simple: Because the threat does not exist. 

Again. to this day, Plaintiff continues to go to work to the SIFC offices in the Arecibo Region as 

per her regular work schedule. At absolutely no point has García suffered, nor has been a victim 

of, an attempt on her life or physical harm. García’s continued and uninterrupted physical 

integrity is, by itself, proof of that. 

As discussed above, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court made clear that a plaintiff that intends to

survive a motion to dismiss must furnish sufficient factual information, which, if ultimately 

proven would establish a violation of federal law. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“A pleading that 

offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.... Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual 

enhancement.” Id. (Citations omitted)). This is where plaintiff’s Complaint runs short given that 

the pleadings fail to provide well-pleaded factual information which, if proven, would make out 

a violation of Title VII. Thus, absent specific factual information to support Plaintiff’s claims for 

relief, the Complaint must fail under Iqbal’s pleading standard. 

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Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who 

complains about discrimination in the workplace. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To prevail in a 

Title VII retaliation claim, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that: “(1) he or she engaged in 

protected activity under Title VII, (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) 

the adverse employment action was causally connected to the protected activity”. Id. at 176 

(D.P.R. 2011). This standard provides the requirements to establish a prima facie case for Title 

VII retaliation.

Under this standard, an adverse employment action is one that affects employment or 

alters the conditions of the workplace. Vega-Colon v. Wyeth Pharm., 625 F.3d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 

2010). The changes must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job 

responsibilities. Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 30 23 (1st Cir. 2010). To determine 

if an employment action is in fact adverse, the court looks for whether an action has materially 

changed the conditions of a plaintiff's employment. Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14 

(1st Cir. 2017). Under this provision, Title VII also states that the individual is not protected 

against all retaliations, they will be protected only from retaliation that produces an injury or 

harm. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).

Similarly, Law No. 115 protects employees from termination, discrimination, or other 

adverse employment actions affecting the terms and conditions of their employment “should the 

employee offer or attempt to offer ... any testimony, expression, or information before a 

legislative, administrative or judicial forum....” 29 LPRA § 194a(a). 

Law No. 115 establishes a two-prong test to determine a prima facie retaliation case. 

Under Law No. 115, the employee must demonstrate, through direct or circumstantial evidence, 

that (1) she participated in a protected activity; and (2) was subsequently fired, threatened, or 

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discriminated against regarding her employment. 29 LPRA § 194a (c); Rivera Figueroa v. 

A.A.A., 177 D.P.R. 345, 362 (2009). Because Law 115 requires the same adverse employment 

action showing as a Title VII retaliation claim, courts have treated the two claims the 

same. See Rivera Rodríguez v. Sears Roebuck De Puerto Rico, Inc., 367 F.Supp.2d 216, 230

(D.P.R.2005).

Even though plaintiff cannot establish that she was subject to 

unlawful discrimination under Title VII, she can still maintain a retaliation claim if she can 

establish the three required elements of the prima face case. See Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d

13 (1st Cir.1994). “The success of a retaliation claim does not require that the alleged wrongful 

conduct itself be illegal.” Alvarez v. Plom–Electric Corp./Imaginacion, et al., Cv. No. 04–

1334(SEC), 2006 WL 6561405 at 3 (D.P.R. Jun. 19, 2006) (citing cases).

As to the second prong, an adverse employment action is defined as one that would 

“dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Godoy v.

Maplehurst Bakeries, Inc., 747 F.Supp.2d 298, 314 (D.P.R.2010). This typically involves actions 

such as “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 

responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Morales Vallellanes v.

Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.2010). 

For a retaliation suit to prosper under both federal and local law, it is essential for 

Plaintiff to have suffered some type of adverse employment action that affects her the terms, 

conditions, compensation, location, benefits, or privileges of the employment in any way. 

Neither the Complaint nor the Motion for Preliminary Injunction provides direct or 

circumstantial evidence that shows that Plaintiffs’ employment terms were affected in any way 

as a result of partaking in protected activity. There is not a single allegation that Plaintiff was 

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fired, suspended, nor has she had her compensation, benefits or privileges unilaterally 

minimized by SIFC. In fact, to this day Plaintiff continues to work at the SIFC offices in the 

Arecibo Region, her compensation has remained unaffected, her benefits remain the same, she 

has not been relocated in any way. 

Furthermore, without an adverse employment action, it is impossible for there to be a 

causal connection with any protected activity. As such, even with the existence of any protected 

activity, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how she has suffered any adverse employment actions, as 

defined by the First Circuit. For this reason, Plaintiff patently fails to fulfill the applicable 

standards to prevail in a retaliation suit under both Title VII and Law No. 115. 

Finally, Rico Law No. 17 provides that sexual harassment in employment is “an illegal 

and undesirable practice,” 29 LPRA § 155. On the other hand, Law No. 69 

bars discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. See 29 LPRA § 1321. “Law 17 and 69 

serve virtually the same purposes and outlaw essentially identical behavior, and Law 69's 

specific prohibition on gender discrimination overlaps with Law 17's bar 

on sexual harassment.” Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 28 (1st Cir.2013) (citing García v.

Sprint PCS Caribe, 841 F.Supp.2d 538, 564 (D.P.R.2012). Moreover, “[t]he First Circuit has 

determined that Title VII's, Law 17's ,... prohibitions against 

gender discrimination and sexual harassment ‘serve virtually the same purposes and outlaw 

essentially identical behavior.’” (citing Gerald, 707 F.3d at 28). That is, “the substantive law 

of Puerto Rico on sexual harassment appears to be aligned with Title VII law; the latter's 

precedents being used freely to construe the former.” Gerald, 707 F.3d at 28. We respectfully 

submit that Plaintiff’s Complaint runs short given that the pleadings fail to provide well-pleaded 

factual information which, if proven, would make out a violation of Law 17 and Law 69. 

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II. Witnesses

A. Factual

1. Plaintiff

a. Keila García Colón - about all aspects of her claim.

b. Angel R. Martínez Santiago - Regional Director - Arecibo Region – about his 

knowledge of the retaliation claims of García and the response from the CSIF;

c. Dr. Luis H. Padró - Regional Medical Director - about his knowledge of the retaliation 

claims of García and the responses to curb the retaliation and protect García;

d. Dr. Ramón Carrillo Torres - Emergency Room Inspector MD - about his knowledge of 

the retaliation claims of García;

e. José Colón - Epidemiology Nurse - about his knowledge of the retaliation against García 

and his efforts to protect García;

f. Nora Rosario Medina – Supervisor - about her knowledge of the sexual harassment and 

retaliation; García’s complaints of sexual hrassament by Toledo and retaliation against 

García; she also has knowledge of the responses to curb the retaliation and protect 

García;

g. Erika Sierra – Nurse - about her knowledge of psychological harassment by Baerga 

against García;

h. Gladys G. Meléndez - Deputy Director Office of Labor Relations – about her knowledge 

of García’s allegations of sexual harassment and retaliation; her investigation of García’s 

allegations;

i. Magalis Soto – former Regional Director – about her knowledge of García’s allegations 

of sexual harassment and retaliation; her failure to correct the situation and her 

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participation in the retaliation; and the referral to the Labor Relations Office;

j. Jessica Mason Rodríguez – Director Office of Labor Relations - about her knowledge of 

García’s allegations of sexual harassment and retaliation as well as the investigative 

process; the decision to remove Migdalia Baerga from the Arecibo Regional Office; and 

her investigation of Gracía’s allegations.

k. Migdalia Baerga - about her knowledge of García’s allegations of sexual harassment; 

about her retaliation against García and her allegations that García was homophobic;

l. Roberto Rosado – about the incident between him and García regarding his failure to 

use a protective mask and García’s instructions to wear one; about Migdalia Baerga’s 

baseless allegations that García had referred to him as a “dirty fagot” (“pato sucio”) on 

the day of the incident with García. 

m. Marilyn Gerena – former Nursing Director – about her knowledge of Prof. Wanda 

Toledo’s harassment of Garcَía; about her efforts with the Dean of National University 

College to remove Toledo from her role as supervisor of the NUC’s nursing students who 

received practical training at the Arecibo Regional Office of the CSIF.

2. Defendant

a. Gladys G. Meléndez - Deputy Director Office of Labor Relations – about her 

knowledge of the allegations raised by Mrs. Garcia in her complaint, the investigation performed 

by the Office of Labor Relations, and related matters.

b. Jessica Mason Rodríguez – Director Office of Labor Relations - about her 

knowledge of the allegations raised by Mrs. Garcia in her complaint, the investigation performed 

by the Office of Labor Relations, and related matters.

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c. Keila García Colón – She will be brought in as a hostile witness to testify about 

the allegations raised in her complaint. 

Defendant reserves the right to supplement or otherwise amend this list, including the 

right to add or withdraw any witness.

B. Expert 

1. Plaintiff

At this time, García potentially anticipates presenting the testimony of her treating 

psychologist and cardiologist. A decision as to the retention of an expert witness in any of these 

fields has not been made because additional medical information is required. 

2. Defendant

At this time, the SIFC does not foresee presenting an expert witness at this time. 

However, Defendant reserves the right to supplement or otherwise amend this list.

III. Discovery

See, Appendix.

IV. Summary of Documentary Evidence in Support of Contentions.

A. Plaintiff

1. Administrative Charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;

2. Notice of Dismissal and Right to Sue;

3. Administrative Order 19-06 (Sexual Harassment Protocol);

4. Letter of October 5, 2020 by Gladys G. Meléndez (R. Rosado grievance);

5. Letter of October 9, 2020 by Gladys G. Meléndez (K. García grievance);

6. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/06/2021 at 10:22 a.m.;

7. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/06/2021 at 10:23 a.m.;

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8. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/22/2021 at 10:22 a.m.;

9. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/26/2021 at 12:56 p.m.;

10. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/26/2021 at 12:58 p.m.;

11. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/26/2021 at 12:59 p.m.;

12. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 04/30/2021 at 7:55 a.m.;

13. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 05/10/2021 at 12:45 p.m.;

14. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 05/10/2021 at 9:14 a.m.;

15. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 05/10/2021 at 9:16 a.m.;

16. Photograph by Keila García Colón taken on 05/10/2021 at 11:59 a.m.;

17. Video by Keila García Colón taken on 03/29/2021 at 8:02 a.m.;

18. Investigation File at Office of Labor Relations (R. Rosado grievance);

19. Investigation File at Office of Labor Relations (Keyla García grievance).

B. Defendant

At this time, the SIFC has not determined what documentary evidence it will use at trial. 

However, the SIFC has produced to Plaintiff, the following documents during the November 10, 

2021 Rule 26 meeting held between the parties. 

1. Administrative Order Adopting a Protocol for the Filing of Discrimination and 

Sexual Harassment in Employment Complaints before the State Insurance Fund 

dated December 11, 2018 [Administrative Order 19-06]

2. Norms and Procedure for filing Complaints regarding Discrimination and Sexual

Harassment at the State Insurance Fund dated Jun 28, 2000.

3. October 9, 2020 letter from Gladys Melendez to Keila Garcia.

4. October 9, 2020 report from the Labor Relations Office. 

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5. October 9, 2020 letter from Gladys Melendez to Maria C. Jurado.

V. Consent to Proceed before a United States Magistrate

After consulting with their clients the parties hereby inform the court that they do not

consent to proceed with the action before a United States Magistrate Judge as provided in 28 

U.S.C. §626.

VI. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TRIAL.

A. Plaintiff.

Five (5) to seven (7) working days for both parties.

B. Defendant.

Three (3) days.

VII. Other Matters

1. Plaintiff

Plaintiff requests that, notwithstanding the resolution of the pending Motion to Dismiss 

(Docket No. 31) filed by defendant, it be ordered to answer the Verified Complaint. Once 

defendant’s response is received plaintiff will be in a better position to determine if she can 

reduce the scope of the full extent of the discovery which she currently intends to conduct to 

prove her allegations and support her claim for relief. 

2. Defendant

The SIFC respectfully requests that this Honorable Court issue a ruling on the SIFC’s 

pending Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 31] to determine the scope of the discovery and to save 

the Court’s judicial resources. 

WHEREFORE, the parties very respectfully pray from this Honorable Court that it 

deem fulfilled by the parties its Orders at Docket Nos. 71 and 75 and that it approve the 

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deadlines suggested by the parties for pretrial discovery and the subsequent prosecution of this 

action. 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 22nd day of November, 2021.

Corporation of the State Insurance Fund

WEINSTEIN-BACAL, MILLER & VEGA, P.S.C.

González Padín Building - Penthouse

154 Rafael Cordero Street, Plaza de Armas

Old San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901

Telephone: (787) 977-2550

Telecopier: (787) 977-2559

Email: pwm@wbmvlaw.com

 moa@wbmvlaw.com

By: s/ Peter W. Miller

 U.S.D.C. No. 213609

By: s/ Myriam C. Ocasio-Arana

 U.S.D.C. No. 228111

Keila García Colón

GONZÁLEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICES, P.S.C.

P.O. Box 9024055

San Juan, PR 00902-4055

Tel: 787-766-5052

jgonzalez@gonzalezmunozlaw.com

info@gonzalezmunozlaw.com

s/Juan Rafael González Muñoz

JUAN RAFAEL GONZÁLEZ MUÑOZ

USDC-PR No. 202312

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García Colón v. Corporation if the State Insurance Fund

Joint Case Management Memorandum

Civil No. 21-1211 RAM)

APPENDIX 

EVENT DATE

Amendment to Pleadings or to Add Parties

 Plaintiff

 Defendant

January 15, 2022

January 15, 2022

Initial Disclosures

(Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i))

November 22, 2020

Service of Written Discovery

 First Set of Interrogatories

 First Request for Production

 First Request for Admissions

December 1, 2021

December 1, 2021

December 1, 2021

Responses to Written Discovery January 11, 2022

1

Supplemental Written Discovery (Optional)

 Second Request for Production

 Second Request for Admissions

January 31, 2022

January 31, 2022

Responses to Supplemental 

Written Discovery March 15, 2022

Plaintiff’s deposition March 15, 2022

Deposition of Plaintiff’s Witnesses April 11-22, 2022

Announcement of Experts

 Plaintiff

 Defendant

January 31, 2022

February 28, 2022

Production of Expert Reports

 Plaintiff

 Defendant

March 15, 2022

April 15, 2022

Expert Witness’ Depositions May 1-31, 20222

 

1 No extensions will be requested. If objections are to be raised to any written discovery these are to be 

raised by December 22, 2022 or they will be waived.

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Conclusion of Discovery June 15, 2022

Dispositive Motions June 30, 2022

Oppositions to Dispositive Motions July 29, 2022

Replies to Oppositions to Dispositive Motions August 15, 2022

Joint Proposed Pretrial Order October 7, 2022

Pretrial/Settlement Conference October 12, 2022

Jury Trial October 24, 2022

 

2 The specific dates will be determined by both parties subject to the experts’ availability.

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