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335-627 2007

POLICE AS FIRST PREVENTERS: LOCAL

STRATEGIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF 

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

Serial No. 109-105

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

JOHN LINDER, Georgia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 

Biological Attack .................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 29

WITNESSES 

Mr. John F. Timoney, Chief of Police, City of Miami, Florida: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Mr. Brett Lovegrove, Superintendent, Anti-Terrorism Branch, City of London 

Police, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13

Major Ahmet Sait Yayla, Counterrrorism and Operations Division, ankara 

Police Department, Ankara, Republic of Turkey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19

(1)

POLICE AS FIRST PREVENTERS: LOCAL 

STRATEGIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR 

Thursday, September 21, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND

BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in Room 

1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Gibbons and Langevin. 

Also Present: Representative Ros-Lehtinen. 

Mr. LINDER. The Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks will come to order. I ask unanimous consent to 

allow the written statement from the Los Angeles police chief to be 

included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. LINDER. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on police as first preventers and local strategies in the war 

on terror. I want to welcome our witnesses and thank you for traveling in some cases great distances to Washington, D.C., to testify 

before us on this important topic. I thank you for keeping us safe 

by serving on the front lines in the global war on terror. 

The threat of a terrorist using a weapon of mass destruction is 

very real. Al Qaeda has stated its intent to acquire a WMD. Preventing it and other terrorist groups from acquiring a nuclear or 

biological weapon is imperative to keeping America and the world 

safe. 

Effective intelligence gathering is essential. We need to focus our 

efforts on finding bad actors in addition to preventing the means 

by which they could cause harm. But locating these bad actors 

needs to happen not just abroad, but at home in our local communities, and prevention efforts must occur at all levels of government. 

Today’s hearing focuses on prevention efforts at the local level by 

local police. Police officers tend to be thought of primarily as first 

responders. But in reality they also serve as first preventers. Local 

police are the ones patrolling the streets, and their instincts and 

knowledge serve as the first line of defense in preventing homegrown terrorists from attacking. 

We all understand the threat. The attackers on 9/11 lived and 

trained in the United States, but we failed to fuse together and understand the small pieces of collective intelligence in order to prevent these attacks. We cannot afford that kind of failure again, es-
2

pecially if that failure means an attack using a weapon of mass destruction anywhere in the world. The sharing of intelligence information quickly and accurately with officers on the ground is of supreme importance. 

I am encouraged by the development of fusion centers and joint 

terrorism task forces that break down artificial jurisdictional barriers in order to provide information to those law enforcement officers who need it, when they need it. It seems to me that intelligence about the next terrorist attack is more likely to come from 

the witnesses at this table than the national and international Intelligence Communities. Regional and multiagency coordination ensures that terrorism prevention is everyone’s responsibility. 

The local leaders we have with us today in some way daily face 

the scourge of terrorism. The threat of terrorism is a global one, 

and the strategies to prevent terrorism must be global as well. Prevention strategies that work in Ankara, Turkey, or London, England, may be applicable to Atlanta, Georgia. Effective policing efforts create a hostile environment for terrorists. By walking the 

beats and getting to know the communities they patrol, local police 

officers will likely to be the ones to identify bad actors and break 

up terrorist cells and disrupt terrorist networks. 

Additionally, local police need training in terrorist tactics and 

identifying the support structures terrorists need to plan and carry 

out the attacks. Local police forces must become effective problem 

solvers and not just incident responders. 

Many in Congress think too often of a ‘‘Washington first’’ solution, but as you all know, in the end all terrorism is local, and we 

must promote local strategies and local solutions to counter the terrorist threat. Prevention begins in the streets of Atlanta and the 

subways of London and the shops of Ankara, the ports of Miami, 

and it is there that we will prevail on the global war on terror. 

Mr. LINDER. I now yield to my friend from Rhode Island Mr. 

Langevin for the purposes of making an opening statement. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to what you have to say, and just on a personal note, I have 

the deepest personal respect for members of our law enforcement 

community, and from my private life I know firsthand the dangers 

that our first responders face day in and day out and the extraordinary job you do to keep our community safe, and we are grateful 

for your dedication. 

I appreciate the opportunity to have a— hearing on this important topic: The police as first responders. 

As many of us know and understand, all terrorism is essentially 

local. We depend on our local law enforcement officials to do everything in their power to prevent attacks om occurring, just as we depend on them to be first responders on the scene once an attack 

has occurred. 

The bipartisan 9/11 Commission has consistently stated that a 

secure homeland primarily depends on State, local and tribal law 

enforcement officers in our communities. These are the people who 

are best positioned to observe criminal and other activity that 

might be the first signs of a terrorist plot, thereby helping to 

thwart attacks before they occur. It is therefore crucial that our 
3

local law enforcement officials be positioned to play offense as well 

as defense. 

While there is no question that we need to ensure that they are 

equipped as responders and are well equipped, we also need to 

focus on providing them with the proper tools to serve as preventers. Most importantly, we need to ensure our local police—our 

police officers, sheriffs and other law enforcement officials are able 

to make sense of what they encounter on the ground and are able 

to share their observations and concerns with the Federal Intelligence Community. This will in turn make our homeland much 

safer. 

The concept of intelligence-led policing has been cited by many 

aspects as one of the best forms of prevention. In order for police 

and sheriff officers to be effective in their preventative efforts, they 

need to be able to fully participate in the intelligence cycle and be 

granted law enforcement intelligence products that suit their 

needs. Unfortunately, six years after the most horrific terrorist attacks on our country, our country has experienced, there is currently no national strategy that focuses on intelligence-led policing. 

Intelligence is only good if it is effectively shared with the people 

able to quickly respond. Information sharing is therefore one of the 

most important tools our local law enforcement officials can have. 

State and local fusion centers were designed to be the hubs of information sharing where police, health officials, the private sector 

and other Homeland Security officials could all come together to receive the same intelligence. However, our Nation’s fusion centers 

only work when they are given the proper funding levels to operate. This is another gap that we need to fix. 

Now, while State and local fusion centers can serve as catalysts 

for intelligence-led policing, without the funding local law enforcement officials cannot be trained in the intelligence cycle, thereby 

rendering the centers ineffective. 

Now, I am committed to continue to work with my colleagues to 

strengthen information sharing and to properly fund our State and 

local fusion centers to better assist our local law enforcement communities. I certainly look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

here today on how best to achieve these goals, and I want to thank 

the witnesses for being here, and I want to thank you, 

Mr.Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. LINDER. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. LINDER. Our witnesses today are Mr. John F. Timoney, chief 

of police, city of Miami, Florida; Mr. Brett Lovegrove, superintendent, Antiterrorism Branch, City of London Police, London, 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and Major 

Ahmet Sait Yayla, the Counterterrorism and Operations Division, 

Ankara Police Department, Ankara, Republic of Turkey. 

I would like to remind you that your whole statement will be 

made part of the record, and we ask you to keep your spoken statements to 5 nutes, and we will have questions afterward. 

Chief Timoney. 
4

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. TIMONEY, CHIEF OF POLICE, MIAMI 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF MIAMI 

Chief Timoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for inviting me to testify before this important committee. I come here as 

not just a chief of a major city in the South, but also as a representative of police professionals all across America. 

The attack of 9/11 took an enormous toll on police and the police 

profession. At that time I was the police commissioner of Philadelphia. Prior to that, I spent 29 years at the New York City Police 

Department retiring after—29 years after as the number two person in the organization. I know many people were killed on 9/11, 

as some were colleagues or were just ordinary citizens. It is a day 

I will never forget. 

The city of Miami, as you are well aware, is—in south Florida 

also referred to as the Gateway to the Americas—has got a huge 

international airport, the third largest in the country. It has got a 

very active seaport with the largest cruise ship and airlines in the 

world. And then not known by many people, but Miami is the second biggest international banking center in the United States after 

New York. 

So these assets along with others make Miami a challenge for 

counterterrorism officials and also an attractive target for terrorists 

looking to strike at the region. And it is important to point out that 

14 of the 19 9/11 highjackers resided and trained in south Florida. 

When I became the police chief of Miami 4 years ago, MiamiDade County had a priority for me to develop a comprehensive 

antiterrorism initiative which included intelligence gathering, community involvement, rapid response and mitigation. Towards that 

end, I am happy to report that we have stood up our own Office 

of Emergency Management and Homeland Security that is responsible for overseeing this entire endeavor. 

We deal in four critical areas: intelligence, prevention and education, response and mitigation, and, obviously, training. 

The Miami Police Department terrorism response plan is quite 

comprehensive. It is meant to identify and deal with any eventuality involving acts of terrorism, whether it is the delivery of a suspicious package or a weapon of mass destruction into populated 

areas of downtown Miami. 

As cochairman of the FBI-South Florida Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, I am fully aware of the enormous challenges that law enforcement in south Florida faces, but I have also witnessed a dramatic change in the posture of the Federal authorities in dealing 

with local law enforcement. I can’t stress enough the importance of 

us working in a multiagency cooperation, with communication and 

coordination. 

I testified before a congressional hearing right after 9/11 when 

I was the police commissioner of Philadelphia, and my remarks 

were to the effect that the next piece of information that I get from 

the FBI will be the first. Well, I am here to say that that has 

changed. It has changed dramatically. 

But let me get back to the four areas where we are focused in 

on, and, Chairman, you had said this in your opening remarks 

about intelligence. That is our number one weapon against any 
5

kind of terrorist attack. Good, actionable intelligence can mean the 

difference. 

It was often the feeling at local law enforcement prior to 9/11 

that intelligence gathering was a Federal responsibility, but the 

events in Madrid and London and some events recently here in the 

United States are highlights that local law enforcement can have 

a very important role. 

If you look at the Madrid bombers, most of those guys were common drug dealers. And so if your narcotics enforcement unit was 

in tune and had performers underground, maybe that plot could 

have been interrupted. Similarly in the London bombings, these 

were just ordinary individuals. Who knows, if the beat officer was 

more in tune with that community, maybe that could have been 

prevented. So we in Miami and in the region are committed to 

making sure our beat officers and officers working the 9/11 areas 

are in tune with that community. 

We are also members, obviously, of the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, and I can tell you the sharing of information and briefings 

is so much better than prior to 9/11. Prior to 9/11 you got informed 

after the event, after an arrest was made. Now I am briefed literally on a daily basis of what is going on and in cases that are 

working. So the relationship is—I am sorry. The relationship is 

very good. 

Also in Florida we have developed the South Florida Regional 

Domestic Security Task Force, again which is kind of an overlay at 

the local and State level of an intelligence branch where we share 

information. 

In the area of prevention and education, there is a role for the 

public in this, and our flagship program is a thing called Miami 

Shield, which your staff has been provided. And on any given day 

and any given week, Miami police officers and vehicles will appear 

at a building in downtown Miami. Officers will take up strategic 

beats; supervisors and detectives will interview pedestrians, building managers, and hand out a variety of brochures, some for the 

citizens, some for the business managers. Some of the brochures 

are quite lengthy, very informative of what you can do at work, but 

also in your place of residence. They are in three languages: Spanish, English and Creole. 

This has been an extremely successful program, and if nothing 

else, in reassuring the people of Miami that the police departments 

are ready, willing and able to deal, God forbid, with any eventuality. 

I just—while I know this meeting is not on responsive mitigation, 

I think at the local level we will still be the first responders, and 

towards that we have conducted a variety of operations over the 

last 3-1/2 years. I will just mention two or three. 

Operation Eagle Eye was an operation we did about 2 years ago 

involving four venues, different parts of the city of Miami, involving over 600 police officers and 1,000 volunteers in weapons of 

mass destruction-type situations. It was observed, evaluated by 

people from Homeland Security, and we learned a lot from that. It 

went very well. We can always learn from these situations. 
6

We also, in Operation Pigeon Drop, tested our own mail room in 

police headquarters. What if there was an anthrax attack? That 

worked out very well. 

We did a similar thing in downtown, one of the high office buildings in Miami, called Operation White Powder, without notice, having an anthrax-type package delivered to test building security, 

and they passed with flying colors. 

And then most important of these operations was the one last 

July, Operation Cassandra, where we tested the issue of interoperable radios between the Miami Police Department, local jurisdictions surrounding Miami, Miami-Dade, both fire departments, and 

the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. That exercise was observed by people from Homeland Security, and in their after-accident report they noted that, first of all, there were no flaws in the 

radio system, and that Miami came out as among the best in the 

country. 

So all of that was, I think—has gone quite well. 

One other thing on the—on the national level which I think was 

extremely important, Homeland Security required all localities to 

be trained in NIMS, the National Information Management System. And this is very important for smaller localities that depend 

on mutual aid coming into a system so that all police departments 

are working from the same sheet of music. 

So really the story today as compared to 5 ars ago is a pretty good 

story. I know a lot of people complain that not enough has been 

done, but I would rather emphasize what has been done, and when 

you look at it objectively over the last 4 years, quite a bit has been 

done; however, like anything else, I guess there could be room for 

improvement. 

And I think I would like just to in my concluding remarks point 

out two things: You know, this progress, first of all, could not have 

been made without the cooperation and partnership with the Federal Government. It is extremely important. However, on the issue 

of funding, it is our preference—I saw last year that New York, for 

example, funding was cut in favor of some rural areas. This is not 

a knock on rural areas, but clearly funding should be based on risk, 

on vulnerability, on target richness. And I think if you used those 

criteria, you have got to conclude that it is going to be one of the 

larger cities that will be the subject of the attack. And so our preference is for the funding to be done that way, number one. 

Number two, that the funding go directly to the cities, and in far 

too many States, it gets hung up at the State level. That is not the 

case in Florida. Jeb Bush has done a good job in getting it to the 

localities. I speak to other chiefs who complain it has not come 

down fast enough. 

And then finally, for me maybe most important, maybe more relevant to this committee, is this whole issue of intelligence. It is 5 

years out. It is not clear to me who is in charge of intelligence on 

a national level. Is it the FBI? Is it Homeland Security? Is it Mr. 

Negroponte’s office? It is not clear. And somebody needs to give 

somebody that task, because if more than one person, one entity, 

has the task, there is nobody to hold accountable. You would be 

back to finger-pointing. 
7

I have seen the change in the FBI under Director Mueller under 

the last 5 years, and it has been a sea change. Some of things may 

have been wrong, but by and large the area of information sharing 

has been tremendous. They have the structure set up. They have 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force. So why would we waste another 

3 or 5 years to stand up another superintelligence agency that may 

or may not work when we already have one in place with a structure in place? And that would be my preference. I have spoken to 

other chiefs across the Nation and that, too, is their preference, but 

I leave it up to this committee using its influence on the White 

House, but somebody has got to make a decision that one entity is 

in charge. 

I thank you very much for your indulgence, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The statement of Chief Timoney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHIEF TIMONEY

Honorable members of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological 

Attack, fellow members of the law enforcement community, distinguished 

guests.good afternoon. I come before you today not only as Chief of Police of a major 

metropolitan city in the South East, but as a representative of police professionals 

across this nation who have been faced with one of the most significant challenges 

in the history of American law enforcement. 

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 took an enormous personal toll on 

the policing profession. At the time, I was Police Commissioner of the Philadelphia 

Police Department. Prior to that, I spent twenty-nine years with the New York City 

Police Department, where I retired as First Deputy Police Commissioner, the number two person in that organization. I knew many of those who died on that day. 

Some were former colleagues; others were just ordinary citizens. 

The City of Miami is South Florida’s largest city. It is known as the ′′Gateway 

to the Americas′′ and serves as an international hub due to its international airport 

(third highest international passenger traffic in the U.S.) and busy seaport (approximately 8 million tons of cargo pass through the port yearly/it is also the busiest 

cruise ship port in world). Additionally, the Miami River is Florida’s fifth busiest 

cargo port. The River terminates near the airport, thereby presenting vulnerability 

to Miami International Airport and its surrounding infrastructure. The Metromover 

and the Metrorail are two components of the county’s mass transportation systems 

that cut through the heart of Miami, where thousands commute on a daily basis. 

Miami is also home to the second largest concentration of international banks in the 

country, 64 consulates, several bi-national chambers of commerce, and foreign trade 

offices. These factors make Miami a unique city that presents special challenges for 

counterterrorism officials and an attractive target for terrorists looking to strike at 

the region’s economy. Additionally, it is important to note that 14 of the 9/11 

highjackers resided in South Florida prior to the attacks. 

When I became Chief of Police of the Miami Police Department in January of 

2003, one of Mayor Manny Diaz’s priorities was to develop a comprehensive 

antiterrorism initiative, including intelligence gathering, community involvement, 

rapid response and mitigation. Toward that end, I am pleased to report that my 

agency has established the Miami Police Department’s Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (OEM), responsible for overseeing training, policy, resource deployment, and the development of situational/operational plans. This Unit 

is charged with the production of the Department’s local terrorism preparedness/response plan. Four critical areas: Intelligence, Prevention/Education, Response/Mitigation, and Training are key components of this plan and are detailed further in 

this testimony. The Miami Police Department’s terrorism response plan is quite 

comprehensive. It is meant to identify and deal with any eventuality involving acts 

of terrorism, whether it is the delivery of a suspicious package or a weapon of mass 

destruction attack in heavily-populated Downtown Miami. 

Further, the Miami Police Department has taken substantial steps to train its 

personnel in counterterrorism. Today, all MPD officers are trained and equipped 

with the latest in Personal Protection Equipment (PPE). They are able to utilize 

their gear immediately upon being mobilized for an all-hazardous incident. Recently, 

a state-of-the-art Mobile Command Center vehicle was added to our emergency re-
8

sponse fleet. This vehicle gives our first responders the ability to have a mobile command center on the scene of an incident within minutes of an emergency. Of equal 

importance is the development of Operation Miami Shield, a counterterrorism 

awareness program explained further in this document (Operation Miami Shield 

manuals enclosed). 

As Co-Chairman of the FBI’s South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force, I am fully 

aware of the enormous challenges the South Florida law enforcement community 

has faced and overcome. I have also witnessed a dramatic change in the posture of 

federal authorities in dealing with local law enforcement. I can’t stress enough the 

importance of multi-agency cooperation, communication and organized coordination 

among agencies in the event we are called to take action. 

Highlighted below is a breakdown of a few of the Miami Police Department’s 

strategies against terrorism.

II. Intelligence: 

Without question, the number one weapon in our fight against terrorism is good, 

actionable intelligence that informs law enforcement of what may happen so authorities can take affirmative steps to prevent or interrupt a possible terrorist plot. 

The emergence of homegrown terror cells in the U.S. and other countries, such as 

Britain and Spain, highlights the importance of intelligence and the significant role 

of local law enforcement.Since the events of September 11, the relationship between 

federal and local law enforcement agencies has improved tremendously and has 

proven to be vital in achieving greater levels of cooperation, coordination, and exchange of information.The following entities have the ability to gather intelligence/

information and disseminate it effectively, and in a timely manner, to the appropriate law enforcement agencies. Our overall effectiveness in the arena of homeland 

security is enhanced by our ability to tap into the following. 

The City of Miami Police Department has joined forces with the FBI as a member 

of the Miami FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. The Task Force has been very aggressive in intelligence gathering and investigation of terrorist activity in this region. 

Most recently, it successfully concluded a significant investigation into a homegrown 

terror cell bent on destroying government and law enforcement buildings in Miami. 

The plot was disrupted with the arrest of seven individuals who now await trial in 

Miami Federal Court. 

The Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force (SERDSTF) consists of allstate and local law enforcement agencies that communicate in the region and share 

information with the common goal of combating terrorism. 

Terrorism Alert Guide is used as a tool by the Miami Police Department. The 

guide utilizes existing public/police partnerships to deter, dissuade, and discourage 

terrorism. The terrorism guide provides several avenues for the gathering of intelligence. 

ThreatCom is a state program run by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) designed to strengthen domestic security prevention, preparedness, 

protection, response, and recovery through interdisciplinary interagency consensus 

and commitment. This is achieved by building and relying on regional mutual aid 

response capabilities. ThreatCom has also developed a paging system that allows 

the forwarding of information and intelligence to state and local law enforcement 

agencies.

III. Prevention/Education: 

Terrorists choose their targets based on weaknesses and vulnerabilities they observe in high rise buildings, critical infrastructure, facilities, and transportation 

sites. They are known to study routines, customs, habits and schedules of those associated with their intended targets. Terrorists, just like the common criminal, seek 

to avoid detection and blend in with the crowd. To deal with this threat, the Miami 

Police Department created Operation Miami Shield. 

Operation Miami Shield is the flagship antiterrorism program of the Miami Police 

Department aimed to engage and educate the general public on the subject. It operates in this manner: Twice a month, on different days and times, locations are chosen within the city to which police personnel and resources are deployed. The selection of the location is based on its potential for a terrorist attack. This is called a 

soft target. Officers are assigned a strategic post that makes them highly visible. 

In addition, terrorism awareness pamphlets are distributed to the general public in 

three languages, English, Spanish and Creole, and an audiovisual public service announcement, also in the three languages, runs continuously at the command post 

for pedestrians to view. Supervisors, in turn, make contact with building managers 

and local merchants to provide them with information, literature and training designed to enhance their awareness and educate them on the actions they should 

take in the event they become a target. 
9

While at the scene, the Miami Police Department uses a valuable tool designed 

to gather and document specific information about a potential target. It is a way 

to catalog critical infrastructure within the city. The tool is the Homeland Security 

Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS CAM). HLS CAM also assists building security, administrative personnel and merchants in identifying and addressing potential weaknesses in their structures or in their daily practice.

Terrorism Alert Guide:

The Miami Shield Terrorism Alert Guide, distributed to citizens and merchants 

during the operation, contains the following:

What does Operation Miami Shield stand for? 

Serve as the eyes and ears for your community 

Have a plan in place at home and work 

Identify potential problems and notify police 

Evaluate your surroundings and stay alert 

Learn evacuation and emergency contingency plans 

Do not aggravate the incident; simply watch and call police

The guide tells citizens to ′′See Something Say Something′′, which explains to the 

public that they are the eyes and ears of the region by working together with police 

and fire rescue/emergency first responders. The guide urges the public to pay attention to their surroundings, notice anything that is unusual and report it to the police. It also lists the Seven (7) Signs of Terrorism:

1. Surveillance 

2. Elicitation 

3. Test of security 

4. Acquiring supplies 

5. Suspicious person out of place 

6. Dry Run/Trial Run 

7. Deploying assets 

Business-card style Miami Shield Information Cards are also distributed throughout the city and are available at the Miami Police Department’s three district police 

stations as well as at satellite locations at the neighborhood level.

IV.Response/Mitigation: 

The Miami Police Department has developed comprehensive plans for response, 

mitigation, and recovery for any natural or man-made disaster which may threaten 

the lives, safety or property of the citizens of Miami. 

The following are examples of operations conducted by the Miami Police Department in an attempt to assess its response capabilities and address training needs.

Operation Eagle Eye: 

On March 4, 2005 the Miami Police Department conducted a large-scale functional Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercise called Operation Eagle Eye. 

The operation involved more than 600 Miami Police officers, sworn personnel from 

neighboring jurisdictions, Miami firefighters, and over 1,000 volunteers. 

Operation Eagle Eye, conducted at four venues, was designed to challenge the responders to accomplish several objectives as well as determine the Department’s 

level of preparedness in response to a terrorist attack. This successful operation revealed the Department’s current capabilities in the area of WMD response and recovery and gave command staff an idea of the areas that needed improvement. This 

operation was witnessed and evaluated by outside observers, including staff from 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Operation Pigeon Drop: 

On January 31, 2006 Operation Pigeon Drop was designed to test Miami Police 

Headquarters’ mail room policies and procedures. The exercise featured the evacuation of ninety percent of the building in response to a simulated anthrax delivery. 

It also tested the agency’s Incident Command System’s ability to coordinate with the 

Miami Fire Rescue’s Hazmat Team and first responders.

Operation White Powder: 

On Thursday April 20th, 2006, the City of Miami Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security assisted the Crescent Corporation in Operation White 

Powder, a test of security measures at 201 Biscayne Tower (a critical infrastructure 

in the City of Miami). The successful operation revealed that they were on track 

with their policies and procedures on evacuations and the handling of a powder incident.

Operation Cassandra: 

On July 20th, 2006, Miami Police participated in Operation Cassandra in cooperation with the Urban Area Security Initiative-Miami Project (UASI). This tactical 
10

interoperability communications exercise focused primarily on communication between participating regional agencies. Members of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security -Office of Grants and Training evaluated the exercise. 

Personnel assigned to a command post at the Orange Bowl Stadium handled a 

simulated explosion in Miami-Dade County’s Administration Building. Over 4,000 

employees work and visit this building on a daily basis. It is also a crucial mass 

transit hub. The after action report revealed that Region VII (Miami and participating agencies) ranked among the best in the country.

Resources: 

The following are examples of resources available to assist the Miami Police Department in recovery efforts. 

Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force (SERDSRF): These regional 

teams provide ample response capabilities throughout the region in response to a 

WMD event. They are equipped with compatible and standardized equipment and 

training and they adhere and comply with relevant sections of the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) and the State of Florida Incident Field Operations 

Guide (FOG). 

Additionally, the Miami Police Department utilizes the federal government’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) in order to ensure the continued performance of 

minimum essential functions during a wide range of potential emergencies. This is 

accomplished through the development of plans, procedures, and provisions for alternate facilities, personnel, resources, interoperable communications, and vital 

records/ databases. 

A Mobile Emergency Command Center Vehicle is now a component of Miami PD’s 

fleet that allows for interoperable communication with regional assets. The command center is also equipped with a satellite system and a mobile weather station.

V: Training: 

The key to a successful terrorism response plan is in the development of standardized training programs such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

and the Incident Command System (ICS). The federal government should be commended for setting national standards for incident command. For example, standardized training programs allow police personnel from any given location to respond 

to an incident by using the same management tools and practices as outlined by 

the federal government. 

The following are examples of terrorism response training programs that have 

been conducted by the Miami Police Department:

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 

Response Platoon Training 

Simulated Disaster Training 

Preparation for Mobilization Training 

Emergency Operations Center 

Interoperable Communications 

Field Force Training 

Vehicle Rescue Training 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

VI. Conclusion: 

Since September 11th, local police have come a long way. Police departments are 

better trained, better equipped, and certainly better informed than they have ever 

been regarding terrorism. 

This progress could not have been achieved without the support of and partnership with the federal government. Quite simply, local police do not have the resources or funding, and in some cases, the sophistication to deal with a major terrorist incident. The locals often viewed terrorism as a national responsibility to be 

dealt with exclusively by the feds. The events of September 11 and subsequent 

events, here and abroad, have made it clear that terrorism is everybody’s responsibility. Local law enforcement has a very important role in intelligence gathering, investigation, response and mitigation in the event of a terrorist attack. I think we 

have made great progress over the past five years. While some people complain that 

not enough has been done, I think it’s more important to emphasize what, in fact, 

has been done. By any objective analysis, one can only conclude that an awful lot 

has been done. 

There are still, however, two problem areas that I believe need to be addressed. 

First, federal allocation of funds must be based on risk target richness and vulnerability. Clearly, a major city is more likely to be a target of a terrorist attack rather 

than a rural area. The notion of reducing New York City’s funding last year, in 

favor of less populated areas, is just outrageous. Major cities need fair and appro-
11

priate funding that goes directly to the cities in a timely manner, without stop-offs 

at state and county governments. 

Second, we are now five years out from September 11 and it is still not clear to 

me who has the ultimate responsibility for intelligence gathering and dissemination. 

Is it the FBI? Is it Homeland Security? Is it Mr. Negroponte’s office? My preference would be that this task be vested with the FBI. The FBI has made significant improvements to the gathering and timely dissemination of intelligence information under Director Robert Mueller and it already has the appropriate structure 

in place, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, to carry out this responsibility. Do we really want to spend the next three to five years standing up a new intelligence agency 

that offers no guarantee of success and which may, in fact, make us vulnerable over 

the coming years? 

Thank you for giving me the honor to speak before this committee.

Mr. LINDER. I ask the committee to allow Ms. Ros-Lehtinen to sit 

in the hearings and participate if she would like. Without objection, 

so ordered. 

Mr. Lovegrove. 

STATEMENT OF BRETT LOVEGROVE, SUPERINTENDENT, ANTITERRORISM BRANCH, CITY OF LONDON POLICE, LONDON, 

ENGLAND 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. I would like to thank you. I would like to thank 

you on behalf of the United Kingdom police officers for giving me 

the opportunity to give an overview of the United Kingdom structure in how we manage incidents and manage counterterrorism 

issues, and also focus on the intelligence aspects of how they are 

managed in the United Kingdom in a structural sense. 

My report, as you are aware, focuses on a number of component 

parts that contribute towards the overall preparedness of the 

United Kingdom. Each aspect is being developed over time, and 

most certainly as a result of the Republican terrorist attacks during the 1980s, 1990s and into 2000. 

It wasn’t always that way. Many years ago the emergency services would develop strategies and tactical responses in isolation. 

Partnerships were more informal, and therefore, information and 

intelligence-sharing opportunities were few. Technological and communication systems were fragmented, and legislative instruments 

worked in isolation, although they were there. 

Today I am happy to report that we have indeed got a much better structure that has been developed over those tragedies. The 

Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 has formalized the United Kingdom’s national approach to working together. It has brought some 

isolated areas of work together in a coherent structure. And some 

examples are striated geographical regions in which authorities develop and deliver strategies for emergency response. And you would 

imagine that this is a much easier task in the U.K. than perhaps 

would be in the United States just because of the sheer size of your 

country. 

Divided authorities. It hass divided authorities into Category 1 

and 2 responders with particular responsibility for sharing information and practice. 

And thirdly, a method of accountability to all of our communities 

through the United Kingdom Government. 

One thing in the United Kingdom, in terms of responding to 

emergency incidents when they take place, such as the 7th of July, 

we have what we call a Gold Command structure, and at times of 

major incidents and major tragedies, this enhanced working re-
12

quires a structure within which all parties can coordinate resources 

and understand precisely their responsibilities. 

What is hopeful, it seems, of tragedies, we have decided many 

years ago that the policing organization within which the tragedy 

takes place takes primacy, takes the lead. Now, that is important. 

I was the commander of the first explosions in London on the 7th 

of July, and the one thing that wasn’t going through my head because it didn’t need to was an argument about jurisdiction. Everybody within that Gold Command structure, through tabletop exercising, through developing strategies together, through understanding each others’ business, knew that we had prime responsibility for the scene. And the reason why that is is because as any 

police officer knows, the police officer is usually there among the 

first organizations, but always has the responsibility to the community long after the other specialists, such as the ambulance service 

and fire departments, have left the scene. And so taking primacy 

of a scene and of an investigation just makes sense. 

The Gold, Silver, Bronze structure can be briefly described as a 

Gold Commander of which there is only one, and in terms of terrorist attacks, it is always a police officer. Around the Gold coordinating group, our chief officers are each of the specialist departments, the blue light agencies; it could be the health protection 

agencies, military and the specialists that contribute to the major 

instances at hand. 

The civil commander that sits underneath that Gold structure is 

the tactical head that ensures that the delivery of tactics and the 

delivery of resources to the scene of the tragedy actually gets delivered efficiently. 

And, of course, the Bronze commander is the team leader that 

delivers the tactics out on the street, and that perhaps internationally is what most people saw on the television cameras on the 7th 

of July, the Bronze teams going in to save lives in a coordinated 

way. 

Even for a small gathering of such an island such as the United 

Kingdom, the ability to share intelligence has always proven elusive until this day. Today an organization called JTAC, which is 

the Joint Terrorism Analysis Cell, provides the single point of contact when receiving and transmitting intelligence. JTAC is made 

up of a number of organizations, and they sit together all the time 

every day. And they are organizations that ordinarily receive national and international sources of intelligence, so that on a dayto-day basis, a global intelligence picture can be delivered fast time 

and fed out via a secret and secure cluster to the different regions 

in the United Kingdom, and that can happen in hours rather than 

days and weeks. 

I would like to say at this point that the value of partnerships 

in the United Kingdom is perhaps the most valuable, not only, part 

of the intelligence network we have, but the most valuable way of 

delivering our services. For example, we have independent advisory 

groups, teams, they are teams of community representatives who 

we invite onto our strategic groups to develop the strategies with 

us, and their contribution is absolutely invaluable. Tabletop exercising is incredibly important to test our tactical response to make 

sure everybody understands each others’ organizations. A weekly 
13

bridge call to the security professionals to make sure that they understand what the latest threat is and what they—what we are 

going to do about protecting them, and what we would like them 

to do. And, of course, covert and overt operations. 

Technology solutions. The city of London perhaps has the highest 

density of CCTV cameras and automatic number plate recorders in 

the—certainly the United Kingdom. ANPR, Automatic Number 

Place Recorders, in the city of London alone recorded over 38 million registration plates within which we were able to discover terrorist movements, arrest criminals, serious criminals who undertake serious crime, and arrest them appropriately. 

So we—technologically the city of London is a hard target. The 

communications systems that we have in terms of not only intelligence, but communicating with the public for us are quite easy; 

on the 7th of July was able to communicate with half a million people at a time using our community e-mail, our pager and text 

alerts, and that was invaluable to me as head of counterterrorism 

to show and tell them exactly what I wanted them to do and what 

they wanted me to do, because they are working with us in partnership to mitigate any further threat to themselves. An incredibly 

important tool. 

And, of course, legislation. I have already mentioned the Civil 

Contingencies Act, but we also have the Police and Criminal Evidence Act which provides the powerful stop and search, and the 

Terrorism Act of 2000 which provides us with a facility to make 

sure that we stop and search, under reasonable grounds, people 

who we suspect to be terrorists. 

And lastly, before I finish, we have learned a lot of lessons from 

the 7th of July, and I have said in my report that perhaps it would 

not seem good to actually mention those lesson learned here in detail because in the United Kingdom there may well be an inquiry 

of the 7th of July to make sure we do learn the lessons and everybody understands that we have. But if I can just say three lessons 

learned, three areas. 

Firstly, the technology communications with partners, we need to 

be better at that. That means more investment by the government, 

better on the information that is forthcoming. We need to be better 

in our media strategies, getting messages out faster to the wider 

public outside of London, not just the London community if indeed 

another tragedy happens there. And thirdly, to make sure the location of the Gold coordination group allows communication with 

those agencies that they so effectively need. 

So we are learning organization. We continue to do that. But the 

point I would like to make is in terms of intelligence, we place an 

incredibly high value on our partnerships with the community and 

the intelligence that they provide to us. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Lovegrove. 

[The statement of Mr. Lovegrove follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRETT LOVEGROVE

Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee, may I thank you on behalf of 

the City of London Police for the opportunity to testify before you today. It is well 

known that our two countries stand shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism in all its forms. Our valued partnership allows us to exchange information 

and experiences; this is one of the mainstays of our international determination. 
14

Can I also take this opportunity to thank you for your support after the tragedy 

that unfolded in London on the 7th July 2005. I am heartened to know that this 

support continues whilst the investigations into the bombings continue. 

My testimony will cover the following:

• A Contextual Outline of the City of London • The National and Local Emergency Management Structure • The Command Structure • The Intelligence System • The Value of Partnerships • Technological Solutions • Communication Systems • Legislation • Lessons Learned

A Contextual Outline of the City of London 

The City of London is the financial heart of the United Kingdom. It is not only 

part of the critical national infrastructure; it provides a significant contribution to 

the financial well being of the international community. 

This international aspect of the City makes it ‘target rich’.

• The City generates over 10% of the gross domestic product for the UK • It manages over $500 billion foreign exchange turnover per day • It takes 56% of the global equity market 

• The City has a 24/7 culture with a busy transport, leisure and retail economy 

• Over 550 foreign banks operate within the area 

• It is said that the City has more American banks than New York and more 

Japanese banks than Tokyo

The four main priorities of the City of London Police are:

• Counter Terrorism 

• Economic Crime 

• Community Policing 

• Public Order

The ‘glue’ that holds the effectiveness of the counter terrorism efforts together is 

the number of effective partnerships with the business and residential community 

which I shall elaborate upon later in this statement.

The National and Local Emergency Management Structure 

The emergency response to terrorist attacks has been honed over the years by the 

activities of Irish Republican terrorism in the 1970/1980’s. The London Emergency 

Services Liaison Panel (LESLP, http://www.leslp.gov.uk/) was set up in October 

1996 to ensure that the ‘blue light’ agencies provided a partnership approach to 

man-made and natural disasters. 

Since then, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has demanded a more inclusive approach to large-scale incidents. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (established in 

2001), aims to co-ordinate government department effort and ensure that the UK’s 

communities remain safe and secure and that we retain a World-class capability to 

recover from emergencies. Their specific objectives are:

• To identify and predict emergencies 

• Maintain a state of readiness 

• Build resilience for the future 

• Provide leadership to the resilience community 

• Promote effective management

The 2004 Act required the UK to develop Regional Resilience Forums designed 

to respond and managed disasters. 

A government minister chairs the London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) and 

its membership includes the chief officers of the police, fire, ambulance, utilities, 

business representatives, local authorities and transport operators. This membership is replicated on a national basis. 

Because of its size and the fact that London is made up of 32 boroughs, it is divided into six Local Resilience Fora (LRF’s) that ultimately report to the LRRF. 

The responsibility of responding is divided into Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Category 1 responders include:

• Emergency services 

• Local authorities 

• Health 

• The environment agency

Category 2 responders include: 

• The utility companies 
15

• Transport 

• Health and Safety Executive

Because the areas that underpin this structure are specialised, a number of subgroups of advisors and experts undertake work on specific subject matter. The subgroups are also capable of responding fast time to events when they occur. I refer 

you to Appendix ‘A’. 

London’s responders also work to the Strategic Emergency Plan (which can be 

found at http://www.londonprepared/plan), which is a comprehensive summary of 

the key plans of the members of the London Resilience Partnership. It serves as the 

reference document for ‘Gold’ level representatives who would have a strategic responsibility when responding to major incidents.

The Command Structure 

In light of the number of partners that could be called in to support the strategic 

command and the tactical delivery of a major incident, it is critical that all the skills 

and assets belonging to the individual partners are co-ordinated in the most effective way possible. 

For some years now, the UK has refined a Gold, Silver and Bronze system of incident command. I refer you to Appendix ‘B’. 

The Gold Commander who is, in the event of a terrorist incident, a police officer, 

chairs the Gold Group and remains in overall command. The members of the Gold 

Group are chief officers of the Category 1 and 2 responder organisations. They set 

the overall strategy for the incident and are responsible for resourcing the incident 

and their own individual organisations but tactical decisions to their own respective 

Silver Commanders. The Gold Group remains in contact with their Silver Commanders but do not interfere with the tactical response. 

The Silver Group mirror the Gold Group in their membership but are responsible 

for tactically delivering the Gold Strategy. The Silver Commander is responsible for 

developing and co-ordinating the tactical plan and provides the pivotal link between 

the Gold Group strategy and the tactical delivery at Bronze level. 

The Bronze Commander is the team leader who ensures the effective tactical delivery of the Silver Commander’s plan. 

Each level must keep in frequent contact, especially if the overall strategy or tactical plan changes. 

The benefits are:

• It’s a simple structure that is easily overlaid onto any major incident (including public disorder and CBRN events) 

• It is easily understood by multi-agency partners 

• It focuses on role and function and not rank 

This command structure is tested within police forces every day and are the subject of regular testing at all levels.

The Intelligence System 

In the wake of the July attacks, the police and security services, in order to develop community leaders within London especially within the Muslim community, 

have together undertaken a significant amount of work. Operation Canyon (an intelligence gathering initiative within all our communities) was launched as a formal 

operation to identify and maximise opportunities. This has proven to be very successful. The Special Branch (SB-the national police organisation that gathers and 

exploits intelligence relating to extremist political and terrorist activity) in the UK 

has taken the lead in this area of work. 

At a regional level the Special Branch Regional Intelligence Cells (RIC) have 

evolved and each UK region has it’s own facility. They are staffed by the police 

forces within their region on a secondment basis and are centrally funded. Their 

role is, as the name suggests, the development of intelligence across the region, and 

each RIC has capability in respect of surveillance, analysis and financial investigators and they co-ordinate intelligence in cross border enquiries within a RIC area. 

Also emerging are regional CT ‘hubs’ that have a capability to carry out the executive action phase of CT investigations. 

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Cell (JTAC) continues to provide a co-ordinated response to threat assessment and intelligence reporting and provide a valuable national briefing facility. It co-ordinates information from various government departments and is the single point of contact for intelligence products relating to national 

and international terrorism. 

Locally, the City of London SB provides a high quality level of service, especially 

to our internal staff and our business communities in the form of briefings and intelligence sharing. They also monitor the activation of powers under the Terrorism 

Act 2000. 
16

Because Counter Terrorism is the number one objective of the City of London Police, this police force deploys a number of counter terrorism tactics. Some of these 

will be very familiar to any police service in the UK and the US. 

All officers are briefed daily on the International and Irish terrorist threat to the 

United Kingdom.

The briefings will include: • Methods undertaken by terrorists for hostile reconnaissance • Terrorists fund raising through ′′white collar crime′′ • Terrorists fund raising through tax avoidance in areas of fuel, tobacco, and 

alcohol

Patrolling tactics are formulated specifically to our needs by appointed officers 

within the Force and implemented as part of a daily vigilance level of the City of 

London Police. 

Patrols in response to specific intelligence are implemented under Operation Rainbow. Operation Rainbow is a menu of nationally agreed policing options to combat 

terrorism and police forces are tasked at a local, regional and national level.

• Local - By appointed officers within the City of London • Regional - By appointed officers from forces within the London area • National - By appointed officers from forces within England and Wales

The Value of Partnerships 

In addition to the immeasurable benefits of the emergency responders working together, the City of London understands and values each and every business and residential partnership that we have worked hard to forge. 

We recognised long ago that law enforcement agencies do not have all the answers. Indeed, our partners have a vast array of skills and knowledge that we can 

never have. Our partner activity in the community includes:

• The Independent Advisory Group included in all our policing activity • CT briefings throughout the year to Chief Executive Board level down to 

‘front of house’ security professionals 

• Table-top exercising key stakeholders with a particular focus on business continuity 

• Weekly ‘Bridge Call’ (or conference call) to update key people on CT threats 

and crime issues for cascading to their personnel 

• Covert and overt CT operations

On the last point, I would like to briefly highlight two examples of this work. 

Firstly, Project Griffin is a joint police and security professional initiative that focuses attention on the identification of terrorists undertaking hostile reconnaissance 

activity. There are three strands:

• The awareness day • The bridge call • The cordon deployment

The awareness day includes a range of specialists delivering presentations on the 

latest threat assessment, construction of explosives, terrorist methodology, hostile 

reconnaissance behaviour and cordon deployment. 

The bridge call ensures that all Project Griffin partners are kept up to date with 

the latest threat so that they can deploy their own resources appropriately. 

The cordon deployment is activated if a major incident occurs thereby releasing 

police officers to undertake other duties that they are specially trained for. 

Project Griffin has been rolled out across most of the larger cities in England and 

Wales and Scotland have introduced it in Glasgow. The result is that we have 3000 

extra pairs of eyes and ears to help us combat the terrorist planning phase (4000 

across the UK), a positive and lively range of partnerships upon which we can build 

further initiatives, an enviable professional relationship with business who have a 

joint vested interest 

Secondly, Operation Buffalo is a partnership initiative with the business community that tests the quality of a company’s physical security whereby under-cover officers try to penetrate their security arrangements. The learning that emanates from 

this activity is invaluable and helps companies to ‘target harden’ their arrangements 

where necessary.

Technological Solutions 

It is well known that the City of London has an extensive CCTV coverage that 

exists both in the public environment and within the privately owned buildings. The 

police controlled system is digitally managed so that, for mainly investigative and 

evidential reasons, the system can be quickly interrogated. 

Additionally, the City of London Police benefit from the Automatic Number Plate 

Recording (ANPR) system. The ANPR system is provided with information from the 
17

Police National Computer (PNC) that contains details of all UK registered vehicles, 

persons of interest to law enforcement agencies and government departments, and 

all offender antecedent history and identifying features. 

When a vehicle that has an ‘interest marker’ passes through the ANPR system, 

command and control are immediately alerted and an appropriate policing response 

deployed. Additionally, the mobile version of the ANPR system allows its deployment in support of covert or overt operations against identified targets. In 2005, the 

ANPR system read nearly 36 million registration plates that led to numerous arrests and even more items of intelligence. This has proved to be an invaluable CT 

facility. 

The City of London Police remains at the leading edge of UK technological development and works hard to exploit new and workable technology.

Communication Systems 

For many years, the City of London Police have utilised a combined e-mail, pager 

and text facility that allows us, in extremis, to communicate directly with 500,000 

people in the community at a time. It is also an additional way to communicate police activity and how the police wish the community to respond. 

This facility proved exceptionally useful during the tragedy of the 7th July last 

year and allowed key stakeholders to manage the expectations of their staff. 

We have also built a loudspeaker system, connected to Police Headquarters command and control, which allows us to communicate with key ‘crowded places’ and 

direct people away from dangers and towards safe areas.

Legislation 

All police officers are deployed on patrols use powers under the Terrorism Act 

2000 to stop and search members of the public and their vehicles. Under section 43 

of the Act, the officer must have suspicion that the person stopped is a terrorist. 

Section 44 is authorised by a high-ranking police officer and must be ratified by the 

Secretary of State. Section 44 authorises a police officer in uniform to stop and 

search any person and any vehicle. No suspicion on behalf of the police officer is 

required. 

The City of London Police uses these powers extensively. In the year 2005/06, 

8594 members of the public were stopped under the Act. 

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, provides the power to stop and search 

people if they personally have reasonable grounds to believe that a person (or persons) have committed an offence or have stolen items or articles concerned in crime 

on their person. A separate power exists specifically to search people in a defined 

area and time for knives and other weapons. 

This combined activity, provided it is done sensitively, appropriately and with 

good reason, serves as a deterrent to both the common criminal and a sophisticated 

terrorist planner. 

We are always cognisant of maintaining the human rights of individuals and in 

our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, we always consider whether any of our activity contravenes the Human Rights Act. A standing item on any CT planning agenda 

is the community risk assessment whereby managers are able to gauge the effect 

of a CT operation on the wider community.

Lessons Learned 

It would not be helpful for me to describe in detail about the police response to 

the tragic events of the 7th July last year at a time where a UK debate is taking 

place about whether or not a public inquiry should undertake a review. 

It is right to say, however, that we are a learning organisation that has already 

examined the recommendations in the publicly accessible report published by the 

London Assembly and made plans to ensure that future responses by this force will 

have paid heed to them.

Mr. LINDER. Major Yayla. 

STATEMENT OF AHMET SAIT YAYLA, MAJOR, 

COUNTERTERRORISM AND OPERATIONS DIVISION, ANKARA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, ANKARA, TURKEY 

Major Yayla. Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members, first of all, I would like to thank you very much for inviting 

me here to testify for the Ankara Police Department. As I previously presented in my written testimony, considering the time 

communication, I would like to address the highlights of my testimony. 
18

The first is before our experience from the Turkish National Police and from Ankara Police Department, the methods that they 

were operated to deal with domestic terrorism are also proved effective in dealing with international terrorism operating in Turkey 

which is a present-day concern. Now we look at those terrorist organizations that we consider as domestic terrorism, we also realize 

that almost all of them have their international apparatus. For example, the PKK freely operates in some of the countries around 

Turkey, like Syria, northern Iraq and some countries in some cases 

Europe. So they receive a lot of international support even if they 

only operate in Turkey in terms of the spread of their terrorism. 

The second important matter, the community asks is the Turkish 

National Police and Ankara Police Department deal with terrorism 

as a crime problem and observes all legal procedures by using all 

available resources at its hand. By this, for example, the Ankara 

Police Department with over 15,000 officers can direct all of its officers and teams when they are needed to halt or to oversee a terrorist threat. All of the police officers in the city of Ankara can 

communicate to look at one channel through the radios, and this 

gives us an opportunity to better deal with the problem of terrorism especially during the crisis situation. 

The Turkish Police considers as terrorism is considered a crime 

problem, which is the police can handle. There is the police rather 

than the military at the center of this problem that deals solely 

with this problem. The four important factors, the police who make 

great progress in fighting terrorism by integrating intelligence with 

operations against terrorist groups. By relying on intelligence, the 

police are able to address terrorism without disrupting communities. As a result, there is not a backlash by the community 

against the police, which comes back as a support of the community in the fight against terrorism. 

One of the most important objectives of the terrorist organizations is to create a conflict between the governments and societies 

so that the societies will be away from the governments and will 

not help them in their fight or in their dealings to carry out this 

fight against terrorism. By using intelligence, we can diminish distress between the government and public. 

The fifth important aspect is the police, in addressing terrorism, 

are following the law, acting within the law, and rely on intelligence and information, and especially do not rely on torture for 

confessions that are drawn from the terrorists or suspects. Rather, 

for our perspective, police work combined with intelligence is essential to our success, especially in Ankara and in other areas of Turkey. 

The second important method. It is also very important to go 

after the causes of terrorism so that the repeat cycle of the terrorists can be interrupted. If the terrorists lose their justification, they 

are not going to be able to recruit more people. And by this we can 

diminish the threat coming from the terrorist organizations. 

Another important question against terrorism is the international cooperation and international harmonized training to local 

police so that they have cooperation and have a better fight against 

terrorism on an international level. By this way, the international 
19

terrorism may be stopped at its form before it goes beyond the borders. 

And finally, one of the most important tools for the Turkish National Police and for Ankara Police Department that were very effective in sharing information at hand was the police network we 

use in Turkey that connects the whole country to one network 

where all of the police officers can reach where there is a police station in the country. By this way, the information can be shared. Especially, this is very useful in the fight against terrorism. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Major. 

[The statement of Major Yayla follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AHMET SAIT YAYLA

Turkey, has been one of the world’s most important land bridges linking Europe, 

Asia, and Africa throughout history. Furthermore, Turkey is surrounded by neighboring regions where years of political problems, terrorism, and unrest have shaped 

the political and social fabric of Turkish society. These regions include the Middle 

East, Balkans, and Caucasian Republics. Turkey’s unique, critical geo-political position coupled with the catalyzing effects of world politics, including the Cold War and 

Turkey’s own political, social and economic problems made, Turkey a suitable 

ground for many different terrorist organizations, especially between the 1960’s and 

1990’s. Due to the effects of different terrorist campaigns over the years, Turkey has 

lost over 35,000 people to terrorism since 1960. 

Unfortunately, Turkey began to experience terrorism at home much earlier than 

many other Western countries, which necessitated developing tactics and systems 

to cope with the problem of terrorism. In this regard, this testimony examines some 

of the more important precautionary measures and tactics that have been adopted 

by the Turkish National Police (TNP) and will also consider the missteps and successes in the fight against terrorism with the explanation of the role of information 

sharing and current policies adopted by the TNP. The testimony starts with a brief 

explanation about the structure of the government of Turkey in the fight against 

terrorism, followed by more effective steps and policy changes that were implemented by the Turkish Government. It is believed that tactical and organizational 

changes made a higher rate of success possible and that those changes need to be 

widely known in order to serve as examples for other countries that have recently 

begun to experience terrorism. 

Turkey has a central government style and it has four main national agencies 

that deal with terrorism. The first is the Turkish National Police, which has jurisdiction over eighty percent of the population in Turkey, including the cities, towns, 

townships, greater rural communities, border gates, highways, airports, and other 

stations. The second is the Gendarmerie, which has jurisdiction over fifteen percent 

of the population in the rural countryside and in villages. The third is the Turkish 

Military, whose main job with terrorism is to deal with the terrorists on the borders 

of Turkey and in very remote rural areas close the borders, especially in the southern part of Turkey. And finally, there is the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) that 

collects intelligence which could be used to counter terrorism. 

Unlike most of the law enforcement agencies in the U.S., the TNP is a national 

police agency with a personnel of over 200,000 that provides all law enforcement 

services in the urban areas of Turkey. In comparison to the United States’ criminal 

justice structure, the TNP could be considered as a combination of the federal agencies, such as the FBI, DEA, and the local law enforcement agencies including the 

local and city police departments and the state police. One of the primary duties 

of the TNP is to deal with terrorism, and to take precautionary measures to prevent 

possible terrorist attacks. The TNP became especially effective and successful 

against terrorism after measures and policy changes were adopted in the late 1980’s 

and early 1990’s. 

These changes were made because of increased terrorist threats, which will be explained in the next section.The TNP has two main departments that deal with terrorism around the country: the Anti-Terrorism Department and the Intelligence Department. However, dealing with or preventing terrorism is not the duty of these 

two departments only. Other departments, such as city police departments, or any 

other division or department of the TNP, are also required to take measures against 

terrorism whenever necessary.
20

Anti-Terrorism Department 

The central Anti-Terrorism Department and Intelligence Department are located 

in the headquarters of the TNP. Also, satellite anti-terrorism divisions and intelligence divisions have been established within all of the city and township police departments. Central departments act as coordinators for the city anti-terrorism divisions and intelligence divisions and provide assistance to them. Concurrently, they 

act as the main database centers because they receive information from local departments, analyze that information, and make it available for the related personnel 

in the headquarters and cities. The central departments also act as the database 

and archive centers for the general efforts against terrorism. In contrast, the central 

departments, city anti-terrorism divisions and intelligence divisions deal with more 

immediate threats of local terrorism to their cities. The city police chiefs are in 

charge but must also coordinate their efforts with the central departments. 

The main duty of the city anti-terrorism divisions is to deal with the terrorist 

threats in their cities. This is accomplished by carrying out operations against terrorists and their organizations, taking precautions to prevent terrorist attacks and 

movements, arresting and interviewing suspects, questioning the terrorists, and taking the suspects and terrorists before justice officials. All of the activities of the antiterrorism divisions are monitored by independent prosecutors. Suspects’ lawyers are 

required to be present immediately following an arrest, when the suspect is taken 

into the custody of anti-terrorism divisions, and during the interview or questioning 

process. All of the investigations related to terrorist activities are carried out by the 

anti-terrorism divisions, who then send all information gained to the Anti-Terrorism 

Department at the Headquarters so that the Anti-Terrorism Department can gauge 

the overall climate of terrorism in Turkey and inform and coordinate the city antiterrorism departments. All of the activities and information that are received by the 

city anti-terrorism departments are entered into the TNP Central Computer Network Anti-Terrorism Project so that the information is shared and available for the 

other city anti-terrorism departments whenever needed. 

A typical city anti-terrorism division would have enough expert personnel specialized in operations and interrogation, a bomb squad, archival personnel, information 

systems designers, tactical operations teams, immediate response teams, and technical support personnel. Police officers who are specifically trained in the stated 

areas are allowed to work only within their areas of expertise and they receive regular in-service training to maintain up-to-date knowledge in their field. Only officers 

who are specially trained by the Anti-Terrorism Department are allowed to work in 

the city anti-terrorism divisions. The chiefs of city anti-terrorism divisions are directly responsible to the city police chiefs and to the Anti-Terrorism Department for 

national harmony of the job in areas of data input, information sharing, and training. City anti-terrorism divisions also work collaboratively with the city intelligence 

divisions.

Intelligence Department 

Similar to the Anti-Terrorism Department, intelligence divisions are established 

in city police departments that work under the city police chiefs’ supervision and 

coordinate with the Central Intelligence Department at the TNP headquarters. Intelligence divisions collect and gather intelligence through different operations in 

their cities. The police officers that work for the Intelligence Departments are selected and trained by the Central Intelligence Department after successfully finishing an intelligence course that provides specialized training. During this course, 

candidates are assigned to different cities to work for the intelligence divisions. The 

personnel of the intelligence divisions are specialized in their work areas and they 

also receive training related to their tasks to ensure the quality of the work. In this 

regard, intelligence divisions have many different offices where the police officers 

focus solely on their areas of expertise unless requested to join a wider effort. For 

example, an officer assigned to the bureau that targets religiously inspired terrorist 

organizations would generally only work for that office. This specialization makes 

the officers quite knowledgeable in their field and it enables them to gain a deeper 

level of knowledge and gain more details of the terrorist organizations they are following. Another important aspect of this division is target specified intelligence collecting. Instead of following a wide group of suspects, intelligence divisions focus on 

a small number of well known suspects in order to control different terrorist organizations. This policy enables the TNP to get only related information which saves 

time and resources and reduces the response time. By controlling a small group of 

people, the TNP can learn what kind of activities that terrorist organization is carrying out, what specific threat they impose, who the new contacts or recruits are, 

where the terrorist cells or safe houses are and more importantly what the capacity 

of that terrorist organization is. 
21

Intelligence divisions collect and evaluate the intelligence they have gathered, and 

then inform the Central Intelligence Department at the TNP Headquarters through 

a special computer network that is specifically designed for this task. All of the information is required to be shared with the headquarters. This sharing enables the 

Headquarters to see the all-inclusive picture of terrorist activities and movements 

throughout Turkey and, if needed, steer the city intelligence divisions appropriately. 

When necessary, the Central Intelligence Department can also make information 

available for all of the city intelligence divisions around Turkey so that the other 

officers who know anything related to this operation can add their input. This 

shared information can also enhance activities or investigations in their cities. 

City intelligence divisions also verify the information they have with the city antiterrorism divisions because other anti-terrorism divisions may also have related information through their interviews, interrogations, the documents that were obtained from searches, etc. When needed or on a regular basis, anti-terrorism and 

intelligence divisions or their corresponding bureaus meet to discuss the developments in their cities and to share the information they have regarding their responsibilities. Anti-terrorism operations are planned with the presence of intelligence divisions’ correspondents to ensure they contribute and input their knowledge and 

ideas. As the operations are carried out, there is also always a representative from 

an intelligence division to ensure that intelligence officers get first hand information 

and contribute their input from the operations or interrogations. This cooperation 

and collaboration between the intelligence divisions and anti-terrorism divisions is 

one of the keys to the success of the TNP against terrorism. 

Another important aspect of this cooperation is the collaborative teamwork on 

specific terrorist related cases. This is a key element of the TNP’s success because 

instead of waiting for intelligence from the anti-terrorism divisions, this partnership 

enables the intelligence divisions to go directly to the field with anti-terrorism divisions in order to collect specific intelligence related to specific events.

Changes Implemented to Improve TNP’s Capability to Deal with Terrorism 

The intensity of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties as a result of the 

incidents which began to rise sharply at the beginning of the 1980’s in Turkey, led 

to an organizational revolution of the TNP.The following measures and steps were 

taken by the TNP to ensure success and efficiency regarding terrorism. One of the 

first steps was to reform the system of personnel and provide additional education 

and training. Another was the formation of the Central Anti-Terrorism Department 

and Intelligence Department at the TNP Headquarters and their satellites in the 

cities. As a part of this step, one of the largest police computer and information systems networks in the world named POL-NET was created. Additionally, new policies and promotion of information sharing helped the exchange of information between the cities and the headquarters. Other reforms included the establishment of 

advanced Police Criminal Laboratories, the foundation of the Special Operations Department, social programs, and the adaptation of advanced technology.

Personnel Reform along with Education and Training Activities 

One of the first experiences of the police officers in the field was realizing how 

little they knew about the terrorist organizations they were investigating. In fact, 

they rarely received specialized training regarding terrorism or investigation techniques of terrorist incidents. Another dilemma was the fact that most of the terrorists had some college education or were college graduates. This posed difficulties especially during interrogation when a mind game between the interrogators and terrorists would take place. 

In order to cope with this problem, the TNP prepared a long-term plan to perform 

several personnel reforms concerning education and training. The initial steps were 

long-term precautions to ensure a better future for the TNP. From this perspective, 

the TNP increased the number of police colleges from one to five. Police colleges are 

equivalent to vocational high schools and are also boarding schools. Graduates of 

the police colleges attend the national Police Academy, which basically provides a 

bachelor’s degree similar to a degree obtained from the universities’ criminal justice 

departments in the U.S.. The graduates of the national Police Academy became midlevel managers of the TNP. This initial step proved to be very successful and effective because the schools became more specialized and selective. 

More importantly, police colleges were highly successful in establishing bonds between their students. Almost all of the students became brothers or buddies for life 

and supported each other through their tenure in the following years. This bond 

helped eradicate reluctance in sharing the proper information in the following years. 

College graduates easily and willingly, in fact without being asked, shared information with their co-workers and other police officers in different cities or in the headquarters for the success of the TNP simply because their friends were in charge of 
22

those departments and they wanted to help them in their duties so that they would 

be more successful in providing safety to their citizens. This bond and friendship 

between the mid-level leadership and later the high-level leadership of the TNP has 

been one of the biggest secrets behind its success. Finally, even the terrorists who 

had been arrested under the old system admitted that it was more difficult to influence or maneuver the new interrogators . 

The Police College students are accepted to the national Police Academy. The 

academy is located in Ankara, in the capital city of Turkey, where several other 

major universities are located. Different Police College students along with other 

male and female students who were accepted to the national Police Academy from 

different high schools through a thorough selection process, received a top quality 

education for four years from the experts who were either academy professors or 

who were among the best and most accepted faculties of different universities in Ankara. The national Police Academy not only provided state of the art education, but 

also was an excellent base for establishing strong bonds for the future leadership 

of the TNP because its graduates become sergeants as soon as they graduate. 

Furthermore, TNP officers were also encouraged to attend master’s programs in 

different universities, including the Police Academy Institute for Security Sciences 

to increase their level of expertise. In addition, several officers were sent abroad to 

receive their doctorates in different universities in the United States and Europe. 

The TNP adopted this policy so that its members can receive higher level education 

and earn relevant doctoral degrees in addition to studying other police agencies 

abroad and their policies. 

Currently, there are 170 senior officers in the United States who are working towards their doctorate degrees in several different U.S. universities. Those officers 

are selected through a highly competitive process. Their expenses are paid by the 

Turkish Government. The TNP also has an institute named Turkish Institute for 

Police Studies (TIPS) that is located in the United States to assist its officers in the 

U.S. and carry out research. TIPS acts as a bridge between Turkey and in this case 

the U.S. by interacting with several U.S. local and federal law enforcement departments, carrying out different activities including conferences, seminars and workshops, and training exchange with corresponding U.S. law enforcement. 

The TNP also pays close attention to its police officers who carry out daily field 

activities. Middle school graduation used to be adequate in order to become police 

officers during 1980’s. This level was increased to high school. Only high school or 

college graduates are currently accepted into the police schools of the TNP where 

regular police officers must graduate. The training in the police schools also was enriched and the duration of the police schools was first increased to nine months, 

then to one year, and then to a two year associate degree after 2000. Finally, the 

TNP established a contract with Eskisehir Anatolia University, one of the largest 

universities in Turkey, to provide distance education to its police officers so that the 

police officers could become college (university) graduates over the years. Currently, 

over 60,000 police officers are attending several different programs of Eskisehir 

Anatolia University to receive their undergraduate degrees through distance education. 

In addition to the commitment of providing appropriate and modern education to 

its members, the TNP also continuously trained its members in their areas of expertise. Especially after the 80’s, the TNP has adopted a policy of professionalism and 

only allowed certain experts to work for certain departments. For example, if an officer did not receive training on terrorism or intelligence, he would not be allowed 

to work in anti-terrorism or intelligence departments. In this regard, central departments including the Anti-Terrorism Department and the Intelligence Department 

started to train their officers in the cities and shared the knowledge of experts 

through these trainings. Experts from the field who were daily facing the terrorist 

threat and who were actually carrying out operations and interrogations at the Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir, and Bursa police departments, were invited to 

teach in those courses so that real field experts could share their first-hand experience and facts with the trainees. 

This also led to sharing experiences of different large city police departments. Although the TNP is only one agency, different TNP city departments were becoming 

real experts in different areas simply by adopting the circumstances in their cities. 

Their experiences were shared during these training courses. In this way, the TNP 

began to provide extensive in-service training programs through the coordination of 

the Education and Training Department. Currently, the TNP annually provides inservice training to over 80,000 officers. 

Establishment of Central Anti-Terrorism and Intelligence Departments at the 

TNP Headquarters and their Satellites in the CitiesOne of the main problems of the 

TNP was not being able to share information throughout Turkey. Terrorism is an 
23

organized activity and terrorists in different cities, today in different countries, 

interact with each other to plan, support and carry out activities. Therefore, it is 

quite normal that a city anti-terrorism division might have information regarding 

a terrorist or a terrorist organization that is needed by another city. This problem 

imposed extremely negative consequences because even though a terrorist was 

known by a TNP officer, he might not be caught because no one else knew about 

him. Before the 80’s, there was a term called ′′captain’s notebook′′. This term comes 

from the captains who were bureau directors in charge of the activities of a particular terrorist movement in a city and who would write down everything related 

to that terrorist organization in a notebook. 

They would be reluctant to show that notebook to anyone else simply because that 

notebook meant their success to keep their jobs. Once a captain retired or was reassigned to somewhere else, the information in those notebooks would be useless. To 

prevent this waste in resources, the TNP established central anti-terrorism and intelligence departments that have organizational power over the city anti-terrorism 

and intelligence departments to establish a communication and information network 

so that the information could be shared among different city divisions and so the 

overall efforts would be organized by the central departments for more successful 

operations and precautions. 

City anti-terrorism and intelligence divisions, although under the supervision of 

the city police chiefs who are also under the supervision of the TNP General Director, began to coordinate with the central departments after those departments were 

established as central departments by the mid-80s. Basically, the central departments acted as information pools and the city divisions passed any information they 

had to the central departments. However, the information flow was not one-way and 

the central departments fed the city divisions with the information they were receiving from other cities. Central departments also provided training and technical support to the city divisions and informed them about recent developments. Over the 

years, this structure proved to be so successful and effective that information flow 

and sharing between the departments became rapid and useful as officers realized 

the importance of collaboration. 

Another important step with the central departments was the appointments of 

new sergeants who recently graduated from the national Police Academy. These new 

sergeants were educated and trained for eight consecutive years and they were quite 

eager to help the TNP to cope with the problem of terrorism as soon as possible. 

With this new energy and dynamism, central departments started to adopt many 

new technologies and policies to improve the tactics and strategies against terrorism. Eventually, those sergeants became the captains and chiefs of their departments and today all of those departments are headed by the Police Academy graduates who have been extensively working for anti-terrorism and intelligence departments and who are very experienced in their fields.

TNP Computer and Information Systems Network, POLNET 

Another step to effectiveness in dealing with terrorism was the establishment of 

the Department of Information Technology in 1982. This department’s main duty is 

to help the TNP to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its duties. This department basically produces information systems’ projects by working with the officers in the field so that the software and systems are developed appropriately for 

the needs of the field. It then makes those programs and systems available to the 

TNP. The Department of Information Technology established one of the largest 

closed computer network systems for the TNP, which is an organizational intranet 

with around 15,000 computers and over 30,000 users in every location where the 

TNP has jurisdiction including TNP Headquarters, city police departments, police 

stations, airports, border gates, and other places where the TNP has infrastructures 

around the country. Currently, this network is one of the largest Microsoft-based 

networks in the world. 

The Department of Information Technologies assisted the fight against terrorism 

by developing special software packages that are designed by the officers who were 

working at anti-terrorism departments and by making that package available to the 

officers at other anti-terrorism departments. In this way the TNP anti-terrorism departments were able to input, search and share data as soon as needed. This network helped the TNP to obtain information considerably faster and to share information more appropriately. It also enabled the central Anti-terrorism Department’s 

capability of coordination to be more effective. A similar but more special network 

was also established for the Intelligence Department and its divisions. The intelligence divisions at city police departments were able to use POL-NET and their 

own special networks as well. 

Of course, POL-NET was not solely limited to terrorist related activities. POLNET has over 30 different projects including passports, driver’s licenses, border gate 
24

control, AFIS, vehicle registration, traffic control, public security, foreigner registration and many others. All of those systems were also great investigative tools for 

the anti-terrorism and intelligence departments. Designated users in those departments would search for suspects and their related activities, such as addresses, 

entry or exit to the country, location of foreigners’ housing, traffic tickets, registered 

vehicles and many other features. This system enables officers to reach the suspects 

very quickly. Consequently, POL-NET and the Department of Information Technologies were a revolutionary support for the TNP in dealing with terrorism and 

today, it still continues to be one of the greatest supports. POL-NET is known today 

as one of the world’s largest internal networks and it is the largest Microsoft based 

internal network in the world as of today.

New Policies and Culture Regarding Information Sharing 

There are three important reasons why TNP officials are not reluctant to share 

information. First of all, everybody at TNP recognized the importance and value of 

information sharing after they saw how it helped to dismantle the terrorist organizations with the stated methods above. Secondly, TNP was furnished with appropriate tools to share information effectively and quickly including the Pol-Net, and 

the internal phone system that connects all of the offices around the country, the 

internal email system, countrywide radio system. Also, all of the TNP officers have 

GSM phones which can be used to call any TNP officials free of charge. Finally, 

bonds between the leadership of the TNP that were established during the Police 

College and national Police Academy years make it extremely easy to share information formally and informally simply because the managers at the offices know each 

other very well. This also made sharing information easy especially during emergencies and crises. All of the stated factors above yielded an establishment of understanding or a culture of ′′information is for sharing and it must be shared unless 

otherwise stated′′ at the TNP.

Social Programs to Prevent Terrorism 

The TNP felt the necessity of taking some social approach to terrorism by the beginning of the 90s as well. There were two important reasons. The first is that the 

youth were becoming victims of terrorism propaganda. The second is the dilemma 

of newly recruited terrorists. The situation is that once they join the terrorist organization they cannot leave that organization. If they try to leave, the terrorist organization will punish them or they are afraid of going to jail if they leave the terrorist organization. To prevent these two negative effects on the youth, the TNP carried out several social strategies. One of the first tactics was amnesties for the terrorists who would turn themselves in. Until now, eight general amnesties were declared and many terrorists saved themselves through those amnesties. The second 

strategy that was implemented was giving a chance to the first time arrestees who 

were being newly recruited and not yet members of the terrorist organizations with 

the requirement of not having carried out any terrorist activity. A second chance 

was given by working with the prosecutors’ offices if the arrestees assured to leave 

the terrorist organization and not to interact with the terrorists again. Even though 

this policy was not formal, it worked very well and many newly recruited terrorists 

were saved in this way. Because of this the families were also involved in this process and the teenagers were left to the care of their families. Another approach was 

having the police closer to the communities by carrying out different activities that 

targeted youths, such as knowledge competitions among the high school students. 

This approach could be considered a similar program to community policing. And 

finally, the TNP Central Anti-Terrorism Department printed many pamphlets and 

brochures to inform the youth about the real dangers of terrorism. All of the activities stated above were somewhat successful and saved at least some newly recruited 

terrorists or potential terrorist candidates according to the statements of people who 

saved themselves through one of those programs.

Adaptation of Advanced Technologies 

The TNP also felt the necessity of equipping itself with new technology to catch 

up with the terrorists. Two of the most advanced adaptations were the POL-NET 

and Criminal Labs, which were explained previously. Apart from those, departments 

were furnished with any necessary equipment which not only the headquarters but 

also the city departments were allowed to purchase. This expedited acquiring the 

new technology. Additionally, bomb squads were equipped with newly designed 

equipment to counter the terrorists’ usual use of explosives. Today, there are bomb 

squads with proper equipment in every city of Turkey that can go to the scene immediately. Consequently, TNP and its departments adopted new and changing technology as needed in order to be at least one technological step ahead of the terrorists technologically as much as possible.
25

Human Rights, New Regulations and Obeying the Rule of Law 

One of the main reasons of joining terrorist organizations according to the surveys 

of the terrorists during their interrogations , was the assumption that the TNP did 

not consider the international rules of human rights for the suspects in their custody and did not obey the rule of law when it came to the terrorist suspects. In fact, 

many terrorist suspects were made to believe by their organizations that they would 

be killed or seriously harmed after they were arrested or they would be detained 

for months even though it was not the case. Furthermore, the TNP realized that 

once a terrorist suspect was arrested, that suspect’s relatives and friends became 

easy recruitment targets for the terrorist organizations. In order to cope with this, 

Turkey adopted new and clearer regulations and policies in regards to handling terrorist suspects. First of all, the detention procedures were changed. The duration 

of detention was shortened to a maximum four days. Very strict guidelines were 

adopted as detention rules in order to ensure that no improper behaviors existed 

against the detainees. For example, the detainees were not chained and only handcuffed when they were out of the detention rooms. More importantly, the suspects 

were allowed to meet with their lawyers alone during their detention for legal assistance before they were brought in front of the judges. 

Consequently, the implementation of the strict guidelines regarding the interviewing and interrogation procedures and human right issues halted the 

mispropaganda of the terrorist organizations. Many terrorists were shocked as a result of the transparent policies adopted by the TNP during their detention because 

almost all of the terrorists were made to believe that the police would act inappropriately during their detention. One of the main problems of the TNP was the claim 

that the TNP did not obey the rule of law. These precautions along with the shortening of the detention duration stopped these claims. The terrorist organizations 

were not able to use these in their propaganda against the TNP. This also reduced 

the number of the new recruits at least because the families and friends of the terrorist suspects were clearly aware of the status of the suspects in the TNP custody. 

Finally, all of these also helped the TNP to gain the trust of terrorist families and 

they started to visit the TNP anti-terrorism divisions frequently to seek assistance 

from the police.

Closing 

This article was not written to praise the TNP; however, it was written to present 

the measures taken by the TNP to deal with terrorism more effectively and professionally so that other countries or agencies could learn from its experiences. The 

TNP, while not without faults, proved itself as an exemplary force by being successful against terrorism through its reforms that began in the mid-1980s. Today, terrorist incidents in Turkey have diminished to a minimal level, so much so that the 

national media is not reporting terrorist incidents around the country on a daily 

basis. Consequently, the commitment to education, the organizational culture regarding information sharing, and structural and technological reforms, including establishment of Anti-Terrorism, Intelligence and Information Technologies departments, establishment of POL-NET has enabled the TNP to deal with terrorism more 

effectively and efficiently at both the local and the national level.

Mr. LINDER. Chief Timoney, you hit on something that was interesting to me and has been a thorn under my saddle for some time. 

That is the intelligence aspect of this that I think we are inadequate on. How do you train the duty cop? What kind of training 

do you put them through to make him more responsive to intelligence? 

Chief Timoney. The—really, for the average police officers it is 

just the whole notion of them being out there, being accessible and 

not being surprised by the way you may get information. 

We have a few things going on in Miami which I can’t get into, 

but it came as a result of the regular officer in the car in certain 

areas getting information. And by the way, the information is usually coming from somebody that is involved in the criminal trade, 

in the drug dealers, drug users. 

I mentioned to you at lunch a case I was involved in when I was 

in narcotics. A woman who was an elderly woman who is a millionaire 10 times over, looking to have her husband killed from a very 

prominent family, went down and engaged a drug dealer in the 
26

lower east side of Manhattan who then notified my informant, who 

notified me, and we introduced our undercover to that operation for 

6 months and got the money and then broke that case. And she 

was actually tried and convicted. 

So you are going to get this information every once in a while 

from a legitimate citizen, but most often from people who are on 

the other side of the law who are looking either to make a deal for 

themselves, make some money or what have you. 

Mr. LINDER. Do you have any special attention to or concerns 

with in training your street cops on the threats about nuclear and 

biological risks? 

Chief Timoney. Ideally we would train every police officer, but realistically the ones that have been trained in that are those police 

officers that are working in the downtown area. They have all been 

trained, the supervisors have been trained. They actually carry a 

thing on their gun belt, the detector, in the event that some radioactive device was in any of the buildings or anywhere in the whole 

downtown area and the Brickell Banking Corridor. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Lovegrove, what percentage of people that live 

in England are Muslim? 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. I am sorry? 

Mr. LINDER. What percent of the people who live in England are 

Muslims? 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. Are what? 

Mr. LINDER. Are Muslim. 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. There are a maximum, about 350,000 Muslims 

in the United Kingdom. 

Mr. LINDER. How do they react to the community policing? Do 

they have—do you build a relationship with that community? 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. Well, we certainly have, but over a number of 

years. It is not something that we have done in response to the 7th 

of July. We certainly have isolated extremely good examples of best 

practice prior to the 7th of July. Wherever there is a Muslim community in London, we would focus on that community as we would 

any other minority community. Of course, since the 7th of July, 

there has been a much better joined-up piece of work to embrace 

the whole of the Muslim community, because what happened in the 

7th—on the 7th of July affected the Muslim community in terms 

of their hatred towards what those four men did. That it—we have 

found that the Muslim community have rallied behind us to make 

sure that they remain a very important part of the communities of 

the United Kingdom. 

Mr. LINDER. Didn’t the tip come from a Muslim community? 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. The first response came from us because we already had those links. However, we were delighted by the really 

positive response by the Muslim community to take terrorism out 

of where they live and they work. 

Having said that, of course, we are not naive. There are some 

parts of the Muslim community that either remain silent or remain 

secretive about what they know. That is for many different reasons. That doesn’t mean the Muslim community wish anybody 

harm as a whole. We still believe they are the vast minority in the 

Muslim community and some other communities, wider commu-
27

nities, who take on terrorist activities that wish to cause people 

harm. 

Mr. LINDER. Major Yayla, you commented that one of your challenges and one of the things you work on in Turkey is to try and 

determine the cause of terrorism. Have you come up with a conclusion? 

Major Yayla. When we look at domestic terrorism, we can find 

and we can see some reasons that are very apparent to see and 

even some—through some researchers we can see, but when we 

look at international terrorism like al Qaeda, no. 

Mr. LINDER. They are all pretty well educated and fairly wealthy 

actors, the ones who at least were in the September 11th experience here. 

Major Yayla. You are right. They are a lot of different kinds of 

people, and we see a lot of—amongst the terrorists who are attacking against different targets. So I believe like education level of the 

terrorists is extremely high in Turkey. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. My time has expired. Does the gentleman from Rhode Island wish to inquire? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your testimony. 

Two of the biggest problems that we hear about intelligence that 

related to counterterrorism is stovepiping and lack of human intelligence. Obviously stovepiping occurs not just between Federal 

agencies, but most especially when multiple levels of governments 

get involved, as I am sure you have all experienced in some way 

or another. 

Can you tell us the key issues that you would like to see resolved 

so that stovepipes are removed and you get all of the information 

that you do need, and because of your close contact with your local 

communities you can—it would be a great source. And let me ask 

you this: Is the Federal Government listening to you and 

partnering with you as a valued resource? 

Chief Timoney. On the information sharing as it now stands, it 

really is—it is pretty good. It is completely different than it was 

prior to 9/11. 

On the human intelligence side, I think, for example, local police 

departments, as far as getting into those communities, have done 

a much better job because there is a maxim in local policing, big 

city policing, that you wouldn’t have a police department that kind 

of represents the community you serve. So, for example, if you pick 

the Chinese community in New York, and I was a captain in 

Chinatown in the early 1980s—in 1980; there were about two or 

three by the mid-1980s. There may have been 20 Chinese police officers as a result of going out and agressively recruiting Chinese 

candidates. The MIPD now has 700 Chinese officers. 

It is my sense—I am not picking on anybody in the Federal Government—it is my sense that the law enforcement agencies haven’t 

done that good of a job. They don’t suffer from the same community 

pressures that we at the local level do, which, even if you were inclined to go that way, you have to go that way for survival. 

I think the same thing should apply for the intelligence agencies 

within the United States. You have got to get out there, to be much 

more aggressive. If you look at the NYPD and what they have re-
28

cruited in the Muslim community working for the NYPD at their 

intel, it is a showcase. That is what you are supposed to be doing. 

But often I feel that there is some—there is a gap at the Federal 

level that the Federal officials and all of the agencies don’t feel the 

same pressure that we at the local level have the pressure to 

change and diversify and all of those things. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Gentlemen, how have you dealt with the issue of 

stovepiping and sharing of intelligence? 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. I think we are fortunate. I do feel quite fortunate in this respect because the United Kingdom’s government has 

not only supported the fact that we can structure ourselves and 

make a single point of contact, the JTAC facility, within which 

there are police, military intelligence, transportation, security, 

health protection agencies, all in one office, as I have been there. 

It is quite a big office. They are all talking to each other, and the 

analysts that take that bigger picture and put it into real workable 

products that people like me can use is really quite impressive and 

does work. 

They support that. But what is more impressive is the government has restructured itself to do that. In my report you will note 

I talk about the London Regional Resilience Forum, which is only 

one regime in the United Kingdom where the combined authorities 

of London work together to mitigate not only natural, but manmade disasters such as terrorism. 

So it is—it is not just a spiritual support the government gives 

us. I can actually see the structural support and practical support 

the United Kingdom does give. So I feel fortunate in that way. 

Major Yayla. In our case if you do not share intelligence or information, there is no fight against terrorism. The professional terrorist members, especially the cells, they operate just like regular 

people. And for the community, it is almost impossible to realize 

them as the terrorists or to have any tips against them, just like 

the al Qaeda members in Miami. So if you look from the outside, 

they are regular members of the community. So if you do not have 

any intelligence against them, and if you do not share this intelligence with the proper divisions, we cannot fight against terrorism, and we cannot be successful against terrorism. 

In our case, for example, in the Ankara PD, the intelligence department, the police have their own intelligence against terrorism 

and an antiterrorism department that carries out operations 

against the terrorist groups work together. They have everything 

from the beginning of the operation until the end of the operation 

shared on the same table. And whenever the intelligence department has any specific information regarding a terrorist threat, it 

is immediately shared with the antiterrorism divisions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With the Chairman’s indulgence, I just have one 

quick additional question for Chief Timoney, if I could. 

To follow up on my last question, in my home State of Rhode Island, we are part of the New England State Police Information 

Network, or NESPIN, which is part of the Regional InformationSharing System, or RISS. For those of you who don’t know, RISS 

is a federally funded program adminstered by the Department of 

Justice in cooperation with the Department of Justice programs 

and the Bureau of Justice assistance to serve as a communication 
29

network to serve for local law enforcement to target anything from 

terrorism to cybercrime. 

So my question is, Chief, does the Miami Police Department participate in RISS, or do you participate in another system; and do 

you find the system to be successful; and how do you think it can 

be improved to better suit your needs? 

Chief Timoney. Yeah. That is a very interesting question because 

you can go to different parts of the country and find these different 

systems. In general, the call fusion centers, I mean, they may go 

to the name of RISS. They may go to name of FIG, Field Intelligence Group. What we are working on in the process in Miami, 

because there was a—before that there was the two, the terrorism 

early warning system, which got mixed reviews. So we are trying 

to improve in that process in Miami coming up with a whole new 

entity under the auspices and in partnership with the FBI called 

the Field Intelligence Group. 

One of the realities, and this is something that people don’t talk 

about—I talk about it all the time—to set up an intelligence-gathering unit simply for terrorism at the local level, it is not that busy. 

There isn’t that much information coming in. And my biggest worry 

is complacency, that these police officers and agents lose interest. 

So my preference is that while we are dealing with—obviously, 

with terrorism, there is a nexus with criminal intelligence and 

gangs. So we put them all in the same umbrella. We have a certain 

amount of terrorism expertise, but we want to have enough work 

to keep them busy, to keep them interested, because the enemy is 

really complacency and boredom. And sometimes you can go literally for weeks without good intel coming in, and you need to have 

something to be working on. So it may be criminal intelligence, you 

know, on who is doing bank robberies or gang or drug intelligence. 

So there isn’t any one system that is - that is, I would say the—

you know, the showcase for anyone in the Nation. It varies from 

region to region. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from Nevada wishes to inquire. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today. And 

having read through your testimony, each of you have presented us 

with unique information that is very helpful to us, and we thank 

you for that. 

Continuing on with much of this discussion about intelligence. I 

am curious how each of your communities, whether it is Miami, 

London or Ankara, how do you receive international intelligence 

that is valuable to your operation? 

Chief Timoney. Yeah. Right now it is not changing. It is the FBI. 

We get it from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The FBI gets it is 

from the CIA. But our point of contact is the FBI. I get questioned 

all the time with Homeland Security, but we deal with the FBI. 

That is kind of the fact of life. And so that is where we get the information, from the FBI. 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. I have two valuable sources. One is very formal, 

and the other is informal. The formal way is through our special 

branch, which is a national entity broken down into regions, and 

if—and all intelligence comes through a special branch, and dare 
30

I say it, I use the word JTAC again, it comes through JTAC to 

makes sure there are no gaps in any kind of intelligence process. 

But where I am in the city of London, I think it is either the first 

or second largest international sector in the world, and I get an 

amazing amount of global intelligence from the business systems 

itself, which is a very good reflection of the partnerships and trust 

and confidence that we have in each other. I then feed that into 

the JTAC system, and it is analyzed, and then a product comes out 

of that, an actual operational product. 

But that global intelligence has proved to be invaluable. Some of 

the biggest financial systems in the world will develop that intelligence to protect their assets and their people worldwide. That is 

very important to them. But, of course, that same intelligence 

around methodology of terrorist attacks, the latest information 

from different countries in the world is fed back to the United 

Kingdom, because we know in London, that is—we have seen not 

only the 7th of July, but in other instances certainly more recently 

where the threat against airliners has been mitigated, intelligence, 

international intelligence, has to be handled very well and very, 

very fast. So we—it has worked before. We continue to work hard 

to make sure it works better, but it is simple, but it works. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you. 

Major Yayla. 

Major Yayla. We have four sources for international intelligence. 

The first is the Turkish National Intelligence Service. When they 

have appropriate information regarding international intelligence, 

they will share that information with us. 

The second is the international agreements that the TNP and 

Ankara PD has. For example, the FBI and the CIA person in Ankara will visit us. We will have lunch, dinners with them or other 

representatives from other states, and they will, from time to time, 

share the information they have regarding international terrorist 

groups with us. And this is very common with the FBI and CIA 

representatives in Ankara. 

The third is the interceptions we do to our terrorist department, 

the communication; for example, the terrorist trying to call international numbers from Turkey, or the communication between Turkey and the other countries. 

The fourth one is 2-hour interrogations and investigations. When 

you arrest a terrorist, and if he speaks during his interrogation, he 

will provide information if he had been in an international level. 

Or the communication that we capture in the terrorist cells will 

give us some information. 

Mr. GIBBONS. You know, I want to congratulate each and every 

one of you for creating value-added programs within each of your 

communities that makes intelligence the first line, first defense, 

preventative use of intelligence for preventing a terrorist attack, 

and thank you for doing that. 

Many of the programs you have created and talked about here 

I am sure are models that other communities will be able to look 

at and adapt, or adopt in whole or in part to their own communities. 

This is not all a good news scenario, I am sure. I mean, sitting 

here, you are all telling very, very positive stories about accom-
31

plishments and successes and how we are moving forward in the 

war on terrorism and being able to use intelligence. But I think at 

the end of the day, each of you in your communities, each of you 

in your leadership role, must sit back and wonder, you know, what 

is it that you are missing, because in this job, your job, what you 

miss does hurt you. What you don’t know will hurt you. 

I would only ask in a follow-up question very briefly from each 

of you, what keeps you awake at night at the end of the day? 

Chief Timoney. When I first went to Miami getting the job, I took 

a helicopter ride, and you only appreciate the vulnerability of 

Miami from the air when you look down and you see 10,000 boats. 

They are all white; they all look alike. We know there is human 

smuggling, we know there is drug smuggling, and any one of those 

boats can come up the mouth of the river loaded with a bomb of 

some type. There are high-rise buildings on both sides, and I think 

about that a lot. 

Mr. LOVEGROVE. It is difficult to choose just one, but I will go 

from the top of the list. I think it is a realization that the terrorist 

is an ingenious person. They will keep innovating, and they won’t 

stop. They will keep doing things differently. So once I have had 

the sleepless night and I wake up, the very first thing I say to myself, and I make sure my team understands this, is what am I 

going to do differently today than I did yesterday, because if I don’t 

do anything differently today, the terrorist will. 

Who would have thought that liquid explosives would, a few 

weeks ago, be smuggled on board aircrafts and used to create other 

tragedies? That was we managed to stop that one with, I have to 

say, the tremendous help of the United States, and acknowledgment of the States is absolutely fantastic. And that probably answers my last question around international intelligence. We have 

a fantastic relationship with the U.S. Long may that continue. 

But what keeps me awake is keeping ahead of the terrorists. But 

so far, you know, we are doing okay. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Major Yayla. 

Major Yayla. I always think about the explosives because they 

can do the most damage. For example, for the last 9 months the 

TNP captured around 3,500 pounds of plastic explosives like C4, 

A4, in the last 9 months. And the terrorist carried out bombings 

by using around 50 pounds of explosives that we were not able to 

catch on time before they were used. I always think about that 

small 50-pound plastic explosives that can damage thousands of 

people that we were not able to catch on time, and that the terrorists carried out to run 10 attacks by using that 50 pounds of explosives. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me, and 

thank you to these gentlemen for their great service both to their 

countries and to the combined efforts of our countries together in 

the war on terrorism. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentlelady from Florida seeks to inquire. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for the opportunity. I 

just wanted to sing some words of praise to our police chief. I have 

the great honor of representing a good chunk of the city of Miami, 

and we are in good hands with this police chief. 
32

As you pointed out in your testimony, written and verbal, you 

said without question the number one weapon in our fight against 

terrorism is good, actionable intelligence, and I know that 

Mr. bbons was talking about that. But how difficult is it to make 

that distinction between what we would classify as true threats 

and quacks? 

Recently there was a sting operation in south Florida involving 

a group who might have posed a true security threat, but they 

seemed to lack arms and organization, a sponsor, a plan; yet when 

we look at the operations of the 9/11 highjackers, and you correctly 

pointed out that 14 of those had south Florida roots, all that they 

had were box cutters. And look at the damage they did. Were we 

to have arrested them before their horrible deeds were put into motion, many Americans would be shaking their heads and saying, 

what threat? What problem? Nothing could have happened. And we 

don’t want this feeling of complacency spreading in the United 

States to think that, unless an individual is tied to an organized 

entity and has the wherewithal and funds and real operation behind them, that they do not pose a threat. Box cutters don’t appear 

to be a grave threat, and they forever changed our Nation. 

So how difficult is it for you working with Federal agencies and 

local and State agencies to make that distinction, if a distinction 

needs to be made, between a true threat, something that looks like 

a threat, but may even be—almost hardly passes the smell test. 

And what improvement, secondly, would you like to see of the communication, even though you think it is much improved, between 

the Federal, State and local enforcement agencies? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chief Timoney. That really is the $64,000 question: How do you 

tell real—a terrorist from these that—they talk a good game, and 

you don’t know. You get the threat, and in that case I remember 

getting briefed early on, and I was a little skeptical, as was the 

FBI, but the guy is saying certain things, and you have to follow 

it. Not once did this individual ever kind of back off. As a matter 

of fact it—it increased. 

I don’t want to get into the details because the trial is coming 

up, but suffice to say there were enough overt acts taken by these 

individuals that we had to take them serious, and then after about 

4 or 5 months, we shut the case down for an entirely separate matter, which I don’t even have to go into now, but had nothing to do 

with the strength or weakness of the case. 

People say, well, they don’t look like terrorists; they are from 

model city. I can guarantee you that if Scotland Yard had arrested 

the July 7th bombers 2 weeks earlier, people would have been saying the same thing, those are not real terrorists, one guy is a 19-

year-old Jamaican, for God’s sake, because we all have this perception of a terrorist being a Mohammad Atta walking through an airport. They all have to look like that. Well, guess what; they don’t. 

The home-grown types don’t look like that. It is a difficult situation. The ones in Madrid were low-level drug dealers engaged in 

this. 

So once you take the information, you have accepted it, and you 

have got to run with the case. And as far as the improving the intelligence, again, I think the FBI has made great, great strides. 
33

Can it be a improved? I guess everything can be improved upon. 

What I can tell you is there has been a marked improvement over 

the last 4 or 5 years, and just the relationship is completely different. It isn’t the FBI calling you as they get ready to go do a 

press conference with somebody they locked up in your locality. I 

am involved in the briefings. On the cases themselves I get intel 

briefings on a regular basis, so it is not the same as it was prior 

to 9/11. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. I want to thank each of you for coming and bringing 

your wealth of experience and knowledge and sharing with this 

committee. I think we need to focus more on intelligence. I kept 

thinking after the recent experience in Great Britain, that for a 

week later blue-haired ladies couldn’t carry their lipstick on the 

airplanes. 

I think we focus too often on things instead of people. There are 

an infinite number of ways and things to use to hurt us. There are 

a finite number of bad actors. Maybe it is time to start looking for 

people instead of things. 

Thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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