54334 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 202 / Wednesday, October 21, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 

29 CFR Part 1910 

[Docket No. OSHA–2009–0023] 

RIN 1218–AC41 

Combustible Dust 

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA), Labor. 

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: In this advance notice of 

proposed rulemaking (ANPR), OSHA is 

requesting comments, including data 

and other information, on issues related 

to the hazards of combustible dust in 

the workplace. For the purposes of this 

notice, the term ‘‘combustible dust’’ 

includes all combustible particulate 

solids of any size, shape, or chemical 

composition that could present a fire or 

deflagration hazard when suspended in 

air or other oxidizing medium. OSHA 

plans to use the information received in 

response to this notice in developing a 

proposed standard for combustible dust. 

DATES: Submit comments in response to 

this ANPR by January 19, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments as 

follows: 

• Electronic. Submit comments 

electronically at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, which is the 

Federal eRulemaking Portal. Follow the 

instructions online for submitting 

comments. 

• Facsimile. Commenters may fax 

submissions, including attachments, 

that are no longer than 10 pages in 

length to the OSHA Docket Office at 

(202) 693–1648; OSHA does not require 

hard copies of these documents. 

Commenters must submit lengthy 

attachments that supplement these 

documents (e.g., studies, journal 

articles), in triplicate hard copy, to the 

OSHA Docket Office, Technical Data 

Center, Room N–2625, U.S. Department 

of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave., NW., 

Washington, DC 20210. These 

attachments must clearly identify the 

commenter’s name, date, subject, and 

docket number (i.e., OSHA–2009–0023) 

so the Agency can attach them to the 

appropriate comments. 

• Regular mail, express delivery, 

hand (courier) delivery, and messenger 

service. Submit three copies of 

comments and any additional material 

(e.g., studies, journal articles) to the 

OSHA Docket Office, Docket No. 

OSHA–2009–0023 (or Regulation 

Identifier Number (RIN) 1218–AC41), 

Technical Data Center, Room N–2625, 

U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, 

DC 20210; telephone (202) 693–2350 

(TDY number: (877) 889–5627). Note 

that security procedures may result in 

significant delays in receiving 

comments and other written materials 

by regular mail. Contact the OSHA 

Docket Office for information about 

security procedures concerning delivery 

of materials by express delivery, hand 

delivery, and messenger service. The 

hours of operation for the OSHA Docket 

Office are 8:15 a.m.–4:45 p.m., e.t. 

• Instructions. All submissions must 

include the Agency name and the OSHA 

docket number or RIN for this 

rulemaking (i.e., OSHA Docket No. 

OSHA–2009–0023 or RIN 1218–AC41). 

Submissions, including any personal 

information provided, are placed in the 

public docket without change and will 

be available online at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the 

Agency cautions commenters about 

submitting statements they do not want 

made available to the public, or 

submitting comments that contain 

personal information (either about 

themselves or others) such as Social 

Security numbers, birth dates, and 

medical data. 

• Docket: To read or download 

submissions or other material in the 

docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov 

or the OSHA Docket Office at the 

address above. While all documents in 

the docket are listed in the http:// 

www.regulations.gov index, some 

information (e.g., copyrighted material) 

is not publicly available to read or 

download through this Web site. All 

submissions, including copyrighted 

material, are available for inspection 

and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. 

Contact the OSHA Docket Office for 

assistance in locating docket 

submissions. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Information regarding this ANPR is 

available from the following sources: 

• Press inquiries. Contact Jennifer 

Ashley, Director, OSHA Office of 

Communications, Room N–3647, U.S. 

Department of Labor, 200 Constitution 

Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210; 

telephone: (202) 693–1999. 

• General and technical information. 

Contact Don Pittenger, Director, Office 

of Safety Systems, OSHA Directorate of 

Standards and Guidance, Room N–3718, 

U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, 

DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693–2255; 

fax: (202) 693–1663. 

• Copies of this Federal Register 

notice. Electronic copies are available at 

http://www.regulations.gov. This 

Federal Register notice, as well as news 

releases and other relevant information, 

also are available at OSHA’s Web page 

at http://www.osha.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Background 

A. Introduction 

B. Dust Explosions in Grain Handling 

Facilities 

C. Dust Explosions in Other Industries 

D. CSB Combustible Dust Study 

E. Congressional Response 

F. Existing OSHA Standards 

G. Consensus and Industry Standards 

H. National Emphasis Program Analysis 

I. Regulatory Issues 

II. Request for Data, Information, and 

Comments 

A. Industry Background 

B. Definition of Combustible Dust 

C. Hazard Recognition 

D. Hazard Assessment 

E. Hazard Communication and Training 

F. Consensus, Industry, and Insurance 

Standards 

G. State and Local Codes 

H. Engineering Controls 

I. Administrative Controls 

J. Emergency Response 

K. Investigation of Incidents 

L. Regulatory Approach 

M. Economic Impacts and Benefits 

N. Impacts on Small Entities 

O. Compliance Assistance 

III. Public Participation 

IV. Authority and Signature 

I. Background 

A. Introduction 

The hazards of combustible dust 

encompass a wide array of materials, 

industries, and processes. Any 

combustible material can burn rapidly 

when in a finely divided form. Materials 

that may form combustible dust include, 

but are not limited to, wood, coal, 

plastics, biosolids, candy, sugar, spice, 

starch, flour, feed, grain, fertilizer, 

tobacco, paper, soap, rubber, drugs, 

dried blood, dyes, certain textiles, and 

metals (such as aluminum and 

magnesium). 

Five elements are needed for a 

combustible dust explosion to occur. 

The first three elements are those 

necessary for a fire: Fuel, heat, and an 

oxidizer. These three elements form the 

‘‘fire triangle,’’ in which combustible 

dust is the fuel, heat is provided by any 

source of ignition, and oxygen is present 

in air and in oxidizers. 

The fourth element is dispersal of 

dust into a cloud of the proper 

concentration. These four conditions are 

necessary for a deflagration, which is 

violent combustion accompanied by a 

pressure wave. The combustion is rapid, 

but propagates at a speed less than the 

speed of sound. 


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1The terms ‘‘deflagration’’, ‘‘explosion’’, and 

‘‘minimum explosible concentration’’ are used in 

this notice as defined in NFPA 654 (2006 edition) 

for combustible dust only. This notice does not 

address the terms ‘‘detonation’’ or ‘‘explosion’’ as 

they relate to materials classified as explosives. 

A fifth element, confinement, is 

necessary for an explosion. Confinement 

can be any enclosure—including, but 

not limited to, a building, room, duct, or 

processing and storage equipment. An 

explosion occurs when the pressure 

developed by a deflagration bursts or 

ruptures the enclosure. Together, these 

five elements (fuel, heat, an oxidizer, 

dispersion and confinement) are known 

as the ‘‘dust explosion pentagon.’’ The 

minimum explosible concentration is 

the lowest concentration of combustible 

dust suspended in air that will support 

a deflagration.1

Secondary explosions or deflagrations 

occur when pressure waves from an 

initial (or primary) deflagration or 

explosion cause dispersal and ignition 

of combustible dust that has 

accumulated on surfaces. Secondary 

explosions are often more devastating 

than primary explosions due to the 

increased amount of fuel and the size of 

the ignition source (i.e., the initial 

event). In some cases, explosions 

continue to cascade throughout an area 

or facility. 

OSHA is developing a standard that 

will comprehensively address the fire 

and explosion hazards of combustible 

dust. The Agency’s existing standards 

address some, but not all, of the 

elements needed to protect workers 

from these hazards. For example, 

OSHA’s general industry housekeeping 

standard (29 CFR 1910.22(a)(1)) 

addresses accumulations of dust, 

including dusts that may be 

combustible, and the general industry 

electrical standard (29 CFR 1910, 

subpart S) helps to control electrical 

ignition hazards. When workers are 

exposed to hazards not currently 

addressed in the OSHA standards, 

employers are cited under the General 

Duty Clause (GDC) specified by Section 

5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and 

Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act; see 29 

U.S.C. 654). The information requested 

in this notice will help the Agency 

develop a standard that would better 

protect workers from the hazards of 

combustible dust. 

Industries that may have combustible 

dust hazards include, among others: 

Agriculture, animal food manufacturing, 

grain handling, food manufacturing, 

wood product manufacturing, chemical 

manufacturing, textile manufacturing, 

furniture manufacturing, metal 

processing, fabricated metal products 

and machinery manufacturing, pesticide 

manufacturing, pharmaceutical 

manufacturing, tire manufacturing, 

production of rubber and plastics, 

plastics and rubber products 

manufacturing, recycling, wastewater 

treatment, and coal handling and 

processing. To determine which 

industries may be affected by an OSHA 

standard regulating combustible dust 

hazards, OSHA identified industries 

that had previous incidents relating to 

combustible dust. Table 1 summarizes 

this data. Incidents were identified 

using data from the U.S. Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 

(CSB) involving incidents occurring 

from 1980 to 2005. For incidents 

between 2006 and 2008, OSHA used 

reports gathered by the Web site 

‘‘dustexplosions.blogspot.com.’’ Using 

these two data sources, OSHA assigned 

a North American Industry 

Classification System (NAICS) code to 

each incident using the available 

information. The groups of NAICS codes 

in this table were determined by 

combining similar industries together 

that had explosions in the past. 

Incidents having insufficient 

information to assign a NAICS code to 

the affected establishment were 

classified as ‘‘unknown.’’ OSHA’s 

preliminary analyses show that, in 

industries for which combustible dust 

fires or explosions have occurred, there 

are 426,000 establishments employing 

16 million workers (see Table 1). The 

table does not show that these 

industries include over 333,000 small 

businesses with 6.5 million employees. 

It is possible that some establishments 

in these industries do not have 

significant dust hazards. 

TABLE 1—INDUSTRIES HAVING AT LEAST ONE RECORDED COMBUSTIBLE DUST INCIDENT REPORTED SINCE 1980, 

ACCORDING TO OSHA RESEARCH

NAICS 

group 1 Name of industry 1

Incidents 

(1980– 

2008) 2

Firms 3 Establishments 3 Employees 3

115111 ......... Cotton Ginning ....................................................................................... 1 260 279 2,654 

221000 ......... Utilities, Electric Power Gen .................................................................. 28 6,554 17,174 614,427 

311000 ......... Food Manufacturing (Except 311100, 311200, 311300, 311800, 

311900).

8 5,820 7,786 834,277 

311100 ......... Animal Food Mfg. (Except 311119) ....................................................... 2 176 248 16,202 

311119 ......... Other Animal Food Mfg ......................................................................... 5 1,046 1,549 31,971 

311200 ......... Grain and Oilseed Milling (Except 311221 and 311230) ...................... 5 392 658 31,439 

311221 ......... Wet Corn Milling .................................................................................... 21 33 65 8,875 

311230 ......... Breakfast Cereal Mfg ............................................................................. 6 43 66 13,410 

311300 ......... Sugar & Confectionary Product Mfg. (Except 311313) ......................... 5 1,581 1,700 66,341 

311313 ......... Beet Sugar Manufacturing ..................................................................... 6 10 33 6,263 

311800 ......... Bakeries ................................................................................................. 4 9,301 10,072 288,393 

311900 ......... Other Food Manufacturing ..................................................................... 8 2,768 3,205 161,567 

312000 ......... Beverage and Tobacco Product Mfg. (Except 312110) ........................ 4 2,193 2,379 83,531 

313000 ......... Textile Mills ............................................................................................ 11 2,770 3,243 187,766 

314000 ......... Textile Product Mills .............................................................................. 2 6,456 6,726 155,586 

321000 ......... Wood Product Mfg. (Except 321113 and 321219) ................................ 28 11,192 12,749 449,650 

321113 ......... Sawmills ................................................................................................. 7 3,398 3,731 104,666 

321219 ......... Reconstituted Wood Prod. Mfg ............................................................. 14 167 255 22,190 

322000 ......... Paper Manufacturing ............................................................................. 18 3,269 5,139 441,430 

324000 ......... Petroleum & Coal Products Mfg ............................................................ 1 1,166 2,448 102,997 

325000 ......... Chemical Mfg. (Except 325188 and 325410) ........................................ 31 7,737 10,749 514,732 

325188 ......... Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg ............................................................... 11 390 612 40,589 

325410 ......... Pharmaceutical & Medicine Mfg ............................................................ 8 1,481 1,886 249,743 

326000 ......... Plastics and Rubber Products Mfg. (Except 326211) ........................... 17 11,365 11,454 846,857 


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54336 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 202 / Wednesday, October 21, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

2National Academy of Science, International 

Symposium on Grain Elevator Explosions, July 11– 

12, 1978, National Materials Advisory Board 

Committee on Evaluation of Industrial Hazards. 3U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board Investigation Report No. 2006–H–1, 

Combustible Dust Hazard Study; November 2006, 

page 67. 

4Regulatory Review of OSHA’s Grain Handling 

Standard [29 CFR 1910.272], February 2003. 

5Regulatory Review of OSHA’s Grain Handling 

Standard [29 CFR 1910.272], February 2003. 

6 Kansas State University, in cooperation with 

USDA Federal Grain Inspection Service, available 

online at: http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/pr_histpubs/ 

Dust_Exp.htm. 

7USDA Grain Inspection, Packers, and 

Stockyards Administration, personal e-mail 

communication from USDA to OSHA, Jul 10, 2009, 

with attachment entitled, ‘‘Explosion Data.’’ 

TABLE 1—INDUSTRIES HAVING AT LEAST ONE RECORDED COMBUSTIBLE DUST INCIDENT REPORTED SINCE 1980, 

ACCORDING TO OSHA RESEARCH—Continued 

NAICS 

group 1 Name of industry 1

Incidents 

(1980– 

2008) 2

Firms 3 Establishments 3 Employees 3

326211 ......... Tire Manufacturing ................................................................................. 5 91 138 53,985 

327000 ......... Nonmetallic Mineral Prod. Mfg .............................................................. 4 11,332 17,350 482,459 

331000 ......... Primary Metal Manufacturing ................................................................. 32 4,310 5,285 449,914 

332000 ......... Fabricated Metal Product Mfg ............................................................... 27 54,969 59,064 1,563,713 

333000 ......... Machinery Manufacturing ...................................................................... 7 23,842 26,317 1,126,671 

334000 ......... Computer, Electronic Equip. Mfg ........................................................... 2 12,733 14,548 1,057,485 

336000 ......... Transportation Equipment Mfg .............................................................. 16 10,552 12,707 1,622,527 

337000 ......... Furniture & Related Product Mfg. (Except 337100) .............................. 2 4,779 5,148 188,908 

337100 ......... Household & Institutional Furniture, Cabinet Mfg ................................. 16 15,878 16,301 354,341 

339000 ......... Miscellaneous Manufacturing ................................................................ 7 29,925 31,239 686,096 

423000 ......... Merchant Wholesalers (423110, 423210, 423310, 423930) ................. 4 22,669 27,704 432,265 

488000 ......... Support Activities for Transportation ..................................................... 1 29,416 37,083 579,589 

493000 ......... Warehousing and Storage ..................................................................... 1 7,176 13,849 595,325 

511000 ......... Publishing Industries .............................................................................. 1 22,874 31,821 1,039,739 

561210 ......... Facilities Support Services .................................................................... 1 1,680 4,115 164,637 

562000 ......... Waste Management and Remediation Services ................................... 3 16,189 19,919 345,334 

Other ............ Unknown Industry Category .................................................................. 42 .................... .................... ....................

Total ....................................................................................................... 422 347,983 426,794 16,018,544 

Sources: 

1 North American Industry Classification System, United States, 2008. 

2 Incident data from U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and http://dustexplosions.blogspot.com. 3 County Business Patterns 2006—U.S. Census Bureau. 

B. Dust Explosions in Grain Handling 

Facilities 

In the 1970s, agriculture and food 

processing industries experienced 

several combustible dust explosions. A 

1977 grain-dust explosion in Westwago, 

Louisiana, killed 36 workers. It remains 

the deadliest grain-dust explosion of the 

modern era. Five days later, another 

grain-dust explosion in Galveston, 

Texas, caused the deaths of 9 workers 

and injured 34 others.2 As a result of 

these and other grain-dust explosions in 

the 1970s, OSHA issued a document 

entitled ‘‘Grain Elevator Industry 

Hazard Alert,’’ which provided 

employers, workers, and other officials 

with information concerning the 

hazards and safe handling of grain. 

Later in the 1970s, the Agency 

initiated rulemaking to address the 

problem of grain-dust explosions. On 

December 31, 1987, after extensive 

public comment on its proposed rule 

and several public hearings, OSHA 

published its final standard on Grain 

handling facilities, 29 CFR 1910.272 (52 

FR 44592). In its Combustible Dust 

Hazard Study of November 2006 

(discussed further in Section 1(D) of this 

notice), the U.S. Chemical Safety and 

Hazard Investigation Board stated: 

‘‘OSHA’s Grain handling facilities 

standard provides a model for OSHA 

action that has proven effective in 

reducing catastrophic dust explosions in 

the grain industry.’’ 3

During a review of the Grain handling 

facilities standard in 2003, OSHA 

received comments from union 

representatives claiming that, since its 

promulgation, grain explosions were 

down 42 percent, and injuries and 

deaths from grain explosions were 

reduced by 60 percent and 70 percent 

respectively.4 Figure 1 shows the 

number of grain-dust explosions per 

year since 1978. For the ten years prior 

to the standard (1978–1987), the average 

number of explosions per year was 20.5. 

This average decreased to 10.3 

explosions per year from 1988 to 1997 

and further decreased to 6.3 per year 

from 1998 to 2007. OSHA gathered this 

data from the Regulatory Review of 

OSHA’s Grain Handling Standard,5

Kansas State University in cooperation 

with USDA Federal Grain Inspection 

Service,6 and USDA Grain Inspection, 

Packers, and Stockyards 

Administration.7


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8Cashdollar, K. L., & Hertzberg, M., eds (1987) 

Industrial Dust Explosions, ASTM International, 

U.S., p. 345. 

9U.S. Fire Administration Technical Report #110, 

Manufacturing Mill Fire, Methuen, MA, December 

11, 1995. 

10Michigan Department of Energy, Labor & 

Economic Growth, CIS Reaches Historic Settlement 

Agreement with Ford and UAW, 1999 available 

online: http://www.michigan.gov/dleg/0,1607,7- 

154-10573_11472–52301-,00.html. 

11U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), 1999. Joint 

Foundry Explosion Investigation Team Report, Jahn 

Foundry Corporation, Springfield, MA, February 

25, 1999. 

12OSHA, 2002, Region 4 Report on Explosion at 

Rouse Polymerics, U.S. Department of Labor. 

C. Dust Explosions in Other Industries 

The flammability and explosiveness 

of various types of organic and 

inorganic dusts has been recognized for 

well over a century. The devastating 

effects of secondary explosions resulting 

from accumulated dust have also been 

well documented, particularly since the 

early years of the 20th century; the 

hazards of some dusts, particularly coal 

dust, mineral dusts, and flour, were 

recognized many years before the 20th 

century. However, no national 

organizations focused on the hazards of 

combustible dusts until the National 

Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

established a committee to do so in 

1922. The NFPA’s work resulted in a 

wealth of knowledge about the 

prevention and control of dustexplosion hazards in material handling 

and manufacturing processes. In 1923, 

NFPA published the first national 

consensus standard to address the 

prevention of dust explosions in grain 

terminals and flour mills.8

Over the past 15 years, a number of 

industries have experienced serious 

dust explosions, causing loss of life and 

injuries, as well as property damage. 

The first of these incidents, an 

explosion and fire in a textile factory in 

Methuen, Massachusetts in 1995, 

injured 37 people and destroyed several 

large buildings.9 After a detailed 

investigation of this incident, OSHA 

issued a Hazard Information Bulletin in 

1998 for the textile industry. 

In 1999, an automotive plant near 

Dearborn, Michigan experienced an 

explosion in one of the boilers in its 

power plant. Analysis of the explosion 

indicated that the initial boiler 

explosion may have caused 

accumulated coal dust on plant surfaces 

to become airborne, fueling a secondary 

explosion that destroyed part of the 

facility. Six workers were killed and 36 

were injured.10

In the same year, there was an 

explosion at a foundry in Springfield, 

Massachusetts, involving powdered 

phenolic resin in the iron castings 

manufacturing process. This explosion 

killed three workers and injured nine. 

Investigators found heavy resin deposits 

in ducts and other surfaces. From this 

finding, they concluded that a primary 

explosion in a dust extraction duct had 

dispersed the settled dust, and that the 

dispersed dust then fueled secondary 

explosions in the facility.11

A rubber-dust explosion at a rubber 

recycling plant in Vicksburg, 

Mississippi in 2002, resulted in five 

fatalities and seven injuries. Part of the 

recycling process involved grinding 

rubber tires; the grinding process 

produced rubber dust, which 

accumulated on building surfaces and 

in a product bagging bin that was not 

equipped with explosion vents. A fire 

started on the roof of the plant. When 

it spread to the bagging bin, it dispersed 

the layers of dust in the bin and on the 

surrounding surfaces, fueling an 

explosion.12

A massive explosion in 2003 at a 

pharmaceuticals device manufacturing 

facility in Kinston, North Carolina, 

injured 38 workers and killed 6. In a 

process in which rubber strips were 

dipped into a polyethylene slurry, fans 

were used to help dry the coated rubber, 

causing fine polyethylene powder to be 

disbursed. Employees diligently cleaned 

the visible areas of the process room; 

however, most of the employees were 

unaware that combustible polyethylene 


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54338 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 202 / Wednesday, October 21, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

13 Investigation Report, Dust Explosion, West 

Pharmaceutical Services, Inc., U.S. Chemical Safety 

and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), September 

2004. 

14CSB, 2005, Investigation Report, Combustible 

Dust Fire and Explosions, CTA Acoustics, Inc., 

February 2005. 

15CSB, 2003, Investigation Report, Hayes Lemerz 

Dust Explosions and Fire, September 2003. 

16U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board Investigation Report No. 2008–05–1–GA, 

Sugar Dust Explosion and Fire; September 2009. 

17U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board Investigation Report No. 2006–H–1, 

Combustible Dust Hazard Study; November 2006, p. 

31. 

dust was accumulating in the enclosed 

space above the suspended ceiling, 

carried there by the building ventilation 

system. Due to the extensive damage to 

the facility, and the deaths of potential 

witnesses, investigators were unable to 

definitively determine the ignition 

source or the method of dust 

dispersal.13

That same year, phenolic resin again 

fueled a fatal dust explosion, this time 

in an acoustic insulation manufacturing 

facility in Corbin, Kentucky. As workers 

were cleaning fugitive dust 

accumulations with compressed air, a 

cloud of phenolic resin formed near a 

malfunctioning appliance, which likely 

ignited the cloud of dust. The initial 

deflagration dispersed large quantities 

of combustible dust that had 

accumulated on surfaces throughout the 

facility. The resulting dust clouds fueled 

several secondary explosions. The 

building was destroyed, 7 workers were 

killed, and 37 were injured.14

Even finely divided metals can cause 

dust explosions. Again in 2003, one 

worker was killed and several injured in 

an aluminum dust explosion at a wheel 

manufacturing facility. At the point in 

the process in which scrap aluminum 

was reduced to small chips, aluminum 

particles were drawn into a dust 

collector. An initial explosion in the 

dust collector spread through the 

ventilation system, causing a secondary 

explosion involving the dust 

accumulated on overhead beams, ducts, 

and other structures.15

As a result of this series of incidents 

in 2003, OSHA produced a Safety and 

Health Information Bulletin (SHIB), 

Combustible Dust in Industry: 

Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of 

Fire and Explosions. This widely 

disseminated guidance document 

provided employers and workers with 

information on combustible dust 

explosions, including mitigation. It 

contains references to both the 

applicable OSHA standards and the 

related industry consensus standards. 

However, incidents continued to occur 

despite the availability of these 

standards and the guidance in the SHIB. 

In early 2008, a catastrophic incident 

at a sugar refinery in Port Wentworth, 

Georgia, killed 14 workers and seriously 

injured 36 others. The CSB 

investigated 16 and determined that an 

initial dust explosion occurred in an 

enclosed steel belt conveyor below three 

105-foot-tall silos, most likely ignited by 

an overheated conveyor bearing. Large 

quantities of sugar dust that had 

accumulated on surfaces throughout the 

plant fueled a series of massive 

secondary explosions and fires, 

destroying much of the facility. The 

plant had a history of previous, smaller 

initial explosion incidents that did not 

result in significant damage or 

secondary explosions. The fine OSHA 

proposed for this employer is the thirdlargest fine ever proposed for a single 

incident. 

The sugar plant incident highlighted 

a lack of hazard awareness and a failure 

to comply with existing Federal 

standards and State codes. OSHA took 

prompt action to further heighten 

awareness of this hazard by producing 

additional guidance for employers and 

workers, including a Web page, a fact 

sheet, and a poster. The Agency mailed 

the SHIB directly to 30,000 employers 

suspected of having combustible dust 

hazards, and also focused enforcement 

efforts on sugar plants. 

D. CSB Combustible Dust Study 

The CSB conducted a study of dust 

explosion incidents between 1980 and 

2005. The 2006 report from that study 

identified 281 incidents that killed 119 

workers and injured 718.17 From 2006 

through 2008, OSHA has found records 

of an additional 16 deaths and 84 

injuries; these records are included in 

Table 1 above. Among CSB’s findings 

and conclusions were the following: 

• Many industry and safety 

professionals lack awareness of 

combustible dust hazards. 

• The widely recognized standards of 

good engineering practice in the NFPA’s 

voluntary consensus standards were not 

being followed in many facilities. 

• State and local fire codes were 

ineffective as a viable mechanism to 

reduce dust explosion risks in general 

industry nationwide. 

• OSHA’s focus has been on 

enforcement activities in response to 

combustible dust incidents. 

• The only comprehensive OSHA 

standard that specifically addresses 

combustible dust hazards (the 1987 

Grain handling facilities standard) has 

effectively reduced the risk and 

consequences of grain-dust explosions, 

and incorporates many of the same 

principles that can be found in the 

NFPA standards. 

The report of CSB’s combustible dust 

study also listed five recommendations 

for OSHA. This notice addresses the 

first of these recommendations: 

‘‘Issue a standard designed to prevent 

combustible dust fires and explosions in 

general industry. Base the standard on 

current National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) dust explosion 

standards (including NFPA 654 and 

NFPA 484), and include at least 

• Hazard assessment, 

• engineering controls, 

• housekeeping, 

• building design, 

• explosion protection, 

• operating procedures, and 

• worker training.’’ 

The second CSB recommendation 

requested that OSHA revise its Hazard 

Communication Standard (HCS) (29 

CFR 1910.1200) to clarify the coverage 

and requirements related to combustible 

dust. This recommendation is being 

addressed in a separate rulemaking. 

The third and fourth CSB 

recommendations suggested that OSHA, 

respectively, communicate with the 

United Nations Economic Commission 

for Europe the need to amend the 

Globally Harmonized System to address 

combustible dust hazards, and provide 

combustible dust-related training 

through the OSHA Training Institute. 

Both of these recommendations have 

been accomplished. 

The fifth CSB recommendation 

suggested that OSHA initiate a Special 

Emphasis Program for Combustible 

Dust, to include an outreach program 

focused on the information in OSHA’s 

Safety and Health Information Bulletin, 

Combustible Dust in Industry: 

Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of 

Fire and Explosions. The Agency went 

beyond CSB’s recommendation and 

implemented a National Emphasis 

Program (NEP) to increase OSHA’s 

enforcement activities throughout the 

country and to focus on specific 

industry groups that experienced either 

frequent combustible dust incidents or 

combustible dust incidents with 

catastrophic consequences. The NEP 

was launched on October 17, 2007, and 

is ongoing. It was revised in 2008 to 

more closely focus on sugar plants. 

E. Congressional Response 

Interest intensified in regulatory 

action during the months after the 

sugar-plant incident in 2008. Employee 

unions expressed support for CSB’s 

rulemaking recommendations. On May 

1, 2008, the U.S. House of 

Representatives introduced a bill 


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entitled H.R. 5522, Worker Protection 

Against Combustible Dust Explosions 

and Fires Act of 2008. This bill directed 

OSHA to issue an interim combustible 

dust rule and an amendment to the HCS 

in 90 days, and a final rule in 18 

months. H.R. 5522 was passed by the 

House and referred to the Senate. 

Two Congressional hearings were 

held on H.R. 5522. The first hearing was 

held by the House Committee on 

Education and Labor on March 12, 2008, 

and the second hearing was held by the 

Subcommittee on Employment and 

Workplace Safety of the Senate Housing, 

Education, Labor and Pensions 

Committee on July 29, 2008. Assistant 

Secretary of Labor Ed Foulke testified 

for OSHA at these hearings; also 

testifying were representatives of CSB, 

NFPA, and the Georgia sugar plant that 

sustained the 2008 explosion. 

On February 4, 2009, H.R. 849, 

Worker Protection Against Combustible 

Dust Explosions and Fires Act of 2009, 

was introduced into the current session 

of Congress. The provisions of this 

resolution are the same as H.R. 5522. 

F. Existing OSHA Standards 

The Agency does not have a single, 

comprehensive standard that addresses 

combustible dust hazards across all 

industries. Current OSHA standards 

provide limited protection from dust 

hazards in two ways: First, certain 

standards address some dust hazards for 

specific industries. Among these 

standards are the following: 

• 29 CFR 1910.261—Pulp, paper, and 

paperboard mills. 

• 29 CFR 1910.263—Bakery 

equipment. 

• 29 CFR 1910.265—Sawmills. 

• 29 CFR 1910.269—Electric power 

generation, transmission, and 

distribution. 

• 29 CFR 1910.272—Grain handling 

facilities. 

Second, some general industry 

standards address one or more of the 

elements that can contribute to dust 

explosions, such as ignition sources and 

dust accumulations, or the standards 

require the communication of 

information that employers and workers 

need to address dust hazards. Among 

these standards are: 

• 29 CFR 1910.22(a)—Housekeeping. 

• 29 CFR 1910.178—Powered 

industrial trucks. 

• 29 CFR 1910 Subpart Q—Welding, 

Cutting, and Brazing. 

• 29 CFR 1910. 269—Electric power 

generation, transmission, and 

distribution. 

• 29 CFR 1910.307—Hazardous 

(classified) locations. 

• 29 CFR 1910.334(d)—Occasional 

use of flammable or ignitable materials. 

• 29 CFR 1910.1200—Hazard 

Communication. 

As noted earlier, OSHA’s existing 

standards for combustible dust do not 

provide a comprehensive set of 

requirements to fully address all of the 

prevention and mitigation methods 

specific to combustible dust hazards. 

Accordingly, some ignition sources are 

specifically covered (e.g., electrical 

installations, powered industrial 

trucks), while other ignition sources are 

not covered (e.g., mechanical sparks, 

friction, open flames). Additionally, 

OSHA standards address the 

accumulation of fugitive dust (i.e., dust 

that escapes from equipment or areas 

where it is normally present), but do not 

include measures that would prevent 

the escape of dust in the first place. 

Also, many built-in engineering controls 

(including the design of facilities, 

explosion venting, suppression systems, 

and explosion protection systems) are 

not addressed in the OSHA standards. 

OSHA is asking a series of questions 

about the need to address these areas in 

a new combustible dust standard to 

afford adequate and complete protection 

to workers. 

G. Consensus and Industry Standards 

NFPA issues a number of national 

consensus standards that address the 

hazards of combustible dust. For 

example, NFPA 654, Standard for the 

Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions 

from the Manufacturing, Processing, 

and Handling of Combustible 

Particulate Solids, addresses the 

hazards of combustible dust in a general 

manner. Specific industries are 

excluded from NFPA 654, but are 

covered by other NFPA standards, 

including NFPA 61, Standard for the 

Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions 

in Agricultural and Food Processing 

Facilities; NFPA 484, Standard for 

Combustible Metals; NFPA 655, 

Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires 

and Explosions; and NFPA 664, 

Standard for the Prevention of Fires and 

Explosions in Wood Processing and 

Woodworking Facilities. 

These five NFPA combustible dust 

standards have mandatory secondary 

references to a large number of other 

standards. The 2006 edition of NFPA 

654 mandates compliance with 36 other 

NFPA standards. These 36 secondary 

references, in turn, reference additional 

standards. In effect, no one standard 

comprehensively addresses the hazards 

of combustible dust, which may pose 

difficulties for some employers trying to 

develop programs to mitigate 

combustible dust hazards. In addition, 

the provisions of these five NFPA 

standards differ, which may add to 

these difficulties. Some elements of 

protection are addressed in some 

standards but not in others; other 

elements are addressed in different 

ways in the various standards. For 

example, NFPA 61, 484, and 654 

contain provisions for drive belts, while 

NFPA 655 and 664 have no provisions 

directly addressing drive belts. 

In addition to the NFPA standards 

listed above, NFPA issues a number of 

standards that cover the design and 

installation of protection systems 

specific to deflagration and explosion 

hazards, including combustible dust. 

Two of these standards are NFPA 68, 

Standard on Explosions Protection by 

Deflagration Venting, and NFPA 69, 

Standard on Explosion Prevention 

Systems. NFPA also has a series of 

standards that cover automatic fire 

suppression and alarm systems for a 

variety of facilities and hazards, but are 

not specific to combustible dust, 

deflagrations, or explosions. 

A large majority of State and local 

jurisdictions in the United States have 

adopted the NFPA standards because 

both of the model fire codes used in this 

country (i.e., International Code 

Council’s International Fire Code, and 

NFPA’s Fire Code) make these NFPA 

standards mandatory. However, the 

2006 report on CSB’s combustible dust 

study indicates that enforcement of 

these fire codes at the State and local 

level is ‘‘inconsistent and largely 

ineffective.’’ For example, the 2008 

sugar-plant incident occurred in 

Georgia, a State having a fire code that 

mandated compliance with, among 

other combustible dust-related 

consensus standards, NFPA 61, 

Standard for the Prevention of Fires and 

Dust Explosions in Agricultural and 

Food Processing Facilities. 

NFPA standards are updated on a 

regular basis, usually every three years. 

In the Agency’s experience, consensus 

standards incorporated by reference into 

OSHA rules quickly become out of date, 

making it difficult for employers to 

comply when the out-of-date consensus 

standards become difficult to obtain. 

Furthermore, OSHA cannot legally 

update NFPA or other consensus 

standards used in its rules by referring 

to the ‘‘current’’ or ‘‘most recent’’ 

edition of the consensus standards. 

Despite the aforementioned 

challenges with the application and 

enforcement of NFPA standards, the 

standards are used to a significant 

extent throughout industry, particularly 

by large companies, engineering 

consultants, and firms designing 

facilities with combustible dust hazards. 

Therefore, OSHA is asking for comment 


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18U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 

Board Investigation Report No. 2006–H–1, 

Combustible Dust Hazard Study; November 2006, 

page 68. 

on how best to incorporate the 

provisions of the consensus standards. 

H. National Emphasis Program Analysis 

OSHA analyzed the results of its 

Combustible Dust National Emphasis 

Program (NEP) to better understand 

where combustible dust hazards exist 

and where improvements may be 

needed to ensure that workers are 

protected from combustible dust 

hazards. Between November 1, 2007, 

and February 24, 2009, OSHA 

conducted 813 inspections under this 

NEP—665 in States under Federal 

OSHA authority, and 148 in States 

having an OSHA-approved State Plan. 

OSHA cited employers for 3,662 

violations. 

Of the 665 Federal NEP inspections, 

160 citations were issued under the 

General Duty Clause (GDC) for hazards 

related to combustible dust. Therefore, 

the rate of GDC usage for combustibledust-related hazards in the NEP 

inspections was 24 percent during the 

time period noted above (These 

statistics were derived from the 

information available at the time this 

notice was developed; the numbers may 

change over time through the informal 

conference and settlement process.) 

The 160 GDC violations referenced 32 

different industry or consensus 

standards developed by 6 different 

standards-developing organizations. The 

eleven most frequently referenced 

consensus standards were as follows, in 

descending order of frequency: 

• NFPA 654, Standard for the 

Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions 

from the Manufacturing, Processing, 

and Handling of Combustible 

Particulate Solids. 

• NFPA 664, Standard for the 

Prevention of Fires and Explosions in 

Wood Processing and Woodworking 

Facilities. 

• NFPA 61, Standard for the 

Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions 

in Agricultural and Food Processing 

Facilities. 

• NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion 

Prevention Systems. 

• NFPA 484, Standard for 

Combustible Metals. 

• NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion 

Protection by Deflagration Venting. 

• ASME B20.1, Standard for 

Conveyors and Related Equipment. 

• ANSI/ITSDF B56.1, Safety 

Standard for Low and High Lift Trucks. 

• FM Global Loss Prevention Data 

Sheet 7–76, Prevention and Mitigation 

of Combustible Dust Explosions and 

Fires. 

• NFPA 505, Standard on Powered 

Industrial Trucks. 

• NFPA 86, Standard on Ovens and 

Furnaces. 

It has been necessary to cite the GDC 

extensively to address the various 

aspects of combustible dust hazards. 

GDC citations focused on each of the 

elements that could contribute to a dust 

fire or explosion, including containment 

or control of dust, isolation or control of 

ignition sources, and explosion venting 

or suppression systems. The following 

hazards were the most commonly cited 

GDC violations: 

• Baghouse dust collectors located 

inside a building without proper 

explosion protection systems, such as 

explosion venting or explosion 

suppression systems. 

• Deflagration isolation systems not 

provided to prevent deflagration 

propagation from dust collectors to 

other parts of the plant. 

• Rooms with excessive dust 

accumulations not equipped with 

explosion relief venting to the exterior. 

• Horizontal surfaces not minimized 

to prevent accumulation of dust. 

• Air from dust collectors recycled 

through ductwork back into the work 

area. 

• Legs of bucket elevator enclosures 

not equipped with explosion relief 

venting. 

• Explosion vents on bucket elevator 

enclosures directed into work areas and 

not to a safe, outside location away from 

platforms, means of egress, or other 

potentially occupied areas. 

• Pulverizers not provided with 

explosion venting or deflagration 

suppression systems. 

• Dust collection system ductwork 

not constructed of metal. 

• Open-flame propane heater used for 

comfort heating in an area where 

agricultural products were milled. 

• Equipment (such as grinders and 

shakers) not maintained to minimize the 

leakage of combustible dust into the 

surrounding area. 

• Electric grinders used in dust 

hazard areas without a hot-work permit 

system. 

This list provides some indication of 

the areas in which current standards do 

not cover combustible dust hazards in 

general industry. Only the last two 

items on the list are administrative or 

operational in nature, involving 

maintenance, work practices, policies, 

and procedures. The other ten items 

involve engineering controls, such as 

fixed facilities or protection features 

built into the plant or the processing 

systems. These specific GDC violations 

point to areas that may be appropriate 

to cover in a prospective OSHA 

standard for combustible dust. 

Therefore, OSHA arranged the questions 

it is asking to solicit information 

separately for engineering controls and 

administrative controls. 

The main finding of this NEP analysis 

is the unusually high rate of GDC use in 

combustible dust inspections (24 

percent). Ordinarily, the GDC is used on 

a much more limited basis. For the same 

time period between November 1, 2007 

and February 24, 2009, the 48,969 

Federal OSHA inspections that were 

conducted outside the NEP yielded 

1,736 GDC citations (a rate of 3.5 

percent). Therefore, the GDC was used 

almost seven times as often for 

combustible-dust-related citations than 

for all other citations. This unusually 

high proportion suggests the need for a 

comprehensive OSHA standard. 

I. Regulatory Issues 

The CSB recommended that OSHA 

issue a standard to prevent combustible 

dust fires and explosions. The CSB 

determined that many tragic accidents 

in the past decade could have been 

avoided or minimized if employers had 

complied with applicable national 

consensus standards. OSHA recognizes 

that regulatory action needs to be 

considered as part of its overall 

approach to protecting workers from 

combustible dust hazards. The Agency 

already has made significant efforts to 

address the need for additional 

information and training on combustible 

dust hazards. Among these efforts are 

OSHA’s SHIB, fact sheet, and poster; 

additional information provided on the 

Agency’s Web site; outreach to 

employers; and specialized training for 

compliance officers. In addition, 

through the NEP, OSHA also enhanced 

compliance through strengthened 

enforcement of existing standards and 

citations under the General Duty Clause. 

The existing regulatory regime is 

fragmented and incomplete. The 

Agency’s analysis of the combustible 

dust NEP, above, shows that existing 

OSHA standards do not regulate 

important elements of combustible dust 

hazards. The consensus standards 

related to combustible dust are large, 

complex, numerous, and interrelated, 

which make it difficult for employers to 

comply with them. In addition, where 

these consensus standards have been 

adopted as part of State or local codes, 

available evidence shows that they are 

poorly enforced at the local and State 

levels.18 Therefore, OSHA has 

preliminarily concluded that national 

consensus standards alone, even when 


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19The 2006 edition of NFPA 654 explains in 

Annex section A.3.3.4 the reason that the previous 

size-based definition is no longer used: ‘‘Dusts 

traditionally have been defined as a material 420 

μm or smaller (capable of passing through a U.S. 

No. 40 standard sieve). Combustible particulates 

with an effective diameter of less than 420 μm 

should be deemed to fulfill the criterion of the 

definition. However, flat platelet-shaped particles, 

flakes, or particles of fibers with lengths that are 

large compared to their diameter usually do not 

pass through a 420 μm sieve yet still pose a 

deflagration hazard.’’ 

adopted by State or local governments, 

are insufficient to adequately protect 

workers from these hazards. 

As noted earlier, combustible dust 

hazards are present in a wide range of 

industries. Many different materials, 

both organic and inorganic, can produce 

dust capable of fueling explosions. 

OSHA plans to evaluate affected 

industries to determine the most 

effective way to regulate the 

combustible dust hazards present in 

these industries. It may be appropriate 

for OSHA to treat specific industries 

differently, based at least in part on 

current national consensus standards. 

OSHA must consider many factors in 

developing a comprehensive standard 

for combustible dust. Some of these 

factors relate directly to the 

characteristics of the hazard and the 

range of variables encountered in the 

workplace, which affect the 

combustibility or explosibility of dusts. 

For any dust materials having a specific 

chemical composition, the chance of a 

combustible dust deflagration depends 

on many variables, including: 

• Size of particles 

• Shape of particles 

• Particle surface-area-to-volume ratio 

• Agglomeration (how well particles 

stick together) 

• Impurities present in the material 

• Moisture content of the material 

• The predisbursal dust layer depth 

and location 

• The concentration of particles in a 

dust cloud 

• The spatial distribution of particles 

in a dust cloud (the variation in 

concentration throughout a dust cloud) 

• Oxygen concentration 

• Turbulence in the space or area 

• Characteristics of the ignition 

source (including magnitude and level 

of energy) 

• Location of the ignition source in 

relation to the dust cloud 

Many more variables come into play 

for combustible dust incidents than for 

scenarios involving flammable gases, 

flammable liquids, or larger-sized 

flammable solids. The ignition of vaporair mixtures, especially at rest, is much 

more predictable and reproducible than 

the ignition of combustible dust. 

Consequently, some mitigation methods 

used to address combustible dust 

hazards are not straightforward. 

Prescriptive requirements may not be 

reasonable or effective in such a 

scenario. 

Another factor involves whether and 

how to integrate current and future 

national consensus standards into a 

regulatory scheme. One means of doing 

so may be for OSHA to require 

compliance with various NFPA 

standards, rather than to develop a 

government-unique standard. Some of 

the issues with this approach are 

discussed earlier in section I(G) of this 

notice. Another approach may be to 

reference NFPA standards as acceptable 

compliance options. 

OSHA must also consider the 

interrelationship of a combustible dust 

standard and other OSHA standards that 

address different features of the hazard, 

for example, the hazard communication, 

electrical, grain handling, and other 

standards noted earlier in section I(F) of 

this notice. 

The information currently available 

indicates that the risk of combustible 

dust explosions is considerable and that 

a single, comprehensive standard 

addressing all of these hazards will 

likely provide clarity for employers and 

increased safety for exposed workers. 

OSHA is requesting information and 

comment from the public to evaluate 

what regulatory action it should take to 

further address combustible dust 

hazards within the general industry 

standards. 

II. Request for Data, Information, and 

Comments 

OSHA is providing the following 

questions to facilitate the collection of 

needed information and to facilitate 

public comment on relevant issues. 

OSHA invites commenters to respond to 

any questions for which they have 

specific knowledge, data, or 

information, regardless of their 

involvement with combustible dust, 

e.g., employer, employee, consultant, 

researcher, fire or building code 

enforcement official. Commenters also 

are encouraged to address any aspect of 

combustible dust safety that they 

believe would assist the Agency in 

considering appropriate regulatory 

action on the matter. OSHA requests 

that commenters provide a detailed 

response to questions, including a 

rationale or reasoning for the position 

taken, rather than simply replying ‘‘yes’’ 

or ‘‘no.’’ Also, relevant data that may be 

useful to OSHA’s deliberations, or that 

may assist it in conducting an analysis 

of the impacts of future Agency actions, 

should be submitted. To assess the 

costs, benefits, or feasibility of any 

possible regulatory intervention, the 

Agency needs specific quantitative 

information on various safety measures. 

Therefore, for those recommendations 

involving specific interventions, any 

data in terms of costs and benefits 

associated with the recommendation 

would be helpful. To assist it in 

analyzing comments, OSHA requests 

that commenters reference the question 

number to which they are responding. 

A. Industry Background 

OSHA is interested in determining the 

extent of combustible dust hazards. The 

following questions address the extent 

of the hazards, and provide a context in 

which to understand your answers to 

subsequent questions. 

1. What business are you in? What 

NAICS industry or industries are you 

in? 

2. How many employees do you have? 

How many are production employees? 

How many employees work in areas 

where combustible dusts are present? 

What types of jobs do they perform? 

3. What is the area of your facility? 

What percentage of this area has 

combustible dusts normally present? 

What percentage is subject to possible 

fugitive dust accumulations? 

4. What type or types of combustible 

dusts are present? 

5. Would you expect other firms in 

your industry to have similar 

combustible dusts hazards or are the 

products or processes that generate 

combustible dust in your facility 

unusual for your industry? Why? 

B. Definition of Combustible Dust 

No single, universally accepted 

definition of combustible dust is 

available. Even among standards 

promulgated by the same standardsdeveloping organization, the definitions 

vary significantly. NFPA 654 and 655 

define combustible dust in general 

terms without regard for particle size. 

This approach recognizes that factors 

such as particle shape, agglomeration, 

and other characteristics listed earlier in 

this notice, can affect explosibility. 

Other standards (such as NFPA 61, 484, 

and 664) define combustible dust in 

terms of a minimum particle size. The 

definition in previous editions of NFPA 

654 (which may still be used in some 

areas of the country) was also sizebased.19 Furthermore, OSHA’s grain 

standard uses a size-based definition for 

‘‘fugitive grain dust.’’ 

Many different materials may form 

combustible dust, and several laboratory 

tests are available to characterize them. 

Some of these tests help determine a 

dust’s basic explosibility. Other tests 

yield results on the degree of 


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explosibility; these tests are useful for 

designers of built-in protective features 

or systems. In some cases, the hazards 

of certain dusts are widely known (for 

example, wood dust). In these cases, 

basic testing to determine whether the 

dust is explosive may not be necessary. 

OSHA is interested in data on the extent 

to which different materials are, or may 

form, combustible dust. 

6. Do you determine whether a dust 

is considered a combustible dust by 

reference to data, testing, or some other 

means? Please explain. 

7. What additional tests do you 

conduct to determine the level of 

combustibility of a particular dust? 

8. Do you have any dusts that you 

assume to be combustible, and, thus, 

preclude the need or expense of testing? 

If so, please indicate what type of dust. 

9. Certain definitions, in particular 

those definitions based on particle size 

alone, would not cover some materials 

that can present an explosion hazard in 

certain situations. Accordingly, identify 

any dusts that can explode that would 

not be included in your definition. 

Would your definition include some 

dusts for which explosions are very rare 

or unknown? If so, which ones? 

C. Hazard Recognition 

The CSB report on its combustible 

dust hazard study, as well as the 

investigative reports of specific 

combustible dust incidents discussed 

above, show a pattern of employers and 

workers being either unaware of the 

hazards posed by combustible dust, or 

of the seriousness of the hazards. As a 

result, many workers were not 

adequately protected from these 

hazards. Employers who have 

recognized the hazards were made 

aware of them in a variety of ways. 

OSHA is interested in data on the 

contributions of in-house experts, 

outside consultants, insurance 

representatives, and local or State code 

authorities in improving awareness of 

the hazard. 

10. How did you become aware that 

you had combustible dust present in 

your facility? 

11. Who is responsible for 

determining if a dust is combustible? 

What expertise do they have? 

12. How do you determine if dust is 

combustible? Do you use published 

data, and if so, from what source? Do 

you sample dust for laboratory testing, 

and if so, how often? Do you rely on 

labels or data sheets, including MSDSs, 

developed by others? Do suppliers 

provide you with information related to 

combustible dust? Please explain. 

13. To what extent do the local code 

authorities, insurance representatives, 

or other outside experts determine the 

presence of combustible dust in your 

facility? 

D. Hazard Assessment 

Hazard assessments are systematic 

approaches to evaluating a hazard and 

selecting control or mitigation methods. 

CSB’s report on its combustible dust 

hazard study recommends hazard 

assessments as necessary for the 

mitigation of combustible dust hazards. 

It should be noted that NFPA 654 refers 

to a hazard assessment as a ‘‘Process 

Hazard Analysis.’’ In addition to 

information about how employers 

perform hazard assessments, OSHA is 

also interested in the extent to which 

experts (both external and on-staff) are 

involved in hazard assessments. 

14. Do you conduct assessments of 

combustible dust hazards? How often? 

What assessment method do you use? 

Describe the information you use in 

performing the assessment, as well as 

the information the assessment yields 

and how you use this information. 

15. On whom do you rely for 

technical assistance when performing 

the assessment? In-house staff, local/ 

State authorities, insurance 

representatives, or consultants? 

16. How do you decide when outside 

expertise or assistance is necessary? 

How do you assess the capability of 

outside experts? 

17. Are your employees involved in 

the hazard assessment? Does their 

involvement improve the assessment? 

Does their involvement improve their 

understanding of the hazard and its 

mitigation? 

E. Hazard Communication and Training 

OSHA’s Hazard Communication 

Standard (HCS), 29 CFR 1910.1200, 

comprehensively addresses the 

evaluation of the potential hazards of 

chemicals and the communication of 

hazard information to workers. 

Regarding dusts and other particulates, 

as with all chemicals covered by the 

HCS, a hazard evaluation must be 

conducted, taking into consideration all 

discernible hazards, including 

explosibility. It is incumbent upon 

manufacturers and importers to provide 

information on the potential for, and 

control of, combustible dusts. 

The HCS standard has three main 

components that are essential to the 

effective functioning of a program. First, 

chemical manufacturers and importers 

must review available scientific 

evidence concerning the physical and 

health hazards of the chemicals they 

produce or import to determine if they 

are hazardous. This procedure is called 

a hazard determination or hazard 

evaluation. Second, for every chemical 

found to be hazardous, the chemical 

manufacturer or importer must develop 

Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) 

and container labels to be transmitted to 

downstream users of the chemicals. 

Employers are required to maintain an 

MSDS in the workplace for each 

hazardous chemical that they use. 

Third, all employers must develop a 

written hazard communication program 

and provide information and training to 

employees about the hazardous 

chemicals in their workplace. 

Regarding combustible dusts, 

anticipated operations, uses, and 

downstream material processing that 

generate dusts should be considered 

normal conditions when using a 

substance. These conditions include 

operations and uses such as abrasive 

blasting, cutting, grinding, polishing, or 

crushing materials; conveying, mixing, 

sifting, or screening dry materials; and 

the build-up of dried residue from 

processing wet materials. 

The HCS requires chemical 

manufacturers and importers to develop 

an MSDS for each hazardous chemical 

they produce or import. The following 

MSDS requirements are applicable to 

combustible dust hazards: Chemical and 

common names of the hazardous 

chemical and all ingredients determined 

to present a physical hazard, physical 

and chemical characteristics of the 

hazardous chemical, any generally 

applicable precautions for safe handling 

and use, any generally applicable 

control measures, date of MSDS 

preparation or last revision, and the 

name, address, and telephone number of 

the responsible party preparing the 

MSDS. 

During its combustible dust study, 

CSB reviewed MSDSs of 140 known 

substances that produce combustible 

dusts, and found that information 

regarding potential combustible dust 

hazards was poorly or inadequately 

transmitted to employers and workers; 

according to this report, 41 percent of 

the MSDSs reviewed in the CSB study 

did not warn users about potential 

explosion hazards. Of the remaining 59 

percent of MSDSs sampled, most of the 

information was not stated in a place or 

manner clearly recognized by 

employees, or not specific to hazards 

related to combustible dusts. The CSB 

concluded that many of the MSDSs did 

not identify the potential for 

combustible dust explosions that could 

reasonably have been anticipated during 

downstream material processing. 

Training is also a critical component 

of any program to control combustible 

dust and prevent fires and explosions. 

Employees need to understand the 


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hazards, how to prevent the hazards, 

and what to do in the event of a fire or 

explosion. 

The following questions address 

MSDSs and training related to 

combustible dust hazards. 

18. Do the MSDSs you develop or use 

identify the risks associated with 

combustible dust hazards? Do they list 

mitigation measures? Are you aware of 

MSDSs that should identify combustible 

dust as a hazard and do not? If so, please 

explain. 

19. Do you communicate information 

on the risks of, and controls for, 

combustible dust hazards to your 

employees as a part of your hazard 

communication program? 

20. Do you train your employees on 

the hazards of combustible dust and its 

mitigation? Do you also provide 

refresher training? What is covered in 

each type of training that you provide? 

How many of your employees receive 

each type of training that you provide? 

How many hours of training is provided 

and at what frequency (on hire, 

annually, as needed)? Who provides the 

training? What are their qualifications? 

Do you use standardized training 

materials (such as films, books, and 

computer classes)? 

21. Do you have any means of 

determining if employees understand 

the training? Do you have any means of 

determining if employees are applying 

the training? If so, describe these means. 

F. Consensus, Industry, and Insurance 

Standards 

Under the OSH Act, OSHA must 

consider the provisions of national 

consensus standards, such as those 

promulgated by NFPA, in its rulemaking 

efforts. In addition to this mandate, 

OSHA may consider standards that are 

not developed using the consensusstandards process when determining 

appropriate protective measures for 

employees. The following questions 

refer to these standards. 

22. Do you follow the provisions in 

NFPA standards for combustible dust? If 

so, which standards? Is this use 

voluntary, or based on mandates by 

local authorities, insurance carriers, or 

other entities? Do you have any 

difficulty in using the NFPA standards 

because of conflicting definitions, 

varying requirements, secondary 

references to other standards, or any 

other reason? If so, describe these 

difficulties. 

23. Do you use FM Global Property 

Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7–76, 

Prevention and Mitigation of 

Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires, 

as an aid in determining how to mitigate 

the hazards of combustible dust? Is this 

use voluntary or mandated by your 

insurance carrier? 

24. Are there any other standards or 

guides you use to address the hazards of 

combustible dust? If so, please indicate 

which ones, or describe them. 

G. State and Local Codes 

NFPA standards carry the force of law 

when adopted by a jurisdiction (Federal, 

State, county, or municipal); these 

standards also can be mandated by an 

insurance company or other entity. In 

some cases, even when not mandated, 

employers comply with these standards 

(or portions of them) as a matter of 

policy. Many State fire codes contain 

mandatory references to NFPA’s 

combustible dust-related standards 

either directly, or by the adoption of a 

model fire code. The two model fire 

codes used in this country (i.e., 

International Code Council’s 

International Fire Code and NFPA’s Fire 

Code) both mandate compliance with 

NFPA’s combustible-dust-related 

standards. Despite the existence of 

consensus and insurance standards, and 

State fire codes, major incidents 

continue to occur, as described earlier 

in this notice. 

The CSB’s 2006 report on its 

combustible dust hazard study 

concluded that State and local 

enforcement of NFPA standards was 

inadequate to protect workers. The 

reasons found include limited 

resources, insufficient training, and 

enforcement efforts that concentrate on 

facilities other than industrial facilities. 

OSHA’s National Emphasis Program 

for combustible dust has resulted in 

many employers abating combustible 

dust hazards in their facilities. Some 

employers voluntarily upgraded their 

facilities, procedures, and policies based 

on outreach and guidance material 

made available by a variety of 

organizations (including OSHA) or in 

response to the publicity surrounding 

major dust explosions. These efforts 

increased worker and employer 

awareness of the benefits of complying 

with NFPA standards. Nevertheless, it is 

difficult to project trends for hazards 

that result in infrequent, major incidents 

such as combustible dust explosions. 

Because of the variability of the many 

components required for a significant 

combustible dust explosion, facilities 

can operate for decades without an 

incident, yet suffer a catastrophic event 

after a slight change in conditions. The 

following questions address 

enforcement issues involving 

combustible dust. 

25. Does the fire or building code 

(State, local, or other) in your area 

specifically address the hazards of 

combustible dust? If so, how? 

26. Has your facility been inspected 

by State or local authorities? Is this a 

regular occurrence? If so, at what 

frequency? Were these inspections 

initiated by the authorities, or did you 

take the initiative to contact them? Did 

the inspections include combustible 

dust hazards? Did the inspection 

officials have expertise on combustible 

dust hazards? What action did you take 

as a result of State or local inspections? 

27. Do you know if State or local 

enforcement efforts have been effective 

in controlling combustible dust 

hazards? If you have information on any 

studies of this issue other than the 

CSB’s study (for example, studies 

conducted by insurance organizations, 

code authorities, trade associations, 

consultants, or unions), please provide 

information on them. 

H. Engineering Controls 

Various methods of controlling 

occupational hazards fall into a 

hierarchy in order of their effectiveness. 

A typical hierarchy (beginning with the 

most effective method) is: 

• Elimination. 

• Substitution. 

• Engineering controls. 

• Administrative controls. 

• Personal protective equipment. 

Administrative controls include work 

practices, personnel scheduling, 

operational procedures, and equipment 

maintenance. Engineering controls are 

fixed measures that are built into a 

facility or processing equipment to 

either remove a hazard (i.e., preventing 

it from occurring) or to minimize the 

effects of an incident (after a fire or 

explosion has begun). OSHA believes 

that, for combustible dust hazards, these 

two types of engineering controls may 

belong at different levels in the 

hierarchy. Those engineering controls 

that prevent the occurrence of an 

incident, hereinafter referred to as 

‘‘primary engineering controls,’’ belong 

where they are normally seen in the 

hierarchy; ahead of administrative 

controls. Those engineering controls 

that minimize deaths, injuries, or 

damage after a fire or explosion has 

begun, hereinafter referred to as 

‘‘secondary engineering controls,’’ may 

be more appropriately placed in the 

hierarchy after administrative controls. 

Therefore, OSHA has grouped the 

questions in this section into two 

categories: (a) Primary engineering 

controls, and (b) secondary engineering 

controls. 

Collectively, primary and secondary 

engineering controls often include 

features of building design, processing 


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systems, ventilation systems, protective 

systems, and alarm systems. In NFPA 

654, these provisions are not retroactive; 

that is, facilities, equipment, structures, 

or installations that existed or were 

approved prior to the standard 

becoming effective may remain as is. 

While retrofitting of most equipment is 

not mandated under this standard, it 

allows the authority having jurisdiction 

to require retrofitting of equipment or 

features in situations presenting an 

unacceptable degree of risk. 

If OSHA were to incorporate 

provisions for engineering controls in a 

combustible dust standard, it would 

need to address whether any of these 

controls should be (1) retrofitted for all 

existing facilities immediately, (2) 

mandated after a specified date or 

period (i.e., a delayed effective date), or 

(3) required only for facilities built after 

a specified date or period (i.e., a 

‘‘grandfather’’ clause). The Agency is, 

therefore, asking the following questions 

regarding engineering controls. 

28. Do your facilities or equipment 

have any of the following primary 

engineering controls to mitigate 

combustible dust hazards? If so, 

describe in detail where they are 

installed and how they function to 

mitigate combustible dust hazards. 

a. Features to prevent escape of dust 

into unwanted areas. 

b. Features to prevent the 

accumulation of dust on surfaces. 

c. Oxygen concentration reduction. 

d. Dilution with noncombustible dust. 

e. Foreign material (such as tramp 

metal) separation devices. 

f. Monitoring and alarms for abnormal 

conditions. 

g. Automatic interlocks, shutoffs, or 

overflow systems. 

h. Manual emergency controls. 

i. Lightning protection systems. 

j. Features to mitigate the hazards of 

process heating systems. 

k. Features to mitigate the hazards of 

comfort heating systems. 

l. Features to mitigate the hazards of 

hot surfaces. 

m. Class II electrical equipment and 

wiring. 

n. Other mitigation features or 

engineering controls designed or built 

into your facility or processing 

equipment to prevent the occurrence of 

fires or explosions. 

29. Do your facilities or equipment 

have any of the following secondary 

engineering controls to mitigate 

combustible dust hazards? If so, please 

describe in detail where they are 

installed and how they function to help 

mitigate combustible dust hazards. 

a. Air-material separators (dust 

collection systems) 

b. Segregation with physical barriers. 

c. Separation by distance. 

d. Fire-resistant construction. 

e. Deflagration pressure containment. 

f. Deflagration suppression systems. 

g. Automatic fire suppression 

systems. 

h. Manual fire suppression 

equipment. 

i. Deflagration venting. 

j. Dust retention and flame arresting 

devices. 

k. Relief valves or devices. 

l. Abort gates or dampers. 

m. Isolation devices to preclude 

deflagration propagation. 

n. Evacuation alarm systems. 

o. Fire, heat, smoke, flame, or spark/ 

ember detection systems. 

p. Other mitigation features or 

engineering controls designed or built 

into your facility or processing 

equipment to limit deaths, injuries, or 

damage after a fire or explosion has 

occurred. 

30. Do you feel that secondary 

engineering controls should be in the 

preferred hierarchy of controls after 

administrative controls? Why or why 

not? Please describe incidents where 

secondary engineering controls were 

effective or ineffective. 

31. How much did each fixed feature 

cost to install? Are there any special 

maintenance or operating costs 

associated with these features (such as 

energy costs, waste disposal costs, 

maintenance activities such as clean 

up)? Are there any other routine costs 

associated with these measures? 

32. How did you decide which of 

these features to provide in your 

facility? Were these features installed 

during the initial construction of the 

facility, or retrofitted at a later time? 

I. Administrative Controls 

Typically, an OSHA standard 

includes provisions for administrative 

methods and work practices to control 

or mitigate a hazard. These provisions 

include operational procedures, 

portable equipment, equipment 

maintenance, or personal protective 

equipment. In NFPA 654, these types of 

provisions are retroactive, which means 

they apply to all facilities, both new and 

existing. The following questions 

address the use of administrative and 

work practice controls in your facility. 

33. Does your facility have any 

methods that prevent or limit the escape 

of dust? Please describe these methods. 

34. Do you have a program or policy 

specifically for cleaning surfaces to 

remove accumulated fugitive dust? 

What surfaces does this program cover? 

What is the frequency with which you 

remove dust from surfaces? Do you 

inspect hidden and non-work areas, 

such as ventilation systems, product or 

input storage areas, concealed spaces, 

areas above suspended ceilings, beams, 

and ledges, for fugitive dust 

accumulation? 

35. Do you have criteria or measures 

for what amount or level of fugitive dust 

accumulation is tolerable (such as a 

specific depth over a given area, 

inability to discern underlying color)? 

Please describe these criteria and 

measures. 

36. Do you use cleaning methods that 

preclude dust disbursal? Which 

methods do you use, and under what 

conditions? What methods do you 

prohibit, and why? 

37. Do workers’ assignments, in whole 

or in part, involve cleaning dust from 

surfaces? How many workers perform 

this task, and how many hours per week 

do they spend on dust removal? Can the 

cleaning be done with minimal 

interruption of the facilities’ operations? 

38. Do you implement ignition 

controls for any of the following ignition 

sources for areas where combustible 

dust may be present? If so, indicate 

which sources and provide details. Did 

you consult with your operational 

employees in developing these 

programs or policies? How do you 

assure that your programs or policies are 

followed by all relevant parties? 

a. Control of static electricity. 

b. Use of cartridge-actuated tools. 

c. Control of open flames and sparks 

(including cutting, welding, grinding, 

chipping). 

d. Control of smoking. 

e. Restrictions for hot surfaces. 

f. Use of powered industrial trucks 

(EX or DX designation). 

39. Do you have a program in place 

for the maintenance and testing of fixed 

facilities, equipment, structures, or 

systems? If so, please describe the 

program. 

40. Do you have or use any personal 

protective equipment specific to 

combustible dust hazards? If so, please 

describe the equipment, and the reasons 

for its use. 

41. Are any of your administrative or 

work practice programs or policies 

written? If so, please provide a copy of 

these written documents. 

J. Emergency Response 

Fighting combustible dust fires, or 

fires near combustible dust hazards, 

presents unique hazards. If done 

incorrectly, risk of death and injury may 

rise for both employees and firefighters. 

For example, opening a containment 

system or using straight-stream nozzles 

can cause dispersion of dust, which can 

then become the fuel for an initial or 


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secondary fire or deflagration. The 

following questions address emergencyresponse procedures in your facility. 

42. Do you provide facility 

information to industrial fire brigades or 

other emergency responders for the 

purpose of assisting their efforts to 

respond to fires or explosions? If so, 

please describe the information you 

provide to them. 

43. Do you provide training to 

employees, industrial fire brigades, or 

other emergency responders on the 

hazards of fighting fires in combustible 

dust-producing facilities? If so, respond 

to the following questions, and provide 

details and explanation. Do you train 

these groups on combustible dust 

hazards and their mitigation? Do you 

also provide refresher training? What is 

covered in this training? How many 

people receive this training? How many 

hours of training is provided and at 

what frequency (on hire, annually, as 

needed)? Who provides the training? 

What are their qualifications? Do you 

use standardized training materials 

(such as films, books, and computer 

classes)? Do you have any means of 

determining if attendees understand the 

training? Do you have any means of 

determining if attendees apply the 

training after they receive it? Please 

describe any instances where the 

training provided affected the outcome 

of an incident. 

K. Investigation of Incidents 

Much can be learned from 

combustible dust fires and explosions. 

In some cases, frequent minor incidents 

failed to garner the attention of 

employers, leading to complacency in 

the workplace. In other cases, minor 

incidents shielded the catastrophic 

potential of combustible dust hazards. 

Many of the provisions included in 

the consensus standards addressing 

combustible dust have been refined over 

the years based on loss experience. 

Potentially, even more can be learned by 

studying incidents in which protective 

features effectively prevented death or 

injury, or incidents considered near 

misses. Some possible characterizations 

of near misses are situations under 

which a combustible dust cloud nearly 

ignited, a fire caused no deflagration or 

explosion, or a deflagration or explosion 

resulted in no injury or death. The 

following questions address your 

facility’s responses to combustible dust 

fires, explosions, and near misses. 

44. Have you had any combustibledust-related fires, explosions, or near 

misses? Is so, describe these incidents in 

detail, and indicate what changes were 

implemented to prevent a reoccurrence. 

How do you define or characterize a 

near miss? 

45. Are combustible-dust-related fires, 

explosions, or near misses investigated? 

If so, indicate how thoroughly, who 

performs them, and what professional 

qualifications they have. Do you 

document investigation results? If so, 

please provide examples of such 

documentation. 

46. Does such a fire, explosion, or 

near miss cause a new hazard 

assessment to be conducted? Do these 

incidents cause you to review your 

engineering or administrative controls? 

L. Regulatory Approach 

OSHA is considering a variety of 

regulatory approaches to eliminate or 

mitigate combustible dust hazards. Your 

comments on the following issues will 

help OSHA decide how best to protect 

workers effectively from combustible 

dust hazards. 

47. OSHA recognizes that the risk 

from combustible dust hazards varies 

with the type of material involved and 

the conditions present, the particular 

processes used at a facility, and the 

number of workers exposed. These 

hazards exist in facilities ranging from 

a woodworking shop with one employee 

to a large manufacturing plant with 

thousands of workers. Should OSHA 

scale its requirements to be more or less 

restrictive depending on either the size 

of, or type of dust present in, the 

facility? How should this scaling be 

done (i.e., how should the provisions of 

a standard be applied to different 

facilities)? Are there situations or 

conditions that should limit the 

provisions that apply? If so, please 

explain. 

48. Given the various definitions in 

the consensus standards, how should 

OSHA define combustible dust—by 

minimum particle size, without regard 

for particle size, or should the definition 

vary for the type of dust? Provide the 

technical basis for your response. 

49. Data indicates that mineral dusts 

(such as silicates, sulphates, nitrates, 

carbonates, phosphates, cement, salt, 

gypsum, sand, and limestone) are not 

explosible. Should OSHA exclude 

mineral dusts or any other dust from 

coverage? If so, which dusts? Please 

provide the technical data 

substantiating the lack of explosibility. 

50. Some dusts (such as wood dust) 

are widely understood to be 

combustible, and are explosible under a 

wide range of conditions. Should OSHA 

consider certain dusts explosible under 

any conditions, thereby precluding the 

need for testing? Alternatively, should 

OSHA permit employers to make this 

determination? If so, for which types of 

dust? Please explain your responses. 

51. The NFPA combustible-dustrelated standards have some similar 

provisions, but also have some 

provisions that vary for different types 

of dusts. Other NFPA standards have 

provisions that apply only to specific 

dusts. Should an OSHA standard cover 

different types of dusts separately, 

together, or in some other manner? 

Please explain your response. 

52. The approach suggested by the 

CSB and others contains many of the 

elements in OSHA’s Process Safety 

Management (PSM) Standard. Should 

an OSHA standard take an approach 

similar to the PSM Standard, e.g., by 

requiring the development and 

implementation of a site-specific plan 

tailored to the facility and hazards in 

question? Please provide a rationale for 

your response. 

53. NFPA 654 contains a provision for 

combustible dust hazard assessment, 

which helps refine the actions required 

for adequate safety under the specific 

conditions present in a facility. OSHA 

recognizes that this approach may not 

be necessary for all types and sizes of 

facilities. For example, a small furniture 

shop may be able to safely operate 

under a fixed set of requirements for the 

well-understood hazards of wood dust. 

Should every provision of an OSHA 

combustible dust standard be addressed 

in a hazard assessment, or just 

provisions involving engineering 

controls? Should the hazard assessment 

vary according to the size or type of 

facility? Please explain your response. 

54. It has been suggested that OSHA 

incorporate NFPA standards by 

reference to address combustible dust 

hazards. The Agency is concerned with 

a number of issues regarding this 

approach. These concerns include, but 

are not limited to: 

a. The scope of NFPA standards 

exceeding OSHA’s mandate to protect 

only employees. 

b. The multitude of mandatory 

primary references, secondary 

references, and other subordinate 

references in each NFPA standard that 

could result in an unnecessary burden 

on employers. 

c. The differences between the various 

NFPA combustible-dust-related 

standards. 

d. The frequent updating of standards 

by NFPA, making the OSHA standard 

outdated. 

e. The limited availability of older 

editions of NFPA standards. 

f. The difficulty involved in readily 

updating the consensus standards 

referenced in an OSHA combustible 

dust standard to the current or most 


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recent edition of the consensus 

standards. 

g. The fact that OSHA cannot legally 

update NFPA or other consensus 

standards used in its rules by referring 

to the ‘‘current’’ or ‘‘most recent’’ 

edition of the consensus standards. 

How do you think the Agency should 

make use of NFPA standards in a 

prospective OSHA standard? If the 

NFPA standards are not directly 

incorporated by reference into the 

OSHA standard, would it be appropriate 

for the OSHA standard to reference 

NFPA standards as compliance 

alternatives (e.g., if an employer 

complies with the referenced NFPA 

standard applicable to an operation, 

OSHA would deem the employer to be 

in compliance with the applicable 

provision of the OSHA standard)? 

55. Outreach efforts (both public and 

private), employer awareness, and 

OSHA’s enforcement have increased in 

response to various combustible dust 

incidents over the last decade. As a 

result, many employers continue to 

upgrade their facilities and update their 

operating procedures to prevent and 

control combustible dust hazards. 

Would an OSHA combustible dust 

standard increase employee safety 

beyond the level already attained 

through current Federal efforts, State 

and local requirements, and voluntary 

standards? What approach would most 

effectively increase the safety of 

employees? Please provide a rationale 

for your response. 

56. In 2003, OSHA concluded in its 

regulatory review that no significant 

changes were needed to OSHA’s 

standard on Grain handling facilities at 

that time. Are any revisions needed to 

the portions of this standard that 

address fires and explosions? Are 

revisions to this standard necessary to 

harmonize it with the treatment of other 

dusts? Should the existing provisions of 

the standard that address fires and 

explosions be covered under a 

combustible dust rule? If OSHA retained 

the standard and issued a combustible 

dust standard that applied to other 

facilities and processes, would portions 

of your plant be covered by both 

standards? If so, would this present a 

problem? Please explain your response. 

57. OSHA anticipates that 

administrative and work practice 

controls would be included in a 

combustible dust standard. For instance, 

several OSHA standards already address 

the accumulation of fugitive 

combustible dust, but do not address the 

escape of dust. Some ignition sources 

are covered under current OSHA 

standards (such as electrical and 

powered industrial trucks), but other, 

easily controlled ignition sources, 

would likely be addressed in a 

prospective OSHA combustible dust 

standard (such as open flames, sparks, 

hot surfaces, static electricity, tools, and 

smoking). Engineering controls can be 

more costly and take longer to 

implement than administrative controls. 

Should an OSHA combustible dust 

standard have requirements for 

engineering controls to control fugitive 

combustible dust? Which engineering 

controls should or should not be 

required, and under what 

circumstances? Should OSHA require 

retrofitting of engineering controls, and 

if so, which controls? What time period 

should OSHA allow for retrofitting? 

What are the costs associated with 

retrofitting these controls? 

58. Workers are often in the best 

position to understand how processes 

work and the characteristics of the 

materials involved. Workers also may be 

in the best position to see how 

variations in procedures or equipment 

can affect their safety. Should 

operational employees participate in the 

development of engineering and 

administrative controls? Will this 

participation improve their safety? 

Please explain your response. 

59. Facilities, processes, and materials 

are subject to change over time. These 

changes can affect potential hazards, 

and, thereby, the means used to mitigate 

those hazards. If these changes are not 

examined to determine if corresponding 

changes in protection or prevention are 

necessary, worker safety could be 

decreased. Should change management 

be a component of an OSHA standard? 

Why or why not? 

60. A fire, explosion, or near-miss, 

could indicate that improvements are 

necessary to provide an adequate level 

of employee safety. Improvements may 

depend on the incident’s severity or 

consequences. Should investigations of 

fires or explosions be a part of an OSHA 

combustible dust standard? Should a 

fire or explosion be classified for 

reporting purposes in terms of its 

severity, effect, size, or duration? If so, 

provide details. Should investigations 

and reporting of near-misses be a part of 

an OSHA standard? Please explain your 

response. 

61. Should an OSHA combustible 

dust standard address the hazards of 

fighting fires in combustible-dustproducing facilities? If so, should the 

standard address fire fighting by 

designated employees, an employer’s 

industrial fire brigade, or other 

emergency responders? In your 

response, provide details on hazards 

specific to fighting fires in or near 

combustible dust. 

M. Economic Impacts and Benefits 

As part of the process of developing 

a standard, OSHA must estimate the 

costs, economic impacts, and benefits of 

the standard. OSHA also analyzes the 

benefits of its standards in terms of 

reduced deaths, injuries, and property 

loss. The following questions will 

provide OSHA with needed economic 

impact and benefits information. 

62. What are the potential economic 

impacts associated with the 

promulgation of a standard specific to 

the hazards of combustible dust? 

Describe these impacts in terms of 

benefits from the reduction of incidents 

and injuries; effects on revenue and 

profit; and any other relevant impact 

measure. If you have any examples of 

estimates of the costs of controlling 

combustible dust hazards, please 

provide them. 

63. What changes, if any, in market 

conditions would reasonably be 

expected to result from issuing a 

standard on combustible dust? Describe 

any changes in market structure or 

concentration, and any effects on 

services, that would reasonably be 

expected from issuing such a standard. 

64. Would a comprehensive OSHA 

standard on combustible dust reduce 

fire and explosion hazards? How would 

an OSHA standard address any 

noncompliance problem (such as, 

noncompliance with the housekeeping 

standard or the GDC)? 

N. Impacts on Small Entities 

In developing a standard, OSHA must 

determine whether it will have a 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small businesses. If the 

standard has such impacts, OSHA is 

required to develop a regulatory 

flexibility analysis and assemble a Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act (SBREFA) Panel prior to 

publishing a proposal. Regardless of the 

significance of the impacts, OSHA seeks 

ways of minimizing the burdens on 

small businesses consistent with 

OSHA’s statutory and regulatory 

requirements and objectives. OSHA has 

preliminarily determined that 330,000 

small firms owning 351,000 

establishments and employing 6.5 

million employees are in industries that 

experienced combustible dusts fires or 

explosions in the past. 

65. How many, and what type of 

small firms, or other small entities, have 

combustible dust hazards, and what 

percentage of their industry (NAICS 

code) do these entities comprise? 

66. How, and to what extent, would 

small entities in your industry be 

affected by an OSHA standard 


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regulating combustible dust? Do special 

circumstances exist that make 

controlling combustible dust more 

difficult or more costly for small entities 

than for large entities? Describe these 

circumstances. 

O. Compliance Assistance 

As indicated above, OSHA has 

provided outreach and guidance 

documents, and training, related to 

combustible dust hazards. Through the 

following questions, the Agency seeks 

information on the effectiveness and 

benefits of its outreach, guidance, and 

training efforts, as well as suggestions 

for future products. 

67. Are you familiar with any of the 

following guidance and outreach 

products OSHA has produced? Which 

of these products have you used as an 

aid in determining what to do about 

combustible dust in your facility? 

a. Safety and Health Information 

Bulletin—Combustible Dust in Industry: 

Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of 

Fire and Explosions. 

b. Web site Safety and Health Topics 

Page—Combustible Dust. 

c. Hazard Alert Fact Sheet— 

Combustible Dust Explosions. 

d. Poster—Combustible Dust—Does 

your company or firm process any of 

these products or materials in powdered 

form? 

68. What types of materials, products, 

or outreach would assist you and 

employees in addressing combustible 

dust hazards? Do small businesses have 

special needs with respect to the form 

or content of such materials? Would 

dust-specific or industry-specific 

materials be useful? 

69. Do you prefer paper publications 

such as booklets, fact sheets, and quick 

cards, or electronic tools such as OSHA 

safety and health topics pages and 

eTools? 

III. Public Participation 

Submit comments in response to this 

document by (1) hard copy, (2) fax 

transmission (facsimile), or (3) 

electronically through the Federal 

Rulemaking Portal. Because of securityrelated procedures, a significant delay 

may occur in receiving comments by 

regular mail. Contact the OSHA Docket 

Office at (202) 693–2350 for information 

about security procedures concerning 

the delivery of materials by express 

delivery, hand delivery, and messenger 

service. 

All comments and submissions are 

available for inspection and copying at 

the OSHA Docket Office at the 

Technical Data Center, Room N–2625, 

U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, 

DC 20210. Comments and submissions 

are also available at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. OSHA cautions 

commenters about submitting personal 

information such as Social Security 

numbers and birth dates. Contact the 

OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693–2350 

for information about accessing 

materials in the docket. 

Electronic copies of this Federal 

Register notice, as well as news releases 

and other relevant documents, are 

available at OSHA’s Web page: http:// 

www.osha.gov/index.html. 

IV. Authority and Signature 

This document was prepared under 

the direction of Jordan Barab, Acting 

Assistant Secretary of Labor for 

Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. 

Department of Labor, pursuant to 

sections 4, 6, and 8 of the Occupational 

Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 

653, 655, 657), 29 CFR part 1911, and 

Secretary’s Order 5–2007 (72 FR 31160). 

Jordan Barab, 

Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for 

Occupational Safety and Health. 

[FR Doc. E9–25075 Filed 10–20–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–26–P 


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