NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 08a0788n.06 Filed: De cembe r 29, 2008 No. 07-1604 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT J oseph M. Dorr , Plaintiff-Appellee , v. C i ty o f E c o r s e ; L ar

r y S a l i s b u r y, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Before: KEITH, MERRITT, GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ges

DA MO N J. KEITH, Circuit Judge

. I n th is a c ti o n inv o lv in g a c la im b r o u g h t u n d e r 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 f

or vio la tio n o f P la int if

f- Ap pe lle e Jose phM. Do rr ’s (“ Do rr ” ) sub sta nti ve du e pr oc e ss righ ts , D e f

e n d a nts
- A p p e lla nts Cit y of Ecor se (“ City ”) a

nd L arr y Salisbury (“Salisbury”), w ho serve d

a s th e may or

of Ec or se duri ngthe re le va

nt p e ri od , a

pp e a l the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of De fe nd a nts ’ motion for judgme nt as a matter of l aw, pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P. 50, and Defenda nts’ reque st for

a new trial, pursuan t to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Defe ndants also appe al the district cour t’s awa rd of attorney s’ fe es and c osts, and the awa rd of punitive dama g es ag ainst Salisb ury . For the re asons explained below, we AF F IRM the de c isi on s o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUND A. F actualNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 2

I n th e ir

ve ry fi rs t meet in g, Sa lis bury

inf or me d D or r t hat Sa lis bury

ha d b e e n invo lve d in 1 numerous lawsuits with the previous owner of Dorr’s property , and that he w ould also do ever y thing in his power to kee p Dorr f rom occ upy ing the proper ty
. This matter ce nters ar ound an ong oing dispute betwee n two neig hbors – Dorr and Salisbury – in the c ity of Ec or se , Mic hig an. I n Nov e mbe r 199 6, Do rr purc ha se d h is h ome in E c or se , d ir e c tly next door to Salisbury

. At the t ime of t he purchase, Dorr’ s home was over ninety y ear s old, in need of substantial repa irs and not in compliance with Cit y ’s cu rre nt zoni ng ordinanc e setba ck require ments. I n fac t, the home, like many others in Ecor se built in the ear ly 1900s, had never been in compliance w it h m o d er n zoning ordinanc es. Ac cording ly , Dorr’ s proper ty was c onsidered a lawful non-c onforming structure
. Up on purc ha sin g his ho me and g a ini ng the re qu isi te a pp ro va ls fr om City , Do rr

imm e diate ly beg an makin g repa irs and sig nificant improveme nts to the home and bring ing it up to code . On Marc h 2 0, 19 97 , a ft e r D or r h a d c omp le te d s ub sta

nti a l r e pa ir s to the pr op erty , Ci ty iss ue d h im a

cer tificate of occupa

ncy . Around the same time, Dorr also rec eived a

beautific ation awa

rd (“ Kee p Mic hig an B e a

uti fu l A ward ”) fro m a

loc a l c ivi c a sso c ia tio n in re c og nit ion

of the c on sid e ra

ble improvements he made to the proper ty
. Fr om the time D orr purcha sed the home, a nd throug hout the time he worke d on repa iring the h o me , D o r

r an d Sa li s b u r y h a d a c o n te n ti o u s r e lati o n s h ip. 1 I n late 19 96 , Sa lis bury fi le d a laws uit ag ainst D o rr ( and City) in Way ne County

Circuit Court, alleg ing va rious zoning ordinanc e vio la tio ns . Sa lis bury ’s laws uit wa s e ve ntu a lly

a dju dic a te d a s a

“ no c a us e of a c tio n, ” and

on a pp e a l, the Court of Appe als of Mi chig an deemed Salisbury ’s lawsuit “fr ivolous” and broug ht to harass a ndNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 3 injure Dorr . Acc ording ly , the cour t ordere d Salisbury to pay actua l damag es and ex penses, including attorney s’ fe es, to Dorr

and City

. I n ear ly J une 2003, Dor

r applied to City

for a building permit in order to construct a 16' x 22' extension of his g ara g e. On J une 19, 2003, City issued Dorr a

building per

mit, and he commenc ed construction. Dor

r complete d construction of the extension i n ear ly September. O n September 11, 2003, Dorr r ece ived appr oval from City on his final g ara g e inspec tion. On Novembe r 1, 2003, Salisbury beca me may or of Ec orse. A ro u n d t he same time, Dorr, having rec ently divorce d, decide d to sell his house in Ecorse in orde r to move closer to his children. On April 11, 2004, Dorr entere d into an ag ree ment to sell his home for $165,000. Pursuant to City ’s ordinanc es, in order

to sell the home, Dorr

was re quired to obtain a new c ertificate of oc cupanc y and underg o standard building code inspections. On J une 8, 2004, Dorr rec eived Ci ty ’s approval for a

c e rt if ic a te of oc c up ancy

fo r t he plumbi ngand

e le c tr ic a l r e qu ir e me nts . O n Jun e 15 , 2 00 4, City i n f o r m e d D o r r t h a th e n e e d e d o n l y a

f u r n a c e c e rt i f

i c a t i o nt o r e c e i v e h i s f

i n a l c e rt i f i c a t e o f o c c u p a n c y. Howeve r, over the next couple of months, Cit y ’s building de partment a sked Dorr to make additional minor repa irs to his home befor e City would issue the final cer tificate of occupa

ncy . On Aug ust 31, 2004, Dorr’ s proper

ty passed the f

inal inspection requir ed for the ce rtificate of occ upancy . D e s p i t e p a s s i n g a l l n e c e s s ar y i n s p e c t i o n s , D o r

r w a s d e n i e d

a c e rt i f i c a t e o f o c c u p a n c y. Be tween June 2004 and June 2 005, Dorr r epeatedly petitioned City ’s building de partment for the

cer tificate of occupa ncy , but was denie d at all levels. F i n al l y , Do rr petitioned the Cit y ’s Z oning Boa rd of Appe als, the final de cision maker on zoning issues. The zon i n g board de nied Dorr a

cer tificate of occupa ncy .No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 4

City

and Salisbury

moved for dir ecte d verdic t, pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 50(a) , at the end 2 of Dorr ’s openingstatement, and at the close of D orr’ s case -in-chie f. B oth motions wer e denie d. Ultimately , Dorr obta ined a c ourt order from the State of

Michig an Circuit C ourt of Way ne C o u n t y, s i g n e d

N o v e mb e r

2 9 , 2 0 0 6 , c o mp e l l i n g C i t y t o i s s u e D o r r h i s c e rt i f i c a t e o f o c c u p a n c y. Ho we ve r, wh e n D or

r p re se nte d th e c ourt

or de r t o Ci ty ’s bu ild ingde pa rtme nt, City

sti ll ref us e d to iss ue a c e rt if

ic a te of oc c up anc y . Do rr c on tin ue d to c a ll a

nd wr ite City

re g ard ingthe iss ua

nc e of his

certific a te o f

o c c u p an c y , to n o a v a il

. T h e in a b il it y to o b ta in a c e rti f ic a te o f o c c u p an c y p rec luded Dorr f rom selling his home. B. Pr ocedural O nA u g u s t9 , 2 0 0 5 , D o r r s u e d C i t y an d S a l i s b u r y, i nh i s o f

f i c i a l an d i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y,

a lle g ingthe y

vio la te d D or

r’ s subs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss ri g hts by un lawf ull y de nyinghim

a c e rt if ic a te of oc c up anc y , wh ic h p re ve nte d h im f ro m se lli nghis pr op e rt

y . A ft e r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d Ci ty and Salisbury ’s motion for summary judgme nt as unt imely , the m atter went to trial. On January 17, 20 07 , a jur y fo un d th a t bo th C ity and S ali sb ury vio la te d D or

r’ s su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss r ig hts , in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1 983, by denying D orr his ce rtificate of occ upancy , and aw arde d Dorr compensatory

damag es in the amount of $22,000 ( $11,000 eac h ag ainst both C i ty and Salisbury

), and punitive damag es in the amount of $55,000 a g ainst Salisbury

. After the verdic t w as ente red, City and Salisbury

timely filed a r enew ed motion for judg ment

as a mat ter of

law, purs ua

nt t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 0( b) and , a lte rn a tiv e ly , mo ve d f or a ne w tri a l, 2 pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 59. Additionally , Dorr filed a motion for attorney s’ fee s and costs. On May 3, 2007, the district c ourt issued an order denying City and Salisbury ’s motion for judgme nt asNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 5 a matter of law a nd the re quest for a new trial. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the court a war ded Do rr a tto rn e y s’ fe e s in

the a mou nt o f $ 27 ,9 75 .0 0 a

nd c os ts i n th e a mou

nt of $1 ,9 83 .0 0, to b e pa id jointly and seve rally

by City and Salisbury

. C i t y an d Salisbury

filed a timely

appea l of the district court’ s denial of their post-trial motions, as well as the cour t’s awa rd of attorn ey s ’ fe es and costs. On appea l, Cit y and Salisbury argue that the district cour t co m m i tted four r ever sible err ors. Fir st, Cit y and Salisbury

argue the district court er

red by denying the m judgment a s a matter of law on Dorr’ s § 1983 claim. Second, Salisbury argues t he dis trict court erre d by denying him judgme nt as a matter of law on the awa

rd of punitive d am age s. Third, City and Salisbury

argue they

are entitled to a new tr ial beca use the district court er

red by making improper evidentiary ruling s. Finally , City and Salisbury

argue that the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in i ts a

wa rd of a tto rn e y s’ fe e s a

nd c os ts t o D or

r. We a dd

re ss e a c h o f t

he se arguments in turn. II. AN AL YSI S A . J ud g m e ntA s A M a t t e r o f L a w We conduct a de novo re vie w o f t he dist ri ct cou rt ’s de nia l of a mot ion fo r j ud g me nt a s a matter of la

w, and of a re newe d motion for judg ment as a matter of law

. W hite v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 364 F.3d 789, 794 ( 6th Cir. 2004); Po uil lon v . City of O wos so , 206 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2000). I n deter

m i n i n g whether either motion should have be en g rante d, we r eview the entire r ecor d and “must draw all rea sonable inferenc es i n favor of t he nonmovi ng party , and [] may not make credibility deter minations or weigh the evidenc e.” Ree ves v . Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The mot ion may be g rante d only

wher e a pa

rty has bee n fully

hear dNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 6 on an is sue during a jury

trial, there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct for the jury , and ther e is no leg ally sufficie nt evidentiary

basis for a rea sonable jury to f ind f or the preva iling par

ty with respec t to t hat is su e . F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 0 ( a ); Gray v . To sh iba Am . Co ns um e r P ro ds

. , 26 3 F .3 d 59 5, 59 8 ( 6th Cir. 2001). 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Whil e not a source of substantive rig hts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a rem ed y fo r t he deprivat i o n o r unlawful violation “of a ny rig hts, privilege s, or immuniti es sec ured by the Con sti tut ion

and la ws .” 42 U. S.C. §1 98 3. To pr ov e a c la im und e r § 19 83 , a

pla int if f m us t e sta bli sh he wa s deprived of

a rig ht secure d by

the United States Constitut ion or laws of the United States, and that he wa s subjected to or c aused to be subjected to this deprivation by a per son acting under c olor of state law. 42 U. S.C. §1 98 3; Ellison v. Garbarino , 4 8 F. 3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1995). A

mun ic ipa lity , suc h as Ec or se , sue d und e r § 1983 wi ll be lia ble on ly if the inj ur y oc c ur s p ur su a nt t o a municipal c u s t o m o r policy

. Mo ne ll v . D e p’ t of So c . S e rv s. , 4 36 U. S. 6 58 , 6 94 (1 97 8) ; se e als o Garner v. Me mp h is Police Dep’ t , 8 F .3 d 3 58 , 3 64 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) (“ [T]o s a tis fy the Mo ne ll require ments a plaintiff must ‘identify the policy , connec t the policy to the city

itself and show that t h e p ar t i cu l ar

i n j u ry wa s i n cu rr ed b ec au s e o f t h e e x ec u t i o no f t h at p o l i cy . ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Coo ga n v . Ci ty of W ixom , 820 F.2d 170, 176 ( 6th Cir. 1987))

. Her e, the jury

found both City

and Sali s b u ry liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating Dorr’ s substantive due proce ss r ights by denying Dorr his c ertificate of occupa n cy . C i t y

and S a l i s b u r y s u b s e qu e n t l y

r e n e w e d t h e i r m o t i o nf o r j u d g m e n ta s a

m a t t e r o f l aw , an d a l t e r n a t i v e l y,No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 7

Despite their c ontention otherwise, it is questionable whe ther this issue was prope rly raised 3 by Def endants prior to submissi on to the jury or in their re newe d motion for judge ment as a matter of law, in a ccor dance with F ed. R. Civ. P. 50. Se e Fo rd v . Co un ty of G ra nd Tra v e rse , 535 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2008) (a

post-trial motion for judg ment as a matter of law “is not a vailable at any one’s reque st on an issue not br oug ht be fore the court prior to submission of the case to the jury ”) ( quoting Am . &Fo re ign In s. Co. v . B olt , 106 F.3d 155,160 ( 6th Cir. 1997)). The rec ord indicates the parties ag ree d that one of the issues to be liti gat ed wa s whether Dorr ha d a prote cted pr operty rig ht “trig g ere d by

the i ssuance of a building permit.” In addition, at the close of

Dorr’ s case -in-chie f, def

ense c ounsel moved for

direc ted ver dict , a

r g u ing “ there has bee n no showing that there is a custom, a policy , any sort of pattern of an eff

ort, if y ou will, to deny

Mr. Dorr’ s [s ic], what he says to be a right, a [certificate of occupanc y] .” I n Kusens v. Pascal Co. , 448 F.3d 349 ( 6th Cir. 2006), we re cog nized that courts have ta ken a libera l v i ew o f wh at consti tutes a pre -ver dict motion sufficient to support a post-ver dict motion wher e the g rounds in the pre -ver dict moti o n ar e n o t stated with “tec hnical pre cision,” but the purposes of Rule 50(b) – “i.e., providing notice to the court a nd opposing c ounsel of any defic iencies in the opposing pa

rty ’s ca se prior to sendingit to the jury ” ar e satisfied. Id. at 361. We find it a close ca ll as to whether the above ref ere nces satisfy

the purposes of

Rule 50 such that De fe n d ants proper ly prese rved this issue for r eview on a ppeal. Ne verthe less, revie wing the issue, and viewingthe ev i d en ce i n fa vor of Plaintiff, a r easona ble jury could find that Dorr

had a protec ted prope rty

rig ht. moved for a new trial. City and Salisbury asser t on appea l that the district c ourt err ed in its finding beca use there was no leg al ly

sufficie nt evidentiary

basis for the jur

y to find (1) that Dor

r had a pr ote c ta ble pro perty

int e re st i n th e c e rt if

ic a te of oc c up anc y ; (2 ) a

pr a c tic e or

c us tom by City 3 sufficie nt to impos e liability on C i t y for de priving Dorr of

a prote cted r ight; or ( 3) that Salisbury

a c te d a rb itr a ri ly a nd c a pr ic iou sly , und e r c olo r o f s ta te law, to d e pr ive Do rr of a pr ote c te d r ig ht. Havingthe bene fit of ora l argument, and havingcar efully conducte d a de novo revie w of the re cord, we disag ree . I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r D or r e sta bli sh e d a ve ste d p ro pe rt

y int e re st, we mus t lo ok

to substantive state zoning law s. Se e Sil v e r v . F ra nk lin Twp. Bd

. o f Zo nin g A

pp e als , 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir. 1992) . I n Silver , th is C ourt su mma ri zed the c ri te ri a

up on wh ic h a pe rs on ob ta ins aNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 8 pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y ri g ht u nd e r t he F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt. Ap ply ingan “ e nti tle me nt t e st, ” we he ld that a prote ctable pr operty rig ht suppor

ting a substantive due proce ss c laim e x ists only if a plaintiff h as a “‘ l eg itimate claim of e nti tle me nt’ or a ‘j us tif ia ble e xp e c tati o n ’ in

th e a p p r o v a l o f

h is p la n .” Silver, 9 6 6 F. 2 d

at 1 0 3 6 (q u o t i n g Bd

. of Re ge nts v . R oth , 4 08 U. S. 5 64 , 5 77 (1 97 2) ); se e als o T r i o mphe Investors v. City of Northwood , 49 F.3d 198, 202- 03 (6th Cir. 1995). U n d e r M ic higa n law, it is well established that possession of a valid building per

mit coupled with substantial reliance there on, including a ctual construc tion, will bestow vested prope rt y ri ghts to a non-conf orming structure
. See D ingeman Adv er. v. Algoma Twp. , 223 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Mi ch

. 1974) ; s e e als o Schende n v. Addison Twp. , 2004 WL 1908231, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug . 26, 2004). I n the i nstant matter, prior to Salisbury ’s m ay oral term, not only had Dorr been g rante d two

se pa rate bu ild ingpe rm its fr om C ity – on e for the or ig ina l c on str uc tio n, and

ano the r f or the sma ll addition to his home – but, in relianc e on the C ity -issued bui lding permits, he had also c ompleted

renovations to the orig inal structure , as well as construc tion of the addition and passe d all rele vant building code inspecti o ns. Moreove r, despite City and Salisbury ’s asser

tion that Dorr’s nonconfor ming use exceede d what City sanctioned, nothing i n the record or at ora l argument indicates City ever attempted to re voke t he building pe rmits or the ea rlier c ertifica

te of oc cupanc y

it issued to Dorr. Additionally , Dorr ha d a sig ned cour t o rd er from the Way

ne County

Circuit Court

mand a tin g tha

t Cit y is su e Dor r a c e rt if

ic a te of oc c up anc y . T his e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o support the jury ’s deter

mination that Dorr established vested rig hts in the non-c onforming structure , and ac cording ly , a prote cted pr operty interest in the ce rtificate of occ upancy .No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 9 As noted above , even a fter a protec ted prope rty

interest has been established, for City to be liable under § 1983, Dorr must also show that (1) City and Salisbury

acte d pursuant to a c ustom or policy of the municipa l i t y an d (2) the injury or har m to Dorr wa s incurre d as a dire ct re sult of the execution of that policy

. Garner , 8 F .3 d at 36 4. Un de r § 1983 , a pr a c tic e or

c us tom inv olv e s a widespre ad cour se of c onduct by municipal officia ls that ha s become a traditional way of ca rry ing out policy

. Mo ne ll , 436 U.S. at 690-91. Dorr pr esente d evidenc e that City approve d all of hi s permits, and the pa rties stipulated that Dorr’ s home passed its final inspec tion. Dorr also prese nted evidence from former City inspectors that on c e Sa lis bury

wa s e le c te d ma

y or of Ec or se in N ov e mbe r 2 00 3, he c ha ng e d th e wa

y City

e nf or c e d it s zon ingc od e . D or r p re se nte d e vid e nc e that Sa lis bury hir e d a ne w b uil din g of

fi cia l to

e nf or c e the c od e in th e mann e r S a lis bury saw f it, pa rt ic ula rl y in r e g ard

to p ro pe rt

y se tba c ks

. Salisbury himself testified that he wa nted “strict e nforc eme nt. ” F in a ll y , D orr pr esente d evidenc e that he wa s denied his ce rtificate of o cc u p an cy beca use his proper

ty did not conform to setbac k require ments, even thoug h City had appr oved his building plans, and that Carl B rown, Salisbury ’s

ne w, ha nd -p ic ke d buil din g of

fi c ia l, wa s the pe rs on wh o mad e the de te rm inatio n th a t D or r’ s p ro pe rt

y was now unla

wfully non-conf orming

. W e fi nd th e evide nc e Do rr pr e se nte d s uf

fi c ie nt f or the jur y to h a ve c on c lud e d th a t a c ity policy of strict enf

orce ment beca

me the tra ditio n al wa y o f enforcingCity ’s zoning code once Salisbury beca me may or, in contra st to City ’s prior decisions on zoning issues. Thus, we disag ree with Defe ndants’ asse rtion that Dorr’ s evidenc e wa s insufficient to hold City liable.No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 10 City and Sa lis bury a lso ur g e us to fi nd that th e re wa s n o le g a lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nti ary

ba sis fo r t he jur y to h a ve fo und th at S ali sb ury wa s a c tin g un de r c olo r o f s ta te law. I n s up po rt of thi s

asser tion, Ci ty and Salisbury

contend that Salisbury

had nothing to do with the de cision to g rant or deny Dorr’ s cer

tificate of occupa ncy , and had no input into whether building pe rmits were issued. City a nd Sa lis bury fu rt he r n ote that Sa lis bury ’s a c tio ns inv olv ing laws uit s pr ior to 20 03 we re “ pure ly private,” and not ac ts under color of state law

. I n order for Salisbury

to be held liable unde r § 1983, he “ must [ have] possess[ed] power by virtue of s t at e l aw , then misuse[d] that power in a way that violates fede ral c onstitut ional rig hts.” Ch r is ti a n v . B elche r , 8 8 8 F.2d 410, 414 ( 6th Cir. 1989). I t is not controverted that Salisbury was may or at the time Dor

r soug ht to o b t ai n t he ce rtificate of occ upancy neede d to sell his home. As may or, Salisbury

was indee d clothed with the state’ s authority

. See Screws v. Un i t ed S t a tes , 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). Salisbury ’s own trial testimony indicated that he was dire ctly involved with the ci t y ’s af fa i rs o n z o n i n g i s s u es . M o re o v er , Do rr p re s en t ed ev i d en ce t h at S al i s b u ry d ec i d edt o ch an ge the City policy reg ardi n g l aw ful non-conf orming structure s and strictly enfor ce City ’s zoning ordinanc es and building codes. A dditionally , the j u ry was pre sented with evide nce indicating the may or’s off

ice wa s involved with the gra nt or denial of z oning de cisions. Finally , Dorr pr esente d evidenc e that Salisbury

reta liated ag ainst inspectors who g rante d permits to Dorr, a nd that Salisbury knew that the r easons use d by City ’s building de partment to withhold Dorr’ s cer tificate of occupa

ncy

we re the same on e s d e eme d frivo lou s and int e nd e d to ha

ra ss D or r i n Sa lis bury ’s e arl ie r l a ws uit ag ainst Dorr.No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 11

A s n o t e d

e ar l i e r , w h e nd e c i d i n g w h e th e r t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rte r

r e d i nd e n y i n g D e f

e nd a nts ’ 4 motion for judgme nt as a matter of law, we consider a ll evidence in the light most favor able to the Plaintiff and must not make cre dibilit y deter minations. Ree ves , 5 30 U. S. at 15 0; W hit e , 364 F.3d at 794-95. Salisbury had the oppor

tunity to present e vidence to counter Dorr’s claims that he play ed a critica l role in City ’s re fusal to pr ovide Dorr a cer tificate of occupa ncy . I ndeed, Salisbury

testified that he had nothing to do with the decision to deny Dorr a cer tificate of occupa ncy , and he de nied having any

input in whether c ertifica tes of occ upancy

wer e g rante d or denie d, in ge nera l. The jury was fr ee to believe S alisbury ’s t estimony in whole or in part, but chose not to credit Salisbury

. The 4 evidenc e pre sented is leg ally sufficie nt to establish that Salis bury acte d under c olor of state la w. Finally , Dorr presente d sufficie nt evidenc e of damag es resulting fr om Cit y and Salisbury ’s actions. Afte r he c ompleted the improveme nts on his property , Dorr’ s home was va lued at $165,000. He su bs e qu e ntl y

e nte re d in to a

c on tr a c t to se ll the ho us e fo r $ 16 5, 00 0 b ut w a s le g a lly un a ble to c los e

on the sa le a s a re su lt o f C ity ’s re fu sa l to g ra nt t he c e rt if ic a te of oc c up anc y . Re su lta

ntl y , D or r c ou ld not close on a $120,000 pur chase ag ree ment for a nother home c loser to his chi l d re n . E ac h of the City officia ls who testified at trial, including Salisbury , indicated that they wer e aw are that Dorr

wo uld no t be a ble to s e ll hi s ho us e wi tho ut a c e rt if ic a te of oc c up anc y . T hu s, it w a s c le a rl y fore seea ble t hat Dorr would suffe r damag es as a result of C ity and S alisbury ’s refusal t o issue the

cer tificate of occupa ncy . Def endants off

ere d no evidenc e to prove otherwise. A ccor dingly , the evidenc e pre sented is leg ally sufficie nt to establish Dorr’s damag es. We there fore conclude that the district court did not err in denying City

and Salisbury ’s mot ion fo r j ud g me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw w ithre g ard to t he § 1 98 3 c la im.No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 12 2. P uni tive Dam ages After it found City

and Salisbury

liable to Dorr un d er the § 1983 claims, the jury awa rded Do rr punit ive dama g e s a g a ins t Sa lis bury . Sa lis bury c onte ste d th e awa

rd of punit ive dama g e s in his motion for judgme nt as a matter of la w, ar g uing that the jury

lacke d any

leg ally sufficie nt evidence to find that Salisbury

acte d with actual malice . The district cour t denied Salisbury ’s motion, which Sa lis bury c ha lle ng e s o n a

pp e a l. The standa

rd of r eview fo r an aw ard of punitive damag es is rea sonablene ss. W alker v

. Nor ris , 917 F. 2 d 1 4 4 9 , 1 4 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990) (c i t i n g Smith v. W ade , 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983)). Puniti ve dama g es may

be aw arde d in a § 1983 ac tion “when the de fenda nt’s conduct is shown to be motivated by

evil motive or intent, or when it involves re ckless or cal l o u s indiffer ence to the fede rally protec ted rig hts of others.” Hi ll v. Ma rsh all , 962 F.2d 1209, 1217 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sm ith , 461 U.S. at 56). Review of the trial rec ord establishes that there was suff icient evidenc e to pre sent a que stion of fa ct for the jury

on the issue of punitive dama g es. Dorr prese nted suffic ient evidenc e re g arding Salisbury ’s actions as m ay or i n 2003 and 2004 from which the j ury could i nfer malicious intent. For example, Dorr pr esente d evidenc e that Salisbury terminated inspe ct o rs wh o approve d permits for Do rr , and e nd e d City ’s c on tr a c t wi th fi rm s th a t r e sis te d Sa lis bury ’s ne w p oli c y of str ic t e nf or c e me nt. I n a dd iti on , Sa lis bury

te sti fi e d h e wa s w e ll a

wa re that Cit y ’s bu ild ingde pa

rtme nt w a s us ingthe same g rounds to deny

Dorr a cer tificate of occupa ncy that the M i ch i gan Court of Appe als held we re fr ivo lou s and

br ou g ht t o “ injure or hara ss” Do rr . A c c or din g ly , th e re wa s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e toNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 13 support a finding by the j ury of m alice or, at l east “rec kless or callous indiffer ence ” on the part of Salisbury . Moreove r, as punitive dama g es ar e aw arde d to punish and deter, se e Sm ith , 461 U.S. at 54, it cannot be sa id that the jury ’s assessment of the appr opriate a mount to deter Salisbury

was not eminently rea sonable. F or these re as o n s , we find that the district court did not err in de ny ing Sa lis bury jud g me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw w ithre g ard to p un iti ve dama g e s. B. Motion f

or a Ne w T rial This Court reviews a

district court’s de nial of a ne w trial for an abuse of discre tion. The motion should be denied if the verdic t is one which could rea sonably have been rea ched. W alker v

. Ba in , 2 57 F .3 d 660 , 670 (6 th Cir . 200 1) . T he ve rd ic t sh ou ld n ot b e c on sid e re d unr e a so na ble sim ply beca use diffe rent infe renc es and c onclusions could have be en dra wn. Id. City and Salisbury alleg e that a series of evidentiar y err ors require d the district c ourt to gr ant them a new

trial. Specifica lly , City and Salisbury argue the district cour

t erre d in allowing te stimony reg ardingprior unre lated lawsuits broug ht by Salisbury to be introduce d into evidence beca use the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e wa s su bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

its pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t, r e su lti ngin substantial injust ice to De fenda nts. We reviewevidentiar

y ruling s on the rele vance and mater ialit y o f ev i d ence for a buse of discretion. Geisler v. F

olsom , 7 3 5 F

. 2 d 9 9 1 , 9 9 7 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 8 4 )

. T h e c o u rt is g r an ted “br oad discretion to deter

mine matters of r eleva

nce” and will only

revie w for a

n “abuse of discre tion that aff ecte d the s ubstantial rig hts of a par ty .” W ill iam s v . Na sh v ill e Ne two rk, 13 2 F .3 d 11 23 , 1 12 9 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 7) (c iti ngF e d. R. E vid . 4 03 ))

. An a bu se of dis c re tio n that do e s no t a ff e c t su bs tanti a l r ig htsNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 14 is h arm le ss e rr or

and is t o be dis re g ard e d. F e d. R. C iv. P. 6 1; se e als o Rye v. Black & Dec ker M

fg. Co., 889 F.2 d 100, 103 (6th Cir.1989). Abuse of discretion is define d as “a definite a

nd firm conviction” that the tr ial court e rre d. Balani v

. Immigration & Naturali zation Serv. , 669 F.2d 1157, 1160 (6th Cir. 1982). No such c onviction can be found her e. F irst, in the parties’ Jo i n t Fi n al P retrial Order , Def endants stipulated to the fac t that “Salisbury broug ht a frivolous lawsuit [ag ainst Dorr] in 1996 perta ining to ce rtain zoning issues,” a nd that “Mayor S alisbury was ordere d to pay costs for br inging his lawsuit ag ainst Do rr . ” Second, the evidenc e conc erningthe prior law suits was solicited on

e xami na tio n o f S a lis bury

by Do rr ’s c ouns e l, w ith ou t ob je c tio n, in t

he fo llo wi nge xch ang e : Q: [T] he Court of Appe als not only told y ou that y our ca se wa s frivolous, they told you it wa s broug ht to hara ss a nd i n j ury [sic ] Mr . D oo r [s ic ], di dn ’t it? A: Ibelieve so.

F ina lly , Sali sb ur

y te sti fi e d th a t, a s ma

y or , h e re pla c e d th e pr e vio us bu ild ingins pe c tor and pe rs on a lly hired the ne w building inspec tor sent to Dorr’ s proper ty , and that Cit y ’s b u i l d i ng depar tment

su bs e qu e ntl y

us e d th e same g ro un ds up on wh ic h Sa lis bury ba se d his fr ivo lou s le g a l a c tio n a g a ins t Dorr a s justification for deny ing D orr’ s cer

tificate of occupa ncy . Th e dis tr ic t court fo un d the e vid e nc e of the pr ior laws uit s pla inl y re le va nt to Sal isb ur

y ’s state of mind reg ardingDorr, a

nd his motive while acting as may or. Salisbury had the oppor

tunity on the stand to expl ain t h e p ri o r l awsuit , and g ener ally denied that he had an imprope r motive. The jury

we ig h e d h is r e s p o n s e an d b a s e d o n it s d e c is io n , f o u n d th a t h e la c k e d c r e d ib il it y . I n li g h t of

theNo. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 15

rec ord and the rele vant s tandar d of review, C ity and Salisbury ’s ar g ument that the district court e rre d in allowing the evidenc e of the parties’ prior lawsuits is not supported. There fore , we f ind that the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a

bu se its dis c re tio n w he n it a llo we d th is i nf

or ma tio n to be a dmi tte d in to evidenc e. C. Att orneys’ F ees and Costs De fe nd ants a lso a

pp e a l th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f $ 27 ,9 75 in atto rn e y s’ fe e s, and $1 ,9 83 in

c os ts t o D or

r. I n a § 19 83 a c tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt may , in its dis c re tio n, a llo w the pr e va ili ngpa rt y

rea sonable attorney s’ fe es and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) . We reviewan aw ard of attorney s’ fe es under the same standa

rd as e videntiary deter

minations a

nd will therefor e “usua lly sustain a district court’s a war d and division of attorney s’ fe es abse nt a n abuse of discretion.” De an v . H oli da yIn ns , Inc. , 860 F.2d 670, 672 ( 6th Cir. 1988).

“ [T]he dis tr ic t c ourt

has di scr eti on

in d e te rm ini ngthe a mou nt o f a fe e awa rd [, w hic h] is

a pp ro pr ia te in v ie w o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s su

pe ri or un de rs tand ing of the lit ig a tio n and the de sir a bil ity of avoiding fre quent appellate revie w of what essentially are fac tual matters.” He nle yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 46 1 U .S. 42 4, 43 7 (19 83 ). He re , the dis tr ic t court a c tua lly de nie d Dor r’ s r e qu e st o f $ 58 ,9 87 .5 0 in

a tto rn e y s’ fe e s, a g re e ingwi th D e fe nd ants that th e re qu e ste d amou nt w a s e xce ssi ve . T he c ourt a lso reje cted Dor

r’s c ontention that his couns el’s hourly rate of $275 wa s rea sonable. The court

art ic ulate d v a lid re a so ns , inc lud ing pr e va ili ng mark e t ra te and the qu a lity of re pr e se ntatio n, fo r i ts deter mination that “a rate of $150.00 pe r hour is more a ppropriate than that re quested by [Dorr].”No. 07-1604

J os e ph M. Do rr v . Ci ty

of E c or se ; L arry Sa lis bu ry Pag e 16 Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd

no ind ic atio n th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

awa rd inga tto rn e y s’ f e e s an d c o s t s t o D o r

r i nt h e a m o u n t s o f

$ 2 7 , 9 7 5 an d

$ 1 , 9 8 3 , r e s p e c t i v e l y. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision as to all issues.