# Official Journal C 455/2014

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 455 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5718 December 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 455

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5718 December 2014

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 455/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7405 — Yanfeng/JCI Interiors Business) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 455/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7405 — Yanfeng/JCI Interiors Business) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 455/02 | Euro exchange rates | 2 |
| 2014/C 455/03 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 7 July 2014 regarding a draft decision relating to Case M.7184 — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Art. 14(2) proc.) — Rapporteur: Croatia | 3 |
| 2014/C 455/04 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Article 14(2) proc.) (M.7184) | 4 |
| 2014/C 455/05 | Summary of Commission Decision of 23 July 2014 imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration in breach of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Case M.7184 — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Article 14(2) proc.)) (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | Court of Auditors |
| 2014/C 455/06 | Special Report No 21/2014 EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor value for money | 8 |
| | NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA |
| | EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| 2014/C 455/07 | Public holidays in 2015: EEA/EFTA States and EEA institutions | 9 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 455/02

Euro exchange rates

2

2014/C 455/03

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 7 July 2014 regarding a draft decision relating to Case M.7184 — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Art. 14(2) proc.) — Rapporteur: Croatia

3

2014/C 455/04

Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Article 14(2) proc.) (M.7184)

4

2014/C 455/05

Summary of Commission Decision of 23 July 2014 imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration in breach of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Case M.7184 — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Article 14(2) proc.)) (
  1
  )

1

5

Court of Auditors

2014/C 455/06

Special Report No 21/2014 EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor value for money

8

NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA

EFTA Surveillance Authority

2014/C 455/07

Public holidays in 2015: EEA/EFTA States and EEA institutions

9

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 455/08 | Call for proposals EACEA/30/2014 — Erasmus+ Programme — Key Action 3: Support for policy reform — Initiatives for policy innovation — Policy experimentation in school education sector | 10 |
| | COURT PROCEEDINGS |
| | EFTA Court |
| 2014/C 455/09 | Action brought on 17 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against Iceland (Case E-20/14) | 14 |
| 2014/C 455/10 | Action brought on 22 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against Iceland (Case E-21/14) | 15 |

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

2014/C 455/08

Call for proposals EACEA/30/2014 — Erasmus+ Programme — Key Action 3: Support for policy reform — Initiatives for policy innovation — Policy experimentation in school education sector

10

COURT PROCEEDINGS

EFTA Court

2014/C 455/09

Action brought on 17 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against Iceland (Case E-20/14)

14

2014/C 455/10

Action brought on 22 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against Iceland (Case E-21/14)

15

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7405 — Yanfeng/JCI Interiors Business)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 455/01)

On 11 December 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in the English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7405. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7405. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/2

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Euro exchange rates (1)

17 December 2014

(2014/C 455/02)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,2448 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 145,89 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4405 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,79320 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,5019 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2010 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,2505 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,626 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 314,42 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,45280 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2258 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4750 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,9330 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,5203 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4482 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 9,6518 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6073 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6247 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 363,34 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 14,5710 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,7143 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,6700 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 15 758,64 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,3400 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 55,751 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 82,1728 |
| THB | Thai baht | 41,035 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,3988 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 18,3496 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 79,1973 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,2448

JPY

Japanese yen

145,89

DKK

Danish krone

7,4405

GBP

Pound sterling

0,79320

SEK

Swedish krona

9,5019

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2010

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,2505

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,626

HUF

Hungarian forint

314,42

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,45280

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2258

RON

Romanian leu

4,4750

TRY

Turkish lira

2,9330

AUD

Australian dollar

1,5203

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4482

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

9,6518

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6073

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6247

KRW

South Korean won

1 363,34

ZAR

South African rand

14,5710

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,7143

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,6700

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

15 758,64

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,3400

PHP

Philippine peso

55,751

RUB

Russian rouble

82,1728

THB

Thai baht

41,035

BRL

Brazilian real

3,3988

MXN

Mexican peso

18,3496

INR

Indian rupee

79,1973

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(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/3

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 7 July 2014 regarding a draft decision relating to Case M.7184 — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Art. 14(2) proc.)

Rapporteur: Croatia

(2014/C 455/03)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Marine Harvest has negligently infringed Article 4(1) of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004). |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Marine Harvest has negligently infringed Article 4(1) of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004).

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that Marine Harvest has negligently infringed Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that Marine Harvest has negligently infringed Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004).

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Marine Harvest should be fined pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) and Article 14(2)(b) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Marine Harvest should be fined pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) and Article 14(2)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the factors that were considered relevant for the purposes of fixing the amount of the fines for Marine Harvest pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) and Article 14(2)(b) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the factors that were considered relevant for the purposes of fixing the amount of the fines for Marine Harvest pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) and Article 14(2)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the actual level of the fines proposed by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the actual level of the fines proposed by the Commission.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

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| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/4 |
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18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/4

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Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

Marine Harvest/Morpol (Article 14(2) proc.)

(M.7184)

(2014/C 455/04)

| 1. | The draft decision pursuant to Article 14(2) of the Merger Regulation (2) concludes in substance that Marine Harvest ASA (‘Marine Harvest’), by implementing a transaction amounting to the acquisition of sole control of Morpol ASA (‘Morpol’) before notifying it to the European Commission, infringed the prior notification requirement and the ‘standstill obligation’ that follow respectively from Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The draft decision pursuant to Article 14(2) of the Merger Regulation (2) concludes in substance that Marine Harvest ASA (‘Marine Harvest’), by implementing a transaction amounting to the acquisition of sole control of Morpol ASA (‘Morpol’) before notifying it to the European Commission, infringed the prior notification requirement and the ‘standstill obligation’ that follow respectively from Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation.

| 2. | Marine Harvest notified its acquisition of sole control over Morpol to the Commission on 9 August 2013. By decision of 30 September 2013, the Commission declared that concentration compatible with the common market, subject to the commitments offered by Marine Harvest. That decision alluded to the possibility of a separate procedure relating to the possible infringement of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marine Harvest notified its acquisition of sole control over Morpol to the Commission on 9 August 2013. By decision of 30 September 2013, the Commission declared that concentration compatible with the common market, subject to the commitments offered by Marine Harvest. That decision alluded to the possibility of a separate procedure relating to the possible infringement of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation (3).

| 3. | By letter of 30 January 2014, the Commission informed Marine Harvest of its ongoing investigation into these possible infringements and of the opening of a separate case file related to that investigation. |
| --- | --- |

3.

By letter of 30 January 2014, the Commission informed Marine Harvest of its ongoing investigation into these possible infringements and of the opening of a separate case file related to that investigation.

| 4. | On 31 March 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (the ‘SO’), in which it set out its preliminary view that Marine Harvest had infringed Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 31 March 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (the ‘SO’), in which it set out its preliminary view that Marine Harvest had infringed Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation.

| 5. | In the letter accompanying the SO, the Directorate-General for Competition (‘DG Competition’) offered Marine Harvest the opportunity of obtaining access to the Commission’s file. |
| --- | --- |

5.

In the letter accompanying the SO, the Directorate-General for Competition (‘DG Competition’) offered Marine Harvest the opportunity of obtaining access to the Commission’s file.

| 6. | At Marine Harvest’s request, DG Competition extended the time limit for replying to the SO from 24 April 2014 to 30 April 2014. Marine Harvest responded to the SO on 30 April 2014. |
| --- | --- |

6.

At Marine Harvest’s request, DG Competition extended the time limit for replying to the SO from 24 April 2014 to 30 April 2014. Marine Harvest responded to the SO on 30 April 2014.

| 7. | A formal oral hearing took place on 6 May 2014. It was attended by Marine Harvest and its legal advisers, officials from the Commission departments and services involved in the case, and representatives of the competition authorities of eight EU Member States. |
| --- | --- |

7.

A formal oral hearing took place on 6 May 2014. It was attended by Marine Harvest and its legal advisers, officials from the Commission departments and services involved in the case, and representatives of the competition authorities of eight EU Member States.

| 8. | Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which Marine Harvest has been afforded the opportunity of making known its views. I conclude that it does. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which Marine Harvest has been afforded the opportunity of making known its views. I conclude that it does.

| 9. | Overall, I consider that the effective exercise of procedural rights has been respected during the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Overall, I consider that the effective exercise of procedural rights has been respected during the present proceedings.

Brussels, 10 July 2014.

Wouter WILS

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(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1) (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

2

(3)  Decision of 30 September 2013 in Case M.6850 Marine Harvest / Morpol, paragraph 9.

3

Marine Harvest / Morpol

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| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/5 |
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18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/5

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Summary of Commission Decision

of 23 July 2014

imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration in breach of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004

(Case M.7184 — Marine Harvest/Morpol (Article 14(2) proc.))

(Only the English version is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 455/05)

On 23 July 2014 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
   (1)
  , and in particular Article 14(2) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Marine Harvest ASA (‘Marine Harvest’) is a Norwegian seafood company listed on the Oslo and the New York Stock Exchanges which produces farmed salmon and white halibut and offers a wide range of value added products of various seafood species. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Marine Harvest ASA (‘Marine Harvest’) is a Norwegian seafood company listed on the Oslo and the New York Stock Exchanges which produces farmed salmon and white halibut and offers a wide range of value added products of various seafood species.

| (2) | Morpol ASA (‘Morpol’) is a Norwegian producer and processor of salmon. It produces farmed salmon and offers a broad range of value added salmon products, such as smoked, marinated, fresh and frozen salmon products. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Morpol ASA (‘Morpol’) is a Norwegian producer and processor of salmon. It produces farmed salmon and offers a broad range of value added salmon products, such as smoked, marinated, fresh and frozen salmon products.

| (3) | On 14 December 2012, Marine Harvest entered into a Share Purchase Agreement with Friendmall and Bazmonta for the sale of the 48,5 % shareholding these companies owned in Morpol. Both companies were previously controlled by one individual, Mr Jerzy Malek, the founder and former CEO of Morpol. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 14 December 2012, Marine Harvest entered into a Share Purchase Agreement with Friendmall and Bazmonta for the sale of the 48,5 % shareholding these companies owned in Morpol. Both companies were previously controlled by one individual, Mr Jerzy Malek, the founder and former CEO of Morpol.

| (4) | The closing of this transaction took place on 18 December 2012. This acquisition is referred to as the ‘December 2012 Acquisition’. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The closing of this transaction took place on 18 December 2012. This acquisition is referred to as the ‘December 2012 Acquisition’.

| (5) | On 15 January 2013 Marine Harvest submitted a mandatory public offer for the remaining shares in Morpol pursuant to Norwegian law. This public offer was successful. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 15 January 2013 Marine Harvest submitted a mandatory public offer for the remaining shares in Morpol pursuant to Norwegian law. This public offer was successful.

| (6) | On 21 December 2012, three days after closing of the December 2012 Acquisition, Marine Harvest contacted the Commission for the first time about the transaction by means of a Case Team Allocation Request. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 21 December 2012, three days after closing of the December 2012 Acquisition, Marine Harvest contacted the Commission for the first time about the transaction by means of a Case Team Allocation Request.

| (7) | On 5 March 2013, Marine Harvest submitted a first draft Form CO which focused on an overall market encompassing farming, primary processing and secondary processing of salmon of all origins. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 5 March 2013, Marine Harvest submitted a first draft Form CO which focused on an overall market encompassing farming, primary processing and secondary processing of salmon of all origins.

| (8) | Between March and June 2013 the Commission sent Marine Harvest several requests for information in order to gather specific market information on potential separate markets including the market for the farming and primary processing of Scottish salmon as well as the internal documents that Marine Harvest and Morpol prepared in connection with the transaction. It was only in late July 2013 that the Form CO could be considered complete. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Between March and June 2013 the Commission sent Marine Harvest several requests for information in order to gather specific market information on potential separate markets including the market for the farming and primary processing of Scottish salmon as well as the internal documents that Marine Harvest and Morpol prepared in connection with the transaction. It was only in late July 2013 that the Form CO could be considered complete.

| (9) | On 9 August 2013, the transaction was formally notified to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

On 9 August 2013, the transaction was formally notified to the Commission.

| (10) | On 30 September 2013, the Commission adopted a conditional clearance decision which approved the concentration subject to compliance with their commitments. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 30 September 2013, the Commission adopted a conditional clearance decision which approved the concentration subject to compliance with their commitments.

| (11) | In its decision, the Commission concluded that the December 2012 Acquisition had already conferred upon Marine Harvest de facto sole control over Morpol, and anticipated that an infringement of the stand-still obligation and the notification requirement could not be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In its decision, the Commission concluded that the December 2012 Acquisition had already conferred upon Marine Harvest de facto sole control over Morpol, and anticipated that an infringement of the stand-still obligation and the notification requirement could not be excluded.

| (12) | The Commission also anticipated that it might examine in a separate procedure whether a sanction under Article 14(2) of the Merger Regulation would be appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Commission also anticipated that it might examine in a separate procedure whether a sanction under Article 14(2) of the Merger Regulation would be appropriate.

II.   THE INFRINGEMENT

| (13) | Pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) and (b) of the Merger Regulation, ‘(t)he Commission may by decision impose fines not exceeding 10 % of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking concerned within the meaning of Article 5 on the persons referred to in Article 3(1)(b) or the undertakings concerned where, either intentionally or negligently, they:






  (a) | fail to notify a concentration in accordance with Articles 4 or 22(3) prior to its implementation, unless they are expressly authorised to do so by Article 7(2) or by a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3). |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

Pursuant to Article 14(2)(a) and (b) of the Merger Regulation, ‘(t)he Commission may by decision impose fines not exceeding 10 % of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking concerned within the meaning of Article 5 on the persons referred to in Article 3(1)(b) or the undertakings concerned where, either intentionally or negligently, they:

(a)

fail to notify a concentration in accordance with Articles 4 or 22(3) prior to its implementation, unless they are expressly authorised to do so by Article 7(2) or by a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3).

| (b) | implement a concentration in breach of Article 7’. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

implement a concentration in breach of Article 7’.

| (14) | The implementation of the present concentration prior to the notification and clearance therefore constitutes an infringement of the notification requirement in Article 4(1) and the standstill obligation in Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The implementation of the present concentration prior to the notification and clearance therefore constitutes an infringement of the notification requirement in Article 4(1) and the standstill obligation in Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation.

Acquisition of control

| (15) | The Commission considers that the acquisition of a 48,5 % stake in Morpol in December 2012 conferred to Marine Harvest sole control over Morpol. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Commission considers that the acquisition of a 48,5 % stake in Morpol in December 2012 conferred to Marine Harvest sole control over Morpol.

| (16) | On the basis of the attendance rate of the ordinary and extraordinary general meetings of Morpol in the last three years prior to the acquisition by Marine Harvest and the wide dispersion of the remaining shares, the Commission considers that Mr Malek exercised sole de facto control over Morpol at the time of the sale of his stake in Morpol to Marine Harvest. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

On the basis of the attendance rate of the ordinary and extraordinary general meetings of Morpol in the last three years prior to the acquisition by Marine Harvest and the wide dispersion of the remaining shares, the Commission considers that Mr Malek exercised sole de facto control over Morpol at the time of the sale of his stake in Morpol to Marine Harvest.

| (17) | Through the acquisition of the 48,5 % shareholding in Morpol, Marine Harvest acquired the same rights and possibilities to exercise decisive influence on Morpol which were previously enjoyed by Mr Malek. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Through the acquisition of the 48,5 % shareholding in Morpol, Marine Harvest acquired the same rights and possibilities to exercise decisive influence on Morpol which were previously enjoyed by Mr Malek.

Early implementation

| (18) | The Commission considers that the concentration was implemented at the time of the closing of Share Purchase Agreement with Friendmall and Bazmonta on 18 December 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The Commission considers that the concentration was implemented at the time of the closing of Share Purchase Agreement with Friendmall and Bazmonta on 18 December 2012.

Non-applicability of Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation

| (19) | The Commission considers that the transaction does not benefit from the exemption under Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation. This provision relates only to the acquisition of control by public offer or successive purchases of securities from various sellers whereas in the present case control was acquired in one step from just one seller. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Commission considers that the transaction does not benefit from the exemption under Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation. This provision relates only to the acquisition of control by public offer or successive purchases of securities from various sellers whereas in the present case control was acquired in one step from just one seller.

| (20) | The Commission considers therefore, in line with its precedents, that Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation is not intended to apply to this type of situation, where the procurement of a significant block of shares is carried out from just one seller and where it is straightforward to establish, on the basis of votes cast at previous ordinary and extraordinary general meetings, that this block of shares will confer de facto sole control over the target company. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Commission considers therefore, in line with its precedents, that Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation is not intended to apply to this type of situation, where the procurement of a significant block of shares is carried out from just one seller and where it is straightforward to establish, on the basis of votes cast at previous ordinary and extraordinary general meetings, that this block of shares will confer de facto sole control over the target company.

III.   THE DECISION TO IMPOSE FINES

| (21) | The Commission considers that the procedural infringements warrant a significant fine on the basis of the following facts and elements. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Commission considers that the procedural infringements warrant a significant fine on the basis of the following facts and elements.

Nature of the infringement

| (22) | The Commission considers that any infringement of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation is, by nature, a serious infringement, because such behaviour undermines the effectiveness of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Commission considers that any infringement of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation is, by nature, a serious infringement, because such behaviour undermines the effectiveness of the Merger Regulation.

Gravity of the infringement

| (23) | Marine Harvest’s conduct was at least partially based on defective legal advice. The company had received advice according to which Marine Harvest may take over the shares in Morpol, but cannot vote for the share until the transaction is cleared by the Commission. The Commission takes the view that the existence of mistaken legal advice indicates that Marine Harvest’s infringement has not been intentional but rather negligent. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Marine Harvest’s conduct was at least partially based on defective legal advice. The company had received advice according to which Marine Harvest may take over the shares in Morpol, but cannot vote for the share until the transaction is cleared by the Commission. The Commission takes the view that the existence of mistaken legal advice indicates that Marine Harvest’s infringement has not been intentional but rather negligent.

| (24) | In any event, Marine Harvest’s conduct was negligent, because (i) Marine Harvest is a large European company with significant previous experiences in merger proceedings, (ii) Marine Harvest obtained legal advice at a very late stage, i.e. on the day of the closing of the deal, (iii) the existence of a precedent on the interpretation of Article 7(2) Merger Regulation (Yara/Kemira Growhow) should have led Marine Harvest to the conclusion that its conduct was most likely not covered by the exception of Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation and (iv) Marine Harvest had already been fined for early implementation at national level in the context of its acquisition of Fjord Seafood. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In any event, Marine Harvest’s conduct was negligent, because (i) Marine Harvest is a large European company with significant previous experiences in merger proceedings, (ii) Marine Harvest obtained legal advice at a very late stage, i.e. on the day of the closing of the deal, (iii) the existence of a precedent on the interpretation of Article 7(2) Merger Regulation (Yara/Kemira Growhow) should have led Marine Harvest to the conclusion that its conduct was most likely not covered by the exception of Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation and (iv) Marine Harvest had already been fined for early implementation at national level in the context of its acquisition of Fjord Seafood.

| (25) | Moreover, the Commission notes that — on substance — Marine Harvest’s acquisition of Morpol raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. In this context, the Commission considers that the implemented merger could have led to a negative impact on competition in the possible market for Scottish salmon for the whole duration of the infringement. As it is particularly important to ensure that a transaction which is potentially problematic is not implemented before scrutiny, the presence of a potential damage caused by the merger is likely to render the infringement even more serious. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Moreover, the Commission notes that — on substance — Marine Harvest’s acquisition of Morpol raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. In this context, the Commission considers that the implemented merger could have led to a negative impact on competition in the possible market for Scottish salmon for the whole duration of the infringement. As it is particularly important to ensure that a transaction which is potentially problematic is not implemented before scrutiny, the presence of a potential damage caused by the merger is likely to render the infringement even more serious.

The duration of the infringement

| (26) | The infringement to Article 4(1) is an instantaneous infringement, which has no specific duration. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The infringement to Article 4(1) is an instantaneous infringement, which has no specific duration.

| (27) | As regards the duration of the infringement to Article 7(1), the Commission considers the pre-notification period should be included in the period of the infringement of Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation, in the light of the potential competitive harm caused by the implementation of the transaction before clearance and the fact that Marine Harvest’s behaviour has not been sufficiently forthcoming in the course of the pre-notification phase to justify the exclusion of the pre-notification period from the overall duration of the infringement. As such, Marine Harvest’s infringement to Article 7(1) covered a period of nine months and 12 days. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

As regards the duration of the infringement to Article 7(1), the Commission considers the pre-notification period should be included in the period of the infringement of Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation, in the light of the potential competitive harm caused by the implementation of the transaction before clearance and the fact that Marine Harvest’s behaviour has not been sufficiently forthcoming in the course of the pre-notification phase to justify the exclusion of the pre-notification period from the overall duration of the infringement. As such, Marine Harvest’s infringement to Article 7(1) covered a period of nine months and 12 days.

Mitigating and aggravating circumstances

| (28) | The Commission considers that certain mitigating circumstances should be taken into account when setting the fine. Firstly, Marine Harvest has not exercised its voting rights in Morpol after having acquired control over it. Secondly, Marine Harvest informed the Commission by way of the Case Team Allocation Request shortly after the closing of the December 2012 Acquisition. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The Commission considers that certain mitigating circumstances should be taken into account when setting the fine. Firstly, Marine Harvest has not exercised its voting rights in Morpol after having acquired control over it. Secondly, Marine Harvest informed the Commission by way of the Case Team Allocation Request shortly after the closing of the December 2012 Acquisition.

| (29) | There are no aggravating circumstances in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

There are no aggravating circumstances in this case.

IV.   ASSESSMENT

| (30) | It is concluded that Marine Harvest has negligently infringed Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation. Marine Harvest’s abstention from the exercise of voting rights at Morpol’s general shareholders’ meetings and the ring-fence of Morpol’s activities are mitigating circumstances, as well as Marine Harvest’s willingness to promptly inform the Commission of its acquisition of Morpol. Finally, it can be noted that there are no aggravating circumstances in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

It is concluded that Marine Harvest has negligently infringed Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the Merger Regulation. Marine Harvest’s abstention from the exercise of voting rights at Morpol’s general shareholders’ meetings and the ring-fence of Morpol’s activities are mitigating circumstances, as well as Marine Harvest’s willingness to promptly inform the Commission of its acquisition of Morpol. Finally, it can be noted that there are no aggravating circumstances in this case.

| (31) | When imposing penalties, the Commission takes into account the need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect. In the case of an undertaking of the size of Marine Harvest, the amount of the penalty must be significant in order to have a deterrent effect. This is even more the case when the transaction which has been implemented before clearance raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

When imposing penalties, the Commission takes into account the need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect. In the case of an undertaking of the size of Marine Harvest, the amount of the penalty must be significant in order to have a deterrent effect. This is even more the case when the transaction which has been implemented before clearance raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market.

| (32) | It is concluded to impose fines under Article 14(2) of the Merger Regulation of EUR 10 000 000 for the infringement of Article 4(1) of the Merger Regulation, and of EUR 10 000 000 for the infringement of Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

It is concluded to impose fines under Article 14(2) of the Merger Regulation of EUR 10 000 000 for the infringement of Article 4(1) of the Merger Regulation, and of EUR 10 000 000 for the infringement of Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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Court of Auditors

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/8

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Special Report No 21/2014 ‘EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor value for money’

(2014/C 455/06)

The European Court of Auditors hereby informs you that Special Report No 21/2014 ‘EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor value for money’ has just been published.

The report can be accessed for consultation or downloading on the European Court of Auditors’ website: http://eca.europa.eu

A hard copy version of the report may be obtained free of charge on request to the Court of Auditors:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Publications (PUB) |
| 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Publications (PUB)

12, rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

or by filling in an electronic order form on EU-Bookshop.

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NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA

EFTA Surveillance Authority

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/9

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Public holidays in 2015: EEA/EFTA States and EEA institutions

(2014/C 455/07)

| | Iceland | Liechtenstein | Norway | EFTA Surveillance Authority | EFTA Court |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 January | X | X | X | X | X |
| 2 January | | X | | X | |
| 6 January | | X | | | |
| 2 February | | X | | | |
| 17 February | | X | | | |
| 19 March | | X | | | |
| 2 April | X | | X | X | |
| 3 April | X | X | X | X | |
| 6 April | X | X | X | X | X |
| 23 April | X | | | | |
| 1 May | X | X | X | X | X |
| 14 May | X | X | X | X | X |
| 15 May | | | | X | |
| 17 May | | | X | | |
| 25 May | X | X | X | X | X |
| 4 June | | X | | | |
| 17 June | X | | | | |
| 23 June | | | | | X |
| 3 August | X | | | | |
| 15 August | | X | | | |
| 8 September | | X | | | |
| 1 November | | X | | | |
| 2 November | | | | X | |
| 8 December | | X | | | |
| 24 December | | | | X | |
| 25 December | X | X | X | X | X |
| 28 December | X | X | X | X | |
| 29 December | | | | X | |
| 30 December | | | | X | |
| 31 December | | X | | X | |

Iceland

Liechtenstein

Norway

EFTA Surveillance Authority

EFTA Court

1 January

X

X

X

X

X

2 January

X

X

6 January

X

2 February

X

17 February

X

19 March

X

2 April

X

X

X

3 April

X

X

X

X

6 April

X

X

X

X

X

23 April

X

1 May

X

X

X

X

X

14 May

X

X

X

X

X

15 May

X

17 May

X

25 May

X

X

X

X

X

4 June

X

17 June

X

23 June

X

3 August

X

15 August

X

8 September

X

1 November

X

2 November

X

8 December

X

24 December

X

25 December

X

X

X

X

X

28 December

X

X

X

X

29 December

X

30 December

X

31 December

X

X

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V Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/10

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Call for proposals EACEA/30/2014

Erasmus+ Programme

Key Action 3: Support for policy reform — Initiatives for policy innovation

Policy experimentation in school education sector

(2014/C 455/08)

1.   Description, objectives, and priority themes

This call has as its primary purpose to encourage the relevant public authorities to submit proposals for testing innovative policy ideas and reforms in the area of recruitment, selection and induction of new teachers coming to the profession through alternative pathways. Such new entrants could be graduates, mid-career professionals or unemployed people with no formal training in teaching that demonstrate a concrete interest to become teachers. There is a multitude of ways to enable flexible entry into the teaching profession, including – but not limited to – mid-career certification possibilities and short-term intensive induction followed by on-the-job training with mentoring support.

The priority theme for this call is:

Strengthen recruitment, selection and induction of the best and most suitable candidates to the teaching profession by developing alternative pathways to teaching.

2.   Eligible countries

Proposals from legal entities established in one of the following programme countries are eligible:

| — | the 28 Member States of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

—

the 28 Member States of the European Union;

| — | the EFTA/EEA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway; |
| --- | --- |

—

the EFTA/EEA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway;

| — | EU candidate countries: Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. |
| --- | --- |

—

EU candidate countries: Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

3.   Eligible applicants

The term ‘applicants’ refers to all organisations and institutions participating in a proposal regardless of their role in the project.

Applicants considered eligible to respond to this call are:

| a) | Public authorities (Ministry or equivalent) responsible for education and training at the highest level in the relevant national or regional context. Public authorities at the highest level responsible for sectors other than education and training (e.g. employment, finance, social affairs, health, etc.) are considered eligible as long as they demonstrate that they have a specific competence in the area in which the policy experimentation is to be carried out. Public authorities can delegate to be represented by other public or private organisations, as well as legally established networks or associations of public authorities, provided that the delegation is in writing and makes explicit reference to the proposal being submitted. In such case, the delegating public authorities must be involved in the proposal as partners. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Public authorities (Ministry or equivalent) responsible for education and training at the highest level in the relevant national or regional context. Public authorities at the highest level responsible for sectors other than education and training (e.g. employment, finance, social affairs, health, etc.) are considered eligible as long as they demonstrate that they have a specific competence in the area in which the policy experimentation is to be carried out. Public authorities can delegate to be represented by other public or private organisations, as well as legally established networks or associations of public authorities, provided that the delegation is in writing and makes explicit reference to the proposal being submitted. In such case, the delegating public authorities must be involved in the proposal as partners.

| b) | Public or private organisations or institutions active in the fields of education and training. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Public or private organisations or institutions active in the fields of education and training.

| c) | Public or private organisations or institutions carrying out activities linked to education and training in other socioeconomic sectors (e.g. chambers of commerce, cultural organisations, evaluation entities, research entities, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

c)

Public or private organisations or institutions carrying out activities linked to education and training in other socioeconomic sectors (e.g. chambers of commerce, cultural organisations, evaluation entities, research entities, etc.).

4.   Minimum partnership composition

The minimum partnership requirement for this call is 4 entities representing 3 eligible countries. Specifically:

| a. | At least one public authority (Ministry or equivalent) or delegated body – as described in 3.a) - from 3 different eligible countries, or a legally established network/association of public authorities representing at least three different eligible countries.
  The network or association must have a mandate from at least 3 relevant public authorities — as described under 3.a) - to operate on their behalf for the specific proposal.
  Proposals must include at least one public authority as indicated under point 3 a) from a Member State.
  Public authorities participating or represented in the proposal shall be responsible for strategic leadership of the project and for steering the policy experimentation in their own jurisdiction. |
| --- | --- |

a.

At least one public authority (Ministry or equivalent) or delegated body – as described in 3.a) - from 3 different eligible countries, or a legally established network/association of public authorities representing at least three different eligible countries.

The network or association must have a mandate from at least 3 relevant public authorities — as described under 3.a) - to operate on their behalf for the specific proposal.

Proposals must include at least one public authority as indicated under point 3 a) from a Member State.

Public authorities participating or represented in the proposal shall be responsible for strategic leadership of the project and for steering the policy experimentation in their own jurisdiction.

| b. | At least one public or private entity with expertise in evaluation of policy impact. Such entity shall be responsible for the methodological aspects and the evaluation protocols. The proposal can involve more than one evaluation entity, as long as the work is coordinated and consistent. |
| --- | --- |

b.

At least one public or private entity with expertise in evaluation of policy impact. Such entity shall be responsible for the methodological aspects and the evaluation protocols. The proposal can involve more than one evaluation entity, as long as the work is coordinated and consistent.

5.   Coordination

A proposal can only be coordinated and submitted — on behalf of all applicants – by one of the following:

| a) | A public authority as described under 3.a) |
| --- | --- |

a)

A public authority as described under 3.a)

| b) | A legally established network or association of public authorities indicated under point 3.a) |
| --- | --- |

b)

A legally established network or association of public authorities indicated under point 3.a)

| c) | A public or private entity delegated by public authorities indicated under point 3.a) to reply to the call. Delegated entities must have an explicit endorsement in writing by a public authority as described under 3.a), to submit and coordinate the proposal on their behalf |
| --- | --- |

c)

A public or private entity delegated by public authorities indicated under point 3.a) to reply to the call. Delegated entities must have an explicit endorsement in writing by a public authority as described under 3.a), to submit and coordinate the proposal on their behalf

Proposals must be submitted by the legal representative of the coordinating authority on behalf of all applicants. Natural persons may not apply for a grant.

6.   Eligible activities

Activities must start between 1 December 2015 and 1 March 2016. The project duration must be between 24 and 36 months.

The activities to be funded under this call include as a minimum:

| — | Development of field trials on the implementation of innovative measures. Appropriate attention has to be given to developing a robust evidence base and involving reliable monitoring, evaluation and reporting procedures based on recognised methodological approaches, developed by a competent and experienced policy impact evaluator in consultation with the relevant project partners. This should include (the list is not exhaustive): identifying and selecting the measure(s) to be tested, the samples and the set of actions envisaged; defining the expected impact of the measure in measurable terms and assessing its relevance with regard to the expected results, including by thoroughly searching for examples of similar policy interventions that have been conducted domestically or abroad; defining a robust methodology and indicators to measure the impact of the tested measure at national and European level. |
| --- | --- |

—

Development of field trials on the implementation of innovative measures. Appropriate attention has to be given to developing a robust evidence base and involving reliable monitoring, evaluation and reporting procedures based on recognised methodological approaches, developed by a competent and experienced policy impact evaluator in consultation with the relevant project partners. This should include (the list is not exhaustive): identifying and selecting the measure(s) to be tested, the samples and the set of actions envisaged; defining the expected impact of the measure in measurable terms and assessing its relevance with regard to the expected results, including by thoroughly searching for examples of similar policy interventions that have been conducted domestically or abroad; defining a robust methodology and indicators to measure the impact of the tested measure at national and European level.

| — | Parallel implementation of the field trials in various countries participating in the project under the leadership of the respective authorities (Ministry or equivalent). A sufficiently representative number of participating entities/establishments should be involved to reach a reasonable and representative critical mass and provide a significant evidence base. |
| --- | --- |

—

Parallel implementation of the field trials in various countries participating in the project under the leadership of the respective authorities (Ministry or equivalent). A sufficiently representative number of participating entities/establishments should be involved to reach a reasonable and representative critical mass and provide a significant evidence base.

| — | Analysis and evaluation: effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the tested measure, but also of the experimentation methodology, of the conditions for scalability and the transnational transfer of the lessons learned and good practice (peer learning). |
| --- | --- |

—

Analysis and evaluation: effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the tested measure, but also of the experimentation methodology, of the conditions for scalability and the transnational transfer of the lessons learned and good practice (peer learning).

| — | Awareness-raising, dissemination and exploitation of the project concept and its results at regional, national and European level throughout the project duration and in the longer term, and to foster transferability between different sectors, systems and policies. |
| --- | --- |

—

Awareness-raising, dissemination and exploitation of the project concept and its results at regional, national and European level throughout the project duration and in the longer term, and to foster transferability between different sectors, systems and policies.

An exploitation plan of the experimentation results through the Open Methods of Coordination in education and training and in youth, in connection with the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, is recommended.

7.   Award criteria

The award criteria for the funding of a proposal are:

| 1. | Relevance (20 %) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Relevance (20 %)

| 2. | Quality of the project design and implementation (30 %) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Quality of the project design and implementation (30 %)

| 3. | Quality of the partnership (20 %) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Quality of the partnership (20 %)

| 4. | Impact, dissemination and sustainability (30 %) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Impact, dissemination and sustainability (30 %)

The present call is divided in two submission/evaluation stages: (1) pre-proposal stage, and (2) full proposal stage. This approach intends to simplify the application process by requesting in the first phase only limited information on the proposal. Only those pre-proposals satisfying the eligibility criteria and reaching the minimum threshold of 60 % on the score for the award criterion Relevance will access the second phase for which applicants will be requested to submit a full application package.

Eligible pre-proposals will be assessed on the basis of the award criterion Relevance. Full proposals will be assessed on the basis of exclusion and selection criteria, and the three remaining award criteria: Quality of the project design and implementation; Quality of the partnership; and Impact, dissemination, and sustainability.

The final score for a proposal will be the total score obtained at the pre-proposal stage and the full proposal stage (by applying the weighting indicated).

8.   Budget

The total budget available for the co-financing of projects under the present call is EUR 5 000 000.

Financial contribution from the EU cannot exceed 75 % of the total eligible project costs.

The maximum grant per project will be EUR 2 500 000.

The Agency reserves the right not to distribute all the funds available for the call.

9.   Procedure for submission of proposals and deadlines

Before submitting an application, applicants will have to register their organisation in the Unique Registration Facility (URF) and receive a Participant Identification Code (PIC). The PIC will be requested in the application form.

The Unique Registration Facility is the tool through which all legal and financial information related to organisations will be managed. It is accessible via the Education, Audiovisual, Culture, Citizenship and Volunteering Participant Portal. Information on how to register can be found in the portal under the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/education/participants/portal

Grant applications must be drawn up in one of the official EU languages and using the official application package. Please ensure you are using the correct application form for respectively the pre-proposal stage and the full proposal stage.

The application package is available on the internet at the following address:

https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/funding/key-action-3-prospective-initiatives-policy-experimentation-in-school-education-sector-eacea-302014_en

Applications must be submitted by the following deadlines:

| — | Pre-proposals (eForm): 20 March 2015, 12:00 (midday, Brussels time) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-proposals (eForm): 20 March 2015, 12:00 (midday, Brussels time)

| — | Full proposals (paper application form): 1 October 2015 (date of postmark) |
| --- | --- |

—

Full proposals (paper application form): 1 October 2015 (date of postmark)

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COURT PROCEEDINGS

EFTA Court

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/14

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Action brought on 17 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against Iceland

(Case E-20/14)

(2014/C 455/09)

An action against Iceland was brought before the EFTA Court on 17 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Markus Schneider and Clémence Perrin, acting as Agents of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority requests the EFTA Court to:

| 1. | Declare that by failing to adopt the measures necessary to make, as such and within the time prescribed, part of its internal legal order the Act referred to at point 56x of Chapter V of Annex XIII to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents), as adapted to the Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto, Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare that by failing to adopt the measures necessary to make, as such and within the time prescribed, part of its internal legal order the Act referred to at point 56x of Chapter V of Annex XIII to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents), as adapted to the Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto, Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the Agreement.

| 2. | Order Iceland to bear the costs of these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Order Iceland to bear the costs of these proceedings.

Legal and factual background and pleas in law adduced in support:

| — | The application addresses Iceland’s failure to comply, no later than on 19 April 2014, with a reasoned opinion delivered by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 19 February 2014 regarding that State’s failure to make, as such, part of its national legal order Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents, as referred to at point 56x of Chapter V of Annex XIII to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and as adapted to that Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto. |
| --- | --- |

—

The application addresses Iceland’s failure to comply, no later than on 19 April 2014, with a reasoned opinion delivered by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 19 February 2014 regarding that State’s failure to make, as such, part of its national legal order Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents, as referred to at point 56x of Chapter V of Annex XIII to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and as adapted to that Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto.

| — | The EFTA Surveillance Authority submits that Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the EEA Agreement by failing to make the Regulation as such part of its internal legal order within the time prescribed. |
| --- | --- |

—

The EFTA Surveillance Authority submits that Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the EEA Agreement by failing to make the Regulation as such part of its internal legal order within the time prescribed.

---

| 18.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 455/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 455/15

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Action brought on 22 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against Iceland

(Case E-21/14)

(2014/C 455/10)

An action against Iceland was brought before the EFTA Court on 22 October 2014 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Markus Schneider and Clémence Perrin, acting as Agents of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority requests the EFTA Court to:

| 1. | Declare that by failing to adopt, and/or to notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority forthwith of, the measures necessary to implement the Act referred to at point 4 of Chapter IV of Annex II to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products), as adapted to the Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto, within the time prescribed, Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Act and under Article 7 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare that by failing to adopt, and/or to notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority forthwith of, the measures necessary to implement the Act referred to at point 4 of Chapter IV of Annex II to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products), as adapted to the Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto, within the time prescribed, Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Act and under Article 7 of the EEA Agreement.

| 2. | Order Iceland to bear the costs of these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Order Iceland to bear the costs of these proceedings.

Legal and factual background and pleas in law adduced in support:

| — | The application addresses Iceland’s failure to comply, no later than on 18 February 2014, with a reasoned opinion delivered by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 18 December 2013 regarding that State’s failure to implement into its national legal order Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products (‘the Act’), as referred to at point 4 of Chapter IV of Annex II to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and as adapted to that Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto. |
| --- | --- |

—

The application addresses Iceland’s failure to comply, no later than on 18 February 2014, with a reasoned opinion delivered by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 18 December 2013 regarding that State’s failure to implement into its national legal order Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products (‘the Act’), as referred to at point 4 of Chapter IV of Annex II to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and as adapted to that Agreement by way of Protocol 1 thereto.

| — | The EFTA Surveillance Authority submits that Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 16 of the Act and under Article 7 of the EEA Agreement by failing to adopt, and/or to notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority of, the measures necessary to implement the Act within the time prescribed. |
| --- | --- |

—

The EFTA Surveillance Authority submits that Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 16 of the Act and under Article 7 of the EEA Agreement by failing to adopt, and/or to notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority of, the measures necessary to implement the Act within the time prescribed.

---