Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anna Onaitis Holden

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of A.K. (Minor Child)

and

V.K. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

June 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-83

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Larry Bradley, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1704-JT-351
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 2 of 9

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] V.K. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental 

rights to A.K. (“the Child”). At all times relevant to this appeal, Father worked

as a semi-truck driver and was away from home for multiple days at a time. 

While Father was away from home, the Child was left in her mother’s care. 

The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved in the 

Child’s life after receiving reports of an incident involving the Child’s mother. 

The Child was subsequently determined to be a child in need of services 

(“CHINS”) and Father was ordered to complete a parenting assessment as well 

as any services deemed necessary. Father, however, failed to complete the 

parenting assessment or participate in services. 

[2] DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Father’s parental rights to the 

Child on April 5, 2017. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court 

issued an order granting DCS’s petition. On appeal, Father argues that DCS 

violated his due process rights by failing to offer him services aimed at 

reunification. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 3 of 9

[3] Father and H.K. (“Mother”) are married and are the biological parents of the 

Child, who was born on December 15, 2014.1 At all times relevant to this 

appeal, Father was employed as a truck driver. As a result of his employment, 

Father was often absent from home for days and weeks at a time. While Father 

was away from home, Mother was the Child’s primary caregiver.

[4] DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Chijuana Lockridge became involved 

with the Child in November of 2015, after receiving reports of (1) a domestic 

disturbance involving Mother and (2) potential drug or alcohol use by Mother. 

DCS filed a petition alleging the Child was a CHINS on November 3, 2015. 

Father was not named on this petition because DCS did not initially know that 

he was the Child’s father. In March of 2016, DCS first learned that Father was 

the Child’s father after Mother informed DCS that she was married; the 

individual that DCS initially believed to be the Child’s father was not the 

Child’s father; and that her husband, Father, was the Child’s father. DCS then 

amended the CHINS petition to include Father. 

[5] Father appeared before the juvenile court for the first time on March 3, 2016. 

At this time, Father informed FCM Lockridge that “he was not present at the 

time of the incident and that he is always on the road driving and that he’s 

never really home and that [Mother] has friends over to the house from time to 

 

1

 Mother’s parental rights to the Child were previously terminated and Mother does not participate in this 

appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 4 of 9

time and he doesn’t know who those friends are.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 24. FCM 

Lockridge also spoke to Father about potential services, explaining

that if there was a need for any assistance with housing, there’s 

home-based case management. There’s home-based therapy for 

the family, the visitations in the supervised setting, if there were 

any substance abuse issues we have random screens and IOP that 

can be referred. And, any other services that he felt he needed as 

a parent that he would be able to benefit from.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 40. FCM Lockridge attempted to impress upon Father the 

importance of services. Father, however, informed her that “he was always on 

the road and wouldn’t be able to complete services.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. FCM 

Lockridge asked Father to “give [her] a call” when his schedule permitted so 

that she could help arrange the assessment and services around Father’s work 

schedule. Tr. Vol. II, p. 42. 

[6] At the conclusion of the March 3, 2016 hearing, Father was “authorized to 

have supervised parenting time” with the Child. DCS Ex. 2. Father attended a 

supervised visit with the Child and Mother in April of 2016. During this visit, 

there was no reaction from the Child when Father entered the room, no 

interaction between Father and the Child, and “it didn’t appear that [the Child] 

even knew who he was.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. In addition, Father was “on his 

phone most of the visit.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. 

[7] Also in April of 2016, Patricia Doberneck, the Court-Appointed Special 

Advocate (“CASA”) assigned to the case, went to the family’s home for a 

previously-scheduled home visit. However, upon arriving at the home, Father 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 5 of 9

came out of the house and “would not let [Doberneck] in.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 12. 

Father’s actions gave Doberneck the impression that “they were hiding 

something.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 14.

[8] Father attended a second supervised visit with the Child in August of 2016. 

Father did not attend any other supervised visits with the Child. Other than the 

April and August visits, Father has had no contact with the Child since she was 

removed from Mother’s care in November of 2015.

[9] With respect to Father, the Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS on August 

15, 2016. On September 8, 2016, the juvenile court entered a dispositional 

order in which it ordered Father to complete a parenting assessment and to 

follow all recommendations. Father, however, never completed the courtordered parenting assessment. FCM Lockridge unsuccessfully attempted to 

contact Father “a couple times.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 42. She was left with the 

understanding that Father would let her know when he would be able to 

complete the assessment and any necessary services. Despite being given her 

contact information in March of 2016, Father did not contact FCM Lockridge 

until June of 2017. 

[10] Father appeared before the juvenile court for a hearing on December 8, 2016. 

During this hearing, Father indicated that he would take the steps necessary to 

become more involved in the Child’s life. Father, however, did not do so. 

[11] On April 5, 2017, DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Father’s 

parental rights to the Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 6 of 9

hearing on DCS’s petition on December 11, 2017. During the evidentiary 

hearing, DCS presented evidence demonstrating that Father had (1) failed to 

complete the court-ordered parenting assessment and (2) indicated that he could 

not participate in services due to his work schedule. Doberneck testified that 

she had “seen very little motivation on [Father’s] part as far as wanting to be 

involved with [the Child]” and that she was “just not sure that there’s been 

much interest on [Father’s] part in spending time with [the Child].” Tr. Vol. II, 

pp. 12–13. DCS also presented evidence that (1) Mother continued to struggle 

with substance abuse and was not in a position to care for the Child, (2) the 

Child was thriving in her current placement, and (3) its plan was for the Child 

to be adopted by her current foster parents. On January 18, 2018, the juvenile 

court issued an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

Discussion and Decision

[12] “The involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is 

designed to be used only as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have 

failed.” A.P. v. Porter Cty. Office of Family & Children, 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of 

children are among associational rights the United States 

Supreme Court has ranked as of basic importance in our society 

and are rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against 

the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. A 

case involving the State’s authority to permanently sever a 

parent-child bond demands the close consideration the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 7 of 9

Court has long required when a family association so undeniably 

important is at stake.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

I. Procedural Due Process

[13] The nature of the process due in parental rights termination 

proceedings turns on a balancing of the ‘three distinct factors’ 

specified in [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)]: the 

private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error 

created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing 

governmental interest supporting use of the challenged 

procedure. 

Id. (internal citation omitted). “Finally, we must keep in mind the general 

proposition that if the State imparts a due process right, then it must give that 

right.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

[14] Father contends that the juvenile court’s termination order should be reversed 

because DCS violated his due process rights by failing to offer him services. 

The Indiana Supreme Court has long recognized that, in seeking 

termination of parental rights, the DCS has no obligation to 

plead and prove that services have been offered to the parent to 

assist in fulfilling parental obligations. Likewise, we have stated 

on several occasions that, although the DCS is generally required 

to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families during 

the CHINS proceedings, that requirement under our CHINS 

statutes is not a requisite element of our parental rights 

termination statute, and a failure to provide services does not 

serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as 

contrary to law. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 8 of 9

In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted, emphasis in original). Like the parties in In re J.W., Jr., 

Father’s argument on appeal effectively amounts to “a request to make the 

providing of services by the DCS a basis on which to directly attack the 

termination order.” See id. As we concluded in that case, such a request “is 

contrary to our case law, and reads into our termination statutes a provision 

that our legislature has not [seen] fit to include.” Id. (rejecting the Appellants’ 

argument that the termination order should be set aside because DCS allegedly 

failed to provide services during the underlying CHINS proceedings).

[15] Review of the record clearly demonstrates that DCS was prepared to offer 

Father any services that were deemed necessary, but that Father rejected the 

services because of his work schedule. We have previously concluded that “a 

parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and 

then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his 

parenting.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); see also 

Jackson v. Madison Cty. Dept. of Family and Children, 690 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1998). 

[16] In this case, Father did not merely “sit idly by” but rather expressly declined the 

opportunity to complete a parenting assessment or participate in services. As is 

outlined above, on March 3, 2016, Father informed FCM Lockridge that “he 

was always on the road and wouldn’t be able to complete services.” Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 25. Although being authorized to have supervised parenting time, Father 

only visited the Child twice between March of 2016 and August of 2016. Other 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-83 | June 21, 2018 Page 9 of 9

than these two visits, Father has had no contact with the Child since November 

of 2015. Father also failed to complete the court-ordered parenting assessment, 

completion of which was important to determine what services, if any, were 

necessary before the Child could be returned to Father’s care. Further, 

although FCM Lockridge reached out to Father and offered to arrange the 

assessment and services around his work schedule, Father did not take 

advantage of FCM Lockridge’s offer. 

[17] It was “within the [juvenile] court’s purview to credit or not credit” Father’s 

claim that DCS refused to offer him the services necessary for reunification with 

the Child. See In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d at 1191. Given the facts and 

circumstances of this case, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision in 

this regard. 

[18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.