GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Transportation and Related Agencies,

Committee on Appropriations, House of

Representatives

July 2000 COMMERCIAL

MOTOR VEHICLES

Effectiveness of

Actions Being Taken

to Improve Motor

Carrier Safety Is

Unknown

GAO/RCED-00-189

Page 1 GAO/RCED-00-189 Motor Carrier Safety

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-284418 Letr

July 17, 2000

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation

and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In 1998, 5,374 people died on our nation’s roads from crashes involving

large trucks (those with a gross weight of at least 10,001 pounds), a figure

largely unchanged from a decade ago. Some fatal crashes are the result of

truck drivers’ operating their vehicles while fatigued. The number of

fatigue-related fatalities is not known with any precision. However, there is

widespread agreement that the federal rules governing the hours that

commercial motor vehicle drivers must rest before driving needs to be

revised.

Federal responsibilities for motor carrier safety reside in the Department of

Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (the

motor carrier administration), which was created to give motor carrier

safety increased attention and stature within DOT.1 In this regard, DOT has

initiated a number of actions to reduce fatalities, including (1) establishing

a goal to reduce the number of truck-related fatalities by 50 percent by

20092 and (2) proposing changes in the regulations that govern the amount

of time in a day that drivers may work (called “hours of service”), aimed at

allowing them to obtain more rest. However, the proposal has engendered

much critical comment from safety advocates, enforcement organizations,

and industry representatives.

1

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, P.L. 106-159, Dec. 9, 1999. Previously,

these responsibilities rested with DOT’s Federal Highway Administration.

2

The goal of reducing truck-related fatalities has been incorporated into DOT’s fiscal year

2001 performance plan. Such plans are required by the Government Performance and

Results Act of 1993.
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We reported earlier to you on the issue of large truck safety.3 Because of

your continuing concern in this area, you asked us to review efforts being

undertaken by the motor carrier administration to reduce the number of

truck-related fatalities. Specifically, we examined (1) the motor carrier

administration’s overall strategy for reducing fatalities resulting from

crashes involving large trucks; (2) specific actions the motor carrier

administration is taking to meet this goal; (3) the extent to which the motor

carrier administration has considered additional improvements suggested

by the safety community, industry, and others; and (4) the bases for the

motor carrier administration’s estimates for the expected number of lives

to be saved as a result of proposed revisions to its hours of service rules.

Results in Brief The motor carrier administration has developed an overall strategy for

improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles (trucks and buses).

This strategy, called the Safety Action Plan, covers the years 2000 through

2003 and contains 47 initiatives that are intended to be an initial step in

enabling the Department to reach its goal of reducing fatalities due to

crashes involving large trucks by 50 percent by 2009. These initiatives fall

within several broad categories, including increasing the enforcement of

federal safety regulations; increasing safety awareness; improving safety

information and technology; and improving performance standards for

vehicles, drivers, and motor carriers. However, the Department has not

articulated how the individual initiatives, or sets of initiatives, in the plan

will contribute to reductions in truck-related fatalities. DOT does not

expect to have information for several years that would allow it to estimate

the degree to which its initiatives will reduce truck-related fatalities and

still expects that making such estimates would be difficult. In addition, the

Department has not determined whether it can reasonably expect to

complete all 47 activities with expected budgetary and human resources.

Department officials told us that publication of the motor carrier

administration’s Safety Action Plan signals its intent to carry it out and that

the Department expects to examine these resource needs this year.

Because the Department’s goal of reducing truck-related fatalities is

extremely ambitious, it is important for the Department to determine how

the actions it is taking will lead to a reduction in the number of truck3

Truck Safety: Motor Carriers Office Hampered by Limited Information on Causes of

Crashes and Other Data Problems (GAO/RCED-99-182, June 29, 1999). See also Commercial

Motor Vehicles: Significant Actions Remain to Improve Truck Safety (GAO/T-RCED-00-102,

Mar. 2, 2000).
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related fatalities and whether it can reasonably expect to carry out the

initiatives in its Safety Action Plan.

In response to the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999,

criticisms by this Subcommittee, and recommendations by DOT’s Inspector

General, us, and others, the Department has taken initial steps toward

improving motor carrier safety. These steps include establishing a new

organizational structure—the motor carrier administration—that has

accountability for truck safety and that supports a greater emphasis on

enforcement and compliance. Also, the Department appears to be making

progress on some of the individual initiatives in its Safety Action Plan. For

example, under its Large Truck Crash Causation Project, which is intended

to result in a national database on the causes and contributing factors of

large truck crashes, DOT has studied the feasibility of conducting the

project and has selected four pilot sites to test the data-gathering

methodology. Testing at the four pilot sites is expected to begin this July,

and a full test (24 sites) is expected to begin in January 2001.

The motor carrier administration sought comments on a draft of its Safety

Action Plan from 49 organizations representing industry and the safety

community. Nine of these organizations provided written comments. We

found that the Department made changes to the plan to address most of the

comments. For example, in response to comments from an organization

representing bus companies, the motor carrier administration added a task

to the plan to gather more safety information on these types of vehicles.

The motor carrier administration recently published proposed revisions to

its regulations that limit the number of hours that drivers of commercial

motor vehicles are permitted to drive before resting. Under the proposed

rule, the Department estimates that 115 fatigue-related fatalities would be

avoided annually. DOT acknowledged that there was uncertainty

surrounding this estimate. According to motor carrier administration

officials, this estimate is based on two primary assumptions: (1) fatigue is

either a primary or secondary factor in 15 percent of fatal large truck

crashes and (2) long-haul and regional drivers’ (generally, drivers who

travel 75,000 miles or more per year) use of electronic devices that monitor

the number of hours they drive under the proposed rule would result in a

20-percent decrease in the number of fatigue-related crashes. DOT officials

told us that they did not have a firm analytic basis for either assumption

because of the lack of well-defined data on crash causation. Department

officials said they supplemented their review of available research with

their professional judgment to arrive at these assumptions. DOT recognizes
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the uncertainty of its estimates but emphasized that providing drivers with

more time for sleep will lessen fatigue and thereby reduce the number of

fatigue-related crashes. The reasonableness of the Department’s

assumptions and the resulting estimate of the number of lives that could be

saved if the proposed rule is adopted, however, are unknown. If DOT’s

assumptions are unreasonable, then its estimate of the number of lives that

could be saved as a result of adopting the proposed rule could change

markedly. For example, the Department estimated that if adopting

electronic on-board recorders for long-haul and regional drivers resulted in

5 percent, rather than in 20 percent, fewer fatigue-related crashes, then

38—not 115—lives could be saved each year as a result of adopting the

proposed rule.

The Department of Transportation commented on a draft of this report and

characterized it as fair and balanced. The Department suggested several

changes to provide added context, such as discussing the difficulty of

estimating lives saved through its safety initiatives and also made a number

of technical and clarifying comments. We incorporated these changes

where appropriate.

Background According to DOT and industry sources, there are over 500,000 interstate

motor carriers, which utilize about 7.2 million large trucks, and about 9.8

million drivers. In recent years, the numbers of carriers, trucks, and drivers

have been increasing. While the number of truck-related fatalities has

decreased slightly since 1997, it is largely unchanged from a decade ago

(see fig. 1). In addition, the fatality rate—the number of fatalities per 100

million miles traveled by large trucks—has remained fairly constant over

the past several years at about 2.8 deaths per 100 million miles traveled,

after decreasing by over 20 percent between 1989 and 1992.
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Figure 1: Fatalities From Large Truck Crashes and Fatality Rates, 1989-1998

Note: According to preliminary 1999 data, 5,203 people were killed in truck-related crashes in 1999.

Information on fatality rates for 1999 will not be available until this fall.

Source: DOT.

The December 1999 Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act established the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration within DOT. It also authorized

additional funding for grants to state agencies to help ensure compliance

with federal and state motor carrier safety rules (primarily through

roadside inspections and compliance reviews4

), provided additional

enforcement tools and improvements to the commercial driver’s license

program, and required a long-term strategic plan and periodic progress

reports. Other responsibilities of the new administration include collecting

and disseminating safety data concerning motor carriers and identifying,

coordinating, and administering research and development to enhance

motor carrier safety.

DOT’s existing hours of service regulations have been in effect in their

current form since 1962. Under these regulations, commercial motor

4

Compliance reviews are on-site reviews of motor carriers’ compliance with federal safety

regulations.

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Years

Fatalities Fatality rate

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fatalities Fatality rate
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Page 6 GAO/RCED-00-189 Motor Carrier Safety

vehicle drivers in interstate commerce are generally permitted to drive up

to 10 hours after 8 consecutive hours off duty. After being on duty for 15

hours (e.g., 10 hours driving and 5 hours performing nondriving tasks such

as waiting for cargo or loading and unloading cargo), a driver may not drive

without taking 8 consecutive hours off duty. The existing regulations also

provide that if a motor carrier does not operate commercial vehicles every

day of the week, its drivers may not drive more than 60 hours over 7

consecutive days; if the carrier operates commercial motor vehicles every

day, its drivers may not drive more than 70 hours over 8 consecutive days.

The regulations do not require that drivers take uninterrupted time off duty

that would serve as a weekend.

In response to concerns that the current regulations do not provide drivers

with adequate opportunities for sleep (e.g., the 8 hours off duty does not

leave enough time for sleeping, housekeeping on the road, eating, and

recreation) and a statutory mandate to revise the regulations,5 the

Department announced proposed revisions in April 2000 and asked for

public comment.6 The Department believes that the proposed rule is a

major improvement because it is science-based (related to sleep cycles),

allows for an adequate period of sleep, allows for more regular work and

off-duty patterns to coincide with circadian rhythms,7 and reduces the

maximum number of hours a driver can be behind the wheel from 16 to 12

within a 24-hour cycle. As a result, the Department believes that adopting

the proposed rule would result in better-rested, more alert drivers and

would thus reduce fatigue-related fatalities and injuries.

5

The ICC Termination Act of 1995 required the Federal Highway Administration to modify its

existing hours of service regulations to incorporate methods of reducing fatigue-related

incidents such as crashes.

6

The proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on May 2, 2000.

7

A circadian rhythm is a self-sustained biological rhythm that normally has a period of

approximately 24 hours.
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The proposed rule sets different requirements for different types of drivers.

For example, long-haul drivers would have to have at least 10 consecutive

hours off duty in each 24-hour cycle (allowing the opportunity to obtain a

minimum of 8 consecutive hours of sleep daily).8 Of the remaining 14

hours, they would be able to work 12 hours with 2 hours off during the

work shift. Regional drivers would also have to have at least 10 consecutive

hours off duty in each 24-hour period.9 The distinction between driving

time and on-duty time under the existing rules would be eliminated under

DOT’s proposal. Weekly on-duty time (both driving and performing other

work activities, such as loading and unloading and waiting for pickup and

delivery) would be limited to 60 hours during a 7-day period for long-haul

and regional drivers, with a requirement that the drivers have between 32

and 56 consecutive hours off duty at the end of each work week.10 Other

requirements would be set for local drivers (drivers whose primary duties

are other than driving).

There are many ways to meet the work and off-duty requirements under

both the current rules and the proposed rule. Two examples of how the

proposed rule (“new drivers” A and B) and the current rules (“current

drivers” A and B) could be met over the course of 2 days are shown in

figure 2. New driver B is presented with a work/rest pattern that is more in

line with the body’s circadian rhythm than is current driver B.

8

Long-haul drivers are away from their home base for more than 3 days at a time and

generally travel over 100,000 miles a year.

9

Regional drivers are away from their home base 3 or fewer days at a time and generally

travel between 75,000 and 100,000 miles per year.

10The proposed regulations would allow for some variation for long-haul drivers on trips

requiring 2 or more consecutive work weeks away from the normal work reporting location.
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Figure 2: Examples of Drivers’ On-Duty and Off-Duty Requirements Under Existing and Proposed Hours of Service Rules

Source: GAO’s analysis of DOT’s current and proposed rules.

DOT’s Strategy Does

Not Articulate How

Initiatives Will

Contribute to Reducing

Truck-Related

Fatalities

DOT has developed an overall strategy for improving truck safety called the

Safety Action Plan. However, the strategy does not articulate how the

individual initiatives, or specific sets of initiatives, will contribute to

reductions in truck-related fatalities. Nor has the motor carrier

administration determined whether it has the resources to successfully

carry out the initiatives in its plan.

6 a.m.

12 hrs. on 12 hrs. off

5 hrs. load 10 hrs. drive

10 hrs. drive

8 hrs. off

8 hrs. off 8 hrs. off 10 hrs. drive 2 hrs.

off

10 hrs. off 10 hrs. on 12 hrs. off 2 hrs. 

on

24 hours

on duty

in 2 days

24 hours

on duty

in 2 days

32 hours

on duty

in 2 days

30 hours

on duty

in 2 days

4 hrs. on 1 4 hrs. on 1 4 hrs. on

New 

driver A

New 

driver B

Current 

driver A

Current 

driver B

12 hrs. on

9 hrs. drive

15 hrs. on 15 hrs. on

6 hrs. drive 4 hrs. drive

5 hrs. load 8 hrs. off 2 hrs.

on 1

12 hrs. off

noon 6 p.m. midnight 6 a.m.

Day 1 Day 2

noon 6 p.m. midnight
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Page 9 GAO/RCED-00-189 Motor Carrier Safety

DOT Has an Overall

Strategy for Reducing

Fatalities, but It Lacks

Specificity on How

Initiatives Will Contribute to

Reaching DOT’s Goal

The motor carrier administration’s February 2000 Safety Action Plan,

which contains 47 initiatives that are either planned or under way, is the

Department’s blueprint for reducing large-truck-related fatalities. These

initiatives fall within broad categories, including increasing the

enforcement of federal safety regulations; increasing safety awareness;

improving safety information and technology; and improving performance

standards for vehicles, drivers, and motor carriers. According to DOT,

these 47 initiatives represent the most important of its many actions to

reduce truck-related crashes. However, the motor carrier administration

has not articulated how individual initiatives or sets of initiatives contained

in the plan will contribute to reducing truck-related fatalities.11

In our June 1999 report to this Subcommittee, we recommended that DOT

prioritize the initiatives in its draft Safety Action Plan according to the

potential for the initiatives to reduce crashes and deaths.12 During a March

2000 hearing before this Subcommittee, the motor carrier administration’s

acting deputy administrator stated that the plan is a statement of the

agency’s top priorities for the next 3 years and that the highest priority has

been assigned to strengthening targeted enforcement, completing

important rules, improving safety information and technology, and

increasing safety awareness. The motor carrier administration also stated

that it has limited ability to prioritize the initiatives in its Safety Action Plan

according to their potential for reducing truck-related fatalities for two

reasons. First, of the 47 initiatives in the plan, 35 are were mandated by the

Congress, such as establishing consistent nationwide enforcement

penalties (required by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century).

Four of the initiatives stem from recommendations made by the

Department’s Inspector General, our recommendations, and an

independent assessment of DOT’s efforts commissioned by the Secretary of

Transportation (referred to as the Mineta review). The remaining eight

initiatives were established by DOT. The Safety Action Plan gives priority to

the 35 initiatives mandated by the Congress.

Second, the Department does not yet know the extent to which the

initiatives in the plan will contribute to reducing large-truck-related

11Subsequent to the plan’s issuance, DOT published in the Federal Register a proposed

change to its hours of service rule. DOT estimated that 115 lives could be saved each year if

the proposed rule is adopted.

12See GAO/RCED-99-182 and GAO/T-RCED-00-102.
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fatalities. For example, under one of the initiatives, the motor carrier

administration plans to obtain data on the causes of large truck crashes,

analyze them and, ultimately, identify interventions that will have the

greatest impact on reducing these crashes. These efforts, when completed,

would allow the Department to better establish priorities. However, useful

nationwide data resulting from this initiative will not be available until at

least 2003. Also, under the evaluation component of its Safety Action Plan,

the motor carrier administration plans to evaluate the overall effectiveness

of three of its programs for reducing truck-related crashes and

fatalities—the roadside inspection program, the compliance review

program, and the traffic enforcement program. However, according to a

motor carrier administration official, for many of the initiatives in the

Safety Action Plan, the Department does not have a plan for evaluating

their effectiveness toward reducing truck-related fatalities.

DOT said that, because very little useful information exists on crash

causation, it is difficult for the Department to quantify how many lives

would be saved by a specific initiative. For example, the Department has no

way of accurately predicting how many fatalities would be avoided by

increasing the number of roadside inspections conducted annually from

about 2 million (the current level) to, say, 2.5 million. We agree that the

scarcity of information on crash causation will pose substantial

impediments to determining the degree to which the initiatives will reduce

fatalities. However, as this information becomes available over the next

several years, the motor carrier administration will be in a better position

to take action on our recommendation to prioritize its activities. We also

recognize that estimates of lives saved carry with them some degree of

uncertainty; however, we continue to maintain that the motor carrier

administration is better served by focusing on those activities (or sets of

interrelated activities) with the greatest potential to save lives even if the

estimate of that potential is considered “rough.” Our view is consistent with

the Department’s recent action to propose revisions to drivers’ hours of

service rules, the safety impact of which the Department acknowledges is

subject to uncertainty. (The uncertainty of the safety impact of the

Department’s proposed hours of service rule is discussed later in this

report.) Finally, we disagree with the Department that it has little flexibility

in deciding which initiatives to carry out. If the Department can

substantiate that one or more of its initiatives are likely to make marginal

or no contribution to improved safety, it can seek legislative changes.
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DOT Has Still Not

Determined Whether It Has

the Budgetary and Human

Resources to Carry Out Its

Safety Action Plan

We reported in June 1999 that DOT’s Safety Action Plan did not address

whether the Department had sufficient resources to carry out the plan

successfully. For example, in promotional material, the motor carrier

administration cited one of its initiatives—the Performance and

Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) program—as its

premier enforcement program.13 According to a motor carrier

administration official, the administration had allocated about half of its

information systems budget to this program. However, it had allocated few

people to the program. Because the Safety Action Plan is a significant

undertaking, we recommended that DOT only undertake those activities

that it was reasonably sure that it could complete within available

budgetary and human resources.

The motor carrier administration has not yet prepared multiyear estimates

of the resources it is likely to need to carry out its Safety Action Plan but

plans to do so. In response to requirements in the Motor Carrier Safety

Improvement Act of 1999 and the Government Performance and Results

Act of 1993,14 the motor carrier administration has prepared an annual

performance plan15 that contains, among other things, estimates of the

resources it needs for fiscal year 2001. According to the head of the motor

carrier administration’s strategic planning unit, the motor carrier

administration will assess current and future resource requirements for

fiscal years 2001 through 2010 as part of its strategic planning process.16

13PRISM links state motor vehicle registration and licensing programs with DOT’s

commercial vehicle safety efforts and is intended to improve safety by providing states with

information that would allow them to suspend or revoke registrations for motor carriers

with poor safety performance.

14The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires that executive agencies

prepare multiyear strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance

reports. The strategic plans are to include a mission statement, general goals and objectives,

and the strategies the agency will use to achieve those goals and objectives.

15Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan (Feb.

2000).

16The strategic plan is expected to contain a plan and schedule for, among other things,

reducing the number and rates of crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving commercial

motor vehicles and numeric or measurable goals that would enable the motor carrier

administration to assess its progress toward accomplishing its goals for large truck safety.

Typically, a strategic plan would be prepared before an annual performance plan. However,

because the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act was recently enacted, the agency

prepared the fiscal year 2001 annual performance plan even though a strategic plan has not

yet been developed.
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The motor carrier administration expects to complete a draft of this plan by

this fall and to issue the final plan around the end of this calendar year.

DOT said that its budget request to the Congress for fiscal year 2001

contains adequate funds and staffing to carry out the Safety Action Plan in

the coming year. In addition, DOT said that publication of the plan indicates

that the motor carrier administration plans to complete all 47 initiatives.

Despite the assurance that the Department has estimated its 1-year needs,

we find it troubling that DOT did not determine whether it is likely to have

the resources over the long term to successfully carry out its Safety Action

Plan before adopting the plan. For example, an activity that is relatively

inexpensive at its outset could have significantly greater costs when it is

fully implemented in later years. In addition, DOT has set itself a very

ambitious goal of reducing fatalities related to crashes involving trucks by

50 percent over 10 years. To achieve this goal, DOT must make over 20

times the annual progress it has made over the past decade. By not

determining whether it can reasonably expect to have the resources to

carry out its plan, DOT could be making a very difficult goal harder to

achieve. We are encouraged that the motor carrier administration has

indicated that it will ultimately carry out our recommendation.

The Motor Carrier

Administration Has

Acted to Improve

Truck Safety

The motor carrier administration has taken some initial steps toward

improving truck safety. These include improved accountability for motor

carrier safety within DOT; increases in DOT’s enforcement and compliance

activities; and progress made on some individual initiatives in response to

recommendations made by us and by the Department’s Inspector General.
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New Modal Administration

Established With More

Focused Accountability

To meet the requirements of the December 1999 act, in early January 2000,

the Secretary of Transportation approved the organizational structure for a

new administration within DOT. The Secretary installed the former Acting

Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety as the Acting Chief Safety

Officer and, in May 2000, the Secretary appointed an Acting Deputy

Administrator for the motor carrier administration. Also, staff members are

serving in all office director positions on a permanent or acting basis. The

remaining staff of the motor carrier administration have been transferred

from its predecessor organization. Currently, the agency is operating at

previously established funding and staffing levels and receives

administrative support from the Federal Highway Administration.17

The establishment of the motor carrier administration within DOT

enhances accountability and visibility for motor carrier safety because its

primary function is safety and it has been placed on a par with other modal

administrations within the Department. Moreover, the agency’s new

organizational structure—which features an Associate Administrator for

Enforcement and Program Delivery (currently, the position is vacant) and

an Office Director for Enforcement and Compliance (currently, the position

is filled on an “acting” basis)—supports a greater emphasis on enforcement

and compliance. In contrast to its predecessor organization, which was

within the Federal Highway Administration, field operations now receive

instructions directly from the Associate Administrator for Enforcement

and Program Delivery, increasing accountability and reducing the potential

for conflicting instructions. In addition, beginning in fiscal year 2001, the

agency will have attorneys and support staff in four regional service

centers whose sole responsibility will be to enforce compliance with truck

safety regulations. Previously, these attorneys performed legal work,

including truck safety work, for the Federal Highway Administration as a

whole.

17The 1999 Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act prohibits the motor carrier administration

from increasing, before fiscal year 2001, the number of headquarters staff beyond the

number transferred from the Federal Highway Administration in fiscal year 2000.
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However, we have stated that to achieve real and lasting progress, it will be

important for DOT to demonstrate to the Congress and to the public that it

can follow through on its efforts over the long term to achieve significant

measurable improvements in motor carrier safety.18 Currently, several key

leadership positions, including the Administrator and four Associate

Administrators, are unfilled.19 The longer it takes DOT to fill these positions

with able leaders, the more difficult it will be for the agency to accomplish

the challenging goals it has before it.

The Motor Carrier

Administration Is Increasing

Its Enforcement Activity

The motor carrier administration is presently carrying out 10 initiatives

under the Safety Action Plan to increase the level of compliance among

high-risk motor carriers with federal safety regulations. Many of these

initiatives stem from criticisms by this Subcommittee and DOT’s Inspector

General and from recent legislative changes. In addition, in response to

these criticisms, the motor carrier administration has increased its

compliance and enforcement activities. In April 1999, DOT issued guidance

to its enforcement and compliance staff responsible for truck safety that

called for increasing (1) the number of compliance reviews (from two to an

average of four or five per month) that each staff member would be

expected to conduct and (2) the civil penalties assessed for violations of

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, in accordance with the

Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. For example, DOT

increased the number of federal compliance reviews at motor carrier

offices by about 30 percent—from 5,147 in fiscal year 1998 to 6,654 in fiscal

year 1999. During the same period, the number of enforcement cases that

generally stem from compliance reviews rose from 2,444 to 2,899—an

increase of nearly 20 percent. Also, the amount of civil penalties assessed

per case increased by about 40 percent from an average of $3,750 in fiscal

year 1998 to an average of $5,241 for the second quarter of fiscal year 2000.

18GAO/T-RCED-00-102.

19The four Associate Administrators are for administration; research, technology, and

information management; policy and program development; and enforcement and program

delivery.
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Efforts Are Being

Undertaken to Improve

Safety Information and

Technology

DOT also appears to be making progress with its initiatives on improving

safety information and technology. For example, under its Large Truck

Crash Causation Project, which is intended to result in a national database

on the causes and contributing factors of large truck crashes, DOT has

studied the feasibility of conducting the project and has selected four pilot

sites to test its data-gathering methodology. The pilot program is expected

to begin this July, with the full test (24 sites) expected to begin in January

2001. The motor carrier administration views this project to be essential to

reaching DOT’s long-term goal because the database would allow it to

develop and implement countermeasures to reduce the occurrence and

severity of large truck crashes. As we reported to this Subcommittee last

year, having timely, reliable, and sufficiently detailed information about the

causes of these crashes is essential for developing and implementing truck

safety strategies.20 A separate effort is under way to increase the accuracy

and timeliness of information reported by states on truck crashes. This

information will enhance DOT’s ability to target problem carriers based on

crash occurrence.

The Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN)

program, another initiative for improving safety information and

technology, is intended to provide enforcement officials with greater

access to current safety and interstate credentials information (e.g.,

liability insurance and vehicle titling), the ability to better target problem

carriers and commercial motor vehicles, and the ability to check carriers’

safety and credentials history at the time of registration. The motor carrier

administration’s overall goal is to have CVISN deployed in a majority of the

states by September 2003. To date, three states are expected to complete

initial deployment by the end of fiscal year 2000; two states are expected to

achieve initial deployment by the end of fiscal year 2001; and another five

states are in various stages of completing deployment. In addition, 20 states

are participating in a series of workshops designed to provide them with

information on how to implement and deploy the CVISN program in their

states. The motor carrier administration plans to have at least 16 of these

20 states reach the initial deployment stage by 2003.

20GAO/RCED-99-182.
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The Motor Carrier

Administration Has

Considered Others’

Views on Its Activities

In March 1999, the Department released its draft Safety Action Plan. The

administration sought comments on the draft from 49 organizations

representing a wide range of interests in the motor carrier industry,

including associations representing truck drivers, carriers, insurance firms,

law enforcement, the motorcoach industry, and safety advocates. Nine

organizations provided a wide range of written comments on the draft

plan.21 We found that for most of the issues raised by organizations that

commented on the draft plan, the Department made changes to the plan to

address those comments.

Of the nine organizations that submitted written comments, four were

safety advocacy organizations; the others represented the trucking

industry, commercial truck drivers, the motorcoach industry, law

enforcement, and engineering. These organizations’ overall opinions of the

draft plan ranged from praise to condemnation. To a greater or lesser

extent, they all suggested changes.

The motor carrier administration released a revised Safety Action Plan in

February 2000 that contained many changes as a result of the comments it

received on the draft plan. For example, a commercial passenger carrier

organization had commented that the draft plan did not reflect the

differences between trucks and buses. In response, the motor carrier

administration modified its plan by including several specific actions and

references to the commercial passenger carrier industry. As part of an

initiative to increase enforcement of high-risk motor carriers, for instance,

the motor carrier administration included a task to develop a new

methodology for gathering information on commercial passenger

operations (e.g., buses). Also, in response to comments received from a law

enforcement organization, the motor carrier administration added a

section to the plan describing truck safety initiatives at the border with

Canada. Officials from the law enforcement organization told us that they

felt that all of their comments had been addressed in the plan.

Other organizations, however, did not believe that their comments were

adequately addressed. For example, one safety advocacy organization

stated that the revised plan inadequately addresses a variety of issues,

21To find out why more organizations did not provide comments, we contacted five

organizations that did not submit comments on the draft plan. These organizations told us

that they either had no problems with the plan, did not recall seeing the draft plan, or could

not take the time to submit comments.
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including the rating of motor carriers on safety performance, the amount of

time needed to acquire safety data, and the need for more new safetyrelated technology.

The Impact of the

Proposed Rule on

Safety Depends Largely

on the Validity of Key

Assumptions

In May 2000, the motor carrier administration published proposed changes

to the current regulations that limit the number of hours operators of large

trucks are permitted to drive before resting. The motor carrier

administration estimates that the proposed rule would result in 115 fewer

fatigue-related fatalities each year.22 DOT acknowledged that this estimate

was subject to uncertainty. According to motor carrier administration

officials, this estimate was based on two critical assumptions: (1) that 15

percent of truck-related fatal crashes are fatigue-related and (2) that the

proposed rule would reduce fatigue-related deaths by 20 percent annually

for those carriers that are required to install electronic on-board recorders.

We found, from discussions with motor carrier administration officials, that

DOT supplemented its review of the information on truck crashes with its

judgment in quantifying these two assumptions.23

The Estimate for the

Percentage of FatigueRelated Fatalities Was

Based on Research and

Professional Judgment

According to motor carrier administration officials, to establish the

baseline estimate for the percentage of large-truck-related fatal crashes

that involve a fatigued truck driver, the motor carrier administration,

among other things, reviewed several studies on the number of such

crashes and analyzed differences in the estimates. Overall, these estimates

ranged from a low of 0.24 percent (from police accident reports) to a high

of 40 percent (from a study of single vehicle crashes at night). DOT officials

believed that neither figure represented a reasonable amount. We were told

that DOT officials relied on a report that indicates that the amount of large

22As discussed in this section, DOT estimated that the number of fatigue-related fatalities

annually were 298, 215, and 242, respectively, for long-haul, regional, and all other drivers.

DOT estimated that its rule would result in a 20-percent reduction in fatalities for long-haul

and regional drivers (because of the adoption of electronic on-board recorders) and a 5-

percent reduction for all other drivers. Thus, (0.2)(298) + (0.2)(215) + (0.05)(242) = 115. The

motor carrier administration also estimates that the proposed changes would avoid 2,995

injuries annually and would result in discounted benefits of $6.8 billion, discounted costs of

$3.4 billion, and discounted net benefits of $3.4 billion.

23We did not review the research on which DOT based its rulemaking or how DOT

interpreted it and applied its findings. As a result, we did not assess the merits of its efforts

or whether the judgments it applied were reasonable in estimating the expected safety

impact of the proposed rule.
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truck crashes that involve fatigue range from 2.8 to 6.1 percent and, based

on their professional judgment, selected the midpoint—4.5 percent.

In addition, DOT officials believed that other crashes may have been the

indirect result of fatigue. For example, we were told that research suggests

that about 25 to 50 percent of fatal crashes involved “recognition failure”

(e.g., inattention or “looked but did not see”). In these cases, DOT reasoned

that fatigue may have indirectly contributed to the crashes. Using their

professional judgment, DOT officials estimated that 10 percent of fatal

crashes were indirectly related to fatigue. DOT then summed the

percentages of crashes estimated to be directly (4.5 percent) and indirectly

(10 percent) caused by fatigue and added 0.5 percent (to round up to a

whole number) to arrive at its estimate of 15 percent as the proportion of

fatal large truck crashes that are related to fatigue.

Using 5,035 as the number of people who die each year in large-truckrelated crashes, the motor carrier administration estimated that about 755

of the deaths (15 percent of 5,035) involved fatigue.24 Of these 755 largetruck-related fatalities, the motor carrier administration estimates that 298

involved long-haul truck drivers, 215 involved regional truck drivers, and

242 involved other types of truck drivers (e.g., local drivers).25

The Effect of Proposed

Electronic On-Board

Recorder Requirement Was

Based on DOT Officials’

Professional Judgment

The second key assumption underlying the estimated number of fatalities

that would be avoided under the proposed rule is that long-haul and

regional truck drivers would experience a 20-percent decrease in fatalities

annually (compared with a 5-percent decrease for other types of truck

drivers covered by the rule). DOT believes that long-haul and regional

drivers will experience a greater decrease in the number of fatalities

because the new rule would require them to have their trucks equipped

with electronic on-board recorders that monitor the number of hours they

drive.26 The Department believes that the on-board recorders will allow

24The Department derived 5,035 by multiplying the number of trucks involved in fatal

crashes, 4,577 (from the Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents database, 1991-1996), times

1.1—the ratio of fatalities to fatal crashes between 1988 and 1997.

25The motor carrier administration allocated the 755 truck-related fatalities among these

three groups based on information obtained from the Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents

database, which contains information on, among other things, truck trip distances.

26DOT estimated that the on-board recorder requirement would cost the industry about $1

billion over 10 years.
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enforcement personnel, such as state police, to determine whether a driver

has violated the hours of service rule. As a result, the motor carrier

administration believes that long-haul and regional truck drivers are more

likely to comply with the Department’s hours of service regulations and, in

turn, have fewer fatigue-related fatal crashes.

Motor carrier administration officials told us that there is little research

and on-road testing on which to base an estimate of the safety impact of

requiring on-board recorders. However, they cited surveys of drivers that

found that 40 to 75 percent of drivers may have violated the hours of

service rules, depending on the definition of violation used. Moreover, they

stated that while the proposed rule will not eliminate hours of service

violations, the use of electronic on-board recorders will make violations

more difficult to mask. DOT did not have an analytic basis for its estimate

but used its judgment to designate a 20-percent reduction in fatalities as

resulting from the requirement that electronic on-board recorders be

installed on certain large trucks. DOT officials told us that DOT believed

the 20-percent amount to be “in the ballpark,” given its findings about

potentially widespread violations of the current hours of service rules.

The Expected Decrease in

the Number of FatigueRelated Fatalities Is

Sensitive to the

Assumptions Chosen

DOT acknowledged that its estimate of the number of fatalities that would

be avoided as a result of the proposed rule is difficult to predict because of

the lack of definitive data on crash causation. DOT assessed how estimates

of lives saved could change if different assumptions were used. For

example, if the assumption for the percentage of fatal large truck crashes

that involve fatigue was 7.5 percent rather than 15 percent, the estimated

number of fatalities avoided annually would be reduced to 48 instead of

115. Similarly, if long-haul and regional truck drivers experience the same

amount of decline in fatal fatigue-related crashes as that expected of other

truck drivers (5 percent), the number of fatalities avoided annually would

only be 38—a 67-percent decrease from the estimate of 115.

Industry and Safety

Representatives Have

Criticized DOT’s Safety

Impact Estimate

Industry and safety representatives are critical of DOT’s estimates of the

expected safety impacts of the proposed rule. For example, representatives

of a trucking industry association we spoke with believe that the estimate

of 15 percent of fatal truck crashes being fatigue-related is too high. They

assert that studies show that less than 15 percent of these crashes are

related to fatigue. Moreover, these officials believe that, with the exception

of drivers who drive more than 14 hours per day, the electronic on-board

recorders will not lead to greater compliance with the hours of service
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regulations and, therefore, will have little impact on safety. As a result, the

officials believe that the motor carrier administration has overestimated

the number of fatalities that will be avoided under the proposed rule.

Furthermore, officials representing motorcoach operators (primarily bus

companies) told us that that the motor carrier administration included the

motorcoach industry in the proposed rule, along with the trucking industry,

without taking into account that the motorcoach industry has a small

number of fatal accidents annually and even fewer that are related to

fatigue. Moreover, these officials told us that the proposal is based on scant

motorcoach research; however, it is likely to have significant costs for the

industry.

A representative of a safety advocacy group also raised concerns about the

limited justification the motor carrier administration provided to support

its baseline estimate of the percentage of fatal truck crashes that involve a

fatigued truck driver and its estimate of the safety benefit that would result

from requiring trucks driven by long-haul and regional drivers to be

equipped with electronic on-board recorders. Although DOT’s proposed

rule emphasizes rest, officials representing safety advocacy groups also

expressed concern about the proposal to permit truck drivers to drive more

hours consecutively (e.g., up to 12 within a 24-hour period) despite some

research that indicates that driving performance decreases after 8 to 10

hours of driving.

DOT emphasized that providing drivers with more time for sleep will lessen

fatigue and thereby reduce the number of fatigue-related crashes.

Recognizing the uncertainty associated with its estimates of the expected

safety impacts of its proposed rule, the agency is seeking comments on all

of these estimates as part of the process of moving forward to a final hours

of service rule.

Revisions to the Department’s hours of service rules are clearly an

important part of its goal for reducing truck-related fatalities. They are

important because the expected number of lives to be saved if the

proposed rule is adopted represents nearly half of the annual reduction in

fatalities that must be achieved to reduce truck-related fatalities by 50

percent by 2009. The Department has recognized the uncertainty

surrounding its estimates of the safety benefits of its proposed rule and has

asked for comments on the reasonableness of these estimates.27 Attaining

27The comment period closes October 30, 2000.
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additional insights could be useful to the Department in understanding the

expected benefits from revising the existing hours of service rules.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report

for its review and comment. We met with the Director of the motor carrier

administration’s Office of Policy, Plans, and Regulations, who provided us

with comments. Overall DOT stated that the draft report was fair and

balanced. DOT had three overarching comments. First, it believed that the

report should reflect the fact that estimating the prospective impact of its

Safety Action Plan initiatives on reducing truck-related fatalities would be a

very difficult task. Second, our report should recognize that the

Department has requested adequate resources to carry out its Safety Action

Plan initiatives in fiscal year 2001 and that, by publishing the plan, it has

stated its intent to carry out the actions described in the plan. Third, DOT

recognized the uncertainty of its estimates of fatality reductions contained

in its proposed hours of service rule and that this uncertainty stems from a

lack of well-defined data on crash causation. However, the Department

believes that increasing the time available for truck drivers to sleep will

lessen fatigue and therefore save lives. DOT also said one of the expressed

purposes of its notice of proposed rulemaking was to seek comments on its

fatality reduction estimates. We incorporated these comments into this

final report. In addition, the Department offered a number of technical and

clarifying comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information on the Department’s overall strategy for reducing

fatalities related to crashes involving large trucks by 50 percent by 2009 and

on the actions DOT is currently undertaking to reduce the number of these

fatalities, we reviewed the motor carrier administration’s February 2000

Safety Action Plan, which covers the period 2000-2003, the fiscal year 2001

Performance Plan, and other available documentation. We also interviewed

motor carrier administration officials, including the Office Director, Policy,

Plans, and Regulations and the Acting Office Director, Enforcement and

Compliance. To obtain information on the views of the highway safety

community and the motor carrier industry, we reviewed their written

comments on the draft Safety Action Plan and interviewed officials of

several of those organizations. Organizations that we contacted for this and

other portions of our work were Common Cause, Advocates for Highway
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Page 22 GAO/RCED-00-189 Motor Carrier Safety

Safety, the American Trucking Associations, the National Private Truck

Council, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the United Motorcoach

Association, and the American Bus Association.

To obtain information on the bases the motor carrier administration used

for estimating the safety impact of its proposed revisions to the regulations

governing the amount of time drivers of commercial motor vehicles are

permitted to drive before resting, we reviewed the notice of proposed

rulemaking for hours of service for commercial motor vehicle operators

and the preliminary regulatory evaluation for the proposed rule. In

addition, we interviewed motor carrier administration officials responsible

for developing the rule and preparing the estimate of the number of

fatalities that are expected to be avoided annually under the proposal. We

also interviewed representatives of the industry and the safety community

to obtain their views on the bases the motor carrier administration used to

develop its estimate of the impact that its proposed rule will have on safety.

We performed our work from November 1999 though July 2000 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees and

subcommittees responsible for transportation issues; the Honorable

Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the Honorable Clyde Hart,

acting Deputy Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration;

the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and

other interested parties. We will make copies available to others on request.
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Page 23 GAO/RCED-00-189 Motor Carrier Safety

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me

at (202) 512-2834. Key contributors to this report were Leonard Ellis, James

Ratzenberger, and Charles E. Wilson, Jr.

Sincerely yours,

Phyllis F. Scheinberg

Associate Director,

Transportation Issues

(348199) Letr
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