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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-2587

T OM B E U X I ON G

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J E NN I F E R A. F I S C H E R

, et al ., Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Western Di stric t o f Wi sconsi n. No. 3: 13 -cv-00 41 8-jd p — Jame s D. Pe te rson, Judg e.

A RGU E D D E C E MB E R 8, 2014

— D E C I D E D M A Y 18, 2015

Before B AUE R and H AMI L TON , Circ uit Judges, and E L L I S , District Judge. *
B AU E R , Cir cui t Judge. Plainti ff- appellant, T om Beu Xiong (“Xi ong”), i s a former employee of defendant-appell ee, Dane County Department of Human Ser vic es (“the Department”), and for mer member o f t he defendant-app e l l ee, Dane Co unty

The Hono rab l e S ar a L

. E l l i s, of the Uni ted States Distri ct Co urt fo r the * Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, si tting by desi gna tio n.2 No. 14-2587
Professi onal So ci al W

or ker s, Local 2634, AFS CME, AFL-CIO (“the Uni on” ). X i ong appeals the di smi ssal of hi s clai ms of breach of duty of fai r repr e sentation again st the Uni on and breach of collecti v e bargaining a gr eement again st the Departm e nt, as w ell as v arious consti tutional clai ms again st Xi on g’s supervis or

, Jenni fer Fis cher (“Fi sch er”), the Uni on , an d the Department (collectiv ely “the defendants”). W e affi rm. I. BACKGRO UND Thi s case arise s out of the defendants’ behavi or tow ard Xiong before a nd after he w as ter minated from hi s jo b as a seni or clini cal soci al w or ker

. Xiong began w or kin g for the Department as a soci al w or k e r in 1990, serving prim arily the elderly and physi cally di sabled individu als. As a memb er of the Uni on, he w as cov ered by a collecti v e bargaining agr eement (“CBA”) that prov i ded, among ot he r t hings, that the Uni on w ould assi st and repr esent e mp loy ees thro ughout the pre-di sci plinary

, gr i ev ance, and terminati on pro cess es. In May 2012, Xiong’s supervis or , Fis cher , lear ne d that Xiong h a d c om m i tte d s i gni fi cant w or k rule violati ons. Notably , Fis cher di scov ered that Xiong had forg e d he r si gnature on a numb er of documents, called in si ck to w or k after Fis cher had explic i tly deni ed hi s requests to be e x cu sed, fai led to meet deadlines or complete pape r w or k relat ed to an upcoming audi t, a tte nded di v or ce proceedings during w or k tim e wi thout authorizati on, and mov ed a cli ent fr o m one fami ly home to another wi thout completing the required paperw o r k

. As a result, Fis cher sent a lette r to Xiong on May 22, 2012, indi cating that she had concerns relat ed to hi s employment and requesting hi s presen ce at a pre-di sci plinary meetin g scheduled forNo. 14-2587 3 May 24, 2012. The lette r i denti fi ed si x areas of concern and nine
w or k rules tha t Fi s che r beli ev ed Xiong had brok en. Fis cher also informed Xiong that, d ue to the nature of the concerns and potent i al violati ons, he w ould hav e an oppor tuni ty to respond t o t he allegations again st hi m and to hav e a repr esentativ e from the Uni on present at t he meetin g. Fis cher sent copi es of the lette r to her supervis or s, inclu ding Theresa Sanders (“Sanders”), Fr an Genter (“Genter”), and the Di recto r of the Department, Lynn Green (“Green”), as w ell as the Presi dent of the Union, Kate Grav el (“Grav el”).
Havin g take n unauthorized leav e on May 22 and 23, Xiong di d not receive Fis cher’s lette r unt i l he arr i v ed at w or k on Ma y 2 4

. How ev er

, he di scu ssed the lette r’s accu sati ons wi th Grav el by phone on May 23 and informed her t hat h e wi shed to hav e a Uni on repr esentativ e present at the pre-di sci plinary meetin g. On May 24, 2012, Xiong atte nded the pre-di sci plinary meetin g a ccompani ed by hi s uni on stew ard, Sue DeBuh r (“DeBu hr”), at whi ch Fis cher a nd Sanders lai d out their

concerns w i th Xiong’s behav i or
. When g i v en the oppo rtuni ty t o r espond, Xiong admi tte d to each of the allegations again st hi m. Fis cher also di scu ssed Xiong’s recent fai lur e t o pass the 2012 Long T

erm Care Functi onal Screen T est, pass age of whi ch

w as required to maintain X i ong’s certifi cati on as a soci al

w o r k er
. Xiong had take n the test in Mar ch 2012 and receiv ed

a fai ling score of 67 percent. G reen had contacted the Wi sconsin Department of Health Ser vic es (“DH S”) after learnin g of Xiong’s fai ling score and ask e d DHS to permi t Xiong to complete a plan of corr ecti on. DHS deni ed Green’s request on May 10, 2012, ci tin g a new poli cy establi shed by the s tate that prohibi ted indi vidu als who scored less than 70 percent on the4 No. 14-2587
func tional s creen test fro m taking r emedi al measu res. Consequently , by the tim e of hi s pre-di sci plinary meetin g on May 24, Xiong w as no longer certifi ed to per form a subs tantial part o f hi s w or k wi th the Depart ment. A w eek after the meetin g, Xiong receiv ed a lette r , si gned by Fis cher , inf o rming hi m that he had been ter minated. It i s undi sputed that Fis cher di d not hav e the authority under the Dane County Ci vil Ser vic e Or dinance to make the dec i si on to fi re Xiong. R ather

, thi s po w er i s held by those who are desi gnated as “appointing authoriti es” under the or dinance; in thi s case, that person w as Green. Fis cher testifi ed at her deposi tion that she personally consu lted wi th three lev els of management prior to deli v erin g Xiong’s ter minati on notic e: her di rect supervis or

, Sanders; Sanders’ supervis or , Genter; and t he Employ ee Relations department. She also testifi ed tha t sh e gav e Genter the lette r and receiv ed hi s approv al before the ter minati on meeting wi th Xiong. As w e wi ll di scu ss b elow , i t i s not clear at whi ch poin t Green authorized the deci si on t o ter minate Xiong, but Green w as copi ed on the lette r of ter mination a nd Xiong admi ts that Genter told the Uni on that the deci si on to ter minate Xiong w as made “f ar abov e” hi m. Under t he ter ms of the CBA betw een the Union andDane County (“the County”), employ ees may only be ter minated for goo d cause
. A n employ ee wi shing to challen ge adv erse employment acti ons may do so by either following the gr i evance pr ocess outlined in the CBA or using t he appeals pro cedure establi shed by the Dane County Ci vil Ser vic e Or dinance. Xiong chose to challen ge hi s te rm in a ti on under the CBA, whi ch sets out a four -step process. At St ep 1 , the employ ee and the Uni on take up the gr i ev ance or ally wit h t he employ ee’s fi rstNo. 14-2587 5
l ine of supervis i on. If the parties are unabl e to come t o a mutually sati sfac tor y deci si on, the employ ee or t he U ni on
mov es on to the seco nd st e p o f the process. At St ep 2, the employ ee or the Uni on presents the gr i ev ance in wri tin g to the department head—in thi s case, Green. If the matter is not resolv ed there , t he employ ee or the Uni on may adv ance the gr i ev ance to St ep 3, whi ch inv olv es presentin g the gr i ev ance to the County Executi v e or desi gnee. Fin ally , i f the gr i ev a nc e i s not sett led at the thi rd s tep, the Uni on m ay tak e the matt er t o arbi tr ation. I n o r d e r for the Uni on to pursue thi s fourth step, how ev er , members of the Uni on’s bargaining uni t mus t v ote to do so. After bypassing the fi rst tw o steps o f t he griev ance procedure, the Uni on began Xiong’s appeal at St ep 3 of the process. At a hearin g be fo r e T rav i s Myr en, the Dane County Chi ef Admini strat i ve Offi cer and Di recto r of Admini strat i on, the Uni on presented arg uments in Xiong’s defense and requested that he be sus pended, r a t he r than ter minated. Myr en, ci tin g
concerns that Xiong w as no longer certifi ed to perfor m hi s jo b duti es and finding that hi s w or k rule violati ons repr esented a “gr oss violat io n o f tr ust,” deni ed the appeal. Faced wi th the deci si on of whether to pursue arbi tr ation, the Uni on board met wi th Xiong a nd allow ed hi m to present hi s si de of the gr i evance once more. Ultim ately , the Uni on board v ote d unani

mo u s ly n ot to a rb i tr ate Xiong’s case. After rej ecting a sev erance and benefi ts offer by the County in exchange for dropping the gr i ev ance, Xiong fi led the underlyin g acti on again st the Uni on, the Department, and F i sch er
. At the close of di scov ery , the parties fi led cross motions for

sum mary judgment. As a prelim inary matter , the di stric t court6 No. 14-2587
noted that Xiong did not follow local court r ules. Pursuant to these rules, i f a nonmoving party di sputes a fact, the nonmovin g p a r t y mus t state i ts own v ersi on of the fact and supp or t thatv ersi on wi th evidenc e. See Rule II(D), Procedure to be Follo w ed on M o t i ons for Summary Judgment (W .D. Wi s.). Although Xiong li sted the defendants’ facts that he agr eed wi th, he di d not respond to a numbe r o f other s in accordance wi th thi s local rule. The court found that X io ng ’ s non-response to certain propo sed findings of fact sub mi tte d by the defendants fai led to r ai se a genuine di spute and accepted

as undi sputed all o f the defendants’ propo sed facts. The di stric t co ur t gr anted the defendants’ motions for sum mary judgment. Thi s appeal follow ed. II. ANAL

YSIS Xiong contends that the di stric t court err oneously gr anted

sum mary judgment in fav or of Fis ch e r , the Department, and the Union. W

e rev i ew thi s grant de novo , view ing all evidenc e in the li ght most fav or able to the nonmoving party ; sum mary judgment wi ll be upheld i f the recor d r e veals “no genuine i ssu e of material fact and the mov ant i s entitled to judgment as
a matter of law

.” Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 56(a); Anderson v
. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A. Breach of the Duty ofFair Represen tati on Xiong alleges that the Uni on fai led to fulfi ll i ts duty to fai rly repr esent hi m thro ughout th e g r i ev ance process when i t bypassed steps 1 and 2 of the gr i ev ance process and refused to take hi s gr i ev ance t o a r bitrat i on. It i s w ell-establi shed that l abor uni ons ow e a duty of fai r repr esentation to their me mbers. See Clark v
. Hein -W arner Corp., 99 N.W

.2d 132, 136–37No. 14-2587 7 (Wi s. 1959) (holding that uni ons hav e an imp l ie d fi duci ary duty of fai r repr esentation); Mahnke v
. W is. Emp’t Relations Co mm
. , 2 2 5 N.W

.2d 617 (Wi s. 1975) (adoptin g federal prec e d e nt in analyzing clai ms fo r br e ach of the duty of fai r repr esentation, as art i culated in V aca v
. Sipes , 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)) ; V aca, 386 U.S. at 182 (explaining that the duty of fai r repr esentation serv es as a “bulwark to prev ent arbi tr ary uni on conduc t again st individu als str i pped o f t raditi onal forms of redr ess”)

. How ev er

, uni on s a re a ffor ded consi derable latitude and a wi de range of reasonab leness in deci ding whether to pursue a gr i ev ance thro ugh arbi tr atio n. Mahnke, 225 N.W .2d at 622 (ci tin g Humphrey v
. Moo re, 375 U.S. 355 (1964))

. Accordingly , a uni on’s deci si on to refuse to process or pursue an employ ee’s gr i ev a nc e any further breaches i ts duty of fai r repr esentation “o nl y when a uni on’s conduc t tow ard a member of the collecti v e bargaining uni t i s arbi tr ary , di scri minator y or in bad fai th.” Mahnke, 225 N.W .2d at 622 (quoting V

aca, 386 U.S. at 190). Xiong’s clai m that the Uni on’s decisio n to bypass steps 1 and 2 and proceed di rectly to St ep 3 w as arbi tr ary i s unpersuasi v e. Whether the Uni on a c te d a rb i tr a ri ly “requires inqui ry into the objectiv e adequacy of uni on acti on.” Serv

. Emps. Int’l Union Local No. 150 v
. W

is. Emp’t R e lations Comm. , 791 N.W .2d 662, 668 (Wi s. Ct. App. 2010) (ci tin g T rnka v
. L oc al Union No. 688, United Auto ., Aerospace & Agric. Implement W orkers , 30 F .3d 60, 63 (7th Ci r . 1994)). See also S erv
. Emps. Int’l Union, 791 N.W .2d at 669 (ci tin g Airlin e Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v
. O’Nei ll , 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) for the propo si tion that a “uni on’s acti ons are arbi tr ary only i f, in li ght of the factual and legal landsc ape at the tim e of the uni on’s acti ons, the union’s behavi or i s so far outsi de a8 No. 14-2587
‘wi de range of reasonableness’ as to be i rr ational”)

. The recor d ind icates t hat the Uni on often proceeded di rectly to St ep 3 in
cases where the fi rst tw o le vel s o f rev i ew had already been invol ved in the di sci plinary deci si on. Here, the Uni on deter

mined that the best course of acti on w as to bypass steps 1 and 2 becau se the ind iv i duals who w ould process Xiong’s gr i evance at each of those respecti v e stages, Fis cher and Green, had already made a final deci si on reg ardin g Xiong’s ter minati on and w ere unli kely to change course on appeal. Thi s conclu si on
w as info r med by the Uni on’s fi rst-hand knowledge of the ci rcums tances surrounding Xiong’s ter minati on: not only w as the Uni on present during Fis cher’s pre-di sci plinary mee t ing wi th Xi ong—where X i ong admi tte d to the allegations again st hi m—bu t the Uni on w as told by Genter , one of Fis cher’s superi or s, that the matter w as out of hi s hands and the deci si on to ter minate Xiong had been made “far ab ov e” hi m. Based on thi s information, i t w as reasonable for the Uni on to beli ev e that pursuing steps 1 and 2 w ould be unproducti v e, and to appeal the matter di rectly to the County’ s Di recto r of Admini strat i on. Xiong’s second arg ument—that the uni on’s deci si on not to adv ance hi s gr i ev ance to arbi tr ation (Step 4) w a s a r bi

tr ary —also fa ils. A uni on’s conduc t i s arbi tr ary i f i t i gnor es a meritorious gr i ev ance or processes a gr i ev an c e in a p e rf un c to ry
manner , but an employ ee does not hav e an a bs o lute right to adv ance a gr i ev ance to arbi tr ation. V aca, 386 U.S. at 191; Coleman v
. Ou tbo ard Marine Co., 285 N.W .2d 631, 635 (Wi s. 1979). Here, the Union w as in regular contact wi th Xi ong and repr esented hi m at ev ery turn of the ter minati on process. Not only w as the Uni on w ell-aw a r e of the charges again st Xiong, the U nio n also knew that the County had deni ed Xiong’sNo. 14-2587 9
St ep 3 gr i ev ance becau se hi s conduc t amounted to a “gr oss violati on of tr ust” and needed to be “tre ated wi th the highes t degr ee o f sev erity

.” Mor eov er

, the Uni on di scov ered that Xiong had not pass ed hi s func tion a l scree n test and that, according to state poli cy , Xiong w ould not be allo w ed to take any remedial measu res in or der to become certifi ed to perfor m hi s w or k wi th the Department. Although the Uni on adv ocated for a tr ansfer so that Xiong could continue to w o r k wit h the Department in a capac i ty that di d not require func tional screen test certifi cati on, the Department deni ed thi s request, explain

ing t ha t Xiong’s conduc t w as too seri ous to excuse and he

w ould hav e been ter minated reg ardless of hi s test score. Regar dless, the Uni on sti ll afforded Xiong a final oppor tuni ty to present hi s case before t he board before deci ding not to pursue arbi tr ation, as w ell as negot i ated a fav or able separation agr eement that w ould help mi tigate the loss o f his health insu rance. T

aken as a whole, the recor d shows that the Uni on’s

r e fus al to arbi tr ate Xiong’s gr i ev ance w as reasonable, and Xiong has fai led to adduc e any evidenc e from which a jury could conclu de the Uni on di sregar ded his rights or fai led to adequately r epresent him

. B. Breach of the Dane County Civil Service O rdinanc e Xiong alleges that the manner in whi ch he w as ter minated violated the Dane Co un t y Ci vil Ser vic e Or dinance. Section 18.13 of thi s or dinance prov i des that “any app ointin g au th or i ty may
... di sch arg e an employ ee.” Section 18.04(1) defines an “appointing authorit y ” as “any county board, commi ssi on, commi tte e, insti tution, agency , elected offi ci al, or department head that has been gr anted authority to hi re employ ees in the county ci vil service.” It i s undi sputed by the parties that Green,10 No. 14-2587

no t Fis cher

, w as the proper “appointing authority” wi th t he pow er to terminate Xi ong. Th e parties also agr ee that Fis cher , in consultation with t he Employ ee Relations depart ment and her supervis or s, Sanders and Genter , composed and si gne d the l e tte r informing Xiong that he had been ter minated. X io ng contends that, in doin g so, F ischer exceeded her authority in violati on of the o rdin ance. Xiong fai ls to adduc e sufficie nt evidenc e to supp or t thi s clai m. Xiong focus es much of his arg ument on whether “Fis cher [has ] the authority to si gned [si c] a ter minati on lette r after consu ltin g wi th 3 lev el [si c] of management abov e her , but not the appointing authority , who i s Green.” How ev er , the fact that Fis cher si gned the ter minati on n otice i s not suffi ci ent to sus tain a reasonable inference t ha t X i ong’s ter minati on violated the ter ms of the Dane County Ci vil Ser vic e Or dinance. The or dinance states that whenev er an appointing authority “deci des to take acti on” again st an employ ee, wri tte n notic e shall ei ther be mai led to the employ ee’s last known address or giv en to the e mploy ee wi thin t w o bus iness days of the acti on being take n. As far as what i s required of the wri tte n notic e, the

or dinance on l y st ates that the notic e shall explain the employ ee’s right to appeal and describe the reasons for the acti on. Criti cally , the or dinance does not require the appointing authority to si gn, wri te, or personally deli v er the notic e, nor does i t prev ent so meone other than the appointing authority from doin g so. Accordingly , Xiong ha s no clai m based on the fact that Fis cher relay ed the final d e ci si on to hi m in the ter minati on lett er
. The real questi on i s whether or not Green aut ho r i zed the deci si on to ter minate Xiong. Once again , Xiong fai ls to i denti fyNo. 14-2587 11
suffi ci ent facts from the recor d to supp o r t the reasonable inference that hi s ter minati on violated t he ter ms of the Dane County Ci vil Ser vic e Or dinance. Xiong contends that i t i s “undi sputed that [Fi sch er] made the deci si on” becau se she

us e d t he w or ds “I” and “me” thro ughout the ter minati on lette r
. Speci fi cally

, Xiong take s i ssu e wi th a sentence that reads, “I hav e deter mined that y ou hav e violated the following w or k rules.” But thi s evidenc e does not bear on whether F isc he r made the final deci si on to ter minate Xiong. Fis cher nev er states in the lette r th a t s h e deci ded to ter minate Xiong; she wri tes only that “[b] ecaus e y ou do no t hav e the necess ary quali fi cations ... and bec ause y ou hav e violated the abov e w or k r ules, y ou are being ter minated effecti v e Fr i day June 1, 20 12.” Thi s languag e does not i mply that Fis cher made the deci si on to ter minate Xiong; rat her , i t shows bey ond a reasonable di spute that F i sch er’s lett er mer ely r elay ed the final determin ation. Xiong also poin ts to the fact t hat Fis cher ne ver personally

consu lted wi th Green prior to wri tin g th e t e rminati on lette r
. Whi le thi s det a il is not insi gni fi cant, it i s t he ro le of thi s court to examine the recor d as a whole and deter mine i f it contains suffi ci ent evidenc e—as op posed to evidenc e that i s merely colorable—t o rais e a genuine i ssu e for tr i al. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50 (ci tations omi tte d) (“[T ]here i s no i ssu e for trial unles s there i s suffi ci ent evidenc e fav or ing th e no nmovin g party for a jury to ret urn a v erdict fo r t hat party

. If the evidence i s merely colorable

... sum mary judgment may be gr anted.”). It i s undi sputed that Fis cher consu lted wi th three level s of upper management before deli v ering the notic e of ter minati on to Xiong. It i s also clear that Green w as copi ed on both the May 22 lette r

, whi ch described the seri ous allegations12 No. 14-2587 again st Xiong, and the June 1 ter minati on notice

. Fin ally , and perhaps most i mport antly , Xiong admit s that Genter , who

w or ks di rectly below Green, told the Un io n t ha t the deci si on to terminate Xiong’s employment w as “out of hi s hands ” and

w a s made “far abov e” hi m, suggesting that an indi vidu a l hi gher than Fis che r

, Sanders, and Genter made the deci si on. Based o n t hi s r ecord evidenc e as a wh ole, ev en when viewed in the li ght most fav or able to the plainti ff, Xiong ca nnot establi sh a g e nu ine i ssu e of a material fact wi th respect to hi s clai m that hi s ter minati on violated th e t e r ms of the Dane County C i vil Serv i ce Ordinan ce. C. Due Process Violations
W e now turn to Xiong’s consti t uti onal clai ms again st the Uni on, Fis cher

, and the Department, whi ch he brings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sui ts under § 1983 are meant to deter state actor s from using the “color of state law” to depriv e indi vidu

als of rights guarante ed by the Constituti on. F r i e s v
. Helsper, 146 F .3d 452, 457 (7th Ci r
. 1998). Thus, in or der to bring a clai m under thi s secti on, the plainti ff mus t show t w o elements: (1) the party again st whom the clai m i s brought quali fi es as a “person acting under t he color of state law”; and (2) the conduc t alleged amount e d t o a depriv ation of rights, privi

leges, or i mmu ni ties under the Constituti on or the laws of the Uni ted St ates. Parrat t v
. T aylor , 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1 9 81) (ov er ruled in part on other gr ounds, Daniels v
. W illiams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986))

. Xiong alleges that the Uni on violated hi s Four t e enth Amendment right to due process when i t prohibi ted hi m from arbi tr atin g hi s gr i ev ance. As a gener al matter , “uni ons are notNo. 14-2587 13

state actor s; they are priv ate actor s.” Hallinan v
. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F .3d 811, 815 (7th Ci r
. 2009). Nev ert heless, conduc t of priv ate a ct o r s may , in some cases, amount to “stat e acti on” where the depriv ation is “caus ed by the exer ci se of some right or privi lege created by the state

... or by a person for whom the state i s responsible” and “the party charged wi th the depriv ation

... may fai rly be sai d to be a state actor .” Lugar v
. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). “A priv ate defendant acts ‘under co l o r of’ state law for purposes of Section 1 9 83 when [i t] i s a ‘wi llful partici pant in jo int acti on wi th the St ate or it s a gents.’” Mala k v
. Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F .2d 277, 281 (7th Ci r
. 1986) (quoting Denn is

v. Sparks, 499 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).
T o s ucc eed again st the Uni on, Xi ong mus t allege facts that show a suffi ci ent nexus betw een the state and the Uni on so that the Uni on’s alleged infring e ment of Xiong’s federal rights i s “fai rly attr i

butable to the state.” Lugar , 457 U.S. at 937. See also Hallinan , 570 F

. 3d at 815–16 (desc rib ing the numerous si tuations in whi ch the Court has found that priv ate conduc t too k on the color of state law); Jackso n v. Metr o. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In hi s compl aint, Xiong essenti ally alleges that the Uni on and the County w anted to maintain their co l l e cti v e bargaining relat i onshi p wi thout incu rr ing addi tional costs, so t he y co nspi red to li mi t the abi li ty of County employ ees to inv oke arbi tr ation. How ev er , ev en puttin g asi de the fact that the CBA gr i ev ance procedure w as not m an d a tory (Xi ong could hav e elected to pursue a civ i l service appeal instead), thi s arg ument is not persuasiv e. It i s w el l e st a blis hed t hat “a bare allegation of a conspi racy betw een priv ate and state entiti es i s insu ff icient to bring the priv ate entity wi thin the scope of14 No. 14-2587 § 1983.” Messman v
. Helmke, 133 F .3d 1042, 1045 (7th Ci r
. 1998). Furt hermor e, a l thou gh the C B A c re a te s a gr i e v an ce mechani sm in whi ch the County and the Uni on agr ee t o p a r tic i pate, thi s j o intly negot i ated procedure i s not suffi ci ent on i ts o wn t o sh o w a close nexus betw een the Uni on and the state. See D r i s c oll v
. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 139, 484 F .2 d 682, 690 (7th Ci r
. 1973) (“[G ]ov ernmental reg ulati o n or partici pation in some of the affai rs of uni ons does not consequently make e ve ry uni on a c tivity so i mbu ed wi th governmental acti on that i t can be subjected to consti tutional restr aints.”); Hallinan, 570 F .3d at 818. As Xiong has not i denti fi ed any facts showing that the Uni on acted un d e r t he color of state law wh e n i t refused to arbi tr ate Xiong’s gr i ev ance—s uch as evidenc e that the Uni on “acted as a state instrument ali ty , p e rfor m e d tr a d iti onal ly exclusiv e sov ereign func tions, or [was ] compelled or ev en encouraged by the state” to refuse to arbi tr ate Xiong’s clai ms, Leahy v
. Bd. of T rs. of Cmty

. Coll. Dist. No. 508 , 912 F .3d 917, 921 (7th Ci r
. 1990)—Xi ong’s § 1983 clai m again st the Union m ust fai l. Xiong’s § 1983 clai ms agains t the Department and F i sch er fare no better

. As a prelim inary poin t, Xiong brought hi s § 1983 clai ms again st Fis cher in her “offi ci al ca paci ty .” Offi ci al capac i ty sui ts “gener ally repr esent only another w a y of pleading an acti on again st an e nt it y of whi ch an offi cer i s an agent.” Kentu cky v
. Graha m , 473 U.S. 159, 1 6 5 (1985). Sinc e an offi ci al capac i ty sui t again st Fis cher w ould be re d un d ant, giv en t ha t t he Department i s a defendant as w ell, the di stric t cour t gav e Xiong t he benefi t of the doubt and construed the complaint as being again st Fis cher in her indi vidu al capac i ty

. Based

on the facts alleged here, w e need not di scu ss the propr i ety ofNo. 14-2587 15
the di stric t court ’s deci si on in that regar d becau se whether or not Xiong intended to bring hi s § 1983 clai m again st Fis cher in her in di vidu al capac i ty do es not im pact our analysi s. Xiong alleges that Fis cher and the Department violated hi s right t o d ue process in fai ling to comply wi th § 18.13 of the Dane County Ci vil Ser vic e Or dinance. As prev i ously di scus sed, thi s secti on relat es to ter minati on procedures. T o state
a clai m for a due process violati on, Xiong mus t fi rst show that he w as depriv ed of a prot ected proper ty intere st. W allac e v
. T illey, 41 F .3d 296, 299 (7th Ci r
. 1994). Once he has done so, the inqui ry turns to whether the depri v ation w as consti tutionally suffi ci ent. Id. at 299. Here, nei ther the Department nor Fis cher di spute t hat Xiong had a prot ected proper ty intere st in hi s employment wi th the Depar t me nt , so w e wi ll focus only on whether Xiong receiv ed adequate due process dur ing the ter minati on pro ceedings. Xiong arg ues that he di d not receive adequate due process during the pre-ter minati on proceedings wi th the Department. Speci fi cally

, he contends that he di d not receiv e suffi ci ent notic e of the May 24 pre-di sci plinary meetin g becau se he only receiv ed wr it t en notic e a few hours prior

. W e find thi s arg um e nt unp e rsu a s ive
. A p re - te rm in a ti on proceeding i s es s e nti a l ly “a deter minati on of whether there are reasonable gr ounds to beli ev e that the charges again st the emp l o y ee are tr ue and supp or t the propo sed act io n, ” Clevel and Bd. of Educ. v
. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 545–46 (1985), and an employ er sati sfi es the requirements of due process i f the employ ee receiv es: “(1) or al

or wri t t e n notic e of the charges; (2) an explanation of the employ er’s evi dence; and (3) an oppor tuni ty to tell hi s si de of16 No. 14-2587
the stor y .” Bodenstab v
. Cnty

. of Cook , 569 F .3d 651, 664 (7th Ci r
. 2009). The purpose of requiring notic e of pre-ter mina t i on proceedings i s t o permi t the employ ee to g a t he r hi s t houghts about the allegations again st hi m an d formulate a response. See Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F .3d 383, 386 (7th Ci r . 1998). Here, the recor d indi cates th a t Xiong w as afforded an oppor tuni ty to r eview the charges agains t hi m and formulate

a response. Fis cher’s May 22 lette r to Xiong, whi ch w as sent to the U nio n as well, detailed numerous concerns about hi s jo b perfor manc e and sev eral potent i al w or kplace violati ons, and informed hi m of t he upcoming pre-di sci plinary meetin g on May 24. Whi le Xiong di d not receive thi s wri tte n notic e unti l

sev eral hours before the pre-di sci plinary meetin g, he receiv ed

or a l no tic e of i ts contents on May 23 thro ugh Grav el, who spoke to Xiong by phone about the allegations surrounding hi s
w or kplace conduct. Xiong also had an oppor tuni ty to meet wi th Grav el and hi s Uni on stew ard on May 24, prior to the predi sci plinary meetin g, in o r d e r to di scu ss the concerns art i culated in Fis cher’s l e t t e r and formulate a response. Fin ally , Fis cher again lai d out her concerns about Xiong’s w or k perfor manc e at the May 24 meetin g and Xiong, who w as giv en
a chanc e to respond to the allegations, admi tte d to the conduc t that led to hi s ter minati on. T aken as a whole, these facts indi cate tha t X iong w as afforded adequate due process thro ughout the pr e-terminati on phase. Xiong also arg ues that he di d not receiv e adequat e due process thro ughout the post-ter minati on proceedings becau se Fis cher and the Department bypassed steps 1 and 2 o f the gr i ev ance process. Ho w e v er , both the recor d and the law prev ent Xiong from suc ceeding on thi s clai m. T o begin wi th,No. 14-2587 17 Xiong’s clai m again st the Department i s mi splac ed, as the CBA betw een the Union and the County places the onus to ini tiate and continue the gr i ev ance appeal procedure on the employ ee and the Union . The CBA imposes no duty on the Department to do anythin g unti l the employ ee or the Uni on make an o ral request to b egin the process at Step 1 and a wri tte n request to continue the appeal at St ep 2. The recor d does not contain any evidenc e that the Department forced the Uni on to bypass steps 1 and 2 o f t he gr i ev ance process in Xiong’s case, nor i s there any evidenc e to s u p p ort Xiong’s asserti on that the Uni on asked for steps 1 and 2. Rather , t he e v ide nce shows that the Uni on deliberately made a choi ce to bypass ste p s 1 and 2, beli eving that t hese meas ures w ould be counterpro ducti v e. Furt hermor e, ev en i f the eviden ce sh ow ed that the Uni on bypassed steps 1 and 2 of the gr i ev ance process at the Department’s insi stence, Xiong’s due process clai m w ould sti ll fai l. T o begin wi th, fai lure to comply wi th state proced ures does not automatic ally equate to a violati on of Xiong’s due p r ocess
r ig ht s. Mann v
. V

ogel, 707 F .3d 872, 882 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Whil e the requirements of due process v ary wi th the particu lars of the proceeding, i t i s w ell-establi shed that the essenti al requirements of due process are notic e a nd an oppor tuni ty to be heard. Loudermi ll , 470 U.S. at 542. In thi s case, Xiong w as afforded a hearin g in front of T rav i s Myr en, the D ane County Chi ef A dmini strat i v e Offi cer and Director o f A dmini strat i on, at whi ch he w as repr esented by the Uni on and giv en the oppor tuni ty to present hi s si de of the stor y
. Unli ke Fis cher and Green, who w ould hav e heard Xi ong’s griev ance for a second tim e at steps 1 and 2, respecti v ely , Myr en had not play ed any

ro le in the pre-ter minati on proceedings, nor in t he ini tial18 No. 14-2587
deci si on to ter minate Xiong. By proceeding d i rectly to S tep 3, there fore, Xiong gained the benefi t of a n i mpartial deci si onmaker in a d d i tion to being afforded a full hearin g. Such process more than meets the d e ma nd s of the Constituti on. Mor eov er

, Xiong’s clai m also fai ls becau se he cannot show that the Uni on breached i ts duty of fai r repr esentation. See V aca, 386 U.S. at 186 (holding that a “wrongfully di sch arg ed employ ee
ma y bring an acti on again st hi s employ er in the face of a defense ba se d upon the fai lure to exhaust contractual remedi es” as l o ng a s the employ ee can “prove that the uni on breached i ts duty of fair r e p r e sent ation in i ts handling of the employ ee’s gr i ev ance”); Mahnke, 225 N.W .2d at 623. Becaus e Xiong has not prov i ded any evidenc e from whi ch

a jury co ul d conclu de that hi s due process clai m again st the Department, nor any other due process arg ument that he rais es, has me r it, the deci si on of the di stric t court i s AFF IRM ED.