ALIEN SMUGGLING

Management and

Operational

Improvements

Needed to Address

Growing Problem

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 2000

GAO/GGD-00-103

United States General Accounting Office General Government Division

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 1 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

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May 1, 2000

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch

Chairman

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Alien smuggling is a significant and growing problem. Although it is likely

that most smuggled aliens are brought into the United States to pursue

employment opportunities, some are smuggled as part of a criminal or

terrorist enterprise that can pose a serious threat to U.S. national security.

According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), smugglers

collectively may earn several billion dollars per year bringing illegal aliens

across our borders.

Over the past 6 fiscal years, INS has experienced unprecedented increases

in personnel and other resources to implement the Attorney General’s

strategy to deter and disrupt the entry of illegal aliens into the United

States. This is our fourth1

 in a series of mandated2 reports on the

implementation of that strategy. As agreed with your Committees, this

report assesses the strategy’s objective that is related to combating alien

smuggling. Specifically, this report addresses the following:

 

1

 We have issued three previous reports in response to this mandate: Illegal Immigration: Southwest

Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997); Illegal

Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Employment Exist (GAO/GGD-99-33, Apr. 2,

1999); and Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation (GAO/GGD-99-44,

May 19, 1999).

2

 These reports are mandated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996 (1996 Act), Public Law 104-208.
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• What is known about the nature and extent of alien smuggling into the

United States.

• INS’ strategy for combating alien smuggling.

• How well the strategy has been implemented and the results to date.

INS data indicate that over the last 2 fiscal years, alien smuggling has

increased and INS predicts that the smuggling will continue to grow. In

fiscal year 1999, 14 percent of all Border Patrol apprehensions were

smuggled aliens compared to 9 percent in 1997. According to INS, aliens

from countries other than Mexico purportedly rely more heavily on

organized smugglers and an increase in apprehensions of aliens from other

countries would indicate an increase in alien smuggling. Apprehensions of

aliens from countries other than Mexico increased from 58,000, or 4

percent of all INS apprehensions in fiscal year 1997, to about 81,000, or

almost 5 percent in fiscal year 1999. INS believes that alien smuggling will

become a more significant enforcement problem in the future because

alien smuggling organizations are expected to become more sophisticated,

organized, and complex.

INS issued an anti-smuggling strategy in 1997 that contains domestic and

international components. The domestic component calls for (1) INS to

focus its investigations on major smuggling operations and (2) INS’ antismuggling investigative field units to coordinate their activities and share

anti-smuggling intelligence information with each other. INS’ initial efforts

were to be directed at South/Central Texas, which is identified as one of

three major alien smuggling corridors in the United States. As part of the

domestic component, the strategy calls for INS’ Intelligence Program to

optimize its ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence

information to identify targets for enforcement and help focus INS’ antismuggling resources on efforts that would have the greatest impact. The

international component includes INS’ conducting operations in

cooperation with foreign governments to disrupt alien smuggling in

countries that either are major sources of illegal immigration or through

which illegal aliens travel on their way to the United States.

Domestically, INS’ Investigations Program devoted about 400 workyears to

anti-smuggling investigations in fiscal year 1999. During this period, INS

completed several major anti-smuggling cases and over 2,000 other cases,

of which slightly over 300 were in the South/Central Texas corridor.

Nationwide, INS arrested about 4,100 smugglers and over 40,000 smuggled

aliens. INS prosecuted almost 2,000 smugglers of whom about 61 percent

were convicted. The convicted smugglers received an average sentence of

about 10 months and an average fine of about $140.

Results in Brief
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INS’ ability to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of the domestic

component of its strategy is impeded by several factors, including the

following:

• Lack of program coordination: In several border areas, multiple antismuggling enforcement units exist that overlap in their jurisdictions,

operate autonomously, and report to different INS officials. INS field

officials make determinations about which cases to investigate with no

clear criteria on how the determinations should be made, resulting in

inconsistent decisionmaking across locations. Within the South/Central

Texas corridor, INS’ anti-smuggling investigation field units have generally

not coordinated their enforcement operations with one another.

According to INS’ Investigations Program officials, the autonomy of the

individual anti-smuggling field units and the lack of a single chain of

command are major obstacles to a more effective anti-smuggling program.

• Absence of an automated case tracking and management system: INS

lacks an agencywide automated case tracking and management system

that would allow INS’ anti-smuggling program managers to monitor their

ongoing investigations, determine if other anti-smuggling units may be

investigating the same target individual or organization, or know if

previous investigations had been conducted on a particular target. INS

anti-smuggling units are not required to share information on their antismuggling cases. As a result, on occasion, different INS investigative units

have simultaneously investigated the same individuals and/or

organizations.

• Limited performance measures: INS’ fiscal year 1999 performance goals

focused mainly on the number of smugglers presented for prosecution to

the U.S. Attorney and the number of designated priority cases. INS has not

issued performance indicators that would assess the effectiveness of the

strategy’s objective to deter and disrupt alien smuggling. Performance

indicators, such as a shift in smuggling activity between geographic areas

along the border, were under development at the time of our review.

INS’ Intelligence Program has been impeded by a lack of understanding

among field staff on how to report intelligence information, a lack of staff

to perform intelligence functions at most INS district offices, and an

inefficient and cumbersome process of organizing data that does not allow

for rapid retrieval and analysis. As a result, INS has limited ability to

identify targets for enforcement and to help focus its anti-smuggling

resources on efforts that would have the greatest impact.
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As part of its international component, INS conducted operations in 34

countries between August 1995 and November 1999. During these

operations, INS assisted in intercepting undocumented aliens destined for

the United States, trained foreign officials on migration controls, and

provided assistance in prosecuting alien smugglers. However, there have

been impediments to INS’ ability to have more than a temporary impact on

alien smuggling overseas. According to INS and Department of State

officials, these impediments include corruption of some foreign officials

and the lack of laws against alien smuggling in some countries.

Without improvements in its Investigations and Intelligence Programs, INS’

ability to disrupt and deter increasingly sophisticated and organized alien

smugglers and dismantle their organizations will continue to be hampered.

We make recommendations in this report to address the problems that we

identify.

Combating the smuggling of aliens into the United States involves

numerous federal agencies and, sometimes, the cooperation and

assistance of foreign governments. Within the United States, INS is the key

agency tasked with enforcing the criminal statutes that prohibit alien

smuggling.

Several INS programs are involved in the agency’s anti-smuggling efforts.

The Investigations Program is responsible for investigating alien smuggling

activities. This program has nearly 280 investigators who are assigned fulltime to INS Border Patrol sectors and district offices3

 to investigate alien

smuggling activities.4

 INS’ Intelligence Program is responsible for

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information related to alien

smuggling and other methods that are used to enter the United States

illegally. In fiscal year 1999, the Intelligence Program spent about $14

million.5

 Most of the Intelligence Program staff are assigned to INS

headquarters, INS’ Forensic Document Laboratory, the El Paso

Intelligence Center (EPIC), and INS’ three regional offices. The

International Affairs Program is responsible for working with other

agencies and countries to deter alien smuggling in countries that are the

 

3

 INS is organized into 33 district offices in the United States, 3 located in foreign countries, and 21

Border Patrol sectors.

4

 We do not know how much money INS spent on anti-smuggling activities because INS’ Investigations

Program budget—which was approximately $301 million in fiscal year 1999—was not broken out into

subprogram budget amounts.

5

 This budget does not include staff who perform intelligence activities in districts and sectors. These

staff are funded by other INS programs.

Background
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source of illegal aliens as well as in countries that illegal aliens may transit

on their way to the United States. In fiscal year 1999, International Affairs

personnel in INS’ overseas offices spent about 28 staff years on

enforcement-related activities.6

Other federal agencies are also involved in combating alien smuggling. For

example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Customs

Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration have participated with

INS in joint investigations of alien smugglers. Under a memorandum of

understanding with INS, the FBI provides technical assistance to INS

regarding any wiretaps that INS conducts. State’s Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is the primary focal point for

coordinating international cooperation to halt alien smuggling. State has

helped some foreign countries draft alien smuggling legislation and has

provided funds to foreign countries that have intercepted smuggled aliens

destined for the United States to assist them in returning these aliens to

their home countries. The Coast Guard, which is responsible for enforcing

immigration law at sea, conducts patrols to interdict undocumented aliens

at sea. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Office of Transnational

Issues provides analytical assessments related to alien smuggling, and the

Department of Defense’s National Security Agency (NSA) assists in the

interdiction of smuggled aliens overseas. Lastly, the National Security

Council’s Office of Transnational Threats Alien Smuggling Sub-Group is

responsible for coordinating the development of U.S. policy in response to

specific immigration-related situations or emergencies.

As agreed with your offices, this report addresses (1) what is known about

the nature and extent of alien smuggling into the United States, (2) INS’

strategy for combating alien smuggling, and (3) how well INS has

implemented the strategy and the results to date.

To determine what is known about the nature and extent of alien

smuggling, we (1) reviewed INS threat assessments, classified intelligence

documents, and academic studies related to alien smuggling; (2)

interviewed INS, State, and Coast Guard officials as well as intelligence

agency officials at the CIA and NSA; and (3) analyzed INS and Coast Guard

statistical data on the number of smuggled aliens apprehended.

To determine INS’ strategy for combating alien smuggling, we (1) reviewed

various INS and Administration strategy documents and (2) interviewed

 

6

 These data on International Affairs personnel in INS’ overseas offices do not include staff detailed

from INS offices in the United States.

Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology
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INS, State, Coast Guard, EPIC, CIA, and National Security Council

officials.

To determine how well INS has implemented the strategy and what the

results have been, we (1) reviewed INS directives and plans related to its

anti-smuggling strategy; (2) analyzed INS workload data provided to us by

INS and other reports on the number and types of smuggling investigations

completed; and (3) interviewed officials at INS headquarters and Western

and Central regions and from INS’ field offices in Los Angeles and San

Diego, CA; Houston, McAllen, and Harlingen, TX; and Mexico City, Mexico.

We chose these field locations because they were identified as major

smuggling corridors in INS’ anti-smuggling strategy. In addition, we

reviewed certain aspects of INS’ Intelligence Program because INS’ antismuggling strategy stated that developing an effective Intelligence

Program was critical to its anti-smuggling efforts. Specifically, we (1)

reviewed INS policy and procedures related to the collection, analysis, and

dissemination of intelligence information; (2) reviewed Intelligence

Program strategic planning documents; and (3) interviewed INS

headquarters and field intelligence officials.

We requested a classification review of a draft of this report from NSA. On

April 13, 2000, the Comptroller of NSA responded that NSA had completed

their review and had determined the report to be unclassified.

We performed our work between July 1999 and February 2000 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Between fiscal years 1997 and 1999, the number of apprehended aliens

smuggled into the United States increased nearly 80 percent. INS believes

that its increased enforcement efforts along the southwest border have

prompted greater reliance on alien smugglers, and that alien smuggling is

becoming more sophisticated, complex, organized, and flexible. In

addition, INS believes organized crime groups will increasingly use

smugglers to smuggle their members into the United States to engage in

criminal activities.

Alien Smuggling Is a

Growing Problem
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INS’ November 1999 INS Intelligence Assessment7 stated that illegal

border-crossers have increasingly relied on alien smugglers to enhance

their chances of successfully entering the United States. INS data indicate

that the number of smuggled aliens apprehended attempting to enter the

United States increased nearly 80 percent over 2 years, from about 138,000

in fiscal year 1997 to about 247,000 in fiscal year 1999. In fiscal year 1997, 9

percent of the 1.4 million illegal aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol

were smuggled compared to 14 percent of the 1.6 million aliens

apprehended in fiscal year 1999.8

Another indication that alien smuggling is increasing may be the number

and proportion of illegal aliens apprehended who are from countries other

than Mexico. According to INS, aliens who are from countries other than

Mexico rely more heavily on organized smugglers. In fiscal year 1997,

58,000, or almost 4 percent of all INS apprehensions, were illegal aliens

from countries other than Mexico compared to about 81,000, or almost 5

percent, in fiscal year 1999. The Coast Guard intercepted over 4,800 aliens

in fiscal year 1999, which was an increase of 118 percent from the 2,200

aliens intercepted in fiscal year 1997.9

 Figure 1 shows the 11 source

countries that, excluding Mexico, have the greatest number of INS

apprehensions.

 7

 Fraud and Illegal Entry to the United States: Year 2002 Planning (Washington, D.C.: Immigration and

Naturalization Service, Nov. 15, 1999).

8

 INS data track the number of smuggled aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol as well as those

apprehended at U.S. ports of entry. Smuggled aliens include, for example, aliens found hidden in

vehicles or other conveyances.

9

Between fiscal years 1991 and 1997, the number of Coast Guard interdictions fluctuated, ranging from

about 5,000 in fiscal year 1991 to over 64,000 in 1994. There were no 2 consecutive years over this

period in which the number of interdictions either increased or deceased.

Growth in Smuggled Aliens
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Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

Figure 1: Source Countries With the Highest Number of INS Apprehensions, Excluding Mexico
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According to an October 1999 INS Western Region intelligence report,

some “lower level” drug smugglers are finding it more difficult to compete

with the larger drug cartels and have turned to smuggling aliens

exclusively. Another reason that drug smugglers may be turning to alien

smuggling, according to the report, is lesser penalties for alien smuggling

compared to drug smuggling.

Central America is a key source and transit point for illegal immigration to

the United States. According to a 1995 U.S. Interagency Working Group

report on alien smuggling, Central America is the source of 200,000 to

300,000 aliens attempting to enter the United States each year. An

additional 100,000 a year from countries outside of Central America may

transit the area en route to the United States. According to EPIC, 10 of the

top 11 alien smugglers responsible for most of the smuggling across the

southwest border are headquartered in Central American countries. An

INS official told us that the Mexican government has a database that

contains the names of over 2,000 individuals who are involved in alien

smuggling.

An October 1999 INS intelligence report stated that the smuggling of

nationals from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a significant

enforcement problem that would increase due to expected high levels of

unemployment in the PRC. The report estimated that between 12,000 and

24,000 PRC nationals might have entered in 1999. Although the Coast

Guard has not received significant increases in resources or changed the

way it conducts operations, the number of PRC nationals that the Coast

Guard has intercepted has more than quadrupled in the past 2 years, from

240 in fiscal year 1997 to nearly 1,100 in fiscal year 1999.10 Similarly, the

number of Cuban nationals intercepted by the Coast Guard also has

quadrupled in 2 years, from about 400 in fiscal year 1997 to about 1,600 in

fiscal year 1999.

How many smuggling organizations are operating is unknown but the

number is believed to be substantial. According to an INS intelligence

report, various sources have estimated that there may be up to 300

smuggling organizations in Mexico alone. Reportedly, the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police suspect that at least 50 major alien smuggling

organizations in Toronto transport 5,000 aliens into the United States

annually.

 

10Between fiscal years 1991 and 1997, the number of PRC nationals interdicted by the Coast Guard

fluctuated, ranging from 61 in fiscal year 1996 to about 2,500 in fiscal year 1993.

Sources of Illegal

Immigration

Alien Smuggling

Organizations
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According to INS, there are generally two types of smuggling

organizations. The first, called “blue collar” smugglers, are small

operations that smuggle mostly large numbers of Mexican nationals and

operate out of a border area. The other type, called “white collar”

organizations, smuggle nationals who are from countries other then

Mexico, are international in scope, and charge significantly higher fees.

According to INS reports, smuggling fees can range from a few hundred

dollars to cross the U.S. border to up to $50,000 to be smuggled from China

to the United States.

Organized crime groups contribute to alien smuggling and present a

growing problem to INS. According to INS’ November 1999 Intelligence

Assessment, Colombian; Nigerian; Albanian; and Russian organized crime

groups all view the United States as fertile ground for a myriad of criminal

activities. For example, a November 1999 INS Central Region intelligence

report stated that Russian organized crime activities, including the

suspected smuggling of Russian prostitutes, have expanded into a major

midwestern metropolitan area. According to INS intelligence reports,

Chinese organized crime groups reportedly control the smuggling of PRC

nationals.

INS predicts that alien smuggling will become a more significant

enforcement problem in the future. INS believes that alien smuggling

organizations will become more sophisticated, complex, and organized

and will use additional routes and methods to introduce illegal aliens into

the United States. For example, alien smugglers are expected to

• increasingly use fraud to obtain immigration benefits (e.g., permanent

residency and work authorization) for aliens they smuggle into the United

States,

• have more ties to organized crime groups as they smuggle their members

into the United States to engage in criminal activities,

• increasingly use corrupt foreign government officials and airline

employees who are based in foreign locations, and

• capitalize on the easing of travel restrictions to facilitate entry into the

United States.

According to INS’ November 1999 Intelligence Assessment, smugglers can

quickly change routes and methods of operation to counter INS

enforcement measures. For example, after the Coast Guard intercepted

several boats of PRC nationals in the Western Pacific in the spring of 1999,

smuggling efforts by air increased. Some smugglers along the southwest

border have reportedly begun using tractor-trailers to move large loads of

Alien Smuggling Becoming

a More Significant

Enforcement Problem
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smuggled aliens, hoping to blend in among the increased truck traffic

along the southwest border. Other smugglers have established “legitimate

businesses,” such as bus transportation companies and employment

agencies, as covers for their alien smuggling activities. Some smugglers

have developed a network that includes document vendors, travel

agencies, guides, transportation, and local-area border smugglers.

Some smugglers are reportedly taking advantage of the Visa Waiver Pilot

Program (VWPP) to smuggle aliens into the United States.11 Under this

program, nationals from designated countries only need a valid passport to

enter the United States. According to INS’ November 1999 Intelligence

Assessment, smugglers are increasingly fraudulently using counterfeit or

genuine passports from VWPP countries to smuggle non-VWPP nationals.

For example, INS has reported an increase in PRC nationals who present

themselves at U.S. ports of entry with high-quality, fraudulent Japanese

passports.12 Also, according to INS, fraudulent use of stolen or blank

VWPP passports is one of the most serious problems it faces because these

documents are genuine and their fraudulent use is difficult to detect.

According to INS’ November 1999 Intelligence Assessment, at least 100,000

VWPP passports have been reported lost or stolen, but the actual number

is unknown.

Smugglers have also capitalized on the elimination of visa requirements in

other countries to smuggle aliens into the United States. INS has predicted

that these changes may open new routes for aliens who desire to illegally

migrate to the United States. For example, an October 1999 INS

intelligence report stated that smugglers were taking advantage of the

elimination of Mexico’s visa requirement for Polish nationals.

Apprehensions of Polish nationals increased from 70 in fiscal year 1998 to

231 in fiscal year 1999.

INS has found that smugglers are also engaging in fraud to facilitate their

clients’ entry into the United States. For example, INS’ reviews of over

5,000 L-1 visa petitions found that fraud was readily apparent in over 90

percent of the cases.13 Either the company that the alien was allegedly

 

11Under 8 U.S.C. 1187, VWPP allows nationals from certain countries designated by the Attorney

General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to enter the United States without a nonimmigrant

visa. Unlike most foreign nationals, these nationals do not have to obtain a visa from the United States

consulate.

12 Japan is a VWPP country.

13 An L-1 visa allows an alien to work for a U.S. business in a managerial capacity. Businesses must

submit a visa petition with INS.
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going to work for did not exist or the company was unaware of a petition

for the alien. According to INS’ November 1999 Intelligence Assessment, it

is difficult for INS to detect this type of fraud because it requires INS

personnel to visit the business that petitioned for the alien and verify the

supporting documentation for the visa petition. Many INS senior managers

have reportedly characterized the abuse of the L-1 visa provision as “the

new wave in alien smuggling.”

INS issued an anti-smuggling strategy in 1997. The goal of the strategy is to

deter and disrupt alien smuggling at all levels of operation, including

overseas, at the border, and in the interior of the United States, and to

dismantle alien smuggling organizations. To accomplish this goal, the

strategy contains two major components—domestic and international.

The strategy’s domestic component calls for anti-smuggling investigative

units in INS’ Border Patrol sectors and districts along the southwest

border to coordinate their enforcement activities to identify, detect,

disrupt, and prosecute alien smuggling organizations. Toward this end, INS

is to

• emphasize the investigations of major smuggling operations, particularly

those tied to other criminal activity or illegal employment; and

• formalize and institutionalize intraagency and interagency tactical

coordination, intelligence sharing, and anti-smuggling and investigative

case activities.

INS has determined that most alien smuggling occurs across the southwest

border through major corridors located in south and central Texas,

southern California, and the Tucson, AZ, areas. The strategy called for INS

to first focus its anti-smuggling efforts on the South/Central Texas

corridor, which includes INS’ McAllen, Laredo, and Del Rio Border Patrol

sectors and its San Antonio, Harlingen, Dallas, and Houston district

offices. According to INS, a “shift” in smuggling activity from one area to

another would be an indicator that INS was disrupting alien smuggling

activities. To implement the strategy, INS required every INS district and

sector to develop strategic plans.

Within the domestic component, INS’ anti-smuggling strategy states that

intelligence collection, assessment, and dissemination are essential

elements of a coordinated, comprehensive anti-smuggling program. As a

result, in 1997, INS’ Intelligence Program identified improvements that

were necessary for the program to more effectively support INS’

enforcement efforts, including anti-smuggling. These improvements

INS Has Established a

Strategy to Deter and

Disrupt Alien

Smuggling
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included optimizing intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination,

storage, and retrieval by training field staff on intelligence collection

methods and procedures and developing automated systems for collating,

analyzing, and disseminating the collected information.

Within the international component, INS’ anti-smuggling strategy calls for

interdicting smuggled aliens as far away from the U.S. border as possible

and to repatriate them when appropriate. The strategy calls for programs

designed to disrupt alien smuggling in source and transit countries. INS’

responsibilities include (1) training foreign officials on migration controls,

(2) assisting foreign governments in disrupting and dismantling alien

smuggling organizations, and (3) aiding the development of laws making

alien smuggling a crime.

Although INS has had success in conducting some major smuggling cases

using new investigative tools, its ability to conduct thousands of other antismuggling cases has been hampered by operational and management

problems. INS does not have mechanisms in place to help ensure that antismuggling units coordinate their cases, such as having an agencywide

automated case tracking and management system that all investigators can

readily access to determine whether an investigation on a given target is

already open or has been previously opened. In addition, INS does not

have criteria for determining which investigations it should open to ensure

best use of its anti-smuggling resources. Further, outcome-based

performance measures of progress toward the strategy’s goals have not

been developed. Finally, INS’ Intelligence Program is impeded by a lack of

understanding among field staff on how to report intelligence information;

a lack of staff to perform intelligence functions at most INS district offices;

and an inefficient and cumbersome process of organizing data that does

not allow for rapid retrieval and analysis.

During the past 3 years, the number of workyears devoted to the antismuggling investigations has increased because INS detailed staff from

other investigations to anti-smuggling. In fiscal year 1999, INS completed

over 2,000 anti-smuggling cases nationwide. INS used its newly granted

wiretap authority for high priority investigations and worked cooperatively

with several other law enforcement agencies. Although INS completed

several major smuggling cases in fiscal year 1999, and arrested 58

smugglers who were part of 2 separate international smuggling

organizations, implementation of the strategy in the South/Central Texas

corridor has been limited.

Operational and

Management Problems

Limit Implementation

of the Domestic

Strategy

INS’ Efforts to Implement

the Domestic Strategy
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According to INS officials, the number of investigators nationwide who

were dedicated full-time to INS’ anti-smuggling investigations increased

slightly between fiscal years 1997 and 1999. At the end of fiscal year 1999,

INS had 276 investigators assigned to the anti-smuggling investigations

compared to about 245 in fiscal year 1997—an increase of 13 percent. Of

the 276 investigators, approximately 54 percent were in Border Patrol

sectors, and 46 percent were in district offices.

The number of workyears14 devoted to anti-smuggling investigations

increased 29 percent, from 313 workyears in fiscal year 1997 to 404 in

fiscal year 1999. INS officials stated that the increase in workyears resulted

from detailing investigators from other types of investigations (e.g., fraud,

criminal alien, or worksite) to anti-smuggling cases. The 404 workyears

spent on anti-smuggling investigations in fiscal year 1999 represented

about 14 percent of the 2,800 workyears spent on all investigative

activities.

As shown in figure 2, the amount of time spent on anti-smuggling activities

was relatively stable between fiscal years 1992 and 1996 and has increased

since INS announced its Anti-Smuggling Strategy in 1997.

 

14 INS tracks staff workyears reported through its Performance Analysis System to determine the level

of effort devoted to specific investigative activities.

Anti-smuggling Staffing and

Workload
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Note: Includes actual time spent by INS agents and support staff on investigations targeting

individuals or organizations involved in alien smuggling. These investigative staff could be assigned

to anti-smuggling activities full-time or detailed to cases for short periods of time throughout the year.

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

According to INS program officials, the increase in full-time resources

devoted to alien smuggling was not commensurate with the increase in the

growth of alien smuggling. In addition, because agents were detailed from

other areas to work on anti-smuggling cases, other INS investigations were

delayed or not done.

INS’ workload data show that anti-smuggling investigators opened 2,369

cases and completed 2,031 cases in fiscal year 1999. Of the completed

cases, it is unclear how many were Category I investigations. They are

defined as investigations that target sophisticated, organized crime

syndicates whose primary illegal activity is large-scale smuggling,

transportation, or harboring of illegal aliens into or through the United

States. These organizations reportedly operate over multiple districts,

sectors, or regions, and their sophistication is such that traditional

investigative techniques will not dismantle or disrupt their operations.

According to INS headquarters officials, in fiscal year 1999, they approved

five of nine requests by field offices for Category I investigations. At the

Figure 2: Anti-smuggling Workyears

Fiscal Years 1992 through 1999
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end of fiscal year 1999, the officials said there were seven ongoing and

three completed Category I investigations. However, according to INS’

automated workload database, which contains data input by field antismuggling offices, 121 investigations, or 6 percent of the total completed

investigations in fiscal year 1999, were Category I. INS headquarters

officials told us that the discrepancy between headquarters’ and the field’s

count of completed Category I cases was due to field units incorrectly

categorizing their cases. They said that field units might not have been

aware that Category I cases can only be designated by headquarters. The

officials told us that they have notified field offices of these discrepancies,

and that field offices are responsible for amending data in INS’ automated

workload database. However, many field offices have not done so.

Category II and Category III15 cases, which are designated as such by the

field offices that have responsibility for inputting data to the workload

database, represented 23 percent and 71 percent, respectively, of all antismuggling investigations completed in fiscal year 1999. Task force

investigations, which involve other law enforcement agencies, represented

about 4 percent of completed investigations that same year. While

Category III investigations accounted for the largest portion of completed

investigations, Category I and II investigations consumed the majority of

investigative time (about 68 percent of workyears in fiscal year 1999).

INS headquarters officials told us that they did not have information on the

results of the three Category I investigations completed in fiscal year 1999.

Of the 7 investigations that were ongoing at the end of fiscal year 1999, 2

had produced 62 arrests as of February 2000. These investigations were

the first ones in which INS funded and staffed wiretaps.16 One

investigation took place on the northern border and one on the southern

border of the United States. INS cooperated with several federal, state, and

overseas law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the Internal

Revenue Service, the Postal Inspection Service, the Customs Service,

State, and the Office of the U.S. Attorney. According to INS, Operation

Seek and Keep along the southern border dismantled the largest alien

smuggling organization in U.S. history, and Operation Over the Rainbow II

 

15 Category II cases generally involve smaller scale smuggling activity than Category I cases. For

example, a Category II smuggler would transport aliens less than 100 miles from the border, transport

from 100 to 250 aliens, and use accomplices in their smuggling activities. Category III cases typically

include freelance operators who smuggle infrequently or independently, or nonprofessional violators

who smuggle relatives, household employees, or employees of small businesses.

16 Congress empowered the Attorney General to authorize wiretap applications in cases relating to alien

smuggling in section 201 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

This section, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. 2516 (1) (m), allows for the interception of oral or wire

communications upon approval of a judge.

Anti-smuggling Results
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broke up the largest global alien smuggling operation on the northern

border.

• Operation Seek and Keep involved the investigation of an international

alien smuggling and money laundering ring that brought in an estimated

10,000 illegal aliens to the United States and generated nearly $22 million

in proceeds over a 3-year period. This organization smuggled aliens who

were nationals of Ecuador, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria.

According to INS, a hallmark of this investigation was the cooperation and

coordination among several U.S. and overseas law enforcement agencies.

INS intercepted about 35,000 telephone calls while the wiretap was in

operation. As of January 2000, the investigation cost about $4 million and

resulted in 24 arrests, including the head of the organization. According to

INS, Operation Seek and Keep effectively dismantled the smuggling

organization.

• Operation Over the Rainbow II was INS’ first investigation of a large-scale,

international alien smuggling organization along the northern border. The

organization smuggled an estimated 3,600 Chinese nationals during 1997

and 1998 through Canada and the St. Regis Mohawk Territory

(Akwesasne). INS estimated the smugglers’ proceeds over this 2-year

period to be $170 million. According to INS and U.S. Attorney officials

involved in the investigation, coordination among law enforcement

agencies on both sides of the border was key to dismantling the North

America portion of this international smuggling organization. INS

coordinated their investigation with several federal agencies as well as the

St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police, New York State Police, Toronto Police

Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. INS also conducted a

wiretap during the investigation, which led to the arrest of 38 individuals

and produced hundreds of leads relating to other illegal activities.

Other INS alien smuggling investigations have also resulted in the arrest,

prosecution, and conviction of alien smugglers. During fiscal year 1999,

INS prosecution data indicate that over 40,000 smuggled aliens and about

4,100 smugglers were arrested. As a result of these arrests, in fiscal year

1999, the Office of the U.S. Attorney prosecuted almost 2,000 smugglers; of

these, almost 1,200, or 61 percent, were convicted. These convicted

smugglers received an average sentence of 10 months and average fine of

$140.17 According to INS officials, most of the smuggled Mexican nationals

 

17 The data on sentences and fines imposed represent the mean of prosecution data input by INS field

offices into the Performance Analysis System, Report of Prosecutions.
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are returned to Mexico. Those from other countries were either detained

or released.

INS has not fully implemented its strategy in South/Central Texas, the

primary target corridor. Although one of the strategy’s goals was to

coordinate existing enforcement operations within the corridor, district

and sector anti-smuggling units within the South/Central Texas corridor

continued to operate autonomously. As a result, INS has not mounted a

coordinated effort to combat alien smuggling in the South/Central Texas

corridor. Of the 2,031 anti-smuggling cases that INS completed in fiscal

year 1999, 322 were in the sectors and districts that comprise INS’

South/Central Texas corridor.

At the end of our fieldwork in February 2000, INS officials told us that the

four districts and three Border Patrol sectors in the corridor were

reviewing their unit strategic plans. Further, they were beginning to

develop a plan to coordinate their investigative activities within the

corridor. According to INS officials, a supervisory agent was to be detailed

to oversee the corridor strategy and an anti-smuggling conference was

being planned.

Headquarters and regional INS officials told us that progress in the

South/Central Texas corridor was limited because their investigative

resources were concentrated on two major, interregional smuggling cases.

The officials also said that significant budget restrictions have hampered

the INS’ ability to continue supporting complex, sophisticated alien

smuggling investigations because these investigations are labor-intensive

and costly. For example, as of January 2000, INS had reportedly spent

about $4 million for Operation Seek and Keep, which was in the targeted

corridor and included purchasing wiretap equipment, setting up listening

posts, and contracting for translation services. According to INS’ midyear

review of its fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan, “INS will be hardpressed to provide the necessary resources to properly complete existing

investigations much less initiate new cases which would require a funding

level not available at this time.”

INS’ ability to implement the domestic component of its strategy is

impeded by several factors. First, INS does not have procedures in place to

coordinate resources for initiating and managing anti-smuggling cases.

Second, INS does not have an agencywide automated case tracking and

management system to help determine when and where investigations are

taking place. Third, INS does not have a performance measurement system

that measures progress toward the strategy’s goals.

Limited Implementation of

Strategy in Primary Target

Corridor

Impediments to

Implementation of the

Strategy
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Although many INS anti-smuggling units share geographic jurisdictions,

our fieldwork along the southwest border revealed that these border units

have generally not coordinated their investigative activities, as called for in

the strategy and in INS’ Annual Performance Plan. INS’ anti-smuggling

units, funded through INS’ Investigations Program, are located in both INS

districts and Border Patrol sectors. Although these anti-smuggling units

may share jurisdictions and may be located in the same cities, they report

through different chains of command—the Border Patrol sector unit

reports to the Border Patrol chief patrol agent, and the district unit reports

to the district director.18 Headquarters, district, and sector officials told us

that coordination among anti-smuggling units, especially units that share

geographic jurisdictions, is difficult because the district director and

sector chief may not agree on priority investigative targets or tactical

approaches, among other things.

Anti-smuggling units along the southwest border operate autonomously

and are not required to notify or consult with other anti-smuggling units

before starting or while conducting investigations. However, there are two

exceptions, according to INS officials. First, under INS’ anti-smuggling

strategy, INS’ Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations can

designate certain investigations as having the highest priority. Such cases

are called “nationally designated” cases. INS is to notify all INS field

offices of these investigations and requires field offices to submit any

information they have on the targets of the investigation to the INS office

leading the investigation. According to INS officials, INS headquarters

closely monitors these investigations through regular reporting and

frequent contact between Investigations program officials and the INS field

office leading the investigation. The second exception is “high-profile

Category I investigations,” which require headquarters approval. INS’

headquarters anti-smuggling office is responsible for monitoring and

funding cases that involve multiple regions, wiretap authority, and

undercover operations.

INS managers did not have clear criteria for deciding which anti-smuggling

investigations to open or a coordinated mechanism to manage the over

2,300 investigations opened nationwide in fiscal year 1999. INS’

headquarters anti-smuggling office is not in the chain of command to direct

or oversee these cases. INS supervisory agents in two different units in the

same geographical area could have completely different investigative

priorities and tactics. Lacking criteria for determining which are the

 

18 Both the district directors and Border Patrol chief patrol agents report to one of three regional

directors, who in turn, report to the INS Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations.

INS Operations Not

Coordinated; Criteria for

Opening Investigations

Unclear
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highest priority investigations to open, and without a requirement for units

within the same jurisdiction to coordinate their anti-smuggling

enforcement efforts, opportunities exist for inconsistent decisionmaking

and duplication of effort.

INS headquarters and regional officials told us that achieving the strategy’s

goals of targeting major investigations and coordinating enforcement

operations has been difficult because district and sector anti-smuggling

units do not report through a single chain of command. They said that

communication between sectors and districts, outside of the few,

headquarters-designated, high-profile cases, is sporadic. According to INS’

Investigations Program officials, the autonomy of the individual antismuggling field units and the lack of a single chain of command are major

obstacles to a more effective anti-smuggling program.

Unlike federal law enforcement agencies such as the Drug Enforcement

Administration, INS does not have an agencywide, automated case

tracking and management system that maintains data on individuals and

organizations that are or have been the target of investigations. INS district

and sector agents are to report how many investigations they have opened

and closed monthly, but they need not report the names of individuals or

organizations they investigated, the status of case activity, or the results

achieved. When anti-smuggling agents open an investigation, they do not

have a system to check whether any other INS unit has undertaken an

investigation of that individual or organization.

INS officials told us that the lack of a case tracking and management

system has, on occasion, led to duplicate investigations. In one instance,

they found that two anti-smuggling units were investigating the same

organization. The duplicative investigations were uncovered when the two

offices submitted requests for undercover operations to headquarters and

a headquarters staff person recognized the duplication.

Because INS does not have an agencywide, automated database of antismuggling investigations, INS headquarters cannot determine how many

high priority cases targeting sophisticated, well-organized smuggling

organizations it could have identified and investigated in fiscal year 1999.

Given the geographic dispersion of INS’ anti-smuggling units and the many

hundreds of anti-smuggling investigations that are open at one time, an

agencywide, automated case tracking and management system would

better enable INS headquarters and other offices to recognize whether

multiple anti-smuggling units are targeting the same smuggler or smuggling

organization. This would, in turn, enable INS officials to better detect

INS Lacks Agencywide,

Automated Case Management

System
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large-scale smuggling operations and instigate investigations that held

greater potential for leading to major smuggling organizations.

INS officials told us that there have been instances in which targeted

individuals had been investigated by INS in the past, but the officials were

not aware of this when they began their investigation. INS district and

sector investigators told us that these situations were not uncommon

occurrences.

To assess its progress in implementing its anti-smuggling strategy, INS set

the following two numeric anti-smuggling goals in the Annual Performance

Plan for fiscal year 1999:

• present 7 major interregional alien smuggling cases for criminal

prosecution to disrupt and dismantle smuggling organizations and

• present 1,460 smugglers for prosecution for alien smuggling-related

violations.

INS officials told us that they had met their fiscal year 1999 goals. They

said INS presented 7 major interregional cases and 1,967 smugglers for

prosecution for alien smuggling-related violations.

Although INS met the anti-smuggling goals that it set out in its fiscal year

1999 Annual Performance Plan, it has not developed outcome-based

measures that would indicate progress made toward achieving the

strategy’s objectives of identifying, deterring, disrupting, and dismantling

alien smuggling. In its fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan, INS said

it would develop measures that would enable it to track the strategy’s

impact on alien smuggling, for example, a “shift in smuggling corridors.”

However, no such measures were developed in fiscal year 1999. Nor did

INS collect systematic data on other indicators of the strategy’s impacts,

such as changes in smuggling fees, usage, or tactics.

INS’ fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan reiterated INS’ intent to

collect baseline data to track the “deterrence and disruption of alien

smuggling.” As of February 2000, INS had not specified what measures it

will use to assess whether the strategies’ objectives are being met.

Outcome Measures for Antismuggling Not Established
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INS’ domestic strategy cites the need for an intelligence program that

optimizes the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence

information. However, INS’ Intelligence Program lacks some of the key

building blocks of an effective program.

According to INS Intelligence Program officials and other information we

obtained,19 an effective intelligence program should include the following

elements:

• Polices and procedures for reporting intelligence information that are clear

to field staff and a mechanism for providing feedback to field staff on the

usefulness of their reports to improve and encourage future reporting.

• Sufficient intelligence staff in INS field locations to collect, collate, and

analyze information obtained from INS field staff and other sources.

• Organization of all relevant data in a centralized database that allows for

rapid retrieval and analysis and relationships between apparently

disconnected data to be established.

We found that (1) INS field staff were unclear about policies and

procedures for reporting intelligence information, (2) most of INS’ 33

district offices did not have any full-time intelligence staff, and (3)

analyzing intelligence reports was cumbersome and inefficient. These

impediments have limited the Intelligence Program’s ability to effectively

support INS’ enforcement efforts.

A 1998 Intelligence Program survey found that INS field office

enforcement personnel were unclear about guidelines, procedures, and

effective techniques for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating

intelligence information. The survey respondents indicated that they

generally did not receive feedback on the usefulness of their intelligence

reports and did not know whether their reports were useful. The

Intelligence Program’s report on the survey results stated that intelligencerelated training was critically needed.

INS’ fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan report stated that INS’

Intelligence Program provided intelligence-related training to about 7,800

field staff in fiscal year 1999. According to one district’s training materials,

the 1-day training session covered the importance of INS intelligence

operations and the process for reporting intelligence information. INS

plans call for additional intelligence training in fiscal year 2000.

 

19 S.R. Schneider, The Criminal Intelligence Function: Toward a Comprehensive and Normative Model,

International Association of Law Enforcement Analysts, 1998.

Obstacles to INS’ Having an

Effective Intelligence

Program

Field Staff Unclear on

Intelligence Reporting

Requirements
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According to INS intelligence officials, the quantity and quality of

intelligence information provided by field personnel has been inconsistent.

They cited several reasons for this inconsistency. For example, one

district intelligence official told us that intelligence reporting by inspectors

at a port of entry in his district declined during 1999 because a shortage of

inspectors necessitated that inspector personnel spend their duty time “on

the line,” thus retricting their ability to prepare intelligence reports. In

addition, he said that his district lacked intelligence staff to interview

smuggled aliens in INS detention facilities to obtain further intelligence

about smuggling operations.

In December 1995, the Intelligence Program proposed that each INS

district office have an intelligence unit.20 INS’ June 1998 Standard

Operating Procedures for district intelligence offices stated that the

primary duty of the district intelligence office is to collect and analyze

information to inform district management of any changes that may affect

INS operations.

As of January 2000, 21 of INS’ 33 district offices did not have anyone

assigned full-time to intelligence-related duties. In fiscal years 1998 and

1999, INS requested, but did not receive, additional positions for its

Intelligence Program. In both years, INS’ Annual Performance Plan reports

stated that collection, reporting, and analysis of intelligence information

were hampered by the lack of personnel to perform them.

INS cannot retrieve and analyze intelligence information rapidly or

efficiently. This is because intelligence reports are written in a narrative

format that is cumbersome to analyze. INS has not fully deployed an

automated system that can readily analyze the data, and some intelligence

information is not automated at all. In addition, INS does not require field

staff to use available mechanisms that would facilitate analysis of

intelligence information.

Procedures state that INS personnel should submit intelligence

information in a narrative report on Form G-392. The report is to be sent

electronically to various locations, including intelligence officials at INS’

three regions, INS headquarters, and EPIC. At INS headquarters, the

narrative information is to be copied into a database, Orion NetLEADS.

Although INS intends the Orion system to be its primary intelligence

 

20 Proposal to Reengineer the Service Intelligence Program (Washington, D.C.: INS Office of

Intelligence, Dec. 27, 1995).

Analysis of Intelligence

Information Is Cumbersome and

Inefficient
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Page 24 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

reporting and analysis tool, as of February 2000, INS’ use of the system

was limited.

None of the nearly 8,000 intelligence reports received by INS’ headquarters

Intelligence office in fiscal year 1999 was converted from a narrative to a

database format. The reports were simply copied into the Orion system in

the same narrative format in which they were originally created. As a

result, the reports could only be searched for keywords. According to an

INS intelligence official, this type of search results in a list of potentially

hundreds of intelligence reports, which an analyst must review one by one.

This is a cumbersome and an inefficient method of analysis.

To fully utilize the capabilities of the Orion system, information must be

entered using a database format in which each piece of information (e.g.,

name, address, telephone number, and vehicle license plate number) is

entered in a separate data field. According to a headquarters Intelligence

Program official, the narrative reports were not converted to database

format because competing work demands required program staff to work

on other tasks, such as intelligence planning, analysis, and report writing.

At the end of fiscal year 1999, the Orion software was installed on 144

computers in INS field locations and from 1 to 3 individuals were

authorized to use the software of each computer. Most of INS’ 20,000 field

staff did not have access to the Orion system. According to an INS

Intelligence Program official, the Intelligence Program did not have the

$250,000 necessary to purchase a license that would allow INS to deploy

the system servicewide.

INS has other automated methods for reporting intelligence information,

but they do not have the analytic capabilities of the Orion system. For

example, for field sites without access to the Orion system, INS developed

a template for creating intelligence reports using off-the-shelf database

software. According to INS officials, all field staff can use this method to

create intelligence reports beginning February 2000. If field staff use this

method, the data can be readily entered into the Orion system for analysis.

However, according to an INS Intelligence Program official, although INS

has several methods for preparing intelligence reports in a database

format, staff are not required to use any of them. They can still use the

narrative format.

INS procedures require that personnel send both intelligence and alien

smuggling incident reports to EPIC. These reports can be used by EPIC’s

Alien Intelligence Unit to develop intelligence about alien smuggling.

During our visit to EPIC, officials told us that they had a backlog of nearly
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25,000 alien smuggling incident reports submitted by INS that were either

handwritten or typed. They said that they had not automated these data

because EPIC lacked sufficient staff to do so. According to an INS official,

policies and procedures need to be updated to require staff to use a

database method for preparing both intelligence and alien smuggling

incident reports so they could be efficiently analyzed.

INS’ 1999 Annual Performance Plan states that the goal of the Intelligence

Program is to assist INS’ enforcement mission through improved

intelligence support. The plan established a number of output-related

goals, including producing an INS Intelligence Assessment, deploying the

Orion system to 60 additional locations, increasing intelligence training for

field staff, and providing investigative leads to field investigative units.

According to INS, it met or exceeded all of these goals. The Intelligence

Program

• issued an overall intelligence assessment in November 1999,

• deployed the Orion system to an additional 141 locations,

• provided training to nearly 8,000 field staff, and

• provided about 19,000 investigative leads.

However, the extent to which these outputs contributed to the Intelligence

Program’s goal of optimizing the collection, analysis, and dissemination of

intelligence information is not clear. INS has not developed outcome-based

performance measures to gauge the success of the program in these areas.

INS’ strategy for combating alien smuggling calls for INS to conduct

operations that disrupt alien smuggling in foreign countries to prevent

undocumented aliens from reaching the United States. In cooperation with

foreign governments, INS and the State Department conducted short-term

operations resulting in the interception of thousands of illegal aliens

destined for the United States and the arrest and/or prosecution of alien

smugglers. Although INS has not conducted an evaluation of the long-term

effects of these operations on alien smuggling, the effect of these

operations appears short-lived. Corruption among foreign government

officials and the lack of laws in some countries making alien smuggling a

crime have been cited as allowing alien smugglers to continue to operate.

Outcome Measures for

Intelligence Program Not

Established

Obstacles Impede

International Activities

From Having LongTerm Impact
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In 1995, INS began to conduct operations intended to disrupt alien

smuggling overseas. In 1996, INS formalized these operations into

Operation Global Reach, a cooperative, multiyear initiative with foreign

governments and international air carriers, whose goal is to disrupt alien

smuggling overseas. During fiscal year 1999, INS overseas staff spent about

28 staff years on enforcement-related activities, including anti-smuggling.

Between August 1995 and November 1999, INS conducted operations

intended to disrupt alien smuggling in 34 countries located in Latin

America, the Caribbean, and Asia. Most of the operations lasted about 30

to 60 days. Activities conducted during these operations included

• training about 8,400 foreign law enforcement authorities and international

air carrier personnel how to identify fraudulent U.S. entry documents,

• providing host country governments with assistance in prosecuting alien

smugglers and those who sell fraudulent documents, and

• assisting host country governments in intercepting illegal aliens destined

for the United States.

INS and the State Department have both provided funds for the return to

their home countries of illegal aliens destined for the United States and

apprehended in foreign countries. During fiscal year 1999, INS funded the

return of nearly 3,000 undocumented aliens who were intercepted by

foreign countries. Between 1996 and 1999, the State Department spent

about $676,000 for the return of about 800 smuggled aliens apprehended by

foreign countries. A State Department official told us that other countries

would be willing to intercept and return smuggled aliens they may

encounter, but these countries lack the needed funds. According to this

official, the State Department lacks sufficient funds to assist all countries

that are willing to return intercepted aliens to their home countries before

they reach the United States.

Although international operations helped to train foreign officials,

intercept aliens, and cultivate relationships between INS and host country

officials, INS reports indicate that alien smuggling appeared to have

reverted to previous levels once the operations ended. Two major

obstacles were reported to us as impeding efforts to deter alien smuggling

in foreign countries.

According to INS, corruption among foreign government officials and

airline personnel within the illegal alien source and transit countries is a

significant threat to INS operations. INS’ November 1999 Intelligence

Assessment stated that smugglers have reportedly corrupted senior-level

Overseas Activities

Designed to Disrupt Alien

Smuggling

Obstacles Impeding

Overseas Deterrence

Efforts
B-283952

Page 27 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

officials as well as officials in key positions, such as immigration officials

at airports and border checkpoints. The report stated the People’s

Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China reportedly has ties to

Chinese organized crime groups involved in alien smuggling. The report

also stated that few governments have shown a willingness to vigorously

prosecute offenders because, in many cases, corruption has reached the

highest levels. The report concluded that official corruption facilitates

alien smuggling, thereby negating the effect of initiatives to deter the

smuggling.

INS identified corrupt officials and employees during various international

operations. For example, in 1 Central American country, INS enforcement

personnel identified corrupt immigration employees and supervisors at an

airport and had information suggesting that 2 judges and 17 other

immigration officials may have been involved. In a Caribbean nation, the

director of immigration dismissed over 70 immigration employees and had

many of them arrested as a result of information developed by the disrupt

operation team. INS reports indicated that in some countries, honest

officials feel powerless to combat alien smuggling because their jobs

and/or their lives are threatened by widespread government corruption. In

some other countries, according to the reports, the government has

recognized the problem of corruption and has been trying to root it out.

The second major obstacle is the lack of alien smuggling laws in some

countries. Of Mexico and the seven Central American countries, only

Mexico, Honduras, and Panama have laws with associated fines and/or

imprisonment for alien smuggling. Other countries either expel the

smuggler or have no penalty at all. INS and State Department officials told

us that without laws against alien smuggling, alien smugglers will continue

to operate and negate the effect of other initiatives to disrupt alien

smuggling.

To gauge its effectiveness in disrupting alien smuggling and preventing

illegal aliens from entering the United States, INS established several

performance goals. Although the goals were met in fiscal year 1999, INS

itself does not believe that its overseas efforts have produced long-term

impacts.

INS’ fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan sets out the measures by

which INS would assess its performance overseas. INS. INS accomplished

the following in addressing these measures:

INS’ Overseas Performance

Goals Met, But Appear to

Have Little Lasting Impact
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Page 28 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

• INS exceeded its goal of helping to intercept about 8,000 undocumented

aliens destined for the United States. In fiscal year 1999, INS helped

foreign countries intercept about 9,000 such aliens. INS estimated that it

would have incurred nearly $1 million in detention costs had these aliens

reached the United States.

• INS exceeded its goal of assisting foreign countries in repatriating 200

undocumented aliens. In fiscal year 1999, INS helped repatriate nearly

3,000 such aliens.

• INS slightly exceeded its goal of assisting in 106 prosecutions. In fiscal

year 1999, INS assisted in 119 prosecutions.

According to INS reports on various overseas operations, its efforts led to

the (1) arrest of several major alien smugglers and document vendors in

one Caribbean nation, (2) arrest of one of Central America’s biggest alien

smugglers, and (3) apprehension and removal of 2,011 aliens from a

Central American country as well as the arrest of 13 alien smugglers and

the prosecution of 22 others for possessing fraudulent documents.

INS’ informal information-gathering indicates that the effects of the

overseas disruption operations have been short-lived. According to an INS

report, after one operation conducted in five Central American countries

ended, the number of undocumented aliens arriving at four key U.S.

airports from those countries reverted to nearly the level it was before the

operation. According to another report, the impact of the training that INS

personnel provided to foreign air carrier and law enforcement personnel

diminished within a few months. INS believes that the personnel they have

trained do not receive continued encouragement and support to perform

their jobs professionally and, therefore, revert to their old practices.

Without improvements in its investigations and intelligence programs, INS’

anti-smuggling efforts will continue to be hampered in the face of the

growing tide of aliens entering the United States with the aid of smuggling

organizations. Alien smuggling investigative efforts have been fragmented

and uncoordinated. Other than for the nationally designated and other

“high-profile” cases, INS does not have criteria for determining which

investigations it should open. Therefore, INS does not know if its

investigative resources are focused on the highest priority cases. INS also

lacks an agencywide, automated case tracking and management system

that contains basic data on individuals and organizations targeted by

current and previous investigations. Such a case tracking and management

system would help alleviate the problem of duplicative investigations,

facilitate the sharing of intelligence information on targeted organizations

Conclusions
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Page 29 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

and individuals, and provide information to INS managers about where and

how their resources are being deployed.

To date, INS has used performance indicators such as the number of major

investigations and persons presented for prosecution under the alien

smuggling statute. These indicators measure program outputs, but they do

not provide information on the extent to which INS’ anti-smuggling efforts

have helped achieve the strategy’s objective of deterring and disrupting

alien smuggling. INS has outlined other expected results from its strategy,

such as an increase in the sophistication of smuggling methods and/or a

shift in smuggling corridors. However, INS has not specified how these

results will be measured. We recognize that it is difficult to directly

measure outcomes such as deterrence and disruption of anti-smuggling.

However, we believe that there are a variety of measures available—

including information on smuggling fees, usage, and tactics, and shifts in

the flow of smuggled alien traffic—that could be used to collect systematic

data and develop a composite picture of progress toward achieving the

strategy’s objectives.

INS’ intelligence efforts lack several of the key building blocks necessary

for the program to support INS’ anti-smuggling efforts. INS’ procedures for

reporting intelligence information have been inefficient because they have

failed to take advantage of advances in electronic information processing.

Until INS converts from a narrative to a database format for reporting

intelligence information, the retrieval, analysis, and dissemination of

intelligence information will remain problematic.

The above impediments make it difficult, if not impossible, for INS to meet

the challenges posed by increasingly sophisticated major smuggling

organizations.

We recommend that the INS Commissioner

• establish criteria for opening an anti-smuggling case to help ensure that

INS’ anti-smuggling resources are focused on the highest priority cases;

• establish a cost-effective case tracking and management system of alien

smuggling investigations that is automated, agencywide, and readily

available to investigative personnel and program managers to facilitate the

sharing of case information and prevent duplication of effort;

• establish performance measures for the anti-smuggling efforts and

intelligence program with which to gauge program effects; and

• require that intelligence reports be prepared using a database format so

the information can be systematically analyzed.

Recommendations
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We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney

General, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Transportation.

The Department of Justice had no comments on the draft report. However,

INS Intelligence and Investigations officials provided oral comments in a

meeting on April 19, 2000. The INS officials also provided technical

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Overall, the INS

officials agreed with our conclusions and recommendations and said they

are already taking several actions to address them.

• With respect to establishing criteria for opening an anti-smuggling case,

INS plans to develop in fiscal year 2001 a comprehensive policy regarding

the criteria for opening an anti-smuggling case, including clarifying that

Category I cases can only be designated by INS headquarters.

• With respect to developing an automated case tracking and management

system, INS has under development an Enforcement Case Tracking

System which, among other things, is to be used to track and manage all

INS investigations. INS expects to complete system deployment by the

end of fiscal year 2001. At that time, anti-smuggling case information

should be available to all investigative personnel and program managers.

• Regarding anti-smuggling performance measures, INS is developing a plan

for measuring “shifts” in alien smuggling, which it intends to complete by

the end of fiscal year 2000 and implement in fiscal year 2001.

• With respect to intelligence reporting, INS plans to complete deployment

by the end of fiscal year 2002 of the software that is to allow intelligence

information to be collected in a database format.

Although these are steps in the right direction, they will have to be

effectively implemented before INS fully responds to the concerns raised

in this report. For example, as we reported in 1997,21 a variety of indicators

may be useful to evaluate the effects of INS’ anti-smuggling strategy. We

therefore encourage INS to identify additional performance measures to

gauge the strategy’s effectiveness. Further, as it deploys its case tracking

and management system and intelligence software, standardized policies

and procedures and appropriate resources could help promote effective

data collection and analysis and help INS respond to any challenges that

occur.

 

21 GAO/GGD-98-21.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation
B-283952

Page 31 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

On April 7, 2000, the Acting Director of the State Department’s Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provided oral

comments on our draft report. Regarding our finding on coordination

problems, he stated that in September 1998, the Bureau proposed

establishing an interagency Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking

Coordination Center. Such a center was intended to coordinate federal

efforts to combat alien smuggling and serve as the focal point for

intelligence on alien smuggling and trafficking activities. Because our

focus was on the Attorney General’s strategy to deter and disrupt alien

smuggling, we did not evaluate the issues associated with establishing

such an interagency coordination mechanism or its potential impact on the

issues raised in this report.

Transportation had no comment on our draft report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney

General; the Honorable Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and

Naturalization Service; the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary of

State; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to

others upon request.

The major contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix I. If

you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call

Evi L. Rezmovic or me on (202) 512-8777.

Richard M. Stana

Associate Director, Administration of

 Justice Issues
Page 32 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

Contents

1 Letter

Appendix I 34

GAO Contacts and

Staff

Acknowledgments

Figure 1: Source Countries With the Highest Number of

INS Apprehensions, Excluding Mexico

8

Figure 2: Anti-smuggling Workyears Fiscal Years 1992

through 1999

15

Figures

Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

NSA National Security Agency

PRC People's Republic of China

VWPP Visa Waiver Pilot Program
Page 33 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling
Appendix I

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling

Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777

Evi L. Rezmovic, (202) 512-2580

In addition to the persons named above, Mike Dino, Nancy Kawahara,

Hector Wong, and Mike Kassack made key contributions to this report.

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments
Page 35 GAO/GGD-00-103 Alien Smuggling
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