United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

Management, the Federal Workforce, and 

the District of Columbia, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, U.S. Senate

INTELLECTUAL 

PROPERTY 

Better Data Analysis 

and Integration Could 

Help U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection 

Improve Border 

Enforcement Efforts 

April 2007 

 

GAO-07-735 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2007

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

Better Data Analysis and Integration 

Could Help U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Improve Border Enforcement 

Efforts 

Highlights of GAO-07-735, a report to the 

RM, Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

U.S. government efforts to protect

and enforce intellectual property

rights are crucial to preventing 

billions of dollars in economic

losses and for mitigating health and 

safety risks from trade in 

counterfeit and pirated goods. The

Department of Homeland

Security’s Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) leads intellectual 

property (IP) enforcement activity

at the U.S. border. GAO was asked

to (1) examine key aspects of 

CBP’s process to carry out border 

enforcement, (2) analyze CBP’s 

border enforcement outcomes 

during fiscal years 2001 to 2006, 

and (3) evaluate CBP’s approach

for improving border enforcement.

GAO examined relevant 

documents, interviewed agency 

officials in Washington, D.C. and 

seven port locations, and analyzed

CBP data on trade and IP seizure 

and penalty activity. This is the 

public version of a law 

enforcement sensitive report by the 

same title (GAO-07-350SU). 

What GAO Recommends

In the restricted report, GAO 

recommended that the CBP 

Commissioner (1) include 

measures to guide and assess IP 

enforcement outcomes in CBP’s 

strategic plan; (2) improve CBP’s IP 

enforcement data; and (3) use 

existing data to better understand 

ports’ IP enforcement activities and 

outcomes, and link ports’

performance to measures in CBP’s 

strategic plan. CBP generally 

agreed with our recommendations. 

CBP’s Office of International Trade (OT), formed in 2006, and Office of Field 

Operations (OFO) carry out IP border enforcement processes, including 

targeting and examining suspicious shipments, seizing infringing goods, and 

assessing penalties as warranted. CBP uses computer-based and manual 

targeting to determine which shipments it will examine, and both methods 

have strengths and limitations. Port practices for recording exam results

vary, making it difficult for CBP to fully assess the effectiveness of its IP 

targeting efforts. 

 

Since 2001, CBP’s IP enforcement outcomes have been concentrated among

particular transport modes, product types, and ports. Rising numbers of lowvalue seizures from mail facilities have driven growth in seizure actions, but 

uneven seizures of high-value goods from sea containers have caused the 

estimated value of seizures to fluctuate. The vast majority of seizure and 

penalty outcomes in the last 6 years have been concentrated among 10 or 

fewer of CBP’s 300-plus ports. For example, 10 ports account for 98 percent 

of the $1.1 billion in penalties assessed during fiscal years 2001 to 2006. 

CBP lacks agencywide performance measures in its strategic plan and an

integrated approach across key offices to guide and improve IP enforcement. 

Narrowly focused initiatives led by offices now under OT have had limited 

results. CBP has not done a broader analysis to examine variances in port IP 

enforcement outcomes. For example, GAO found that some of the largest IPimporting ports had very small seizure rates relative to other top IPimporting ports. A lack of integration between OT and OFO impedes using 

this type of analysis to identify potential IP enforcement improvements. 

Top 25 IP-Importing Ports’ Seizure Rates: Percent of IP Seizures in IP Imports (by Value), 

Fiscal Year 2005 

Percent of IP seizures in IP imports

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

0.14

Average top 25 ports

Gray bars indicate the eight ports in which the percentage of IP seizures (by value)

in IP imports was larger than the average for the top 25 ports

Por

Port U

Port V

Port W

Port X

Port Y

t T

Port S

Por

Port R

t P

Port J

Port K

Port L

Port M

Port N

Port O

Port Q

Port I

Port H

Port G

Port A

Port B

Port C

Port D

Port E

Port F

Note: Port names are not included in the figure for law enforcement reasons. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-735.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Loren Yager at 

(202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6

CBP Undertakes a Series of Steps, Amid Challenges, to Enforce IP 

Rights at the Border 12 

IP Enforcement Outcomes Have Been Concentrated in Certain 

Areas and Reflect Pockets of Activity 24 

CBP’s Approach to Improving IP Enforcement Lacks Integration 

and Has Produced Limited Results 32 

Conclusions 43

Recommendations for Executive Action 45 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 48 

Appendix II Analysis of Top Six Ports’ IP Enforcement 

Outcomes 52 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 57 

GAO Comments 62 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 65 

Tables 

Table 1: Percent of Total Estimated Domestic Value Seized by

Commodity, Fiscal Years 2001-2006 29 

Table 2: Top 10 Ports’ Percent of Seizure and Penalty Outcomes, 

Fiscal Years 2001-2006 31 

Table 3: CBP IP Penalty Amounts Assessed versus Collected, Fiscal 

Years 2001-2006 37 

Table 4: IP Seizure Rates of Top 25 Ports (by IP Import Value), 

Fiscal Year 2005 42 

Page i GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement 
Figures 

Figure 1: Import Value by Mode of Transport, Fiscal Year 2005 10 

Figure 2: Number of Trade, Compliance Measurement, and 

Nontrade Exams CBP Performed, Fiscal Years 2001-2005 11 

Figure 3: Overview of CBP’s Process for Conducting IP Border 

Enforcement 14

Figure 4: Percent of IP Seizure Actions and Domestic Value by

Transportation Mode, Fiscal Years 2003-2006 26 

Figure 5: Trends in Number of IP Seizure Actions and Estimated 

Domestic Values, Fiscal Years 2001-2006 27 

Figure 6: Top 25 IP-Importing Ports’ Seizure Rates: Percent of IP 

Seizures in IP Imports (by Value), Fiscal Year 2005 41 

Figure 7: IP Enforcement Outcomes for Top Six Ports, Fiscal Years 

2001-2006 54

Abbreviations 

ATS Automated Targeting System 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

HTS Harmonized Tariff System 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IP intellectual property 

MSRP Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price 

OFO Office of Field Operations 

OT Office of International Trade 

STOP Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy

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Page ii GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 26, 2007 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Senator Voinovich:

The illegal importation and distribution of counterfeit and pirated goods

poses an increasing cost to the United States economy and threatens the 

health and safety of its citizens.1

 The United States dominates the creation

and exportation of intellectual property (IP)—creations of the mind—and 

provides broad protection for IP through means such as copyrights, 

patents, and trademarks. However, IP protection in many parts of the 

world is inadequate, and as a result, U.S. goods are subject to substantial 

counterfeiting and piracy in other countries.2

 The Department of Justice 

has reported on the growing threat of IP crime in the United States, noting

that IP has become increasingly more critical to our country’s economic 

security. Other federal agencies have testified that the economic benefits 

of capitalizing on IP goods have drawn the attention of counterfeiters and 

pirates, and that the magnitude and complexity of IP rights violations have 

increased in recent years.3

 In an effort to protect American public health

and safety and safeguard the U.S. economy, a number of federal agencies 

are involved in keeping IP-infringing goods from entering the country and 

investigating or prosecuting those responsible for their importation. The 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) leads enforcement activity at the U.S. border by 

 1

Counterfeit goods carry a false trademark identical to, or substantially indistinguishable 

from, a U.S. registered trademark (See Timothy P. Trainer and Vicki E. Allums, Protecting 

Intellectual Property Across Borders, 2006 ed. (Eagan, MN: Thomson/West, 2006).) Pirated 

goods are reproduced without authorization, especially in infringement or copyright.

2

GAO, Intellectual Property: U.S. Efforts Have Contributed to Strengthened Laws 

Overseas, but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-912 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004). 

3

Officials from the Departments of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, and 

Homeland Security have all recently reported on the growing threats to the United States 

from increases in counterfeit goods. 

Page 1 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
detecting and seizing counterfeit or pirated goods that enter the United 

States through its 300-plus ports of entry and assessing penalties against IP

rights offenders.4

In response to your request to review federal enforcement efforts of IP at 

the borders, this report (1) examines key aspects of CBP’s process to carry

out border enforcement, (2) analyzes CBP’s border enforcement outcomes 

during fiscal years 2001 through 2006, and (3) evaluates CBP’s approach 

for improving border enforcement. We plan to report on CBP and other 

federal agencies’ activities and resources devoted to IP enforcement later

in 2007. 

To address these issues, we met with CBP officials in Washington, D.C., 

and at seven port locations and reviewed relevant agency documents to 

understand CBP policies and practices related to IP border enforcement. 

At the ports, we examined port organizational structures and practices for

enforcing IP rights, and we spoke with various CBP personnel who are 

responsible for identifying, examining, seizing, and assessing penalties on

goods that involve IP violations. We analyzed CBP data on the volume and 

value of trade entering U.S. ports and on its IP seizure and penalty activity. 

Most of this analysis was based on data covering fiscal years 2001 through

2006, but some data were only available for fiscal years 2003 through 2006.

We identified certain limitations in the seizure and penalty data but found

them sufficiently reliable to indicate broad trends in enforcement 

outcomes. We discussed CBP’s efforts with knowledgeable agency

officials and obtained information on certain steps CBP has taken to 

improve its efforts. Our work focused on tangible goods that cross U.S. 

borders, rather than goods that are pirated over the Internet. We 

conducted our work from November 2005 through January 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The 

original version of this report was issued on March 20, 2007, as a restricted 

report, copies of which are available for official use only.5

 This public 

 4

Given its role in overseeing the import and export of physical goods, CBP’s efforts are 

primarily directed toward counterfeit goods manufactured overseas and, occasionally, the

means to create or finish them in the United States. Computer- or Internet-based piracy of

copyrighted media, such as music, movies, or software, is also a significant problem, but 

because these activities usually have no link to the border, CBP is not as involved in

fighting this form of IP infringement. Our use of the term “counterfeit” in this report refers 

broadly to violations that may involve a range of IP infringement. 

5

GAO, Intellectual Property: Better Data Analysis and Integration Could Help U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Improve Border Enforcement Efforts, GAO-07-350SU

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2007). 

Page 2 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
version of the original report does not contain certain information that 

DHS regarded as law enforcement sensitive and requested that we remove. 

CBP undertakes a series of steps to enforce IP rights at the U.S. border 

and faces numerous challenges throughout this process. CBP’s process 

includes three key functions: (1) targeting suspicious shipments, (2) 

examining goods to determine their authenticity, and (3) enforcing IP laws 

through seizure and penalty actions. CBP’s Office of International Trade, 

formed in October 2006, focuses on trade policy and program development 

and the Office of Field Operations oversees port operations and 

implements CBP policies; both play important roles in carrying out key IP 

functions. To help determine which of the millions of shipments entering 

the United States each year require further review, CBP relies on two 

primary targeting methods, computer-based and manual, but both have 

certain strengths and limitations for targeting IP violations. Both offices 

use computer-based targeting to electronically identify commercial 

shipments by known or suspected violators, which typically enter the 

country via sea, air, and truck. However, the primary computer method 

used for IP targeting does not work for noncommercial shipments, has 

limited usefulness in express consignment (e.g., Federal Express) and 

international mail processing environments, and has uncovered a 

relatively small portion of IP violations. Manual targeting involves skilled 

port employees making real-time decisions based on instinct and 

experience and can be used for any transport mode, but it requires 

dedication of time and resources, and its role in uncovering IP violations 

cannot be determined. Once a shipment has been targeted, CBP 

examination techniques range from document reviews to physical exams, 

with physical exams being the best method for evaluating potential IP 

violations. Determining whether infringement has occurred can be a

challenging process in which port staff may require input from CBP’s legal 

and product experts and from the rights holders themselves. Although port 

staff are required to enter exam results in CBP’s data systems, CBP 

officials said that information on IP exams has been unevenly recorded 

across ports, making it difficult for CBP to fully analyze the effect of its 

targeting efforts in this area. CBP’s IP enforcement process concludes by 

ports seizing infringing goods and, if warranted, assessing penalties 

against offenders. 

Results in Brief 

The bulk of CBP’s enforcement outcomes in recent years have been 

generated by pockets of activity within certain modes of transport and 

product types as well as among a limited number of port locations. 

Although both seizure numbers and estimated values have increased in 

Page 3 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
recent years, the increase in numbers can be attributed almost exclusively 

to seizures of small-value shipments made from air transportation, 

particularly express consignment and international mail. This type of 

seizure grew particularly rapidly in 2006, leading to a near doubling in the

number of seizure actions compared with those in the prior year, an

outcome that may reflect a shift in smuggling techniques that has forced 

CBP to be more reliant on manual targeting methods. In contrast, more 

than half of estimated seizure value has been generated by a much smaller 

number of seizures from ocean-going cargo containers, a transportation 

mode in which computer-based targeting is used. The sheer size of some 

of these seizures has caused total estimated seizure values to fluctuate 

from year to year, reaching a high in 2006. Wearing apparel, cigarettes, 

footwear, and handbags have accounted for the majority of seizure value 

in the past 6 years. A limited number of ports have produced the bulk of 

seizure and penalty activity since 2001, with nearly three-fourths of 

aggregate seizure value and 84 percent of penalty cases opened accounted

for by the top 10 ports as ranked by those outcomes.6

 These are a mix of 

ports, including a few of the nation’s largest and some that are smaller. Six 

of these ports have consistently driven enforcement outcomes over time. 

Despite recent increases in seizure outcomes, CBP lacks an integrated 

approach across key offices for further improving border enforcement 

outcomes, causing it to focus on certain efforts that have produced limited

results while not taking initiative to understand and address the variations 

among ports’ enforcement outcomes. Although CBP’s strategic plan 

highlights the importance of IP enforcement, the plan lacks any 

performance measures in this area to guide agencywide efforts and 

measure outcomes. CBP offices that formed the Office of International 

Trade have led certain initiatives to improve IP enforcement processes, 

including developing a statistically driven risk-assessment model to 

improve targeting, auditing certain importers’ internal controls for 

preventing importation of infringing goods, and issuing guidance to give 

ports more discretion in deciding when to issue penalties in cases where 

collection is unlikely. However, these efforts have produced limited 

results: poor data collection during port-based pilots prevents CBP from 

fully assessing the effectiveness of its risk model; the audits have 

produced some enforcement actions, but are time consuming and many

 6

We ranked ports according to their aggregate number of seizure actions, estimated seizure 

values, IP penalty cases opened, and IP penalty amounts assessed during fiscal years 2001 

through 2006. The top 10 ports for each category differ, but there is considerable overlap

among the ports so ranked in each category. 

Page 4 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
are not yet complete; and the guidance, while reducing new penalty 

amounts as expected, has not helped to bridge the large gap between 

amounts assessed and those collected. Beyond these efforts, CBP has not 

analyzed existing data to identify factors that might account for variations 

in enforcement outcomes within or among certain ports, in part because 

port priorities and practices are highly decentralized. In addition to 

identifying a concentration of IP enforcement outcomes among certain

ports, we also compared IP seizures to “IP imports” (goods that have been

monitored by CBP for IP violations and goods that are similar to them) 

across a larger number of ports. We determined that, of 25 ports that 

represented 75 percent of the value of fiscal year 2005 IP imports, just 8 

had seizure rates (seizure value as a percent of import value) that were 

higher than the group average. Surprisingly, the port with the highest 

seizure rate also had the smallest value of IP imports among the ports we 

examined. In contrast, the IP seizure rates for several of the ports with 

relatively larger IP import values were well below the group average. This 

illustrates the type of analysis that CBP could perform using existing data

to better understand and potentially improve port enforcement outcomes. 

Such analysis would likely be conducted by the Office of International 

Trade, but overseeing and influencing port operations is the purview of 

Office of Field Operations. 

To develop a more effective approach to IP border enforcement, in the law 

enforcement sensitive report we recommended that the CBP 

Commissioner direct the Offices of International Trade and Field 

Operations to work together to (1) include in CBP’s strategic plan 

measures to guide and assess IP enforcement efforts, (2) improve CBP’s 

data on IP enforcement, and (3) analyze the data to better understand 

ports’ IP enforcement activities and outcomes and link ports’ performance 

to CBP’s strategic plan.

We provided a draft of the law enforcement sensitive report to DHS for 

review by CBP and ICE. In commenting on that report, CBP generally 

agreed with our recommendations. CBP and ICE also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated into the law enforcement sensitive 

report as appropriate. We also provided a draft of this report to DHS for 

sensitivity review by CBP and ICE, which agreed that we had 

appropriately removed law enforcement sensitive information. 

Page 5 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Intellectual property is the result of human innovation and creation to 

develop products that people consume every day, whether it is the music 

we listen to, the books we read, the cars we drive, or the medicine we 

take. The protection of IP is recognized as important to continuing that 

innovation and creativity, and the United States has several laws aimed at 

protecting IP rights. Copyrights, patents, and trademarks are the most 

common forms of protective rights for IP.7

 Protection is granted by 

guaranteeing owners limited exclusive rights to whatever economic 

reward the market may provide for their creations and products. 

According to the U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Coordinator, industries 

that relied on IP protection were estimated to account for over half of all

U.S. exports, represented 40 percent of U.S. economic growth, and 

employed about 18 million Americans in 2006, making IP protection 

important to protecting our nation’s economy.8

 It is difficult to reliably 

measure criminal activity, but industry groups suggest that counterfeiting 

and piracy are on the rise and that a broader range of products, from auto 

parts to razor blades, and from medicines to infant formula, are subject to

counterfeit production. The threat to America’s health and safety from the 

theft of IP and counterfeiting of products is an increasing concern for 

many reasons—counterfeit batteries can explode, counterfeit car parts 

can fail to perform, and counterfeit pharmaceuticals can lack the 

ingredients necessary to cure deadly diseases.9

 In addition to public health 

Background 

Counterfeit Goods Pose a 

Cost to U.S. Economy and 

a Threat to Health and 

Safety 

 7

A copyright provides protection for literary and artistic works such as books, musical 

compositions, computer software, and cinematographic works (movies). A copyright is a

property right in an original work of authorship that arises automatically upon creation of 

such a work and belongs, in the first instance, to the author. A patent protects an invention 

by giving the inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a new,

useful, nonobvious invention during a specific term. Trademarks are words, phrases, logos,

or other graphic symbols used by manufacturers or merchants to identify their goods and 

distinguish them from others. Other types of intellectual property include trade secrets, 

industrial designs, and geographic indications. Geographic indications are names used to

identify products with quality, reputation, or other characteristics attributable to the origin 

of the product.

8

Statement by Chris Israel, U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Coordinator, before the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Federal Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia on July 26, 2006. 

9

The World Health Organization estimates that 10 percent of all pharmaceuticals worldwide 

are counterfeit. 

Page 6 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
and safety concerns, the annual losses that companies face from IP 

violations are substantial.

CBP Leads IP Enforcement 

at the Border 

Multiple federal agencies play a role in combating counterfeiting and 

piracy, and their efforts were wrapped into the administration’s Strategy 

Targeting Organized Piracy, launched in October 2004. One objective of 

this effort is to improve border enforcement, and CBP is the agency

primarily responsible for such enforcement, given its authority to detain

and examine shipments and seize goods that violate U.S. law. CBP’s 

current mission has two goals: preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons 

from entering the United States while facilitating the flow of legitimate 

trade and travel; and its priority mission is to ensure homeland security.10

CBP is responsible for enforcing antiterrorism, trade, immigration, and 

agricultural policy, laws, and regulations at more than 300 ports of entry. 

Two CBP offices play a role in carrying out policies and procedures 

related to IP enforcement: 

• Office of International Trade (OT) – Established in October 2006, this 

office consolidates the trade policy, program development, and 

compliance measurement functions of CBP into one office.11 This office is 

responsible for providing uniformity and clarity for the development of 

CBP’s national strategy to facilitate legitimate trade and managing the 

design and implementation of strategic initiatives related to trade 

compliance and enforcement, including IP rights.

• Office of Field Operations (OFO) – This office houses CBP’s border 

operations and is comprised of 20 field offices under which are CBP’s 325 

 10Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, border inspection functions of a number of

agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service,

and the Department of Agriculture were transferred to DHS. P.L. 107-296, Title IV. CBP is 

responsible for carrying out these functions by assessing and collecting customs duties, 

excise taxes, and fees and penalties due on imported merchandise; interdicting and seizing 

contraband; processing persons, baggage, cargo, and mail; detecting and apprehending

persons engaged in fraudulent practices designed to circumvent Customs and related laws; 

protecting American business and labor and IP rights; and, protecting the general welfare 

and security of the United States by enforcing import and export restrictions and 

prohibitions. 

11The Office of International Trade was formed by merging CBP’s Office of Strategic Trade, 

Office of Regulations and Rulings, and certain trade-related policy functions of the Office 

of Field Operations. 

Page 7 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
ports of entry.12 Overseeing more than 25,000 employees, including more 

than 20,000 CBP officers, OFO is responsible for carrying out CBP’s cargo 

and passenger-processing activities related to security, trade, immigration, 

and agricultural inspection. 

Daily management of port operations is highly decentralized, with field 

offices overseeing but not directly managing port operations. CBP’s port 

operations oversee an array of cargo- and passenger-processing 

environments, and port management structures are not uniform. For 

example, some ports’ management oversees a single port of entry while 

others oversee multiple ports of entry (e.g., a seaport and nearby airport). 

• Seaports – CBP operations in the sea environment primarily consist of 

cargo container processing, but may include passenger processing for 

cruise ships. Cargo containers arriving at seaports may be transported to 

interior ports for processing via an import mechanism called the in-bond 

system.13 CBP receives manifest information 24 hours before lading at 

foreign ports so that it may screen cargo container data to identify highrisk shipments.14

• Airports – CBP processes passengers and cargo at U.S. airports with 

international flights. CBP’s air environment includes air cargo, express 

consignment carriers, such as Federal Express, and international mail. Air 

cargo shipments are generally larger in size than express consignment or 

international mail shipments. CBP receives manifest information in the air 

environment 4 hours prior to arrival. 

• Land Border Crossings – CBP processes passengers, commercial truck 

and rail, and personal vehicles at land border crossings. CBP receives 

 12U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Securing America’s Borders at Ports of Entry,

Office of Field Operations, Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007 through 2011. 

13Because of the in-bond system, a significant portion of goods received at U.S. ports do not 

immediately enter U.S. commerce but are instead transferred to other ports for official 

entry or are transported through the United States to Mexico or Canada. For example, 

containers arriving at the port of Los Angeles might be transferred via truck to the port of

Cleveland for official entry. In a recent report, GAO found that weaknesses in CBP’s 

management of the in-bond system persist and that CBP does not adequately monitor and 

track in-bond shipments (see International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond

Cargo System Impede Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue,

Trade, and Security Concerns, GAO-07-561 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2007). 

14A manifest is a listing of the conveyance’s cargo, e.g., goods within an ocean-going 

container. 

Page 8 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
manifest information for commercial truck and rail shipments 30 minutes 

to 2 hours prior to arrival, depending on the transport mode. 

The volume of goods and people that CBP processes for entry into the 

United States every year is substantial and has been steadily increasing. 

For example, the number of “entries summaries” filed with CBP rose from 

nearly 24 million in fiscal year 2001 to nearly 30 million in fiscal year 

2005.

15 In fiscal year 2005, CBP processed approximately 20 million sea, 

truck, and rail containers and about 450 million passengers and 

pedestrians.16 At the same time, the value of import trade has been 

growing, rising from about $1.2 trillion in fiscal year 2001 to about $1.7 

trillion in fiscal year 2005, according to CBP statistics.17 The largest share 

of imports by value arrives at the United States via ocean-going cargo 

containers, followed by air transport, as illustrated in figure 1. According 

to CBP, the proportion of import value by transport mode has remained 

relatively static since fiscal year 1999.

 15A formal entry is required for imports greater than $2,500 in value, and refers to 

information (usually in electronic format, but sometimes in paper format) that is filed by 

the importer or broker. Entry data includes the manufacturer’s identification number, the

importer’s identification number, country of origin of the goods, and a more precise

description of merchandise and is used by CBP to, among other things, assess customs 

duties and determine when cargo will be cleared to leave a port. 

16Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2005, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection. 

17Import Trade Trends, Fiscal Year 2005 Year End Report, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection. 

Page 9 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Figure 1: Import Value by Mode of Transport, Fiscal Year 2005 

Note: “Land” includes imports that entered via truck or rail. “Other” includes imports that entered 

through foreign trade zones, warehouses, and other methods. 

Although all goods imported into the United States are subject to 

examination, CBP examines only a small portion of them.18 Most exams 

are conducted for security reasons, and these have been increasing each 

year, while the number of trade-specific exams has not grown since 2001, 

as shown in figure 2. In addition, CBP conducts a small portion of exams 

under its Compliance Measurement Program, which has components to 

address both security and trade compliance.19

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

Sea

Land

Other

Air

43%

23%

10%

24%

 18CBP is authorized by law (19 U.S.C. 1499(c)(1)) to examine all merchandise entering the 

territory of the United States. 

19The Compliance Measurement Program is a statistical sampling program that randomly 

selects shipments for review and examination to determine the degree to which they

comply with relevant laws and regulations. The program initially focused on trade

compliance and revenue issues. In fiscal year 2006, CBP expanded the program to also 

focus on supply chain security. 

Page 10 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Figure 2: Number of Trade, Compliance Measurement, and Nontrade Exams CBP 

Performed, Fiscal Years 2001-2005 

Note: According to CBP, “nontrade exams” include exams conducted for security, narcotics, or

agricultural reasons. These data include security exams conducted through nonintrusive inspection 

techniques such as mobile X-ray machines. 

After the formation of DHS and in light of homeland security priorities, 

CBP determined that it needed to focus its trade enforcement resources 

and activities on the most pressing trade issues. CBP has six Priority Trade 

Issues, one of which involves IP.20 According to CBP’s Intellectual Property 

Rights Trade Strategy, the agency’s goal is to improve the effectiveness of 

its IP enforcement activities; ensure a uniform enforcement approach 

across its multiple port locations; and focus on making seizures with high 

aggregate values, that threaten health and safety or economic security, or 

Number (in hundreds)

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

Nontrade exams

Compliance measurement exams

Trade exams

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

 20The number and focus of Priority Trade Issues has changed over time. As of fiscal year 

2006, the Priority Trade Issues included agriculture, antidumping and countervailing duties, 

IP rights, penalties, revenue, and textiles and wearing apparel. 

Page 11 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
that have possible ties to terrorist activity. CBP is also responsible for 

enforcing International Trade Commission exclusion orders that arise 

from an administrative process in which the commission determines that 

certain products constitute infringement of a relevant U.S. law and should 

be excluded entry to the United States.

21 CBP coordinates its efforts with 

DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which 

investigates IP violations and builds cases for prosecution. 

CBP takes a series of steps to enforce IP rights at the border and faces a 

number of challenges throughout this process. Two key offices, OT and 

OFO, are responsible for carrying out these steps, which include (1) 

targeting suspicious shipments; (2) examining detained shipments to 

determine if they carry infringing or excluded goods; and (3) enforcing IP 

laws by seizing goods and, if warranted, assessing penalties against 

importers. CBP uses two primary methods to target IP violations: 

computer-based and manual targeting. Their use varies, depending on the

individual port approaches and the transportation mode being targeted, 

and both methods have certain strengths and limitations. OT and OFO 

both use computer-based methods to target vast numbers of commercial 

shipments, but the primary computer method used for IP purposes has led 

to a relatively small percent of IP seizures. Manual targeting by port 

employees is more ad hoc and flexible than computer-based targeting,

given its reliance on employee skill and availability, but determining its 

effect on IP enforcement is difficult. Ports conduct exams on targeted 

shipments, and determining whether infringement has occurred during an

exam can be a challenging process that requires training and input from 

experts. Because of differing port practices, information on IP exams has 

been unevenly recorded across ports, according to officials, making it 

difficult for CBP to fully analyze the effect of its targeting efforts in this 

area. CBP’s process for enforcing IP concludes with ports seizing 

infringing goods and, if warranted, referring cases to ICE and assessing 

penalties. According to CBP officials, storing and destroying infringing 

goods has been costly, and the penalty process has resulted in few 

collections. Agency IP enforcement efforts have primarily been focused on

goods for which the trademark or copyright has been recorded with CBP. 

CBP Undertakes a 

Series of Steps, Amid 

Challenges, to 

Enforce IP Rights at 

the Border 

 21Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930, as amended (Title 19 U.S.C. 1337), makes it is 

unlawful to import into the United States articles that infringe a U.S. patent, trademark,

copyright or mask work. 

Page 12 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Because importing counterfeit goods is an inherently deceptive activity, it 

presents challenges to CBP’s ability to process large volumes of goods and 

determine those that are legitimate. CBP regularly confronts nefarious 

importers who attempt to smuggle IP-infringing goods into the country 

through various means. For example, according to a CBP press release, in

August 2006, the Norfolk seaport found fake Nike shoes concealed inside a 

refrigerated container behind the jellyfish and salt kelp declared on the 

manifest.22 In addition, CBP contends with counterfeiter practices that 

make it difficult to detect shipments containing IP-infringing goods or 

distinguish legitimate from unauthorized goods. The law enforcement 

sensitive report described some of these practices in greater detail. 

Amid these challenges, however, OT and OFO both have responsibility for 

executing a series of actions to (1) target potential IP infringing goods as 

they enter the United States, (2) examine suspicious goods, and (3) 

enforce IP laws through seizures and penalties, if warranted. Figure 3 

depicts an overview of CBP’s process. 

CBP Operates in a 

Challenging Environment 

to Combat the Entry of 

Counterfeit Goods 

 22CBP, “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Intercepts “Cool” Counterfeit Shoes Worth

Over One Million Dollars,” press release, Washington, D.C., August 3, 2006. 

Page 13 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Figure 3: Overview of CBP’s Process for Conducting IP Border Enforcement 

CBP uses both computer-based and manual targeting approaches to target 

counterfeit goods either before or as they enter the United States—both 

methods have strengths and limitations related to scope, data accuracy 

and overall sophistication, and resource requirements. CBP ports vary in

the degree to which they use these methods, depending on their overall 

approach to IP enforcement and the modes of transport that they oversee.

The primary computer-based targeting method used for IP purposes has 

uncovered a relatively small share of IP seizures. The effect of manual 

targeting is more difficult to determine. In addition, CBP undertakes other 

targeting and compliance measurement actions that, while not intended 

for IP enforcement, have uncovered IP violations.

CBP’s computer-based targeting for IP violations is handled primarily 

through its Cargo Selectivity program, a system that targets commercial 

Sources: GAO (data); Nova Development (clip art).

Shipments

arrive at 

U.S. ports

Targeting Examining

Conduct document 

review or physical 

exam

Computerbased

Manual Physical exam: open 

shipments and pull 

samples for 

evaluation

Detain goods, further 

assess authenticity

Consult rights-holders

and legal counsel

No 

IP violation 

found

Possible 

IP 

violation

No 

IP violation 

detected

IP 

violation 

found

Release into commerce:

may occur at any point during the detention and 

examination process, depending on circumstances 

Enforcing

Seize goods

Store/destroy 

goods

Assess

penalties

(when 

warranted)

CBP Uses Various 

Targeting Methods, 

Depending on Port 

Practices and Transport 

Modes, Each Having 

Strengths and Limitations 

Computer-Based Targeting 

Page 14 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
shipments, which are typically transported to the United States by sea, air, 

and truck.23 Commercial shipments may arrive to the United States via 

various modes of transport, but the largest shipments arrive via oceangoing cargo containers. When data about a particular shipment match the 

targeting criteria entered into the system, the port of entry is electronically 

notified, and the shipment is flagged for examination. Cargo Selectivity is

not used to target noncommercial shipments, which typically enter the 

United States via express consignment, international mail, passengers, or 

private vehicle. 

Cargo Selectivity criteria can be developed to target on a nationwide basis 

or on a local, port-specific basis. National criteria for targeting suspected 

IP violations are developed and overseen by the Strategic Trade Center in

Los Angeles (formerly in the Office of Strategic Trade and now under OT), 

where International Trade Specialists with expertise in particular 

industries develop criteria based on their analysis of recent seizure activity 

and information from industry representatives.24 CBP officials said that 

Cargo Selectivity criteria are designed to target known or suspected 

violators and that criteria can be written to target on all or some of a 

limited number of data elements. Ports develop local criteria in a similar 

fashion; however, they differ in the degree to which they use national or 

local criteria. 

CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) is another computer-based 

targeting tool, but it is not used to systematically target for IP violations. 

ATS is a primary component of CBP’s approach for security targeting.25 As 

we note later in this report, CBP has conducted one pilot test of an ATS 

module for targeting IP violations. 

 23Cargo Selectivity has been long used to help CBP and legacy Customs to determine 

whether and how “intensively”—ranging from document review to physical examination—

it should examine certain shipments for various types of violations. In addition to IP

violations, CBP uses Cargo Selectivity to target other types of trade issues, such as tariff 

classification, quota issues related to textiles, and revenue matters. 

24CBP has five Strategic Trade Centers located around the country, each aligned with one 

of the agency’s Priority Trade Issues. The Strategic Trade Center in Los Angeles is 

responsible for addressing IP enforcement and penalties.

25ATS is a complex model that calculates a risk score for each cargo shipment arriving in

the United States. The system is primarily used for security targeting, but CBP is 

considering ways to expand its use to include targeting for nonsecurity matters as well. 

Page 15 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Manual targeting describes a range of activities in which individual 

employees at the ports or the Los Angeles Strategic Trade Center—based 

on their own knowledge, analysis, and experience—identify certain 

shipments for examination. According to CBP officials and based on our 

observations at select ports, manual targeting may involve CBP staff 

flagging shipments by: 

Manual Targeting 

• conducting queries (such as in ATS) or executing analysis of 

electronically-filed manifest or entry data; 

• reviewing entry paperwork (including paper and electronic entries), which 

may be generated as a computer-based targeting;26

• visually observing packages in a processing or storage environment; and

• receiving information from other CBP employees within their own port or 

at other ports regarding a given shipment, perhaps based on information 

obtained from law enforcement agencies or rights holders. 

Both Cargo Selectivity and manual targeting methods have certain 

strengths and limitations relating to their scope, usefulness, and feasibility: 

Both Targeting Methods Have 

Strengths and Limitations 

• Cargo Selectivity allows CBP to quickly screen vast volumes of 

commercial shipments on a nationwide basis, but it doesn’t work for all 

types of shipments, and it has uncovered a relatively small share of IP 

violations since fiscal year 2003. Cargo Selectivity can use only a limited 

number of elements to target potentially infringing shipments, and getting 

criteria into the system takes time. According to CBP officials, the lack of

sophistication and cumbersome process limits the system’s overall 

usefulness for performing IP targeting.27 Also, CBP must use caution when

developing its Cargo Selectivity targeting criteria in order to minimize the 

number of suspect shipments that are false positives, which can create 

 26CBP receives a large portion of manifest and entry data in electronic format. According to

CBP officials, CBP’s data systems may require entry packets to be generated from 

electronically filed data, but many shipments are released without this requirement. 

27According to some CBP officials, the lack of sophistication makes it particularly difficult 

for the agency to enforce certain exclusion orders. CBP uses national Cargo Selectivity 

criteria to specify which manufacturers or products are subject to exclusion orders, but 

when the orders are more general in nature and identify products to be excluded based on

certain production processes, it is very difficult to write criteria to correctly target 

offending goods without creating a large number of false positives and an unmanageable 

workload for the ports.

Page 16 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
unmanageable workloads for the ports, delay the movement of legitimate 

goods, and burden importers with exam costs. CBP data shows that IP 

targeting using Cargo Selectivity accounted for only about 3 percent of 

seizure actions made by CBP during fiscal years 2003 through 2006 and 

about 10 percent of the total estimated value of goods seized. More 

information on CBP’s seizure outcomes is provided later in this report. 

• Ports use manual targeting to overcome some of the limitations of Cargo 

Selectivity. CBP officials at several ports we visited expressed the view 

that there is no substitute for the skills and experience of a well-trained 

CBP officer, but other officials noted that CBP can’t rely on manual 

targeting to process vast volumes of trade. According to CBP officials, 

manual targeting is heavily dependent on employee availability and 

expertise; therefore, its use for IP targeting at some ports may be limited,

particularly as CBP increasingly focuses its staff resources on security 

matters. CBP lacks data to fully determine the extent to which its seizure 

outcomes have resulted from manual targeting, but the portion could be

large, given the relatively small portion that stems from Cargo Selectivity.

CBP undertakes other actions that, while not intended for IP enforcement, 

have uncovered IP violations, such as targeting for other trade violations 

or security reasons or actions that measure compliance with laws and 

regulations. For example, CBP’s Compliance Measure Program, a 

statistical sampling program, is designed to examine randomly selected 

shipments for their compliance with a range of laws and regulations, 

including IP laws. According to CBP, IP violations have been found in a 

very small percent—less than one-tenth of 1 percent—of such exams.28 In 

addition, Cargo Selectivity, when used to target for reasons such as 

terrorism or other trade issues, has revealed IP violations. Specifically, an

additional 3 percent of seizure actions and 10 percent of estimated seizure 

value was uncovered from non-IP related criteria during fiscal years 2003 

to 2005. Finally, any shipment that ATS identifies as high risk is 

automatically subjected to nonintrusive examinations using radiation 

detection and gamma-ray or X-ray scanning technologies. Such 

examinations may reveal unexpected results, such as contents that appear

to differ from what is described in the manifest or entry data. When IP 

Other Targeting or 

Compliance Measurement 

Actions May Uncover IP 

Violations 

 28Of about 287,000 Compliance Measurement exams conducted during fiscal years 2000, 

2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005, IP violations were uncovered in an average of about 0.06 percent 

of them. The program was temporarily suspended in fiscal year 2002. Reviewing the 

structure and implementation of the Compliance Measurement program was outside the

scope of this audit. 

Page 17 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
violations are suspected, the container is referred for further review to 

port personnel who handle trade enforcement. CBP could not provide data

to show how often IP violations were found in this way. 

Once shipments have been targeted for examination, CBP personnel at the 

ports are to examine shipments and record the results of their exams in 

CBP’s data systems. Because of high counterfeit quality and complex U.S. 

IP laws, determining whether IP infringement has occurred can be 

difficult. CBP provides some training to assist ports in this endeavor. 

Because of variations in port practices for recording IP exam results, 

CBP’s exam data are uneven, according to CBP officials, and limits the 

agency’s ability to assess CBP’s targeting effectiveness. 

CBP uses the term “exam” to refer to a range of actions, including 

paperwork reviews, nonintrusive exams, and physical exams in which 

CBP examines all or a portion of the targeted goods. According to CBP 

officials, physical exams are the best means for assessing potential IP 

infringement. The procedures for conducting physical examinations differ 

according to the mode of transport and the movement of goods for 

examination.

29

Targeted Shipments Are 

Subject to Examination, 

but Determining 

Infringement Can Be 

Difficult, and Exam 

Results Are Unevenly 

Recorded 

Physical Exams Are Performed 

to Determine IP Violations 

• Sea Cargo Examinations. In the sea cargo environment, sea containers 

are generally transported and examined away from their point of arrival at 

CBP exam facilities located at some distance from the port itself. When 

multiple shipments are contained in a single cargo container, these are 

first moved to a container freight station for debundling and then targeted

shipments within the container are moved to the examination warehouse. 

• Air Cargo Examinations. In the air environment, the examination 

location may vary. For example, air cargo shipments may be examined at

their arrival location or moved to a CBP exam facility while international 

mail and express consignment shipments may be examined at their arrival 

location. 

 29CBP officials at certain ports said that sometimes targeted shipments do not arrive as

intended for examination because of human error or fraud. Problems associated with the

physical control over containers have been identified in the past. (See DHS Inspector 

General, Audit of Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers (Unclassified Summary), 

OIG-05-26 (Washington, D.C., July 2005). In this audit, we did not review CBP’s internal 

controls for ensuring that targeted IP shipments were examined as intended. 

Page 18 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
• Land Border Crossing Examinations. At land border crossings, 

vehicles and packages are moved to examination areas while still under 

CBP’s control. 

CBP personnel who perform physical exams at the ports have discretion 

over how intensive an exam will be. For example, according to CBP and 

ICE officials, decisions are made about how many boxes will be opened 

from a single ocean-going cargo container; which boxes will be opened; 

and whether the container will be partly or fully unloaded. 

CBP personnel are to follow a common set of procedures grounded in law 

and regulation once shipments are opened for examination. When CBP 

decides to examine goods, it has a 5-day period, following the date on

which the goods were presented for examination, to decide whether it will 

detain or release them.30 If examining personnel can immediately identify

goods as counterfeit, perhaps because they have recently seized similar 

goods or the violations are obvious, CBP initiates procedures to detain the 

goods. However, because this is often not the case, samples of the 

merchandise may be provided to commodity experts at the ports called 

Import Specialists who evaluate the goods for IP infringement. As a result 

of their evaluation, Import Specialists will either order the goods to be 

detained for further review or released.31

When CBP decides to detain goods, it must notify the importer of the 

detention within 5 days after the decision was made, and may also notify 

the affected rights holder.32 The notice to the importer advises, among 

other things, the reason for the detention and the nature of any 

information or tests that CBP requires in order to process the matter. The 

importer and rights holder can take various actions, and communication 

with CBP may ensue for a period of 30 days. According to CBP officials, 

some rights holders are willing to negotiate with importers, which may 

involve financial compensation for the rights holder. If the importer’s 

actions fail to secure release of the goods within 30 days or CBP finds 

them to be infringing, the agency proceeds with seizure and forfeiture 

actions. 

 3019 U.S.C. 1499 (c) (1). 

31Import Specialists may use input from other experts in CBP, including attorneys,

commodity specialists, and laboratory technicians, as well as rights holders or the U.S. 

agencies with which the rights are registered. 

3219 U.S.C. 1499 (c) (2). 

Page 19 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Because of high counterfeit quality and the complexity of U.S. laws, 

making a determination of IP infringement in some instances is difficult. 

To help ports assess whether goods are authentic, CBP’s agency 

regulations33 provide rights holders the option to record trademarks, trade 

names, or copyrights with CBP. CBP currently charges $190 for its 

recordation application. Through the fee-based recordation process, CBP 

collects information from an IP owner about specific registered 

trademarks, copyrights, or trade names, and then enters that information 

into an electronic database accessible by CBP officers at ports across the 

country. However, CBP officials said that some IP owners do not record 

their rights with CBP, meaning that CBP lacks information about their 

products and access to individuals within the company who can address 

potential infringement. Moreover, when counterfeit quality is quite good,

even the rights holder may have to conduct research to distinguish real 

from fake. 

In addition, the complexity of U.S. IP laws and CBP’s array of seizure 

authorities present challenges to port staff, according to CBP officials. 

CBP has an array of detention and seizure authorities for IP violations; 

port personnel must be aware of these authorities and ensure their actions

are in accord with them. CBP advises the ports that the most appropriate

seizure authority will depend on the type of IP right infringed, whether the 

right is federally registered, whether the right is recorded with CBP, and 

the type of alleged infringement.34 CBP is authorized, in some instances, to 

seize goods for which the right is registered with appropriate rightsgranting authorities but not recorded with CBP; however, OT’s lead IP 

attorney stated that because the statutory bases for such enforcement are 

established by criminal statutes that invoke certain limitations and 

evidentiary requirements, such seizures would be available only in cases 

involving clear instances of counterfeiting or piracy and would require 

CBP to establish more elements of the infringement than is required for 

recorded rights. Therefore, CBP directs ports to focus their IP 

enforcement on recorded goods. For certain other types of violations, CBP 

Identifying IP Violations Can 

Be Difficult 

 3319 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 133, Subparts A, B, and D. 

34Customs Directive 2310-010A, December 11, 2000. 

Page 20 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
does not commence seizure actions either because of agency policy or the 

lack of proper authority.35

CBP and rights holders offer training to port personnel to assist them in 

evaluations. For example, OT’s IP attorneys train port personnel, including

CBP Officers, Import Specialists, and others, on the legal and regulatory 

authorities in this area. Between 35 and 40 ports received training in each

of fiscal years 2005 and 2006. In addition, private sector training is 

periodically arranged for CBP ports. Rights holder representatives give

CBP staff advice about how to determine whether goods are counterfeit.

For example, rights holders may tell CBP about security features they 

embed in their products or other methods they use to protect their IP. 

CBP maintains data systems in which port staff are required to record the

results of exams they conduct, but the uneven quality of exam data has 

made it difficult for the agency to accurately analyze the results of IP 

targeting and to fully track all incidents of IP violations, according to CBP 

officials. CBP requires port staff to document exam results, whether or not 

violations were found, in order to contribute to the agency’s repository of 

enforcement knowledge and for future targeting purposes. Officials in OT 

and its legacy offices familiar with the agency’s data for IP-related exams 

told us the data are not uniform or timely and contains inaccuracies. For 

example, these officials said they have found instances where goods were 

seized for IP violations, but exam records did not indicate that any 

discrepancies were found. Also, officials said that staff at some ports 

quickly record exam results, but staff at other ports do not record exam 

results until several months after the goods have been detained or seized,

if ever. Among ports that quickly record results, sometimes port staff must 

later revise the exam results if further investigation determines that the 

Uneven Quality of Exam Data 

Limits CBP’s Ability to Analyze 

IP Enforcement Efforts 

 35For example, CBP advises staff to determine whether, in the case of suspected trademark 

violations, the goods are counterfeit, “confusingly similar,” or “gray market.” According to 

CBP, confusingly similar marks are those that, while not identical to, or substantially 

indistinguishable from, genuine marks, are nonetheless similar enough to the genuine mark 

so as to constitute an infringement. Gray market goods are genuine trademarked goods

that were manufactured and intended for sale in another country but were imported to the

United States without the authorization of the trademark holder. Customs Directive 2310-

010A states that, where the subject trademarks are recorded with CBP, the agency has 

authority to seize violative goods based on either of those trademark violations. With 

regard to marks not recorded with CBP, while the agency may seize goods bearing 

counterfeit versions of trademarks registered on the Principal Register of the U.S. Patent 

and Trademark Office but not recorded with CBP, the agency refrains from seizing goods

bearing nonrecorded confusingly similar marks for policy reasons and lacks statutory 

authority to seize restricted gray market goods bearing nonrecorded trademarks. 

Page 21 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
goods are legitimate. In addition, although port staff are directed to 

indicate in CBP’s data systems whether IP violations were found and can

add additional information about laws that were violated or a narrative 

description of the goods, officials in OT and its legacy offices that are 

familiar with the data said that whether and how they record this 

information varies. These officials were not sure what accounted for 

variations in the quality of exam results across ports, and we did not 

independently assess CBP’s policies or port practices for recording exam 

results. 

CBP’s process for enforcing IP rights concludes with the seizure of 

counterfeit goods and, if warranted, the assessment of penalties against 

the IP infringer. A seizure action, as defined by CBP, entails CBP taking 

control and/or possession of articles imported contrary to law. Penalties 

result in monetary fines imposed on the violator.36

Once CBP officers have examined goods and determined that they are 

counterfeit, the legal process to seize goods is initiated. This process, 

carried out by Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture offices at the ports, entails 

(1) resolving or deciding CBP compliance actions; (2) providing advice to 

other CBP officers on the various trade violations; (3) securing or 

maintaining seized property; and (4) making sure CBP’s automated system 

accurately reflects description, location, value, and forfeiture status of 

seized goods. CBP calculates the domestic value of seizures to track the 

value of goods it intercepts.37 For penalties it issues under 19 U.S.C. 

1526(f), CBP calculates the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price 

(MSRP)—which would have been the value of the merchandise if it were 

genuine. CBP determines whether additional enforcement in the form of 

civil penalties should be assessed. It is CBP’s policy not to assess a 

penalty, however, until all forfeiture proceedings have been completed, 

and the property, except for representative samples, has been destroyed. 

When assessing 19 U.S.C. 1526(f) penalties against a first-time violator, the 

CBP’s Key IP Enforcement 

Actions Entail Seizing 

Goods and Issuing 

Penalties

 36CBP is granted the authority to seize goods under various statutes, however 19 U.S.C. §

1526(e) is the statute under which CBP commonly seizes counterfeit goods due to

trademark violations. CBP has the authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f) to assess monetary 

penalties for these violations. 

37Domestic value is calculated as the landed cost plus profit (the cost of the merchandise

when last purchased, plus all duties, fees, broker’s charges, profit, unlading charges, and 

U.S. freight charges to bring the good to the importer’s premises), a value generally lower 

than the price at which the goods might sell to the final consumer. 

Page 22 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
amount of the penalty may be equal to or less than the MSRP. In the event 

of a second or subsequent seizure, the amount of the penalty is assessed at 

twice the value of the merchandise, based on the MSRP at the time of 

seizure. For seizures valued over $100,000 in domestic value, OFO 

maintains responsibility for reviewing the case before any legal action is 

taken. For penalties that are assessed, CBP officials said that substantial 

resources are dedicated to processing penalty cases, but they also said 

that penalty amounts are seldom fully collected. CBP’s collection issues 

are discussed later in this report. 

Depending on the size and value of a seizure, CBP officers coordinate with 

ICE agents who then consult the Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorneys 

Offices to determine if criminal investigation and prosecution is 

warranted. For example, a repeat violator may warrant criminal action if 

ICE has enough information to initiate a criminal investigation and build a 

case. 

Seized goods have to be secured, as they have potential value but cannot 

be allowed to enter U.S. commerce. Storage may be prolonged by law 

enforcement actions, but the goods are generally destroyed or otherwise 

disposed of according to law when determined to be illegal and are no 

longer needed. According to CBP officials, as seizures have increased, the 

agency’s storage and destruction costs have grown and become 

increasingly burdensome. CBP reports that it spent over $9.1 million to 

destroy seized property between fiscal years 2001 and 2006.

38 CBP officials 

said that the environmental regulations for disposing of goods, particularly

in states like California, prevent CBP from disposing of certain counterfeit

goods in landfills. Often the goods are destroyed through incineration. 

 38Between fiscal years 2001 and 2006, CBP spent about $2.5 million to destroy apparel; 

about $662,000 to destroy electronics; about $500,000 to destroy DVDs; about $382,000 to

destroy shoes; and about $352,000 to destroy batteries. 

Page 23 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
The bulk of CBP’s enforcement outcomes have been concentrated within 

certain modes of transport and product types and reflect pockets of 

activity among a limited number of ports. Although the total number of 

seizure actions has grown since fiscal year 2001, nearly doubling between 

fiscal years 2005 and 2006, most of these actions involved small-value

seizures made from air-based modes of transport and may reflect a shift in

smuggling techniques toward larger numbers of smaller-sized shipments. 

The total estimated domestic value of goods seized since fiscal year 2001,

however, has fluctuated due to variations in seizure activity involving 

large, ocean-going containers in which the highest-value seizures tend to 

be made. While the types of goods seized have varied over time, wearing 

apparel, cigarettes, footwear, and handbags have accounted for the 

majority of estimated seizure value in the past 6 years. Ten or fewer ports, 

including some of the nation’s largest ports and others that are 

significantly smaller, have accounted for the bulk of seizure and penalty 

outcomes since 2001. Of these ports, six have made consistent

contributions each year to IP enforcement outcomes. 

CBP measures IP seizure activity two ways: number of seizure actions and 

estimated domestic value of goods seized. The number of goods in one 

seizure action can range from a few items shipped via international mail to 

hundreds of boxes of goods in a ocean-going cargo container. CBP 

maintains the official seizure statistics for DHS, including those made by 

CBP, ICE, or jointly by the two agencies. CBP captures data on the 

transport mode or processing environment in which goods were seized, 

but in compiling seizure data, neither OT nor its legacy offices routinely 

verify this data field. In addition, there are certain limitations in CBP’s 

seizure data, such as the precision of the estimates. However, we found 

CBP’s data to be sufficiently reliable to indicate broad trends. 

IP Enforcement 

Outcomes Have Been 

Concentrated in 

Certain Areas and 

Reflect Pockets of 

Activity 

Page 24 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
For fiscal years 2003 through 2006, most IP seizure actions have been 

concentrated in the air transportation environment, while most seizure 

value has been concentrated in ocean-going cargo containers.

39 As shown 

in figure 4, about 78 percent of total seizure actions during fiscal years 

2003 through 2006 occurred in air transportation processing 

environments.40 Significantly fewer seizure actions were made from oceangoing cargo containers or land-based transport modes, such as truck, train, 

or auto. Conversely, ocean-going cargo container seizures represented 

about 60 percent of total estimated seizure value during those years, with 

significantly smaller portions of value generated by air- and land-based 

seizures.41 Even though about one-fourth of U.S. imports enter by landbased modes of transport, seizure actions and values in this mode were 

less than 5 percent of total seizures, as measured by either indicator. 

Majority of IP Seizure 

Actions Occurred in Air 

Transportation 

Environment While Value 

of Seized Goods Was 

Concentrated in Sea 

Environment 

 39Data on the mode of transport or processing environment in which seizures were made 

were only available for fiscal years 2003 through 2006. CBP’s data reflect a number of 

modes and processing environments, some of which we have grouped together. For

example, data we report for the air transportation environment include seizures made in air 

cargo, express consignment, international mail, and private aircraft processing 

environments. Data we report on the ocean-going cargo container environment include

seizures made from what CBP refers to as “commercial vessels” and “private vessels.” 

According to CBP, commercial vessels are predominantly carried by ocean-going cargo

containers and processed in the seaport environment, but may also be transported via 

truck or rail to interior ports of entry using the in-bond system. 

40Seizures made in air transportation processing environments were the predominant 

source of seizure actions in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2006, although their percent 

ranged from a high of about 85 percent to a low of about 68 percent. 

41Seizures made from ocean-going cargo containers were the predominant source of seizure 

value in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2006, although the percent ranged from a high of 

about 70 percent to a low of about 53 percent. 

Page 25 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Figure 4: Percent of IP Seizure Actions and Domestic Value by Transportation

Mode, Fiscal Years 2003-2006 

Note: According to CBP, “other” includes no transportation involved (often ICE seizures), “none listed”

(often passenger seizures) and “other” (undefined).

CBP seizure data show that the number of seizure actions has grown 

steadily from fiscal years 2001 to 2006, while domestic values have 

fluctuated. As shown in figure 5, there were over 3,500 seizure actions in 

fiscal year 2001, increasing to over 14,000 in 2006. Also shown in figure 5,

the domestic value of goods seized in these years has fluctuated, reaching 

a high in 2006 of more than $155 million.42 Although the overall trend for 

both measurements is upward, these outcomes represent a small fraction 

of overall imports. For instance, in fiscal year 2005, the domestic value of 

IP seizures represented less than one-tenth of 1 percent (0.02 percent) of 

the total value of imports of goods in product categories that are likely to 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

Other

Other

Sea

Air Sea

Air

4%

Land

2%

Land

18%

78%

7% 13%

18%

60%

Percent of IP Seizure Actions, 2003 - 2006 Percent of Estimated Domestic Value, 2003 - 2006

Number of seizures = 36,452 Estimated domestic value = $481.4 million

 42It is important to note that total estimated seizure value, the value calculated by CBP, in 

any given year is a function of the type of goods seized, which varies from year to year. 

Page 26 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
involve IP protection.43 It is impossible to know whether these seizure 

outcome trends reflect improved enforcement actions or an increase in the

share of counterfeit trade entering the United States during those years. 

Figure 5: Trends in Number of IP Seizure Actions and Estimated Domestic Values, Fiscal Years 2001-2006 

Number of seizures (thousands)

Source: GAO presentation of CBP data.

Year Year

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Estimated domestic value (dollars in millions)

Note: CBP data can be accessed at 

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ipr/seizure/seizure_stats.xml. 

According to our analysis, growth in the number of seizure actions was 

fueled by increases in small-value seizures made in express consignment 

and international mail facilities. CBP publicly cites an 83 percent increase 

in the number of seizure actions from fiscal year 2005 to 2006 as an 

indicator of its growing IP enforcement success. However, our analysis 

shows that this growth was driven primarily by smaller-value seizures. For 

 43This ratio compares the total estimated domestic value of IP seizures with the total 

declared value of IP imports. We defined IP imports as products that involve or may 

involve IP protection and goods that are similar to them. To do so, we reviewed the broad 

product groups that CBP uses to categorize seizure actions and identified all products that

are covered by these groups in the U.S. harmonized tariff schedule. These products include 

such items as shoes, wearing apparel, handbags and luggage, computer hardware, and 

consumer electronics. The subset excludes products such as agriculture and other raw

goods. A complete description of our methodology can be found in appendix I. 

Page 27 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
example, to date, the largest number of seizures for international mail 

occurred in fiscal year 2006, with the number of seizure actions and their 

domestic value more than doubling from the previous year. CBP officials 

said they believed that while some of these seizures are personal 

shipments ordered from Internet sites that sell counterfeit merchandise, 

others have contained quantities of goods too large for personal use. Some 

officials also speculated that counterfeiters may be breaking commercial 

shipments into smaller components to avoid detection and face more 

limited losses in the event of a seizure. However, CBP has not conducted

any systematic analysis to support these observations. 

Our analysis also shows that several factors influence trends in seizure 

value. Spikes in seizure value in fiscal years 2004 and 2006, accounting for 

approximately 30 percent of seizure value in each of those years, were 

largely due to shipments moving through the in-bond system.44 Also, CBP 

data show that about 15 percent of seizure value during fiscal years 2003 

through 2006 stemmed from seizures made by ICE during its 

investigations, and OT and ICE officials said that ICE may have played a 

role in some of the seizures attributed to CBP. Of note in fiscal year 2006, a 

combined CBP and ICE initiative resulted in the seizure of 77 cargo 

containers of fake Nike Air Jordan shoes and 1 container of fake 

Abercrombie & Fitch clothing that were transported in part using the inbond system (they entered the Los Angeles seaport, transited through 

Arizona, and were supposedly destined for export to Mexico). The 

estimated domestic value of these goods was about $19 million, 

representing about 12 percent of total domestic seizure value in fiscal year 

2006. 

Seizures Have Been 

Concentrated among 

Certain Types of Products 

Although the types and quantities of seized goods vary over time, seizures 

over the past 6 years have been highly concentrated among certain types 

of products. For example, seizures of footwear, wearing apparel, 

handbags/wallets/backpacks, and cigarettes accounted for over 60 percent 

 44We recently reported that weaknesses persist in CBP’s management of the in-bond

system, impeding CBP’s ability to ensure proper collection of trade revenue and

management of trade risks. In particular, CBP does not adequately monitor and track inbond shipments and does not consistently perform in-bond compliance reviews to help 

identify program weaknesses. See International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the InBond Cargo System Impede Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue,

Trade, and Security Concerns, GAO-07-561 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2007). 

Page 28 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
of the aggregate value of goods seized over the past 6 years.45 Table 1 

shows that footwear and wearing apparel accounted for 57 percent of 

domestic value of goods seized in fiscal year 2006, with the high percent of 

footwear seized partially resulting from the large CBP/ICE seizure 

described earlier. Health care products and pharmaceuticals accounted for 

only 3 percent of such value. When asked why commodity seizures vary 

from year to year, CBP officials stated that counterfeiters produce fake

goods depending on marketplace demand at any given time. However, it is 

difficult to determine whether CBP and ICE seizures are representative of 

the types of counterfeit products entering the United States in any given 

year or merely reflect counterfeit products that CBP detected.

Table 1: Percent of Total Estimated Domestic Value Seized by Commodity, Fiscal Years 2001-2006

Commodity 

2001 

(percent of

domestic

value) 

2002 

(percent of

domestic

value)

2003

(percent of

domestic

value)

2004 

(percent of

domestic

value)

2005 

(percent of

domestic

value) 

2006 

(percent of

domestic

value)

Aggregate 

2001-2006 

total (percent 

of domestic

value)

a

Wearing apparel 14 9 15 37 17 16 19

Cigarettes 8 38 44 17 10 18

Footwear 5 3 1 10 41 13

Handbags/Wallets/ 

Backpacks 6 3 12 17 16 9 11

Media 13 29 8 4 4 9

Consumer electronics 5 4 6 9 5 5

Computers/Hardware 7 1 5 9 4

Watches/Parts 10 4 4 2 3 2 3

Toys/Electronic games 8 2 2 3 9 3

Batteries 9 2 1

Sunglasses/Parts 6 1 1 1

Headwear 1 1 2 1

Pharmaceuticals 2 1 1

Health care 2 1

 45To determine categories of goods, CBP may not group commodities according to 

Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) numbers because not all seizure records contain HTS 

numbers. CBP officials said that the field for which the HTS number is to be entered can

accept both numbers and text, and that seizing officers sometimes enter incorrect data. 

Therefore, the Los Angeles Strategic Trade Center developed its own method for grouping

seizures into product groups.

Page 29 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Commodity 

2001 

(percent of

domestic

value) 

2002 

(percent of

domestic

value)

2003

(percent of

domestic

value)

2004 

(percent of

domestic

value)

2005 

(percent of

domestic

value) 

2006 

(percent of

domestic

value)

Aggregate 

2001-2006 

total (percent 

of domestic

value)

a

Perfumes 3 0

All other commodities 15 9 6 10 15 8 10

Total estimated domestic 

value (in millions) $57 $99 $94 $139 $93 $155 $638

Total number of seizures 3,586 5,793 6,500 7,255 8,022 14,675 45,831

Source: GAO presentation of CBP data. 

Note: Percentages not provided indicate that CBP did not report the commodity as a separate 

category in a given year. Seizures of these commodities may be included in the “All other 

commodities” category. Due to rounding, commodities may not total to 100 percent for any given 

fiscal year. 

a

“Aggregate 2001-2006 total (percent of domestic value)” was calculated by aggregating the reported

estimated domestic value per commodity in each year, and dividing this total by the total estimated 

domestic value of seizures for fiscal years 2001to 2006. 

CBP reports that seizures are also concentrated in one trading partner—

for fiscal years 2001 through 2006 combined, exports from China account 

for 65 percent of total seized IP domestic value. Hong Kong and Taiwan 

are distant seconds to China, accounting for 6 and 5 percent of seizures in 

that period, respectively. The combined share of goods seized that were 

exported from China and Hong Kong grew about 40 percent per year 

during this period. Also listed among trading partners for which goods 

were seized for IP violations in fiscal years 2001 through 2006 are Korea, 

Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, and Singapore. 

Ten or Fewer Ports Have 

Accounted for the Bulk of 

IP Enforcement Outcomes 

CBP’s IP enforcement outcomes, including seizures and penalties, have

been highly concentrated among a limited number of ports across the 

country. We analyzed CBP’s seizure and penalty data for fiscal years 2001 

through 2006 and found that the bulk of enforcement activity was carried 

out by 10 or fewer ports in each of four enforcement categories we 

reviewed: (1) total number of seizures, (2) total seizures by domestic 

value, (3) total penalty cases opened, and (4) total amount of penalties 

assessed. The top 10 ports for each category differ, but there is

considerable overlap among the ports so ranked in each category. Table 2 

also shows that during fiscal years 2001 through 2006, the top 10 ports 

ranked by total seizure actions accounted for nearly two-thirds of those 

actions, and the top 10 ports ranked by total domestic seizure values 

accounted for nearly three-fourths of those values. Table 2 shows even 

greater concentration among the top 10 ports for penalty cases opened 

Page 30 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
and penalty amounts assessed. Our analysis indicates that, while seizure 

actions have been more broadly disbursed among CBP’s ports, fewer of 

them have accounted for seizure values, and even fewer ports have 

assessed penalties for the seizures they make. The mix of ports in these 

rankings is surprising because they include some of the nation’s largest 

ports as well as several that are significantly smaller. Moreover, as we 

discuss later, some of the ports among which seizures are concentrated 

are not among the top ports in terms of IP import value; and conversely, 

some high IP-importing ports have shown more limited seizure outcomes. 

Table 2: Top 10 Ports’ Percent of Seizure and Penalty Outcomes, Fiscal Years 2001-

2006 

Dollars in millions 

Enforcement measures 

Number or value of

enforcement outcomes Percent of total

Top ten ports’ number of IP 

seizures 30,462 66%

Top ten ports’ domestic value of 

IP seizures $463.2 73%

Top ten ports’ number of IP 

penalty cases opened 1,208 84%

Top ten ports’ penalty amounts 

assessed $1,135 97%

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

Notes: We analyzed CBP’s seizure and penalty data for fiscal years 2001 through 2006. We used

seizure data that captures various IP-related violations and penalty data that captures only trademark 

violations where penalties were assessed under 19 U.S.C. 1526(f).

In the law enforcement sensitive version of this report, ports were listed in the table according to their 

rank order in each enforcement category we analyzed. Port names have not been included in this 

table for law enforcement reasons. While the top 10 ports in each category are not the same, there is

considerable overlap among them. 

Some of the ports included in our analysis may have multiple processing environments, and seizures

associated with such ports may stem from more than one processing environment. Because of 

inconsistencies in how CBP records seizures by ports, we were unable to fully determine how many

processing environments are reflected in the above data. 

Because of inconsistencies in the way CBP records seizures by port, it can

be difficult to determine precisely which processing environments 

accounted for seizure outcomes. We were able to determine the seizure 

reporting practices of the seven ports that we visited. For example, at one

port, CBP uses one port “code” to record IP seizures made at the seaport 

and the nearby airport. Seizure data for another port includes seizures 

made at the seaport and from the international mail processing 

environment but does not include other air-based seizures made at the 

Page 31 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
nearby airport, which are reported separately. Neither OT nor its legacy

OFO office at the headquarters level could provide us information to 

understand the seizure reporting practices of CBP’s ports. 

Among these top 10 ports, there is further concentration of activity. For 

example, we found that four ports ranked in the top 10 for all four 

categories and two ports ranked in the top 10 for three of the four 

categories. This indicates that the majority of enforcement outcomes were 

produced by a handful of ports over the 6-year time period. Appendix II 

contains additional analysis of these six ports’ enforcement outcomes. 

Outside of the most active seizing ports, seizure outcomes have been more 

disbursed and prone to fluctuation. CBP’s seizure data showed that around 

243 ports of entry made seizures at least once during the past 6 years. 

About 190 of those ports reported fewer than 100 aggregate seizure actions 

since 2001, and over 100 reported less than $100,000 in 6 years’ aggregate 

domestic value of seizures. Some of these ports had very little activity for 

2001 through 2006, while others had occasional spikes in their seizure 

actions or domestic seizure values. 

CBP lacks an integrated approach across key offices for improving border 

enforcement outcomes, having focused on certain efforts that have 

produced limited results while not taking the initiative to understand and 

address the variations among ports’ enforcement outcomes. While CBP’s 

strategic plan notes the importance of IP enforcement under two of CBP’s 

strategic goals, the plan lacks performance measures to guide CBP’s IP 

border enforcement efforts and assess its agencywide progress. CBP 

efforts to improve its IP border enforcement process, led by OT or its 

legacy offices, have produced mixed results: (1) poor data collection 

during port-based pilots limits OT’s ability to evaluate the effectiveness of 

a new risk model for IP targeting; (2) audits conducted to assess certain 

importers’ IP-related controls have resulted in some penalties, but many 

audits are not yet complete; and (3) actual collections on IP penalties 

remain far below the assessed amounts. Meanwhile, CBP has not 

attempted to understand variations within or among ports’ enforcement 

outcomes. Using CBP’s own import and seizure data, we identified some 

factors that may have influenced enforcement outcomes and some 

enforcement anomalies among key ports that bear further investigation. 

We also performed a simple analysis that could help CBP identify ports 

with higher or lower than average seizure outcomes. For example, of 25 

ports that accounted for over 75 percent of the value of total IP-type 

imports in fiscal year 2005, just 8 of them had higher than average shares 

CBP’s Approach to 

Improving IP 

Enforcement Lacks 

Integration and Has 

Produced Limited 

Results 

Page 32 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
of IP seizures (by value) compared with their IP imports (by value). Such

analysis could be further refined by incorporating information about ports’ 

import composition or by making comparisons across similar processing 

environments. Lacking an integrated approach, such analysis would likely 

be conducted by OT, but the responsibility for overseeing and influencing 

port operations lies with OFO. 

CBP’s Strategic Plan Lacks 

Performance Measures for 

IP Enforcement 

In its agency strategic plan,46 CBP notes the importance of IP enforcement 

under two strategic goals, however it has not included any performance 

measures to guide its IP border enforcement efforts and assess progress 

on its agencywide efforts. Leading organizations use strategic plans and 

performance measures to communicate their vision and priorities on an 

agency-wide basis and establish accountability. Under its strategic goal to 

facilitate legitimate trade and travel, CBP identifies the enforcement of 

relevant U.S. laws under its jurisdiction, including IP, as one of its strategic 

objectives. Although IP is included as a strategic objective, there are no 

specific IP performance measures under this goal. CBP also addresses IP 

enforcement under its goal to protect America and its citizens by 

prohibiting the introduction of illicit contraband, counterfeit goods, and 

other harmful materials. However, performance measures for this goal 

relate to prohibited agricultural items and narcotics. For example, there 

are three separate measures that address narcotics seizures, but none 

specific to IP. 

CBP does measure and report internally on the number of IP seizure 

actions and estimated seizure value and has other indicators related to IP

enforcement, but these measures and indicators are not included as 

performance measures in its strategic plan. These measures and indicators 

are found in CBP’s IP Rights Trade Strategy, an internal document 

classified as “For Official Use Only” with limited distribution across CBP.47

In our discussions with CBP, agency officials responsible for developing

and overseeing the IP Rights Trade Strategy referred to it as an internal 

planning document on IP enforcement. The internal nature of this 

document, unlike an agency’s strategic plan with performance measures, 

limits its usefulness in holding CBP accountable to Congress for its 

performance on IP enforcement. 

 46Protecting America: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2005-2010 Strategic Plan.

47Due to the status of IP enforcement as a Priority Trade Issue, CBP developed this internal 

planning document to articulate its approach for addressing this issue. 

Page 33 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Offices that are now part of OT have taken the lead in carrying out certain

efforts to improve IP border enforcement, but these efforts have produced 

limited results. In its IP Rights Trade Strategy, CBP states that its goal is to

support the administration’s Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) 

and to focus on high value seizures and seizures related to public health 

and safety issues. Among the initiatives outlined in the document, key IP 

border enforcement efforts include (1) improving computer-based IP 

targeting, primarily by developing a statistical risk-assessment model to 

complement Cargo Selectivity; (2) using audits to assess certain importers’ 

controls for preventing IP infringing imports; and (3) issuing guidance to 

give ports more discretion on when to assess IP penalties. Although 

computer-based targeting and audits are considered STOP priorities, none 

of these efforts have thus far significantly impacted CBP’s efforts to focus 

on high value seizures or seizures related to public health and safety. 

A key component of CBP’s IP enforcement improvement efforts has been 

the development of a statistically driven risk assessment model. However, 

problems with implementation in the first field-based pilot test, and poor 

data collection in a second pilot test prevents OT from fully evaluating the 

model’s results. CBP developed this model to improve its ability to target

unknown IP violators. The model figures prominently in CBP’s strategic 

plan and has been continually highlighted as one of CBP’s main 

contributions to STOP. 

Legacy OT Offices Have 

Led Certain IP 

Improvement Efforts, but 

These Have Produced 

Mixed Results 

Effectiveness of New Targeting 

Model Cannot Be Determined 

CBP’s risk model differs from Cargo Selectivity in two key ways: first, it 

uses statistical analysis of past seizures and certain other information to 

target future shipments, whereas Cargo Selectivity relies on human 

analysis to develop criteria. Second, CBP officials told us the model is 

designed to identify unknown violators based on its analysis of past 

seizure patterns, whereas Cargo Selectivity primarily targets known or 

suspected violators. However, pilot tests conducted in 2005 and 2006 

revealed problems and produced limited results: 

• In the first pilot, run for 1 month by the Los Angeles Strategic Trade 

Center, the model was more efficient at targeting IP violations than Cargo 

Selectivity, according to CBP. However, CBP’s implementation

methodology resulted in certain targeted shipments being released before

they could be examined, affecting CBP’s ability to fully evaluate the 

model’s accuracy. Also, the model sometimes targeted the shipments of 

actual rights holders, forcing CBP analysts to intervene to prevent exams 

of authentic goods. The pilot helped CBP refine the risk threshold at which 

it should conduct examinations based on the model’s targeting. 

Page 34 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
• The second pilot was run for about 3 months at one seaport and two land

border crossings, but OT is unable to determine how the model worked 

because of weaknesses and inconsistencies in the data that participating 

ports collected for the pilot, according to OT officials. For example, for 

some targeted shipments, the data does not contain any exam results, even 

though goods were ultimately seized from those shipments. In other 

instances, the data contains exam results for shipments that were too low 

risk to have been targeted by the model. 

Although CBP has already cited the model as an accomplishment, it does 

not know how well the model works. OT officials said they plan to develop 

and carry out a third pilot by having the Los Angeles Strategic Trade 

Center keep track of what the model has targeted and what the exams 

revealed. However, this may be difficult because the center will have to 

communicate directly with ports involved in the pilot to determine what 

exams were conducted and what results were found. It is not clear 

whether further revisions will improve the model or what role the model 

will play in CBP’s overall IP targeting strategy. 

After the first pilot of the risk model, OFO officials said they began 

developing a set of rules to target IP violations using ATS. These rules 

were developed with input from the former Office of Strategic Trade (now 

part of OT) and were tested concurrently with the risk model during the 

second pilot. However, data collection weaknesses also limit CBP’s ability 

to assess the effectiveness of these rules, and their role in future targeting 

is unclear. 

Another prominent undertaking that is discussed in CBP’s strategic plan 

and represents a second CBP contribution to STOP is the use of audits to

uncover IP violations among select importers. These audits, initiated by 

the former Office of Strategic Trade (now part of OT), are referred to as 

“post-entry” audits because they examine records of goods that have been 

imported and released into commerce. This single-issue audit is designed 

to evaluate the adequacy of an importer’s internal controls over IP 

imports, test whether the internal controls provide reasonable assurance 

that the company is compliant with CBP laws and regulations, and 

potentially find previously undetected IP violations made by the importer. 

These audits are most likely to be effective when dealing with compliance 

problems of established importers and less so when dealing with 

importers that purposely evade federal scrutiny, as is the case for 

importers involved in counterfeit trade. 

Audits Have Resulted in Some 

Seizures and Penalties, but 

Their Efficacy Is Limited 

Page 35 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
The audits began in 2005 and have produced some enforcement outcomes, 

but they and the post-audit decision process have been time consuming. 

OT’s Regulatory Audit Division, in consultation with the Los Angeles 

Strategic Trade Center, selected approximately 20 importers as audit 

candidates in each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006, some of which had a 

history of IP violations.48 Of these 41 audits, 23 have been completed, 12

are in progress, 4 were suspended because they involved companies that 

ICE was investigating, and 2 have not yet started. CBP has selected about 

half of the next 20 companies to be audited for fiscal year 2007. The

completed audits found evidence that some companies had imported IP 

infringing goods, some counterfeit goods had been released into 

commerce, and other infringing goods remained in company warehouses. 

According to agency officials, based on these violations, CBP decided to 

assess penalties against certain companies, but the intra-agency review 

process for the penalties took about 1 year because of intra-agency 

discussions about the legal basis for assessing penalties on goods that had

already entered commerce. Although CBP has moved forward with 

penalties in certain cases—four companies were assessed penalties 

totaling over $5.7 million—future penalty decisions must be deliberated on 

the facts in each case, according to CBP officials. CBP officials said they 

periodically monitor the import performance of these audited companies 

and found one additional instance of IP infringement. When audit findings 

are significant, CBP works with the importer to develop a Compliance 

Improvement Plan to help prevent further IP violations. 

At CBP’s December 2006 Trade Symposium, the Assistant Commissioner 

for Trade discussed CBP’s plan to conduct a greater share of its trade 

enforcement using these post-entry audits rather than cargo exams. The 

time consuming nature of these audits and their greater efficacy with 

established importers than with smugglers indicates the difficulties that 

the agency will face in making this kind of enforcement shift. 

A third undertaking has been the development of new guidance to reduce 

the number of uncollectible penalties that CBP assesses, thereby freeing

up port resources for other activities. CBP officials reported that 

significant resources are dedicated to processing penalty cases; however,

New Penalty Guidance Reduces 

the Number of Uncollectible 

Penalties, but Actual 

Collections Remain Low 

 48In 2005, staff at the Los Angeles Strategic Trade Center chose nine importers that were 

known IP violators, the statistical risk model was used to select nine importers, and three 

were chosen both by the risk model and because they were known violators. Since then, 

candidates chosen were either known violators or suspects; selection was not linked to the

risk model. 

Page 36 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
they noted that few penalties are collected and such enforcement has little 

deterrent effect. We reviewed CBP penalty data and found that less than 1 

percent of penalty amounts assessed for IP violations were collected 

annually during fiscal years 2001 through 2006 (see table 3). 

Table 3: CBP IP Penalty Amounts Assessed versus Collected, Fiscal Years 2001-

2006 

Dollars in millions

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006a

Total penalty amount assessed $52.0 $65.0 $45.0 $442.9 $423.9 $136.6

Total penalty amount collected $0.5 $0.3 $0.4 $0.5 $0.4 $0.6

Percent collected 0.90 0.48 0.91 0.11 0.10 0.45

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

Note: Penalty data are based on penalties assessed under 19 U.S.C. 1526(f). CBP also assesses 

penalties for IP violations under 19 U.S.C. 1595a(b) and provided us information on these types of 

penalties, but because CBP could not identify which were IP related, these types of penalties are not 

included in the table. 

a

Fiscal year 2006 is reported based on data provided in January 2007. CBP officials said that the 

amount collected may change because some open penalty cases are still being processed, but they

said that future adjustments are unlikely to significantly change the disparity between penalty 

amounts assessed and collected.

Various factors contribute to CBP’s limited collection rates on IP 

penalties, including petitions for mitigation or dismissal by the violator, 

dismissal due to criminal prosecutions, and the nature of counterfeit 

importation. CBP officials said that many violators petition to have a 

penalty mitigated or dismissed, and these actions often reduce the amount 

of the penalty that CBP collects.49 One agency official explained that some 

penalties are dismissed as a result of the case going to criminal 

prosecution, in which the U.S. Attorney negotiates to have a penalty 

dropped in exchange for information or other evidence that will support 

the criminal case. Also, the deceptive nature of counterfeit importation 

makes it difficult for CBP to track violators and enforce penalties. 

To address the problem of poor collections, OFO communicated new CBP 

guidance to ports in 2006 that caused new penalty cases and assessed 

amounts to drop, but this has had limited impact on narrowing the gap 

 49When a collection action goes to court, the Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorney Offices 

are responsible for prosecuting the government’s case. However, according to several CBP

officials, U.S. Attorney Offices generally do not agree to pursue penalty cases because of

their own resource limitations or because they view CBP’s penalty amounts as excessive. 

Page 37 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
between the amounts assessed and collected. CBP’s guidance addresses 10 

problem scenarios under which penalties are unlikely to be collected so 

that Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture offices will be able to avoid assessing 

penalties in those circumstances. The objective of the guidance is to 

reduce resources spent assessing uncollectible penalties as well as to 

reduce the gap between penalties assessed and collected. The total 

penalties assessed declined by two-thirds between fiscal years 2005 and 

2006, from about $424 million to about $137 million, which CBP officials 

attribute to the new guidance. Despite an increase in the amount of 

penalties collected between fiscal year 2005 to 2006, from about $406,000 

to about $614,000, less than 1 percent of the total penalties assessed was 

collected for each of the fiscal years we reviewed. 

Despite some of its improvement efforts, CBP has not undertaken any 

systematic analysis of its seizure and penalty activity to understand 

variations in enforcement outcomes within or across ports or to learn 

from ports that have been relatively more successful in capturing 

fraudulent IP goods. For example, CBP has not analyzed the potential 

reasons for fluctuations in seizure outcomes at key ports that have 

impacted its overall seizure outcomes, and it has not identified

inconsistencies between seizure and penalty outcomes at certain ports. 

Performing this type of analysis raises questions about individual ports’ 

performance outcomes and may help to inform CBP about potentially 

effective port practices for IP enforcement. For example, in our analysis of

25 ports that brought in over 75 percent of the total value of IP-type 

imports in fiscal year 2005, we identified 8 whose seizure rate (i.e., the 

percent of IP seizures out of IP imports at that port, by value) was higher 

than the average for the top 25 IP-importing ports. We also found that 

some of the largest IP-importing ports had very small seizure rates relative

to other IP-importing ports. Such analysis can be performed using existing 

data and could help CBP focus on identifying the handful of ports with 

relatively stronger enforcement records and determining whether their 

strategies and practices could be expanded and used at other ports. 

CBP has not analyzed year-to-year fluctuations in ports’ seizure activity or 

other enforcement outcomes that may seem inconsistent with a port’s 

overall IP enforcement profile. In some years, fluctuations at key ports 

have had a significant impact on the agency’s overall enforcement results. 

For example, the number of seizure actions at one port has accounted for 

a growing share of all seizure actions since fiscal year 2001, representing 

nearly half of all seizure actions in fiscal year 2006, while seizure actions at 

another port have gone down over time, representing 18 percent of total

CBP Has Not Analyzed 

Variations in Port 

Enforcement Outcomes 

CBP Has Not Analyzed Yearly 

Fluctuations in Port 

Enforcement Outcomes 

Page 38 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
seizure actions in fiscal year 2002 and less than 1 percent in fiscal year 

2006. Two ports have been leading contributors to total estimated seizure 

values. However, while the value of seizures made by one of these ports 

has generally risen from fiscal year 2001 to 2006, the value of seizures 

made by the other port has fluctuated significantly, representing about 60 

percent of total seizure value in fiscal year 2002 and about 17 percent of 

total seizure value in fiscal year 2005. The identities of these ports have not 

been included in this report for law enforcement reasons. 

In addition, CBP has not analyzed individual ports’ seizure and penalty 

outcomes to identify potential inconsistencies in the use of certain 

enforcement tools. We identified some ports with high seizure outcomes 

that have not had correspondingly high penalty outcomes. While ports may 

not necessarily assess penalties on all of their seizure outcomes, 

particularly if the seizure value is limited, we identified ports with 

relatively high average seizure values but limited penalty outcomes. For 

instance, three ports ranked among the top 10 ports for seizure value for 

fiscal years 2001 through 2006, with average seizure values ranging from 

about $83,000 to about $123,000, but none of these ports ranked among the 

top 10 for penalty cases opened, and only one of them ranked among the 

top 10 for penalty amounts assessed. The penalty cases these ports opened 

during this period ranged between 3 and 7 percent of their seizures. In 

comparison, the second highest ranked port for seizure value, with an 

average seizure value of about $88,000, was also one of the most active 

ports for penalty actions, opening penalty cases for about 37 percent of its 

seizures. Moreover, during our audit, we identified a sharp drop in penalty 

outcomes for one of the top 10 ports, starting in fiscal year 2004, that 

neither OT nor OFO had identified. In investigating the reason for the 

drop, OFO determined that the port was not following proper procedures 

for assessing and reporting its IP penalties. We asked OT officials to 

explain these anomalies between seizure and penalty outcomes, and they 

responded that such analysis had not been conducted. 

We asked officials in OT and its legacy offices whether they had analyzed 

port enforcement outcomes in this way and to what they attributed these 

fluctuations and inconsistencies. These officials said that imports vary 

among ports, seizures fluctuate according to changes in the nature of 

counterfeit trade, and ports have different priorities for performing IP 

enforcement. Overall outcomes or fluctuations might also be due to 

variations in ports’ enforcement techniques or changes in IP enforcement 

resources or the availability of skilled personnel. For example, an official 

at one port we visited told us that during fiscal year 2004, the port made an 

important change in its methods for performing trade-related targeting, by

Page 39 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
disbanding a seven-person team that had focused solely on trade targeting 

and shifting these resources to security targeting. During our February 

2005 visit to this port, the port official stated that this change had 

contributed to significantly lower seizure activity at the port in 2005. When

we discussed seizure outcomes at another port with OT officials—which 

have resulted predominantly from the manual targeting skills of port 

staff—they compared the workload created by these seizures with their 

limited impact given that these are predominantly small value seizures. OT 

officials said neither they, nor their legacy offices, have conducted any 

analysis of individual ports’ seizure and penalty outcomes. Additional 

analysis of selected ports’ enforcement outcomes are contained in 

appendix II.

CBP has also not conducted any analysis of ports’ relative enforcement 

outcomes. One way to conduct this analysis is to identify ports whose 

seizure rate—the share of their IP seizures (by value) out of their total IP 

imports (by value)—is relatively higher or lower than other ports. For 

example, in fiscal year 2005, we focused on the top 25 ports that account 

for over 75 percent of the value of all IP imports into the United States.50 Of 

these 25 ports, we found that 8 had seizure rates higher than the group 

average seizure rate of 0.015 percent. Surprisingly, the port with the 

highest seizure rate, seizing about 0.123 percent of its fiscal year 2005 IP 

import value, was also the port with the smallest value of IP imports 

among the ports we examined. This port accounted for only about 1 

percent of all IP import value that year, but over 7 percent of total seizure 

value. In contrast, the IP seizure rates for several ports with relatively

larger IP import values were well below the group average. Figure 6 shows 

the top 25 IP-importing ports by value in fiscal year 2005 and ranks them 

by their seizure rate that year. The eight ports in which the seizure rate is 

greater than the average (shown by the dotted line on the figure) are 

highlighted in grey. The figure also shows that many ports had very low 

seizure rates relative to the average. Port names have not been included 

for law enforcement reasons. 

CBP Has Not Analyzed Relative 

IP Enforcement Outcomes 

among Ports 

 50These 25 ports account for 77 percent of the value of all IP imports into over 300 ports of 

entry into the United States, as well as 71 percent of the value of IP seizures in fiscal year 

2005. 

Page 40 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Figure 6: Top 25 IP-Importing Ports’ Seizure Rates: Percent of IP Seizures in IP Imports (by Value), Fiscal Year 2005 

Percent of IP seizures in IP imports

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

0.14

Average top 25 ports

Gray bars indicate the eight ports in which the percentage of IP seizures (by value) in IP imports

was larger than the average for the top 25 ports

Port Y

Por

Port K

Port L

Port M

Port N

Port O

Port P

Port Q

Port R

Port S

Port T

Port U

Port V

Port W

Port X

t J

Port I

Port A

Port B

Port C

Port D

Port E

Port F

Port G

Port H

Note: Port names are not included in this figure for law enforcement reasons. 

Figure 6 illustrates the differences across ports in terms of IP seizures 

compared with IP imports in fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for 

which we had IP import data. We also examined these data over previous

years and found similar results. For example, Port A had the first or 

second highest rate of any port in the top 25. Also, the eight ports with 

above-average ratios in fiscal year 2005 are consistent with prior years. 

Because of the wide range of factors that affect IP seizures (including the

unknown amount of goods actually involved in IP violations transiting a 

given port), these data alone are not a complete measure of port 

performance. Ports can be compared relative to each other, but port 

performance in even those ports that appear relatively more successful 

could still be potentially improved. For example, the majority of these top 

25 ports had IP seizures that accounted for less than one hundredth of a 

percent of their IP import value. Table 4 further illustrates the variability in 

seizure actions and the range of seizure rates among the top IP-importing 

ports. 

Page 41 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Table 4: IP Seizure Rates of Top 25 Ports (by IP Import Value), Fiscal Year 2005 

Porta

IP imports 

(billions 

US$)

a

IP seizures 

(number)

IP seizures 

(thousands

US$)

a

IP seizure rate (IP 

seizures/IP 

imports) 

(percent)

Port A 38 0.123

Port B 215 0.066

Port C 245 0.065

Port D 2,737 0.023

Port E 177 0.019

Port F 318 0.018

Port G 391 0.016

Port H 42 0.015

Port I 9 0.012

Port J 22 0.006

Port K 197 0.005

Port L 29 0.004

Port M 10 0.003

Port N 91 0.003

Port O 154 0.002

Port P 21 0.002

Port Q 52 0.002

Port R 62 0.001

Port S 17 0.001

Port T 16 0.001

Port U 1 0.000

Port V 13 0.000

Port W 22 0.000

Port X 1 0.000

Port Y 8 0.000

Subtotal: Top 25

ports $430 4,888 $66,419 0.015

Subtotal: 

Remaining ports $125 3,134 $26,816 0.021

Total all ports $555 8,022 $93,235 0.017

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

Note: Although we report fiscal year 2005 values here for illustration, we conducted the analysis for 

each of fiscal years 2002 through 2005 and found similar results. In each year, the top 25 ports

identified here accounted for between 75 and 78 percent of total IP imports and their average ratio of 

IP seizures to IP imports ranged from 0.015 percent to 0.030 percent. 

Page 42 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
a

Port names and data on the ports’ fiscal year 2005 IP imports and value of IP seizures are not 

included in this table for law enforcement reasons. For fiscal year 2005, the IP import values for these 

ports ranged from about $5 billion to about $89 billion. The domestic value of their IP seizures ranged

from about $1,000 to about $18.9 million. 

CBP lacks an integrated approach across key offices for further improving 

border enforcement outcomes. Our analysis of CBP’s data is one 

illustration of the kind of work that the agency could do using existing 

data to understand differences in IP enforcement outcomes across ports, 

potentially identifying areas where improvements could be made, and 

more effectively managing its resources to meet the agency’s goals and 

objectives. CBP could refine this analysis by comparing across similar 

ports and processing environments, such as seaports to seaports and 

airports to airports, however inconsistencies in how CBP currently 

captures seizure activity across ports, as previously discussed, makes this 

refinement more difficult. CBP could use its experience and practical 

knowledge of some of the factors affecting trade flows at their ports to 

further inform the analysis. When we discussed our analysis with CBP, OT 

officials said they have not conducted this type of analysis because they do

not have any responsibility or authority to oversee and influence port 

operations, which is under the purview of OFO. However, OT is 

responsible for overseeing CBP’s implementation of its Priority Trade 

Initiatives, and it has access to data that could inform OFO’s 

understanding of port IP enforcement practices and outcomes and inform 

CBP’s resource allocation decisions.51

Enforcing IP protection at U.S. borders has become progressively more 

challenging for CBP as the volume of trade entering the United States 

increases, and as the of types of IP-infringing goods expand. CBP needs to 

Lack of Integration across 

Key Offices Impedes 

Further Improvements in 

IP Enforcement 

Conclusions 

 51CBP is required under section 403 the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 

2006 (SAFE Port Act), P.L. 109-347, to develop a Resource Allocation Model for 

determining optimum staffing levels required to carry out CBP commercial operations, 

including IP enforcement. The legislation requires CBP to submit the model to the Senate 

Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee no later than June 30, 2007, 

and every 2 years thereafter. In addition, the conference report (H. Rept. No. 109-699) 

accompanying DHS’ fiscal year appropriations legislation (P.L. 109-295) directed CBP to 

submit, by January 23, 2007, a resource allocation model for current and future years’ 

staffing requirements that specifically assesses optimal staffing levels at all land, air, and 

sea ports of entry and provides a complete explanation of CBP’s methodology for aligning

staffing levels to threats, vulnerabilities, and workload across all mission areas. CBP has 

completed one component of the model for air passenger processing and expected to

complete others by March 31, 2007. 

Page 43 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
maximize its IP enforcement efforts in an environment strained by the 

need to balance its primary mission to protect homeland security with 

trade facilitation and enforcement of U.S. trade laws, among other 

objectives. While CBP has publicly cited increases in enforcement 

outcomes based on larger numbers and higher values of IP seizures, 

indicating its success, it has not fully disclosed the composition of those 

seizures or analyzed what has accounted for the increases. However, as 

indicated by our review, a limited number of ports have driven overall IP 

enforcement activity. 

CBP’s strategic plan lacks measures to guide agencywide IP enforcement 

efforts, and the efforts of two key offices responsible for carrying out IP 

enforcement, OT and OFO, are not well integrated. So far, the agency’s 

main efforts to improve IP enforcement have involved initiatives carried 

out primarily by OT, and these have produced limited results. However, 

neither OT nor OFO has been engaged in trying to assess the effectiveness 

of CBP’s core IP border enforcement efforts—namely, the targeting, 

examination, seizure, and penalty activities undertaken by CBP’s front-line 

port operations. CBP’s ability to fully assess ports’ IP enforcement 

activities is hampered by inconsistencies in the way IP enforcement data

are recorded at the ports. In addition, OT does not have responsibility or 

authority to oversee or influence port operations.

As demonstrated by our own analysis of CBP data, the agency has 

sufficient information available despite the data’s limitations to conduct a 

more comprehensive review of IP border enforcement outcomes in ways 

that would provide insights about targeting, examination, seizure, and 

penalty assessment practices across ports. Certain improvements to 

existing data could make this type of review even more powerful. In 

addition, such analysis could prove useful as CBP responds to 

congressional directives to develop resource allocation models in order to 

determine the optimal staffing levels needed to carry out its commercial 

operations and other missions. CBP would be able to make more 

measurable links between its strategic objectives and enforcement 

outcomes, leading to more effective management practices and allocation 

of limited resources. Given the challenging environment in which CBP 

must process a vast influx of goods into the United States every day, it is 

particularly important that the agency consistently collect key data, 

perform useful analysis of the data, and use the data to better inform 

policies and practices and make decisions to focus its use of limited 

resources. 

Page 44 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
To develop a more effective approach to IP border enforcement, we 

recommended in the law enforcement sensitive report that the CBP 

Commissioner direct the Offices of International Trade and Field 

Operations to work together to take the following three actions: 

• Clarify agencywide goals related to IP enforcement activity by working 

with the Office of Management and Budget to include in its agency’s 

strategic plan measures to guide and assess IP enforcement outcomes; 

• Improve data on IP enforcement activity by: 

• Determining the completeness and reliability of existing IP 

enforcement data and identifying aspects of the data that need to be 

improved; 

• Ensuring uniformity in port practices to overcome any weaknesses in 

data reporting; 

• Use existing data to understand and improve IP border enforcement 

activity by: 

• Analyzing IP enforcement outcomes across ports and other useful 

categories, such as modes of transportation; 

• Reporting the results of this analysis internally to provide performance 

feedback to the ports, better link port performance to performance 

measures in CBP’s Strategic Plan, and inform resource allocation 

decisions. 

We provided a draft of the law enforcement sensitive report to DHS for 

review by CBP and ICE. Through DHS, CBP commented that it generally

agreed with our recommendations and provided certain additional 

comments. Specifically, CBP said it would consider developing IP 

enforcement measures and include them in the agency’s strategic plan to 

clarify agencywide goals. CBP concurred with our second 

recommendation to improve its IP enforcement data. 

Regarding our third recommendation, CBP generally agreed to use 

existing data to understand and improve IP border enforcement activity. It 

stated that strong data analysis and targeting are critical to successful IP 

enforcement and agreed to improve the linkages between the agency’s IP 

enforcement objectives and port performance. However, CBP did not 

regard our analysis of ports’ IP seizures relative to IP imports as a useful 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 45 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
tool for addressing the threat of IP infringement and identified a range of 

limitations with our analysis. We disagree. This simple presentation can be 

a powerful tool to generate discussion among IP policymakers and port 

management and staff about IP seizure patterns, risks, and outcomes. CBP 

has not yet attempted to complete even this basic analysis or initiate such 

discussions. Doing so would invariably lead to potential refinements of the 

analysis; we suggest a number of these in the report, some of which CBP 

identifies in its comments. We encourage CBP to refine this analysis and 

develop and use other types of analysis to ensure that ports are helping the 

agency achieve its IP enforcement objectives. 

CBP made certain additional comments about the draft law enforcement 

sensitive report. For example, CBP said that our report focused on 

transaction-level seizures and penalties, while not fully recognizing the 

importance of additional elements of its IP enforcement approach. We

focused on seizures and penalties because they are the core IP

enforcement activities for which CBP is responsible, and we found that 

CBP had not systematically analyzed its own performance of these 

activities. However, we also discuss the risk model, the audits, and the 

new penalty guidance; and these elements are reasonable components of a 

broader approach, but we believe their effect on overall IP enforcement 

has been limited. Moreover, we believe that CBP needs to continue to 

ensure the robustness of its core enforcement activities. CBP also stated 

that our report failed to note that the formation of OT in October 2006 was 

designed in part to address the lack of integration between OT and OFO. 

We disagree that the formation of this office has, in itself, addressed the 

lack of integration that we identify in the report regarding IP enforcement. 

Although OT consolidates CBP’s trade policy and program development 

functions, including those related to IP enforcement, front-line 

implementation of policies and programs continue to be carried out at the 

ports under the leadership of OFO. OT and OFO will need to work closely 

together to overcome the historic lack of integration regarding IP policy 

and program development and execution. CBP and ICE also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated in the law enforcement 

sensitive report as appropriate. 

We also provided DHS a draft copy of this public report for a sensitivity 

review by CBP and ICE. CBP and ICE agreed that we have appropriately 

removed information that they considered law enforcement sensitive. 

Page 46 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees and the Librarian of Congress; the Secretaries of the 

Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State; the

Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the Assistant 

Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Directors of 

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the U.S. Food and Drug 

Administration; the Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission; 

and the U.S. Trade Representative. We will make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. We provided copies of the law 

enforcement sensitive report to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, the Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and appropriate congressional committees with a need to 

know. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Loren Yager, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

Page 47 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of 

Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

asked us to (1) examine key aspects of the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s (CBP) process to carry out enforcement of intellectual 

property (IP) at U.S. borders; (2) analyze CBP’s border enforcement 

outcomes during fiscal years 2001 through 2006; and (3) evaluate CBP’s 

approach for improving border enforcement. 

To examine key aspects of CBP’s border enforcement process, we 

reviewed documents and interviewed officials at CBP headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., and at selected port locations. At headquarters, we met 

with officials in the Office of International Trade (OT) and Office of Field 

Office Operations (OFO) and obtained documents. We reviewed agency

strategic plans, annual performance accountability reports, laws, 

regulations, and policies that addressed agency goals and the roles and 

responsibilities of these two key offices and field locations in enforcing IP 

rights at the border, including CBP’s internal plan for addressing IP 

enforcement as a Priority Trade Issue. We also reviewed documents and 

interviewed officials at OT’s Los Angeles Strategic Trade Center, which 

has been responsible for developing and implementing CPB’s approach to 

IP enforcement since approximately 2002. We analyzed data that the 

center provided on the use and outcomes of using Cargo Selectivity 

criteria to target for IP violations. In addition, we reviewed documents and 

interviewed CBP officials at four field offices and seven ports (the names 

of the ports where we conducted field work are not included in this report 

for law enforcement reasons). We selected these ports in order to observe 

CBP’s IP enforcement practices at ports with high and medium import 

levels (measured by value) and across a range of processing environments. 

Five of these ports were among the top 25 IP-importing ports in fiscal year 

2005, and five of them were among the six most active CBP ports as 

measured by selected IP enforcement outcomes. We reviewed documents 

on CBP’s organizational structures at these ports and the ports’ 

approaches for carrying out their overall missions, including IP

enforcement. The CBP officials we interviewed at these ports were 

responsible for identifying, examining, seizing, and assessing penalties on

goods that involve IP violations. In addition, we reviewed relevant papers, 

studies, and our reports that addressed key aspects of CBP’s mission and 

its IP border enforcement responsibilities. We also met with officials from 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, the Department of Commerce’s Patent and Trademark 

Office, the Department of Justice, the U.S. Copyright Office, and the U.S. 

Page 48 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

International Trade Commission, to discuss their respective roles in 

registering IP rights and investigating and prosecuting IP violations. 

To analyze CBP’s border enforcement outcomes, we obtained and 

reviewed seizure and penalty enforcement data covering fiscal years 2001 

through 2006. First, to measure the value of IP-related trade entering U.S. 

ports, we identified products, using detailed product codes, that are likely 

to embody intellectual properties and obtained CBP data on the 

importation of these products by port over fiscal years 2002 to 2005. In 

order to identify these products, we reviewed the broad product groups 

that CBP uses to categorize seizure actions and domestic value and then 

identified all individual products that are covered by these groups within 

the U.S. harmonized tariff schedule. We discussed our detailed product list 

with CBP, which concurred with our list, and we obtained import data 

from them according to the list. We reviewed these data for internal 

consistency and any known limitations on its quality. We determined that 

these data were sufficiently reliable to provide the value of IP imports by 

port over the time period we examined. Second, we assessed CBP’s IP 

enforcement efforts on an aggregate, product, and port basis by analyzing 

its seizure and penalty data. Specifically, we obtained data from CBP on 

seizure and penalty outcomes for individual ports of entry for fiscal years 

2001 through 2006. For fiscal years 2003 through 2006, we obtained data

on the mode of transport or processing environments in which seizure 

were made. Finally, we obtained data on seizures by product category and 

source country from CBP’s external Web site.1

 To assess the reliability of

the seizure and penalty data, we examined them for internal consistency 

and discussed with CBP how the data are collected and reviewed. We also

reviewed our prior work that reported on CBP’s seizure data.2

 Based on 

this prior work and our discussions with CBP officials, we identified some 

limitations in the seizure data related to the precision of the seizure value

estimates and the veracity of the fields that indicate product types and 

modes of transport or processing environments. We also found some 

inconsistencies in the various data sets we received, which we reported to

CBP. The limitations and inconsistencies we identified, however, did not 

indicate large discrepancies in the data, and we found the data to be 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting on broad trends in 

seizures and penalties over time and among ports. Based on our 

 1

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ipr/seizure. 

2

GAO, Intellectual Property: U.S. Efforts Have Contributed to Strengthened Laws 

Overseas, but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-912 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004). 

Page 49 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

discussions with CBP headquarters and port officials, we selected four 

types of enforcement actions by which to analyze port outcomes: (1) 

number of seizure actions, (2) domestic value of seizures, (3) number of 

penalty cases opened, and (4) penalty amounts assessed. We aggregated 

the data on these enforcement actions for fiscal years 2001 through 2006,

ranked ports by each of the enforcement actions, and identified the top 10 

ports for each of the categories. 

To evaluate CBP’s approach for improving border enforcement, we 

discussed CBP’s efforts with knowledgeable OT and OFO officials in 

Washington, D.C., and the field offices and ports we visited. We reviewed 

CBP’s and OFO’s strategic plans, CBP’s annual performance and 

accountability reports, and CBP’s internal plan for addressing IP 

enforcement as a Priority Trade Issue to identify CBP’s goals, objectives, 

and plans for conducting and improving IP enforcement at the border. We 

also examined documents related to the administration’s Strategy 

Targeting Organized Piracy. From this, we identified key initiatives that 

CBP has undertaken to improve the effectiveness of IP border 

enforcement and discussed the status of these initiatives with 

knowledgeable CBP officials. We also assessed the initiatives to determine 

how they relate to CBP’s IP enforcement goals. We analyzed IP

enforcement outcomes across ports, identified fluctuations that have

significantly impacted CBP’s overall IP enforcement outcomes and 

inconsistencies in outcomes at certain ports, and discussed these 

observations with CBP officials. We compared IP seizures with IP imports 

on a value basis for the top 25 IP-importing ports for fiscal years 2002 

through 2005, determined the average seizure rate for these ports, and 

compared the ports’ individual seizure rates with the average. While 

estimated domestic value of seizures and values for IP imports are not 

equivalent measurements, we determined that these were sufficiently 

reliable proxies for the purpose of seizure to import comparisons. We also 

conducted interviews with CBP officials in headquarters and field 

locations to obtain information on how OT and OFO carry out their 

operations and in final meetings discussed ways in which OT and OFO 

could better use their data to improve IP enforcement. 

This report is based on a law enforcement sensitive report issued on 

March 20, 2007, as a restricted report, copies of which are available for 

Page 50 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

official use only.3 This public version does not contain certain information 

that DHS regarded as law enforcement sensitive and requested that it not 

be included. We provided DHS a draft copy of this public report for a 

sensitivity review by CBP and ICE, which agreed that we had 

appropriately removed law enforcement sensitive information. 

We conducted our work from November 2005 through January 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 3

GAO, Intellectual Property: Better Data Analysis and Integration Could Help U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Improve Border Enforcement Efforts, GAO-07-350SU 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2007). 

Page 51 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix II: Analysis of Top Six Ports’ IP Appendix II: Analysis of T Enforcement Outcomes op Six Ports’ IP 

Enforcement Outcomes 

To analyze IP enforcement outcomes across ports, we selected four 

categories of enforcement outcomes from the data CBP provided: (1) 

number of seizure actions, (2) domestic value of seizure, (3) number of 

penalty cases opened, and (4) penalty amounts assessed. We analyzed data

by port location for fiscal years 2001 through 2006. For four of these 

categories, we found that six ports accounted for the bulk of enforcement 

activity (see fig. 7). Four of these ports ranked in the top 10 for all four IP 

enforcement categories and 2 ranked in the top 10 for three out of the four 

categories. These ports may include multiple processing environments 

(e.g., land, sea, air modes), and seizure associated with such ports may 

stem from more than one processing environment. Because of 

inconsistencies in how CBP records seizures by port, we were unable to 

fully determine how many processing environments are reflected in the 

enforcement data. We were able to determine the seizure reporting 

practices of the seven ports that we visited. For example, at one location,

CBP has one port “code” that includes seizures made at the seaport as well 

as the nearby airport. However, seizure data for another location includes 

seizures made at the seaport and from the international mail processing 

environment, but does not include other air-based seizures made at the 

nearby airport, which are reported separately. Neither OFO nor OT 

officials at the headquarters level could provide us information to 

understand the seizure reporting practices of CBP’s ports. 

As figure 7 illustrates, CBP’s data can be used to compare enforcement 

outcomes across the ports (left to right) or compare outcomes within a 

single port (top to bottom). With the exception of Port D, the scales are 

uniform. When analyzing IP enforcement outcomes both across ports and 

within a single port, we found wide variability when comparing outcomes 

from year to year and among the enforcement categories. For example, the 

Port F experienced increases in the number of seizure actions for fiscal 

years 2002 and 2004; but in alternating years, the number dropped, in some 

cases by as much as 50 percent. Penalty outcomes also fluctuated by port 

location. For example, Port G had relatively constant numbers of penalty 

cases opened and penalty amounts assessed until fiscal year 2005, when 

these outcomes peaked, and then fell off sharply in fiscal year 2006. When

examining outcomes within a single port, we found that the fluctuations in

seizure outcomes did not mirror fluctuations in penalty outcomes. For 

example, Port C had a relatively steady number of seizure actions between 

fiscal years 2003 and 2006, but the number of penalty cases opened 

fluctuated greatly during the same time period. While we did not expect to 

find a direct correlation between seizure and penalty outcomes, given that 

the seizure data consists of all IP-related activity and penalty data limited 

to only those assessed under 19 U.S.C. 1526(f), we did not expect to find 

Page 52 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix II: Analysis of Top Six Ports’ IP 

Enforcement Outcomes 

such wide variations within the most active ports during the 6-year time 

period we reviewed. 

Page 53 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix II: Analysis of Top Six Ports’ IP 

Enforcement Outcomes 

Figure 7: IP Enforcement Outcomes for Top Six Ports, Fiscal Years 2001-2006 

2006

2001

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

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2001

2006

Enforcement outcomes by number

Enforcement outcomes by value (dollars in millions)

Total seizure actions

Total penalty cases opened

Domestic value of seizures (dollars)

Total amount of penalties issued (dollars)

2001

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Total seizure actions

Total penalty cases opened

Domestic value of seizures (dollars)

Total amount of penalties issued (dollars)

Total seizure actions

Total penalty cases opened

Domestic value of seizures (dollars)

Total amount of penalties issued (dollars)

Port B Port Da Port Fb

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200

300

400

Page 54 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix II: Analysis of Top Six Ports’ IP 

Enforcement Outcomes 

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

Total seizure actions

Total penalty cases opened

Domestic value of seizures (dollars)

Total amount of penalties issued (dollars)

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

2001

2006

Total seizure actions

Total penalty cases opened

Domestic value of seizures (dollars)

Total amount of penalties issued (dollars)

Total seizure actions

Total penalty cases opened

Domestic value of seizures (dollars)

Total amount of penalties issued (dollars)

Port K Port C Port G

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0

100

200

300

400

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0

100

200

300

400

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0

100

200

300

400

Page 55 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix II: Analysis of Top Six Ports’ IP 

Enforcement Outcomes 

a

The scale for Port D is not uniform because it had substantially more seizure actions compared with 

other ports, making it difficult to compare in a uniform scale. 

b

Penalty data for Port F was not available for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 due to a change in the 

way the port records its IP-related penalties. CBP was unable to provide more complete information 

for this port. As a result, total IP penalty outcomes for this port are likely underrepresented in the 

above figure. 

Page 56 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix. 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

Page 57 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 7. 

Page 58 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 59 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 8. 

Page 60 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

See comment 9. 

Page 61 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s letter dated March 6, 2007, which commented on GAO’s law 

enforcement sensitive report. 

1. We disagree that OT’s formation has, in itself, addressed the lack of 

integration that we identify in the report regarding IP enforcement. 

Although OT consolidates its legacy offices’ trade policy and program 

development functions—specifically, the Office of Strategic Trade, the 

Office of Regulations and Rulings, and a headquarters component of 

the Office of Field Operations, front-line implementation of policies 

and programs continue to be carried out at the ports under the 

leadership of OFO. Because there is still separation between the office 

that sets policy and the office that implements policy, there is no 

evidence that the creation of OT will address the lack of integration 

that initiated congressional action and that we identified in our review. 

OT and OFO will need to work closely together to overcome the lack 

of integration between policy development and implementation that 

we refer to in the report. Regarding CBP’s comment that we 

inaccurately refer to OT throughout the report, we modified the report 

to clarify references to OT and its legacy offices. 

GAO Comments 

2. CBP mischaracterizes the purpose and usefulness of our analysis of IP 

imports and enforcement activity at its ports. Seizing IP infringing 

goods is a core IP enforcement activity for which CBP is responsible, 

but CBP has not conducted systematic analysis of its own data to 

examine variations in enforcement outcomes over time or among 

ports. This simple analysis can be a powerful tool to generate 

discussion among IP policymakers and port management and staff 

about IP seizure patterns, risks, and outcomes and to improve CBP’s 

approach to IP enforcement. We do not suggest using it to target 

imports. We clearly state that our analysis is only illustrative of the 

types of analysis that CBP could undertake and that CBP should refine 

and develop its own approach. We support CBP’s decision to follow 

our recommendation to conduct such analysis. 

3. Our measure of IP imports is broader than CBP suggests, but it is not 

intended as a measure of risk. CBP does not currently have such a 

measure, and we believe our measure, which we reviewed with CBP, is 

useful. Our measure is intended to identify the overall relative volume 

of potential IP traffic that ports process, which is lower than total 

import volume. Doing so enables us to examine IP seizure activity 

relative to a meaningful measure of port volume. Our measure is based 

not only on tariff classifications where CBP actually found IP

Page 62 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

violations but also their related products groups. These classifications 

may include both IP and non-IP goods that are not separated out in the 

tariff schedule. Doing so is appropriate because CBP cannot easily 

distinguish, based on the tariff information, whether goods involve IP 

protection, have been purposely misclassified, or are being used to 

smuggle infringing products. The draft report explained our selection 

process and methodology, but we added clarity to further explain our 

measure and how we developed it. We also state that this analysis is 

one logical way to examine port performance and do not suggest, as 

CBP states in its response to our third recommendation, that the 

seizures-to-imports ratio is, in itself, a complete performance measure. 

4. We also agree that CBP should consider the range of factors that affect

IP goods in conducting its analysis. We clearly stated in the report that 

our analysis was only one way to examine port performance. Our 

analysis was not intended to be used for risk analysis or targeting, but 

only to provide a measure of seizure activity relative to port size, and 

we did not assume a direct correlation between the volume of IP 

imports and risk. 

5. We agree that CBP’s import data does not fully capture IP import 

values at express consignment and mail facilities, but even with this 

likely underreporting of such imports, several ports at which such 

facilities are dominant ranked among the top IP importing ports. As we 

state in the report, we agree that CBP should take differences across 

port environments into account in developing its own analysis. 

6. We focused on “transaction-level seizures and penalties” because these 

are the core IP enforcement activities for which CBP is responsible, 

and we found that CBP had not systematically analyzed its own 

performance of these core activities. We also address additional 

elements of CBP’s approach to improve IP enforcement that fell within 

the scope of our audit, including its IP audits. However, we found that 

these efforts have had a limited impact on overall IP enforcement, 

while perhaps drawing attention away from improvements to its core 

activities. For example, CBP acknowledges that its audits, completed 

thus far on 41 companies during a 21⁄2-year period, are most effective

for improving IP enforcement among legitimate importers, but these 

importers likely do not account for the bulk of IP infringing goods that 

enter the United States. 

7. CBP mischaracterizes our analysis by asserting that our report states 

across-the-board that CBP lacks performance measures for IP 

enforcement. Our draft report stated that the agency’s strategic plan 

lacks specific measures for IP enforcement, but noted that CBP does 

Page 63 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

indeed measure and report internally on the number of IP seizure 

actions and estimated seizure value. The draft report also discussed 

certain actions that CBP has taken under its “Intellectual Property 

Rights Trade Strategy,” an internal planning document that is the same 

as what CBP calls the “National IPR Trade Strategy” in its letter. 

However, we disagree with CBP’s assertion that this document serves 

as an agencywide guide for CBP’s IP enforcement efforts. In our 

discussions with CBP about this document, CBP officials said the 

document was written for internal planning purposes. We found that 

the distribution of this document has been limited. For example, CBP 

documents show that revisions to the IP Rights Trade Strategy have 

not been distributed to the field since 2003. Moreover, certain CBP 

officials told us that the ports are generally not familiar with this 

document. Finally, given the document’s classification as “For Official 

Use Only,” it is not distributed to Congress or the public, unlike the 

agency’s strategic plan, which limits its usefulness for holding CBP 

accountable for its performance on IP enforcement. We added 

information in our report to clarify the importance of agencywide 

strategic plans and performance measures in communicating priorities 

on an agencywide basis and establishing accountability. We added 

information that the IP Rights Trade Strategy contains other indicators 

related to IP enforcement. We also modified our recommendation to 

clarify that we recommend that CBP include IP enforcement-related 

measures in its strategic plan. Given the Office of Management and 

Budget’s role in the strategic planning process, we also clarified that 

CBP should work with the Office of Management and Budget to 

include IP-enforcement related measures in its strategic plan.

8. See comment 7. 

9. See comments 2 and 3. 

Page 64 GAO-07-735 IP Border Enforcement
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 65 GAO-07-735

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Loren Yager, (202) 512-4128, or yagerl@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Christine Broderick, Assistant 

Director; Shirley Brothwell; Carmen Donohue; Adrienne Spahr; and 

Timothy Wedding made significant contributions to this report. Virginia 

Chanley, Jerome Sandau, Ernie Jackson, Karen Deans, Etana Finkler, and 

Jena Sinkfield also provided assistance. 

IP Border Enforcement

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320487) 
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