United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

An Analysis of the 

Special Operations 

Command’s 

Management of 

Weapon System 

Programs 

June 2007 

 

GAO-07-620 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2007

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

An Analysis of Special Operations 

Command’s Management of Weapon 

System Programs 

Highlights of GAO-07-620, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate 

Special Operations Command’s 

(SOCOM) duties have greatly 

increased since the attacks of

September 11, 2001. Today, Special 

Operations Forces are at work in

Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM

has been assigned to lead U.S.

efforts in the Global War on

Terrorism. SOCOM’s acquisitions 

budget has also greatly increased in 

this period—more than doubling

from $788 million in 2001 to 

approximately $1.91 billion in 2006. 

In light of SOCOM’s expanded

duties, Congress requested that 

GAO review SOCOM’s management

of its acquisition programs. GAO’s

evaluation includes an assessment 

of: the types of acquisition 

programs SOCOM has undertaken 

since 2001 and whether the 

programs are consistent with its 

mission; the extent to which 

SOCOM’s programs have

progressed as planned; and the 

challenges SOCOM faces in 

managing its acquisition programs. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Defense take steps to

ensure SOCOM (1) establishes 

sound business cases when starting 

programs, particularly its more 

complex and department-managed 

programs; (2) has the workforce 

size and composition to match its 

acquisition workload; and 

(3) improves its acquisition 

management information system. 

DOD generally concurred with 

these recommendations.

SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs that are 

consistent with the command’s mission to provide equipment that addresses

the unique needs of the Special Operations Forces. SOCOM has committed 

to spend about $6 billion on these programs. About 88 percent of the 

programs are relatively small, have short acquisition cycles, and use 

modified commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify 

existing service equipment and assets. SOCOM’s acquisition plans—as 

reflected in its current 5-year plan—continue to focus on relatively smallscale, short-cycle programs with modest development efforts. 

Overall, SOCOM’s acquisition program performance has been mixed. About 

60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 

have progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule

estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost increases 

because of the need to buy additional quantities of equipment for ongoing 

combat operations. The other 40 percent of SOCOM’s acquisition programs 

have not progressed as planned and experienced modest to, in a small 

number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays because of a 

range of technical and programmatic issues. Although fewer in number, the 

programs that experienced problems comprise about 50 percent of 

acquisition funding because they tend to be the larger and costlier, platformbased programs that SOCOM is acquiring and those where SOCOM depends 

on one of the military departments for equipment and program management 

support. 

SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges to ensure its 

acquisition programs are consistently completed on time and within budget. 

Urgent requirements to support SOCOM’s ongoing combat missions have 

and will continue to challenge SOCOM’s ability to balance near- and longterm needs against available funding resources. In addition, SOCOM has 

difficulty tracking progress on programs where it has delegated management 

authority to one of the military departments and has not consistently applied

a knowledge-based acquisition approach in executing programs, particularly 

the larger and more complex programs. Furthermore, SOCOM has 

encountered challenges ensuring it has the workforce size and composition 

to carry out its acquisition work. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-620.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul Francis at 

(202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

SOCOM’s Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the 

Command’s Mission 8 

SOCOM’S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed 18 

SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its 

Acquisition Programs 21 

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Actions 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29 

Appendix II SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures, and Organizational 

Structure for Managing Acquisitions 30 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 36 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38 

Related GAO Products 39 

Tables 

Table 1: SOCOM Component Commands End Strength 6 

Table 2. SOCOM Acquisition Programs from 2001 to 2006 by Type 

and Funding 9 

Table 3: Summary of SOCOM Programs by Acquisition Categories 10 

Table 4: Estimated Ranges of Acquisition Program Costs 10 

Table 5: Summary of Programs That Have and Have Not Been

Progressing as Planned 19 

Table 6: Summary of Acquisition Programs by Management 

Structure 20

Page i GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Table 7: SOCOM’s Civilian and Military Acquisition Workforce 

Composition and Training Levels 24 

Table 8: SOCOM’s Military Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) and

DOD Certification Levels 25 

Table 9: Summary of SOCOM Acquisition Programs’ MDAs and 

Program Managers 34 

Figures 

Figure 1: Leaflet Delivery System 11 

Figure 2: SOCOM’s Family of Sniper Rifles 12 

Figure 3: MH-47G 14 

Figure 4: Example of a SOCOM-Modified Commercial Vehicle 15 

Figure 5: MANPACK Advanced Concept Technology Development 17 

Figure 6: SOCOM’s Acquisition Programs Management Structure 34 

Page ii GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Abbreviations 

ACAT Acquisition Category 

AMP Avionics Modernization Program 

ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict 

CAAP Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration 

CAP Critical Acquisition Position 

DAWIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act

DOD Department of Defense 

GWOT global war on terrorism 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

MDA Milestone Decision Authority 

MILDEP military department 

SEAL Sea Air and Land 

SOALIS Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics 

Information System 

SOCOM Special Operations Command 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

UDA Urgent Deployment Acquisitions 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics 

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Page iii GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

June 28, 2007 

The Honorable Jack Reed 

Chairman 

The Honorable Elizabeth Dole 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 1987 to 

oversee the training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. Special Operations 

Forces (SOF). A key objective in establishing a unified command was to 

ensure that the Special Operations Forces of the military services would 

be equipped with the right weapon systems to carry out their unique 

missions. The SOCOM commander was granted the authority to 

independently develop, acquire, and field specialized equipment. This 

“special operations forces-peculiar” equipment may be newly created or 

standard equipment modified to meet SOF needs, but may not duplicate 

equipment provided from the other military services.1

In the past several years, SOCOM’s acquisition program budget has 

increased significantly—from $788 million in 2001 to approximately 

$1.91 billion in 2006—as the role of the special operations forces in U.S. 

military operations has grown. For example, in 2003, the Secretary of 

Defense expanded SOCOM’s duties to include leading the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) global war on terrorism (GWOT) operations. In keeping 

with this expanded role, DOD has begun to re-tool SOCOM from primarily 

a supporting command into a command responsible for planning and 

executing missions in GWOT. The change became more prominent with 

the fiscal year 2004 budget request, in which the President proposed a 

47 percent increase in SOCOM’s funding. 

 1

Pursuant to Title 10 United States Code, Section 167, the Commander, U. S. Special 

Operations Command (SOCOM) is vested with the responsibilities and the authority for the 

development and acquisition of special operations forces (SOF)-peculiar equipment, the

authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute its

own budget. SOF-peculiar equipment is defined as equipment, materials, supplies, and 

services required for SOF activities for which there is no service-common requirement. 

Page 1 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
In light of SOCOM’s expanded acquisition duties, Congress requested that 

GAO review SOCOM’s management of its acquisition programs. To do so 

we addressed the following questions: 

• What types of acquisition programs has SOCOM undertaken since 2001 

and are they consistent with SOCOM’s mission?

• To what extent have SOCOM’s acquisition programs progressed as 

planned, meeting their initial cost and schedule estimates? 

• What challenges if any does SOCOM face in managing its acquisition 

programs? 

SOCOM has encountered difficulties over the past several years with two 

of its flagship acquisition programs—the Advanced SEAL Delivery System

(ASDS) and the CV-22 Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft.2

 The ASDS program 

is funded by SOCOM and managed by the Navy. The basic CV-22 platform

is funded by the Air Force and produced under a Navy contract. SOCOM 

funds SOF-peculiar modifications to the CV-22. Both the ASDS and CV-22 

programs have experienced significant cost, schedule, and performance 

problems because of requirements, technology, and design issues. Since 

both programs began before 2001, we did not include them in our analysis. 

However, we have reported separately on the programs, and those reports 

are listed at the end of this report. 

To assess SOCOM’s management of its acquisition programs, we collected

and reviewed information on all programs undertaken by the command 

between 2001 and 2006. We analyzed the information to determine what 

types of systems were being acquired and whether programs were meeting 

planned cost, schedule, and quantity objectives. To identify the challenges

they face, we examined and analyzed pertinent documentation to include 

DOD, military departments, and SOCOM directives, instructions, policies,

and operating procedures related to the Defense Acquisition System, and 

we interviewed key officials from SOCOM’s Special Operations Acquisition 

 2

The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a long–range submersible capability to deliver 

special operations forces for clandestine missions. The submersible “hybrid combatant”

provides improved range, speed, and payload, and habitability for the operators. CV-22 

Osprey is a tiltrotor aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff, hover, and vertical landing 

qualities of a helicopter with the long-range, fuel efficiency, and speed of a turboprop

aircraft. Its mission is to conduct long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions 

for SOF.

Page 2 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
and Logistics and Resources and Requirements organizations. We relied 

on previous GAO work as a framework for knowledge-based acquisition.

We performed our review from July 2006 through May 2007 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Since January 2001, SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition 

programs that are consistent with the command’s mission to provide 

equipment that addresses the unique needs of the special operations 

forces and for which there is no service-common requirement. SOCOM has 

committed about $6 billion to date on these programs. About 88 percent of 

the programs are Acquisition Category (ACAT) III level in size,3

 have short 

acquisition cycles, and use commercial off-the-shelf and 

nondevelopmental items or modify existing service equipment and assets. 

For example, SOCOM has modified commercially available trucks, 

information technology equipment, and weapon systems, as well as 

undertaken extensive modifications to service systems such as the Army’s 

CH-47 helicopter. In the latter case, the Army funded the basic aircraft and 

Army-common improvements, and SOCOM funds the special operations 

modifications, which include extended range and enhanced defensive 

capabilities. Since 2001, SOCOM has undertaken only one ACAT I level 

program. It was to develop a common avionics package for its fleet of 

transport, tanker, and gunship aircraft. SOCOM’s acquisition plans—as 

reflected in its current Future Year Defense Program4

—continue to focus 

Results in Brief 

 3

DOD categorizes acquisition programs into several categories—ACAT I, II, and III. These 

categories are determined by the cost threshold in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars, special 

interest, and the level of decision authority. ACAT I programs have an estimated eventual 

total expenditure for research, development, technology, and evaluation of more than 

$365 million or for procurement of more than $2.190 billion, and milestone decision 

authority resides with DOD’s Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and

Logistics (USD/AT&L), head of the DOD component, or if delegated the DOD component 

acquisition executive. ACAT II programs have an estimated eventual total expenditure for 

research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $140 million or for procurement

in excess of $660 million, and milestone decision authority resides with the DOD 

component acquisition executive or its designee. ACAT III programs are all other 

acquisition programs that do not meet the criteria of an ACAT II or above program and 

milestone decision authority is designated by the component acquisition executive at the

lowest appropriate level. 

4

DOD’s Future Year Defense Programs reflect decisions made in the planning, 

programming, and budgeting system, which is intended to produce the best possible 

mixture of forces, equipment, and support to accomplish the mission. 

Page 3 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
on starting new programs that will be relatively small-scale, short-cycle,

and involve modifications of existing systems. 

Overall, SOCOM’s acquisition program performance has been mixed. 

About 60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken 

since 2001 progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and 

schedule estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost 

increases from buying additional quantities of equipment for ongoing 

combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other 40 percent of 

SOCOM’s acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and 

experienced modest to, in a number of cases, significant cost increases 

and schedule delays because of a range of technical, programmatic, or 

funding issues. Although fewer in number, the programs that experienced

problems make up about 50 percent of acquisition funding because these 

acquisitions tend to be the larger and costlier platform-based programs 

SOCOM is developing and programs where SOCOM is dependent on one of 

the military departments for the basic platform or equipment and/or for 

program management support. We could not compare SOCOM’s 

acquisition performance with DOD’s overall performance, mainly because

aggregate data on DOD’s smaller programs are not kept. 

SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its 

acquisition programs are more consistently completed on time and within 

budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM’s role in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, and its new role as the lead in the global war on terrorism have and 

will continue to challenge SOCOM’s ability to balance near- and long-term 

needs against available funding resources. For example, according to 

SOCOM, in order to fund urgent deployment acquisitions in the past 

5-years, the command reallocated about $259 million from existing and 

planned programs. Additionally, SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress 

of programs for which it has delegated management authority to the 

military departments and addressing problems early on when they occur

in these delegated programs. Also, while SOCOM employs elements of a 

knowledge-based acquisition approach, it is not consistently applied. For 

example, SOCOM has started some programs without ensuring that there 

was a solid match between requirements and the necessary resources, 

such as key technologies, to complete the development. In addition, a key 

database SOCOM uses for managing all of its acquisition programs has not 

been kept up to date, impeding program oversight. Furthermore, SOCOM 

plans to expand the size of its acquisition workforce by about 75 percent; 

however, in recent years SOCOM has encountered difficulties in being able

to hire personnel in reasonable time frames and ensuring that its program 

managers are fully certified in accordance with DOD standards. 

Page 4 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program 

outcomes, we are making recommendations that the Secretary of Defense

take steps to ensure that SOCOM: (1) establishes sound business cases 

when starting programs, particularly its more complex and military 

department-managed acquisition programs, and applies the elements of a 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy; (2) has the workforce size and 

composition to match its acquisition workload; and (3) improves the 

accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its acquisition management 

information system. DOD partially concurred with the first 

recommendation and fully concurred with the other two 

recommendations. With respect to the first recommendation, DOD 

concurred with applying elements of a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy, but only after it is defined by DOD within the 5000 Series of 

documents. This should not result in a delay in action on DOD’s part as 

DOD’s acquisition policy already includes the key elements of a 

knowledge-based acquisition approach particularly regarding technology, 

design, and production. It is important that SOCOM follow this policy 

because we have found that programs experience cost, schedule, and 

performance problems when they proceed into system development and 

initial manufacturing with lower levels of knowledge than specified in 

DOD’s acquisition policy. 

SOCOM is one of ten combatant commands5

 directly responsible to the 

Secretary of Defense. The command was established by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,6

 and codified in 10 USC 

Section 167. As a functional command, SOCOM’s primary responsibility is

to prepare the special operations forces (SOF) to carry out assigned 

missions. When appropriate, SOCOM may be called upon to conduct 

special operations activities unilaterally or provide support to other U.S. 

military forces. In 2003, the Secretary of Defense expanded SOCOM’s role 

to include leading the DOD’s GWOT operations. In this central role, 

SOCOM plans, directs, and executes special operations in the conduct of 

the GWOT in order to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks that threaten 

the United States, its citizens, and its interests worldwide. SOCOM also 

organizes, trains, and equips SOF warriors provided to the geographic 

combatant commanders and to the American ambassadors and their 

Background 

 5

A Unified Combatant Command is a U.S. joint military command composed of forces from

two or more services and has broad and continuing mission. 

6

Pub. L. No. 99-661 Div A, §1311 (Nov.14, 1986), codified at 10 U.S.C §167. 

Page 5 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
country teams. In keeping with this expanded role, DOD has begun to 

re-tool SOCOM from primarily a supporting command into a command 

responsible for planning, synchronizing, and executing missions in the 

GWOT. SOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, 

Florida, and has four component commands, and one sub-unified 

command located at different military bases. The Marine Corps Special 

Operations Command joined SOCOM on February 24, 2006. Table 1 shows 

the end strength of each of the component commands. 

Table 1: SOCOM Component Commands End Strength

Component command Location End strength

Joint Special Operations Command (Sub-unified 

Command) 

Pope Air Force Base and Ft. Bragg, N.C. 1,250

Army Special Forces Command Ft. Bragg, N.C. 22,386

Naval Special Warfare Command Coronado, Calif. 7,507

Air Force Special Operations Command Hurlburt Field, Fla. 12,801

Marine Corps Special Operations Command Camp Lejeune, N.C. 1,414

Total 45,358

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

Congress created SOCOM to improve the ability of the United States to 

conduct special operations. Congress vested the command with the 

responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of 

SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the 

head of agency, and the authority to execute its own budget. SOF-peculiar 

equipment is defined as equipment, materials, supplies, and services 

required for SOF activities for which there is no service-common 

requirement. According to SOCOM, these are limited to items and services

initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for service-common 

use by other DOD forces; modifications approved for application to 

standard items and services used by other DOD forces; and items and 

services critical for the immediate accomplishment of a SOF activity.

To fund the acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment, SOCOM was also given 

responsibility for supervising a separate Major Force Program-11 budget 

account.7

 Congress determined that a dedicated funding mechanism was 

 7

Congress directed DOD to include a new special operations budget category, major force

program-11. This provides the command with funding authority for the development and

acquisition of equipment, materials, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations. 

Page 6 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
necessary because, in the past, the military departments had tended to 

give lower priority to SOF’s equipment needs than to their own needs. 

For fiscal year 2006, SOCOM’s total budget was $7.2 billion, of which 

$1.9 billion was for development-and-acquisition-related purposes. 

In acquiring SOF equipment, SOCOM falls under the same DOD acquisition 

policies and guidelines and workforce requirements that apply to the 

military departments and other defense agencies. The military 

departments and SOCOM are governed by DOD’s 5000 Series for the 

Defense Acquisition System.8

 Similarly, each military department, along 

with SOCOM, has its own policies and procedures to implement higher 

level directives and guide the management of acquisition activities within 

the military departments or command. 

SOCOM’s acquisition workforce training and tenure is governed by the 

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), enacted in

1990.

9

 The Act specifically created a formal acquisition corps and defined 

educational, experience, and tenure criteria needed for key positions, 

including program managers, contracting officers, and other personnel 

involved in the acquisition process. According to DOD, members of the 

acquisition corps may earn three progressive certification levels—basic 

(Level I), intermediate (Level II), and advanced (Level III).10 Each 

certification level is comprised of a combination of education, experience, 

and training elements. Certification recognizes the level to which a 

member of the acquisition workforce has achieved functional and core 

acquisition competencies required by a specific career field. Members of 

SOCOM’s acquisition workforce are required to meet the same training 

and certification requirements as those in the military departments. 

SOCOM’s approach to acquisition management also has some distinctive 

features. The command is unique in DOD in that it plans, funds, acquires,

and sustains weapon systems all under one roof. Specifically, all the key 

entities involved in the acquisition life-cycle process—requirements 

 8

DOD Directive 5000.1, Subject: The Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003) and 

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Subject: Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System (May 12, 2003). 

9

10 U.S.C. Sections 1701-1764. 

10DOD Instructions 5000.66, Subject: Operations of the Defense Acquisition, Technology,

Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program (Dec. 21, 

2005). 

Page 7 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
developers, comptroller, contracting personnel, logistics planners, and 

program offices—are colocated. SOCOM also uses a centralized approach

to assess and prioritize requirements and select programs based on 

competing needs and available resources. SOCOM’s customers—the SOF 

warriors—are directly involved in determining what weapon systems are 

pursued. In addition, SOCOM can arrange to transfer program 

management and milestone decision authority11 responsibilities to one of 

the military departments to execute the program on behalf of SOCOM. 

SOCOM has done this with many of its programs that involve some 

modification of military department-provided equipment or in cases where 

the military departments may have greater technical and program 

management expertise. Further description of how SOCOM is structured 

to manage its acquisitions is provided in appendix II. 

SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs since 

January 2001 that are consistent with the command’s mission to address 

unique SOF needs and those needs for which there are no service-common 

requirement. SOCOM has committed about $6 billion to date on these 

programs. The vast majority of SOCOM’s acquisition programs are ACAT 

III level in size, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified 

commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing 

service equipment and assets. In acquiring systems, SOCOM has 

emphasized the need for “80 percent” solutions that provide improved 

capabilities incrementally to the warfighter in reasonable time frames, 

rather than major development efforts that require advanced technologies 

and years of research and development. Both the ASDS and CV-22 

programs were started in the 1990s. Since 2001, SOCOM has undertaken 

only one ACAT I level program. It was to develop a common avionics 

package for its fleet of transport, tanker, and gunship aircraft. SOCOM’s 

acquisition plans for the future—as reflected in its current Future Year 

Defense Program—continue to maintain its SOF-peculiar focus. 

SOCOM’s Acquisition 

Programs Are 

Consistent with the 

Command’s Mission 

 11The milestone decision authority is the designated individual with overall responsibility 

for a program. The MDA has the authority to approve entry of an acquisition program into

the next phase of the acquisition process and is accountable for cost, schedule, and 

performance reporting to higher authority, including congressional reporting. For ACAT I 

level programs, USD (AT&L), head of a DOD component, or if delegated the DOD

component acquisition executive is the initial milestone decision authority. 

Page 8 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
SOCOM initiated 86 acquisition programs from 2001 to 2006 to meet SOFpeculiar requirements, which can be grouped into five major areas: rotary

wing, fixed wing, maritime systems, information and intelligence systems, 

and special operations forces warrior equipment (e.g., vehicles and 

weapons).12 Table 2 shows the number and funding for these programs by 

each major grouping. 

Most of SOCOM’s 

Acquisition Programs Are 

Small 

Table 2. SOCOM Acquisition Programs from 2001 to 2006 by Type and Funding

Program types Number of programs Funding ($M)

Rotary wing 10 $2,019

Fixed wing 29 1,670

Maritime systems 5 30

Information and intelligence systems 15 393

Special Operations Warrior 27 885

Total 86 $4997a

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

a

This amount excludes about $254 million in supplemental funding. 

As table 3 shows, 76 of SOCOM’s 86 acquisition programs are ACAT III 

level in size, and the majority of these programs use nondevelopmental 

and commercial off-the- shelf items to meet SOF-peculiar needs. A further 

breakdown of these programs, depicted in table 4, indicates that most cost 

less than $25 million. The small number of larger, ACAT I and II level

programs are fixed and rotary wing systems, costing $200 million or more. 

These larger programs involve modifications to existing platform systems 

and more substantial technology development efforts. The one ACAT I 

level program SOCOM initiated since 2001—the Common Avionics 

Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program—is intended to provide 

specialized capabilities for MC-130H and AC-130H/U transport, tanker, and 

gunship aircraft, including low probability of detection and improved 

terrain following and avoidance radar. 

 12SOCOM also has mission planning and training systems, which are included in the fixed 

wing programs. 

Page 9 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Table 3: Summary of SOCOM Programs by Acquisition Categories 

Acquisition

categories 

Number of 

programs Program types 

I 1 Fixed wing

II 6 Fixed wing and Rotary wing 

III 76 Fixed wing, Rotary wing, Information & Intelligence 

systems, Maritime systems, and Special Operations 

Forces Warrior

N/Aa3 Information & Intelligence systems 

Total 86

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

a

According to SOCOM, these programs do not meet the criteria to be designated as a regular 

acquisition category. 

Table 4: Estimated Ranges of Acquisition Program Costs 

Number acquisition programs Cost ranges ($M)

 6 Greater than $200 

 7 $101 to $200 

11 $51 to $100 

14 $25 to $50 

48 Less than $25

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

Several key examples of the types of programs SOCOM has undertaken 

are described below. 

The leaflet delivery system is an ACAT III program that was fielded by 

SOCOM at a cost of about $20 million. The system uses a fully reusable, 

commercial-off-the-shelf, unmanned aerial vehicle as a component of the 

autonomously guided parafoil system it has developed. The delivery 

system is capable of delivering leaflets or psychological operations 

materials to target audiences in peacetime and in war. It took SOCOM 

about 8 months to field this capability to the SOF warrior. It can be ground 

launched from the back of a high-mobility multiwheeled vehicle and air 

launched from a C-130, C-141, or C-17 cargo aircraft. Figure 1 below shows 

the leaflet delivery system. 

Leaflet Delivery System

Page 10 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 1: Leaflet Delivery System 

Source: SOCOM.

SOCOM’s current family of sniper rifles was acquired as 

nondevelopmental and commercial off-the-shelf items, which according to

the program office, enables rapid acquisition of an initial capability as well 

as efficient spiral development of enhanced capabilities as mission 

requirements direct. SOCOM currently has four rifles in its family of sniper 

rifles, the MK 11—7.62mm Sniper Support Rifle, the MK 12—5.56mm 

Special Purpose Rifle, the MK 13—.300 Winchester Magnum, and the 

MK 15—.50 caliber. Each will only fire one type of ammunition and with 

varying effective ranges. Two of the sniper rifles, MK 11 and MK 12, will be 

replaced by the Sniper Support Rifle variant of the SOF Combat Assault 

Rifle, which is an ACAT III program consisting of a modified commercial 

off-the-shelf system, and is estimated to cost about $50 million. The new 

sniper rifle is a modular design, and the caliber of the rifle can be changed 

by replacing the barrel, bolt, and trigger modules. The life expectancy of 

the SOCOM rifles shown in figure 2 is about 5 years. Therefore, according 

to the SOF Warrior program office, SOF plans a phased replacement of 

like or enhanced capability every 5 years. 

Commercially Designed Sniper 

Weapons 

Page 11 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 2: SOCOM’s Family of Sniper Rifles 

MK 11 rifle, 7.62mm MK 12 rifle, 5.56mm

MK 13 rifle, .300 WINMAG MK 15 rifle, .50 Cal

Source: SOCOM.

SOCOM has an ACAT II program underway, estimated to cost about 

$200 million, which modifies the Army’s service-common CH-47 helicopter 

to meet its SOF-peculiar requirements. Several features on the aircraft are 

SOCOM-peculiar such as the long aerial refueling probe on the front of the 

aircraft, the standardized extended range fuel tank, and the common 

aviation architecture systems cockpit. The CH-47 helicopter, when 

modified by SOCOM, becomes a MH-47G helicopter that provides SOCOM 

with a heavy assault helicopter with the latest avionics, sensors, aircraft 

survivability features, and weapons systems. All MH-47 helicopters in 

SOCOM’s inventory—which includes the MH-47D and the MH-47E 

Modification to the Army’s 

Service-Common CH-47 

Helicopter

Page 12 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
aircraft—will be converted to the MH-47G configuration over time. 

According to SOCOM, at least two of the SOF-peculiar features on the 

MH-47G helicopter were adopted by the Army and are now servicecommon features. SOCOM developed standardized engines and an 

enhanced air transportation kit that were designed to meet a SOF-peculiar 

requirement. However, once they operational, the Army decided it could 

use the capability as well and adopted it. Figure 3 shows some of the basic 

modifications to the CH-47 that were provided by the Army and those that 

were provided by SOCOM. 

Page 13 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 3: MH-47G 

New 41 section 3P and 6P

vibration reduction

(airframe stiffening)

New FLIR and MMR

CAAS cockpit

Cockpit structure new

build

Expanded left-FWD

gunner’s window

SIIR CM/DIRFC

Left-aft gunner’s window

Enhanced air 

transportability provisions

Component

recapitalization

Dual mode searchlight

(TR and white light)

Standardize aircraft max

gross weight (54,000 lbs)

Improved bilge paint and

corrosion protection 

Standardize extended

range (fat tank)

configuration

Rebuild airframe structure

(New electrical wires/

hydraulic lines)

Standardized engines

(T55-GA-714A)

Source: SOCOM.

Army provided

SOF provided

Some SOCOM Programs 

Are Targeted to Urgent 

Needs 

In addition to regular acquisition programs, SOCOM has acquired various

equipment and material to meet urgent needs related to planned and 

ongoing military operations. According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs 

qualify for consideration if they meet one of two criteria: a potential 

mission failure or loss of life. Because of the urgency of these needs, 

SOCOM’s focus is on acquiring readily available equipment in short time 

Page 14 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
frames. Since 2001, SOCOM has addressed about 50 urgent mission needs 

and fielded equipment to its deployed SOF warriors at cost of about 

$339 million. For example, to address an urgent operational need to move 

personnel and materiel more effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq without 

attracting local attention or projecting an overt military presence, SOCOM 

acquired and modified about 150 commercial off-the-shelf 4x4 trucks, 

sedans, and sport utility vehicles and fielded them in about 4 weeks. 

Figure 4 below shows an example of a modified commercial truck used by

SOCOM. 

Figure 4: Example of a SOCOM-Modified Commercial Vehicle 

Source: SOCOM

Source: SOCOM.

According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs are not to be used as a means 

of circumventing or accelerating the normal program approval or funding 

processes. To that end, equipment acquired via the urgent needs process is 

fielded and sustained only for the duration of the military operation. The 

sponsoring Component Commander is responsible for determining postoperation disposition of any equipment acquired as a result of an urgent 

needs request. 

SOCOM has also fielded critical combat-related technologies through 

DOD’s Advanced Concept Technology Development program. DOD 

Page 15 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
initiated the program in 1994 to help get new technologies that meet 

critical military needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than 

the traditional acquisition process.13 Over the past 5 years, SOCOM has 

fielded seven Advanced Concept Technology Development programs at a 

cost of about $385 million. For example, as shown in the figure 5, SOCOM 

fielded the MANPACK radio threat detector which was an Advanced 

Concept program. The MANPACK is designed to provide the basic 

capability to identify and locate threat and friendly emitters, locate 

unknown emitters, and provide situational awareness to the SOF operator 

with little or no interaction from the user. 

 13DOD guidelines for selecting Advanced Concept Technology Developments include the 

following: (1) the time frame for evaluating their military utility is typically 2 to 4 years; 

(2) the technology should be sufficiently mature; (3) they should provide an effective 

response to a priority military need; (4) a lead service or agency has been designated; 

(5) risks have been identified and accepted; (6) demonstrations or exercises have been

identified that will provide a basis for assessing the military utility; and (7) funding is 

sufficient to complete them. 

Page 16 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 5: MANPACK Advanced Concept Technology Development 

Source: SOCOM.

SOCOM’s acquisition plan for the future—as reflected in its current Future 

Year Defense Program—continues to maintain a focus on providing 

SOF-peculiar equipment. The acquisition programs SOCOM plans to start 

Page 17 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
over the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 time frame are similar to the programs 

that SOCOM is currently acquiring. There are 13 acquisition programs 

remaining in SOCOM’s fiscal year 2007 to 2011 plan, and all are at the 

ACAT III level. These programs continue to be small scale, low cost, and 

will employ modified commercial-off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental 

items. For example, the SOF Combat Assault sniper rifle was among the 

remaining 2007 to 2011 programs and is SOF-peculiar and a 

nondevelopmental item. 

Fifty-one (about 60 percent) of the 86 acquisition programs SOCOM has 

undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, either staying within 

original cost and schedule estimates or experiencing cost increases 

unrelated to progress, such as for adding quantities to support ongoing 

combat operations . The other 35 (40 percent) of SOCOM’s 86 programs 

have experienced or are likely to experience modest to, in a number of 

cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays due to a range of 

technical, programmatic, or funding issues. Although fewer in number, 

these programs make up about 50 percent of SOCOM’s total funding for its 

acquisition programs. Ten of the programs have an estimated schedule slip 

of at least one year, and several programs were canceled because of a 

need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered 

in developing the weapon system. The programs that have not progressed 

as planned tend to be the larger, more complex platform-based programs 

SOCOM is developing and programs where SOCOM is dependent on the 

military departments for the basic platform or for equipment and/or other

resources, such as program management support. Programs that are 

smaller, with less development risk, have better results. 

SOCOM’S Acquisition 

Program Performance 

Has Been Mixed 

As shown in table 5, there are some differences in the type of programs 

that are and are not progressing as planned, but the overall picture is 

mixed. 

Page 18 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Table 5: Summary of Programs That Have and Have Not Been Progressing as Planned 

Progressing as planned Not progressing as planned

Type programs Number of programs Dollar value (millions) Number of programs Dollar value (millions)

Fixed wing 15 $352.2 14 $1,317.5

Information and intelligence 10 65.6 5 327.8

Maritime systems 4 22.8 1 7.0

Rotary wing 6 1,492.5 4 526.6

SOF Warrior 16 543.3 11 341.9

Total 51 $2,476.5 35 $2,520.7

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

In terms of the number of programs, fixed wing and SOF warrior systems 

comprise a large proportion (25 out of 35) of those that are not meeting 

original cost and schedule estimates. However, when viewed by the 

amount of funding allocated to these programs, fixed and rotary wing 

systems make up the majority ($1,844 million out of $2,521 million) that 

are not progressing as planned. We were not able to put these results in 

context, that is, to compare them with DOD as a whole to determine 

whether SOCOM’s performance was typical or atypical. This is primarily 

because of the fact that DOD does not keep aggregate performance data 

on ACAT III programs—which comprise most of SOCOM’s acquisition 

portfolio. 

Many of the fixed and rotary wing programs are the larger programs in 

SOCOM’s portfolio, involving modifications to existing military-service or 

special-operations platform systems. As such, these programs require 

more systems engineering and design/integration efforts than other 

smaller programs being acquired by SOCOM. For example, the estimated 

costs for SOCOM’s fixed-wing AC-130U 30-millimeter gun-modification 

program has increased 92 percent because of technical and design issues, 

and the program has been deferred until fiscal year 2008 when additional 

funding may be available. Likewise, the AC-130U+4 program, which is 

intended to modify the C-130 aircraft into a side-firing gunship, has been

delayed by 7 months because of technical issues with the aircraft ‘s 

configuration and design. 

Many of SOCOM programs that are not progressing as planned are also 

programs in which the military departments are involved in a management 

capacity. As shown in table 6, 22 of the 35 programs that have not stayed 

within original cost and schedule estimates have one of the military 

departments in a management role—either as the milestone decision 

Page 19 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
authority or program manager or both. All of the fixed and rotary wing 

programs that are not progressing as planned are in this category. In 

contrast, however, SOCOM does manage its five largest information and 

intelligence system programs, but they are not progressing as planned. 

Table 6: Summary of Acquisition Programs by Management Structure 

Progressing as planned Not progressing as planned

Management structure No. of programs Cost (in millions) No. of programs Cost (in millions)

SOCOM managed programs 26 $632.3 13 $626.0

MILDEP role in managing programs 25 1844.2 22 1895.0

Total 51 $2476.5 35 $2521.0

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

In assessing how programs have progressed, we identified a small number 

of programs (8 out of 86) that SOCOM canceled or deferred because of a

need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered 

during development. Most of these programs were canceled early before 

significant funding and time were committed. In the other few programs, 

however, we found significant time and effort was invested before they 

were cancelled. For example, SOCOM’s High Power Fiber Optic Towed 

Decoy program, which was being developed to provide a fiber optic towed

decoy capability to SOCOM’s fleet of AC and MC-130 aircraft, was 

canceled after spending about $85 million because of higher funding 

priorities. SOCOM’s one ACAT 1 program, the Common Avionics 

Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program was also subsequently 

terminated. The CAAP program, which was managed by the U.S. Air 

Force, was being designed to provide SOF-peculiar avionics capability to 

the U.S. Air Force’s Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) on the 

MC-130 H and AC-130H/U aircraft. It was designed to give SOF-peculiar 

capabilities to the aircraft, including enhanced abilities to follow terrain 

and avoid detection while using Air Force-provided radar. However, 

SOCOM terminated all funding for the CAAP program in its fiscal years 

2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum. SOCOM determined that it 

was cost prohibitive to continue the program after the Air Force ran into 

problems with the AMP program and determined that the cost to complete 

development of both AMP and CAAP would more than double the original 

estimates. 

Page 20 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its 

acquisition programs are completed on time and within budget. Urgent 

requirements arising from SOCOM’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its 

new role in the GWOT have and will continue to challenge SOCOM’s 

ability to balance near- and long-term needs against available funding 

resources. For example, in order to fund almost 50 urgent deployment 

acquisitions in the past 5 years, SOCOM has had to reallocate $259 million 

from existing and planned acquisition programs. Additionally, even though 

SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, it 

is not consistently applied, and some programs have started without a 

good match between requirements and resources. SOCOM also has 

difficulty tracking progress on programs for which it has delegated 

management authority to the military departments and addressing 

problems earlier in these programs. Moreover, a key SOCOM tool for 

managing its acquisition programs has not been consistently maintained 

with up-to-date information. In addition, SOCOM has encountered 

workforce challenges such as being able to hire civilian personnel in 

reasonable time frames and ensuring that its military personnel are fully 

compliant with DOD standards. 

Addressing high-priority urgent needs from the field will continue to 

challenge SOCOM’s ability to complete existing programs on time and 

within budget. In its roles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and GWOT, SOCOM will 

continue to fulfill urgent needs with acquisition programs. But because of 

the short time frames involved, funding for these programs is not built into 

the budget. In the past 5 years, SOCOM reallocated about $259 million 

from budgeted programs to fund almost 50 urgent deployment

acquisitions. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, SOCOM did begin to receive

money from Congress in its budget—about $80 million and $22 million 

respectively—to help defray some of the costs of its urgent deployment 

acquisition programs. According to SOCOM’s Acquisition Executive, 

urgent deployment acquisitions are expected to continue over the next 

several years, and the command anticipates requesting about $20 to 

$25 million each year from 2008 to 2013 to help pay for these needs. 

Although funding shifts are disruptive in SOCOM, as they are in the 

military departments, SOCOM’s strategic planning structure for assessing

and selecting programs is well-suited for making the trade-offs among 

priorities needed to address urgent needs. 

SOCOM Faces 

Management and 

Workforce Challenges 

in Its Acquisition 

Programs 

SOCOM Management 

Challenges 

SOCOM also has difficulty tracking progress and addressing problems 

early in programs where it has delegated management authority to the 

military departments. Having access to all the military departments 

Page 21 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
provides SOCOM the means to leverage resources and expertise that may 

not reside at SOCOM, such as program management, engineering and 

technical services, testing and evaluation support, and logistical support. 

However, in some cases when SOCOM has relied on the military 

departments for technical or basic capabilities, its programs have been 

adversely affected when the department-provided capabilities are delayed. 

When delays occur, there tends to be a cascading effect on SOCOM 

programs. For example, initial schedule delays in the U.S. Air Force’s AMP 

for C-130 aircraft resulted in delays in SOCOM’s ability to acquire the 

CAAP program on the C-130 aircraft. The AMP program was to provide a 

basic cockpit configuration and avionics capability for different C-130 

aircraft, and SOCOM’s CAAP capability would provide additional avionics 

capabilities for SOF missions. The AMP program encountered technical 

and integration problems during installation trials and is now being 

restructured. Because of delays and cost growth with AMP, cost to 

complete the CAAP program increased significantly leading to SOCOM’s 

decision to cancel the CAAP program and defer this capability. 

According to SOCOM’s acquisition executive, although SOCOM has overarching memorandums of agreement establishing program management 

arrangements with each of the military departments, not all of the 

agreements are signed at the appropriate levels of authority within the 

military departments. While the agreement with the Army is signed by the 

Secretary of the Army, the Air Force and Navy agreements are signed by

the chiefs of staff. This is a challenge to SOCOM because acquisition and 

budget authority resides with the military department secretary and not 

with the chief of staff. When problems occur in programs managed by the 

Air Force or Navy, SOCOM may have less standing to make a case that 

they are not living up to the memorandums of agreement, than the 

command would with the Army. SOCOM also acknowledges that 

memorandums of agreement for specific programs—particularly the 

larger, more complex programs SOCOM delegates to the military 

departments—have not been detailed enough in terms of laying out the 

roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing programs, nor 

detailed enough in laying out how SOCOM will be able to track progress 

and participate in regular program reviews with the military departments. 

While written agreements by themselves may not result in better 

SOCOM-military department programs, they are important in that they 

provide a foundation for effective program management. SOCOM is 

currently taking steps to update the written agreements with the military 

departments and also examining whether some of its programs would be 

better under SOCOM management. 

Page 22 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, but 

it is not consistently applied. We have frequently reported on the need to 

develop a solid, executable business case before committing resources to 

a new product development effort. A business case should be based on 

DOD’s acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial 

firms and other successful DOD programs. Our work has shown that the 

business case in its simplest form demonstrates evidence that (1) the 

warfighter’s needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen 

concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced 

within existing resources—that is: proven technologies, design knowledge, 

adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when it is 

needed. We found that although SOCOM has a systematic strategic 

planning process to prioritize and select programs, it has started some 

programs, particularly the larger and more complex programs, without 

ensuring that there was a solid match between the requirements and 

resources to complete the development. For example, SOCOM terminated

the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration Program because of 

excessive cost growth resulting from technical problems and schedule 

delays with the Air Force’s Avionics Modernization Program. While 

SOCOM attributes the cause of program problems in part to poor 

contractor performance, it also acknowledges that technology challenges 

and development costs were significantly underestimated when the 

program started. In addition, the Navy-managed Advanced SEAL Delivery 

System (ASDS), which has been one of SOCOM’s largest investments since 

ASDS started in the mid-90s, encountered significant problems because 

the capabilities required for the delivery system outstripped the 

developer’s resources in terms of technical knowledge, time, and money. 

Although the first boat was accepted for operational use in 2003, it did not 

meet technical or performance requirements. Currently, reliability issues 

with the boat are being examined, and an assessment of alternate material 

solutions are underway to determine how best to address the remaining 

operational requirements. 

SOCOM’s tool for managing its acquisition programs—called the Special 

Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System (SOALIS)—lacks 

sufficient oversight and maintenance. At the time of our review, we found 

that information for most programs was out of date and that some 

programs had not been updated in years, even though the program 

executive officers and program directors are required to keep SOALIS 

accurate and up to date on at least a monthly basis. Further, we found no 

enforcement mechanism to ensure oversight of this important 

management tool. According to SOCOM’s Standard Operating Procedures 

Directive, SOALIS is intended to give SOCOM decision makers and 

Page 23 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
stakeholders essential information on the status and progress of ongoing 

acquisition efforts. Although regular progress reviews take place on 

individual programs, the lack of up-to-date information on all programs 

can impede SOCOM’s ability to conduct effective oversight. 

SOCOM Workforce 

Challenges 

SOCOM’s acquisition workforce has remained relatively small for many 

years, but plans are underway to increase the size of the acquisition 

workforce about 75 percent by the end of 2008. This is being done to 

address the growth in acquisitions work that has taken place over the past 

several years as well as expected future growth in acquisitions with 

SOCOM’s expanded role in the GWOT. Since 2001, SOCOM’s workforce 

has remained fairly stable, growing by only 10 positions to a total of 

185 government—civilian and military—acquisition employees. SOCOM 

plans to expand its governmental acquisition workforce to about 

300 employees. Currently, the governmental workforce is heavily 

supplemented by contractors. Specifically, contractors comprise about 

two-thirds of the overall workforce supporting SOCOM’s acquisition 

activities. The contractor support includes logistics, training, education,

and testing support, and engineering and technical services. In order to 

prepare for the upcoming workforce expansion, SOCOM is conducting a 

manpower study. The study, which is scheduled to be completed in fiscal

year 2008, is designed to assess the composition of the workforce and 

determine workloads associated with each SOCOM position—including all 

acquisition positions—to aid SOCOM officials in their placement of newly 

hired government employees. Also, to lower costs, SOCOM’s acquisition 

executive anticipates a reduced reliance on contractors in conjunction 

with the expansion of the governmental acquisition workforce. How much 

of a reduction will be based on the outcome of the ongoing manpower 

study and resource considerations. 

As can be seen in table 7, the majority of SOCOM’s current civilian 

acquisition workforce has attained DOD’s level III certification. 

Table 7: SOCOM’s Civilian and Military Acquisition Workforce Composition and Training Levels 

Certification levels Level I Level II Level III None Vacancies Total positions

Civilian workforce 2 14 76 0 10 102

Military workforce 1 11 19 6 6 43

Total 3 25 95 6 16 145

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

Page 24 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Additionally, SOCOM’s senior level civilian acquisition workforce at the 

GS-14, GS-15, and senior executive service levels, along with those 

assigned to Critical Acquisition Positions14 that require level III 

certification, have all earned level III certification. We found that the 

vacancy rate for civilian acquisition positions is about 10 percent and that 

the bulk of the unfilled positions are at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels, leaving 

vacancies in some key management positions. The command has 

encountered challenges in filling vacancies in the upper-level, civilianacquisition-workforce positions. According to SOCOM’s acquisition 

executive, the difficulty in hiring qualified personnel to fill these critical 

vacancies is due, in part, to the lengthy process required to hire qualified 

acquisition personnel. SOCOM uses the Air Force personnel system as its 

executive hiring agency. However, this process has taken as long as 

240 days to hire at the upper levels.

SOCOM’s military acquisition workforce certification rated at level III is 

not as high as its civilian counterparts. This is particularly true for critical

acquisition positions, which usually involve significant supervisory or 

management responsibilities (e.g., program manager). As table 8 shows, 

about 40 percent of these positions are held by officers who do not meet 

the level III certification standards required by DOD. 

Table 8: SOCOM’s Military Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) and DOD Certification

Levels 

Program manager certification levels Number of officers in CAPs

Level III 13

Level II 6

Level I 1

No certification 2

Source: GAO analysis of SOCOM data. 

 14As defined in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), any 

acquisition position in DOD that is required to be filled by (a) military grade of lieutenant 

colonel (or commander for the Navy) or a higher grade or (b) an employee in a senior

position in the National Security Personnel System or in the Senior Executive Service, is

required to be designated as a critical acquisition position. 

Page 25 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
While DOD guidelines15 allow acquisition officers to attain the appropriate 

certification up to 24 months after being assigned to a critical position, we 

found that 3 of SOCOM’s 22 military officers filling these positions are still 

lacking the required certification. Although waivers are permitted on a 

case-by-case basis, at the time of our review SOCOM did not have a 

process in place to review and grant required waivers for those officers 

not in compliance with DOD standards. 

One of the challenges SOCOM faces in filling military acquisition positions 

is that the command often requires military operational experience and/or 

specialized skills. According to SOCOM, Army and Navy policies require 

their acquisition officers to have operational assignments before being 

assigned to the acquisition career field, but officers in the Air Force do not 

have to gain prior operational experience. In addition, some of the 

acquisition positions at SOCOM require unique special operations 

experience. For instance, some of the Navy’s acquisition positions at 

SOCOM are designated to be filled by Navy SEAL personnel, a group in 

short supply and generally not trained in acquisition. Since SOCOM is 

reliant on the services to provide military acquisition personnel to the 

command, SOCOM runs the risk of not being able to fill acquisition 

positions if it turns down candidates sent forward by the services who do

not meet all the position requirements. 

Thus far, SOCOM has done well with small acquisitions that modify readily 

available commercial technologies and nondevelopmental items. It has 

had more difficulty delivering the more complex systems that involve

significant development and reliance on the military departments. As 

SOCOM prepares for more growth in its acquisition function to meet the 

expanding needs for special operations forces, it will be important for the 

command to leverage its experience into better results in the future. For 

those more complex acquisitions that must be undertaken, opportunities 

exist for SOCOM to improve its results by ensuring that better business 

cases exist before embarking on such acquisitions, especially if they 

depend on acquisitions being managed by other military departments. 

In addition, the foundation for all acquisitions can be improved by 

(1) ensuring that the size and composition of the workforce is a good 

Conclusions 

 15DOD Instruction 5000.66, Subject: Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program (Dec. 21, 2005) 

and Department of Defense Desk Guide for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Workforce Career Management (Jan. 10, 2006). 

Page 26 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
match for the acquisition workload undertaken by SOCOM and (2) having 

a sound management information system to track programs. 

To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program 

outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following

three steps to ensure: 

• SOCOM establishes sound business cases for its more complex and 

military department-managed acquisition programs. Integral to this is 

applying the elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy 

(That is: programs match requirements with resources.) and having

effective agreements in place with the military departments that 

specify clear roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing 

programs. 

• as SOCOM increases its acquisition workforce, it (1) obtains 

personnel with the skills and abilities needed for more complex 

acquisitions, (2) makes sure personnel meet DOD acquisition 

certification level requirements, and (3) has the ability to make the 

hiring process as efficient as possible. 

• SOCOM improves the accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its 

acquisition management information system. To accomplish this, 

SOCOM should (1) establish enforcement mechanisms to make sure 

program managers submit updated information on a regular basis 

and (2) conduct quality checks to make sure the information is 

reliable. 

In DOD’s letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD partially 

concurred with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the 

other two recommendations. In partially concurring with the first 

recommendation, DOD agreed with the need to update memorandums of 

agreement between SOCOM and the military departments and apply 

elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy but only after it is 

defined by DOD within the 5000 series of documents. This should not 

result in a delay in action on DOD’s part as DOD’s acquisition policy 

already includes the key elements of a knowledge-based acquisition 

approach particularly regarding technology, design, and production. It is 

important that SOCOM follow this policy because we have found that 

programs experience cost, schedule, and performance problems when 

they proceed into system development and initial manufacturing with 

Recommendations for 

Executive Actions 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 27 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
lower levels of knowledge than specified in DOD’s acquisition policy. 

We believe that if properly implemented and enforced, a knowledge-based 

acquisition approach, as defined in DOD acquisition policy, can help 

reduce development risks and lead to better program outcomes on a more 

consistent basis. 

DOD’s written comments appear at appendix III. Additionally, SOCOM 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to this report to the Secretary of 

Defense, Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and other 

interested parties. We will also provide copies to others on request. 

In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 

at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in 

appendix IV.

Paul L. Francis 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 

Management 

Page 28 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess what type of programs SOCOM has undertaken and whether 

they have progressed as planned, we collected and reviewed information 

on all programs undertaken by the command between 2001 and 2006. We 

collected specific information on each program pertaining to its size, use 

of commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items, and acquisition 

strategy. In addition, we collected data on planned versus actual cost, 

schedule and quantities to be fielded. We analyzed this information to 

determine what types of systems were being acquired and the extent to 

which programs were meeting planned cost, schedule, and quantity 

objectives. We relied on GAO’s Applied Research and Methodology teams 

to array and analyze the acquisition programs in our review. Further, we 

interviewed SOCOM’s senior-level program executive officers to access 

and review available data on about 50 urgent acquisition systems 

programs, and a small number of the Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration programs transitioned by SOCOM to its forces. 

To assess and determine the management and workforce challenges facing 

SOCOM, we (1) reviewed and analyzed the current impact that unfunded 

near-term requirements had on the regular approved acquisition programs; 

(2) we reviewed and analyzed the command’s key acquisition program 

management tool—the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics 

Information System—for managing its acquisition programs; and (3) to 

assess the workforce challenges that SOCOM faces, we interviewed key 

SOCOM acquisition officials from SOCOM’s Special Operations

Acquisition and Logistics Center and key civilian and military personnel 

management officials at Tampa, Florida. We relied on previous GAO work 

as a framework for knowledge-based acquisition. 

We performed our review from July 2006 through June 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 29 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
A

and Orga

A

ppendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures,

nizational Structure for Managing

cquisitions 

Page 30 GAO-07-620

Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures, 

and Organizational Structure for Managing 

Acquisitions 

Unlike the military departments, which have geographically dispersed 

acquisition organizations, SOCOM’s acquisition activities are 

geographically consolidated. All acquisition support functions integral to 

SOCOM’s acquisition activities—contracting, budgeting, and requirements 

setting—are located at SOCOM headquarters. 

SOCOM Plans, Resources, 

Acquires, and Sustains 

Weapon Systems All under 

One Roof 

The SOCOM Commander has duties analogous to both service Secretaries 

and the service Chiefs. For example, like the Secretaries, he has budget, 

programming, research, development and acquisition, contracting, and 

procurement authority, and he can direct investigations and audits. Similar 

to the service Chiefs, the Commander of SOCOM is charged with 

organizing, training, and equipping SOF personnel, establishing 

requirements, conducting operational testing, and providing operational 

logistics. Unlike other combatant commanders, the SOCOM Commander 

has both command and acquisition authorities—he is the only combatant

commander with a “checkbook.” This arrangement allows SOCOM 

officials to plan, resource, and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment. 

SOCOM decides what weapon systems and equipment to acquire through a 

centralized strategic-planning and resource allocation process where 

requirements are assessed and prioritized and programs are selected

based on competing needs and available resources. The process has many 

of the characteristics of an integrated portfolio management framework 

that GAO recently reported as lacking at DOD in its departmentwide 

approach to weapon system investments.1

 That is, SOCOM addresses 

weapon system programs collectively from an enterprise level, rather than 

as independent and unrelated programs. Proposed programs are assessed 

through a screening process that weighs the relative costs, benefits, and 

risks of each, and selects those that help SOCOM balance near and future 

term opportunities, different SOF component capability needs, and 

 1

GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington,

D.C., Mar. 30, 2007). In this review, GAO compared DOD’s processes for investing in

weapon systems to the best practices that successful commercial companies use to invest 

in new products. GAO found that DOD’s organizational structures, processes, and practices

for planning and acquiring weapon systems at a department wide level are fragmented, 

making it difficult for the department to prioritize needs, make informed trade-offs, and 

achieve a balanced mix of programs that are affordable, feasible, and provide the best 

value to the warfighter. Commercial companies use an integrated portfolio management 

approach to product development where the relative pros and cons of market 

opportunities and competing product proposals are assessed and a balanced mix of 

products is selected that ensures a good return on investment and moves the company

toward achieving its strategic goals and objectives within available resources. 

Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures,

and Organizational Structure for Managing

Acquisitions 

available resources against the demand for new and ongoing systems and 

equipment. 

SOCOM has a close relationship with its customers—the SOF 

community—and receives inputs regarding capability needs directly from

SOF operators and component commands on an ongoing basis. SOCOM 

officials with operational experience and expertise in different program 

areas assess and prioritize the requests from the component commands on 

a bi-annual basis. These officials rate each proposal in terms of its 

potential to fulfill required military operational tasks. The officials then 

forward their assessments to SOCOM’s central decision-making body—

the Board of Directors—for a final determination of what acquisition 

programs should be undertaken by the command and where resources 

should go. 

The Board of Directors is composed of the SOCOM commander, all SOF 

component commanders, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))—OSD’s 

principal advisor on special operations activities and the organization 

charged with interfacing with SOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC)’s position on the 

Board of Directors allows DOD insight and a voice into what acquisition 

programs SOCOM undertakes.2

 Although DOD has an oversight role and 

decision authority over ACAT I programs, as previously discussed, over 

95 percent of SOCOM’s acquisition programs are below the ACAT I level. 

Therefore, ASD(SO/LIC) has no direct day-to-day oversight role in the bulk

of SOCOM programs. The Board of Directors is SOCOM’s primary and 

final approval authority regarding regular planned SOF-peculiar 

acquisition programs. 

Once the need for a SOF capability is verified and approved through 

SOCOM’s strategic planning process, it is reviewed through DOD’s Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to verify that it 

 2

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

(ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on Special Operations (SO) and LowIntensity Conflict (LIC) activities. ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for developing, coordinating, 

and overseeing the implementation of policy for SO and LIC activities and for ensuring

adherence to approved policy. ASD(SO/LIC) is also required to provide supervision of the 

preparation and justification of Special Operations Forces programs and budget. ASD

(SO/LIC) is also charged to be the proponent for SO and LIC issues in the Defense 

Acquisition Board and other appropriate boards and committees, and maintain liaison to 

monitor progress in achieving milestones. 

Page 31 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures,

and Organizational Structure for Managing

Acquisitions 

is a SOF-unique requirement, and not duplicative of a Service-common 

system.3

 However, according to SOCOM officials, JCIDS often fails to 

resolve time-sensitive SOF capabilities gaps that may be identified during 

active combat. Therefore, to support SOF acquisition priorities, SOCOM 

established its own version of the larger joint-requirement-setting 

process—the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System—

which interoperates with the command’s Acquisition Management System 

and Strategic Planning Process. 

SOCOM employs a two-tiered SOF Capabilities Integration and 

Development System—standard and fast track—to support SOF priorities. 

The standard capabilities process parallels the JCIDS process although it

is internal to SOCOM to specifically address SOF-unique capability gaps. 

The fast track process is used when a SOCOM component identifies an 

urgent and critical capability gap—derived from a combat-mission need 

statement. This process is not intended as a means to circumvent the 

command’s standard acquisition portfolio management process, rather it is 

SOCOM’s method to accelerate its response to compelling and timesensitive SOF-peculiar needs. 

Under the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System, 

validation and approval of a combat mission need statement mandates an

offset of resources as it constitutes a “must-pay” bill for SOCOM. Once the 

mission need statement is approved through the Fast-Track CIDS process, 

SOCOM officials initiate an urgent deployment acquisition to expedite the 

acquisition and field the required equipment. At this point, command 

officials reallocate resources to fund the urgent deployment acquisition. 

SOCOM’s goal is to field equipment within 180 days of approval. 

SOCOM Has Unique 

Program Management 

Structure Options 

SOCOM can arrange to transfer program management and milestone 

decision authority (MDA) responsibilities to one of the military 

departments to execute the program on behalf of the command. SOCOM 

has delegated responsibilities to the military departments in many of the 

acquisition programs underway that involve some modification of military 

department-provided equipment or in cases where the services have 

greater technical and specific platform program management expertise, 

 3

JCIDS is intended to manage military requirements across DOD, and provide a top down,

analytic-based process for affirming capability gaps and proposed solutions to meet the 

needs of the warfighter. 

Page 32 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures,

and Organizational Structure for Managing

Acquisitions 

such as fixed and rotary wing aircraft or submarine programs. SOCOM’s 

Acquisition Executive is the milestone decision authority for all SOCOM 

acquisition programs, unless the executive delegates that authority. 

However, through memorandums of agreement with the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force, SOCOM employs a range of program management structures. 

The command has the following three basic options for managing 

individual programs: 

• SOCOM can manage a program in-house by designating both a 

SOCOM program manager and MDA to execute the program. 

• SOCOM, through a program specific memorandum of agreement 

with a military department, can agree on appointment of a 

department program manager to manage the program under the 

direction of a SOCOM MDA. 

• SOCOM can transfer both program management and MDA 

responsibility to a military department through a program-specific 

memorandum of agreement, to execute the program on behalf of 

SOCOM. 

Applicable policies and procedures vary somewhat for each of the 

program management options just described. For example, for SOCOM 

MDA and SOCOM managed programs, SOCOM’s acquisition and logistics 

directives and standard operating procedures apply, and according to 

SOCOM, any exceptions are noted in the acquisition program’s Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum. Secondly, for SOCOM MDA and military 

department managed programs, responsibilities and exceptions to SOCOM 

procedures are intended to be defined in program specific memorandums 

of agreement. Finally, for programs with a military department MDA and 

program manager, the military department’s policies and procedures 

normally apply. Table 9 illustrates how the acquisition executive has 

delegated or retained decision authority for programs undertaken from 

2001 to 2006. 

Page 33 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures,

and Organizational Structure for Managing

Acquisitions 

Table 9: Summary of SOCOM Acquisition Programs’ MDAs and Program Managers 

Milestone decision authority SOCOM 

Military 

department 

(MILDEP) 

Program manager SOCOM MILDEP MILDEP

Percentages 45% 18% 37%a

Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis. 

a

Totals do not include one program with a non-MILDEP MDA and one program with a MILDEP MDA 

and SOCOM program manager. 

SOCOM is the MDA for over 60 percent of its acquisition programs. The 

SOCOM MDA could be the Acquisition Executive or a program executive 

officer, depending on the size and importance of the program. The 

Acquisition Executive has delegated the MDA role to the military 

departments for approximately 37 percent of SOCOM’s acquisition 

programs. For programs managed directly by SOCOM, the command has a 

hierarchical management structure, as shown in figure 6, which resembles 

the military departments in its internal acquisition organizational make-up. 

Figure 6: SOCOM’s Acquisition Programs Management Structure 

Acquisition executive

principal deputy

PEOs

Fixed wing

Rotary wing

Maritime

Intelligence systems

Special programs

SOF Warrior

Mission training and

preparation systems

Director of

procurement

Director of

logistics

Director of

management

Director of

advanced

technology

Source: SOCOM.

The program executive offices utilize program managers and system 

acquisition managers organized by program. System acquisition managers 

are charged with assisting the military department in program planning 

Page 34 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: SOCOM’s Policies, Procedures,

and Organizational Structure for Managing

Acquisitions 

and execution and also representing SOCOM at military department-led 

integrated-product teams, technical conferences, and program reviews. 

System acquisition managers are normally used when the MDA and 

program manager or both options are assigned to a military department. 

Page 35 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 38 GAO-07-620

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul L. Francis, Director, (202) 512-4841 

In addition to the contact above, John Oppenheim, Assistant Director, 

Leon S. Gill, John Ortiz, Michele Williamson, Julia Kennon, Greg Campbell, 

and Marie Ahearn made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Defense Acquisitions
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-07-406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. 

Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. 

GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006. 

Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. 

GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. 

GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Defense Acquistions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. 

GAO-03-476. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003. 

Defense Acquistions: Advanced SEAL Delivery System Program Needs 

Increased Oversight. GAO-03-442. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2003. 

Defense Acquistions: Readiness of the Marine Corps’ V-22 Aircraft for 

Full-Rate Production. GAO-01-369R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2001.

Navy Aviation: V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet 

to Be Determined. NSIAD/GAO-98-13. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 1997. 

 (120563) Page 39 GAO-07-620 Defense Acquisitions
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