GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 7, 2007 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Thelma Drake 

House of Representatives 

Subject: State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from 

Lebanon

The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during July and 

August 2006 was one of the largest overseas evacuations of American citizens in 

recent history. The Department of State (State) has the lead responsibility for 

evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in times of crisis. However, 

the size and unforeseen nature of the Lebanon evacuation required the assistance of 

the Defense Department (DOD). Specifically, State needed DOD’s ability to secure 

safe passage for American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD’s expertise and 

resources in providing sea and air transportation for large numbers of people. 

At your request, we have been conducting an ongoing review of State’s efforts to plan 

for, execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S. government personnel and 

American citizens from overseas posts. As part of this review, we collected 

information on State and DOD’s efforts to evacuate U.S. citizens from Lebanon in July 

and August 2006. To address your questions about the Lebanon evacuation, we 

briefed members of your staff on April 30, 2007, on (1) how State and DOD prepare 

for evacuations; (2) how State and DOD carried out the Lebanon evacuation; and (3) 

our observations on State and DOD’s successes and challenges in implementing the 

evacuation. This letter summarizes the main points from our presentation. See 

Enclosure II for a copy of the briefing slides from that presentation, which we have 

updated based on technical comments from State and DOD. 

To answer our three objectives, we met with State and DOD officials in Beirut, 

Lebanon; Nicosia, Cyprus; Washington D.C.; and at DOD’s Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) headquarters in Illinois. In addition, we reviewed State and DOD 

documents on preparing for evacuations and other crises, as well as documentation 

related to the Lebanon evacuation that we obtained from these locations. We 

performed our work from July 2006 to April 2007 in accordance with generally 
Page 2 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

accepted government auditing standards. For additional information on our scope 

and methodology, see enclosure I. 

Results in Brief 

State and DOD have several tools to prepare for the evacuation of American citizens 

in a time of crisis. For example, U.S. embassies world-wide are required to develop 

Emergency Action Plans (EAP) to prepare for emergencies, take part in periodic 

crisis management exercises, and develop estimates of the number of American 

citizens in each country. Within DOD, the Marine Corps regularly trains Marine 

Expeditionary Units on how to conduct evacuations of civilians. State and DOD also 

have a Memorandum of Agreement to define their respective roles and 

responsibilities in the event State requires DOD’s assistance in carrying out an 

evacuation. 

State and DOD’s evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon was an unusually 

large, complex operation that arose suddenly from an unforeseen international crisis. 

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah guerillas kidnapped two Israeli soldiers at Israel’s border 

with Lebanon. Israel responded the next day with a major military assault, bombing 

Lebanon’s airport in Beirut and forcing its closure, blockading Lebanon’s ports, and 

bombing roads and bridges. On July 14, State and DOD began developing a plan to 

move American citizens from Beirut to Cyprus with helicopters, U.S. military ships, 

and contracted commercial ships. Although small groups of Americans began leaving 

Beirut by helicopter two days later--July 16, 2006—the first large group of Americans 

did not depart by boat from Beirut to Cyprus until July 19. The thousands of 

Americans arriving in Cyprus began overwhelming local hotels, which were already 

at close to peak capacity during the height of the summer tourist season. As a result, 

State arranged for emergency shelter and asked for DOD’s assistance in arranging 

flights back to the United States. The last American evacuees departing on U.S. 

government-arranged flights left Cyprus on August 2, 2006. 

Though State and DOD’s evacuation effort was an overall success, the departments 

were challenged in several areas. State and DOD successfully evacuated nearly 15,000 

American citizens from a war zone to the United States in less than a month. This 

significant accomplishment was the result of State and DOD’s ability to develop and 

carry out an evacuation operation within a rapidly evolving context with uncertain 

information. We found three key areas where State and DOD faced challenges in 

evacuating American citizens. First, the magnitude of the Lebanon crisis taxed 

State’s capacity to respond. Second, State did not communicate effectively with the 

public, including potential evacuees in Lebanon and their family and friends in the 

United States. For example, State initially restricted Beirut Embassy officials’ ability 

to convey critical information via the media to Americans seeking to leave Lebanon. 

Third, State and DOD’s different institutional cultures and systems impeded their 

ability to work together; among other things, these differences resulted in 

miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships and planes to evacuate 

American citizens. State is taking some steps to address these challenges. 

The observations in this report will be incorporated in our broader review of State’s 

efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S. government 
Page 3 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

 

personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. We expect to issue that report 

in September. 

Background 

At the beginning of the summer of 2006, after the conclusion of a long civil war and 

periods of unrest spanning several decades, tourists and Lebanese-Americans were 

returning to visit or stay in Lebanon. While State had a travel warning in place 

describing recent incidents, such as assassinations, bombings, and demonstrations, 

and noting that “the potential for violence remains,” the warning did not mention the 

possibility of a large-scale war breaking out. In July 2006, State estimated that there 

were about 50,000 Americans in Lebanon. 

Shortly after the outbreak of war on July 13, 2006, the U.S. embassy in Beirut was 

flooded with calls from American citizens seeking to leave. The U.S. Ambassador in 

Beirut concluded that State, on its own, would not be able to safely evacuate 

potentially thousands of American citizens from the midst of an ongoing war in 

Lebanon. As a result, on July 14, 2006, State took the relatively unusual step of asking 

DOD for military assistance to evacuate American citizens.1

 Although State has 

conducted more than 80 evacuations of U.S. government personnel and U.S. private 

citizens over the last 5 years, very few involved DOD. In most of these cases, State 

was able to rely on commercially available transportation. 

State and DOD Have Several Tools to Prepare for Evacuations 

State has several tools to prepare for evacuations. For example, every U.S. overseas 

post is required to have: 

• An Emergency Action Plan (EAP) based on State guidance compiled in the 

Emergency Planning Handbook. The EAP includes planning for specific 

emergencies and "tripwires" used to determine when to authorize post staff 

and dependants to leave, order them to leave, close down the post, or initiate 

the evacuation of American citizens. 

• Crisis management exercises (CME), which are emergency simulations 

intended to improve crisis preparedness. CMEs are conducted every 1 to 2-

and-a-half years, depending on the dangers State associates with living at the 

post. 

• An F-77 report, which provides an estimate of the number of Americans in the 

country. 

At State headquarters in Washington, D.C., a Crisis Management Support unit 

coordinates crisis response with other departments and agencies, supports 

taskforces that assist posts in handling crises, and trains staff in evacuation 

1

 State can request DOD’s assistance by having its Executive Secretary send a memo to his or her 

counterpart at DOD. Once the decision has been made to use military personnel and equipment to 

assist with an evacuation, the military commander is solely responsible for conducting the operations, 

albeit in coordination with and under policies established by the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular 

representative in the affected country. 
Page 4 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

 

procedures and policy. Several State bureaus are also involved in preparations for 

possible evacuations. For example, these include the Bureau of Administration, 

which is responsible for transportation logistics; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

which generates emergency guidance and oversees planning for crises; and the 

Consular Affairs Bureau, which interfaces with American citizens abroad. State also 

encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register with the department when 

traveling abroad. According to State officials, this allows State to have better 

information on the number and location of American citizens in a country should a 

crisis arise. Pursuant to statutory authority, State has a mechanism for seeking 

reimbursement from American citizens for commercial transportation costs 

associated with an evacuation.2

 

Within DOD, the Marine Corps trains Marine Expeditionary Units in evacuating 

civilians. These units are trained to rapidly plan and execute operations to address 

regional uncertainties and threats. The training typically includes U.S. embassy 

officials and other State and U.S. government personnel who might be involved in a 

crisis response. The other DOD entities involved in the Lebanon evacuation included 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which coordinated interaction with State; 

TRANSCOM’s subcommands responsible for arranging air and sea transport; and two 

regional commands: Central Command (CENTCOM), which at the time covered 

Lebanon, and European Command (EUCOM), which covered Cyprus, Turkey, and 

Israel.3

A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between State and DOD addresses the roles 

and responsibilities of each agency in implementing evacuations. State is responsible 

for the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens abroad and is generally 

responsible for evacuating U.S. citizens. However, under the MOA, State may request 

assistance from DOD if it is unable to obtain commercial transportation to support an 

evacuation. Once DOD assistance has been requested, DOD is solely responsible for 

conducting the evacuation, in consultation with the U.S. Ambassador. During an 

evacuation, the MOA calls for high-level coordination between State and DOD 

through a liaison group that is responsible for evacuation planning and 

implementation. 

Evacuation from Lebanon Was Unusually Large and Complex 

The evacuation from Lebanon presented State and DOD with several significant 

challenges. First, it was conducted during an ongoing conflict where air and land 

evacuation routes were blocked. In addition, safely navigating sea routes required 

negotiation with Israel. Second, since the crisis was unforeseen, DOD did not have 

naval assets immediately available for a sea evacuation. Third, thousands of 

2

 State evacuates U.S. citizens from overseas locations according to 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(A), which 

authorizes expenditures from the department’s appropriation for Emergencies in the Diplomatic or 

Consular Service (the “K Fund”) for “the evacuation when their lives are endangered by war, civil 

unrest, or natural disaster of (i) United States Government employees and their dependents; and (ii) 

private United States citizens or third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum 

extent practicable...” 

3

 Lebanon is now covered by EUCOM for evacuation purposes. 
Page 5 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

American citizens wanted to leave Lebanon. State and DOD were also actively 

engaged in trying to address military, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues related to 

the wider conflict. 

U.S. Embassy officials in Beirut requested DOD’s help on July 14, the day after Israel 

initiated its bombing campaign. Together, State and DOD developed a plan to sealift 

thousands of U.S. citizens out of Beirut and airlift several hundred urgent cases, 

including those who were sick or infirm, to Cyprus via helicopter. DOD designated 

CENTCOM as the command responsible for addressing the Lebanon crisis. The 24th

Marine Expeditionary Unit set sail on July 14 from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, 

a trip that would take 6 days. Meanwhile, on July 15, TRANSCOM posted a bid for 

commercial ships to assist with the evacuation, and DOD began evacuating small 

groups to Cyprus via helicopter on July 16. The first U.S.-contracted ship departed 

Beirut for Cyprus on July 19 with an initial load of more than 1,000 U.S. evacuees. 

This Lebanese-owned ship was one of several commercial vessels contracted by 

TRANSCOM during the crisis. U.S. naval ships from the 24th Marine Expeditionary 

Unit began evacuating Americans from Beirut the next day. 

By July 23, State and DOD had evacuated almost 10,000 American citizens to Cyprus. 

These citizens were arriving in Cyprus faster than State could arrange charter flights 

for them back to the United States (see fig. 1). Therefore, because of the presence of 

these U.S. citizens, along with citizens from other countries also evacuated to Cyprus 

as well as visitors in Cyprus during the peak summer tourist season, local hotels were 

quickly overwhelmed. The U.S. embassy in Nicosia worked with the Cypriot 

government to arrange for the Americans to stay at the Nicosia fairgrounds, in large 

exhibit halls normally used for trade shows. The Cypriot government, DOD, State, 

NGOs, and local businesses provided cots, portable showers, food, entertainment, 

and other amenities for U.S. citizens until they could be flown back to the United 

States. 

Figure 1: U.S. Evacuees in Cyprus: Arrivals and Departures

The evacuation was unusually large, complex, and actually consisted of two distinct 

evacuation phases: first, removing nearly 15,000 people from the war zone in 
Page 6 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

Lebanon to temporary safe havens—DOD transported about 90 percent of the U.S. 

evacuees to Cyprus, and took the rest to Incirlik Airbase in Turkey; and, second, 

flying them from these safe havens to the United States. Normally, DOD limits its 

assistance to removing evacuees from danger, and then turns them over to State at a 

safe haven, where State assists them in making travel arrangements to return home. 

In the Lebanon evacuation, however, State asked DOD to assist in the transportation 

of evacuees to the United States. Due to the large numbers of American and other 

evacuees as well as tourists on Cyprus, regularly scheduled commercial flights were 

already close to fully booked and there was intense competition for contracting 

charter flights. TRANSCOM arranged for a combination of commercial charter and 

military planes to fly the evacuees out of Cyprus and Turkey. TRANSCOM was also 

using these same resources to move troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and had to divert 

some flights intended for that purpose to the evacuation operation. The last 

Americans evacuated from both Beirut and Cyprus on U.S. government-arranged 

transport left on August 2, just 3 weeks after the crisis began. Most of the American 

citizens evacuated to Cyprus returned to the U.S. on flights arranged by DOD.4

 

However, according to a State consular official in Cyprus, about 2,000 people who 

arrived in Cyprus as part of the U.S. evacuation effort made their own arrangements 

to leave the island.5

 

State and DOD Safely Evacuated Almost 15,000 Americans, but Faced 

Several Challenges

State and DOD safely evacuated almost 15,000 Americans from an unpredictable war 

zone with uncertain information regarding the number of U.S. citizens seeking to 

leave. However, State faced challenges in three key areas that impeded the 

evacuation efforts—the magnitude of the crisis, State’s shortcomings in 

communicating with the public, and State’s difficulties working with DOD. State is 

taking some actions to respond to these challenges. 

State and DOD Safely Evacuated Nearly 15,000 Americans

State and DOD evacuated nearly 15,000 Americans from a war zone with no U.S. 

evacuees killed or injured during the course of the operation. Moreover, the 

departments had to plan the evacuation with uncertain information. According to a 

high-level official at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the unpredictable nature of the war, 

in which both Christian and Muslim areas were bombed, may have caused greater 

numbers of people to panic and leave than State had originally anticipated. In 

addition, a consular official at the embassy noted that State’s announcement, several 

days into the evacuation, that it would not seek reimbursement for evacuation-related 

costs may have further increased the numbers of American citizens seeking to leave. 

Early in the evacuation, State and DOD instituted a vital communication tool—twice 

 

4

 According to State officials, State chartered some of these flights, and paid for many of the 

commercial flights arranged by DOD. 

5

 State officials noted that State and the Department of Homeland Security considered less than 75 of 

these individuals to be security risks and denied them permission to board U.S.-bound flights. The 

officials added that some of those denied permission to go to the United States may have eventually 

made their way back to Lebanon. 
Page 7 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

daily video conferences with key officials in both agencies—that was not in State’s 

emergency plan for Beirut, yet, according to State officials, was critical to the success 

of the evacuation efforts. 

Magnitude of the Crisis Taxed State’s Capacity to Respond 

State’s emergency guidance and post-specific action plan were quickly overtaken by 

the speed, severity, and scope of the crisis, and Beirut embassy officials said they did 

not use them. Nearly every aspect of State’s preparations for evacuation was 

overwhelmed. For example: 

• Embassy officials in Beirut told us they did not use the Emergency Planning 

Handbook or the EAP. The Beirut EAP called for using commercial flights 

from the airport to evacuate people from the country, but the airport was 

closed and overland travel was prohibitively risky.6

• Consular officials had trouble registering the surging numbers of U.S. citizens 

who had not registered with the embassy before the crisis and were now 

seeking the embassy’s assistance in getting out of Lebanon. 

• Five days into the crisis, State suspended its policy of collecting promissory 

notes from evacuees regarding reimbursement for evacuation-related costs; 

State officials said they viewed this policy as a potential hurdle in the 

evacuation process. 

• State’s Administration Bureau also had difficulty chartering the large volume 

of flights needed out of Cyprus, and had to turn to TRANSCOM for help. State 

lacked the manpower, training, and tracking equipment for an operation of this 

magnitude. For example, State had difficulty determining how many flights it 

needed. 

• The email system at the taskforces coordinating the evacuation was 

overwhelmed. Information was shared primarily by email and all email 

messages were automatically sent to all taskforce members, making it difficult 

to prioritize actions or determine which actions had been completed. 

Since the evacuation, State has taken several steps to address some of these issues 

including: 

• Encouraging American travelers to register with State by distributing 

brochures on how to register as part of the passport application process. 

• Sending several cables to all posts detailing various practical lessons learned 

from the Lebanon evacuation. 

• Interviewing U.S. government officials and locally-employed staff in Lebanon, 

Cyprus, Turkey, and Washington, as well as evacuees, to glean more lessons, 

with the intention of using the videotaped interviews as a training tool. 

• Introducing a web-based portal for sharing information efficiently within State 

and between State and other agencies. 

 

6

 Given that sea and air transport were not possible or practical for extricating Americans from 

landlocked towns in southern Lebanon, the embassy orchestrated a bus convoy to bring them to 

Beirut. This was an extremely dangerous trip that was closely coordinated with Israeli military 

authorities and involved very tight timeframes for safe travel between bombing runs. 
Page 8 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

State Did Not Communicate Efficiently with the Public 

In the crucial first days of the crisis, State did not communicate efficiently with the 

public. For example, State initially tried to control media contact from Washington, 

which constrained the Beirut embassy’s ability to communicate logistical information 

in a timely manner to U.S. citizens seeking to leave. Initially, evacuees had a difficult 

time getting information from State on what to do or where to assemble. Embassy 

officials in Lebanon stated that people were reassured when State subsequently 

modified its policy to allow embassy staff to speak directly to the media, and said this 

contact also served as a vital source of information when other forms of 

communication were compromised due to the bombing of cell phone towers and 

power stations. 

State’s Emergency Planning Handbook provides guidance on communicating with the 

media in various crisis situations and requires posts to coordinate such contact with 

Washington. However, the Handbook has no specific guidance for addressing the 

public during a mass evacuation of American citizens from a war zone, and the Beirut 

Embassy’s Emergency Action Plan has no additional guidance on media 

communications. 

State taskforces in Washington also had difficulty responding to the public because 

their members did not have adequate training or access to a reliable, centralized 

source of information. For example, relatives of Americans trying to leave Lebanon 

were not always able to get through to taskforce hotlines or to obtain consistent 

information from State about the developing situation in Lebanon and U.S. efforts to 

aid their loved ones7

. As a result, State is developing new, web-based tools and 

training to improve taskforce performance. The tools provide a centralized source of 

information, with links to the latest situation reports, maps, and other information. 

The links also eliminate the need for mass emails. After testing an initial roll out of 

these tools, the Ambassador to Beirut said they were a significant improvement over 

the system he used to interact with the taskforces during the crisis. 

State and DOD Encountered Difficulties Working Together 

State and DOD have different institutional cultures and systems, which impeded their 

ability to work together. For example, officials at both agencies noted that State and 

DOD speak different “languages,” which made it difficult for State to communicate its 

needs and the urgency of the crisis to DOD. A case in point presented to us was that, 

where State officials might request “10 planes,” DOD officials would want to know 

the precise numbers of people and tonnage of equipment to be transported. DOD 

would then determine the number and type of aircraft needed. State acknowledged 

these communication difficulties in a cable to all posts that discussed lessons learned 

from the Lebanon evacuation. The cable urged State officials to “define requests for 

military assistance in terms of specific requirements” and to “adapt your language 

when necessary” to military specifications. In addition, State consular and DOD 

officials in Lebanon and Cyprus use data systems with different classification levels, 

 

7

 According to State, the Consular Affairs contract call center and task forces responded to more than 

25,000 calls from the public, with many coming directly from Americans in Lebanon. 
Page 9 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

which inhibited the exchange of important logistical information. Compounding 

these institutional differences, the Memorandum of Agreement between the two 

agencies does not specify the capabilities and limitations of each, or a threshold at 

which DOD can take over transportation logistics from State. For example, in 

situations where a large number of persons are seeking or needing to leave within a 

short period of time, and commercial transportation resources (e.g., flights) are 

limited, DOD would likely have more assets to draw on in order to implement the 

evacuation. 

These issues resulted in miscommunications and possible delays in chartering ships 

and planes. For example, State officials in Lebanon acted quickly after the crisis hit, 

but had to wait 5 days before the first U.S.-controlled ship began evacuating people 

from the country. Further, State and DOD were competing for some of the same 

commercial planes, thereby creating duplicate requests that gave the perception of 

fewer available planes for contract. Communication challenges between State and 

DOD also resulted in additional time processing evacuees, since State consular 

officers did not know that DOD can create passenger manifests more efficiently than 

they can.8

 

In an attempt to address some of these challenges, State sent two officials from its 

Administration Bureau to TRANSCOM headquarters for several days to learn more 

about how TRANSCOM operates and its capabilities, and to develop relationships 

with key contacts there. State’s new taskforce web tools also address information 

exchange issues with DOD by including a direct link to DOD sites and information. 

The observations in this report will be incorporated in our broader review of State’s 

efforts to plan for, execute, and recover from the evacuation of U.S. government 

personnel and American citizens from overseas posts. We expect to issue that report 

in September. 

Agency Comments 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense. State 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. DOD did 

not comment on the report. 

As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report 

earlier, we plan no further distribution until 5 days from the report date. At that time, 

we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and Defense and 

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others on 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

 

8

 Despite the difficulties described above, Embassy Nicosia reported excellent civilian-military 

coordination with Combined Task Force 59 in Cyprus. 
Page 10 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512- 4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key 

contributors to this report include David Maurer, Assistant Director; Joseph Carney; 

Ian Ferguson; Jon Fremont; and Kay Halpern. 

Sincerely Yours, 

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Enclosures 

 
Page 11 GAO-07-893R U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon 

Enclosure I 

Scope and Methodology 

To review State and DOD’s preparation for evacuations we examined State and DOD 

documents related to evacuation planning, including State’s Emergency Planning 

Handbook, the Beirut Embassy’s Emergency Action Plan, and the Memorandum of 

Agreement between State and DOD. We also met with State officials in the 

Diplomatic Security Bureau and the Foreign Service Institute, which overseas crisis 

management training, and with DOD officials in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

To review how State and DOD carried out the evacuation, and make observations on 

these agencies’ successes and challenges in doing so, we traveled to Lebanon and 

Cyprus, where we met with U.S. embassy and host government officials involved in 

the evacuation. In Lebanon we visited sites where U.S. evacuees were processed and 

where they boarded transport vessels to U.S. navy ships, as well as the Port of Beirut, 

where they boarded commercial ships. In Cyprus, we visited the ports of Larnaca 

and Limassol, where evacuees arrived; the airport at Larnaca, where they boarded 

flights to the United States; and the Nicosia fairgrounds, where they were housed 

during the interim. In Washington, we met with the Undersecretary of State for 

Management; the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and other officials 

from the Consular Affairs Bureau; and officials from the Bureaus for European and 

Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, Administration, Political-Military Affairs, and 

Resource Management. We also met with the Crisis Management Support Director 

and toured State’s Operations Center, where the taskforces are located; we visited 

the taskforce rooms on August 3, 2006, while there was still fresh evidence of their 

work on the Lebanon crisis. We met with DOD officials in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and TRANSCOM’s Military Sealift 

Command, and traveled to Scott Air Force Base in Illinois to meet with officials at 

TRANSCOM’s headquarters and its Air Mobility Command. In addition, we spoke by 

telephone with CENTCOM officials in Tampa, Florida. We examined State and DOD 

documents related to the Lebanon evacuation, including situation reports, lessons 

learned cables and other documents discussing lessons learned. We obtained and 

reviewed materials documenting the number of evacuees arriving and departing 

Cyprus, the contracting of ships and planes, and other materials related to the 

Lebanon evacuation. We assessed the reliability of this data by interviewing agency 

officials knowledgeable about the data, and by reviewing existing documents. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to estimate the number of 

American citizens evacuated. We performed our work from July 2006 to April 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

(320501) 
12 GA0-07-893R U

Enclosure II

Briefing for the Staff of the House C

Foreign Affairs and Representative T

April 30, 2007 

The Evacuation of America

from Lebanon in July 
13 GA0-07-893R U

The Evacuation of Am

Citizens from Lebanon in 

Source: Lebanon Internal Security Force.
14 GA0-07-893R U

Objectives

• We assessed:

• CONTEXT: How State and 

prepare for evacuations

• TIMELINE: How State and 

carried out the evacuation Citizens from Lebanon

• OBSERVATIONS: What w

and what challenges were State and DOD 
15 GA0-07-893R U

Context

 The Departments of State 

Defense (DOD) have seveprepare for evacuations

 Several State and DOD en

involved in the Lebanon ev

 The Lebanon evacuation w

typical evacuation
16 GA0-07-893R U

Context: 

State tools to prepare for ev

Emergency Planning Handbook (

contains State’s emergency policies and procedpost’s principal reference for preparing and revAction Plan. 

Emergency Action Plan (EAP) – A

required to create and periodically update an Eplanning for specific emergencies and "tripwireswhen to authorize post staff and dependants to leave, close down the post, or initiate the evacucitizens.

Crisis Management Exercises (CM

crisis simulations conducted at all posts every 1intended to improve crisis preparedness. 
17 GA0-07-893R U

Context: 

State tools to prepare for ev

Task Forces – Task Forces are State’s primary crisis m

forces facilitate State and interagency coordination and comto a particular crisis.

Crisis Management Support (CMS) – State

task forces during crises and trains staff in evacuation procalso chairs a Washington-based interagency liaison group.

Washington Liaison Group – This interagency b

representatives from State, DOD, and other agencies that response and evacuation planning.

Promissory Notes – Private American citizens are n

promissory notes when being evacuated. State then bills thave cost them for commercial transport.

Traveler registration – State encourages American

when traveling abroad, but cannot require them to do so.

F-77 report – The F-77 report provides an estimation of 

American citizens in a country, based in part on traveler re

State and DOD in planning for and conducting evacuations 
18 GA0-07-893R U

Context: DOD and joint DO

planning and preparation for e

Memorandum of Agreement (

current MOA between State and DOD on tevacuation of U.S. citizens and other desigwhich dates from 1997-1998, is meant to dresponsibilities of each agency in carrying 

DOD Training of Marine Expe

Units (MEUs) – DOD regularly trai

conduct noncombatant evacuation operatioinvolves the evacuation of noncombatants, 
19 GA0-07-893R U

Context: State entities 

involved in Lebanon evacuation

Secretary of 

State

Executive Secretariat

Executive Secretary

Crisis Management 

Support

(Taskforces)

Under Secretary for 

Political Affairs

Under Secretary 

for Management

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data; clip art (Corel).

European 

and

Eurasian 

Affairs

Near 

Eastern 

Affairs

Embassy

Nicosia

Embassy

Ankara

Embassy

Beirut

Embassy

Tel Aviv

Administration

Transportation 

logistics

American Citizen Services

Diplomatic 

Security

Consular

Affairs

Fo

Se

Ins
20 GA0-07-893R U

Context: DOD entities 

involved in Lebanon evacuation
21 GA0-07-893R U

Context:

Lebanon evacuation was no

Typical evacuations

 Unfold with time to assess tripwires 

and consult EAP

 Involve primarily U.S. government 

employees and dependants

 Do not usually involve DOD Evacuees leave via regularly 

scheduled commercial flights

 If DOD involved, it takes evacuees 

out of harm’s way but not all the way back to U.S.

 Private American citizens sign 

promissory notes and subsequently billed by State for cost ofcommercial transport

Lebano

 Crisis situat

than 24 hour

 Involved ma

15,000 – of pcitizens

 Required DO Involved mil

as well as DOadditional, cplanes 

 State and DO

temporary sathen flew the

 Promissory 

then deemed 
22 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline

 The crisis hits Planning for evacuation Departing Lebanon  Cyprus arrivals and depart
23 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline: the cr

Wednesday, July 12, 2006 Hezbollah incursion at Israeli 

border

Thursday, July 13, 2006 Israel bombs Beirut airport; airport

closes; Israel blockades port

Friday, July 14, 2006 State requests Noncombatant

Evacuation Operation (NEO) from DOD

 State authorizes departure for

Embassy Beirut non-emergency staff who wish to leave

Monday, August 14, 2006 Hostilities end with cease-fire 

between Hezbollah and Israel Source: Lebanon Internal Security 
24 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline : planning for ev

Friday, July 14, 2006:  DOD designates Central Command (CENTCOM) as the command responsible for addressing the Lebanon crisis. CENTCOM orders naval ships under its command in the Red Sea to set sail for 

Lebanon.

Saturday, July 15, 2006:  DOD established rules of engagement for Lebanon evacuation based on 

recommendations from U.S. Ambassador in Beirut and DOD commander.

 Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) posts a solicitation for commercial ships to support the evacuation. Monday, July 17, 2006:  DOD orders TRANSCOM to give sole source contract to a cruise ship, the Orient QueenThursday, July 20, 2006 Embassy Nicosia sets up fairgrounds as temporary shelter for evacuees. 

Source: Defense Intellige
25 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline: departing Le

Saturday, July 15, 2006 Embassy Beirut 

issues warden messages and press releases informing American citizens of developing crisis and urging them to register with embassy.

Sunday, July 16, 2006: Military helicopters 

begin ferrying small groups to Cyprus.

Tuesday, July 18, 2006: State determines 

that it is “impracticable to charge reimbursement” from evacuees “in this exceptional case.”

Source
26 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline: departing Le

Wednesday, July 19, 2006: The first U.S.-

controlled ship (Orient Queen) departs Beirut with over 1,000 U.S. evacuees, one day after arriving in Lebanon.

Thursday, July 20, 2006: The first U.S. Navy 

ship arrives in Beirut, loads over 1,000 U.S. evacuees, and departs for Cyprus.

Saturday, July 29, 2006: Last ship with U.S. 

evacuees departs Beirut with 286 private American passengers.

Wednesday, August 2, 2006: Last helicopter 

departs Beirut with 33 American evacuees. 

Source: L
27 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline: 

Cyprus arrivals and dep

Sunday, July 16, 2006: The first U.S. 

evacuees begin arriving via helicopter.

Wednesday, July 19, 2006: The first flight 

carrying 145 evacuees departs Cyprus for the United States. 

Thursday, July 20, 2006: The first U.S.-

controlled ship arrives in Cyprus with over 1,000 evacuees.

Saturday, July 22, 2006: The number of U.S. 

evacuees arriving in Cyprus reaches its peak, with 3,755 arrivals. 

Monday, July 24, 2006: The number of U.S. 

evacuees departing Cyprus reaches its peak, with 2,578 leaving. 

Wednesday, August 2, 2006 The last U.S.-

arranged flight leaves Cyprus with 170 American evacuees. Source: U
28 GA0-07-893R U

Timeline: Cyprus arrivals and departures
29 GA0-07-893R U

Observations

What worked well: 

 State and DOD safely evacuated almost 15

from a war zone.

 State and DOD developed and carried out 

operation within a rapidly evolving context, information.

 Twice daily video teleconferences worked w

in EAP.

Challenges:

 The magnitude of crisis taxed State’s capac State did not communicate efficiently with t

 State and DOD encountered difficulties wo
30 GA0-07-893R U

Magnitude of crisis taxed 

capacity to respon

 EPH and EAP quickly overtaken by e

Beirut did not use these planning documents because they 

of this speed, severity, and scope.

 Consular officials had trouble meetin

demand during the crisis: They admitted th

had difficulty registering.

 Promissory notes not practical: State in

them but deemed them impractical 5 days into the crisis.

 State lacked sufficient capacity to ar

State had difficulty chartering the large volume of flights nerequired TRANSCOM’S help to move thousands out of Cypovercrowding at the Nicosia fairgrounds as the number of e

 Taskforce email system overwhelme

all taskforce members, making it difficult to prioritize action

actions had already been completed.
31 GA0-07-893R U

State did not communicate 

with the public

 EPH and EAP guidance counterproductive: It 

Embassy Beirut’s ability to communicate logistical timely manner to American citizens seeking to lea

State initially tried to control media contac

Washington: Embassy Beirut officials said Amin Lebanon were reassured when embassy stsubsequently allowed to speak directly to the also served as a vital source of information whcommunication were compromised.

 Taskforces did not expedite responses to pub

acknowledged that the public had difficulty getting taskforce call centers; taskforce members did not training or access to a reliable, centralized source 
32 GA0-07-893R U

State and DOD encountered d

working together 

 Differences in institutional “languag

State’s ability to communicate its needs and the urgeDOD. 

 The MOA does not specify each agency

limitations, or a threshold at which DOD can take ovelogistics from State. 

 Impaired communication on critical 

arrival of ships and planes and passenger manifests, and DOD officials’ differing data systems. 

 These challenges resulted in:

 miscommunications and possible delays in chart

planes.

 time wasted processing evacuees, since State c

know that DOD can create ship passenger manifthan they can.
33 GA0-07-893R U

Actions State has taken after th

evacuation 

 New web-based tools to improve cap

communications: CMS is developing these t

taskforce communications within State, with the puband DOD, and has begun to use them in responding 

 Working with DOD: The Administration Bure

TRANSCOM to learn more about how TRANSCOM 

 Disseminating lessons learned:

 The Consular Affairs Bureau is conducting an “o

learn more about the Lebanon evacuation and t

 The Undersecretaries for Political Affairs and M

Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs detailing lessons learned from the Lebanon eva

 Mechanism to increase traveler regis

Consular Affairs Bureau is encouraging American trathe State Department. 
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