DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2014

DOMINIQUE BRICE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D13-4192

[October 1, 2014]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Robert L. Pegg, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 312008CF000743A.

Dominique Brice, Florida City, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Dominique Brice appeals an order summarily denying her rule 3.850 

motion. We reverse as to ground one, and otherwise affirm.

Brice was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide after she lost 

control of her vehicle and struck and killed two men, who had been 

standing at the side of the interstate highway beside their motorcycles. 

Although she and her brother—a passenger in her vehicle—testified at trial 

that external traffic conditions caused her to lose control, numerous state 

witnesses testified that she was speeding, weaving, and driving recklessly 

before the accident. She was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 

222 months (18.5 years) in prison, the lowest permissible sentence 

generated by her Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet.1

1 The sentence was structured as 15 years in prison for count I, and 3.5 years in 

prison, followed by 5 years of probation, for count II.
2

In ground one, Brice claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing 

to properly convey a five-year plea offer allegedly made by the state. She 

asserts that she rejected the offer because counsel advised her to do so, 

failing to properly evaluate the facts of the case and explain the likelihood 

of a conviction and lengthy sentence. She alleged that there was a 

reasonable probability that she would have accepted the offer and that the 

plea would have been entered without the prosecutor withdrawing it or the 

judge refusing to accept it. She explained that, despite the overwhelming 

evidence that she had caused the death of the victims by recklessly 

operating a motor vehicle, counsel told her the state “had no case” and 

told her to “reject the plea offer.” Counsel also allegedly failed to inform 

her that she could avoid the lifetime suspension of her driver’s license by 

accepting the offer.

In Morgan v. State, 991 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2008), the supreme court held 

that an allegation that counsel was ineffective for misadvising the 

defendant to reject a plea offer could entitle a defendant to an evidentiary 

hearing. But, “[s]ome specific deficiency on the part of counsel must be 

alleged[,]” such as, an “allegation that counsel’s assessment of the chances 

of success at trial was unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of 

[the] case or that counsel had not investigated or otherwise was not 

familiar with the case.” Id. at 841.

After the Supreme Court of the United States issued Lafler v. Cooper, 

132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), the 

Florida Supreme Court decided Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013). 

Now, to show prejudice in such cases, the defendant must demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that: (1) the defendant would have accepted the 

offer had counsel advised the defendant correctly; (2) the prosecutor would 

not have withdrawn the offer; (3) the court would have accepted the offer; 

and (4) the conviction or sentence would have been less severe than the 

judgment and sentence imposed. Id. at 430.

Brice made all these allegations, including that counsel’s assessment

of the chances of success at trial was unreasonable under the facts and 

circumstances of this case. The motion specified that counsel should have 

been aware of the strength of the state’s case from witness statements and 

depositions. She attached a summary of the testimony given by the state’s 

witnesses at trial. We conclude that the claim was sufficiently pleaded

and reverse the summary denial of this ground for further proceedings. 

We affirm the summary denial of Brice’s remaining grounds without 

further discussion.
3

Affirmed in part. Reversed in part and remanded.

WARNER, TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.