research report

EPA/600/R-05/083

October 2005

Workshop on

Decontamination, Cleanup, and 

Associated Issues for Sites 

Contaminated With Chemical, Biological, 

or Radiological Materials

by

Sarah Dun

Eastern Research Group, Inc.

Lexington, MA 02421

Joseph Wood

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Research Triangle Park, NC 27511

Blair Martin

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Research and Development

National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Research Triangle Park, NC 27511

Contract No. EP-C-04-056

Office of Research and Development

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Cincinnati, OH 45268
ii NHSRC
Decontamination Workshop iii 

Note

The majority of this report was prepared by Sarah Dun of Eastern Research 

Group, Inc. (ERG), an EPA contractor, as a general record of discussion for 

the “Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for 

Sites Contaminated With Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Agents.” 

Joseph Wood was coauthor and editor of technical content. This report 

captures the main points of scheduled presentations and summarizes 

discussions among the workshop panelists, but it does not contain a 

verbatim transcript of all issues discussed.

The production of this document has been funded wholly by the 

United States Environmental Protection Agency under Contract No. EPC-04-056 to ERG.
iv NHSRC

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .....................................................vi

Executive Summary ............................................................................viii

Introduction .......................................................................................xvii

1. Opening Remarks ............................................................................. 1

2. Presentations and Associated Question and Answer Periods ............ 3

DHS S&T Biological and Chemical Restoration Programs .......... 3

Crime Scene Management and WMD Terrorism ......................... 5

CDC/NIOSH and Health Response to Biothreat Agents: 

Environmental Monitoring ............................................. 6

Ranking Threats for Decontamination Research ........................... 7

OPP Sterilant Registration Project: Improving the 

Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC) 

Sporicidal Activity Test and the Evaluation of 

Quantitative Methods ...................................................... 9

Crisis Exemptions for Products Intended to Inactivate Bacillus 

anthracis ......................................................................... 10

Sampling and Clearance Lessons Learned ................................... 12

The Use of the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) to 

Qualitatively and Quantitatively Monitor Ambient 

Air for Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) and 

Decontamination Agents in Real Time at Parts per 

Trillion by Volume Levels or Below ............................... 14

Insurance and Indemnity Issues ................................................... 15

The Role of the On-Scene Coordinator in the Process ................ 16

Introduction to the Government Decontamination Services ...... 17

Laboratory Capacity Issues .......................................................... 18

Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide ...... 20

STERIS Chem-Bio Decontamination ......................................... 22

Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP) for Room/Building 

Decontamination Following Chemical or Biological 

Agent Attack: Overview of Efficacy and 

Practical Issues ................................................................ 23

Whole-Structure Decontamination of Bacterial Spores by 

Methyl Bromide Fumigation ......................................... 24

DF-200 Decontamination of CBW Agents, Other Biological 

Pathogens, and Toxic Industrial Chemicals ................... 25

Capitol Hill Ricin Incident: Decontamination Dilemmas .......... 26

Restoration from Decontamination: USPS Experience ............... 28
Decontamination Workshop 

Another Look at Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation: 

Concentration-Times, Efficacy Tests, and Biological 

Indicators ....................................................................... 30

Innovative and Emerging Decontamination Technologies .......... 31

Systematic Decontamination Project: Homeland Security 

Verification of Chemical and Biological 

Decontamination Technologies ..................................... 33

Use of HVAC Systems in Building Decontamination................. 33

Building Disinfection Byproducts: Experimental Evaluation 

and Decision Tool .......................................................... 35

Evaluation of Two Biological Decontamination Methods in 

a Room-Sized Test Chamber ......................................... 36

Verification of Commercial Decontamination Technologies 

in Bench-Scale Studies Using B. anthracis Spores .......... 37

Technical Support Working Group Decontamination 

Research and Development Activities ............................ 39

“Dirty Bombs” (Radiological Dispersion Devices [RDDs]) 

and Cleanup .................................................................. 41

Radiological and Nuclear Terror: Technical Aspects and 

Implications for Decontamination and Site 

Cleanup ......................................................................... 42

UK Approach to RDD Cleanup ................................................. 44

3. Panel Discussion—Lessons Learned ...................................................... 47

 Information Sharing and Agency Coordination .......................... 47

Preparedness ................................................................................. 48

Sampling and Analytical Issues .................................................... 49

Decontamination Process ............................................................ 49

4. Panel Discussion—Research and Development Needs.......................... 51

5. Appendices ............................................................................................. 55

 Appendix A: Agenda .................................................................... 55

 Appendix B: List of Participants .................................................. 58

 Appendix C: Presentation Slides .................................................. 62
vi NHSRC

ANL Argonne National Laboratory

ARL Army Research Laboratory

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

BASIS Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System

°C degrees Celsius

CARC chemical agent resistant coatings

Ci curie

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

cm2 square centimeter

CWA chemical warfare agent

DCMD Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

DDAP Domestic Demonstration and Application Program

DEFRA Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIMP diisopropyl methylphosphonate

DoD Department of Defense

DoE Department of Energy

ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

eLRN Environmental Laboratory Response Network

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

ETV Environmental Technology Verification

°F degrees Fahrenheit

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

ft2 square foot

ft3 cubic foot

g gram

GC gas chromatograph

GDS Government Decontamination Service

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

kg kilogram

L liter

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LRN Laboratory Response Network

m3 cubic meter

min minute

mg milligram

mrem millirem

mVHP modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Decontamination Workshop vii 

NAS National Academy of Science

NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NMRC Naval Medical Research Center

NRT National Response Team

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OPP Office of Pesticide Programs

ORD Office of Research and Development

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSC on-scene coordinator

PCR polymerase chain reaction

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

ppb parts per billion

ppm parts per million

PROTECT Program for Response Options and Technology

 Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism

PVC polyvinyl chloride

RDD radiological dispersion device

RIMNET Radiation Incident Monitoring Network

RVTP Rapid viability test protocol

Sabre Sabre Technical Services

SAFTEY Act Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies

 Act of 2002

SNL Sandia National Laboratory

STERIS STERIS Corporation

TAGA Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer

TSM Three-Step Method

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

UK United Kingdom

USAMRIID U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

 Diseases

USAR Urban Search and Rescue

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USPS U.S. Postal Service

UV ultraviolet

VERIFIN Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons

 Convention

VHP vaporous hydrogen peroxide
viii NHSRC

Executive Summary

The Decontamination and Consequence Management 

Division (DCMD) of EPA’s National Homeland Security 

Research Center (NHSRC) held its first “Workshop 

on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues 

for Sites Contaminated With Chemical, Biological, 

or Radiological Materials” at the International Trade 

Center Building in Washington, D.C., February 

23–25, 2005. The workshop opened with a plenary 

session. The subsequent 31 presentations addressed 5 

topics: the decontamination process, decontamination 

technologies, research and development, lessons 

learned, and radiological contamination. The speakers 

represented national laboratories and federal agencies 

such as EPA, the Department of Homeland Security, 

the Postal Service, the Department of Defense, the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the 

FBI; academia; and key companies conducting research 

or providing decontamination technologies and services. 

Representatives from Great Britain provided the United 

Kingdom perspective on decontamination issues. 

Plenary Session

Blair Martin, of EPA’s National Risk Management 

Research Laboratory, moderated the workshop and gave 

the opening remarks. Martin participated in most of the 

decontamination activities for the buildings that were 

contaminated with B. anthracis spores sent through the 

mail in the fall of 2001. These bioterrorist events were 

the primary impetus for forming EPA’s NHSRC, and 

the majority of discussion at the workshop was related to 

building decontamination. All of the affected buildings 

have now been successfully decontaminated. Martin 

discussed the elements of a decontamination event and 

noted that the actual destruction of spores (accomplished 

mostly via fumigation) represents only a small portion 

of the overall time and cost of a decontamination event. 

The elements of building decontamination also include 

establishing a decision-making process; characterization, 

sampling, and monitoring of contaminants and 

decontamination chemical levels; building preparation; 

the decontamination; materials disposal plan; and overall 

communications

Lance Brooks discussed the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate’s 

biological and chemical restoration programs (referred to 

as DDAP, i.e., Domestic Demonstration and Applications 

rograms). He discussed some of the projects under way 

r being planned, most of which focus on transportation 

ystems and wide urban areas. These projects involve 

or will involve) technology demonstrations, tabletop 

xercises, and the development of template response plans 

nd protocols for particular scenarios, all designed to 

educe the time to get critical facilities or areas restored 

nd operational. One completed project discussed was 

he Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System 

BASIS), a precursor to the Biowatch program, which is a 

etwork of monitors (with subsequent laboratory analysis) 

et up in major urban areas as an early warning system to 

etect aerosolized biological agents.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faces 

any challenges with forensics sampling and crime 

cene management following an incident involving 

hemical, biological, or radiological weapons, according 

o Benjamin Garrett of the FBI. These challenges include 

etermining that a deliberate release (as opposed to a 

atural event) has occurred, knowing where to sample, 

nd conducting analyses of evidence without harming 

he investigator or damaging the evidence. The primary 

urpose of sampling by the FBI is to gather evidence. 

y contrast, EPA conducts sampling to characterize the 

xtent of contamination and determine the effectiveness of 

econtamination. The FBI should share its data with other 

gencies such as EPA and the Centers for Desease Control 

nd Prevention (CDC), but the involved parties need to 

evise a process for doing so without harming the FBI’s 

nvestigation.

ession 1: The Decontamination Process

ancy Adams, Director of the DCMD/NHSRC, 

oted that her division conducts research and develops 

echnologies related to incidents involving biological, 

hemical, and radiological agents. Efforts focus on 

econtamination science and technology, sampling 

ethods, contaminant containment, tracking 

ontaminant movement, and disposal. Adams’s 

resentation detailed the methods used by NHSRC to 

ank threats. These involve the identification and ranking 

f high-priority agents, identification and ranking of likely 

errorist targets, and identification of terrorist goals (e.g., 

oss of life, economic damage, and inducing fear). These 

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Decontamination Workshop ix 

components are combined to couple threat agents with 

target facilities and to develop likely terrorist scenarios. She 

compared the DCMD threat-ranking approach to those 

developed by other agencies and noted that NHSRC uses 

the ranking results primarily to guide decontamination 

research efforts.

The CDC’s Kenneth Martinez explained that 

although the primary purpose for environmental 

sampling is to address public health concerns, sample 

collection and analytical methods are similar regardless of 

whether the data will be used for public health decisions, 

scene characterization, or crime scene investigation. 

Environmental sampling may identify agent sources, 

assess the nature and extent of contamination, support 

risk assessment and public health decisions, identify 

people needing medical treatment, and guide reoccupancy 

decisions. The three sampling phases in a response are 

screening, characterization, and restoration. The CDC 

has developed a sampling protocol for B. anthracis spores 

and is investigating and validating sampling and analytical 

methods for bio-contaminants, focusing in particular 

on surface sample collection efficiencies, air sampling, 

methods comparison, and variability issues.

Steve Tomasino described EPA’s Office of Pesticide 

Programs (OPP) research and development of biological 

agent analysis methods, in particular OPP’s evaluation 

of laboratory sporicidal efficacy test methods. EPA 

regulations require the Association of Official Analytical 

Chemists (AOAC) sporicidal activity test to register 

and approve the use of a chemical to be used as a 

decontaminant for a particular microorganism such as 

B. anthracis. This test has a number of limitations, for 

example, the results are qualitative, the test requires 21 

days for incubation, and the test lacks standardization. 

OPP has identified potential modifications to the existing 

AOAC method and two new promising methods that they 

are currently testing with surrogates: one developed by 

the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 

and one referred to as the three-step method (TSM). OPP 

submitted the study results to an expert panel, which 

selected TSM as the preferred method. As part of ongoing 

efforts, OPP will conduct additional surrogate studies with 

TSM beginning in April 2005. The TSM will undergo a 

multi-laboratory validation study in September 2005, and 

a summary report of findings is due in December 2005.

Registration of bio-decontamination chemicals 

requires test data regarding product chemistry, product 

toxicity, and product efficacy using the AOAC test, 

according to Jeffrey Kempter of EPA’s OPP. When the 

anthrax attacks occurred in September and October 2001, 

no products were registered for use against B. anthracis. 

Accordingly, crisis exemptions had to be issued for each 

decontamination chemical for use at each contaminated 

site. Crisis exemption requests had to include remediation 

action plans, sampling and analysis plans, and ambient 

air monitoring plans. OPP granted crisis exemptions 

for four liquid B. anthracis sporicides for use on hard, 

nonporous surfaces only: aqueous chlorine dioxide, 

hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite, 

and hydrogen peroxide/quarternary ammonium foam. 

Five gases have received crisis exemptions: gaseous chlorine 

dioxide (for buildings), vaporized hydrogen peroxide 

(for buildings), paraformaldehyde (for equipment in 

tented enclosures), methyl bromide (for laboratory and 

field study), and ethylene oxide (for specialized off-site 

treatment of specific items). Although no chemicals have 

yet been registered for B. anthracis decontamination, OPP 

is moving toward that goal. 

Mark Durno and Tony Intrepido gave a joint 

presentation on building sampling and clearance issues. A 

technical assistance document prepared by EPA’s National 

Response Team details a sampling approach for any 

biological incident. Other agencies are conducting studies 

related to sampling approaches and analytical techniques. 

For collecting field data, there are several methods, 

including hand-held assays, infrared sensors, and rapid 

polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. Verification 

sampling (following decontamination, to determine 

efficacy and to allow for reoccupation of the building) 

typically has been exhaustive, but as research advances 

and laboratory techniques become more relevant to field 

applications, this process will become more efficient.

Dave Mickunas, of EPA’s Environmental Response 

Team, discussed the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer 

(TAGA) for real-time monitoring of chemical warfare 

agents (CWAs) and fumigants (such as chlorine dioxide) 

in ambient air. EPA’s TAGA consists of an Atmospheric 

Pressure Chemical Ionization (APCI) source coupled 

to a three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. Mickunas is 

developing CWA spectra and calibration curves and 

conducting other analyses, such as verifying detection 

limits, determining the dynamic linear range, establishing 

surrogates, and identifying interferences. The TAGA is 

situated in a mobile unit (a van) and has been successfully 

used at B. anthracis decontamination events to detect 

fumigant leaks.
 NHSRC

In the decontamination of postal facilities, the 

United States Postal Service (USPS) accepted full liability 

and assigned broad indemnity to the decontamination 

contractors, according to Jerry Robinson, an attorney for 

the USPS. To minimize their risk, the USPS then obtained

a $100 million insurance policy, which cost $4 million. 

However, in a future incident, most government agencies 

will not be able to indemnify decontamination vendors 

because these agencies are not allowed to enter into the 

open-ended contracts required for indemnification. 

Decontamination contractors should obtain a SAFETY 

Act designation and certification for their technologies, 

which would allow them to be immediately available 

to perform decontamination services. To be certified, 

however, vendors must purchase insurance. 

Marty Powell explained that an EPA on-scene 

coordinator (OSC) has two primary responsibilities: 

to determine whether the contaminant poses a threat 

to the public or environment and to ensure that the 

threat is mitigated. Oddly enough, “on-scene” indicates 

involvement in an event without requiring a physical 

presence. The OSCs are coordinators, not commanders; 

they direct federal response assets. OSCs draw from a large

tool box of resources (e.g., contractor support, scientific 

support, special units, and public relations support teams) 

and provide these resources to local and state agencies. 

The OSCs ensure that the remediation work at a site 

is completed properly. They have the ability to make 

decisions at a site without obtaining a permit.

Robert Bettley-Smith, of the UK Department 

for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 

described his country’s Government Decontamination 

Service (GDS). The GDS will be a DEFRA agency and 

will be formally established in summer 2005. The GDS 

will provide guidance and identify resources, such as 

information about vendors, their capabilities, and their 

technologies. In the UK, authorities at the county level are

responsible for hazardous events and have experience with 

chemical transport and releases, but they lack experience 

with biological events. Therefore, GDS will focus its 

efforts on such events and develop a response plan. The 

agency is considering establishing a centralized data system

to facilitate the sharing of knowledge across nations and to

prevent research overlap.

Rob Rothman, of EPA/NHSRC, addressed the 

development of standard analytical methods and 

laboratory capacity issues. EPA has identified 109 

priority agents and specific analytical methods for various 

matrices. Revisions to these standard analytical methods 

re scheduled for June 2005. They will include updates to 

xisting methods and will add new methods for analysis 

f drinking water, CWA degradation products, and four 

adiological agents. Laboratories must have the capacity 

o handle thousands of samples collected over the course 

f a response, from initial identification of the threat 

gent to cleanup, clearance, and surveillance. Most of 

he samples will be taken in the first few months, but 

ome sampling will be conducted years after the event. 

o address capacity concerns, EPA is working with the 

DC to develop a three-tiered Environmental Laboratory 

eference Network (eLRN), similar to CDC’s existing 

RN. The network would include screening or sentinel 

abs, confirmatory labs, and reference labs.

ession 2: Decontamination Technologies

ohn Mason gave an overview of his company’s 

echnology. Sabre Technical Services (Sabre) has experience 

ith B. anthracis decontamination, using chlorine dioxide 

umigation at the AMI building in Boca Raton, Florida; 

n contaminated containers in Newark Harbor; and at 

 facility in Utica, New York, where tenting was used to 

eal the building. With the Sabre technology, sodium 

ypochlorite is reacted with HCl to produce chlorine 

as; the chlorine gas is then reacted with sodium chlorite 

olution to produce aqueous ClO2

, which is then stripped 

o the air. At AMI, Sabre used the building’s HVAC 

ystem to distribute the fumigant in order to achieve a 

oncentration of 750 parts per million (ppm) for a 12-

our period. Approximately 200 biological indicator 

est strips were placed throughout the building, and in 

ost-treatment sampling, all strips indicated no growth. 

racking sample locations and communicating results 

ere two concerns when dealing with hundreds of 

amples. Sabre has developed software that produces 

 three-dimensional sampling map to address these 

oncerns.

Most of STERIS Corporation’s decontamination 

xperience involves using vaporous hydrogen peroxide 

VHP) for bio-decontamination in pharmaceutical and 

lean room applications, according to Iain McVey. Because 

f this, his company was selected to fumigate two B. 

nthracis-contaminated government buildings. STERIS 

s currently collaborating with the DoD to demonstrate 

econtamination of chemical agents, using “modified 

HP,” and to develop a mobile VHP generating system. A 

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Decontamination Workshop xi 

benefit of VHP is that it decomposes to water and oxygen 

so residual contamination is not a concern. However, the 

rapid decay of VHP also means that repeated injections 

are needed to ensure that the proper concentration is 

reached. Multiple injection points may be the best option 

for optimal distribution. 

Mike Herd, of BIOQUELL, Inc., discussed his 

company’s hydrogen peroxide vapor technology for room 

and building decontamination. The technology works 

by flash evaporating a 30 percent to 35 percent aqueous 

hydrogen peroxide solution until a micro-condensate 

forms on surfaces within the treatment area. Data showed 

that the micro-condensate greatly improves the kinetics 

of decontamination. The system is designed to apply 

to buildings of any size and consists of self-sufficient 

units that can be chained together. Hydrogen peroxide 

vapor tends to form strong hydrogen bonds between 

the molecules, which limits its movement in air, so 

the BIOQUELL system uses a rotating nozzle system 

that distributes the vapor dynamically. BIOQUELL 

participated in tests by EPA’s Environmental Technology 

Verification (ETV) program to determine its technology’s 

effectiveness in destroying B. anthracis spores on seven 

different building materials. Herd discussed several case 

studies to illustrate the application and effectiveness of the 

technology.

Methyl bromide is commonly used for termite control 

and for fumigation of imported produce, according 

to Rudolf Scheffrahn of the University of Florida. In 

conjunction with EPA, he has conducted laboratory and 

field studies to assess methyl bromide as a fumigant for B. 

anthracis. In the 2004 field study, a 30,000-ft3 home was 

first sealed using tenting, as is commonly done for termite 

treatments in Florida. Gaseous methyl bromide was 

generated by passing the liquid through a heat exchanger. 

Better destruction efficiency with methyl bromide is 

achieved with higher temperatures, so fans and heaters 

maintained a target temperature of about 35° C within 

the house. After fumigation for two days, essentially all 

50 spore strips placed throughout the house indicated no 

growth. No damage to electronic equipment was observed. 

Schaffrahn opined that the advantages to methyl bromide 

are that it diffuses readily; is very stable, easily detected, 

and low in cost; can be used with any humidity level; has 

already been approved to treat some bacteria; and treats 

porous and other types of materials with minimal damage. 

A disadvantage is that it depletes stratospheric ozone.

 Rita Betty of Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) 

presented a report on the testing of a decontamination 

formulation (DF-200) for CWAs, toxic industrial 

chemicals, and biological agents and for combating 

aerosolized chemical and biological agent clouds. DF200 is an aqueous-phase formula that has been used 

successfully by the military. The commercial product 

is a mixture of surfactant, hydrogen peroxide solution, 

and a novel activator. After mixing on site, the final 

hydrogen peroxide concentration is about 3.5 percent. 

DF-200 is less corrosive than bleach and other available 

decontamination materials. SNL tested DF-200 with 

GD (soman), HD (mustard gas), and the nerve agent 

VX in stirred reactor studies and achieved 100 percent 

decontamination of live agents after a 60-minute exposure 

period. In other studies, DF-200 rapidly (within a 

15-minute exposure period) neutralized nerve agents, 

sodium cyanide, phosgene, and carbon disulfide, as well 

as biologicals (B. anthracis and Y. pestis). Mustard agents 

required more time (a 30-minute exposure period) because 

of mustard’s low solubility. The DF-200 residue in indoor 

areas can be removed using a wet-dry vacuum. 

According to Jack Kelly, of EPA, ricin is a white 

powder that can be made fairly easily from the proteins 

of castor plant beans. Ricin is considered extremely toxic 

by any exposure route, and no vaccines or antidotes are 

available. On February 2, 2004, ricin was found in the 

mail room attached to a United States senator’s office. 

EPA et al. had collected at least 670 samples from three 

affected rooms and identified 19 positive results, all from 

one room. EPA removed and stored personal and office 

items from the affected room. Large hard-surface items 

were left in place and decontaminated with a sodium 

hypochlorite solution. Post-treatment testing found no 

ricin activity. Clothing and office materials, along with 

indicator vials of crude and pure ricin, underwent heat 

treatment, which resulted in 100 percent deactivation of 

13 of the 14 purified ricin vials and 94.4 percent to 99.7 

percent deactivation for 14 of the 28 crude ricin vials. 

Another set of office materials underwent a single heat 

treatment and/or ethylene oxide treatment. Results from 

test vials undergoing ethylene oxide treatment alone or 

heat followed by ethylene oxide treatment indicated that 

the combined treatment was most effective.

Richard Orlusky highlighted the USPS’s experiences 

in restoring the Trenton mail facility after completing 

decontamination. Although B. anthracis contamination 

of the Trenton facility occurred in 2001, the building 

was not reopened until March 2005. Fumigation with 
xii NHSRC

chlorine dioxide gas did not occur until October 2003, 

and restoration activities began in February 2004. The 

USPS kept the HVAC systems running after closing 

the building, but over time, components of the system 

failed, resulting in interior temperatures reaching 100°F. 

Restoring environmental controls is key to creating a 

comfortable work environment (repairs were conducted 

by workers wearing personal protective equipment) and 

to minimizing equipment and building degradation. If 

fumigation is the selected decontamination method, then 

surface cleaning with a bleach agent should be conducted 

sparingly, since it is highly damaging to many materials. 

Additional chlorine dioxide research may show effective 

decontamination at lower concentrations and reduced 

contact times, which may reduce damage caused by the 

fumigant itself. 

Paula Krauter, of Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL), presented research on developing a 

rapid viability test protocol (RVTP), which is a 15-hour 

method for processing biological indicator strips using 

real-time PCR. They compared the RVTP against the 

standard culture method, which requires 7 days for results

Testing involved exposing more than 1,000 biological 

indicator strips to 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for up to 

12 hours (a number of these strips were exposed for less 

than 12 hours). Half of the strips were analyzed by RVTP

and half by the standard culture technique. In general, 

no significant difference in results provided by the two 

methods was identified. The standard culture method 

reported a 1.5 percent false positive rate. No false negative

or positives were observed for RVTP. Tests to compare 

stainless steel and paper strip biological indicators were 

also conducted. At non-lethal doses of chlorine dioxide, 

LLNL found a significantly higher number of positive 

results for the paper strips, i.e., better kill was indicated 

with the stainless steel disks. 

Session 3: Decontamination Research and 

Development

Mark Brickhouse, of the U.S. Army’s Edgewood Chemica

and Biological Center (ECBC), described the work 

with public- and private-sector researchers to evaluate 

a number of emerging decontamination technologies. 

These include modified VHP, which contains ammonia 

as an activator for both chemical and biological 

decontamination. “Forced hot air” acts to accelerate 

weathering and increases off-gassing for chemical agents 

. 

s 

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but is insufficient for treating biological agents. Deconreen is an environmentally friendly decontaminant based 

n commercial chemicals and is designed to replace DS2 

nd DF-200 in military use. Studies have proven Deconreen to be effective against chemical and biological 

gents, but it is disruptive to surfaces. Surface coatings are 

eing developed to either resist or react with and destroy 

hemical or biological agents. Enzymes to decontaminate 

erve agents, sulfur mustard, and biological agents and 

oxins are being investigated. Supercritical carbon dioxide 

s an effective cleaning and sterilizing agent and is being 

nvestigated as a decontamination technology.

Phil Koga, of ECBC, discussed a systematic 

econtamination study funded by EPA. This study will 

ssess the impact of fumigant (chlorine dioxide and 

ydrogen peroxide vapor) concentration, exposure time, 

uilding material (porous and nonporous), temperature, 

nd relative humidity on destruction of different 

icroorganisms (e.g., avirulent and virulent B. anthracis

pores and surrogates). In addition, testing seeks to provide 

nformation about the effects of six different building 

aterials on the decay of fumigant concentration in test 

hambers (e.g., velocity deposition will be quantified) and 

he effects of the fumigants on the integrity of the building 

aterials.

Tina Carlsen, of LLNL, discussed research on 

xamining both decontamination of HVAC systems using 

ydrogen peroxide vapor and the use of HVAC systems in 

he fumigation process. Tests with VHP in a medium-scale 

VAC system indicated that galvanized steel reduced the 

ydrogen peroxide concentration, whereas PVC had less 

f an effect. In another test, using 90 feet of galvanized 

teel ductwork with sensors located throughout, the 

ydrogen peroxide concentration decreased as a function 

f distance traveled along the ductwork, and VHP 

ecreased with increasing temperature and decreasing flow 

ate. Ongoing research will include biological indicator 

ests within the ductwork to characterize kill rates and 

ptimize VHP efficacy as well as characterization tests 

ith alternate ductwork materials.

Research at the University of Texas is focusing on 

uilding material impacts on fumigant levels and gaseous 

yproduct production, in a project lead by Rich Corsi. 

orsi stated that the research includes an evaluation of 

he chemical interactions of ozone, chlorine dioxide, 

ethyl bromide, and hydrogen peroxide vapor with 24 

ommon building materials; quantification of deposition 

elocities; identification of building decontamination 

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Decontamination Workshop xiii 

byproducts; and incorporation of the results into a novel 

software application. Results show significant differences 

among disinfectants. Byproduct persistence was also likely, 

as indicated by 5-day and 1-year tests of off-gassing. For 

most materials, with the exception of ceiling tiles and 

HVAC system components, ozone was more reactive than 

chlorine dioxide. 

Mark Buttner discussed the research at the University 

of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to test the efficacy of 

two decontamination products (DF-100 and chlorine 

dioxide gas); compare surface sampling methods (swipe, 

heavy wipe, and swab sample processing kit); and 

compare analytical techniques for biological agents, 

using cultures, quantitative polymerase chain reactions 

(PCRs), and hand-held assays. Other experimental 

parameters included the effects of building material 

and environmental background (e.g., dust) on the 

decontamination method. Each of the three sampling 

methods demonstrated comparable spore collection 

efficiencies. After decontamination with DF-100, postdecontamination samples found no culturable spores 

although the quantitative PCR analysis indicated that 

spore DNA remained. Similarly, after decontamination 

with chlorine dioxide, post-decontamination samples 

found no culturable spores in 24 of 27 samples, but 

quantitative PCR analysis indicated that spore DNA 

remained. The hand-held assay results were positive for all 

samples. Neither decontamination method was affected 

by environmental background, although the quantitative 

PCR analysis method was inhibited by the dust.

An overview of EPA’s Environmental Technology 

Verification (ETV) program for decontamination 

technologies was presented by Mike Taylor of Battelle 

Memorial Institute. Three decontamination technologies 

(all fumigants) have been verified so far: BIOQUELL, 

Inc.’s hydrogen peroxide gas; Certek, Inc.’s formaldehyde 

gas, and CDG Research, Inc.’s chlorine dioxide gas. 

The verification procedure consisted of connecting 

the decontamination technology to the test chamber, 

inoculating test material coupons (representing seven 

different materials) with 108 spores of B. anthracis or 

surrogates, placing the coupons in the test chamber, 

implementing the decontamination technology, removing 

the test material coupons, and analyzing the coupons. 

Decontamination efficacy was quantified by calculating 

the log reduction in viable spores on the test materials and 

by identifying positive or negative bacterial growth on the 

biological indicators and spore strips. It was noted that 

homeland security related technologies would no longer 

be verified under ETV but would be tested under a new 

EPA NHSRC program called the Technology Testing and 

Evaluation Program (TTEP).

According to Rebecca Blackmon, the Technical 

Support Working Group (TSWG) is an independent 

federal agency, with oversight from DoD and the 

Department of State, that does rapid R&D and 

prototyping to support federal agency requirements. The 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

subgroup focuses on agent detection, decontamination, 

protection, and information collection, with ongoing 

projects. The biological background in critical facilities is 

being investigated, since it may interfere with detection 

of actual bio-agents. A statistical design tool for sampling 

contaminated buildings is under development. In 

conjunction with others, TSWG is developing a realtime, portable sensor system to monitor CWAs and 

toxic industrial chemicals. Another sensor web is being 

developed to monitor and control building temperature, 

humidity, light intensity, and decontaminant agent 

concentrations for a facility undergoing decontamination. 

Decontamination technologies using plasma and 

electrostatics are being developed. Other technologies are 

being developed to mitigate the spread of radiological 

releases and remove radiological contaminants from 

building materials.

Session 4: Lessons Learned and Research and 

Development Needs 

Panelists and other participants at the workshop 

provided numerous examples of lessons learned from the 

decontamination activities that took place following the B. 

anthracis incidents in 2001. These are summarized below 

in four main categories. During this discussion, several 

participants also noted research that is needed; a summary 

of these items follows.

Interagency coordination and information/data 

sharing Workshop participants emphasized the 

importance of information/data sharing and coordination 

not only during a response action, but also during 

ongoing research. They provided examples of information 

sharing and coordination efforts, suggested tools to 

improve these efforts, highlighted the benefits of sharing 

information while addressing research needs, and 

noted security concerns to consider. Several workshop 

participants (primarily OSCs) emphasized the need for 
xiv NHSRC

information (e.g., on decontamination methods) when 

responding to an event. Several participants suggested the 

development of databases or repositories of information 

on technologies, agents, available laboratories, test 

methods, technical experts, etc. Others noted that this 

workshop was a great way for information exchange and 

that this type of workshop should be continued.

Preparedness Workshop participants all agreed that 

planning and preparing for the aftermath of a terrorist 

event is critical to responding quickly and appropriately. 

They suggested a number of ways facilities and agencies 

could prepare. Workshop participants repeatedly suggeste

exercises (especially tabletop) as a means of identifying 

possible threat scenarios, developing response plans, and 

pinpointing data gaps. They suggested interagency panels 

and peer reviews for these exercises. The focus of such 

exercises typically becomes the technical aspect of the 

response plan, but in a real-world situation, the technical 

side of a response may be easy compared with regulatory 

or communication issues. Examples of materials that 

would help prepare agencies and facilities include a matrix

to link threat agents with appropriate decontamination 

methods and site conditions, template response plans, and

standards/protocols (e.g., for sampling).

Sampling issues Workshop participants expressed 

diverse views regarding sampling issues. Some suggested 

minimizing sampling requirements to streamline a 

decontamination event because it consumes much of the 

overall response time. Others believed that eliminating 

one or more of the sampling phases (characterization, 

verification, or clearance) would be detrimental to the 

process. Participants also voiced differences of opinion 

over the utility of biological indicators in assessing 

environmental contamination. Decontamination events 

rely on biological indicators (e.g., spore strips), but results 

from these tests may not correlate well with environmenta

conditions (i.e., actual levels of spores). One participant 

noted that no positive environmental samples were 

found in the B. anthracis decontamination when the 

biological indicators were negative and desired fumigant 

concentration had been achieved. 

The decontamination process A number of buildings 

have now been bio-decontaminated, and participants 

noted many specific lessons learned. When fumigation 

is the selected decontamination method, the fumigation 

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itself is only a small portion of the overall decontamination 

imeline. Sealing a building can be costly and timeonsuming, but tenting is an effective technique. 

reserving sensitive and valuable materials should be 

onsidered when one is selecting a decontamination 

echnology. Leave as much material as possible inside a 

uilding for fumigation to alleviate disposal concerns. 

gencies working with an OSC need to understand the 

ommand structure at a decontamination event. An 

nvironmental clearance committee supports local agency 

ecisions about when it is safe to reoccupy a building 

y providing information and credibility. The clearance 

ommittee itself does not make decisions. To support an 

SC, however, technical working groups should consist 

f people who are authorized to make decisions for their 

gencies.

The following is a compilation of suggested research 

nd development needs, as discussed during the R&D 

anel discussion, as well as during the Lessons Learned 

iscussion. Nancy Adams noted that some of the 

uggested research items are currently being investigated or 

re already planned for future investigation.

Decontamination

• Real-time monitoring of fumigants

• Tenting as a means of sealing a building

• Cost analysis of an overall decontamination event, 

including the disposal and restoration

• The chemical interactions and reaction products 

between decontaminants, threat agents, background 

(e.g., dust, organic material), and materials 

(common building materials but also sensitive/

valuable equipment) 

• Risk and exposure assessment of biological agents to 

establish safe levels for reoccupation

Sampling and Analysis

• Correlating environmental samples to biological 

indicators; understanding the basic science of 

biological indicators (BIs); developing new BIs 

using more common materials such as carpet, or 

worse-case materials, in lieu of typical BI materials 

such as paper or steel 

• Real-time monitoring technology (e.g., developing 

faster, cheaper, and better technologies) for all types 

of agents 

• Background levels of live bio-agents 

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Decontamination Workshop xv 

• Comparison of surface sampling methods for bioagents

• Using statistics for sampling design and standards

• New analytical techniques, such as rapid testing 

protocols

• Methods for sampling irreplaceable items (e.g., 

paintings or historical documents)

• Identification of better surrogates

Other threat agents

• Interactions of chemical and radiological agents 

with various materials

• Applicability of chelaters, HEPA filters, and other 

decontamination technologies to radiological agen

Most of the information presented during the 

workshop applied to B. anthracis. A number of worksho

participants mentioned the need to expand research 

related to the decontamination of other chemical, 

biological, and radiological threat agents. Agents 

specifically mentioned included ricin.

Containment

• Aerosolization, dispersion, and resuspension of 

biological and radiological agents

• Surface coatings and building materials that serve 

biocides or limit chemical infiltration

• Smart building systems, e.g., specially designed 

HVAC systems to limit agent spread

General

• Research is needed to address decontamination of 

wide, outdoor areas, including agricultural produc

decontamination and disposal, and multiple agent

attack events.

• Identifying dual-use technologies would help us 

prepare by allowing us to develop technologies 

and manufacture equipment before the next event

occurs.

• Biotechnology-based decontamination approaches

(bacteria, enzymes) are needed.

• A panel of experts distant from ongoing 

decontamination discussions and research should 

be convened to independently review the collectiv

research efforts ongoing at various agencies and 

facilities.

Session 5: Radiological Dispersion Device 

Cleanup

Fred Holbrook and John MacKinney, from EPA’s 

NHSRC, each presented information related to 

radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). RDDs use 

conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials. 

It is expected that these devices would cause low-level 

radiological contamination and cause psychological and 

economic harm but that fatalities would be low. Among 

the radiological agents that are potential components of 

RDDs, cesium fluoride is of particular concern because it 

is a fine, talclike powder, which is easily dispersed over a 

broad area. 

Worldwide control of radiological materials is a 

problem, as evidenced by the large amounts of missing 

and unaccounted-for radioactive material. Because of this, 

most experts believe an RDD event is the most probable 

homeland security threat. Tests are being conducted to 

examine whether a radiological agent will aerosolize and 

how the shape of the charge may affect dispersion; models 

are being developed to predict possible dispersion patterns. 

Studies of particle dispersion have shown that indoor 

particulate concentrations following an event may be high. 

Using threat scenarios, we can create standard response 

and mitigation procedures, plan possible cleanup actions, 

and evaluate existing technologies. DHS is assessing 

possible optimized approaches to decontamination 

and restoration after an RDD release and considering 

cleanup criteria based on societal needs, expected land 

uses, and decontamination technologies. Radiological 

decontamination techniques are based on mechanical, 

chemical, or biological removal; some chemical methods 

include the use of acids, chelants, foams, gels, oxidizers, 

and polymers. 

According to Malcolm Wakerley, after the Chernobyl 

nuclear incident, the UK created the Radiation Incident 

Monitoring Network (RIMNET). This system consists of 

92 gamma detectors (located approximately 30 kilometers 

apart) that supply data to a group of laboratories. 

Information from these sensors helped the UK identify 

areas of contamination after the Chernobyl accident. The 

RIMNET system includes a modeling component that 

can assess short-, medium-,and long-range impacts and 

is linked with meteorological data to backtrack from an 

alarmed detector to a radiation source. Additionally, the 

UK has created a handbook in response to a review of 

decontamination and remediation technologies conducted 

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following a series of other radioactive accidents. 

The handbook includes a simple logic diagram and

22 tables on decontamination technologies and 

considerations.

The UK plans to maintain the handbook over the 

next three years and add lessons learned from exercises 

and case studies.
Decontamination Workshop xvii 

Introduction

This report summarizes presentations and discussions 

from the “Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and

Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated With Chemical,

Biological, or Radiological Materials,” which was held 

February 23–25, 2005, in Washington, D.C. The 

workshop objectives were to:

• Allow agencies, organizations, and individuals 

 to share information about the decontamination

 of chemical, biological, and radiological releases.

 Specific topics addressed included elements of a

 decontamination event and ways to reduce the

 response time and cost; decontamination 

 technologies used in real-world situations 

 (e.g., anthrax events in the United States, hospita

 decontamination projects worldwide); and 

 research and development projects underway or 

 planned by various organizations and agencies.

• Discuss some of the lessons learned about the 

 decontamination process and suggest steps to 

 improve that process. 

• Identify research needs to fill data gaps and 

 articulate opportunities for improving the curren

 understanding of the decontamination process.

Workshop participants included representatives 

from federal agencies and laboratories (e.g., the 

Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, and Edgewood Chemical

Biological Center), academia, and decontamination 

technology companies. During the workshop, speakers 

gave presentations on specific topics, including 

decontamination event experiences, decontamination 

technologies, current and planned research projects, and 

radiological agent concerns. Following each presentation, 

speakers held a brief question and answer period. On the 

third day of the workshop, participants engaged in two 

free-flowing discussion sessions. During the first session, 

participants were asked to share the lessons learned durin

research projects and real-world decontamination events. 

The second session focused on areas and topics in need 

of further research. Both discussion sessions allowed 

participants to elaborate upon the questions and issues 

raised during the presentations.

 

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This report summarizes the information provided 

nd issues raised during the workshop presentations and 

ssociated question and answer periods. It also summarizes 

he content of the discussion sessions. The technical 

ontent of this report is based entirely on discussions at the 

orkshop.

Although workshop presentations and discussions 

ddressed a number of individual topics, workshop 

articipants raised several key issues to consider during 

ngoing research and future decontamination efforts:

• Information sharing and interagency 

 coordination Workshop participants repeatedly 

emphasized the importance of information sharing 

and coordination during a response action, as well 

as ongoing information sharing among researchers. 

During presentations, speakers provided examples 

of both effective and ineffective information 

sharing. They consistently indicated that better 

information sharing leads to faster, cheaper, 

and easier decontamination efforts. During the 

discussion sessions, workshop participants suggested 

tools for improving the sharing of information, 

highlighted the benefits of sharing information 

while addressing research needs, and noted security 

concerns to consider. 

• Preparedness Workshop participants agreed that 

planning and preparing for threat events is critical 

to responding quickly and appropriately to these 

events. Presentations highlighted a number of 

research projects that focus on preparing facilities, 

specifically airports and transportation centers, 

for future terrorist events and identifying possible 

response actions. During the discussion sessions, 

workshop participants suggested a number of ways 

facilities and agencies could prepare for a terrorist 

event. 

• Sample methodology and design Workshop 

participants discussed sampling concerns related 

to research projects and decontamination events. 

When discussing research projects, workshop 

participants voiced concerns about developing 

standardized sampling methods so that results were 

comparable across projects, as well as concerns 

about identifying appropriate surrogates. When 

discussing decontamination events, workshop 

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xviii NHSRC

participants emphasized the need for clear sampling 

objectives, the utility of different sampling methods, 

and the need to streamline the sampling process. 

Some conflicting views were raised. For example, 

some suggested minimizing sampling requirements 

to streamline a decontamination event, whereas 

others believed that eliminating sampling phases 

would be detrimental to the process. Participants 

also voiced differences of opinion about the utility 

of biological indicators and spore strips in assessing 

environmental contamination. 

• Research needs Workshop participants identified 

a number of research needs from basic research in 

fumigation chemistry and effectiveness to advanced 

research on sampling methods (e.g., developing 

cost-effective, real-time sampling methods). See the 

“Panel Discussion—Research and Development 

Needs” section of this report for further details.
Decontamination Workshop  

Opening Remarks

Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, National Homeland Security Research 

Center

The Decontamination and Consequence Management 

Division (DCMD) of the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research 

Center (NHSRC) organized this workshop so that 

agencies, organizations, and individuals could share 

information about the decontamination of chemical, 

biological, and radiological releases. Specific topics 

included:

• Elements of a decontamination event and ways 

to reduce the response time and cost

• Decontamination technologies used in real-world 

situations (e.g., anthrax events in the United States, 

hospital decontamination projects worldwide)

• Research and development projects under way or 

planned by various organizations and agencies

• Lessons learned during real-world situations and 

research projects

• Additional research and development needs.

In fall 2001, Bacillus anthracis spores sent through 

the mail contaminated several United States Postal Service 

(USPS) buildings. Using a variety of methods, the USPS 

decontaminated these buildings. The removal and off-site 

decontamination of building contents, surface cleaning, 

and fumigation provided the backdrop to this workshop.

Drawing on his personal experience, Martin explained

the elements of the decontamination process:

• Selecting a decontamination technology 

When selecting a decontamination method, 

considerations include building security, interagency

relationships, incident command structure, 

preparation and review of technical documents, 

contractor selection, and crisis exemption 

applications and approvals. The last three items are 

pacing items that affect the project schedule.

• Building characterization and monitoring 

Characterization and monitoring, which can occur 

simultaneously, are conducted for several reasons. 

Forensic sampling, which tracks the movement 

of an agent from the release point, addresses the 

criminal aspects of an event. Characterization 

sampling identifies the nature and extent of 

contamination. Biological indicators, fumigation 

sampling, and environmental conditions sampling 

(i.e., temperature, humidity, and pressure) 

are used to ensure a successful fumigation. 

Outdoor monitoring of the fumigant ensures 

safety. Clearance sampling confirms successful 

decontamination and allows reuse of the building. 

• Decontamination The decontamination 

event includes procuring, installing, testing, 

operating, disassembling, and finally removing 

the decontamination equipment. Procurement 

and testing are pacing items that affect the 

project schedule. Considerations during the 

decontamination event are system safety; the 

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 

systems; and possible fumigant leak areas. The EPA 

trace atmospheric gas analyzer (TAGA), which 

is discussed in detail in a later presentation, is a 

mobile testing unit that was useful for identifying 

leaks during actual decontamination events. Over 

the course of a 2- to 3-year process, the actual 

decontamination or fumigation is a 1-day event. 

The fumigation may increase to 2 to 3 days if a 

no-growth endpoint is selected as the building 

clearance requirement. The cost of the fumigation 

itself is also only a fraction of the overall cost of the 

entire decontamination process.

• Materials disposal Materials may be removed 

from a building before or after decontamination. 

The decision whether to remove materials depends 

on their value, the ease of decontaminating them, 

their impact on the decontamination agent, and 

the impact of the decontamination agent on them. 

Final disposal options must also be considered. 

What special handling is needed to dispose 

of material removed from a building prior to 

decontamination? Can materials that are removed 

after decontamination be sent to nonhazardous 

waste landfills or incinerators? Waste disposal 

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also includes any wastes generated from the 

decontamination or fumigation effort itself. 

• Communication systems A successful 

decontamination event relies on successful 

communication. Communication plans should 

include law enforcement agencies, health agencies, 

environmental regulatory agencies, advisory groups, 

contractors, on-scene coordinators (OSCs), building

workers and occupants, as well as residents and 

businesses in the surrounding communities.

Martin also listed a number of building-related activities 

hat need to be considered: orderly building closure; 

ontamination containment, especially within the HVAC 

ystem; documentation to guide decontamination; and 

quipment storage needs. A building content assessment 

s needed to identify items that might be affected by 

reatment. 

Finally, Martin indicated that workshop participants 

ave a broad range of experiences with and perspectives 

bout decontamination events. He hoped that they could 

penly share their knowledge over the course of the 

eeting.

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Decontamination Workshop  

Presentations and Associated 

Question and Answer Periods

DHS S&T Biological and 

Chemical Restoration 

Programs

Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security

This presentation provided a brief overview of restoration 

programs under way at the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). 

Decontamination is being researched and evaluated 

by a number of agencies, such as EPA’s Office of Research 

and Development (ORD), DHS’s Homeland Security 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARP), and the 

Systems Engineering and Development Office. DHS’s role

in researching, testing, and evaluating decontamination 

processes is outlined in the National Response Plan, which 

is scheduled for release on April 14, 2005. DHS hopes to 

coordinate efforts with EPA. More information is available 

at www.HSARPAbaa.com.

At the beginning of a project, DHS works with 

the decontamination-user community to identify and 

address their needs. The stated program goal is to provide 

“integrated field demonstrations of the next-generation 

solutions, which bring together the user, technology, 

and ConOps in a real-world test of a particular 

solution.” In other words, DHS personnel are looking 

to answer the question of how biological or chemical 

agent decontamination will be conducted in the future. 

They work with off-the-shelf or government-owned 

technologies. Although DHS does not intend to 

develop technologies, it will, if necessary, work to 

further develop technologies near completion.

Projects conducted by DHS include:

• Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information 

System (BASIS) BASIS is geared toward providing 

enhanced biological security at special events and 

determining whether a biological release event has 

occurred. The system is easy to set up and deploy 

but has a limited operational period and covers a 

fixed location. It served as a platform for a newer 

program called BioWatch. Results reported from 

BASIS and BioWatch initiate treatment and 

response. BioWatch was used successfully during 

the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and is now in 

place in about 30 metropolitan areas. 

• Program for Response Options and Technology 

Enhancements for Chemical/Biological 

Terrorism (PROTECT) Developed in partnership 

with transit facilities, the project provides 

response plans and solutions for events in such 

facilities, for example, the sarin release in the 

Tokyo subway. DHS found that implementing 

the technology component of a response is often 

easier than addressing the response’s regulatory, 

communications, and other aspects. In a 

demonstration project, PROTECT placed agent 

detectors and televisions in strategic positions 

in a transit facility. The system includes a laptop 

from which an incident commander could log 

into the system, control cameras, access software, 

and examine alarmed detectors to coordinate a 

response. The program also includes a formalized 

plan for operating the system and creates incident 

commander transparency. Using the system reduced 

response time from as much as 40 minutes down to 

5 minutes. 

• Restoration of Large Airport Facilities This 

program is in progress and focuses on the 

coordination and understanding of the restoration 

process for a large airport. San Francisco 

International Airport, for example, loses $80 

million a day if closed. This is not a technologydriven project but focuses on condensing the 

decontamination timeline. The goal of the 

project is to reduce the time and money needed 

to restore a critical transportation facility after an 

attack. Under this project, DHS brought together 

stakeholders to conduct tabletop exercises, including 

a large-scale demonstration exercise to identify 

and address critical aspects of the response (e.g., 

2
 NHSRC

development and approval of a decontamination 

plan, fumigation verification, facility clearance, 

and overall coordination and communication). 

Project products include templates that provide 

guidelines for developing response plans and 

protocols that are then pre-approved by EPA 

and other regulatory agencies. The project has 

specifically examined improving the verification 

step (i.e., rapid verification mechanisms), assessing 

sample placement to improve sampling clearance, 

using rapid bioviability sampling technologies, and 

developing decision support software. A project 

report is scheduled for release in late spring 2005.

The following projects are in the planning phase, and 

DHS is looking for a partner agency or organization: 

• Restoration of a Transit System This project 

focuses on transit facilities, such as subways, that 

have open platforms, tunnels, and transport from 

below to above ground. These facilities present 

many different challenges. The overall project 

goal is to reduce time between the event and 

restoration. Revenue loss and street traffic impacts 

are problems when these systems shut down. This 

project will draw from the large airport facilities 

project and create templates for response plans and 

protocols (e.g., restoration plans, contamination 

characterization methods, decontamination and 

verification sampling for surface, clearance methods,

decision tools) that apply to urban transit systems. A

large-scale demonstration project is planned.

• Restoration of a Wide Area (Urban) This 

project focuses on open areas but will likely include 

indoor areas as well. In these areas, contamination 

migration to enclosed and semi-enclosed areas 

is a concern. The project goal is to reduce the 

overall time to restore a large outdoor urban area 

following a biological attack. As for other projects, 

DHS will develop strategies, templates, response 

plans, and protocols for addressing an event. Two 

smaller ongoing programs lead into this project. 

One focuses on technologies and protocols; the 

other examines overall policies. A large-scale 

demonstration project is planned.

• Facilities Chemical Restoration Demonstration

The goal of this project is to reduce the overall time 

to restore a critical facility following a chemical 

attack. DHS will develop strategies, templates, 

response plans, and protocols for addressing a 

chemical release event. A large-scale demonstration 

project is planned.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• How will DHS reduce the time required to 

complete a decontamination event? DHS projects 

are geared toward understanding what aspects 

contribute to the time and personnel needed to 

complete decontamination and how these aspects 

can be adjusted to reduce the time frame. DHS is 

also exploring sampling software that can speed up 

the decontamination process.

• Has DHS partnered with contractors or is 

DHS working to identify technologies to be 

used in place? Demonstration projects are run 

through DHS and NHSRC. These agencies will 

partner with industries, as identified in the predemonstration phase.

• What performance measures were used to 

declare BioWatch a success? BioWatch has 

been implemented in partnership with EPA and 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC). The agencies determined BioWatch’s 

success by reviewing a matrix of criteria. They 

concluded that the system was operational, reported 

no false positives, and had minimal downtime. 

BioWatch strives to provide biological security for as 

large an area as possible.

• When detection systems are installed, when 

and how do you respond to a positive alarm? 

How does this procedure apply to BioWatch? 

DHS works with EPA, CDC, and the FBI to 

confirm positive responses. When an alarm sounds, 

several layers of testing begin. In the first layer, the 

alarm is reported and agencies provide guidance 

to local organizations. Secondary testing occurs 

in areas around the positive sampler. Organisms, 

if detected, are checked for viability. Agencies 

then determine whether they can confirm that an 

event has occurred. Once an incident is identified, 

investigations move to the FBI and CDC. 

Participants should note that BioWatch is only one 

tool for determining whether an event truly has 

occurred. 
Decontamination Workshop  

Crime Scene Management 

and WMD Terrorism

Ben Garrett, Federal Bureau of Investigation

When the FBI becomes involved in a decontamination 

event, its goal is to manage the crime scene and handle 

weapons of mass destruction. It is concerned about the 

criminal aspects of the event. As such, the FBI focuses on 

forensics, which is the collecting and gathering of evidence 

for the identification, prosecution, and conviction of the 

perpetrators. 

Garrett identified four phases to an incident response:

• Tactical The tactical phase includes entering the 

affected building or area and removing the threat. 

A plan to enter the area without harm must be in 

place. 

• Operational This phase involves protecting the 

public and mitigating hazards. The FBI involves 

local emergency response agencies in these efforts. 

• Crime scene Evidence collecting, packaging, and 

transporting make up this phase. 

• Remediation The FBI is not responsible for the 

cleanup or decontamination of a building or scene. 

EPA and other partners address that phase of a 

response.

Some considerations associated with the forensic 

aspects of an event include:

• Detection To prove that a crime occurred, the FBI 

must be able to detect the crime. For example, when

anthrax is detected, the FBI must separate natural 

occurrences of anthrax from an intentional release.

• Sampling The FBI’s focus is on gathering evidence 

in a manner that will withstand legal challenge. 

In the case of a biological release, the evidence is 

microscopic. How do you find the crime scene? 

How do you collect microscopic evidence? How do 

you preserve the evidence’s integrity?

• Traditional exams Fingerprints, fibers, genetics, 

and toolmarks are examples of traditional forensic 

evidence. The FBI must consider collecting and 

evaluating this evidence while protecting people 

from the biological or chemical threat. The 

traditional exams are key to linking the evidence 

to the perpetrator. Therefore, the FBI prefers to 

use decontamination methods that preserve the 

integrity of the evidence. They must consider 

questions such as “Will the decontamination agent 

remove fingerprints?”

Biological and chemical agents pose unique challenges 

for detecting, sampling, and evaluating evidence. These 

challenges arise before the FBI arrives at a scene, and 

responses to these challenges may compromise evidence. 

Similar problems arise when addressing radiologicals.

Garrett provided two examples that illustrate FBI 

concerns and considerations. 

• The FBI responded to an incident involving three 

family members who had a history of dealing with 

ricin and blaming each other for the crime. While 

evidence was being collected, miscommunication 

led to improper evidence handling, which destroyed 

traditional evidence along with the toxin threat.

• A local public health agency investigated a number 

of cases of salmonella poisoning in Oregon. Rumors 

speculated that the illness had been intentionally 

spread in order to influence election results. The 

public health agency determined that the event was 

a natural occurrence, the result of poor hygiene. 

Later, several people confessed to intentionally 

spreading the illness.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• During a weapon of mass destruction event and 

FBI investigation, does the FBI help address the 

public health ramifications? Historically, the FBI 

has been reluctant to share evidence about ongoing 

cases, even when evidence or data may be useful 

for addressing public health concerns. The Bureau, 

however, has made strides to improve information 

sharing. It has a public health agent at CDC to 

serve as a conduit for information and includes 

local, state, and federal public health agencies in 

conference calls discussing investigation results. For 

example, in August 2002, a New Jersey post office 

box tested positive for anthrax. The FBI provided 

information about this event to the New Jersey 

CDC and other public health officials. Although 

the FBI has working relationships with CDC and 

local and state public health agencies, a concern 

that information sharing will compromise an 

investigation will always exist.
 NHSRC

• What are your thoughts about sharing 

evidence data with EPA and others assessing 

the extent of contamination and planning the 

decontamination? Garrett believes that the FBI 

should share data, but the involved parties need to 

devise a process for sharing information without 

harming the FBI’s investigation. From experience, 

the FBI has learned that it must strike a balance 

between sharing information and maintaining 

the integrity of the investigation to successfully 

prosecute.

CDC/NIOSH and Health 

Response to Biothreat 

Agents: Environmental 

Monitoring

Capt. Kenneth F. Martinez, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health

Agencies involved in a bioterrorism event hold many 

different perspectives about sampling needs. For CDC, 

sampling addresses public health concerns. Sample 

collection methods and analysis results, however, 

are similar regardless of the data’s end use for public 

health decisions, scene characterization, or crime scene 

investigation, so information sharing between agencies is 

important.

When the first events occurred, communication 

between agencies was strained. Agencies now understand 

the value of working together and are moving toward 

sharing information more freely. They must, however, 

remember that each has to address its unique mission.

Environmental sampling may identify exposure 

locations, determine agent sources and exposure pathways,

characterize pathogens and agents, assess the nature and 

extent of contamination, support risk assessment and 

public health decisions, identify people needing medical 

treatment, and guide reoccupancy decisions. Public health 

sampling may examine the paths for agent spread in 

order to limit that spread. For example, CDC considered 

whether postal employees exposed to anthrax transported 

spores home on their clothing.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety 

and Health (NIOSH) has also been involved with 

sampling at bioterrorism events. NIOSH has focused on 

understanding ventilation systems, transport of agents by 

people, and safety and health issues. Over the course of 

the anthrax outbreaks, agencies collected approximately 

10,000 samples. In conducting sampling and obtaining 

results, agencies must remember that no numeric criteria 

exist to interpret biological sampling data. Sample results 

cannot be extrapolated to predict exposure. Developing 

standards, however, is currently under way.

Martinez highlighted the importance of planning 

environmental sampling at biological or chemical events. 

Environmental sampling can be the driving force behind 

public health decisions. CDC’s existing sampling plans are 

clinically based. When planning sampling, agencies must 

consider the need for continuity of operations at a facility 

during a response. 

CDC has identified three sampling phases:

• Screening Screening occurs in the first few 

days following the incident. For the anthrax 

events, agencies needed assurance that an event 

had occurred (i.e., an agent had been released). 

Sampling plans should optimize finding sources and 

assessing their concentrations as soon as possible.

• Characterization Sampling for contaminant 

characterization is conducted to prepare for 

remediation. False positives and negatives are not as 

much of a concern during characterization. 

• Remediation/restoration Agencies must have a 

high level of confidence in sampling results. Results 

are used to confirm that the agent was removed.

CDC responded to anthrax releases in Florida, New 

Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Washington, D.C. 

In all but two cases, CDC identified the sources of the 

anthrax release. (CDC never found the source of anthrax 

affecting a health care worker in New York City or an 

elderly woman in Connecticut.) To identify sources, CDC 

followed a consistent sampling strategy. They followed the 

trail of the source and considered dissemination methods 

(e.g., air, personnel). For anthrax delivered through the 

mail, CDC sampled the mail-sorting machines and 

electrostatic collection points (e.g., computer monitors). 

At Capitol Hill, CDC collected samples from elevators, 

furniture, floors, ventilation systems, vehicles, and 

clothing. CDC personnel collected primarily bulk samples 

or surface samples. They rarely collected air samples. At 

the time no method to validate spore sampling results 

existed. Confidence in sampling results comes from 

experience with industrial hygiene sampling and past 

disease sampling. 
Decontamination Workshop  

After the 2001 events, CDC developed a sampling 

protocol (which will be updated) and conducted 

validation studies. CDC also evaluated validation studies 

by Sanderson et al. (collection efficiencies), McCleery et 

al. (air sampling), Dugway Proving Ground (biological 

agent simulants), and Sandia National Laboratory 

(anthrax simulants). The Dugway Proving Ground study, 

conducted with EPA, involved releasing an agent in an 

air chamber, letting the agent settle, and then collecting 

and sending the sample to a laboratory for analysis. This 

study allowed method comparison and evaluation of interlaboratory variability.

CDC applied the lessons learned during the anthrax 

events to a ricin event in South Carolina (October 2003), 

the BioWatch program agent identification in Texas 

(October 2003), and the SARS outbreaks (spring 2003). 

CDC coordinated with other agencies to share data, based

sampling strategies on potential agent transport pathways, 

and applied updated sampling methodologies.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• When CDC conducted subway sampling, what 

were some of the sampling challenges? To assess 

the incident of the health care worker in New York 

City who contracted anthrax, CDC was asked to 

sample as many potential sources as possible. CDC 

could not identify a clear contamination pathway 

but did know the exact subway line that the worker 

rode. Using police department personnel trained 

in sampling techniques, CDC sampled the subway 

line. Each sampling person was accompanied by 

a strategist to help identify appropriate sampling 

locations. None of the samples collected in the 

subway were positive for B. anthracis. Because 

B. anthracis out-competes other organisms, 

interferences were not a concern.

• Has CDC considered the impacts of 

nonculturable but viable organisms? CDC 

researchers are currently examining this concern. 

They have completed some research with B. 

anthracis; the information gathered for this 

organism, particularly validation studies, is 

applicable to other organisms. CDC has methods 

for identifying organisms. Bioviability and its 

impact on infectivity are critical issues.

• What validation methods do you plan to use 

in the future? Agencies are currently debating 

validation methods and techniques. At the same 

time, a number of novel technologies are also 

becoming available. CDC research focuses on 

methods that are cost-effective and easily accessible 

to first responders. CDC is also concerned about 

collection and recovery systems. Some specific 

research has examined sampling methods such as 

swabs, wipes, and vacuuming. 

Ranking Threats for 

Decontamination Research

Nancy Adams, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, National Homeland Security Research 

Center 

NHSRC/DCMD provides research to support 

decontaminating and restoring facilities by working with 

decontamination teams, emergency response teams, and 

on-scene coordinators. One aspect of NHSRC’s research 

is to identify agents of greatest interest and to examine 

ongoing research to address these agents. 

This presentation focused on the methods used by 

NHSRC to identify and rank threat agents. In addition to 

ranking agents, NHSRC/DCMD conducts research on 

sampling methods, contaminant containment, tracking 

contaminant movement, and decontamination and 

disposal issues. NHSRC does not focus on collecting 

evidence. 

Adams discussed four different methods used to rank 

threat agents. Specific results of the ranking processes 

were excluded from the presentation because of security 

concerns. NHSRC is continually updating ranking results 

to ensure that its research has the proper focus. 

• DCMD approach This ranking approach 

identifies and ranks high-priority threat 

agents, identifies and ranks likely terrorist 

targets, and identifies terrorist goals (e.g., loss 

of life, economic damage, and inducing fear). 

To identify and rank threat agents, NHSRC 

examined the ranking schemes and results of other 

agencies and organizations, including CDC, DoD, EPA, 

the State Department, and the intelligence community. 

NHSRC then developed a list of ranking factors: 

infective dose, persistence, availability (e.g., small pox 

is well guarded), prior use, ease of detection, severity 
 NHSRC

of effects, transmission, preventives/treatments, ease of 

decontamination (e.g., fumigation, latent desiccation), 

latency, and ease of airborne dispersion. NHSRC is 

more concerned with airborne dispersion, but they are 

beginning to address water distribution. Each ranking 

factor is given a weight (1 to 5) for relevance. The weights 

are somewhat arbitrary and can be changed. Each agent is 

assigned a value (0 to 4) for each ranking factor. NHSRC 

has clearly defined the agent-specific values (e.g., for 

the ranking factor “severity of effects,” 0 is mild and 4 is 

death). The overall threat agent rank is the sum of the 

products of the ranking weight and the agent-specific 

value. 

NHSRC identified a number of target buildings (e.g., 

shopping centers, convention centers, airports, hospitals, 

museums, and federal agencies). The building ranking 

factors are building access, HVAC access, potential for 

infiltration outdoors, room size, and people traffic. Each 

of these factors is then weighted (1 to 5). Infiltration has 

a low weight because buildings are typically either entirely 

open or closed. Each building is assigned a value (1 to 

5) for each ranking factor. The overall building rank is 

the sum of the products of the ranking weight and the 

building value.

NHSRC combines the agent rank, building rank, and

terrorist goals to link agents to events and develop threat 

scenarios. NHSRC calculated a threat value by summing 

individual ranking factors (e.g., agent availability, agent 

hazard index, ease of agent use, people traffic, and nonhealth impacts). Agent availability refers to the ease of 

obtaining an agent and prior use of an agent. The agent 

hazard index involves the infectious dose, lethality, 

severity of effects, contagiousness, latency, and treatment 

availability. Ease of use refers to dispersion options and the 

potential for infiltration, and people traffic refers to the 

number of people who use an area. Non-health impacts 

include economic, symbolic, political, and psychological 

impacts. NHSRC then ranked different threat scenarios 

according to visual patterns and statistical cluster analyses 

to help focus work on a small number of persistent agents 

with severe potential effects. 

• Science Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC) ranking approach SAIC researchers 

completed a similar but independent ranking 

process for NHSRC. They considered threats 

(physical contaminants and “cyber” threats), 

targets (buildings, water systems, and wastewater 

systems), and impacts (health, economic, and 

environmental). SAIC developed a ranking 

algorithm that calculated a risk number based on 

the probability and consequences of an event. The 

risk index was the product of agent availability, 

event feasibility, and the sum of possible health 

impacts, economic impacts, and environmental 

impacts. Values for each of these variables were 

identified using a series of decision trees. SAIC 

calculated risk indices ranging from 0 to 300,000. 

At the conclusion of the project, SAIC found results 

similar to those of the DCMD approach.

• Expert systems approach This approach 

considered the open literature, classified reports, 

NHSRC reports, and EPA lists of contaminants and 

threats. Experts then gathered in a threat scenario 

meeting and developed a list of priority agents. This 

list was similar to those developed by NHSRC and 

SAIC. 

• Battelle systematic decontamination effort This 

effort employed a method similar to the DCMD 

approach and achieved similar results. 

NHSRC received input from a number of agencies to 

ensure that the final threat list would be all-encompassing. 

NHSRC (including DCMD and the Threat and 

Consequence Assessment Division), DHS, DoD, EPA 

Office of Water, EPA Office of Solid Waste, and EPA 

Emergency Response Team members all provided input.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• How does the NHSRC ranking scheme compare 

with the rankings and categorizations developed 

by other agencies? NHSRC uses the ranking results 

primarily to focus research efforts. Ranking schemes 

and categorizations are based on agency-specific 

missions. For example, CDC is concerned with 

health effects, so it may rank small pox as a threat 

agent because of its drastic health consequences. 

NHSRC is concerned with decontamination; since 

small pox is fragile in the environment, NHSRC 

would rank it as a low priority.

• NHSRC should add a category for technical 

surprises (e.g., non-cultural but viable 

organisms). NHSRC is researching methods 

for determining organism viability as well as 

bioengineered organisms and newer chemical 

threats. 
Decontamination Workshop  

OPP Sterilant Registration 

Project: Improving the 

Association of Official 

Analytical Chemists (AOAC) 

Sporicidal Activity Test 

and the Evaluation of 

Quantitative Methods

Stephen Tomasino, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs

EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) is researching 

and developing biological analysis methods. This 

presentation updated workshop participants about the 

method development project status and OPP’s evaluation 

of laboratory sporicidal efficacy methods. OPP operates 

a microbiological laboratory, which is the home of this 

OPP project, at Fort Meade, Maryland. This laboratory 

is registered with CDC’s select agent program and may 

become part of CDC’s Laboratory Response Network 

(LRN).

As part of the method development project, OPP is 

developing methods that allow laboratories to simulate 

real-world conditions. The methods consider the threat 

agent or surrogate, types of materials, application methods,

and carrier systems. Goals of the project include advancing

the science of efficacy testing, standardizing methods, 

creating comparable efficacy testing results, identifying 

a surrogate for B. anthracis, and building a platform for 

testing additional biological agents.

OPP’s ultimate goal, however, is to design comparable

efficacy data to help develop regulatory guidance. The 

AOAC sporicidal activity test is the standard test currently 

employed. A single carrier contains 105

–106 spores, and 

a full study uses 720 carriers. This test has a number of 

limitations: results are qualitative, the test requires 21 

days for incubation, and the test lacks standardization. A 

passing result means that none of the carriers was positive. 

OPP is following a four-tiered approach to developing a 

method that is easier to run and understand:

• Tier 1 OPP evaluated methods, including 

modified AOAC tests, with the agent B. subtilis.

• Tier 2 Activities under tier 2 will be launched 

soon and will include evaluating surrogates for B. 

anthracis.

• Tier 3 Collaborative and validation testing will 

occur under tier 3.

• Tier 4 This step involves identifying, developing, 

and conducting comparative evaluations of field-test 

methods. OPP is currently focusing on laboratory 

assays and is not pursuing field-testing. 

Ensuring that performance standards are maintained 

is critical when developing new methods or making 

changes to an established method. OPP has identified 

modifications to the existing AOAC method and two 

new promising methods, which they are testing with 

surrogates.

Modified AOAC Method The current AOAC tests 

use a liquid extract from raw garden soil (soil extraction 

nutrient broth) as the test medium. To standardize the 

test, OPP recommends replacing the extract with a 

synthetic broth manufactured to standard specifications. 

OPP also recommended replacing porcelain carriers with 

stainless steel carriers, adding a carrier count procedure 

with a minimum of five to six logs per carrier, adding a 

neutralization confirmation procedure, and replacing the 

egg-meat medium.

OPP tested the current AOAC method against the 

modified AOAC to examine whether changes in the 

test medium and the carrier material affected the text 

performance. Tomasino presented a number of slides 

detailing these test results. Overall results were comparable. 

As part of ongoing efforts, OPP completed a final study 

protocol for the modified AOAC method in March 

2005 and will begin validation testing in April 2005. The 

validation report is due in July 2005, and approval of the 

report is expected in August 2005.

The two new methods under evaluation are 

quantitative methods with inoculated vials serving as 

the carriers. When identifying new test methods, OPP 

considered a number of attributes, such as available 

protocol, validation, previous use for testing sporicides, 

readily available equipment, expertise, flexible contact 

times and temperatures, enumeration approaches, percent 

recovery results, deactivation of the agent, reproducibility, 

turnaround time, suitability for various product forms, 

and adequate controls. Two methods met these criteria:

• ASTM E 2111-00 Standard Quantitative Carrier 

Test Method The ASTM method uses a glass vial 

as a carrier. Following exposure, the vial’s contents 

are syphoned through a filter to capture spores. The 

filter is then plated to assess spore growth, which 

indicates that spores remain.
1

• Three-Step Method (TSM) (Sagripanti et al., 

1996) TSM employs a glass coupon as the carrier. 

To determine whether spores remain, the coupon 

undergoes a three-step process: centrifuge, sonicare,

and incubation.

OPP focused tests on liquids and hard surfaces. Each 

test method required a different amount of sporicide. To 

assess the variability and repeatability of each method, 

three separate laboratories completed three replicates of 

tests following each method.

Repeatability studies highlight inconsistencies 

within a laboratory. Reproducibility studies highlight 

inconsistencies between laboratories. Repeatability and 

reproducibility standard deviations were acceptably small 

for all test methods. Tomasino presented slides detailing 

the test methods and conditions (e.g., pH, sporicide 

concentration, and exposure period) and the results 

achieved for each method (expressed as the control carrier 

log density or the log reduction). OPP’s study results 

did not show any method to be clearly superior. OPP 

submitted the study results to an expert panel, which 

selected TSM as the preferred method. As part of ongoing

efforts, OPP will conduct additional surrogate studies wit

TSM beginning in April 2005. TSM and two to three 

surrogates will undergo a multi-laboratory validation stud

in September 2005, and a summary report of findings is 

due in December 2005.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• What fumigants are you testing? To date, OPP 

has tested only liquid fumigants. However, OPP 

believes that TSM can be modified to test other 

fumigants and other surfaces. 

• What are the surrogate selection criteria? OPP 

began testing with virulent anthrax. The surrogate 

selection criteria will be straightforward and may be

used by other researchers. 

h 

y 

Crisis Exemptions for 

Products Intended to 

Inactivate Bacillus anthracis

Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs

Crisis exemption is the process of receiving approval to 

use an unregistered chemical as a decontaminant for 

a particular microorganism, such as B. anthracis. This 

presentation provided background information about the 

crisis exemption process, considerations for evaluating and 

selecting sporicides, issues that demand attention, and the 

current state of the registration process.

A number of groups (e.g., researchers, regulators, 

chemical producers, first responders) and the public are 

involved in deciding what chemicals should be used to 

decontaminate an anthrax event. First responders want 

chemicals that are safe and act quickly. The public looks 

for chemicals that are safe to use but provide adequate 

decontamination.

In the United States, decontamination agents 

fall under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 

Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA applies to chemicals 

sold for inactivating biological agents. These chemicals 

are considered pesticides and must be registered. When 

anthrax attacks occurred in 2001, no chemical had been 

registered for decontaminating B. anthracis. As such, the 

government created the crisis exemption process to allow 

chemical decontamination. A crisis exemption was needed 

for each decontamination event. Of the 63 requests, OPP 

approved 28 and rejected 35. Both federal agencies and 

private companies submitted requests and each request 

included remediation action plans, sampling and analysis 

plans, and ambient air monitoring plans.

When evaluating and selecting sporicides,

OPP considers both safety and efficacy issues.

 • Safety Concerns regarding safety include 

containment of the contamination area and 

fumigant, fumigant toxicity and potential human 

exposure, fumigant generation method, ability 

to achieve negative pressure in a building, posttreatment aeration and scrubbing needs, system 

backups, and ambient air monitoring needs. A key 

concern is that the fumigation be successful after the 

first treatment. Air treatment systems are also a key 

concern when considering containment and posttreatment cleanup.
Decontamination Workshop  

• Efficacy Issues associated with treatment efficacy 

include fumigation processes (e.g., treating the 

building as a whole or in sections), fumigant 

distribution (e.g., using fans), reaching and holding 

decontamination process parameters, monitoring 

process parameters (e.g., concentration, time, and 

relative humidity), biological indicator sampling, 

and clearance sampling. Sealing a building to 

prevent or minimize leaks is a time-consuming part 

of ensuring the fumigation efficacy.

Liquids OPP has granted crisis exemptions for four 

liquid B. anthracis sporicides: aqueous chlorine dioxide, 

hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite, 

and hydrogen peroxide/quarternary ammonium foam. 

These liquids were approved for use on hard, nonporous 

surfaces only. The exemption for DF-100 was withdrawn 

because the fumigant failed tests with the AOAC method.

DF-200, which is the improved version of DF-100, has 

reportedly passed testing.

Gases/Vapors Five gases and vapors have 

received crisis exemptions: gaseous chlorine dioxide 

(buildings), vaporized hydrogen peroxide (buildings), 

paraformaldehyde (equipment in tented enclosures), 

methyl bromide (laboratory and field study), and 

ethylene oxide (specialized off-site treatment of specific 

items). Several vendors offer hydrogen peroxide as a 

decontamination agent. 

OPP is moving toward registering chemicals for 

B. anthracis decontamination, but several regulatory 

issues must be addressed first. EPA needs to establish 

standard efficacy test methods. The registration data 

requirements need to be rigorous but reasonable. EPA 

must also consider the question of how clean is clean. A 

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study focusing on 

anthrax, plague, and small pox is pending. This study will 

likely include several recommendations for regulatory 

requirements, such as a site-by-site risk assessment. The 

study will also address natural versus residual exposures, 

past decontamination efforts, and enclosed versus semienclosed facilities. 

Registration requires test data regarding product 

chemistry, toxicity, and efficacy. These tests are 

straightforward and are guided by the concept that a 

product registered for use against an agent must be tested 

against that agent. OPP may accept surrogate data if the 

surrogate is proven to be equally susceptible to a product. 

Product labeling includes details regarding the product use

and safety precautions. For registration, a product may be 

labeled for restricted use and require a substantial technical 

use manual.

To address efficacy testing, EPA is leveraging 

interagency cooperation. EPA and others participate 

in an expert panel to share information and prevent 

redundancies. They are trying to identify one set of tests 

that is acceptable to all the agencies. These tests could 

then be used for regulatory and/or registration purposes. 

Kempter highlighted the OPP method testing discussed in 

Tomasino’s presentation. 

Kempter discussed “Lemon Drop” as an example of a 

crisis exemption situation. The United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) identified a shipment of lemons with a viable 

threat for biological contamination. USCG needed, and 

OPP provided, a crisis exemption within 24 hours. 

OPP and others have been successful at completing 

decontamination. Certain decontamination methods are 

safe and effective, some personnel and equipment can 

be mobilized quickly, and OPP can quickly issue crisis 

exemptions for known decontamination methods. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• For sporicidal testing, is there a standard for 

material compatibility? Material compatibility 

standards have not been required. If OPP identifies 

a chemical that passes toxicity and efficacy tests 

but has known compatibility problems, OPP will 

require the manufacturer to label the product 

accordingly. OPP is unlikely to fail a chemical 

based on compatibility. A workshop participant 

noted that many concerns are associated with 

material compatibility and fumigation. Material 

compatibility involves more than just damage to a 

material; it also involves the impact of a fumigant 

on materials, the impact of a material on a 

fumigant, and the ability of a fumigant to penetrate 

a material.

• Have all the chemicals that were used to 

decontaminate B. anthracis been registered? 

No chemicals have been registered for use against 

anthrax. Decontamination is still conducted under 

crisis exemptions and each situation is reviewed on 

a case-by-case basis. Some of the chemicals used in 

anthrax decontamination, however, are registered 

for other uses. OPP is working with laboratories 

and others to prepare for crisis exemption 

submissions, if needed.
12

Sampling and Clearance 

Lessons Learned

Mark Durno, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency

Tony Intrepido, U.S. Army Center for Health 

Promotion and Prevention Medicine

Durno is an OSC and end-user of decontamination 

technologies. He was involved in the Capitol Hill anthrax 

incident and has participated in technical working groups. 

This presentation discussed many of the approaches 

presented earlier but provided an end-user’s perspective. 

The basic sampling approach is the same for 

chemical, biological, and radiological agents. The anthrax 

technical assistance document prepared by the National 

Response Team (NRT) (available at www.nrt.org) provides 

immediate response actions for first responders at a scene. 

The approach outlined in that document is consistent with

other terrorism response or hazardous release situations. 

The specifics of a sampling plan, however, change from 

site to site. Parameters to formalize before sampling begins 

include objectives, approaches, sampling and analytical 

methods, transportation concerns, coordination efforts, 

and data interpretation.

Considerations when developing sampling objectives 

include:

• Defining goals Sampling goals may 

include assessing risk, characterizing contamination,

supporting decisions, or verifying decontamination. 

• Establishing data quality objectives Even if 

expressed as notes in a log book, data quality 

objectives are critical to a successful sampling event. 

• Identifying standards No decontamination 

standards are currently available.

In addition, professionals (e.g., from the medical, 

environmental, laboratory, and public health 

communities) involved in the decontamination process 

should be consulted. Sampling event objectives for first 

responders may include real-time monitoring, screening, 

bulk material sampling, or unknown material sampling. 

As the sampling effort moves toward assessing the extent 

of contamination or decontamination, the objectives may 

shift to forensics or the effectiveness of decontamination. 

Transitional sampling, an Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) approach, clears a building for 

safe reoccupation. 

Regardless of the objectives, Durno emphasized, the 

sampling approach must be logical. An approach devised 

in the heat of the moment is destined to have problems. 

A carefully designed approach is more likely to lead to 

a smooth sampling event. Two examples of sampling 

approaches are: 

• Known source When B. anthracis was 

transported in the mail, the contaminated letters 

were the known sources. For each room where 

a contaminated letter may have been, sampling 

occurred at the areas through which it most likely 

passed. If a positive result occurred, sampling in the 

affected area was expanded. 

• Known contamination with an unknown source

In this instance, statistical analysis of an area can 

improve the probability of finding a positive 

detection and identifying a source. A negative result, 

however, does not necessarily indicate that the agent 

is absent from an area. 

Intrepido continued the presentation with a 

discussion of lessons learned from the sampling efforts.

In April 2004, Intrepido participated in a workshop 

to discuss sampling and detection issues. During that 

workshop, discussions included topics such as hazard 

identification, field detection, sampling efficacy, analytical 

capabilities, and post-decontamination sampling. The first 

topic applied to first responders and the last three topics 

applied to characterization and remediation activities. 

• Hazard identification Hazard identification is 

critcal for first responders because their actions may 

spread contamination. Like hazardous materials, 

biological agents must be contained. Assessing and 

establishing the credibility of the threat is key.

• Field detections Several methods for collecting 

field data are available (e.g., hand-held assays, 

infrared sensors, and rapid polymerase chain 

reaction testing). Misuse of these tools, however, can 

lead to poor decisions. Intrepido discouraged using 

these methods without proper training. Other field 

detection technologies are under development and 

testing. 

• Sampling efficacy Intrepido listed a number of 

available guidance materials and references, as well 

as several studies by NIOSH, USPS, and others, 

that address sampling efficacy concerns. Further 

efficacy studies, however, are needed to identify 

acceptable detection limits.
Decontamination Workshop  

• Analytical capabilities Laboratories are working 

to improve analytical capabilities and analytical 

support for decontamination projects. CDC has 

established the Laboratory Response Network 

(LRN) and is working to standardize analytical 

methods used throughout the LRN. DoD is 

establishing a similar environmental LRN (eLRN) 

to harmonize sampling. 

• Post-decontamination sampling To date, 

verification sampling has been exhaustive. As 

research advances and laboratory applications 

become more relevant to field applications, 

clearance will become more efficient.

To provide better guidance, the NRT technical 

assistance document should consider first responder 

needs, include a matrix of appropriate sampling strategies 

and methods (including statistical tools), encourage the 

use of relevant professionals, and develop consistent 

nomenclature.

Two examples illustrate different factors that affect a 

sampling strategy.

• Hart building A clear understanding of 

contamination avenues was present. Sampling was 

planned using this knowledge. 

• USPS buildings People were working for days and 

weeks after the initial release. A dynamic sampling 

plan considered movement of the agent and objects 

in the building, and so sampling included lifting 

some objects and sampling underneath them. 

Appeasement sampling became part of the approach

to assuage people’s fear. Additional sampling also 

became necessary when one laboratory provided 

quantitative sampling results and other laboratories 

reported only qualitative results (i.e., positive or 

negative). The quantitative and qualitative results 

were not comparable. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• A workshop participant expressed concern about 

false negatives. Statistical design, if correct, can 

consider data risk. In research at the Edgewood 

Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), differences in 

kill efficacy were based on differences in surfaces. 

Most tests use a stainless steel surface, which does 

not account for surface variability in real-world 

situations.

• Did you conduct any high-volume air sampling? 

NIOSH and the Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (ATSDR) helped EPA develop 

an aggressive high-volume air sampling protocol, 

which was similar to asbestos sampling protocols. 

They sealed several rooms and passed one to two 

room volumes of air through a dry filter unit. 

Although the data were insufficient for statistical 

verification, the results improved EPA’s confidence 

in other data, such as surface sampling data. EPA 

also augmented sampling data using other sampling 

methods (e.g., gelatin filters) that can detect low 

concentrations. Overall, the dry filters from the 

high-volume sampling reported positive results 

but not with the same frequency as other sampling 

methods. EPA hopes that more research in this area 

will be conducted. 

• When designing a statistical sampling approach 

for B. anthracis, the agent’s specific aerosol 

properties are considered. When designing a 

statistical sampling approach for two or three 

different agents, how do you consider agents’ 

different aerosol properties? When searching for 

unknowns, targeting specific areas for sampling is 

difficult. As more information becomes available 

and you begin to understand the nature of 

contamination, you can target areas and change 

sampling approaches. 

• When identifying the logic behind a sampling 

sequence, should you consider clearance 

sampling needs? At the Hart Building, vertical 

and horizontal grid-style sampling with air 

sampling was conducted. Clearance sampling at 

this building was more involved than clearance 

sampling at other buildings because an extended 

period had lapsed between exposure and 

decontamination. Sampling included redundancy, 

extensive horizontal (i.e., surface) sampling, and 

consideration of airborne movement. Intrepido 

noted that the decontamination process at the 

Hart Building helped to develop a new sampling 

nomenclature. The technical language regarding 

the decontamination process is also continuing to 

evolve. 
14

The Use of the Trace 

Atmospheric Gas Analyzer 

(TAGA) to Qualitatively 

and Quantitatively Monitor 

Ambient Air for Chemical 

Warfare Agents (CWAs) and 

Decontamination Agents in 

Real Time at Parts per Trillion

by Volume Levels or Below

Dave Mickunas, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, Environmental Response Team

The presenter and others are developing and testing 

methods for real-time, low-level monitoring for chemical 

warfare agents (CWAs) and decontamination agents in 

ambient air. EPA’s TAGA consists of an Atmospheric 

Pressure Chemical Ionization (APCI) source linked 

to a three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. This project 

included developing CWA spectra and calibration 

curves, developing chemical ionization capabilities to 

detect CWA’s, verifying detection limits, determining the 

dynamic linear range, establishing surrogates, identifying 

interferences, and demonstrating methods. Mickunas 

presented a series of slides detailing the test methods, test 

conditions, test materials, chemicals of interest, and some 

unique test conditions.

Chemical agents of interest throughout the task 

included GA (Tabun), GB, GD, GF (cyclosarin), 

VX, HD, and the nitrogen mustard agents HN1

, 

HN2

, and HN3. Chlorine dioxide and chlorine were 

the decontamination agents of interest. Initial testing 

occurred in a laboratory chamber. EPA used diisopropyl 

methylphosphonate (DIMP) as a surrogate for G and B 

agents and half mustard as a surrogate for mustard.

One aspect of the testing was to assess how well agents 

would transfer through a glass sampling tube without 

being adsorbed or reacting with the tubing. Because 

laboratory testing must be conducted under a hood, 

researchers could test only a limited tubing length. Results 

showed that the glass tubing was not entirely inert. EPA 

is considering additional test conditions, such as adding 

heat, to assess reactions with the glass tubing. 

After testing the systems in a fixed laboratory, 

EPA moved the system to a mobile laboratory, which 

consisted of a TAGA mounted in a bus. The APCI uses 

electrons and protons to ionize a chemical. Ambient air 

enters the instrument; molecules are ionized and then 

passed through the three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. 

TAGA measures charges and creates a unique spectral 

“fingerprint” as the result for each chemical. Information 

gathered in the mobile laboratory can then be sent to an 

incident command location via satellite. 

Mickunas presented the TAGA fingerprints for 

a number of the agents of interest. The technology 

considered the molecular weights of the parent and 

daughter ions. TAGA can even detect low concentrations 

of chemicals with low vapor pressures, such as VX. Ion 

counting is key to the success of this method. For the 

tested agents, EPA recorded between 200 and 7,000 ion 

counts per part per billion (ppb), which indicates a good 

response.

Overall, TAGA is a good testing method for the 

agents of interest. The mobile unit can identify an 

evacuation area, but it is not currently configured for 

sampling high concentrations. At a decontamination 

event, TAGA can be used to detect fumigant leaks and 

identify concentrations exceeding shutdown levels (e.g., 

chlorine dioxide concentrations of 25 ppb for three 15-

minute periods, or 100 ppb for one 15-minute period).

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• Workshop participants commented that TAGA and 

the mobile laboratory can serve as a leak-detection 

technology. The detection limits for hand-held 

sensors are too high to detect leaks. Mickunas 

agreed and noted that the TAGA technology is 

about six times more sensitive than hand-held 

instruments. 

• Is the method applicable to high-molecularweight compounds (e.g., ricin)? The 

pharmaceutical industry, which deals with highmolecular-weight compounds, uses this technology. 

Air monitoring was not the original end use of 

the technology. The method works with these 

compounds because it examines charges on 

molecules.

• Are there concerns about using this technology 

at fumigations in high rises? Downwash is a 

concern. Overall, many opportunities exist to 
Decontamination Workshop  

research the logistical implementation of TAGA 

and the mobile laboratory. 

• Does vehicle exhaust interfere with the results? 

Vehicle exhaust interference is minimal, less than 

30 percent. 

• Are fixed monitoring stations in a community 

required with TAGA and mobile laboratories? 

From experience, this workshop participant 

has found that fixed stations are costly and 

time-consuming to use. Mickunas agreed that 

fixed monitoring stations have limited value. A 

contamination plume from a leak can be very 

narrow and can pass between fixed stations without 

detection. The mobile monitoring unit provides 

more information and more ways to identify and 

resolve leaks. 

Insurance and Indemnity 

Issues

Jerry Robinson, U.S. Postal Service

This presentation examined insurance and indemnity 

issues at decontamination sites. The USPS is concerned 

not with industrial accidents but with terrorist actions. 

Therefore, some of the insurance and indemnity options 

mentioned in the presentation apply only to terrorist 

attacks. An act of terror can be broadly defined as anything

unlawful that causes harm or attempts to use weapons of 

mass destruction. A terrorist group does not need to be 

identified and the act may be conducted by a domestic or 

foreign group. 

In October 2001, anthrax releases contaminated 

the USPS Brentwood and Trenton facilities. The attacks 

caused illness in 22 people and the death of 5 people. The 

attacks also rendered the facilities unusable, damaged mailsorting equipment, and instilled fear in postal workers and 

the public. The USPS contracted with vendors to fumigate

and restore the facilities.

As the property owner, the USPS needed to protect 

contractors from undesirable outcomes occurring as a 

result of the decontamination process (e.g., explosion, 

unsuccessful fumigation, and harm to postal or vendor 

workers). Obtaining this protection comes at great cost 

and great delay. 

Addressing liability for harm to people is the most 

difficult aspect of protecting the vendors and the USPS. 

Involved parties may try to distribute the liability to 

minimize each party’s risk. For the decontamination 

events, the USPS reluctantly accepted full liability and 

assigned broad indemnity with few exceptions (e.g., 

outcomes occurring as a result of gross vendor error). 

Many months, however, passed before the USPS reached 

the decision to accept liability. To minimize their risk, the 

USPS then obtained some insurance coverage—a $100 

million policy costing $4 million. Decontamination of 

one facility, however, cost more than $100 million, so this 

policy did not cover the USPS completely. 

The USPS course of action has two problems. 

First, most government agencies cannot indemnify 

decontamination vendors because these agencies are not 

allowed to enter into the open-ended contracts required 

for indemnification. DoD has exceptions to this restriction 

for issues related to weapons. The current administration 

is also very reluctant to grant terrorism exceptions; the 

USPS has an indefinite income stream and, for this 

reason, was able to accept indefinite liability. Second, 

insurance is not an available standby solution and much 

time is needed to negotiate an insurance policy after an 

event occurs. Most insurance companies will not hold 

an open insurance policy without payment, but opening 

an unnecessary insurance policy is not a smart business 

practice. Nonetheless, the USPS is looking for an available 

standby solution.

Robinson suggested that contractors obtain a 

SAFETY Act designation and certification for their 

technologies. This would allow contractors to be 

immediately available to perform decontamination 

services. The SAFETY Act—that is, the Support AntiTerrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 

2002—is part of the Homeland Security Act. The 

SAFETY Act covers decontamination technologies 

because these technologies are a response to a terror act. 

As well as fostering the deployment of more anti-terrorism 

technologies, the Act creates a system of litigation and 

risk management for those technologies. Litigation 

management restricts punitive and non-economic 

damages to government contractors; risk management 

restricts liability to the extent that insurance allows.

The SAFETY Act, however, requires a vendor to 

purchase insurance, determined by DHS, in order to 

be certified. The insurance level is supposed to be the 

maximum amount that can be purchased without unduly 

raising product price. This is a vague standard for DHS 

to follow. The SAFETY Act also includes a government 

contractor liability exemption. This exemption absolves 
16

contractors from responsibility for undesirable outcomes 

of the decontamination (e.g., damage to property or 

personal injury). Some attorneys are concerned that the 

government contractor liability exemption will not stand 

up in court. For example, a judge faced with a person 

harmed during a decontamination event and responsible 

for overwhelming medical bills may deem the contractor 

liable because no other responsible party is available. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• Does the SAFETY Act cover decontamination 

at private companies? Private companies are 

covered as long as a terror act, and not an industrial 

accident, caused the damage.

• Is federal insurance an option? The atomic power 

industry has used a federal insurer model, but the 

federal government is the insurer of last resort. 

The current Congress has not adopted a federal 

insurance policy for terror acts. 

• Do you see companies investing in insurance 

because they want decontamination and response

business? Robinson stated that there is a limited 

market for decontamination services and suggested 

that more insurance options might be available if 

more contractors entered this market.

• Is the contractor liability exemption rebuttable? 

This exemption is only rebuttable if there is proof of 

fraud in the application to DHS.

The Role of the On-Scene 

Coordinator in the Process

Marty Powell, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency

Powell has worked for EPA for 20 years and served as 

an OSC for about 10 of these years. This presentation 

provided an overview of an OSC’s two responsibilities: 

1. To determine whether there has been a release of an 

oil, hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant 

and whether the release poses a threat to the public 

or environment.

2. To ensure that the threat is mitigated. These 

responsibilities remain the same on all projects, 

although project specifics change. 

An OSC’s role in a project is defined by the title “onscene coordinator” itself. “On-scene” implies a different 

role from “on-site.” “On-site” implies a federal presence at 

a specific threat location; “on-scene” indicates involvement 

in an event without requiring a physical presence. OSCs 

are coordinators, not commanders. Commanders control 

site actions, whereas coordinators play a number of roles to 

provide information and support remediation efforts. The 

command structure at a site may seem complex, so the 

OSC can act as a liaison within this structure.

OSCs direct federal response assets. They draw from 

a large tool box of resources (e.g., contractor support, 

scientific support, special units, and public relations 

support teams) and provide these resources to local 

and state agencies to ensure that these agencies are not 

overwhelmed by the remediation process. They also ensure 

that remediation work at a site is completed properly. For 

example, the USPS commanded decontamination efforts 

at the postal facilities contaminated with anthrax. The 

OSC simply supported the USPS’s efforts. 

Many workshop participants may be contacted by an 

OSC. Researchers may act as information resources for 

an OSC, or technology vendors may work with OSCs 

to identify resources for testing their technology. OSCs 

may also evaluate the remediation equipment used for 

decontamination. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments 

• One workshop participant has worked with OSCs 

over the past three years. The OSCs understood 

available federal information and assets and 

obtained them as necessary and worked behind 

the scene of the decontamination to ensure 

success. Another participant agreed that the OSC 

is a valuable source of information, which can be 

used to support decisions. Powell emphasized that 

OSCs can access many EPA resources and facilitate 

obtaining these resources. They provide a link 

between scientific research and implementation of 

technologies. 

• Another participant noted that an OSC has a broad 

range of authority and power. For one site, the OSC 

determined the chlorine concentration needed for 

decontamination. Powell responded that an OSC 

has the ability to make decisions for a site without 

obtaining a permit. Regulations requiring permits 

often do not consider emergency response needs. 
Decontamination Workshop  

In addition, OSCs have no liability and cannot 

be sued for their decisions. The role of the OSC is 

complicated by the needs of different agencies, such 

as other offices within EPA, the United States Coast 

Guard (USCG), and the Department of Energy 

(DoE). Regardless of agency, though, an OSC’s 

roles and responsibilities remain unchanged: they 

work toward an end goal of threat identification and

mitigation.

• One participant, who works as an OSC, noted that 

a shortcoming in many responses is coordinating 

government and academic research to solve 

problems. An OSC may seek more information 

about a compound, but the literature may provide 

scattered and conflicting information. The OSC 

is then charged with making decisions based on 

this information. This participant emphasized the 

need for more research, planning, and preparedness 

information.

• What triggers the appointment of an OSC? A 

notification of some kind of release, for example, 

a call to EPA or the National Response Center, 

triggers the appointment. (An industry call to 

EPA about a spill is a notification.) An OSC may 

respond by granting responsibility to state or 

local agencies but is still responsible for ensuring 

mitigation. Sometimes the response includes a fullscale investigation.

• In the remediation phase, does the OSC act 

as the incident commander under the Federal 

Response Plan? In Florida, when the FBI 

completed investigations and released the 

building for decontamination, did EPA establish 

a command structure? An OSC is unlikely 

to become the incident commander. The OSC 

considers site operations, such as what vendor is 

providing what services. The command structure, 

however, can vary. The USCG strike team is one 

resource available to an OSC. Typically, this team 

serves as the incident commander at coastal sites. 

Agencies involved in a decontamination event may 

work together to formalize the incident command 

structure. EPA is currently working toward 

developing a more uniform approach. 

Introduction to 

the Government 

Decontamination Services

Robert Bettley-Smith, Department for 

Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 

Government Decontamination Service

Bettley-Smith presented the United Kingdom 

(UK) approach to threat events and subsequent 

decontamination and provided a history of events that 

have occurred. The UK is examining possible future 

threats and building its arsenal of technologies to address 

them. These efforts consider global uncertainty and draw 

on a cross-government effort to ensure preparedness.

In April 2003, the UK commissioned a study to assess 

the need for an agency to address chemical, biological, and 

radiological threats. The study recommended actions to 

improve the UK’s ability to respond to threat events. In 

January 2005, the government announced its intention 

to establish the Government Decontamination Service 

(GDS). Currently, the government is balancing efforts 

to improve the UK’s capability to address an event and 

establish the organization to implement this capability. 

GDS must consider current government structure 

and authority. In the UK, authorities at the county 

level are responsible for hazardous events. They are well 

prepared for chemical events because of their experience 

with chemical transport and releases. They also have 

experience with radiological events (e.g., the Chernobyl 

event). They lack, however, experience with biological 

events, so GDS will focus its efforts on these threats. GDS 

considers biological event decontamination as a specialized 

field with expertise available from the private sector. There 

is a concern that local authorities could be overwhelmed 

by the exigencies of decontamination following an attack 

and could respond inappropriately. 

The UK hopes to learn from the U.S. anthrax 

events and other countries’ responses to biological 

threats. The Australian response plan was evaluated 

in November 2003. This plan is grounded in military 

actions, a precondition that is not applicable to the 

UK. Also reviewed was the French plan, which includes 

public notification as required by French laws. Again, 

this plan is not wholly applicable to the UK. BettleySmith emphasized the importance of understanding 

the background for a response plan model, including 
18

constitutional restrictions and responsible parties. The UK 

has also considered establishing a centralized data system 

for facilitating and sharing knowledge across nations and 

preventing research overlap.

In addition to developing a response plan, GDS may 

provide information about vendors and technologies 

capable of biological decontamination. This information 

may be presented in the form of a catalog of available 

goods and services, including long-term, durable responses

and proven technologies. GDS may also enter agreements 

requiring that vendors offering these services be available 

to the government when necessary. 

Overall, GDS will serve three primary functions:

• Provide advice and guidance GDS will guide 

responsible authorities as they plan for emergencies 

and test these plans. It will prepare a strategic 

national guidance document; provide ad hoc advice; 

review case studies; and participate in exercises that 

test command and coordination abilities, identify 

solutions, and highlight response plan weaknesses. 

Individuals have already evaluated three case study 

events (a cesium release and two bombings) to assess

responses and suggest actions to improve responses.

• Identify resources GDS will provide information 

about vendors, their capabilities, and their 

technologies and facilitate interactions between 

local authorities and vendors. Some interim 

arrangements, modeled on the response to the U.S. 

anthrax events, are in place, but the public demands

more confidence in vendor relationships and 

technology success. The lack of technology fieldtesting is a concern because a technology must work

when needed.

• Advise the central government GDS will track the

UK’s decontamination capabilities and report to the

central government. 

GDS will not assume responsibility for 

decontamination, fund decontamination, or handle 

humans, animals, or their remains. If an event occurs 

in the UK today, GDS will likely provide advice and 

guidance and help secure contracts. It may also be able to 

provide an OSC.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• Is there a perception of urgency to address 

decontamination capabilities and preparedness 

in other European communities? Bettley-Smith 

was most familiar with activities in the UK and 

was unable to provide an overview of actions 

occurring throughout Europe. Concern has been 

high in Australia since before the Sydney Olympics. 

France is also working to address decontamination 

concerns. Some of the UK actions have been driven 

by threat assessments, and the UK is working to 

ensure that event responses are proportional to the 

risk. 

• Does the UK face the same insurance and 

indemnity issue as the U.S.? In the UK, the 

government serves as the insurance underwriter, 

with certain reinsurance provisions. The 

government is working with the insurance industry 

to quantify risks. Once insurance providers can 

quantify the risk, they can underwrite it. Key 

contractors will likely carry insurance for a variety 

of situations. After a terror event has occurred, the 

risks during the remediation phase of the event are 

the same as the risks during the remediation phase 

of a hazardous materials release. These are insurable 

risks. Insurance may be difficult, but not impossible, 

to obtain.

Laboratory Capacity Issues

Rob Rothman, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, National Homeland Security Research 

Center 

This presentation addressed laboratory capacity issues as 

they relate to homeland security. A homeland security 

presidential directive requires that “federal agencies 

be prepared to respond to chemical, biological, and 

radiological attacks.”

Laboratories face several issues with regard to meeting 

this directive: 

• Validation Validated sampling methods provide 

a level of confidence in reported sampling results 

and in answering the question “How clean is 

clean?” These methods are lacking for some priority 

chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

• Expertise Laboratories must have expertise in 

handling CWAs, which may degrade quickly. 

• Capacity A laboratory may be called to analyze 

thousands of samples quickly, especially if an attack 

affects city operations. 
Decontamination Workshop  

Creating standardized analytical methods is one way 

to address these issues. Standardized methods would 

ensure consistent and proficient sample analysis across 

laboratories. In September 2004, EPA identified 109 

priority agents and specific analytical methods for gas, 

solid, oily solid, and aqueous samples. 

Revisions to the standard analytical methods are 

scheduled for June 2005. This revision will include 

updates to existing methods and will add new methods for 

analyzing drinking water, CWA degradation products, and 

four radiological agents (strontium-90, cesium, iridium, 

and cobalt-60).

Research with CWAs must occur under high-security 

conditions and within laboratories under the rigorous 

personnel-reliability program. Only a finite number of 

laboratories meet these conditions. Rothman listed some 

of the available analytical methods for CWAs, which 

include a joint U.S. and Finnish method, Organization for 

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) methods, 

Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (VERIFIN) Blue Books, and the Wiley 

Encyclopedia of Analytical Methods. EPA not only needs 

to package this existing information in the standardized 

analytical methods document but also needs to develop 

new methods. Some chemical-specific concerns in the 

development of methods are that GS degrades quickly 

(within 24 hours) and VX, mustard, and lewisite are 

relatively persistent. Methods, therefore, must be able to 

detect either the primary agent or degradation products.

In addition to developing analytical methods, 

laboratories must have the capacity to handle samples 

collected during a response. Samples to identify the threat 

agent and assess the nature and extent of contamination 

are collected at the greatest rate within days of the event. 

Thousands of samples, collected within days or weeks 

of the initial event may need to be analyzed. Cleanup, 

clearance, and surveillance samples taken weeks, months, 

and possibly years after the event may be collected in 

greater numbers, but likely at slower rates, than initial 

sampling.

To address capacity concerns, EPA is working with 

CDC to develop the environmental Laboratory Response 

Network (eLRN). CDC’s existing LRN serves as a 

model for the three-tiered eLRN. Screening or sentinel 

laboratories will provide analyses and participate in 

sampling surges. Confirmatory laboratories will coordinate 

with the sentinel laboratories and first responders. These 

laboratories will also provide method validation. Reference 

laboratories will provide definitive agent identification 

for an event, develop methods and guidance, and 

provide quality assurance. Tentatively identified reference 

laboratories include the EPA ORD laboratories in Las 

Vegas (chemical focus) and Cincinnati (biological focus). 

These two laboratories are currently working toward 

identifying preferred analytical methods for all priority 

agents in all media, developing validated methods for 

CWAs, and preparing a nationwide quality assurance 

program. 

Optimally, these laboratories will operate under the 

same system to provide as much consistency as possible. 

The network would also be able to address all hazards, 

provide rapid sentinel screening, employ high-confidence 

methods, and offer surge capacity. Laboratories will add 

real-time technologies to their capabilities when these 

methods are validated and supported by research. Through 

the eLRN, EPA hopes to eliminate problems of analytical 

inconsistencies and lack of sample comparability. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• One workshop participant provided additional 

details about CDC’s LRN. CDC developed the 

LRN to support medical responses. Sentinel 

laboratories are given cleared status to conduct 

analyses; they include hospitals and others with 

access to biological analysis methods. Confirmatory 

laboratories are part of a secure system addressing 

public health concerns (i.e., state and federal public 

health laboratories). Confirmatory laboratories 

undergo proficiency testing and follow a quality 

assurance/quality control program. Reference 

laboratories include the CDC laboratories. The 

impetus for creating the LRN was the need for 

high-quality, interpretable results that support 

public health decisions. Security at these laboratories 

is critical. Rothman agreed with the participant 

about security: it is critical, especially when 

laboratories are handling CWAs. EPA is currently 

discussing security issues and will likely limit 

security clearance to a small number of laboratories 

that will develop protocols and then distribute these 

protocols throughout the network. Use of surrogates 
2

and degradation products may also facilitate 

material handling and address security concerns.

• Is EPA considering geographic distribution 

of the laboratories for the eLRN? Geographic 

distribution is one of the many factors under 

consideration. For example, EPA is considering 

using the 10 EPA regional laboratories as part of the 

eLRN.

• How did EPA select the four radiological 

agents for inclusion in the revised standardized 

analytical methods document? These four 

radiological agents represent a starting point. They 

are high-energy gamma emitters that are readily 

available.

• Will the eLRN include private laboratories?

Private laboratories may be included in the eLRN as

sentinel laboratories.

Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation

and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide

John Mason, Sabre Technical Services

Sabre Technology Services (Sabre) fumigated the AMI 

building in Boca Raton and containers involved in 

“Lemon Drop.” (USCG identified a shipment of lemons 

with a viable threat for biological contamination.) USCG 

needed, and OPP was able to provide, a crisis exemption 

within 24 hours. Mason presented information about 

the chlorine dioxide fumigation technology used at these 

locations and the lessons learned from conducting these 

fumigations. 

At these events, Sabre sought options to accelerate 

the decontamination and clearance process. Options 

included minimizing wastes generated, minimizing liquid 

pre-treatments, applying mobile fumigation technologies, 

streamlining the clearance process, ensuring proper sample 

tracking and quality control, and communicating clearly 

with the affected community. At both events, Sabre 

demonstrated its mobile fumigation technology. At the 

AMI building, streamlining the clearance process would 

have been the best option to reduce time. A tremendous 

effort was also exerted to describe and discuss the 

fumigation process to the public and regulatory agencies.

To illustrate the process, Mason described the 

fumigation at the AMI building in detail. The fumigation 

itself lasted 7 days from equipment setup to complete 

fumigation. However, 30 days of planning preceded the 

actual fumigation. Before fumigation could start, Sabre 

considered whether B. anthracis contamination remained 

after 2.5 years of vacancy. Contamination followed the 

mail route and affected the HVAC system above the mail 

areas. Sampling protocols developed for the Capitol Hill 

anthrax event were applied to the AMI building. 

Having confirmed the presence of B. anthracis, Sabre 

demonstrated the technology to ensure that the fumigant 

would reach all areas requiring decontamination. Sabre 

used the building’s HVAC system to distribute the 

fumigant. For the demonstration, about 1,500 biological 

indicators and 15 test strips were placed throughout 

the building. Sabre released the fumigant to achieve a 

concentration of 750 parts per million (ppm) for a 12-

hour period. The building remained at a minimum of 

75°F and 50 percent relative humidity. The indicators and 

test strips confirmed that the fumigant would reach all 

targets.

The Sabre technology involves transforming liquid 

chlorine to gas. The technology passes the liquid through 

packing material to achieve the phase change. They 

controlled for the necessary temperature and humidity 

level using the building’s HVAC system. In Boca Raton, 

dehumidifying the air was necessary. 

During the full-scale AMI fumigation, Sabre placed 

approximately 200 log-8 test strips throughout the 

building. In post-treatment sampling, all strips showed 

a no-growth response. Tracking sample locations and 

communicating results were concerns, so Sabre developed 

a three-dimensional sampling map of the AMI building. 

The software enabled people to visualize the sampling 

locations and track the sample chain of custody. 

As Sabre completed the AMI building fumigation, 

the company was called to apply the same technology to 

the contaminated containers identified in Newark Harbor. 

Sabre used this event to test its mobile equipment. The 

total transit time from Boca Raton to Newark was about 

20 hours. Within 48 hours of leaving Boca Raton, Sabre 

was ready to begin fumigation. Insurance and a crisis 

exemption were both obtained within 24 hours because 

the agencies involved in Newark had worked with Sabre at 

the Boca Raton building and were familiar with the Sabre 

technology. The fumigation in Newark was completed 

within 10 days.

These two projects illustrate the need for preplanning. The planning phase can be streamlined when 

agencies and organizations are familiar with a technology. 

Data tracking is also critical. Demonstrations of the 
Decontamination Workshop 

decontamination technology at the AMI building were 

needed partially to ensure that the fumigant was contained 

within the building. Sabre has since conducted tests of 

tenting with negative pressure to contain fumigants at 

a facility in Utica, New York. Obtaining insurance also 

contributed significantly to project delays. The AMI 

building fumigation was delayed from November to May 

because of insurance issues. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• When decontaminating the containers in Newark 

Harbor, were you told what the target agent 

was? Can you discuss project considerations for 

conducting decontamination for an unknown? 

Sabre received minimal information about the 

target agent in this situation. They were told to treat 

the containers for an unknown biological agent. 

This situation highlights the need for better testing 

and method development. The containers had been 

tested for only three elements, but treatment was 

needed quickly because of the critical location of 

the containers. Agencies involved did not know 

whether the biological threat was real or a hoax. The 

containers had tested positive for narcotics. For the 

safety of all involved, they assumed that the threat 

was real. Before a bomb squad or customs officials 

could enter the containers, decontamination for the 

biological threat had to occur.

• Can you elaborate on your sampling, specifically 

the different sampling at the AMI building 

points used to track fumigant levels? Sabre 

placed thousands of fumigant indicators to confirm 

that the fumigant reached desired areas. The 

indicators change color once they reach a certain 

concentration.

• How did you gain community support for 

fumigation of the AMI building? Sabre included 

the community early in the decontamination 

process. A public relations firm provided 

community relations support. In addition, the 

project had the mayor’s support. Sabre was open 

about their activities and made themselves available 

to community groups and media outlets. Sabre held 

process demonstrations and arranged a round-table 

discussion for the community the day before the 

scheduled fumigation. More than 100 people from 

the community attended this event.

• Because the original contamination occurred 

long before building closure, how did you 

ensure treatment of surfaces that had since 

been covered? For surface-to-surface mates, Sabre 

inserted a geoplate between the two surfaces to 

allow fumigant penetration. They considered items 

such as coffee cups on a surface, dictionaries on 

tables, and surfaces within chair cushions. 

• How was electronic equipment handled? The 

equipment that could run was kept running during 

fumigation. About 60 percent of the equipment 

was nonfunctional by the time of fumigation. Since 

fumigation, Sabre has not observed soft metal 

corrosion. In high-humidity areas, rust films are 

forming, but this would occur in any facility left 

vacant for a long period.

• What was your approach to insurance? Sabre 

combined insurance with a no-growth standard 

for two reasons: 1) a no-growth standard decreases 

the number of possible questions in the clearance 

process, and 2) it combines clearance with a 

standard. As a private company, Sabre must have 

insurance. Immediately following the events 

of 9/11, insurance was unavailable because 

insurance companies had mold and biological 

exclusions to protect themselves from costly mold 

situations. Suppliers and vendors on a biological 

decontamination project would have lost their 

base insurance because of the mold and biological 

exclusions. Companies are working to remove this 

exclusion for bio-weapons, and standby insurance is 

now available. 

• At the AMI building, Sabre used tubing to 

check fumigant concentrations inside. Have you 

considered telemetry systems? Sabre selected the 

tubing approach—a simple technology—to keep 

the overall process simple. Telemetry tied to titration 

results is desireable but cost-prohibitive at this 

point.
22

STERIS Chem-Bio 

Decontamination

Iain McVey, STERIS Corporation

STERIS Corporation (STERIS) provides technologies to 

prevent infection and contamination. Their technologies 

are used in the pharmaceutical industry but also apply to 

decontamination following biological terror events. 

Vaporous hydrogen peroxide (VHP) decontamination 

methods have widespread use in pharmaceutical 

companies and clean rooms. A pharmaceutical company 

may house manufacturing equipment in a chain of glove 

boxes. Decontamination, which may occur monthly or 

even daily, consists of simply injecting VHP into the boxes 

in this chain.

After the events of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, 

STERIS began modifying its technologies to apply to 

anthrax. STERIS used its proprietary VHP to fumigate 

two buildings contaminated with anthrax:

• GSA Building 410 This 1.4 million-ft3

 building 

was an office supply storage area and a mail-sorting 

facility for the White House. STERIS conducted 

fumigation with the building contents in place. The 

building was separated into 200,000-ft3

 fumigation 

zones because no data for fumigation of a whole 

building were available. The HVAC systems were 

treated as separate zones. The decontamination took 

3 weeks. 

• Building SA-32 STERIS simplified the 

decontamination system based on information 

gathered during the GSA Building 410 

decontamination. This 1.5 million-ft3

 building 

was also separated into 200,000-ft3

 zones. All of its 

contents were removed for easier decontamination. 

Decontamination at this building took 2 weeks.

At both of these buildings, STERIS successfully 

employed its VHP technology. McVey stated that a benefit 

of hydrogen peroxide is that it decomposes to water 

and oxygen so residual contamination is not a concern. 

However, the rapid decay of VHP also means that 

repeated injections are needed to ensure that the proper 

concentrations are reached. Multiple injection points, 

not a single point, may be the best option for optimal 

distribution. 

In collaboration with the ECBC, STERIS continues 

to study the VHP technology. ECBC operates an 

abandoned building as a large-scale test site. The building 

houses former office and lab areas, which provide a variety 

of surfaces and materials for testing. When conducting 

efficacy tests, STERIS places the VHP units in a sealed 

room. Sensors on the unit track the vapor concentrations. 

Because the whole unit is within the room, the unit is selfdecontaminating. Bench- and chamber-scale tests have 

shown modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide (mVHPTM) 

(patent pending) to be effective against chemical agents as 

well as biological agents.

 Because contamination of the cargo air fleet is a 

concern, STERIS also completed a demonstration project 

to test mVHP for decontaminating a C-141 cargo aircraft. 

STERIS set up the hydrogen peroxide system in a cargo 

plane slated to be scrapped. Project setup took 2 days. 

STERIS tested different fumigation time periods and 

concentrations and conducted chemical and biological 

sampling in on-site mobile units. STERIS also exposed 

aircraft materials to 100 hours of hydrogen peroxide 

to investigate concerns about structural integrity. Tests 

showed that VHP did affect structural components but 

that there were no ill effects on avionics. 

STERIS is working to reduce the system size so 

that the system will fit on a cargo plane. STERIS is also 

working to develop a mobile/modular system, spacecraft 

decontamination systems (with NASA), and an integrated 

mVHP/HVAC system.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• Has STERIS tested the different effects of 

VHP on fabrics, materials, paintings, wood, 

and irreplaceable historical artifacts? The GSA 

Building 410 storage area contained personal items 

of the President and Vice President, including 

several paintings. No problems with the paintings 

have been reported to STERIS. Fumigating carpet 

is a concern. The deeper the carpet, the longer the 

exposure period needs to be. Most chemical agents 

make very good plasticizers, so they will soak into 

materials such as paint. When hydrogen peroxide is 

introduced as a gas, it works in a similar fashion.

• Is relative humidity control required? STERIS 

personnel use a 35 percent hydrogen peroxide 

aqueous solution for bioefficacy, so they introduce 

water with the hydrogen peroxide. If humidity is 

too high, the hydrogen peroxide gas just condenses. 

STERIS uses a system to keep humidity below the 

condensation level.
Decontamination Workshop  

• At the NBC offices in New York City, was a crisis 

exemption needed for VHP? STERIS obtained 

a crisis exemption for the NBC decontamination. 

There was a concern about releasing VHP in an 

occupied building. Affected rooms, therefore, were 

treated by liquid decontamination. At this site, the 

effect of hydrogen peroxide on personal items was 

also a great concern. STERIS removed personal 

items and fumigated them with VHP off-site. 

• What was involved in emptying Building SA-32? 

STERIS removed the old mail-sorting machine, 

which was autoclaved for decontamination and 

incinerated for disposal. STERIS personnel also 

removed the wallboard down to the studs, so they 

really fumigated an empty shell of a building. 

Hydrogen Peroxide 

Vapor for Room/Building 

Decontamination Following a

Chemical or Biological Agent 

Attack: Overview of Efficacy 

and Practical Issues

Mike Herd, BIOQUELL, Inc.

BIOQUELL, Inc., is a company with experience using 

hydrogen peroxide vapor for decontamination applications 

in the healthcare, bio-defense, pharmaceutical, and 

environmental industries.

Hydrogen peroxide vapor forms a condensate at 

a submicron level. By nature, it is residue-free because 

it degrades to oxygen and water. A treated area can be 

reoccupied when the concentration there reaches a 

time-weighted average of 1 ppm. Users must remember, 

however, that decontamination using any type of fumigant 

does not replace actual cleaning and is not appropriate for 

use on spills that must be physically removed.

The BIOQUELL system was designed to apply to any 

size room or location. The system consists of self-sufficient 

units that can be chained together to form an infinitely 

scalable system, although Herd noted that practical 

application would limit the number of connected units. 

The units operate independently of a building’s HVAC 

system. They are self-sanitizing because they are sealed in 

the treatment area. 

The technology works by flash evaporating a 

30 percent to 35 percent hydrogen peroxide solution into 

the environment. The hydrogen peroxide then creates a 

micro-condensate on surfaces within the treatment area. 

The micro-condensate greatly improves the kinetics of 

decontamination; the D-value is less than 2 minutes when 

the micro-condensate occurs and 2 hours without the 

micro-condensate. BIOQUELL uses an optic condensation 

monitor to detect the onset of the micro-condensation. 

Relative humidity has not been a factor in the use of this 

technology; success has been achieved in environments 

ranging from 5 percent to 85 percent humidity. Modeling 

is necessary for planning decontamination events and 

ensuring success. In 2002, BIOQUELL published a paper 

detailing the physical chemistry behind the process. 

Hydrogen peroxide tends to form strong hydrogen 

bonds between the molecules, which limits its movement. 

To ensure proper distribution, BIOQUELL releases 

hydrogen peroxide vapor from a self-contained unit 

with a rotating nozzle system that distributes the vapor 

dynamically.

BIOQUELL is currently examining material 

compatibility issues associated with using hydrogen 

peroxide vapor on different substrates. Initial efficacy tests 

under EPA’s Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) 

program for decontamination and destruction of anthrax 

have been conducted on seven materials (carpet, bare 

wood, glass, laminate, galvanized metal ductwork, painted 

wallboard, and painted cement). The first four of these 

materials are nonporous; the last three are porous. Some 

spore reduction occurred on each of these materials, which 

was unexpected—no reduction was expected on porous 

materials, such as the carpet. A report summarizing the 

results of this study is available at www.epa.gov/etv. Further 

efficacy testing with other pathogens is planned. Herd 

indicated that BIOQUELL hopes to conduct research 

with CWAs and would like to identify a partner for this 

research. 

Herd discussed several case studies to illustrate 

technology applications. The presentation slides provided 

specific details regarding these case studies. In one incident, 

BIOQUELL personnel responded to the SARS incident 

in Singapore. Within 3 days they arrived on-site and began 

decontamination. In this instance, they treated 88 rooms 

without having to modify the building. Medical equipment 

was included in the treatment. No material compatibility 

issues arose after treatments at these or other hospitals.
24

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• Using the workshop meeting room as an 

example, would you recommend removing 

the contents before fumigating with hydrogen 

peroxide vapor? Would you recommend precleaning? Herd estimated that three of the 

BIOQUELL model R machines would suffice 

to fumigate the meeting room. Decisions about 

material removal or pre-cleaning are made on a 

case-by-case basis and depend on the end use of the 

room (e.g., reuse or replacement of the contents).

• How do you seal a hospital room, how long does 

it take, and do you train hospital people to apply

the technology? Hydrogen peroxide is a “lazy” 

gas and does not move readily. BIOQUELL tapes 

a room and then conducts sentinel monitoring to 

identify possible leaks. BIOQUELL manufactures a

small decontamination unit for hospitals. Hospital 

staff could be trained to use the technology, but 

they would likely need assistance for room-level 

decontamination. 

• Does concrete or the concrete surface coating 

interact with hydrogen peroxide vapor? Have 

you seen any interaction with smooth, hard 

surfaces in hospital applications? Were your 

material compatibility tests representative of 

real-life conditions? To Herd’s knowledge, tests 

found no interaction with concrete. He thought 

that researchers had identified the surface geometry 

of concrete as a key factor in concrete interactions. 

A workshop participant noted that the later 

presentation describing research conducted under 

the EPA ETV program would discuss material 

compatibility findings with regard to concrete. 

• Has BIOQUELL hung spore strips in the air to 

test whether decontamination of airborne (vs. 

surface) spores also occurs? Some testing of air kill

has been conducted to assess how HVAC systems 

may affect decontamination. Herd volunteered to 

share the data upon request.

Whole-Structure 

Decontamination of Bacterial 

Spores by Methyl Bromide 

Fumigation

Rudolf Scheffrahn, University of Florida

Scheffrahn is an entomologist with the University 

of Florida. His expertise with termite fumigants and 

fumigation events research is relevant to decontamination. 

He discussed a laboratory and field study of methyl 

bromide fumigation and tenting techniques as they apply 

to decontamination following a terror event.

Every day in Ft. Lauderdale, fumigants are used to 

clear quarantined fruit and vegetables. Ship containers, 

each holding $50,0000 to $60,000 worth of product, are 

sealed and fumigated for 2 to 4 hours. Methyl bromide, 

which has served as an agricultural chemical for more than 

60 years, is one fumigant used. Methyl bromide diffuses 

readily and is very stable, which means that clearing a 

treated building is necessary. Methyl bromide can be used 

with any humidity level and has already been approved 

to treat some bacteria. However, methyl bromide is a 

stratospheric ozone depleter.

In partnership with EPA, Scheffrahn conducted 

laboratory and field studies to assess methyl bromide as 

a fumigant for anthrax. In laboratory trials, spore strips 

were placed in desiccation chambers and exposed to 

methyl bromide. The spore strips were then incubated to 

assess the kill rate. After 48 hours at 37°C, complete kill 

was observed for B. anthracis and G. stearothermophilus. 

However, B. atrophaeus and B. thuringiensis experienced 

only partial kills.

Research continued with a 2004 field study at 

a 30,000-ft3

 home in the Florida Keys. The house 

represented a typical residential environment with the 

addition of computers and electronic equipment to assess 

collateral damage. Researchers placed spore strips (G. 

stearothermophilus on paper, B. thuringiensis on paper, B. 

atrophaeus on paper, and B. atrophaeus on stainless steel) 

throughout the structure (e.g., on walls and carpeting, 

inside a computer CD drive, in chair fabric, wall plates, 

light fixtures, hanging files, and a sealed refrigerator). 

They also established eight real-time monitoring locations 

within the house. The house was then sealed, using 

tenting—as is commonly done for termite treatments in 

Florida.
Decontamination Workshop  

The fumigation involved passing liquid methyl 

bromide through a heat exchanger to create the gas. 

At EPA’s request, the researchers tested a higher gas 

concentration than truly necessary. (More than 600 

pounds of methyl bromide were used to reach the 

mean concentration of 312 milligrams per liter [mg/L]. 

Scheffrahn estimated that 150 pounds of methyl bromide 

would have sufficed.) Reactions with methyl bromide 

are temperature dependent; higher temperatures result in 

better kill efficacy. As such, fans and heaters maintained 

a target temperature of 35°C within the house. The fans 

moved the heat through the house but were not necessary 

to diffuse the methyl bromide. After a 48-hour exposure 

period, the researchers aerated the structure to remove the 

methyl bromide, and after 4 days, methyl bromide was 

not detected around the house. At 48 of 50 spore strip 

locations, no growth was observed. Growth occurred on 

all controls. The two failure locations were the refrigerator 

and at an improperly mounted spore strip location. No 

damage to electronic equipment was observed. 

Advantages to the methyl bromide and tenting 

system included the low cost (approximately $150 per 

1,000 ft3

); rapid turnover to completion (approximately 

200 hours); treatment of all porous material, voids, and 

HVAC systems; application at any humidity; and absence 

of collateral damage. To demonstrate how quickly a home 

can be sealed with a tent, Scheffrahn showed an example 

of a four-man crew in Ft. Lauderdale installing a tent 

around a 3,000-ft2

 home in about 40 minutes. 

Scheffrahn also suggested some future research 

avenues: real-time infrared methyl bromide detectors; air 

displacement with materials (e.g., nylon 66) to reduce the 

total treatment volume; silicone ground seals, and methyl 

bromide scrubbing. At quarantine locations, scrubbers are 

used to treat methyl bromide.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• What was the temperature inside the refrigerator?

[Room temperature.] The refrigerator was off to 

prevent recirculation, and the door was closed 

tightly during the fumigation.

• If sulfuro fluoride is a substitute for methyl 

bromide, why not use that against anthrax? 

Sulfuro fluoride treats only insects and has limited 

use against insect eggs. Methyl bromide, however, 

can treat bacteria.

• Does methyl bromide present an explosion 

hazard? No, methyl bromide was once used as an 

ingredient in fire extinguishers.

• What are the long-term availability and costs of 

methyl bromide? Methyl bromide will remain a 

quarantine fumigant until a suitable replacement 

can be found. Researchers have been searching 

for a replacement for 10 years or so. Suitable 

replacements are already available for other methyl 

bromide uses.

• How would scrubber waste be disposed of? 

Scheffrahn thought that the scrubber waste would 

be treated as a hazardous waste and incinerated.

• Can methyl bromide be used on wet surfaces? 

There have been some studies with damp (free 

water vs. high-humidity) wood treatment. Methyl 

bromide has low solubility—about 1.5 grams per 

100 milliliters of water.

• Was there an attempt to have methyl bromide 

approved for treatment of the anthrax releases? 

Scheffrahn understood that Great Lakes, the 

company that manufactures methyl bromide for 

fumigation, was contacted. Research found during 

a literature review indicated that methyl bromide 

could kill anthrax, but the data were unclear. The 

primary study examined anthrax kill in woolens and 

tested only pure methyl bromide. The uncertainties 

of the data eliminated methyl bromide from 

consideration. More recent research has found that 

a 2 percent methyl bromide by volume is sufficient 

for efficacy.

DF-200 Decontamination 

of CBW Agents, Other 

Biological Pathogens, and 

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Rita Betty, Sandia National Laboratory

Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) is testing a 

decontamination formulation (DF-200) for neutralizing 

CWAs and toxic industrial chemicals, killing biological 

agents, and combating aerosolized chemical and biological 

agent clouds. 

DF-200 is an aqueous-phase formula that has 

been used successfully by the military. The commercial 

product is mixed on-site as a tertiary system of surfactant, 
26

a 7.9 percent hydrogen peroxide solution, and a novel 

activator. The hydrogen peroxide solution is below 8 

percent to allow for easy shipping. After mixing, the final 

hydrogen peroxide concentration is about 3.5 percent. 

DF-200 is less corrosive than bleach and other available 

decontamination materials. 

SNL tested DF-200 and DS2 (a corrosive 

decontaminant used by the military in the past) as 

decontaminants for GD, VX, and HD in stirred reactor 

studies. Results were similar, with DS2 performing only 

slightly better at the 1-minute exposure period. Both 

chemicals achieved 100 percent decontamination of live 

agents after a 60-minute exposure period. In other studies,

DF-200 rapidly (within a 15-minute exposure period) 

neutralized nerve agents, sodium cyanide, phosgene, and 

carbon disulfide, as well as biologicals (B. anthracis and Y. 

pestis). Mustard agents required more time (a 30-minute 

exposure period) because of mustard’s low solubility. 

A benefit of using DF-200 to neutralize VX is that it 

cleaves the phosphorous-sulfur bonds to create less-toxic 

byproducts. Overall, SNL has completed a number of tests

of DF-200. Specific results are classified, but generally the 

results demonstrate a high efficacy. Betty provided contact 

information for those seeking to learn more.

Laboratories at Kansas State University have tested 

DF-200 and biofilms. Samples consisted of six- to sevenlog biofilms that underwent a 1-minute exposure to DF200. The biofilms were allowed to grow for 1, 3, 7, and 

14 days prior to treatment. The 1-minute exposure to 

DF-200 successfully decontaminated the sample biofilms. 

DF-200 was also completely successful in eliminating 

infectivity and viral RNA integrity in influenza tests.

Toxic industrial chemicals, which are an increasing 

threat, provide unique challenges for decontamination 

because of the variety in their chemical and physical 

properties. They also attack by differing mechanisms: 

nucleophilic attack, oxidation, reduction, or buffering. 

Foam is a highly effective treatment method, except 

against toxic metals or strong acids and bases that may 

react violently.

SNL is also conducting a feasibility study of using 

foam (e.g., DF-200) for knocking down an aerosol agent 

cloud intended to drift to target areas. The study explores 

methods for cloud knockdown and neutralization. SNL 

does not intend to design a system for implementing 

treatment.

DoD considers DF-200 to be the best available 

decontamination technology. SNL developed DF-200 to 

enable rapid and safe neutralization of agents. Currently, 

DF-200 is available in a variety of sizes and dispersal 

techniques (e.g., 5-gallon backpack size) to meet multiple 

needs. DF-200 is available to first responders addressing 

a terror event. In 2004, EPA registered DF-200 for 

disinfecting hard, nonporous materials. Applications 

beyond decontaminating threat events may also exist.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• What remains after decontamination with 

DF-200, and how is it treated? The residue and 

cleanup depend on the release scenario. After the 

foam collapses, a wet-dry vacuum will remove it 

from indoor areas. After an outdoor release, the 

foam dries to a light, silky residue, which may 

weather in a short period of time.

• What is created in air when the foam mixes 

with the agent? Is the air still dangerous after 

the kill? When is it safe to reoccupy an area? To 

be effective as knockdown, the foam is deployed 

as small droplets that eventually fall to the ground. 

The droplets maximize the capture efficiency of 

the agent. No gas is involved. Overall, the process 

creates a neutral cloud.

• In the subway example, what is the active spray 

duration? The foam spray is not necessarily 

continuous. In chamber tests, 1-minute spray 

durations were used. For the 8-cubic-foot chamber, 

about 2 liters of DF-200 are deployed in this time. 

Capitol Hill Ricin Incident: 

Decontamination Dilemmas

Jack Kelly, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

Emergency Response Team

The ricin incident at Capitol Hill provides a real-world 

example of issues faced at a decontamination event. The 

Capitol Police responding to the ricin event had little 

information about ricin, so they called in OSCs, whose 

primary purpose at this event was to gather information. 

This presentation reviews OSC actions. In the end, the 

OSCs themselves were forced to make decisions about 

ricin based on limited information.
Decontamination Workshop  

Ricin was first developed as a weapon during World 

War I. It is a white powder that can be made fairly easily 

from the protein toxins of castor plant beans. Worldwide, 

more than a million tons of castor beans are processed for 

castor oil annually. Castor oil production in the United 

States, however, ceased in the 1970s. Ricin is composed of 

two toxins that act together to cause toxicity by inhibiting 

protein synthesis in cells. Ricin is considered extremely 

toxic by any exposure route (inhalation, ingestion, or 

injection). No vaccines or antidotes are available. 

On February 2, 2004, ricin was found in the 

mail room attached to a senator’s office in the Dirksen 

Building. The Capitol Police contacted an OSC that day 

and requested assistance. Field sampling and follow-up 

laboratory analysis confirmed the presence of ricin. EPA 

was asked to receive, inventory, and store mail from the 

building; conduct additional characterization; perform 

decontamination of the affected areas and their contents; 

and conduct clearance sampling. A February 9, 2004, 

deadline for decontamination was established. 

By February 8, 2004, EPA had containerized 

approximately 80 drums of unopened mail and stored 

clothing from 32 potentially exposed individuals. EPA, the

FBI, and Capitol Police had collected at least 670 samples 

from three affected rooms and identified 19 positive 

results—all from one room. From the affected room, EPA 

removed and stored personal and office items. Large hardsurface items were left in place.

The mail room was clearly contaminated. Bordering 

rooms on either side were considered buffer rooms and 

potentially contaminated. EPA looked toward existing 

research and data to devise a decontamination plan. 

The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 

Diseases (USAMRIID) Blue Book served as the primary 

resource. Technologies considered were chlorine dioxide 

fumigation, heat treatment, and sodium hypochlorite 

solution cleaning. 

EPA chose to decontaminate with a sodium 

hypochlorite solution. This decision was based on the 

small size of the decontamination area, the extent of 

ricin contamination, knowledge of ricin properties, a 

literature review, and input from an advisory group. 

Decontamination occurred in the mail room that was 

known to be contaminated; the two buffer rooms; the 

room that held evacuees; and the common hallways, 

elevators, and mail drops. EPA covered the mail room 

with the solution and effectively cleaned the room. Posttreatment testing found no ricin activity. The building was 

reopened on February 9, 2004, with the mail room and 

buffer rooms remaining closed for renovations. 

EPA considered several options for decontaminating 

the clothing, office items, mail, and mail equipment that 

had been removed from the building. A decontamination 

team researched the options and suggested heat treatment. 

If the heat treatment were unsuccessful, ethylene oxide 

fumigation would follow. Chlorine dioxide fumigation 

was the third option.

The decontamination team considered packaging 

items for decontamination, setting sterilization 

specifications, and establishing efficacy measurements. The 

team also considered ricin concentrations, ricin locations 

on materials, and ricin toxicity values. Because of the 

unknowns surrounding ricin, EPA decided that near 100 

percent denaturation of ricin was needed. 

In cooperation with ECBC and the Naval Medical 

Research Center (NMRC), EPA obtained crude and 

purified ricin to test treatment efficacy. Clothing and office 

materials, along with indicator vials of crude and pure 

ricin, underwent heat treatment. Temperature probes in 

the treatment bags tracked the temperature (82–88 °C). 

Treatment resulted in 100 percent deactivation of 13 of 

the 14 purified ricin vials. For the crude ricin, 14 of the 28 

vials reported 94.4 percent to 99.7 percent deactivation. 

EPA was unable to determine why crude ricin was more 

difficult to denature than purified ricin. The vials that did 

not achieve 100 percent deactivation underwent a second 

heat treatment. Some of the vials were reanalyzed within 

4 days of treatment and others 3 weeks after treatment. 

The crude ricin reported 99.8 percent to 99.99 percent 

deactivation after 4 days and greater than 99.99 percent 

deactivation after 3 weeks. The purified ricin reported 100 

percent deactivation after 4 days and only 99.92 percent 

to 99.99 percent deactivation after 3 weeks. EPA believed 

this reactivation may have been due to protein refolding. 

The decontamination team documented their findings in 

a brief memorandum. Recommendations for the fate of 

the clothing and office materials that underwent the single 

heat treatment were left to the OSC.

EPA received a second set of materials, including 

paper items, mail, and vacuum cleaner contents, for 

decontamination at the end of March 2004. These 

materials underwent a single heat treatment. In addition, 

EPA conducted ethylene oxide pilot tests to assess efficacy. 

The pilot test resulted in deactivation up to 99.9 percent, 

so EPA decided to expose the heat-treated materials to 

ethylene oxide. Results from test vials undergoing ethylene 
28

oxide treatment alone or heat followed by ethylene oxide 

treatment indicated that the combined treatment was 

most effective. In the combined treatment, 9 of the 11 

crude ricin vials experienced 100 percent deactivation, 

with the other 2 samples reporting 99.995 percent and 

99.997 percent deactivation. All 11 purified ricin vials 

were 100 percent deactivated. Again, the decontamination 

team documented findings in a memorandum and the 

OSC provided recommendations for reuse.

Kelly noted several lessons learned from this 

decontamination event: 

• Documentation EPA correctly assumed that 

they would receive requests to retrieve information 

for the criminal investigation. Documenting the 

materials held in each container was critical. 

• Communication The decontamination team first 

considered simply disposing of replaceable personal 

items (e.g., clothing) and reimbursing the owners. 

However, the owners were emphatic about having 

items returned. An effective communications 

program might have persuaded owners to accept 

reimbursement as a solution. 

• Coordination Interagency groups and the 

decontamination groups worked well together 

and may have a place in a response. Large groups, 

however, may suffer delays simply because of the 

group size. Collaboration with other agencies, such 

as ECBC and NMRC, was critical for the research 

projects conducted as part of decontamination. This 

collaboration allowed the involved OSCs to focus 

on managing the response and avoid becoming 

bogged down by the technology. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• How do the percentages reported for deactivation 

relate to kill? The mammalian cell assays assess 

reduction in activity and provide results as the 

percent of toxicity inactivity. Crude and purified 

ricin were used as surrogates for the ricin actually 

found during the event.

• What was the ricin particle size? This information 

was never made public.

• Ricin is a considerable concern for the 

USPS. Have fumigation vendors looked at 

decontaminating ricin? Some studies of ricin 

fumigation have been conducted. Vendors, 

however, are unable to obtain ricin for testing 

their decontamination technologies. They have 

conducted some studies of protein degradation that 

may be applicable to ricin. Vendors also hypothesize 

that if a fumigant can destroy a prion, it should 

be able to destroy ricin. Overall, ricin should be a 

priority agent for further research.

Restoration From 

Decontamination: USPS 

Experience

Richard Orlusky, U.S. Postal Service

In October 2001, the USPS Trenton facility closed as the 

result of an anthrax event. This presentation highlighted 

the USPS’s experiences in restoring this building after 

decontamination. 

Although contamination occurred in 2001, the 

Trenton facility was closed until offices in Washington, 

D.C., had been decontaminated. Construction of the 

fumigation system in Trenton began in April 2003, and 

fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas occurred in October 

of that year. An environmental clearance committee 

recommended reoccupancy in February 2004. At that 

time, the USPS and the vendor began removing the 

fumigation equipment, conducting limited building 

restoration (e.g., cleaning the HVAC system), and meeting 

with restoration contractors to plan restoration activities. 

The USPS began restoring the mail machinery in March 

2004 and restoration contractors mobilized at the site in 

May 2004. The building reopened in March 2005. 

Critical factors that impacted the restoration included:

• The building’s age and the type and condition of the 

equipment

• The effects of the decontamination effort (e.g., 

surface cleaning with bleach damages equipment 

and flooring)

• Building degradation from inoperable control 

systems (e.g., shutting down the HVAC system led 

to high temperatures and high humidity)

• Equipment degradation from a lack of preventive 

maintenance (e.g., mail-sorting equipment requires 

extensive preventive maintenance and performs 

poorly after sitting idle)
Decontamination Workshop  

Orlusky noted that if the USPS had known the 

extent of damage caused by fumigation with chlorine 

dioxide, they would have used a different, less damaging 

material. They would have reserved bleach for surface 

decontamination only. Orlusky also noted that the longer 

a building and its equipment are left idle, the longer it 

takes to restore the equipment. At the Trenton facility, 

the interior temperature reached 90 to 100 °F, which 

resulted in a harsh working environment. Restoring 

environmental controls is key to creating a comfortable 

work environment and minimizing equipment and 

building degradation. 

Restoration considerations included: 

• The cost of inspecting and servicing components 

 versus replacing components

• The service life of existing building equipment

• Necessary building upgrades

• Building aesthetics

Inspecting and servicing equipment are hidden costs 

of decontamination and restoration. These costs should be

weighed against the cost of simply replacing equipment. 

Aesthetics also carry hidden costs, but the importance 

of aesthetics, which impact worker relations and public 

relations, should not be underestimated. The USPS 

spent considerable money replacing bathroom fixtures, 

renovating the lobby, and replacing locking devices (e.g., 

employee lockers and P.O. boxes). 

At the Trenton facility, restoration included rebuilding

the mail machinery; inspecting electrical wiring, circuit 

breakers, motor controls, and transformers to identify 

replacement versus repair points; laying new flooring 

over workroom floor tiles and replacing carpet in office 

areas; replacing components of the HVAC systems; and 

addressing building aesthetics. 

Orlusky discussed the following lessons learned from 

the USPS’s experiences: 

• Prepare up-to-date as-built plans. Many delays 

experienced by the USPS stemmed from the lack 

of accurate as-built plans and drawings. These plans 

are critical to ensuring successful decontamination 

and restoration.

• Consider the facility. The age of the building, 

maintenance status, and type of equipment are 

major determinants of cost, time, and scope. These 

factors should be considered when planning the 

decontamination and restoration. 

• Plan restoration actions early. Including the 

restoration contractor in discussions with the 

fumigation contractor can help with planning a 

comprehensive scope of work. 

• Select the decontamination technology wisely. 

If fumigation is the selected decontamination 

method, then surface cleaning with a bleach 

agent should be conducted sparingly. Additional 

chloride dioxide research may show effective 

decontamination at lower concentrations and 

reduced contact times, which may reduce damage 

caused by the fumigant itself. 

• Maintain the facility. Restoring environmental 

controls as quickly as possible, maintaining 

equipment, and reducing the downtime before and 

after fumigation reduce the overall time needed to 

restore a facility. 

• Estimate hidden costs. Costs beyond the 

decontamination and fumigation event themselves 

can be substantial. In addition to aesthetic and 

equipment-servicing costs, industrial hygiene 

activities, such as health and safety training, 

emergency response and evacuation planning, as 

well as site security, add to the overall cost. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• A workshop participant stated that bleach 

alternatives have been approved under crisis 

exemptions. In instances of heavy contamination, 

however, some pre-cleaning is necessary to reduce 

biocontaminants to levels that will respond to 

additional treatment. Orlusky agreed that bleach 

cleaning is necessary in some instances. After several 

attempts, the decontamination crew developed a 

successful bleaching technique. Bleach cleaning, 

however, was a labor-intensive practice.

• How were the HVAC systems addressed? The 

USPS kept the HVAC systems running after closing 

the building, but over time components of the 

system failed. Workers wore personal protective 

equipment while conducting repairs.

• Did the USPS conduct OSHA restoration 

sampling? OSHA has posted a guidance document 

for restoration sampling on its Internet site, and 

the USPS submitted a restoration sampling plan 

to OSHA. The agencies worked closely together to 

conduct restoration sampling, which was a major 

effort. The facility employees appreciated this 

relationship with OSHA. 
3

Another Look at Chlorine 

Dioxide Fumigation: 

Concentration-Times, 

Efficacy Tests, and Biological 

Indicators

Paula Krauter, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 

and SNL, in partnership with the San Francisco 

International Airport, have been collaborating in a 

Domestic Demonstration and Application Program 

(DDAP) to develop and demonstrate procedures, 

plans, and techniques for the rapid restoration of a 

major transportation facility. DDAP consists of many 

components. This presentation focused on research, 

development, and evaluation of rapid efficacy tests 

to improve the verification and clearance phases of 

decontamination. LLNL specifically studied fumigation 

with chlorine dioxide.

Researchers developed a rapid viability test protocol 

(RVTP), which is an overnight method for processing 

biological indicator strips using real-time polymerase chain

reaction (PCR). LLNL’s research sought to demonstrate 

this method’s ability to test thousands of samples and 

demonstrate a tracking and data analysis tool. The 

research compared the RVTP against the standard culture 

method, which requires 7 days for results, to assess the 

accuracy of the RVTP. The research included a rigorous 

quality assurance program to evaluate potential crosscontamination, to determine the RVTP’s ability to detect 

blind positives, and establish assay sensitivity. In testing 

the RVTP, LLNL included a number of blind positives, 

degradation products that would interfere with the 

methods, and positive and negative controls. 

LLNL conducted testing over the course of 2 days. 

Testing involved exposing more than 1,000 biological 

indicator strips to 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for up 

to 12 hours. A number of strips were also exposed to 

nonlethal concentrations of chlorine dioxide by varying 

the contact times. (LLNL used a test chamber and 

technology provided by Sabre.) Researches were able 

to tightly control the chlorine dioxide concentration, 

temperature, and humidity within the test chamber. The 

chlorine dioxide was generated by combining sodium 

hypochlorite and hydrochloric acid to produce chlorine. 

The chlorine was then combined with sodium chlorite. 

Half of the strips were analyzed by RVTP and half by the 

standard culture technique. LLRN barcoded each to track 

sample locations in the test chamber and test results. The 

barcode maintained the sample chain-of-custody.

Krauter presented details of the RVTP and standard 

culture test conditions. Results of the standard culture 

are determined by visual turbidity, which is a subjective 

endpoint. RVTP results are less subjective; positive results 

are based on a specific number of DNA detections. At 

a dose of 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for 6 or more 

hours, no viable growth was identified by either RVTP 

or standard cultures. No significant difference in results 

provided by the two methods was identified. The standard 

culture method reported a 1.5 percent false positive rate. 

No false negatives or positives were observed for RVTP. 

Both stainless steel and paper strip biological 

indicators were tested. At nonlethal doses of chlorine 

dioxide, LLNL found a significant difference in number 

of positive results identified for the stainless steel versus 

paper strips. These biological indicators differ in several 

qualities: porosity, spore viability, purity, and spore piling. 

These results highlight considerations for selecting a 

decontamination method (gas or liquid) applicable to 

conditions (porous versus hard surfaces). 

Overall, LLNL’s research met the objective of 

developing an analytical method that can provide accurate 

results in 15 hours. Continuing research includes testing 

RVTP with a high-throughput automation mode and 

applying RVTP to a variety of environmental samples 

(e.g., wipes and filters).

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• LLNL’s results found better kill on the stainless steel 

disks versus paper strips. These results conflict with 

other research with glass and paper. Krauter noted 

this inconsistency. LLNL used a different fumigant 

generation process and a different technology 

to apply spores to the stainless steel disks. These 

differences may have affected the results.

• What kind of variability was there in the 

replicates? For each test concentration and 

time period, LLNL tested 50 individuals and 

identified positives within the test group. They then 

conducted the standard student T-test on results.

• How were nonlethal doses achieved? The study 
Decontamination Workshop  

consistently exposed test strips to 750 ppm of 

chlorine dioxide, but the exposure period varied to 

achieve a nonlethal dose. The test results indicated 

a need for more information on the 3- to 5-hour 

exposure periods and for log-8 versus log-6 test 

strips.

• What is the cost of RVTP? Krauter did not 

have specific information about analysis costs, but 

another workshop participant indicated that RVTP 

costs about 5 cents per sample.

Innovative and Emerging 

Decontamination 

Technologies

Mark Brickhouse, Edgewood Chemical and 

Biological Center

This presentation provided an overview of ECBC 

activities. Public- and private-sector researchers are 

evaluating a number of decontamination technologies, 

such as mVHP, forced hot air, Decon Green, chlorine 

dioxide, enzymes, solvent suspensions and wipes, ionic 

liquids, and supercritical carbon dioxide. ECBC and DoD

are seeking replacements for liquid decontaminants, such 

as bleach because of problems with corrosivity. 

Congress funds most ECBC projects, which have 

focused on field-testing technologies. The following 

summarizes ongoing efforts. 

• Modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide 

(mVHP) ECBC and STERIS co-developed this 

decontamination technology, which includes 

ammonia as an activator. They have conducted 

field-testing at an abandoned building and in 

a C-141 cargo plane, as described during the 

presentation by McVey of STERIS. Field-testing 

proved efficacious against biological and chemical 

agents. The C-141 cargo plane served as a 

demonstration of the mobile technology. For bare 

metal coupons, greater than 99.9 percent kill rates 

were found for biologicals and a mustard simulant 

was reduced to less than the 8-hour time-weighted 

average in 5-, 10-, and 24-hour test runs. On 

more absorptive surfaces, however, longer exposure 

periods and higher concentrations were required for 

success. 

These tests also examined methods for distributing the 

VHP and provided data for modeling efforts. Ongoing 

research with mVHP includes reducing the equipment 

size to a system transportable on military vehicles; assessing 

material compatibility and equipment sensitivities; 

expanding aircraft studies; and assessing applications for 

ambulances, hospitals, or hotel suites.

• Forced hot air Injecting an area with forced 

hot air acts as accelerated weathering. Past tests 

were unsuccessful because of uneven heating; 

even heating prevents recondensation. ECBC has 

conducted more recent testing in aircraft using 

airflow strategies that achieve consistent target 

surface temperatures. Results indicated that forced 

hot air increases off-gassing for chemical agents 

but is insufficient for treating biological agents. 

Studies consistently found that longer cycle 

times are needed for more absorptive materials. 

Considerations for forced hot air systems include 

material compatibility, treatment volume, and air 

distribution. ECBC believes the system could be 

modified to treat other vehicles. 

• Combined VHP and forced hot air A combined 

system takes advantage of the benefits of both 

technologies. The forced hot air enhances hydrogen 

peroxide vaporization, controls heat and relative 

humidity, and enhances the diffusion of VHP. The 

forced hot air also improves desorption of chemical 

agents. The effluent from treating an aircraft can 

be routed through a carbon-based filtration system, 

catalytic oxidation, or thermal oxidation treatment 

system. ECBC may conduct further research on the 

combined technology in fiscal year 2007.

• Decon Green ECBC is also developing Decon 

Green, an environmentally friendly decontaminant 

formulated using commercial chemicals. Decon 

Green is designed to replace DS2 and DF-200 in 

military use. Studies have proven Decon Green 

to be effective against chemical and biological 

agents, but the chemical is disruptive to surfaces. To 

improve material compatibility, reformulations have 

slightly reduced kill efficacies. Decon Green has a 

number of benefits: it is ready for use 15 minutes 

after mixing, applicable in a variety of weather 

conditions, effective for 12 hours after mixing, 

compatible with protective clothing, and disposable 

as a nonhazardous material after hydrogen peroxide 

degradation.
32

• Resistant coatings Traditional chemical agent 

resistant coatings (CARCs) are nonreactive, durable 

and nonmarring, weather resistant, and flexible. 

Research for next-generation CARCs has been 

funded. 

• Reactive coatings These materials actively destroy 

surface chemical agent contamination either by 

hydrolysis or oxidation. Research information 

on reactive coatings is readily available, and 

reactive materials such as these are widely used 

in industrial processes. Identifying and studying 

materials resistant to biological and chemical 

agents will likely be a strategic research area in 

the next few years. Potential agents for reactive 

coatings include metal oxides, activated carbon, 

zeolites, microporous membranes, novel polymers, 

dendrimers, and microencapsulation materials. 

Current research with reactive coatings aims to 

identify a coating that could achieve 99.999 percent 

decontamination when partnered with other 

standard decontamination technologies. ECBC 

is partnering with the Army Research Laboratory 

(ARL) to study hyperbranched polymers and 

polyoxometalates. ECBC will perform the efficacy 

and material compatibility tests. 

• Other research materials ECBC and others are 

conducting research on several other materials. In a 

joint venture with NATICK, ECBC is evaluating 

active moieties in uniforms for personal protection. 

Catalysts, such as metal oxides, activated carbon, 

and polyoxometalates would be included in 

uniform fabrics to improve personnel protection 

from chemical agent vapors. ECBC is also 

investigating self-decontaminating coatings (e.g., 

polyoxometalates and other inorganic catalysts) 

for water infrastructure protection and zeolitebased systems that would apply to a wide variety of 

situations. 

In addition to researching specific decontamination 

agents, ECBC is conducting several other research 

projects:

• Comparative decontamination The object 

of this study is to compare the efficacy of three 

different commercial fumigation products and 

study the effects of parameters such as temperature 

and relative humidity.

• Enzyme decontamination ECBC and 

Genencor International have partnered to 

investigate the use of enzymes to decontaminate 

nerve agents, sulfur mustard, and biological agents 

and toxins. They have signed an exclusive patent 

license agreement to begin commercial production 

of viable enzyme products. These products are 

available to first responders. 

• Sensitive equipment decontamination ECBC 

is also researching small-scale decontamination 

systems that are capable of treating a wide range of 

chemical and agent materials. Two research areas 

are sorbent/reactive suspensions and solvent wipes. 

Ongoing tests of these technologies are planned. 

Nonreactive wipes also play a role in reducing gross 

contamination. 

• Ionic liquid-based decontamination Ionic 

liquid has been a productive research area for the 

past 5 to 10 years. Researchers have identified a 

broad class of ionic liquids for decontamination 

of CWAs. Ionic liquids would replace traditional 

solvents by combining solvent, surfactant, buffer, 

and oxidizing agent functionalities. Further tests are 

planned.

• Supercritical carbon dioxide decontamination 

ECBC developed a bench-scale supercritical 

carbon dioxide reactor to test this decontamination 

technology. This material seems to be an effective 

cleaning and sterilizing agent. Supercritical carbon 

dioxide is also environmentally friendly and recycles 

carbon dioxide, thus preventing the release of 

greenhouse gases. The technology is readily available 

for garment cleaning, hard-surface cleaning, and 

sterilization. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• What technologies apply to wide-area 

decontamination, such as large cities? Foam and 

base-activated technologies can both be developed 

for wide areas. GL1800 is modified airport de-icing 

equipment that can be used for deploying a liquid 

over a large area. 

• Is the forced hot air technology effective 

against virus contamination? ECBC has tested 

decontamination technologies against virus 

contamination, but a decontaminant must be 

able to kill a spore to be considered a biological 
Decontamination Workshop  

decontaminant. A first responder will not 

necessarily know the differences among viruses, 

biological agents, and spores.

• When conducting aircraft research, why was 

the HVAC system excluded from study? ECBC 

researchers excluded the HVAC system because 

they were considering contamination scenarios that 

may not involve the HVAC system. Contamination 

of the main cargo area was seen as the more likely 

scenario. 

Systematic Decontamination

Project: Homeland Security 

Verification of Chemical and 

Biological Decontamination 

Technologies

Phil Koga, Edgewood Chemical and Biological 

Center

When decontaminating an anthrax-contaminated 

building, one must consider treatment options (e.g., 

surface treatment versus fumigation), efficacy data, and 

material impacts. ECBC, in conjunction with NHSRC, 

is conducting systematic studies on the performance of 

chlorine dioxide and VHP for decontamination. 

As part of its research, ECBC is conducting a 

bioefficacy study to assess concentration and exposure 

time, evaluate six types of materials (porous and 

nonporous), and test avirulent and virulent B. anthracis. 

The study also examines sub-optimal temperatures and 

relative humidities as well as B. anthracis surrogates. The 

test design included three fumigants (STERIS’s VHP, 

ClorDiSys, Inc.’s chlorine dioxide, and Sabre’s chlorine 

dioxide), six microorganisms, and test coupons made of 

six different materials. The two chlorine dioxide fumigants 

differed in that ClorDiSys, Inc., uses a dry generation 

process and Sabre uses a wet process. 

ECBC conducted range-finding tests to assess optimal 

fumigant concentrations and exposure periods and 

examine the effects of temperature and humidity. Koga 

presented specific test details. Testing seeks also to provide 

information about the effects of six different building 

materials on the fumigant concentrations and the effects 

of the fumigants on the integrity of the building materials. 

This testing is linked with the bioefficacy studies. ECBC is 

looking to use American Society for Testing and Materials 

(ASTM) standards for strength and other characteristics. 

Deposition velocity testing has begun, and material 

compatibility testing is slated for April 2005. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• When generating chlorine dioxide, determining 

whether chlorine gas is present is critical. Other 

researchers used ammonia-based analytical tests to 

identify chlorine dioxide. 

• One workshop participant suggested that 

ECBC use corrosivity tests developed in the 

telecommunications industry when conducting 

material compatibility tests with circuits. This test 

includes exposing a copper plate to an agent and 

counting the holes that form. Koga indicated that 

ECBC considered testing the circuit function, as 

well as material compatibility.

• Has ECBC considered pore symmetry tests or 

other methods to assess surface degradation? 

ECBC has considered a number of methods but is 

open to other recommendations.

• Is there a need for a secondary scrubber for 

chlorine gas when fumigating with chlorine 

dioxide? ECBC is testing for the presence of 

chlorine gas in the chlorine dioxide gas stream and 

addressing this concern.

• What was the spore recovery material for the 

coupons? ECBC used a water-based material. 

Use of HVAC Systems in 

Building Decontamination

Tina Carlsen, Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory

LLNL and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 

(LBNL) became involved in decontamination 

research after the sarin release in the Tokyo subway. 

This presentation describes their HVAC system 

decontamination studies. 

After the Tokyo subway incident, three potential 

attack scenarios were identified: open air (e.g., a stadium), 

semi-enclosed (e.g., a subway), and enclosed (e.g., a 

building or an airplane). In two of these scenarios, HVAC 

systems are involved, so LLNL’s research focuses on HVAC 

systems and gaseous fumigants used in decontamination. 
34

Specifically, the research examines both decontamination 

of HVAC systems and use of HVAC systems in 

decontamination. The research includes a medium-scale, 

well-instrumented demonstration with hydrogen peroxide 

(generated using the STERIS technology). 

The LLNL test facility consists of an office trailer split 

into two rooms: a test room and a control room. The test 

room contains an HVAC system created with 6-inchround galvanized steel ductwork, aged to remove organics. 

Preliminary experiments involved injecting the test room 

with hydrogen peroxide through the ductwork. The 

decontamination cycle consisted of four steps: dehumidify 

to reach 30 percent relative humidity, condition by 

injection with hydrogen peroxide at 7.3 grams per 

minute (g/min) for 12 minutes, sterilize by injection with 

hydrogen peroxide at 4.2 g/min for 3 hours, and aerate for

4 hours. 

LLNL expected a hydrogen peroxide concentration of

1 mg/L during the sterilization phase. In testing, however, 

the hydrogen peroxide concentrations were significantly 

lower. Concentrations dropped near one corner of the 

room. A test with biological indicators supported this 

finding; some positive indicators were found. LLNL 

hypothesized that the galvanized steel was affecting the 

hydrogen peroxide concentrations. A subsequent study 

using polyvinyl chloride (PVC) ductwork supported this 

hypothesis. The bulk hydrogen peroxide concentration 

was much greater when introduced with PVC than with 

galvanized steel. 

LLNL created a new circular ductwork configuration 

that included 90 feet of galvanized steel with sensors 

located throughout. After injecting this system with 

hydrogen peroxide, LLRN found that the hydrogen 

peroxide concentration decreases as a function of flow rate,

temperature, and distance traveled along the ductwork. 

These results indicate a need for increased injection rates 

or multiple injection points. Condensation is a concern 

when increasing the injection rate. 

In conjunction with LBNL, LLNL is creating a 

computational fluid dynamic model to characterize 

decomposition in the ductwork. Available test data 

indicate that the VHP degradation process is third order. 

Once this model is created and validated, it can be used to 

assess longer systems and larger configurations.

LLNL is also conducting surveys of buildings with 

HVAC systems. The surveys identify the features that 

have the greatest impact on hydrogen peroxide. LLNL 

collects real-world data about these features. Information 

collected includes square footage, interior materials, 

layout, HVAC system operation modes, injection point 

locations, humidity controls, HVAC system returns, 

and areas not serviced by the HVAC system. An HVAC 

engineer can help to address architectural concerns. LLNL 

has collected HVAC system information from three 

federal buildings (a two-story, modern office building; an 

older, multistory office building; and an indoor arena). 

Collected information is classified because these are federal 

facilities. The surveys identified architectural features 

that would be difficult to decontaminate. LLNL also 

concluded that an HVAC engineer should be involved in 

the building surveys. The results may support a database of 

information needed for developing remediation strategies 

and individual building assessments. 

Ongoing research will include biological indicator 

tests within the ductwork to characterize kill rates and 

optimize VHP efficacy, characterization tests with 

alternate ductwork materials, and completion of the 

modeling program. Ongoing room-scale studies include 

characterization of VHP distribution and development of 

predictive models. During characterization tests, LLNL 

researchers will evaluate different modes of fumigant 

introduction and dispersal. They will also increase the 

sensor density in the test room to provide additional data. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

Workshop participants commented on the application 

of the research to real-world situations. Several participants 

commented that larger office buildings often use 

fiberglass-lined ductwork and that returns may be lined 

with papier-mâché or fiberglass. Another participant noted 

that the presence of slime and dirt in HVAC systems 

would affect study results. And yet another participant 

noted that the iron content of the ductwork would also 

affect results. Carlsen agreed that any lining, material, or 

dirt in the ductwork would affect results. An initial project 

goal was to provide information for airports, which usually 

have HVAC systems made of unlined galvanized steel. 

LLNL obtained their galvanized steel ductwork from a 

commercial business and did not test for iron content. 

LLNL researchers have not yet studied lined ducts, but 

they would welcome additional research to add to the 

body of knowledge. LLNL started its research with a basic, 

clean system. Subsequent efforts could involve expanding 

the system or testing a dirty system. Because of funding 

limitations, LLNL researchers selected room scaling as a 
Decontamination Workshop 

next phase. They hope to conduct dirty system testing in 

the future. 

Building Disinfection 

Byproducts: Experimental 

Evaluation and Decision Tool

Richard Corsi, University of Texas

Corsi’s research focuses on the effects of building materials 

on fumigants and the production of gaseous byproducts. 

The research investigates how materials affect the amount 

of fumigant needed for decontamination and provides 

anecdotal evidence regarding material compatibility.

In conducting building decontamination, a 

disinfectant must reach a specific dose to ensure efficacy. 

The dose is based on the disinfectant concentration, as well 

as on exposure time, and can be expressed as ppm-hours. 

Disinfectant consumption by materials in the treatment 

space (e.g., a room) affect the dose. Consumption may 

reduce the disinfectant air concentration, increase the 

time to the threshold concentration, suppress doses, and 

require greater mass injection rates and increased injection 

times. Another concern of fumigation is the production 

and persistence of disinfectant byproducts. Byproducts 

themselves may be toxic, persist in a building, compromise 

worker safety, and increase the time to reoccupation. 

Researchers have evidence that a fumigant can enter 

and react with porous materials. The term deposition 

velocity describes the mass transport of a disinfectant in or 

out of material and chemical reactions. Corsi presented an 

equation describing disinfectant concentration in a room 

over time, which is a function of injection rate, gas-phase 

decay, and velocity deposition. The deposition velocity is a 

function of time and materials. 

Issues regarding byproduct formation and release 

include byproduct identification, formation factors, and 

persistence. Factors affecting byproduct formation include 

the disinfectant, disinfectant concentration, material, 

relative humidity, and exposure time. 

Corsi’s research evaluated 4 disinfectants and 24 

materials, quantified deposition velocities, and identified 

byproducts and release rates. Some byproducts are 

volatile while others are more persistent. This research 

tried to identify and quantify byproduct formation. 

Data from this research feed several tools: a software 

application that will support decisions regarding fumigant 

applications (DADS); a database of experimental results 

(e.g., deposition velocities, byproducts); and screening 

calculations that facilitate fumigation system design, 

consider fumigant consumption, and rank byproducts. 

The test included 96 combinations of materials 

and disinfectants that served as standard conditions. 

Relative humidity and dose remained consistent. Relative 

humidities, disinfectant doses, and disinfectant and 

material combinations were then adjusted, yielding 36 

variations. Tests were replicated 14 times. The research 

generated more than 3,000 samples. The four disinfectants 

tested included ozone, chlorine dioxide, hydrogen 

peroxide, and methyl bromide. The 24 test materials 

included commonly purchased construction materials 

(e.g., concrete, carpet, wallboard, ductwork). 

The experiment system consisted of four closed 

chambers that were simultaneously injected with a single 

disinfectant. The system included controls to maintain 

specific disinfectant concentrations, temperatures, and 

relative humidities. The four chambers vented to a single 

monitored exhaust point and then passed through a 

potassium iodide scrubber. In the tests, one of the four 

chambers remained empty as a control and the other three 

chambers contained test materials. Each test run of the 

system consisted of a 9-hour background phase, a 4- to 

16-hour disinfection phase, and a persistence phase of at 

least 20 hours. During the background phase to identify 

chemical emitters from the test materials, test temperature 

and relative humidity were reached, but no disinfectant 

entered the system. The disinfectant was injected into the 

system during the disinfection phase. 

Overall, tests conducted so far have identified 

significant materials effects for ozone and chlorine dioxide, 

significant disinfectant effects, significant concentration 

effects, rapid decay in consumption rates (for ozone 

and chlorine dioxide), and non-zero endpoints. Corsi 

provided specific test data to illustrate the findings. Ceiling 

tiles and office partitions continued to be consumers of 

chlorine dioxide and ozone throughout the disinfection 

phase. Concrete was almost completely passivated. Most 

materials had low deposition velocities after 16 hours, but 

all materials had non-zero endpoints. 

Byproduct formation is highly dynamic and produces 

unique material/disinfectant fingerprints. There were 

significant differences among disinfectants. Byproduct 

persistence (off-gassing) was also likely; 5-day and 1-

year tests showed persistence in some byproducts. For 

most materials, with the exception of ceiling tiles and 
36

HVAC system components, ozone was more reactive 

than chlorine dioxide. Ozone byproducts included 16 

saturated carbonyls and about 50 additional, unquantified 

chemicals. Chlorine dioxide byproducts also included 16 

saturated carbonyls, 6 unknown chlorine compounds, 

and a number of additional unquantified compounds. 

The chlorine dioxide reaction with latex paint created 

significant quantities of an unknown chlorine compound. 

The reaction behind this byproduct formation remains 

unknown. VHP created only a small amount of volatile 

byproducts. Methyl bromide itself was a greater concern 

for building reoccupation than byproduct formation. 

Reports summarizing research findings are slated 

for release in July 2005. Completion of the software 

supporting decisions regarding fumigant applications 

(DADS) is scheduled for June 2005. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• How were materials placed in the test chambers? 

For carpet or flooring, the bottom of the test 

chamber was completely covered. Other materials 

with edges that would not be exposed in a realworld situation were sealed with sodium silicate 

along the edges. Paper, however, was simply stacked 

in the chamber as it would be stacked on a desk. 

• Was the presence of hexanol due to residual levels

or continual emissions? Hexanol may have been 

residual. Compared with the amount involved 

in the persistence phase of the test, the amount 

emitted in the background phase was small.

• How were blanks considered? The beginning 

of each experiment was considered a blank. The 

9-hour background phase was used to identify 

background chemical concentrations. 

• Were the chambers sealed from light? Chambers 

were sealed from light. 

• How were air concentrations considered? Flow 

rates and air concentrations were used to find mass 

per volume. The results are reported as relative 

emissions. Had the tests lasted longer, higher masses 

would have been reported. A workshop participant 

also commented that the test identified only volatile 

byproducts.

• What efforts were made to establish that no 

chlorine gas was formed? The chamber exhaust 

was tested to prove that chlorine gas was not 

formed.

Evaluation of Two Biological 

Decontamination Methods in 

a Room-Sized Test Chamber

Mark Buttner, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Researchers at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 

conducted research to test the efficacy of two 

decontamination products (DF-100 and chlorine dioxide 

gas) and compare surface sampling methods and analytical 

techniques for detecting biological agents, using cultures, 

quantitative PCR, and hand-held assays.

DF-100 is a Modec, Inc., decontamination foam 

with two liquid components. Product ingredients include 

cationic detergents, fatty alcohols, stabilized hydrogen 

peroxide, water, and inert materials. DF-100 has since 

been replaced by DF-200. The Gas:Solid technology 

by CDG Research Corporation produced the chlorine 

dioxide for testing. Spores of B. atrophaeus served as the 

test organism and TSAC cultures, hand-held assays, 

PCR primer/probe sequences, and TaqMan assay (7700 

Sequence Detection System) served as the analysis 

methods. The 7700 Sequence has since been replaced by a 

7900 Sequence system. 

Researchers conducted tests in a controlled chamber. 

They placed the test surface materials in the chamber, ran 

the chamber HVAC system, introduced dry spores (using 

a Pitt-3 dry aerosol generator), stopped the HVAC system, 

and allowed the spores to settle overnight. They conducted 

sampling the next day. Test surface materials included 

wood laminate (desk material), vinyl tile (flooring), and 

painted metal (a metal file cabinet). Predecontamination 

samples were collected using readily available methods: 

swipe, heavy wipe (damp cloth), and swab sample 

processing kit (foam swab). After initial sampling, 

researchers injected the decontaminants and collected 

post-decontamination samples. Samples were analyzed 

using the three test methods (culture, quantitative PCR, 

and hand-held assay).

During spore injection, the average airborne 

concentration was 1.5 x 106

 spores per cubic meter. The 

culture and quantitative PCR methods reported 105

 to 106

spore per square foot in the predecontamination samples. 

Each of the three sampling methods demonstrated 

comparable spore collection efficiencies. Similar levels 

of spores were found on each of the three test surface 

materials as well. The results from the predecontamination 
Decontamination Workshop  

served as the control for the post-decontamination 

sampling. 

After decontamination with DF-100, postdecontamination samples found no culturable spores 

although the quantitative PCR analysis indicated that 

spore DNA remained. Earlier studies of DF-100 with viral

agents identified no viral RNA after treatment, however, a 

virus is more fragile than a spore. 

After decontamination with chlorine dioxide, postdecontamination samples found no culturable spores 

in 24 of 27 samples. Of the three positive samples, each 

supported only one colony. The quantitative PCR analysis 

indicated that spore DNA remained. The hand-held assay 

results were positive for all samples. 

Researchers also conducted one environmental 

background trial for each decontamination method to 

determine the impact of dust on the effectiveness of the 

decontamination method and the analytical method. 

They collected dust from the outdoor air filters of several 

commercial buildings and then aerosolized 10 grams of 

this dust in the test chamber. They found an approximate 

soiling level of 2 milligrams of soil per 100 square 

centimeters. Researchers then injected spores into the 

chamber and conducted decontamination. Spore culture 

data were comparable between the predecontamination 

samples with and without environmental background. 

The dust, however, did inhibit the quantitative PCR 

results. Culture data for post-decontamination samples 

were similar with or without environmental background. 

Quantitative PCR results indicated that spore DNA 

remained in post-decontamination samples. 

Buttner listed some practical considerations for 

each of the decontaminants tested. DF-100 is fast 

and easy to use, but it is limited to use on nonporous, 

washable surfaces. It also resulted in material damage 

(e.g., it dissolved floor polish, stripped paint, and caused 

bubbling of wood laminate). Chlorine dioxide gas can 

decontaminate an entire space with contents in place. 

This method, however, requires specialized equipment, 

training, and personnel. It also causes material damage 

(e.g., it yellowed wall paint and corroded aluminum).

In conclusion, both decontamination methods were 

effective in reducing the number of culturable spores 

and neither method was affected by environmental 

background. Spore DNA remained after treatment with 

both decontaminants. The quantitative PCR analysis 

method, however, was inhibited by environmental 

background. This study did not assess the infection 

potential of nonculturable pathogens. 

Buttner provided the following references for this 

research:

• Buttner, M.P., P. Cruz, L.D. Stetzenbach, A.K. 

Klima-Comba, V.L. Stevens, and T.D. Cronin. 

2004. “Determination of the efficacy of two 

building decontamination strategies by surface 

sampling with culture and quantitative PCR 

analysis.” Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 70:4740–4747.

• Buttner, M.P., P. Cruz, L.D. Stetzenbach, A.K. 

Klima-Comba, V.L. Stevens, and P.A. Emanuel. 

2004. “Evaluation of the Biological Sampling Kit 

(BiSKit) for large-area surface sampling.” Appl. 

Environ. Microbiol. 70:7040–7045.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• Would you expect similar material compatibility 

concerns with DF-200? Buttner indicated that 

speculating about results for DF-200 would be 

inappropriate. Nonetheless, a workshop participant 

speculated that material compatibility issues would 

be fewer for DF-200 than for DF-100 because DF200 has a lower solvent content. 

• Did you have a biocide neutralization step postsampling? No biocide neutralization step was 

conducted.

Verification of Commercial 

Decontamination 

Technologies in Bench-Scale 

Studies Using B. anthracis

Spores

Mike Taylor, Battelle Memorial Institute

EPA’s ETV program verifies environmental technology 

performance and objectively reports results to end-users 

such as permitters and buyers. The program performs 

tests as outlined in quality assurance plans developed in 

conjunction with technical experts, stakeholders, and 

vendors. ETV does not purposely try to fail technologies. 

Battelle works as a contractor to ETV. This presentation 

provided results from testing three decontamination 

technologies: BIOQUELL Inc.’s hydrogen peroxide gas; 

CERTEK Inc.’s formaldehyde gas, and CDG Research 

Inc.’s chlorine dioxide gas. 
38

The testing apparatus consisted of the technology 

under evaluation and a test chamber. The test chamber is 

a compact glove box with a decontaminant injection port, 

sensors, and an exhaust port. In this system, Battelle used 

spore strips to assess biological efficacy and construction 

material coupons to assess material compatibility. 

Researchers tested seven material coupons (carpet, bare 

wood, glass, laminate, galvanized metal ductwork, 

painted wallboard, and painted concrete). The painted 

concrete coupons consisted of sawed and painted cinder 

block. Each coupon measured 0.75 by 5 inches. Battelle 

evaluated biological efficacy by assessing the log reduction 

in viable spores on the test materials and identifying 

positive or negative bacterial growth on the biological 

indicators and spore strips. The biological indicators and 

spore strips provided a link to real-world events, which 

rely on these indicators for decontamination sampling. 

Changes in coupon appearance, color, texture, and 

other parameters indicated coupon damage and material 

compatibility concerns.

The general test procedure consisted of connecting 

the decontamination technology to the test chamber, 

inoculating test material coupons and placing them in 

the test chamber, implementing the decontamination 

technology, and removing and analyzing the coupons. 

Before inoculating the coupons, Battelle wiped each one 

with isopropyl alcohol. Coupons were not autoclaved, so 

some microbes remained and Battelle observed microbe 

growth. Each coupon was inoculated with 108

 of the 

biological test agents. B. anthracis analyses were conducted 

with a 15-minute extraction followed by 1- and 7-day 

growth assessments. The supernatant from the extraction 

process underwent a 1-hour heat shock and dilution 

plating for enumeration. Efficacy data (log reductions) 

were calculated as the log of the viable spores recovered 

from control samples minus the log of the remaining 

spores on the decontaminated samples. Battelle also 

conducted several statistical analyses to assess results 

variability. 

Taylor presented the specific study conditions for 

each of the three technologies tested, as well as the specific 

study results, including mean efficacy for spore reduction 

on each test material, statistical analyses for each test 

material, and growth on the biological indicators and 

spore strips. Results for the efficacy tests and statistical 

analyses are expressed as log reductions from 1 to 8, with 

8 indicating 100 percent kill. Battelle found that surrogate 

results did not compare to B. anthracis results. Results for 

the biological indicators are qualitative; positive results 

indicate growth and negative results indicate an absence of 

growth. Some of the biological indicators and spore strips 

were positive after decontamination with the CERTEK 

Inc. formaldehyde. The indicators and strips were placed 

in a pouch and the positives were likely the result of 

uneven gas penetration into the pouch. Testing with the 

CDG Research Inc. chlorine dioxide gas is undergoing 

repeat testing and verification. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• One workshop participant commented that ETV 

originally intended to test technologies volunteered 

by vendors, with vendors sharing the costs. For 

homeland security related technologies, this format 

changed to a new program called Technology 

Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) and is 

fully funded by EPA, which allows flexibility in 

testing. 

• A number of research projects with chlorine dioxide 

gas are ongoing. Additional areas of research 

may examine chlorine gas and reactions in gas 

chromatograph (GC) columns and study flow rates 

through the test chamber. Chlorine dioxide can be 

as much as 50 times more soluble in organics than 

in water. This is a trait that should be considered.

• A workshop participant noted that studies need to 

consider air exchange rates. The laboratory studies 

should mimic the air exchange rates found in realworld situations.

• Why was methyl bromide excluded from testing? 

Battelle discussed including methyl bromide, but 

EPA funding and approval, which was not received, 

is necessary. Battelle, however, is willing to discuss 

various technology options with vendors interested 

in the testing program. 

• What were the replicates for each 

decontaminant? Because tests began after the 

anthrax incidents following 9/11, Battelle was 

pushed for results. The tests examined a single dose 

(concentration × time) with three replicates.

• Are you anticipating any major changes in 

protocol as new projects start? Some minor 

changes may occur, but the overall study design 

should remain the same. Battelle may add monitors 

to examine the rate of volatilization and to identify 

degradation products. It will likely change the 
Decontamination Workshop  

protocol for cleaning the test material coupons and 

move away from the isopropyl solution wipes.

Technical Support Working 

Group Decontamination 

Research and Development 

Activities

Rebecca Blackmon, Technical Support Working 

Group

The presentation provided an overview of projects 

underway by the Technical Support Working Group 

(TSWG). These projects, which can last from 7 

months to 2 years, focus on methods that speed up the 

decontamination process. The presentation was organized 

by projects that affect activities before, during, and after 

decontamination.

Under TSWG, the Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear subgroup identifies user needs 

related to these materials and conducts rapid research, 

development, and prototyping. Their focus areas are agent 

detection, decontamination, protection, and information 

collection. TSWG and the subgroup projects include:

• Biological backgrounds in critical facilities 

The intent of this two-phase project is to determine 

seasonal and diurnal variations in existing 

background bacterial and viral aerosol load with 

a focus on threat agents (e.g., B. anthracis). The 

project will provide information about the bacterial 

background at critical locations, which will help 

responders identify possible interferences if a 

bioterrorist event occurs. As part of the project, 

researchers collect integrated and time-resolved 

samples at multiple locations and link these samples 

with HVAC systems and environmental data. 

Samples undergo analysis with classic microbiology 

and microassay methods. The University of 

Minnesota and Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL) are partners in this project. 

Phase I of the project serves as a demonstration for 

Phase II. Under Phase I, the research partners completed 

a 1-month sampling program at local airports to assess 

sampling protocols. Phase I also included developing 

extraction protocols and developing and evaluating lowcost microassay methods. Phase II is in the planning 

phase. Over the course of 1 year, researchers will conduct 

quarterly sampling and analyze the samples using the 

microassays identified or developed during Phase I. The 

data from Phase II will provide an understanding of the 

variability and prevalence of biological background as 

affected by season, weather, activity level, and geographic 

location. 

• Statistical design tool for sampling contaminated 

buildings Under this project, TSWG, in 

partnership with Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL), will develop a user-friendly 

software tool that will design statistically valid 

surface sampling protocols for determining the 

extent of contamination following a chemical or 

biological terrorist attack. Users will input specific 

statistical requirements and tailor the program’s 

generic floor plan to meet specifics of the facility 

and HVAC system under investigation. The 

program includes decision criteria that affect 

sampling protocols (e.g., providing the user the 

confidence intervals that the sampling protocol 

will identify hot spots and maximum agent 

concentrations). Users, however, should discuss 

statistical sampling needs (e.g., level of confidence) 

before an event occurs. The software will also help 

users estimate costs associated with sampling. The 

project is slated for completion in June 2005. 

• Wireless multisensor environmental monitors 

In conjunction with Esensor, Inc., and SUNY 

Buffalo, TSWG is developing a real-time sensor 

system that is lightweight, portable, inexpensive, 

and battery-operated. The system contains eight 

interchangeable sensors that monitor CWAs and 

toxic industrial chemicals. The sensors use wireless 

or Internet/Ethernet connections compatible 

with other wireless systems to communicate 

results. This type of system is especially relevant 

to decontamination events. A bomb squad could 

also use the system to assess suspicious packages. 

TSWG is targeting a cost of $3,000 to $5,000 for 

the system. A prototype has been designed, and 

production of a system for testing is under way. 

• Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) sensor web 

Although similar to the wireless multisensor 

monitors, the JPL sensor web has unique 

applications. This project responds to an EPA 

requirement for monitoring chlorine dioxide during 

decontamination. The system may also apply to 

urban search-and-rescue operations (e.g., searching 
4

collapsed buildings) when inserting a sensor is safer 

than inserting a person to assess environmental 

conditions. This wireless network monitors and 

controls temperature, humidity, light intensity, and 

decontaminant agent concentrations in a facility 

undergoing decontamination. The system is selfnetworking and has proven reliability from fieldtesting (e.g., monitoring for explosives along the 

Alaska pipeline). JPL has built a 40-pod network 

and demonstrated this network for sensing chlorine 

dioxide. The pod sensors consist of a single pass 

sample cell with no mirrors or reference beams. 

The sensors are easy to calibrate and have a wide 

detection range (80 to 1,000 ppm for chlorine 

dioxide). The sensors are also inexpensive to 

produce and require little power to run. As a next 

step, JPL aims to miniaturize the chlorine dioxide 

sensor and develop an Urban Search and Rescue 

(USAR) gas sensor. 

• Electrostatic decontamination system This 

is an effective, safe, and logistically efficient 

decontamination system now in its fifth generation. 

Clean Earth Technologies demonstrated chemical 

and biological agent decontamination without 

damaging surfaces. The technology is within the 

EPA regulatory processes, with the biological aspect 

undergoing verification testing. 

The decontamination unit for this technology 

has a rugged, compact, modular design. A single 

operator can easily use the system. Without brushing, 

scrubbing, mopping, or scraping, the decontaminant 

provides a greater than log-6 kill for B. anthracis spores 

within seconds. Compared with foam technologies, 

approximately six times less of this decontaminant is 

needed to achieve success. The decontaminant also has 

high material compatibility; a paper document can be 

submersed in the decontaminant for 24 hours without 

harming the print. The system can be employed with or 

without ultraviolet (UV) light. UV light increases the kill 

rate when used with the biological decontaminant. Testing

has shown that the system is effective against biological 

agents, chemical agents, and viruses (e.g., flu, polio). The 

decontamination process does not destroy DNA and 

therefore does not compromise DNA evidence. 

• Atmospheric plasma decontamination This 

decontamination method provides effective and 

efficient neutralization of biological agents but 

minimizes damage to high-value items (e.g., 

items of historical interest). The technology has 

been demonstrated with oil paintings, tapestries, 

black and white photographs, and ink on paper. 

AOAC sporicidal testing has also been successfully 

completed. TSWG completed this project in July 

2004. A report summarizing results is available on 

request.

• Expedient mitigation of radiological releases 

The project examines methods to minimize the 

spread of radioactive particles from a radiological 

dispersion device (RDD). A strippable polymer 

coating would be applied to surfaces after rescue 

operations and during the decontamination 

planning phase. The polymer coating developed 

by TSWG requires 24 hours for curing. 

Demonstrations have shown that it is durable 

yet easy to strip. The coating can also be applied 

using equipment familiar to first responders (e.g., 

hoses and backpack systems). Ongoing efforts 

under this project include testing the coating with 

radiologicals and investigating a dual use with dust 

re-entrainment mitigation.

• Radiological decontamination technologies 

In conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory 

(ANL), TSWG is examining a chemical process to 

nondestructively remove cesium-137 from porous 

building materials. The process applies an ionic 

wash followed by a superabsorbent gel that captures 

the cesium-137. The gel is then vacuum-removed 

from the surface. The process is particularly 

applicable to concrete decontamination. ANL has 

completed laboratory testing and may conduct 

field-testing in 2005. ANL is also modifying the 

gel formation for other materials and examining 

application technologies. Commercialization 

negotiations are in progress. 

• Mass personnel decontamination protocol 

TSWG has completed the guidance document 

“Best Practices and Guidelines for Mass Personnel 

Decontamination.” This document, which is 

available for order on the Internet (www.cbiac.

aprea.army.mil), includes information for 

decontamination of chemical, biological, and 

radiological agents on people. A first edition was 

completed in 2003, and a second edition was 

released in September 2004. 
Decontamination Workshop  

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• What is the minimum detection levels on the 

monitors and sensors (ppm/ppb/ppt)? TSWG 

is involved with two sensor projects—one uses 

existing sensors placed in pods, the other requires 

developing a new technology. Blackmon believes 

these sensors detect contamination to the ppm level.

• For the electrostatic decontamination system, 

what was the test substrate and how was the 

biological solution applied? Blackmon did not 

have immediate access to the project details but said 

she would obtain the information for the workshop 

participant. Blackmon provided her contact 

information to workshop participants. 

“Dirty Bombs” (Radiological 

Dispersion Devices [RDDs]) 

and Cleanup

Fred Holbrook, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency

RDDs, or “dirty bombs,” use conventional explosives 

(e.g., TNT, RDX) to disperse radioactive materials. These 

bombs would cause low-level radiological contamination 

and cause psychological and economic damage. Fatalities 

from RDD events, however, would be expected to be 

low. Holbrook listed several radiological agents that are 

potential components of RDDs and specified the half-life 

of each. (The more radioactive materials have shorter halflives.) To cause the worst health effects, the radiological 

agent must enter a person’s lungs. Cesium fluoride is of 

particular concern because it is a fine, talclike powder, i.e., 

it is easily dispersed. 

An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear 

weapon that can cause vast destruction (e.g., destroy 

buildings, start fires, and cause tremendous loss of life). 

Enriched uranium can be a fuel source for a nuclear 

device; approximately 1,300 to 2,100 metric tons of 

enriched uranium throughout the world have questionable 

controls. The two bombs dropped on Japan to end World 

War II are examples of nuclear devices. Little Boy, which 

was dropped on Hiroshima, used 60 kilograms (kg) of 

enriched uranium as a fuel source. Fat Man, which was 

dropped on Nagasaki, used 6 kg of plutonium as a fuel 

source.

About 90 percent of specialized radiological 

materials, such as weaponized radionuclides (e.g., 

uranium, plutonium), are under government control. 

Academic, industrial, agricultural, and medical settings 

use radiological materials for many different applications. 

Medical treatments, specifically, require thousands of 

curies. Of the 2 million sources of radiological agents, 

about 5,000 are susceptible to becoming orphaned (lost, 

stolen, etc.) each day. Worldwide control is a problem 

(e.g., the former Soviet Union contains many “orphans”).

Radiation is described in terms of alpha and beta 

particles and gamma rays. Alpha particles move short 

distances and can be blocked by paper or skin. Beta 

particles are higher energy but can be shielded by 

aluminum foil or skin. These particles can travel several 

feet and exposures can result in deep, serious burns. 

Gamma rays consist of high-energy, short wavelength 

protons. These particles are pure energy and can travel 

many feet. They are very penetrating and can cause severe 

health effects. Radiation is measured as the number of 

nuclei decay per second. One curie (Ci) is considered 

a large radiation source; 100 Ci is considered very 

dangerous.

Radiation doses are reported as rems. Holbrook listed 

several radiation doses and associated health effects. At 25 

to 50 rems, a person may have decreased numbers of white 

blood cells. An RDD event is unlikely to produce a dose 

above 25 rem. 

A 1987 event in Brazil provides an example of a 

nonterror event that nonetheless resulted in a terrible 

endpoint. Scavengers found cesium in an abandoned 

radiotherapy clinic. The scavengers took the material 

home to their village. As a result, 20 people received a 

high radiation dose, 129 people were contaminated, and 

thousands more were monitored for radiation sickness. 

In another event, a young girl found cesium (a glowing 

blue powder), painted her body with it, and then ate food 

without washing her hands. She died within 30 days. This 

event occurred in a tourist and agricultural area and caused 

economic disaster in that area. The cleanup cost about $20 

million.

High cleanup costs are a consideration for addressing 

radiological agent events. An obvious first step would 

be to reduce the possibility of an event. Holbrook 

suggested programs that would encourage users to return 

radioactive materials to the manufacturer to minimize the 

number of orphan sources. A public health campaign to 

educate people about radiation and radioactive releases 
42

may reduce the extent of cleanup required by political 

pressures. Holbrook illustrated impact areas from the 

release of a 2-Ci source of cesium-137. A large number 

of people would receive a dose of 150 millirems (mrems), 

which is equivalent to the difference in background 

radiation between Washington, D.C., and Denver, 

Colorado. However, that small increase in risk may seem 

unacceptable if not properly communicated. 

Decontamination options include acid dissolution 

of a radiological agent from the contaminated substrate, 

chelant bonding for excretion from organisms (including 

humans), and blasting with abrasive materials for removal 

of the contaminated material. Holbrook highlighted 

several specific decontamination technologies in his 

presentation. He noted that one strain of bacteria can 

consume as much as 0.5 inches of concrete per year when 

a sulfur gel is applied to the concrete. He also noted that 

DoD and power plant authorities have successfully used 

foams on a variety of surfaces. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• What is the difference between a low-level and 

high-level radioactive waste facility? These two 

types of facilities are vastly different. Only about 

three facilities in the United States currently 

accept low-level radiological wastes, so disposal 

of radiological wastes after decontamination is a 

substantial problem. 

• Will radioactive waste facilities accept mixed 

wastes? Will some of the decontamination 

technologies mentioned produce mixed 

waste? Wastes that contain both radioactive and 

hazardous chemical materials are a huge problem. 

Radioactive waste facilities do not accept mixed 

wastes. When reviewing available technologies, 

many characteristics and factors must be considered,

including cost, feasibility, life cycle, performance, 

maintenance, and safety. Strong acid technologies 

can be hazardous to the people deploying the 

technology and may create a mixed waste.

Radiological and Nuclear 

Terror: Technical Aspects 

and Implications for 

Decontamination and Site 

Cleanup

John MacKinney, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, National Homeland Security Research 

Center

RDDs and nuclear weapons are vastly different. An RDD 

(i.e., a “dirty bomb”) may consist of radiological agents 

injected into an HVAC or water system, dispersed from 

a crop duster, or disseminated covertly. A nuclear weapon 

may include smuggled weapons or improvised devices 

produced with smuggled weapons-grade materials. This 

presentation not only discussed issues associated with 

RDDs but also identified a nuclear weapon event as a 

worst-case scenario. 

The United States and other countries have experience 

with radiological agents from activities with uranium 

and plutonium in commercial and defense facilities; 

remediation at hazardous waste sites; running waste 

management facilities; and operating commercial, test, 

and research reactors and laboratories. These facilities 

are in fixed locations where accident prevention and 

response programs are in place. Facilities may also provide 

a long warning period before releases occur. Conversely, 

terror events are unpredictable. They can occur anywhere 

without warning. As such, RDDs present new challenges 

for local and federal responders. Most people, however, 

believe an RDD event is the most likely threat, especially 

considering the abundance of missing and unaccountedfor radioactive material.

The question becomes how do we prepare for an 

RDD event. One solution is to develop many different 

release scenarios and plan accordingly. The radiation 

released from a device is unlikely to result in fatalities, 

although the actual explosion may cause harm. A principal 

effect of RDDs is to deny access to places. An RDD may 

consist of an explosive device or any means of dispersing 

radiological agents (e.g., spraying from an automobile 

or aircraft, injecting into a building or water system). A 

device may distribute radiation in a small area (e.g., the 

size of the meeting room) or a much larger area (e.g., tens 

of city blocks). 
Decontamination Workshop  

Chernobyl was the worst nuclear disaster in 

history. This event released more than 100 million Ci 

of contamination. For contrast, MacKinney presented a 

realistic radiological release example. Within 24 hours, 

a small radiological device (10 Ci of cesium-137) would 

disperse about a 1-rem dose of radiation to an area several 

tens of city blocks, based on a simple gaussian dispersion 

model.

Currently, researchers at SNL are examining explosives

and radiological devices. The tests are being conducted in 

igloos (50 m3

 in size) formerly used to examine explosions 

at plutonium pits. Current tests are small and use 0.5 

pound of explosive with solid metal bars or ceramic disks 

of radiological materials. The research examines whether a 

radiological agent will aerosolize and how the shape of the 

charge may affect dispersal. Aerosolized or in vapor form, 

a radiological agent can enter a person’s body and cause 

harm. Researchers tested a number of materials to examine

how the material properties affected aerosolization (e.g., 

form or shape, thermal properties, shock physics, vapor 

pressure). Entrainment is not inherent to the radioactive 

materials but is another complication because the 

explosion will entrain dirt and particles of concrete.

Stress levels induce different material reactions 

and different particle sizes. In a worst-case scenario, 

an explosion will impart enough stress to change a 

radiological element to a vapor form. (The vapor then 

condenses as sub-micron particles, which are readily 

dispersed.) For most of the metal bars tested, the 

explosion dispersed large chunks of metals. Tests found 

that bismuth, however, aerosolizes very well: 80 percent is 

aerosolized into the respirable range because the bismuth 

passes to the vapor stage during the tests. A carefully 

configured charge can also aerosolize cobalt. Ceramics, 

including strontium 90, used in the former Soviet Union 

shipping beacons, also tended to create large chunks. (A 

large chunk is 12 to 15 microns in diameter and a very 

large chunk is 1 inch in diameter.) Cesium chloride poses 

another threat because it passes through the liquid to the 

vapor phase during an explosion.

Several factors influence the dispersion pattern of 

an RDD. Larger chunks remain local to the impact 

area. Smaller particles disperse more widely depending 

on particle dynamics (e.g., phase changes, size, shape, 

and aerodynamics). Buoyant rise—the lift from the heat 

of the explosion—and meteorology also play roles in 

dispersion. Smaller particles can be caught on air currents. 

Models can predict possible dispersion patterns, however, 

further research is needed. MacKinney showed examples 

of dispersion patterns with and without buildings. 

With the buildings, materials disperse in patterns that 

are not necessarily intuitive. In addition, studies of 

particle dispersion have shown that indoor particulate 

concentrations following an event may be high.

Returning to the topic of preparing for an RDD 

event, MacKinney provided several suggestions. 

Organizations should develop threat scenarios—much 

has been done and is ongoing in this area. Using these 

scenarios, we can create standard response and mitigation 

procedures, plan possible cleanup actions, and evaluate 

existing technologies. Additional research is needed to 

adapt existing technologies to threat scenarios and to 

develop and test new technologies. When developing 

decontamination technologies, research organizations 

should avoid rushing to invest in solutions that address 

a single problem and should invest only in technologies 

with sound scientific support and real-world experience. 

Research should target technologies that fill gaps. 

The decontamination and restoration periods after 

an event follow a similar pattern, regardless of the threat 

agent (e.g., chemical, biological, or radiological). The 

first step is the safe shutdown of the affected building or 

area. A shutdown has huge implications when involving 

city blocks and private properties. Through work groups, 

DHS is assessing possible optimized approaches to 

decontamination and restoration after an RDD release. 

This approach would be flexible in selecting cleanup 

criteria based on societal needs, expected land uses, and 

decontamination technologies. 

Nuclear devices present another radiological threat. 

They include improvised devices, as well as weapons 

bought or stolen from a nuclear state. A nuclear device 

has a likely yield of 0 (failure) to 50 kilotons. The most 

likely event would involve a device with a 5- to 20-kiloton 

capacity. A 10-kiloton device, which is considered small, 

has the explosion capacity of nineteen 100-ton coal cars. 

The bomb exploded at Hiroshima was 13 kilotons; the 

bomb exploded at Nagasaki was 22 kilotons.

After detonation, temperatures soar within a fraction 

of a second with the fireball reaching millions of degrees. 

The extreme rise in heat is followed immediately by 

incredible winds (measured near 700 miles per hours 

during historic testing events). Most deaths after 

detonation are caused by burns. In addition to proximity 

to the detonation point, an individual’s specific injuries 

depend on location within a building and building 
44

materials. DHS modeling estimated that a nuclear 

detonation in Washington, D.C., would result in 50,000 

deaths from the initial blast and another 50,000 to 

100,000 deaths due to radiation. Radioactive fallout could 

extend hundreds of miles. 

In conclusion, an RDD detonation is a likely threat. 

Organizations must understand possible threat scenarios 

and can use models to help simulate urban impacts. 

Decontamination technologies must mesh with larger 

remediation and renovation goals. Although a large 

nuclear device attack is unlikely, this threat cannot be 

ignored because of the severity of the impact.

Questions, Answers, and Comments

• When creating an RDD, why not grind the 

radiological material? Because of the radiation 

dose, grinding may be fatal. If the proper safety 

precautions are used, grinding may work to further 

distribute the ceramic-form radiological materials, 

but grinding metal-form radiological materials 

might prevent the shock wave that creates the phase 

change. A number of technical issues are involved in 

creating successful RDDs.

UK Approach to RDD 

Cleanup

Malcolm Wakerley, Department for Environment, 

Food, and Rural Affairs

The UK learned lessons about radiological contamination 

as the result of past nonterrorist, nuclear incidents (e.g., 

the U.S. B-52 bomber accident in Spain, Chernobyl 

reactor fallout, and Brazil’s cancer therapy unit wastes). 

These incidents provided information about contaminant 

movement resulting from an RDD detonation. The 

Chernobyl incident and the events of 9/11 in the United 

States prompted the creation and upgrade of a radiation 

monitoring network and radiation response handbook. 

This presentation focused on these two items.

After the Chernobyl incident, the UK created the 

Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET). 

This system consists of 92 gamma detectors, located 

approximately 30 kilometers apart, that supply data 

to a group of laboratories. The sensors are very simple 

and cannot detect alpha-emitting materials. Many of 

the sensors have been in service for more than 20 years. 

Information from these sensors helped the UK identify 

areas of contamination after the Chernobyl incident. For 

example, contamination was patchy because of heavy rains 

within the fallout area. The UK identified some areas that 

were no longer safe for grazing sheep.

RIMNET provides a vast amount of data regarding 

local background levels of radiation, which can be used 

to identify irregular events. The system is linked to 

government departments, and all departments can access 

the data simultaneously. Agencies can use RIMNET as a 

tool for communicating with politicians, communities, 

and international partners. For example, an incident 

occurring in the UK will also impact nations on mainland 

Europe. In an exercise with sensors in Scotland, the 

RIMNET database was able to upload years’ worth of 

sampling data within 30 minutes. 

Updates to the RIMNET system include a 

modeling component that can assess short-, medium-, 

and long-range impacts. The system is also linked with 

meteorological data. With these components, the system 

can backtrack from an alarmed detector to a radiation 

source. If a release occurs anywhere in world, the system 

can also calculate when radiation will reach the UK. If the 

release occurs in the UK, the system can calculate when 

radiation will reach other countries. The UK also has the 

ability to run models that, within 10 minutes of a release, 

can identify areas to shut down to prevent contaminant 

movement.

A model output in the presentation illustrated 

releases associated with a 6,000-Ci cobalt bomb that 

aerosolized. The map shows the inhalation dose from 

the passing cloud. The predominant dose, however, 

results from deposition. The area closest to the release 

presents the greatest concern. Doses are lower farther from 

the release point, but a public relations concern exists 

regarding communicating dose impacts to communities. 

Commonly, communities want doses to return to levels 

present before an event. Determining how and to what 

level decontamination occurs becomes a political question. 

As such, releases become instruments of economic as well 

as health destruction.

In 1996, the UK created a radiological handbook in 

response to a review of decontamination and remediation 

technologies conducted after a series of additional 

radioactive accidents. The review identified trees, soil, 

and grass as contributing substantially to exposure 

doses. Vertical surfaces were only minor contributors to 

overall dose. The existing response system is predicated 
Decontamination Workshop  

on equipment available to local authorities, but 

specialized military equipment would be available for 

decontamination. The radiological handbook includes a 

simple logic diagram and 22 tables on decontamination 

technologies and considerations. It also includes an 

example release incident and discusses the UK inventory 

of decontamination equipment.

After the events of 9/11 in the United States, the 

UK expressed increased interest in the 1996 review and 

handbook. The handbook has grown since 1996 and now 

includes radiological agents that terrorists might use. (The 

radiological threat agents addressed by the UK are similar 

to the priority radiological threat agents selected by the 

United States) The handbook provides reliable, consistent, 

and comprehensive information to help decision makers 

select the most practical decontamination methods and 

to guide them through the decontamination process. 

The UK is currently working to expand the handbook to 

address various climates and crops so that it is relevant to 

all of Europe and potentially to the United States. 

Emergency planners use the handbook during 

threat event exercises so its use will be intuitive during 

a real event. The handbook follows a 10-step decision 

process outlined in detail in the presentation. Generally, 

these steps involve considering the nature and extent of 

the contamination, the availability and applicability of 

decontamination methods, and the land uses of affected 

areas. Each land use area is then considered and evaluated 

individually. Land use areas in an inhabited area, for 

example, may include residential, commercial, and 

recreational areas. 

The UK plans to maintain the handbook over 

the next 3 years and add lessons as they are learned. In 

exercises, the UK has examined case studies of accidents 

using the handbook as a resource and considering 

advances in technologies to reassess what actions 

should have been taken. The UK is willing to share the 

information it has gained, as well as the radiological 

handbook, with the United States. 

Wakerly concluded with his thoughts on a potential 

RDD attack. The attack will likely occur in an urban 

setting. Ground surfaces, such as soil and grass around 

homes and work areas, will provide the predominant 

radiation routes of exposure after the initial attack. 

Removing radiation from those areas will provide the best 

reduction in dose. 

Questions, Answers, and Comments

After his presentation, Wakerly commented that the UK 

is examining the practical side of using the handbook 

and decision trees. The handbook has worked well for 

tabletop exercises. In real-world situations, however, 

many additional concerns exist (e.g., seals for vehicles 

conducting decontamination). Wakerly asked how the 

United States was addressing the many radiological issues. 

A workshop participant responded that RDDs are a new 

research area for the United States Some investigations, 

however, are under way. For example, a TSWG project 

examines the next generation of materials for personal 

protective equipment. These materials will be lightweight 

and breathable because heat is a substantial issue when 

using personal protective equipment.
46 NHSRC
Decontamination Workshop  

Panel Discussion—Lessons 

Learned

Several bio-decontamination events are now 

complete. Workshop participants shared their experiences 

at these events with others in order to discuss lessons 

learned about the decontamination process and to suggest 

steps that would improve that process. 

Information Sharing and 

Agency Coordination

Workshop participants uniformly agreed that improving 

coordination and information sharing efforts among 

federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private 

companies and communities, would improve responses to 

chemical, biological, and radiological threat events. They 

agreed that sharing information early when a threat event 

occurs would result in responses that are faster and better. 

• Examples of existing efforts Although 

information sharing and coordination efforts can be 

much improved, workshop participants provided 

examples of current efforts among agencies.

▶ EPA ORD recently published two reports 

as a means of sharing information with 

others. The first summarizes EPA data from 

decontamination events. The second compiles 

building decontamination data and reviews 

decontamination options beyond crisis 

exemption options. EPA has not been proactive 

in distributing these reports, but they are 

available to workshop participants upon their 

request.

▶ DoD requires annual internal agency research 

updates and coordinates efforts with EPA. 

▶ Participants from the UK noted that they 

publish information on the Internet. They also 

encouraged ongoing coordination between the 

United States and UK.

• Security concerns When sharing information, 

agencies must be cautious that information is not 

used against us. Data security must be considered 

when sharing information. One participant 

suggested that CDC and EPA detail employees 

to the FBI to facilitate information sharing for 

decontamination and public health concerns 

without compromising the criminal investigation 

aspect of an event. For example, a whole report 

may be classified, but only a small portion contains 

classified information. Security and classification 

issues will likely continue to be a problem. 

Suggestions for information sharing methods 

One workshop participant suggested that DHS 

spearhead efforts toward better information sharing. 

Another recognized the benefit of this workshop 

and suggested that NHSRC and others regularly 

host workshops of its type for government, private, 

civilian, and military groups. Others also provided 

suggestions for data repositories. One workshop 

participant suggested creating virtual repositories 

containing electronic documents and papercopy documents converted to electronic forms to 

maximize information sharing. These repositories 

would serve as centralized information centers and 

might include:

▶ Research and priority agent repositories 

that list completed, ongoing, or planned 

research efforts and priority agents for 

research If agencies and researchers had a clear 

understanding of efforts underway by others, 

they could reduce potential redundancies, 

address priority issues quickly, and appropriate 

funds properly. EPA has launched an internal 

campaign to track research projects. This effort 

will not only prevent research redundancies but 

also feed into budgeting decisions.

▶ Decontamination portfolios that link threat 

agents with decontamination technologies

The repository should list technologies that are 

validated as well as those under development. A 

workshop participant noted that the National 

Decontamination Team may be creating this 

type of repository.

•

3
48

▶ Agent repositories that list threat agents linked

with laboratories able to analyze these agents 

This repository could also include acceptable 

surrogates for research projects and methods 

for preparing these surrogates to provide 

consistency across research studies.

▶ Databases that list people with expertise in 

areas pertaining to decontamination Such 

a database could list training and work 

experience. One workshop participant noted 

that this database exists and is available 

through EPA.

Several workshop participants who work as OSCs 

emphasized the need for information when responding to 

an event. They need information about decontamination 

methods that work or do not work and why. They also 

need information in order to address the specific concerns 

of agencies from multiple levels of government (e.g., local 

boards of health, mayors’ offices). 

Preparedness

Organizations can prepare for a chemical, biological, or 

radiological agent event in a number of ways. Workshop 

participants repeatedly suggested tabletop exercises 

as a way to identify possible threat scenarios, develop 

response plans, and pinpoint data gaps. They suggested 

interagency panels and peer reviews for these exercises. 

The exercises should illustrate the pressures of the event 

and the complexity of decontamination planning (e.g., 

addressing HVAC systems). Workshop participants 

suggested focusing these exercises on airports and 

transportation facilities. One workshop participant noted 

that exercises can become complex and attempt to address 

worst-case scenarios. In these exercises, the focus becomes 

the technical aspect of the response plan. In a real-world 

situation, the technical side of a response may be easy 

compared with regulatory or communication issues.

Materials that would help prepare agencies and 

facilities include:

• Matrix of responses Similar to a decontamination 

database, this matrix would link threat agents with 

appropriate decontamination methods and site 

conditions (e.g., a contained building contaminated 

with anthrax). All known decontamination 

agents and material compatibility issues should 

be included. Some of this information may be 

subjective or anecdotal. Nonetheless, having this 

information readily available would likely streamline 

the response. 

• Response plans Workshop participants agreed 

that exercises should encourage organizations to 

prepare plans. For example, plans could identify 

methods to treat irreplaceable objects (e.g., 

paintings, historical documents) or process large 

volumes of personal items. FEMA has published 

a radiological response plan that addresses 

communication and preparedness concerns. All 

response plans should include communication 

strategies (e.g., protocol for notifying the President 

and other government officials). 

• Standards Research and planning for pieces of the 

response is under way or complete, but a means for 

looking at the overall response process is lacking. 

A protocol that outlines a systematic way to assess 

an event would be useful. This protocol should 

cover both simple indoor and complex indoor/

outdoor situations and should include standards. 

A workshop participant noted that the process 

of writing and preparing standards may identify 

potential problems and force decisions before an 

event.

• Up-to-date drawings In one participant’s 

experience, the lack of accurate building plans led 

to delays and increased expense in decontaminating 

an impacted building. Having accurate plans readily 

available is critical for rapid response.

One workshop participant noted that prepositioning 

decontamination equipment may be appropriate. Others 

thought that this action was not economically viable. If 

the government buys the infrastructure for a technology 

now, the technology may be obsolete when needed. 

Having the equipment in the right place at the right 

time and ensuring that it would operate after years on 

standby are also concerns. A participant suggested that 

technology vendors research dual uses of decontamination 

technologies, such as applications in agricultural 

decontamination for insects and mold, responses to 

hazardous material releases, or uses in hospital settings. 

Dual-use technologies would provide a sustainable 

business model and provide technologies for addressing 

agents if needed. Another workshop participant noted 

that the military often develops technologies and then 

turns them over to the commercial market. They are then 

available commercially when needed. 
Decontamination Workshop  

Sampling and Analytical 

Issues

Workshop participants discussed several topics regarding 

sampling utility and sampling methods. These topics 

included:

• Streamlining the sampling process Several 

workshop participants noted that sampling (for 

characterization, verification, and clearance) took 

up much of the response timeline. They suggested 

streamlined sampling (e.g., minimize or eliminate 

characterization sampling when fumigation is 

the planned response; only screen samples to 

determine viability). When characterization 

sampling is minimized, verification and clearance 

sampling become more important. Individual 

workshop participants noted that the clearance 

samples were most important when reoccupying a 

building and that good communication with the 

affected community (e.g., workers in a building) is 

necessary to minimize clearance sampling.

Other workshop participants strongly believed 

that no sampling phase should be eliminated. One 

participant believed that characterization sampling 

took up only a small segment of the response 

timeline and should not be compromised.

• Using biological indicators Decontamination 

events rely on biological indicators (e.g., spore 

strips), but results from these tests may not 

correlate to environmental conditions (i.e., actual 

levels of spores). Several workshop participants 

identified correlating these tests as a research need. 

Having participated in five or six decontamination 

events, one participant noted that no positive 

environmental samples were found when the 

biological indicators were negative and desired 

fumigant concentration had been achieved. 

Another noted that establishing a link between 

indicators (e.g., paper or stainless steel strips) 

and environmental samples may help speed 

reoccupation of sensitive areas. Several other 

participants noted that pharmaceutical companies 

already use biological indicators to confirm 

sterilization. Decontamination research may be 

able to draw from this experience. In termite 

fumigation, vendors also rely on indicators to 

confirm complete fumigation. 

Other workshop participants were more 

hesitant about linking different types of indicators 

to environmental samples. One noted that 

spores on steel coupons or paper strips will not 

respond the same as spores on desks, fabric, or 

other materials in a building. As such, hospital 

and pharmaceutical practices may be of limited 

usefulness. Currently, biological indicators and 

spore strips confirm that a decontamination agent 

was present, but indicators and strips do not 

directly confirm that decontamination of agents in 

the environment has occurred.

• Improving sampling methods Workshop 

participants noted lessons learned and identified 

concerns regarding sampling methods.

Lessons learned:

▶ Calibrating sampling instruments and 

ensuring proper operation before 

sampling is critical.

▶ Fixed sampling points are costly and difficult 

to site, and they provide a limited amount of 

information. A mobile unit (e.g., TAGA) can 

be more useful.

▶ Remotely monitoring a building with a 

titration system can be difficult. In one 

participant’s experience, the system required 

5,000 feet of tubing and months for setup 

and operation.

Concerns raised:

▶ Many questions arose from a lack of 

understanding. For example, additional 

environmental sampling was required at 

one facility to address workers’ concern 

about the safety of their workstations. 

▶ Rapid screening and sampling may overlook 

multiple-agent attacks. For example, a 

terrorist may use a single event to drive people 

toward a common area and a second event. 

▶ Any sampling protocol should address multiagent attacks. Once an agent is identified 

at an event, agencies may race toward 

decontamination. Other agents may be 

overlooked. 
5

Decontamination Process

Workshop participants provided comments based on their 

experience at decontamination events. 

• When fumigation is the selected decontamination 

method, the fumigation itself takes up only a small 

segment of the decontamination timeline. 

For example, a 1-week fumigation requires 6 

weeks of preparation and several months of postfumigation activities.

• Knowing the target agent is critical for properly 

planning a response. One workshop participant 

noted that time and money could have been saved 

at one site if the decision makers knew that the 

target agent was a weaponized biological agent. 

They would have selected fumigation immediately 

instead of spending time considering alternative 

decontamination technologies.

• Sealing a building can be costly and timeconsuming. In addition to the cost of sealing the 

building, budgets must also include inspection 

costs. A project in Utica, New York, found tenting 

to be an effective means of sealing a building. 

• Preserving sensitive and valuable materials is a 

concern when one is selecting a decontamination 

technology. One workshop participant suggested 

innovative research grants to businesses or 

academics as a way to address concerns about 

preserving materials.

• One workshop participant suggested leaving as 

much material as possible inside a building for 

fumigation to alleviate disposal concerns. 

• CDC is concerned about the public health side 

of an event and facility safety for reoccupation. 

However, decisions about reoccupation are made 

by the local health agencies, so CDC responses 

to an incident must be carefully crafted and must 

respect the command structure. CDC only supports

the local agencies and must be careful not to say 

anything that could be construed as policy.

• A representative from CDC indicated that 

historically a clear understanding of the different 

phases of a response was lacking. Participants in 

a decontamination event should recognize that 

the response phases are not separate and distinct; 

however, activities are becoming clearer as agencies 

gain more decontamination experience.

• An OSC provides information to agencies involved 

in a decontamination event. Agencies use this 

information to support their decisions. (One 

OSC at the workshop indicated that many of the 

technical experts present could be called upon to 

provide information to support a decontamination 

event.) Agencies working with an OSC need 

to understand the command structure at a 

decontamination event. 

• An environmental clearance committee supports 

local agency decisions about when it is safe to 

reoccupy a building by providing information 

and credibility. The more the local agencies know, 

the better able they are to make decisions. The 

committee itself does not make decisions. 

• One workshop participant served on several 

environmental clearance committees. This 

participant noted that the facility operator at one 

site supported the committee as an independent 

group assessing clearance for reoccupation.

• An OSC attending the workshop voiced support of 

environmental clearance committees and technical 

working groups. To support an OSC, however, 

technical working groups should consist of people 

who are authorized to make decisions for their 

agencies. Environmental clearance committees 

should recognize that they serve as advisory bodies, 

recommending cleanup values to the local agencies 

that make the decisions.
Decontamination Workshop  

Panel Discussion—Research and 

Development Needs

Over the course of the 3-day workshop, presenters 

described a number of ongoing research projects. During 

the second panel discussion, workshop participants 

suggested many additional research needs. Again, workshop 

participants emphasized the need for agency coordination 

to maximize research efforts. The following is a list of 

suggestions provided during the second panel discussion, as 

well as research needs identified during the lessons learned 

panel discussion.

• Both basic and applied research are needed. 

Researchers must ensure that their efforts translate to 

real-world situations. Small-chamber studies provide 

a systematic approach, but these studies do not assess 

real-life concerns. Studies should simulate responses 

in real buildings. Issues of scale and engineering 

may be a concern when moving from laboratory 

to field-testing. For example, real-world situations 

often include greater surface areas and volumes for 

decontamination. Workshop participants provided 

several specific suggestions for applied research topics:

▶ Real-time monitoring technology (e.g., 

developing faster, cheaper, and better 

technologies) for agents and fumigants

▶ Appropriate sampling methods (e.g., 

determining whether cotton wipes or rayon 

wipes are better for surface sampling) for bioagents (e.g., spores)

▶ Validation of decontamination technologies

▶ Tenting as a means of sealing a facility for 

fumigation

• Most of the information presented during the 

workshop applied to B. anthracis. A number of 

workshop participants mentioned the need to 

expand research related to other chemical, biological, 

and radiological threat agents. Most agreed that 

additional basic research on radiological agents is 

needed. Specifically, participants suggested research 

topics including:

▶ Interactions of chemical and radiological agents 

with building and environmental materials

▶ Movement of fine radiological particles

▶ Aerosolization and re-aerosolization of biological 

and radiological agents

▶ Effects of heat and humidity on the deactivation 

of ricin

▶ Applicability of chelaters, HEPA filters, 

and other decontamination technologies to 

radiological agents

▶ Activated reagents and their use on CWAs

▶ Decontamination of infectious agents in an 

environment with a heavy organic load

• In addition to expanding research on specific threat 

agents, workshop participants thought research 

should expand to consider more threat scenarios, 

such as a large, outdoor contamination event. 

Events that may cause agricultural contamination or 

economic damage are also of concern. 

• Research efforts should assess the whole cost of 

a decontamination event, including the disposal 

and restoration components. These efforts should 

identify potential savings areas that would reduce 

the expense and time required for decontamination 

and restoration. Gathering information and 

conducting decontaminations quickly could cut 

costs. A workshop participant noted that removing 

building contents before decontamination requires 

consideration of the restraints of working in a 

contaminated environment as well as packaging 

and transporting waste materials pulled from 

the building. If materials are removed after 

decontamination, perhaps they could be handled 

as relatively innocuous materials. Waste products 

from the decontamination process itself must also be 

considered. 

• Dual-use technologies should be identified or 

developed before the next threat event occurs. 

Technologies for decontaminating biological 

agents, specifically, could have many uses (e.g., 

decontaminating mold-infested buildings, hospitals, 

and manufacturing facilities). As an added benefit, 

research on dual-use technologies can also foster 

collaboration between public and private sectors. 

4
52

• Workshop participants also encouraged research into 

biotechnology-based decontamination approaches 

(e.g., bacteria-eating anthrax). One workshop 

participant mentioned an existing project studying 

viruses that attack anthrax. Another discussed a 

personal experience with a past project researching 

a bacterial virus for remediating a pathogen threat. 

This research was difficult to pursue because of 

concern that this project could be construed as 

biological warfare. Rather than using a bacterial virus, 

an enzyme extracted from the virus could destroy 

B. anthracis and other pathogens very quickly. (This 

technique also has a hospital application.) Current 

research is pursuing enzymes as a means of addressing 

chemical and biological agents.

• Several workshop participants mentioned the 

need for better surrogates. One participant noted 

that identifying surrogates is more complex than 

identifying a single surrogate for a single threat 

agent. Surrogates can change based on the threat 

agent, decontamination methods, and material 

characteristics. Researchers should consult 

microbiologists to consider whether biological 

indicators, spore strips, glass disks, and other media 

truly simulate B. anthracis releases. Identifying 

successful surrogates would enable academic 

institutions and others without clearance to work 

with threat agents to advance decontamination 

technologies.

• Workshop participants repeatedly mentioned 

biological indicators and spore strips as an area of 

uncertainty. For example, the test coupons need 

to better represent real-world situations (e.g., 

carpet coupons versus steel disks). The participants 

suggested additional research to improve available 

indicator and strip technologies and to develop 

new methods for ensuring that agent deactivation 

occurred. One workshop participant specifically 

mentioned the need for understanding the biology 

behind these technologies. Decontamination events 

rely heavily on biological indicators and spore strips, 

but information from these tests is not directly 

comparable to environmental samples. As during 

the lessons learned panel discussion, workshop 

participants held conflicting opinions about 

whether relating biological indicators and strips 

to environmental conditions (actual spores) was 

appropriate. 

• During the lessons learned panel discussion, 

workshop participants mentioned specific research 

needs regarding existing sampling methods. One 

participant identified the need for research to address 

several questions: How much sampling is enough? 

What samples are truly necessary? How clean is 

clean? Other research topics specifically mentioned 

were rapid testing protocols, methods for sampling 

irreplaceable items (e.g., paintings or historical 

documents), accurate and inexpensive real-time 

monitors, and sampling standards (e.g., 

1 spore strip per 100 ft2

). 

• Several workshop participants suggested additional 

research to develop surfaces and coatings that are 

easy to clean, serve as biocides, or limit chemical 

infiltration. Specifically, studies could develop a 

way to seal porous materials, which can be difficult 

to decontaminate. Some research of surfaces and 

coatings is under way. 

• Architects and engineers are notably absent from 

this meeting. These experts can provide information 

about designing buildings with smart systems—using 

building materials to combat contamination. A 

workshop participant mentioned that comprehensive 

planning at a State Department building resulted in 

a structure that minimizes the potential impact of a 

contamination event. For example, the mail room 

has a self-contained HVAC system with HEPA 

filters. Mail is processed through holding areas that 

can be tested for threat agents before the mail enters 

the building.

• Many of the presentations given during the 

workshop discussed material compatibility issues. 

Workshop participants agreed that additional 

research to understand interactions between 

decontaminants (e.g., fumigants), threat agents, 

and building materials is needed. Much remains 

unknown about chemical off-gassing, for example, 

or decontaminant impacts on sensitive equipment 

(e.g., computer components, aircraft systems). A 

workshop participant noted that the IBM facility 

in Rochester, New York, has a laboratory for testing 

sensitive equipment. IBM is open to having others 

use this laboratory for research. One presenter found 

that a number of carbonyls formed during chlorine 

dioxide fumigation tests. Very little of the reacted 

chlorine from those tests was recovered. The fate of 

the remaining chlorine remains unknown. More 
Decontamination Workshop  

information is needed to understand chemical 

reactions during fumigation and the formation of 

fumigation byproducts.

• Workshop participants suggested research 

to characterize background (e.g., dust, filth, 

grime) to understand how these materials may 

impact decontamination, especially fumigation 

technologies. LLNL plans to test and characterize 

grime in subways, and DoE seeks to characterize 

background characteristics of airborne materials that 

could be threat agents. For example, live anthrax 

spores can be found everywhere. Understanding 

these background levels should prevent unnecessary 

fumigation.

• Several workshop participants suggested additional 

research to address the question “How clean is 

clean?” They suggested conducting risk-based 

modeling to understand the aggregate risk before, 

during, and after a decontamination event. For 

example, if no growth is reported for 106

 spore 

strips, is a building safe for reoccupation? From 

a risk-based perspective, how should we address 

intact, nonviable spores?

• Nonculturable but viable organisms have not been 

addressed. Citing personal observations, a workshop 

participant noted that biological indicators report 

positive results on different days (i.e., some are 

positive on day 1, some on day 4, and occasionally 

some on day 6). The reason for this is unknown. 

Perhaps results vary based on different culture 

media.

• One workshop participant suggested convening 

a panel of experts distant from ongoing 

decontamination discussions and research to 

independently review the collective research efforts 

ongoing at various agencies and facilities. This 

panel may be able to identify topics that have been 

overlooked or projects that are redundant. They 

may also be able to determine whether current 

research is focusing on too few decontamination 

technologies or identify other areas of interest. The 

panel would meet periodically (e.g., to observe the 

presentations and discussions at this workshop). 

Their input may prevent us from being blindsided 

by an unexpected terrorist attack.
54
Decontamination Workshop  

Appendices 5

Appendix A: Agenda

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2005

8:00am Registration/Check-in

PLENARY SESSION

9:00am Opening remarks; decontamination timeline;

summary of all events thus far ............................................................................................... Blair Martin 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)

9:30am DDAP program ...................................................................................................................... Lance Brooks 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

10:00am BREAK

10:15am FBI/Forensics sampling ........................................................................................................... Ben Garrett

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

SESSION 1: The Decontamination Process

10:45am CDC approach to sampling ................................................................................................. Ken Martinez

Centers for Disease Control (CDC)

11:15pm Agents of interest ........................................................................................... Nancy Adams, EPA/NHSRC

11:45am LUNCH

 

12:45pm AOAC sterilant registration method ......................................................................... Steve Tomasino, EPA

1:15pm Crisis exemptions ............................................................................................................ Jeff Kempter, EPA

1:45pm Sampling issues ............................................................................................... Mark Durno, EPA Region 5

2:15pm BREAK

2:30pm Ambient monitoring for fumigants/CW agents–TAGA van ................................. Dave Mickunas, EPA

3:00pm Insurance and indemnity issues .......................................................................................... Jerry Robinson 

United States Postal Service (USPS)
56

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 (continued)

SESSION 1: The Decontamination Process (continued)

3:30pm The role of on-site coordinators in the process ............................................................ Marty Powell, EPA

4:00pm The UK perspective on decontamination approaches .............................................. Robert Bettley-Smith

 (GDRS)

4:30pm Lab capacity issues ...........................................................................................Rob Rothman, EPA/NHSRC

5:00pm ADJOURN

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2005

SESSION 2: Decontamination Technologies

8:30am ClO2

 fumigation, liquid ClO2/bleach ...................................................................................... John Mason

Sabre Technical Services

9:00am ClO2 system test Aniston ................................................................................................... Tom McWhorter 

CDG Technology

9:30am VHP fumigation, liquid HP, and sporeclenz ........................................................................... Iain McVey

STERIS Corporation

10:00am BREAK

10:15am VHP fumigation ......................................................................................................................... Mike Herd

Bioquell, Inc.

10:45am Methyl bromide fumigation .............................................................................................. Rudi Scheffrahn 

University of Florida

11:15am Foam decontamination technologies ......................................................................................... Rita Betty 

Sandia National Laboratory

11:45pm LUNCH

2:30pm Ricin ............................................................................................................................. Jack Kelly, EPA/ERT

1:00pm Restoration from decontamination ............................................................................. Rich Orlusky, USPS

1:30pm Evaluating ClO2

 fumigation efficacy .................................................................................... Paula Krauter

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

2:00pm Innovative/emerging decontamination technologies .................................................... Mark Brickhouse

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
Decontamination Workshop  

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2005 (continued)

SESSION 3: Decontamination R&D

2:30pm Systematic decontamination studies ............................................................................ Phil Koga (ECBC)

3:00pm Use of HVAC systems in building decontamination ........................................................... Tina Carlsen 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

3:30pm BREAK

3:45pm Impact of materials on disinfection and byproduct formation ............................................... Rich Corsi 

University of Texas

4:15pm Chamber studies ................................................................................................................... Mark Buttner

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

4:45pm Decontamination ETV program ............................................................................................ Mike Taylor

Battelle Memorial Institute

5:15pm TSWG R&D activities .................................................................................................. Rebecca Blackmon

Technical Support Working Group

5:45pm ADJOURN

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2005

SESSION 4: Lessons Learned

8:30am PANEL DISCUSSIONS

 • Lessons learned from building decontamination work

10:30am BREAK

10:45am • Research and technology development needs

12:00pm LUNCH

SESSION 5: Radiological Dispersion Device Cleanup

1:00pm Scenarios ............................................................................................................................... Fred Holbrook

 (DOE) EPA/NHSRC

1:30pm Dirty Bombs ............................................................................................................. John MacKinney, EPA

2:00pm Radiological cleanup ...................................................................................................... Malcolm Wakerley 

DEFRA/Radio Active Substances

2:30pm Wrap-up .......................................................................................................................... Blair Martin, EPA
58

Appendix B: List of Participants 

The following pages list workshop participants. The list does not include those who were invited to participate but 

could not attend the workshop. Asterisks denote presenters.

Nancy Adams

Director, Decontamination and 

Consequence Management

National Homeland Security

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

MC E-343-06 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 

Nick Adams

President

BioQuell, Inc.

101 Witmer Road - Suite 500 

Horsham, PA 19044

*Robert Bettley-Smith

Department for Environment, 

 Food & Rural Affairs

4/E4 Ashdown House 

123 Victoria Street

London, SW1E 6DE

United Kingdom

*Rita Betty

Member Technical Staff

Chemical and Biological 

Technologies

Sandia National Laboratory

P.O. Box 5800 (0734)

Albuquerque, NM 87185

*Rebecca Blackmon

Subject Matter Expert

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

& Nuclear Countermeasures

Technical Support Working Group

12821 Old Fort Road, Suite 302 

Fort Washington, MD 20744

Nicolas Brescia

On-Scene Coordinator

Removal Branch

Hazardous Site Cleanup Division

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1650 Arch Street (3HS31)

Philadelphia, PA 19103

*Mark Brickhouse

Team Leader

Decontamination Sciences

Physical and Chemical Scientist

Research Development 

 Engineering Command

Edgewood Chemical 

 Biological Center

5183 Black Hawk Road 

 (AMSRD-ECB-RT-PD)

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

21010-5424

 

 

 

 

 

 

*Lance Brooks

Scientist

Programs, Plans, Budget

Science & Technology Directorate

Department of Homeland Security

Room 10-D47 

Washington, DC 20528

Karen Burgan

Senior Policy Advisor

Office of Emergency Management

Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response

National Planning and 

Preparedness Division

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

(5202A)

Washington, DC 20460

*Mark Buttner

Microbiologist

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

4505 South Maryland Parkway 

Box 454009

Las Vegas, NV 89154-4009

*Tina Carlsen

Senior Environmental Scientist

Environmental Chemistry 

 and Biology

Environmental Restoration

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory

P.O. Box 808 (L-528)

Livermore, CA 94550

Karen Cavanagh

General Counsel and Chief 

Operating Officer

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

17 Computer Drive, E 

Albany, NY 12205

John Chang

Chemical Engineer

IEMB

Air Pollution Prevention 

 & Control Division

National Risk Management 

Research Laboratory

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Richard Corsi

Professor

Department of Civil Engineering

Center for Energy & 

 Environmental Research

University of Texas at Austin

10100 Burnet Road (R7100)

Austin, TX 78757

 

 

 

 

 

John Drake

Project Manager

Decontamination and Consequence 

Management Division

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

10282 Rock Springs Road 

 (OH/WVDP)

West Valley, NY 10282

*Mark Durno

On-Scene Coordinator

Emergency Response

Superfund Division

U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency - Region 5

25089 Center Ridge Road (ME-W)

Westlake, OH 44145

Haroona Franklin

Head of Contracts and Resources

GDS Project

2 Little Smith Street 

London SW1P 3DH

United Kingdom

Scott Fredericks

Environmental Reponse Team

Office of Superfund 

Remediation & Technology 

Innovation

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

*Benjamin Garrett

Senior Scientist for WMD

Hazardous Materials Response Unit

Federal Bureau of Investigation

2501 Investigation Parkway 

Quantico, VA 22135

Perry Gaughan

On-Scene Coordinator - Region 3

Removal and Response Branch

Hazardous Site Clean Up

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1650 Arch Street (3HS31)

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Harold Heaton

Principal Staff Physicist

Special Applications Branch

National Security 

 Technology Department

Johns Hopkins Applied 

 Physics Laboratory

11100 Johns Hopkins Road 

 (17N-686)

Laurel, MD 20723

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  

Craig Heimbach

Physicist

Neutron Interactions and Dosimetry

Ionizing Radiation

National Institute of Standards 

 and Technology 

100 Bureau Drive (8461)

Gaithersburg, MD 20899

*Michael Herd

Vice President

Bioquell, Inc.

101 Witmer Road - Suite 500 

Horsham, PA 19044

*Fred Holbrook

Senior Engineer

Decontamination and 

 Consequence Management

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King 

 Drive (163)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Anthony Intrepido

Program Manager

Industrial Hygiene Field Services

Directorate of Occupational Health

U.S. Army Center for Health 

Promotion and Protective Mediums

5158 Blackhawk Road 

ATTN: MCHB-TS-OFS

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

21010

Jenna Jambeck

Post-Doc

Atmospheric Protection Branch

Air Pollution Prevention 

 & Control Division

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-02)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Peter Jutro

Deputy Director

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

(8801R)

Washington, DC 20460

*Jack Kelly

On Scene Coordinator

Removal Response Branch

Hazardous Site Cleanup Division

U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency - Region 3

1650 Arch Street (3HS31)

Philadelphia, PA 19103

*Jeff Kempter

Senior Advisor

Office of Pesticide Programs

Antimicrobials Division

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

(7510C)

Washington, DC 20460

Max Kiefer

Assistant Director Emergency 

Preparednness and Response

Office of Director

National Institute fo Occupational 

Safety and Health

Centers for Disease Control 

 and Prevention

1600 Clifton Road (MS E-20)

Atlanta, GA 30333

*Philip Koga

Associate Director for 

 Special Programs

Edgewood Chemical & 

 Biological Center

Research & Technology Directorate

U.S. Army Research 

Development & Engineering 

Command

RDECOM-ECBC /AMSRD-ECB-RT

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

21010-5424

*Paula Krauter

Environmental Microbiologist

Environmental Protection 

Department

Environmental Restoration

Lawrence Livermore 

 National Laboratory

7000 East Avenue (L-528)

Livermore, CA 94550

Terrance Leighton

Senior Scientist

CIVD/CHORI

5700 Martin Luther King Parkway 

Oakland, CA 94609

Paul Lemieux

Chemical Engineer

Decontamination & 

 Consequences Management

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

109 T.W. Alexander Drive 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

*John MacKinney

Senior Scientist

Center For Radiological 

 Emergency Response/ORIA

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

(6608J)

Washington, DC 20460

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*Blair Martin

Associate Division Director

National Risk Management 

Research Laboratory

Air Pollution Prevention and 

 Control Division

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

109 T.W. Alexander Drive 

 (E343-04)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27511

*Kenneth Martinez

Regional Operations Director

Coordinating Office of Emergency

Preparedness and Response

Office of the Director

Centers for Disease Control/NIOSH

4676 Columbia Parkway (R-11)

Cincinnati, OH 45226

*John Mason

Chief Executive Officer

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

17 Computer Drive, E 

Albany, NY 12205

Michael McLoughlin

Program Manager

Department of Homeland Security, 

Science and Technology

HSARPA

Washington, DC 20528

*Iain McVey

Project Manager

Defense and Industrial

STERIS Corporation

5960 Heisley Road 

Mentor, OH 44060

*David Mickunas

Chemist

Environmental Response Team

Office of Superfund 

Remediation Technology Innovation

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

Building 18 - 2890 

 Woodbridge Avenue 

Edison, NJ 08837

Mark Minier

Vice President

Sabre Technical Services

17 Computer Drive, E 

Albany, NY 12205

Robert Murtha

President

MURTECH

820 Cromwell Park Drive 

Glen Burnie, MD 21061

Laurel O’Connor

Senior Research Scientist

Battelle

1204 Research Drive 

Aberdeen, MD 21001-1228

 

 

 

 

 
6

*Richard Orlusky

Environmental Coordinator

Environmental Policy Management

United States Postal Service

21 Kilmer Road 

Edison, NJ 08899

Cayce Parrish

Principal Technical Advisor

Office of the Administrator

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

(1109A)

Washington, DC 20460

*Marty Powell

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

303 Methodist Building

11th and Chapline Streets (3HS33)

Wheeling, WV 26003

Vipin Rastogi

Senior Research Biologist

Research & Technology Directorate

U.S. Army - Edgewood Chemical & 

Biological Center

E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

21010

*Gerald Robinson

Attorney, Purchasing & 

 Commercial Protection Law

United States Postal Service - 

 Law Department

475 L’Enfant Plaza, SW 

Washington, DC 20260-1136

Richard Rossman

Principal Research Scientist

SA&E

Battelle Memorial Institute

1204 Technology Drive 

Aberdeen, MD 21001

*Rob Rothman

Physical Scientist

Office of Research & Development

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King 

 Drive (163)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Shawn Ryan

Chemical Engineer

Decontamination & Consequence 

Management Division

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive 

 (MD-H-137-03)

Research Triangle Park, NC

*Rudolf Scheffrahn

Professor of Entomology

University of Florida

3205 College Avenue 

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33314

Lewis Schwartz

Vice President, Operations & 

Opportunity Development

Defense and Industrial

STERIS Corporation

5960 Heisley Road 

Mentor, OH 44060

Les Sparks

Senior Chemical Engineer

Decontamination and 

Consequence Management Division

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

(ND 305-03)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Harry Stone

Program Manager

Battelle

10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155 

Cincinnati, OH 45242

Michael Takacs

Health Physicist

Nuclear & Chemical Hazards

DHS/FEMA

Department of Homeland Security

500 C Street, SW - Room 200 

Washington, DC 20472-0001

*Michael Taylor

Program Manager

Measurement and Data 

 Analysis Sciences

Energy and Environment Division

Battelle Memorial Institute

10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155 

Cincinnati, OH 45242

Rodney Taylor

Managing Director

Breitstone & Company, Ltd.

534 Willow Avenue 

Cedarhurst, NY 11516

*Stephen Tomasino

Senior Scientist

Microbiology Laboratory Branch

Biological and Economic 

 Analysis Division

Office of Pesticide Programs

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

Environmental Science Center 

701 Mapes Road (7503C)

Ft. Meade, MD 20755

Abe Turetsky

Edgewood Chemical & 

 Biological Center

U.S. Army

E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

21010

 

 

 

 

 

John Vitko

Director, Biological 

Countermeasurers

Science and Technology Directorate

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 29528

Chris Wagner

On-Scene Coordinator

EPA National 

 Decontamination Team

26 West Martin Luther King Drive 

(MS 271)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

*Malcolm Wakerley

CBRN Specialist

Radioactive Substances

Department for Environment, 

 Food & Rural Affairs

4/E4 Ashdown House 

 123 Victoria Street

London SW1E 6DE

United Kingdom

Phan Winter

Associate, SETA for DHS

Booz Allen Hamilton

4001 Fairfax Drive - Suite 750 

Arlington, VA 22203

Joseph Wood

Decontamination and 

Consequence Management Division

National Homeland Security 

Research Center

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

E343-06 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Rosemary Workman

Environmental Scientist

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental 

 Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

(1109)

Washington, DC 20460

 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  

Appendix C: Presentation Slides

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 

 



 



 





  



  

 

 





 



  



  





 

 

 

 

 



  



 
62 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  

























































































































 















 

 

 

































 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 




































64 

















 





  

 

 

  

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

  

 

 





 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 



 

















 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 















 



 

 

 

 



 

 

 















 

 







 

  









 



 



 

 

 

 





















 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 
































































Decontamination Workshop  













 



 

 

 

 

 

 











 





 





 







 





 



  





  



 







 



 





 



 





 



 



 

 













 



 
66 

 



 



 

 

 

 

 









 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 



 



 















 



 





 

 

 

 



 

 

 

  



 

  

 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  

 

 

 















 






68 



 













 



 



 



 



 



 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 





 



 



 
Decontamination Workshop  



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





  

  

  

 





 

 

 





 

 

 

 
7 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6RXUFH(3$SKRWRVGXULQJ&DSLWRO+LOO&OHDQXS













 

 



 

 

  

 

 

 









 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  









 

 

 

 

 



   

 

  

 

 

  

 

 



 

  

 



 



 



 

 

 

 

 





 

 



 



  

 
72 

 



 



 

  

 

 

 

 



 





 





 



 





 

 



 



 







 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  























 

 

 

 



 



 



 



 

 



 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 



 



 

 

 



 


74 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  





















 

 

 

 









 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 



 

 

   

 

 

 



 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  



 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 

 



 

 













 

  

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

  

 

 

  

  

 

 

 

 
76 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



































































 







































































 

























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
























































































Decontamination Workshop  





 



 









  









 

 

 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 



 

 

 



 

 

 
78 





 

































 

 





 





 





 

 



 

  



  

   

 

 

 

  





 



 



   

 



 


Decontamination Workshop  































 







 

 



 



 

 

 

 

 









 

























   











   







   



 



 



 



 



 





 

 
8 















 

 



 

 















 







 



  



  

 







   

   

   

   

   























   

   

   

   

   

 







 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 



 


Decontamination Workshop  











 

 

 

 



 



 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 



 



 

 



 



 

 























 
82 

  

 

 

 



 





 



 

 



 



























 



 

 



 





 



 





 



 







 











 








Decontamination Workshop  







 

























   





















  













 

 

 

 

 

 

 





  



















 





 



 











  

 


84 





 



 











  











 

   













 











 

   

























 

  

  

  

  

 



 

 

  

  

  

 



 





 

 



 

 

  
Decontamination Workshop  











3UHVHQWHGDW







































 



 















 





 





 

 







 







 





 



 



 



 
















86 





























































 















 















 

































 

























 





































 



 











































 





















 



























 






























Decontamination Workshop  



  



 









 





















 













 















 













 









 







 









 

















































 





 





 











 





 



 



 


88 









 

 

 







 



 



 



























































 











 



 



 



 









  





 







 



 



  



 



 

 



 


Decontamination Workshop  













 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 



 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
9 



 

 

 

 

 



 



 



 

 



 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  















 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 



 







  



 

 

 

 

 

  



 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
92 



 

 

 

 

  

 

 



 

 





 

 

 

  



 



 





  



  







 



  









 

 



 



 

 

 



 





 

 



 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop  





























 





 







 

 



 



 

 

 



 



  







 



 







  





 



 



 

 






94 



 









 



















 

















  

   

 

 















 







 







 









 









 









 




Decontamination Workshop  

 

 

 
96 





 

 

  

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

















 









 



      



















































 

 





 







  

     

















































 

















                            





     
Decontamination Workshop 97 

























      





  

 

 

 

 













 

 



 









 

   











       



























 











 

 



 









 

















 

        





































 











 

 



 



























                         





































         





  
98 NHSRC 

 

 

 

 

 







 













  

  

       

























 







 

 















   

 

     





























 







 

 

 





















 

       









































 







 

























                            





   



























      





  
Decontamination Workshop 99 

 

 

 

 







 





 









 











      

































 





 

 























 

 

 

  

      



























 





 























                            





     





























      





  

 

 

 

 



















 
100 NHSRC 

 

 









       





















































 

 

 













       

















































 

 





















                            





  































       





  

 

 

 

 



















 

 



 



 

      

























































 

 
Decontamination Workshop 101 

 

 





     

       







































 

 























       





   





























       





  

 

 

 

 

 







 













  

       





























 









 

















   

         

























 








102 NHSRC 

 















 

 

      





























 







































       





 

          

          

           

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

          



























































 

 

 

 



         

        

           

        

        

        

        

        

        

        

        

        













 



































 

          

          

         





          

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

    





















 













 








Decontamination Workshop 103 







 





















 







   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   



      

















      











   



      

















      











  



        





















      











  



        

















      

















   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   


104 NHSRC 







   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

  







   













      











   



   

























      



















   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

  



      

















      











  



      

















      




















Decontamination Workshop 105 













 

 



 

 





  





 



 





 





 

 

 

 

 

 



 



 



 
















106 NHSRC 



 































 





























 





 











 

 



 



 


Decontamination Workshop 107 





























 









 





 

 





 





 





 







 





 





 
108 NHSRC 





5REHUW%HWWOH\ 5REHUW%HWWOH\6PLWK)5,&6 6PLWK)5,&6

*'63URMHFW'LUHFWRU

'HSDUWPHQWIRU(QYLURQPHQW)RRGDQG5XUDO$IIDLUV'HIUD



 

 



 



   



  



  



  

 



 



 

 

 







 





 





  





  





 


Decontamination Workshop 109 

 

 

  

 

 

 





 

 

 





  

  

  



 

  

 

 

 

JGV#GHIUDJVLJRYXN
110 NHSRC 





















 



 



 

 















 

 













 

 

 

 











 



 

 

 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop 111 



  

  

  

  

















 

 











  



 



  



 



 



 



 







 



  



 



 



 





     









 



    

    



     

 













  







 




112 NHSRC 









































 

 



 

 

 

 

 



 







 





  





 

 





 

 

 



 

 

 
Decontamination Workshop 113

 

















 

 

  

 

   







































 





















 



 









      

 





























  



 



  



 

 



 

 

 



 





 



 

 

 

 

 






114 NHSRC











 







  



 



















 

 

 





   





















































   

  



 



 

 

 



 

 

 



 







  




































Decontamination Workshop 115

 

  

  

 



 



 



 

 



  

 

 

 



 





 





 

 



 



 





 



 





 



 

 

 

 



 


116 NHSRC



  

 











 

 



 



  

  



   





  







 

  





 



 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



  

 



  



 

 







 







 

 

 



 


Decontamination Workshop 117







 

 

 

 

 





 

  





 



 







 

 

 



 



 



 

  

 





 

 



 

  







 






















118 NHSRC





 





































 

 

 



























 














Decontamination Workshop 119 











 

 

 

 

 











 

 

 
120 NHSRC 

 











   

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

    



    

 

 






Decontamination Workshop 121 













       



















    

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

 





  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

 






122 NHSRC 
Decontamination Workshop 123 








124 NHSRC 



 

 

 



 

 

 



 

  

 

 



 

 



 


Decontamination Workshop 125 





 

 

 

 

 
126 NHSRC 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 






Decontamination Workshop 127 
128 NHSRC 
Decontamination Workshop 129















    























 

 

 

 

 

 



   

  























    

  





















 



 



 





 



 



























 

















































    

    

 











 





 


130 NHSRC



 

 

 

  

  

  

  

  

  

 

 



























   



























      



  



  



  



  



















  



 



 























  



















   

   





































   

   



   

    

     

   

   

   

    

    

    

 



 

  



 



 







 














Decontamination Workshop 131









   





 

 

 



     

    









   

    

    



    



    



  



  







 







 

 



 



  

 





 



 







 



 

 



 

 

   













   

 







 

    

   















      

 





































 

   

  

 



 









  


132 NHSRC











 

 

 

 

 















 















  

 









 





 











  



 

 







 



 




Decontamination Workshop 133

 







 









 





 

 





 







 


134 NHSRC 

 





 













 



 

 

  

 



  

 



 



  



  

 



  



 





 



 

 







 





 

 



 


Decontamination Workshop 135 



 

  





 



 



 



 

  



  

  



  

 

  

 

   



   







 









 











 


136 NHSRC 



 

 





 

  

 

  











 



 



 



 



   



 



 
Decontamination Workshop 137 



 

 



 



  

  

  





 

 

 





 











  

 



 









 







 



 



  

 

 



 

 

  



  

 

 



  

 

 








138 NHSRC 





  

 







 



   



 



    



 



 







 







 



 



 





  

  

 





   

 



  



 



   



 







 

 
Decontamination Workshop 139 

 



 

 



 





 



 





 



 





 



 



  



  



 



 



 



 

  



 

 



 





 





   



 

 

  



 





 

 



 





 

































       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       



       

       
140 NHSRC 



  





  

 

 





 

 

 

 

 



 

  



 



 

 

 

  

 

 

  











  





 



 





 







 

 



 



 



 



 

 

 

 



 





 

 

 


Decontamination Workshop 141 



 



 



 

  

 

 

  





            

 





  







































        

         

        

        

         

        

         

        

        

        

        

             

          

 











 









































        

         

        

        

         

        

        

        

        

        

        

   



       

    

 

    



 

   

   

 

  

 

  



  











 





 



 









  









 

 



 





 

  






142 NHSRC 



 

  



 



 





  

 





 



 





 



 
Decontamination Workshop 143 















  

  

  

  

 



   

  



  



  

  

   

 

 



 



 

 









 





  







 

 



 

 

  

 

  







 

 





  





  



 



 



 

 

 



  

  

  

 

  



 






144 NHSRC 



 













    













 

 



  

 

  

 

 





 

 



 

 







 





































  



 









  

 



 

 

 



 

 

 

 



 

  

  

  

 













       











 

       

           

 

         

           

 

         



 

        
Decontamination Workshop 145 





 

 

 

  





 

 

 

 



  

 







































    

























    

 

¡

















     









 















         

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

 

 

 

 













 











    











 











        





 
146 NHSRC 





 

 



 



 

 



 

 

¡

 





 



 ¡



 





 



 

 





 





 









































 













 

  





























 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  







 





 















 

 

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

 

 

 








Decontamination Workshop 147 



 

  

  

  

  

  

  

 













 



 

 

 

 

 









 



 



 



  





 

  

 



 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 
148 NHSRC 





  









 











 

 

 





 

 



 

 



























 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 



 

  

  

  

  

   

  

  

 
Decontamination Workshop 149 





  

  

 

  

  

  

  

 

 







 



 









   





   

  







 

















 

 

 

 



 



 



 



   

 

  

 



 

 
150 NHSRC 



 

 

   

  



  

 

 

 



 



  

 



  

 





 



 



 

 

 

   

 

 



 



 

 

 

 



 





 



 

 

 

 

 

 





 



  

 

  



 

 

 


Decontamination Workshop 151 







 

  

  

  

 







 







  



 











 



 





 

   

   

   

 

  

  





 
152 NHSRC 





 























   

   

   

   

   









  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  







 

 



 





 

 
Decontamination Workshop 153 





 

 







 



 







 

 





 



 









 

  



 



 

 







 

 




154 NHSRC 

















 

 

 

 

 

 

  

  

  

 



  

 





 





 

 





 

 

 

 

































 




Decontamination Workshop 155 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 



   

  



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  







 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 



   































 











 

  
156 NHSRC 



 

 

 

 



  

 

 













 

 

 





 





 



     



    



    



     

    

    

    





   



   

 

 

 



   



   



   



    

   

   

   





   





 



   



   



   



    

   

   

   





   

 
Decontamination Workshop 157 

 



        

       

       

        

       

       

     

  

 







 















 

 









 



      



     



    



     

     

    

   





   



   

 

 

 



   



   



   



    

   

   

   





   





 



   



   



   



    

   

   

   





   

 

 























 


158 NHSRC 

 



   



    



   



     

   

    

   





    



   

  

 



   



   



   



    

   

   

   





   





 



   



   



   



    

   

   

   





   

 



 

   

  

  

  

  

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

  

  

 











 

 











 

 

 

 





 

 

 





 

 
Decontamination Workshop 159 











 



 



 



 

 







 

 

 

  

















  



 

 



 





  

  

  

  

 

  

 

  
160 NHSRC 

 

 



 













 







 

 

 



  



 



 



 



 



 



 

 



 



 



  

 

 

 

  

 

 

 





  





 

 

 

  


Decontamination Workshop 161 



 



   



   

   

  





 





 

 

 

 



  

  

  







   





 































 























































  



   



   


162 NHSRC 



 

 

 











 





 













 

 

 

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
Decontamination Workshop 165 

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





                      



 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 



 

 



 





 

 

 





 



 



 



 

 





 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 
United States

Environmental Protection

Agency

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use

$300

EPA/600/R-05/083

October 2005

PRESORTED STANDARD

POSTAGE & FEES PAID

EPA

PERMIT NO. G-35