UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAKE STANLEY DEWILDE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

UNITED STATES; DIRECTOR OF 

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, 

FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 23-8054 

(D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00003-SWS) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Jake Stanley DeWilde appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se 

Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the transfer or 

possession of machineguns. The district court dismissed the action for lack of 

jurisdiction, concluding that DeWilde lacked standing. Alternatively, the district 

court concluded that even if DeWilde had standing, the action should be dismissed 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 10, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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for failure to state a claim because machineguns are not protected by the Second 

Amendment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal for lack of standing. We express no opinion on the merits of the 

Second Amendment claim. 

I 

This suit began when DeWilde attempted to represent a trust as a pro se 

non-attorney. He filed an initial complaint “Individually and as Trustee of the 

DeWilde Arms Trust.” R. at 5; see id. at 6, para. 3. In that capacity, he alleged that 

he applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) to make 

an M16 machinegun, but the ATF denied the trust’s application, citing § 922(o). See 

id. at 11, para. 19. Attached to the complaint is the application form submitted by 

DeWilde on behalf of the trust and denied by the ATF. It states that the application 

is filed on behalf of a “Trust or Legal Entity.” Id. at 15. The applicant on the form is 

identified as “DeWilde Arms Trust,” id., and DeWilde signed the application as 

“Jake DeWilde, Trustee,” id. at 16. According to DeWilde, § 922(o) violates his 

Second Amendment rights because he “desires to own an M16 machinegun for all 

lawful purposes, including defense of hearth and home and militia functions.” R. at 

11, para. 23. He requested a declaratory judgment that § 922(o) is unconstitutional 

and a mandatory injunction requiring the ATF to approve the trust’s application to 

manufacture a machinegun. See id., para. 25. 

The government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, 

that DeWilde lacked authority to represent the trust as a pro se non-attorney, even 

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though he alleged he is the trustee. See id. at 54-55 (citing United States v. Lain, 

773 F. App’x 476, 477 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (holding that trusts are 

artificial legal entities existing independently of their trustees and may appear in 

court only through licensed counsel, “[s]o if the trustee is not a licensed attorney, he 

or she cannot represent the trust”)). 

To remedy the pleading defect, DeWilde amended the complaint. He dropped 

the trust as a party-plaintiff and instituted the action solely in his individual 

capacity—not as a trustee. See id. at 73. The rest of his allegations and demands for 

relief were substantively identical to those in the original complaint. The 

government then moved to dismiss the amended complaint. 

The district court raised standing sua sponte and concluded DeWilde failed to 

allege an injury in fact. The district court observed that he relied on two factual 

allegations to establish his standing: 1) he submitted the ATF application to make an 

M16 machinegun and 2) he desired to own an M16 machinegun. The court rejected 

his reliance on the first allegation, reasoning that the trust—not DeWilde—applied to 

the ATF to manufacture a machinegun, and DeWilde signed the application as a 

trustee—not in his individual capacity—yet the trust and the trustee were no longer 

parties to the amended complaint. The court pointed out that DeWilde filed the 

amended complaint solely in his individual capacity, he never applied to the ATF to 

make a machinegun in his individual capacity, nor did the ATF deny him an 

application. As for DeWilde’s second factual allegation—his desire to own a 

machinegun—the court ruled that the allegation was “too indefinite to establish a 

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particularized injury and insufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact.” Id. at 286-87. 

The court explained that DeWilde sought to invalidate a criminal statute prohibiting 

the possession and transfer of machineguns, but he did not allege that he owns, 

possesses, or transfers machineguns such that he faced a credible threat of 

prosecution. Instead, he merely alleged a general grievance that was insufficient to 

confer standing. 

II 

We review questions of standing de novo. Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United 

States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish 

standing, and a plaintiff must support each element of standing “in the same way as 

any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the 

manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 

Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because the district court resolved the standing issue at 

the pleading stage, we, like the district court, “must accept as true all material 

allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the 

complaining party.” Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013); 

see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage, 

general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may 

suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that the general allegations embrace 

those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Although we afford pro se pleadings a liberal 

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construction, we will not “supply additional factual allegations to round out a 

plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. 

New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]tanding generally has three requirements: (1) an injury in fact; 

(2) causation; and (3) redressability.” Colo. Outfitters, 823 F.3d at 544. The injuryin-fact element requires that a plaintiff “offer something more than the hypothetical 

possibility of injury. The alleged injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual 

or imminent.” Id. “[I]mminence is . . . a somewhat elastic concept, [but] it cannot be 

stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too 

speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” Id. at 

544-45 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context—a pre-enforcement 

challenge to a criminal statute—“a plaintiff must typically demonstrate (1) an 

intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional 

interest, but proscribed by the challenged statute,” and (2) that there exists a credible 

threat of prosecution thereunder.” Id. at 545 (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[I]t is not necessary that the plaintiff first expose himself to actual arrest 

or prosecution to be entitled to challenge the statute that he claims deters the exercise 

of his constitutional rights.” Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 

289, 298 (1979) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]hen 

plaintiffs do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a 

prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible, they do not 

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allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court.” Id. at 298-99 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

DeWilde relies on two factual allegations to establish his standing. First, he 

alleged that he submitted the application to the ATF to make a machinegun. This 

allegation fails to establish his standing because he did not submit the application on 

his own behalf. Rather, the application confirms that he applied to the ATF in his 

capacity as a trustee on behalf of the trust to enable the trust to manufacture a 

machinegun. As the district court pointed out, DeWilde himself has not, in his 

individual capacity, applied for or been denied an application to make a machinegun. 

DeWilde contends the district court misunderstood “the fundamental 

relationship between [him] and his trust, as well as the absolute powers he possesses 

in the administration of his trust.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. In essence, he asserts the 

district court mistakenly treated the trust as a distinct legal entity, thereby denying 

him the right to plead and conduct his case. But this argument fails to distinguish 

between DeWilde’s legal status as an individual, and the trust’s separate and distinct 

legal status as an artificial legal entity. Trusts are artificial legal entities that exist 

independently of their trustees. See Conagra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, 

LLC, 776 F.3d 1175, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015). If a trustee is not a licensed attorney, the 

trustee cannot represent the trust. See Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismarck, 20 F.3d 

347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A nonlawyer, such as these purported ‘trustee(s) pro se,’ 

has no right to represent another entity, i.e., a trust, in a court of the United States.”); 

see also In re Wilson, 860 F. App’x 147, 149-50 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) 

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(applying the same analysis); Lain, 773 F. App’x at 477 (same).1

 DeWilde disputes 

this rule, arguing it denies him the right “to plead and conduct his case personally.” 

Aplt. Opening Br. at 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654). But again, he is not the trust, and 

as a non-licensed pro se party, he cannot prosecute his case on behalf of the trust, see 

Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202 

(1993) (recognizing § 1654 does not allow “artificial entities” to appear in federal 

court without licensed counsel); see also Wilson, 860 F. App’x at 150 (rejecting the 

same argument). 

 DeWilde’s second allegation also fails to establish his standing. He alleged he 

“desires to own an M16 machinegun for all lawful purposes, including defense of 

hearth and home and militia functions.” R. at 79, para. 23. In evaluating this 

allegation, our decision in Colorado Outfitters, 832 F.3d 537, is instructive. That 

case involved a Second Amendment pre-enforcement challenge to a statute that 

outlawed the possession, sale, and transfer of large-capacity magazines (LCMs). See 

id. at 542. The statute contained an exception that permitted grandfathered LCMs 

(those owned prior to the statute’s effective date) so long as the owner maintained 

continuous possession of the LCMs. See id. Standing was predicated in part on the 

testimony of a plaintiff who owned grandfathered LCMs and claimed the statute 

impacted her “because eventually, her LCMs will wear out and because it would be 

possible to lose her LCMs (or lose continuous possession of them) in the meantime.” 

1

 We may cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value. See 10th Cir. 

R. 32.1(A). 

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Id. at 551 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded this 

testimony “failed to demonstrate an imminent injury for purposes of mounting a 

pre-enforcement challenge to [the] statute” because it “expressed no concrete plans to 

engage in conduct that had any potential to violate [the statute].” Id.

DeWilde’s allegations are similarly vague. He alleged that he “desires to own 

an M16 machinegun for all lawful purposes,” R. at 79, para. 23, but he alleges no 

concrete plan to possess or transfer a machinegun in violation of § 922(o). He also 

gives no indication that he has ever possessed a firearm, nor does he say when or if 

he plans to acquire or manufacture a machinegun or transfer one. See Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 564 (explaining that intentions to engage in conduct “without any 

description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when” the conduct 

will occur is insufficient). He simply “desires” to own a machinegun. But a “vague 

desire” to engage in some conduct is not enough to establish standing; “a plaintiff 

must describe concrete plans.” Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 875 

(10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Supreme Court has 

instructed that ‘some day’ intentions do not support a finding of the ‘actual or 

imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Id. at 874-75 (ellipsis omitted) (quoting 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). DeWilde’s alleged “desire” to own a machinegun is too 

abstract to constitute a concrete, imminent injury. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016) (“A concrete injury must be de facto; that is, it must 

actually exist. . . . “[It must be] real, and not abstract.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). And without alleging when or even if he might possess or transfer a 

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machinegun, there is no suggestion he faces a credible threat of prosecution or 

investigation. 

Still, DeWilde asserts his allegations are virtually identical to those other 

courts have found sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. He adds that, 

not only did he allege that he desires to own a machinegun, but he also submitted the 

ATF application, provided his fingerprints and photograph, and paid the required tax 

stamp on the application. These latter efforts were taken on behalf of the trust, 

however, so they do not bolster his standing argument. 

To the extent DeWilde cites decisions from other courts, his cases do not help 

him. The non-binding decisions he cites from other circuits have been vacated or 

abrogated. See Teter v. Lopez, 76 F.4th 938 (9th Cir. 2023), vacated for reh’g 

en banc, 2024 WL 719051 (Feb. 22, 2024); Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by N.Y. 

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); Nat’l Rifle 

Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 

194-95 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by Bruen, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2111.2

 Moreover, 

these extra-circuit cases are distinguishable because standing was predicated on more 

concrete injuries. See Teter, 76 F.4th at 944 (plaintiffs were “forced to dispose of 

their butterfly knives” and “would purchase replacements” if the law were 

2

 For the first time in his reply brief, DeWilde cites two passing statements in 

Bruen, where the Court noted the petitioners “wanted” handguns. 142 S. Ct. at 2125. 

But these descriptors are meaningless because the Court did not engage in any 

standing analysis. 

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invalidated (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jackson, 746 F.3d at 967 (plaintiff 

would purchase ammunition if the legal prohibition were invalidated); Nat’l Rifle 

Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 190-91 (plaintiff prevented from purchasing handguns due to age 

restriction). And DeWilde’s remaining cases are all non-binding district court 

decisions cited for the proposition that an impairment on his “desire to make and 

own” a machinegun is enough to establish an injury in fact. Aplt. Opening Br. at 9. 

But as we have explained, binding precedent from this court and the Supreme Court 

requires more than “‘some day’ intentions.” Baker, 979 F.3d at 874 (quoting Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 564). A mere desire to possess a machinegun, untethered from any 

allegation that he faces a credible threat of prosecution, is insufficient to establish an 

injury in fact. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of 

standing. 

III 

 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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