INTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY 

PERSONNEL

Strategic Approach 

and Training 

Requirements Needed 

to Guide Joint Duty 

Program

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2012

GAO-12-679

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-679, a report to 

congressional requesters

June 2012

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL

Strategic Approach and Training Requirements 

Needed to Guide Joint Duty Program

Why GAO Did This Study

In the years following the terrorist 

attacks on September 11, 2001, 

Congress enacted the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004, which gives the Director of 

National Intelligence the responsibility 

to establish a personnel rotational 

program (the Joint Duty Program) 

across the IC. The intended purpose is 

to facilitate IC personnel’s 

understanding of the wide range of 

intelligence requirements, methods, 

users, and capabilities. GAO evaluated 

the extent to which (1) IC elements are 

participating in the Joint Duty Program, 

(2) the ODNI has developed a strategic 

framework to help ensure the effective 

implementation of the Joint Duty 

Program, and (3) ODNI has 

established training and education 

programs to support the Joint Duty 

Program. GAO reviewed the Joint Duty 

Program’s legislative requirements and 

guidance, analyzed data on program 

participants, and interviewed program 

officials from the entire IC. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS take 

steps to have the Coast Guard 

participate in the Joint Duty Program. 

GAO also recommends that ODNI 

develop a strategic framework to 

implement the program across the IC 

and that ODNI establish and document 

the program’s training requirements 

and develop a plan and timeline for 

implementing them. DHS and the 

Coast Guard agreed with GAO’s

recommendation to the Coast Guard. 

ODNI generally agreed with GAO’s

recommendations, but raised concerns 

about the findings on performance 

goals and the strategic framework. 

GAO continues to believe in the 

findings as stated in the report.

What GAO Found

All of the Intelligence Community (IC) elements except for one are participating in 

the Joint Duty Program and the IC elements generally view the program as 

beneficial. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Defense 

Security Service, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 

and 15 other IC components have identified an office or individual responsible for 

facilitating the program. However, the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), which 

ordinarily operates under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), does not 

participate in the program, even though the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 and IC guidance stipulate that the Joint Duty Program 

applies to the defined IC, which includes the Coast Guard’s civilian personnel in 

its National Intelligence Element. Coast Guard officials stated it delayed its 

participation in the program because it first plans to conduct a workforce study 

that will determine how the Coast Guard will participate, but it has not identified a 

timeframe for the study’s completion, and the position assigned to conduct the 

study is currently vacant. As a result, personnel in other IC elements may not 

fully understand the Coast Guard’s intelligence mission and Coast Guard 

employees may have limited opportunities to collaborate with other IC elements. 

ODNI has not established a strategic framework to guide the implementation of 

the Joint Duty Program across the IC. GAO has noted in prior work the 

importance of having a strategic framework to guide program implementation. 

However, ODNI has not clearly defined the program’s mission, established 

performance goals, and measured progress toward achieving those goals.

Further, program officials told GAO that they collected IC element data on joint 

duty rotations, but GAO found that they had not used these data to evaluate 

progress toward achieving program goals. In addition, although the Director of 

National Intelligence has emphasized the importance of the program, GAO found 

that the ODNI Joint Duty Program Office Chief position has experienced 

repeated turnover since the program’s inception. Specifically, five different 

people have served in the Joint Duty Program Chief position in the past 3 years. 

Further, ODNI officials stated that the Joint Duty Chief position had recently been 

downgraded from a Senior National Intelligence Service position to a General 

Schedule 15 position. Absent a comprehensive strategic framework that 

transcends turnovers in program leadership, program efforts are disjointed, and 

decision makers within ODNI lack the information they need to successfully 

manage the program. 

ODNI also has not formally established professional training and education 

programs to support the Joint Duty Program, as directed in 2007 ODNI guidance. 

ODNI has identified three IC-related courses intended for personnel participating 

in the Joint Duty Program but has waived the requirement to complete these 

courses. Officials from nine IC elements expressed various concerns about the 

content and rigor of the three courses, such as that the courses could be 

duplicative of existing agency-specific training courses. Further, ODNI has not 

yet determined or documented the program’s training requirements in guidance 

and has not yet developed a plan and timeline for implementing the training. As a 

result, ODNI is not positioned to use the Joint Duty Program to foster the widest

possible understanding of intelligence requirements, methods, users, and 

capabilities.

View GAO-12-679. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Letter 1 

Background 5

All IC Elements Except for One Are Participating in the Joint Duty 

Program 9

ODNI Has Not Established a Strategic Framework to Guide 

Implementation 12

ODNI Has Not Formally Established Professional Training and 

Education Programs to Support the Joint Duty Program 19

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 22

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29

Appendix II Noninteractive Graphic and Text for Figure 1 34

Appendix III Overview of the Joint Duty Program 36

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 39

Appendix V Comments from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 41

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45

Figures

Figure 1: Organization of the Intelligence Community (IC) 6

Figure 2: Timeline of Key IC Joint Duty Related Events 8

Figure 3: Process Employees Use to Apply for and Rotate to a Joint 

Duty Assignment 9

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GS General Schedule

IC Intelligence Community

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

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Page 1 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

June 20, 2012

The Honorable Daniel Akaka

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight of Management, the Federal Workforce, and

 the District of Columbia

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable John Tierney

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign

 Operations

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Flake

House of Representatives

In the years following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the 

President and Congress commissioned reviews that identified significant 

institutional, cultural, and organizational factors that had prevented the 

components of the U.S. Intelligence Community1 (IC) from operating in an 

effective and collaborative manner.2

 

1

The U.S. Intelligence Community comprises 17 components. The Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence oversees the Intelligence Community, and is counted as one of the 

17 components. The other 16 components are: the National Security Agency, National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Air Force 

Intelligence (Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Central 

Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis), Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), Department of 

Treasury (Office of Intelligence and Analysis), Federal Bureau of Investigation (National 

Security Branch), Drug Enforcement Administration (Office of National Security 

Intelligence), U.S. Coast Guard (Intelligence and Criminal Investigations), and Department 

of Energy (Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence). 

In one report to the President, a 

2

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community 

Report on IC Pay Modernization: Response to Section 308 of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Apr. 22, 2008).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

commission concluded that the IC had failed to encourage joint personnel 

assignments that could break down cultural barriers and foster 

collaboration among intelligence components.3 In enacting the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), 

Congress included a provision requiring the Director of National 

Intelligence to prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of IC 

personnel to other IC elements4 during their careers, in order to obtain the 

widest possible understanding of the range of intelligence requirements, 

methods, users, and capabilities through the IC.5

• Encourage and facilitate assignments and details of personnel to 

national intelligence centers, and between elements of the IC;

Specifically, according 

to IRTPA, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with IC 

element heads, is to prescribe personnel policies and programs to:

• Set standards for education, training, and career development of 

personnel within the IC; and

• Make service in more than one element of the IC a condition of 

promotion to such positions within the IC as the Director of National 

Intelligence specifies.

The Director of National Intelligence issued a directive6 and policy 

guidance7

 

3

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Mar. 31, 

2005). 

for the Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program 

(Joint Duty Program) in 2006 and 2007, respectively, that prescribe 

4

For purposes of this report, references to the IC elements include the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Defense Security Service, and the 17 IC 

components noted above because they are all subject to the Joint Duty Program 

requirement. Although the Defense Security Service is technically not part of the IC, it is 

also included in our scope because Defense Security Service civilian personnel fall under 

the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence and are subject to the Joint Duty Program 

requirement.

5

Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1011 (2004) (amending § 102A of the National Security Act of 

1947, as codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1).

6

Intelligence Community Directive 601, Human Capital: Joint Intelligence Community Duty 

Assignments (May 16, 2006) (as amended Sept. 4, 2009).

7

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1, Intelligence Community Civilian Joint 

Duty Program Implementing Instructions (June 25, 2007) (as amended Sept. 4, 2009).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

requirements for obtaining joint duty credit.8 According to the directive, IC 

joint duty positions are typically limited to those classified at General 

Schedule (GS) 13 and above (or similar categories). A joint duty 

assignment means a temporary detail of employees away from their 

home elements to rotational assignments in an appropriate joint duty 

position with another IC element for at least 12 months.9 Further, the 

policy guidance establishes an expectation that ODNI will, in consultation 

with the heads of the IC elements, develop a Joint Leadership 

Development Program to provide professional training and education to 

personnel who are on, or have completed, one or more joint duty 

assignments. Subject to the provisions of the policy guidance, promotion 

to Senior Executive/Senior Professional positions is contingent on earning 

joint duty credit.10

In 2009, the Chairman and then-Ranking Member of the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, asked us to review the Joint Duty 

Program. Subsequently, the then-Chairman and then-Ranking Member of 

the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, asked to be 

added as requestors.11

 

8

Subject to the conditions described in the policy guidance, joint duty credit can generally 

be earned by working for at least 12 months in another IC element, in an organization 

outside the IC, within an employee’s home element in a position that has been specifically 

designated as providing joint duty credit, and in certain liaison and equivalent positions or 

on internal assignments (e.g., serving on joint task forces). Furthermore, any individual 

deployed to a designated combat zone for 179 days or more will satisfy the 12-month 

minimum requirement for joint duty credit.

In response to this request, we examined the 

9

Under the directive, a joint duty assignment may also be a permanent assignment of an 

employee from a position in one IC element to a position in another IC element.

10Under this directive, Senior Executives/Senior Professionals include IC civilian 

employees in Senior National Intelligence Service, Defense Intelligence Senior Executive 

Service, Senior Intelligence Service, Senior Executive Service, Senior Level, senior 

Scientific and Technical, and/or equivalent positions that are classified above GS-15, or 

employees with comparable rank. 

11When the 112th Congress organized, the name of the House subcommittee was 

changed to the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign 

Operations. In addition, former Ranking Member Flake was no longer a member of the 

subcommittee but asked to remain a requester for this engagement, and the new 

subcommittee Chairman, Representative Chaffetz, asked to be added to the request.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

extent to which (1) IC elements are participating in the Joint Duty 

Program, (2) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has 

developed a strategic framework to help ensure the effective 

implementation of the Joint Duty Program across the IC, and (3) ODNI 

has established training and education programs to support the Joint Duty 

Program. 

To evaluate the extent to which the IC elements are participating in the 

Joint Duty Program, we interviewed cognizant agency officials and 

reviewed program documentation and guidance from ODNI, the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Defense Security 

Service, and the Joint Duty Program offices (or equivalent entity) from 

each of the remaining 16 IC components. To evaluate the extent to which 

ODNI has developed a strategic framework to help ensure the effective 

implementation of the Joint Duty Program across the IC, we reviewed 

legislative requirements set out in IRTPA and governmentwide best 

practices for program implementation;12

 

12GAO, Government Performance: GPRA Modernization Act Provides Opportunities to 

Help Address Fiscal, Performance, and Management Challenges, 

collected, reviewed, and 

analyzed key guidance issued by ODNI; and interviewed cognizant 

agency officials within ODNI, the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence, the Defense Security Service, and the joint duty 

program offices (or similar entity) of each of the remaining 16 IC 

components. We also requested, reviewed, and analyzed data from the 

IC elements to describe personnel participation in the IC Joint Duty 

Program. These data included the job series of individuals on rotations to 

IC elements and the method by which joint duty credit was earned. We 

found the data were sufficiently reliable to ascertain the characteristics of 

IC personnel participating in the Joint Duty Program in fiscal years 2010 

and 2011. To evaluate the extent to which ODNI has established training 

and education programs to support the Joint Duty Program, we reviewed 

requirements related to training and education programs set out in 

IRTPA, Intelligence Community Directive 601 and Intelligence Community 

Policy Guidance 601.1—which prescribe the Joint Duty Program—and 

analyzed ODNI documents related to those programs. We also 

interviewed officials from each of the IC elements to gain their 

perspectives on the actions ODNI had taken to establish training and 

education requirements for the Joint Duty Program. Additionally, we 

GAO-11-466T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2011). 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

interviewed officials from the National Intelligence University to ascertain 

the extent to which they support the Joint Duty Program.

We conducted this performance audit from January 201013 through June 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more thorough 

description of our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.

Established by IRTPA, the Director of National Intelligence serves as 

head of the IC, acts as the principal advisor to the President and National 

Security Council on intelligence matters, and oversees and directs the 

implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The IC comprises 

17 different organizations across the federal government. The Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence oversees all DOD 

intelligence policies and activities. As shown in figure 1, the IC elements 

that are subject to ODNI’s Joint Duty Program requirements consist of the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Defense Security Service, and 

16 IC components.

 

13We initially began this engagement in January 2010, and notified ODNI of our intention 

to schedule an entrance conference in early February. At the end of March 2010, ODNI 

provided us with a copy of the ODNI Office of the Inspector General, The Intelligence 

Community Civilian Joint Duty Program: Implementation Status Report, CAS-2008-0003 

(Washington, D.C.: October 2009). We initially agreed with ODNI to postpone the 

entrance conference pending our review of their report. Subsequently, section 348 of the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259 (2010), directed 

ODNI, in consultation with the Comptroller General, to develop a written directive 

governing GAO’s access to information from elements of the IC. Pending issuance of this 

guidance, we suspended this engagement temporarily. The ODNI issued guidance in April 

2011, accompanied by comments from the Comptroller General, and work on this 

engagement resumed in August 2011. See Intelligence Community Directive 114: 

Comptroller General Access to Intelligence Community Information (effective June 30, 

2011).

Background

Organization of the IC
Page 6 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel

a

 The DSS is not a component of the IC, but falls under the USDI and, under DOD policy, is a participant in the Joint Duty Program.

Figure 1: Organization of the Intelligence Community (IC)

Army 

Military

Intelligence

Department of Defense

Naval

Intelligence

Department of Defense

Marine Corps

Intelligence

Department of Defense

Air Force

Intelligence,

Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance

Department of Defense

Defense

Intelligence

Agency

Department of Defense

National

GeospatialIntelligence Agency

Department of Defense

National

Reconnaissance 

Office

Department of Defense

National

Security

Agency

Department of Defense

Central

Intelligence

Agency

Independent

Office of

Intelligence and

Counterintelligence

Department of Energy

Office of

Intelligence

and Analysis

Department of Homeland Security

Coast Guard

Intelligence and 

Criminal

Investigations

Department of Homeland Security

National

Security

Branch

Office of National

Security

Intelligence

Department of Justice (DEA)

Bureau of

Intelligence

and Research

Department of State

Office of

Intelligence and 

Analysis

Department of the Treasury

Office of the

Director of National 

Intelligence

Office of the Under 

Secretary of 

Defense for 

Intelligence

Defense

Security

Servicea

Department of Defense

DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE

UN I T ED S TATE S O F A M E RI C A

Interactivity instructions: Click on the office to view more information. See appendix II for the non-interactive, printer-friendly version. 

Source: GAO analysis of ODNI information.

Department of Justice (FBI)
 

Page 7 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

IRTPA provides statutory authority to the Director of National Intelligence 

to create the Joint Duty Program. Specifically, IRTPA provides that ODNI 

shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of IC personnel 

through various elements of the IC in the course of their careers in order 

to facilitate the widest possible understanding by these personnel of the 

variety of intelligence requirements, methods, users, and capabilities. 

Such mechanisms may include establishing requirements for education, 

training, and evaluation for service involving more than one element of 

the IC.

Congress noted in IRTPA that the mechanisms prescribed for the Joint 

Duty Program should, to the extent practical, try to duplicate the joint 

officer management policies established by the Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.14

To help facilitate the transformation to a more integrated and collaborative 

Intelligence Community, in October 2007 ODNI released a 500 Day Plan 

that identified six key focus areas which contained core and enabling 

initiatives that ODNI planned to execute to deepen integration of the IC’s 

people, processes, and technologies.

At the time 

Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, cultural change was needed to move 

DOD away from its service parochialisms toward interservice cooperation 

and coordination so that DOD could better prepare its military leaders to 

plan, support, and conduct joint, or multiservice, operations. GoldwaterNichols required DOD to develop officers in joint matters through 

education, to assign officers who meet specified criteria to joint positions, 

and to factor this joint education and experience into its officer promotion 

decisions.

15

 

14Pub. Law No. 99-433 (1986).

The first key focus area in the 500 

Day Plan was creating a culture of collaboration, and a core initiative in 

the plan to address this area was implementing the civilian IC Joint Duty 

Program, which also included the design, development, and execution of 

the Joint Leadership Development Program. The Joint Leadership 

Development Program was intended to provide professional training and 

15United States Intelligence Community, 500 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration (Oct. 

10, 2007). This document was a key source of strategic direction when the Joint Duty 

Program was initially implemented, and it emphasized the importance of training and 

education as part of the program. However, in June 2012 ODNI told us that this plan is 

now outdated and no longer provides strategic direction for ODNI.

Establishment of the Joint 

Duty Program
 

Page 8 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

education for employees who are participating in or who have completed 

a joint duty assignment.

Figure 2 provides a timeline of the key events surrounding the 

implementation of the Joint Duty Program.

Figure 2: Timeline of Key IC Joint Duty Related Events
 

Page 9 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

While individuals apply for joint duty assignments using the internal 

policies and procedures established by their home element, the basic 

procedures that employees must follow to apply for and rotate to a joint 

duty assignment are uniform, as established by ODNI guidance. Figure 3 

provides an overview of these fundamental processes.

Figure 3: Process Employees Use to Apply for and Rotate to a Joint Duty Assignment

For a more complete overview of the Joint Duty Program, see appendix 

III.

To date, all of the IC elements are participating in the Joint Duty Program 

except for the U.S. Coast Guard,16 and each of the participating IC 

elements has identified an agency-specific office or individual responsible 

for facilitating the Joint Duty Program at that level. Responsibilities of the 

office or individual responsible for facilitating the program include 

managing the rotations of personnel to other IC elements—for example, 

negotiating memorandums of understanding for assignments and 

adjudicating joint duty credit.17

 

16The U.S. Coast Guard is a component agency of the Department of Homeland Security.

In addition, each IC element has some 

flexibility with respect to how its internal process for participating in the 

17The ODNI has developed a standard memorandum of understanding that includes 

provisions governing rotational assignments and is used by all of the IC elements, who 

then tailor the provisions to govern each individual rotational assignment. 

Process Employees Use to 

Apply for and Rotate to a 

Joint Duty Assignment

All IC Elements 

Except for One Are 

Participating in the 

Joint Duty Program
 

Page 10 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Joint Duty Program is implemented. As a result of this flexibility, several 

IC elements have established unique measures that facilitate the Joint 

Duty Program at their element. For example, the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency preapproves individuals to participate in joint duty 

assignments prior to the application process to ensure that employees 

meet Joint Duty Program standard requirements, strategically places 

employees in appropriate rotational assignments, and plans for 

employees’ return after their rotations. The U.S. Marine Corps has 

initiated a similar process. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

is starting a mandatory “out-briefing” class for all personnel temporarily 

assigned to another organization, including Joint Duty Program 

participants. This class will cover issues that personnel commonly face 

while they are away from their home element, such as the way time and 

attendance should be handled and how the reintegration process will 

work. Furthermore, at the Department of State, returning joint duty 

participants complete presentations and brief co-workers through “Trade 

Craft” presentations, which serve as a forum to share knowledge gained 

during joint duty rotations.

IC officials cited enhanced collaboration, increased networking, and a 

better understanding of the community as a whole as positive aspects of 

the Joint Duty Program. Further, around half of the IC element officials we 

interviewed stated that senior-level agency leaders supported the 

program. Several officials noted that ODNI’s monthly community of 

practice meetings for Joint Duty Program managers were a good way to 

share information about the program—for example, best practices 

regarding different IC elements’ program implementation measures. 

Other IC element officials noted that the Joint Duty Program provides a 

benefit to their elements because personnel returning from joint duty 

assignments are able to leverage their new skills or knowledge to benefit 

the home element. Finally, officials from the IC elements identified one 

other benefit of the program—individuals rotating to other IC elements 

have a new opportunity to develop professionally.

The U.S. Coast Guard, however, has not participated in the Joint Duty 

Program. U.S. Coast Guard officials stated that its participation has been 

delayed because they plan to conduct a workforce study on 

developmental needs for their civilian personnel, which will include 

determining how the U.S. Coast Guard will participate in the Joint Duty 

Program. However, the U.S. Coast Guard has not identified a time frame 

for the completion of the workforce study and noted that the position 

assigned the responsibility for conducting the study is vacant because the 

U.S. Coast Guard is currently under a hiring freeze due to budgetary 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

constraints. U.S. Coast Guard officials did note they have begun sending 

a representative to the ODNI Community of Practice meetings so that the 

U.S. Coast Guard can learn about joint duty best practices and 

challenges that other IC elements have faced. Nevertheless, IRTPA, 

Intelligence Community Directive 601, and DOD Instruction 1400.3618

stipulate that the Joint Duty Program applies to the defined IC, which 

includes the U.S. Coast Guard’s civilian intelligence personnel in its 

National Intelligence Element. Because the ODNI Joint Duty Program 

guidance states that joint duty credit is a mandatory qualification 

requirement in order for personnel to be eligible for promotion to any 

civilian position classified above the GS-15 level (such as Senior 

Executive Service positions), nonparticipation means that the U.S. Coast

Guard may be unable to promote any of its civilian intelligence personnel 

to fill vacancies in intelligence positions at the senior executive level. 

Although Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1 allows the 

requirement of joint duty certification for promotion to senior executive 

positions to be waived, ODNI officials stated they do not anticipate 

granting waivers in the future.19 Although the U.S. Coast Guard’s civilian 

intelligence workforce is smaller than those of most of the other IC 

elements, without the U.S. Coast Guard’s participation in the Joint Duty 

Program, personnel in the other IC elements may not fully understand the 

U.S. Coast Guard’s intelligence requirements, methods, users, and 

capabilities to secure the nation’s ports and coastal waters. Further, the 

U.S. Coast Guard’s IC employees may be missing an opportunity to 

better understand other IC elements’ missions, cultures, and capabilities, 

apply that knowledge to achieving the U.S. Coast Guard’s mission, and 

improve collaboration with other IC elements.

 

18Department of Defense Instruction 1400.36, DOD Implementation of the Joint 

Intelligence Community Duty Assignment (JDA) Program (June 2, 2008).

19The authority to grant joint duty waivers and exemptions may be exercised at the 

discretion of the Director of National Intelligence, and for Department of Defense IC 

agencies and elements, at the discretion of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, when designated as the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI).
 

Page 12 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

ODNI does not have a strategic framework to effectively guide the 

implementation of the Joint Duty Program. Our previous work has shown 

the importance of establishing a comprehensive and integrated strategic 

framework to help ensure successful organizational transformation.20

Further, our prior work has demonstrated that having an effective plan for 

implementing programs and measuring progress can help decision 

makers determine whether initiatives are achieving desired results.21

Specifically, we have reported that an effective plan for implementing a 

results-oriented strategic framework requires agencies to (1) clearly 

define a program’s mission, (2) establish performance goals for which 

they will be held accountable and have quantifiable measures to gauge 

progress toward those goals, (3) determine strategies and resources to 

effectively accomplish those goals, (4) use performance information to 

make programmatic decisions necessary to make improvements, and 

(5) formally communicate results in performance reports.22

Accordingly, we reviewed and analyzed a variety of ODNI documents 

such as joint duty guidance, the Joint Duty Program’s “IC Joint Duty 

Communications Strategy,” and the Joint Duty Program’s “Joint Duty 

 

20GAO, Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief 

Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership, GAO-07-1072 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007).

21See for example, GAO, Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater 

Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework, GAO-11-809 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 21, 2011); Government Performance: GPRA Modernization Act Provides 

Opportunities to Help Address Fiscal, Performance, and Management Challenges, 

GAO-11-466T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2011); Military Personnel: DOD Needs an 

Oversight Framework and Standards to Improve Management of Its Casualty Assistance 

Programs, GAO-06-1010 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006); Results-Oriented 

Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, 

GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

22GAO-11-809. 

ODNI Has Not 

Established a 

Strategic Framework 

to Guide 

Implementation

ODNI Lacks a Strategic 

Framework
 

Page 13 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Vision, Mission, & Strategy” to determine if the components of a strategic 

framework existed either independently or as a single comprehensive 

framework. At the time of our review, ODNI’s “Joint Duty Vision, Mission, 

& Strategy,” for example, stated that the program’s mission was to “create 

cross-agency expertise” and that the program’s strategy was to “provide 

the workforce with opportunities for cross-agency collaboration and 

interdisciplinary experience.” However, this document did not include the 

key components of a strategic framework, and neither does ODNI’s joint 

duty directive or policy guidance. We found that although ODNI has taken 

some steps related to some of the components, such as collecting data 

on Joint Duty Program participation from the IC elements, opportunities 

for improvement exist in all components of a results-oriented strategic 

framework, as discussed below. Additionally, in May 2012, ODNI officials 

told us that their current “Joint Duty Vision, Mission, & Strategy” as well 

as its “IC Joint Duty Communications Strategy” were outdated, 

incomplete, and did not reflect the views of the current leadership.23

Define the mission. Prior to ODNI’s decision to rewrite its “Joint Duty 

Vision, Mission, & Strategy” noted above, some of the IC officials we 

interviewed stated that the Joint Duty Program mission is not clearly 

defined. As a result, IC elements interpret Joint Duty Program policy and 

guidance inconsistently. For some, the primary mission of joint duty 

assignments is to increase interagency collaboration, while for others, the 

mission is to enhance career development opportunities for individual 

participants. Additionally, ODNI guidance is unclear about whether joint 

duty assignments are intended for mission-critical employees or for those 

in support positions. In analyzing the IC elements’ response to our data 

request for listings of the occupational series of program participants, we 

found that some elements afford opportunities for employees in support 

positions, such as human capital and administrative positions, to be 

regular participants in the program. At other elements, most program 

participants have mission-critical positions, such as intelligence analyst 

positions.

ODNI 

officials also stated that these documents would be rewritten in their 

entirety; however, at the time of our review, officials indicated that no 

timeline for completion had been set.

 

23The position of Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital and 

Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer was last filled in November 2011. 

The position of Joint Duty Program Chief was last filled in March 2012.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

In addition, although IRTPA requires the Director of National Intelligence 

to establish mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of IC personnel 

throughout the IC, ODNI guidance allows personnel participating in the 

Joint Duty Program to rotate outside of the IC or within their home 

element, which further exacerbates the lack of clarity in the program’s 

mission. Of the 12 IC elements that responded to our data request with 

information about where their employees were completing the rotation, 10 

IC elements reported that at least one person was currently rotating 

outside of the IC. We asked ODNI officials about these disparities and 

officials told us that the key expectations of a joint duty rotation are that 

the participant will complete work that is IC related, is at another element, 

and that the work can be justified as beneficial to the individual, the 

element, and the IC. The officials explained that a business case must be 

built for a person to receive joint duty credit outside of these key 

expectations.

Establish performance goals and measure progress toward those 

goals. Similarly, ODNI has not established specific performance goals or 

quantifiable metrics for measuring progress of the Joint Duty Program. 

We have previously reported that for planning and performance 

measurement to be effective, managers need to use performance 

information to identify performance problems and look for solutions, 

develop approaches that improve results, and make other important 

management decisions.24

 

24GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for 

Management Decision Making,

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1 

established a requirement that all civilian IC personnel must have joint 

duty credit prior to being promoted to positions above the GS-15 level, a 

point that the Director of National Intelligence further articulated in a 2010 

memorandum to the workforce. Since 2007, ODNI’s Joint Duty Program 

Office has collected data about joint duty rotations from each IC element. 

While this information has been used to illustrate the promotion rates of 

joint duty participants and the number of personnel with joint duty credit, 

ODNI does not use these data in combination with defined goals to 

measure outcomes or program success. ODNI officials stated it 

aggregates the data collected and uses them to brief the Director of 

National Intelligence. Officials at several of the IC elements we met stated 

that the data fields identified and the frequency with which data are 

collected by the ODNI Joint Duty Program Office changed regularly with 

GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
 

Page 15 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

the turnover in the Joint Duty Program Office Chief position, making it 

difficult to identify trends and outcomes. Finally, officials at one element 

stated they have requested but not received feedback on the data they 

provide to ODNI. These officials noted, therefore, that they are unsure 

about whether they are providing the best possible data.

Identify resources. In addition, ODNI has not comprehensively identified 

resources needed to accomplish the mission of the Joint Duty Program. 

Financial resources dedicated to the Joint Duty Program vary significantly 

among the IC elements. For example, some IC elements have the 

financial resources to fill the positions left vacant when an employee 

leaves for a joint duty rotation and other IC elements struggle to absorb 

vacancies. An element’s ability to plan financially is further complicated 

because joint duty positions vary with respect to whether they are 

“reimbursable” (the element receiving the new employee pays that 

employee’s salary) or “non-reimbursable” (the element sending its 

employee to another element pays that employee’s salary). In fact, one IC 

element stated it was instituting a formal policy that its employees cannot 

participate in joint duty rotations that are non-reimbursable, which may 

limit rotation opportunities for that element’s employees. Other IC 

elements do not have a preference as to whether an employee accepts a 

reimbursable or non-reimbursable joint duty assignment.

ODNI has taken steps to address this issue by funding some positions left 

vacant during rotations. ODNI officials told us that these funds are 

disbursed on a first-come, first-served basis, and that IC elements making 

the request have to present a business case for their funding needs. To 

date, the officials said that the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. 

Air Force, and the U.S. Navy have used the funds more often than other 

eligible IC elements. According to Intelligence Community Policy 

Guidance 601.1, six IC elements25

Use performance information to make decisions for improvement.

ODNI also has not consistently used performance information to make 

cannot apply for these ODNI funds. At 

the time of our review, ODNI had identified resources to fund fewer than 

50 non-reimbursable positions, but ODNI officials stated that they are 

able to meet the current demand with those funds.

 

25These six elements are the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 

the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

decisions for improvement. While ODNI has used performance 

information and responded to recommendations from an ODNI Inspector 

General’s 2009 report, this effort does not ensure an institutionalized 

method for monitoring improvement. In October 2009, the ODNI Office of 

the Inspector General issued a report reviewing the implementation of the 

Joint Duty Program,

26

In addition to the 2009 Inspector General report, ODNI has developed an 

optional survey instrument for those individuals who have completed a 

joint duty rotation. However, because the survey is optional, at the time of 

our review ODNI had not collected enough responses for the results to be 

statistically significant. As a result, IC element officials we met stated they 

had not seen any of the results from these surveys and it is unclear how 

the results of these surveys are being used. Further, the ODNI Joint Duty 

Program Chief began a review of the Joint Duty Program in September 

2011 with an estimated completion date of October 2011. ODNI officials 

stated that the preliminary results of the review were briefed to the 

Director of National Intelligence in December 2011. As of June 2012, this 

review was in draft and ODNI officials had not determined when a final 

report would be issued.

which resulted in 20 recommendations that were 

intended to address the impediments affecting implementation of the 

program and to improve program participation. According to ODNI 

Inspector General officials, all of the recommendations have been closed 

and implemented. However, during the course of our review, we found 

that a number of challenges noted in the 2009 ODNI Inspector General 

report still existed. For example, the report found that the IC senior 

leaders and employees were confused about the purpose of the Joint 

Duty Program. In response to this finding, the report recommended that 

the ODNI Associate Director of National Intelligence/Chief Human Capital 

Office clarify the purpose of the Joint Duty Program to include both 

leadership development and broader collaboration throughout the IC. 

According to ODNI officials, the recommendation was closed and 

implemented. However, as we note in this report, the mission of the 

program remains unclear.

 

26Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Inspector General, The 

Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program: Implementation Status Report, CAS2008-0003 (Washington, D.C.: October 2009). The investigation that led to this report was 

conducted at the request of the ODNI Chief Human Capital Officer, as a result of several 

impediments to the program that had been identified in a prior inspector general report on 

the status of integration and collaboration in the IC.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Communicate results. Finally, ODNI officials provided us with a 

document entitled “IC Joint Duty Communications Strategy”, which is 

focused on increasing outreach and awareness of the program among 

the IC elements. While the ODNI officials stated, as noted above, that this 

document is being rewritten, we found that the document did not contain 

specific completion dates for the goals and activities identified. Moreover, 

it was not a plan for communicating results of a programmatic evaluation 

to the IC elements. The IC elements do not benefit from ODNI data calls 

or performance information collected from the voluntary surveys of joint 

duty participants because ODNI does not communicate their results to the 

IC elements. Although various demographic data are collected from each 

of the IC elements on a quarterly basis, this information is not made 

available or shared with the IC elements. ODNI officials we interviewed 

stated that they were unable to share results of the voluntary surveys with 

each of the IC elements because they did not have a representative 

sample of participants.

Previous GAO reports have noted the significance of strong leadership 

support—both at the senior leadership and immediate supervisor level—

as key to the successful implementation and oversight of programs, 

including interagency rotation programs.27 Further, our work has shown 

that focused and sustained leadership is at the center of successful 

organizational transformation.28 Our work has also shown that turnover in 

leadership can lead to critical gaps in institutional knowledge.29

 

27See for example, GAO, Interagency Collaboration: State and Army Personnel Rotation 

Programs Can Build on Positive Results with Additional Preparation and Evaluation, 

GAO-12-386 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2012); High-Risk Series: An Update, 

GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011); and Defense Acquisitions: Strong 

Leadership Is Key to Planning and Executing Stable Weapons Programs, GAO-10-522 

(Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2010).

28See for example, GAO-07-1072 and GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A 

Comprehensive Plan, Integrated Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure 

Success, GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2006).

29See for example, GAO, DHS Human Capital: Senior Leadership Vacancy Rate 

Generally Declined, but Components’ Rates Varied, GAO-12-264 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

10, 2012); and Older Workers: Federal Agencies Face Challenges but Have Opportunities 

to Hire and Retain Experienced Employees, GAO-08-630T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 

2008). 

Joint Duty Program Has 

Experienced Repeated 

Leadership Turnover
 

Page 18 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

While the current Director of National Intelligence has emphasized the 

importance of the Joint Duty Program in creating a culture of collaboration 

in the IC, the Joint Duty Program Office Chief position—the individual 

responsible for implementing the program across the IC—has 

experienced repeated turnover since the program’s inception. 

Specifically, since 2007, six different people have served in the Joint Duty 

Program Chief position, and five of these people have served in the Chief 

position over the last 3 years. Data provided by ODNI shows that terms of 

service for the last five incumbents in the Chief position have ranged from 

4 months to 10 months. IC element officials noted that institutional 

knowledge within the ODNI Joint Duty Program office has not been 

transferred between Chiefs and that the different Chiefs have interpreted 

the program’s mission and implementation differently, which in turn has 

led to confusion among the IC elements. For example, officials at one IC 

element stated that turnover of leadership at ODNI has made program 

implementation more difficult and has led to inconsistencies both in 

leadership styles and in program terminology.

Further, ODNI officials told us that, while all six Chiefs were senior 

executives, the Joint Duty Chief position had recently been downgraded 

from a Senior National Intelligence Service position to a General 

Schedule 15 position. The downgrade was made as part of a larger effort 

within ODNI to reduce the number of senior executive positions. 

Moreover, officials stated that in spring 2012, when the program Chief 

position was last filled, it was advertised as both a permanent and a joint 

duty assignment position.

Without an established comprehensive strategic framework that includes 

the key components to guide effective implementation, program efforts 

have been disjointed, and decision makers within ODNI have not had the 

information they need to successfully manage the Joint Duty Program. 

Such a strategic framework could transcend the turnovers in program 

leadership that the Joint Duty Program has repeatedly experienced.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

While ODNI has taken limited steps to establish the training and 

education component of the Joint Duty Program, to date ODNI has not 

formally established or implemented the training and education programs 

envisioned by IRTPA. IRTPA requires the Director of National Intelligence 

to prescribe, in consultation with the heads of the IC elements, personnel 

policies and programs that “set standards for education, training, and 

career development of personnel of the intelligence community.” In 2007, 

the Director of National Intelligence issued Intelligence Community Policy 

Guidance 601.1, which indicates that the Director of National Intelligence 

intends to establish a Joint Leadership Development Program to provide 

professional training and education for employees who are participating in 

or who have completed a joint duty assignment. The guidance provides 

that completion of the Joint Leadership Development Program or an 

equivalent course of study will be required for personnel to be certified as 

having completed the Joint Duty Program, but waives this requirement 

until such time as the Director of National Intelligence establishes and 

implements the Joint Leadership Development Program. ODNI also 

identified the design, development, and execution of the Joint Leadership 

Development Program as part of a core initiative for its 500 day plan 

issued in 2007.30

Instead, ODNI has recently taken some steps to develop what ODNI 

officials call the “learning component” to the Joint Duty Program. In 

October 2011, ODNI officials identified the following three training 

courses that they had developed specifically for the Joint Duty Program to 

promote a culture of collaboration and integration across the IC: 

(1) Understanding the Intelligence Community, for employees new to the 

IC; (2) Integrating the Intelligence Community, for General Schedule-13 

through General Schedule-15 IC personnel with management 

responsibilities; and (3) Leading the Intelligence Community, for Senior 

Executives. ODNI officials explained that Joint Duty Program participants 

would be expected to complete only one of the three courses. Further, on 

Approximately 5 years after ODNI’s issuance of 

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1, however, ODNI has not 

formally established the Joint Leadership Development Program. In June 

2012, ODNI told us that this program has been terminated.

 

30United States Intelligence Community, 500 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration (Oct. 

10, 2007). This document was a key source of strategic direction for ODNI when the Joint 

Duty Program was initially implemented, and it emphasized the importance of training and 

education as part of the program. However, in June 2012 ODNI told us that this plan is 

now outdated and no longer provides strategic direction for ODNI.

ODNI Has Not 

Formally Established 

Professional Training 

and Education 

Programs to Support 

the Joint Duty 

Program 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

October 4, 2011, the Director of National Intelligence issued a memo 

stating that the joint duty training requirement can be met by completing 

an existing degree or certificate program at the National Intelligence 

University.31

Currently, however, IC personnel are not required to take any of these 

three courses when participating in the Joint Duty Program because 

ODNI has not determined or documented in guidance what courses will 

make up the training component of the program. ODNI officials stated that 

they intend to revise Intelligence Community Directive 601 and 

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1 to provide a more detailed 

description of the training component than is provided currently in those 

documents. However, the officials did not have a time frame for when 

they expected the revisions to be completed and did not elaborate on how 

the guidance might be revised.

ODNI officials also said that, in the future, ODNI may allow 

personnel to take other courses to receive joint duty training credit, but 

ODNI had not yet made a determination at the time of our audit work.

Accordingly, the extent to which Joint Duty Program participants who 

have completed joint duty rotations have taken any of the three courses 

developed for the Joint Duty Program is unclear. None of the IC elements 

whose officials responded to our request for attendance data indicated 

that any of their Joint Duty Program participants had received credit for 

taking any of the courses. Specifically, officials from nine IC elements 

reported that none of the personnel who have received joint duty credit 

had taken any of the courses, and officials from four IC elements reported 

that they did not track these data.

While ODNI noted that the three courses had received praise from some 

class participants in course evaluations that are administered at the 

conclusion of every course, during the course of our review officials from 

nine IC elements expressed concerns about the content and rigor of the 

three courses. Officials from three of the IC elements told us that the 

courses did not appear to be tailored to support the Joint Duty Program or 

correlate to the performance management standards for leadership. 

ODNI officials explained that because each of the IC elements has its 

own leadership development program, ODNI had opted for the courses to 

 

31The National Intelligence University is a federal degree granting institution that educates 

and prepares intelligence officers to meet current and future challenges to the national 

security of the United States.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

focus on developing a collaborative culture and an appreciation for other 

agencies’ challenges. Officials from three other IC elements expressed 

concern that the courses could potentially duplicate or overlap with 

existing IC agency training courses. ODNI officials told us that they had 

not reviewed the IC elements’ individual training courses since 2009. 

Finally, three other IC elements noted that the courses are not sufficiently 

rigorous, like academic year-long programs offered by U.S. military 

service war colleges or DOD’s National Defense University. ODNI officials 

explained that they wanted to keep the classes short enough so that Joint 

Duty Program participants would not be taken offline for a long period of 

time to complete the training. The officials stated that unlike the military 

and its joint duty program, there is no capacity in the civilian IC workforce 

to replace personnel who are away at training.

Finally, at the time of our review, ODNI had not yet developed an 

implementation plan and timeline for the training component once the 

requirements are formally established. ODNI officials explained, for 

example, that they have not yet determined how to phase in the training 

across the IC, or whether personnel who have already completed joint 

duty rotations will be grandfathered, or exempted, from having to 

complete the training requirements. The officials stated that their key 

focus was on GS-15 personnel, as that was the population where 

personnel must have the joint duty credit in order to be promoted. The 

officials added that when ODNI moves forward with implementation of the 

training component of the Joint Duty Program, they will either grandfather 

personnel or set a date by which participants must have completed the 

required training. Until the training and education component of the Joint 

Duty Program is fully developed and a timeline established for 

implementation, the program may be unable to fully succeed in its goal of 

achieving the widest possible understanding of IC personnel of various 

intelligence requirements, methods, users, and capabilities, which could 

hinder IC efforts to work together and collaborate to prevent or counter 

terrorism. 

IRTPA empowers the Director of National Intelligence to create a Joint 

Duty Program that could more fully integrate the IC by helping to remove 

or reduce the significant institutional, cultural, and organizational factors 

that impeded the IC from operating in an effective and collaborative 

manner. To date, however, the Joint Duty Program remains a disjointed 

effort. The IC elements—with the exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, 

which plans on first conducting a workforce study on developmental 

needs for their civilian personnel to help determine how they will 

Conclusions
 

Page 22 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

participate in the Joint Duty Program—have responded by taking 

element-specific steps to actively participate in the Joint Duty Program. 

Nonetheless, repeated turnover in the Joint Duty Program Office’s Chief 

position (five Chiefs in the past 3 years), has hindered development of a 

strategic plan that could enhance the clarity of the Joint Duty Program’s 

mission, measure progress towards goals, and instill accountability in 

achieving those goals. The fact that ODNI has identified a need to modify 

or rewrite the Joint Duty Program’s directive, policy guidance, “Joint Duty 

Vision, Mission, & Strategy” and “IC Joint Duty Communications 

Strategy”, further highlights the need to develop a strategic framework to 

provide a clear road map to guide the Joint Duty Program. The absence 

of a strategic framework coupled with turnover of personnel in the Chief 

position has limited ODNI’s ability to foster the institutional knowledge that 

transcends turnovers in program leadership and is necessary to sustain 

the Joint Duty Program and more fully integrate the IC through joint 

assignments. The same is true for the training component of the Joint 

Duty Program. The fact that the training component remains unfocused 

and unimplemented means the program is missing an essential element 

to provide for cross-agency understanding and collaboration. Absent the 

development of a comprehensive strategic framework to guide program 

implementation and of formal training requirements with a plan to 

implement them, the Joint Duty Program is not positioned to foster the 

widest possible understanding of intelligence requirements, methods, 

users, and capabilities.

To help ensure that personnel in all of the IC elements fully understand 

the U.S. Coast Guard’s intelligence mission to secure the nation’s ports 

and coastal waters, that the U.S. Coast Guard’s civilian intelligence 

employees do not miss an opportunity to develop collaborative 

relationships with and to understand other IC elements, and that U.S. 

Coast Guard civilians remain viable for promotion to senior positions 

requiring joint duty credit, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security direct the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard to take steps to 

participate in the Joint Duty Program consistent with ODNI policy and 

guidance.

To improve the effectiveness of the implementation of the Joint Duty 

Program and to help ensure that institutional knowledge about the 

program transcends the individual tenure of each serving Joint Duty 

Program Chief, we recommend that the Director of National Intelligence 

develop a comprehensive strategic framework for the Joint Duty Program. 

This framework could include things such as

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 23 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

• clearly defining its mission,

• establishing performance goals,

• developing quantifiable metrics for measuring progress toward 

achieving performance goals,

• determining the financial resources necessary to accomplish the 

mission of the program,

• using performance information and metrics to make decisions to 

improve the program, and

• communicating results effectively with each of the IC elements.

To implement those provisions of IRTPA that address joint training and 

education and facilitate the widest possible understanding and 

collaboration among the IC, we recommend that the Director of National 

Intelligence take the following two actions:

• Establish formal training and education requirements for the Joint 

Duty Program, revise the existing policy guidance to clearly identify 

and describe these requirements, and eliminate the waiver that is 

currently in the guidance; and

• Develop a formal plan and timeline to implement the training and 

education component of the Joint Duty Program.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security 

and ODNI for review and comment. In written comments, the Department 

of Homeland Security agreed with the recommendation regarding the 

U.S. Coast Guard, and cited actions being taken to implement a joint duty 

program at the U.S. Coast Guard. The Department of Homeland 

Security’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV. ODNI 

generally agreed with our three recommendations addressed to it, and 

provided two specific comments related to our findings. ODNI’s 

comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. ODNI also 

provided a number of general and technical comments that we 

considered and incorporated, as appropriate.

The Department of Homeland Security noted that they and the U.S. Coast 

Guard agreed with our first recommendation that the U.S. Coast Guard 

take steps to participate in the Joint Duty Program consistent with ODNI 

policy and guidance. The Department of Homeland Security stated that 

establishing a formal civilian Joint Duty Program was one of the U.S. 

Coast Guard’s many human resource priorities, and that policy and 

guidance was presently being developed for such a program. The 

Department of Homeland Security also stated that it believes the U.S. 

Coast Guard is operating within the spirit of the Joint Duty Program with 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 24 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

regard to information sharing, collaboration, and professional 

development due to its military intelligence positions that are assigned to 

other agencies. They noted that the U.S. Coast Guard anticipates making 

significant progress in developing its civilian Joint Duty Program in the 

coming months, and noted specific actions that will be taken to do this. 

ODNI did not comment on this recommendation and, instead, deferred to 

the U.S. Coast Guard for a formal response.

ODNI agreed with our second recommendation to develop a 

comprehensive strategic framework for the Joint Duty Program, which 

could include things such as clearly defining its mission, establishing 

performance goals, developing quantifiable metrics for measuring 

progress toward achieving performance goals, determining the financial 

resources necessary to accomplish the mission of the program, using 

performance information and metrics to make decisions to improve the 

program, and communicating results effectively with each of the IC 

elements. ODNI stated that the Joint Duty Program would benefit from a 

single comprehensive strategic document, and noted that the Director of 

National Intelligence has requested that a program strategy be developed 

to help guide the program. ODNI expressed appreciation for GAO’s 

guidance. As we note in our report, a comprehensive and integrated 

strategic framework can help ensure successful organizational 

transformation and can help effectively guide implementation.

ODNI partially agreed with our third recommendation that ODNI establish 

formal training and education requirements for the Joint Duty Program, 

revise the existing policy guidance to clearly identify and describe these 

requirements, and eliminate the waiver that is presently in the guidance. 

ODNI also partially agreed with our fourth recommendation that ODNI 

develop a formal plan and timeline to implement the training and 

education component of the joint duty program. While ODNI’s comments 

treated these two recommendations as one recommendation in its 

response, we consider these to be two separate recommendations that 

will require separate, independent actions from ODNI to implement. In its 

response, ODNI explained that it agreed that ODNI needed to provide 

formal guidance regarding the learning component to the Joint Duty 

Program, and stated that it would develop this guidance in conjunction 

with its revision of the Joint Duty Program policy. However, in responding 

to these recommendations, ODNI also stated that it did not concur with 

GAO’s assertion that the current program is not fully complying with the 

requirements of the IRTPA, noting that section 102A(l)(3)(B) of IRTPA 

states only that the program “may include . . . the establishment of 

requirements for education, training, service, and evaluation for service 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

involving more than one element of the intelligence community” 

[emphasis added by ODNI]. Our recommendations are based on an 

assessment of the steps ODNI has taken to implement the training, 

education, and joint duty elements contained in IRTPA, and are intended 

to enhance that implementation. We modified the language in the 

recommendation to address ODNI’s concerns regarding compliance with 

IRTPA. We continue to believe that ODNI should revise its existing policy 

guidance to formally establish and clearly identify and describe the 

training component of the Joint Duty Program. Further, as we discussed 

in our report, ODNI first formalized its intention to establish a training 

program as part of the Joint Duty Program in its policy guidance 5 years 

ago, but ODNI has not made substantive progress in implementing this 

program. Therefore, we continue to believe that the ODNI should develop 

a formal plan and timeline to implement the training and education 

component of the Joint Duty Program.

In addition to generally agreeing with our three recommendations directed

to the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI provided two specific 

comments related to our findings:

• Related to our statement in the report that ODNI has not established 

specific performance goals or quantifiable metrics for measuring 

progress of the Joint Duty Program, ODNI asserted that that the 

statement is inaccurate. ODNI noted that the Joint Duty Program’s 

key performance goal is that all IC officers earn joint duty credit prior 

to promotion above the GS-15 level. ODNI also stated that as of its 

last data call in the fall of 2011, all but one person had been promoted 

with joint duty credit. ODNI further stated that it collects additional 

data on the total number of civilian personnel in the IC with joint duty 

credit. While we agree that ODNI collects this information, we believe 

that these data do not go far enough to effectively measure the 

success of the Joint Duty Program. As we note in our report, for 

performance measures to be effective, information should be used to 

identify performance problems and corresponding solutions, develop 

approaches that improve results, and make other important 

management decisions. The data ODNI collects, however, do not 

provide information about whether joint duty participants are obtaining 

the widest possible understanding of the IC. We note in the report that 

IRTPA requires the Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the 

rotation of IC personnel to other IC elements in order to obtain the 

widest possible understanding of the range of intelligence 

requirements, methods, users, and capabilities. Furthermore, the 

promotion rate data that ODNI collects does not differentiate between 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

those personnel in the IC who earned joint duty credit through the 

Joint Duty Program and those personnel in the IC who were granted 

joint duty credit for experiences that predate the creation of the Joint 

Duty Program in 2006. According to ODNI policy guidance, joint duty 

credit is granted for joint duty experience completed as far back as 

September 11, 2001. We also note in our report that ODNI currently 

administers surveys to IC personnel upon completion of their joint 

duty assignment. These surveys could potentially provide a 

mechanism to measure the quality of the Joint Duty Program and 

determine if IC personnel are gaining an understanding of the range 

of intelligence requirements, methods, and capabilities of the IC. 

However, as we note in the report, these surveys are optional. In 

addition, ODNI has not collected a sufficient number of these surveys 

to make the results meaningful, and it has not shared the information 

collected with the IC components. We have previously reported that 

successful performance measurement provides useful information for 

decisionmaking.32 Further, the Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government note that management should track major 

achievements and compare actual performance to planned or 

expected results to analyze significant differences. 33

• ODNI also disagreed with our statement that without an established 

comprehensive strategic framework that includes the key components 

to guide effective implementation, and that transcends program leader 

turnover, program efforts have been disjointed, and decisionmakers 

within ODNI have not had the information they need to successfully 

manage the Joint Duty Program. In its written comments, ODNI stated 

that the Joint Duty Program is a key tool to integrating the IC. ODNI 

further stated that the program has met the performance measures 

identified in Intelligence Community Directive 601. Finally, ODNI 

stated that, while it agrees that a comprehensive strategic plan could 

be beneficial to the Joint Duty Program, it disagrees that the program 

has been unsuccessful without such a document. We agree that the 

Joint Duty Program can be a key tool in integrating the IC. In our 

report, we note that IC officials we met stated that enhanced 

collaboration, increased networking, and a better understanding of the 

 

32GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).

33GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
 

Page 27 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

community as a whole were positive aspects of the Joint Duty 

Program. We disagree, however, with ODNI’s statement that 

Intelligence Community Directive 601 contains performance 

measures. We noted above that ODNI collects data on joint duty 

participants, but collection of these data elements is not included or 

outlined in the directive. We continue to believe that a results-oriented 

strategic framework is important for implementing programs because 

it helps agencies to define a program’s mission, establish 

performance goals and measures, identify needed resources, use 

performance information to inform decisions, and communicate 

results.

As we state in the report, ODNI has taken steps related to some of the 

components of a strategic framework, such as by providing some 

funding for positions left vacant during rotations, responding to 

recommendations from the ODNI Inspector General’s 2009 report, 

and collecting data on Joint Duty Program participation. However, 

opportunities exist for improvement in all areas. For example, we 

reported that ODNI does not consistently use the data it collects to 

measure program success and does not communicate survey results 

or data collection results with the IC elements. It is even more critical 

for a comprehensive strategic framework to be in place in the absence 

of stability in key leadership positions such as the Joint Duty Program 

Chief. As we reported, the Joint Duty Program Chief has experienced 

repeated turnover (five Chiefs in the past 3 years), with tenure lasting 

between 4 months to 10 months, and IC element officials we met with 

expressed concern that institutional knowledge is not transferred 

between Chiefs. During the course of our own audit work, in fact, 

there was a 3 month gap between tenures of Joint Duty Program 

Chiefs. As such, we believe that our statement that the Joint Duty 

Program efforts have been disjointed is merited. We state in our 

report that sustained leadership is at the center of successful 

organizational transformation and that turnover in leadership can lead 

to critical gaps in institutional knowledge. In its comments, ODNI 

concurred with our recommendation to develop a strategic plan that 

transcends turnover at the Joint Duty Program Chief Position, which 

can help ensure successful organizational transformation and can 

help effectively guide implementation.
 

Page 28 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Director of National Intelligence, the Commandant of the 

U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Homeland 

Security, State, and Treasury. In addition, the report is available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix VI.

Brenda S. Farrell 

Director, Defense Capabilities

 and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

The scope of our review of the Intelligence Community (IC) Civilian Joint 

Duty Program (Joint Duty Program) included the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI), which is responsible for establishing policy 

and procedures for the Joint Duty Program across the IC; the 16 

remaining IC components;1

We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed key officials from 

the following offices within each IC element:

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence in its capacity as the oversight entity for the Department of 

Defense (DOD) IC elements; and the Defense Security Service, because 

its civilian personnel fall under the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence and are subject, under DOD policy, to the IC 

Joint Duty Program requirements.

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence

• Human Capital Office,

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

• Defense Intelligence Agency

• Directorate for Human Capital

• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

• Career Development Division

• National Security Agency

• Joint Duty Program Office

• National Reconnaissance Office

• Office of Strategic Human Capital

 

1

The U.S. Intelligence Community comprises 17 components. The Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence oversees the Intelligence Community, and is counted as one of the 

17 components. The other 16 components are: the National Security Agency, National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Air Force 

Intelligence (Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Central 

Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis), Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), Department of 

Treasury (Office of Intelligence and Analysis), Federal Bureau of Investigation (National 

Security Branch), Drug Enforcement Administration (Office of National Security 

Intelligence), U.S. Coast Guard (Intelligence and Criminal Investigations), and Department 

of Energy (Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

• The intelligence elements within the military services

• U.S. Army

• Intelligence Personnel Management and Operations

• U.S. Navy

• Naval Intelligence, Human Capital Office

• U.S. Marine Corps

• Intelligence Department, Human Capital Office

• U.S. Air Force

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Force 

Development

• Defense Security Service

• Office of Human Resources,

• Central Intelligence Agency

• Corporate Human Resources Programs,

• Department of Energy

• Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,

• Department of Homeland Security

• Office of Intelligence and Analysis

• Office of Human Capital

• U.S. Coast Guard

• Office of Intelligence Workforce Management,

• Department of Justice

• Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Law Enforcement and Intelligence Community Liaison Office

• Drug Enforcement Administration

• Office of National Security Intelligence,

• Department of State

• Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and

• Department of the Treasury

• Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the National Intelligence 

University to ascertain the extent to which they support the Joint Duty 

Program. 

To evaluate the extent to which IC elements are participating in the Joint 

Duty Program, we interviewed cognizant agency officials and reviewed 

available program documentation and guidance from ODNI, the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Joint Duty 

Program offices (or similar entity) of each of the IC elements.

To evaluate the extent to which ODNI has developed a strategic 

framework to help ensure the effective implementation of the Joint Duty 

Program across the IC, we reviewed the sections of the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20042 (IRTPA) related to the 

establishment of the Joint Duty Program. We also reviewed 

governmentwide accepted best practices for program implementation 

along with previous GAO reports,3 and compared these with the 

implementation of the Joint Duty Program. We also obtained and 

reviewed the ODNI Inspector General’s report on the Joint Duty Program4

 

2

Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1011 (2004) (amending § 102A of the National Security Act of 

1947, as codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1).

to further identify and describe challenges that existed in implementing 

the Joint Duty Program as well as to ascertain if any lessons learned 

were identified. In addition, we conducted structured interviews with 

cognizant agency officials within each of the IC elements to determine the 

approach each IC element is taking in implementing the Joint Duty 

Program and to help identify challenges to the program’s implementation 

as well as any lessons learned that can be derived from the IC elements’ 

perspectives. Finally, we requested data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 

on program participants from ODNI, the Office of the Under Secretary of 

3

GAO, Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and 

an Oversight Framework, GAO-11-809 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2011); Government 

Performance: GPRA Modernization Act Provides Opportunities to Help Address Fiscal, 

Performance, and Management Challenges, GAO-11-466T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 

2011); Military Personnel: DOD Needs an Oversight Framework and Standards to 

Improve Management of Its Casualty Assistance Programs, GAO-06-1010 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006); Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid 

Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

4

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Inspector General, The 

Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program: Implementation Status Report, CAS2008-0003 (Washington, D.C.: October 2009).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Defense for Intelligence, the Defense Security Service, and the IC 

components—including participant-specific data on: where joint duty 

rotations took place, rotation start and end dates, pay-grade and job 

series of the participant, how joint duty credit was earned (i.e., joint 

assignment, combat deployment, task force), whether or not the 

participant was granted a waiver, and whether or not the participant had 

completed a Joint Duty Certified Intelligence Learning Network Course.5

In response to our data request, 12 IC elements provided data on an 

individual level, as we specifically requested.6

To evaluate the extent to which ODNI has established training and 

education programs to support the Joint Duty Program, we reviewed 

legislative language in IRTPA that establishes expectations for joint 

training and education and compared actions ODNI is taking against the 

legislative criteria. To determine the actions ODNI had taken to establish 

training requirements, we reviewed ODNI guidance, including Intelligence 

Community Directive 601

Further, to assess the 

reliability of the data, we discussed these data with knowledgeable 

officials at the respective IC element to gain an understanding of the 

processes and databases used to collect and record data and to 

understand existing data quality control procedures and known limitations 

of the data. We found the data were sufficiently reliable to ascertain the 

characteristics of IC personnel participating in the Joint Duty Program in 

fiscal years 2010 and 2011.

7 and Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 

601.1,8

 

5

We did not collect personally identifying information for any joint duty participants.

descriptions of three training courses that ODNI officials explained 

6

Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of the 

Treasury, Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Defense 

Security Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence, and Defense Intelligence Agency provided data on an individual 

level and were included in our analysis. The Central Intelligence Agency, Department of 

State, Director of National Intelligence, National Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of 

Investigation provided data on an aggregate level and data were not included in our 

analysis. The U.S. Coast Guard did not provide data because, as we note in this report, it 

did not have a Joint Duty Program at the time of our review. Similarly, the National 

Reconnaissance Office did not provide data because employees on a joint duty rotation 

are accounted for by their home agency. 

7

Intelligence Community Directive 601, Human Capital: Joint Intelligence Community Duty 

Assignments (May 16, 2006) (as amended Sept. 4, 2009). 

8

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1, Intelligence Community Civilian Joint 

Duty Program Implementing Instructions (June 25, 2007) (as amended Sept. 4, 2009). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

would be used to meet the training and education requirement in the 

future, and other documents, such as the ODNI 500 day plan9

We conducted this performance audit from January 2010

and the 

2009 ODNI Inspector General Report. In addition, we spoke with officials 

from ODNI and the National Intelligence University regarding efforts that 

had been undertaken to develop and implement the training and 

education component of the Joint Duty Program, and any challenges 

associated with implementation. We also met with officials from all of the 

IC elements to gain their perspectives on the actions ODNI had taken to 

establish training and education requirements for the Joint Duty Program. 

Furthermore, we requested and analyzed data from all of the IC elements 

to determine the extent that program participants had already completed 

any of the training courses that potentially would be required as part of 

the Joint Duty Program.

10

 

9

United States Intelligence Community, 500 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration (Oct. 

10, 2007).

through June 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

10We initially began this engagement in January 2010, and notified the ODNI of our 

intention to schedule an entrance conference in early February. At the end of March 2010, 

ODNI provided us with a copy of the ODNI Office of the Inspector General, The 

Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program: Implementation Status Report, CAS2008-0003 (Washington, D.C.: October 2009). We initially agreed with ODNI to postpone 

the entrance conference pending our review of their report. Subsequently, section 348 of 

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259 (2010), 

directed ODNI, in consultation with the Comptroller General, to develop a written directive 

governing GAO’s access to information from elements of the IC. Pending issuance of this 

guidance, we suspended this engagement temporarily. The ODNI issued guidance in April 

2011, accompanied by comments from the Comptroller General, and work on this 

engagement resumed in August 2011. See Intelligence Community Directive 114: 

Comptroller General Access to Intelligence Community Information (effective June 30, 

2011).
Appendix II: Noninteractive Graphic and Text 

for Figure 1

Page 34 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Organization of the Intelligence Community (IC)

Appendix II: Noninteractive Graphic and Text 

for Figure 1

Element Duties

Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI)

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 established the 

position of Director of National Intelligence with the responsibilities of serving as head of the 

IC, acting as the principal adviser to the President and National Security Council on 

intelligence matters, and overseeing and directing the implementation of the National 

Intelligence Program.

Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI)

Department of Defense

OUSDI is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to 

intelligence. The Under Secretary also serves as the Director of Defense Intelligence, acting as 

the primary military intelligence advisor to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Department of Defense

DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence for the Department of 

Defense. DIA provides timely, objective, all-source military intelligence to policy makers, to 

U.S. armed forces around the world, and to the DOD acquisition community and force planners 

to counter a variety of threats and challenges across the spectrum of conflict.

National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA)

Department of Defense

NGA is a Department of Defense combat support agency and a member of the IC. NGA 

develops imagery and map-based intelligence solutions for U.S. national defense, homeland 

security, and safety of navigation.

National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO)

Department of Defense

NRO is a joint organization under the Department of Defense engaged in research and 

development, acquisition, launch, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems 

necessary to meet the needs of the IC and the Department of Defense. The NRO workforce 

includes personnel assigned to the NRO primarily from the Air Force, the CIA, and the Navy. 

However, the other uniformed services and other elements of the Department of Defense and 

the IC are also represented.

National Security Agency (NSA)

Department of Defense

NSA is the United States’ cryptologic organization, with responsibility for protecting U.S. 

national security information systems and collecting and disseminating foreign signals 

intelligence. Areas of expertise include cryptanalysis, cryptography, mathematics, computer 

science, and foreign language analysis. NSA is part of the Department of Defense, and is 

staffed by a combination of civilian and military personnel.

Army Military Intelligence

Department of the Army

Army Military Intelligence formulates Army intelligence policy, plans, programs, and budgets 

and oversees Army-level multidiscipline intelligence operations, intelligence support to 

Computer Network Operations, military intelligence personnel, training, readiness and 

equipping, security, foreign liaison and future threats.

Naval Intelligence

Department of the Navy

The Office of Naval Intelligence is a major IC production center for maritime intelligence, 

analyzing and producing assessments of foreign naval capabilities, trends, operations and 

tactics, global civil maritime activity, and an extensive array of all-source analytical products.

Marine Corps Intelligence

Department of the Navy

Marine Corps Intelligence produces tactical and operational intelligence for tactical and 

operational commanders and their staffs, as well as for other customers. Its IC component is 

comprised of all intelligence professionals in the Marine Corps. Most Marine Corps intelligence 

professionals are integrated into operating forces at all echelons of command from 

battalion/squadron to Marine Expeditionary Force. 

Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Department of the Air Force

The Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency organizes, trains, equips, 

and presents assigned forces and capabilities to conduct ISR for Combatant Commanders and 

the nation. It implements and oversees the execution of Air Force headquarters policy and 

guidance to expand Air Force ISR capabilities to meet current and future challenges. 
Appendix II: Noninteractive Graphic and Text 

for Figure 1

Page 35 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Source: GAO analysis of ODNI information.

Defense Security Service

Department of Defense

Defense Security Service is a Department of Defense support agency that supports national 

security and the warfighter. Defense Security Service clears industrial facilities, personnel, and 

associated information systems. Defense Security Service also secures the nation’s 

technological base and oversees the protection of classified information. Although the Defense 

Security Service is not part of the IC, Defense Security Service falls under the USDI and is 

subject to the Joint Duty Program requirement as a matter of DOD policy.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) CIA is the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policy 

makers. The CIA’s intelligence analysis on overseas developments informs decisions by policy 

makers and other senior decision makers in the national security and defense arenas. 

Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence

Department of Energy

Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is the IC’s premier 

technical intelligence resource in four core areas: nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; 

energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste.

Coast Guard Intelligence and 

Criminal Investigations

Department of Homeland Security

Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations directs, coordinates, and oversees 

intelligence and investigative operations and activities that support all Coast Guard objectives 

by providing actionable intelligence to strategic decision makers, as well as operational and 

tactical commanders. 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS)

DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis is DHS’s headquarters intelligence element. It uses 

information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future 

threats to the United States. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis focuses on threats related 

to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues, to include explosives 

and infectious diseases; critical infrastructure protection; extremists within the homeland; and 

travelers entering the homeland. 

Office of National Security 

Intelligence

Department of Justice (Drug 

Enforcement Administration)

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence leverages the 

global law enforcement drug intelligence assets of the Drug Enforcement Administration to 

report on matters relating to national security. Its goal is to enhance U.S. efforts to protect 

national security and combat global terrorism, as well as facilitate IC support to the Drug 

Enforcement Administration’s law enforcement mission. Office of National Security Intelligence 

facilitates intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the IC and 

homeland security elements.

National Security Branch

Department of Justice (Federal 

Bureau of Investigation)

The National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a threat-based, 

intelligence driven, national security organization that protects the United States from critical 

threats while safeguarding civil liberties. As both a component of the Department of Justice 

and a full member of the U.S. IC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation serves as a vital link 

between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

Department of State

State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) serves as the focal point within the 

Department of State for all policy issues and activities involving the IC. INR analysts draw on 

all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, INR’s public opinion polling, and interaction with 

U.S. and foreign scholars, covering all countries and regional or transnational issues. 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Department of the Treasury

Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis receives, analyzes, collates, and disseminates 

foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information related to the operation and 

responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury. OIA’s strategic priorities are terrorist 

financing, insurgency financing, and rogue regimes/proliferation financing. 
Appendix III: Overview of the Joint Duty 

Program

Page 36 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) directive for the 

Joint Duty Program1 requires that Intelligence Community (IC) personnel 

participating in the Joint Duty Program rotate from their employing or 

home element to a joint duty position in another IC element (the gaining 

element) for at least 12 months and for no more than 36 months, unless a 

written exception for a different time frame has been requested and 

approved.2 Joint duty positions are normally classified at a pay grade of at 

least General Schedule grade 13 or equivalent. The ODNI policy 

guidance3 for the Joint Duty Program further states that, by successfully 

completing an assignment to a gaining agency and the IC Joint 

Leadership Development Program (a training program designated for 

Joint Duty Program participants), individuals receive the “joint duty 

certification” they will need to apply for promotion to senior level (above 

General Schedule grade 15 or equivalent) positions.4

Under the policy guidance, participating individuals can receive joint duty 

credit for working

• in another IC element,

• in ODNI or one of its components,5

• within a home agency in a position that has been specifically 

designated as providing joint duty credit,

 

1

Intelligence Community Directive 601, Human Capital: Joint Intelligence Community Duty 

Assignments (May 16, 2006) (as amended Sept. 4, 2009).

2

A joint duty assignment may also be a permanent assignment of an employee from a 

position in one IC element to a position in another IC element.

3

Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1, Intelligence Community Civilian Joint 

Duty Program Implementing Instructions (June 25, 2007) (as amended Sept. 4, 2009).

4

Exemptions to the joint duty certification requirement can be granted if a senior position is 

unique and requires expertise that cannot be found elsewhere. 

5

The ODNI components include organizations such as the National Counterterrorism 

Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, and the National Counterintelligence 

Executive.

Appendix III: Overview of the Joint Duty 

Program 
Appendix III: Overview of the Joint Duty 

Program

Page 37 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

• in certain liaison and equivalent positions or on internal assignments 

(e.g., serving on joint task forces), and

• in an organization outside the IC.6

In addition, individuals may request joint duty credit for certain 

assignments that they previously completed inside or outside the IC. 

Furthermore, any individual deployed to a designated combat zone for 

179 days or more will satisfy the 12-month minimum requirement for joint 

duty credit.

ODNI established the Joint Duty Program website where the IC elements 

are to post opportunities (vacancy announcements) for joint duty positions 

that the agencies wish to fill on a rotational basis. Each IC element is 

responsible for posting all joint duty opportunities available on the ODNI 

Joint Duty website. The corresponding vacancy announcements are to 

include pertinent information about the position, such as qualification 

requirements, duty location, time frame, and security clearance 

requirements. ODNI officials explained that announcements may be 

posted on a classified and unclassified version of the website. Each IC 

element has designated a point of contact who is responsible for 

coordinating the individual joint duty assignments of its program 

participants. In addition, individuals apply for joint duty assignments using 

the internal policies and procedures established by their home IC 

element. A proposed joint duty assignment must be approved by the 

employee’s first-level supervisor and second-level manager. Further, 

ODNI has developed a standard memorandum of understanding that 

includes provisions governing rotational assignments and is used by all of 

the IC elements, who then tailor the provisions to govern each individual 

rotational assignment.

While on a joint duty assignment, an individual generally remains a 

permanent employee of his or her home agency. The person designated 

as that individual’s immediate supervisor at the gaining agency evaluates 

the individual’s performance during the joint duty assignment period. A 

higher level management official at the gaining agency reviews the 

evaluation and provides it to a designated official from the individual’s 

 

6

This could include organizations such as the National Security Council, the Homeland 

Security Council, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, and other comparable 

interagency, intergovernmental, private sector, non-governmental, academic or 

educational, foreign national, or international organizations.
Appendix III: Overview of the Joint Duty 

Program

Page 38 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

home agency, who then comments on the evaluation in writing and 

submits this for inclusion in the final performance evaluation provided to 

the employee. The individual’s rating is determined using the home 

agency’s performance management system and associated forms. The 

gaining agency determines whether the individual receives a performance 

bonus and funds any bonus awarded. After completion of a joint duty 

assignment, the home agency is responsible for placing an individual in 

his or her former (or an equivalent) position and duty location, unless 

other provisions are agreed to by the employee. Claims for joint duty 

credit must be filed by employees on a standard form that is available on 

the ODNI Joint Duty Program website. Employees submit the claim forms 

to their employing IC element in accordance with the internal policies and 

processes of that agency, along with official documentation of the claimed 

assignment.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 39 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 40 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 
Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence

Page 41 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence
Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence

Page 42 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 
Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence

Page 43 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 
Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence

Page 44 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 45 GAO-12-679 Intelligence Community Personnel 

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, David Moser (Assistant Director), 

Patrick Breiding, Renee Brown, Mae Jones, James Krustapentus, 

Gregory Marchand, Steven Putansu, Jillena Roberts, Amie Steele, and 

John Van Schaik made key contributions to this report.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351466)
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