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36–943 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–103

INTERRUPTING TERRORIST TRAVEL: STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL

TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 2, 2007

Serial No. J–110–32

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JON KYL, Arizona 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JENNIFER DUCK, Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 1

Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ............ 17

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 4

WITNESSES 

Donovan, Patrick D., Assistant Director for Diplomatic Security, Director 

of Domestic Operations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of 

State, Washington, D.C. ...................................................................................... 7

Ervin, Clark Kent, Director of Homeland Security, Aspen Institute, and 

Former Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, and Author, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 26

Everitt, Michael P., Unit Chief, Forensic Document Laboratory, Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, 

D.C. ........................................................................................................................ 9

Morris, Paul, Executive Director, Admissibility Requirements and Migration 

Control, Office of Field operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ................................................. 12

Noble, Hon. Ronald K., Secretary General, Interpol, Lyon, France .................... 23

Simkin, Andrew, Director, Office of Fraud Prevention Programs, Bureau of 

Consular Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. ............................... 5

Zimmer, Brian, Senior Associate, Kelly, Anderson & Associates, and Former 

Senior Investigator, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. ....................................................................................... 28

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Andrew Simkin to questions submitted by Senators Feinstein 

and Schumer ......................................................................................................... 37

Responses of Paul Morris and Michael Everitt to questions submitted by 

Senators Schumer and Feinstein ........................................................................ 45

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Donovan, Patrick D., Assistant Director for Diplomatic Security, Director 

of Domestic Operations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of 

State, Washington, D.C., statement ................................................................... 61

Ervin, Clark Kent, Director of Homeland Security, Aspen Institute, and 

Former Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, and Author, 

Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................................. 66

Everitt, Michael P., Unit Chief, Forensic Document Laboratory, Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, 

D.C., statement .................................................................................................... 72

Kephart, Janice, former Counsel, 9/11 Commission and President, 9/11 Security Solutions, LLC .............................................................................................. 84

Morris, Paul, Executive Director, Admissibility Requirements and Migration 

Control, Office of Field operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statements ............................ 87

Noble, Hon. Ronald K., Secretary General, Interpol, Lyon, France, statements ..................................................................................................................... 94

Simkin, Andrew, Director, Office of Fraud Prevention Programs, Bureau of 

Consular Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C., statement ............ 115

Page

IV

United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., Visa and Passport 

Security Strategic Plan ........................................................................................ 127

Zimmer, Brian, Senior Associate, Kelly, Anderson & Associates, and former 

Senior Investigator, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., statement and attachments ....................................... 167

(1)

INTERRUPTING TERRORIST TRAVEL: 

STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL DOCUMENTS 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 2007

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND

HOMELAND SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 

room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Feinstein, Schumer, and Kyl. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I would like to call this Subcommittee 

meeting to order. My Ranking Member, Senator Kyl, is here. I believe we will be joined by Senator Schumer, who has asked to make 

a statement, and, of course, we will afford him that opportunity. 

We are going to try to move this as quickly as possible. Senator 

Kyl has a critical appointment at around 10:30, and I have one at 

noon. But this is an important Subcommittee, and I would just like 

our witnesses to try to think about what they are going to say and 

say it in as close to 5 minutes as you possibly can. And I will begin 

with a statement that hopefully will set the parameters for the 

hearing. 

For terrorists, international travel documents are as important 

as weapons. Now, that is not my statement. That is the conclusion 

of the authors of the 9/11 report over 5 years ago. The 9/11 report 

pointed out that international travel presents greater danger to 

terrorists because they must surface to pass through regulated 

channels. They must present themselves to border security officials 

or attempt to circumvent inspection points. 

The moment that the terrorist presents a false document to Border Patrol inspectors is a critical moment in the protection of our 

borders. In that short, brief interview at the border point, the officer must be able to determine whether the person attempting to 

enter the United States intends to harm the people of this country. 

Today there are many tools that a border inspector or the consular officer or other Government agents can use to identify real 

travelers from those with bad motives. The ongoing question and 

2

the reason we are here today is whether United States Government 

agencies are taking advantage of all those tools. 

This is a subject we come back to over and over again in this 

Subcommittee, and this is a subject that is extremely important to 

me. I am not going to rest until I believe that the United States 

Government is taking all the security measures it can take to interrupt terrorist travel. 

The point of this hearing today is to assess where we are and 

where the Government still needs to improve when it comes to document security. We cannot be complacent when it comes to this 

subject. The evidence has shown repeatedly that false travel documents provide a gateway for organized crime and terror. 

The 9/11 terrorists devoted extensive resources to acquiring and 

manipulating passports, all to avoid detection of their nefarious activities and objectives. We know, for example, that at least two of 

the 9/11 hijackers used passports that were altered when they entered this country, and as many as 15 of the 19 had some other 

irregularity with their travel document. 

In the 5 years since 9/11, of the 353 individuals who the Department of Justice classified and prosecuted as international terrorists, 24 were charged with document crimes. For example, in September of 2005, Mohammed Khalil was convicted on several visa 

fraud charges. Mr. Khalil was the ringleader of a massive visa 

fraud scheme operating out of a mosque he established in a 

Brookyln basement. Over a 10-year period, Khalil sponsored over 

200 fraudulent applications for individuals seeking religious work 

visas to enter the United States, charging cash fees ranging from 

$5,000 to $8,000 dollars. Prosecutors claim that he netted more 

than $600,000 from the scheme. 

Although Khalil has not been linked to specific terrorist activities, prosecutors pointed to a taped conversation in which Khalil reportedly praised Osama bin Laden and called for Muslims to arm 

themselves for another attack. 

In another case, defendants Cedric Carpenter and Lamont 

Ranson were prosecuted and sentenced in Mississippi for conspiring to sell false documents to individuals they believed were 

members of Abu Sayyaf, a Philippine-based group designated as a 

foreign terrorist organization. 

In my own home State of California, seven counterfeit document 

mills in Los Angeles were seized on March 30, 2006. ICE agents 

arrested 11 individuals on charges of supplying a significant number of the fraudulent identity and immigration documents being 

sold on the streets of Los Angeles. 

Now, it is true most of this is to bring people illegally across the 

border, but, nonetheless, there is no safeguard on how these false 

documents can be used. 

And just this past December, the United States Department of 

State’s Diplomatic Security Service charged 25 defendants in Los 

Angeles for attempting to obtain and actually obtaining United 

States passports using fake identities. 

Today, over 5 years later, Interpol reports that they have records 

of more than 12 million stolen and lost travel documents from 113 

different countries. Now, these are the only ones we know about, 

but Interpol is a vast source of information. And as far as I know—

3

and I am sure these witnesses will correct me if I am wrong—the 

Government does not scan passports to pick up on the Interpol 

data, which I think is a significant lapse if, in fact, it is true. 

Interpol estimates that 30 to 40 million travel documents have 

been stolen worldwide. 

We know that over the past few years, passport and visa forgery 

has become more sophisticated thanks to new technology. In the 

past, the tools of the counterfeit document trade were typewriters 

and pieces of plastic. Today’s document forgers use computer software and high-resolution digital scanners to ply their trade. Criminal organizations are also using the Internet to market and distribute fake documents and immigration benefits to customers. 

It is not only foreign passports that can be forged. Forged and 

fraudulent United States passports can be most dangerous when in 

the wrong hands, because with a U.S. passport criminals can establish American citizenship and have unlimited access to virtually 

every country in the world. 

Despite evidence that these crimes are widespread and that millions of travel documents are on the black market, in 2004 the 

State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service reports that it 

made about 500 arrests for passport fraud with only 300 convictions. 

For these reasons, I believe that our job is not over. Senator Sessions and I have introduced a bill to strengthen current passport 

and visa laws in a number of key ways. Our bill would create 

strong penalties to punish those who traffic in fraudulent travel 

documents. This must happen. The current law makes no distinction between those caught with multiple false travel documents, 

the very worst offenders who are often part of organized crime 

rings, and those with only one false document. Our bill would 

change that. 

We would also add provisions to the current passport and visa 

fraud laws to ensure that conspiracies and attempts to commit 

these crimes are investigated and prosecuted just as vigorously as 

the completed crime. Currently, offenders who engage in passport 

or visa fraud generally serve less than a year in prison, providing 

little incentive for U.S. 

Attorney’s Offices to expend scarce resources in prosecuting these 

crimes, and that is a big problem. 

So we think our bill provides much needed reform. It strengthens 

the penalties against people using documents to illegally gain entry 

to this country and empowers the agents and prosecutors who enforce our borders to take swift and strong action against these 

criminals. 

So I hope my colleagues, including my colleague on the right, will 

join Senator Sessions and me in cosponsoring this important legislation. But legislation is not enough. The Department of Homeland 

Security and State Department must work with Interpol to ensure 

that the front-line inspectors, those at airports and consular offices, 

have real-time access—real-time access—to lost and stolen passport 

databases. The inspectors must be trained to use these databases 

to ensure that no one carrying a stolen passport is allowed into this 

country. 

4

So that is what this hearing is all about. We have very credible 

and informed witnesses, and I would like to turn it over to my 

Ranking Member, with whom I have worked now on this Committee I guess for at least 10 years. 

Senator KYL. Over 12 years now. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Over 12 years. 

Senator KYL. Time flies when you are having fun. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It has been a great pleasure for me. Senator Kyl. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Madam Chairman, thank you, and let me begin by 

thanking you for holding this hearing. 

First let me say that I agree with everything you have said. This 

is a bipartisan issue. We have worked in this Subcommittee in a 

very constructive and bipartisan way now for over 12 years, and it 

is a pleasure always to work with you, now to be your wing man 

now that the political tables are slightly turned here. It does not 

make any difference in this Subcommittee. 

But this is an excellent complement, actually, to a hearing that 

we held last September when we focused on ways of how to improve the security of international flights to the United States 

without necessarily interfering—or disrupting, I should say, the 

travel for many millions of people who fly here every day. 

But Senator Feinstein is absolutely right that complacency could 

be one of our main enemies here. We should recall that 9/11 began, 

with all due respect, to the State Department’s inadequate interviews—actually, they had contracted it out to private parties—and 

inadequate review and document inspection, which allowed the 9/

11 hijackers to come in and stay in the United States. 

It seems to me the question now is not so much how much 

progress we have made, but how much more we need to do. If another 9/11 were to happen, people would ask would more could 

have been done, and I think everybody here today—and judging 

from some of the statements that I have read of the witnesses, it 

is clear that everyone agrees that more reasonably can be done. 

I would like to thank all of the witnesses for being here today 

and especially a couple that I have contacted, Secretary General 

Ron Noble of Interpol, for joining us. Our office has been in contact 

and working to improve security, and Senator Feinstein has discussed that. And also Mr. Brian Zimmer. The appendix in Mr. Zimmer’s testimony on the Federal laws that Congress has passed to 

improve Federal identity documents is a very good summary, and 

I think that will be very helpful to us. 

The arrival of international terrorism to our shores has made us 

all aware of the need for improved security at our borders and 

ports of entry. We have had to adapt to a much more sophisticated 

enemy than I think any of us had thought when the terrorist attacks first occurred. And we have had to adapt with more sophisticated screening mechanisms, identity documents, data sharing, and 

the like. 

So the testimony that I think we will hear today, again, while 

it shows that we have come a long way, I think will also reveal how 

5

much more work remains to be done. And our obligation here in 

Congress will be to continue to initiate efforts such as Senator 

Feinstein mentioned, as well as to work with the administration to 

improve domestic security, pass meaningful legislation that addresses the gaps in security, and importantly then to provide the 

funding that is necessary to effectuate the changes that we all believe are necessary. So again, Senator Feinstein, thank you for 

holding this very important hearing. 

And as Senator Feinstein said, I will have to leave just before 

10:30, and please know that that in no way detracts from my interest in this. And I may have questions that I will want to submit 

to the witnesses as a result of the oral testimony here. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I might say that Ron Noble is the Secretary General of Interpol, 

and he has come here from Lyon, France, and we very much appreciate it. He will lead off on the second panel. But I would like to 

introduce the first panel to you, and we will go right down the line. 

The first person testifying will be Andrew Simkin. He is the Director of Fraud Prevention Programs, the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State. 

The second person will be Patrick Donovan, the Assistant Director for Domestic Operations and Acting Director of Diplomatic Security for Counter Measures of the Department of State. 

And Michael Everitt, the Unit Chief of the Forensic Documents 

Laboratory, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security. 

And then, finally, Paul Morris, the Executive Director of Admissibility Requirements and Migration Control, Office of Field Operations from United States Customs and Border Protection. 

So as you can see, this is a very qualified and credible panel, and 

I just hate to do it, but we would like to ask questions. So if you 

could say what you mean in 5 minutes, it would really be appreciated, and I will ask the clocks to be started. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. Simkin, may we start off with you. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW SIMKIN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF CONSULAR 

AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. SIMKIN. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member 

Kyl. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the work that we do 

to interrupt terrorist travel. It is a tremendously important topic 

for America, and it is one to which I have dedicated a lot of thought 

and effort over my 20 years of service as a consular officer. 

As you indicated, Chairman Feinstein, the staff members of the 

9/11 Commission identified travel as some of the key moments for 

interrupting terrorists’ activities. One comparison that I heard was 

comparing terrorists to submarines operating in hiding most of the 

time, but needing to surface at key moments, making them more 

vulnerable to detection. When a terrorist applies for a visa to enter 

our country, it is a key moment of opportunity for us to interrupt 

his travel. Airline check-in and port-of-entry screening are other 

key moments. 

6

I would like to describe some of the things that we are doing to 

take maximum advantage of those opportunities. 

Our systems for checking names and biographic data against terrorist watchlists and other databases are more comprehensive and 

sophisticated than ever before. Thanks to interagency data sharing, 

we are making good progress in international sharing of data on 

known terrorists and data on lost and stolen passports. We have 

added biometric capabilities using both fingerprinting and facial 

recognition technology to identify persons who may be applying for 

visas under false identities. We recently began the rollout of an upgrade from a two-fingerprint system to ten prints. This transition 

should be finished by December of this year. 

Bearing in mind that many persons with criminal intent have no 

known record and, thus, do not appear in any biographic or biometric database, we take advantage of personal interviews conducted 

by consular officers specially trained to observe demeanor and detect inconsistencies, who ask applicants all sorts of questions. In 

addition to the interview, consular officers use an increasingly sophisticated array of techniques and technologies to defeat visa 

fraud. 

By law, the burden of proof is on the applicant. On an average 

day at over 200 posts around the world, we turn away 5,000 foreign 

nationals who do not qualify for visas because they fail to meet 

that burden of proof. 

The terrorist’s travel may be deterred by the risk that he might 

not only be refused a visa, but that information we gather from his 

application, including fingerprints, phone numbers, et cetera, may 

compromise his entire operation. We work closely with DS, DHS, 

and other U.S. Government colleagues to follow up on cases of suspected fraud or security concerns. 

Along with our efforts to prevent terrorists from receiving U.S. 

travel documents, we also seek to safeguard the integrity of visas 

and passports against alteration, forgery and misuse. We share our 

U.S. visa and passport databases with our Customs and Border 

Protection colleagues so that any document can be electronically 

verified. 

The U.S. passport was also recently completely redesigned, incorporating multiple new security features, including an electronic 

chip, and I have brought samples of the new passports for the 

Committee. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. These are fraudulent passports? 

Mr. SIMKIN. No. These are genuine. I believe you each should 

have one sample of the e-passport, which is the regular passport, 

with the symbol on the cover indicating electronic chip. And the 

other sample is the emergency photo digitized passport. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. This is the symbol? 

Mr. SIMKIN. Correct, yes. The other is the new emergency photo 

digitized passport, which is now in effect at all of our posts overseas, issued to persons who have emergency travel, such as having 

lost a passport overseas. These are issued for up to one year of validity. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you provide the Committee with 

some samples of fraudulent passports so we might—

Mr. SIMKIN. We certainly could. 

7

Chairman FEINSTEIN.—see the different technique used. 

Mr. SIMKIN. We would be happy to. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please continue. 

Mr. SIMKIN. OK. In conclusion, I thank you for your interest in 

the work of consular officers, who truly work the front line in interrupting terrorist travel while at the same time serving as the public face of America, showing fairness and consideration in dealing 

with millions of legitimate travelers. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simkin appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Simkin. 

Mr. Donovan? 

STATEMENT OF PATRICK D. DONOVAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Good morning, Madam Chair and Ranking Member Kyl. I am honored to appear before you today with my distinguished colleagues. I would like to thank you and the Committee 

members for your continued support and interest in the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s protective and investigative programs. I 

would especially like to thank you for your support in strengthening passport and visa legislation. Through congressional support, 

DS safeguards American diplomats and facilities around the world 

and protects the integrity of U.S. travel documents. With your permission, I would like to present a brief statement and submit a 

copy of our Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan as my full 

testimony for the record. 

One of the most critical national security challenges that the 

American people will face for the foreseeable future is the desire 

by terrorist groups and individuals to inflict catastrophic harm 

upon the United States. A key element in all terrorist operational 

planning is access to the target. Such access requires the acquisition of travel documents, including visas and passports—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you pull the mike down just a little 

bit, please? 

Mr. DONOVAN. I am sorry, ma’am? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Pull the mike a little bit down. I think you 

will pick up better. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Such access requires the acquisition of travel documents, including visas and passports, that allow terrorists to 

enter, and move freely within, our country. 

As the law enforcement arm of the Department of State, DS is 

responsible for upholding the integrity of the U.S. 

visa and passport through enforcement of relevant portions of the 

United States Criminal Code. DS is the most geographically extensive Federal law enforcement agency in the United States Government, with approximately 1,400 Special Agents dispersed among 25 

field and resident offices domestically, with representation on 26 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and with assignments to U.S. embassies and consulates in 159 countries. DS is uniquely positioned and 

committed to meet the serious national security challenge of travel 

8

document fraud. Our agents conduct investigations into passport 

and visa fraud violations wherever they occur. Our partnership 

with the Bureau of Consular Affairs has enabled us to jointly focus 

on protecting the U.S. passports and visas. 

Overseas, we work with foreign partner nations to target and 

disrupt document fraud rings and human smuggling networks. Domestically, we work with local, State, and Federal law enforcement 

agencies to investigate, arrest, and seek prosecution of fraud violators. Throughout this global network of law enforcement professionals, DS Special Agents are on the front lines of combating terrorist and criminal travel. 

Terrorists targeting the U.S. attempt to discover, manipulate, 

and exploit vulnerabilities within our travel document system. To 

successfully counter this threat, DS has crafted a Visa and Passport Strategic Plan that leverages our international expertise and 

worldwide presence. The plan provides the framework for a Visa 

and Passport Security Program and will significantly augment the 

Department’s ongoing efforts to prevent terrorist travel. Our approach incorporates the principles of the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel and the objectives of the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

The Strategic Plan requires the deployment of additional DS personnel to critical posts worldwide, resources to enhance our intelligence and data-sharing efforts, and training and technical assistance to our foreign partners. Presently DS Special Agents assigned 

to consular sections abroad focus solely on travel document fraud. 

By the end of this year, DS will have 33 Special Agents assigned 

to key posts investigating document fraud. By the end of 2008, we 

will have 50 agents in this capacity. Since 2004, the results have 

been promising, yielding nearly 1,050 arrests for document fraud 

and related offenses, in excess of 3,400 visa refusals and revocations, and more than 6,200 foreign law enforcement and security 

personnel trained. 

The plan is built on a cornerstone of three strategic goals: to defend the U.S. and our foreign partners from terrorist attack 

through aggressive, coordinated international law enforcement actions and initiatives; to detect terrorist activity, methods of operation, and trends that exploit international travel vulnerabilities; 

and, lastly, to disrupt terrorist efforts to use fraudulent travel documents through strengthening the capabilities of our foreign partners by such highly successful programs as the DS’ Anti-Terrorism 

Assistance Program. 

Our Strategic Plan offers a comprehensive and proactive approach to ensuring the integrity and security of U.S. 

passports and visas. 

Thank you for the opportunity to brief you on this vital aspect 

of DS’s mission. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donovan appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Mr. Donovan. 

Mr. Everitt? 

9

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. EVERITT, UNIT CHIEF, FORENSIC 

DOCUMENTS LABORATORY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 

ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. EVERITT. Good morning, Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Kyl, distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased 

to be here today to discuss strengthening the security of international travel documents to prevent terrorist travel. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Forensic Document Laboratory is dedicated exclusively to fraudulent document detection and 

deterrence. The FDL is accredited by the American Society of 

Crime Lab Directors-Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) 

in questioned documents and latent prints and enjoys a worldwide 

reputation for excellence in the detection and identification of 

fraudulent travel and identity documents. 

The FDL provides a wide variety of forensic and support services 

to all Department of Homeland Security components, including 

ICE, CBP, USCIS, the Secret Service, and the Coast Guard. The 

FDL also supports all Federal, State, and local agencies, as well as 

foreign government law enforcement and border control entities 

upon request. The FDL is an integral part of a comprehensive approach to disrupting terrorist travel and works both domestically 

and internationally to strengthen the security of international travel documents. 

The FDL is like many other forensic laboratories in that it has 

a cadre of highly trained and experienced forensic scientists and 

support staff who conduct forensic examinations. These FDL employees make up the Forensic Section of the FDL and include forensic document examiners, physical scientists, ink chemists, fingerprint specialists, forensic photographers, and seized property 

specialists. This team of experts processes over 5,000 submissions 

each year. 

The training requirements for the forensic section positions are 

rigorous. As an example, before conducting their first solo examination, forensic document examiners must successfully complete an 

in-house, 30-month, full-time training program. Comprehensive 

training programs such as these are necessary to acquire and 

maintain laboratory accreditation and personal certification. 

The FDL differs from most forensic laboratories in that it also 

has a separate group of employees who collect and analyze information developed by the Forensic Section about fraudulent documents and distributes that information to the field via publication, 

real-time support, and training. These employees are senior intelligence officers that make up the Operations Section of the FDL. 

Many of the senior intelligence officers working at the FDL have 

previously worked at large ports of entry and have extensive experience with international travelers and the documents that they 

use. 

Operations Section personnel provides real-time support to field 

personnel throughout the world with questions about suspected 

documents. These personnel include Department of State consular 

officers adjudicating visa requests, USCIS personnel adjudicating 

requests for immigration-related benefits, and ICE and CBP personnel working in the field and at ports of entry and other Federal, 

10

State, and local law enforcement officers. In fiscal year 2006, the 

FDL received over 5,200 inquiries of which more than 2,400 were 

from non-DHS agencies. 

Publications produced by the Operations Section include Document Alerts, Intelligence Briefs, and Reference Guides. These publications are printed and distributed to more than over 800 law enforcement and border control agencies worldwide to assist officers 

in identifying fraudulent documents. Many of these documents are 

also posted on DHS Internet portals to make them available to 

other law enforcement entities. 

Senior intelligence officers also design and provide fraudulent 

document recognition and training programs for DHS personnel 

and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers. This 

fiscal year alone, the FDL has trained more than 1,900 individuals 

in locations around the world, including the United States, South 

Africa, El Salvador, Botswana, Jordan, Trinidad and Tobago, 

Kenya, Turkey, and Yemen. Much of this training is in support of 

Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of State initiatives. The FDL also receives requests for 

training from State and local law enforcement and from private 

concerns. 

The problem of fraudulent documents is a perplexing one. The 

wide availability of technology to create high-quality fraudulent 

documents demands that the producers and issuers of legitimate 

documents develop and use new security features and production 

techniques that cannot easily be duplicated. Many new security 

features and production techniques have been developed; unfortunately, they are not always used in many travel and identity documents issued in the United States and other places throughout the 

world. 

Travel and identity document producers and those who issue legitimate documents are in a constant battle to develop new production and security features and make travel and identification documents more secure. We try to assist in that and providing counterfeit deterrence studies to those who produce travel and identity 

documents. 

It is important to understand that fraudulent travel and identity 

documents are not only a challenging problem for the United 

States, but for law enforcement officials throughout the world. As 

long as identification is required to travel and obtain services, 

criminals and terrorists will attempt to produce fraudulent documents. The ICE FDL will continue to work diligently to combat the 

production and use of fraudulent documents through our efforts in 

document examination, the development of higher-quality documents, and the training of law enforcement and border control officers throughout the world. 

On behalf of the men and women of ICE, and specifically the 

men and women of the Forensic Document Laboratory, who are the 

country’s subject matter experts on travel and identity documents, 

I thank the Subcommittee and its distinguished members for your 

continued support. I would also extend an open invitation to members to visit the ICE Forensic Document Laboratory as I believe 

you would find the visit both interesting and enlightening. 

I would be pleased to answer your questions at this time. 

11

[The prepared statement of Mr. Everitt appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Everitt. 

Because Senator Kyl has to leave, he would like to ask you a couple of questions. 

Senator KYL. I just have one main question, and I will try to submit written questions to the rest of you. But with proper training, 

could a person detect the counterfeiting of a U.S. passport if that 

passport has been screened into a computer from an off-site computer to, let’s say, a DHS office here in Washington? 

Mr. EVERITT. I am sorry, sir. I am not sure I understand your 

question. 

Senator KYL. You take the passport in Omaha, Nebraska, and 

you screen it into a computer, which is connected to DHS. 

Mr. EVERITT. Yes. 

Senator KYL. A trained individual looks at that computer screen 

with the passport on it. Can you detect—to what degree of certainty could you detect a counterfeiting of that U.S. passport? 

Mr. EVERITT. That is a service that actually the FDL provides 

through real-time support. What we would do then is we work—

it is not a matter of us just looking at that scanned image. We 

would be on a two-way communication with that person. We are 

looking at the image. We are asking them questions—Do you see 

this? Do you see that?—looking for specific security features in the 

document. 

That two-way transaction, oftentimes we can help them make a 

determination, which is a probable cause determination, of whether 

or not that document is valid or not. 

Senator KYL. Excuse me. How trained would the person on the 

transmitting side have to be? 

Mr. EVERITT. Basically trained enough to have the initial suspicion that the document was bad. 

Senator KYL. Let us assume that this is simply being used to determine something like eligibility for employment and there is no 

training involved, but simply an individual who is putting it on a 

computer screening device to transmit to, let’s say, the Department 

of Homeland Security for a determination of validity, and you have 

the basic information typed in, but then you are looking at the photograph and other features on it. 

Mr. EVERITT. They would have to at least have some cursory 

amount of training to understand what we are asking, the questions that we are asking them. In other words, they would have to 

understand what a hologram was or what a kinegram—not the 

technical aspects of those, but at least to know what we are referring to or what we are asking them to look at. 

Senator KYL. What would be involved in that cursory amount of 

training? 

Mr. EVERITT. It is training that we do that can last anywhere 

from 4 hours up to a couple days. 

Senator KYL. So it would be impractical if every employer in the 

country were required to do this, to assume that they could be adequately trained for this to work, for this to provide some high level 

of confidence that you can detect a fraudulent passport? 

12

Mr. EVERITT. It would require some pretty extensive training, 

yes, sir. 

Senator KYL. OK, just by the simple mechanism of screening it 

into the computer. 

Mr. EVERITT. Yes, sir. Using that process, yes, sir. 

Senator KYL. Because you use a specifically designed piece of 

equipment at the ports of entry for—or do you? Let me ask that 

question. Is this strictly a visual thing with the inspectors? Or is 

there a piece of equipment that is used? 

Mr. EVERITT. It is a visual examination of the document. The 

equipment that is used is a reader that is reading the machinereadable zone, the MRZ. 

Senator KYL. Right. 

Mr. EVERITT. And then is making queries against databases 

based on that information. 

Senator KYL. OK. Good. Thank you very much. 

Mr. EVERITT. You are welcome. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Mr. Morris, would you like to proceed? 

STATEMENT OF PAUL MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND MIGRATION CONTROL, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. MORRIS. Good morning, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Kyl. I 

am very pleased to be here today to discuss how the Department 

of Homeland Security, particularly U.S. Customs and Border Protection, is moving forward on programs that will facilitate travel, 

but still provide the level of security required to protect the United 

States and, of course, interrupt terrorist travel. This is an enormous challenge. We share more than 7,000 miles of borders with 

Canada and Mexico and operate 325 official ports of entry. Each 

year, CBP front-line officers inspect more than 422 million travelers through official land, air, and sea ports of entry. 

I begin by expressing my gratitude to the Subcommittee for the 

support you have shown for important initiatives that enhance the 

security of our homeland. Your continued support has enabled CBP 

to make significant progress in effectively securing our borders and 

protecting our country against terrorist threats. 

DHS is committed to working with Secretary General Noble of 

Interpol on the implementation of the Stolen Lost Travel Document 

(SLTD) system this year. CBP has taken the lead in the implementation of this program, and we are currently on schedule to become 

the first major country to use the SLTD as an integrated 

prescreening tool. 

Since its inception on March 1, 2003, CBP has worked diligently 

to facilitate the flow of legitimate travelers into the U.S. A small 

percentage of travelers, however, attempt to enter the U.S. illegally 

through the use of fraudulent documents or other fraudulent 

means. In response, CBP has implemented a number of complementary programs, both domestically and internationally. 

The standardization of travel documents is a critical step to securing our Nation’s borders. Currently, travelers can present thouVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Aug 03, 2007 Jkt 036943 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36943.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
13

sands of different documents to prove their citizenship when attempting to enter the U.S. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) requires all travelers to present a passport or valid 

travel document to enter the U.S. 

The initial phase of WHTI went into effect January 23, 2007, obligating all air travelers to present a passport or other acceptable 

secure document for entry to the U.S. The implementation of the 

air portion of WHTI was highly successful, with documentary compliance rates of 99 percent and no interruption to air transportation. 

As early as January 1, 2008, travelers arriving by land or sea 

will be required to present a valid passport or other secure document, as determined by DHS, working with the Department of 

State. 

US–VISIT uses biographic and biometric information to enhance 

the security of U.S. citizens and visitors. Biometric data obtained 

overseas when the Department of State issues a traveler’s visa is 

verified with the biometric data collected at the port of entry, confirming that the individual applying for admission is the same person who was granted the visa. Biometrics protect our Nation and 

our visitors by making it virtually impossible for anyone else to 

claim their identity should their travel documents, such as a visa, 

be stolen or duplicated. 

Each year approximately 15 million people from designated Visa 

Waiver Program, or VWP, countries enter the U.S. free to travel 

for 90 days without a visa. In an effort to provide for secure 

verification of passport validity and to better detect fraudulent 

passports from VWP countries, e-passports were mandated for participating countries in October 2006. These e-passports, which have 

an embedded electronic circuit chip—similar to the one used by the 

U.S.—contain biographic and biometric data, and they assist CBP 

front-line officers in detecting fraudulent passports and passports 

in which the photograph was substituted or altered. 

In a continuing effort to extend our zone of security outward, the 

Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) posts officers overseas at 

high-volume, high-risk airports to screen passengers before they 

board aircraft destined for the U.S. Since the IAP became operational, more than 1,624 passengers have been prevented from 

boarding planes bound for the U.S. Current IAP locations include 

Amsterdam, Warsaw, London-Heathrow, and Tokyo-Narita. 

Additionally, the Carrier Liaison Program was developed to enhance our border security by helping commercial carriers to become 

more effective in identifying improperly documented passengers 

destined for the U.S. And in December 2006, we established three 

Regional Carrier Liaison Groups that provide 24/7 points of contact 

for carriers and assist them in making recommendations not to 

board aliens identified as fraudulently or improperly documented. 

These RCLGs in fiscal year 2007 so far have denied boarding for 

419 improperly documented travelers, 150 of whom were carrying 

fraudulent documents. 

In January 2005, we established the Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit to collect documents, provide ports with analysis of document trends and intelligence information, and target persons being 

smuggled into the U.S. using fraudulent documents. 

14

In addition to those initiatives, we have been working in four 

areas to improve the data CBP gathers and maintains on lost and 

stolen passports: 

First, we have been refining the use of targeting systems to 

search for ‘‘near misses’’ to account for alterations of passport numbers by forgers attempting to defeat the watch listing of lost and 

stolen documents. 

We are currently accessing the Interpol SLTD, and as we continue that work with Interpol, we will increase our ability to access 

that information in different ways. 

We are working with Australia and New Zealand on the Regional 

Movement Alert System pilot, and this is a trilateral pilot that enables participating countries to access data on lost, stolen, and otherwise invalid travel documents in real time. 

And we are working to become the first point of intake for all lost 

and stolen passport information to the U.S. This would ensure that 

this critical data is immediately directed to the border screening 

system. 

Chairman Feinstein, Senator Kyl, I have outlined today some of 

the ways that CBP and DHS, working with our key partners, detect and intercept fraudulent documents at or before the border, 

while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. I appreciate this opportunity to testify and would be happy to answer any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morris appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Gentlemen. I appreciate it. 

I would like to refer you, Mr. Morris—and you will have to just 

take these numbers down and read it—pages 11, 12, 13, and 14 of 

the transcript from a hearing held in this Subcommittee on September 7, 2006, and the Homeland Security witness was special 

counsel Mr. Rosenzweig, and I asked some questions, and I would 

like to quickly go over them. And I am talking about a GAO report 

here that has been done on the Visa Waiver Program, and it says, 

‘‘It also recommends that DHS develop and implement a plan to 

make Interpol’s stolen travel document database automatically 

available to immigration officers at primary inspection points.’’

And then we go on to, ‘‘What four countries do not share lost or 

stolen passport information with Interpol?’’ And the countries at 

that time are Holland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. 

And then I would like to quote to you Mr. Rosenzweig’s testimony. ‘‘My goal would be to have the operational difficulties resolved, at least in theory, by the end of this year and then operational in the second or third quarter of next year. That is an aspirational goal, I should add.’’ And then I say, ‘‘Of 2006? I am writing 

it down, and I am going to get you to sign it afterwards.’’

Rosenzweig: ‘‘Absolutely.’’

Feinstein: ‘‘Operational when? ’’

Rosenzweig: ‘‘My goal is the second or third quarter of next year, 

2007.’’

Mr. Ahern: ‘‘Senator, if I might add a little more, give my colleague here a break for a second, if I might,’’ and he goes on: ‘‘...it 

is reflected that we get a considerable amount of lost and stolen 

15

passport information directly into our systems today through the 

State Department. We also get a direct feed from the U.K. Government to the State Department on lost and stolen passports. So we 

have a considerable amount of lost and stolen passports in our system today, so that is fed in through the Department of State’s class 

system into our integrated border inspection system. So we do have 

access to a considerable amount.’’

Now, I have been trying on and on and on to get a time for a 

real-time Interpol connection, and here we have testimony that it 

will be in place by the second or third quarter of this year. My 

question: Will DHS meet this goal? 

Mr. MORRIS. I believe that we will, Senator. We—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So your answer is ‘‘yes, I believe,’’ or ‘‘yes’’? 

Mr. MORRIS. We are currently designing the system within 

Interpol. We intend to test the system in early fall of this year, and 

we will have a pilot test at a major U.S. international airport in 

place shortly thereafter. Immediately after that brief pilot test, we 

intend to have a rapid deployment to the balance of our border control system. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I will be asking Mr. Noble these 

questions, but I assume—let me try and extrapolate what I hear 

from that. There will be a pilot test by the second or third quarter 

of this year. That pilot test will go on for how long? 

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately 30 days. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thirty days, and then after the 30-day period, a full system will be put in place. And that will take how long 

to put in place? 

Mr. MORRIS. If the pilot is successful and we are able to address 

any issues or concerns that may arise at that point, it should be 

a rapid deployment. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And what does that mean? 

Mr. MORRIS. That as soon as we can put the system in place, it 

will be in place. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, are we talking about 1 month, 6 

months, a year? 

Mr. MORRIS. Without knowing what the success of the pilot may 

be at this point, I would say it would be much more rapid than 

that. We are hoping for immediate implementation after the pilot 

if the issues can be addressed. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I guess my problem always is hope, you 

know, goal, and generally no time deadline is ever kept. So I really 

hope this is an exception because I really believe the security of our 

Nation is at stake. And I think this is a very worthwhile program. 

Mr. MORRIS. And we agree 100 percent, Senator. And perhaps I 

should correct my statement and say that we expect that it will be 

a rapid implementation immediately after the pilot is concluded. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. I will have you back after the third 

quarter, and I will pull out this transcript of today and read it back 

to you, and hopefully we will be there. 

Mr. MORRIS. Do I have to sign it, Senator? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. With that understanding. All right. 

If I might ask a question, and then I see we are joined by Senator Schumer, and he wants to make a statement and ask some 

16

questions, so I will turn it over to him. The two passports, Mr. 

Simkin, that you gave us, one of the passports looks like the face 

page is embossed onto the passport. Is that correct? And that is the 

passport of Allen Ethan, or Ethan Allen. 

Mr. SIMKIN. This one is an emergency photo digitized passport. 

This is the new system for issuing passports in emergencies at our 

posts overseas, and it is actually printed on a sticky foil that is 

then placed in the passport book. And, yes, there are some security 

features there over the photo and over the biographic data. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is this a process that is easy for somebody 

to replicate? 

Mr. SIMKIN. It is not easy to replicate. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. But can it be replicated outside of the Government? 

Mr. SIMKIN. We are not aware of any successful attempts to replicate this at this point. Of course, there are people always trying 

to duplicate our documents, so it is a constant effort to stay ahead 

of those efforts. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right. Well, I have a relatively new passport, and it has a chip embedded in it. 

Mr. SIMKIN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And the face page is very different than 

these face pages. 

Mr. SIMKIN. Is it similar to the model—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It is blue. It is a regular—yes, it is not an 

official passport. So I am puzzled by this. It is a much thicker page, 

and I thought all new passports were being done that way. 

Mr. SIMKIN. This exemplar is the current exemplar, and it is the 

only one that has the chip in it. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Which one is that? 

Mr. SIMKIN. The one with the symbol on the cover with the two 

bars and the circle in the middle. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right. All right. So this has a chip in it? 

Mr. SIMKIN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And this, too, is blended onto the page. I 

guess—

Mr. SIMKIN. Yes, in this case it is printed on this page. It is not 

on a foil that is stuck into the passport. And then it is protected 

by a crystogram, and it is hard to tell, but we have actually an 

image of the U.S. Capitol in the center of the crystogram, an image 

of George Washington in the upper right, which make it difficult 

to alter or forge. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes. I do not see either of them, but—Mr. 

Simkin. I found it hard in this light. You sort of have to-Chairman 

Feinstein. Right. 

Mr. SIMKIN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. One other question. Mr. Everitt, today 

there is no law that prohibits the trafficking in ten or more passports or other travel documents. And one of the things I have 

learned from reading intelligence is that within visa waiver countries, there are large numbers of stolen passports, Geneva Convention travel documents, international driver’s licenses. 

In your experience, has the number of document mills that 

produce false documents for sale been increasing? 

17

Mr. EVERITT. It is hard to say whether they have been increasing 

or not. There has always been a large number of document mills 

for producing fraudulent documents. It is one of those things that 

you do not know they are there until you find them. 

I can say that there is a huge number of fraudulent documents 

circulating throughout the world. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. What effort is made to round up the stolen 

passports that are stolen—and I cannot mention the countries, but 

they are European countries—by the thousands? What effort is 

being made to secure those documents? 

Mr. EVERITT. Well, I think that all the countries, just like us, you 

know, have investigative elements that are out there looking for 

these documents, trying to find them whenever they can. And, of 

course, anytime that these documents are encountered at ports of 

entry or exit, whether it be in Europe or in the United States, they 

are immediately seized. 

We get reports on a fairly consistent basis of these documents—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do we have the methodology to be able—

let’s say a Central European country experienced a large theft of 

counterfeit-proof passports and it is a visa waiver country, and that 

passport can be bought by someone who would do us harm, who 

comes into this country with the passport from a visa waiver country. What is being done to see that that does not happen? 

Mr. EVERITT. Well, hopefully the country that had the passports 

stolen would report those to Interpol. Those numbers would then 

be transmitted to CBP through the National Targeting Center. 

That information is passed amongst all the different types of entities. Lookouts are placed for them, and then hopefully when that 

person attempts to use that passport, it will be interdicted and 

they will be stopped. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I would be curious, then, because I 

have sent your agency the intelligence report on the theft, and I 

would be very interested in knowing exactly what action was 

taken, if any. So might I ask you that question, and we will follow 

that up with a letter as well. 

Mr. EVERITT. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. Thank you. 

Senator Schumer, thank you for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Senator SCHUMER. Well, thank you, Senator Feinstein. I want to 

thank you for holding a very important hearing. Securing international travel documents is a critical building block of the larger 

project of border security. And as a representative of a border 

State, like Chairman Feinstein, I fully agree with her. We need security and efficiency at our international borders. We need both. 

My question today is going to focus on a specific travel document, 

the so-called PASS card, People Access Security Services card. As 

everybody is probably aware, this is the card Department of State 

and Homeland Security are proposing to issue to travelers as part 

of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. I am very dubious of 

the PASS card. I have serious questions about it. Again, I think 

that in a certain sense it is bureaucracy at its worst, taking an 

18

overall solution that has worked in other places and not looking at 

how it works when you go across the border, that people travel 

from Fort Erie, Canada, to Buffalo daily—every day back and 

forth—and they do not get passports. They do not apply in advance 

to travel. It is expensive and will really hurt commerce. 

At the same time, I have some privacy concerns, and I am disappointed that Homeland Security once again, instead of trying to 

be creative and find a solution that both will deal with our security 

needs as well as the travel back and forth, does not try to do that. 

And they say, well, passports work when you fly from Detroit to 

Munich; therefore, they can work when you go from Hamilton, Ontario, to Detroit. It is just different, and we are not looking at that. 

I am really troubled by everything about it, and one would hope 

that we would have an executive branch that would deal with the 

problems, the unique problems that citizens have in Washington 

State, in North Dakota, in Michigan, in New York, in Maine, instead of just saying we are going to try to shove this round peg 

through a square hole, call it by a slightly different name, and not 

deal with the problems that it will create, or, oh, they will adjust 

to it. 

What if people do not? What if commerce across the Niagara 

River slows down by a third and the economy, which is tough 

enough in wester New York, plummets? 

So I am disappointed, I have to say. I want security. I do not 

want to back off on security. I would prefer not to delay anything—

but not if we just get these kinds of answers, which I think we 

have gotten, Madam Chairman, throughout the whole system. 

So that is where my questions are aimed. I am worried about the 

PASS card because of the inefficiencies, without the security. In a 

sense, we are getting the worst of all worlds. And when I say security assurances, I am concerned both about the security of the borders and about the privacy and security of individuals’ personal information. 

DHS has said they want to require these passports in January 

2008—that is pretty soon—even though the final deadline is not 

until June 2009, about 18 months later. Yet we have yet to see a 

regulation, a final regulation on the WHTI or on the proposed 

PASS card. So there are a whole lot of unanswered questions, and 

it is supposed to be less than 6 months away. It is mind-boggling. 

I hope we will get the answers soon, maybe even in a few minutes. In the meantime, we have to deal with the issue. 

The State Department has said it will process PASS cards just 

like passports, but it is now a 10-week wait for a passport. Are we 

going to have a 10-week wait for somebody who learns of a wedding, say, and wants to go across the border in 6 weeks? Or for a 

school bus, a bunch of school kids that want to go look at something in Buffalo and they are from Canada? It is going to change 

the whole way of life because the Niagara River is not unlike the 

Hudson River in the sense that people cross it regularly, day by 

day, and that is true in Detroit and it is in true in Washington 

State and it is true in Maine. It is true in other parts of New York 

State. 

19

So, I do not know, I just do not see the concern here. We need 

to be careful that we are maintaining efficiency and protecting security. And I hope this hearing will advance the cause. 

So my questions are mainly directed at Paul Morris and Andrew 

Simkin of DHS and State. First, you said you want to use radiofrequency vicinity-read technology in the proposed PASS card. That 

is not the most secure technology available for this type of card. 

The PASS cards lacks many of the security features that are possible for, say, the e-passport. However, State and DHS have 

claimed that the proposed PASS card technology will be more efficient. I appreciate and agree with the goal, but I want to look behind the claim that the PASS card would both be secure and efficient, that it would let us have our cake and eat it, too. 

So my question to you two gentlemen is: The proposed technology 

for the PASS card is different from the technology used for existing 

U.S. border documents like e-passport and Nexus registered traveler card, right? I assume that is correct. Yes? 

Mr. SIMKIN. Well, the technology is actually still subject to some 

testing and analysis before a final decision will be made. But the 

proposal is, yes, it would be vicinity-read. 

Senator SCHUMER. All right. Now, Mr. Morris, if you disagree 

with any of that, you can chime in. But you agree it is different, 

I presume. OK. Given this specific technology has not been used for 

U.S. travel documents before, have the proposed PASS cards themselves been field tested in a real border environment? 

Mr. SIMKIN. No. 

Senator SCHUMER. No. And we are supposed to have this fully 

implemented in 9 months, right? 

Mr. SIMKIN. Well, actually the time range could be as early as 

January 2008 by law, or it could be as late as June of 2009. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. And you do not have a set date yet by 

which you will be ready? 

Mr. SIMKIN. We do not have a set date. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. What about the machines to read the 

PASS cards? Has DHS or State done any field test of these cards 

readers, Mr. Morris? 

Mr. MORRIS. Well, it comes down to the final technology that is 

selected for the card and testing in conjunction with that. We have 

done some field testing of various technologies. It is certainly in 

general a viable technology. The final solution, we will have to take 

a look at it. 

Senator SCHUMER. But the type you aim to use has not been tested yet in the field? 

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct, sir. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. So you have stated, both State and DHS, 

that PASS cards will be readable at 20 feet away as a car approaches the border crossing. Is that a guess? I mean, do we know 

when there is a traffic stream with different lanes and different 

cars going back and forth that it will work 20 feet away? 

Mr. SIMKIN. The passport card is an alternate to the paper passport. As you know, we have a proposed rule, and I know that you 

submitted comments, and many of your constituents did. Those 

comments are being evaluated now prior to the issuance of a final 

rule, and it is a joint State and DHS effort. 

20

We are committed to working closely with the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology to ensure that whatever technology 

goes into the card is a workable one. 

Senator SCHUMER. Yes, but we do not know if it is readable at 

20 feet yet. We have not done an on-the-ground experiment yet 

or—

Mr. SIMKIN. It is going to require extensive testing. 

Senator SCHUMER. It is? OK. So we have not done that yet. 

OK. The current plan also requires CPB to have a database that 

will store and pull up personal information based on the PASS 

cards. That database would be a gold mine for identity theft 

thieves and terrorists. What testing has been done to make sure 

the database is protected from hackers and from physical attacks? 

Because it is going to be in a lot of places, I guess, or accessible 

in a lot of places. Mr. Morris? 

Mr. MORRIS. As with all of our systems of law enforcement information, they are appropriately firewalled, appropriately secured to 

ensure that none of the Privacy Act-protected information is going 

to make it into the hands of anyone but those that need it and 

have appropriate access to the—

Senator SCHUMER. Well, that is a general hypothetical statement. What specific plans have been done, put in place? I mean, 

you are saying you are going to implement it as early as 8 months 

from now or 7 months from now. What practical steps have been 

taken, what tests have been done, to make sure that it cannot be—

that identity thieves cannot prey on this? 

Mr. MORRIS. I would have to take that back as a question for the 

record, sir. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. If we could by unanimous consent, I 

would be happy to get an answer in writing. In a week? 

Mr. MORRIS. Certainly. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So ordered. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you. 

So it is a real concern that the proposed PASS card will be just 

as inconvenient and inefficient at busy border crossings as a passport book and will be a double whammy because it provides less 

security than the new e-passports. And I do not see a change here. 

Let me just ask a couple of other questions. 

What is your answer to the 10-week backlog that we now have 

with passports given the needs that people have right away, given 

the fact that only 7 percent—I get the numbers mixed up. It is 7 

percent of either Canadians or Americans have a passport and 9 

percent of the other, at least in the western New York area. 

Mr. SIMKIN. OK. Nationally, we believe it is about 27 percent of 

American citizens hold passports at the present time. That is going 

up. As a result of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we 

have seen a very strong surge in passport demand. Last year, we 

issued a record 12.1 million passports. This year, we are on track 

to issue over 17 million passports. We have all of our passport 

agencies working extra shifts, working mandatory overtime. We 

have task forces operating in Washington. 

We have not been able to get the delay down to where we would 

like it to be. We are committed to following the rigorous adjudicaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Aug 03, 2007 Jkt 036943 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36943.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
21

tion processes to make sure that we only issue passports to persons 

entitled to them. 

Senator SCHUMER. So what do you say to somebody, if this plan 

were in effect, who gets an invitation to a party, to a wedding, to 

something on the other side of the border 3 or 4 weeks from now 

and they do not have a passport? 

Mr. SIMKIN. We take a lot of steps to try to accommodate emergency situations. We have walk-in service at most of our agencies. 

We have an expedited service that can cut that time down considerably from 10 weeks. 

Senator SCHUMER. Have you made any plans to improve things 

on the border areas so we will not have long waits, so that people 

who on the spur—I mean, this does not even deal with the issue, 

about a quarter of the fans, for instance, who see the Buffalo Sabres are Canadians. I bet a lot of them decide to go that day. Now, 

are there plans to deal with these kinds of things? Let us take 

something that is not just a hockey game. Let us say, you know, 

there has to be a business meeting, there has to be a serious gathering of different people for one thing or another—a funeral. 

Mr. SIMKIN. Well, it is a legal requirement under the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative, under the IRTPA legislation. We are 

trying to do everything we can to provide the best customer service 

to enable people to travel in the time that they wish to. We get 

hundreds of thousands of calls, and many of those calls we can 

prioritize the passport application for short-term travel. We can 

also route people to walk-in counter service to be able to try to 

meet their travel needs. 

Senator SCHUMER. Walk-in counter service? Do you have plans to 

open up lots of these walk-in counter places throughout western 

New York and throughout eastern Canada by January of 2008? Do 

you have any plans for that? 

Mr. SIMKIN. No. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. I mean, my questions are pretty obvious 

here in terms of where we are going. 

You would both agree that if there is a 6-week wait to get—let’s 

say it is not 10 weeks, it goes back to 6—a 6-week wait before anyone could travel across the board, that would greatly hurt commerce along the whole Northern border dramatically and hurt the 

economy significantly? Do you agree with that? Yes or no. 

Mr. SIMKIN. I am really not an expert in commerce. It is obvious 

that there is an inconvenience factor to this—

Senator SCHUMER. No, no, no. I did not ask inconvenience. That 

belittles it. A serious economic effect. 

Mr. SIMKIN. I really could not say what the effect is. I am not 

aware of any studies of what the effect would be. 

Senator SCHUMER. Isn’t it common sense that if people who are 

used to traveling across the border in a totally different way now 

have to wait 6 weeks before they travel? 

Mr. SIMKIN. One thing I would point out with regard to the documents required for entry to the United States, this is a requirement that is levied at the port of entry. State and DHS work together on these things. Our job in the State Department is to issue 

the passports properly to people entitled to them in as fast and efficient a way as we possibly can. 

22

Senator SCHUMER. Now there is a 10-week wait. 

Mr. SIMKIN. Correct. 

Senator SCHUMER. That is not very fast. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator, if I may? 

Senator SCHUMER. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you could truncate—

Senator SCHUMER. I am almost finished. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Because we have got another panel. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. You agree, Mr. Morris? What is your 

view? Would a 6-week or a 10-week wait interfere with commerce 

across the Northern border from Seattle over to Presque Isle, or 

wherever the eastern order of Maine is? 

Mr. MORRIS. I think I would have to suggest, Senator that stating that it is a 6-week wait is perhaps not entirely accurate. 

Senator SCHUMER. No, but if it were. If it were. 

Mr. MORRIS. Well, we have launched a significant media campaign to make individuals aware of the current requirement for air 

travel. We are going to continue that to make any individuals 

aware of the land border and seaport requirement as well. Our 

hope would be that they would plan in advance to get the passport 

that they need so that there is no interruption in their travel when 

the actual requirement is put in place. And for those—

Senator SCHUMER. There are certain things you cannot plan for, 

right? Funerals, emergencies, business meetings. 

Mr. MORRIS. That is true, and within Customs and Border Protection’s discretionary authority, we can address those types of 

cases on a case-by-case basis as they arise. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. I would just say—and I just have one 

more. I know you want to move, Madam Chairperson. I mean, we 

work with both of your Departments on these case-by-case bases, 

and sometimes it works out and sometimes it does not. And all of 

us have dealt with this because we get calls from our office regularly, and I would urge you to give more thought to this and not 

just treat it as business as usual or say, ‘‘We will work it out on 

a case-by-case basis,’’ because if this is implemented and then it 

creates a real problem, you all know that it is going to be worse 

than if it is—well, it is going to create huge problems. 

Just one more question. Many of us like the idea of using driver’s 

licenses, the special new driver’s licenses, as a better way to do 

this. It is a document people are familiar with. It is more inconvenience to you, less problems for the people at the border. Washington State is doing a pilot project in this regard. Can you tell us 

how it is going? 

Mr. MORRIS. I can tell you, Senator, that we have been actively 

engaged with the State of Washington in looking at this particular 

pilot. We would be happy to provide you more information through 

a—

Senator SCHUMER. You are not familiar with it right now? 

Mr. MORRIS. No, I am not, sir. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. Please, if you would. That is very important. 

Mr. MORRIS. Certainly. 

Senator SCHUMER. And I would urge you to look at alternatives 

like the driver’s license alternative, which, as you can imagine, 

23

most everyone has a driver’s license, they are used to a driver’s license, they do not have to apply in advance, they do not have to 

pay, they have it anyway. I would urge you to look at that rather 

than sort of stick to business as usual, which does not quite work 

for our border. 

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Before I close out the panel, I would like to bring to their attention an article on the front page of the New York Times this morning, and that is the article entitled ‘‘U.S. Seeks Closing of Visa 

Loophole,’’ by Jane Perlez. And it points out that the head of the 

London bomb attack actually has a passport through the Visa 

Waiver Program and could have come to this country at any time 

under the Visa Waiver Program. 

I truly believe that the Visa Waiver Program is the soft underbelly of this Nation. The predominance of stolen passports makes 

it so easy and there are so many countries in the Visa Waiver Program. I just want to quote a part of it. ‘‘Among the options that 

have been put on the table, according to British officials, was the 

most onerous option to Britain, that of canceling the entire Visa 

Waiver Program that allows all Britons entry to the United States 

without a visa.’’

I think—and I have been following this program closely for some 

amount of time—that the way it is run and the sloppiness with 

which it has been run really places this Nation in serious jeopardy. 

And I have said this over and over and over again. I was the one 

who fought against getting rid of the 3 per cent visa refusal rate 

for countries that want to participate in the program. I think we 

have a big problem there in that millions of people come in, well 

over 15 million people a year, essentially on a program where there 

is no check and no balance. And I would just like to leave you with 

those thoughts. And I think we are going to have much more to say 

about it in the future. 

So thank you very much for your testimony this morning. It is 

appreciated, and if you gentlemen have a chance to stay to listen 

to Mr. Noble, it might well be edifying. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I would like to ask the second panel to 

come forward: the Honorable Ronald K. Noble, the Secretary General of Interpol; Clark Kent Ervin, Director of Homeland Security, 

Aspen Institute, former Inspector General, Department of Homeland Defense, and Author, ‘‘Open Target: Where America Is Vulnerable to Attack’’; and also Brian Zimmer, Senior Associate, Kelly, 

Anderson & Associates, and former Senior Investigator, Committee 

on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. 

If we can, we will begin with Mr. Noble, and let me thank you 

so much for coming here. It is very much appreciated. And I think 

you can note from my questions the interest that I have in the subject, and so I would very much appreciate your comments, if you 

can, addressing these points. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD K. NOBLE, SECRETARY 

GENERAL, INTERPOL, LYON, FRANCE 

Mr. NOBLE. Thank you very much. Chairman Feinstein, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, good morning. I will broadVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Aug 03, 2007 Jkt 036943 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36943.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
24

en the focus of my oral testimony to lay the foundation for why urgency should be felt by us all as we deal with the issue that brings 

us together today. 

Al Qaeda and al Qaeda-inspired terrorists are trying to kill and 

harm the world’s citizens. They are doing so right now. Depending 

on the group, the circumstances, and the opportunities, they would 

love nothing more than to kill U.S. citizens and the friends of U.S. 

citizens on U.S. soil. But they also love targeting U.S. embassies, 

U.S. military vehicles and personnel, U.S. businesses, and U.S. citizens anywhere—anywhere they might be found in the world. They 

know the combustible ingredients that attract worldwide attention. 

Al Qaeda strikes U.S. targets. 

There are those who blindly take comfort that the U.S. has not 

been hit hard within its borders since September 11, 2001. I know 

one high-ranking U.S. Government official who was so dedicated 

and committed to protecting U.S. citizens on U.S. soil that on any 

given day he could tell you how many days it had been since September 11, 2001. 

In my capacity as Interpol’s Secretary General, I take no comfort, 

absolutely no comfort, in the fact that al Qaeda has not struck the 

U.S. within its borders since 9/11. Of course, we all should be 

thankful that no innocent lives have been taken or harmed. But 

viewing the absence of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil for a certain 

amount of time as a success is the wrong approach. And you talked 

about complacency earlier. It can give one a false sense of comfort, 

and it can make you falsely conclude that al Qaeda cannot strike 

as opposed to that al Qaeda has not yet chosen to strike. 

For me, I use different points of reference in terms of time and 

comfort. I see the time since the last terrorist attack as a time 

bomb that must be defused before it explodes. My point of reference 

is not the number of days between September 11, 2001, and today, 

which happens to be 2,059, but the number of days between the 

first World Trade Center attack by al Qaeda on February 26, 1993, 

and the second set of attacks on September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda 

waited and prepared for more than 8 years, 3,119 days, before 

striking the U.S. again on U.S. soil. 

This means that we cannot and should not take any real comfort 

from the fact that the U.S. has not been hit again since then. As 

I said, I use time bombs as my points of reference. I see members 

of al Qaeda, terrorists linked to al Qaeda, or individuals who are 

inspired by al Qaeda as human time bombs. They have almost 200 

countries in the world where they can operate, whether they can 

plan or prepare and through which they can travel. The challenge 

for our generation and maybe for generations to follow is how can 

we individually and collectively prevent these vicious terrorists 

from killing or harming us and those we love and represent. 

Since September 11, 2001, Interpol has been regularly transforming itself to help each and every one of its member countries 

to disrupt, to prevent, to investigate, to track down, to apprehend, 

and to prosecute terrorists the world over. We have done so by 

thinking about this issue almost every minute of every day, by 

meeting and consulting with our member country national central 

bureaus and law enforcement officials from around the world, by 

engaging elected officials, appointed Government officials, reportVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Aug 03, 2007 Jkt 036943 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36943.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
25

ers, business leaders, and citizens in discussions about what they 

see as weaknesses in their countries’ or even other countries’ 

antiterrorist efforts. 

The best way to describe Interpol’s state-of-the-art approach to 

enhancing the border security of each and every country is to visualize tripwires interconnected around the globe and in the paths 

of terrorists and other dangerous criminals. Depending upon the 

type of tripwire that is tripped, either a silent or a loud alarm is 

triggered and alerting law enforcement that they might have a person of interest to another law enforcement agency somewhere in 

the world standing right in front of them, permitting them to move 

the person from primary to secondary inspection. 

Interpol’s tripwire system is in place and is working. Between 

2000 and 2006, the number of annual checks on our databases increased nearly tenfold, from 81,000 to over 703,000. Between 2000 

and 2006, the number of international wanted persons notices 

issued annually by us has nearly tripled from 1,000 to 2,800. The 

number of diffusions, or what we would know in the U.S. as Be On 

the Look-Outs, issued annually through Interpol has more than 

doubled from 5,000 to over 12,000. The number of annual arrests 

of individuals who were subject to Interpol Red Notices or diffusions has surged from 534 to over 4,000, a 698-percent increase. 

Now, despite the success that Interpol and its member countries 

have achieved working together in terms of gathering and sharing 

information from a wide variety of countries on suspected terrorists, and especially on stolen travel documents, there seems to be 

an intractable resistance in some corners of the U.S.’ and other 

countries’ bureaucracies to using information coming from global 

sources. These entities prefer to use the systems that were in place 

prior to the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and prior 

to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 

As I said in my written testimony, if this view continues to reflect the attitude of those whom we expect to protect us from the 

next wave of terrorist attacks, we are in serious—and I repeat—

serious trouble. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Would you be specific on that point? 

Mr. NOBLE. Yes. If you were to read this morning’s Wall Street 

Journal article regarding this hearing, you would see a quote given 

by the spokesperson from Customs and Border Protection saying 

that the Interpol system is not there yet, is not where it should be 

yet. And I believe this attitude courageously spoken on the record 

reflects the view of those people who remember Interpol 5 years 

ago or 6 years ago or 10 years ago when this was true. We have 

changed. The world has changed. We believe it is important for 

that to be recognized. 

I will conclude with my formal remarks to say that, Chairman—

and I say this with all sincerity—since you have organized these 

hearings, Interpol and our Stolen Lost and Travel Document database has gotten more attention from the U.S. than we received in 

my 61⁄2 years as Secretary General—not that the U.S. has not been 

trying and has not helped us. In fact, it is for that reason that we 

have the system in place, because they complained about the old 

system that was only an investigative tool. So thanks to the feedback, the work of the USNCB, and the hard work of individuals in 

26

U.S. Customs and U.S. Border. Now it is different. Progress has 

been made, but what I feel as Secretary General and the point I 

want to make is the time bomb, the ticking, your reference to what 

was promised last year, it will happen this year, we hope it will 

happen this year. But until it happens this year, there have got to 

be interim measures we can take. 

When I was 9 years old working in my father’s store, we used 

to have a book with the numbers of all the credit cards that were 

reported stolen or that were no longer valid that we would refer to. 

So what Interpol is saying, the perfect system may never be developed, but the system we have in place now that is being used by 

Switzerland over 300,000 times a month is coming up with 100 hits 

each month. The system that we put in place in the Caribbean before the Cricket World Cup, the Caribbean countries, whom people 

oftentimes criticize as not being aggressive or hard-working 

enough, put the system in place in 4 months and now have gotten 

more hits in 4 months than they got in the prior 6 years. 

So we need the U.S. not only to put the system in place, but to 

advocate that other countries should put the system in place. Without the U.S. support, without the support of the elected Members 

of Congress, this Congress and other congresses and parliaments 

around the world, we believe people will take their time to make 

sure the system is put in place. And Interpol believes that time 

continues to run out for us. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Noble appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Noble. I have many questions. 

Mr. Ervin? 

STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ASPEN INSTITUTE, AND FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you very much, Chairman Feinstein, for inviting me to testify on this very important topic, and I want to thank 

you for being the leader on this issue of dealing with the Visa 

Waiver Program and the related problem of stolen and lost passports. As you know, I have submitted a lengthy statement for the 

record, so I will only summarize it here. 

Like you, I believe that the single greatest vulnerability with regard to international documents is the Visa Waiver Program and, 

as I say, the inextricably interrelated problem of lost and stolen 

passports. 

As we put it back in a 2004 report during my time as DHS Inspector General, ‘‘In the post-9/11 world the visa is more than a 

mere stamp in a passport. It is the end result of a rigorous screening process that the bearer must undergo before travel. By the end 

of the process, U.S. authorities have collected and stored considerable information about the traveler and his or her planned journey. 

When the visa is waived for broad classes of travelers, those travelers avoid this extensive examination, and the United States does 

not collect comparable information regarding them.’’

27

Visitors from non-visa waiver countries are nowadays almost always interviewed at an American embassy or consulate abroad 

about 90 percent. Many, if not most, of our interviewers are conversant in the language of the applicants, familiar with their customs, 

and trained in fraud detection techniques. Consular officials have 

the further luxury of spacing the interviews apart so as to maximize the time they have to question applicants. 

By way of contrast, there is no time for port-of-entry inspectors 

to interview visa waiver travelers. Hundreds of passengers, as we 

all know, disembark at any one time from international flights, 

and, understandably, inspectors feel pressure to clear them within 

45 minutes. And even if they did interview passengers, most inspectors speak only English. The relative few who speak another 

language tend to speak Spanish, not languages like Arabic, Farsi, 

or Urdu, spoken in countries of concern. 

Far more written information is collected from non-visa waiver 

travelers than visa waiver travelers, and the finger scans taken at 

the port of entry from non-visa waiver travelers can be compared 

with those taken at the embassy or consulate where the visa application was made, establishing to a certainty that the person at the 

port of entry is the very same person who applied for the visa 

abroad. 

It is not, then, for nothing that shoe bomber Richard Reid was 

a British citizen. It is not for nothing that Zacarias Moussaoui, 

whom some believe to have been the 20th 9/11 hijacker, was a 

French citizens. Terrorists prize passports from visa waiver countries because visa waiver travelers are subjected to much less scrutiny. That is why passports from visa waiver countries are occasionally stolen and used to attempt to enter the United States. 

We do not know the full extent of this problem, but we do know 

that it remains a serious one. The latest figures that I am aware 

of are from January to June 2005, when, according to GAO, 298 

stolen visa waiver country passports were used to try to enter the 

United States. We do not know, of course, how many times customs 

inspectors failed to spot stolen passports. At least when we looked 

into this problem back in 2004, we found, incredibly enough, that 

DHS customs inspectors admitted travelers with stolen passports 

into this country 73 percent of the time when they knew that the 

passports were stolen. 

I want to take issue, if I may, with Mr. Everitt who said that 

it is invariably the case that when stolen passports are discovered 

by port-of-entry inspectors, they are confiscated. At least when we 

looked into this problem in 2004, on occasion, also incredibly, the 

passports were given back to the traveler so that he could go back 

to his country and attempt to use the stolen passport yet again. 

Instead of jettisoning the Visa Waiver Program, the administration, the President himself, and some Members of Congress want 

to expand it to reward certain countries for being good allies. There 

are other ways to show our appreciation than by further widening 

a security gap, it seems to me. Doing away with the Visa Waiver 

Program need not hurt tourism, trade, and our international 

image. As a committed internationalist and a former State Department official myself—I was the Inspector General there before becoming the Inspector General at Homeland Security. It was I, inciVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Aug 03, 2007 Jkt 036943 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36943.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
28

dentally, and my staff who recommended that we increase the 

number of visa applicants who were interviewed. I have always believed that the State Department in general, and its consular bureau in particular, are seriously underfunded. If significantly more 

resources were provided to State, they could hire the additional 

consular officers needed to process applications from these 27 countries so that their travelers would not need to wait unduly long for 

a visa to visit the United States. And while we would lose, admittedly, our reciprocal right to visa waiver countries without a visa, 

that, it seems to me, is a rather small price to pay to close a big 

security gap. 

I just want to mention, in my statement I talk also, as you know, 

about the Visa Security Officer Program, the importance to my 

mind that the deadline with regard to the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative, with regard to American passports, as to land 

and sea, be implemented on the deadline that is in the law, and 

we can talk about that, I hope, during the course of the questionand-answer period. 

But I just want to end by noting, as you did, the New York 

Times article this morning. If, in fact, the Secretary is considering 

either ending the Visa Waiver Program with regard to Britain entirely or applying it to British citizens of Pakistani descent—which 

seems to me is ethically questionable and would be politically difficult. So as between the two, if either is chosen, it seems to me 

likely that the administration would jettison Britain from the Visa 

Waiver Program. 

If we are going to do that, if we are contemplating doing that 

with regard to our closest ally, then I question whether we should 

extend the Visa Waiver Program to countries like Estonia, for example. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ervin appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ervin. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Zimmer? 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN ZIMMER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, KELLY, 

ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, AND FORMER SENIOR INVESTIGATOR, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. ZIMMER. Chairman Feinstein, thank you for this opportunity 

to share my thoughts on strengthening the security of international 

travel documents. 

If one thinks of homeland security measures to prevent attacks 

and subversion by foreign terrorists as a patchwork quilt, it is evident that many of the patches which were absent before 9/11 have 

been put in place. The important premise is now generally accepted 

that identity documents needs to be physically very secure, very 

counter-resistant, and issued to people only after a thorough adjudication and authentication of source documents. This was not true 

before 9/11. 

Some important security patches are still missing, and others in 

place are only stop-gap measures and require more work. The missVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Aug 03, 2007 Jkt 036943 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36943.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
29

ing ‘‘security patch’’ of greatest concern to me is the lack of substantial use of passport and identity card reading technology to authenticate documents at ports of entry. Another critical ‘‘security 

patch’’ that continues to be put on the back burner is the establishment of exit controls at every port of entry. The sophistication of 

our terrorist opponents requires that the Federal Government close 

these holes in the blanket of homeland security. 

Much has been accomplished to interrupt terrorist travel, and 

worthwhile initiatives have been undertaken by the administration 

to improve the security of travel documents, many of which are the 

result of congressional mandates and some initially proposed by 

Senator Feinstein and Senator Kyl. 

In the appendix to my written testimony, I have listed legislation 

since 2001 affecting travel and identity document security, and 

those of us familiar with the work of Senator Feinstein and Senator Kyl will recognize many of their initiatives. 

As a former House Judiciary staff member, it is particularly satisfying to see so much of the legislative branch’s vision for improved security becoming reality. 

The adjudication for U.S. passports is highly dependent on the 

identity authentication prior to issuing driver’s licenses, and so the 

REAL ID Act is included among the legislation in the appendix to 

my written testimony. It needs to be recognized as a critical element in securing international travel documents that we issue. 

Since some of the other witnesses have pointed out, as have the 

Senators, some of the absences of the administration, I would like 

to point out a few of the recent accomplishments they have completed. 

It is my view that the implementation of Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative for air travel to and from the United States in 

January of this year went off very effectively, to many people’s surprise, including my own. This success occurred because of the thorough public outreach by the Federal agencies involved, the post office, and DHS’s coordinated planning with airports and airline carriers. 

There has been a continued active outreach, and comprehensive 

planning for the next phase of WHTI at land ports of entry. DHS 

is undertaking a renovation of the border infrastructure to improve 

inspections and expedite travel, and also accommodate new readers 

for the PASS card and passport. 

The continued expansion of the Immigration Advisory Program is 

an accomplishment of this administration, required by Congress 

but, nonetheless, largely moving at a faster pace than I would have 

envisioned 2 years ago. It stops people from getting on planes 

bound for the United States when their identity documents do not 

measure up and, more importantly, when close inspection identifies 

them as high-risk travelers with actual or potential terrorist affiliations. With reference to Great Britain, this seems to me to be one 

of the more obvious immediate solutions that could be imposed 

prior to determination that they have to be dropped entirely. An effort should be made to see what could be done with that as soon 

as possible. 

There have been continued improvements at US–VISIT. This 

goes on behind the scenes, but there is an improving consolidation 

30

of watchlist indicators which works and directly applies to travelers 

under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, and I think it is extremely 

important work that is going on there. I applaud those who are 

completing it. 

I think we have to acknowledge the administration has expanded 

use of terrorist watchlists to screen passenger manifest lists of 

international flights and has moved it from a largely unautomated 

process 6 years ago to one that is highly automated today in which 

information is quickly put into the filters that apply to manifests. 

There has been—not as rigorous as some would like, but much 

more rigorous than occurred before—enforcement of requirements 

on countries participating the Visa Waiver Program. We have to 

feel that, notwithstanding it was slower than we might have liked, 

today the passports of Visa Waiver Program countries are far more 

robust, and most of them have an improved adjudication process 

before issuing them. 

In conclusion, I think the Administration has met many of the 

mandates, but I think is struggling to meet the rest, and I thank 

you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zimmer appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Zimmer, and 

let me thank all of you. 

I would like to begin with Mr. Noble. And, Mr. Noble, I am going 

to ask you about ten quick questions. I want it for the transcript. 

If you can answer yes or no or briefly fill in, you may want to fill 

in in writing later. 

What kind of information is available on the Interpol database? 

Mr. NOBLE. The stolen or lost passport number, the issuing country, whether the passport was stolen blank or lost, and the date of 

reported theft or loss. So no personal, no privacy information. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. How many passports are registered in the database? 

Mr. NOBLE. We have over 6.7 million passports registered and 

over 14 million total stolen travel documents. And I might add, 

Chairman, since your last hearings—and we monitor your hearings—Norway, Japan, and Sweden are all now participating countries. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Oh, good. That is excellent. 

How many passports are from visa waiver countries? 

Mr. NOBLE. From visa waiver countries, we have about 2.7 million. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And how many countries now contribute 

their data? 

Mr. NOBLE. 123 countries, and just to highlight, 5 years ago 

when we started, we had less than 12 countries and 3,000 documents, and now we have 123 countries and over 14 million documents. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. How does data get into the database? 

Mr. NOBLE. The country that is the owner of the passport enters 

the data directly. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So who owns the data? 

Mr. NOBLE. The country that issues the passport. Only they can 

enter it, only they can modify it, only they can delete it. 

31

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Can another country add, delete, or modify 

U.S. data in the Interpol database? 

Mr. NOBLE. No. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. How fast is the search of the Interpol database? 

Mr. NOBLE. Instant, 2 to 4 seconds. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is it expensive to connect border entry 

points to the database? 

Mr. NOBLE. The image that we have here for you is Switzerland. 

Switzerland was able to connect 20,000 of its law enforcement officers to Interpol’s system for about 100,000 euros. And up there on 

that screen, you see the hits that have occurred between December 

2005 and April 2007. And highlighted in red for you, Chairman, is 

the visa waiver country hits. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And we do not currently use this database? 

Mr. NOBLE. The U.S. uses this database for investigative purposes and also has run samples to see whether or not it works. But 

on a real-time basis, when people are entering the country, the system is not yet being consulted regularly by the U.S. But as you 

heard and as I read in the newspaper, the plans are for it to occur 

by this fiscal year or at the latest this calendar year. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I am very pleased to hear that. One last 

question. How much training is required to use the system? 

Mr. NOBLE. The same training that is required to scan the passport for purposes of it being searched at the national level. Once 

the passport is scanned, a light flashes up, either green or red, indicating whether or not there has been a hit. So very easy. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, let me just say to you, I really hope 

we get into this system in a robust way. I am very worried. This 

country is still like a sieve. You know, Mr. Zimmer mentioned the 

US–VISIT program. We still cannot tell if people who come into 

this country ever leave. And I do not think the American people 

understand how lax our controls really are. 

I am going to follow up, and I am very grateful for you being 

here to see that we do get into this system. I think it is important. 

Mr. NOBLE. Could I just follow up with one other point that you 

made? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, please. go ahead. 

Mr. NOBLE. Because there have been some strong comments 

made about what should happen with regard to visa waiver countries. I do not want to get involved in a matter that does not concern me directly, but I would say that if the U.S. is thinking about 

eliminating the visa waiver for all of those countries that right now 

are some of your strongest partners in the fight against terrorism, 

I would try an interim response first. An interim response, I believe, is the same response that we use every day with our credit 

cards. If our credit card is lost or stolen, it takes us a matter of 

seconds or minutes for us to report that and even less time for the 

credit card company to cancel it. 

If we were to require all countries to report theft of stolen blank 

passports, which you highlighted, which is a major problem, and if 

it was put into the system instantly, and if all countries were required to have the system to check it instantly, it would have no 

value to—

32

Chairman FEINSTEIN. What do we need to do that? 

Mr. NOBLE. This is what the U.S.—I am sorry for pointing. This 

is where they were sitting before. Excuse me, sir. The U.S. is planning to do that, and I want to give you one case example to explain 

this. 

On April 23, 2003, there was a theft of 850 passports in Cyprus, 

850 blank passports, on April 23rd—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Of this year. 

Mr. NOBLE. 2003. 2003. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. 

Mr. NOBLE. On January 20th of this year, 11 Iraqis were stopped 

at Monterrey, Mexico, because an immigration officer asked one of 

them a question that made him suspicious. Eventually, it turned 

out that these 11 Iraqis had 8 of the passports that had been stolen 

way back in 2003. But for those immigration officers stopping the 

persons in Monterrey, their plans were to get to California and 

then claim asylum. 

For us, we cannot take comfort by the view that there are a number of people, honest people, hard-working people, who want to 

claim asylum. We have to remember that the first World Trade 

Center attacks occurred by Ramzi Yousef carrying a stolen Iraqi 

passport and claiming asylum in order to get into the U.S. 

These same passports, after Interpol got member countries together, turned up in March and April in Spain and in Poland, and 

from this one case were able to dig down and identify 14 people 

and identify a trafficking ring. 

So it is one thing to connect to the system, but we also need to 

make sure that, as my colleague to the left said, that if and when 

there is a hit, we do not give them the passport back and we do 

not ignore that the hit has occurred. 

Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Just in response, I do not think the United States is preparing 

to do away with the Visa Waiver Program per se. I hope there is 

a greater recognition of the hazards it presents because we do not 

even know if these people go home. 

Mr. NOBLE. Understood. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I mean, once they come to this country, 

they are lost, effectively. And this is over 15 million people a year 

from 27 countries. This is a lot of people. 

So if I might, Mr. Zimmer, you mentioned that you think 

progress is being made with the US–VISIT program, and I am delighted to hear that. Do you think there is much progress being 

made with respect to identifying when people are actually leaving 

the country who are here? 

Mr. ZIMMER. No, I do not, and personally, a Congressman that 

I worked for—and, of course, I worked with your staff over the 

years—it remains a deep concern to me that people at the State 

level are so indifferent to this, because a majority of the States 

would have the same option of adding lost and stolen passports 

from Interpol. They would not have to go through the Federal Government. None of them are interested in this project that I know 

of, despite its wide publicity. And a majority of them will issue a 

driver’s license, at least a temporary one, but many will issue one 

33

for the full term based on any passport presented with no other 

identification. So it is a serious issue. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ervin? 

Mr. ERVIN. May I add something to that, Chairman? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, you may. 

Mr. ERVIN. As you know, surely, a few months ago, I think about 

6 months ago or so, Secretary Chertoff or the Department, anyway, 

announced essentially that the Department had given up on the 

notion of having an exit feature to US–VISIT because of the cost. 

And it seems to me, as you said, that this is a huge vulnerability. 

If, in fact, it is subsequently learned that we have inadvertently 

admitted a terrorist in this country, as you say, we have no way 

of knowing whether that person definitively has left the country. 

The US–VISIT system is incomplete and, to some degree, ineffectual, as long as it does not have a complementary exit feature. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I would agree with that 100 percent. 

Mr. Noble, over 420 million travelers come into the United States 

each year. This gives, I think, Americans the scope of this. So 

many people come here. Is the Interpol database equipped to handle that many inquiries? 

Mr. NOBLE. Recognizing how careful you are about the record 

that is established here, I want to be very careful. 

Interpol’s system can handle triggering the fact that a passport 

that has been reported stolen or lost is being used. But then afterwards, there is a verification process that is required, where 

human beings have to determine whether or not the passport has 

been stolen, whether or not the passport has been lost. And for that 

volume of people, we are going to need human resources. 

Right now, as Secretary General of Interpol, I do not have one 

human being from the Department of Homeland Security assigned 

to Interpol headquarters in Lyon. We do not—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is that right? 

Mr. NOBLE. Not one. We have Secret Service—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Homeland Security has—what?—over 

200,000 employees. That is amazing. 

Mr. NOBLE. To me it is amazing, and I am going to try to beg 

the Secretary tomorrow to change that. 

The USNCB, which gets 10,000 messages per month, has vacancies. We believe we are a hub that can leverage the support that 

the U.S. gets around the world. But if the U.S. does not think it 

is important enough for Homeland Security to send people to work 

at Interpol, even though we developed these systems, even though 

we are the ones that invented it based on the U.S. feedback, it is 

hard for us to persuade other countries to dedicate the resources. 

I think with all of the human beings they have working in the 

Department of Homeland Security, they could find a handful of 

human beings to send to the USNCB and to Interpol headquarters 

to work on this important issue. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I would agree, and I hope to see Secretary Chertoff this afternoon, and I will mention it to him, that 

is for sure. 

Is it possible to screen people through Interpol before planes land 

in the U.S.? If so, how would that work? 

34

Mr. NOBLE. When I used to be the Chairman of the Financial Action Task Force, we were working for the system of currency transaction reports and suspicious activity reports where banks are required to send to the U.S. Government any currency transactions 

above a certain amount. 

In our view, if you required the same thing of airlines or airline 

reservation companies or of banks, you do not have them send personal data; you have them send to the U.S. Government the numbers of the passports being used for purposes of getting on an airline, making a reservation, or opening a bank account. Then a U.S. 

agency can get the information and actually decide whether or not 

the hit should lead to a disruption or actual monitoring and following of the individual. 

So I believe that could be a very important legislative—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I just asked my staff, isn’t that being done 

now? And you are nodding yes. Perhaps could you just add to this. 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. That is part of the AFIS transmission to the 

United States collected by CBP. The passport and the passport 

number is transmitted, and that will be what is used to bounce 

against the SLTD system by CBP. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So, in other words, the manifest information comes before the plane leaves. Is that not correct? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. There is a rule out right now to change it from 

15 minutes after departure to before the plane leaves. The final 

rule is about to be announced. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. That is helpful. Would you let us 

know when the rule is announced? 

Mr. BARTOLDUS. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. NOBLE. That is very helpful and very positive, but I am proposing that we could consider pushing it out even further before 

the person gets on the plane, before the person gets a ticket, to 

alert law enforcement in the country concerned that this person is, 

in fact, possessing a passport that has been reported lost or stolen. 

That would give the investigative agencies in the country where 

the person boards the opportunity to do something. It would give 

the law enforcement in the U.S. an opportunity to do something. 

And it would not involve any kind of privacy violations whatsoever 

for the individuals concerned. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. In other words, the passport number, when 

you make your reservation, would automatically be checked—we 

should look at that, too. 

Mr. NOBLE. Yes, and then the hits would be sent out to the country that the airline will transit through, the end destination, and 

the origin of the passport. And that way, like with the Bank Secrecy Act, you can determine whether or not to investigate it overtly or investigate it covertly. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do other nation’s airlines do this now? 

Mr. NOBLE. No. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. No one does it now. 

Mr. NOBLE. No one does it. No one does it. It is the first time 

it is being proposed, here today. And the goal is—I do not know 

how to think about this. Sometimes I think of borders of the U.S. 

as being the front-line defense, and sometimes I think of them as 

35

being the last line of defense. And one of Interpol’s goals is for 

countries around the world to view the effort as being a mutually 

important sharing of responsibility. So if we could get the airlines 

to send this information to Interpol’s database—and we do not kick 

the information back to the airlines, so we do not tell them whether there is a hit or not. We just have it go to the law enforcement 

agencies, and they can make the determination about what to do. 

And we would have more than the time that it takes for the plane 

to take off and land in a country. I think it would be an extraordinary contribution to the problem of—

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think it would, too, and it would certainly 

prevent mistakes being made on board, you know, by crew and pilots. So it might be very, very useful. 

I think the time is moving on, but let me say thank you very 

much to the panel, and let me ask Mr. Ervin and Mr. Zimmer, do 

you have anything you would like to add at this point? 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, there are a number of things, Senator, but if 

I could just make one point on this last issue. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. 

Mr. ERVIN. I do not have it in front of me, but I noted in my book 

last year that there was an offer made to Secretary Chertoff that 

I became aware of, and I think it was a September 2005 letter from 

the Air Transport Association, that lobbying organization, and the 

Association of European Airlines to make the passenger manifest 

available to the United States Government at the time of checkin—not an hour before, and certainly not 15 minutes after the 

flight leaves, but at the time of check-in. And we all know now in 

the post-9/11 world, the check-in happens probably 2 to 3 hours before the flight leaves. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. That is right. 

Mr. ERVIN. To my understanding, the Department has yet to 

take these two key institutions up on that offer. Obviously, if the 

passport numbers were then checked at that time, that would be 

a tremendously useful tool. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I agree with that. I think that is a very 

good idea, and we will write a letter to Secretary Chertoff with that 

in it. 

Mr. Zimmer, any farewell comments? 

Mr. ZIMMER. I will be brief. U.S. passports issued prior to the latest passport will remain in circulation and active use for border 

entry until 2016. Every major Mexican city near the border has a 

fairly substantial black market in lost and stolen passports and B–

1 and B–2 crossing cards, which are often rented, by the way, by 

their legitimate owners. And, by the way, you could probably arrange for a clandestine visit and see one yourself if you are willing 

to disguise yourself. They are not at all secret and subtle, and 

these cities are easy to find. In fact, you just hold your hand up 

like this, and someone may walk up to you and take you there. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is that right? 

Mr. ZIMMER. That is correct. Even though you would have to be 

a little bit less sophisticated in appearance than you are today. 

But the reason I point that out is that these markets are open 

to all comers, whether you are Iraqi, Polish, Argentine. They are 

available. Americans buy documents there when they have issues 

36

with their identities in the United States and can come back in 

with a valid passport containing a photo to which they have a close 

resemblance. This is the most difficult thing to detect at the border—an imposter who looks like the photo in the passport and who 

has memorized the details on the passport. 

Much of that could be stopped by changes in the procedures of 

the border inspectors and by the introductions of machines. This 

has been resisted by CBP since long before 9/11, and the machines 

themselves have been out there for 4 or 5 years. They are used extensively throughout Scandinavia. They are rolling out across Europe where countries are becoming more aware of this. The technology is there. It is backed by software that lists thousands of documents and to which lost and stolen passport data could easily be 

added so that they could be read. It also determines whether they 

are counterfeit documents. 

This is not that expensive, and it would absolutely stop most of 

this market in Mexico, and I understand it is growing in Canada, 

which makes sense. 

So I think this is an unbelievably overlooked opportunity. All the 

legislation is there. It is not expensive, but it is going to take a 

change in culture and concept at Customs and Border Patrol. 

Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I think that is a very helpful 

suggestion. We know the machines are there, but I am told the 

readers are not. They cannot read the machines, and so that is a 

problem. 

Mr. ZIMMER. Excuse me, ma’am. Your legislation in 2002 required them to put 1,000 scanners, and they do work, and so far 

they are using less than 500 of them. They have been mostly sitting in warehouses. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So you are saying they can read—

Mr. ZIMMER. Absolutely. They simply choose not to use the reading machines they already purchased, nor have they upgraded with 

the more sophisticated readers that are available and are regularly 

purchased by countries like Iceland and Sweden, which read, 

again, thousands of documents. 

These have been demonstrated at some of the technology conferences. I think I was here at one 18 months ago on the Senate 

side where there was a choice of three of these machines from 

three different vendors. So you do not even have a sole-source 

issue. 

Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Well, I think this has been 

very interesting, and I know Senator Kyl’s staff is here, and I think 

we might do some joint letters and flesh out some of the things 

that have been developed here this morning and get more information and hopefully encourage some changes. 

I would like to thank you very much for being here, especially 

you, Mr. Noble, for coming all the way across the Atlantic. We appreciate it very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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