[Cite as Reyna v. Reyna, 2019-Ohio-2069.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

NICOLE REYNA, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 5-18-23 

 v. 

ANDRES E. REYNA, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Domestic Relations Division 

Trial Court No. 2014-DR-00373 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: May 28, 2019 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Chelsea L. Meister for Appellant 
Case No. 5-18-23 

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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Andres E. Reyna (“Andres”), appeals the October 

1, 2018 judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} Andres and plaintiff-appellee, Nicole Reyna (“Nicole”), were married 

on January 7, 2005. (Doc. Nos. 1, 19). Two children were born of the marriage. 

(Doc. Nos. 1, 19). 

{¶3} On November 12, 2014, Nicole filed a complaint in the trial court 

requesting a divorce from Andres. (Doc. No. 1). On December 9, 2014, Andres 

filed his answer to Nicole’s complaint for divorce. (Doc. No. 19). 

{¶4} On August 12, 2015, the trial court granted Andres and Nicole a divorce 

from each other. (Doc. No. 47). Under the terms of a shared parenting agreement 

incorporated into the divorce decree, Andres agreed to pay Nicole $250 per month, 

plus processing fees, in child support when private health insurance was available 

or $250 per month in child support, plus processing fees, with a monthly cash 

medical support order of $201.92 when private health insurance was not available. 

(Id.). At the time, Andres’s actual annual child support obligation as computed 

using the schedule and applicable child support worksheet was $12,546.04 when 

health insurance was provided and $10,645.15 when health insurance was not 

provided. (Id.). Andres and Nicole explained the substantial deviation from the 
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guideline child support amount as being based on their “shared parenting 

arrangements and the ability of each to financially care for the children when they 

are in their respective care.” (Id.). In addition, they stated that the deviation was 

justified by their agreement to share equally the “costs related to school fees, school 

lunches and reasonable extracurricular activities the children participate in.” (Id.). 

{¶5} On June 1, 2017, Nicole filed a motion to review Andres’s child support 

obligation. (Doc. No. 57). 

{¶6} A hearing on Nicole’s motion was held before the magistrate on August 

15, 2017. (Doc. Nos. 74, 75); (Aug. 15, 2017 Tr. at 1). On February 20, 2018, the 

magistrate issued her decision recommending that Andres’s child support obligation 

be increased. (Doc. No. 75). Specifically, the magistrate found that the amount of 

child support Andres would be required to pay as recalculated using the schedule 

and applicable child support worksheet, $13,891, was more than 10 percent greater 

than the amount of child support Andres was required to pay under the existing child 

support order. (Id.). See R.C. 3119.79(A). The magistrate concluded that this 

difference constituted a “change of circumstances substantial enough to require a 

modification of * * * child support.” (Doc. No. 75). Accordingly, after applying a 

23 percent deviation to Andres’s actual annual child support obligation, the 

magistrate recommended that Andres be ordered to pay Nicole $909.53 per month, 

plus processing fees, in child support when health insurance is provided or $749.16 
Case No. 5-18-23 

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per month, plus processing fees, when health insurance is not provided, with cash 

medical support of $242.75 per month. (Id.). 

{¶7} On March 5, 2018, Andres filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

(Doc. No. 76). On April 27, 2018, Andres filed a transcript of the August 15, 2017 

hearing conducted before the magistrate. On May 29, 2018, Andres filed 

supplemental objections to the magistrate’s decision. (Doc. No. 82). 

{¶8} On August 28, 2018, the trial court overruled Andres’s objections to the 

magistrate’s decision. (Doc. No. 83). On October 1, 2018, the trial court filed its 

judgment adopting the magistrate’s recommendations. (Doc. No. 84). 

{¶9} On October 15, 2018, Andres filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 86). 

He raises one assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

Whether the trial court erred in recalculating appellant’s child 

support order without first finding that a change in circumstances 

had occurred? 

{¶10} In his assignment of error, Andres argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by modifying his child support obligation. In particular, Andres argues 

that the 10 percent difference between the amount of child support due under the 

existing child support order and the amount that he would be required to pay under 

the recalculated child support worksheet is not, by itself, a sufficient basis to modify 

his child support obligation. (Appellant’s Brief at 7-8). According to Andres, in 
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cases where the parties have previously agreed to a deviation in the amount of child 

support, as he and Nicole did, the moving party must also demonstrate that since the 

child support order was implemented, there has been a substantial change of 

circumstances not contemplated by the parties. (Id. at 7-8). Andres contends that 

Nicole failed to show that there has been a substantial change of circumstances not 

contemplated by the parties at the time of their agreement. (Id. at 8-9). Thus, he 

argues that the trial court was without authority to modify his child support 

obligation. (Id. at 8-9). 

{¶11} Whatever merit Andres’s arguments may have, they are not properly 

before this court. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, Andres’s arguments on 

appeal relate to whether the trial court had the ability to modify his child support 

obligation absent a showing that there had been a substantial change of 

circumstances not contemplated by the parties. However, Andres did not make this 

argument in his objections to the magistrate’s decision. In fact, in his objections, 

Andres conceded that a modification was warranted: 

Defendant does not object to the mere fact that his child support 

should be increased because he acknowledges that he has received an 

increase in income, however, the parties’ reasons for deviating the 

original child support amount has not changed. Defendant states that 

the total deviation should remain the same, and the amount of child 
Case No. 5-18-23 

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support he be obligated to pay be increased relative to his increase in 

income * * *. 

(Doc. No. 76). Furthermore, in his supplemental objections, Andres reiterated that 

he was only requesting “a greater deviation based on the significant debt he is still 

paying as part of the parties’ divorce settlement, as well as his significant in-kind 

contributions that were not considered in the Magistrate’s Decision.” (Doc. No. 

82). Finally, in its decision overruling Andres’s objections, the trial court observed 

that Andres “objects to the amount of the child support order and to the percentage 

of deviation determined appropriate by the Magistrate.” (Doc. No. 83). The trial 

court’s understanding of Andres’s objections mirrors our own. That is, Andres 

objected only to the manner in which the magistrate modified his child support 

obligation; he did not raise an objection to the magistrate’s conclusion that his child 

support obligation could be modified. 

{¶12} Civ.R. 53 provides: 

Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on 

appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, 

whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or 

conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has 

objected to that finding or conclusion as required 

by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). 
Case No. 5-18-23 

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Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). Therefore, because Andres assigns as error an issue that he 

did not raise in his objections to the magistrate’s decision, we would be limited to 

examining the trial court’s judgment for plain error. 

“In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and 

may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional 

circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial 

court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy 

of the underlying judicial process itself.” 

Haldy v. Hoeffel, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-17-02, 2017-Ohio-8786, ¶ 13, quoting 

Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶13} Andres does not argue that the trial court’s conclusion that his child 

support obligation could be modified is plainly erroneous. “‘[T]his court will not 

sua sponte undertake a plain-error analysis if [an appellant] fails to do so.’” Krill v. 

Krill, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-13-15, 2014-Ohio-2577, ¶ 70, quoting McMaster v. 

Akron Health Dept., Housing Div., 189 Ohio App.3d 222, 2010-Ohio-3851, ¶ 20 

(9th Dist.). Consequently, we need not and do not further address Andres’s 

assignment of error. 

{¶14} Accordingly, Andres’s assignment of error is overruled. 
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{¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN, P.J., concurs. 

/jlr 

SHAW, J., concurring in Judgment Only. 

{¶16} While I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s 

judgment modifying the prior child support order, I write separately to express my 

opinion that Andres sufficiently articulated his objections to the magistrate’s 

decision in order to preserve this issue on appeal. Therefore, I believe this case 

should be resolved on the merits instead of relying on Civ.R. 53 to issue an 

affirmance on procedural grounds. 

{¶17} Andres argues on appeal that the trial court improperly modified the 

parties’ agreement on child support, without first finding that a substantial change 

of circumstances not contemplated by the parties has occurred, in addition to finding 

that the recalculated child support worksheet amount is greater than ten percent of 

the prior calculated amount and the amount previously ordered. See R.C. 

3119.79(A),(C); see also, Adams v. Adams, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-12-03, 2012-

Ohio-5131, (holding that in a case where the parties have previously agreed to a 
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deviation in the amount of child support, the moving party must prove more than 

the existence of a ten percent deviation to demonstrate the required substantial 

change of circumstances); accord Trombley v. Trombley, 9th Dist. Medina No. 

17CA0012-M, 2018-Ohio-1880. 

{¶18} In the case sub judice, the parties’ shared parenting plan, which was 

incorporated into the divorce decree, stated the following: 

The present child support obligation is a deviation from the 

guideline support sheet attached hereto. This deviation is based 

on the parties’ shared parenting arrangements and the ability of 

each to financially care for the children when they are in their 

respective care. In addition, Father will be sharing equally in the 

costs related to schools fees, school lunches and reasonable 

extracurricular activities the children participate in. This 

deviation and expense sharing arrangement of the parties will be 

effective until July 1, 2016, at which time child support may be 

reviewed by the parties. 

(Doc. No. 47, ¶ 10) (emphasis added). Thus, in this somewhat unique instance, the 

parties specifically agreed to the initial deviation for a limited period only and 

provided for the review of the deviation and financial amounts of the child support 

order after one year, without restriction or reference to the court finding either a 

change of circumstances or a ten percent deviation. As a result, unlike other cases 

in which the trial court was asked by one of the parties to modify a prior child support 

agreement pursuant to the authority of R.C. 3119.79, the trial court in this case was 

essentially asked to implement the parties’ prior agreement pursuant to the express 

terms of that very agreement. 
Case No. 5-18-23 

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{¶19} In such an instance, I would argue that neither the ten percent deviation 

nor the substantial change of circumstance requirement is necessary to invoke the 

authority of the trial court to modify this agreement because the agreement itself 

already authorized review of the deviation and expense sharing arrangements of the 

child support order after one year. Given that the new child support order of the 

trial court is well within, and in fact below the current worksheet calculations, and 

is also generally supported in the record by all of the factors cited by the trial court 

in its judgment entry (including for that matter, the ten percent deviation standard 

of R.C. 3119.79(A)), I would conclude that there is no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s new order. Accordingly, I concur with the final judgment of the 

majority that the trial court’s current child support order should be affirmed.