U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67–394 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

S. HRG. 106–740

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 4, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Bernstein, Ms. Stephanie, Justice for Pan Am 103 .............................................. 19

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23

Bolton, Hon. John R., former Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organization Affairs, and senior vice president, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC .......................................................................................... 25

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Neumann, Hon. Ronald E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near

Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................... 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

(III)

(1)

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2000

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN

AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen

Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Brownback and Torricelli.

Senator BROWNBACK. The hearing will come to order.

Ambassador Neumann, welcome. Pleased to have you here.

I think it would be appropriate at the very outset of this hearing

if we would just have a moment of silent prayer for the victims of

Pan Am 103 and the trial that goes on today and for their families.

So, if you would join me in that moment, I would appreciate it.

[A moment of silence observed.]

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

We are here today to discuss the question of U.S. policy toward

Libya. To be frank, I would have thought there would be little to

say on this matter at this point in time. We have got a trial that

has begun on the case of Pan Am 103 just yesterday. As yet, there

is no official decision on the question of who is responsible for the

murder of 270 people, including 189 Americans.

There is also a trial ongoing in Germany in the 1986 La Belle

Disco bombing which killed two American servicemen. As with Pan

Am 103, the Government of Libya is suspected in the attack.

Unfortunately, rather than the icy cold hostility, which I would

have expected from the U.S. Government toward Libya at this

point in time, I perceive the slow warming of relationships with

Libya. A couple of months ago, there was a mission from the Department of State to Libya to see if the travel ban should be lifted.

Now perhaps the legal basis for the travel ban no longer exists. I

cannot say, but I can say one thing for sure: Nothing has changed

in the last year that would justify sending this message other than

a change of heart in Washington. Qadhafi is the same dictator he

ever was.

Why would the Clinton administration want to send any signal

to the Qadhafi regime that we are in any way satisfied with its

conduct? Qadhafi has expressed no regret for the death of 270 men,

women, and children. He has taken no responsibility. To the contrary, he has made comments indicating that he believes the world

is coming around to his position.

2

It is true the Clinton administration has not gone as far as many

European governments who seem unfazed by terrorists murdering

scores of their own citizens. On the other hand, I am very much

concerned there is a lack of commitment to finding and punishing

the murderers in this world. I am very much afraid, in fact, that

the Clinton administration and the United Nations would like this

trial at Camp Zeist to be the end of the road.

Indeed, though Secretary of State Albright has gone out of her

way to assure that that is not the case, I have some suspicion that

the Secretary General of the United Nations may well have told

Colonel Qadhafi that he need not fear from this trial in The Netherlands. It will not destabilize his government. If that is not the

case, why will the Secretary General and the Secretary of State not

release the contents of Mr. Annan’s letter to Colonel Qadhafi cajoling him into cooperating in the trial now taking place. How, I wonder, could a finding that the Government of Libya planned and ordered its operatives to execute the downing of Pan Am 103 do anything but destabilize the Qadhafi regime?

The more I think about this, the more troubled I get. We are not

talking about anything abstract. We are talking about the wanton

murder of men, women, little children, and babies. Think of them.

Think of their families, the grief that they go through and the constant torment that they have. The 189 American families deserve

for their Government to be relentless in hunting down the terrorists who so horribly killed their loved ones.

Now maybe, Ambassador Neumann, you will have a different

story to tell. I hope so. What I want to get at here today is where

is the administration going with policy toward Libya. Why is it

moving, if it is moving, at this time with these trials undergoing

at the present time? This seems to be happening in many places

around the world, but I want to focus today on what is taking place

in Libya.

So, I look forward to your testimony. I think there will be some

other members joining us as we go along. Then I have a number

of questions that I would like to ask you as well. Thank you for

joining us today.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD E. NEUMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador NEUMANN. Thank you, Senator Brownback. I appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S. policy toward

Libya and I welcome the opportunity to address a topic of interest

to many members. We have achieved a significant success in meeting long-established goals, but this is a continuing story whose ending is as yet unclear.

U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent through three administrations. Our goals have been to end

Libyan support for terrorism, prevent Tripoli’s ability to obtain

weapons of mass destruction, and contain Qadhafi’s regional ambitions. Since Lockerbie, we have added additional aims, including

bringing the persons responsible to justice. I would like to discuss

current developments in the context of U.S. policy goals and unilatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
3

eral and multilateral efforts on behalf of these goals and consider

what remains to be done.

Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm relationship with the Libyans and pursued policies centered on our interests in operating at Wheelus Air Force Base with its 4,600

Americans, the considerable U.S. oil interests, and other key

issues.

After Qadhafi’s 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured. Concerns about Libya’s foreign policies came to dominate our policymaking. Chief among these concerns are state sponsorship of terrorism, support for groups violently opposed to Israel and the peace

process, preventing of Tripoli’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass

destruction, and unhelpful activities in neighboring African states.

Since that time, the U.S. policy agenda toward Libya has focused

on these concerns.

Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished

throughout the 1970’s, the political relationship deteriorated,

marked by confrontation and by intermittent reconciliation attempts on both sides. In the 1980’s, we ended the longstanding

commercial relationship and rejected any possibility of reconciliation so long as Libya pursued its policies of concern. We imposed

sanctions piece-by-piece in response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning with the disapproval of all further military sales

to Libya and the designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. We ultimately imposed comprehensive sanctions on

all commercial and financial transactions with Libya under an Executive order in 1986. The unilateral sanctions regime against

Libya has remained one of the most comprehensive.

Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as being responsible for the La

Belle Disco bombing and in retaliation bombed select military and

terrorist-related targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Our judgment on

Libyan responsibility for that bombing was recently given additional credibility by new testimony in the Berlin trial of the La

Belle bombing suspects.

In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies finally

began to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU resolved to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence abroad, embargo arms sales to

Libya, and encourage policy and security cooperation against Libyan support for terrorism.

We obtained U.N. Security Council support against Libya for its

sponsorship of terrorism following evidence of Libyan involvement

in the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772 bombings. In

1992 and 1993, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions

calling on Libya to surrender the suspects, accept responsibility for

the actions of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose

all it knew of the crime, and cooperate with the criminal investigation, cease all forms of terrorist action and assistance to terrorist

groups, and prove its renunciation of terrorism by concrete actions.

The Security Council imposed civil aviation, financial, and diplomatic sanctions against Libya.

Carefully targeted U.N. sanctions against Libya were for many

years one of the most successful multilateral sanctions regimes.

Rigorously observed sanctions succeeded in isolating Libya and limiting its access to dollars and other hard currencies for almost a

4

decade. However, 2 years ago, support for the international sanctions began to fade. Deliberate violations by some states were increasing. We found little support to upgrade or even maintain the

international sanctions.

For 10 years, the United States made every effort to bring the

perpetrators of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 to justice.

Libya’s surrender of the Pan Am 103 suspects came as a result of

our intensive efforts to bring them to trial. Beginning in the fall

of 1997, along with the British and the Dutch, we developed a detailed plan for a trial before a Scottish court seated in The Netherlands. After we unveiled the plan in August 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed the initiative and again urged

Libya to surrender the suspects. International opinion welcomed

this proposal. Libya finally turned over the suspects under the

terms we had laid out. The U.S. engaged in no negotiations and

placed no restrictions on the prosecutors’ freedom to follow the evidence. The Scottish trial in The Netherlands will be a genuine

criminal proceeding, conforming with the rules and traditions of

Scottish jurisprudence, and the prosecution will follow the evidence

wherever it leads. Since the Libyan suspects’ surrender, they have

awaited trial in a Scottish jail in The Netherlands. The trial began

yesterday and is expected to take some time.

Over time, faced with the U.N. and the U.S. sanctions, as well

as the attendant political isolation, Libya has reduced its support

for terrorism and sought to distance itself from terrorist groups. As

reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism for the last 2 years, Libya

has not been implicated in any international terrorist act for several years and has taken important steps.

Libya has expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, uprooting its infrastructure and seeking to eliminate any ANO presence in Libya.

It has cooperated with other intelligence services in the region to

deport remaining ANO members from Libya. Ironically, the ANO

has publicly threatened terrorist retaliation against Libya.

In addition to withdrawing its support from Palestinian groups

that oppose the peace process, Libya has thrown its support to

Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The Libyan Government has told all Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority is

the only address for their concerns. Given Libya’s status as one of

the original Arab radical states, this support for the Palestinian

Authority represents an historic policy shift toward peace that we

should all welcome.

In the last year, Libya has imposed visa restrictions to limit the

ability of terrorists to enter its territory as a haven.

Libya has also cooperated with Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen

against terrorist groups. In the context of the Arab League Interior

Ministers agreement to cooperate on counter-terrorism, we have

seen the extradition of a number of suspected terrorists between

Libya and Jordan and Libya and Yemen.

While we recognize the positive steps Libya has taken, a number

of issues remain on which Libya must act. One key question is

what else remains for Libya to do on terrorism to show that the

break is permanent and not just opportunistic. Libya should comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions, including payment

of appropriate compensation, acceptance of responsibility for the acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
5

tions of its officials, renunciation of and an end to support for terrorism, and cooperation with the Pan Am 103 trial and investigation. In October 1999, Libya allowed the Scottish investigators to

travel to Libya and obtain access to requested witnesses and documents. We will insist that any similar future request be granted

and that Libyan witnesses be able to testify in The Netherlands

unimpeded. Such Libyan cooperation is an explicit U.N. Security

Council requirement before U.N. sanctions are lifted. It is also a

concrete way for Libya to demonstrate that it has changed its policy, not just its rhetoric on terrorism.

We want to see Libya sever all remaining ties with and support

for terrorist groups. That would include terminating all contacts,

travel on Libyan soil, and financial assistance. We also seek clear

and concrete Libyan support for the peace process, including the

underlying principles of the Madrid process. Such steps would be

a concrete, definitive way for Libya to demonstrate its abandonment of violent opposition to the peace process and cessation of its

support for opponents of peace. In this regard, we are closely

watching Libya’s talks with the EU and possible participation, with

Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in the Barcelona process.

Looking to the future, we would like Libya to join and comply with

certain international anti-terrorism conventions, which it has indicated a willingness to do.

We remain concerned about Libyan programs to develop weapons

of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. British authorities at London’s Gatwick Airport recently intercepted Scud missile

parts interdicted at Gatwick bound for Libya. We seek to prevent

Libya’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and

delivery systems and encourage other countries to do the same.

Multilateral efforts to contain these Libyan programs have thus far

achieved substantial success. We would like to see Libya join the

Chemical Weapons Convention and comply with the CWC and the

Biological Weapons Convention. These actions would signal its seriousness of purpose and be an important, concrete step toward responsible behavior.

Libya’s recent record on intervention outside its borders is less

clear and requires close attention. Libya continues to be deeply engaged in Africa, including Sierra Leone, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea,

and Sudan. We want to see it play a constructive role. For example, Libya has joined with Egypt to push for a negotiated resolution

of the longstanding conflict in Sudan. We support the mediation efforts led by East African states under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, because its Declaration of Principles spells

out the key issues which must be resolved for the achievement of

a just, lasting settlement. At the same time, we have stepped up

efforts to cooperate with Egypt in the search for peace as a single,

unified process stands the best change of achieving a settlement in

the Sudan. However, given the long history of dangerous intervention by Libya outside its borders, as well as more recent reports of

providing arms throughout the region, we will continue to take

steps to ensure that Libya seeks to resolve, rather than aggravate,

regional conflicts.

There has been intense press speculation and some congressional

interest about possible changes to travel-related restrictions for

6

Libya. In March, the Secretary authorized a consular trip to Libya

for the specific, limited purpose of assessing whether there continues to be an imminent danger to U.S. travelers. An imminent

danger was the factual, legal basis for imposing a restriction on the

use of U.S. passports for travel to, in, or through Libya in 1981.

Based on all reports, we believe it was appropriate to assess the

situation on the ground for ourselves. The Department is still reviewing the trip findings, as well as other relevant information, including reports from European diplomats, our protecting power,

and travelers to Libya. Speculation about the outcome of this review would be premature; however, knowing of your interest in the

matter, we will continue to stay in close touch with you on this

issue.

On our key concerns, terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace,

regional intervention, Libya no longer poses the threat it once did.

On WMD and missiles, our efforts to impede Libya’s programs have

had substantial success. That said, we must continue to watch

Libya closely and will maintain pressure until all of these concerns

are fully addressed. Our goal continues to be to deter Libyan policies of concern. An improved bilateral relationship is not in itself

an end. We will oppose lifting U.N. sanctions against Libya until

we are satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant U.N. Security

Council requirements. The provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act regarding investment in Libya’s petroleum sector will

continue to be considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has determined and certified to Congress that the U.N. Security Council resolution requirements have been met. Also until that

time, we expect to maintain core unilateral economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business.

Again, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear in front of the subcommittee on these important

issues and welcome the opportunity to address any specific questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Neumann follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD E. NEUMANN

I appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S. policy toward Libya

and welcome the opportunity to address a topic of interest to many members. We

have achieved significant success in meeting long established goals, but this is a

continuing story whose ending is as yet unclear.

U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent through

three Administrations. Our goals have been to end Libyan support for terrorism,

prevent Tripoli’s ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction and contain Qadhafi’s regional ambitions. Since Lockerbie, we have added additional aims, including

bringing the persons responsible to justice. I would like to discuss current developments in the context of U.S. policy goals and unilateral and multilateral efforts on

behalf of these goals, and consider what remains to be done.

Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm relationship with the

Libyans and pursued policies centered on our interests in operations at Wheelus Air

Force Base with its 4,600 Americans the considerable U.S. oil interests, and other

key issues.

After Qadhafi’s 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured. Concerns about Libya’s

foreign policies came to dominate our policymaking. Chief among these concerns are

state sponsorship of terrorism, support for groups violently opposed to Israel and the

Peace Process, preventing of Tripoli’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction

and unhelpful activities in neighboring African states. Since that time, the U.S. policy agenda toward Libya has been focused on these concerns.

Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished throughout the

1970s, the political relationship deteriorated, marked by confrontation and by interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
7

mittent reconciliation attempts on both sides. In the 1980s, we ended the longstanding commercial relationship and rejected any possibility of reconciliation so

long as Libya pursued its policies of concern. We imposed sanctions piece-by-piece

in response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning with the disapproval of all

further military sales to Libya and the designation of Libya as a state sponsor of

terrorism in 1979. We ultimately imposed comprehensive sanctions on all commercial and financial transactions with Libya under an Executive order in 1986. The

unilateral sanctions regime against Libya has remained one of the most comprehensive.

Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as responsible for the La Belle Disco bombing

and in retaliation bombed select military and terrorist-related targets in Tripoli and

Benghazi. Our judgment on Libyan responsibility for the bombing was recently

given additional credibility by new testimony in the Berlin trial of the La Belle

bombing suspects.

In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies finally began to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU resolved to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence

abroad, embargo arms sales to Libya and encourage policy and security cooperation

against Libyan support for terrorism.

We obtained U.N. Security Council support against Libya for its sponsorship of

terrorism following evidence of Libyan involvement in the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103

and 1989 UTA 772 bombings. In 1992 and 1993, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on Libya to surrender the suspects, accept responsibility

for the actions of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose all it knew of

the crime and cooperate with the criminal investigation, cease all forms of terrorist

action and assistance to terrorist groups, and prove its renunciation of terrorism by

concrete actions. The Security Council imposed civil aviation, financial, and diplomatic sanctions against Libya.

Carefully targeted, U.N. sanctions against Libya were for many years one of the

most successful multilateral sanctions regimes. Rigorously observed sanctions succeeded in isolating Libya and limiting its access to dollars and other hard currencies

for almost a decade. However, two years ago, support for the international sanctions

began to fade. Deliberate violations by some states were increasing. We found little

support to upgrade or even maintain the international sanctions.

For ten years, the United States made every effort to bring the perpetrators of

the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 to justice. Libya’s surrender of the Pan Am

103 suspects came as a result of our intensive efforts to bring them to trial. Beginning in the fall of 1997, along with the British and the Dutch, we developed a detailed plan for a trial before a Scottish court seated in The Netherlands. After we

unveiled the plan in August 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed

the initiative and again urged Libya to surrender the suspects. International opinion welcomed this proposal. Libya finally turned over the suspects, under the terms

we had laid out. The U.S. engaged in no negotiations and placed no restrictions on

the prosecutors’ freedom to follow the evidence. The Scottish trial in The Netherlands will be a genuine criminal proceeding, conforming with the rules and traditions of Scottish jurisprudence, and the prosecution will follow the evidence wherever it leads. Since the Libyan suspects’ surrender, they have awaited trial in a

Scottish jail in The Netherlands. The trial began yesterday and is expected to take

some time.

Over time, faced with U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as well as the attendant political

isolation, Libya has reduced its support for terrorism and sought to distance itself

from terrorist groups. As reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism for the last two

years, Libya has not been implicated in any international terrorist act for several

years and has taken important steps.

Libya has expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, uprooting its infrastructure and

seeking to eliminate any ANO presence in Libya. It has cooperated with other intelligence services in the region to deport remaining ANO members from Libya. Ironically, the ANO has publicly threatened terrorist retaliation against Libya.

In addition to withdrawing its support from Palestinian groups that oppose the

Peace Process, Libya has thrown its support to Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The Libyan Government has told all Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority is the only address for their concerns. Given Libya’s status as one

of the original Arab radical states, this support for the Palestinian Authority represents an historic policy shift toward peace that we should all welcome.

In the last year, Libya has imposed visa restrictions to limit the ability of terrorists to enter its territory as a haven.

Libya has also cooperated with Egypt, Jordan and Yemen against terrorist groups.

In the context of the Arab League Interior Ministers agreement, to cooperate on

8

counter-terrorism, we have seen the extradition of a number of suspected terrorists

between Libya and Jordan and Libya and Yemen.

While we recognize positive steps Libya has taken, a number of issues remain on

which Libya must act. One key question is what else remains for Libya to do on

terrorism to show that the break is permanent and not just opportunistic. Libya

should comply with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including payment of appropriate compensation, acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials,

renunciation of and an end to support for terrorism, and cooperation with the Pan

Am 103 investigation and trial. In October, 1999, Libya allowed the Scottish investigators to travel to Libya and obtain access to requested witnesses and documents.

We will insist that any similar, future requests be granted and that Libyan witnesses be able to testify in The Netherlands unimpeded. Such Libyan cooperation

is an explicit U.N. Security Council requirement, before U.N. sanctions are lifted.

It is also a concrete way for Libya to demonstrate that it has changed its policy,

not just its rhetoric, on terrorism.

We want to see Libya sever all remaining ties with and support for terrorist

groups. That would include terminating all contacts, travel on Libyan soil, and financial assistance. We also seek clear and concrete Libyan support for the Peace

Process, including the underlying principles of the Madrid process. Such steps would

be a concrete, definitive way for Libya to demonstrate its abandonment of violent

opposition to the Peace Process and cessation of its support for opponents of peace.

In this regard, we are closely watching Libya’s talks with the EU and possible participation, with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in the Barcelona Process.

Looking to the future, we would like Libya to join and comply with certain international anti-terrorism conventions, which it has indicated a willingness to do.

We remain concerned about Libyan programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. British authorities at London’s Gatwick

Airport recently intercepted Scud missile parts interdicted at Gatwick bound for

Libya. We seek to prevent Libya’s efforts to acquire WMD and delivery systems and

encourage other countries to do the same. Multilateral efforts to contain these Libyan programs have, thus far, achieved substantial success. We would like to see

Libya join the Chemical Weapons Convention and comply with the CWC and the

Biological Weapons Convention. These actions would signal its seriousness of purpose and be an important, concrete step toward more responsible behavior.

Libya’s recent record on intervention outside its borders is less clear and requires

close attention. Libya continues to be deeply engaged in Africa, including Sierra

Leone, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sudan. We want to see it play a constructive

role. For example, Libya has joined with Egypt to push for a negotiated resolution

of the longstanding conflict in Sudan. We support the mediation efforts led by East

African states under the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, because its

Declaration of Principles spells out the key issues which must be resolved for

achievement of a just, lasting settlement. At same time, we have stepped up effort

to cooperate with Egypt in the search for peace, as a single, unified process stands

the best chance of achieving a settlement in Sudan. However, given the long history

of dangerous intervention by Libya outside its borders as well as more recent reports of providing arms throughout the region, we will continue to take steps to ensure that Libya seeks to resolve, rather than aggravate, regional conflicts.

There has been intense press speculation and some congressional interest about

possible changes to travel-related restrictions for Libya. In March, the Secretary authorized a consular trip to Libya for the specific, limited purpose of assessing whether there continues to be an ‘‘imminent danger’’ to U.S. travelers. An ‘‘imminent danger’’ was the factual, legal basis for imposing a restriction on the use of a U.S. passport for travel to, in, or through Libya in 1981. Based on all reports, we believed

it was appropriate to assess the situation on the ground for ourselves. The Department is still reviewing the trip findings as well as other relevant information, including reports from European diplomats, our Protecting Power, and travelers to

Libya. Speculation about the outcome of this review would be premature; however,

knowing of your interest in the matter, we will continue to stay in close contact with

you on this issue.

On our key concerns—terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace, and regional

intervention—Libya no longer poses the threat it once did. On WMD and missiles,

our efforts to impede Libya’s programs have had substantial success. That said, we

must continue to watch Libya closely and will maintain pressure until all of these

concerns are fully addressed. Our goal continues to be to deter Libyan policies of

concern. An improved bilateral relationship is not, in itself, an end. We will oppose

lifting U.N. sanctions against Libya until we are satisfied that Libya has met all

the relevant U.N. Security Council requirements. The provisions of the Iran and

Libya Sanctions Act regarding investment in Libya’s petroleum sector will continue

9

to be considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has determined and

certified to Congress that the UNSCR requirements have been met. Also, until that

time, we expect to maintain core unilateral economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business.

Again I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear

in front of the subcommittee on these important issues, and would welcome the opportunity to address any specific questions you might have.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate the

statement.

Libya remains on the official list of state sponsors of terrorism?

Is that correct?

Ambassador NEUMANN. They do remain on the list. It just came

out last week or Monday? Last week. The list came out again. It

is an annual report and Libya still figures on the list.

Senator BROWNBACK. So, it is still in our estimation a state sponsor of terrorism. Is that correct?

Ambassador NEUMANN. It is still a state sponsor of terrorism,

Mr. Chairman, although it has not participated, so far as we know,

in any active act of terrorism in the last couple of years.

Senator BROWNBACK. In March, the Secretary of State announced that she was sending a team to Libya to review the ban

on travel of U.S. citizens. Now, this was seen by the Libyan Government and by a number of U.S. citizens as an overture that could

lead to a warming of relations. I know the State Department has

since said the travel ban review has nothing to do with the Pan Am

trial or with the OPEC meeting that was soon coming up in Vienna. But can you explain why, after the ban was put in place in

1981, the administration decided to review it just weeks before the

trial and just a week ahead of this OPEC meeting?

Ambassador NEUMANN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I kind of thought

you might ask that question.

The ban—it is actually not a ban. It is a restriction on the use

of passports, but that is a technical issue. The law on this is fairly

specific and has made the point that Americans’ freedom to travel

is to be restricted only for reasons of security, which includes the

existence of a state of war between the United States and the country in question, ongoing armed conflict, or the threat of imminent

danger to American citizens. It is not a sanction as the rest of the

unilateral or multilateral sanctions are.

In the very long period of our strained lack of relations with

Libya, we have considered regularly that there was a threat to

Americans who traveled in Libya, or could be, because of the behavior of the Libyans. Over the last year or 2, as Libyan policy on

terrorism has altered, particularly after the suspected Pan Am 103

bombers were turned over and the number of foreign travelers increased, the evidence and the record of what was happening in

Libya seemed to us to call into question whether we were acting

consistent with the intent of that law.

That question came up initially back in November when the Secretary renewed the restriction. The restriction has to be renewed

every year or it expires. She looked at it then but felt that we still

did not have a clear picture. The question continued to reoccur. The

trial obviously is going to go on for a very long time, possibly a year

or more. I do not know that there is going to be a perfect time, nor

is there a decision yet. But the Secretary has treated this as a very

10

serious question and felt that she did have to look at the intent,

as we understood it, of not restricting Americans’ freedom to travel

for political purposes unless there was a question of safety. But she

felt that she also wanted an on-the-ground appraisal, and she sent

the consular team to get it. They have come back. That report is

still being considered. It is still under review in the Department.

Because of the nature of the statute, we did not consider it as

part of the sanctions regime. It is not. We do not consider it as a

political signal to Libya. The Libyans are happy to make whatever

they can out of it. We were very careful in the team as well. We

sent only consular and security officials. We sent nobody who has

a political brief or responsibility, nor did we discuss political subjects with the Libyans.

Senator BROWNBACK. I thought you would answer that way as

well with the question that I had.

The travel ban has been in place for nearly 20 years. The administration has great discretion on when it considers these sorts of

matters. The timing of this seems quite either odd or insensitive

given the trial taking place at this point in time. I would sure hope

that the administration’s discretion and consideration of this would

also take into consideration these other factors because you could

have considered this anytime that the administration has been in

office, and here you are just within weeks of the trial, of the OPEC

meeting. It seems either odd or insensitive.

I want to focus you on another question. The administration has

stated that Qadhafi did not receive assurances from the U.S. or the

U.N. that prosecutors in the upcoming trial would focus only on the

two accused and not possible Libyan Government involvement in

the bombing.

At the same time, the administration has refused to release a letter from Kofi Annan to Qadhafi to the Members of this body or to

family members that have been impacted. When can I assure the

victims’ family members present here today that this letter will be

released?

Ambassador NEUMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought we

would get that question also.

The letter I think belongs in a context. First of all, as I have

said, we have made no deal. There is nothing which prohibits the

prosecutors from following the evidence wherever they want to go.

Just to pause for a moment, remember when the resolutions

were passed, we still had to convince Libya and the United Nations

had to convince Libya to turn over the suspects. Now, we have a

pretty clear idea in this country and in Great Britain what we

mean by a fair trial. I have no particular reason to believe that

Colonel Qadhafi, who has probably never seen a fair trial, let alone

participated in one, has any similar conception of jurisprudence.

And the questions which were coming back through the United Nations, which we had asked to be the intermediary to try to get

these people out, suggested a near paranoia that they would be

used or manipulated in some form of Stalinist type of show trial.

What we said in public and what we said to the Secretary General were two things, and we were quite explicit and kept them

quite distinct. One was that we would not use these people for political purposes. That meant we would not use them as part of

11

some political circus, some Stalinist type of show trial. And the

other statement we made, which was also true and also correct,

was that the prosecutors were free to follow the evidence wherever

it led. There was no deal and there was no restriction on them.

That eventually satisfied the Libyans and they turned over the two

suspects.

Now, the letter itself is a U.N. document, a document of the Secretary General. We have to work with the Secretary General on a

whole variety of issues, and confidentiality respecting his documents and his request is part of that. We have not objected ourselves to turning over the letter, but it is his letter. We also have

had people from the administration briefing both Members and

staff on the contents of that letter, and we can do more of that. I

know that the Secretary General has also been asked directly by

a Member of Congress if he would hand the letter over and he declined to do so.

I do not think it is probably the practice of Members generally

to hand over correspondence of friends, but if they do, I am sure

they do it up here, as we would do it, with the clear understanding

that that is going to have an impact on your ability to have confidential dealings with the same person in the future. And that is

something which is important to the larger handling of our diplomatic business, and that is the reason that we will not turn over

the Secretary General’s letter without his consent.

Senator BROWNBACK. Are you pressuring the U.N. Secretary

General to release the letter?

Ambassador NEUMANN. We have raised the question with him,

as did a Member of Congress, and he has declined to turn it over.

Senator BROWNBACK. I think there is a little difference, at least

there is in my mind, whether I raise the issue with somebody or

I really press them that this should be released. We have families

that have lost loved ones that feel, rightly so, very strongly about

this and want to get to the bottom of what is happening to their

family members. Are you just raising it or are you actually pressing the U.N. to release this letter to the family members?

Ambassador NEUMANN. We have raised it with him, but we have

not gone beyond that.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, I would submit to you you should aggressively press this. I am sure you have met with a number of the

families and I would hope you would feel the passion for some sort

of clarity when others are dealing with their lives and the lives of

their family members. I would hope you would press the U.N. very

aggressively to release this to them where you have got their family members that were killed.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Mr. Chairman, we will re-raise the question. I think I have to say in all honesty that I doubt personally

whether any single document is going to lay to rest the suspicion

which is out there. But I can say with complete confidence that

there is no deal. There is nothing which restricts the prosecutors.

I find it a little odd that people actually think that one could manipulate a Scottish court in this way. I do not think one could personally, but maybe I live in a different world. But the fact is there

is no deal. There is nothing which limits them. We have said that.

We have said at the highest levels of this Government. The preVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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vious Lord Advocate of Scotland has said it, and I think you will

see it in the conduct of the trial.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, I would suggest to you that it does

not seem odd at all that if you have got a primary piece of evidence

about whether there is a deal or no deal and it is not released, that

that creates its own suspicions and a great deal of them. This

would be in the Government’s best interest, in honesty and trying

to allay these fears, to get that out to them because otherwise you

just ask for that sort of suspicion.

Ambassador NEUMANN. I fully take your point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. I note that Colonel Qadhafi thinks this is

not about Libya. Here is an interview that he did in Sky News on

the eve of the Lockerbie trial. Here are some of his quotes. This

is from Colonel Qadhafi in this interview he did. ‘‘By and large, the

responsibility, as far as this matter is concerned, is an individual

one,’’ said Colonel Qadhafi. ‘‘The court is sitting to judge them, not

whether they are Libyan agents. The court is sitting to decide if

they are guilty or not.’’ He sure does not think the trail is going

to press toward him in this.

I would hope that our position will be we will follow this trail relentlessly wherever it goes.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, that is our position. We will follow the evidence wherever it goes.

Second, I noted that interview this morning myself, and I can

simply say to you that I have not a clue what Colonel Qadhafi is

talking about, but I attach no credibility whatsoever to that statement of views. On the other hand, if I were in Colonel Qadhafi’s

shoes, that is the position that I would, of course, be taking myself,

as I think would any of the rest of us.

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to turn this over to Senator

Torricelli.

But I guess what probably troubles me the most is it seems that

the number of hearings that I have had here, that there seems to

be a growing pattern of a willingness to try to engage nations that

we have had very difficult relations or lack of relations with around

the world here toward the end of this administration and a willingness to push aside the very sticking points as to why we have had

these difficult relations or lack of relations. That is troubling to me

because if you try to build the relationship without dealing with

the fundamental problem between the two, that is not going to last.

It is not going to be sustainable, and you are going to do it at a

great price of harm to our standing and our standing for principles

around the world and any sort of lasting relationship that you just

say, well, we are going to avoid that nasty subject or we are going

to try to kind of paper over it or shovel it aside while we try to

go on.

That is not going to work. That is not going to be sustainable,

and it does injustice to things that this country has stood for for

a long time. I would hope the administration would not pursue that

form of policy with Libya, with Iran, toward Iraq, toward Cuba,

any nations around the world with which we have difficult problems.

Ambassador NEUMANN. May I respond to that, Mr. Chairman?

Because I think you have touched on an element which is absoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
13

lutely central to the consideration that you have asked me to come

here for today because I think were we to pursue the kind of policy

that some have talked about, pushing aside, ignoring these interests, that would be quite wrong.

But what I am here to tell you today is not only are we not doing

that, but I think in fact that we have had a considerable success,

for which, despite ongoing doubts and questions, one might even

give us some credit. Libya has moved out of active perpetration of

terrorist actions. I do not know whether it will stay there. That is

one of the questions that we are raising and looking at hard, but

that is protecting American lives.

Libya has cut ties with, for sure, some terrorist organizations,

possibly others. That is again something which needs investigation,

but that is a success.

Libya has moved from active sponsorship of radical Palestinian

groups which were dedicated to overthrowing the peace process to

an active support of Chairman Arafat’s Palestinians in the peace

talks. That is a success.

The two bombing suspects are out and are under trial when for

10 years they were not. And that too is a success.

None of those steps that I have referred to as successes are the

end of the process, nor are we arguing they are or asserting they

are. All I am saying to you is that I believe we have had a substantial measure of progress to date, that we have been very realistic

and very hard-headed in looking at what is going on, that we have

given very little to Libya in return, and that we are continuing to

be very methodical, very hard-headed, very clear-sighted in looking

at what goes on. And the story is not over, and we do not have the

assurances we want in a whole series of things, cooperation with

the trial, payment of compensation. We are continuing to hold all

those things up as essential steps that Libya has to perform. I

think that is a correct policy and it has been the policy of three administrations going back quite a ways.

So, that is simply what I wanted to say, that I think it has been

to date—and I emphasize the ‘‘to date’’—a success and it is being

handled very, very coldly. It is not a policy of warming up for the

sake of warming up. There is not even that much warming up in

it.

Thank you for letting me make those comments.

Senator BROWNBACK. And I appreciate your making those comments. I would also note that they remain a part of an exclusive

club of seven state sponsors of terrorism.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Absolutely.

Senator BROWNBACK. I have been in southern Sudan with troops

saying that there have been Libyan troops fighting on the other

side. Now, I did not witness, nor can I verify that that is the case.

And we have these trials that continue to take place where you

have got 189 U.S. families. There may be some progress. There is

a substantial distance yet to travel.

Senator Torricelli.

Senator TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

very much for holding this hearing.

Mr. Chairman, there are few qualities I admire more about the

American people than our eternal optimism, but the belief that the

14

United States is ever going to witness a reformation of the policies,

the personalities of the Governments of North Korea or Cuba or

Libya or Iraq is a triumph of hope over reality. The reality is that

we are not going to witness changes. Month by month, we may witness different levels of activities, but Muammar Qadhafi is a defined individual with a set agenda that is never going to change.

It is enormously damaging to the interests of this country that he

ever received confusing signals that we are prepared to change our

policies absent a fundamental change in his government. That is

not only something true of Libya. It is true of North Korea and

Iraq and Cuba and a variety of these other rogue nations.

But this is a consistent problem with American foreign policy.

We go toe to toe with these outlaw regimes. They institute little or

modest changes and we announce or initiate reviews of policy, providing no incentive whatsoever for changes in the regimes.

I want to make certain that the administration understands the

bipartisan view of the Senate on the issue specifically of Libya. Are

you familiar with Senate Resolution 287?

Ambassador NEUMANN. That was the one passed a week ago

with——

Senator TORRICELLI. It was. Let us make clear that we understand where the institution resides on this.

One, Libya’s refusal to accept responsibility for its role in terrorist attacks against United States citizens suggests an imminent

danger to the physical safety of United States travelers. That appears to me to be clear. If Libya refuses to acknowledge that its

agents killed American citizens through the destruction of an aircraft, does not change personnel, does not change a policy, does not

hold its own people responsible, then that terrorist act is a continuing policy. Therefore, by definition, Americans would continue

to be in danger. There being no intervening event, no one held accountable internally within Libya, I think that would be sound policy.

Is there something you can cite to show that the Senate is wrong

in its conclusion that an imminent danger continues because of a

refusal to accept responsibility? It seems to me the judgment of the

Senate would be sound on this.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Since we have not made a judgment yet,

I obviously cannot tell you what that judgment is. I do not think

we are so asleep that we have missed that resolution or the sense

of the Senate about it.

Senator TORRICELLI. What I am saying is that the entire U.S.

Senate, having looked at the facts, concluded that there is no intervening event to suggest that Americans today would be safe to

travel to Libya. I just want to go through a couple of points in the

resolution because if you have facts that we are unaware of showing that we are wrong in our judgment, this is a good time to provide them.

Resolution 287 says that the administration should consult fully

with Congress in considering a policy toward Libya, including disclosure of any assurances received by Qadhafi relative to judicial

proceedings in The Hague. The chairman has already reviewed this

with you, and you, recognizing the consequences, I take it, are

making clear to us that these prosecutors are free, because in your

15

judgment it would be the normal course of business, to ask the suspects, the defendants in this case, about any instructions they received from other people in the Libyan Government, about knowledge of the Libyan Government, and that others who would be responsible in the normal course of judicial proceeding would be

given consideration if they were to cooperate fully in determining

those ultimately responsible. Indeed, there is no reason to believe

that would not happen. Is that right?

Ambassador NEUMANN. There is no restriction whatsoever on

what the prosecutors can do and how they can follow the evidence.

Senator TORRICELLI. No reason to believe that they would do the

normal course of business in pursuing the case.

Ambassador NEUMANN. There is no reason they would not follow

the normal course of business. I am neither a British Government

official nor a Scottish prosecutor, so I cannot tell you what they

will do.

Senator TORRICELLI. Based on all the knowledge that is available

to you——

Ambassador NEUMANN. Based on knowledge available to me,

there is no limitation.

Senator TORRICELLI. The Senate concluded the travel ban and all

the United States restrictions on Libya should not be eased until

all cases of American victims of Libyan terrorism are resolved and

the Government of Libya has cooperated fully in bringing the perpetrators to justice.

That would mean at a minimum the travel ban, in the judgment

of the Senate, should not be lifted until this trial has come to a

conclusion. But even the conclusion of the trial would not necessarily mean the travel ban should be lifted because there is still

an affirmative duty by the Government of Libya to cooperate beyond the end of this trial. At least that is my judgment as one who

voted for this resolution.

So, the State Department may be conducting its own review, but

let us be clear, in this institution of the Government, we have already reached a determination on these facts, that lifting this travel ban is not in the interest of this Government. There is no question in your mind then about where we all stand.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Oh, no, there is no question in my mind

about where the Senate is in their resolution, Senator Torricelli.

I would like to make a couple of small observations, if I might.

Senator TORRICELLI. Please.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Obviously, I cannot debate a judgment

that we have not—you have made a judgment. We have not made

one. So, I am not in a position to quite go toe-to-toe with you on

that.

There are a couple of points of fact I just want to note. First of

all, the passport restriction is not a sanction. I think you have observed that——

Senator TORRICELLI. I am aware of that.

Ambassador NEUMANN [continuing]. In the structure of your

comments which focused on the particular elements.

Second, our understanding is that it is to be applied only when

there is an imminent danger to Americans, and that is a question

which we are looking at. It is not structured as a sanction. There

16

are a great many countries in the world in which there is danger

to Americans where we do not have a travel ban. There are obviously the facts that have to be reviewed and what you have pointed

out. Yes, I certainly am aware of both the points you have raised

and the issue of consultation with the Congress. I would hope that

this hearing today is an aspect of consultation, but I do not take

it to be the sum total of that.

Senator TORRICELLI. It is unambiguous in our view I assume.

Ambassador NEUMANN. I do not think I can mistake your view,

sir.

Senator TORRICELLI. Let us approach this idea of imminency as

a matter of law. In the years that have passed, in my judgment,

given no evidence that Libyan Government policy has changed and

the leadership of the government has not changed, there is no reason to believe that the thresholds of imminency cannot be reached.

This would be like arguing that there is a statute of limitations on

mass murder. The policy here is the same. The personnel are the

same. The government is unchanged. And what reason would we

believe that there has been some break suggesting the danger is

not imminent? This would be like the Oklahoma City bombers,

never having been apprehended, and 12 years later saying, well,

we have not caught them, but there is no reason to believe they

are still dangerous. Our government is not of such a forgiving nature with internal crime. I do not know why we would have such

a fundamentally different view of the Libyan Government.

Ambassador NEUMANN. It is an interesting analogy. I am not

sure I am in a very good position to argue it when we have not yet

made a judgment because, if I argue with you on the question, I

sound like we have made a judgment which I am defending. We

have not yet made it.

Senator TORRICELLI. Let us approach the conversation with the

mind that you have not reached a judgment. Therefore, you are arguing a hypothetical. But let us establish the point of law on what

an imminent threat means.

Ambassador NEUMANN. You know diplomats hate to argue

hypotheticals, Senator.

Senator TORRICELLI. Well, then let us argue law. What does imminent threat mean? I gave you the Oklahoma City example. In

domestic law in this country, any prosecutor in America who abandoned the case or changed an investigation or declared that there

was no threat to citizens from a mass murderer simply because

they had been silent for 12 years we would impeach from office.

Now, the State Department is at least inviting that definition of

law. So, clarify for me why my analogy is not sound.

Ambassador NEUMANN. I think the analogy is at least open to

challenge, although I really think that to do that without having

both my legal colleagues and the Secretary of State making a decision is to put me in the position of preempting a bit my boss, which

I think you would understand I am a little reluctant to do.

The point of the trip was to look at a number of matters of fact

in reaching a judgment of imminent threat, a judgment which still

has to be made. Some of the things they did on that trip were to

talk to—there are a number of Americans who are married to Libyans who have lived in Libya for years. They talked to them. There

17

are a considerable number of foreign embassies whose own nationals are traveling regularly in Libya. Remember that the terrorist

issue was not one that only addressed Americans. We wanted to

talk to them as well.

There is a question of where Libyan policy is and that is a question about which we still have some reservations, as I thought I indicated. So, I can say to you that we think there are a number of

issues of fact that need looking at, but I do not think it is appropriate for me to get out in front of my boss and argue an analogy

which, whatever I stipulate, appears to be stipulating to a decision

which she has not made and I have to preserve her——

Senator TORRICELLI. That is fine, as long as the point remains

that at least, speaking only for myself, the idea that the imminency

of any threat has now lapsed is without merit and cannot be a

foundation of any change of policy.

I also do not challenge that there is an ongoing review of American relations with any country. Our eyes and ears should be open

at all times. I do, as the chairman suggested, question the sensitivity of having undertaken the trip and conducting this review at

this moment. To have families that I represent in New Jersey

packing to go to The Netherlands to seek justice for their loved

ones who died by this terrorist act, while representatives of the

United States are simultaneously packing to go to Libya, in the

long history of American diplomacy could be a new height of insensitivity. And there has been a lot of competition for that honor, but

this probably wins. It is an extraordinary act. Nevertheless, it has

occurred.

Mr. Chairman, I have, I think, made clear how I feel both about

the visit, but more than that any attempt to change the travel ban

based on this belief that sufficient time has passed. Let me only

suggest that if there is a message yet to be conveyed to the State

Department for those who do believe there should be some, even

limited rapproachment with Libya, if the administration were to

exercise its authority to lift the travel ban, I believe the Congress

would have no choice but to respond by a change of law instituting

further sanctions against Libya. The administration has a right to

lift the travel ban. It is in your judgment. It is in our judgment to

replace it with a change of policy in law. I do not believe we would

have any choice but to do so if this error of judgment were made.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Torricelli.

Ambassador Neumann, I am sitting here and I am listening to

a discussion. I think the aspect that is so troubling to me about it

is the Congress does not have a question about this. I think the

resolution that the Senator from New Jersey read passed unanimously in this body. So, there is not a muddled confusion here

about this and it is not a partisan issue. This just seems pretty

clear to people, that this relationship is not at a point, no matter

what you may argue what Libya has done, that we would lift the

travel ban or send any indicator that this thing is changing at all.

And yet, the administration, as I listen to the dialog and I listen

to your answers to me, it is like you are looking for that reason to

do something here to send a different signal to Libya. And it seems

to be a pattern of different countries around the world that this is

18

taking place here in the waning hours of this administration for

whatever reason.

That is deeply troubling to this Member. I think it is troubling

overall to this body. I know it is to Senator Torricelli from his comments and questions here, that those are the sort of foreign policy

moves it sounds like or it seems like at least internally being discussed within the State Department and probes being put out in

different ways.

Now, I know how the Libyans interpret your moves, and we

roughly deem them about the same as the Libyans. I would hope

you would stop sending those sorts of signals, and if you desire

more clarity from the view of the legislative branch on this, I think

we can provide that to you, but I do not know that we need to give

you more clarity on any of these issues, whether it is on Libya or

if it is on Cuba or Iraq. I think people are just pretty clear on this.

I want to ask you one final question. I have seen reports that in

calculating what it deems to be appropriate compensation paid by

the Libyan Government for the bombing of Pan Am 103, the State

Department has employed formulas used in past cases of accidental

killings of Americans abroad. Now, I would hope that that cannot

be right and that you would clear that up for me. Is that report

accurate?

Ambassador NEUMANN. No, I do not believe it is accurate. First

of all, we have never taken a position on a compensation sum, a

figure of any kind. There is a civil suit of the families that is also

in progress. We have said compensation has to be paid. We have

said to virtually every third party who has talked to us about this

either on Libya’s behalf radiating a message or who might carry a

message back that the Libyans need to deal with this. They should

deal with it sooner rather than later, and they need to look at settling the case and paying compensation.

We have not interjected ourselves with either a figure, and it has

been our understanding that the attorneys for the families have

not wanted the U.S. Government to be actively involved in this

case. So, I do not quite know where the notion comes from that we

have picked some kind of a figure.

Senator BROWNBACK. And there is not a figure that the State Department has been contemplating on appropriate compensation. Is

that correct?

Ambassador NEUMANN. To the best of my knowledge, there is no

figure that we have deemed to represent appropriate compensation.

Senator BROWNBACK. I would ask for you to inquire further and

be certain of your answer. If you would supply that to me, I would

appreciate that, if there is any figure that the State Department

has been considering for appropriate compensation. If you would

provide that to me.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

A thorough review of pertinent State Department records revealed that, during

President Clinton’s first term in office, members of the Administration, including

former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, publicly speculated about amounts

that would constitute adequate compensation to the families of victims of the Pan

Am 103 bombing. Such speculation ceased, however, when Pan Am 103 family members asked Administration officials to leave the calculation of adequate compensation to the courts. During President Clinton’s second term, members of the AdminisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
19

tration, both at the State Department and at the NSC, have avoided any speculation

concerning a figure that would represent appropriate compensation.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Ambassador, for appearing in

front of the committee. I appreciate your willingness to take our

questions on the difficult issues in front of us.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Well, thank you for letting me come forth

and thank you for giving me a little bit of time to talk about our

side.

I hope you will at least continue to consider the fact that it is

not a broad policy of rapprochement, that it has been a policy of

trying to achieve the goals that we have set out and the previous

administrations of both parties have set out. To date there is a limited amount of progress, which is real and which does serve American interests, and we have not given anything away in that process. But I would have to say in certain clarity that, yes, I do agree

with you. Your views are clear and they certainly have been communicated. We look forward to continuing to talk.

Senator BROWNBACK. And they are not just my views.

Ambassador NEUMANN. No.

Senator BROWNBACK. This is a unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate that I would hope would carry at least some weight with the

administration on this view.

Ambassador NEUMANN. Thank you, sir.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

The second panel will be the Honorable John Bolton, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs

and now senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute,

and Ms. Stephanie Bernstein with the group, Justice of Pan Am

103.

Ms. Bernstein, I believe we will go first with you, if you would

not mind going first.

Ms. BERNSTEIN. OK, that is fine.

Senator BROWNBACK. I deeply appreciate your willingness to go

through this and be here with us today to talk about the issue in

front of us on the relationship with Libya and justice of Pan Am

103 victims. Thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE BERNSTEIN, JUSTICE OF PAN AM

103, BETHESDA, MD

Ms. BERNSTEIN. Thank you for holding the hearing, Senator

Brownback, and I want to also thank Senator Torricelli, who has

been a longtime supporter of the family members. I know of all

that you have done through Dan and Susan Cohen and others.

My husband, Mike Bernstein, was an ordinary person and he

died an extraordinary death. He was 1 of 270 people murdered in

the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Mike’s dreams were

simple. He wanted to guide his children into adulthood. He wanted

to grow old with his wife. He wanted to do work which brought him

satisfaction and which contributed to making the world a better

place than he found it.

Mike was a Federal employee. He was the Assistant Deputy Director of the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of

Justice. This is the office which locates, denaturalizes, and deports

people who entered the United States illegally after the Second

20

World War. They had participated in Nazi atrocities and lied about

it during their immigration interviews.

In fact and ironically, my last face-to-face conversation with Mike

was when I drove him to Dulles Airport. He was on official U.S.

Government business at the time that he was murdered. He was

a delegation of attorneys from the Department of State trying to

convince the Government of Austria to take back an Austrian citizen the Austrians would rather not have taken back. He discussed

his strategy with me in the car on the way to Dulles. His concern

was not how he would handle the Austrians; his concern was how

he would handle the State Department. Unfortunately, he was not

right in terms of the negotiations. They were successful. The Austrians took this man back, but he was absolutely right. And I will

talk a little bit about the attitude that we have heard expressed

this morning.

In addition to me, Mike left two children. My daughter was 71⁄2

and my son was 4. He left a wife, a mother, and countless friends.

He was 36 years old.

The President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism,

which was appointed by President Bush in the aftermath of the

Lockerbie bombing, advocated a very strenuous response to terrorism. Among other things it recommended, that we do not treat

international terrorism solely as a law enforcement problem just

because a law enforcement approach usually does not target more

than a few members of the group which actually carried out the

terrorist attack. Such an approach is not effective against those

who sponsor those kinds of attacks.

The commission further recommended that while multinational

responses to terrorist acts are the ideal, nations must reserve the

right to respond unilaterally because terrorist acts are often acts

of aggression against a country.

Absolutely none of these recommendations have been followed in

the Lockerbie bombing. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations

have promised the families of those murdered over Lockerbie that

the U.S. Government was committed to discovering who ordered,

paid for, and executed this terrible crime. These promises have

been hollow.

The families have been told repeatedly that intelligence data

exist which answer these questions. Instead of acting on this information, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have done what

was expedient, not what was right. In moving the Lockerbie bombing to the venue of the United Nations, the Bush administration

avoided taking responsibility for what was an attack on American

citizens and, therefore, an attack on this country. Pan Am 103 was

targeted because it had an American flag on its tail. The Bush administration had no problem defending U.S. interests during the

Gulf war when it perceived that oil was at stake. It did not have

the courage, however, to stand up for American citizens who lost

their lives precisely because they were Americans.

The Clinton administration has placated the Lockerbie families

with the right language, but its record has been just as poor. While

assuring the families that no deals would be made with Libya and

promising us that the United States would hold firm on the Libyan

sanctions in the United Nations, the Clinton administration was

21

secretly pursuing the deal which resulted in the trial which began

yesterday in The Netherlands and which I and other family members are able to view here in Washington.

I was fascinated to hear in Ambassador Neumann’s testimony

that these secret talks began in the fall of 1997, at the same time

that the State Department and the administration were assuring

the families up and down that there were no such talks under way.

There was no such deal in the offing.

Although this trial has been dressed up by the administration

and the State Department, it is unlikely to produce justice, and

furthermore, will result in the end of any meaningful effort to discover the truth about what happened and to hold those responsible

accountable.

Sections of the letter which gave the Libyans the assurances necessary to turn the suspects over were read to me and other family

members. And in the Post today, Qadhafi is quoted in an interview

with Sky TV referring to the agreement with the United States and

Britain. In return for his turning the suspects over for trial, he

said, ‘‘the court will not raise questions about Libyan Government

involvement in the bombing. The agreement is to try these two suspects, these two suspects only,’’ he said.

The letter and its accompanying annex, as we have talked about

already today, have not been made public. First, family members

were told that these documents did not exist. This was after portions had been read to us. Next, we were told that they could not

be found. Finally, in response to two Freedom of Information Act

requests, we were told that the documents had been classified. Just

3 weeks ago, Sandy Berger in a letter to a Pan Am family member

changed direction yet again, writing that it is the U.N.’s decision

whether to make these documents public. He stated that our Government ‘‘disagrees’’ with Kofi Annan’s decision not to make the

documents public, and that ‘‘we will continue to urge disclosure of

this correspondence.’’ I maintain regardless of what is in that letter, there is no way

that Qadhafi would have turned the suspects over without some

type of guarantee. Prince Bandhar, Nelson Mandella were very involved in these negotiations, and we have no idea what was said

to Qadhafi.

The trial itself was designed with Qadhafi’s concerns in mind.

And I was further interested to hear that the Scottish court has not

been manipulated. The Scottish court is sitting outside Scotland.

There is no jury because Colonel Qadhafi did not want a jury. This

has never, ever happened in a murder trial in Scotland.

Qadhafi was concerned that there would not be a fair trial, and

as we know, the suspects are being tried at a former U.S. military

base in The Netherlands. Because Qadhafi was fearful that a jury

would be more likely to return a guilty verdict, he specified that

the trial be held before three judges.

In addition, Qadhafi pressed for the trial to be held under Scottish law because of its strict standards for admissible evidence, and

this is a tremendous disadvantage in a case which is largely circumstantial. I believe it is very possible that the defendants will

go free at the conclusion of the trial. In addition to verdicts of

guilty and not guilty, Scottish law provides for a verdict of not

22

proven. The result of this verdict is the same as a verdict of not

guilty: the accused would go free.

Although the Clinton administration has made promises to the

Pan Am families that the conduct of the trial will not be hampered

by the contents of the letter and annex sent to Qadhafi, this is an

empty promise. And I think this is a very important point. Mrs.

Albright and others have promised that the prosecutors will take

the evidence wherever it goes. This is either cynical manipulation

or naivete. I do not know which is worse. In fact, the criminal case

against the two Libyans, as I understand it, is very narrowly focused. U.S. prosecutors have told family members that it is highly

unlikely that any evidence which could be used to pursue those

higher up the chain of command will come out at the trial.

Even without the assurances given to Qadhafi to get him to turn

the suspects over for trial, it is unlikely that others will ever be

held accountable. I believe that the United States is well on its way

to resuming normal relations with Libya. We talked about the visit

by the State Department group a month and a half ago, and I just

want to add they were there for a grand total of 26 hours.

Once normal relations are resumed with Libya, no further investigation will occur. U.S. oil companies are anxious to do business

again with Libya. There is a lot of money to be made. Those countries, such as Great Britain, which have already resumed diplomatic relations with Libya are reaping enormous economic benefits.

Former U.S. public officials and some current ones are getting

into the act as well. Former D.C. Delegate Walter Faunteroy has

been trying to put together a delegation to travel to Libya. This

group includes several current Congressmen, and met with officials

at the State Department in February to discuss such a trip. At this

meeting, representatives from the group were told by the State Department that if they do travel to Libya, the subject of compensation for the Lockerbie families will be discussed. This is an attempt

by the Libyans and others to buy the families’ silence.

Herman Cohen, a former State Department official during the

Bush administration, recently traveled to Libya to discuss relations

between the two countries with an eye toward improving the climate so that business can resume. During his trip, he met with

Qadhafi, as well as Abdullah Senussi. Senussi is Qadhafi’s brotherin-law. He was convicted last year in absentia by a French court

in the UTA bombing. This was a mid-air bombing similar to

Lockerbie in which 171 people, including the wife of an American

diplomat, were murdered. These and other business contacts by

U.S. citizens are detailed in a recent Time magazine article.

As a family member whose husband was murdered in a terrorist

attack, these efforts to promote business at the expense of justice

are deeply disturbing. I am afraid that we are sending a message

that terrorists and the countries which sponsor or harbor them will

not have to pay a price for their actions. When we allow ourselves

to believe that encouraging business relationships with these countries will somehow inoculate us against further terrorist attacks, I

believe that we are dangerously naive. Is it really good business to

do business with terrorists? Should the murder of innocent human

beings ever be a prelude to business as usual?

23

I wish that I could be more optimistic that there will ever be justice for my husband and the others who were so brutally murdered

with him. Despite years of effort by family members whose loved

ones fell from the sky that December night in Scotland, we have

only what I fear will be a show trial and the rehabilitation of the

regime which ordered the attack. If we have learned anything from

Lockerbie I hope it is that sweeping murder under the rug by convincing ourselves that we are pursuing justice will only undermine

global stability and compromise the principles on which this country was founded.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bernstein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE BERNSTEIN

My husband, Mike Bernstein, was an ordinary person who died an extraordinary

death. He was one of 270 people murdered in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight

103. His dreams were simple: he wanted to guide his children into adulthood. He

wanted to grow old with his wife. He wanted to do work which brought him satisfaction and which contributed to making the world a better place than he found it.

Mike was a federal employee. He was the Assistant Deputy Director of the Office

of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice. This is the office which finds,

denaturalizes, and deports persons who entered the United States illegally after

World War II because they had participated in Nazi atrocities during the Holocaust.

Mike left two children, ages 4 and 7, a wife, a mother, and countless friends. He

was 36 years old.

Prior to Mike’s murder, I was able to hold at arm’s length the evil which drives

people, in the name of a cause or revenge to take the lives of innocent men, women,

and children. After Lockerbie, many of us became fearful that ordinary activities,

like putting a loved on an airplane, could have devastating consequences. During

a train ride to New York, shortly after his Dad’s murder, my then four year old

asked me if people ever put bombs on trains.

In the years since my husband’s murder, I have thought a great deal about terrorism, and about how peace loving nations can deter it. I believe that the only way

to deter terrorism is to pursue justice against its perpetrators, and to make clear

that sponsoring terrorism, or harboring those who carry it out will not be tolerated

by the civilized world.

The President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, appointed by

President Bush after the Lockerbie bombing, advocated such a strenuous response

to terrorism. In its report to the President, the Commission recommended that

international terrorism not be treated solely as a law enforcement problem, because

a law enforcement approach usually does not target more than a few members of

the group which actually carried out the terrorist attack. Such an approach is not

effective against those who sponsor terrorist attacks. The Commission further stated

that while multinational responses to terrorist acts are the ideal, nations must reserve the right to respond unilaterally. Terrorist acts are often acts of aggression

against a country.

None of these recommendations have been followed in the case of the Lockerbie

bombing. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have promised the families of

those murdered over Lockerbie that the United States government was committed

to discovering who ordered, paid for, and executed this terrible crime. These promises have been hollow.

The families have been told repeatedly that intelligence data exist which answer

these questions. Instead of acting on this information, both the Bush and Clinton

administrations have done what was expedient, not what was right. In moving the

Lockerbie bombing to the United Nations, the Bush administration avoided taking

responsibility for what was an attack on American citizens, and therefore, an attack

on America. Pan Am 103 was targeted because it had an American flag on its tail;

of the 270 killed in this murderous attack, 189 were U.S. citizens. The Bush administration had no problem defending U.S. interests during the Gulf War when it perceived oil was at stake. It did not have the courage, however, to stand up for American citizens who lost their lives precisely because they were Americans.

The Clinton administration has placated the Lockerbie families with the right language, but its record has been just as poor. While assuring the families that no

deals would be made with Libya, and promising us that the United States would

24

hold firm on the Libyan sanctions in the U.N., the Clinton administration was secretly pursuing the deal which has resulted in the trial which began yesterday in

the Netherlands. Although the trial has been dressed up by the administration and

the State Department, it is unlikely to produce justice, and, furthermore, will result

in the end of any meaningful effort to discover the truth about what happened and

to hold those responsible accountable.

Sections of the letter which provided the Libyans the assurances necessary to turn

the suspects over were read to me and other family members. Promises were made

that the Libyan regime would not be undermined or embarrassed during the trial.

This letter and its accompanying annex have not been made public. First, we were

told that the documents did not exist. Next, we were told the documents could not

be found. Finally, in response to two Freedom of Information Act requests, we were

told the documents have been classified. Just three weeks ago, Sandy Berger, in a

letter to a Pan Am family member, changed direction again, writing that it is the

U.N.’s decision whether to make these documents public. He stated that our government ‘‘disagrees’’ with the Secretary General’s decision not to make the documents

public, and that ‘‘we will continue to urge disclosure of this correspondence.’’ The trial itself was designed with Gadhafi’s concerns in mind. He did not want

the trial to be held in Scotland or the United States, as specified in the indictments

of the two suspects. He was concerned that they would not receive a fair trial, so

the suspects are being tried at a former U.S. military base now owned by the Dutch,

who, for the purposes of the trial, have ceded the land to the Scots. Because Gadhafi

was fearful that a jury would be more likely to return a guilty verdict, he specified

that the trial be held before three judges. This has never been done before in the

history of the Scottish legal system. Gadhafi pressed for the trial to be under Scottish law because of its strict standards for admissible evidence, a tremendous disadvantage in a case which is largely circumstantial.

It is very possible that the accused will go free at the conclusion of the trial. In

addition to verdicts of guilty and not guilty, Scottish law provides for a verdict of

‘‘not proven.’’ The result of this verdict is the same as a verdict of not guilty—the

accused would go free.

Although the Clinton administration has made promises to the Pan Am families

that the conduct of the trial will not be hampered by the contents of the letter and

annex sent to Gadhafi, this is an empty promise. Mrs. Albright and others have

promised that the prosecutors will ‘‘take the evidence wherever it goes.’’ This is either cynical manipulation or naivete—I don’t know which is worse. In fact, the

criminal case against the two Libyans is very narrowly focused. Prosecutors have

told family members that it is highly unlikely that any evidence which could be

used to pursue those higher up the chain of command will come out at the trial.

Even without the assurances given to Gadhafi to get him to turn the suspects

over for trial, it is unlikely that others will ever be held accountable. The United

States is well on the way to resuming normal relations with Libya. Once that occurs, no further investigation will occur. U.S. oil companies are anxious to do business again in Libya; there is much money to be made. Those countries, such as

Great Britain, which have already resumed diplomatic relations with Libya are

reaping huge economic benefits. The visit to Libya this spring by a delegation from

the State Department to evaluate whether the passport ban should be lifted sent

yet another signal that normal relations are just a matter of time.

Former U.S. public officials are getting into the act as well. Former Delegate Walter Faunteroy has been trying to put together a delegation to travel to Libya. This

group includes several current Congressmen, and met with officials at the State Department in February to discuss such a trip. At this meeting, representatives from

the group were told by the State Department that if they do travel to Libya, the

subject of compensation for the Lockerbie families will be discussed. This is an attempt by the Libyans and others to buy the families’ silence.

Herman Cohen, a former State Department official during the Bush administration, recently traveled to Libya to discuss relations between the two countries, with

an eye toward improving the climate so that business can resume. During his trip,

he met with Gadhafi, as well as with Abdullah Senussi. Senussi is Gadhafi’s brother-in-law, and was convicted last year in absentia by a French court in the UTA

bombing. This was a mid-air bombing, similar to Lockerbie, in which 171 people,

including the wife of an American diplomat, were murdered. These and other business contacts with Libya by U.S. citizens are detailed in a recent Time Magazine

article (‘‘Why Libya Wants In,’’ March 27, 2000).

As a family member whose husband was murdered in a terrorist attack, these efforts to promote business at the expense of justice are deeply disturbing. I am afraid

that we are sending a message that terrorists and the countries which sponsor or

harbor them will not have to pay a price for their actions. When we allow ourselves

25

to believe that encouraging business relationships with these countries will somehow inoculate us against further terrorist attacks, I believe that we are dangerously

naive. Is it really good business to do business with terrorists? Should the murder

of innocent human beings ever be a prelude to business as usual?

I wish that I could be more optimistic that there will ever be justice for my husband and the others so brutally murdered with him. Despite years of effort by family members whose loved ones fell from the sky that December night in Scotland,

we have only what I fear will be a show trial and the rehabilitation of the regime

which ordered the attack. If we have learned anything from Lockerbie, I hope it is

that sweeping murder under the rug by convincing ourselves that we are pursuing

justice will only undermine global stability and compromise the principles on which

this country was founded.

The cases in which my husband sought justice were many decades old. He believed strongly that justice was worth pursuing. He felt that there should be no time

limit on justice when atrocities are committed. After Mike’s murder, I received a letter from Yvan Roy, the Director of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes

Section of the Department of Justice of Canada. He wrote:

The dedication of people such as Michael is that which combats the

senseless cycle of hatred and devastation. All for which we can work and

pray is that through the commitment of people like Michael, we continually

proceed further towards the goals which will hopefully diminish and eventually one day eliminate the havoc that is wrought on innocent individuals.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. Thank you for your powerful

testimony and your thoughtfulness and your willingness to come

here to testify today.

Mr. Bolton, thank you for joining us. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, FORMER ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

AFFAIRS; SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me come

right to the point.

Our national policy toward Libya today is a policy of appeasement. There just simply is no other way to describe it, and I think

you can understand it best by looking at the evolution of the handling of the Pan Am 103 matter.

First, it seems to me, if we have learned anything in hindsight,

is that, beginning with the Bush administration, in which I served,

we should have treated Pan Am 103 as an attack on the United

States and responded accordingly. We made a mistake by treating

it as a diplomatic or judicial matter. We should have followed

President Reagan’s example in the wake of the La Belle Disco

bombing. We should have attacked Libya militarily and hopefully

gotten a little bit luckier than the Reagan administration bombing.

We should treat the war on terrorism seriously. It may be too

late now to do anything militarily with respect to the perpetrators

of Pan Am 103, but we should have no illusions in the future that

every other terrorist and potential terrorist in the world has

marked our policy over the past 11 years carefully and has drawn,

sad to say, the appropriate conclusions.

Second, Mr. Chairman, we were wrong from the outset to take

the Pan Am 103 attack to the Security Council and to restrict ourselves to U.N. processes. I can say here, just as a personal matter,

I am the only person I know—I may be the only person ever—who

has been both an Assistant Secretary of State and an Assistant Attorney General. I know both of these Departments inside and out.

26

And I know what happened in 1991 and 1992 when the Bush administration made a decision to seek Security Council condemnation of Libya, followed by a very limited regime of sanctions, Mr.

Chairman, in Security Council Resolution 748.

At the time I opposed the notion that we should take Pan Am

103 into the Security Council. And I do not want to overstate this.

I did not, at the time, appreciate much of what I have come to see

since then. My argument at the time, which was overruled, was

that we would expend an enormous amount of political and diplomatic effort and not achieve very much concretely. I would say, unfortunately, I think that prediction was true. We did expend an

awful lot of diplomatic effort, and we achieved by a vote of 10 to

0 with 5 abstentions in Resolution 748 a very minimal set of sanctions that was only modified to a very insubstantial degree in 1993.

The result, however, was that once we had wrapped ourselves

around the U.N. axle, the unilateral resort to military force became, as a practical matter, more and more difficult, indeed impossible.

Now what we see, as you and Senator Torricelli and other witnesses have commented on, is an apparent rush toward full normalization of diplomatic relations with Libya. This is a scene in a

whole series of steps that you previously discussed, and it is also

underlined in the pattern that you have mentioned of a similar

rush toward normalization with countries like Cuba, the Sudan,

Syria, Iran, and North Korea. I think this pattern clearly is not a

series of discrete decisions. The sixth floor of the State Department

is not capable of coming up with so coherent a policy. It must be

a policy at the top level, which I would urge this committee to look

into.

We have heard a lot today from the administration about statements about this and statements about that and some steps here

and things we are not quite sure about. Let us look at the real

record.

The seizure by British customs authorities, only a few months

ago, of shipments of so-called auto parts on their way from China

to Libya, were crates containing Scud missiles. Now, this is in flat

violation of the weapons embargo contained in Resolution 748. It

was seized by British authorities under authority of European

Union sanctions against Libya which were imposed after 748. You

are not working on Scud missiles like that just waking up one

morning and saying, well, I think I will order. This is obviously

part of a pattern that the Libyans have been engaged in, and the

notion that Scud missiles and the threat that they posed to the

southern countries of Europe is something that we should ignore

I just find inexplicable. This is not talk. This is not assertion. This

is not abstract theory. This is real Libyan conduct, just a few

months ago, that tells us what they are really up to.

Third, Mr. Chairman, the United States, particularly in the past

2 years, has made repeated, unilateral, unreciprocated concessions

to Libya that I think gravely threaten the prosecution’s case at

Camp Zeist and undermine our own legal system at the same time.

Let me turn immediately to this question of whether there are

assurances or a deal between Libya on the one hand and the

United States and the United Kingdom on the other. We know

27

from what members of the families have told us that before the

magical classification of the Secretary General’s letter, they were

read portions of it. And a number of things stick in their minds,

but one phrase that comes up over and over again is a commitment

not to ‘‘undermine’’ the Government of Libya, that the prosecution

of the case will not ‘‘undermine’’ the Government of Libya.

Now, I think Deputy Assistant Secretary Neumann has explained to us today exactly how that phrase got in there and why

Muammar Qadhafi, as recently as yesterday, is proud to say publicly he thinks he has a deal. This idea that we would say, we have

no interest in doing a Stalinist show trial—I do not know where

that idea came from. I do not think anybody on our side of the

table has ever thought of that. If that is Qadhafi’s concern, that is

really his problem. But in an effort to satisfy Qadhafi that we are

not going to conduct a Stalinist show trial, it seems to me entirely

possible that the Secretary General and the international diplomats and international leaders aiding him could have given assurances—whether they are embodied in this letter or not, obviously we do not know—that there was not a political aim, that

there was not a desire to undermine the Libyan regime, thus giving

Qadhafi sufficient assurances that his position would not be threatened, that he would willingly sacrifice these two individuals, over

whom, bear in mind, he retains considerable authority. He has

their families back in Libya. I do not think these people are going

to do anything other than play the script out for them that Qadhafi

has written. But the point is that Qadhafi holds the card to make

sure that, in fact, his regime is not threatened.

Now, you can say at the same time, well, the prosecutors can

pursue the evidence wherever it leads. Pursue what evidence, Mr.

Chairman? It is unquestioned—top FBI officials have said this— that the Government of Libya has been for the past 10 years seriously about the business of destroying evidence, tampering with

evidence, fabricating evidence, destroying witnesses, tampering

with witnesses, coming up with new witnesses. This is not a trial

in the United States for murder. This is a trial being conducted

against a rogue regime that has no concept whatever of due process, as it has demonstrated repeatedly.

The really interesting question here, as we watch the trial unfold, is what Scottish judges are going to do if confronted with objections from the defense that the prosecutors have begun to engage in a political trial of the Libyan regime. How is a Scottish

judge supposed to rule on an objection like that? And if the objections go the wrong way from Libya’s point of view, what happens

to the trial? Worse yet, if the objections are sustained—that is to

say, go the right way from the Libya point of view—what is going

to happen to the defendants? I think it is clear they are going to

walk.

This element of concession and these repeated concessions to the

Libyans has colored American policy throughout the past 2 years.

A number of things have been mentioned.

We have given up the argument that these defendants should

have been tried under American law. Is that significant? Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Scottish law does not provide for the death

penalty. And I cannot think of a more appropriate case for the imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
28

position of the death penalty than for the people who are found

guilty of the murder of 270 innocent civilians in a terrorist bombing.

In addition, Resolution 1248 provided that the Secretary General

will name U.N. observers to watch the trial. Indeed, he has recently done so. U.N. observers, Mr. Chairman? Is Scottish justice

not quite up to Libya’s high standards of due process? We have a

problem with Scottish justice that we need five U.N. observers?

And what is their role going to be if they see the trial drifting in

a political direction? At least I know one of the observers, a former

Egyptian Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New

York. The press has reported that one other of them has represented the Libyan mission to New York in his capacity as a lawyer. I am really not looking forward to the conduct of these five

U.N. observers.

And then, just as icing on the cake, if these defendants are convicted, there will be U.N. observers monitoring their incarceration

in Scotland, as if Scottish jails also do not measure up to those

high Libyan standards.

Mr. Chairman, these are very serious negative precedents for

other cases of international terrorism that may arise. I think given

that this is sort of the threshold for what we are going to see in

the future, I can see this trend only being downhill.

Let me just address very quickly one other aspect here that goes

to this question of the visas that Senator Torricelli raised. There

is, it seems to me, not very much question that there is a continuing and ongoing obstruction of justice here. If, as well, the investigators at our Department of Justice, who by the way have

been systematically excluded from most negotiations, most decisionmaking over the Pan Am 103 matter by the State Department—but if they are accurate that not a sparrow falls in Libyan

intelligence services without Qadhafi’s approval, then there is also

no question that Qadhafi himself is a co-conspirator, indeed, the

lead co-conspirator in the murder itself, as well as in the ongoing

obstruction of justice. If that is the case, Senator Torricelli, it is not

even a matter of a transgression being committed 11 years ago, it

is a continuing transgression. There is still illegality under terms

of American law and, therefore, still full and complete legal warrant under the terms of the statute to worry about the safety of

Americans. The terrorist, in fact, is still loose.

Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by saying that what this

weak and craven policy has done is to leave us with effectively no

Libyan policy, especially if the trial goes badly and the high standard of proof, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is not met. I have

been very encouraged in the past couple of months by the increased

attention that Members of Congress have given to this matter and

by the efforts that have been made to obtain Kofi Annan’s letter

and other things. I think your decision to hold this hearing this

morning is extremely important not only for the Pan Am 103 families who have been so abused in the 11 years since the tragedy, but

for the larger issue of how America deals with terrorist attacks like

this. It is unquestioned, it seems to me—and the Senate has reflected this—that an attack on one American is an attack on all.

And I hope congressional interest in this matter will increase. I

29

hope it becomes the subject of discussion in our Presidential campaign. I think it is something that all Americans should take a lot

more seriously than we have the past several years.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity

to appear before you this morning to testify on American policy toward Libya. I have

a prepared statement I would like to submit for the record, which I will summarize,

and then I would be happy to answer any questions Members the Subcommittee

may have.

Yesterday, trial began for two Libyan intelligence agents, accused of the heinous

murder of 270 innocent civilians in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 on December 21, 1988. At first glance, the prosecution’s formal opening in a Scottish court

sitting in the Netherlands may seem like something to celebrate, a time for rhetoric

about ‘‘the rule of law’’ in international affairs. We will certainly hear a good deal

of that from the Clinton Administration.

Unfortunately, however, the trial may actually mark the final collapse of U.S. policy toward Libya, and the end of our efforts for a real vindication of Pan Am 103’s

victims. This collapse embodies both a failure of will to use military force to respond

to a brutal attack on our citizens, and self-imposed, potentially crippling limitations

on even the narrow avenue of prosecution. While this erroneous approach started

during the Bush Administration, it has been refined and perfected in the Clinton

State Department. Equally repellent, we must simultaneously watch the spectacle

of the Administration’s pell-mell rush to resume full diplomatic relations with Libya,

as soon as it can elide the inconvenient indignation of the Pan Am 103 families and

their Congressional supporters.

How have we allowed such a policy to develop to full maturity? What should we

have done over the past eleven years, and what should we do now to meet our obligations not only to the immediate victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing and their

families, but to redeem our larger national interests, not least of which is to rescue

whatever may be left of our credibility in the struggle against international terrorism?

1. We should have treated the Pan Am 103 bombing as an attack on the United

States, and responded accordingly

Eleven-plus years after Pan Am 103’s destruction and nine years since American

and Scottish prosecutors indicted these two defendants, we are long past any realistic prospect of a proper military response. All we can do now is note our basic mistake in 1991-92 to judicialize this issue rather than to use force, in contrast with

President Reagan’s decision to launch air strikes against Libya for the 1986 ‘‘disco

bombing’’ of U.S. servicemen in Germany.

Although it sounds better to unleash hard-headed prosecutors rather than

weakkneed diplomats against terrorists, there is a better option still: cold steel. Instead of responding to the bombing as if it were a domestic murder case, we should

have seen this Libyan act of terror as the political-military attack that it was, and

responded accordingly. The American response—either unilaterally or with whichever allies would join us—should have been to declare war on the terrorists, just

as President Clinton purports to have done against Osama bin Laden. Then, unlike

President Clinton, we should have gotten serious about it. Using military force

against terrorists does not violate our legal or moral obligations. It does prevent the

law from being perverted by its sworn enemies. That is the real lesson we should

have taught Gadhafi—and all the others who are watching—about Pan Am 103.

Instead, we have followed a debilitating diplomatic course of concessions and further restrictions on our legal system’s integrity and autonomy. Every sign now

points toward an imperfect trial, tilted toward acquittal. This is simply no way to

deal with terrorism. Prosecutors in the Anglo-American system must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, an extremely high burden of proof in any criminal trial,

and even more difficult when the defendants’ government has almost certainly destroyed or tampered with the evidence and witnesses.

2. The United States was wrong from the outset to take the Pan Am 103 attack to

the Security Council, and to restrict ourselves to United Nations processes

In January, 1992, in Resolution 731, the Security Council took the unprecedented

step of deploring Libya’s failure to cooperate with international law-enforcement efVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 Nov 17, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67394 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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forts. Two months later, in another unprecedented step, the Council’s Resolution

748 imposed economic sanctions against Libya. Although hailed at the time as great

victories, in fact, there was little enthusiasm for the initial condemnation of Libya,

and we were barely able to gain support for the imposition of sanctions. We have

been under continuous pressure since 1992 to scale back or eliminate the sanctions

on any pretext, largely from Europeans who would rather trade with Moammar

Gadhafi than punish him for murder. Ironically, not even Gadhafi is playing along

with this charade. In an April 3 speech to the African-European summit in Cairo,

he declared that ‘‘Africa is not a ping-pong ball to be hit once by Europe, once by

the U.S.,’’ and ‘‘we do not need democracy; we need water pumps.’’ Unfortunately, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s unseemly haste to achieve

the normalization of relations with Libya embodies the State Department’s typical

deference to the European Union, combined with the Near East bureau’s inevitable ‘‘clientitis’’ toward authoritarian regimes. Only the unlikely but powerful combination of Senators Jesse Helms and Edward Kennedy has slowed down the Department’s efforts, through their resolution, recently adopted by the full Senate, cautioning against the rush toward normalization.

Libya’s own actions in the months preceding the opening of trial have been openly

contemptuous toward the United States and the United Kingdom. In November,

1999, for example, British authorities at London’s Gatwick Airport seized a shipment of ‘‘auto parts’’ bound indirectly from China to Libya. Based on tips received

as early as April, 1999, the British believed, correctly, that the ‘‘auto parts’’ were

in fact Scud missile components, violating a European Union arms embargo against

Libya. Nonetheless, undeterred by Libya’s blatant disregard for international sanctions, the United Kingdom did normalize relations with Gadhafi, and the Clinton

Administration seems intent on doing so as well. What does it take for our Administration to realize the error of policies of reconciliation with Gadhafi? In addition to

Scud missile components, does it need hard evidence of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to become concerned?

There is absolutely no warrant to move toward the normalization of American diplomatic relations with Libya, whatever the verdict of the Scottish court. How anyone

could interpret Gadhafi’s actions over the past several years as meriting the return

of ‘‘business as usual’’ with his dictatorship is a mystery, except in the context of

the larger drift of American policy toward fanatically anti-American governments.

From Libya, to the Sudan, to Cuba, to Iran, to North Korea, and perhaps elsewhere, Secretary Albright seems determined to restore relations with rogue regimes

whose only common thread is their hatred of the United States and blatantly criminal behavior toward our citizens and our interests. Any one of these rapprochements

could be seen in isolation as a simple mistake in judgment—a failure by a State

Department regional bureau—but it is only when all of these mistakes are taken

together do we see that they must be part of a deliberate Administration policy.

Such a sweeping, comprehensive reversal of previous U.S. policy could only come

from the Secretary’s Seventh Floor suite, and that is why the Senate’s recent rejection of normalization with Libya, led by this Committee, is so important.

3. The United States has made repeated, unilateral concessions to Libya that threaten the prosecution’s case, and undermine our own legal system

Secretary Albright, demonstrating she is no prosecutor, has made several critical

mistakes in the preparation and handling of the trial itself. These mistakes have

made it unfortunately likely that the trial will simply be a piece of political theater,

far removed from the original law-enforcement scenario that its proponents envisaged a decade ago.

Initially, Secretary Albright conceded, without gaining anything in return, that

the case would be tried under Scottish law, which does not provide for the death

penalty for convicted murderers. While Scotland undeniably has a jurisdictional

claim in the case, because eleven of its citizens died on the ground near Lockerbie,

the American claim was far stronger, given that 189 of our citizens were among the

270 total fatalities. One can imagine valid reasons for deferring to the Scots, but

to lose even the possibility of the death penalty without obtaining a single American

objective in exchange is a stunning failure of the Secretary’s diplomacy.

We can also see now that the next concession—to hold the trial in the Netherlands, rather than in Scotland itself—while seemingly unimportant initially, is also

having adverse consequences. Leaks that the Administration would accept the Pan

Am 103 trial in a third country originally appeared in July, 1998, before the terrorist bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Yet even after those bombings, and the subsequent American military retaliation, the Administration proceeded to give way on the Pan Am 103 trial location, which had, in the Bush Administration, been part of a ‘‘take it or leave it’’ proposition to Libya that the trial be

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held in the United States or Scotland. Secretary Albright’s concession that the trial

could be held in the Netherlands (symbolically, site of the International Court of

Justice at The Hague) was also billed as ‘‘take it or leave it,’’ which could only further undermine our credibility with Gadhafi and the other closely-watching outlaw

regimes. Indeed, after only a momentary hesitation, the Libyans began demanding

further negotiations and concessions, just as they have done, ceaselessly, since they

first faced the prospect of economic sanctions in 1991.

A further concession is also embodied in the August, 1998 Security Council Resolution, namely that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan would name international

‘‘observers’’ to ‘‘monitor’’ the Scottish judges’ conduct of the trial. Whatever the individual qualifications of the five trial observers named to date—and one of them is

reported to have served as lawyer for Libya’s U.N. mission in New York—the fact

remains that this concession is an insult to the entire Scottish judicial system. The

idea that Scottish justice may not be up to Libya’s high standards of due process,

or that there is some ‘‘international’’ standard that is somehow better than Scotland’s (and, implicitly, America’s) should have been flatly unacceptable to the Administration.

An equally bad precedent is that the United States and the United Kingdom also

conceded that, if convicted and imprisoned, the defendants would be ‘‘monitored’’ by

the United Nations. Perhaps Gadhafi is unfamiliar with the concept, but in nations

where the rule of law prevails, prisoners generally are required to be treated humanely and are allowed to consult with counsel, to practice their religions, to receive

legitimate visitors, and the like. For understandable security reasons, prisoners are

not treated uniformly. Convicted murderers do face different circumstances than tax

evaders. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom still qualifies as a democratic, civilizedenough place that it can be expected to meet its own legal standards.

The notion that Scottish prisons might not meet Libyan norms is breathtaking.

Bear in mind also that the United States is already under criticism at the United

Nations for even permitting the death penalty, let alone the way it is administered.

The Pan Am 103 precedent raises the prospect that controversial cases with the

slightest international coloration will be subject to calls for U.N. monitoring or oversight. What seems at first like a slight concession to Gadhafi’s peculiar sensitivities

is actually a potentially open-ended invitation to global entanglement in our criminal justice system.

Finally, and worst of all, Secretary Albright and her diplomats acquiesced in a

letter sent by Secretary General Kofi Annan to Gadhafi, which essentially guaranteed Gadhafi that he would not be linked to the murders at the trial. This letter

(which has now apparently been classified by the Department of State) has never

been made public, and it is unclear whether it was co-signed by American and British diplomats or simply ‘‘cleared’’ by them in draft. In any event, compounding her

many other blunders, the Secretary has waged a full-scale war against the Pan Am

103 families, several Members of Congress, and numerous journalists who have

been trying to obtain a copy of the Annan letter. This policy of compromising with

Gadhafi but stonewalling American family members has only increased concerns

about what the Annan letter actually says.

Based on revelations to the Pan Am 103 families before the Annan letter was classified, we can conclude with some confidence that the Secretary General has effectively insulated Gadhafi from criminal liability for the bombing, which many believe

he personally ordered. The Annan letter is said to promise Gadhafi that the prosecutors’ conduct of the trial will in no way ‘‘undermine’’ the Libyan regime. It is inconceivable that our Department of Justice willingly agreed to limitations on the prosecutors, and Attorney General Janet Reno acknowledged as much last fall in a briefing to the Pan Am 103 families. Nonetheless, our diplomats have agreed that the

public trial of the hit men will be limited by vague words that mean we may never

learn the full story.

Certainly, the United States has, at times, decided not to proceed with criminal

trials that might have had an adverse impact on national security. Because of concerns about protecting intelligence sources and methods, or because of overriding

foreign policy priorities, even clearly winnable prosecutions have been abandoned.

Such decisions reflect tough assessments as to when critical national interests legitimately trump criminal-justice priorities. But what the Clinton Administration has

accepted here is something far different. Its concessions to Gadhafi (albeit through

its chosen agent, the U.N. Secretary General) are made to a potential defendant,

or at least a co-conspirator, in the murder that is the very subject of the investigation.

By knuckling under to Libya’s demands, President Clinton has left to Scottish

judges the ticklish job of adjudicating Libyan objections at trial to particular questions, witnesses or exhibits, any of which might be said to ‘‘undermine’’ the Libyan

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government. That is not only irresponsible, but disingenuous. On what basis could

any common-law judge legitimately rule on such a fundamentally political question?

Moreover, if the court rules ‘‘incorrectly’’ from Libya’s perspective, is the deal off?

Even worse, if the court rules ‘‘correctly’’ from Libya’s perspective, will the prosecution’s case be fatally weakened, and the defendants walk? As a precedent for future

negotiations with terrorists (which we supposedly abjure), this new ‘‘Gadhafi

Clause’’ will become an irreducible minimum condition for regimes abetting violence.

Not only are our unilateral, unreciprocated concessions unwise in and of themselves, they also represent a series of small but continuing victories for Gadhafi in

his unending efforts to ‘‘internationalize’’ the trial, and thus take it out of the purview of either Scottish or American justice. Gadhafi had consistently argued that

the two Libyans he handed over could not get a ‘‘fair trial’’ from Scottish or American courts, and every concession made to this absurd contention strengthened the

international perception that perhaps we were also unsure that they could receive

a fair trial. Unfortunately, the pattern of American concessions we have seen here

will inevitably be cited as a precedent in similar situations in the future, and therefore constitute yet another step on the treacherous path toward removing the responsibility for criminal justice from nation-states, and internationalizing it in potentially irresponsible and unaccountable hands.

4. The disintegration of American policy toward Libya means that the Administration has no policy if the Scottish judges at Camp Zeist acquit the Libyan defendants

This result is entirely possible, given the high standard of proof required for convictions, the lack of cooperation from the Libyan government, and the prosecutors’

needs to shield sensitive intelligence sources and methods from exposure. A finding

of ‘‘not guilty’’ (or a so-called ‘‘Scottish verdict’’) is not the legal or moral equivalent

of finding the defendants ‘‘innocent,’’ but no one will recognize that distinction in

the trial’s aftermath. Gadhafi and his fellow thugs will have beaten the judicial system, and Secretary Albright can proceed toward diplomatic normalization

unencumbered by any further obligations to the Pan Am 103 families.

Indeed, even if the two intelligence operatives are convicted, Gadhafi will almost

certainly escape prosecution, even though he is widely believed to have given the

direct order that led to Pan Am 103’s destruction. This fact alone demonstrates the

intellectual and political poverty of the Administration’s position.

Inexplicably, only a few Members of Congress have even monitored, let alone opposed, the collapse of America’s opposition to Libya’s outrages. Nor has it been the

subject of debate in the presidential campaign, at least until now. While the defendants on trial at Camp Zeist may ultimately be convicted, there is no prospect of adequate justice while Gadhafi remains untouched. Since that seems sadly likely, we

need a larger debate about how America asserts its interests and protects its citizens from attack, by terrorists or anyone else. This requires an American posture

that accepts military force rather than prosecution as the preferred response, that

is willing and even inclined to respond unilaterally to be effective, and that has an

attention span long enough to allow us to win through to vindication. Questions of

international terrorism—and Libya particularly—fully warrant presidential campaign debate.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Bolton. I appreciate your comments too about holding the hearing. I think it is an

important one. I worry about it in the specifics of the case of the

victims. I worry about it in general in the case of what U.S. policy

drift is doing toward rogue regimes around the world.

Mr. Bolton, you stated that a number of steps have been taken

toward normalizing the relationship between the United States and

Libya. The Ambassador just ahead of you basically denied and stated—I am not sure how to really frame it other than we have not

done that yet I guess would probably be the best way to categorize

it.

What items, what steps do you see that the administration has

taken toward normalizing the relationship with Libya?

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think certainly the consular visit was about

as clear an example as you could get, that they were in there for

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a very brief period of time just to check the box that they had made

a trip to Libya.

I think also you have to look at what the administration has

done over the course of events since August 1998 to try to move

toward a suspension of Security Council sanctions. That was the

first step that had to be undertaken because the next steps obviously, having achieved their objective in the multilateral arena, are

now to deal with the ILSA sanctions and the other matters that

Congress has been so involved in.

But I fear that the pattern has already been laid out by Prime

Minister Blair’s Government. It is no secret, in conversations I

have had with UK diplomats and others, that UK and U.S. policy

on Libya is being very closely coordinated. The United Kingdom recently returned its Ambassador to Libya. The top British diplomat

in the Foreign Office has just recently visited Libya, may still be

there, looking for facilities and the other necessary administrative

support to greatly expand the UK mission there. The entire European Union is moving back toward full diplomatic relations, and indeed, just a few months ago, we narrowly avoided the embarrassment of the head of the European Commission inviting Qadhafi to

come to Brussels for consultations. There is no question that commercial interests in Europe are looking avidly at a substantial increase of investments in Libya once the sanctions really are lifted

permanently. And we have already heard from officials of American

companies, who I think are quite naturally pursuing their economic

objectives, and do not want to see Europeans get business, who are

not concerned with the larger policy issues that the Senate and the

executive branch should be.

All of this moves in the direction of recognition. This is a pattern

I have seen in case after case as the United States moves from opposition to a regime toward full diplomatic recognition. No step is

inevitable. I would not want to be heard to say that it is, and I

think vociferous opposition from the Senate and from the House

can have a major impact on the thinking at the State Department.

At least it should. It always had a major impact when I was there,

I can tell you that. I hope that this body and the other body continue their very close scrutiny of what is going on because it is not

inevitable and it can be stopped.

Senator BROWNBACK. Ms. Bernstein, I asked the Ambassador a

question about compensation discussions with the victim families

and the State Department’s involvement or putting forward any

sort of level of compensation. Are you familiar with any of these

discussions, and do you have any thoughts on the State Department’s role in these discussions?

Ms. BERNSTEIN. I am not familiar with any of those discussions.

I am not surprised. I would not be surprised to learn that there

have been. As I indicated, in the meeting that took place in February, which I know was attended by a representative from Congressman Rahall’s office, because he is one of the Congressmen who

expressed an interest to traveling to Libya, this did come up.

As I mentioned, I think it is a cynical attempt to buy the families

off, and I think that it is perceived as kind of the last stumbling

block, or one of the last stumbling blocks, before normal relations

can be resumed. Although I cannot presume to speak for all the

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American families, I really do believe in my heart that family members are not going to be silenced in that way, and that is how I

perceive this. It would be an attempt to silence us.

Senator BROWNBACK. To buy you off.

Ms. BERNSTEIN. Absolutely, absolutely.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, let me thank both of you for coming

here and particularly, Ms. Bernstein, for all that you have been

through in this horrible episode in U.S. history, the worst air terrorism act in the history of the world that has occurred and the

families that were torn apart through this and the grief and lack

of resolution in the years that have ensued. I am hopeful we can

continue to try to press toward getting real answers to what happened and people really responsible for it ultimately, all the way

up the chain being held responsible for what happened to the families, which is ultimately what all of us want to get and want to see,

that we do not just try to paper over something or pay off somebody in an effort to rush toward something that is going to prove

in the end to be something of a bad move and a very bad mistake

for the United States to re-engage this government that has shown

no remorse, no resolution to say that this was wrong and that we

are going to deal with it. You have my pledge for us to continue

to proceed to get to the final justice of this matter.

Ms. BERNSTEIN. Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to

speak to you this morning. I will convey what you have said to the

family members I will be joining shortly to watch the trial proceeds

today.

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Torricelli.

Senator TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions

only to express, much as you did, that Ms. Bernstein, your family

is very fortunate that they have had in you such an advocate and

articulate spokesperson to deal not only with the tragedy of your

family but all of these families.

Mr. Bolton, thank you as well for your analysis of the situation.

It is an extraordinary thing that the United States entered the

20th century threatening war against Mr. Qadhafi’s predecessors

in North Africa because of the kidnapping of a single American

woman. A century later, 293 people are murdered and we deal with

it like it is an individual law enforcement problem. I do not know

how we came to the circumstances where a plane or a ship of the

United States can be destroyed and our citizens murdered and it

is anything less than an act of war. It was a profound misjudgment

in the Bush administration not to deal with this as an attack upon

the United States. I trust there has been a lesson learned.

One likes to think that in our country policy evolves and wisdom

grows. Each generation before has dealt with these situations differently. This was, after all, with different technology at a different

time, what brought the United States into World War I. Ships of

the United States were attacked, and I might point out lesser numbers of lives were lost. The United States dealt with this as an attack upon our country.

From the outset of this, no one has had any doubts that ultimately responsibility for this act was with the Libyan Government.

It was not necessary to know who or how or under exactly what

circumstances to know that this was an act of war against the

35

United States and its Government. That is how it should have been

dealt with. Indeed, as you pointed out, Mr. Bolton, that is how Ronald Reagan dealt with it. I trust a future American President, having seen the various lessons and how different administrations

dealt with similar facts, will have a different resolve.

But like our Chairman, Senator Brownback, I want you and each

of the families to know, Ms. Bernstein, that we are not going to

leave this matter either. Our eyes will be closely focused on how

the administration deals with this issue, and we are not going

away.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Torricelli.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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