Information on pre-ditching communica-
tion provided in the training manuals is
adequate, provided the term ditching is
confined to a deliberate, controlled, land-
ing of an aircraft on water with plenty of
time to prepare. In contrast, there are
many areas that need to be addressed con-
cerning early communication and coordi-
nation in water-related emergencies. As
advance warning time decreases, commu-
nication is greatly reduced or non-existent;
specific instructions for such quickly-
developing emergencies should be devel-
oped. Better crew resource management
techniques that provide enhanced coor-
dination among the cockpit and cabin
crews, especially during the early stages of
such emergencies, would be helpful in this
regard.

Similar communication problems exist
related to confusing emergency signals.
Airline buy-outs and mergers pair pilots
and flight attendants with different train-
ing experiences, and while retraining pro-
grams have been designed to overcome
these differences, flight attendants inter-
viewed suggested that the “first” training
one receives is the one likely to be
remembered in an emergency. Since
different emergency signals are taught by
the airlines, retrained crewmembers may
become confused about which signal
should be recognized as indicating an
emergency. This potential dilemma could
be resolved if all airlines adopted a uni-
versal emergency signal.

Information concerning the evacuation
phase of water-related accidents is limited.
This portion of training directs flight
attendants to determine usable exits,
ensure that rafts are inflated, and shout
commands, but offers no
detailed guidance concerning the cir-
cumstances created by the (un)anticipated

evacuation

14

damage of the aircraft upon water impact.
The expected flotation time of specific
aircraft models is not included in the in-
flight manuals, potentially producing poor
decisions about such evacuation-related
topics as the potential time for, and de-
sirability of, slide/raft portability, among
others.

Each piece of emergency equipment is
defined in the training manuals; however,
differences in the contents, storage loca-
tions, and specific operation of emergency
equipment cause one to wonder if flight
attendants who are qualified on multiple
aircraft would be capable of efficient ac-
tion. It is also questionable how effectively
flight attendants could move stowed rafts
to exits or slide/rafts from unusable exits
to accessible door-ways, even with the help
of able-bodied passengers.

Tt is critical that all water-related emer-
gency equipment be made of waterproof
materials. Accidents such as U.S. Air
Flight 5050, at LaGuardia International
Airport on September 20, 1989 (Appendix
B, Case 6), reveal that dangerous
circumstances can arise because of inade-
quate equipment. In that accident a
megaphone proved to be the only effective
mode of communication among the crew
and passengers; unfortunately, it quit
working when it became wet. Similarly,
the survival manual provided in the
survival kit is perceived by flight
attendants to be the "Bible of Survival." As
such, the manuals should be made of
waterproof paper, which is not currently
the situation.

Incorporating pictures into the training
materials or using video presentations
would also give flight attendants a better
appreciation of proper techniques. Differ-
ences in the instructions for equipment


In this analysis, flotation starts when the
airplane comes to rest. The initial flotation
attitude (depth and angle of the airplane in the
water) is based primarily on calculations
related to the buoyancy contributions of the
wing box and fuselage. Change in airplane
attitude over time, because of inward water
leakage through known sources, i.e., vents,
valves, etc., not closed in the pre-ditching
procedures, is computed at multiple time
intervals until the airplane is estimated to sink.
All of the evacuation and water survival
related activities that must be accomplished
have to be achievable within this time.

Pre-Ditching Communication. Pre-ditching
communication is considered to be the prepa-
ration phase of an inflight emergency. For a
ditching, this phase begins with the identi-
fication of a problem and terminates when the
aircraft stops moving in the water. There are
no suggestions regarding pre-ditching commu-
nications among the crew in the recommended
training materials of the airframe manufac-
turers. However, it is recommended that a
passenger briefing be performed in anticipa-
tion of a ditching. This briefing would incor-
porate appropriate amendments to the normal
pre-landing briefing. Additionally, these ma-
terials recommend that flight attendants
demonstrate how to don the life vests and use
the flotation seat cushions, if time allows; that
passengers should be instructed to remove
high-heel shoes; and that helpers should be
assigned to passengers who might need
assistance. The establishment of division lines
within the cabin is also recommended to
distribute passengers evenly among the exits.
Unplanned water landings are not addressed.

Airframe manufacturers recommend that once
the impact has occurred, flight attendants
should assess the situation and immediately
initiate the evacuation, as appropriate. Other
recommendations include the following:

Move to assigned stations.

Prepare escape routes.

Inflate slide/rafts, if equipped.

Shout evacuation and stlide/raft loading
commands.

ecee

Evacuation Recommendations. A checklist
for immediate action is outlined in several of
the airframe manufacturers’ training materials.
This checklist includes such items as:

e Direct passengers away from unusable
exits.

¢ Retrieve emergency locator transmitter(s)
from airplane storage locations and carry
aboard raft.

e Retrieve survival kit.

¢ Tie radio beacon to raft and deploy, if
equipped.

e Direct first evacuees to move to center
seating areas as they enter raft.

e Keep weight distribution even.

e Ensure that the airplane is fully evacuated.

slide/raft

releasing the girt attachment and discon-

e Release from airplane by
necting or cutting mooring line.

¢ Guide evacuees in the water to raft
boarding stations and bring aboard.

¢ Toss heavy line to any evacuees who may
be floundering in water.

© Move rafts from fuel-saturated waters, but
stay in the vicinity of the airplane until it
sinks,

e Attend to serious injuries.

¢ Check condition of raft. Repair, bail, or
dry as necessary.

e Connect two or more rafts using sea
anchor line.

* Deploy sea anchor.

Emergency Equipment Usage. Care for the
life raft is the most common instruction. Some
detail is given regarding repair, proper infla-
tion and keeping the raft floor dry. Some


10.

it.

12.

13.

The use of approved flotation seat
cushions in all passenger-carrying aircraft,
whether the aircraft were new or being
refurbished, would provide passengers
with a means of flotation in an inad-
vertent water landing during other than
extended overwater flights.

Emergency disaster plans for airports
located near significant bodies of water
could include procedures for handling
water-impact accidents of aircraft taking
off or landing at the airport. The most
meritorious of these plans would provide
training for rescuers, airport personnel,
and airline crewmembers and would con-
duct drills to test emergency responsive-
ness and interagency coordination.

Definitions for ditching and inadvertent
water landing are not included in the
FARs. Descriptive clarification of these
events would aid transport category
aviation operators in the development of
training programs and selection of
emergency equipment.

Research projects could provide needed
information in the following areas:

© The effectiveness of passenger brief-

ings related to ditching in order to
assure that the most effective infor-
mation and methods are being used.

¢ The minimum donning time and

maximum flotation effectiveness of life
vests, especially with regard to infants,
children, the elderly, and those with
special needs.

¢ The effectiveness of using an adult life

vest to brace infants and children in an
emergency impact.

18

e The effectiveness of survival kits to
permit better formulation of FAA
guidelines.

REFERENCES

1. Allgood, M., Reynolds, H., & Snow, C.
(1975). Anthropometry Of Airline Stewar-
desses (FAA-AM-75-2).

2. Anderson, K. (1984, January 30). Cited in:
Can We Keep The Skies Safe? News-
week, 103, 24-31.

3. Antufiano, M., Shaw, R., Brown, J.,
Nelson, H., & Storey, R. (1991). Global
Survival (FAA-CAMI/AAM-420).

4. Beck, M., Sandza, R., Cook, W., Hager,
M., Morris, H., Doherty, S., & Resener,
M. (1984, January 30). Can We Keep The
Skies Safe? Newsweek, 103, 24-31.

5, Chen, C, & Muller, M. (1994).
Commuter/Air Taxi Ditchings and Water-
Related Impacts That Occurred From 1979
to 1989 (DOT/FAA/TC-92/4).

6. Code of Federal Regulations (1994).
Chapter 14, Part 139.3 CH. 1 (1-1-94
Edition) Federal Aviation Administration,
DOT.

7. Colby, P. (personal communication
December 8, 1994). Florida Public Safety
Division of Water Rescue, Airport Disas-
ter Drill, Ft. Lauderdale, FL.

8. Johnson, R. A. (1984) Study on Transport
Airplane Unplanned Water Contact, FAA
Technical Center Report (DOT/FAA/
TC-84/3).


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank the many airlines and airframe manufacturers who provided the training materials analyzed
for this report. We also appreciate the representatives of those organizations who reviewed and commented
on the report. The final product is much enhanced by those thoughtful remarks.

Thanks, too, to the flight attendants and trainers who provided valuable information. A special thank you is
given to the personnel of the US Coast Guard Station at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for providing the
invaluable sea-going transportation that made data gathering for the Water Emergency Demonstration
Project possible. Their hospitality and professionalism were unmatched.


After the airplane came to rest, the evacuation in
the cabin was initiated inadvertently by the purser
stationed at door 2L. He heard no command
from the flight crew to evacuate, and although the
emergency evacuation signal was activated, he did
not hear it. The flight attendants at doors 4L and
4R had no awareness of an emergency situation
and momentarily waited until they saw actions by
the forward flight attendants before opening the
doors and initiating the evacuation of the last
section of the airplane. All of the cabin doors,
except for 1R and 3L, were opened by the flight
attendants. All of the combination slide/rafts de-
ployed automatically and, except for the slide/
raft at 4L, all inflated.

Evacuation of the plane went smoothly except for
two intoxicated passengers who refused to leave
the airplane and had to be bodily removed from
the cabin by the flight crew. The JFK Port Au-
thority of New York and New Jersey emergency
crews responded immediately. When they arrived
at 2121, they saw no fire. About 80% of the
passengers had exited the aircraft. Rescue workers
observed a number of passengers and crew
members forward of the No. 1 engine, two of
whom were in the water. One of the rescuers
entered the water and assisted about 12 pass-
engers who were in a slide raft in the basin at the
end of the approach lighting system pier. Several
firefighters escorted passengers on the end of the
pier over the left wing and back onto the pier and
away from the aircraft. Firefighters also rescued
another slide/raft of passengers adrift in the
basin, forward of the No. 3 engine. All were pul-
led to safety and it was estimated that all pass-
engers were on land and safely clear of the aircraft
within 5 to 7 minutes.

Fatal: None

Serious: 1 passenger
Minor: 3 flight crew, 8
passengers

None: 11 flight crew, 154
passengers

Injuries:

B-5

(Case No.5) | NTSB/AAR-84/15,  Scandina-
vian Airlines System Flight 901, McDonnell
Douglas DC-10-30 Norwegian Registry LN-RKB
John F. Kennedy International Airport, New
York, February 28, 1984.

Case No. 6: Synopsis excerpt:

On September 20, 1989, USAir Flight 5050 was
an “extra section" passenger flight to replace the
regularly scheduled, but canceled, flight 1846
from New York City's LaGuardia Airport to
Charlotte Douglas Int. Airport, Charlotte, North
Carolina. Instrument conditions prevailed, and
the runway was wet. The accident occurred in
darkness. As the first officer began the takeoff
roll on runway 31, the airplane drifted to the left,
and the captain used the nosewheel steering tiller
to correct the drift. Later in the takeoff, the flight
crew heard a "bang" and a rumbling noise. The
captain then took control from the first officer
and rejected the takeoff. The airplane did not stop
on the runway, crossing the end of the runway at
a ground speed of 34 knots. It came to rest in
Bowery Bay on a pier that supports the approach

lights for runway 13 (Figure 5).

Immediately following the impact, the captain
verbally performed the Passenger Evacuation
checklist. The captain, the first officer, an off-duty
Pan American captain, flight attendants, and an
airport police officer (who jumped into the water
from the runway deck) assisted the passengers in
evacuation. A flight attendant deployed the evac-
uation slide at R-l ; the R-2 slide was disarmed
before the door was opened because the flight
attendant believed that the slide would float up-
ward and block the exit because of the closeness
of the water. The L-2 door was opened and then
closed when water entered the cabin. Depending
upon where the passengers were seated, their
evacuations were impeded by darkness, cabin
separations at seat rows 4 and 21, and unusable
floor level exits on the left side.


usage and survival kit contents should be
rectified. Presently, Advisory Circular 120-
47 suggests contents for survival kits, but
since there is no Technical Standard Order
(TSO) that specifies content, survival kits
differ from airplane to airplane.

The issue of managing personal flotation is
confused. Life vests differ in style and
function not only from airplane to air-
plane, but they can also vary within the
same airplane. This latter situation indi-
cates that the vest used for the pre-flight
briefing is, in some cases, different from
the vests that the passengers would use.
Among airlines, flight attendants offer
conflicting advice to passengers on infla-
tion time and usage of life vests. There are
also conflicting techniques on how to
properly prepare an infant for impact, and
there are numerous techniques suggested
for providing flotation for children. This
suggests that some recommended tech-
niques may be erroneous or inadequate.
Significantly, none of the flight attendants
and/or instructors interviewed for this
report expressed confidence in the recom-
mended methods. The “correct” procedure
for proper inflation of life vests needs to be
established. Instructions for managing el-
derly, injured, or handicapped individuals
are insufficient for a water-related emer-
gency. The system of assigning a buddy
could be very successful in preparing
children, the handicapped, or the elderly,
if procedures were adopted for effectively
establishing flotation of these individuals.

The topic of survival is only discussed
relative to the survival kit. Although the
contents of survival kits differ, the basic in-
formation is acceptable, if expanded. Many
issues dealing with the environment, in-
juries, and mental attitude of victims are
not discussed. For example, passengers
could be abandoning the aircraft directly

15

into the water instead of the rafts. It is
likely that jet fuel, oil, and hydraulic fluid
would be contaminating the water; these
fluids can cause temporary loss of sensory
acuity, e.g., vision and hearing, and pro-
duce nausea. Low water temperature may
also present a serious threat of hypo-
thermia. Adverse passenger reaction to this
stressful environment may range from
panic to immobility; distressed passengers,
especially non-swimmers, are very suscep-
tible to incapacitation and drowning.
Flight attendants may become the primary
emergency care givers, and specific infor-
mation for ditching-related first aid would
be invaluable for establishing competency
of treatment in a water landing. Also
neglected is information regarding person-
al hygiene issues.

On the water, the cornerstone of survival
is effective raft management. Topics such
as distributing weight in rafts and capsizing
should be expanded. Capsizing is always a
possibility, especially in high seas or
extreme winds. If the raft capsizes with the
canopy up, there is a danger of persons
being trapped below the raft inside the
canopy. This creates a life-threatening sit-
uation. Additionally, the raft commander
must make responsible decisions based
upon the danger of the wave action
(especially in foul weather) and relate them
to the survivors. The wave action may be
cause to consider removing the canopy at
the risk of exposure, should capsizing be a
risk. The raft commander should instruct
all passengers to wear their life vests at all
times and should designate one person to
secure himself or herself to the raft in case
it capsizes (NASC, 1991). This can retard
the additional wind-related drift of the raft
and prevent the capsized survivors from
losing it. It is also important to secure all
of the survival equipment in the raft to
prevent loss if the raft capsizes. In this re-


APPENDIX A

WATER-EMERGENCY DEMON-
STRATION PROJECT

In an effort to gain insight into the effectiveness
of airline training procedures, seven airlines and
several ditching equipment manufacturers joined
with 65 concerned agencies to conduct an airport
disaster exercise for the Ft. Lauderdale-Holly-
wood International Airport. A few of the
participating entities include the Florida Depart-
ment of Public Safety, the U.S. Coast Guard, the
US Secret Service, FAA, NTSB, LB&M Aviation,
the 301st Rescue Squadron Para-jumpers, the
Port Everglades Sheriff's Dept., local fire depart-
ments and emergency medical systems, police,
hospitals, and the county morgue. This exercise
provided training to air and rescue crews and also
tested the airport's Emergency Disaster Exercise
Plan. The exercise scenario included an inadver-
tent water landing designed to simultaneously
start the emergency response by all participants.
An emergency alert code was given to all of the
rescue agencies, countywide, and they responded
as if it were an actual emergency.

Phase one. An L-1011 with 300 people on board
crashed into the Intracoastal Waterway moments
after takeoff from Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood
International Airport. Fifty people were dead and
two hundred fifty survivors were floating in the
water or clinging to aircraft wreckage, waiting to
be rescued. A central command post was estab-
lished at the scene to coordinate activities of the
agencies, ambulances and rescue
helicopters ferried critically-injured survivors to
local hospitals. The US Coast Guard also estab-
lished a wide area search pattern, looking for
additional stray survivors.

rescue

Al

The exercise began with pilots and_ flight
attendants from the participating airlines, along
with other designated victims, stationed on the
L-1011 mockup positioned in the middle of the
waterway (see Figure 3). Upon command, these
passengers evacuated the aircraft. Some passengers
exited directly into the water while others boarded
the slide/raft and waited to be rescued. After
being rescued, the swviors were taken to a triage
station where the severity of their injuries was
determined and emergency treatment admini-
stered.

Phase two. An aircraft has ditched at sea and
sunk; survivors are awaiting rescue overnight in
slide/rafts and a ten-man life raft. Airborne
rescue personnel arrived on the scene the fol-
lowing morning, picking the survivors from the
water.

The exercise was conducted outside the impact
zone, in the open water of the Atlantic Ocean.
Participating airline personnel were deployed in
the slide/rafts and the life raft (see Figure 4). The
US Coast Guard, Florida Marine Patrol, Florida
Public Safety, US Secret Service and the Broward
County Sheriff's Office maintained visual sur-
veillance, while participants conducted tests of
survival equipment. This testing included
deployment of the raft canopy, use of survival kit
equipment, use of flotation devices, righting the
capsized slide/raft or raft, communication, use of
visual signaling equipment, radar signature testing,
and airborne rescue. This scenario tested inter-
agency coordination and provided valuable train-
ing for rescuers and airline crew members; it also
furnished first-hand knowledge of what the flight
attendants might encounter in an actual ditching.
Participants were debriefed at the conclusion of
both exercises. Comments included:


mation, so that flight attendants have the
information base with which to become as
effective as possible. Similarly, flight atten-
dants should have significant water survival
skills training to prepare them to act ef-
ficiently. Given the ready availability of water-
related materials and procedures proven in
other aquatic and emergency environments,
these training enhancements should be easy to
achieve. Specific activities that should be
accomplished to support this process include
the following:

1. Comprehensive state-of-the-art training
materials produced by airframe manu-
facturers would provide enhanced sup-
port to the airlines who adopt only the
airframe manufacturers' recommenda-
tions as their official training programs.

2. Updated sources of passenger informa-
tion (briefings, signage, etc.) on water
impact information would be helpful.
Information, such as where to obtain life
vests, instructions to leave baggage be-
hind, and that the evacuation slide may
be used as a raft, would better inform
passengers.

3. Enhanced ditching and water survival op-
erations could be used to augment current
emergency training requirements. Detail-
ed information thoroughly covering each
subject area with illustrated written
material, video presentations, and practi-
cal proficiency testing would be inval-
uable. Ditching and water survival infor-
mation should include current data on:

Aircraft Flotation Expectations
Crew Communication
Evacuation

Equipment

Survival/Raft Management
Ditching-Specific First Aid
Rescue

ecereevee

17

Recurrent training could serve as a bene-
ficial medium to conduct joint flight deck
and cabin crew ditching scenarios, com-
munication training, and evacuation
drills, and provide an opportunity to en-
hance standardization of training mater-
ials and in-flight emergency coordination
procedures. Performing drills in an
aquatic environment would provide for
maximum effectiveness.

Flight attendant participation in ditching
drills conducted in an aquatic environ-
ment, using pertinent manuals and equip-
ment, would provide enhanced expertise
in dealing with probable hazards, human
performance under stressful situations,
evacuation, survival, and rescue.

Adopting a standardized emergency signal
for ditching by all airlines would alleviate
potential confusion of retrained crew-
members.

Emergency equipment locations could be
adopted among aircraft types so that
flight attendants qualified on multiple air-
craft types can react immediately during
emergencies without the need to consult
equipment location documentation.

Providing only one type of life vest
aboard any single airplane, including the
one used in the flight attendant briefing/
demonstration, would allow better prepa-
ration of passengers in the event of a
water landing.

Use of waterproof materials in equipment
critical to survival in a water environment
would improve both the usability and
survivability of such materials. Included
would be the ditching, water survival,
first aid, and emergency portions of flight
attendant in-flight manuals.


About 20 passengers were able to successfully
evacuate through the left overwing exits and stand
on the wing, which was out of the water.
Someone unstowed the fabric ditching line from
above a left overwing exit and tied it to its wing
fitting, providing these passenger something to
hold on to while awaiting rescue. The ditching
line was also unstowed from the right overwing
exit opening but evacuees did not know it needed
to be tied to the right wing fitting. The forward
portion of the right wing was out of the water and
passengers held onto the ditching line so they
could stay out of the water.

Passengers who egressed at the two floor-level
exits entered the water and because of the 1-knot
current, some persons drifted away from the air-
plane and under the runway deck. Crew members
threw flotation seat cushions and crew life
preservers, which were held by passengers and
crew members, some of whom could not swim.
Several persons complained that they could not
hold onto the cushions or that the cushions did
not keep them afloat. Some clung to pilings under
the deck and floating debris. Some passengers
also swallowed fuel that was on the surface of the
water. There was no fire.

The first rescue boat, a New York Police
Department Harbor Unit, arrived approximately
10 minutes after the accident; it was joined shortly
by US Coast Guard boats, boats from other
agencies, and two Coast Guard helicopters. Sev-
eral of the passengers complained that waves
from boats, and down wash from the rescue heli-
copters, hampered the ability to stay afloat. One
passenger sustained a fractured right ankle and a
lacerated hand when a rescue boat backed over
her in the darkness. The captain and the lead
flight attendant were the last crew members to
leave the cabin after assisting rescue workers, who
‘were attempting to extricate passengers trapped in
seats 21F and 22A. According to Coast Guard
records, all persons were removed from the air-
craft within 90 minutes.

B-6

Problems later identified by the crew members
included a problem with one hand-held, battery
powered cabin megaphone; the other megaphone
was not used. The lead flight attendant stated that
he attempted to use it to give evacuation com-
mands, but subsequently his commands were
"squelching" (feedback) and that it became more
effective to simply yell the commands. Also, this
megaphone quit operating completely after it
became wet.

During the investigation, it was discovered that
the megaphone used at the USAir training center
had a volume knob that atypically tumed to the
left to increase the volume. The lead flight atten-
dant could not specify which way he operated the
volume knob, or whether he operated it at all
during the rescue sequence. The megaphone he
used was not recovered following the accident.

It should also be noted that although crewmem-
bers had life preservers, FAA regulations did not
require life preservers for passengers aboard this
flight. Also, because it was not required by the
FAA, flight attendants had not received hands-on
ditching training in water.

Passengers: 57 passengers including one 5
year old and an 8 month old
baby held by its mother.

Injuries: Fatal: 2 passengers - suffo-

cation - seats 21A & 21B
Serious: 3 passengers

Minor: 6 crew, 12 passengers
None: 37 passengers
Unknown”: 3 passengers
*Hospital records were not
available for three passengers.

(Case No. 6) NTSB/AAR-90/03,  USAir,

Inc., Boeing 737-400, LaGuardia Airport,
Flushing, New York, September 20, 1989.

YXUS. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1998 - 660-088/80002


FIGURE 1
Vertical Flotation

Rescue. None of the airlines included rescue in
the training manuals, nor did they report
incorporating the information anywhere else
in the training curriculum. The only instruc-
tion given on this subject area is to wait in the
raft until guidance is received from rescue
personnel.

DISCUSSION

Proper preparation and control of the pass-
engers by the crew is the single most im-
portant factor in occupant survival during
ditching, according to a National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB) study, Air Carrier
Overwater Emergency Equipment And Pro-
cedures (1985). The study found that the
behavior of the cockpit and cabin crew-
members in preparing for a ditching, or in the
immediate aftermath of an inadvertent water
impact, can have a significant effect on the

12

FIGURE 2
Horizontal Flotation

chances for survival. A recommendation for
additional crew training stated, "Quick re-
sponse procedures following inadvertent water
contacts" is needed, "in addition to, or in place
of, the planned ditching training given by
most carriers." Given the current scope and
focus of the training programs reviewed, this
recommendation remains in need of action.

Information given in the ditching and water
survival recommendations of airframe manu-
facturers is incomplete, but recall that these
recommendations are not meant to be the
definitive training for airlines that purchase
aircraft. They are simply a basis for certifi-
cation, as required in FAR section 25.1581.
Based on the limited information provided, it
is highly questionable whether a crew would
have sufficient information and training to
react effectively in a ditching emergency. Also,
many of the airframe manufacturers’ recom-
mended training materials only make sugges-


TABLE 3

50 Busiest FAA-Controlled Airports / 1996

(Proximity To Large Bodies Of Water)

Water Ocean,
Rank Name & State Within Gulf or Reservoir River
5 Miles Great or Lake
Lake
1. Chicago O'Hare Int., IL yes x
2. Dallas/Ft. Worth Int., TX yes x x
3. Los Angeles Int., CA yes: x
4. Attanta Int., GA yes x
5. Detroit Metro Wayne Co., MI yes x
6. Miami Int, FL yes x
7. Phoenix Sky Harbor Int., AZ no
8. Van Nuys, CA yes x
9. St. Louis Int., MO yes x
10. Oakland Int., CA yes x
M1. Minneapolis,St. Paul, MN yes x
12. Long Beach, CA yes x
13. Las Vegas McCarran Int, NV yes x
14, ‘Santa Ana, Orange Co. CA yes x
15. Boston Logan, MA. yes x
16. Charlotte Douglas, NC yes x x
47. Newark, NJ yes x
18. Denver Int., CO no
19. Pittsburgh Greater Int., PA. yes x
20. San Francisco, CA yes x
21. Philadelphia Int., PA yes x
22. Cincinnati Greater, KY yes x
23. Houston Intercontinental, TX yes x
24. Seattle Tacoma Int., WA yes x
2. Salt Lake City Int, UT yes x
26. Honolulu, HI yes x
27. John F. Kennedy, NY yes x
28. Memphis Int., TN yes x
29. Denver/Centennial, CO no
30. Prescott, AZ. no
31. La Guardia, NY yes x
32. Orlando Int., FL. yes x
33. Seattle Boeing, WA yes x
34, Washington Dulles Int, VA yes x
35. Pontiac, MI yes x
36, Washington National, DC yes x
37. Portiand Int., OR yes x
38. Sanford, FL yes x
39. Cleveland Hopkins Int, OH yes x
40 Fort Worth Meacham, TX. yes x
a. ‘Anchorage Int., AK yes x
42. ‘San Jose Int., CA yes x
43. Daytona Beach, FL yes x
44. Tampa Int., FL yes x
45. Baltimore/Washington Int., MD yes x
46. San Antonio, Int. TX no
47. Chicago Midway, IL yes x
48. Houston Hobby, TX yes x
49. North Las Vegas, NV. yes x
50. Deer Valley, AZ no



senior flight attendant tried to pull the slide
inflation handle at the forward passenger door,
but she could not find it. She thought the slide
pack may have separated from the girt bar, so she
abandoned her effort to find it. She grabbed a
megaphone and began giving orders, "Get your
life vest from under your seats and come
forward." The crew assisted passengers with the
life vests, because many were having difficulties
finding and using them. The aircraft was not
equipped with (nor was it required to carry)
approved flotation seat cushions or life rafts. Life
vests were located under the passenger seats, al-
though 42% of the passengers later stated they
had not seen the life vest demonstration and 59%
of the passengers admitted they had not read the
briefing card this trip. Many passengers were
unaware that vests were contained in plastic bags
located in fabric compartments under their seats.
Several tried to use their seat cushions as flotation
devices, but found that they came apart and/or
were not buoyant. Those who did secure their life
vest had various problems with the straps, don-
ning the vest, and they had never seen the light on
a life vest demonstrated. The accident investi-
gation report states that 72% of the passengers
needed specific or direct assistance in the use of
the life vests, and this became a critical problem
because 30% of the passengers could not swim.
One flight attendant ducked under water in an
effort to secure more life vests and subsequently
passed them out the door to crew members who
were assisting passengers in the evacuation. One
overwing window exit floated inside the cabin
during the evacuation, temporarily impeding the
egress of some of the passengers; however, most
felt the initial evacuation took place very rapidly.

A large barge in the vicinity of the crash rescued
most of the survivors within approximately 30
minutes of impact. Survivors with obvious back
and abdominal injuries were pulled on top of the
fuselage and were subsequently transported to the
barge using boards and stretchers. Many boats
responding to emergency requests began trans-
ferring the victims to shore approximately one

B-3

hour after impact. Numerous ambulances and
other vehicles transported victims to five area
hospitals.

Passengers:

The 52 passengers included 26 adult males, 25
adult females, and 1 child 2% years old.

Fatal: 3 Passengers (drowned
apparently after evacuating the
aircraft)

Serious: 2 flight attendants, 9
passengers

Minor: 3 flight crew, 1 flight
attendant, 17 passengers
None: 23 passengers

Injuries:

Most of the injuries were lacerations and
contusions, first degree chemical burns from the
jet fuel, and concussions, However, it should be
noted that of the 11 serious injuries, 10 were spi-
nal and back injuries.

(Case No. 3) | NISB Human Factors Group
Chairman's Factual Report, National Airlines
B-727, Pensacola, FL, May 8, 1978.

Case No. 4: Synopsis excerpt:

On May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines L-1011 en
route from Miami, Florida to Nassau, Grand
Bahama Island, experienced a loss of oil pressure
in the no. 2 engine and the engine was shut down.
The captain elected to return to Miami and
notified the senior flight attendant of his decision.
The no. 1 and no. 3 engines then flamed out, and
the flight crew instructed the flight attendants to
prepare for a ditching; however, the flight atten-
dants were neither told the nature of the problem
nor the amount of time available to prepare the
cabin and the passengers for the ditching. The
senior flight attendant briefed the other flight
attendants, and they instructed the passengers to
don their life preservers. Flight attendants assisted
passengers in donning their life preservers, and


from the flashlight provided in the survival kit
very well. They suggested that a revision be made
in training that required a lookout to shine the
flashlight outside the raft or slide/raft every 30
minutes. This, they suggested, would greatly
increase the possibility for observance by res-
cuers. A discussion over the problems exper-
ienced with using the pyrotechnic flares resulted
in a suggestion that they be replaced with less
dangerous chemical light sticks. The US Coast
Guard team reported that light slicks would re-

main active for about 24 hours and could even be
observed by night vision equipment while inside a
canopied raft.

The issues that were brought up by both the
passenger participants and the rescue agencies
indicated that substantial improvement could be
made in the equipment and procedures related to
ditching and water survival. Many believed that
the improvements could be instituted through en-
hancements to flight attendant training programs.

A4


Analysis of Ditching and Water Survival Training Programs of Major
Airframe Manufacturers and Airlines

INTRODUCTION

In the commercial transport aviation industry,
there is a belief by many that water landings
(ditchings) are almost non-existent. However,
between 1959 and 1979, there were 16 survi-
vable air carrier water accidents worldwide
(Johnson, 1984; see Table 1), ie., approxi-
mately 10 percent of the total survivable air
carrier accidents. In addition, a report filed by
the International Civil Aviation Organization
(Chen & Muller, 1994), indicates there were a
total of 33 water-impact accidents worldwide
from 1982 through 1989 in the commuter
category alone (Table 2). These numbers are
higher than many would expect, yet they are
lower than one might imagine, since at least

179 Certified U.S. Airports (for definition, see
CFR 14 Part 139) are located within 5 miles of
a significant body of water (NTSB, 1985), and
the number of such airports worldwide is
much higher. Further, 44 of the 50 busiest
US. airports in 1996 (DOT/FAA, 1997) are
located within 5 miles of a significant body of
water (see Table 3). These statistics suggest that
the likelihood of an unplanned water landing
event will increase as the number of transport
category aircraft operations increase; dramatic
increases in operations are predicted for early
in the next century (see Phillips, 1994). As a
consequence, state-of-the-art emergency equip-
ment and aircrew training in ditching and
water survival procedures are likely to become
more important than ever before.

TABLE 1
Survivable Worldwide Water Landings (1959-1979)
Location Aircraft Type Date
Oso, Washington B-707 10/19/59
Boston B-720 9/24/61
Rio De Janiero DC-8 8/20/62
New York (JFK) B-707 4ITI64
Hong Kong CVL 6/30/67
Hong Kong 11/5/67
Los Angeles DC-8 1/13/69
Mexico City B-727 9/21/69
Naha, Okinawa DC-8 7/27/70
St. Croix, V.I. DC-9 5/2/70
Miami L-1011 12/29/72
Rio De Janiero B-707 6/9/73
Madiera B-727 11/19/77
Madiera CVL 12/18/77
Pensacola B-727 5/8/78
Palermo, Italy DC-9 12/23/78





tions for handling a ditching. The review of
airline flight attendant training programs
revealed that some airlines adopt the airframe
manufacturers’ suggested ditching training as
their official ditching training curriculum.
Given the limited information on ditching-
related procedures provided by the airframe
manufacturers, any ditching and water survival
training program based entirely on that
information is inadequate. Specific deficiencies
include:

¢ The pre-ditching communication guide-lines
give no directions related to crew commu-
nication nor instructions for unplanned
water landings.

e Basic information on evacuation is identi-
fied but not explained. Adverse conditions
such as disabled exits, fuselage breakup,
equipment malfunction, poor lighting,
evacuation of injured persons, passenger
disorientation, rising water, poor commu-
nication, and environmental stressors are
not addressed. There are also no instruc-
tions given for such activities as donning
life vests or how to distribute weight
evenly in rafts.

¢ No detailed information for usage of
emergency equipment is provided. None of
the airframe manufacturers’ ditching ma-
terials address the specifics of the survival
kit or give instructions for first aid.

e The airframe manufacturers’ materials
offer no information on the subject of
survival. Issues such as raft management,
hypothermia, severe injuries, shock, salt
water sores, dehydration, water source,
food source, sunburn, sun blindness, haz-
ardous marine life, communication, sea
conditions, and mental attitude are not
covered.

13

¢ Procedures for actual rescue, a description
of rescue devices, and important tips for
rescue equipment usage are not provided.

Thus, if the airframe manufacturer’s recom-
mendations were the only guidance available,
crew and passengers would generally be ill-
equipped to survive.

The status of the reviewed airline ditching and
water survival training programs also indicates
that enhanced information and training could
better prepare flight attendants to perform
their duties effectively following a planned or
inadvertent water landing. The basic know-
ledge for cabin preparation and evacuation is
in place. However, successful performance of
these tasks is uncertain in a ditching or un-
planned water landing. In addition, the survi-
vors of water-related accidents are immediately
exposed to life threatening hazards that are
potentially far more critical than those of a
land accident. Having survived a land impact,
even injured, panicked, or unconscious, pass-
engers have a good chance of living until help
arrives. In an aquatic environment, however, a
properly donned life vest or flotation seat
cushion may be the only link to survival.
Without receiving instructions from a calm,
but commanding, flight attendant regarding
where to obtain equipment or how to use it,
passengers may perish. This would be es-
pecially true for unplanned events.

Generally, airline flight attendant training
programs are geared toward land-related acci-
dents. Although most programs have been
augmented with elements related to ditching,
most also remain incomplete in this area.
Training programs must be comprehensive
enough to ensure that flight attendants are
instilled with skill and confidence
sponding to water landings. The specific state
of current ditching training may be described
as follows:

in re-


© Delta Air Lines L-1011, Emergency fuel
landing, Korea, 1991

¢ Lan Chile BAE-146, Runway overrun,
Chile, 1991

¢ Delta Air Lines L-1011, In-flight fire,
Goose Bay, 1992

¢ Northwest Air Lines B-747, In-flight fire,
Tokyo, 1991

¢ U.S. Air F-28, Crash during attempted
takeoff , New York, 1992

¢ Northwest Air Lines BAE-146, Runway
overrun, China, 1993

¢ Air France B-747, Runway overrun,
Tahiti, 1993

¢ China Air B-747, Runway overrun, Hong
Kong, 1993

© Continental DC-9, Runway overrun, New
York, 1994

NTSB accident reports show that in inad-
vertent, survivable water-related accidents, the
aircraft is likely to come to rest in a nose-high
flotation attitude, sustain severe damage, ex-
perience rapid flooding, and in most cases, sink
within a few minutes. World Airways, Flight
30H (Case No. 1) and US Air, Flight 405 (Case
No. 2) are typical examples of this type of
accident, in which passengers and crew must
deal with emotional distress, damaged equip-
ment, communication problems, rising water,
environmental stressors, and injury, not to
mention evacuation of children, the handi-
capped, and the elderly. Those who success-
fully evacuate the aircraft find themselves
faced with drowning, especially those who are
compromised in some way. Injuries, burns,
sun, shortages of rafts, scarcity of supplies, and
the potential of dangerous marine life are all
issues of concern voiced by accident survivors.
Waiting for help to arrive can be very chal-
lenging mentally and physically, as well. The
threat of hypothermia becomes reality as time
elapses. When rescuers arrive, it may still take
hours for all of the survivors to be transported

to safe surroundings (Colby, 1994). In all, the

challenges to crew and passengers in water-
related accidents are formidable, and the prepa-
ration of crew and passengers for such events
is crucial if they are to survive.

Accident reports also indicate that passengers
are generally uneducated about emergency
aircraft evacuation and accident survival issues
(e.g., Appendix B; Case Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6). In
those accidents, survivors reported a lack of
knowledge about obtaining and using flotation
devices, were unaware that they should leave
their carry-on luggage behind, and were un-
aware that the escape slide could serve as a raft.
The survivors also had little idea about what to
expect during rescue or how to use rescue
equipment.

Similar communication difficulties have been
experienced among crew members during un-
anticipated emergencies. For example, Nation-
al Airlines Flight 193, a Boeing 727-235, had
numerous problems caused by absence of com-
munication among the crew (see Appendix B,
Case No. 3). In a similar case, an Eastern
Airlines L-1011, enroute from Miami, Florida,
to Nassau, Grand Bahama Island, experienced
engine failures, and the flight attendants
prepared the cabin and braced the passengers
for ditching for 9 minutes before the flight
attendants were informed that the need for
such preparations had passed. The NTSB
investigation found that the pre-ditching
instructions contained in Eastern Airline's
flightcrew manual were inconsistent with the
instructions found in the flight attendant
manuals (Appendix B, Case No. 4), probably
causing the confusion. Scandinavian Airlines
System Flight 901(Case No. 5) was also
plagued by a lack of communication among
the crew, some of whom were even unaware
that an emergency event was in progress.


10.

11.

12.

National Aviation Schools Command
(1991). Naval Aviation Water Survival
Training Pro-gram (Initial N-1).

National Transportation Safety Board
(1978). Human Factors Group Chairman’s
Factual Report, National Airlines B-727
Pensacola, FL, May 8, 1978.

National Transportation Safety Board
(1985). Safety Study, Air Carrier Overwater
Emergency Equipment and Procedures
(NTSB/SS/-85/02).

Phillips, E. (1994, August 29). Focus On
Accident Prevention Key To Future Air-
line Safety. Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 141, 52-53.

19

13.

14.

US. Coast Guard, Department of the
Navy, & Department of Air Force, (1955),
Aircraft Emergency Procedures Over Water
(CG Publication No. CG-306). (OPNAV
Publication No. OPNAV-3730.4). (AF
Publication No. AFM64-6). Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

US. Department of Transportation
(DOT/ FAA). (1996; 1997). Administra-
tor’s Fact Book, Washington, DC: Office of
Business Information and Consultation.
(ABC-100).


DOTI/FAA/AM-98/19 Analysis of Ditching and

Office of Aviation Medicine ter Survival Training
Washington, D.C. 20591 Programs of Major Airframe
Manufacturers and Airlines

Donna K. Cosper

LB & M Associates, Inc.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73159

Garnet A. McLean

Civil Aeromedical Institute
Federal Aviation Administration

Oklahoma City, OK 73125

July 1998
Final Report

This document is available to the public
through the National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

@

U.S. Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration


ing near a coastal airport. Appendix B contains
synopses of other pertinent water landing
events. In the conclusion, a set of recommen-
dations is provided that identifies the defi-
ciencies noted, suggests operational and
research options that the industry and
government should consider to address those
deficiencies, and recommends changes that
training programs could incorporate to en-
hance safety and survivability after emergency
water landings.

DITCHING AND WATER SURVIVAL
RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAJOR AIR-
FRAME MANUFACTURERS

The ditching procedures recommended by the
major airframe manufacturers are provided, in
accordance with FAR Section 25.1581, to serve
as the baseline for airline ditching and water
survival training programs. These airframe
manufacturers’ recommendations are not
meant to form the definitive training program
for airlines that purchase aircraft, but simply
to establish a basis for certification.

Aircraft Flotation Characteristics. FAR Part
airworthiness standards for
transport category aircraft and sets the crash

25 regulates

performance standards for certification of
these aircraft. Section 25.801 (c) requires that:
"The probable behavior of the airplane in a
water landing must be investigated by model
tests or by comparison with airplanes of sim-
ilar configuration for which the ditching
characteristics are known." Section 25.801 (d)
states: "It must be shown that, under
reasonably probable water conditions, the
flotation time and trim of the airplane will
allow the occupants to leave the airplane and
enter the life rafts required by section 25.1415.
If compliance with this provision is shown by
buoyancy and trim computations, appropriate

allowances must be made for probable
structural damage and leakage. The jettisonable
volume of fuel may be considered as buoyancy
volume." Section 25.801 (¢) continues: "Unless
the effects of the collapse of external doors and
windows are accounted for in the investigation
of the probable behavior of the airplane in a
water landing (as prescribed in paragraphs (c)
and (d) of section 25.801), the external doors
and windows must be designed to withstand
probable maximum local pressures.”

Airframe manufacturers base their ditching
analyses on a calm sea with steady wind, so
that the velocity of the aircraft relative to the
water is minimized. The airplane is assumed to
have the appropriate approach configuration,
attitude, velocity, and heading. Based on these
considerations, the probable behavior of the
airplane during water entry is compared with
previous testing of conventionally configured
transport category aircraft. Effects of wind
velocity and sea state are included in a ditching
analysis, but not in the flotation analysis (see
Table 4).

Water impact loads are determined using these
water entry conditions. The airplane structure
is evaluated relative to these loads and
strengthened, as necessary, to withstand local
pressures. Consequently, no damage to the
primary structure, i.e., fuselage shell and wing
box, is assumed; however, secondary structure
and some major external components designed
to separate from the airplane under certain
load conditions are assumed to do so, These
components include trailing edge flaps and
wing-mounted engines. The separation is as-
sumed to have no influence on aircraft ditch-
ing behavior, but does change the airplane
gross weight and center of gravity for the flo-
tation analysis.


These events illustrate how communication
among the crew and passengers is especially
important to managing time in emergency sit-
uations; unanticipated water landings offer
special requirements for atypical communica-
tions. Since these events tend to occur during
takeoff or landing, the crew and passengers are
seated, the cabin is secured, carry-on baggage is
stowed, and the meal service has not begun or
has been completed. Therefore, many of the
procedures on the Ditching-Emergency proce-
dures checklist would not be necessary.
However, without any anticipation of a water
landing during cruise flight, or that a water-
related emergency is imminent, many required
duties related to these activities would likely
go undone.

In addition to communications, other factors
influence survival in water-related emergen-
cies; these include crew leadership, passenger
reactions, aircraft damage and water condi-
tions. Crew leadership is based on knowledge
about the passenger reactions, as well as infor-
mation about techniques of emergency equip-
ment usage, survival procedures, and rescue
techniques. Passenger reactions should be
expected to range from panic to fighting to
immobility. The aircraft, when intact, should
generally remain afloat in calm seas for several
minutes, usually sinking tail first. Aircraft
flaps, slats, engine pylons, probes, other parts,
and debris could detach, presenting hazards to
survivors and equipment. Much of the aircraft
condition, as well as the ability to deplane into
the rafts, will depend on the state of the sea. In
an actual emergency situation, the hazard to
passengers and crew will increase as time
passes, and proper crew training will allow the
crew to function effectively and maintain
control of the situation.

Additionally, rescue operations themselves
also produce dangers, such as a raft capsizing
from helicopter rotor wash and the possibility
of electrocution if passengers or crew grasp the

steel rescue cable dangling from the static
electrically-charged helicopter fuselage while
being in the water. These topics are very
different from similar land-based evacuation
and survival requirements, and the minimal
amount of water survival resources available
requires crewmembers and passengers to pos-
sess significant skill and courage to survive.
Specific emergency water survival training de-
signed to provide such information would help
instill that competency.

To determine the information provided, and
the preparedness of flight attendants for water
landing events, an analysis of ditching and
water survival procedures training was con-
ducted. Reviewed were emergency procedures
recommended by airframe manufacturers, as
well as information supplied in airline flight
attendant training programs. Written materials
for the analysis were provided by six major
airframe manufacturers and nine major air-
lines; further, interviews were conducted with
training instructors and flight attendants.
Information was made available on seven dif-
ferent transport category aircraft types, and
the flight attendant training materials provided
for the study include the Initial Training
Manual for Ditching/Water Survival, the Recur-
rent Training Manual for Ditching/Water
Survival, and the Flight Attendant In-Flight
Manual for each of the airlines. The organiza-
tion of these materials provided the organiza-
tion for this report within the sections on
airframe manufacturer recommendations and
airline flight attendant training programs, i.e.,
each section described later in this report
corresponds to the general organization of the
materials reviewed.

Also included in this analysis is Appendix A,
which contains a description and debriefing
record of a recent Water Emergency Demon-
stration Project conducted to evaluate ditch-
ing related emergency equipment, procedures,
and rescue operations after a simulated ditch-


Case No. 2: Synopsis excerpt:

On Sunday, March 22, 1992, about 2135 Eastern
Standard time, a Fokker 28-4000, N485US,
operating as USAir Flight 405, crashed during an
attempted takeoff from runway 13 at LaGuardia
Airport, Flushing, New York. The airplane was a
scheduled passenger flight from Jacksonville,
Florida, to Cleveland, Ohio, with a stopover at
LaGuardia Airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board de-
termined that the probable causes of this accident
were: 1) the failure of the airline industry and the
FAA to provide flight crews with procedures,
requirements, and criteria compatible with depar-
ture delays in conditions conducive to airframe
icing, and 2) the decision by the flight crew to
take off without positive assurance that the
airplane's wings were free of ice accumulation
after 35 minutes of exposure to precipitation
following deicing. The ice contamination on the
wings resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of
control after liftoff. Contributing to the cause of
the accident were the inappropriate procedures
used by, and inadequate coordination between,
the flight crew that led to a takeoff rotation at a
lower than prescribed air speed.

The first officer stated that the last thing he
remembered was a flash, a jolt, a rumbling along
the ground, and then a sudden stop. The airplane
came to rest partially inverted at the edge of
Flushing Bay, and parts of the fuselage and
cockpit were submerged in water. After the air-
plane came to rest, passengers stated that several
small lingering fires broke out on the water and
on the wreckage debris. Aircraft rescue and fire
fighters responded to the accident scene, extin-
guished the fires, and began rescue efforts. The
airplane was totally destroyed.

Total passengers and crew were
51.

Passengers:

Injuries: Fatal: 2 crew, 25 passengers

B-2

Serious: 1 crew, 8 passengers
Minor: 1 crew, 11 passengers
Unknown’, 3 passengers
*Hospital records were not
available for 3 passengers.

(Case No. 2) | NTSB-DCA-92-MA-025, US Air
Inc., Fokker F-28, Flight 405, N485, LaGuardia
Int. Airport, Flushing, New York, March 22,
1992.

Case No. 3: Synopsis excerpt:

National Airlines, Boeing 727-235, Flight 193, was
inbound on an Airport Surveillance Radar
approach to the Pensacola Regional Airport. The
aircraft inadvertently impacted in approximately
17 feet of water near the center of Escambia Bay,
approximately three miles from the approach end
of runway 25 at approximately 2121 CDT on May
8, 1978.

The passengers were all seated with lap belts on,
trays stowed, and seat backs upright as the senior
flight attendant was preparing to read the
standard pre-landing announcement. There were
no warnings, or changes in aircraft altitude or
power before impact. Passengers interviewed af-
ter the crash believed the severity of the impact to
be categorized as, “hitting very hard on land."
Most reported that they were thrown forward
and/or downward. Those seated near the wing
and to the rear said that they either smelled,
tasted, or were struck by jet fuel immediately after
impact. Passengers were very concerned about the
possibility of a fire, although no post-crash fire
occurred. There was a "gush" of water into the
airplane and the water began to rise very fast.
Some of the injured were trapped in their seats by
the rising water.

The passengers evacuated the cabin as the aircraft
settled tail first in the shallow water. Three over-
wing exits were opened by passengers. The two
forward, floor-level, doors were opened by the
crew after numerous problems. One man escaped

by opening the aft (right) emergency door. The


APPENDIX B

ACCIDENT/INCIDENT HISTORY

Case No. 1: Synopsis excerpt:

On January 23, 1982, World Airways, Inc. Flight
30H, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, was a
regularly scheduled passenger flight from
Oakland, California to Boston, Massachusetts,
with an en route stop at Newark, New Jersey.
Following a non precision instrument approach to
runway 15R at Boston Logan International Air-
port, the airplane touched down about 2,500 feet
beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191 foot
usable part of the runway. When the captain
realized that he could not stop the airplane on the
runway, he steered it to the left to avoid the
runway 33L approach light pier. Four seconds
later, at 1936:40, during the hours of darkness,
Flight 30H inadvertently went over the sea wall
and into Boston Harbor (Figure 5).

Total Passengers and Crew Aboard Flight 30H:
212

Injuries: Fatal: 2 Passengers
Serious: 2 Flight Crew, 2
Passengers
Minor: 5 Flight Crew, 19
Passengers, 2 Rescue Personnel
None: 5 Flight Crew, 174
Passengers

(Case No. 1) | NISB-AAR-82-15, World Air-
ways, Inc., Flight 30H, N112WA.

McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, Boston Logan
International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts,
January 23, 1982.

FIGURE 5
Us Air Flight 5050

B-1


TABLE 2
Commuter Aircraft Water Impact Accidents (1982-1989)

Country No. of Accidents
United States 14
Canada 10
United Kingdom 2
Costa Rica 1
Denmark 1
Germany 1
Japan 1
New Zealand 4
Australia 4
Brazil 1
Total 33

Although "ditching" is not defined in the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), it is
usually described as a planned emergency
event in which the crew, with the aircraft
under control, deliberately lands in water. In
contrast would be an inadvertent water im-
pact in which there is little or no time for crew
or passenger preparation. Ditchings allow
some amount of time for donning life
preservers and preparing the aircraft and
passengers for the emergency. Current water
survival-related regulations and training are
focused primarily on ditchings occurring at sea
on extended overwater flights; however, vir-
tually all survivable water-related accidents are
inadvertent and occur near airports (NTSB,
1985). Thus, water landing accidents are gen-
erally unplanned and, because airline training
programs rarely address issues of this nature,
flight crews are at a disadvantage in dealing
with an inadvertent water landing (NTSB,
1985). In fact, typical ditching procedures may
be inappropriate in such instances, as likely
water-related accident scenarios would include
problems at the time of take-off or landing
(NTSB, 1978). The following list shows 21
additional accidents or near accidents that
suggest a need for such specific procedures and

training in the areas of water survival,
emergency procedures and emergency equip-
ment utilization.

¢ World Airways DC-10, Runway overrun,
Boston, 1982

e Air Florida B-737, Icing accident,
Washington, 1982

e Scandinavian Airlines DC-10, Runway
overrun, New York, 1984

e American Air Lines DC-10, Runway
overrun, Puerto Rico, 1985

e Eastern Air Lines L-1011, Triple engine
failure, Miami, 1985

¢ Delta Air Lines B-767, Double engine
shutdown, Los Angeles,1987

¢ South African Airways B-747, In-flight
fire, Indian Ocean, 1988

e Aloha Air Lines B-737, Structural failure,
Hawaiian Islands, 1988

© United Air Lines B-747, Cargo door
failure, Hawaiian Islands, 1989

e U.S. Air B-737, Runway overrun, New
York, 1989

¢ Fawcett Air B-727, Possible ditching,
Newfoundland, 1990

¢ Delta Air Lines B-767ER, In-flight fire,
Maine, 1991


gard, it would be beneficial for flight atten-
dants to practice righting a capsized raft
during training, especially on the open sea,
if possible.

Flight attendants would also have a better
understanding of basic raft survivability if
more information on raft shapes and sizes
were included in training. For example,
explanations of the bearing on seawor-
thiness produced by changes in freeboard
(the distance from the surface of the water
to the top of the raft's buoyancy tube)
would better prepare flight attendants to
maintain raft stability and flotation, es-
pecially with damaged rafts.

Essential information concerning what to
expect during the various types of rescue,
and practice in the use of rescue equip-
ment, is omitted from training. The sub-
ject of rescue should be dealt with in such
a manner that flight attendants are pre-
pared to meet the challenges involved.
Rescue procedures and the use of rescue
devices should be taught in the initial
training class. It is important that flight
attendants know what to do should rotor
wash from a rescue helicopter capsize the
raft and how to handle extraction of the
survivors if a rescue swimmer is not de-

ployed.

To prevent depressing the morale of
survivors, flight attendants should know to
inform survivors that when a helicopter
comes to rescue them it will only
accommodate a certain number of pass-
engers, and that remaining survivors will
have to wait for the next flight. They
should also be familiar with the various
types of rescue equipment and how to
prevent injuries while using them. Flight
attendants with knowledge in these areas
will understand risks, such as the static
electrical charge that exists on a helicopter

16

fuselage in flight, and be prepared to make
informed safety decisions. Currently, how-
ever, the lack of training and practice on
rescue-related topics indicates that flight
attendants do not have the skill or
proficiency to assist with rescue.

¢ The time allotted to cover ditching and
water survival material in initial flight
attendant training is typically only eight
hours. This time also includes any ditching
drills conducted in water. Recurrent train-
ing time spent on ditching and water
survival varies, but is generally less than
during initial training, and such training is
rarely conducted Updated
ditching - water landing - water survival
information and techniques could be
taught in the same time presently allotted
for these subjects; the airline training
instructors interviewed during this study
indicated that this could be achieved if
updated training information were made
available. Such materials are, in fact,
readily available from civil sources and the
US. military (Antufiano, 1991; CG/
OPNAV/AF, 1955), and could be assem-
bled into a meaningful and relevant airline
training program. The addition of these
materials would greatly improve training.

in water.

CONCLUSION

One must acknowledge that virtually all
commercial aircraft, crews, and passengers are
susceptible to water-related accidents. Such
accidents are violent, unpredictable, and dis-
orienting; proper crew procedures, communi-
cation, and coordination play a significant role
in assuring survival. Given the importance of
these activities, flight attendants should have
significant didactic and practical training in
handling water-related emergency situations.
Ditching and water survival training materials
need to be updated with state-of-the-art infor-


FIGURE 3
EMERGENCY DISASTER DRILL

Concerning Evacuation:

Participants who could not hear the flight
attendant's evacuation commands felt
panic.

There were problems with conflicting
instructions given for the use of life vests.
Participants with baby carriers had
numerous problems.

Participants who had to exit the aircraft
directly into water were frightened and
unsure of what to do.

Concerning Survival:

Participants had problems keeping the
slide/rafts dry.

No one assumed command which
resulted in problems with raft manage-
ment.

No one was assigned to be the lookout.

The survival kit presented multiple
problems. Items were very hard to open,
the survival manual was not waterproof,
the sponge was small and hard to use, and
the flare was hard to light. In fact, the raft
was singed while trying to use it.

As participants’ hands become less agile
from the cold, items such as the drinking
water were almost impossible to open.
Seasickness created problems.

Personal hygiene was a major issue,
especially for females.

Participants stated they were cramped,
tired, and filled with anxiety after a short
time in the slide/rafts with strangers.
There was no mooring line or emergency
locator attached to the raft. This caused a
discussion about the storage location of
locator beacons on various aircraft.




manuals also note that the rafts are equipped
with locator lights, but it is not clarified that
the lights are water-activated. Sea anchor
deployment is referred to, but not explained.
The installation of the raft canopy is ad-
dressed, although it is noted in some training
materials that, if the raft should capsize with
the canopy deployed, the raft would be
impossible to right. No advice is offered for
coping with this circumstance, and it is im-
plied that this occurrence would create a non-
survivable situation. It is suggested that the raft
life line could be used to secure survivors in
the water until they can be assisted aboard the
raft.

Survival. Virtually no attention is given to the
survival stage of ditching. The most complete
materials state that, "Care should be given to
survivors. They should be directed to keep
their life jackets on and stay low in the raft.
First aid should be administered to injured
personnel, and survivors should be reassured
that assistance will arrive in a short time."
Rescue. The majority of the airframe
manufacturers’ recommendations identify the
need to prepare for assisting rescue, although
no specific procedures are given. Included are
statements that rescue may be accomplished by
surface craft, helicopters, or amphibian air-
craft. The actual rescue is described simply as
demanding.

DITCHING AND WATER SURVIVAL
TRAINING GIVEN BY AIRLINES

In the early days of commercial aviation, flight
attendants were considered to be pretty, well-
groomed air hostesses, even though they were
required to be registered nurses (Allgood,
Reynolds, & Snow, 1975). Flight attendants
today are no longer required to have medical
training, although they still face substantial

responsibilities. They are more appreciated for
the service they provide to passengers, but
flight attendants are also recognized as emer-
gency care givers and cabin safety experts.

To prepare flight attendants for these roles,
airlines are required to provide them with
FAA-approved training that programs specific
hours for selected safety-related subjects and
proficiency testing. Flight attendants are also
required by the FAA to attend recurrent
training annually to demonstrate skills compe-
tency in emergency procedures, including
those related to ditching and water survival.
Because accidents seldom occur in commercial
aviation, flight attendants must rely on this
initial and recurrent training to guide their
actions in the event of an emergency.

PreDitching Communication. Typically, flight at-
tendant training programs establish that when
a problem arises an emergency signal will be
sounded by the captain. Upon hearing this
signal, the senior flight attendant is to commu-
nicate with the flight deck to gain knowledge
about the emergency situation. The infor-
mation to be obtained includes the type of
emergency expected, the amount of prepa-
ration time available, at what point the signal
for bracing will be given, the signal for evac-
uation, determination of who will inform the
passengers, and synchronization of watches.
The senior flight attendant is then to relay
these details to the other flight attendants, who
prepare the aircraft and the passengers for
ditching.

The flight attendants utilize the emergency
procedures for water landings found in the in-
flight manuals, typically presented as a one
page list of Ditching - Emergency Procedures.
The duties are outlined in order of impor-
tance; thus, flight attendants are instructed to
start with the first procedure and work down
the list as time permits.


advise passengers to hold the cushions in front
of their bodies, to rest their chins on the
cushions, to wrap their arms around the
cushions with their hands grasping the outside
loops, and to float vertically in the water
(Figure 1). Others suggest that passengers lie
forward on the cushions, grasp and hold the
loops beneath them, and float horizontally

(Figure 2).

Flight attendant training programs also
provide dissimilar procedures regarding the
appropriate time to inflate the life vests. Some
have flight attendants instructing passengers to
inflate only one chamber of a two chamber life
vest before leaving the airplane, while others
recommend inflating both. Similarly, some
training programs require flight attendants to
advise that the life vest be inflated by pulling
the inflation gas cylinder rings, although a few
advocate that life vests should be inflated with
the oral valve only. Divergent procedures for
donning life vests are also evident; most flight
attendants are trained to tell passengers to
tighten the life vest as tight as possible,
although one airline has flight attendants
advise passengers to tighten the life vest only
until they can put a clinched fist between the
body and the vest. Another airline has the
attendants instruct passengers not to tighten
the vest at all. One airline, that uses a life vest
with a waist and back strap, trains flight
attendants to have passengers throw the life
vest behind the head, so that swimming is
more easily accomplished. No explanation for
these disparate procedures was forthcoming,
leaving unclear the answer of which, if any, of
the procedures is most effective.

The special needs of infants, children, the el-
derly, and handicapped individuals are
tually neglected in the training materials re-
viewed, Flight attendants are told to select and
brief an able-bodied buddy to assist elderly and
the handicapped during a ditching. However,
infant and/or child life vests are not available

vir-

it

on all airplanes, so flight attendants are taught
a variety of ways to put children in adult life
vests. Some are told to strap the child in an
inflated adult life vest and have the parent hold
the child in his or her lap during impact.
Other airlines provide combination child re-
straint/flotation devices, but most rely on par-
ents to bring an approved child restraint,
which typically provides no flotation and will
not accommodate a child in an inflated vest.

Survival. The recommended guidelines for
water survival outlined in the training pro-
gram materials reviewed are minimal. The in-
flight manuals suggest that the crew should
keep survivors near the aircraft, and that
crewmembers should take charge of the rafts
and continue to look for survivors. Instruc-
tions are given to flight attendants to have
survivors remain low in the raft to prevent
capsizing and to deploy the sea anchor as soon
as the raft is clear of any fuel or oil that may
be in the water.

Flight attendants are instructed to organize
survival equipment and assign duties to specific
individuals. A list of recommended duties is
outlined in the survival manual provided in
the life raft survival kit. Typical duties include
signaling, being the lookout, collecting drin-
king water, rationing food, and bailing water.

First aid specific to the aquatic environment is
not covered in the ditching and water survival
portion of most of the training manuals, since
general first aid is included in the training
syllabus as a selected subject of its own. Other
significant issues not covered in the flight
attendant training manuals include hazardous
marine life, adverse sea conditions, severe in-
juries, shock, seasickness, saltwater sores, sun
blindness, personal hygiene, and mental atti-
tude. However, some flight attendant trainers
are Red Cross first aid instructors; therefore,
some flight attendants become certified in Red
Cross first aid.


Technical Report Documentation Page

T. Report No.

DOT/FAA/AM-98/19

2. Government Accession No.

3. Recipient's Catalog No.

4, Title and Subtitle

Analysis of Ditching and Water Survival Training Programs of Major
Airframe Manufacturers and Airlines

5. Report Date

July 1998

7. Author(s)

Cosper, D.K.! and McLean, G.A2

8. Performing Organization Report No.

1 LB&M Associates
10001 S. Penn. Ave,

9. Performing Organization Name and Address
? FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute

P.O. Box 25082

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

DTFA-02-94-T-80076
18. Type of Report and Period Covered

Bldg. M, Suite 220

Oklahoma City, OK 73159
12, Sponsoring Agency name and Address

Office of Aviation Medicine
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

15. Supplemental Notes

This work was performed under task AM-B-94-PRS-89.
16. Abstract

Oklahoma City, OK 73125

74. Sponsoring Agency Code

Current transport category aircrew training programs related to ditching and water survival are reviewed for
content and attention to detail. This activity resulted from industry and regulatory inquiries about the state-
of-the-art in ditching and water survival operations, especially with regard to the increasing number of
aircraft operations, and associated opportunities for emergency water landing events, that the future will
bring. The information on water landing events was gathered from published reports related to these
issues. For example, Johnson (1984) cited 16 transport category water landings that occurred during the
period from 1959 to 1979, and Chen and Muller (1994) reported that 33 water-impact accidents occurred
in commuter-category aircraft from 1982 until 1989. An additional 21 water-related accidents or near
accidents occurred in transport category aircraft from 1980 through 1994. Training materials related to
ditching and water survival were provided by six major airframe manufacturers and nine major aitlines. The
purpose of the study was to examine the information flight attendants, as well as passengers, are provided
about ditching and water survival equipment and procedures, to determine if existing training practices are
satisfactory. Special emphasis is placed on unplanned water landing events. The resulting analysis identifies
deficiencies in both water survival equipment and procedures, and recommends solutions designed to
promote more advanced water landing and water survival operations.

17. Key Words
Ditching, Evacuations, Training, Water Survival

18. Distribution Statement
Document is available to the public through the
National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, Virginia, 22161

21. No, of Pages

33

Reproduction of completed page authorized

19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)

20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified

22. Price





NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of
the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of
information exchange. The United States Government
assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.


they selected and briefed able-bodied persons
who were relocated to seats by the exits, The
flightcrew announced that a ditching was im-
minent and flight attendants instructed pass-
engers to assume the protective brace position.
The passengers and flight attendants stayed in the
brace position for about 9 minutes before the
flight crew announced that they would be landing

in Miami.

The Safety Board found that the preditching
instructions contained in the flight crew manual
were inconsistent with the instructions found in
the flight attendant manuals. The Safety Board
concluded that, in general, the preparation of the
cabin and the passengers for ditching was ade-
quate; however, the absence of information from
the flight crew regarding the amount of time
available for preparing the cabin caused unne-
cessary problems for the flight attendant crew.

The Safety Board issued recommendations to the
FAA and to Eastern Airlines. The Safety Board
recommended that the FAA Principal Operation-
al Inspectors to review and require modification,
as needed, of air carrier flight crew manuals, flight
attendant manuals, and training programs to as-
sure that emergency procedures and checklists
were compatible. The Safety Board specifically
asked that attention be given to communications
among crew members during emergencies, inclu-
ding a requirement that the cockpit crew inform
the flight attendants of the nature of the emer-
gency and the approximate time available for
cabin preparation, and a standardized signal to
flight attendants to direct passengers to assume
the brace position (A-84-018). The FAA issued
ACOB No. 1-76-19, entitled, "Flight and Cabin
CrewMember Coordination and Communication,
and Safety During Potentially Hazardous Condi-
tions of Flight," and the recommendation was
classified as "Closed-Acceptable Action" on No-
vember 16, 1984.

The Safety Board's recommendation to Eastern
Airlines asked that it assure the compatibility of

B-4

manuals and training programs and require joint
cockpit and cabin crew training with respect to
emergency procedures. Further, it appealed for
specific attention to be given to conducting per-
iodic emergency drills in which cockpit/cabin
crew coordination and communication are prac-
ticed and passenger briefings are simulated regar-
ding events that may be expected during such
emergencies. Eastern Airlines produced a video
that emphasized crew coordination, and the video
was shown during pilot and flight attendant
training. The recommendation was classified as
"Closed--Acceptable Action" on February 18,
1986.

(Case No.4) Aircraft Accident Report: Eas-
tern Airlines, Inc., Lockheed L-1011, Miami,
Florida, May 5, 1983 (NTSB/AAR-84/04).

Case No. 5: Synopsis excerpt:

On February 28, 1984, Scandinavian Airlines Sys-
tem Flight 901, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30,
was a on regularly scheduled international pass-
enger flight from Stockholm, Sweden to New
York City, New York, with an en route stop at
Oslo, Norway. Following an approach to runway
4R at New York's John F. Kennedy International
Airport, the airplane touched down about 4,700
ft. beyond the threshold of the 8,400 foot runway
and could not stop on the runway. The airplane
steered to the right to avoid the approach light
pier at the departure end of the runway and came
to rest in a tidal waterway, Thurston Basin,
located about 600 ft. from the departure end of
runway 4R. Of those on board, 163 passengers
and 14 crew members evacuated the airplane
safely, but a few received minor injuries. The nose
and lower forward fuselage sections, wing
engines, flaps, and leading edge devices were
substantially damaged at impact. There was a
small fire localized to some electrical wiring adja-
cent to pneumatic ducting under the cabin floor,
but it self-extinguished almost immediately.


FIGURE 4

Concerning Rescue:

Participants did not anticipate that the
helicopter rotor-wash would be so severe.
Participants were unfamiliar with equipment
used for rescue.

Participants did not realize that they could
not be picked up from inside the raft.
Participants did not realize that a rescue
swimmer was not always dropped from the
helicopter to aid with rescue.

The discussion also highlighted the need for
better passenger briefings, and questions were
raised concerning expected airplane flotation
time, aircraft attitude, and boarding slide/rafts in
sea swells. Participating flight attendants agreed
that better training should be developed concern-
ing rescue procedures and equipment usage. They
felt it would be helpful to have a list of aquatic
rescue "things to do" on water-proof paper added
to the survival kit. It was also suggested that a
notation be added to all training material that said,
"Never Take Your Life Vest Off During Rescue.”

A3

Participants stated that a thermal blanket would
be very useful and suggested that one be added to
the contents of the survival kit. They agreed that
personal hygiene issues (lack of toilet facilities)
and raft management training should be added to
airline ditching and water survival training pro-
grams. Flight attendants suggested a requirement
be adopted that would require all flight attendants
to have current Red Cross Standard first aid
certification, a Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
(CPR) certification, and evidence of passing a Red
Cross adult swim course. They also stated that it
would be beneficial to create a public awareness
program to educate passengers about successful
evacuation procedures and equipment use in
accidents, including those that are only intended
for water-related emergencies.

The US Coast Guard and Florida Department of
Public Safety reported that they had observed
sharks in the area during the activity. They tried to
keep their vessels between the sharks and the
rafts. The US Secret Service team reported that
their night vision equipment picked up the light


TABLE 4
Flotation Analysis Of Five Wide-Body And Two Narrow-Body Aircraft

Aircraft Anticipated Damage Estimated | Flotation | Flotation | Doorsill | Doorsil Expected
Evacuation Time Attitude Height | Height Sinking
Time Above Above Attitude

Water Water
Forward Aft

rN Fuselage Intact
Wings Attached
Trailing Edge Flaps Detach Exceed 91/2 Nose Up 68" 19" Tail
Wing Leading Edge 90 sec. min. First
Attached/Flooded to
Possible Separation of 14 min.
Wing Engines
Doors Above Water Line
/Serviceable
Horizontal Stabilizer
Fails/Bends Up

B Pressurized Fuselage
Intact 3 min. 10 min. Slightly 42" to 20" to Tail
Wing Box Intact and Nose Up 62" 45" First
Separation of Wing - 40 sec.

Mounted Engines
Doors Serviceable

Cc Fuselage Intact

Wing Attached Exceed Exceed Slightly 60" 38" Tail

A\l Doors Function 3 min. 10 min. Nose Up First

Trailing Edge Flaps
Separate

Wing Mounted Engines
Separate

D Fuselage Intact
Wings Attached 4min. & 7 min. & | Nose Up Always Always Tail
56 sec. 43 sec. above above First
water in | water in
analysis | analysis

E Fuselage Intact
Wings Attached 5 min. 18 min. Nose Up 75" 10" Tail
All Doors Function First

F Fuselage Intact
Wings Intact
Pod/Pylons Detach 5 min. & Smin. & Slightly 53" 26" Tail
All Doors Serviceable 15 sec. 20 sec. Nose Up First
Leading Edge May Be
Damaged

Wing Box Structure Intact
Flaps Detach

G Fuselage Intact
Wings Attached 5min.& | Smin.& | Nose Up 50" 20" Tail
Wing Leading Edge May 8 sec. 8 sec. First
be Damaged

Trailing Flaps Detach
Pylon May Detach
Doors Functional



Within the airline in-flight manuals these lists
were presented in a variety of formats. All
included the signal that the captain would use
to announce emergencies, although the signals
differed. Some use a designated number of
bells or chimes, e.g., 3, 4, or 6; others use a
long series of bells or a public address system
command, e.g., "Easy Victor.” At least one
airline activates the emergency lighting sys-
tem.

The airlines also train flight attendants to use
similar passenger briefing methods in a ditch-
ing. Flight attendants are trained to advise
passengers of the problem in a calm, profes-
sional manner, to ask passengers to take off
and secure any loose objects, i.e., jewelry or
glasses, and to stow high heels and other sharp
objects to prevent potential injury and/or
puncturing of life rafts and sliderafts. They
also inform passengers about how to obtain
life vests and/or seat cushions, and assure them
that they will receive individual help, if
necessary. The universal focus is on keeping
passengers calm and being helpful.

Evacuation. The evacuation section of most
flight attendant training manuals is also similar
in content. Flight attendants are informed
that, upon detection of a problem, an eval-
uation of the situation should be initiated as
the first step. Flight attendants are instructed
to select and brief able-bodied passengers to
help retrieve stowed rafts and/or move
slide/rafts, as necessary, and to lead the exit
process and take command of the rafts or
slide/rafts until a crew member becomes
available. The training manuals direct that
after these initial procedures are accomplished,
and at the appropriate time, the flight
attendants would command the evacuation.
They are further directed to continue their
assessment of external conditions as the exits
are activated and to redirect passengers to
another exit if the exit or its attached slide/raft
becomes unusable. Certain crewmembers are

10

designated to retrieve the emergency locator
transmitter(s) from the aircraft to carry aboard
the rafts. Other crew-members are to ensure
that the plane is fully evacuated. The manuals
state that once the aircraft has been fully
evacuated, the crew should then release the
rafts from the airplane and assume command

of the rafts.

Emergency Equipment Usage. Instructions
are provided for flight attendants to examine
the buoyancy tubes of the raft for proper
inflation and to frequently check for leaks.
These instructions indicate that a hand pump
is enclosed in the survival kit to inflate the raft
and a repair kit is also provided to repair
punctures. All of the training manuals describe
how to erect the canopy for each of the raft
types that they have in the fleet. Although the
diversity of equipment can be somewhat con-
fusing, the most helpful manuals incorporate
pictures or drawings.

Taking inventory of all the auxiliary emer-
gency equipment available is the next point
identified. Each training manual details the
contents of the survival kit, although the
contents differ from airline to airline. Impor-
tantly, some survival manuals provided in the
survival kit are made of water-soluble paper,
which could quickly render the manual
unusable.

Flight attendants are instructed to use the
mooring line to tie rafts together to prevent
them from becoming separated or lost. Direc-
tions are given in eight of the training manuals
to tie the rafts 25 feet apart to allow for wave
action, but one training manual recommends
15 feet. The basis for this difference is unclear.

Personal Flotation. There are many
differences in the methods that address
individual passenger flotation. For example,
the procedures on flotation seat cushion usage
vary. Some airlines have the flight attendants