U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

35–676PDF 2007

INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID PROGRAMS: OPTIONS

TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS

HEARING AND BRIEFING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 24, 2007

Serial No. 110–67

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

NOELLE LUSANE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

HEATHER FLYNN, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

SHERI RICKERT, Republican Professional Staff Member 

FAY JOHNSON, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. William P. Hammink, Director, Office of Food for Peace, U.S. Agency 

for International Development ............................................................................ 7

Thomas Melito, Ph.D., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Accountability Office ................................................................................................ 13

Mr. David Evans, Vice President, Government Resources and Programs, Food 

for the Hungry ...................................................................................................... 44

Ms. Annemarie Reilly, Chief of Staff, Catholic Relief Services ........................... 68

BRIEFER 

Mr. Luı ́s Sitoe, Counselor (Commercial), Embassy of the Republic of Mozambique ...................................................................................................................... 76

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa and Global 

Health: Prepared statement ................................................................................ 3

Mr. William P. Hammink: Prepared statement .................................................... 8

Thomas Melito, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 16

Mr. David Evans: Prepared statement .................................................................. 48

Ms. Annemarie Reilly: Prepared statement .......................................................... 70

Mr. Luı ́s Sitoe: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 79

Mr. David Kauck, Senior Technical Advisor, CARE USA: Statement ................ 84

The Maritime Food Aid Coalition: Statement ....................................................... 88

Mr. David Beckmann, President, Bread for the World: Statement ..................... 99

Part I of the 2006 FAO report titled, ‘‘The State of Food and Agriculture: 

Food Aid for Food Security’’ ................................................................................ 101

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Prepared statement ................................................................... 109

Written responses from Mr. William P. Hammink to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of New Jersey ......................................................... 110

Written response from Ms. Annemarie Reilly to question submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith ................................................ 111

(1)

INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID PROGRAMS: 

OPTIONS TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS 

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PAYNE. I call to order this hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Africa and Global Health. Today we will deal with international 

food aid programs and options to enhance effectiveness. 

Before we begin our proceedings today I would like to extend a 

special warm welcome to a long-time friend of mine, a person who 

is no stranger to Capitol Hill because he has come here many times 

for good causes, our good friend Dikembe Mutombo, who as you 

know was a professional basketball player for Houston Rockets in 

the past and is from the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1997 he 

started his own foundation dedicated to improving the health, education and quality of life in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I 

had the privilege to visit the 300-bed hospital that he has built in 

Kinshasa. It is ready to open fully. I happened to be there in the 

midst of ongoing conflict. He was supposed to come but the NBA 

said that he couldn’t. It was all right for me to be there! But he 

does intend to visit. 

I would ask that you stand. Let’s give a round of applause to our 

special guest. He heard about the fact that this hearing was being 

held, and he just felt that he wanted to just come and sit in, and 

so we really appreciate your interest. You are a great citizen of the 

world. Thank you very much. 

Our hearing today is a first in a series of hearings regarding food 

security, with a special emphasis on Africa. More than a decade 

has passed since the World Food Summit in Rome during which 

time nations pledged to work together to cut the number of undernourished people in half by the year 2015. In 1990 and 1992, the 

baseline period for the World Food Summit, there were 823 million 

undernourished people in the developing world. According to the 

new statistics from the Food and Agricultural Organization, for all 

practical purposes, the number of people who are undernourished 

remains the same. There are 820 million in the Third World who 

are not getting enough food. We need to know why so little 

progress has been made. 
2

I have joined Senator Russ Feingold in requesting that the Government Accounting Office do a review of U.S. efforts on global food 

security. I hope the report will provide some answers. I suspect 

that one of the answers is that the United States and other donors 

need to devote more resources toward long-term development programs that build food security in countries which have a significant 

number of malnourished people. This may not be easy. 

Nearly 25 percent of the developing world’s undernourished people live in Africa. Poverty, poor governance and conflict pose serious challenges to agricultural development. However, those are not 

the only obstacles Africa faces. I had a hearing last week which focused on water in Africa. Lack of water for agricultural production 

is a major problem in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa, and it 

will be more and more of a common concern in other areas on the 

continent. I plan to have a hearing in June about climate change 

in Africa. I am concerned that it too will adversely affect the ability 

of Africans to develop a sustainable farming sector. And as a matter of fact we have already heard that world climate change, believe it or not, will have its greatest impact on Africa, a continent 

that already suffers from so many negative factors. 

In the face of all of these potential hurdles, we must be sure that 

each of the tools we are using to improve food security is operating 

at maximum efficiency. Long-term agricultural development programs are one tool that I strongly believe in. In January of this 

year I joined with the chairman of this committee, Tom Lantos, in 

writing the Director of Foreign Assistance, urging that the administration not cut funds for collaborative research support programs. 

Through CRSPs, the U.S. land grant colleges lend expertise related 

to food production and security and nutrition to U.S. Government 

and developing nations. Not only must we continue to fund such 

programs, but they must be increased in the future. I will work to 

boost the level of investment we are making in that area. 

Food aid has traditionally been another tool to help achieve both 

long-term food security and to help in cases of emergencies. For 

better or for worse, however, during the past several years more 

and more of our food assistance has been channeled toward emergencies. The amount of food aid dedicated toward building capacity 

in the agricultural sector of developing countries has declined from 

$1.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $698 million in fiscal year 2006. 

Things are going in the wrong direction. This is one cause for concern, and there is another. According to the Government Accounting Office, the average amount of food delivered to undernourished 

population has declined by 52 percent, due in part to increasing 

business and transportation costs. 

Clearly the resources available for development programs are 

shrinking, and the amount of commodities our resources buy is diminishing. And if we take a look at the increase in the cost of corn 

where we are seeing the impact on milk and on beef, and on the 

fact that more land is going to be used for corn, therefore decreasing land available for other crops, it will therefore continue to increase the cost of food, which is going to be a real serious problem 

because our increase in funding will not keep up with the increase 

in the cost of food. And so we have a real dilemma facing us. 
3

Over half of the food aid delivered around the world comes from 

the United States. Given the considerable role we play, it is imperative that Congress and the executive branch work together to 

make sure we are doing it right. It seems to me that Congress 

must help the administration do two things as it relates to the current programs: One, fix the mechanisms that already exist, such as 

the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust so that they are more effective; and, two, create new mechanisms. 

The administration has proposed using some of the money available in Public Law 480 for local purchase rather than shipping 

commodities from the United States. The proposal seems sound, 

and I believe this committee should give it serious consideration. 

However, we are going to run into opposition from those who represent areas from which we are buying the food domestically. And 

of course the tremendous increase in transportation with the same 

amount of money, once again, buys less food because transportation 

has increased so much. 

I am told that the Foreign Affairs Committee will consider the 

titles in the farm bill related to food aid under our jurisdiction as 

early as June. And at another forum we are going to have to deal 

with food subsidies, which is something that we know is a can of 

worms. But if we are ever going to look at the world being able to 

sustain itself with food production, the tremendous amount of $300 

billion of food subsidies that go around the world has to be looked 

at. 

In order to inform members ahead of that process, I hope our 

witnesses today will address the following issues so that we can be 

prepared. What are the major challenges to the effectiveness and 

efficiency of our food aid program, and what is to happen in order 

for us to improve it? Secondly, what new tools should Congress provide to the agencies that administer food aid to make certain that 

our assistance feeds more people and commodities reach more people and faster? And finally, how do we balance the increased necessity for emergency food aid with the need to make continued use 

of food aid in long-term development, which is a real challenge. 

So let me thank the witnesses for coming today. With that, let 

me turn to our distinguished ranking member, former chair of this 

subcommittee, Congressman Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us here today for the first in a series of 

hearings regarding food security, with a special focus on Africa. More than a decade 

has passed since the World Food Summit in Rome, during which nations pledged 

to work together to cut the number of undernourished people in half by the year 

2015. 

In 1990–92, the baseline period for the World Food Summit, there were 823 million undernourished people in the developing world. According to the latest data 

from the Food and Agricultural Organization, or FAO, for all practical purposed that 

number has not unchanged. There are still 820 million people in the third world 

who are not getting enough food. 

We need to know why so little progress has been made. I have joined Senator 

Russ Feingold in requesting that the Government Accountability Office do a review 

of U.S. efforts on global food security. I hope the report will provide some answers. 

I suspect that one of those answers is that the United States and other donors need 
4

to devote more resources towards long-term development programs that build food 

security in countries which have a significant number of malnourished people. 

This may not be easy. Nearly 25% of the developing world’s undernourished people live in Africa. Poverty, poor governance and conflict pose serious challenges to 

agricultural development; however those are not the only obstacles Africans face. 

I had a hearing last week which focused on water in Africa. Lack of water for 

agricultural production is a major problem in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and 

will be more and more of a concern in other areas of the continent. I plan to have 

a hearing after the Memorial Day recess focused on climate change in Africa. I am 

concerned that this too will adversely affect the ability of Africans to feed themselves. 

In the face of all of these potential hurdles, we must be sure that each of the tools 

we are using to improve food security is operating at maximum efficiency. Long 

term agricultural development programs are one tool that I strongly believe in. In 

January of this year, I joined the Chairman of this Committee in writing to the Director of Foreign Assistance to ensure that funding is not cut for Collaborative Research Support Programs. 

Through CRSPs, U.S. land grant colleges lend expertise to the U.S. government 

and developing nations related to food production and security, and nutrition. Not 

only must funding for such programs not be cut, it should be increased. I will be 

working to boost the level of investment we are making in that area. 

Food aid has traditionally been another tool to help achieve both long-term food 

security, and to help in cases of emergency. For better or for worse, however, during 

the past several years, more and more of our food assistance has been channeled 

towards addressing emergencies. The amount of food aid dedicated toward building 

capacity in the agricultural sector of developing countries has declined from $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $698 in fiscal year 2006. 

This is one cause for concern. And there is another. According to the Government 

Accountability Office the average amount of food aid commodities delivered to those 

in need has declined by 52% due in part to increasing business and transportation 

costs. Clearly the resources available for development programs are shrinking. And 

the amount of commodities our resources buy is diminishing. 

Over half of the food aid delivered around the world comes from the United 

States. Given the considerable role we play, we have got to make sure that we are 

doing it right. 

It seems to me that Congress must help the administration do two things as relates to the food aid program: One, fix the mechanisms that already exist, such as 

the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, so that they are more effective. And two, create new mechanisms for providing food aid. The administration has proposed using 

some of the money available in P.L. 480 for local purchase rather than shipping 

commodities from the United States. We must give this proposal due consideration. 

This year Congress is set to re-authorize the Farm Bill. I am told that the Foreign 

Affairs Committee will consider the titles related to food aid, which are under its 

jurisdiction, as early as June. I am confident that this discussion will help inform 

members ahead of that process. 

I hope that our witnesses today will address the following issues: 

What are the major challenges to the effectiveness and efficiency of our food aid 

programs and what changes need to happen to make it more effective? 

Are there new tools that Congress needs to provide to the Agencies that administer food aid which will ensure that our food aid feeds more people, and commodities reach people in need faster? 

How do we balance the need to address the increased need for emergency food 

aid without ignoring the need to make continued use of food to aid in long-term development? 

I thank our witnesses for coming today, and turn to my distinguished ranking 

member for an opening statement.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Chairman 

Payne. And I want to thank you for calling this very important and 

timely hearing to examine the means for enhancing the effectiveness of our country’s food aid programs. You will recall that our 

subcommittee held a hearing on the same issue almost exactly a 

year ago on May 25, and we were able to assess the great need and 

urgency then for increasing both the quantity and the quality of delivery of our food aid. This hearing provides a very timely opportunity to reemphasize that urgency and to look for concrete means 
5

to improve food aid in the context of the new farm bill that Congress is considering. 

One of the major points that was made during that prior hearing 

was the need for increased resources for food aid. The Executive 

Director of the U.N. World Food Programme, Jim Morris, responded to a question that I posed as to how much it would cost 

to truly address the hunger crisis in Africa. He responded with an 

estimate of $3 billion a year over a 10-year period, with the Africans leveraging an additional $2 billion, for a total of $5 billion. He 

anticipated that with such assistance Africa could begin to underwrite an increasing percentage of its own food requirements and 

the need for external assistance would decline. That is the solution 

that we should be looking for. 

The American people are to be commended for providing some $1.2 billion in emergency food aid in 2006, but that amount is 60 

percent of our total food assistance. This percentage is not what 

Congress had intended. Title II of Public Law 480 specifies that 75 

percent of commodities provided under that title, which constitutes 

80 percent of total U.S. food aid, must be used for development 

projects. However, USAID has avoided that requirement by resorting to a legislative waiver that applies in cases of emergency. My 

proposal is not to ignore the emergencies, but we cannot continue 

to divert resources from desperately needed food development initiatives. Unless we increase the total food aid budget so that more 

resources can go to non-emergency food aid, we may well see the 

percentages for emergencies increase, and the possibilities for longterm solutions diminish accordingly. 

In addition to the amount that Congress appropriates for food aid 

programs overall, I would strongly urge my colleagues to start 

being realistic about the amounts appropriated in the regular budget. We have settled into a well-established pattern of allocating approximately $2 billion each year for food assistance. However, we 

have been given only a percentage of that in the regular budget, 

and then providing additional amounts in supplemental appropriations relying on non-replenished patrols from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. This has occurred despite the fact that ongoing 

emergency needs are usually clear when the regular budget is 

being considered. 

Organizations that provide food aid have indicated that their assistance programs are significantly impacted by insufficient initial 

appropriations, delays of chronic programs due to diversion of resources to emergency needs and slow approval of supplemental appropriations. They are faced with extremely difficult operational dilemmas, such as diverting funds from other critical programs to 

bridge gaps until anticipated U.S. Government resources come 

through, and ensuring that local markets in production are not 

harmed due to delays in the arrival of food shipments. One of the 

worst difficulties I can imagine is when these providers must reduce the number of those who are receiving assistance as well as 

local personnel overseeing the programs for an interim period until 

full funding is available. 

Those of us who follow HIV/AIDS programs cannot fathom the 

risk of having patients who are receiving antiretroviral therapy 

through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief being told 
6

that they will have to go for a few months without ART because 

the U.S. Congress did not appropriate sufficient funds initially to 

continue covering their medications, and yet food providers on the 

ground have to look in the eyes of those who come to them for a 

bowl of grain and tell them they will have to wait several weeks 

or months to get something to eat. Food is a matter of life and 

death, and we must treat food aid with the seriousness and the 

commitment that it deserves. 

One proposal that is being made to improve our food assistance 

is to rely on the emergency versus non-emergency assistance percentages by applying the legislative language of the International 

Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program to the Title II 

programs. The flexibility of the McGovern bill program allows programs to combine food commodities, cash and technical assistance, 

which many consider a model of how food assistance should be carried out. I would be interested in exploring this possibility more 

with our witnesses, and I hope they comment on it. 

Another important issue for Congress to consider is the ability to 

purchase local food commodities in case of emergency. The administration is requesting authority in the new farm bill to use up to 25 

percent of Title II funding to purchase food commodities for emergency relief in markets closer to where they are needed. I realize 

that this proposal is not without controversy, due to the benefits 

of the farm groups, agribusiness and maritime industry from commodities, supplies and shipping. 

In the fiscal year 2006 conference report for agricultural appropriations the conferees admonished the executive branch not to risk 

upsetting a ‘‘carefully balanced coalition of interests which have 

served the interests of the International Food Assistance Program 

well for more than 50 years.’’ However, the status quo is not serving the interests of our food assistance programs if domestic economic interests are overriding the need to save people from dying 

from hunger. I strongly encourage my congressional colleagues to 

grant the emergency authority that is being requested by the Bush 

administration. 

Mr. Chairman, these are only a few of the extremely important 

issues, and again I commend you for convening this important 

hearing. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Ambassador Watson? 

Ms. WATSON. I just have one comment. I want to thank the presenters who are here, the panelists. And I am really concerned 

about how we are going to address those survivors in the Sudan 

in Darfur who can’t even get the water that they need, let alone 

the food, and what plans we have out there, what the NGOs are 

doing at the current time. So I wait to hear—and how we are addressing the scourge of HIV/AIDS, and I am hoping that both of 

you will comment on where we are. 

So I want to listen. So those are my comments and thank you 

very much. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I have no opening comment, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. We will begin then with our 

first panel. We are very pleased and fortunate to have with us Mr. 

William Hammink, who is the director of the Office of Food for 
7

Peace, where he has served since July 2006. Prior to joining Food 

for Peace, Mr. Hammink was a U.S. Mission Director in Ethiopia 

for 3 years. His career as a U.S. Senior Foreign Service Officer has 

spent more than 25 years at USAID projects working on international development and humanitarian programs. We certainly 

welcome you. He is joined by Mr. Thomas Melito, who is the director of the International Affairs and Trade team at the GAO. In his 

capacity, he is primarily responsible for GAO work involving multilateral organizations and international finance. Over the last 10 

years, Dr. Melito has been focusing on a wide range of development 

issues, including debt relief for poor countries, global health and 

human trafficking. 

Thank you very much. We will proceed with you, Mr. Hammink. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM P. HAMMINK, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am very pleased to be here today with you to examine 

the performance of the U.S. Title II food aid programs managed by 

USAID. The Title II Food for Peace Program is a 53-year-old institution that has saved the lives of many, many millions of people 

around the world. It is an institution that Americans across the 

country recognize and can be extremely proud of. 

As was mentioned, the last 3 years average for our Title II pro- gram was almost $1.8 billion for the purchase of more than 2.3 million metric tons of food each year. I would like to focus my remarks 

on two main areas: The changing world situation affecting Title II 

food aid, and how we can improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of Title II food aid programs. 

First, the changing world situation and context. The frequency, 

magnitude and unpredictability of major food crises are increasing 

due to growing chronic vulnerability, and this is especially true in 

Africa. Over the last decade we have seen large population 

groups—pastoralists in East Africa, poor farmers in the Sahel, 

HIV/AIDS-affected populations in southern Africa—whose lives and 

livelihoods are at severe risk. Continuous and overlapping crises 

are leaving more and more people defenseless, chronically vulnerable to major food crises. 

There is evidence and understanding also that food aid alone will 

not stop hunger. To date, despite the investments and the progress 

made over the past 50 years, globally an estimated 820 million people are still food insecure. Giving food to people will save lives, address short-term hunger needs, but it will not by itself save livelihoods or end hunger. How can we improve our food aid programs? 

Food aid programs need to be able to respond quickly and flexibly 

to support increasingly more vulnerable and desperate populations, 

and also integrated with other resources to more effectively halt 

the loss of livelihoods and try to address the multiple causes of vulnerability. 

Let me just quickly talk about six areas where we are focusing 

to improve food aid programs. First local procurement. I think the 

most important change that the administration has been seeking 

in recent appropriation requests and in the administration’s farm 
8

bill proposals is the authority to use up to 25 percent of the Title 

II funds for the local or regional purchase of food to assist people 

threatened by a food crisis. Let me assure you that our U.S. grown 

food will continue to play the primary role and will be the first 

choice in meeting global needs. If provided this authority by the 

Congress, we would plan to use local and regional purchases judiciously in those situations where fast delivery of food assistance is 

critical to saving lives. 

Second is pre-positioning emergency food aid. To help reduce the 

response time needed, USAID has successfully pre-positioned processed food aid at U.S. ports and overseas. Pre-positioning is an important tool and could be expanded, although there are logistical 

and other limits to pre-positioning food aid. However, pre-positioning is not a substitute for local procurement authority. 

Third, the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, which you have 

mentioned. The Emerson trust is the mechanism to respond to 

major food aid emergencies, and clearly complements Title II. One 

concern is that the releases from the trust have exceeded the statutory limit on its annual replenishment. 

Fourth is prioritization. USAID is strategically focusing nonemergency food aid resources in the most food insecure countries. 

Resources that were historically spread across almost 30 countries 

will be concentrated in about half that many countries in order to 

achieve maximum impact on chronic food insecurity issues. 

Fifth, integration. Under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework, USAID and the State Department are working to integrate 

all foreign assistance resources toward a number of objectives designed to set a given country on a sustainable path toward development. Starting with fiscal year 2007 funds, our Title II non-emergency programs will be integrated in country programs with other 

funds to achieve maximum impact. 

Six, monitoring. The GAO has recommended that USAID increase the monitoring of Title II programs. We support this recommendation. USAID currently uses multiple sources of funding to 

cover monitoring costs for Title II programs. Statutory restrictions 

in the use of Title II resources limit the current level of monitoring. 

Food aid programs are indeed complex and the problems and 

issues that U.S. food aid must address are increasingly complex. 

USAID is committed to ensuring that Title II food aid is managed 

in the most efficient and effective manner possible to continue to 

decrease costs, increase impact, and continue the 53 years of proud 

experience in using food aid to save lives and protect livelihoods. 

We look forward to continued discussions with Congress on how 

we can best do this. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammink follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM P. HAMMINK, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOOD

FOR PEACE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Chairman Paine, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you today to examine the performance of U.S. food aid programs 

with particular reference to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. food 

assistance programs. As you know, USAID manages the P.L. 480 Title II program, 

which includes emergency and non-emergency food aid. The new Farm Bill, which 

will reauthorize the P.L. 480 Title II program, is extremely important to ensure the 

increased efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. Title II food aid overseas. 
9

James Morris, the prior Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), told me shortly before he left office that the Office of Food for Peace 

is much more than an office in USAID. He said that after 52 years of providing U.S. 

food aid to hundreds of millions of people around the world, savings millions of lives 

and affecting the livelihoods of millions more, Food for Peace is not just an office 

but an institution, and one that Americans across the country recognize and can be 

extremely proud of. 

However, like any 52-year institution or program, we need to continue to look for 

ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of how we provide Title II emergency and non-emergency food aid. We appreciate this opportunity to share some 

thoughts with you on ways to do that. 

The U.S. plays a global leadership role in food security and as a humanitarian 

food aid donor. The U.S. is the largest food aid donor in the world, and the largest 

single contributor to the World Food Programme. However, procuring, shipping, 

storing, distributing, monitoring and evaluating approximately 2.5 million metric 

tons of U.S. food aid each year worth over $1 billion is highly complex, especially 

as we try to minimize costs. Our primary focus is to get food aid quickly to sudden 

emergencies to save lives, make better funding decisions, strengthen beneficiary impact of all of our food aid programs, improve predictability of non-emergency food 

aid resources, expand integration of food aid with other development programs, and 

concentrate emergency and non-emergency food aid resources in the most food-insecure countries. 

As a lead-up to the re-authorization of the Farm Bill, food aid reform is being analyzed and discussed by academics and think tanks, at the World Trade Organization, with UN organizations such as FAO and WFP and with a broad spectrum of 

Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). We are participating in these discussions 

and listening closely to all of these proposals and ideas. Because the Farm Bill is 

only taken up approximately every five years, this is an important opportunity to 

take what we have learned from experience, analyses, and research; and to link lessons learned to better inform changes in U.S. food aid programs. 

USAID is also undergoing changes. Under a new Strategic Framework for U.S. 

Foreign Assistance, the Department of State and USAID are developing a fully integrated process for foreign assistance policy, planning, budgeting and implementation. Under the new Framework, our goal is to ensure that Title II food aid will, 

in collaboration with all foreign assistance funds in each country context, have an 

immediate impact—saving lives and protecting livelihoods—while also contributing 

to longer term objectives, such as enhancing community and household resilience to 

shocks and reducing future emergency food aid needs. 

In reviewing the performance of Title II food aid and considering the new Farm 

Bill, I would like to focus this discussion on two main areas: 1) the changing world 

situation and context for the Title II food aid program; 2) how we can improve overall efficiency and effectiveness of Title II food aid programs within that new context. 

The Changing World Situation and Context for Food Aid. 

Food aid does not exist within a vacuum. Rather, it addresses needs within an 

international and local economic and political context, and that context has substantially shifted in recent years. The new Farm Bill will provide us with an opportunity 

to address these changed conditions with a response that will not just prevent hunger and food crises as they occurred years ago, but as they exist now. To do that, 

food aid must address two major trends: 

First, the frequency and magnitude and unpredictability of major food crises are 

increasing due to growing chronic vulnerability. Devastating wars, civil strife and 

natural disasters have often brought in their wake food problems. But over the last 

five to ten years, we have seen a significant increase in the numbers of people who 

are affected by these events, who face total destitution, a loss of household assets 

and livelihoods, and a chronic exposure to even the most minor of these shocks. 

Take drought, for example. There have been droughts periodically for thousands 

of years. And while they have sometimes been deadly, the communities involved 

have generally been able to absorb that shock, restructure their livelihoods, and 

then begin to grow again. 

But now, droughts in Africa appear to be more frequent. Where they used to come 

once every ten or twenty years, they have recently begun appearing several times 

in a ten-year period, and more recently still, to possibly as little as every two or 

three years. With that level of frequency, a community’s full recovery from a 

drought is difficult at best. In many cases, herders’ animals die and the herder sells 

still more animals for food, further shrinking the herd. A farmer who loses his crop 

and food supply may sell his hoes and harrows for food, and then hope to find seed 

to begin again. Each successive drought may find many communities increasingly 
10

characterized by a deeper and more widespread poverty, deteriorating landscapes, 

drying lakes and rivers, an ever poorer agricultural base, no market to sell to or 

buy from, hampered further by poor governance and governmental policies. 

Over the last decade, we have seen large population groups—pastoralists in East 

Africa, poor farmers in the Sahel, HIV/AIDS-affected populations in southern Africa—whose lives and livelihoods are either disappearing, or are at severe risk of destruction. Continuous and overlapping crises can leave more and more people defenseless, chronically vulnerable to major food crises that may be triggered by small 

changes in rainfall, or food prices, or the rising cost of fuel. 

Often, war or civil strife occurs within these same populations, or grows out of 

the conditions they live in. Entire generations in some countries have grown up in 

an atmosphere of extreme poverty overlaid by civil unrest, if not armed conflict. Portions of these conflict-ridden societies, like in Sudan and Somalia, subsist by receiving significant amounts of food aid and other humanitarian support to sustain their 

poor economies, perpetually disrupted by poverty, insecurity and war. In Sudan 

alone, WFP is supporting the food needs of almost two million internally displaced 

people (IDPs) in Darfur and another million people living near the IDP camps in 

Darfur who are affected by the crisis. To date, the U.S. has borne a disproportionate 

share of this food aid burden, providing about 475,000 metric tons per year for 

Sudan and Eastern Chad. Last year the U.S. contributed half of the assessed food 

aid needs and over 65 percent of all the food donated to Sudan. 

Second, there is evidence and understanding that food aid alone will not stop hunger. Today, despite the investments and the progress made over the past 50 years, 

globally an estimated 850 million people are still food insecure. While providing food 

will feed people today, it will not, by itself, lead to sustainable improvements in the 

ability of people to feed themselves. Giving food to people will save lives and address 

short term hunger needs, but it will not protect livelihoods or end hunger. In cases 

of widespread vulnerability, food aid must be used strategically, such as in a national safety net program, and planned along with other U.S., other donor and other 

recipient-country non-food development resources, to attack the underlying causes 

of food insecurity, such as lack of rural credit, markets, infrastructure and off-farm 

job opportunities; or environmental degradation, poor agricultural productivity, and 

poor governmental policies. The new U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework for foreign 

assistance will help. With respect to Title II non-emergency food aid programs, cooperating sponsors can monetize some of the food aid commodities that they receive 

and use the proceeds to implement activities that support the broader Title II food 

aid program. 

How Can We Improve our Food Aid Programs within that New Context? 

Emergency food aid needs are increasing and becoming less predictable, as conflict 

and natural disasters afflict and undermine the survival of a growing number of 

destitute and chronically food insecure people, who are often subsistence farmers, 

or herders and pastoralists. Because of this, food aid programs need to be adapted 

to these new conditions. They need to be able to respond more quickly to increasingly more vulnerable and desperate populations. They must be more effectively 

aimed at halting the loss of livelihoods that is the consequence of a series of even 

small shocks. And they must be combined with other U.S., other donor, and other 

recipient-country non-food development resources so that the multiple causes of vulnerability can be addressed together. Here are some areas where we are considering 

improvements to food aid implementation. 

Local Procurement: First, the most important change that the Administration has 

been seeking in recent appropriation requests and in the Administration’s Farm Bill 

proposals, is the authority to use up to 25 percent of the Title II funds for the local 

or regional purchase and distribution of food to assist people threatened by a food 

crisis. 

The long lead-time required to order and deliver U.S. food aid—normally up to 

four months—means that we often need to make decisions well before needs are 

known. In some cases, the need is sudden, such as during a flood or an outbreak 

of fighting. In other cases, there is an unanticipated break in the flow of rations 

to beneficiaries (pipeline break), or even a short-lived cease fire allowing aid agencies to enter places previously inaccessible because of security issues where, typically, we find people that have been cut off from food for some time. 

In the case of drought we are also challenged to get food to people on time. There 

have been great advances in the ability to predict and track rainfall, undertake 

post-rain harvest assessments, and follow changing prices, resulting in better early 

warning. While we can often predict the impact of poor rains on crops, it is difficult 

to predict its impact on the ability of people to purchase enough food to eat. In the 

Sahel in 2005, for example, merely below-average rains and a marginally weak har-
11

vest, known well in advance, resulted in an unexpected major crisis because these 

conditions were compounded by unpredictable changes in trade flows among neighboring countries. This drew food away from regions with very poor populations, 

causing price spikes and an urgent need for food aid. 

While it is impossible to predict the location and extent of emergencies that would 

require local procurement each year, the Administration might have considered 

using this authority for the immediate response to Iraq in 2003, to the Asian tsunami in 2004, in southern Africa and Niger in 2005, in Lebanon in 2006 and in East 

Africa in 2006 and 2007. We anticipate that purchases would occur in developing 

countries (in accordance with the OECD Development Assistance Committee List of 

Official Development Assistance recipients). 

Let me assure you that our U.S-grown food will continue to play the primary role 

and will be the first choice in meeting global needs. If provided this authority by 

the Congress, we would plan to use local and regional purchases judiciously, in 

those situations where fast delivery of food assistance is critical to saving lives. 

We ask that you seriously consider our proposal and the critical role this authority could play in saving lives of the most vulnerable populations. We are willing to 

work with you to address your concerns in order to move forward to provide for urgent needs. 

Strengthening Assessments: Accurate assessments and well-targeted use of food 

aid are critical for responsible food aid. USAID is therefore giving considerable ongoing attention to working with the WFP and partner PVOs to assist them in 

strengthening emergency food needs assessment and response systems and capabilities. Specifically, USAID is actively involved with other donors in providing guidance to WFP at the Executive Board on policy and program topics related to emergencies, providing technical and advisory input to the UN ‘‘Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity’’ (SENAC) activity, and providing resources to 

strengthen the assessment capacities of P.L. 480 Title II partner non-governmental 

organizations. USAID fully supports the GAO recommendation to enhance needs assessment methodologies and donor and host government collaboration; and can use 

and is using WFP, SENAC, the USAID Famine Early Warning System (FEWSNET) 

and other mechanisms to do so. 

Pre-positioning Emergency Food Aid: To help reduce the response time needed, for 

many years, USAID has pre-positioned processed food aid, both at U.S. ports and 

overseas. These efforts have been very successful. Pre-positioning processed food in 

warehouses not far from major emergency areas allows us to get this food to the 

beneficiaries at risk of starvation faster. Over 60% of the processed food sent to the 

pre-position sites overseas is redirected at an additional cost to meet unanticipated 

emergency needs and never makes it to the pre-position warehouses. While pre-positioning could usefully be expanded, the current Farm Bill has a ceiling on how much 

can be spent on pre-positioning. There are also significant logistical and other limits 

to pre-positioning food aid. For example, processed foods are the main commodities 

that can be successfully stored near emergencies. In addition, there are severe limits 

to the availability, cost, and quality of warehouse space and services near major 

emergencies, and problems certifying the condition of food withdrawn from these 

warehouses. Consistent with the GAO recommendation, we will examine the longterm costs and benefits of pre-positioning. But, while we want to expand pre-positioning, we do not expect to be able to do much more than we are currently. To be 

clear, pre-positioning is not a substitute for local procurement authority, particularly given the logistical limits to pre-positioning with respect to the amount and 

types of commodities that can be stored, as well as speed. 

Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust: The Administration needs to ensure that it responds appropriately to major food aid emergencies. The primary means of funding 

large, unanticipated emergency food aid needs is the Bill Emerson Humanitarian 

Trust (BEHT). The BEHT is an important resource that assists the U.S. to meet 

major urgent humanitarian food aid needs. The BEHT complements Title II by providing resources to address unanticipated emergency food aid needs. However, one 

concern is that the releases from the BEHT have exceeded the statutory limit on 

its annual replenishment. As a result, the BEHT as a resource is shrinking. 

Prioritization: In 2005, USAID issued a new Food Aid Strategic Plan for 2006—

2010. This plan seeks to make the best use of Title II food aid resources by allocating resources to the most vulnerable people in order to help build resiliency and 

enable them to withstand the next drought or flood and, therefore, decrease dependency on food aid in the future. 

We are strategically focusing the food aid resources available for non-emergency 

programs on the most food insecure countries. Resources that were historically 

spread across over 30 countries will be concentrated in about half as many countries 

in order to achieve maximum impact. Through addressing the most pressing food 
12

security needs with focused resources (especially in the countries that continue to 

need emergency food aid) we will work to reduce the need for emergency food aid 

over time. 

To address the underlying causes of food insecurity in these priority countries, we 

need to increase integration of Title II and other funding sources in programming. 

For example, in Haiti USAID uses Child Survival and Health funds to train health 

care workers to monitor the growth of young children who are receiving food aid 

under the Title II program. In Mozambique, Development Assistance funds are 

used, in conjunction with Title II funds, to support road rehabilitation and help 

farmers get their products to market more quickly and for fair prices. 

Integration: Under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework, USAID and the State 

Department are working to integrate all foreign assistance resources toward a number of objectives designed to set a given country on a sustainable path towards development. We have wrapped funding, goals, and performance indicators into one 

system that will be able to tell you who is spending the money, what it is being 

spent on, and what we expect to get from spending it. This information will come 

together in an annual Operational Plan submitted to Washington for each country 

where foreign assistance funds are provided. For the first time, starting with 

FY2007 funds, Title II non-emergency programs will be integrated in country programs to achieve maximum impact. By bringing U.S. foreign assistance resources 

together in a strategic and integrated fashion, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework allows the U.S. Government to implement more-effective and multi-sectoral 

interventions that address the overlapping themes of poverty and hunger and the 

underlying factors that cause them, country by country. Programs are thus more 

comprehensive in scope and complementary in nature, with food aid serving as only 

one tool of many working together to address the chronic causes of poverty and hunger in the most food-insecure countries. 

Rationalizing Program Expenses: As we focus on the most food-insecure countries 

and integrate food aid programs with other programs focused on food insecurity objectives, we need to review our own regulations on non-food resources, such as 

202(e) authority, to ask whether it needs updating. There was a time when the distinction between two main non-freight authorities—internal transport, storage and 

handling (ITSH), on the one hand, and 202(e) administrative expenses on the 

other—made sense. After all, that latter category was viewed as overhead that 

should be limited to ensure that as much food aid went to beneficiaries as possible. 

We are considering whether consolidating these funding authorities would lead to 

a more streamlined, cost-effective operation by having needs, and not funding categories, determine expenditures. 

Another area of food aid resources that deserves a closer look is monetization. As 

the Committee knows, in recent years, monetization has generated a significant 

amount of debate both globally and in the U.S. food aid community based on differing views of the impact that monetization has on local markets and commercial 

imports. At the same time, we know that monetization can have development benefits and can be appropriate for low-income countries that depend on imports to meet 

their food needs. While the U.S. Government strongly supports monetization, many 

in the food aid community are concerned that monetization may be lost as a tool 

in the Doha World Trade Organization negotiations and continue to press for its 

use. Others are prepared to look for alternative means to address the causes of hunger and poverty. FFP agrees with the GAO recommendation to establish a database 

on monetization to record costs and proceeds, in order to inform this debate and 

seek improvements. 

Monitoring: The GAO has recommended that USAID increase the monitoring of 

Title II programs in the countries where the food is monetized and distributed. We 

support the recommendation to conduct more monitoring. USAID currently uses 

multiple sources of funding to cover current monitoring costs for Title II programs. 

Statutory restrictions in the use of Title II resources limit the current level of monitoring. 

Food Aid Quality: Both USAID and USDA are already at work in preparing a 

comprehensive evaluation of food aid specifications and products. The report will 

begin with a thorough evaluation of contracting procedures; the focus will be on the 

expeditious enforcement of contract standards in order to gain higher incidence of 

contract compliance. Next, the review will evaluate USDA product specifications 

with a focus on laboratory testing and manufacturing standards. The focus of this 

second stage will be on improving post-production commodity sampling and testing 

procedures, with emphasis on sound scientific standards. 

The third and final stage of the initiative will review options on nutritional quality and cost effectiveness of commodities currently provided as USDA and USAID 

food aid. We want to ensure that the food we provide is of the highest caliber to 
13

meet the nutritional requirements necessary to address today’s beneficiaries. We 

will have consultations with nutritionists, food technologists, commodity associations, the World Food Program, the PVO community, and all relevant businesses 

that produce, ship, or package food aid. USDA and USAID have already posted requests for information from potential contractors to support this third stage. 

Partnership: Finally, I would like to comment on our commitment to increase and 

improve our consultative partnership with our partners and to increase public-private partnerships related to food aid and reducing food insecurity. For example, the 

Food Assistance Consultative Group (FACG), mandated in the Farm Bill, has not 

been as participative as USAID and our partners would like to see. We plan to propose changes to the structure of the FACG in order to improve the consultative nature of discussions and to focus again on specific issues that should be solved 

through a broader consultative process. These changes do not require any legislation. 

Food aid programs are complex, and the problems and issues that U.S. food aid 

must address are increasingly complex. The Administration is committed to ensuring that Title II food aid is managed in the most efficient and effective manner possible, to decrease costs, increase impact and continue the 52 years of proud experience in using U.S. food aid to save lives and protect and improve the livelihoods 

of vulnerable populations. We look forward to continued discussions and debates 

with Congress on how the Farm Bill can best allow the United States to respond 

to new food aid challenges to reduce global hunger and poverty. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Dr. Melito? 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS MELITO, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MELITO. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

the United States is the largest provider of food aid in the world, 

accounting for over half of all global food aid supplies intended to 

alleviate hunger and support development in low income countries. 

However, the number of food and humanitarian emergencies has 

more than doubled in recent years, especially in Africa. Despite increasing demand for food aid, rising transportation and business 

costs have contributed to a 52 percent decline in average tonnage 

delivered from 2001 to 2006. For the largest U.S. food aid program 

these costs now account for approximately 65 percent of expenditures, highlighting the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of food aid. 

My testimony is based on a report that we issued in April. My 

statement today focuses on the need to, one, increase the efficiency 

of U.S. food aid programs in terms of the amount, timeliness and 

quality of food provided and, two, ensure the effectiveness of U.S. 

food aid so that it reaches the most vulnerable populations and 

does not cause negative market impact. 

In the first finding we identified several factors that hinder the 

efficiency of U.S. food aid programs. First, existing funding and 

planning processes increase delivery costs and time frames. These 

processes make it difficult to schedule procurement to avoid commercial peaks in demand. This often results in higher prices and 

keeps these purchases more evenly distributed throughout the 

year. 

Second, current transportation and contracting practices often 

differ from commercial practices, increasing food aid costs. 

Third, legal requirements within the food aid program result in 

the awarding of food aid contracts to more expensive providers. For 

example, cargo preference laws require 75 percent of food aid to be 

shipped on U.S. flag carriers which are generally more costly than 
14

foreign flag carriers. Department of Transportation reimburses certain transportation costs, but the efficiency of these reimbursements varies. 

Fourth, coordination between U.S. agencies and stakeholders to 

track and respond to food delivery problems has been inadequate. 

For example, while food spoilage has been a long-standing concern, 

U.S. agencies lack a coordinated system to track and respond to 

food quality complaints systematically. However, U.S. agencies 

have taken measures to improve their ability to provide food aid on 

a timelier basis. Specifically, USAID has been pre-positioning commodities for the past several years and plans to continue this practice. Additionally, U.S. agencies have recently implemented a new 

transportation bid process in order to increase competition and reduce time frames. Although both efforts may result in food aid 

reaching vulnerable populations more quickly in an emergency, 

their long-term cost effectiveness has not been measured. Despite 

these efforts, the current practice of using food aid as a means to 

generate cash for development projects, known as monetization, is 

an inherently insufficient use of resources. While the projects funded through monetization are important, available resources are diminished by the costs of procuring, transporting and handling food 

as well as the costs of marketing and selling it to generate cash. 

Furthermore, NGOs must maintain the expertise necessary to 

sell food aid abroad, which diverts resources from their core mission. In addition, U.S. agencies do not maintain data electronically 

on the revenues generated from monetization, impeding their ability to adequately monitor the degree to which monetization revenues cover costs. 

I will now turn to the second main finding. Various challenges 

limit the effective use of food aid to alleviate hunger. Ensuring food 

aid reaches the most vulnerable populations is critical to enhancing 

effectiveness and avoiding negative market impact in recipient 

countries. Specific factors that impede the effective use of food aid 

include the following: First, challenging operating environments 

characterized by poor infrastructure and lack of physical safety and 

security which restrict access to populations in need and cause 

delays. 

Second, insufficient coordination among key stakeholders resulting in disparate estimates of food needs, for example, separate assessments by host governments World Food Programme and NGOs, 

have resulted in significantly different estimates, resulting in 

delays in donor assistance until the various stakeholders reach 

agreement. 

Third, difficulties in identifying the most vulnerable groups and 

understanding the causes of their vulnerability. 

Fourth, resource constraints that aversely affect the timing and 

quality of assessments as well as the quantity of food and other assistance. For example, U.S. food aid funding to conduct assessments prior to program implementation is limited. 

Fifth, impediments to improving nutritional quality of U.S. food 

aid, including the lack of an interagency mechanism to update food 

aid products and specifications. This may result in recipients not 

receiving the most nutritious or appropriate food. 
15

Finally, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid 

programs, particularly in recipient countries. This is due to limited 

staff availability, competing priority and restrictions in the use of 

food aid resources. As a result, U.S. agencies may not be sufficiently accomplishing the goals of getting the right food to the right 

people at the right time. In our April report GAO recommended 

that USAID, USDA and Department of Transportation work together to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. food aid 

by instituting measures to improve logistical planning, transportation contracting, and monitoring food aid among other actions. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to address any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melito follows:]
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I thank both of you for your 

testimony. And let me start with Mr. Hammink. Could you explain 

for us the administration’s rationale for its proposal to allocate up 

to 25 percent of the funds available for 480 Title II funds for local 

or regional purchases to meet emergency food aid needs, and secondly, as you think about that, how much money would that be approximately? And given that the majority of the emergency food aid 

is channeled to Africa, and that in Africa there is very little surplus to buy, would it be better or could we spend that much money 

in fiscal year on regional purchases of food more effectively? 

Mr. HAMMINK. As you can read in the administration’s farm bill 

proposals, this is something that the administration has been requesting for several years. The rationale revolves mainly around 

trying to save lives. There are instances where a ceasefire might 

open up a pipeline to get food in quickly to people who are right 

on the edge. There are instances where a conflict comes up quickly 

or a natural disaster hits where food is just not available, our U.S. 

food is just not available. And the idea behind this would give us 

the flexibility, give us that authority to quickly get in there and get 

food in where it is needed for people who need it quickly before our 

food can arrive from either the pre-positioned sites or from the 

United States. 

I think that it is important to point out that our partners, WFP 

and American NGOs, have for many years now been procuring food 

locally. They have experience in how to do that, and we are confident that they would be able to do that in the most effective way. 

We of course would make sure we are confident in terms of the 

look at impacting on markets and make sure the quality of the food 

is correct. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. The Maritime Aid Coalition 

claims that cash for local purchase will undercut support for Public 

Law 480 and will likely result in a decline in food aid, and I wonder what USAID’s standpoint is. Is there any validity to that claim 

from the administration’s point of view? 

Mr. HAMMINK. The request is for the authority to use up to 25 

percent of the appropriated amount of Title II. That is when a 

major emergency hits. Even at that level it still represents what 

would otherwise be a very, very small amount, less than 1 percent 

of overall U.S. agricultural exports. So we don’t think this would 

undercut support for food aid. 

Mr. PAYNE. Dr. Melito, let me ask you about the Maritime Food 

Aid Coalition. It actually claims that foreign purchase of food to respond to an emergency would not necessarily get food to where it 

is needed faster than say diverting a shipment of food aid on the 

high seas or through pre-positioning. Is the coalition’s claim accurate in your opinion? Could pre-positioning or diversion of ships on 

the high seas provide as fast a response as local or regional purchases? 

Mr. MELITO. We report that on average it is taking 4 to 6 months 

for U.S. food to arrive where it is needed. And this often is too late 

for certain emergencies. There have been some cases where food 

which was intended for the pre-positioning site was redirected, and 

arrived quickly. The best case where this occurred was the tsu-
36

nami. But under current authorizations, a very small percentage of 

food goes to the pre-positioning site. So this couldn’t be used on a 

large scale under the current plan. So under the current structure, 

most food takes 4 to 6 months. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Well, I will yield. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask my first question if I could. In the recent aid report, the GAO recommended that food and implementing agencies 

should enhance reliability and use of needs assessment for new and 

existing food aid programs, for better existing programs, and make 

assessments a priority in forming funding decisions. USAID notes 

in response to the GAO report that needs assessment is a priority 

and it has developed a famine early warning system to provide food 

need assessments. So my question is about the famine early warning system. 

How well is it working? In what countries have we found it to 

be the most efficient? A second question, if I could, would be on the 

whole issue of transportation costs. One of the rationales for the 25 

percent I would think would be relative to transportation costs. But 

I have noted or seen or read that transportation costs are as high 

as up to 55 percent of Public Law 480 Title II moneys. Out of the 

$1.7 billion in 2006, $929 million were spent getting it there, the 

transportation costs. And my question would be, how much of that 

cost can be averted, and therefore beefing up more procurement, 

more purchases, because of cargo preference and other issues? I 

mean, how much do we save if cargo preference weren’t there and 

that funding would end up being on somebody’s table as food? 

If you could start with those two questions and then I will get 

back with one final question. 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you, Congressman Smith. Let me start 

with FEWSNET. The Famine Early Warning System Network 

(FEWSNET) has been around for almost 20 years now. Especially 

in the past decade or so, it has definitely shown its worth. It allows 

USAID and other U.S. Government agencies as well as international organizations to be able to take a look 6 months out. As 

we heard, it takes 4 to 6 months to get our food there. We are really interested in where the next emergency may come. And they 

look at not only rainfall patterns, production patterns, household 

livelihood types of indicators. They work very closely with WFP. 

Where the government has the capacity, they are trying to build 

that capacity for early warning. 

Let me give you just a quick example if I may. Recently in Somalia with the major movement of internally displaced people and 

even previously with what happened there in December, 

FEWSNET was able to tell us, you know, where things were going 

so that we were—and also where the food aid needs might be so 

that we were able to appropriately send the right amount of food 

to Somalia for emergency purposes. Would you like me just to continue? 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. If you would on the——

Mr. HAMMINK. In terms of transportation costs, as the GAO 

audit report states, about 65 percent of our Title II dollar goes for 

other than the costs of buying commodities. That includes trans-
37

port, but it also includes other costs as well. So it is not only transport. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Isn’t 55 percent the transport cost? 

Mr. HAMMINK. No. That is everything else, including what is internal transport, that is including funds to the implementing organization to actually program the food within countries. But a good 

chunk of it is no doubt transport, but I don’t know exactly how 

much. That being said——

Mr. PAYNE. Could you estimate about how much it would be? 

Half maybe? 

Mr. HAMMINK. Do you know, Dr. Melito? 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. CRS put it at 55. 

Mr. MELITO. It is hard to disentangle ocean transportation from 

inland transportation. But the large percent of it is ocean transportation. We have found that, for Title II, commodities are 35 percent. The 65 percent is ocean transportation procurement and inland transportation. We don’t have a detailed breakdown of the——

Mr. HAMMINK. I am told the estimate is about 40 percent. We 

very much agree with the GAO recommendations, and we recently 

met with senior officials from the Department of Transportation 

Maritime Administration as well as USDA to see how we can take 

a look at the recommendations of the GAO and start implementing 

them, looking at the cost of transport, looking at updating our 

memorandum of understanding, and trying perhaps some new 

long-term transport contract arrangements to see if that will save 

money. 

Mr. MELITO. As far as FEWSNET goes, it is important to realize 

it is intended to be a very high level macro initial assessment so 

it doesn’t actually replace the more detailed assessments which 

must follow. I mean it does do a good job to alert you. But you still 

need to do a detailed assessment. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Could you tell me how that works 

in Mozambique where any problem related to food in Mozambique 

used to be a breadbasket, now it has been turned into a very dire 

situation. But how it works—how you factor in political turmoil 

and regrettably the gross misdeeds of Mugabe. 

Mr. PAYNE. You mean Zimbabwe? You said Mozambique. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I meant Zimbabwe. 

Mr. HAMMINK. Sure. FEWSNET has an office in Harare and they 

have been there for many years. They work very closely with international organizations, with USAID and the U.S. Embassy and 

with local—well, international NGOs that are based there. And 

they do come up with different ways of assessment. Obviously you 

have the government assessments, and then you have other assessments, including looking at especially production. And all those 

coming together give us a broader picture. 

Mr. MELITO. I want to answer your second question on transportation. We find that the actual impact of cargo preference on the 

program has been greatly minimized due to recent changes to this 

reimbursement that the Department of Transportation has been 

giving to the program. They have changed the formula in 2004 and 

that has increased greatly the amount of reimbursement. But we 

recommended that they actually look at the MOU, which Mr. 

Hammink referred to, and actually correct for two other areas we 
38

which we think needs to be corrected. One is the age of U.S. vessels, which tends to be fairly old, and the other is there aren’t always farm bids and when there aren’t any farm bids there is no 

reimbursement. But this particular reimbursement was important 

because it really minimizes the cargo preference on the program. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you. Finally, I just note the 

millennium development goals since 1993 to 2003, it would appear 

that there is real progress being made. Obviously there are more 

people. But I have noted that Ghana and even Ethiopia have seen 

a significant diminishment of the number of hungry people. Still 

far too many people are hungry. 

One final question. The 25 percent number, is that a scientific 

number or a best guess of what might work in the President’s proposal? 

Mr. HAMMINK. That really is basically trying to take a stab at 

what we might need in the kinds of emergencies like the tsunami 

or other kinds where we may have to provide that kind of emergency food needs locally quickly. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Okay. 

Mr. HAMMINK. But that is——

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Ambassador Watson? 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so very much for that update. We—I 

guess last year—were with Rusesabagina, Paul Rusesabagina, who 

was the clerk in that movie Hotel Rwanda, and he told us that he 

purchased a trucking company so that he could truck water and 

food into the refugee camps. And one of the biggest problems was 

the—I guess pirating of the vehicles that were intended maybe by 

your organizations to get food into those spots. So that was a big 

issue. But more so than that, in listening to the testimony and earlier talking to Mr. Mutombo, we were talking about nutritious 

foods that would be effectively nutritious for the Africans. And I 

did hear you say, both of you say, that we are concerned about the 

type of foods that we get to them. So would you comment on how 

we might improve the kind of nutritious food? I was giving him 

some input about we African Americans who are prone to diabetes 

because we are eating foods that are foreign to our genetic 

makeups. And so do you take that into consideration? Can we do 

that? Is that possible, so these foods would be more nutritious for 

the survivors, particularly in the Sudan? And they go without food 

so often, and they are dying of starvation in many areas. So I am 

wondering, have you taken a look and can we do something about 

the kinds of foods that we take in? 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you very much for the question. What the 

GAO report also looks at is food aid quality. And with USDA we 

have started a number of reviews and studies, both of the quality 

of the food aid that is now shipped. USAID will be taking the lead 

in a study looking at whether or not the food that we send for 

emergencies and for non-emergency programs have the right nutritional value, especially for the needs of the current beneficiaries. 

And they may have changed. For example, people who are HIVpositive may have different kinds of nutritional needs, especially 

related to fortification of these foods. So we are definitely taking a 
39

look at that in terms of the foods that we are able to send for these 

emergencies. 

Ms. WATSON. Yes. Mr. Melito? 

Mr. MELITO. We have observed in our report that it has been a 

slow process. They have had a commodity working group, USAID 

and USDA, and they have been meeting on this topic, but we have 

expressed some desire for them to move in more of an implementation phase. They have periodically made small changes, but the 

science of micro-nutrients has really moved forward so we can create food that is specifically healthy for HIV victims, for lactating 

mothers and for children and that probably would be an area 

where we could really increase the leverage of our food aid. 

Ms. WATSON. I would like if I have time to talk about AIDS. As 

we know when Mr. Mbeki became President in South Africa, a 

group of us went there with AIDS—I guess it was—or AIDS International was the project with Michael Weinstein, and we took some 

business people with us, and they offered fully equipped ambulances and so on. We went to the hospitals and we found out they 

were only treating the babies that were born with AIDS and sending the mothers home to die. And as we were considering how best 

to help them, we found that there were obstacles in the way, and 

later learned that it was more a political decision on the part of 

Mbeki rather than a practical one. I think the world responded to 

his statement that HIV did not necessarily lead to AIDS. That has 

changed somewhat. 

Can you bring us up to date on, number one, the pharmaceuticals? I know that was a big concern, getting the pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices and make contributions 

and so on. And I just would like to hear what we are doing and 

what you are doing through your organizations to address the concerns about the galloping scourge of AIDS. 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you very much. What is clear increasingly, 

especially in southern Africa, is in countries with a high prevalence 

of HIV/AIDS it is increasingly affecting their ability to maintain 

food security and to maintain their livelihoods. It is very much impacting on what our Title II program is supposed to be focusing on, 

food and security. For the last several years, we have had programs in place and our cooperating sponsor NGOs have actually 

used our food aid programs for support to people who are affected 

and infected by HIV/AIDS. Over the last few years that has significantly increased, in fact, because of the increasing awareness of the 

link between food and nutrition and HIV/AIDS. And so what we 

found in fiscal year 2006 is that our cooperating sponsors, using 

Title II resources under the Development Food Aid Program, actually spent more than $50 million in programs directly supporting 

people affected and infected by HIV/AIDS. We are in close coordination with the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, to look at 

how we can increase cooperation not only here in Washington but 

especially in the field between Food for Peace officers and PEPFAR 

officials. 

Thank you. 

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Melito? 

Mr. MELITO. Teaming off of what Mr. Hammink said, the limitations on the use of nonfood resources has impeded the ability to 
40

really help target HIV/AIDS patients and help maximize our food 

for patients. Also the way the programs are set up, there is a real 

dichotomy between health programs and nutrition programs but 

largely they go together. There are efforts to bridge this but it is 

really something that is just beginning. 

Ms. WATSON. We were down—I was down in South Africa in November-December of last year, and we visited several of the centers 

that were run by NGOs, and we found that if we could get a local 

group that had started up their own clinics and supported them, 

we did better than trying to come in and supplant what they were 

doing, however meager. And what I kind of came away with was 

that we need much more education than we have, and they were 

zeroing in on the majority of the carriers of the HIV, the men. And 

it was the first program down in I guess it was the western plains 

near Kinshasa where they were focusing in on the male carriers. 

And there is a lot of work to be done there. 

Have you taken any steps with the educational process in your 

programs? Because I think that they lack the knowledge to know 

how to prevent the spread of AIDS. Mr. Hammink? 

Mr. HAMMINK. Under our Title II program, the implementing 

partners are looking at how to use food aid to support the food and 

nutrition side. Perhaps as part of their programs—I am not sure, 

they clearly probably have educational components because it is a 

very important part of any intervention to support affected or infected HIV/AIDS people. That is a question you may want to ask 

to our colleagues from the education side as well. 

Thank you. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, 

gentlemen. Sorry I missed your earlier testimony. I am on the 

House Agriculture Committee, too, and subcommittee that particularly deals with foreign agricultural operations, and I noticed you 

referenced that in your testimony, some improvements that could 

potentially be made. Two questions for you, the first deals with 

that somewhat directly, but in terms of rethinking the model. 

If you think about what has provided food security for the United 

States, in fact, almost—such extraordinary productivity that we 

have excess. It is a long history of land grant colleges and an educational establishment that has created multiple opportunities for 

multiple producers. Is there any consideration in your work—I 

know we are talking about primarily emergency food services but 

also non-emergency food assistance. I think about duplicating basically the extension service model, where you have small areas designated with an expert to bring the type of expertise to farmers so 

that they can be self-sufficient and obviously solve long-term chronic food problems. 

Related to that is a question as to what—in which countries in 

sub-Saharan Africa are showing the most promise toward building 

self-sustaining capacities? And if you would unpack as to why they 

are showing that capability. 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you very much. Even one of the recommendations in the GAO report talks about looking at how to 
41

provide adequate nonfood resources in situations where along with 

the food aid resources, you can really make some impact, broader 

impact on some of these underlying causes of food insecurity. I 

think what we are doing is increasingly in close consultation with 

our cooperating sponsor, NGO partners, taking a look at—and they 

are doing an assessment within countries where—what are those 

underlying causes, where can they really make a difference, how 

food aid can be used. And as I mention in my testimony, under the 

new Foreign Assistance Framework we are looking at how the food 

aid programs can be increasingly linked to programs funded from 

other foreign assistance accounts such as child survival or AG productivity or PEPFAR, for example, to have a broader impact on 

some of these underlying causes of food insecurity, whether it is 

water and sanitation or ag productivity, and so based on the assessments within those countries and also based on what the host 

government is interested to really put some emphasis on, they may 

choose ag extension, which you mention to increase agricultural 

productivity. They may choose focusing on water and sanitation, if 

that is the real need to make an impact. And then to look at how 

food aid can most wisely be used to actually make an impact, not 

only on the nutritional side but also on some of these other objectives. 

In terms of your second, countries in sub-Sahara—there are actually quite a few, where encouraged countries like Mozambique, like 

Uganda, like Ghana that are doing very well. A few of those countries were actually stopping or phasing out our Title II non-emergency program because the food security indicators from those 

countries are not as bad as other countries where we are going to 

focus our development food aid programs. So we are encouraging—

the other thing to be aware of, there is now an African Union-led 

approach, CAADP, Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program, that we think could be a very useful framework to 

have government-led multidonor cash and food type approach 

where we could use our food aid much more wisely and have even 

greater impact. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. What are the—if we could go a little bit deeper into the countries that you named, the conditions that are again 

giving rise to adequate productive capacity, that is self-sustaining, 

and I assume consistent with all of the other outcomes that we 

want to see, such as environmental sensitivity and such. Obviously 

civil structures that are in place are fundamental. But what other 

factors are there that are contributing to their success stories? 

Mr. HAMMINK. I think a key one—first, I am not an agriculture 

expert but I have spent a lot of years in Africa—a key one is markets, to make sure a market system and private sector led market 

system are in place. Another one is policies, that they have good 

policies in place to actually promote economic growth, and food security, for that matter. Those are a few. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Dr. Melito, do you have any particular comments on that? And by the way, any proposal you have for the farm 

bill, hurry. It is coming very rapidly. 

Mr. MELITO. I just want to point out that we are undertaking a 

food security analysis at the request of this committee, we have 
42

just begun it. And the two countries that Mr. Hammink mentioned 

are truly success stories. But they are two in a situation where 

generally speaking the continent is going the wrong direction to the 

rest of the world. Food insecurity is—and a percentage basis relatively flat at a high number, around 35 percent in Africa, but the 

actual number of Africans who are hungry have gone up about 35 

million in the last 10 years. So the situation in Africa in a large 

sense is getting worse. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, and this is quite a balancing act because obviously the appropriate humanitarian response and America’s leadership in that regard is necessary and important, yet at 

the same time it was not addressing the fundamental factors in 

creating potentially an overdependence on emergency aid or simply 

dumping our goods and inhibiting the proper functions of markets, 

as you have pointed out. You don’t want to do that. That would undermine long-term sustainable practices. So it is quite a line to 

walk. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. 

So much attention is paid on how to bring food into the countries, and I am kind of wondering do we need a two-pronged approach? One the short term that has to actually respond to emergencies, and the second one on how we could prepare and prevent 

on the long term these emergencies from happening in the first 

place. You know, give a person a fish, they have a meal; teach 

them how to fish, they have more than one meal; and, in our world, 

it is beyond that now. In the modern world, we have to protect the 

environment so that we can have fish or wheat or corn or water 

and rain and whatever it is going to take to be able to have food 

in the first place. 

So what programs do you see the United States Government 

being involved in and in introducing to encourage sustainable, renewable food production? How can the international community 

and private volunteer organizations become more involved? 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you very much. This is really a tough one, 

and your predecessor mentioned this as well. 

In many of these countries with a growing number of chronically 

vulnerable people, for example Ethiopia and other places, you really need a two-pronged approach simultaneously, one of which is to 

bring in emergency food aid where it is needed but do it, again, 

very wisely so that you are not disrupting markets, where it is 

needed for people who are kind of right on the edge or over the 

edge. And in some countries that is being done through what is 

called a safety net program focused on the chronically food insecure 

population. 

At the same time, through our development food aid programs, 

and again linked to other programs where there are development 

assistance funds and child survival funds, really trying to attack 

again these underlying causes of the food insecurity, especially at 

the local and community levels. 

So you need both of those programs going on simultaneously. 
43

The international community is very engaged. All of our partners 

are American NGOs and, in some cases, local NGOs from the country; and we work very closely with them to both assess the needs 

and make sure that we are focusing on the development impact. I 

guess you will be hearing from some of our NGO colleagues later 

on the development impact that they have seen. 

Mr. MELITO. The two-pronged approach you referred to is actually U.S. policy. It is just that the increasing amount of emergencies has swamped the budget, so that for Title II right now only 

20 percent of the budget is available for non-emergency use. So we 

are having increasing need to spend money on emergency resources, leaving less and less available for non-emergencies, which 

then puts us further behind. So it is a very difficult situation. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So we should not have a zero sum budget on this 

one. We should expand where it needs to expand. I said it. You 

didn’t. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

We will have a very quick question from the ranking member. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. 

Mr. Hammink, Frank Wolf, Joe Pitts, Robert Aderholt and I were 

recently in Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. We were there 

trying to find new ways to encourage peace and humanitarian 

issues there. I know you spent 4 years in the West Bank and GAZA 

as Deputy Director of USAID’s humanitarian efforts there. Could 

you give us some insights on what we should be doing to insure 

that those young Palestinians get the food and other humanitarian 

assistance that they say they desperately need, notwithstanding 

Hamas’ presence? 

Mr. HAMMINK. I would have to apologize that I haven’t focused 

on the West Bank and Gaza for several years now. We are providing food assistance to WFP for their emergency program there. 

But I can’t answer your questions. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Maybe for the record you could provide us additional information and whether or not children are 

going hungry because of this recent set of political developments. 

Mr. HAMMINK. I am sorry, I don’t know that. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Also, we might look at, in some countries—I don’t know how difficult it is to get food aid into, for example, a place like in Lebanon, 

that it has been brought out that the Palestinian enclaves are suffering from abject poverty. I don’t know how much hunger is going 

on. There is certainly total unemployment; and that, of course, 

breeds, you know, terrorism and all the things that we try to avoid. 

So I wonder if countries where there are pockets of people who 

may have been there for many—as a matter of fact, in Somalia, 

there was a group of people that were there for many, many years 

from central Africa, but we were able to have the services from our 

relief office to bring in a large number from Somalia. So I wonder 

if there is a way to penetrate into enclaves like that where food is 

necessary. 

Mr. HAMMINK. Thank you. 
44

In fact, we support WFP programs in between 45 and 60 countries in the world, depending on the needs, whether it is eastern 

Chad or northeastern CAR or parts of Somalia. We also provide 

emergency food assistance to Somalia; and so we depend on our 

partners as well as, of course, using that. 

Other types of organizations are taking a look at where those 

pockets of food need are to try to be able to get in and reduce the 

problem and provide the food and try to do that on a very early 

basis so the food is there when it is needed. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you very much. 

Let me thank this panel. You are very informative. We will certainly be following up with both of you. We appreciate it. 

We have a second panel. There will probably be not enough time 

to hear the second panel. So we will recess for about 20 minutes 

for this second vote to occur after this 7-minute vote. We will stand 

in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. PAYNE. We will resume the hearing. Let me certainly apologize for the extra length of time. Some procedural problems arose, 

and therefore the voting session, which was supposed to be 20 minutes, took on a new life of its own. 

We have with us our second panel. 

I am pleased to have Mr. David Evans, who is vice president of 

Government Resources and Programs and director of Food for the 

Hungry’s Washington office and is the current vice chair of the Alliance for Food Aid. Mr. Evans oversees the Food for the Hungry 

portfolio of USAID, USDA, and U.S. State Department funded programs in 10 countries in the areas of food and agriculture, health 

and nutrition, HIV and AIDS, water and sanitation, education and 

emergency relief. Mr. Evans has over 23 years of relief and development program implementation, training, and management experience in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. 

Joining him is Ms. Annemarie Reilly, who is chief of staff to 

Catholic Relief Services’ president, Ken Hackett. She oversees the 

president’s office and assures clear and effective implementation of 

agency strategy and directives from the President through the five 

executive vice presidents. Her key area of expertise includes emergency preparedness and response, as well as strategic planning and 

implementation. 

Ms. Reilly created and managed CRS’s emergency response team 

in 1999. Charged with building the agency’s overall capacity for 

high-quality emergency preparedness, prevention, mitigation and 

response programs, the team responded to a variety of high-profile 

crises, including Kosova in 1999, Gujarrat, India, 2001 earthquake, 

Afghanistan in 2001, and southern Africa in the 2002 food security 

crisis. 

At this time, we will start with Mr. Evans. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID EVANS, VICE PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT RESOURCES AND PROGRAMS, FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY 

Mr. EVANS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this 

opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. 
45

My name is David Evans, and I am the Vice President of Government Resources and Programs in Food for the Hungry. I am testifying today as the vice chairman of the Alliance for Food Aid, also 

known as the Alliance. 

The Alliance is comprised of 15 private voluntary organizations 

and cooperatives, which are commonly called PVOs, that operate 

humanitarian and development assistance programs in 130 countries, partner in USDA and USAID food aid programs, and conduct 

both emergency and non-emergency food aid programs. The members range from some of the largest charitable organizations in the 

United States, such as the American Red Cross, World Vision, 

United Methodist Committee on Relief, that implement a wide variety of projects all over the world, to medium-sized organizations 

that specialize in particular regions of the world or have expertise 

in particular types of programs, such as Food for the Hungry, 

Africare, and ACDI/VOCA. What we have in common is we focus 

our efforts on communities that lack the means to meet their basic 

food needs on a regular and sustainable basis. 

Food aid is used in developing countries that must rely on food 

imports to meet their nutritional needs. Targeting populations in 

need is the initial step in planning a food aid program. PVOs use 

both primary and secondary data from national, regional and local 

surveys to conduct these targeting exercises. Illustrative indicators 

used include child and infant mortality rates, acute and chronic 

rates of malnutrition among young children, percentage of people 

living under the poverty line, agricultural production and productivity, susceptibility to drought and other endogenous shocks, and 

the prevalence of other major diseases such as HIV/AIDS. 

When areas of greatest need in a country are determined, PVOs 

engage in a collaborative food security program design exercise in 

order to build programs that produce high-impact results. We meet 

with the national ministries of health, agriculture, etc., regional 

and community leaders, and faith- and community-based organizations to determine what types of services are already being provided, which services are lacking, and the types of interventions 

that would be most useful for the community and which also lead 

to the greatest impact. 

In this program design phase, market analysis is critical to 

choosing the appropriate commodity and planning the delivery 

schedule. It is required in all food aid programs but is more extensive in monetization programs. A Bellmon determination or disincentive analysis is required for both food monetization and distribution to make sure that the commodities chosen will not interfere with local production and marketing and that there is adequate storage for the commodities provided. PVOs add value to food 

security programs by strengthening the management capabilities of 

local institutions and developing community leaders, providing a 

network of contacts and relationships, encouraging entrepreneurships and private sector development and developing programs that 

have lasting impact. 

All PVOs participating in food aid programs are audited according to U.S. Government requirements and have well-established 

mechanisms for reporting on the use of commodities from the point 

of departure for the U.S. to the ultimate recipients. In the case of 
46

monetization, where funds have been provided for program support, itemized records of the bidding process and funds generated 

and use of such funds are maintained and presented in regular reports to USAID and USDA. We also keep records to assess the ultimate impact of the program on the intended beneficiaries. 

Mr. Chairman, we thank the Congress for its support of food aid 

over the years. Food aid is our Nation’s principal program supporting food security in the developing world. We have provided 

several core recommendations for the 2007 Farm Bill to improve 

the reliability and timeliness of food aid programs and to assure 

adequate amounts are available for both chronic and emergency 

needs. I would like to highlight a few of these in particular. 

First, the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust holds commodities 

and funds for emergency needs. We believe that the Bill Emerson 

Humanitarian Trust should be assured that it has a more reliable 

mechanism for replenishment, and that can be used to provide 

commodities immediately when emergency funds under Title II are 

insufficient to meet critical needs. 

Second, from 2001 to 2006, as you know well, U.S. developmental 

or non-emergency food aid fell by 42 percent. This is counterproductive. Non-emergency food aid programs are often conducted 

in areas where poverty, unpredictable or unfavorable climate and 

remoteness have made it very difficult for people to improve their 

lives without help from the outside. These programs leverage resources and create benefits beyond the targeted recipients, increasing the impact per dollar spent. Giving the people the means to improve their lives also provides hope for a better future and helps 

stabilize vulnerable areas. 

Valuable expertise of PVOs to help these communities and to respond to food crises is being lost, as they must stop their food aid 

activities, leave our local partners, and lose our strategic networks 

in these vulnerable areas. As an example, a World Vision Title II 

program in Kenya targeted 1,528 pastoralist families in the 

Turkana region, an arid environment that is plagued by recurring 

droughts. Before the program, these families were dependent on 

emergency food aid nearly every year. 

Some of the commodities provided were distributed as payment 

for participation in training and for working on projects that improved irrigation, infrastructure, cultivation techniques and land 

management. Other commodities were sold through open tenders, 

and the funds generated support the food for work projects. Within 

6 years, even though there had been droughts, income increased 

from a baseline of $235 per year to $800 per year per family, and 

families could afford to send their children to school, and the communities no longer depended on emergency relief. 

PVOs were hoping to replicate this successful model in other 

areas of Kenya, where pastoralists are still dependent on emergency rations nearly every year. However, USAID is phasing out 

non-emergency programs in Kenya as part of a larger effort to limit 

the scope of developmental food aid programs. Meanwhile, Kenya 

remains a recipient of emergency food aid, and pastoralists are particularly at risk. 

Similarly, programs in Bolivia by Food for the Hungry, Adventist 

Development and Relief Agency and other organizations target 
47

nearly 300,000 people living in remote areas, where 70 percent of 

the population lives under the poverty line and infant mortality 

rates are 116 per 1,000 live births. Over a 3-year period, malnutrition in children in this program area decreased by 35 percent, and 

household incomes increased substantially. 

As is the case with Kenya, developmental food aid is being 

phased out of Bolivia at a time when the country is declining toward a fragile state status. 

Thus, we recommend establishing a safe box under the Title II 

emergency program that assures 1.2 million metric tons will be 

made available for non-emergency food programs each fiscal year. 

This will not incur additional outlays, as the funding is subject to 

appropriations and would come out of the total Title II budget. In 

value terms, this would be approximately $600 million or about 40 

percent of recent Title II program levels. 

Current law directs USAID to make available 1.8 metric tons of 

commodities for Title II non-emergency programs each fiscal year. 

They are permitted to waive this requirement after the beginning 

of the fiscal year if there are sufficient requests for programs or the 

commodities are needed—I am sorry, insufficient requests for development programs or the commodities are needed for emergencies. This implies that USAID should seek proposals for the full 

non-emergency minimum tonnage and only waive the minimum 

under extraordinary circumstances. Instead, months in advance of 

each fiscal year, USAID decides that non-emergency programs will 

be limited to about 750,000 metric tons and does not make the 

minimum tonnage available. 

Fourth, improve administrative procedures through early program approvals, spreading out procurement throughout the year 

and improving product quality and oversight and requiring the 

submission of annual reports. As the largest food aid donor in the 

world, it is critical that government agencies collect and make 

available sufficient information to show how these programs work 

and their impact. 

The Government Accountability Office noted in a recent report 

that cost savings of 12 to 14 percent may be possible if commodity 

orders can be spread out more evenly throughout the program year, 

rather than bunched toward the end of the year. We recommend 

increasing the minimum level of Food for Progress to 500,000 metric tons from the current 400,000 metric ton level. To accommodate 

the additional tonnage, the amount available for transporting the 

commodities would have to be lifted or increased. 

The Food for Progress Act provides assistance to developing 

countries that are introducing market reforms and supporting private sector development. Many poor developing countries are undergoing economic reform; and, therefore, the demand for Food for 

Progress programs is great. Forty-six different PVOs apply for Food 

for Progress programs. For fiscal year 2007, 100 proposals were 

submitted by PVOs and 16 by governments, and only 11 new proposals were approved, and three other programs were provided second year funding. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for supporting these life-giving programs. I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 
48

[The prepared statement of Mr. Evans follows:]
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Mr. PAYNE. Ms. Reilly? 

STATEMENT OF MS. ANNEMARIE REILLY, CHIEF OF STAFF, 

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 

Ms. REILLY. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, and thank you for inviting 

Catholic Relief Services today to testify on our recommendations 

for strengthening food aid in the Farm Bill. The reforms that we 

propose today we hope will improve our ability to address acute 

hunger, while especially contributing to longer term reduction in 

chronic hunger. 

I wish to underscore at the outset that the Foreign Affairs Committee plays a key role in writing the food assistance provisions of 

the Farm Bill. Your predecessor committee, the International Relations Committee, included significant food aid reforms in the 2002 

Farm Bill, yet as you yourself have pointed out in your opening remarks, more has to be done. 

Over the past several years, support to development programs 

has dropped significantly as food aid resources have been diverted 

to meet emergency needs. Catholic Relief Services and other private voluntary agencies support the U.S. Government’s commitment to emergency response, but we should not help those suffering from acute hunger at the expense of the chronically hungry. 

Instead, making the Title II food program more effective and more 

efficient will promote total food security in the partner nations 

where we serve. 

I would like to share with you three recommendations that 

Catholic Relief Services has developed in collaboration with our sister PVOs, CARE, Mercy Corps and Save the Children. 

First, we believe that improving the operation of the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust will bolster our response to emergencies. 

The current mechanism for utilizing the Emerson Trust is far too 

cumbersome. Delays and red tape create more food insecurity, instead of curbing it. We propose when Title II emergency resources 

have been exhausted in a given fiscal year additional emergency 

funding would automatically come from the Emerson Trust. Of 

course, we would also need to insure that the Emerson Trust is replenished in a timely fashion through immediate refunding from 

the Commodity Credit Corporation. 

Second, we propose a bridging mechanism to insure that there 

are no funding breaks in the food aid pipeline. We believe the 

USAID administrator should be authorized to draw on CCC funds 

to contract for commodities and freight to meet programming needs 

in the next fiscal year if the Agriculture Appropriations Bill has 

not become law by October 1st of the new fiscal year. The CCC 

would be reimbursed promptly upon enactment of the regular appropriation or permanent continuing resolution. This reform would 

avoid the need to make small-scale commodity purchases and shipments under continuing resolutions early in the year. Such arrangements push up both commodity and freight costs. They generally force PVOs to scale back and stretch out program resources 

to try to minimize food insecurity, and they harm participants enrolled in planned and approved programs. 
69

Third, Catholic Relief Services and our partners have determined 

that if more cash were available through Title II we could better 

fight world hunger. We recommend that Section 202(e) Title II cash 

resources be increased to 25 percent of the overall Title II budget 

and that the law be amended to allow greater flexibility in its use 

for food aid program support. 

Catholic Relief Services would make three additional recommendations to share with you today. 

First, we ask that Congress appropriate in a timely way a real- istic annual target of $2 billion per year for Title II. This amount 

reflects the actual average of total annual appropriations in the 

past 5 years. While this committee can’t drive the appropriations 

schedule, it can intervene by authorizing the bridge financing noted 

before. 

Second, we propose that a minimum of $600 million or 50% of 

total Title II resources, whichever is greater, be dedicated exclusively to developmental food aid to address chronic hunger. In a 

word, a safe box to insure that developmental food aid is not routinely diverted to emergency needs. 

I would like to share a brief anecdote from when I was the regional director in southern Africa, which illustrates how developmental food aid can address long-term, chronic hunger needs. In 

Lesotho, CRS worked with our local partners to meet the urgent 

food needs of vulnerable populations suffering from a devastating 

drought, while implementing simple, but effective, measures to address longer-term food security. 

For example, some of the most vulnerable in Lesotho were those 

affected by HIV and AIDS. The chronically ill do not have the 

strength they used to when healthy. But instead of relying solely 

on food aid distribution, our program took the additional step of 

building simple keyhole gardens. These were a type of kitchen garden in the shape of a skeleton key on a raised platform that allows 

the grower to cultivate vegetable crops from a standing position. It 

also uses household waste compost systems to provide cheap but effective fertilizer. This kind of developmental activity contributes to 

longer-term food security, diminishing the need for food aid over 

time. 

Third, Catholic Relief Services supports the administration’s request for flexibility in the use of a portion of the Title II budget 

for local or regional purchases of food. Local purchases from local 

producers can bolster local food security in certain circumstances 

and contributes to a faster and more appropriate response to an 

emergency. 

I do not suggest that these reforms alone will end chronic hunger. For example, we must marry these reforms with other innovative development aid, increased access to clean water, and link nutrition with HIV and AIDS care and support. 

Once again, your subcommittee can play a pivotal role in integrating our total foreign assistance program with a full-fledged promotion of food security and in tailoring our programs to meet the 

development challenges in Africa. 

In conclusion, I want to once again express my appreciation to 

you, Chairman Payne, and to all the members of the subcommittee 

for hearing proposals to make a potent program even more power-
70

ful in wiping out world hunger. By adopting these recommendations, you will enable CRS and other organizations to better promote food security, alleviate hunger, and save lives. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to respond to any questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reilly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ANNEMARIE REILLY, CHIEF OF STAFF, CATHOLIC

RELIEF SERVICES

Good afternoon Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for calling this hearing and for providing Catholic Relief 

Services the opportunity to share our insights based on our long experience of delivering and programming food aid for long-term development and emergencies. 

I am delighted that the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health of the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs is holding this early hearing on food aid in the Farm 

Bill. Five years ago during the last revision of the Farm Bill, it was this committee 

that worked most closely with Private Voluntary Organizations in enacting the 

modifications we were seeking to make food aid work better for the world’s 

hungriest people. 

My name is Annemarie Reilly, Chief of Staff for Catholic Relief Services (CRS). 

Operating in 98 countries around the world, CRS is the international relief and development agency of the U.S. Catholic Community. For more than half a century, 

we have worked with Food for Peace in a partnership that has expressed the goodwill and compassion of the American people. The reforms we propose will improve 

our ability to reduce chronic hunger, unlocking the power of food security aid. I 

would like to note that I have presented these reforms in testimony I delivered earlier this month before the Subcommittee on Specialty Crops, Rural Development 

and Foreign Agriculture of the House Committee on Agriculture. I have also forwarded copies of my written testimony to the Senate Agriculture and Foreign Relations committees. 

According to the World Food Program, more than 850 million people on our planet 

are suffering from chronic hunger. The American people should be proud that the 

US government, through PL480 Title II resources, is the largest food aid donor in 

the world. These programs assist millions of people living on the edge to meet their 

daily food needs. In addition, the complementary cash support dedicated to strengthening livelihood systems improves their ability to feed themselves in the long term. 

For example, with five years investment of Title II food and funds, CRS worked 

through a local partner to reverse severe environmental degradation and improve 

the livelihoods of 570 poor households in Legedini, a rural community in eastern 

Ethiopia. Through support provided by USAID and CRS, this community has been 

able to use small-scale irrigation to grow marketable vegetables. They have also 

used this investment to develop small livestock herds and increase sales of milk, improve water and sanitation management, increase the engagement of women in 

micro enterprise, and improve the nutritional content of family meals. Participants 

in a women’s group have begun to save and to invest their savings in business activities that diversify their assets. One woman, Nuria Umere, has been able to purchase an ox, a cow and seven goats, and she is able to send one of her three children 

to school and help her husband meet their household food needs. The success of this 

program is a direct result of the effective combination of food aid to meet immediate 

needs and cash to support complementary livelihood support activities. 

Title II resources are used to set up feeding programs in desperately poor communities around the world and are often coupled with agriculture projects, village 

banking schemes or other livelihoods enhancement efforts. Social safety net programs feed orphan-headed households and people who are too old or too sick to function in the local economy. Title II also provides food for maternal/child programs 

that combine food aid with prenatal and postnatal education and support. This is 

only a small sample of the variety of programs Title II supports to fight chronic 

hunger. Title II programs are extremely important to the families, communities and 

even nations that they serve. 

Although these are significant efforts, there remains a huge unmet need. According to Food for Peace, the US government feeds only about 50 to 70 million of those 

850 million chronically hungry people. We don’t expect the US government to feed 

all of the world’s hungry. CRS is working on recommendations for improvements to 

the Food Aid Convention, due to be renegotiated, which could ensure that more resources will be made available worldwide to fight hunger. We also invest significant 

private resources and funding from other donors to support livelihood systems that 
71

address chronic food needs. But given the enormity of the hunger program, more 

must be done. Yet, more and more of our Title II resources are being diverted away 

from programs that address chronic hunger in order to fund an increasing number 

of emergencies around the world. 

Catholic Relief Services and other private voluntary agencies are very supportive 

of the US government response to emergencies. But this should not be done at the 

expense of the chronically hungry. We are offering some proposals to continue this 

vital work in responding to food emergencies, while at the same time protecting resources for programs that address chronic hunger and the underlying causes of that 

hunger. 

As you are well aware, current law requires that 75% of Title II food aid resources 

be devoted to development (non-emergency) programs. Over the past several years, 

however, the Administration has consistently used the emergency provision to waive 

the 75% rule. The program percentages have now been reversed as development 

food aid programs are diminished or eliminated in many countries so that about 

75% of commodities are used for emergencies year to year, while only about 25% 

remain for development. 

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CRS, CARE, SAVE THE CHILDREN, MERCY CORPS

I would like to share with you three recommendations that CRS has developed 

in collaboration with sister PVOs CARE, Save the Children and Mercy Corps. 

First, we believe that with some adjustments, the Bill Emerson Humanitarian 

Trust (BEHT) could become an invaluable tool in addressing food emergencies. 

Catholic Relief Services, along with our PVO colleagues CARE, Mercy Corps and 

Save the Children, propose that Congress change both the way the Bill Emerson 

Humanitarian Trust is used and the way it operates. When Title II emergency resources have been exhausted in a given fiscal year, additional emergency funding 

would automatically come from the Emerson Trust. We also propose that the resources available for emergencies be increased to 50% of Title II. Using the Emerson 

Trust first as an emergency back-up will also protect non-emergency developmental 

programs. 

Of course, to make this system work, we need to ensure that the Emerson Trust 

is replenished in a timely fashion. Catholic Relief Services is currently drafting specific proposed fixes for the Emerson Trust that would make it a more effective component in the food aid arsenal in our fight against global hunger. The current mechanism for realizing the benefits of the Emerson Trust is cumbersome, the underlying 

authority is vague, long-term availability is uncertain, and the legal and policy constraints on accessing the Trust may conflict with long-term economic development 

goals. The Emerson Trust is in need of reform and the overall goal of such reform 

should be to make it a reliable source of food resources in emergency situations and 

one that may be accessed easily to mitigate the detriment to planned non-emergency 

development funding under Title II. 

CRS is working with others to design the following changes to the Bill Emerson 

Humanitarian Trust:

(1) Provide for the orderly liquidation of current stocks in the Emerson Trust, 

so that it will hold only cash to acquire U.S. commodities as needed;

(2) Establish a true trust by allowing the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 

to invest the cash in the Emerson Trust in conservative short-term instruments for an appropriate return;

(3) Once Title II funds designated for emergencies have been depleted, the Administration should be mandated to use the Emerson Trust until it is exhausted thus avoiding the need to used development food aid to fund emergencies;

(4) When Emerson Trust Fund are drawn down, they must be automatically replenished. Provide limited authority to Commodity Credit Corporation to replenish the Emerson Trust in a fiscal year;

(5) The funding in the Emerson Trust should set at a level appropriate to current needs;

Second, as a bridging mechanism to ensure there are no funding breaks in the 

food aid pipeline, authorize the Administrator to draw on CCC funds to contract for 

commodities and freight to meet programming needs in the next fiscal year prior 

to the actual enactment of an appropriation. The CCC would be reimbursed promptly from the Title II appropriation or continuing resolution when it becomes available. This would avoid the small scale commodity purchases and shipments under 

continuing resolutions early in the year, which push up both commodity and freight 
72

costs, and generally force PVOs to scale back and stretch out program resources to 

try to minimize harm to participants enrolled in planned and approved programs. 

Third, it is our position that if more cash were available through Title II, we 

would have greater flexibility in carrying out our programs to fight world hunger, 

both chronic and in emergency settings. The real causes of global food insecurity 

and hunger are complex and cannot be solved over the long term by the provision 

of food assistance alone. Responding more appropriately means that additional resources in the form of cash, both within and outside of Title II, are essential to support a variety of targeted activities that can more effectively address the root causes 

of vulnerabilities and risks that afflict hungry and food insecure populations. Current Section 202 (e) law permits a small percentage of Title II to be used for program logistics, management and related costs. However, these allowable uses do not 

go far enough to serve as an effective critical cash support mechanism. Section 

202(e) needs to be amended to allow greater flexibility in the use of the funds to 

include administrative, management, technical and program related costs to enhance the effectiveness of Title II commodities. The percentage of funding in an expanded Section 202(e) also needs to be increased to no less than 25% of the Title 

II program levels. 

We could more flexibly use commodities and/or cash in Title II by using language 

patterned after the McGovern/Dole Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. The McGovern/Dole Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program addresses the issue of cash resources with simple language that allows for a mix of commodities and cash for implementers to use to carry out the program. This has 

worked well as implementers are discouraged from monetizing commodities because 

it is much easier and more cost effective to use cash. 

II. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM CRS

CRS has two additional recommendations. 

First, we ask that Congress appropriate a realistic annual target of $2 billion per 

year for Title II. Furthermore, we propose that a minimum of $600 million or 50% 

of total Title II resources, whichever is greater, be dedicated exclusively to development food aid to address chronic hunger—in a word, to put this money for developmental food aid in a ‘‘safe box.’’ The $2 billion figure is consistent with the U.S. 

share of annual needs for the last several years. Full funding of food aid needs up 

front in the initial appropriation would avoid ‘‘bunching’’ of Title II export shipments late in a fiscal year following supplemental appropriations—a change that the 

GAO noted could save 12–14%. Late additional funding, while welcome, causes 

delays and increases both commodity and shipping costs due to higher demand. Sufficient funding up front would simplify programming in the field, eliminate delays 

and extra storage and transportation expenses, and ensure more effective and dependable links with partners who look to the U.S., above all others, for life-saving 

aid. Designated funding would guarantee that we don’t lose the fight against chronic 

hunger by diverting almost all food aid to emergency uses. 

Second, CRS supports the Administration’s request for flexibility in the use of a 

portion of the Title II budget for local or regional purchase of food. CRS endorses 

and undertakes the local purchase of commodities as a cost-effective tool for some 

emergency and non-emergency programs, when analysis of markets indicates it is 

feasible. CRS also engages in the use of vouchers to promote beneficiary acquisition 

of local food. CRS believes local purchase is an option worthy of congressional support in situations where it can bolster local food security and/or contribute to faster 

and more appropriate response to an emergency. It can be a more effective and efficient use of American resources. 

The reforms we propose today will improve our ability to reduce chronic hunger 

and unleash the power of food security aid. Despite Title II’s success, it has not fully 

realized its potential to build food security in developing countries. The right response to this challenge is not to throw out food aid, but to transform it into food 

security aid. I do not suggest that these proposals alone will end chronic hunger. 

For example, we must marry these reforms with other innovative development aid, 

increase access to clean and healthful water, and link nutrition and HIV/AIDS 

treatment. We must also bar food aid in export promotion and retool the cargo preference program. 

In conclusion, I want to once again thank you Chairman Payne and all members 

of the subcommittee for holding this hearing to respond to the needs of the hungry 

throughout the world. Our proposed changes to US food aid programs are a sincere 

effort to help make a great program even greater. By adopting these recommendations CRS, and other organizations that implement U.S. international food assistance programs, can better promote food security, alleviate hunger, and save lives. 
73

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that 

the Committee may have.

Attachment:

Attachment A: Catholic Relief Services Title II Countries, FY2006—FY2008 (Proposed)
74

Mr. PAYNE. We will take a very short break. Mr. Mutombo has 

to leave, and so I might ask the young lady to escort him to the 

room so I can wish him good-bye. 

Then I have a quick question for both of you, and then we will 

conclude by hearing Mr. Sitoe, our final witness. We will be back 

in one moment. 

[Recess taken.] 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Reilly, you state in your testimony that you support the administration’s proposal to use cash for local purchases. Do you also 

support the amount the administration has proposed, up to 25 percent of Public Law 480 Title II funds? 

Ms. REILLY. Yes, we agree; and we believe that there should be 

an effort to explore this much more deliberately. And if it is a pilot 

program, we are very supportive. We think that there are limitations and we do need to be extremely careful in terms of market 

implications but that there are cases where this can be a very useful response. 
75

Mr. PAYNE. Would CRS participate if a pilot project could be developed? 

Ms. REILLY. Yes. We have actually spent over $6 million over the 

last 5 years of our own private resources doing local and regional 

purchases. We would be very happy to participate in something 

like that. 

I would like to make a point, though, Chairman Payne, that we 

would also like to see local purchase considered for development 

programs. We think it could actually be more effective, given that 

you can take a bit more time in doing it right rather than an emergency situation, perhaps going down a road that you might not 

want to go down. 

Mr. PAYNE. All right. That is very good. Well, we appreciate that. 

I wonder, Mr. Evans, as I understand it, Food for the Hungry 

supports a pilot project to determine if cash for local or regional 

purchase is a good use of taxpayers’ money. According to Congressional Research Service, 60 percent of all food aid is purchased locally. The World Food Program engages in local purchase, Canada 

allows 50% of its food aid to be purchased locally or regionally, and 

most of the food aid supplied by the European Union is purchased 

in developing countries. How would you evaluate their programs? 

And if you could tell us, what are lessons learned that the United 

States could apply? And what do you expect to learn through a 

pilot that we cannot learn through the experience of others? 

Would you like to take a stab at those? 

Mr. EVANS. Gladly. 

Yes, the Food for the Hungry, as part of the Alliance for Food 

Aid, does support a pilot for local regional purchases of food for 

emergencies. 

With regards to some of the reasons behind why a pilot and, you 

know, some of these reasons I believe need to be talked about, particularly with regards to World Food Program and other things. In 

other words, what types of evaluations and assessments have occurred? 

We believe that local purchase programs must be designed and 

monitored to avoid distortions in and disruption of local agricultural production and marketing. So that is one key piece that a 

pilot would need to look at. What sort of disruptions does local purchase have with regards to those two things? 

The second area is to assure the quality and safety of products 

provided. So with local purchase, part of the pilot would need to be 

looking at food quality compared to the quality of U.S. products 

that are normally shipped. 

Thirdly, to avoid harmful price increases in local markets, as you 

know, while the local purchase is happening, that might have a 

great boom effect, which might turn into a bust effect after it is 

over. So looking at price increases on local markets and the impacts there and to meet applicable U.S. Government regulations 

and audit requirements. 

To introduce a cash for overseas purchase program, we recommend a pilot that tests various approaches for purchases: Number one, within the recipient country or a nearby low-income country; number two, in cases where the procurement will expedite the 

provision of food aid and could be linked to advancing local agricul-
76

tural production and marketing. So that would be a second thing 

we would be looking at in the pilot. 

And then outcomes from the pilot, plus review of other cash purchase programs, which you mentioned should be used to develop 

appropriate methodologies and best practices for any ongoing programs. 

So, again, we feel as an Alliance that it is important to not just 

rush into this without really looking at it well, looking at all these 

areas mentioned; and we believe the best way to do that would be 

in a pilot way. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank both of you for your testimony. 

We will study it and incorporate your recommendations as we move 

forward to try to make our programs more effective. We certainly 

will take into account what you have told us today. So, once again, 

thank you very much; and we apologize, like I said, for the break 

in the votes that came up. 

Now what we will do at this time is officially adjourn the formal 

meeting. When we have a representative from a foreign country or 

from a United Nations or international organization we call it a 

briefing. But everything for all intents and purposes are the same. 

However, we will adjourn the hearing, and we will move into——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. PAYNE [continuing]. A briefing. 

Oh, I am sorry. Let me ask our final witness, and then I will 

open with you, to ask Mr. Sitoe if he would come forth. Because 

I am afraid votes will come, and he has been here. So I will yield 

all my time to you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Very good. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

All right, Mr. Luis Sitoe? 

Mr. Sitoe joined the Embassy of the Republic of Mozambique in 

Washington as a commercial counselor in July, 2006. Prior to his 

posting to the United States, Mr. Sitoe served in the Ministry of 

Industry and Trade successively as Director for Commerce, Director for Industries, and Director for International Relations. As Director for Commerce, he led the Inter-Ministerial Working Group 

on Food Aid and negotiated several memoranda of understanding 

and agreements on food aid, including with USAID and USDA. He 

was a trade chief negotiator for his country in the Southern African 

Development Community, SADC, and the regional integration process. He worked as well with the SADC EU Economic Partnership 

Agreement, which was related to the European Union. So it is certainly a pleasure for us to have you here, your Excellency. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LUI ́S SITOE, COUNSELOR (COMMERCIAL), 

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE 

Mr. SITOE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman—I see there aren’t members no longer here—and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify about the critical and changing role that the United States 

food aid and other assistance has played in Mozambique’s recovery 

from short-term emergencies and in the longer process of social and 

economic development following decades of conflict. 
77

As we speak, Mr. Chairman, today we are engaged in discussions 

of the Millennium Challenge Compact with Mozambique with the 

United States. This is an extremely important program for Mozambique, which we believe will play a major role in stimulating economic growth and lifting hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans 

out of poverty. 

These are my key points of my statement. 

Mozambique is grateful to the people of the United States for 

their generous donations of food aid and other assistance over the 

years. The United States has provided, just to give an example, 

424,000 metric tons of food aid to Mozambique from 2002 through 

2006. Food aid provided by the United States has been critical in 

Mozambique’s recovery from times of crisis, such as severe flooding 

in recent years. Food aid has also been important in Mozambique’s 

long-term recovery from decades of conflict beginning in 2002. This 

support has helped to lay the foundation for Mozambique’s strong 

economic growth. In 1992, Mozambique’s economy grew at 2 percent. Last year, our GDP grew at 8.5 percent, one of the highest 

rates in Africa. 

United States food assistance to Mozambique has been effective 

because it has evolved in ways that met Mozambique’s constantly 

changing needs. Through 1992, the United States provided a great 

deal of humanitarian assistance and a multi-year Title III program 

with policy conditions that helped Mozambique move toward a free 

market in basic food crops. 

I was directly involved in Mozambique’s transition from heavy 

state involvement in markets, including price setting and import 

and export controls, to a market economy free of controls. We have 

found that allowing private sector-managed import markets to 

work has been the best way to stabilize consumer prices for food. 

Through the ’90s and continuing today, the U.S. has made available food for direct feeding programs, food assistance programs. 

Food assistance has also been monetized, with proceeds going to 

NGOs that serve the most vulnerable, including AIDS orphans. 

Monetization also funded programs that forced the Mozambican 

population’s long-term recovery from conflict. These programs provided research and training that have increased Mozambique’s food 

security over the long term, increasing the agriculture production 

and household income, strengthening markets and improving diets. 

In recent years, the United States has also supported the development of Mozambique’s own capacity to plan for and implement 

emergency programs, including innovative cash assistance programs. During the recent floods in 1999 and 2000 and in 2007, for 

example, Mozambique’s Disaster Relief Agency took the lead role 

in coordinating assistance from tens of nations. In 1999 and 2000, 

USAID worked with the Mozambican leaders to plan and implement an innovative program which distributed about $92 in cash 

to 160,000 flood-affected families. The cash grant enabled the families to move back into their homes more quickly and helped them 

to revive local businesses and traders from whom the flood victims 

purchased necessities, including building materials, pots and pans, 

clothing and livestock. 

Mozambique has seen good economic progress during the last 15 

years, but we face important challenges in providing an integrated 
78

approach to food security. We need to put measures in place to address crises, collaborate with humanitarian organizations and civil 

society to put in place a targeted safety net that insures that the 

needs of the very poor are met, and a forward-looking agricultural 

development agenda that takes into account market factors and 

that will, over time, enable Mozambique to make productive use of 

its many agricultural resources. This requires investment in agriculture, new technologies, infrastructures, and continued development of people’s ability to use the new technologies—new pest-resistant and drought-resistant varieties of crops, for example. 

Lessons learned from Mozambique’s experience for the current 

discussion about food aid reform. 

We need the continued the strong commitment of the United 

States to food aid and emergency assistance programs. However, 

recipient countries need to take increased responsibility for how 

food aid is programmed, especially when it is developmental or 

non-emergency food aid, but also when a limited amount of assistance is available to meet a relatively high level of hunger and poverty. 

The case of Mozambique indicates the importance of program 

flexibility and innovation to craft food and other assistance programs that meet local humanitarian and developmental needs best 

in the short, medium and long term. We support the efforts to provide flexibility and resources for many kinds of program innovations, such as the cash assistance program that was successfully 

implemented during the floods in 1999 and 2000. 

We also welcome the President Bush administration proposal to 

allow up to 25 percent of food aid funding to be used for local and 

regional purchase of food aid. Our development experience has 

made us champions of local and regional market development and 

integration. Because of Mozambique’s unique geography, we import 

food from our neighbors for the southern cities, where most of the 

population is concentrated. We export commodities from our northern producing areas to other countries in the world. Local and regional procurement will help strengthen Africa’s own market, vital 

steps to boosting rural farms and non-farm income. 

Monetized food aid has provided significant resources for United 

States NGO programs in Mozambique that helped families to boost 

agriculture productivity, learn how to work with the market, and 

improve their diets. Monetization of food aid in Mozambique has 

not disrupted commercial markets to our best knowledge. It is well 

recognized that monetization of food aid is an efficient way to provide cash resources. We are very concerned about the possibility of 

losing the cash resources for critical agricultural and other local development programs altogether should monetization disappear. 

In concluding, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before this committee and to present our views 

on food aid and food security. The challenge of assuring the food 

security of all our citizens is one that the Government of Mozambique takes very seriously. We recognize the complexity of the challenge. We are confident that working together we can assure that 

the financial, food and technical assistance of the United States 

will help us to meet these challenges successfully. 

I thank you very much. 
79

Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you very much for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sitoe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LUI ́S SITOE, COUNSELOR (COMMERCIAL), EMBASSY OF

THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and Members of the Sub-Committee: 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify about the critical, and changing, role 

that U.S. food aid and other assistance has played in Mozambique’s recovery from 

short-term emergencies and in the longer process of social and economic development following decades of civil war. 

I represent the Republic of Mozambique, and serve as Commercial Counselor in 

my country’s diplomatic mission to the United States. I am an economist by training. Before coming to the United States, I spent my entire professional career in 

Mozambique’s Ministry of Industry and Trade working to develop Mozambique’s domestic markets and international trade. I have served in various positions, including Director for Commerce, Director for Industries, and Director for International 

Relations. Throughout my career, I have worked closely with the Embassy of the 

United States in Mozambique and with the United States Agency for International 

Development in the design and implementation of food aid and other assistance programs for Mozambique. I am also currently engaged in the ongoing discussions of 

my country’s Millennium Challenge Compact with the United States. This is an extremely important program for Mozambique which we believe will play a major role 

in stimulating economic growth and lifting hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans 

out of poverty. 

These are the key points of my statement:

• Mozambique is grateful to the people of the United States for their generous 

donations of food aid and other assistance over the years. The U.S. has provided 424,000 tons of food aid to Mozambique from 2002 through 2006. Food 

aid provided by the United States has been critical in Mozambique’s recovery 

from times of crisis, such as severe flooding in recent years. Food aid has also 

been very important in Mozambique’s longer-term recovery from decades of 

civil war beginning in 1992. This support has helped to lay the foundation 

for Mozambique’s strong economic growth. In 1992, Mozambique economy 

grew at 2.0%—Last year, our GDP grew at 8.5 %, one of the highest rates 

in all of Africa.

• U.S. food assistance to Mozambique has been effective because it has evolved 

in ways that met Mozambique’s constantly changing needs. Through 1992 the 

United States provided a great deal of humanitarian assistance and a multiyear Title III program with policy conditions that helped Mozambique move 

toward a free market in basic food crops. I was directly involved in Mozambique’s transition from heavy state involvement in markets—including pricesetting, and import and export controls—to a market economy free of controls. 

We have found that allowing private sector-managed import markets to work 

has been the best way to stabilize consumer prices for food. 

Through the 1990s, and continuing today, the US has made available food 

for direct feeding programs. Food assistance has also been monetized, with 

proceeds going to NGOs that serve the most vulnerable, including AIDS orphans. 

Monetization also funded programs that fostered the Mozambican population’s longer-term economic recovery from civil war. These programs provided research, equipment and training that have increased Mozambique’s 

food security over the long term, increasing agricultural production and 

household incomes, strengthening markets, and improving diets. 

In recent years, the U.S. has also supported the development of Mozambique’s own capacity to plan for and implement emergency programs, including innovative cash assistance programs. During the devastating floods of 

1999 and 2000, and in 2007 for example, Mozambique’s Disaster Relief Agency took the lead role in coordinating assistance from tens of nations. In 1999–

2000 USAID worked with Mozambican leaders to plan and implement an innovative program which distributed about $92 in cash to 106,000 flood-affected families. The cash grants enabled the families to move back into their 

homes more quickly, and helped to revive local businesses and traders from 

whom the flood victims purchased necessities including building materials, 

pots and pans, clothing and livestock.

• Mozambique has been good economic progress during the last 15 years, but we 

face important challenges in providing an integrated approach to food security.
80

We need to put measures in place to address crises, collaborate with humanitarian organizations and civil society to put in place a targeted safety net that 

ensure that the needs of the very poor are met, and a forward-looking agricultural development agenda that takes into account market factors and that 

will, over time, enable Mozambique to make productive use of its many agricultural resources. Many families still have too little income to purchase all 

the food they need for their nutritional well-being on the markets. Mozambique still has a large farming population that is still not as productive as 

they should be. Our farmers are not producing enough food for their families 

or are country. Therefore it is very important for us to boost agricultural productivity to improve food security. This requires investment in agriculture, 

new technologies, infrastructure, and continued development of peoples’ abilities to use the new technologies—new pest-resistant and drought-resistant varieties of crops, for example. Part of Mozambique’s food security strategy also 

involves boosting agricultural exports where the country has a competitive 

advantage, such as cashews, and this links Mozambique’s food security interests to continued access to global trading opportunities.

• Lessons from Mozambique’s experience relevant for the current discussion 

about food aid reform:

— We need the continued strong commitment of the United States to food 

aid and emergency assistance programs. However, recipient countries 

need to take increasing responsibility for how food aid is programmed, 

especially when it is developmental or non-emergency food aid, but also 

when a limited amount of assistance is available to meet a relatively 

high level of hunger and poverty. 

— The case of Mozambique illustrates the importance of program flexibility 

and innovation to craft food aid and other assistance programs that 

meet local humanitarian and development needs best—in the short, medium and long term. We support efforts to provide flexibility and resources for many kinds of program innovations, such as the cash assistance program that was successfully implemented during our 1999–2000 

floods. It is also important to allocate sufficient resources to track the 

impact and results of pilot programs so that we can learn from the experience and incorporate the lessons into permanent programs. 

— We also support the Bush Administration’s proposal to allow up to 25% 

of food aid funding to be used for local and regional purchase of food 

aid. Our development experience has made us champions of local and 

regional market development and integration. Because of Mozambique’s 

unique geography, we import food from our neighbors for our southern 

cities where most of the population is concentrated. We export commodities from our northern producing areas to other countries and the 

world. Our experiences, and recent studies, suggest that in many cases 

local and regional purchase offers a faster, less expensive way to meet 

emergency and other food needs. In addition, local and regional procurement will help strengthen Africa’s own markets—a vital step for boosting rural farm and non-farm incomes. 

— Monetized food aid has provided significant resources for U.S. NGO programs in Mozambique that have helped families boost agricultural productivity, learn how to work with the market, and improve their diets. 

Monetization of food aid in Mozambique has not disrupted commercial 

markets to our knowledge. It is well recognized that monetization of 

food aid is an inefficient way to provide cash resources, we are very concerned about the possibility of losing the cash resources for critical agricultural and other local development programs altogether, should monetization disappear.

Mr. PAYNE. I will await the gentlelady from Texas, a member of 

the committee, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Challenges to this series of programs, looking at this from a distance—I happen to be a new member—are always in the effectiveness of the program. And I consider the longevity of the program. 

Let me, before I ask a question, thank the witness for his testimony, and the witnesses previously as well, and just make a brief 

statement. 
81

We don’t want to view food and the ability to establish food security as a carrot for friendship. We want it to be seen as a sincere 

commitment by the United States for improving the lives of people 

around the world. However, many times we have come to understand that many times our aid given through food is not even understood to be—I shouldn’t say a gift but to be part of the foreign 

policy of the United States. 

In addition to the issues dealing with food security, Mr. Sitoe, if 

you would, can you tell us how to be an effective—and if you are 

the wrong person, please correct me—but to be effective with 

spreading the message and the tools for food security? But also 

having the food aid and the support of food security being effectively utilized to build relationships, to show our depth of willingness of commitment and to make the program work right? 

Would you care to answer? 

Mr. SITOE. Thank you for the question. I am not certain if I am 

the right person, but I have my own thoughts on this——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I welcome them. 

Mr. SITOE [continuing]. Issue. 

I see food aid and food security as things that can go and should 

go together. Speaking of our own experience, there was a time 

when we couldn’t produce enough food because of the conflict. We 

couldn’t—or we couldn’t produce all the food we wanted, and we 

were very heavily dependent from donations. That goes back to the 

’80s and ’90s. 

Then, when we reached peace in ’92, we saw a possibility of Mozambique starting producing, to a large extent, its own food; and 

what I have seen there is that we shifted in some crops, we shifted 

from heavy dependence from food aid to local production. 

And here we saw also the role played—because when we had 

that situation where the PVOs started sending food aid not for free 

distribution but to sell, and we saw them using the proceeds to improve the roads, to using the proceeds to acquire technology for the 

peasants, we saw the PVOs helping to identify best crop variety 

that could yield more than what they were using—so here I 

wouldn’t really—if food aid is well-coordinated, it can help to boost 

food security. 

And I think the Congressperson is right by saying that one 

should send a message of food security. Food aid should be timebound and short-term things to do, but aiming at helping countries 

to produce their own food. And I think that was also in the statement of the previous testimonies. 

So that is the way I see it. And based on my own experience, you 

will need food aid, but food aid shouldn’t be there for all the time. 

You should move to be capable to produce your own food, and food 

aid can be used to assist that process. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just deviate just for a moment, because I imagine you are talking about coordinated food aid, international organizations, and possibly the United States as it gives 

direct food aid. And my question, just a slight deviation, does an 

effective coordination of food aid and now moving toward food security help build friendship and alliances? 

Mr. SITOE. Sure. I am certain it does. It does. 
82

What I saw in my own country, which you know we are more to 

the side on the Cold War, what I saw is when we started having 

very important cooperation with the United States the first thing 

that was there was that agricultural equipment was given to the 

people, and we had that sign of two hands holding each other. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. SITOE. They had that sign of two hands holding each other, 

and their comment was, oh, where is this thing coming from? And 

one would answer, from America. Oh, but Americans are being—

or we are being told Americans are imperialists. How can they give 

us those things? 

So I see really—taking from—that, yes, it does help to build a 

friendship. It does help to strengthen the people-to-people relationship. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I understand. 

Let me just raise this other point. I am a convert on this issue 

of food security, and I pay tribute to my predecessor whenever I 

mention the issue of food and hunger, and that is Congressman 

Mickey Leland who lost his life in efforts to feed Ethiopians during 

the extensive drought. Of course, we see that droughts come and 

go, so this whole question of irrigation, teaching how to irrigate, 

providing equipment which then allows the agricultural community 

in and on the continent to continue to grow during hazardous times 

or hazardous weather times, I am an enormous believer in those 

kinds of skills. 

Mr. Sitoe, do you think a move toward those kinds of technology, 

the whole need for water, allowing farmers to farm during difficult 

times is an important direction that should be taken? 

Mr. SITOE. I am certain that it is the right direction that one 

should take. 

Again, what has proven to be difficult for us is that investment 

in infrastructure is that we haven’t been much successful in mobilizing resources for irrigation or to put programs in place on a larger scale. Because I spoke about the PVO—what the PVOs are 

doing. It is limited. I have to recognize that. It is limited. It is 

not—they are not everywhere. They will choose certain areas where 

they can be more effective. But still their efforts are not enough. 

So if one could really—and that is why we are saying, to reach 

food security, food aid will not be enough. Even if you are monetizing the food aid, it will not be enough, because heavy infrastructures cannot be funded through the proceeds that are coming from 

food. So that is what I think. 

If you combine where, as it is now with the Millennium Challenge Account, with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and I 

say we are, as I speak, negotiating with them. If you can tackle 

that issue of infrastructures, then you can really improve food security in our countries. And also that will help to integrate the market, the domestic market, the original market if you have the infrastructures. 

I will give you an example. The northern part of Mozambique is 

in produce surplus, but to bring this food to the needed people in 

the south costs a lot of money. Just because you don’t have an infrastructure in place, it will cost more than bringing the food from 
83

America. It will cost twice or more because of lack of infrastructures. 

That is why in my testimony I say we sell the surplus in the 

north to the rest of the world; and we buy from neighboring countries, which economically has logic, from our neighboring countries 

in the south. But, still, infrastructure will help very much to integrate the market, the domestic market as well as the regional markets. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman for his indulgence. 

I am, as I said, a strong convert for the focus that we need to 

place on food security. 

I yield back my time, and I thank you for instructive testimony. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you for your participation. 

Let me just say, in general, I really commend your country with 

the 8 percent plus growth that you have had in the past year. I 

think that your country was a good example of how combatants, 

when they decided that there had been enough war and they were 

tired, decided to go to Rome and to come up with a negotiated settlement; and immediately—with RENAMO and FRELIMO becoming political parties immediately and started to then take that energy into legislation for the benefit of the country. I think it was 

an outstanding example of the way that conflicts can end and that 

former combatants can then come together to develop the country. 

And of course we all are very appreciative of the work that Graca 

Michelle, even though she has moved to the other country with Mr. 

Mandela, has really done a great deal for children around the 

world. 

So let me just ask a quick question or two. We have about 3 or 

4 more minutes. 

Just in your opinion, what are some things that donors should 

be doing in your opinion to improve the delivery of food aid? If you 

have any suggestions. 

Mr. SITOE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think there were suggestions made by previous testimonies 

made today, and I do agree with the suggestion. And I will mention 

the issue of timeliness, to provide food at the right time. How do 

you provide food at the right time? Because, as it was said, 6 

months, if you are in crisis, it is too much time. In the time the 

food will arrive, no one will be there to take the food. 

Mr. PAYNE. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. SITOE. So if there is a way to shorten the time where they 

will be supplied, in the time that the food will be provided, the better. And these to me can be achieved by this concept of local origin 

purchasing of food. It will reduce the time. Not only the cost but 

also the time. 

I think also this concept—I mean, one would have to work out 

what it means, the pre-positioning of food aid in the region or—it 

has to be looked at. But something that to me makes a lot of sense. 

Because it, again, shortens the time. 

But it might have some other possibilities, like how do you store, 

how do you keep the quality of food? So I think this will be one 

of the things that should be looked at. 

And I also think that, by providing food, one should consider that 

food, it is not a homogenous term. It has to do with the eating hab-
84

1 In FY 08, CARE will program Title II non-emergency resources in about 12 countries. This 

reduction is primarily due to the Office of Food for Peace’s decision to focus its non-emergency 

resources in 15 countries. CARE was consulted by the Office of Food for Peace before this decision was made. CARE supports FFP’s efforts to concentrate its non-emergency programs in 

those countries that are the most food insecure. 

its, it has to do with the culture of people, and if you don’t consider 

those, you might be—you might provide that food timely but not 

achieving yet your own goal. Because people will have to find a 

way to sell this food that you brought to them, and then go and 

look for what they really want to eat. 

I am saying, it is not enough to say, okay, I have provided corn, 

yellow corn to people who don’t even know or that they don’t—it 

is not part of their eating habits. So you will have—that might 

hamper your objective of really providing the food. 

I mean, in terms of crisis, yeah, people will not have a lot of 

choice. They will not maybe be willing to choose what I put in my 

stomach. But for this non-emergency food aid, one should really 

carefully consider what one includes as a food aid at a certain point 

in time. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Well, that kind of answers a question that I was going to wrap 

up with about whether you feel that there is a need—and I guess 

you would agree—for increased dialogue between the donors and 

the countries to attempt to be more effective in what they do, not 

only in delivery but also in what is delivered, as you mentioned, 

to try to accommodate as best as possible people’s normal habits 

and foods that they consume. So I guess you would agree that 

there definitely should be increased dialogue——

Mr. SITOE. Sure. 

Mr. PAYNE [continuing]. Between the donors and the donees. 

Well, let me thank you once again for your briefing before the 

committee. 

I ask unanimous consent that the following submissions for the 

record be a part of the hearing record: A statement from the Maritime Food Aid Coalition; a statement from Care USA; a statement 

prepared by David Beckmann, President of Bread for the World; 

and an FAO report titled, ‘‘The State of Food and Agriculture 2006: 

Food Aid for Food Security.’’

Hearing no objection, it is so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:]

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. DAVID KAUCK, SENIOR TECHNICAL

ADVISOR, CARE USA 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to present CARE’s perspectives on the performance of United States international 

food assistance programs. Ensuring that our nation’s food assistance programs 

achieve success at reducing hunger around the world is a critical challenge for all 

of us. CARE shares your commitment to combat hunger by providing effective and 

accountable programming wherever it is needed. CARE would like to express its 

great appreciation for all the support that the Subcommittee has given to programs 

using food aid. 

CARE has been a cooperating partner of the Food for Peace program since it was 

established in 1954. Over the past 53 years, CARE has programmed more than 18.5 

million tons of food from Food for Peace (valued at over $7.4 billion) to reach more 

than 200 million people. CARE operates food assistance programs today in twentytwo countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia1. In the half-century or so that 
85

2 CARE–USA, ‘‘White Paper on Food Aid Policy,’’ 2006. 

3Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, ‘‘The State of Food Insecurity in 

the World: Eradicating World Hunger—Taking Stock Ten Years After the World Food Summit,’’ 

(Rome: FAO Information Division, 2006) 4 Christopher B. Barrett, ‘‘The United States International Food Assistance Programs: Issues 

and Options for the 2007 Farm Bill,’’ February, 2007. 

U.S. food aid programs have existed in their current form, our work together has 

helped to save countless lives, and protect and improve the health and well-being 

of millions of people living on the edge of disaster. CARE is proud to be a part of 

this great effort. 

CARE’s approach to food assistance has evolved over the years. We began by focusing on the provision of food and other assistance to people facing the threat of 

famine. We still use food in this way, but we have learned that food resources alone, 

although valuable, are not enough to address hunger. To improve people’s lives, we 

developed multi-year programs that combine food assistance with other resources. 

These programs target the neediest people, often before a humanitarian emergency 

is apparent. They are designed to address the underlying causes of hunger and to 

strengthen poor peoples’ capacity to cope with misfortune. 

When it uses food aid, CARE’s central focus is on helping poor people overcome 

hunger. Our objectives are always to save lives and protect livelihoods—while minimizing any unintended harmful consequences that might result from the use of food 

resources. CARE strives to use food only when and where it is appropriate2. Well-managed 

food aid continues to be an important component of a global strategy to reduce hunger. 

While acknowledging the important contribution of U.S. food assistance programs, 

we also accept the challenges that we still face, and they are daunting. There are 

currently approximately 820 million undernourished people in the developing 

world.3 Many of these people are now so poor that they lack the means to rebuild 

their lives following natural disasters or other humanitarian emergencies. These 

problems are particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa, where, for at least the last 

three decades, hunger has steadily worsened, becoming more widespread and persistent over time. The growing numbers of highly vulnerable people who have fallen 

into extreme and intractable poverty help to explain the increased frequency and 

severity of humanitarian emergencies, and the exploding demand for emergency 

food aid. In parts of the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and southern Africa, events that 

would not have triggered major humanitarian emergencies twenty-five years ago do 

so now. While humanitarian crises have increased, the funding needed to adequately support food assistance demands worldwide has declined by nearly half in real terms 

since 1980 4. We recognize that these resource constraints will not be easy to resolve 

in the current budget environment. This is why everything possible must be done 

to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of food aid practices so that we can 

achieve the greatest impact possible with the resources that we have. One important way to achieve this is to improve the timeliness and targeting of food aid. Food 

aid is especially valuable when it arrives on time and reaches the people who need 

it most. If it is late or poorly targeted, essential food aid can be wasted. Worse yet, 

untimely deliveries and poorly targeted food aid can have unintended, and sometimes harmful, economic consequences. 

With these concerns in mind, CARE recommends several specific changes to current policies affecting U.S. food assistance programming. 

Local Purchase 

CARE endorses increasing procurement flexibility in the Title II program so that 

food may be routinely purchased locally or regionally in developing countries. Under 

the right circumstances, having a local purchase option can reduce delays and improve program efficiency and effectiveness, and therefore save lives. 

Although local purchase can be a useful tool under the right conditions, this approach must be undertaken carefully. If not managed properly, local purchase can 

trigger price spikes that are harmful to poor people who must also purchase food 

in order to meet their basic needs. This is why we feel that a carefully monitored 

program would be a useful way to introduce this innovation. 

Better Strategies are Needed to Provide Cash Resources for Food Security Programs 

In addition to direct distribution of food, there is a need for a reasonable level 

of cash assistance for complementary activities intended to reduce hunger. Experience has shown that cash-supported activities are often critical to the success of programs using food. Although current law provides authority for limited cash assist-
86

ance, CARE recommends that Congress increase the total amount of cash assistance 

provided within the Title II program and consider new strategies on how best to 

make those resources available. 

Currently, the Title II program provides three conduits for distributing in-country 

cash support: (1) Section 202(e) funds, provided primarily for administrative and 

operational costs; (2) funding for Internal Transport, Storage and Handling for logistics-related support; and (3) proceeds from the sale of monetized commodities made 

available for costs associated with enhancing the effectiveness of Title II programs. 

The practice of purchasing commodities here in the United States, shipping those 

resources overseas, and then selling them to generate funds for food security programs is far less efficient than the logical alternative—simply providing cash to 

fund food security programs. 

As a step towards improving the efficiency and effectiveness of non-emergency 

food aid programs, we recommend: (a) increasing Section 202(e) funding levels to at 

least 25% of the overall Title II appropriation; and (b) expanding Section 202(e) 

flexibility to permit the use of funds to enhance the effectiveness of program efforts. 

Not only would this substantially improve the cost-effectiveness of non-emergency 

programs, it would also eliminate a source of unnecessary controversy that hangs 

over U.S. food assistance. Economic research supports the view that open market 

sales of imported food aid may in some cases create market distortions that are 

harmful to local farmers, traders and economies. It also shows that monetized food 

tends to displace commercial imports, both from the U.S. and from other countries. 

For this reason, monetization became an especially contentious issue during recent 

WTO negotiations. 

Mr. Chairman, for the reasons just described CARE has made an internal decision 

to phase out of monetization. This transition should be completed by the end of fiscal year 2009. In the future, CARE will confine its use of food aid to emergency and 

safety net programs that involve targeted distribution to the chronically hungry. 

The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust 

The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust [BEHT] was intended to function as a reserve of food and food-associated assistance funding that can be drawn upon quickly 

to address unanticipated, rapid onset humanitarian crises. Unfortunately, at 

present the trust is difficult to access and is usually deployed as a last resort, rather 

than a first response. Several key changes to the Trust would help to make this important emergency asset a much more reliable response mechanism to urgent humanitarian food needs. To this end, we have been working with fellow NGO colleagues, CRS, Save the Children and Mercy Corps and other interested parties and 

would propose the following changes to the Trust :

1. Liquidate in an orderly manner current BEHT stocks which would result in 

the Trust holding only cash to acquire commodities as needed;

2. Establish a true Trust by allowing the cash to be invested in conservative 

short-term instruments—the interest gained would be put into the Trust;

3. Provide limited authority to the Commodity Credit Corporation to replenish 

the Trust automatically, in a fiscal year, when funds are drawn down from 

the Trust;

4. As soon as P.L. 480, Title II, funds designated as emergency resources have 

been obligated, mandate that the Administration go straight to the BEHT 

and use its resources until exhausted, thus protecting non-emergency Title 

II resources; and

5. Set the funding level cap in the BEHT at a level appropriate to current 

needs.

CARE believes that the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust is one of the most vital 

emergency assistance tools that the US has and is eager to work with the Subcommittee to see that such needed reforms strengthen the Trust and ensure that 

it is as an effective urgent response mechanism as possible. 

Addressing the Underlying Causes of Food Insecurity and Hunger 

Chronic hunger is often the result of multiple, deeply rooted causes. In the long 

term, achieving a lasting reduction in the incidence of chronic hunger will require: 

improvements in agricultural productivity; greater access to information, capital, 

basic education, health services, and technical training for the poor; and changes in 

the status of women and girls. This ambitious list obviously goes well beyond the 

mandates set forth in the Farm Bill. Indeed, it is beyond the means of any single 

donor government. But this crucial, broader objective is not impossible, and it is 
87

fully consistent with the values of the American people to help others help themselves. 

Addressing the underlying causes of hunger will require setting common goals 

and promoting coordinated action across programs and agencies, as well as with national governments, implementing partners and other donors. Within the U.S. government, there are several such initiatives underway. One example that CARE has 

direct experience with is Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program. Under this program, multiple donors, including the United States, engage in coordinated planning 

and action. All are working toward a common goal to reduce levels of food insecurity 

in a country where conditions for its poor have not improved, in spite of extraordinary levels of food aid since the 1980s. While food aid plays an important role, 

the program does not rely on food aid alone. Program objectives include building infrastructure, expanding markets, diversifying and expanding the assets of poor 

households, and increasing the Government of Ethiopia’s capacity to provide sustainable safety nets for chronically vulnerable citizens. We ask the Chairman and 

Subcommittee members to consider this example as an encouraging model for coordinated action. 

In closing, we must push ourselves to make food aid a more effective tool for reducing poverty and hunger. 

CARE welcomes this opportunity to communicate our perspectives on U.S. food 

assistance policy at this important moment in the Subcommittee’s work. The intolerable crisis of 820 million hungry people worldwide represents a moral and ethical 

challenge to us all. But with your help, Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that we have 

both the will and the means to make a difference. CARE looks forward to working 

with the Subcommittee in the months ahead to further strengthen the U.S. response 

to the problem of international hunger. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to present our views. I would be pleased to submit answers to your questions 

or provide additional information. 
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. DAVID BECKMANN, PRESIDENT, BREAD FOR THE WORLD

I appreciate the opportunity to submit written testimony on a subject very close 

to my own heart and a prime policy interest of Bread for the World. 

Founded in 1974, Bread for the World is a Christian, nonpartisan organization 

supported by 45 denominations and more than 2500 churches that works to bring 

about public policy changes that address the root causes of hunger and poverty in 

the United States and overseas. Bread for the World’s 58,000 members lobby Congress and the administration to this end, and mobilize a quarter of a million constituent contacts with members of the U.S. Congress every year. Bread for the 

World helps concerned people learn about policy issues that are important to poor 

and hungry people, and then helps them turn this knowledge into positive political 

action. 

The dimensions of global hunger are well known: More than 850 million people—

half of them children—live in a state of chronic hunger and food insecurity; 25,000 

die daily due to hunger and related ailments. We are seeing the Millennium Development Goal of halving global hunger and poverty by 2015 slipping from our grasp. 

For such demeaning hunger and poverty to persist when we have the technological 

and economic means of ending it is a moral affront to American values. 

Food aid has been an important tool in combating global hunger, and has saved 

many lives, and the U.S. can rightly feel proud of its role as the world’s most generous donor of food aid. Its efforts have saved millions of lives. However, the food 

aid program has also been burdened with ancillary objectives that undermine its effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the needs of hungry people around the world. 

Bread for the World has as its fundamental mission seeking justice for hungry 

people. And while we appreciate the political argument for maintaining a broad coalition of U.S. support for food aid, we are convinced by our own polling results that 

ending global hunger is a topic that resonates with the U.S. public. Americans understand that this is fundamentally an issue of social justice, and that meeting the 

real needs of hungry and malnourished people should be the overriding objective of 

a U.S. food aid program. 

The food aid environment has changed significantly from when Food for Peace 

was initiated over 50 years ago, and changes in the food aid program are overdue. 

One need is to simplify and clarify the multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives 

and statutory requirements, which cannot all be met. Specific legislative objectives 

set for U.S. food aid include, in addition to combating world hunger and malnutrition, ‘‘promoting broad-based, equitable and sustainable development,’’ ‘‘developing 

and expanding export markets for U.S. agricultural commodities,’’ ‘‘fostering and encouraging the development of private enterprise and democratic participation,’’ and 

‘‘preventing conflict.’’ On top of these are added operational requirements, including 

minimum tonnage (generally met), sub-minimum tonnage for non-emergency programs (not met since 1995), and value added (generally not met). It is time to clarify 

the mandate of food aid, giving unambiguous priority to combating hunger and malnutrition. 

Bread for the World favors a transition to demand-driven food aid, based more 

on the needs and opportunities and less on supply and availability. Food aid is no 

longer a surplus disposal program, and the volumes involved are too small to affect 

commodity prices in any but exceptional cases. In fact, food aid tends be pro-cyclical, 

so that food aid volume tends to decrease in times of high prices—such as the 

present—when the food needs tend to be the greatest. This is exactly counter to the 

stated objective of meeting the nutritional needs of the world’s hungriest people. 

Bread for the World believes that the farm bill should ensure ongoing and consistent U.S. assistance to people in need of emergency food and nutrition support 

around the world. This means increasing the authorized funding levels for emergency food aid—especially in light of recent agricultural commodity price increases. 

We also need to recognize that commodity food aid is not always the most appropriate response to food insecurity, whether chronic or emergency. One life-affecting 

consideration is that of timeliness, ensuring the quickest response to emergencies 

or windows of opportunity. Other considerations include market impact—whether 

the commodity food aid serves as an incentive or disincentive to local or regional 

production and commerce—and commodity composition—i.e., whether the needs are 

best served by commodities or products available from the U.S. In order to facilitate 

the most effective and efficient responses to food insecurity, Bread for the World 

strongly supports providing the Office of Food for Peace with the flexibility to procure food locally or in the region. We think the Administration’s request in the farm 

bill principles for authority to use up to 25 percent of Title II appropriations for 

local or regional purchase is a step in the right direction, and urge the committee’s 
100

support. Local and regional procurement is not going to be appropriate in every case 

and needs to be carefully applied, but there is already sufficient information and 

experience on the part of the World Food Program, the NGO community and other 

donors to clearly demonstrate the circumstances under which this instrument can 

be effectively applied. 

Along the same lines, we support loosening the restrictions that mandate the 

processing (‘‘value added’’) of food aid and U.S. flag shipping. While these reflect legitimate interests, our main focus should be on meeting needs and saving lives, and 

employing the most appropriate and efficient means to that end. Surely, other 

means can be found for ensuring the viability of the U.S. merchant marine than by 

imposing onerous and costly restrictions on the shipment of food to meet the urgent 

nutritional needs of hungry people around the world. 

The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) is another useful weapon in combating global hunger. We support changes that would render the BEHT more efficient and reliable in addressing food crises. These include making use of the BEHT 

easier and more transparent by clarifying the ‘‘trigger’’ for its utilization relative to 

Title II; increasing efficiency by directing it to hold reserves in the form of cash or 

options instead of commodities, thus reducing costs and increasing flexibility and responsiveness; and instituting provisions for regular replenishment. 

The new Farm Bill could also open opportunities for poor countries to become 

more food self-reliant by reducing protectionist forms of assistance to U.S. farmers. 

Funding within the Farm Bill could be shifted from trade-distorting commodity payments to programs that would be much more helpful for rural America, especially 

for farm and rural families of modest means, and to nutrition assistance for hungry 

people in rural and urban America. These reforms, together with reduced protectionism in Europe and Japan, would remove significant obstacles to agriculture and 

food security for many of the world’s poorest people. 

Finally, we would like to encourage members of this committee to consider the 

problem of world hunger from the broadest perspective, recognizing that getting beyond chronic food insecurity requires developing recipient country capacity to 

produce and trade. Emergency commodity food aid is at one end of a spectrum of 

responses, and needs to be recognized as a temporary fix at best. The U.S. government, along with other donors, needs to put more resources into effectively addressing long-term food security. International aid for agricultural development has 

plummeted over the past 20 years, from 11 percent to just 3 percent of ODA. Increased crop yields in developing countries—something achievable with current 

technologies—would have a profound and lasting impact on global hunger. 

Growth in the developing world would also be good for U.S. agriculture. A 2006 

study, commissioned by Bread for the World Institute and conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute, showed that a seven percent GDP growth 

rate in the developing world would generate nearly $26 billion in additional U.S. 

agricultural exports between 2006 and 2020. 

We have the obligation and the opportunity to end hunger. We need to take advantage of every means for doing so. The changes to the food aid portion of the farm 

bill noted above will, I am confident, move the U.S. closer, in concert with the NGO 

community, the WFP and other donors, toward meeting this urgent objective. 

In closing, I would like to call attention to our policy paper on food aid, ‘‘Feeding 

a Hungry World,’’ issued in April 2006, a copy of which is submitted with this testimony. We would be happy to provide further information on any of the above points. 

Thank you. 
101

[NOTE: Part I of the 2006 FAO report titled, ‘‘The State of Food and Agriculture: 

Food Aid for Food Security,’’ follows. The full report is available in committee 

records and on the World Wide Web at: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

35676adden.pdf]
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Mr. PAYNE. With that, the meeting stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(109)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this hearing. Though some progress has 

been reported toward achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving global 

hunger by 2015, hunger remains endemic in much of sub-Saharan Africa, as well 

as many other regions of the world. I commend the Chairman for his commitment 

to pursuing this issue. May I also thank the Ranking Member, and welcome our 

panel of witnesses: William P. Hammink, Director of the Office of Food for Peace, 

U.S. Agency for International Development; Dr. Thomas Melito, Director of International Affairs and Trade at the U.S. Government Accountability Office; 

Annemarie Reilly, Chief of Staff of Catholic Relief Services; and David Evans, Vice 

President of Government Resources and Programs at Food for the Hungry. I look 

forward to your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, as you and the committee are no doubt aware, 850 million people 

in the world are chronically hungry. Of these, a vast majority, or approximately 824 

million, live in developing countries, particularly in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. While some progress has been made toward reducing the percentage of the 

global population suffering from hunger, these reductions have not been swift or 

large enough to reduce the overall number of hungry people. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa has seen a substantial rise in the number of individuals suffering from 

chronic hunger, from 169 million in 1990 to 206 million in 2003. 

Particularly worrisome is the Central African region, where reports clearly indicate that both the total number of chronically hungry people and the proportion of 

the whole population that they represent are increasing. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the number of undernourished people tripled between 

1990 and 2003. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has 

attributed these increases, which have been observed in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo as well as its neighbors Burundi, Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, to ongoing armed conflict. 

Some nations have had greater success combating chronic hunger, and I strongly 

advocate examining what has allowed this success. The FAO has attributed reductions in the proportion and number of hungry people to an increase in the rate of 

economic growth coupled with a rising level of per capita agricultural production. 

Examples of relatively successful nations include Ethiopia and Ghana, both of which 

achieved reductions in both proportion and number of chronically hunger during a 

period of time in which both also achieved growth in the economy and per capita 

food production. 

Mr. Chairman, these findings confirm that chronic food shortages are closely 

linked to a wide range of underlying factors. Some of these, like drought or storms, 

we have little control over (though I commend this Committee and its Chairman, 

Mr. Lantos, for yesterday approving climate change legislation, calling on the 

United States to take a leading role in working ensure that we are not worsening 

existing environmental dangers). Other factors, like persistent violence or limited 

economic opportunities, we have greater influence over. I believe that we, as a subcommittee, must look at global hunger, and responses to it, within the broader context of these other serious issues. 

The United States has done a great deal to take a leading role in responding to 

alarming global hunger statistics, primarily by providing U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries. In 2006, these deliveries totaled around $2.1 billion 

dollars, or more than 3 million metric tons, which reached 65 countries, over half 

of which were in sub-Saharan Africa. According to USAID estimates, this food aid 
110

benefits 50–70 million people annually. U.S. food aid accounted for 59% of food aid 

supplements by major donors between 1995 and 2005, and the United States is the 

largest contributor to the United Nation’s World Food Program (WFP). 

Mr. Chairman, food aid alone will not solve global hunger problems, and it is not 

a long-term solution to food insecurity. Many politicians and practitioners have argued that food aid is inefficient and a poor use of resources, citing in particular the 

high cost of transporting American agricultural products to overseas destinations. 

In FY2006, to use an example, 55% of the funds allocated to P.L. 480 Title II, the 

largest of the U.S. food aid programs, went to transport costs. In addition, shipping 

commodities from the United States slows any response to acute emergencies, such 

as the 2004 Asian tsunami, which demand the ability to deploy relief immediately. 

Current programs make it difficult or impossible for us to rapidly respond to unexpected and urgent food shortages. 

Likewise, the practice of monetization, or the selling of food aid in local markets, 

has been questioned by various groups. A substantial percentage of U.S. food aid 

is currently distributed using this method. CARE, to name one major international 

organization, has turned away from the practice, noting its legal and financial risks 

and branding it as economically inefficient. In addition, monetization can cause commercial displacement in local markets, and may, in the long run, actually cause significant harm to local farmers and merchants. Some economists and researchers 

have suggested that food aid actually harms residents of poor nations. I strongly 

urge this committee, and this Congress, to take a long term view toward combating 

food shortages, and to seriously consider these potentially serious implications. 

Mr. Chairman, we are currently considering the farm bill, which authorizes most 

food aid programs, so now is the time to look at the effectiveness of these programs. 

I would like to echo the title of this hearing, which urges us to consider ‘‘options 

to enhance effectiveness,’’ and urge this committee to consider whether we are making the best possible use of our funds to provide food relief to the strikingly high 

numbers of chronically hungry people worldwide. I hope that this committee will 

give serious consideration to the suggestions offered by USAID and the Department 

of Agriculture, the assessment conducted by GAO, and the recommendations made 

by private voluntary organizations and cooperatives. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe the U.S. is to be commended for taking a leading role 

in providing food to hungry nations. However, if the way we are providing this aid 

is not effective, and particularly if it may be stunting the development of long-term 

solutions to food instability, I believe we must do a great deal more. I believe we 

must look beyond the eight programs currently employed to deliver U.S. commodities as international food aid, and show creativity and ingenuity as we work to 

make the Millennium Development Goals a reality. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM MR. WILLIAM P. HAMMINK, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOOD

FOR PEACE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Question: 

What is the status of the provision of food aid and other essential humanitarian 

assistance to the populations in need in the West Bank and Gaza in light of sanctions 

and restrictions that have been imposed with respect to the unity Palestinian government following its formation on the March 15, 2007? 

Response: 

The unity Palestinian government collapsed last month and now with a Quartet 

compliant Palestinian Authority (PA) government, the U.S. government has normalized relations with the PA. The United States is continuing its long-standing practice of supporting the Palestinian people and the legitimate Palestinian Authority 

under the direction of President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam 

Fayyad. Because Hamas has failed to accept the international community’s principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements 

and obligations between the parties, the United States has no direct contact with 

Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization. USAID maintains basic humanitarian assistance, including health programs and food assistance, to Palestinians in 

Gaza through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the World 

Food Program (WFP) and independent actors, including local and international nongovernmental organizations. 
111

Question: 

Is assistance reaching those in need, particularly children, and if not, why not? 

Response: 

Yes, basic humanitarian assistance of the UNRWA and WFP is presently reaching 

those in need, including children. Regular monitoring and reporting on childhood 

malnutrition and stunting is conducted by these organizations and shared with 

USAID. 

Question: 

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of United States and Israeli sanctions and restrictions on the Palestinian infrastructure and institutions? 

Response: 

With a Quartet compliant Palestinian Authority government under the direction 

of President Mahmud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S. Government has lifted financial restrictions and is in the process of resuming normal economic and government-to-government engagement with the PA. The PA government 

has agreed to the Quartet principles of renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and 

accepting all previous agreements, including the Roadmap. President Bush and the 

Secretary have stated their support to provide aid to the government quickly with 

targeted and visible activities. USAID now will be able to start infrastructure 

projects and build institutional capacity in the West Bank. Projects include highly 

visible infrastructure projects (school, road construction, water supply); economic 

growth projects, such as expanding agribusinesses; supporting and equipping the 

health sector; working with municipalities on community driven projects to shore up 

support for moderates; and working with independent media to make them sustainable. 

Question: 

What other entities, including foreign governments, are providing humanitarian 

assistance in the occupied territories? 

Response: 

The European Commission, Canada, Japan, Norway, Malaysia, the World Bank, 

and the United Nations. 

WRITTEN RESPONSE FROM MS. ANNEMARIE REILLY, CHIEF OF STAFF, CATHOLIC RE- LIEF SERVICES, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

NEW JERSEY

Question: 

How have the current sanctions and restrictions on dealing with the unity Palestinian government impacted the following:

• Catholic Relief Services’ operations in the West Bank and Gaza,

• the well-being of the civilian population, and

• the stability and long-term development of the Palestinian infrastructure and 

institutions?

What other challenges does CRS face in providing assistance to these areas? 

Response: 

CRS Operations in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza have been able to 

continue with a three-day interruption in Gaza only due to the Hamas-Fatah clashes there last month. We are conducting food distributions to more than 120,000 persons in the West Bank as part of the UNWFP Food for Work/Training project Protracted Relief and Recovery Program. We have also accelerated implementation of 

our youth and education programs with the arrival of the summer school break. 

Today, with a divided Palestinian governance structure, the well-being of the 

civilian population is at a level not significantly different from what it has been 

for the last year. However, the prognosis for the people of Gaza is substantially less 

rosy than that of the people of the West Bank. In the West Bank, the release of 

millions of dollars in customs duties confiscated by Israel and the gradual restoration of salaries for civil servants will yield a pronounced, short-term economic boom. 

In contrast, Gaza’s already deeply degraded economy faces the most serious challenge of its history. Israel is allowing basic foodstuffs to be imported into Gaza, but 

nothing more. The inability to import raw materials to support Gaza’s industrial 
112

and construction sectors, compounded by the abrupt loss of export outlets, has 

caused some 65,000 Gazan workers to be laid off (with up to 450,000 dependants 

affected as well). The combined value of UN and private sector construction projects 

that have come to standstill due to lack of supplies is estimated at over $370 million. 

The UN and NGOs can easily predict the future: the people of Gaza, and particularly the poor, sick and old, will suffer more and more in the coming months. Then, 

they will probably suffer the horrors of war as Hamas and other militant groups 

take out their frustrations through terror acts or other aggression: against their perceived enemies in Gaza or against Israel and her backers through actions carried 

out outside of Gaza. 

In terms of the stability and long-term development of the Palestinian infrastructure and institutions, we are deeply concerned about the direction of policy by the Quartet, by the new Fayyad Government in the West Bank, and by Israel 

in the aftermath of the Hamas takeover of Gaza. What concerns us most is that the 

current policies of divide and conquer are essentially the same approach that has 

in fact nurtured support for Hamas in the last few years. 

While the political intentions of the United States after Hamas’ electoral victory 

in January 2006 may have been guided by a principled opposition to terror, the fact 

is that for many years Hamas was aided by restrictive Israeli policies; abetted by 

short-sighted, instrumental politics on the part of the U.S. government; and cast in 

a favorable light by the corruption and mismanagement of the traditional Fatah 

leadership. And now, at a watershed period in Palestinian history, with perhaps the 

future of Palestinian national aspirations at stake, the Quartet seems to be pursuing the same policy with the same traditional leadership. 

This is a very delicate situation, and an easy and effective policy framework does 

not exist. It is widely recognized that what is needed is some kind of national dialogue among Palestinians and a deep and thorough reform of the PLO along with 

all institutions of Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza. (I am leaving 

out the desperate—foundational—need for a dramatic change in Israeli policies vis 

a vis the Palestinians: this is the sine qua non of political change in the Middle 

East.) However, Hamas has committed heinous acts of terror and cannot be admitted into the fold of statesmanship easily. Yet for the good of the people of Gaza, it 

is necessary to engage Hamas. They cannot be defined entirely by terror and our 

interests as a moral actor go beyond the narrow strategy of increasing Israeli security. 

It is deeply disturbing to see some in the US and Israeli political class celebrate 

the horrible affront to human dignity playing out in Gaza today, simply because it 

might lead to short term improvements for the people of the West Bank. While an 

economic recovery in the West Bank is very welcome, in the long run Hamas and 

what it represents cannot be quarantined and starved. The US Government should 

not support the continued degradation of Gaza by sequestering its people—physically or politically. 

Gaza’s war is a lesson we reject at the risk of seeing it repeated on a larger scale 

next time. Only through dialogue and diplomacy can we help restore sustainable 

order and facilitate adequate governance for people of the Palestinian territories.

Æ