### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

B.B.S., a minor child, G.S.S., a minor child, by and with their next friend, A.S.S., and K.S.S.
, Appellant s ,

v.

MARIA RAQUEL RODRIGUEZ

- MURGUIA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 15

- 0257

[May 11, 2016 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County ; Barbara W. Bronis , Judge; L.T. Case No. 562014DR002854

.

Charles E. Jarrell of Benincasa Law Firm, P.A., Vero Beach, for appellants.

Maria Raquel Rodriguez

- Murguia , Port St. Lucie, pro se.

C ONNER

, J

.

Appellants ( “ t he Children ” ) appeal the trial court’s order d ismissing

t heir cause of action to determine maternity. We reverse because the trial

court should have allowed the Children to establish maternity by way o f a declaratory action under C hapter 86, Florida Statutes

.

T he Children filed a petition as “an action for paternity and to determine parental responsib ility, time

- sharing, and/or chil d support under chapter 742, Florida Statutes, or, in the alternative, for a declaratory judgment establishing maternity pursuant to Florida Statute § 86.011. ” (emphasis added). The petition was filed against Appellee, who was alleged to be the biological and legal mother of the Children

. In th e p etition, the Children alleged that the person listed as their mother on their birth certificates is

“ a fictitious or nonexistent person.” The p etition request ed that

“ m aternity ” be established under Chapter 742 or 86, Florida Statutes, and also requested a parenting plan and child support. Appellee admitted all allegations and agreed to all of the relief requested.

O n its “own motion,” t he trial court entered an order dismissing the2 case with prejudice. Attac hed to t he dismissal o rder was a copy of an other

dismissal order entered in a separate case

, previously filed by Appellee

, before the same court . In the previous case, Appellee and the Children’s father filed a joint petition s eeking to establish the maternity of the

C hildren by way of a petition filed pursuant to Chapter 742

. In the previous case, the trial court entered an order to show cause as to why the

case should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. In response to the orde r to show cause, Appellee explained that on the

Children’s birth certificate

, a female’s name appears as the mother of the

C hildren. Appellee signed the birth certificate as the mother using a false name because she was not in the country legally. When A ppellee tried to amend the Children’s birth certificates to correctly identify herself as their mother, each state where the Children were born would not authorize the change without a court order. Also, b oth states would not authorize a court proceeding to change the name of the birth mother because the Children were no longer living in those states. A s grounds for amending

the birth certificates

, each state apparently would recognize a foreign order which establishes the fact of parentage. 1 Just as in this case, the trial court dismissed the action in the previous case because “ [i] n the view of this court, no cause of action exists under Florida law to determine paternity of a biological mother.”

We determine that the trial court erred in failing to grant the Children

relief pursuant to Chapter 86, Florida Statutes. Section 86.011, Florida Statutes (2014), states :

The circuit and county courts have jurisdiction within their respective jurisdictional amounts to declare rights, status, and

other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is

or could be claimed. No action or procedure is open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment is

demanded. The court’s declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form an d effect and such declaration has the force and effect of a final judgment. The court may render declaratory judgments on the existence, or nonexistence:

(1) Of any immunity, power, privilege, or right; or

1 An order pursuant to a petition to change name would not have been sufficient,

as both states require a judicial determination as to parentage.3 (2) Of any fact upon which the existence or nonexis tence of such immunity, power, privilege, or right does or may depend

, whether such immunity, power, privilege, or right now exists

or will arise in the future. Any person seeking a declaratory judgment may also demand additional, alternative, coercive,

s ubsequent, or supplemental relief in the same action.

§ 86.011 , Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). Both the United States Supreme Court, and our supreme court, have recognized the fundamental rights of parents. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[W]e have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”); D.M.T. v.

T.M.H. , 129 So. 3d 320, 338 (Fla. 2013) (“As the United States Supreme Court has pronounced and this Court has stated, therefore, a biological connection gives rise to an inchoate right to be a parent that may develop into a protected fundamental constitutional right based on the actions of the parent.”). Therefore, there is clearly a right, even a fundamental one, for which a fact, maternity, depends. Th us, the trial court had jurisdiction

to establish maternity under Chapter 86. Our supreme court has also

re cognized the right of a parent to bring a declaratory judgment action to

establish parentage “where such adjudication is necessary to the determination of existing rights or duties between parties to an actual controversy or dispute.” Kendrick v. Everhear t , 390 So. 2d 53, 57

- 58 (Fla. 1980). Since the Children brought the action against Appellee to establish maternity in conjunction with a request for child support and a parenting plan

, there is a dispute for which a dete rmination of maternity is dependent

. 2

We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the Children’s complaint, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Revers ed and remanded

.

C IKLIN
, C.J. and K LINGENSMITH

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

2 We do not address in this appeal the propriety of the trial court’s ruling dismissing the prior proceeding under Chapter 742.