SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3627-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY P. THOMAS, a/k/a RAY

FREDDIE and THOMAS P. JEFFERY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

Submitted March 7, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 

15-12-1374.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Sarah E. Ross, Deputy Attorney

General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Jeffrey P. Thomas, lost his motion to suppress a 

handgun and heroin police had seized from him during a street 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

July 24, 2018
2 A-3627-16T1

encounter. He later pled guilty to second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). For that crime, a 

judge sentenced him to serve a five-year prison term with three 

and one-half years of parole ineligibility. Defendant appeals. 

He argues: 

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO

SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE TIP FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMANT THAT PROMPTED THE INVESTIGATORY STOP

CONSISTED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF INNOCENT

IDENTIFYING DETAILS AND THE POLICE FAILED TO

CORROBORATE THE NOTION THAT THOMAS WAS ENGAGED

IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BEFORE STOPPING HIM.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD GAP-TIME

CREDIT FOR TIME THE DEFENDANT SERVED ON A

MUNICIPAL SENTENCE. (Not Raised Below).

We affirm the conviction and sentence but remand for the 

trial court to compute gap time credits.

A Mercer County grand jury charged defendant in a five-count 

indictment with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), third-degree possession of a controlled 

dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), fourth-degree 

obstructing administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b), thirddegree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a), and third-degree resisting 

arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a). Following the indictment, 

defendant filed a suppression motion. The trial court denied it. 
3 A-3627-16T1

Defendant later pled guilty to the weapons offense, the trial 

court sentenced him, and he appealed. 

The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Detective 

Sergeant Ricardo Diaz, an eleven-year veteran with the New Jersey 

State Police. He testified as follows. On May 14, 2015, he was 

assigned to the Trenton Crime Suppression Central Unit, which was 

established to "help suppress violent crimes in the most 

problematic areas in the City of Trenton." Shortly before 8:00 

p.m., the unit received a telephone call from a confidential source 

who stated "a black male in the area of New Willow Street and 

Beakes Street in Trenton [was] in possession of a handgun." 

Detective Diaz did not speak with the informant. The informant 

spoke to the detective's partner, Detective Blair Astbury, and 

Astbury told Diaz what the informant said. 

Astbury told Diaz the informant had previously provided 

information resulting in approximately six or more arrests and "at 

least one or more" convictions. Diaz acknowledged the informant 

received either credit against a sentence or money for providing 

the police with information. 

The informant told Detective Astbury the person in possession 

of the handgun was "an older black male approximately [fifty] 

years old, approximately six feet tall with gray hair." The 

suspect "was wearing a red collared shirt, black shorts, white 
4 A-3627-16T1

sneakers, and also had an Ace tan bandage wrapped around his right 

wrist and arm." The informant said the male was "in the company 

of an older black female wearing a black shirt and blue jeans." 

Detective Diaz gave conflicting answers when cross-examined 

about whether the informant explained how he knew the person had 

a handgun. In response to defense counsel's question, "[n]ow, 

when you received that information . . . were you provided with 

any information as to how he knew that the individual had a 

handgun," the detective replied, "[n]o ma'am." Counsel persisted: 

"He didn't say that he had observed him with it, nothing whatsoever 

as to how he knew?" Detective Diaz responded, "I believe the 

confidential source observed [defendant] in possession of the 

handgun, which is when . . . he or she called Detective Astbury." 

Pressed further by defense counsel, Detective Diaz said the 

confidential source contacted Detective Astbury and stated that 

he or she observed defendant in possession of a handgun. According 

to Diaz, that was what Detective Astbury told him. 

Detective Diaz and seven other unit members donned tactical 

vests – bullet proof vests placed on the outside of one's clothing 

and containing police identifiers – and drove unmarked vehicles 

to the corner of New Willow Street and Beakes Street. The officers 

parked the vehicles along the curb line of either Beakes Street 

or Willow Street, or perhaps both. The intersection was located 
5 A-3627-16T1

in a high crime area. Nearby was a housing project where police 

had made numerous arrests for controlled dangerous substance 

offenses and gun possessions. There had also been documented 

shootings and homicides in that area. 

Upon arriving, Detective Diaz observed defendant, who matched 

the description given by the confidential source. Defendant was 

walking with a black female. Detective Diaz and three other 

officers made the initial "approach" toward defendant. Detective 

Diaz was closest to defendant, but the other three officers were 

behind the detective. When Detective Diaz first started speaking 

with defendant, the other detectives were standing either to his 

left or to his right. They were close enough to reach defendant 

if he attempted to flee. Defendant stopped, Detective Diaz 

identified himself as "State Police," and the two men engaged in 

a conversation. 

Detective Diaz began what he characterized as "a field 

inquiry." His intention was to talk to defendant and ask him 

routine questions, such as his name, where he was from, and 

questions of that nature. Detective Diaz estimated he and 

defendant were approximately five to ten feet apart. Defendant 

appeared to be intoxicated or perhaps under the influence of some 

type of controlled dangerous substance. Defendant smelled of 
6 A-3627-16T1

alcohol, his clothes were soiled, and his eyes were bloodshot and 

watery. 

As they spoke, defendant "began to blade . . . the right side 

of his body from [the officer]." By "blade," the detective meant 

that when he first approached defendant, he could see both 

defendant's hands and his whole body. As the two men began to 

speak, however, defendant "began turning his body, blading himself 

where [the detective] couldn't see [the defendant's] right 

shoulder, his right shoulder all the way down." The detective 

could only see the left side of defendant's body. 

Defendant "bladed" away from the detective twice. Detective 

Diaz testified: "The first time when he bladed away from me and 

attempted to put his right hand in his pocket I asked him to stop 

immediately, and I wanted to see both his hands. And for officer 

safety I said, put your hands on top of your head." Defendant 

"did comply and put both his hands on his head for a couple 

seconds, and then immediately dropped his hands again, and 

attempted to place it in his right pocket again." 

Concerned defendant had a gun, the detective frisked him for 

weapons. Detective Diaz felt the barrel of a weapon in defendant's 

right pants pocket. The detective retrieved a silver Derringer. 

Asked why he felt the need to frisk defendant for his safety, 

Detective Diaz replied:
7 A-3627-16T1

Based on the description given by the 

confidential source, [defendant] matched all 

the identifiers the source gave us, where we 

were, it's a high crime area. The fact that 

the confidential source said that he was in 

possession of a handgun, the way he was 

blading his body away from me and attempting 

to put his right hand in his pocket, at that 

time I felt threatened as if he may have had 

a weapon on him. 

Asked if defendant was free to leave after the conversation 

commenced, Detective Diaz replied: 

I would say based on how the conversation 

was going he could have been free to leave if 

what happened - - if what I didn't see, and 

if he didn't blade his body in that manner. 

Like I said, just the totality of the 

circumstances. I just - - if the conversation 

would have been different, if he didn't do 

some of the things he did, he probably would 

have been free to go. Because I approached 

him like I would approach anyone else.

After seizing the Derringer, Detective Diaz placed defendant 

under arrest, handcuffed him, and searched him incident to the 

arrest. The detective found two bags of heroin and a glass smoking 

pipe in defendant's other pocket. 

Based on Detective Diaz's testimony, the trial court denied 

defendant's suppression motion. The court found Detective Diaz 

to be "a highly credible witness who testified in a persuasive 

manner." 

After recounting the confidential source's description of the 

suspect and his companion, the court noted: "Det. Sgt. Diaz 
8 A-3627-16T1

conceded that the [confidential source] did not provide a name for 

the individual whom he said had the gun, nor did he explain how 

or why he knew this individual had a gun." Nonetheless, the court 

determined the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigative detention. The court relied upon "[Detective 

Diaz's] experience and expertise in evaluating the veracity and 

reliability of the [confidential source's] information" as well 

as what the court concluded was "sufficient corroboration" of the 

informant's tip, "particularly in light of the totality of the 

circumstances." The court explained:

That evening, a reliable informant, whose 

previous information had led to "at least six" 

prior arrests, relayed information to Det. 

Astbury that an older black male in a certain 

location was in possession of a gun. Because 

the source of the information was a known

informant – compared to an anonymous 9-1-1 

caller, for example – his "reputation [could] 

be assessed and [he could] be held responsible 

if [his] allegations" of criminal activity 

turned out "to be fabricated." FL v. J.L., 

529 U.S. [266,] 270 [(2000)]. The court finds

that under these circumstances, there seemed

[to be] no incentive for the [confidential 

source] to lie about the defendant's alleged 

criminal activity. Additionally, the veracity 

of the [confidential source's] tip can be 

established by the [confidential source's] 

past reliability. State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 

541, 555 (2005). This [confidential source]

had previously provided reliable information 

which had led to arrests; the officers could 

not let a credible tip about a weapon go 

uninvestigated. 
9 A-3627-16T1

Although not relevant to this appeal, the trial court also 

determined Detective Diaz lawfully seized the heroin and pipe from 

defendant's person during the search incident to defendant's 

arrest.

On appeal, defendant argues that his street encounter with 

police, from its inception, was an investigatory stop unsupported 

by a reasonable and articulable suspicion defendant had or was 

about to engage in criminal activity. Defendant contends the 

State failed to establish the reliability of the informant's tip 

because Detective Diaz had no personal knowledge of the informant's 

previous involvement with police, and the State produced no 

evidence as to how the informant acquired knowledge that defendant 

possessed a gun. 

The State contends the street encounter began as a field 

inquiry and escalated into an investigative detention only after 

defendant "bladed" the right side of his body, reached toward his 

pocket, and refused to keep his hands visible. The State argues 

these circumstances, considered in the setting of a high crime 

area and in light of the confidential informant's tip, provided a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion to support Detective Diaz's 

pat down of defendant for a weapon. 

When reviewing a trial court's order granting or denying a 

defendant's suppression motion, "an appellate tribunal must defer 
10 A-3627-16T1

to the factual findings of the trial court when that court has 

made its findings based on the testimonial and documentary evidence 

presented at an evidentiary hearing or trial." State v. Hubbard, 

222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015). Likewise, an appellate court generally 

must defer to a trial court's credibility findings. Ibid. The 

reason for the deference is that factual findings and credibility

determinations "are substantially influenced by [an] opportunity 

to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, 

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Id. at 262 (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). An 

appellate court owes no special deference, however, to either a 

trial court's legal conclusions or "the consequences that flow 

from established facts." Id. at 263 (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 

N.J. 161, 176 (2010)).

The warrantless search here took place during a street 

encounter between police and defendant. Warrantless searches and 

seizures presumably violate the constitutional "right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." 

U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶7. But "[n]ot all 

police-citizen encounters constitute searches or seizures for 

purposes of the warrant requirement." State v Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 

117, 125-26 (2002) (citing State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 

(2001)). 
11 A-3627-16T1

Courts have recognized three types of encounters between 

police and citizens. The first is a field inquiry. Officers are 

permitted to make field inquiries "without grounds for suspicion." 

Maryland, 167 N.J. at 483 (quoting State v. Contreras, 326 N.J. 

Super. 528, 538 (App. Div. 1999)). If an officer initiates a 

field inquiry with an individual, "[t]he individual does not even 

have to listen to the officer's questions and may simply proceed 

on her own way." State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017) 

(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983)). "Because 

a field inquiry is voluntary and does not effect a seizure in 

constitutional terms, no particular suspicion of criminal activity 

is necessary on the part of an officer conducting such an inquiry." 

Id. at 272 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)). 

The second, more intrusive police-citizen encounter is an 

investigative detention, sometimes called an investigatory stop 

or a Terry1 stop. An investigative detention is a seizure in 

constitutional terms. Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272; State v. Stovall, 

170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002). "A police officer may conduct an 

investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the circumstances, 

the officer had a reasonable and particularized suspicion to 

believe that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to 

 

1 Terry v. Ohio, 399 U.S. 1 (1968). 
12 A-3627-16T1

engage in, criminal activity." Stovall, 170 N.J. at 356 (citing 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

The third and most intrusive police-citizen encounter is an 

arrest. An arrest "requires probable cause and generally is 

supported by an arrest warrant or by demonstration of grounds that 

would have justified one." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272 (citing State 

v. Brown, 205 N.J. 133, 144 (2011)). 

In the case before us, defendant argues that his encounter 

with police was from its outset an investigatory stop. The State 

disagrees, contending the encounter began as a field inquiry. The 

trial court agreed with defendant. The court's decision is amply 

supported by the record.

"Whether a detention has occurred is measured from the 

citizen's perspective." Maryland, 167 N.J. at 483 (citing State 

v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 165-66 (1994)). For that reason, an 

officer's conclusory statements that he merely intended to conduct 

a field inquiry or that a citizen was free to leave are "not 

probative." Ibid. Rather, whether a street encounter between an 

officer and a citizen is a field inquiry or an investigative 

detention "always comes down to whether an objectively reasonable 

person would have felt free to leave or to terminate the encounter 

with police." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273.
13 A-3627-16T1

Here, seven officers in several vehicles stopped along a curb 

near or adjacent to the sidewalk where defendant was walking. At 

least four officers wearing bullet proof vests marked with indicia 

that they were police exited the vehicles and approached defendant, 

upon whom they focused. Indeed, other than defendant's companion, 

there is no evidence that other civilians were in the immediate 

vicinity. In addition, Detective Diaz and the other officers 

stood close enough to defendant so they could reach him if he 

attempted to flee in any direction.

The totality of these circumstances supported the trial 

court's conclusion this encounter was an investigatory stop. A 

person lawfully walking down the street who suddenly finds himself 

the focus of multiple law enforcement officers wearing bullet 

proof vests, who have just arrived in several vehicles, stopped, 

approached him, and positioned themselves so that he could be 

detained if he attempted to leave, would not reasonably feel free 

to leave. We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that, 

from the outset, the encounter was an investigatory stop.

The question thus presented is whether the law enforcement 

officers had a "reasonable and particularized suspicion that 

[defendant had] just engaged in, or was about to engage in, 

criminal activity." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Stovall, 170 N.J. at 356). The officers based
14 A-3627-16T1

their suspicion of defendant's criminal activity on a tip received 

from a police informant. 

Courts analyze the reliability of a confidential informant's 

tip under a "totality of the circumstances test." State v. Smith, 

155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998). "An informant's 'veracity' and 'basis of 

knowledge' are two highly relevant factors under the totality of 

the circumstances. State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 110 (1998) 

(citing Smith, 155 N.J. at 93). Neither factor, in and of itself, 

is indispensable to a finding of reliability. "A deficiency in 

one of those factors 'may be compensated for, in determining the 

overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, 

or by some other indicia of reliability.'" Id. at 110-11 (quoting 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983)). 

An informant's veracity can be supported by his or her past 

reliability. Id. at 111. "[I]f the informant does not identify 

the basis of knowledge, a reliable basis of knowledge may 

nonetheless be inferred from the level of detail and amount of 

hard-to-know information disclosed in the tip." Ibid. (citing 

Smith, 155 N.J. at 95). "[T]he nature and details revealed in the 

tip may imply that the informant's knowledge of the alleged 

criminal activity is derived from a trustworthy source." Smith, 

155 N.J. at 94; accord, State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 113 

(1987) (quoting Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969)). An
15 A-3627-16T1

informant's knowledge can also be inferred from the informant's 

prediction of "hard-to-know future events." Smith, 155 N.J. at 

95.

In the case before us, Detective Diaz's reasonable suspicion 

was based upon information provided by a reliable informant. The 

informant gave a detailed description of defendant and his 

companion, information officers corroborated immediately when they 

arrived at the location the informant had described, a location 

known to police as a site of criminality and violence. The 

informant's proven record of reliability, the accuracy of his 

description of defendant, the character of the neighborhood known 

to police, and the detective's experience combined to establish a 

reasonable suspicion to justify Detective Diaz in performing a 

Terry stop and frisk. See Zutic, 155 N.J. at 113 ("If the police 

also had reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was armed 

and dangerous, that . . . could support a protective search" 

(citing State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 12 (1997))). Defendant 

"blading" his right side, disregarding an order from Detective 

Diaz, and reaching toward his pocket virtually compelled the 

officer to conduct a protective pat down for his safety and that 

of his fellow officers. We find no reason to disturb either the 

trial court's findings or its legal conclusions. 
16 A-3627-16T1

 In his second argument, defendant contends he was not 

awarded proper gap-time credits. The State does not oppose a 

remand for the purpose of computing those credits. Hence, we 

remand the case for that purpose.

Remanded for the determination of gap-time credits. 

Defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed in all other 

respects.