Page 1 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 21, 2007 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jo Ann Davis 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security Implications of Cheyenne 

Mountain Realignment Have Not Been Determined

The Department of Defense (DOD) built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center1

located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the early 1960s to withstand a 

multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and to provide protection against chemical and 

biological warfare. The mission of the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate is to monitor, 

process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that could threaten North 

America or have operational effects on U.S. forces or capabilities. This mission is 

conducted at five major centers—the Command Center, Air Warning, Missile 

Correlation, Operations Intelligence Watch, and Space Control—all currently located 

within Cheyenne Mountain. Elements of United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM)2

 and Air Force Space Command3 are also located in Cheyenne 

Mountain. The Air Force’s modernization of the attack warning systems within 

Cheyenne Mountain will cost more than $700 million from fiscal years 2000 through 

2006.4

Peterson Air Force Base, also located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is the 

headquarters of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a binational U.S. and 

Canadian organization staffed by both U.S. and Canadian personnel. The Commander 

of USNORTHCOM is also the Commander of NORAD and he currently has command 

 

1

The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center is now known as the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate. It 

is one of several tenants that compose the Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station near Colorado 

Springs, Colorado. 

2

USSTRATCOM conducts the missile warning mission for North America. 

3

Air Force Space Command conducts the space control mission for North America. 4

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Further Management and Oversight Changes Needed for Efforts to 

Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning Systems, GAO-06-666 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 

2006). 
of two fixed command centers.5

 The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center 

is located at Peterson Air Force Base and conducts air, land, maritime, and homeland 

defense operations, as well as defense support of civil authorities. The command 

center in Cheyenne Mountain is a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center that 

provides air, missile, and space warning, characterization, and assessment for 

NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USSTRATCOM as well as command and control for the 

ground-based mid-course missile defense program. 

DOD officials have stated that they no longer need to continue operating in this 

hardened facility considering that the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile 

strike in today’s environment is low. In July 2006, the former Commander of NORAD 

and USNORTHCOM6

 announced plans to move certain functions from Cheyenne 

Mountain and create an integrated command center at Peterson Air Force Base, 

which he projected at that time would save between $150 million and $200 million per 

year. Additionally, USSTRATCOM announced plans to relocate its missile warning 

mission from Cheyenne Mountain to Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Air 

Force Space Command is in the process of moving the Space Control Center from 

Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM officials told us that after these functions have been moved, 

Cheyenne Mountain will be used as an alternate command center, a continuity of 

operations relocation facility, and a training center. 

You asked us to determine (1) the estimated costs, savings, and benefits associated 

with moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to other locations; and (2) how DOD 

evaluated the security implications associated with moving the functions, and what 

these implications are. On March 13, 2007, we provided your office with a briefing on 

our preliminary observations regarding the proposed relocation. This report 

summarizes the results of that briefing and provides updated information as a result 

of additional work we have performed since that time. 

To determine the costs, savings, and benefits associated with the proposed relocation 

of functions from Cheyenne Mountain, we reviewed and analyzed reports and studies 

conducted by NORAD and USNORTHCOM, Sandia National Laboratories7

 and 

Lockheed Martin8

 on the costs and implications of relocating functions from 

Cheyenne Mountain, and we interviewed NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials to 

identify the expected benefits of the relocation. We also interviewed USSTRATCOM 

and Air Force Space Command officials to identify the costs, savings, and benefits 

associated with the relocation of their functions from Cheyenne Mountain. We also 

interviewed USNORTHCOM and Air Force budget analysts to determine how the cost 

estimates were developed and validated. Based on these interviews, we believe that 

the cost data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To determine the security 

implications of the relocation and how they were evaluated by DOD, we reviewed 

 5

The Commander also has a mobile consolidated command center based at F.E. Warren Air Force 

Base, Wyoming. 6

The new NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander was sworn in on March 23, 2007. 7

Sandia National Laboratories, a federally funded research center, was tasked to study the security

implications of four options for moving missions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. 8

Lockheed Martin conducted this study under contract with the Electronic Systems Center. The

Electronic Systems Center, a component of Air Force Materiel Command, manages the development 

and acquisition of electronic command and control systems for the Air Force. 

Page 2 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
vulnerability assessments and risk assessments conducted by USNORTHCOM and a 

security analysis conducted by Sandia National Laboratories for the proposed 

relocation of NORAD and USNORTHCOM functions, and we discussed these 

assessments and others that are ongoing and their potential effect on operations with 

NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Air Force Space Command officials, and the Joint 

Staff. We conducted our review from January 2007 through May 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the $150 

million to $200 million savings projected by the former Commander from moving

functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. As of April 2007, 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have identified at least $41.7 million in onetime 

costs and $5.5 million in recurring costs related to the move; however, the full costs 

will not be determined until the completion of ongoing security assessments. 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials stated that they expect increased unity of effort 

and operational efficiencies as a result of the integration. Although there is no 

requirement for it, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not done an analysis of the 

operational effects—both positive and negative—of the move. In fiscal years 2006 

and 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM allocated $26.7 million for conducting studies, 

purchasing needed equipment related to the relocation, and renovating the command 

center at Peterson Air Force Base. Renovation of the command center is scheduled 

to begin in June 2007 and be completed in December 2007. NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM officials are planning to allocate $15 million in fiscal year 2008 to 

purchase the remaining equipment for the integrated command center and program 

management support. Additional costs will likely be incurred based on the results of 

ongoing studies related to security requirements. Moreover, Air Force Space 

Command officials estimate that it will cost about $13 million to move their functions 

to Vandenberg Air Force Base, but USSTRATCOM has not yet developed a cost 

estimate for relocating their functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Schriever Air 

Force Base. 

The Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM decided to accept the risk of 

integrating the command centers based on initial risk and vulnerability assessments, 

but the full security implications will not be known until ongoing security 

assessments are completed and a protection level is designated for the integrated 

command center.9

 While initial security assessments provided information on 

vulnerabilities based on current and projected threats, further assessments were 

needed to evaluate the cost of hardening computer terminals against electromagnetic 

pulse and to evaluate the physical security requirements of protecting the integrated 

command center. Before the Air Force can designate a protection level for the new 

command center, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM must decide

whether key computer terminals will move to Peterson Air Force Base or remain in 

Cheyenne Mountain. According to NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials, this 

decision will be made after a study on electromagnetic pulse hardening requirements 

 9

 The Air Force must designate a protection level for the functions moving into the integrated

command center pursuant to Air Force Instruction 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security 

Program (Mar. 1, 2003). 

Page 3 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
is completed in late May 2007. Moreover, a System Effectiveness Assessment, 

scheduled for completion in September 2007, will provide information on the physical 

security needed to protect the Cheyenne Mountain systems that may be replicated at 

Peterson Air Force Base. According to NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials, it could 

take up to 24 months to obtain the resources needed to meet the designated 

protection level requirements. If requirements for the designated protection level 

cannot be met because of funding and resource constraints, waivers will be needed to 

begin operations or specific systems may remain in Cheyenne Mountain. 

We believe Congress should consider restricting DOD’s authority to use funds to 

renovate all proposed locations to accept functions designated to move out of 

Cheyenne Mountain until such time as all security analyses are complete, the full 

costs of the move are determined, and DOD provides Congress with an analysis of the 

operational effects of the proposed realignments. 

Background 

Currently, there is a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center located at 

Peterson Air Force Base and a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center located 

inside Cheyenne Mountain. Command staff are presently located in each of the 

separate command centers. Cheyenne Mountain’s mission is to monitor, process, and 

interpret air, missile, and space events that could threaten North America or have 

operational effects on U.S. forces or capabilities, using air, ground, and space-based 

sensors that link to the complex’s computer systems located more than 2,000 feet 

under ground. This mission is conducted at five major centers within Cheyenne 

Mountain—the Command Center, Air Warning, Missile Correlation, Operations 

Intelligence Watch, and Space Control—by approximately 658 people, including 

support personnel. These personnel belong to NORAD, USNORTHCOM, 

USSTRATCOM, and Air Force Space Command, as shown in table 1. 

Page 4 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
Table 1: Realignment of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel in Cheyenne Mountain 

Number of personnel

Command 

Currently in 

mountain

Remaining in 

mountain

Moving to 

Peterson Air

Force Base

Moving to other 

Air Force Bases 

Positions 

eliminated

NORADa112 TBD TBD 0 0

Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM)b

42 24 18 0 0

Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM)c

81 TBD 17 TBD TBD

Air Force Space 

Command 160 0 12 138 10

Air Force Space 

Command support 

personnel 263 263 0 0 0

Totald658 TBD TBD TBD TBD

Source: USNORTHCOM, NORAD, USSTRATCOM, Air Force, and GAO calculation. 

Notes: TBD = to be determined. a

NORAD has not yet determined the number of personnel that are remaining in the mountain and those moving to Peterson 

Air Force Base. 

b

USNORTHCOM positions remaining in Cheyenne Mountain are for Nuclear Command and Control. c

NORAD and USNORTHCOM have formally requested that USSTRATCOM transfer 17 positions to Peterson to support 

NORAD’s correlation of potential missile and space threats to North America. d

Contractor personnel are not included in the table. There are also 28 Canadian personnel currently working in Cheyenne

Mountain.

No final decisions have been made as to how many personnel will remain in the 

mountain, move to Peterson Air Force Base, or move to other locations. There are 

also approximately 500 contractors in Cheyenne Mountain providing support to each 

of the major centers. It has not been determined how many of these contractors will 

be retained in the mountain after the relocation. 

 

During a series of major exercises conducted in 2005, the Commander of NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM attempted to direct planning, operations, and command and control 

from two separate command centers. In the course of the exercises, the Commander 

identified shortcomings in unity of effort due to the geographic separation of the 

command centers and negatively affecting critical, time-sensitive decisions. As a 

result, in late 2005, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM directed a senior 

command official to analyze options for correcting these shortcomings and to 

determine the limitations and costs of duplicating Cheyenne Mountain capabilities 

within the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson Air Force Base. 

This analysis concluded that it would be cost-prohibitive to duplicate Cheyenne

Mountain capabilities at Peterson Air Force Base. The Commander then tasked the 

official to analyze options to “replicate,” rather than duplicate, capabilities of the two 

command centers in a single location.10 This analysis considered the following four 

options: a single command center at Peterson, a single command center at Cheyenne 

 10USNORTHCOM officials told us that in this context, replicating capabilities means leaving computer

servers, equipment, and infrastructure in the mountain and digitally sending the information to the 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson. Duplicating capabilities would involve 

moving the servers, equipment, and infrastructure. 

Page 5 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
Mountain, a Net-centric battle cab, or two separate command centers. The analysis 

concluded that a single command center at Peterson Air Force Base was the only 

option that provided the physical space required and strengthened unity of effort 

between the commands. 

In February 2006, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander ordered a study to 

determine how best to establish a NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at 

Peterson Air Force Base and place the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate in “warm 

standby” status. The completed study11 outlined a plan to move the air warning, 

missile correlation, and command center functions out of Cheyenne Mountain but to 

leave the core computer systems there, from which they would transmit their data to 

Peterson Air Force Base. The Air Force must designate a protection level for the 

functions moving into the integrated command center. The protection level system 

identifies specific requirements for each security level and recognizes that the users 

must accept varying degrees of risk. If resources are not available to meet the 

assigned protection level requirements, the Commander must request waivers from 

the security requirements until corrections can be made.12 Renovation of the 

integrated command center at Peterson is scheduled to begin in June 2007 and be 

completed in December 2007. Full operational capability is planned for May 2008. 

Once the functions and their associated personnel are moved, NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM officials told us that they plan to use Cheyenne Mountain as an 

alternate command center that could become fully functional within approximately 1 

hour, with adequate warning, if a threat situation so dictated. Additionally, the 

nuclear command and control function for USNORTHCOM will remain in the 

mountain and the computer systems remaining will be used to train and certify

personnel. 

According to Joint Staff officials, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM has 

the authority under Title 10 of the United States Code to make decisions affecting his 

command—including changing the location of command and control—as long as he 

performs his mission as described in the Unified Command Plan. Our review of Title 

10 confirms that a commander of a combatant command, unless otherwise directed 

by the President or the Secretary of Defense, has the authority to perform such 

command functions as organizing commands and forces within that command as he 

considers necessary to carry out the missions assigned to the command.13 According 

to USNORTHCOM officials, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM 

consulted with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, 

and the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff about his plan to move certain functions out 

of Cheyenne Mountain, and he received their verbal concurrence. Moreover, the 

Secretary of Defense stated in a February 2006 memo to the Commander of NORAD 

and USNORTHCOM that he liked the Commander’s approach to place the mountain 

in “warm standby” and achieve a range of cost savings. 

 11U.S. Northern Command, The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Transformation Analysis Report (Colorado 

Springs, Colo.: July 2006). 12 Air Force Instruction 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program, §6.3.2 (Mar. 1, 2003). 1310 U.S.C. §164. 

Page 6 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command also have functions in Cheyenne 

Mountain that are moving to other locations. USSTRATCOM has about 81 people in 

Cheyenne Mountain for its missile warning mission. Of these 81 people, NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM have formally requested that USSTRATCOM transfer 17 positions to 

Peterson to provide some missile warning continuity, while an undetermined number 

of personnel will move to Schriever Air Force Base in early 2008. Likewise, Air Force 

Space Command officials told us that they are in the process of moving about 138 

people in the space control center and unified space vault to Vandenberg Air Force 

Base. This move is scheduled to be completed by October 2007. 

No Savings Result from Proposed Relocation and 

Estimated Costs Have Not Been Fully Determined 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the $150 

million to $200 million savings projected by the previous Commander by moving 

functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. As of April 2007, 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have identified $41.7 million in onetime and 

$5.5 million in recurring costs related to the move so far; however, the full costs will 

not be determined until the completion of ongoing security assessments. NORAD 

and USNORTHCOM officials stated that they expect the relocation to result in 

increased unity of effort and, consequently, improved operational efficiencies. 

Although there is no requirement for it, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not done 

an analysis of the operational effects—both positive and negative—of the move. 

While Air Force Space Command has identified approximately $13 million in costs to 

move its mission to Vandenberg Air Force Base, USSTRATCOM has not yet 

determined the costs to move its mission to Schriever Air Force Base. 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM Relocation

NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not know the full costs of moving functions from 

Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base because two security assessments 

that will determine the recommended security upgrades are still underway. As of 

April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have identified about $41.7 million in

onetime costs needed to integrate the two command centers at Peterson Air Force 

Base, comprising 

• $8.1 million in fiscal year 2006 for various studies related to the relocation and 

for purchasing equipment needed to replicate some computer systems; 

• $18.6 million in fiscal year 2007 for renovating the existing command center at 

Peterson Air Force Base to accommodate the functions being relocated from 

Cheyenne Mountain, for additional study costs, and for completing computer 

purchases; and 

• $15 million for fiscal year 2008 to complete communications and systems 

equipment purchases and program management support. 

In addition, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials estimate that approximately $5.5 

million will be needed annually to operate and maintain the computer systems and to 

provide help desk support once the integrated command center is operational. 

Page 7 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
There are no short-term cost savings from relocating functions from Cheyenne 

Mountain. However, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials stated that certain 

transformational benefits, such as increased unity of effort and improved operational 

efficiencies and effectiveness, are the main reasons for integrating the command 

centers. Specifically, officials stated that having one unified command center will 

increase the situational awareness across all NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions 

and will provide a single voice to decision makers. However, officials noted that they 

have not done an analysis of the operational effects—both positive and negative—of 

the move. Furthermore, the officials stated that they have not thus far effectively 

communicated and documented the anticipated benefits and plan to improve 

communications both within the command and with outside entities. 

Air Force Space Command Relocation

The projected cost for relocating the Space Control Center and the Unified Space 

Vault from Cheyenne Mountain to the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg 

Air Force Base, California, is approximately $13 million. Of this amount, $4.5 million 

was allocated in fiscal year 2006 for studies, renovation of facilities, and relocation of 

equipment to Vandenberg, and $5.4 million was allocated in fiscal year 2007 for 

training, temporary duty to Vandenberg, and relocation of equipment. An additional 

$2.9 million has been requested to complete the move, but at the time of our review, 

Air Force Space Command officials did not know from which fiscal year these 

additional funds would be allocated. Moreover, costs for any needed security 

upgrades at Vandenberg have not yet been determined, pending a security 

assessment that is scheduled to be completed in August 2007. According to Air Force 

Space Command officials, the first phase of the equipment move has been completed, 

and the equipment is operating at Vandenberg. The remaining equipment is 

scheduled to be moved by October 2007. Air Force Space Command officials expect 

that the relocation will enable them to reduce future costs for systems modernization 

and maintenance and for contractor operations. Moreover, these officials stated that 

the space mission does not require “hardening” from nuclear attack and does not 

have to be located in Cheyenne Mountain. 

U.S. Strategic Command Relocation

The costs to relocate the missile warning mission from Cheyenne Mountain to 

Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, have not yet been developed. According to 

USSTRATCOM officials, an ongoing site survey scheduled for completion in late May 

2007 will determine the security requirements, and a subsequent engineering study 

will develop the estimated costs of the planned relocation. USSTRATCOM decided to 

move its missile warning mission to get away from the mountain’s legacy computer 

systems and acquire a more modern net-centric system using distributed nodes. 

Security Implications and Associated Risks of the 

Proposed Relocation Have Not Been Fully Determined 

After reviewing initial risk and vulnerability assessments conducted by 

USNORTHCOM in early 2006, the Commander accepted the risk of integrating the 

two command centers, but the full security implications and the associated risks of 

the proposed relocation will not be known until at least September 2007, following 

Page 8 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
the completion of ongoing security assessments and the designation of a protection 

level for the new command center. An electromagnetic pulse hardening assessment, 

a physical security assessment of the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters 

building, and the designation of a protection level for the new command center are in 

progress. If the protection level designation requirements cannot be met for 

replicating the desired systems due to resource or funding constraints, waivers will 

be needed to proceed with the planned integration or specific systems may remain in 

Cheyenne Mountain. 

Initial Security Assessments

In January 2006, USNORTHCOM conducted a classified risk assessment14 on the 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building at Peterson Air Force Base. As a 

result of this risk analysis, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have taken some steps to 

mitigate known vulnerabilities to the headquarters building from potential threats, 

which exist regardless of the command center integration. For example, NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM have limited the access to backup generators and the garage of the 

headquarters building. Additionally, in March 2006, USNORTHCOM conducted a 

classified risk assessment15 that compared the vulnerability of the Cheyenne 

Mountain Operations Center to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters 

building. After seeing these initial security assessments based on current and 

projected threats, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander deemed that the risk 

incurred by integrating the two command centers was acceptable. 

USNORTHCOM also contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to determine the 

security implications of moving assigned missions to Peterson Air Force Base. 

Sandia’s December 2006 classified report16 analyzed four different options for moving 

the missions. Sandia’s report recommended replicating some of the computer 

systems in Cheyenne Mountain because this solution would require a lower 

protection level than moving all computer systems and would cost less. However, a 

USNORTHCOM official told us that the Commander is still considering other options 

and additional security assessments are ongoing. 

Ongoing Security Assessments

Two security assessments related to moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to 

Peterson Air Force Base are underway. First, Sandia National Laboratories is 

assessing the cost associated with hardening computer terminals used to track air, 

missile, and space events, and examining the methods needed to protect those 

terminals against man-made and natural threats. The results of this assessment, 

which is scheduled to be completed in May 2007, will enable the NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM Commander to assess the feasibility of moving these terminals. 

Second, according to an Air Force Space Command official, the Air Force is 

conducting a Systems Effectiveness Assessment that will determine the effectiveness 

 14U.S. Northern Command, Risk Assessment Report (Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.: January 2006). 15U.S. Northern Command, Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center/Building 2 Vulnerability 

Assessment against Terrorist Attacks (Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.: March 2006). 16Sandia National Laboratories, Phase 2: Security Assessment Results and Conceptual Security 

Designs for North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, 

(Albuquerque, N.Mex.: December 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
of the security system at NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters to detect, delay, 

deny, and neutralize a threat; however, the assessment will not specifically examine 

procedures for protecting against a chemical/biological attack. After the completion 

of this assessment, the leadership will be able to develop an actionable plan with cost 

estimates to build a system to protect the building at those levels through the 

conceptual design process. USNORTHCOM officials expect the results of this 

assessment in September 2007.

According to a USNORTHCOM official, a complete protection level study has never 

been conducted on the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building. 

USNORTHCOM is in the process of completing a Protection Level Designation Matrix 

that includes information on the threat to the headquarters building and its 

significance to the United States’ warfighting capability. This tool will help the 

Department of the Air Force determine a protection level for the building. An Air 

Force Space Command official said that if NORAD and USNORTHCOM cannot meet 

the protection level requirements for the integrated command center due to resource 

or funding constraints, they will have to request waivers and develop a mitigation 

strategy. He added that it could take up to 24 months to get the completed security 

system in place if it was fully funded. 

According to the Deputy Director of Operations of the NORAD and USNORTHCOM 

Command Center, the renovation of the command center is not dependent upon the 

decision regarding the appropriate protection level. This official stated the 

protection level requirements are focused on external vulnerabilities and address 

issues such as cameras, bollards for stand-off distances, and additional security 

forces personnel. Nonetheless, one component of the renovation will depend on the 

results of the ongoing electromagnetic pulse hardening assessment, but this will 

affect only two of the many systems in the command centers. The Deputy Director of 

Operations stated that he does not anticipate having to delay the renovation to await 

any report results but will incorporate all accepted recommendations into the 

renovation of the integrated command center. He said that the contractor has been 

given the authority to proceed with renovation on June 11, 2007. It is scheduled for 

completion in December 2007. 

Conclusions 

The proposed realignment of functions from Cheyenne Mountain represents a major 

transformation for NORAD and USNORTHCOM. Without benefit of an analysis of 

operational effects of the proposed moves, the completed security assessments, and 

final protection level designation to inform him, it is unclear what level of risk the 

Commander is accepting in integrating the two command centers. Furthermore, the 

costs associated with any needed security upgrades are not known and it is unclear 

whether resources and funding are available to meet the protection level 

requirements. Without knowing the complete security effects and cost to replicate 

the functions, neither DOD nor Congress has adequate information to assess the risks 

in relation to the costs of moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain. 

Page 10 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
Matters for Congressional Consideration 

GAO is not making any recommendations for executive action. However, Congress 

should consider restricting DOD’s authority to use funds to renovate new locations to 

accept functions designated to move out of Cheyenne Mountain until such time as all 

security analyses are complete, the full costs of the move are determined, and DOD 

provides Congress with an analysis of the operational effects of the proposed 

realignments. 

 

Agency Comments 

We received technical comments from DOD, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

In their technical comments, NORAD and USNORTHCOM noted that the new 

commander clarified that the relocation was initiated by mission inefficiencies, not 

cost savings, and is required to increase unity of effort and operational effectiveness. 

Further, USNORTHCOM noted that the synergies gained through consolidation of 

missions into a single command center are essential for an effective response to the 

full spectrum of threats to the United States. Nevertheless, our review showed that 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM did not fully analyze the costs and operational effects of 

the proposed move, and, therefore, we are including a matter for congressional 

consideration. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of the Air Force; and the Commanders of NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM and USSTRATCOM. We will make copies available to others upon 

request. This report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key 

contributors to this report were Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director; Amy Higgins; 

Keith Rhodes; Enemencio Sanchez; Kimberly Seay; Brian Shiels; Karen Thornton; and 

Cheryl Weissman. 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

(350965) 

Page 11 GAO-07-803R Defense Infrastructure 
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