An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1403

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

 K.I., and

 A.I.

Catawba County

Nos. 09 JA 22-23

MINOR CHILDREN.

Appeal by respondent from order entered 4 September 2013 by 

Judge L. Suzanne Owsley in Catawba County District Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 14 April 2014.

Valeree R. Adams, Staff Attorney, for petitioner-appellee 

Catawba County Department of Social Services.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by Tawanda N. Foster, 

Appellate Counsel, for guardian ad litem.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant.

DAVIS, Judge.

K.W. (“Respondent”) appeals from an order ceasing further 

efforts to reunify her with her minor children K.I. (“Karen”) 

and A.I. (“Audrey”)1 and awarding guardianship of the children to 

 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the privacy of the minor 

children and for ease of reading. N.C.R. App. P.3.1(b).
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their paternal grandparents (“Mr. and Mrs. G.”). After careful 

review, we affirm.

Factual Background

Karen and Audrey were born in April 2000 and January 2004, 

respectively, while Respondent was married to their father (“Mr. 

I.”). The children lived with Respondent after she and Mr. I. 

divorced. Respondent also had custody of her son (“Calvin”), 

who was born in February 1998. Calvin’s father (“Mr. S.”) 

established paternity through genetic testing and was awarded 

legal and physical custody in July 2009.2

The Catawba County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 

became involved with Respondent’s family in 1999 in response to

reports of domestic violence and drug and alcohol abuse by 

Respondent and Mr. I. DSS received seven such reports between 

October 1999 and January 2009, four of which resulted in DSS 

providing services to Respondent.

In January 2009, DSS learned that in late 2007 or early 

2008, seven-year-old Karen had disclosed multiple incidents of 

sexual abuse by Respondent’s live-in boyfriend (“Mr. H.”). 

Respondent told DSS and Karen that she did not believe the

allegations, and she continued to allow Mr. H. unsupervised 

 

2 Calvin died in a car accident later that year.
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contact with her children. Respondent denied the possibility of 

sexual abuse to emergency room staff who examined Karen in April 

2008. When DSS offered Respondent a safety plan that required 

Mr. H. to leave the home, she demurred, stating that he had 

nowhere to go. Respondent instead suggested that her children 

move in with her mother, their maternal grandmother. Respondent 

made this proposal without revealing to DSS that she had 

witnessed her brother – who also resided with her mother –

attempt to perform oral sex on Karen or that her brother had 

inappropriately touched Calvin and “was allegedly caught 

attempting to sodomize another child.” Respondent’s children 

stayed one night with their maternal grandmother but returned to 

Respondent’s home after Mr. H. moved out.

On 23 January 2009, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging 

that Karen was abused and all three of Respondent’s children 

were neglected and dependent. DSS obtained non-secure custody 

of the children and placed Calvin with Mr. S. and the girls with 

Mr. and Mrs. G. After the petition was filed, Respondent told 

Mrs. G. “that [Respondent] was going to get a lawyer and prove 

that [Karen] lied and get a lie detector test for [Karen] to 

show that she was lying.” Karen subsequently disclosed 

longstanding and ongoing sexual abuse by Respondent’s brother.
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The trial court entered an adjudication of abuse as to 

Karen and adjudications of neglect and dependency as to all 

three children in March 2009. The court cited Respondent’s 

failure to protect Karen after being told of repeated acts of 

sexual abuse by Mr. H., Respondent’s and Mr. I.’s history of 

substance abuse and domestic violence, and prior reports of a 

lack of supervision by Respondent. The court specifically 

approved Calvin’s placement with his father and Karen and 

Audrey’s placement with Mr. and Mrs. G. It later established a 

permanent plan for Karen and Audrey of reunification with 

Respondent.

The trial court granted legal custody of Karen and Audrey 

to Respondent on 13 July 2010 based on her progress with her 

case plan. In November 2012, DSS filed a motion for review, 

alleging that Respondent and her new husband (“Mr. W.”) had 

become intoxicated and engaged in an act of domestic violence in 

front of Karen, Audrey, and one of Karen’s friends. When Karen 

attempted to pull Mr. W. off of Respondent, he “became angry and 

put his arm through a glass door cutting the nerve in his right 

arm.” The motion asserted that both sets of grandparents “have 

expressed concerns regarding the increased drinking by 

[Respondent], which has apparently increased since Mr. [W.] 
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moved into the home.” Karen and Audrey had also “reported that 

their mother drinks a lot and that [Mr. W.] gets crazy and tries 

to hurt [Respondent].”

By order entered 24 January 2013, the trial court placed 

Karen and Audrey with Mr. I. pending conclusion of the hearing 

on DSS’s motion. The court expressed “significant concerns 

regarding the criminal record and behaviors of [Respondent’s] 

new husband, as well as of [Respondent]” and noted that 

Respondent had terminated her daughters’ therapy after they were 

returned to her home. The court also found that Mr. and Mrs. G. 

had been licensed as foster parents while caring for the 

children in 2009 and that DSS had recently visited their home 

and found no concerns.

At the conclusion of the hearing on 19 February 2013, the 

trial court returned Karen and Audrey to DSS custody and 

approved placement with Mr. and Mrs. G. In addition to the

domestic violence incident described above, the court found that 

“Mr. [W.] has a history of domestic violence” and a “significant 

criminal history, including” convictions for alcohol and drug 

offenses. Noting that Respondent “admits she has been drinking 

heavily[,]” the court further found that she “has demonstrated a 

pattern of engaging in relationships with people who engage in 
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violence” and “has a history of using alcohol and drugs to 

excess [and] . . . . of not putting the minor children first in 

making decisions.”

After review hearings on 13 May and 5 August 2013, the 

trial court entered an order on 4 September 2013 relieving DSS 

of further efforts toward reunification and awarding 

guardianship of Karen and Audrey to Mr. and Mrs. G. Respondent 

filed a timely notice of appeal.

Analysis

I. Guardianship

Respondent first claims that the trial court erred by 

awarding guardianship of the children to Mr. and Mrs. G. without 

making the determination required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B600(c). Subsection (c) provides that the court, when appointing 

a guardian under the statute, must “verify that the person being 

appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal 

significance of the appointment and will have adequate resources 

to care appropriately for the juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B600(c) (2013). We have previously held § 7B-600(c) does not

“require that the court make any specific findings in order to 

make the verification.” In re J.E., 182 N.C. App. 612, 617, 643 

S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007).
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Respondent concedes that the court made the following 

finding in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(c):

The Court has conducted an inquiry of [Mr. 

and Mrs. G.], paternal grandparents and 

placement providers. They are present in 

court and understand the responsibilities of 

assuming guardianship of these children. 

They provided placement for the children 

when the children were previously before 

this Court. Mr. and Mrs. [G.] understand 

the legal significance of guardianship and 

have adequate resources to care for the 

children. . . .

She contends, however, that “the findings are not supported by 

competent evidence.”

“All dispositional orders of the trial court after abuse, 

neglect and dependency hearings must contain findings of fact 

based upon the credible evidence presented at the hearing. If 

the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent 

evidence, they are conclusive on appeal.” In re Weiler, 158 

N.C. App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003) (citations 

omitted). We hold that the court’s verification under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-600(c) was supported by ample competent evidence.

Mr. and Mrs. G. attended the review hearing on 5 August 

2013. The court addressed Mrs. G. directly regarding her

responsibilities as a guardian. Mrs. G. agreed to limit and 

supervise Mr. I’s contact with Karen and Audrey and acknowledged 
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that this responsibility would be on “a permanent [and] forever 

basis.” Mrs. G. further confirmed her willingness to cooperate 

with Respondent regarding her visitation with her daughters. 

After reporting that “the girls are doing real well[,]” Mrs. G. 

expressly affirmed to the court: “I think that I can meet all 

the girls’ needs in whatever they need, get them to the places 

they need to be, the things that they want to do.” Though she 

was hopeful of changing the girls’ schools, Mrs. G. expressed a 

willingness to “do whatever the court decides.” Following this 

exchange, the court announced its conclusion that Mrs. G.

“appears to have a good understanding of her statutory 

responsibility and does have the resources to be able to meet

the needs of these children.”

Both DSS and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) submitted 

written reports recommending that the court award guardianship 

of Karen and Audrey to Mr. and Mrs. G. DSS reported that both 

girls were doing well in the placement and felt safe in the 

grandparents’ home. Likewise, the GAL stated: “They are 

receiving the structure, nurturing and safety that the[y] need 

and deserve.” In arguing in favor of guardianship at the 

hearing, DSS pointed out that Mr. and Mrs. G. “are the two 

people that the children have known both the first time that 
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they were before the court and then this time.”

The record before the trial court also included a “Kinship 

Home Study” completed by DSS in February 2009, recommending that 

Mr. and Mrs. G. be approved as a home placement for Karen and 

Audrey. Moreover, the court had overseen Mr. and Mrs. G.’s 

caretaking of the girls during their placements from February 

2009 to January 2010 and from November 2012 until the review 

hearing on 13 August 2013. Such evidence and the court’s 

findings comply with the requirements set forth in § 7B-600(c). 

See J.E., 182 N.C. App. at 617, 643 S.E.2d at 73 (holding that 

trial court complied with § 7B-600(c) by receiving into evidence 

and considering home study reports indicating that proposed 

guardians “have a clear understanding of the responsibility of 

caring for [the juvenile]” and “are committed to raising [the 

juvenile] and providing for his [or her] needs regardless of 

what may be required”).

Respondent also argues that the trial court “failed to 

properly find that it was in the minor children’s best interest 

to grant guardianship [to] the paternal grandparents[.]” See

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(a) (2013). Section 7B-600 “permits the 

trial court to appoint a guardian at any time during the 

juvenile proceedings . . . when it finds such appointment to be 
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in the juvenile’s best interests.” In re E.C., 174 N.C. App.

517, 520, 621 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (2005). The trial court has 

broad discretion when determining a juvenile’s best interests, 

In re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007), 

and an authorized disposition based upon such a determination

“will not be disturbed absent clear evidence that the decision 

was manifestly unsupported by reason.” In re N.B., 167 N.C. 

App. 305, 311, 605 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004). We also note that 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a) prioritizes placements with a family 

member, a priority that extends to subsequent review hearings 

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906 (2011).3 See In re L.L., 172 N.C. 

App. 689, 702, 616 S.E.2d 392, 400 (2005).

To the extent Respondent suggests the court did not make a 

determination concerning Karen’s and Audrey’s best interests, we 

deem it sufficient to quote the following language from the 

order:

3. . . . The best interests of the children 

require more adequate care and supervision 

than the parent(s) can offer.

4. The best interests of the minor children 

 

3 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906 has since been repealed by 2013 N.C. 

Sess. Laws 129, § 25 (June 19, 2013). However, the trial court 

made its determination pursuant to this section at a review 

hearing conducted in August 2013 before the 1 October 2013 date 

upon which the repeal of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906 became 

effective.
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will be served by entry of the following 

order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Guardianship of the minor children is 

granted to [Mr. and Mrs. G.]

Regarding Respondent’s challenge to the sufficiency of the trial 

court’s findings of fact or the evidence to support its

determination, we find no merit to her claim. The trial court 

made detailed findings about the case history, Respondent’s 

protracted issues with substance abuse and domestic violence, 

and the children’s successful placement with Mr. and Mrs. G. 

The court also made findings regarding the children’s need for 

“permanence” and the guardians’ understanding of their 

responsibilities and their capacity to meet them. Finally, we 

observe that the court’s assessment of the children’s best 

interests is consistent with the recommendations of DSS and the 

GAL. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by awarding guardianship of the children to 

Mr. and Mrs. G.

II. Failure to Schedule a Permanency Planning Hearing

Respondent next argues the court failed to comply with the 

following statutory mandate:

If the court's determination to cease 

reunification efforts is made in a hearing 
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that was duly and timely noticed as a 

permanency planning hearing, then the court 

may immediately proceed to consider all of 

the criteria contained in G.S. 7B-907(b). . 

. . If the court's decision to cease 

reunification efforts arises in any other 

hearing, the court shall schedule a 

subsequent hearing within 30 days to address 

the permanent plan in accordance with G.S. 

7B-907.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(c) (2011) (emphasis added).4 

Specifically, Respondent contends that the trial court erred 

because it ceased reunification efforts at a review hearing that 

was not duly noticed as a permanency planning hearing and “did 

not schedule a subsequent hearing within 30 days to address the 

permanent plan . . . as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B507(c).” Rather, the 4 September 2013 order stated that “[t]his 

matter shall come on for a review . . . on the 28th day of 

October, 2013.”

Our Supreme Court has made clear that “[m]andamus is the 

proper remedy when the trial court fails to hold a hearing or 

enter an order as required by statute.” In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 

446, 454, 665 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2008). “A writ of mandamus ensures 

that the trial courts adhere to statutory time frames without 

the ensuing delay of a lengthy appeal.” Id. at 455, 665 S.E.2d 

 

4 Because the statute was amended effective 1 October 2013 by 

2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, § 15, we cite the version in effect at 

the time of the hearing and the resultant order.
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at 60. The time-sensitive nature of child welfare cases makes 

mandamus particularly appropriate in cases such as this, when 

Respondent asserts entitlement to the taking of action by the 

trial court within a relatively brief timeframe. See id.

(observing that “mandamus is not only appropriate, but is the 

superior remedy”). Despite the expedited nature of appeals

filed pursuant to N.C.R. App. P.3.1, it is apparent that appeal 

is not a viable means to enforce a statutory hearing deadline in 

juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings. Id.

Moreover, during the pendency of Respondent’s appeal, our

General Assembly enacted amendments to Article 9 of the Juvenile 

Code applicable to all cases pending on or filed after 1 October 

2013. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129. In pertinent part, these

amendments repealed N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-906 and -907 and 

replaced them with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 (2013). Id. at §§ 

25-26. Section 7B-906.1 eliminates the distinction between 

review hearings and permanency planning hearings by providing 

that all “[r]eview hearings after the initial permanency 

planning hearing shall be designated as subsequent permanency 

planning hearings.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(a).5 Following 

 

5 Likewise, subsection 7B-507(c) now provides that if the court 

ceases reunification efforts at a hearing that was not noticed 

as a permanency planning hearing, it must “schedule a subsequent 
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the initial permanency planning hearing, subsequent permanency 

planning hearings must now “be held at least every six months

thereafter or earlier as set by the court[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

7B-906.1(a). At each hearing, the trial court must assess the 

existing permanent plan and “make specific findings as to the 

best plan of care to achieve a safe, permanent home for the 

juvenile within a reasonable time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B906.1(d)(3). Therefore, in any “review” hearing conducted after 

1 October 2013, the trial court was required to comply with N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 and make findings about the juveniles’ 

permanent plan.

The 30-day deadline contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B507(c) has long since passed given that the trial court ceased 

reunification efforts on 4 September 2013. Moreover, the court 

ordered a review hearing for 28 October 2013, after the 

effective date of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1. The 28 October 

2013 hearing and any subsequent “review” hearing held after the 

issuance of our opinion must proceed as a “subsequent permanency 

planning hearing” in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B906.1(a). As such, we conclude Respondent’s appeal with respect 

 

hearing within 30 days to address the permanent plan in 

accordance with G.S. 7B-906.1.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(c) 

(2013).
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to this issue is moot. Cf. In re Hayes, 111 N.C. App. 384, 388, 

432 S.E.2d 862, 864 (ruling that respondent’s challenge to 

statutory procedure for commitment hearing was moot where “he 

has since had the opportunity to be heard under the amended 

statute”), appeal dismissed, 335 N.C. 173, 436 S.E.2d 376 

(1993).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s 

order ceasing reunification efforts and granting guardianship of 

Karen and Audrey to Mr. and Mrs. G.

AFFIRMED.

Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).