alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
REPLEVIN.

[Hamilton Circuit Court,

January Term, 1894.]

Smith, Swing and Cox, JJ.

#### Laura A. White v. J. G. Semper and E. N. Semper.

Prato and Intent to Sell at a Sacrifice on part of Mortgagee can be set up ntDefense in a replevin Suit.

A claim that defendant in replevin had been induced to give the mortgage by fraud, and that the mortgagee was about to sell the goods at a great sacrifice, can he set up in defense in the replevin suit, and hence no injunction will lie against the suit and to have the mortgage declared void.

On Appear from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county.

SmrTh, J.

We are of the opinion that the demurrer of the. defendants to the petition of the plaintiffs is well taken, and must be sustained on several grounds. The allegations of the petition, in substance, are that the defendants, Semper & Semper, partners, by fraud, obtained a chattel mortgage from her on many articles of personal property, and afterwards, on January 26, 1893,-had replevined the same in an action brought by them against her before a justice of-the peace, which is *409still pending; and that they were about to sell the same in an auction house at a great sacrifice, whereby she will suffer great and irreparable loss; and the-prayer is for an injunction against the prosecution of such suit, and that the; mortgage be declared void.

*E. Pot t r Dustin*and *Jas. S.*Meyers, for plaintiff.

*Wm. H.*Pope, Contra.

It must be presumed that in the replevin suit the law was complied with„ and that the property replevined was not delivered to the plaintiff therein until plaintiffs had given bond according to law, which would completely protect the-rights of the defendant therein, there being no allegation in the petition to show that the property so replevined had other than a pecuniary value; and the mereaverment that she would suffer great and irreparable injury by the sale thereof is wholly insufficient. 31 O. S., 420.

*Second.*— The plaintiff on the averments of the petition had an adequate remedy at law. She might set up the fraud in procuring the mortgage, or the want of consideration therefor in the replevin suit, and if successful, be entitled1 to a verdict and judgment in that action; and the replevin statute itself gives; her the right, if the property has other than pecuniary value, to require the constable to retain it; or she was entitled to give a counter-bond, and retain or be restored to its possession. 88 O. L., 276. With all these legal remedies in an action already pending, she is not at liberty to resort to a court ot equity to obtain relief, which is open to her in the other tribunal. If no amendment is-made to the ' ition, the action will be dismissed.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2586

To provide for the conveyance of certain National Forest System lands to 

the towns of Laona and Wabeno, Wisconsin. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 24, 2003

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL

To provide for the conveyance of certain National Forest 

System lands to the towns of Laona and Wabeno, Wisconsin.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LAND CONVEYANCES, NICOLET NATIONAL FOR4 EST, WISCONSIN. 

5 (a) CONVEYANCE TO TOWN OF LAONA.—

6 (1) CONVEYANCE.—The Secretary of Agri7 culture (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Sec8 retary’’) shall convey, without consideration, to the 

9 town of Laona, Wisconsin, all right, title, and inter10 est of the United States in and to the parcel of Na-
2

•HR 2586 IH 

1 tional Forest System land in Forest County, Wis2 consin, described in paragraph (2), for the purpose 

3 of permitting the town to use the parcel as a site for 

4 an industrial park and for other purposes. 

5 (2) LEGAL DESCRIPTION.—The parcel of land 

referred to in paragraph (1) consists of the SW. 1 6 ⁄4

of the NW. 1⁄4, SE. 1⁄4 of the NW. 1⁄4, NE. 1 7 ⁄4 of 

the SW. 1⁄4, NW. 1⁄4 of the SW. 1 8 ⁄4, and that part 

of the SW. 1⁄4 of the NE. 1 9 ⁄4 not previously conveyed 

10 by the United States in section 6, townships 35 and 

11 36 north, range 15 east, Forest County, Wisconsin. 

12 (b) CONVEYANCE TO TOWN OF WABENO.—

13 (1) CONVEYANCE.—The Secretary shall convey, 

14 without consideration, to the town of Wabeno, Wis15 consin, all right, title, and interest of the United 

16 States in and to the parcel of National Forest Sys17 tem land in Forest County, Wisconsin, described in 

18 paragraph (2), for the purpose of permitting the 

19 town to use the parcel as a site for an industrial 

20 park and for other purposes. 

21 (2) LEGAL DESCRIPTION.—The parcel of land 

referred to in paragraph (1) consists of the SE. 1 22 ⁄4

of the SW. 1⁄4, part of the NW. 1⁄4 of the SW. 1 23 ⁄4, 

NE. 1⁄4 of the SW. 1⁄4, SW. 1⁄4 of the NW. 1 24 ⁄4, and 
3

•HR 2586 IH 

SE. 1⁄4 of the NW. 1 1 ⁄4 in section 7, township 34 

2 north, range 15 east, Forest County, Wisconsin. 

3 (c) SURVEY.—If necessary, the exact acreage and 

4 legal description of the lands to be conveyed under sub5 sections (a) and (b) shall be determined by surveys satis6 factory to the Secretary. The cost of a survey shall be 

7 borne by the recipient of the land. 

8 (d) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The 

9 Secretary may require such additional terms and condi10 tions in connection with the conveyances under this section 

11 as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the inter12 ests of the United States.

Æ
#### Mary M. Letson, Plaintiff, *v.*Alsanford Evans, Etta Myers et al., as Executors, Etc., of Charles Adams, Deceased, Defendants.

(Supreme Court, Oneida Special Term,

December, 1900.)

Joinder — An action to partition property left by a testator cannot be joined with an action to establish a debt against his estate and sell his real estate for it — Code C. P., § 484, subd. 9.

An action to partition real estate, of which a will makes the plain- = tiff and certain of the defendants tenants in common, cannot be joined under Code C. P., § 4S4, subd. 9, in the same complaint with a cause of action to establish a debt against the testator’s estate and sell his real estate to pay it.

The latter action should not be brought in the Supreme Court.

Demurrer by defendant Etta Myers to plaintiff’s complaint.

E. O. Worden, for demurrer.

M. N. Willson, opposed.

Hiscock, J.

The demurrer is sustained upon various grounds: 1. Plaintiff has united in her complaint two purported causes of action which cannot be united. The attempted union could only be claimed to be permissible under subdivision 9, section 484, Code, which provides that causes of action may be united in the same complaint brought to recover upon claims arising out of the same transaction or transactions, or connected with the same subject of action. .That is not this case. One cause of action is based upon a will which makes the plaintiff and certain of the defendants tenants in common, and seeks as its object a partition of the real estate. The second cause of action has for its subject the establishment of a debt against the testator’s estate, and as incidental thereto a sale of his real estate for the payment thereof. They are two entirely different subjects of action.

2. This court is not the proper tribunal in which plaintiff should seek the relief attempted to be secured by her second cause of action upon the facts appearing. Hogan v. Kavanaugh, 138 N. Y. 417.

*4383. Apparently testator left a widow who- has a life estate in the real estate of which partition is sought. Bumsey Pr. 383, and cases there cited. If so, she is a necessary party. Code, | 1538.

The demurrer is, therefore, sustained, with costs to be taxed as in a regular action.

Demurrer sustained, with costs.
# C_2020218EN.01001101.xml

| 2.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 218/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 218/11

---

No state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

(2020/C 218/06)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that the following measure does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement:

| Date of adoption of the decision | 1 April 2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Case No | 81099 |
| Decision No | 024/20/COL |
| EFTA State | Iceland |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Complaint concerning water rights in Svartá |
| Form of aid | No aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs |
| Arnarhvoli |
| 101 Reykjavík |
| ICELAND |

Date of adoption of the decision

1 April 2020

Case No

81099

Decision No

024/20/COL

EFTA State

Iceland

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Complaint concerning water rights in Svartá

Form of aid

No aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

Arnarhvoli

101 Reykjavík

ICELAND

The authentic text of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found on the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/decisions/

---
§ 308.26 Document subpoenas to nonparties. ( a ) *General rules.* ( 1 ) Any party may apply to the ALJ for the issuance of a document discovery subpoena addressed to any person who is not a party to the proceeding. The application must contain a proposed document subpoena and a brief statement showing the general relevance and reasonableness of the scope of documents sought. The subpoenaing party must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for making production in response to the document subpoena.
( 2 ) A party may apply for a document subpoena under this section only within the time period during which such party could serve a discovery request under § 308.24(d). The party obtaining the document subpoena is responsible for serving it on the subpoenaed person and for serving copies on all parties. Document subpoenas may be served in any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or as otherwise provided by law.
( 3 ) The ALJ will promptly issue any document subpoena requested pursuant to this section. If the ALJ determines that the application does not set forth a valid basis for the issuance of the subpoena, or that any of its terms are unreasonable, oppressive, excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome, the ALJ may refuse to issue the subpoena or may issue it in a modified form upon such conditions as may be consistent with the Uniform Rules.
( b ) *Motion to quash or modify.* ( 1 ) Any person to whom a document subpoena is directed may file a motion to quash or modify such subpoena with the ALJ. The motion must be accompanied by a statement of the basis for quashing or modifying the subpoena. The movant must serve the motion on all parties, and any party may respond to such motion within ten days of service of the motion.
( 2 ) Any motion to quash or modify a document subpoena must be filed on the same basis, including the assertion of privilege, upon which a party could object to a discovery request under § 308.25(d), and during the same time limits during which such an objection could be filed.
( c ) *Enforcing document subpoenas.* If a subpoenaed person fails to comply with any subpoena issued pursuant to this section or any order of the ALJ, which directs compliance with all or any portion of a document subpoena, the subpoenaing party or any other aggrieved party may, to the extent authorized by applicable law, apply to an appropriate United States district court for an order requiring compliance with so much of the document subpoena as the ALJ has not quashed or modified. A party's right to seek court enforcement of a document subpoena will in no way limit the sanctions that may be imposed by the ALJ on a party who induces a failure to comply with subpoenas issued under this section.
Proposed Rule: Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 

Meeting Documentation: EPA DRE Protocol Second Round of Peer Review Comments and ResDate Staff Contact Information Name of Organization Summary of Discussion Wr

ComProDid subDoc

February 25, 2010 Scott Bartos 

(202) 343-9167 Bartos.Scott@epamail.epa.gov

• Outside participants identified below. • EPA Climate Change Division and EPA contractors: Kirsten Cappel, EPA; Scott Bartos, EPA; Debbie Ottinger, EPA; Jeremy Scharfenberg, ICF International; Deb Harris, ICF 

International; Shep Burton, ICF International. 

Participants discussed peer comments and EPA responses from the second peer review of EPA’s DRE Protocol. For comments and responses discussed, see the docket. A main topic discussed on the call was the JETIA Method and commenter experience in using the JEITA method. Experience was limited and results mixed; discussion focused in part on more work needed to test the method. The discussion focused in part on more work needed to validate JEITA's proposed method. 

N/A 

Outside Participants: Mike Sherer, Sherer Consulting Services, Inc., Msherereng@aol.com; Laurie Beu, Consultant to ISMI, laurie.beu

Steve Trammell, ISMI, steve.trammell@ismi.sematech.org; Mehran Moalem, Applied Materials, Mehran_MoaleDaniel Clark, Applied Materials, Daniel_Clark@amat.com; Phil Chandler, Applied Materials, Phil_Chandler@aTom Wong, ISMI; Joe Van Gompel, Midac Corp., joe.van.gompel@gmail.com; Bob Ridgeway, Air Products, RIDGEWRG@airproducts.com

1
§ 330.6 Single ownership accounts. ( a ) *Individual accounts.* Funds owned by a natural person and deposited in one or more deposit accounts in his or her own name shall be added together and insured up to the SMDIA in the aggregate. Exception: Despite the general requirement in this paragraph (a), if more than one natural person has the right to withdraw funds from an individual account (excluding persons who have the right to withdraw by virtue of a Power of Attorney), the account shall be treated as a joint ownership account (although not necessarily a qualifying joint account) and shall be insured in accordance with the provisions of § 330.9, unless the deposit account records clearly indicate, to the satisfaction of the FDIC, that the funds are owned by one individual and that other signatories on the account are merely authorized to withdraw funds on behalf of the owner.
( b ) *Sole proprietorship accounts.* Funds owned by a business which is a “sole proprietorship” (as defined in § 330.1(n)) and deposited in one or more deposit accounts in the name of the business shall be treated as the individual account(s) of the person who is the sole proprietor, added to any other individual accounts of that person, and insured up to the SMDIA in the aggregate.
( c ) *Single-name accounts containing community property funds.* Community property funds deposited into one or more deposit accounts in the name of one member of a husband-wife community shall be treated as the individual account(s) of the named member, added to any other individual accounts of that person, and insured up to the SMDIA in the aggregate.
( d ) *Accounts of a decedent and accounts held by executors or administrators of a decedent's estate.* Funds held in the name of a decedent or in the name of the executor, administrator, or other personal representative of his or her estate and deposited into one or more deposit accounts shall be added together and insured up to the SMDIA in the aggregate; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph (d) shall affect the operation of § 330.3(j). The deposit insurance provided by this paragraph (d) shall be separate from any insurance coverage provided for the individual deposit accounts of the executor, administrator, other personal representative or the beneficiaries of the estate.
[63 FR 25756, May 11, 1998, as amended at 71 FR 14631, Mar. 23, 2006; 76 FR 41395, July 14, 2011]
§ 32.6 Nonconforming loans and extensions of credit. ( a ) A loan or extension of credit, within a national bank's or savings association's legal lending limit when made, will not be deemed a violation but will be treated as nonconforming if the loan or extension of credit is no longer in conformity with the bank's or savings association's lending limit because— ( 1 ) The bank's or savings association's capital has declined, borrowers have subsequently merged or formed a common enterprise, lenders have merged, or the lending limit or capital rules have changed;
( 2 ) Collateral securing the loan to satisfy the requirements of a lending limit exception has declined in value; or
( 3 ) In the case of a credit exposure arising from a transaction identified in § 32.9(a) and measured by the Model Method specified in § 32.9(b)(1)(i) or § 32.9 (c)(1)(i), the Current Exposure Method specified in § 32.9(b)(1)(iii), or the Basel Collateral Haircut Method specified in § 32.9(c)(1)(iii), the credit exposure subject to the lending limits of 12 U.S.C. 84 or 12 U.S.C. 1464(u), as applicable, or this part increases after execution of the transaction.
( b ) A national bank or savings association must use reasonable efforts to bring a loan or extension of credit that is nonconforming as a result of paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section into conformity with the bank's or savings association's lending limit unless to do so would be inconsistent with safe and sound banking practices.
( c ) A national bank or savings association must bring a loan that is nonconforming as a result of circumstances described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section into conformity with the bank's or savings association's lending limit within 30 calendar days, except when judicial proceedings, regulatory actions or other extraordinary circumstances beyond the bank's or savings association's control prevent it from taking action.
[77 FR 37279, June 21, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 37944, June 25, 2013]
§ 23.2 Definitions. ( a ) *Affiliate* means an affiliate as described in § 23.6.
( b ) *Capital and surplus* means: ( 1 ) For qualifying community banking organizations that have elected to use the community bank leverage ratio framework, as set forth under the OCC's Capital Adequacy Standards at part 3 of this chapter: ( i ) A qualifying community banking organization's tier 1 capital, as used under § 3.12 of this chapter; plus.
( ii ) A qualifying community banking organization's allowance for loan and lease losses or adjusted allowances for credit losses, as applicable, as reported in the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report); or
( 2 ) For all other national banks: ( i ) A bank's tier 1 and tier 2 capital calculated under the OCC's risk-based capital standards set forth in part 3 of this chapter, as applicable, as reported in the Call Report; plus
( ii ) The balance of a bank's allowance for loan and lease losses or adjusted allowances for credit losses, as applicable, not included in the bank's Tier 2 capital, for purposes of the calculation of risk-based capital described in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, as reported in the Call Report.
( c ) *CEBA Lease* means a personal property lease authorized under 12 U.S.C. 24(Tenth).
( d ) *Conforming lease* means: ( 1 ) A CEBA Lease that conforms with the requirements of subparts A and B of this part; or
( 2 ) A Section 24(Seventh) Lease that conforms with the requirements of subparts A and C of this part.
( e ) *Full-payout lease* means a lease in which the national bank reasonably expects to realize the return of its full investment in the leased property, plus the estimated cost of financing the property over the term of the lease, from: ( 1 ) Rentals;
( 2 ) Estimated tax benefits; and
( 3 ) The estimated residual value of the property at the expiration of the lease term.
( f ) *Net lease* means a lease under which the national bank will not, directly or indirectly, provide or be obligated to provide for: ( 1 ) Servicing, repair, or maintenance of the leased property during the lease term;
( 2 ) Parts or accessories for the leased property;
( 3 ) Loan of replacement or substitute property while the leased property is being serviced;
( 4 ) Payment of insurance for the lessee, except where the lessee has failed in its contractual obligation to purchase or maintain required insurance; or
( 5 ) Renewal of any license or registration for the property unless renewal by the bank is necessary to protect its interest as owner or financier of the property.
( g ) *Off-lease property* means property that reverts to a national bank's possession or control upon the expiration of a lease or upon the default of the lessee.
( h ) *Section 24(Seventh) Lease* means a personal property lease authorized under 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh).
[61 FR 66560, Dec. 18, 1996, as amended at 79 FR 11312, Feb. 28, 2014; 84 FR 4240, Feb. 14, 2019; 84 FR 61794, Nov. 13, 2019; 84 FR 69297, Dec. 18, 2019]
#### § 340.5 Can the FDIC deny a loan to a buyer who is not disqualified from purchasing assets using seller-financing under this regulation?

The FDIC still has the right to make an independent determination, based upon all relevant facts of a person's financial condition and history, of that person's eligibility to receive any loan or extension of credit from the FDIC, even if the person is not in any way disqualified from purchasing assets from the FDIC under the restrictions set forth in this part.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, Powell and Senior Judge Clements

WILLIAM JOHN PETERSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1016-09-4 PER CURIAM AUGUST 18, 2009 WILLIAM PETERSON AND COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(William John Peterson, pro se , on brief).

No brief for appellees.

William John Peterson appeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission

refusing to assess sanctions against Companion Property & Casualty Insurance Company for its

denial of diagnostic medical tes ting. We have reviewed the reco rd and the commission’s opinion

and find that this appeal is without merit. A ccordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the

commission in its final opinion. See Peterson v. William Peterson , VWC File No. 208-42-08

(Mar. 19, 2009). We dispense with oral argumen t and summarily affirm because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in th e materials before the Court and argument would

not aid the decisional process. See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.
#### §§ 3.146-3.150 [Reserved]
§ 366.11 Will the FDIC waive a conflict of interest? ( a ) We may waive a conflict of interest for good cause shown at our discretion when our need to contract for your services outweighs all relevant factors.
( b ) The following are examples of when we may grant you a waiver for a conflict of interest. These examples are not inclusive. ( 1 ) We may grant a waiver to an outside counsel who has a representational conflict. We will weigh all relevant facts and circumstances in making our determination.
( 2 ) We may grant a waiver to allow a contractor to acquire an asset from us who is providing or has provided services on that asset. We will consider whether granting the waiver will adversely affect the fairness of the sale, the type of services provided, and other facts and circumstances relevant to the sale in making our determination.