United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on National 

Security and International Relations, 

House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform 

CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE 

Updated Intelligence, 

Clear Guidance, and 

Consistent Priorities 

Needed to Guide 

Investments in 

Collective Protection 

January 2007 

 

GAO-07-113 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, 

and Consistent Priorities Needed to 

Guide Investments in Collective 

Protection 

Highlights of GAO-07-113, a report to 

the Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on National Security and 

International Relations, House 

Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform 

For the military to operate in

environments contaminated by

chemical and biological warfare

agents, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) has developed collective

protection equipment to provide a 

protected environment for group 

activities. GAO previously reported

persistent problems in providing

collective protection for U.S. forces

in high threat areas overseas. In 

this report, GAO examined

 (1) current intelligence

assessments of chemical and 

biological threats, (2) the extent to 

which DOD has provided collective

protection at critical overseas

facilities and major expeditionary

warfighting assets, and (3) DOD’s 

framework for managing

installation protection policies and 

prioritizing critical installations for 

funding. In conducting this review, 

GAO developed criteria to identify

critical sites in the absence of a 

DOD priority listing of such sites in 

overseas high threat areas—areas 

at high risk of terrorist or missile 

attack. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Director 

of National Intelligence (DNI) 

update the chemical warfare 

National Intelligence Estimate and 

that DOD take actions to provide 

clearer, more consistent policies 

that guide the funding and

placement of collective protection

and other installation preparedness 

activities. In comments on a draft

of this report, the DNI and DOD 

generally agreed with of all of our 

recommendations. 

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security 

environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical

and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and 

biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using missiles,

or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release chemical or 

biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The intelligence 

community has recognized the need to communicate more candidly about 

the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and amount of agents, the 

number of missiles likely armed with chemical and biological warheads, and 

the method of dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in 

understanding the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk 

management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence 

community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a new 

2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the biological 

warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical warfare threat 

since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication policies. 

Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical overseas 

facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets (e.g., infantry 

units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and inconsistent. Nearly 80 

percent of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant commanders 

based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have collective protection 

equipment—including about two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat 

areas. At the same time, GAO found problems such as often vague and 

inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection. DOD guidance 

encourages the use of collective protection but does not prescribe specific 

standards to guide strategic decisions on its use. Military service guidance,

except the Air Force, was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as 

(1) whether decisions on the need for the equipment should be left to local 

commanders’ discretion, (2) when the various types of collective protection 

are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be protected. Thus, 

commanders have difficulty determining the need for collective protection. 

DOD’s framework for managing collective protection and other related 

installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which affects 

DOD’s ability to ensure that collective protection resources are allocated 

efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports have highlighted 

continuing problems with fragmented policies and operating concepts 

among the many and varied programs and organizations involved. These 

problems result in unresolved conflict about issues, such as which critical 

facilities should receive priority for funding improvements, and make it 

difficult for DOD to balance competing warfighting and other needs and 

ensure that funding resources are prudently allocated. Previously, GAO and 

others have recommended DOD designate a single authority to integrate and 

coordinate installation protection policies and activities, and DOD agreed. 

However, despite a new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done so. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-113. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above.For 

more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at 

(202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6

Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key

Aspects of Chemical and Biological Threat 8 

Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or 

Consistently Addressed 13 

Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Policies 

Undermines Decision Making on Critical Priorities 23 

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36 

Appendix II GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense 39 

Appendix III DOD Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry 42 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix V Comments from the Director of National Intelligence 47 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48 

Related GAO Products 49 

Tables 

Table 1: Critical Overseas Sites with Collective Protection 

Equipment 15

Page i GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Table 2: Collective Protection at Selected Expeditionary 

Warfighting Assets 18 

Table 3: Navy Ships Required to Have Collective Protection 20 

Figures 

Figure 1: SCUD B Missile with Launcher 10 

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter 21 

Figure 3: Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical Support 22 

Figure 4: Installation Protection Activities Spread across Multiple 

DOD Organizations 25 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

JPEO Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

January 19, 2007 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and 

 International Relations 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Shays: 

The U.S. security environment has changed markedly in recent years. 

Once focused on the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union, with its nuclear

arsenal and massive conventional forces, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and intelligence community now face a more diverse threat. The 

new security environment includes not only hostile nation states, but also

terrorist organizations around the world who may possess asymmetric 

capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons. Many of these weapons can be difficult

to detect, since much of the technology, equipment, and materials needed

to develop them also have legitimate commercial applications. DOD has 

repeatedly emphasized the growing threat of the use of chemical and

biological weapons against U.S. forces both at home and abroad, and 

recently reported that it is continuing to increase funding for defenses 

against such weapons.1

 Understanding the nature of the chemical and 

biological threat from adversaries, and the dangers this threat poses to 

U.S. forces, is fundamental to DOD’s ability to make risk management 

decisions regarding where and how to focus investments in defending U.S.

forces. 

In the event of chemical or biological weapons use, DOD policy 

emphasizes avoidance of contaminated areas. When avoidance is not 

possible, DOD normally provides protective suits for military personnel 

required to operate in contaminated environments. However, while DOD 

has made improvements, these suits limit mobility and are difficult to wear 

for long periods. For this reason, collective protection areas, which are 

specially constructed environments such as portable tent systems or 

 1

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 6, 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
rooms with equipment designed to provide a pressurized and filtered 

environment for groups of personnel, may be needed at some fixed 

facilities and expeditionary warfighting assets, including ground, naval, 

and air assets. Such collective protection equipment enables individuals 

to remove their individual protective gear and still perform essential 

activities, such as operational command and control, medical, and certain

logistics functions; or simply rest. In prior reports on chemical and

biological defense, we have reported persistent problems regarding the 

provision and effectiveness of collective protection for U.S. forces in high 

threat areas overseas. DOD states that American interests abroad will be 

the most likely targets in the coming decade. The department operates 

numerous overseas facilities that are critical to U.S. ability to project, 

support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide during war 

time. 

DOD’s approach to risk management requires commanders to combine 

assessments of the threats to facilities, their vulnerabilities, and critical 

assets into an overall assessment of risk, which is then used to allocate 

resources to correct vulnerabilities. DOD introduced its risk management 

approach in 2001. However, we recently reported that it was facing 

difficulties in its implementation.2

 For example, we found that DOD’s 

organizational culture resists department-level approaches to priority 

setting and investment decisions. In addition, DOD also faced challenges 

in integrating its management framework and reform initiatives into a 

coherent, unified management approach. DOD is currently examining a 

series of management reforms to help unify and improve operations. 

You asked that we review the effectiveness of DOD’s program to provide 

collective protection for U.S. forces. In this report, we examine 

(1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, 

(2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection against 

vulnerabilities at critical fixed facilities overseas and major warfighting 

expeditionary assets, and (3) DOD’s framework for managing overall 

installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for 

funding. This report is an unclassified version of our December 2006 

classified report. 

To examine the current intelligence assessments of chemical and 

biological threats to DOD facilities, we reviewed briefings and other 

 2

GAO, Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Risk-Based 

Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).

Page 2 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
intelligence products, and we interviewed officials from a variety of 

national and DOD intelligence organizations. These organizations 

included the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and each of the four 

regional combatant commands with critical overseas facilities in their 

areas of operations. For the purposes of our review, we defined high 

threat areas to be those within missile range of three nation states with 

some chemical and biological warfare capabilities or those at high risk of 

terrorist attack. To determine the levels of collective protection provided 

to critical facilities, in the absence of a DOD critical installation priority 

listing across the services, we worked with a number of DOD offices to 

develop the criteria needed to determine which sites were considered 

critical. The criterion called for DOD to identify those sites that must 

remain operational during a chemical or biological event, such as 

command and control nodes, rest and relief areas, emergency medical 

locations, and intelligence sites in order for DOD to complete its mission; 

and where there would be no capability to transfer the function or 

capability to an alternate location. The Joint Staff then assisted us in 

requesting information from the responsible combatant commands 

regarding which installations and facilities overseas were considered 

critical from their warfighting perspectives using our criteria, and the 

amount and type of collective protection equipment available at each site. 

We also worked with military service and department-level offices to 

obtain detailed listings of the type and amount of equipment provided in 

major expeditionary assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and 

aircraft. To examine DOD’s framework for managing overall installation 

protection activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, 

we reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and reports by GAO and 

DOD. We also conducted interviews with responsible officials at the 

department and military services levels, as well as at the U.S. Central, 

European, Pacific, and Southern Commands. We assessed the reliability 

of data used in this report and determined that they were sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review from September 2005 

through August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. More detailed information on our scope and 

methodology is provided in appendix I. 

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security 

environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to 

provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant 

uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat. 

These problems challenge the ability of the intelligence community to 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
develop assessments—such as the national intelligence estimate on 

chemical warfare, which has not been updated since 2002—to help guide 

DOD and other governmental risk assessments and investment decisions. 

Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD 

installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or 

biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other 

means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. Although 

several nations are assessed to have chemical and biological warfare 

capability, the threat is currently assessed with varying levels of 

confidence to stem primarily from a handful of countries. Three countries 

are assessed to have the capability to develop at least some chemical and 

biological agents and possess the missiles to deliver them. DOD expects 

this threat to increase in coming years as these countries continue to 

improve their missile programs. The terrorist threat stems primarily from 

al Qaeda, and while presently limited regarding chemical and biological

weapons, this threat is also expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to 

try to acquire chemical and biological agents. Despite these threat 

assessments, the intelligence community has recognized significant 

uncertainties in the quality and depth of intelligence about those threats. 

Such uncertainty raises questions about the actual level of damage that 

might be sustained during an attack and the actual threat posed by our 

adversaries, and is thus critical information for officials making risk 

management decisions on investments to protect U.S. forces, and those 

approving funding for such investments. However, while the National 

Intelligence Council, under the leadership of the Director of National 

Intelligence, has been able to work together and issue a new 2006 national 

intelligence estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties in the 

biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been able to 

issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare 

threat since 2002. We are recommending that the Director of National 

Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to update

the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the 

necessary steps to bring the report to issuance. 

Collective protection vulnerabilities at both critical overseas facilities and 

in some major expeditionary warfighting assets are not widely or 

consistently addressed with operational capabilities. For example, nearly 

80 percent (97 of 125) of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant

commanders, based on criteria we provided them, did not have collective 

protection equipment available. Moreover, while collective protection 

equipment was limited across all four regional combatant commands, it 

also was not consistently fielded in high threat areas. About two-thirds of 

the critical sites in high threat areas did not receive collective protection. 

Page 4 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
In addition to the uncertainties in assessing key aspects of the chemical 

and biological threat, the reasons for the limited and inconsistent fielding 

of collective protection at critical overseas fixed facilities appear to be 

rooted in the often unclear and inconsistent guidance on its use. While 

DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection, it does not 

prescribe specific criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on its 

use. In addition, guidance provided by the individual services—except for 

the Air Force–is often vague and inconsistent on key issues such as 

(1) whether decisions on the need for collective protection should be left 

to local commanders’ discretion or prescribed by the services, (2) when 

the various types of collective protection are most appropriate, and 

(3) what functions need to be protected. Similarly, we also found 

collective protection shortages and inconsistent guidance affected some 

major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval 

vessels, and medical units. For example, despite the Army and Marine 

Corps infantry often operating in similar environments, the Army called 

for its ground units to have collective protection while the Marine Corps 

did not. In addition, while Navy guidance has for many years required 

ships, such as aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, and some supply ships, 

to have collective protection, about 47 percent of these ships had the 

required equipment. Small medical units and large hospital systems 

designed to be set up in rear areas also exhibited shortages and 

inconsistent requirements. The intelligence uncertainties and vague and 

inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult for commanders to 

make clear risk management assessments of the need for collective

protection and of the risks of not providing it. Given the intelligence 

uncertainties discussed above and the challenges commanders face in 

making decisions regarding the need for collective protection, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the development of 

clear and consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on 

the use of collective protection at DOD facilities. We are also

recommending that the department and military services review their 

current policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent guidance on 

when such equipment is required for naval, ground, and air forces, and 

that the services establish consistent criteria on requirements for 

collective protection at military service medical units. 

DOD’s framework for managing collective protection and other related 

installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, making it 

difficult for the department to ensure that collective protection resources 

are allocated efficiently and effectively. More specifically, opportunities to 

target funds to improve preparedness and protect critical military 

personnel, facilities, and capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass 

Page 5 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
destruction may be lost. As we have previously reported, a large number 

of DOD organizations are engaged in efforts to improve installation 

preparedness, but no single entity has been given the authority and 

responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of installation 

preparedness. In past reports, we and others have recommended the 

department designate a single integrating authority for installation 

preparedness, which the department agreed to do, but has not yet 

implemented. As a result, this lack of an integrated approach and clear 

lines of authority and responsibilities exacerbates an already complex 

challenge of balancing warfighting needs associated with the collective 

protection program with other competing needs. For example, the 

department has not formally established a methodology to identify 

facilities and infrastructure that are critical to protect, and therefore has 

not identified facilities that should receive priority for collective 

protection or other installation protection improvements. Without an 

integrated approach, along with clear lines of authority, responsibility and 

accountability, collective protection resources may continue to be applied

inconsistently, and facilities of a lower priority may be afforded protective 

measures that are needed for more critical facilities. At the close of our 

review in August 2006, DOD announced that it was beginning a major new 

reorganization of its policy directorate to respond to the changing security 

threat and to better support the warfighting commands in this 

environment. We believe the reorganization provides DOD with an 

excellent opportunity to realign responsibilities in an effort to correct its 

long-standing problems in this area. To address these challenges, we 

believe the Secretary of Defense—as part of the new reorganization—

needs to appoint a single authority with responsibility for coordinating and 

integrating worldwide installation preparedness policies and operating 

concepts, as previously recommended. We further recommend that this 

authority also oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on a criterion 

for identifying critical facilities and infrastructure and to develop a system 

for prioritizing critical facilities for funding protection improvements. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD and the Director of 

National Intelligence both generally agreed with all of our 

recommendations. Their written comments and our evaluation of them 

are on page 33 of this report. 

DOD’s program to provide collective protection is managed by the Joint 

Project Manager for Collective Protection under the Joint Program Background 

Page 6 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO).3

 The JPEO 

has overall responsibility for research, development, acquisition, fielding, 

and other aspects of support for chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear defense equipment, as well as medical countermeasures and 

installation protection in support of the National Military Strategy.4

 As one 

of eight project managers in the JPEO, the mission of the Joint Program 

Manager for Collective Protection is to develop, procure, and field 

collective protection equipment that protects U.S. forces from chemical, 

biological, and radiological contamination. 

Between fiscal years 2002 to 2005 DOD’s procurement budget for the 

overall chemical and biological defense program totaled about $2.4 billion, 

including about $218 million for collective protection. During fiscal year 

2006, the procurement budget for collective protection totaled about 

$31.4 million. Most of these funds, about $16.2 million, were budgeted for 

the procurement of expeditionary medical shelters; another $10.4 million 

was budgeted for installation of collective protection equipment on certain

classes of Navy ships; and another $5 million was budgeted to provide 

collective protection for field hospitals. The Joint Program Manager for 

Collective Protection has no program to fund the integration of collective 

protection systems into buildings. Funds for this type of collective 

protection often come from military service construction or operations 

and maintenance program funds. Although the Guardian Installation 

Protection Program under the JPEO was originally designed to provide 

some funding for collective protection and other installation protection 

improvements, this program was primarily focused on domestic 

installations and its funding has been substantially reduced. 

In making decisions regarding whether to seek funding for collective 

protection under DOD’s risk management approach, commanders first 

conduct threat assessments to identify and evaluate potential threats to 

their facilities and forces, such as terrorist attacks, using intelligence 

assessments of such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. 

The intelligence community continuously assesses the chemical and

 3

The Joint Program Executive Office is under the overall leadership of the Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. 

4

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directed DOD to centralize 

the overall coordination and integration of the chemical and biological warfare defense 

program and the chemical and biological medical defense program. Pub. L. No. 103-160 § 

1701. 

Page 7 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
biological warfare threats to U.S. interests around the world, and the 

individual agencies issue finished intelligence products with those 

assessments. Under the leadership of the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council coordinates and

issues periodic national intelligence assessments reflecting the overall

intelligence community’s assessments and judgments on the current and 

future threat from chemical and biological warfare and other threats. 

Following the threat assessments, commanders also use vulnerability and 

criticality assessments as additional inputs to the decision-making process 

for making investments. Vulnerability assessments are conducted to 

identify weaknesses that may be exploited by the identified threats and to 

suggest options that address those weaknesses. For example, a 

vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in security systems, 

computer networks, or unprotected water supplies. Criticality 

assessments are conducted to evaluate and prioritize important assets and 

functions for funding in terms of factors such as mission and significance 

as a target, helping to reduce the potential for expending resources on 

lower priority assets. 

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security 

environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to 

provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant 

uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat. 

These problems have challenged the community’s development of 

assessments—such as the National Intelligence Estimate on chemical 

warfare, which has not been updated since 2002—to help guide DOD and 

other government agencies’ risk assessments and investment decisions. 

Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD 

installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or 

biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other 

means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. The missile 

threat is currently assessed with varying levels of confidence to stem 

primarily from a handful of countries, and DOD expects this threat to 

increase in coming years as these countries continue to improve their 

missile programs. The terrorist threat stems primarily from al Qaeda, and 

while presently limited regarding chemical and biological weapons, this 

threat is also expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to try to acquire

chemical and biological agents. Despite these assessments, the 

intelligence community has recently recognized significant uncertainties in

the quality and depth of intelligence about those threats. Such uncertainty 

raises questions about the operational impact that might be sustained 

Intelligence 

Community Reports 

Uncertainties 

regarding Key Aspects

of Chemical and 

Biological Threat 

Page 8 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
during an attack and the actual threat posed by our adversaries, and is 

thus critical information for officials making risk management decisions 

on investments to protect U.S. forces. However, while the intelligence 

community has been able to work together and issue a new 2006 National

Intelligence Estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties in the 

biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been able to 

issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare 

threat since 2002. 

Current Assessed Threat of 

Missile Attack Stems 

Mainly from Three 

Countries and Is Expected 

to Increase 

The possibility of attack from nation states using missiles—or, in some 

cases, artillery or Special Forces—to spread chemical or biological agents

is viewed as posing a significant threat to U.S. overseas installations. DOD 

intelligence assessments indicate that the current threat stems mainly 

from a handful of countries and DOD expects this threat to increase. 

Intelligence estimates assess that several other countries also have 

chemical and biological warfare capability and the missiles to deliver 

agents. However, these countries are not assessed as major threats since 

our relationships with them are not as adversarial as with the primary 

threat countries. The intelligence community assesses that the primary 

threat countries have the capability to produce at least some types of 

chemical or biological agents, although there is considerable uncertainty 

regarding many important aspects of these countries’ chemical and 

biological warfare programs. They are also assessed to possess the 

missiles to deliver them, even though in most cases it is unclear whether 

they have actually produced, weaponized, or stockpiled any agent. 

Reports also indicate that the missile inventories of these countries are 

composed primarily of SCUDs or their variants, with ranges of 300 

kilometers to 700 kilometers. Figure 1 shows a SCUD B missile with 

launcher. 

Page 9 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Figure 1: SCUD B Missile with Launcher 

Source: DOD.

In addition, the three primary threat countries are assessed not only to be 

actively pursuing technological improvements to these SCUDs and other 

ballistic missiles to increase accuracy, range, and survivability but also 

pursuing the development of new missile systems. For example, 

intelligence reports indicate that one country is trying to extend the range 

Page 10 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
and accuracy of some of its existing ballistic missiles and is also 

developing a solid propellant medium range missile with a range of at least

2,000 kilometers. Similarly, intelligence reports indicate that another of the 

primary threat countries continues to pursue an intercontinental ballistic 

missile and continues to develop extended range SCUDs and variants for 

its medium range missiles that will likely enhance its warfighting 

capabilities and complicate U.S. missile defense systems. 

Intelligence officials believe that terrorists, primarily al Qaeda, continue to

try to acquire chemical and biological agents and therefore pose a threat 

to overseas DOD installations. While the actual status of al Qaeda’s 

acquisition and development of chemical and biological agents is unclear

and its access to effective delivery methods presently is limited, some 

intelligence agencies expect this threat to increase. For example, some 

intelligence reporting projects that over the next decade terrorists are 

likely to conduct a chemical attack against United States’ interests either 

at home or overseas. Future delivery methods could include such devices 

as balloons, crop sprayers, mortars, or unmanned aerial vehicles. During 

our review, 22 countries overseas were assessed as being at high risk of 

some type of terrorist attack. 

DOD expects both adversarial nation states and terrorists to increase their 

chemical and biological warfare capabilities. However, as acknowledged

by intelligence agencies and officials, and highlighted by the Commission

on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of

Mass Destruction in its report to the President,5

 the intelligence 

community has struggled to handle the changing security environment. 

These struggles include significant uncertainty regarding important 

aspects of the chemical and biological threat and how to communicate 

assessments of those threats. These problems can undermine the ability of 

the intelligence community to develop assessments—such as the National 

Intelligence Estimate on chemical warfare, produced under the leadership 

of the Director of National Intelligence. The Estimate has not been 

updated since 2002 and would help guide DOD and other government 

agencies’ risk assessments and investment decisions. 

Terrorist Threat to U.S. 

Installations Also Is 

Expected to Increase 

Significant Uncertainties 

Exist regarding Key 

Aspects of the Terrorist 

and Missile Threat 

 5

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.:

Mar. 31, 2005). 

Page 11 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
As discussed in the Commission’s report, many of the intelligence 

community’s assessments on secretive nations like Iran and North Korea 

rely largely on inherently ambiguous indicators, such as capabilities 

assessments, indirect reports of intentions, deductions based on denial

and deception efforts associated with suspect weapons of mass 

destruction sites, and ambiguous or limited pieces of “confirmatory” 

evidence. As a result, significant uncertainty arises regarding important 

aspects of states’ actual ability to employ chemical and biological warfare 

agents in ways needed to cause large-scale casualties. However, as noted 

in the Commission’s report, in past years the intelligence community may 

not have clearly communicated that uncertainty and dissenting opinions 

about assessments based on that information, to decision makers in an 

attempt to provide a “consensus” assessment. According to intelligence

officials, in the wake of the intelligence failures in Iraq, the community is 

attempting to develop reforms such as providing better assessments that 

more candidly recognize the uncertainties in the intelligence, and 

dissenting views regarding the meaning of such information; as well as 

reforms in areas such as the terms and definitions used to describe the 

severity of the threat. According to these officials, notwithstanding the

attempts at reforms, there are continuing difficulties in gaining agreement 

on such issues which can delay issuance of assessment information. For 

example, we were able to obtain the recent 2006 national intelligence 

estimate on the biological warfare threat. However, we were not able to 

obtain a recent national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare 

threat because it remains in development. The chemical warfare estimate 

was last updated in 2002.

With respect to specific chemical and biological warfare capabilities of 

individual nation states, we found significant uncertainties regarding the 

ability of the primary threat countries to use sophisticated dissemination 

techniques to effectively disperse chemical and biological agents and 

cause large scale casualties. Most ballistic missiles currently in their 

arsenals, such as the SCUD and its variants, are relatively inaccurate, and

this inaccuracy increases with the range to the target. Accordingly, 

techniques such as “air bursting” or “submunition” warhead loads may be 

used to compensate for this inaccuracy. Air bursting, which is literally the 

bursting of a warhead filled with chemical or biological agents in the air, 

can dramatically increase the area of contamination compared to the use 

of warheads bursting on the ground. Similarly, submunitions—which are 

small bomblets inside a warhead—also improve agent dissemination by 

covering an area more evenly than bulk filled munitions. Submunitions 

also provide the opportunity to deliver agents such as sarin that are not 

Page 12 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
robust enough to survive release subsequent to a ground detonation or 

supersonic airburst. 

There is also significant uncertainty regarding terrorists’ ability to acquire 

and disseminate chemical and biological agents. Unclassified intelligence 

information states that al Qaeda is interested in acquiring or producing 

chemical warfare agents such as mustard gas and Sarin, but it is unclear if

it has actually acquired any chemical or biological agents. However, as we 

reported in 1999,

6

 there are many technical challenges that terrorist groups 

such as al Qaeda would have to overcome in order to cause mass 

casualties using sophisticated chemical and biological warfare agents. For 

example, while terrorists do not need specialized knowledge or 

dissemination methods to use simple toxic industrial chemicals such as 

chlorine, they would need a relatively high degree of expertise to 

successfully cause mass casualties with sophisticated agents, such as VX 

and anthrax. As such, some intelligence reporting concludes that given 

our limited access to the al Qaeda organization and its heightened sense of

operational security, the U.S. intelligence community may not be able to 

confirm that it has that capability until it is actually used. 

Combined with the uncertainty of the threat as previously discussed, 

commanders face the difficulty of identifying their vulnerability to that 

threat and how best to protect against it. In judging the vulnerability of his 

or her command to that threat, the commander determines whether to 

have collective protection, and if so, what type of protection is most 

appropriate and what functions need to be protected. At the critical 

facilities identified by the combatant commanders, we found that 

collective protection equipment was not widely or consistently available. 

The reasons for the limited and inconsistent fielding of collective 

protection appear to be rooted in unclear and inconsistent guidance on the 

use of collective protection. For example, while DOD guidance encourages 

the use of collective protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria to 

guide strategic decisions on its use. Moreover, guidance provided by the

individual military services—excepting the Air Force—is often vague, 

inconsistent, or both with respect to key issues. Such issues include 

whether local commanders make the decision to provide or not provide 

the protection or the services prescribe those decisions, as is done in the 

Collective Protection 

Vulnerabilities Are 

Not Widely or 

Consistently 

Addressed 

 6

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of 

Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999). 

Page 13 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Air Force; what type of collective protection is most appropriate; and what 

functions need to be protected. Similarly, we also found collective 

protection equipment shortages and inconsistent guidance affected some 

major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval 

vessels, and medical units. The intelligence uncertainties and vague and 

inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult for commanders to 

make clear risk management assessments of the need for collective

protection and the risks of not providing it. 

Most Critical Fixed 

Facilities in High Threat 

Areas Do Not Have 

Collective Protection 

Officials from the four regional combatant commands responsible for 

overseas operations identified 125 critical sites in 19 countries as critical

to their operations, 97 of which did not have collective protection. 

Moreover, two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas did not 

receive collective protection. In addition, the department did not have an 

overall DOD-wide list of sites formally identified as critical despite longstanding requirements to identify and prioritize such sites. As a result, in 

conjunction with several DOD offices, we developed a definition of the 

term critical and requested that the four regional combatant commanders 

identify sites meeting that definition. 

The 125 sites identified as critical by the combatant commanders are 

located on 64 large installations and other facilities and included many 

command and control centers; many intelligence, communications, 

logistics, and medical facilities; and a number of air bases. These facilities 

were spread across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific and 

were largely concentrated in four countries. As shown in table 1, 28 of 

these sites (22 percent) had collective protection equipment available to 

allow personnel to continue operations in case of attack. The limited 

amount of collective protection we found is consistent with the findings of 

our earlier reports dating back to at least the late 1990s. For example in 

1997, we reported that few defense facilities in Southwest Asia and South

Korea had collective protection. 

Page 14 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Table 1: Critical Overseas Sites with Collective Protection Equipment 

Critical sites in countries with high terrorist 

threat or within range of missiles from

primary threat countries 

Total number 

of critical 

sites 

Critical sites with

collective protection

equipment

Sites with collective 

protection

Sites without 

collective 

protection

125 28 (22%) 24 47

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

While collective protection was limited in all commands, it was also not 

consistently fielded in high threat areas. As shown in table 1, 24 of the 28 

sites with collective protection equipment were located in areas assessed 

to be at high risk of attack by terrorists or within range of missile attack by

the primary threat countries. However, the 24 sites with collective 

protection totaled about one-third of the total of 71 critical fixed facilities 

in high threat areas. For example, 12 of the sites with collective protection 

were located in one country, which is assessed to have a moderate threat

of attack from terrorists, but is within range of attack from a nearby 

hostile nation. The Army identified 4 of its sites in this country as critical

to its mission, but only 2 of the sites had collective protection. 

Additionally, a 2004 DOD security assessment identified 1 of those 2 sites 

as having major shortcomings in collective protection equipment, which 

raised questions about the command post’s viability as a warfighting 

command center. The Air Force provided all 10 of the critical sites on its 

air bases in this country with collective protection, but critical air bases in

another nearby country did not have collective protection despite also 

being in range of missile attack by the hostile neighbor. Air Force officials 

told us they view the threat in this country as moderate. 

Similarly, the Navy provided collective protection to its five critical sites in 

one country in the Middle East, which is assessed as being at high threat of 

terrorist attack and within range of missile attack from a nearby hostile 

country. However, none of the four critical sites on a key air base in 

another nearby country were provided with collective protection, despite 

also being assessed at high threat of terrorist attack and being within 

range of missile attack from the same hostile country. According to Air 

Force officials, while there is no collective protection currently at the 

base, they plan to provide such equipment in the future. 

Page 15 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
While it is difficult to precisely specify the ultimate reasons for the limited 

and inconsistent fielding of collective protection, the quality of guidance

on the use of the equipment appears to have been a contributing factor 

since it was often unclear and inconsistent. DOD does not provide clear 

overarching strategic guidance on many key issues that would help 

commanders make decisions on the use of collective protection. Military 

services and installation commanders are generally expected to address 

key issues that include what level of threat justifies the investment in 

collective protection. DOD guidance generally encourages the use of 

collective protection and provides information on, among other things, the 

nature of the chemical and biological threat to installations and forces, the 

types of equipment available, and the pros and cons of using each, but it 

does not prescribe criteria to guide the use of collective protection. For 

example, in determining what level of threat justifies the investment in 

collective protection, the commander assesses vulnerability from both 

terrorist attack and missile attack. However, as discussed earlier, 

intelligence on these threats does not make clear whether terrorists, such 

as al Qaeda, possess the capability to produce mass casualties through the 

use of chemical or biological weapons. A number of officials told us that 

they believed the provision of collective protection equipment should be 

targeted only at installations at high risk of missile attack, given limited 

DOD resources and the likelihood that terrorist attacks alone lack the 

capability to produce large-scale damage. However, the guidance does not 

establish criteria differentiating between the two types of attacks, which

would help guide decision making. 

Guidance on the Use of 

Collective Protection Was 

Often Unclear and 

Inconsistent 

In addition to DOD’s lack of guidance, military service guidance on the use 

of collective protection, excepting the Air Force, is often vague, 

inconsistent, or both. For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine 

Corps do not require collective protection to be provided at their critical 

fixed facilities or other fixed facilities. Rather, these services rely on the 

discretion of their local installation commanders to determine whether to

have the protection, what type of collective protection should be provided, 

and which functions should be protected. In contrast, Air Force policy 

requires that in the absence of guidance from higher commands, Air Force 

commanders should plan to provide collective protection for 30 percent of

the personnel on their bases in areas judged by the intelligence community 

to be at high risk of attack from terrorists or other non state actors or 

attack from missiles launched by adversarial nations. Consistent with the 

Air Force requirement for collective protection, it had the most critical 

sites with the equipment. Of the 50 critical sites the Air Force operated, 16

had collective protection. Meanwhile, the Army operated 51 critical sites 

Page 16 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
and provided 7 sites with collective protection, while the Navy operated 23 

critical sites and provided 5 with collective protection. 

Once the decision to provide collective protection equipment is made, the

services—again excepting the Air Force—lack specific guidance to 

determine what type of protection is most appropriate and what functions 

need to be protected. The critical facilities identified in our review used 

both integrated systems—with overpressure and filtration systems built in 

to existing buildings—as well as simple portable tent systems. Eighteen of

the 28 sites had the overpressure and filtration systems integrated into the 

construction of the buildings, while 10 sites had portable systems such as 

tents with liners and filtration systems, which could be erected inside the 

buildings or set up at locations around the installations. While both can 

provide protection for groups of various sizes, costs vary significantly 

depending upon factors such as square footage to be protected and other 

construction elements. According to officials, the portable tent systems 

may cost as little as $18,000 depending on the configuration. However, a 

recent installation of an integrated system at Andrews Air Force Base in 

Maryland cost about $1.8 million. In addition, local commands must divert 

existing operations and maintenance funds to pay for the replacement 

filters and other costs to sustain the integrated collective protection 

systems over time. According to officials, this creates a significant 

disincentive to the initial procurement of integrated collective protection 

equipment. 

Finally, we also found little clear guidance regarding which functions 

should be protected. Commanders generally do not have guidance to help

them determine whether to provide protection for command and control 

functions, medical treatment facilities, areas for rest and relief, and other 

base functions, or to cover only parts of these functions. Only the Air 

Force provided clear guidance on this issue. As discussed above, Air Force 

regulations state that commanders should plan to provide collective 

protection for at least 30 percent of base personnel. These regulations also 

describe requirements for coverage of specific functions, including 

command and control, medical facilities, and dormitories and dining 

facilities, and the level of protection required for each. During our 

discussions at the combatant commands we noted that the other services

often had different views on the costs and benefits of the Air Force 

requirement. 

The intelligence uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all 

contribute to the difficulty commanders face in making clear risk 

management assessments of the need for collective protection or of the 

Page 17 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
risk of not providing it. In the absence of clear guidance to aid such 

decisions, the potential for inconsistent and inefficient allocation of DOD 

resources increases. 

Inconsistent Guidance and 

Limited Resources 

Affected Some Major 

Expeditionary Warfighting 

Assets 

Similar to the inconsistent availability of collective protection for critical

overseas fixed facilities, collective protection equipment shortages and 

inconsistent requirements also affected some major expeditionary 

warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units

(see table 2). 

Table 2: Collective Protection at Selected Expeditionary Warfighting Assets 

Asset Percentage of Required/ 

Authorized

Light infantry units 

 Army 

 Marine Corps 

70% 

Not required 

Navy ships 47% 

Air Force aircraft Not required 

Medical units 

 Small Army units 

 Small Marine Corps units 

 Army hospital systems 

 Navy hospital systems 

 Air Force hospital systems 

 Marine Corps hospital systems 

18% 

Not required 

61% 

21% 

96% 

Not required 

Source: DOD. 

While differing missions and other factors may explain inconsistencies in 

the use of collective protection, no clear guidance was evident in many 

cases to explain why forces operating in similar environments were not 

provided the same level of protection against chemical or biological 

attack. 

Despite operating in similar environments in areas such as Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Army and Marine Corps infantry units had different 

requirements for collective protection. For example, according to Army 

officials, the Army requires its light infantry units at the battalion level to 

provide collective protection equipment (M20/M20A1 Simplified Collective 

Protection Equipment Shelters), but the unit commander must make the 

Infantry Units Operating in 

Similar Environments Have 

Different Guidance for 

Collective Protection

Page 18 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
decision to actually request this equipment. Army officials told us that as 

of August 2006, commanders had requested and received 2,506 of the total

Army authorization of 3,558 (70 percent). However, they could not 

provide details on the units requesting the shelters because their systems 

do not track non major end items. 

In contrast, Marine Corps officials stated that they had no requirement for 

collective protection and no systems on hand. According to these 

officials, the current systems that are available are too large and bulky to 

be carried with their fast-moving infantry units. They preferred to depend

on avoidance and decontamination techniques to mitigate any potential

chemical or biological threat. However, Marine Corps officials also 

acknowledged their potential vulnerability and the need for collective 

protection in documents dating back to at least 2002.

7

 Despite the 

acknowledged need for the systems, concerns were subsequently raised 

that analyses of the workload requirements for setup, installation, and 

maintenance requirements, as well as formal techniques and tactics on 

their use, would be needed before any collective protection systems could 

be fielded. According to Marine Corps officials, these requirements had 

not been completed at the time of our review. 

Navy guidance has for many years required ships, such as aircraft carriers, 

destroyers, frigates, and some supply ships to have prescribed levels of 

collective protection equipment.8

 However, as shown in table 3, about 47 

percent of naval vessels required to have collective protection have such 

protection actually installed. According to Navy officials, many of these 

ships were built prior to the requirement for collective protection, and 

funds to retrofit these ships have been limited. 

About One-Half of Navy Ships 

Are Not Meeting Requirements 

 7

U.S. Marine Corps memorandum, Statement of Need for the Interim Collective Protection 

System, November 5, 2002. 

8

OPNAV Instruction 9070.1, Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the U.S. Navy, 

Enclosures (2) and (3) (Sept. 23, 1988). 

Page 19 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Table 3: Navy Ships Required to Have Collective Protection 

Ship class 

Total number 

of ships 

Number of ships with 

collective protection

Aircraft Carriers 12 0

Amphibious Warfare Ships 36 21

Cruisers 23 0

Destroyers 45 45

Fast Combat Support Ships (Military 

Sealift Command) 4 4

Frigates 29 0

Totals 149 70 (47%)

Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center. 

Navy guidance requiring collective protection also appears outdated, 

inconsistent, or both in some areas. For example, according to Navy 

officials, funding limitations have required them to focus existing 

resources on those ships operating closer in to shore in “littoral” waters,

since these ships are more likely to be exposed to chemical or biological 

agents than ships operating further out in deeper “blue water.” However, 

the Navy guidance continues to require that aircraft carriers, which 

generally operate in deep water far from shore, have collective protection 

installed. Navy officials told us that they believed that the requirement 

was originally based on the threat of Cold War Soviet naval tactics, and 

that the guidance had not yet been updated to reflect the current threat 

environment. We also found inconsistencies in the guidance regarding 

supply ships, such as station ships (required) and shuttle ships (not 

required), operating in littoral waters. 

We also found inconsistencies and shortages of collective protection at 

medical units, such as small units that travel with their parent infantry 

units and large hospital systems designed to be set up in rear areas. These 

problems create military limitations and increase risks to U.S. forces and 

capabilities. 

Inconsistent Guidance and 

Shortages of Collective 

Protection Found at Medical 

Units 

For example, Army infantry units contain medical support groups, such as 

battalion aid stations, that deploy with the parent unit into battlefield 

areas. Army guidance requires these medical units to have a certain 

number of Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters consisting 

basically of tents with protective linings and overpressure systems 

attached to the backs of transport vehicles (see fig. 2). In contrast, the 

Marine Corps had not established any requirements for its medical units to

Page 20 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
have these systems. According to Marine Corps officials, avoidance and 

decontamination strategies are their preferred method for handling 

chemical or biological events while operating on the battlefield. In 

addition, according to DOD officials, the Marine Corps often moves in 

small air and sea transports with little room for collective protection 

equipment, consistent with its traditional strategic mission. As a result, 

Marine Corps units may use Army medical support in the areas where they 

are deployed. However, the increasing use of joint operations, where both 

operate in the same geographic area at the same time, may be blurring 

traditional missions. 

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter 

Source: DOD.

While the Army requires its medical support units to have collective 

protection systems, Army figures indicate that only 191 of the 1,035 

required systems (18 percent) were on hand as of the end of fiscal year 

2005. This situation is similar to that found in our 2002 review of Army 

medical units in South Korea, when we found that only about 20 percent of 

the required systems were scheduled to be purchased. The JPEO, which 

procures these systems for the military services, has plans to procure 

Page 21 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
additional systems through fiscal year 2014. However, the planned 

funding for these systems is lagging behind requirements, and the office 

will not be able to procure all the needed systems by 2014. Officials told 

us that only about 60 percent of the funding needed has been budgeted,

and they need an additional $323 million to fulfill all requirements. 

Collective protection for larger expeditionary hospital operations is 

provided by large portable tent systems with liners and pressurized 

interiors, which may be combined to provide 200 to 300 beds or more. The 

Army, Navy, and Air Force all have versions of these mobile hospitals (see 

fig. 3). However, while the Air Force generally met its goal, shortages and 

other serious problems continue to affect Army and Navy medical facility 

collective protection. 

Figure 3: Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical Support 

Source: DOD.

According to Army officials, the Army acquisition goal was to have 23 of 

these systems on hand, but it was only able to obtain 14 because of 

funding limitations. Similarly, Navy officials told us that they only had

enough tent liners to protect about 460 beds of the approximately 2,220 

total bed spaces currently required. Moreover, the collective protection 

liners used to make the hospital tent systems resistant to chemical and 

biological attack were not located with the tents, which were 

prepositioned at various sites around the world. The liners were located 

at a site in Virginia and would need to be moved to the same locations as 

the hospital tent systems in order to provide a collective protection 

capability. According to Navy officials, the Navy is aware of this shortfall 

Page 22 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
and is in the process of redesigning the requirements to provide collective

protection for its mobile fleet hospital tent systems. We reported similar 

shortfalls in collective protection equipment at Army, Navy, and Air Force 

portable hospital systems in South Korea in our 2002 report. 

Our current review found that the Air Force generally met its goal for the 

transportable hospital systems. According to data provided by the Air 

Force, as of May 31, 2006, it had 156 of 162 (96 percent) required systems 

on hand. Marine Corps officials told us that the Corps does not establish 

such large transportable hospital operations and it has no systems in 

stock, instead relying on the Navy to provide for Marine needs in this area. 

Our prior work and that of several DOD offices has highlighted DOD’s 

fragmented framework for managing the strategic use of collective

protection and other installation protection activities. This, combined 

with the lack of agreed upon installation priorities guided by the robust 

application of risk management principles, makes it difficult for the 

department to ensure that funding resources are allocated efficiently and 

effectively. More specifically, opportunities to target funds to improve 

preparedness and protect critical military personnel, facilities, and 

capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be lost. 

Responsibilities for installation protection activities are spread over a 

variety of DOD organizations and programs. These programs are designed 

to address protection from threats ranging from terrorist attacks to 

industrial accidents; however, with their different operating definitions 

and evolving concepts, gaps and inefficiencies in collective protection 

program coverage are created. In a 2004 report, we recommended that

DOD designate a single authority with responsibility for unifying and 

coordinating installation protection policies. However, despite DOD’s 

agreement with that recommendation it has not yet implemented it. These 

problems also prevent DOD from reaching agreement regarding 

departmentwide standards to identify which facilities and infrastructure 

are critical and compile an overall list of critical facilities prioritized for 

receiving funds for protection improvements. 

DOD policies and resulting management activities that direct the strategic 

use of collective protection and other installation protection activities are 

fragmented and disjointed. Responsibilities for key installation protection 

activities such as (1) policy and oversight, (2) installation threat and 

vulnerability assessments and risk management decisions on appropriate 

protections, and (3) funding programs for installation protection 

Fragmented Approach 

to Overall Installation 

Protection Policies 

Undermines Decision 

Making on Critical 

Priorities 

Overall Installation 

Protection Activities Are 

Fragmented and Disjointed 

Page 23 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
improvements are spread across a variety of programs and DOD 

organizations, as shown in figure 4. No single DOD organization has 

responsibility for developing unified policy and coordinating these 

activities. 

Page 24 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Figure 4: Installation Protection Activities Spread across Multiple DOD Organizations

Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict

● Antiterrorism Program

Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense ● Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Program

● Emergency response to chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear and 

 high-yield explosive incidents

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Nuclear and Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs ● Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense

● Guardian Installation Protection Program

Joint Chiefs of Staff

● Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, 

 Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Defense

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations & Environment

Military Services

● (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps)

Installation Commander

Regional Combatant Commanders

● (Central, European, Northern, Pacific 

and Southern Commands)

Activity

Source: GAO analysis of DOD regulations.

Organization/Program

Funding for Protection Activity

Vulnerability/Threat/Risk 

Assessments for Protection Needs

Policy and Oversight

Page 25 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
The variety of DOD organizations bring their own approaches to policy 

and programs for installation protection, and these different approaches 

can result in unresolved conflict and inefficient application of resources. 

For example, responsibilities for installation protection (including 

collective protection) reside primarily with installation commanders, 

regional combatant commanders, the military services, and the Joint Staff. 

At the same time, responsibilities for policy and oversight of installation 

protection activities, such as the antiterrorism program, are spread among 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 

Intensity Conflict, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, and others. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 

developed worldwide antiterrorism policies and standards. However, 

Homeland Defense is responsible for providing policy and oversight of 

domestic antiterrorism activities. 

Responsibilities for making installation threat and vulnerability 

assessments and risk management decisions on collective protection or 

other needed improvements are also spread across multiple organizations 

and levels. For example, local installation commanders have basic 

responsibility for these activities, but the military services, combatant 

commanders, and others with responsibilities for missions taking place at

the installations are also involved. At the same time, organizations such as

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Joint Staff are involved in 

providing over 20 different types of formal assessments of installation 

vulnerabilities. For example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

conducts Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which examine 

the vulnerability of large installations with 300 or more personnel to a 

terrorist attack and the potential for mass casualties and large-scale loss of 

life. The agency as well as others may also conduct “full spectrum 

vulnerability assessments.” As the name implies, these assessments 

examine an installation’s vulnerability to a wide range of threats that could 

interrupt its ability to fulfill its mission, including attacks using chemical 

or biological agents, attacks against information networks, and attacks 

against supporting non-DOD infrastructure. 

Similarly, funding for installation protection improvements also involves a 

variety of organizations. For example, the combatant commanders have

no programs of their own to fund improvements at overseas facilities 

important to their warfighting needs. According to combatant command 

officials, much of the funding for improvements at the overseas 

installations comes from the construction or operations and maintenance 

programs of the military services that operate them. The JPEO Guardian 

Installation Protection program provided another potential source of 

Page 26 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
funding, but the program has faced a number of problems. The Guardian 

program was initiated in 2004 to provide improvements to protect critical

facilities from attacks ranging from terrorists to nation states using 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The program was 

initially provided approximately $1.2 billion in funding for improvements 

at 185 domestic and 15 overseas sites from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. 

However, DOD recently cut funding for the program by about $760 million. 

According to officials, because of the cuts, they stopped funding for 

collective protection and other such improvements while the role of the 

program and its list of projects were being reviewed by DOD. 

Antiterrorism programs also provide some potential funding. Oversight of 

resources used for overall antiterrorism activities is conducted by the 

Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 

while oversight of resources used for domestic antiterrorism activities is 

conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense. 

We and several DOD offices have reported on problems associated with 

the fragmented installation protection program structure. For example in 

August 2004,9

 we reported that the large number of organizations engaged 

in efforts to improve installation preparedness, and the lack of centralized 

authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate departmentwide 

installation preparedness efforts were hindering overall preparedness 

efforts and DOD’s ability to ensure that its resources were applied 

efficiently and effectively. Officials at the department, Joint Staff, service, 

and installation levels told us that the lack of a single focal point to 

integrate departmentwide installation preparedness efforts among the 

many involved organizations adversely affected their ability to resolve 

disagreements and develop needed overarching guidance, concepts of 

operations, and chemical and biological defense standards. Because of 

the absence of departmentwide standards, military services and 

installations faced problems in prioritizing requirements for funding and 

personnel resources, since such standards provided the basis for 

calculating requirements. We recommended that DOD designate a single 

authority with the responsibility to coordinate and integrate worldwide 

installation preparedness improvement efforts at the department, service, 

and installation levels. 

 9

GAO, Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be 

Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning, GAO-04-855 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2004). 

Page 27 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
In May 2006, the DOD Inspector General reported that the problems with

the fragmented and disjointed program structure were continuing.10 

According to the report, responsibilities for installation protection 

activities continued to be spread across multiple programs and 

organizations, with no single DOD organization responsible for unifying 

and coordinating these activities. Problems such as inadequate program 

structure, inadequately coordinated program concepts, and a lack of 

generally accepted terminology describing concepts and doctrine resulted 

in confusion and disagreement in attempts to establish policy and assign 

responsibilities, inefficient application of resources, and the lack of a 

strategic vision balancing all areas of program responsibility. For 

example, the report found that the lack of clear lines of authority and 

responsibilities for installation protection activities between the Assistant 

Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense was causing confusion 

and inefficiency. In this regard, coincident with the establishment of the 

Homeland Defense office in 2003, the Secretary of Defense called for 

development of a chartering DOD Directive within 45 days to formalize the 

responsibilities of the new Assistant Secretary and clarify the relationship 

between Homeland Defense and other offices, such as Special Operations 

and Low Intensity Conflict. However, according to officials in Homeland 

Defense, the chartering directive was never formalized because of 

problems in coordinating with the many DOD offices involved, the 

continuing evolution of their responsibilities, and the focusing of 

resources on developing the June 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support. 

In June 2006, DOD’s Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 

Chemical, and Biological Programs and the Joint Requirements Office also 

issued a study on installation protection confirming many of the problems 

identified earlier by us and the DOD Inspector General.11 This study was 

called for as a result of the funding cuts in the Guardian Installation 

Protection Program. The study pointed out that problems with the 

alignment of antiterrorism, chemical and biological defense, critical 

infrastructure protection, and other programs create difficulty in providing 

military installations with capabilities for all-hazard planning, 

 10Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General: Evaluation of Defense Installation 

Vulnerability Assessments, Report No. IE-2005-001 (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2006). 

11Department of Defense, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 

Explosive Installation Protection Study Report (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006).

Page 28 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
preparedness, response, and recovery. The study also noted that DOD 

organizations were not developing guidance to sufficiently resolve 

problems related to inadequate policy, standards, and doctrine in these 

areas. Moreover, it also reported that despite agreement with our 2004 

recommendation calling for designation of a single authority responsible 

for coordinating and integrating overall installation protection efforts, 

DOD still had not done so. This study made a series of recommendations 

designed to integrate and unify installation protection and emergency

preparedness programs and concepts. This study also developed a plan to 

improve installation protection at DOD facilities, recommending that some 

$560 million be provided for installation protection improvements over 4 

years, with priority given to overseas facilities. However, the amount of 

funding approved by DOD was sufficient only for the lowest levels of 

improvements and did not include funding for collective protection and 

chemical and biological detection improvements. 

At the close of our review in August 2006, DOD announced a new 

reorganization that will affect some of the organizations involved in 

installation protection activities. The need for reorganization was 

identified in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as 

necessary to respond to the changing security threat by reshaping DOD 

offices to better support the warfighting combatant commands and 

respond to the new threat environment. According to DOD officials, the 

specific policy and organizational changes that will result from the 

reorganization will develop over the coming months. 

Priorities for Allocation of 

Installation Protection 

Resources Were Not 

Identified 

Program fragmentation can also prevent DOD from reaching agreement in

prioritizing facilities for protection funding. A long-standing series of 

directives and instructions, as well as DOD’s June 2005 “Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support,” have recognized the importance of 

prioritizing installations in light of constrained resources and called on

DOD to identify critical infrastructure and to prioritize these assets for 

funding improvements.12 Accordingly, early in our review, we requested a 

list of critical overseas facilities from the Directors for Critical 

 12See Department of Defense Directive 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program (Jan. 20, 

1998) (canceled by DODD 3020.40); Department of Defense Instruction 2000.18, 

Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and HighYield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines, paragraph E3.1.8 (Dec. 4, 2002); and

Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, sections 

4 and 5 (Aug. 19, 2005). 

Page 29 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Infrastructure Protection and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, as well as from other offices 

throughout DOD and the military services. However, DOD was unable to 

provide us with such a list. 

According to DOD officials, there are a variety of listings of critical 

facilities and other infrastructure. However, each is compiled from the 

limited perspective of the military service or other DOD organization 

responsible for the asset, and not from an overall DOD strategic 

perspective. According to these officials, gaining agreement on DOD-wide 

priorities is difficult because of the fragmented organizational structure, as

well as policy and program changes following September 11, 2001. 

According to the May 2006 DOD Inspector General report, a lack of stable 

funding and centralized prioritization and oversight for critical 

infrastructure improvements has created problems throughout the 

combatant commands. According to the report, determining which assets 

were critical depended on mission requirements that varied with the level 

of command. Thus, an effort to protect an asset critical to a combatant 

commander from his or her warfighting perspective could receive a low 

priority from an installation commander who may be focused on a 

different, non-warfighting perspective. Similarly, DOD’s June 2006 study 

of installation protection was directed to create a prioritized list of 

installations to receive funding for protective measures, but was unable to

do so. According to the report, it could not develop the list because of the 

short time frame allowed for completion of the study and the controversial 

nature of installation prioritization. 

In recognition of this problem, we sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense 

in November 2005 requesting clarification of the situation and DOD 

actions to correct the problem (see app. II). DOD’s response (see app. III) 

acknowledged the importance of prioritizing its critical assets and stated 

that it published DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Program, in August 2005. This directive called for the development of 

policy and program guidance for DOD-wide critical infrastructure, 

including criteria and methodology to identify and prioritize these assets. 

At the time of our review, this effort was being conducted through the 

Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Program under the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense. In addition, this office was 

also directed to conduct an assessment of all of the activities that 

contribute to the department’s ability to achieve mission assurance to 

identify program gaps and other problems that could interfere with 

mission assurance. According to program officials, the framework for 

prioritizing DOD’s critical infrastructure was expected to be published in

Page 30 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
August 2006 but has not yet been formally adopted. It is unclear when the 

assessment of program gaps will be completed. It is also unclear to what 

extent the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense will address aspects 

of critical infrastructure protection related to overseas facilities identified 

as critical to warfighting missions. 

As we and others have observed for several years, notwithstanding the

emergence of adversaries that can use chemical and biological weapons, 

the fielding of collective protection equipment at both critical overseas 

fixed facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets remains limited

and inconsistent. Assessing the need and priority for such equipment is 

difficult because of the significant uncertainties in the intelligence about 

the nature of the chemical and biological threat. While the intelligence 

community recognizes the need to assess and communicate these 

uncertainties about the chemical warfare threat, this information has not 

been available to the agencies that need it. Specifically, the intelligence 

community, under the leadership of the Director of National Intelligence, 

has not been able to complete an up-to-date National Intelligence Estimate 

on chemical warfare in part due to changing assessment and 

communication policies, as well as issues surrounding the basis or 

evidence for the assessments. In our view, an updated chemical warfare 

National Intelligence Estimate is needed to provide a critical input and 

basis for decisions on investments in chemical warfare defenses, including

collective protection. 

Conclusions 

Uncertainty about the threat can lead to resources being invested in assets 

where they may not be needed. Conversely, not providing collective

protection where it may be needed can place military personnel and 

operations at increased risk. In addition, allowing the current fragmented

and disjointed framework for managing installation protection policies to

continue without agreed-upon priorities for funding or clear requirements 

and service guidance on the appropriate use of collective protection, 

further increases the likelihood that limited DOD resources will be used 

inefficiently and ineffectively. DOD’s ongoing reorganization provides a 

good opportunity to review the policy and programmatic gaps and 

inconsistencies, gain the agreement of the competing organizations 

needed to integrate the policies and operating concepts, and correct the 

long-standing need for an overarching authority in this area. 

Page 31 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
In light of the need for the most current intelligence estimates to help 

guide the government’s—including DOD’s—risk assessments and 

investment decisions, we are recommending that the Director of National

Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to update

the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the 

necessary steps to bring the report to issuance. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To ensure that the problems in the overall installation protection and 

collective protection policies and programs do not continue to place 

military personnel and operations at increased risk and undercut the 

efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource allocations, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense—as part of the ongoing 

reorganization—take the following four actions to ensure better 

coordination and integration of these activities and clearer guidance on 

key operating concepts. To ensure better coordination and integration of

the overall installation protection activities, we are recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense 

• designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to 

coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies 

and operating concepts and 

• assign this single authority with the responsibility to oversee efforts to 

gain DOD-wide agreement on criteria for identifying critical facilities 

and to develop a system for prioritizing critical facilities and 

infrastructure for funding protection improvements. 

To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in the chemical and 

biological collective protection program, we are recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense 

• direct the Joint Staff and military services to develop clear and 

consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on the use 

of collective protection at DOD facilities, including issues such as 

whether decisions on the need for collective protection should be 

prescribed or left to commanders’ discretion, the use of integrated 

overpressure and filtration systems versus portable structures, and 

what mission functions must be protected, and 

• direct the Joint Staff and military services to review their current 

policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent requirements on 

when collective protection is required for medical units, and naval, 

ground, and air forces. 

Page 32 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In written comments on a classified version of our draft report, DOD and 

the Director of National Intelligence both generally agreed with all five of 

our recommendations. Their unclassified comments on the classified 

version are reprinted in appendices IV and V. DOD also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Regarding our first recommendation that the Director of National 

Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to update

the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take the 

necessary steps to bring the report to issuance; the Director’s office stated

that the National Intelligence Council began the process of developing that 

estimate several months ago, and expects the update to be published in 

early 2007. In this regard, DOD also called for the Director of National 

Intelligence to prepare an integrated, worldwide chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threat assessment. DOD 

stated that current assessments are fragmented and not consistent across 

geographic areas. We agree that better coordinated and integrated threat 

assessments, consistent across geographic regions could help improve 

DOD’s decisions regarding investments in the security needs of U.S. forces 

worldwide. We encourage DOD to make this recommendation directly to

the Director of National Intelligence.

DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary 

of Defense designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility 

to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies 

and operating concepts. DOD acknowledged that as currently practiced, 

installation preparedness is not a formal program within the department. 

DOD also noted that while it agreed with our recommendation, it believed 

that the combatant commanders should be responsible for their respective 

areas of responsibility and determine collective protection requirements 

based on operational needs. We agree that the combatant commanders 

should have flexibility to recognize special operational needs in the 

fielding of collective protection in their areas of responsibility. However, 

as our report clearly points out such determinations should take place 

within an agreed-upon, coordinated, and integrated framework of DODwide installation preparedness policies and operating concepts. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, that the 

integrating authority discussed in our second recommendation also be 

given responsibility to oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on 

criteria for identifying critical facilities and for developing an overall 

prioritized list of critical facilities and infrastructure for funding protection 

improvements. The department agreed with our recommendation to 

Page 33 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
assign oversight responsibility to a single integrating authority; however, it

suggested that rather than develop an overall prioritized list, DOD should 

develop a “system” to prioritize the critical facilities for funding protective 

improvements. DOD stated that this “system” to prioritize facilities does 

not have to be a list “from 1 to n”, but instead may be tiers or bands of 

assets based on the strategic impact if that asset was lost or degraded,

using the all hazards approach to vulnerability assessments. We agree that 

the identification of prioritized tiers or types/bands of assets could satisfy 

DOD’s needs in this area, if done appropriately. However, we believe the 

danger with this approach is the identification of tiers or types of assets so 

broad as to invite continued disagreement and gridlock, leaving the 

situation essentially unchanged. Nonetheless, to provide the department 

with flexibility to implement this key action as a system, we adjusted our 

recommendation to reflect DOD’s suggestion. 

DOD concurred without comment with our fourth and fifth 

recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and

Military Services to develop clear and consistent criteria to guide 

overarching strategic decisions on the use of collective protection; and 

that those offices review their current policies and develop consistent 

requirements on the use of collective protection at medical units, and 

naval, ground, and air forces. 

As we agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this 

report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies

of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National 

Intelligence, and to interested congressional committees. We will also 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 34 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix 

VI. 

Sincerely yours, 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 35 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To examine the current assessments of chemical and biological threats to

Department of Defense facilities located overseas, we interviewed 

intelligence officials from a variety of national and DOD intelligence 

organizations, and reviewed briefings and other intelligence products 

generated by these organizations. Specifically, we met with officials from 

the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National 

Ground Intelligence Center and DOD intelligence officials from each of the 

four regional combatant commands with critical overseas facilities located 

in their area of operations. During our meetings, we obtained detailed

briefings and other intelligence products, which described the nature and

likelihood of a chemical or biological attack on U.S. troops and 

installations, as well as other documents that described the capabilities of 

terrorist organizations and adversarial nation states. Although we could 

not independently verify the reliability of the information, we obtained 

explanations of the basis for the assessments from intelligence analysts 

and other officials. We also requested access to and briefings on the most 

recent national intelligence estimates for both chemical and biological 

threats from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although 

the office provided us with the latest intelligence estimate on biological

warfare, we were unable to obtain the latest national intelligence estimate 

on chemical warfare. At the close of our review in August 2006, the

estimate remained in draft status and we were unable to schedule a 

briefing with officials to discuss its contents. 

To determine the levels of collective protection provided to critical 

overseas facilities we worked with several DOD offices, first to develop

criterion needed to determine which DOD sites were considered critical, 

and second, to identify the type and amount of any collective protection 

equipment at each site. During the time of our review DOD had not 

developed an overall agreed-upon methodology and listing of facilities 

considered to be critical. As a result, we were required to develop our 

own criterion for the purposes of this review. To develop this criterion we 

reviewed existing DOD regulations and discussed potential options with 

officials from a variety of DOD offices, including the Defense Critical 

Infrastructure Program, the Joint Staff Office for Antiterrorism and 

Homeland Defense, the Joint Requirements Office, the Joint Program 

Manager for Collective Protection, and the Guardian Installation 

Protection Program office. The criterion called for DOD to identify those 

sites that must remain operational to complete its mission during a 

chemical or biological event, such as command and control nodes, rest 

and relief areas, emergency medical locations, and intelligence sites, and 

where there would be no capability to transfer the function or capability to

an alternate location. The Joint Staff then assisted us by forwarding our 

Page 36 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

criterion to the regional combatant commanders for the U.S. Central, 

European, Pacific, and Southern Commands, and requesting that they

identify their critical facilities and the type and amount of any collective 

protection equipment currently located at those sites. Our method of 

quantifying the critical sites counted the number of individual buildings 

identified as critical sites on DOD installations, when identified separately 

by DOD officials. Following receipt of the responses from the combatant

commands, we verified the accuracy of those lists with officials from each 

command. 

To determine the levels of collective protection provided to major 

expeditionary warfighting assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and

aircraft, we reviewed DOD’s Annual Report on Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs and interviewed contractors and officials from each 

service component, the Tank and Automotive Command, and the Joint 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to obtain 

detailed listings of the type and amount of collective protection equipment 

currently fielded by each service component. Once we obtained these 

listings, we verified the information with officials from each service and 

the Joint Program Executive Office. Based on these efforts and our 

discussions with department and military service officials, we believe that 

the information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. 

To examine DOD’s framework for managing overall installation protection 

activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we reviewed 

applicable regulations, policies, and prior GAO and DOD reports and 

interviewed officials from a variety of DOD offices responsible for 

program management and oversight. Specifically, we met with officials 

from the following offices: 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

Critical Infrastructure Protection Program 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low Intensity Conflict 

• Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs 

• Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense 

• Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and

Nuclear Defense 

• Joint Staff, Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Defense 

• Office of the Inspector General 

Page 37 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Regional combatant commands (Central Command, European 

Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command) 

• Military service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps) 

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

• U.S. Army Chemical School 

We conducted our review from September 2005 through August 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 38 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the 

Secretary of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the 

Secretary of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter of

Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter Inquiry

of Inquiry 

Page 42 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter of

Inquiry

 

Page 43 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of Defense : Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Portions of this 

correspondence have 

been deleted for security 

reasons.

Page 44 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix V: Comments from the Director of Appendix V National Intelligence : Comments from the Director of 

National Intelligence 

Portions of this 

correspondence have 

been deleted for security 

reasons.

Page 47 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 48 GAO-07-113

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood, 

Assistant Director (retired); Robert Repasky, Assistant Director; Lorelei St. 

James, Assistant Director; Shawn Arbogast; Angela Bourciquot; Grace 

Coleman; Jason Jackson; John Nelson; Rebecca Shea; Karen Thornton; 

and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

 

Chemical and Biological Defense
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s 

Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. GAO-06-13. 

Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005. 

Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation 

Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and 

Comprehensive Planning. GAO-04-855. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 

2004. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999. 

(350914) Page 49 GAO-07-113 Chemical and Biological Defense
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