Defense Science Board 

2006 Summer Study 

on 

21st Century Strategic 

Technology Vectors 

Volume II 

Critical Capabilities and Enabling Technologies 

February 2007 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Volume I of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century 

Strategic Technology Vectors represents the consensus view of the study’s 

membership. This volume (II) is the report of the Critical Capabilities and 

Enabling Technologies panel of the summer study. Its findings and 

recommendations were used to create volume I and it provides additional 

detail. Findings and recommendations provided in this and the other panel 

reports (volumes III and IV) do not necessarily represent the consensus view 

of the full summer study membership. 

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the 

Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report 

do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

This report is unclassified.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I i

Table of Contents 

Chapter 1. Introduction..................................................................................1

Chapter 2. Analysis Methodology .................................................................4

Missions......................................................................................................6

Operational Capabilities...........................................................................6

Critical Capabilities ................................................................................ 10

Technologies........................................................................................... 14

Chapter 3. A Different Assessment of Capabilities................................. 23

A Succinct View of the 21st Century Adversary ................................ 23

Dealing with 21st Century Adversaries................................................ 24

Chapter 4. Human Terrain Preparation..................................................... 27

Capability Description and Technology Areas.................................. 27

Rapid Training and Continuous Learning.......................................... 29

Automated Language Processing......................................................... 33

Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavior Modeling............................. 41

Technology Strategies and Recommendations.................................. 51

Chapter 5. Ubiquitous Observation and Recording................................ 54

Capability Description and Technology Areas.................................. 54

Day/Night All-Weather Wide Area Persistent Surveillance............ 57

Close-in Sensors and Tagging Systems............................................... 62

Soldier as a Collector............................................................................. 65

Technology Strategies and Recommendations.................................. 67

Chapter 6. Contextual Exploitation ........................................................... 70

Capability Description and Technology Areas.................................. 70

Mega-Scale Data Management............................................................. 71

Situation-Dependent Information Extraction................................... 72

Human/System Collaboration............................................................. 72

Technology Strategies and Recommendations.................................. 75

Chapter 7. Rapidly Tailored Effects........................................................... 78

Capability Description and Technology Areas.................................. 78

Influence Operations............................................................................. 79

Time-Critical Conventional Strike....................................................... 82

WMD Protection and Mitigation......................................................... 85

Technology Strategies and Recommendations.................................. 89

Chapter 8. Technology Push Perspective.................................................. 92
ii I 

Chapter 9. Conclusions ................................................................................95

Cross-Cutting Outcomes.......................................................................95

Summary..................................................................................................96

Appendix A. Terms of Reference...............................................................97

Appendix B. Panel Membership...............................................................101

Appendix C. Capability Matrices ..............................................................103

Appendix D. Glossary................................................................................123
INTRODUCTION I 1

Chapter 1. Introduction 

The Capabilities Panel was charged by the terms of reference to do 

several things:1

1. Examine the operational missions that the U.S. military might 

be called upon to perform in support of emerging national 

security objectives. 

2. Identify new operational capabilities that would be needed to 

successfully accomplish those missions. 

3. Identify the critical science, technology, and other related 

enablers of the desired capabilities. 

To accomplish these tasks, it was first necessary for the panel to 

define exactly what was meant by “mission,” “capability,” and 

“technology,” and define the criteria that would be used to measure 

criticality. The panel adopted the following definitions: 

Mission. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates 

the action to be taken and the reason therefore (Department of 

Defense [DOD] definition). 

Capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action (DOD 

definition). The panel found it useful to think of capability as the tasks 

associated with performing a particular mission to a set standard. 

Technology. A science- or engineering-based way of doing things 

that supports one or more capabilities. 

Whether or not a capability could be thought of as critical, would be 

based on three reasons: 

 

1. Appendix A contains the terms of reference for the Defense Science Board 2006 

Summer Study. 
2 I CHAPTER 1 

1. A lack of the capability will expose the United States to great risk. 

2. The need for the capability will be essential for the successful 

execution of a mission. 

3. Possession of the capability will give the United States an 

asymmetric advantage. 

Likewise, the panel decided that technologies would be critical if they: 

 are essential to achieve a critical capability 

 are essential for achieving a number of important capabilities 

 contribute significantly to a number of critical capabilities 

 can be employed by adversaries in ways that can defeat U.S. 

capabilities 

The panel looked to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for 

help in identifying operational missions. The panel made the assumption 

that those missions specifically highlighted in the document were those 

of greatest interest to the department. They were: 

 defeat terrorist networks 

 prevent acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) 

 defend the homeland 

 shape nations at strategic crossroads 

To these missions the panel added stability, security, transition, 

and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. This addition was made based 

on the belief that SSTR operations will be an important mission in the 

future just as it is today in Iraq and Afghanistan.2

 The decision to 

concentrate on the missions highlighted in the QDR, with the 

addition of SSTR, had the effect of forcing this study away from an 

examination of conventional warfare and toward more non-traditional 

missions and capabilities. 

 

2. The term SSTR, referenced in the 2006 ODR, was adopted as of November 28, 2005, in 

DOD Directive 3000.05. 
INTRODUCTION I 3

In the chapters that follow, this report explains the methodology 

used by the panel to examine the five selected missions and the process 

by which the most important capabilities, their enabling technology 

areas, and the constituent technologies that underpin them were 

identified. Chapters 47 examine each of the capabilities in greater 

detail, making judgments and recommendations on how the department 

can best achieve the desired capabilities. Chapter 8 discusses technology 

push as it relates to capability achievement. The report concludes with a 

summary of its key findings and recommendations. 
4 I CHAPTER 2 

Chapter 2. Analysis Methodology 

Due to the breadth of the task with which the panel was charged, it 

was decided early on that an analysis framework was required to assist 

in organizing the panel’s deliberations and assuring consistency and 

discipline in identifying the most important technologies for the 

department. This approach also ensured that there was a traceable audit 

trail to illustrate how and why the study conclusions were reached. 

While the panel did some “technology push” brainstorming, the 

analysis framework was driven by critical missions and capabilities that 

the panel concluded were required by the department. 

Figure 1 provides an overview of this analysis framework, which will 

be described in the remainder of this chapter. One of the key elements of 

the approach is that it was conducted by a small group of broadly 

experienced senior people in an environment that fostered discussion and 

debate. The panel was composed of roughly equal numbers of retired 

general officers with operational experience, and industry and laboratory 

executives with deep technical backgrounds.3 This balance was essential to 

achieving the end results. Neither technologists nor operators alone would 

have been able to evaluate the potential of developing technologies, 

determine their impact on required capabilities, and effectively rate the 

contribution of the capabilities on the mission objectives. 

The framework also forced the group to make choices. The 

tendency to treat all technologies and capabilities as being equally 

important was resisted. By rating the impact of candidate capabilities on 

required missions and the impact of the technologies on the desired 

capabilities, the panel created prioritized lists of both capabilities and 

technologies. These results were then examined and discussed by the 

panel to develop insights that provided feedback to earlier steps in the 

process. The panel discussions also aggregated related capabilities to 

define four high-level critical capabilities that were the central result of 

the study. This feature of using an analytic framework informed by 

seasoned judgment is an important difference from many of the 

 

3. Appendix B lists the panel membership. 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 5

existing methodologies currently in use in the department, such as the 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) where 

the process dominates and is so cumbersome that it is difficult to 

develop focused conclusions or to see end-to-end solutions whole. 

Figure 1. Summary of Analysis Framework

Embedded in the analysis are important assumptions that had 

significant impact on the study conclusions. For example, the fact that 

all missions were weighted equally placed a premium on breadth—

capabilities and technologies that impacted many missions were rated 

higher than those narrowly focused on only a single mission. Others 

could make different assumptions and consequently draw different 

conclusions. The panel did not try to justify its assumptions. Rather, it 

identifies them explicitly in the following sections so that the analysis 

can be repeated if different assumptions are desired. 
6 I CHAPTER 2 

Missions 

As stated in the introduction, the panel started with the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (dated February 6, 2006) in which the department’s 

civilian and military leaders identified priority areas for the foreseeable 

future: 

 defeating terrorist networks 

 defending the homeland in depth 

 shaping the choices of nations at strategic crossroads 

 preventing hostile state and non-state actors from acquiring or 

using WMD 

The panel decided to add stability, security, transition, and 

reconstruction (SSTR) as a fifth mission because it is—and will remain—a 

priority mission along with the QDR list, as exemplified in the current 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There was also some uncertainty about 

the meaning of the QDR mission “shaping the choices of nations at 

strategic crossroads.” The panel chose to interpret this mission broadly so 

that it includes both addressing emerging nation-state peer competitors 

and influencing lesser states that are truly at strategic crossroads. 

In its analysis, the panel treated all five of the missions with equal 

weight. The implication of this decision is that capabilities and 

technologies that have broad applicability were given more import than 

those that narrowly addressed only a single mission. 

Operational Capabilities 

After framing the mission drivers, the panel developed the set of 

operational capabilities that would be used to assess the impact of 

candidate technologies. The process for this effort relied extensively on 

the experiences of the entire study team, especially the military officers. 

Each study participant, including the government advisors, was asked 

to identify the three most important capabilities that, in their judgment, 

were required to execute the five missions. This survey produced over 

100 operational capability recommendations. 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 7

A small group within the panel reviewed the inputs to eliminate 

duplication and combined closely-related capabilities to define the 39 

operational capabilities that formed the basis for the subsequent work 

within the study. In making these recommendations, the guidance was 

to give priority to those capabilities which the department needed most 

to improve. As a result, many important areas, such as improved 

precision or stealth, were considered “good enough” in a comparative 

sense and did not appear on the consolidated list. 

After review by the entire panel, the capabilities were prioritized by 

weighting their impact on each of the five missions according to the 

following criteria: 

 crucial, to indicate that the mission could not be completed 

without the capability 

 important, to indicate that the capability made significant 

contributions to mission success 

 contributes, to indicate that the capability was somewhat useful 

to the mission 

 not applicable 

The detailed results of this process are presented in Appendix C and 

summarized in tables 1 through 3. In these table, the capabilities are 

sorted into three groups of decreasing priority: (1) the highest containing 

those capabilities that are deemed crucial to two or more missions, (2) the 

next containing those that are crucial to one mission, and (3) the last 

containing those capabilities that may be important but have not been 

assessed as absolutely crucial to any mission. Within each group relative 

priorities were established by the number of capabilities deemed 

“crucial,” “important,” and “contribute.” 

These capabilities were then compared with the Level 1 and Level 2 

Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) to ensure that there were no important 

omissions from the study.4

 The only significant difference between the 

 

4. JCA Tier 1 & Tier 2 Taxonomy, as listed in “Joint Capability Areas,” briefing provided 

by the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 24, 2005. 
8 I CHAPTER 2 

study’s 39 operational capabilities and the 102 Level 2 JCAs is the fact that 

many of the JCAs were mapped into two of the study’s operational 

capabilities—air/land/sea supremacy and force/strategic asset protection. 

The reason for this is that the JCA placed more emphasis on war fighting 

than did the QDR augmented with the SSTR mission. 

Table 1. Capabilities Crucial to Two or More Missions 

Note: Tables 1–3 use the following abbreviations for the 4 QDR mission areas: Terro

(defeating terrorist networks); Home (defending the homeland in depth); WMD (preventing 

hostile state and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD); Xroad (shaping the choices 

of nations at strategic crossroads). 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 9

Table 2. Capabilities Crucial to One Mission 

Table 3. Other Important Capabilities 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

Critical Capabilities 

The panel examined the ranking of operational capabilities with the 

goal of collecting similar or mutually supporting capabilities into a small set 

of “critical capabilities” as defined in the introduction. These became the 

study’s recommendations to the department as the modern analogs to 

“speed, stealth, and precision” as requested in the study’s terms of 

reference. In accomplishing this task, attention was limited to 

approximately the top half of the operational capabilities. The dividing line 

was established at “soldier focused capability,” at and above which all 

capabilities are crucial to at least one mission and important or crucial to at 

least one other mission. The result of this effort was the definition of four 

critical capabilities that represented consolidation of the crucial/important 

operational capabilities: 

1. human terrain preparation 

2. ubiquitous observation and recording 

3. contextual exploitation 

4. rapidly tailored effects 

These four critical capabilities are all interdependent, as illustrated 

in figure 2. Each requires the other, in and of itself, and the set of four 

is needed to provide a fully effective posture to address the QDR plus 

SSTR missions. In fact, in the view of the panel, the four capabilities 

with their interconnectedness define a 21st century transformation of 

the observed-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. Each of these critical 

capabilities and the operational capabilities that compose them are 

discussed briefly in the remainder of this chapter. They are discussed in 

further detail, along with the key technology areas and their constituent 

technologies, in Chapters 47. 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 11

Figure 2. Four Broad Capability Categories—an OODA-like Loop for the 21st

Century 

Human Terrain Preparation 

In the Cold War, significant intellectual effort was directed at 

understanding and developing strategies to counter the Soviet Union. 

The nation now faces a much more complex set of adversaries, both 

state and non-state actors, about whom a comparable understanding has 

not been developed. The terrorist threat, in particular, with its 

amorphous, loosely networked characteristics makes this an especially 

challenging problem. Since much of the action against both terrorists and 

insurgents will be conducted by small units, either special or conventional 

forces in situations other than major combat operations, decisions made 

at lower levels of command will have the potential for broad-reaching, 

even strategic consequences. Consequently, preparing the human 

terrain—both ours and theirs—is rapidly becoming a critical capability. 

The operational capabilities relevant to this critical capability 

affecting most of the five missions include: cultural and language 

understanding; modeling societal dynamics, stability, and influencers; 

strategic communication; and strategic shaping. While traditional 

technologies will contribute to many of these capabilities, there is also a 

significant opportunity to better leverage the social and neurosciences, 
12 I CHAPTER 2 

particularly those analytic elements that create models to assist in 

understanding individual and collective group behavior. 

Small unit leadership training and enhanced soldier-focused 

capabilities are crucial or important to most of the missions.5 These 

capabilities can be enhanced by immersive games and other social 

science-derived intensive training concepts. They can also be supported 

by a number of information technology concepts that will provide 

individual soldiers relevant “Google”-like search capabilities to increase 

their understanding of the new cultures and surroundings in which they 

are likely to be deployed. 

Ubiquitous Observation and Recording 

Adversaries operate in ways to use stealth as a strategic advantage—

nation-states are using unconventional and insurgency operations to their 

benefit, and non-state actors are inherently hidden in a large neutral or 

possibly sympathetic population. Consequently, the United States needs to 

observe and record those events for later correlation in order to find small 

warning signals in vast amounts of clutter. These observations need to be 

as close to continuous as can be achieved. Further, they must span as 

complete a range of sensor modalities and observation distances as 

practical. While traditional wide-area, all weather intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) is required, many of the targets, especially those 

indicative of WMD activity and terrorist network planning, require very 

close range sensing to be effective. Moreover, traditional ISR itself must be 

adapted and advanced to more effectively deal with urban environments. 

The operational capabilities, crucial to most of the missions, that 

the panel aggregated into this ubiquitous observation and recording 

category include: human intelligence; identification; covert tagging and 

tracking of people and objects globally; persistent ISR of fixed and 

mobile targets; and remote WMD detection. One of the key insights of 

the study is that in many of the new missions, particularly SSTR and 

 

5. Defense Science Board Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional 

Environments, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, March 2006. 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 13

defeating terrorist networks, the individual soldier on patrol can be an 

important observer. DOD should develop technologies to exploit this 

capability more effectively through better debriefing and knowledge 

representation technologies. 

Contextual Exploitation 

The development and deployment of ubiquitous observation 

capabilities will generate massive amounts of data, only a small fraction of 

which will contain actionable information. The challenge of “connecting 

the dots” for new targets, has proven to be a very difficult one. In many 

cases to date, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks, the relevant 

indicators were only identified after the attack with the benefit of 

knowing that an event had occurred. Increased observation provides 

hope of better detection, but only if the capability to process the data and 

turn them into relevant information is also developed. 

The broadly important operational capabilities that the panel 

consolidated into the contextual exploitation group include: knowledge 

discovery/data fusion/decision support, strategic surprise anticipation, 

rapid strategic decision-making, and translation to war plans. To create 

these capabilities, the DOD must get better at handling massive amounts 

of data and at exploiting the synergies of both the computer and the 

human in data analysis, fusion, and integration. 

Rapidly Tailored Effects 

The last of the four critical capabilities central to dealing with the 

priority missions is the ability to take action quickly and effectively to 

influence, dissuade, or defeat the enemy in ways that matter to him while 

minimizing the unintended consequences of the action, namely, rapidly 

tailored effects. The span of potential actions is much broader than those 

characteristic of combat and range from influence operations to prompt 

global strike. Actions include both offensive and defensive options, since, 

for example, the ability to defend/mitigate WMD is likely to have an 

important deterrent effect. 
14 I CHAPTER 2 

One of the major challenges associated with this crucial capability is 

in knowing what action to take. For amorphous, non-state actors who 

do not have significant territory and infrastructure, it has been difficult 

to understand their values and what they hold dear, so that the United 

States can put them at risk in a meaningful way. This uncertainty 

highlights one of the synergies illustrated in figure 2—that the capability 

developed in understanding the human terrain will be essential in 

planning and selecting the most effective action the United States can 

take in a particular situation. 

The operational capabilities that the panel found to be crucial or 

important to most of the priority missions include: covert penetration 

operations; information security, information operations, and cyber 

supremacy; air/land/sea supremacy; joint precision strike from sanctuary; 

secure and render safe WMD; medical surge; and broad spectrum 

medical treatments and preventatives. 

Technologies 

Having outlined the set of capabilities needed to execute the four 

QDR plus SSTR missions, the panel next turned its attention to 

determining what technologies were required to achieve those 

capabilities. The panel’s mix of senior military, industry, and laboratory 

personnel was instrumental in creating a balance between operational 

capabilities “pull” and technology “push.” Initially, the panel determined 

what it collectively viewed as the three most important technology areas 

required to service each of the four critical capabilities. This 

determination was accomplished subjectively by dividing the panel into 

four groups, each one representing one of the critical capabilities. Each 

group, which contained subject matter experts from both a technology as 

well as a user perspective, was asked to settle upon the three most critical 

technology areas appropriate to the capability they represented. The 

results are presented in table 4. 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 15

Table 4. Technology Areas Associated with Critical Capabilities 

Critical Capability Technology Area

 Human, social, cultural, behavioral modeling 

 Automated language processing 

Human terrain preparation

 Rapid training and learning methods and aids 

 Day/night all-weather wide area persistent surveillance 

 Close-in sensing and tagging 

Ubiquitous observation 

and recording

 Soldier-as-collector 

 Mega-scale data management 

 Situation-dependent data exploitation 

Contextual exploitation

 Human/system collaboration 

 Time-critical focused conventional strike 

 Influence operations 

Rapidly tailored effects

 WMD protection and mitigation 

Having identified and agreed upon the 12 key technology areas 

associated with the critical capabilities required for the mission 

challenges of the 21st century, the panel members dug deeper into each 

of the 12. Drawing upon both inside and outside domain experts, the 

following information was generated for each technology area: 

 A description including, where relevant, performance metrics 

that established the level of performance required. 

 The overall state of readiness, as measured on the technology 

readiness level (TRL) scale.6

 The underlying technologies (referred to as “constituent 

technologies”) required for implementation, including, where 

possible, performance goal metrics. Each constituent 

technology was further examined to assess: 

- Its TRL, as well as a characterization into one of the 

following four categories: 

 

6. See the Technology Readiness Level Assessment Deskbook, pg. 240 for full details 

(https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=18545). 
16 I CHAPTER 2 

 promising but immature, needs focused R&D 

investment 

 showing progress, investments being made, stay the 

course 

 action is largely in commercial sector; adapt and 

transition to DOD when appropriate 

 technology is ready today, adopt within DOD 

- What needs to be accomplished or developed to get it ready 

for operational use—included here were technical issues as 

well as service acceptance and training. 

- A rough order of magnitude cost estimate, where possible, 

for the development effort required. 

 Other corollary issues germane to the particular technology 

area. These included such items as model validation, 

interoperability and standards, alternative technologies that were 

on the horizon, special support requirements, unusual cost or 

risk issues, and others. 

Through this process, 43 constituent technologies were identified, 

along with the information described above. These are further detailed 

in Chapters 47, where they are described in the context of the 

capability and critical technology area into which they primarily fit. 

The 43 constituent technologies were assessed as to their relative 

importance in fulfilling the five missions with which this process was 

initiated. This was accomplished by subjectively determining the impact 

each constituent technology would have on the 39 capabilities derived 

from the five missions. Technology impact on capability was defined in 

the same manner as described above for capability impact on mission, 

namely, for each capability, whether the given technology was: 

 required 

 very important 

 a contributor of less importance 

 not applicable 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 17

Thus, a matrix of 43 constituent technologies by 39 capabilities was 

established with the intersections containing a “score” of relative 

importance. The score for “required” was twice the score for “important,” 

which in turn was twice the score for “contributor.” Each of these 

technology scores was then summed over the 39 capabilities, with each 

technology score further weighted by the relative importance of each 

capability in accordance with tables 1, 2, and 3. The capabilities in table 1 

(crucial to two or more missions) were given twice the weight of the 

capabilities in table 2 (crucial to one mission), which in turn were given 

twice the weight of the capabilities in table 3 (important but not crucial). 

The results of this double weighting and summing thus provided a 

convenient and relatively simple way of accounting for each constituent 

technology’s relevancy to mission capability by linking it back through 

the capabilities that it serviced, and then through the missions that those 

capabilities in turn serviced. Once sorted according to the overall result, 

an indication of relative ranking and priority is established. The results are 

presented in table 5. All of the results summarized here are documented 

in Appendix C, which contains the details of the spread sheet the panel 

used to keep track of these analyses. 

Although table 5 lists the relative importance of the various 

technologies that were identified, based on their mission contribution, it is 

not very helpful in establishing a technology roadmap or strategy. The 

problem lies in the fact that the technologies listed in table 5 vary 

considerably in terms of their maturity, if and where they are being 

pursued, the significance of DOD investment, and other factors. A more 

useful view is obtained by parsing the technologies into the four categories 

of development characterization discussed above: (1) promising but 

immature, needs focused R&D investment; (2) showing progress, 

investments being made, stay the course; (3) action is largely in commercial 

sector, adapt and transition to DOD when appropriate; or (4) technology 

is ready today, adopt within DOD. This parsing is presented below in 

tables 6, 7, 8, and 9. The shading in the four tables represents those 

technologies that are in the top 20 of the overall rankings. 
18 I CHAPTER 2 

Table 5. Constituent Technology Ranking

1. Contextual analysis and intent recognition tools 

2. Entity relationship, pattern analysis 

3. Miniature sensor technology 

4. Knowledge discovery (data to information to target recognition) 

5. Efficient energy storage technology 

6. Data management from very diverse sources 

7. Macro human social cultural behavioral models (structure/trends) 

8. Decision support tools (complexity & ambiguity) 

9. All-domain precision geo-location 

10. Cause-effect models (environment, infrastructure, socio-cultural, DIME, PMESII) 

11. Storytelling, gisting and advanced visualization) 

12. Socio-culturally relevant immersive games, training & mission rehearsal tools 

13. Micro human social cultural behavioral models (networks/events) 

14. Campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools (gaming, weapon/target pairing, effects 

estimation) 

15. Integrated coherent micro-macro quant models (taxonomies, application programming 

interfaces, semantics) 

16. Interactive automated debriefing 

17. High performance and high efficiency signal processing 

18. Advanced context/concept search, information retrieval and knowledge discovery 

19. Foreign-to-English translation (voice, chat, email, broadcast, conversation, gisting) 

20. Soldier-centric communications/networking technology (waveforms, transmit/receive) 

21. Multi-level security and accreditation 

22. High density packaging 

23. Language/culture/leadership tutoring and coaching tools 

24. Rapid diagnostics & environmental monitoring 

25. Space-based ground moving target indication/synthetic aperture radar 

26. Active and passive hyper spectral sensing 

27. High altitude long-endurance platforms 

28. Human/team performance measurement models-tools 

29. Broad spectrum medical countermeasures 

30. Human guided algorithms 

31. Speech-to-text transcription (e.g., Phraselator; voice response; speech-to-speech) 

32. Body-borne flexible displays 

33. Natural man machine interface 

34. Directed energy 

35. Stealthy/precision delivery platforms 

36. Standoff active radiation detection 

37. Gigapixel optical imaging 

38. Knowledge representation 

39. Nuclear weapons effects & impact models 

40. Decontamination technologies 

41. Hypersonics 

42. Foliage penetration sensors 

43. Ballistic missile technology
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 19

One caveat for the structured process used by the panel cannot be 

emphasized too strongly. The methodology that was followed is presented solely 

as a way of thinking about the problem of capabilities and technology prioritization 

and as a mechanism for linking technology investment to missions that the 

department considers important. The results were influenced by the 

assumption that all five missions were of equal importance. That may 

or may not be the case as viewed by senior members of the department 

and the administration, and changes in that assumption will affect the 

prioritization of the individual technologies. Thus, DOD should 

examine the process and adapt it to its purposes while retaining the 

major characteristics of simplicity, understandability, traceability, and 

balancing senior level operational and technical perspectives. The 

department should apply sufficient resources to do it well and produce 

its own results and prioritization. 

Having noted that, however, the panel believes that it is unlikely that 

the increased importance of, and inter-relationship between, the four 

critical capabilities will diminish, nor will the growing prominence of the 

social sciences change. These results are a function of the types of 

operations that now dominate many of the activities of America’s troops, 

immerse them in cultures and societies that are unfamiliar to them, and 

place them in situations in which tactical actions can have strategic 

consequences. The department must do better at equipping and training 

at all levels of command and responsibilities in order to more effectively 

operate within this new 21st century security environment. 
20 I CHAPTER 2 

Table 6. Promising but Immature Technologies, Need Focused Research and 

Development Investment 

Miniature sensor technology/TRL 3-5

Macro human, social, cultural, and behavior (HSCB) models (structure/trends)/TRL 4-6

Kinetic and non-kinetic cause-effect models (environment; infrastructure; socio-cultural; 

diplomatic, information, military, economic [DIME]; political, military, economic, social, 

infrastructure, information [PMESII])/TRL 2-6

Micro HSCB (networks/events)/TRL 2-4

Integrated coherent micro-macro quant/comp models (taxonomies, application 

programming interfaces, semantics)/TRL 1-2

Interactive automated debriefing/TRL 3

Rapid diagnostics and environmental monitoring/TRL 3-5

High altitude long-endurance platforms/TRL 3

Human/team performance measurement models-tools/TRL 3-6

Human guided algorithms/TRL 2

Directed energy/TRL 3-7

Stealthy/precision delivery platforms/TRL 6

Standoff active radiation detection/TRL 1-3

Gigapixel optical imaging/TRL 3

Nuclear weapons effects and impact models/TRL 2-5

Hypersonics/TRL 4-5
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY I 21

Table 7. Technologies Showing Progress, Investments are Being Made and 

Should Continue 

Contextual analysis and intent recognition tools/TRL 3

Entity, relationship and pattern analysis/TRL 3

Knowledge discovery (data to information to target recognition)/TRL 2

Decision support tools (complexity & ambiguity)/TRL 3

All-domain precision geo-location/TRL 4-5

High performance and high efficiency signal processing/TRL 5

Foreign-to-English translation (e.g., voice, chat, IM, emails; broadcast, conversational; 

gisting; summarization; (un)constrained)/TRL 3-7

Soldier-centric communications/networking technology (waveforms, transmit/receive )/ 

TRL 5

Multi-level security and accreditation/TRL 3

High density packaging/TRL 5

Language/culture/leadership tutoring and coaching tools/TRL 4

Space-based ground moving target indication/ synthetic aperture radar /TRL 5

Speech-to-text transcription (e.g., Phraselator; voice response translator; 2-way speech-tospeech)/TRL 2-6

Body-borne flexible displays/TRL 4

Decontamination technologies/TRL 2-6

Table 8. Technologies Being Developed in the Commercial Sector, Adapt and 

Transition to DOD When Appropriate 

Efficient energy storage technology/TRL 5 

Data management from very diverse sources/TRL 5

Storytelling, gisting and advanced visualization)/TRL 2-5

High fidelity, socio-culturally relevant immersive games, training and mission rehearsal 

tools/TRL 3-6

Campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools (e.g., gaming; stochastic estimation; weapontarget pairing; (non)lethal weapon effects)/TRL 3-6

Advanced context/concept search, information retrieval and knowledge discovery (data 

mining)/TRL 2-6

Broad spectrum medical countermeasures/TRL 1-3

Natural man machine interface/TRL 2-3

Knowledge representation/TRL 3-5
22 I CHAPTER 2 

Table 9. Technology is Ready, Adopt within DOD 

Active and passive hyper spectral sensing/TRL 5

Foliage penetration sensors/TRL 5

Ballistic missile technology/TRL 7-9

The shaded lines in each of the tables above identify technologies that are in 

the top 20 of the 43 technologies ranked in this report. 
A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES I 23

Chapter 3. A Different Assessment of 

Capabilities

The highly structured methodology described in the previous chapter 

has advantages of traceability and imbedded linkage of operations and 

technology perspectives. However, the panel recognized that this 

approach did not allow for a more intuitive derivation of capabilities 

based on an understanding of what is known about current and emerging 

adversaries. Therefore, a sub-panel was formed to identify capabilities 

based on this more intuitive approach as an independent check on the 

results produced by the more structured approach. 

A Succinct View of the 21st Century Adversary 

In less than two decades, fundamental changes have occurred in the 

security environment facing the United States. The environment has 

changed from one dominated by a single adversary that had been studied 

for decades, to an environment with adversaries about whom little is 

known and whose actions are therefore less predictable. The former 

Soviet Union was a well-developed, geographically based nation-state 

with a large physical, economic, and industrial infrastructure that could 

be watched and assessed over time. These characteristics enabled 

development of an understanding of what motivated it, as well as its 

inherent value structure. 

This Cold War adversary contrasts with many of the transnational, 

terrorist, and/or loosely knit extremist organizations, motivated by ideas 

and concepts alien to the American way of thinking, and embracing value 

structures that are difficult to understand. This lack of understanding 

hampers the nation’s ability to take actions that influence or deter; of 

those actions we do take, to understand and predict the consequences, 

both intended and unintended; and to act in ways consistently supportive 

of U.S. strategic objectives. Most importantly, the department is in the 

early years of trying to gain that understanding, much like the situation 

with respect to the former Soviet Union in the 1950s. 
24 I CHAPTER 3 

Another important difference has also become evident and adds 

different dimensions to the problem of gaining that fundamental 

understanding. Because of the bureaucratic nature of the former Soviet 

Union’s government, their decision process was ponderous, their military 

control highly centralized, and their actions evolved over months to 

years. Today’s adversaries, in contrast, have demonstrated agility that 

allows them to adapt in days or even hours. Their agility offers little time 

to observe what they do before they do it. Moreover, their tendency to 

hide their people, assets, and actions within the civilian population of the 

countries in which they operate makes them even harder to counter. 

As a result, although the United States may collect lots of “data” of 

various kinds, the actionable information that can be extracted about the 

enemy lies buried in all of the other extraneous data that is collected. 

Thus, a new paradigm of contradictory demands emerges—the necessity 

to take quick and effective action against an agile, poorly defined enemy 

based on observables that are buried in all kinds of irrelevant and 

unrelated clutter and noise. Yet despite the differences between the 

current era and the Cold War, today’s enemies retain the same motivating 

characteristic—the ability to bring great harm against the nation. 

Dealing with 21st Century Adversaries 

Given these challenging characteristics associated with current and 

expected future adversaries, an ability to reduce their potential for harm 

leads logically to a set of four “musts” that correspond well with the four 

critical capabilities derived in the panel’s more deliberate process. 

1. Understand “what makes him tick.” Deterrence through the 

threat of holding hostage things an adversary values is always the first 

line of defense. But today’s adversary is neither fixed nor monolithic. 

His goals, objectives, and value structure are all fuzzy. Without 

understanding these things better than is done currently, the nation 

will have little ability either to offer meaningful “carrots” or to carry 

meaningful “sticks.” Enhanced understanding is also central to taking 

productive offensive and defensive, and combat and humanitarian 

actions while avoiding counterproductive results because of 

unintended consequences. Thus, understanding what motivates the 

adversary is central to everything else. 
A DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES I 25

 In parallel, significant improvement needs to be made in training 

provided to the troops, and in particular to junior officers and enlisted 

personnel who, with little time for preparation, are now thrust quickly 

into unusual environments with unfamiliar language, social, and 

cultural behavior. The panel’s process came to the same needed set of 

capabilities under the name of “human terrain preparation.” 

2. Observe, archive, observe, archive. Today’s adversaries are highly 

agile and “stealthy.” An ability to pull meaningful indicators or signals 

regarding their actions and intentions out of the noise and to 

understand what they are about to do before they do it will depend 

on continual observation of their key people, physical resources, 

actions, and patterns of behavior. Further, since much of what is 

observed may only be meaningful after some event occurs, it will be 

necessary to also archive everything collected so that it can be 

analyzed and reviewed at any time in the future. Thus, observing and 

archiving everything about adversaries is of critical importance. This 

corresponds to the “ubiquitous observation and recording” capability 

derived from the panel’s structured process. 

3. “Connect the dots” quickly. The observables inherent to today’s 

adversaries do not in themselves provide actionable information for 

all of the reasons discussed above. The key to transforming the vast 

amount of data that is collected into useful observables and 

ultimately to information upon which timely action can be taken is to 

discern important patterns of adversary actions and behavior through 

geographical, temporal, and societal analysis and association. The task 

is made more difficult because adversary agility often drives quick 

execution of this difficult task. Thus, an ability to quickly “connect 

the dots” in the context of unfolding events coupled to the specific 

nature and culture/behavioral norms of the adversary plays a critical 

role in understanding what is happening, what is about to happen, 

and what actions can be taken to counter. The panel’s process yielded 

“contextual exploitation” as the corresponding critical capability. 

4. Act quickly and decisively in a way that matters to an adversary. 

Although obvious, this task is difficult to do against today’s adversary. 

“Act” must span the range of offense to defense, destruction to 

rebuilding, punitive measures to humanitarian aid to political reward. 
26 I CHAPTER 3 

With a limited understanding of the adversary and his ability to adapt 

quickly, a quick decision to select the “right” action—that is one that 

accomplishes the intended objective without counterproductive 

consequences—and executing it with the right toolset is difficult to 

achieve and, at a minimum, demands more options in the toolkit. 

This ability to act quickly in a wide variety of ways that matter to the 

adversary is the critical “take action” component of the four high 

level capabilities. This capability has been referred to as “rapidly 

tailored effects.” 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 27

Chapter 4. Human Terrain Preparation 

As discussed previously in this report, today’s adversaries are 

neither fixed nor monolithic. Their goals, objectives, and value 

structure are yet to be well understood. Without better understanding, 

the nation has little ability to either offer meaningful “carrots” or carry 

meaningful “sticks.” Enhanced understanding is also central to taking 

productive offensive or defensive combat, security, and humanitarian 

actions while avoiding counterproductive results because of 

unintended consequences. Understanding “what makes the adversary 

tick” is central to everything else. 

Significant improvement in training troops is also needed—in 

particular junior officers and enlisted leaders, who, with little time for 

preparation, are now being thrust quickly into unusual environments 

with unfamiliar language, social behaviors, and cultural norms. This 

collection of human understanding and enhancement is referred to as 

“human terrain preparation” (HTP). 

Capability Description and Technology Areas 

With the emergence of the new 21st century strategic threat—which 

is significantly different from the peer competitor nation-state of the 

Cold War era—it is increasingly important that the United States mount a 

serious effort to understand adversary objectives and motives. During the 

Cold War, substantial intellectual effort was directed at understanding 

and developing strategies to counter the Soviet Union. The nation and 

the department have not yet had time nor committed the level of effort 

needed to develop a comparable understanding of 21st century strategic 

threats—terrorists, warlords, insurgents, rogue WMD proliferators, drug 

smugglers and syndicates, weapons traffickers, and failed states. The 

amorphous, often opaque characteristics of the threat spectrum make 

this a more challenging problem than that of the Cold War. Furthermore, 

much of the engagement against 21st century strategic threats should be 

conducted in pre-conflict (phase 0) conditions, so that the United States 

can prevent hostilities and disagreements from developing into a full-
28 I CHAPTER 4 

scale armed confrontation. Gaining the necessary understanding of the 

cultures and motivations of threats and noncombatants, and the 

environment within which they reside, as well as understanding how to 

prevent hostilities from escalating, requires the United States to apply 

political, military, diplomatic, economic, and other social options. 

Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that managing 

successful stability and reconstruction operations requires as much social 

awareness as military combat savvy. A major challenge to overcome has 

been a severely limited joint, service, or interagency integrated capability 

(organization, methods, tools, training) to effectively collect/consolidate, 

visualize, and understand socio-cultural (“green data”) in order to assist 

commanders in understanding the “human terrain” in which they 

operate. In many instances, the decisive terrain has been the vast majority 

of noncombatants who are not directly involved in the fighting, but 

whose support, willing or coerced, has been critical to influence. Winning 

the hearts and minds of the local population by providing aid to improve 

their lives has been equally as important—and can no longer be 

subordinated—to projecting military force or capturing and killing the 

enemy. Consequently, preparing the human terrain—both ours and theirs— 

will be a critical capability. 

Another key challenge is developing a common socio-cultural 

methodology and toolkit for analysis, planning, and training. HTP should 

provide a joint common relevant picture of the socio-cultural human 

terrain for use by tactical elements, operational commanders, theater 

planners, strategic decision- and policy-makers, interagency organizations, 

and coalition partners. While traditional technologies will contribute to 

the HTP capability, the panel found that there is a significant need to 

better leverage the social sciences, particularly those analytic elements 

that create models to assist in understanding and representing human 

systems, both ours and theirs. 

From the many areas important for maturing HTP, the panel found 

that three critical technology enablers of the HTP capability should be 

given priority: (1) rapid training and continuous learning; (2) automated 

language processing; and (3) human, social, cultural, and behavior 

(HSCB) modeling. These technology areas will provide analysts and war 

fighters with the necessary tools to: 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 29

 Search, query, exploit, understand, and train/learn from vastly 

more foreign multi-lingual, socio-cultural speech and text than 

would otherwise be possible by human transcribers and 

translators alone. 

 Automatically extract entities and entity-relationships from 

massive amounts of data (unstructured, semi-structured, 

structured) and discover instances of relationships and patterns 

of activities among those entities. 

 Apply quantitative and computational models based on a wide 

range of nonlinear mathematical and nondeterministic 

stochastic computational approaches for capturing social 

phenomena and pathological behavior. 

 Collaborate, reason, and share data, information, knowledge, 

and analyses so that analysts and war fighters can hypothesize, 

test, and propose theories and mitigating strategies about 

plausible futures so that decision- and policy-makers can 

effectively evaluate the impact of current or future policies and 

prospective courses of action. 

Rapid Training and Continuous Learning 

Training is a core enabler for every joint war fighting capability and 

is most successful when tools and methods embrace the cognitive 

complexities of how people learn. Focusing on QDR missions and the 

high probability of SSTR missions makes clear that future warriors, 

particularly junior leaders on the future battlefield, must be mature, 

adaptive, and fully aware of the human dimension of the battle space in 

which they operate. In its pamphlet defining future force capabilities, 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command concludes that future 

force leaders must excel at critical reasoning and creative thinking. The 

escalating tempo of operations will demand higher order cognitive 

skills, including the rapid synthesis of operations, intuitive assessments 

of situation, rapid conceptualization of friendly courses of action, and 

the ability to adjust and adapt thinking and tactical decisions to rapidly 

changing condition and situations. It further states that skill sets such as 

negotiation, cultural sensitivity, dealing with ambiguity, and conflict 

resolution are normal requirements in the future environment. 
30 I CHAPTER 4 

Recognizing that tactical actions have strategic significance, DOD 

must orient the breadth and depth of its junior noncommissioned officer 

and officer education programs toward rapidly preparing leaders, 

particularly at the small unit level, for that complex battle space. The 

panel determined that learning tools and methods should focus on 

rapidly developing cognitive decision-making skills, knowledge, 

competencies, and experiences in several areas, including: critical thinking 

and decision-making when encountering complex situations under 

duress; avoiding common “counter-intuitive” judgment errors, such as 

mirror imaging and confusing the unfamiliar with the improbable; key 

SSTR tasks in crowd control, policing, evidence collection, negotiation 

and reconstruction; and assimilating relevant socio-cultural terrain factors 

into each operation, mission, and battle staff function. 

Constituent Technologies 

The panel identified three compelling constituent technologies that 

require focused DOD efforts to best realize the potential for improvement 

over current training, learning methods, and aids. These are: high-fidelity 

immersive games and training, and mission rehearsal tools; language, 

cultural, and leadership tutoring tools; and human and team performance 

measurement. Improvements in these technologies should seek to develop 

multi-cultural interpersonal skills in support of small unit operations, with 

the ultimate goal of accelerating the pace of learning, competency, and 

decision-making effectiveness. Future success at the junior leader level may 

hinge upon an individual’s opportunity to acquire years of knowledge and 

experience in cultural awareness, intuitive decision-making, and skill at 

arms in a matter of weeks. 

High-Fidelity Immersive Games and Training, and Mission 

Rehearsal Tools 

High-fidelity, immersive games and training, and mission rehearsal 

tools should serve as one of the cornerstones of a flexible, user-tailored 

training and learning program. Design should integrate the most 

advanced displays and techniques from the movie and gaming industries, 

while incorporating natural language dialogue, cognitive models, and 

learner models to maximize the learning opportunity and accurately 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 31

determine a learner’s progress. Authoring tools that allow users to rapidly 

manipulate relevant scenarios are an important and necessary 

characteristic of future tools. These tools should offer the opportunity to 

introduce lessons learned from the contemporary operational 

environment, and then tailor the tools to address specific training needs 

at the individual level. Finally, DOD must undertake efforts to 

standardize the tools that are developed so that can be linked in order to 

facilitate team-level immersive events for the service member on the 

ground and in the joint environment. The proliferation of massive, multiplayer games suggests promise in this technical area. 

Language, Culture, and Leadership Tutoring Tools 

Language, culture, and leadership tutoring tools will need to be an 

integral part of training-related technologies in order to more rapidly 

prepare junior leaders and small units for the unique cultural dimensions 

of the future battle space. Ultimate mission success will likely depend less 

upon victory in conventional kinetic operations and more upon forces on 

the ground or in port being adept and influential in the complex social 

networks found in stability and support operations. Training and learning 

tools must adequately represent culture and language nuances, and must 

provide trainees with an opportunity to experience the second and third 

order effects associated with decision-making in this fluid environment. 

Intelligent tutors designed into immersive training tools should reduce 

the need for personal mentors and allow for more immediate and tailored 

feedback to the trainee, thereby expediting the learning process. 

Advances in automated language processing, discussed earlier in this 

chapter, are critical as the foundations for these tutoring tools. 

Human and Team Performance Measurement 

Human and team performance measurement represents an important 

dimension of effective learning tools and methods. After-action reviews 

currently provide a level of feedback to trainees on performance but often 

lack metrics that could better define future individual training needs. 

Measurement of performance, particularly in high stress environments 

experienced on the battlefield, with the added complexities of the urban 

environment, and stability and support operations, requires additional 

study. Such measurement, combined with user-friendly authoring tools, 
32 I CHAPTER 4 

informs trainees and the chain of command, and influences developmental 

efforts for future training sessions. Several current programs and research 

efforts offer promise in achieving the technical goals described by this 

panel. A brief description follows. 

Combat Leader’s Environment (CLE). The U.S. Army’s School 

of Command Preparation at the Command and General Staff College 

recently completed a proof of concept for the CLE. This virtual 

simulation tool places battalion- and brigade-level leaders in an 

immersive environment designed from lived experiences. It provides 

each learner with an opportunity to “think about how they think” in a 

cognitively authentic context. The fundamental premise is that one 

could improve decision-making by environmental realism, repetition, 

variability, and ambiguity. 

Learning with Adaptive Simulation and Training (LAST). This 

Army technology objective, managed by the U.S. Army Simulation and 

Training Technology Center of Research, Development and 

Engineering Command, seeks to deliver effective and engaging training 

simulations that incorporate realistic political and cultural effects of the 

environment and behaviors of an adaptive, asymmetrical enemy force. 

The research focuses on two major areas. First, it seeks to develop the 

pedagogical design and enhanced tools and methods for rapidly creating 

and modifying scenarios relevant to the common operating 

environment in virtual simulations. Second, it develops enhanced virtual 

entities, behavioral models, and political and cultural effects in 

integrated virtual simulations. These efforts are expected to produce 

improvements in instruction and training, decision-making, and learning 

retention through the use of a critical incident scenario library, the 

presentation of increasingly difficult scenarios in a training environment 

(gated training), and through enhanced methods of performance 

assessment and feedback to the trainee. A key feature includes 

advanced tools and methods that will enable trainers to rapidly create 

relevant virtual simulations. 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 33

Enhanced Learning Environment with Creative Technologies.

This Army technology objective, managed by the U.S. Army Simulation 

and Training Technology Center of Research, Development and 

Engineering Command, seeks to capitalize on the unique ability of the 

University of California’s Institute for Creative Technologies to 

incorporate the most advanced techniques of the movie and gaming 

industries in a number of technical areas. These techniques include 

advanced virtual humans (such as, task reasoning, emotions, natural 

language, gestures, spatial cognition), story management, artificial 

intelligence, coaching, advanced graphics, sound, and integrating 

architecture to create the required tools, methods, and training modules. 

Research seeks to develop pedagogical design, methods, tools, and 

metrics required for the use of interactive simulation technology as a 

means to deliver effective training. The program seeks to combine 

enhanced interactive simulation technology in training with a better 

understanding of the learner model and cognitive readiness on soldier 

performance to increase soldier engagement in the training experience, 

thereby increasing retention and decreasing the burden of retraining. 

Automated Language Processing 

Foreign language speech and text are indispensable sources of 

intelligence, but the vast majority available is unexamined. Foreign 

language data and their corresponding providers are massive and growing 

in numbers daily. Moreover, because the time to transcribe and translate 

foreign documents is so labor intensive, compounded by the lack of 

linguists with suitable language skills to review it all, much foreign 

language speech and text are never exploited for intelligence and counterterrorism purposes. And it would be impossible to find, train, or pay 

enough people. New and powerful foreign language technology is needed 

to allow English-speaking analysts to exploit and understand vastly more 

foreign speech and text than is currently possible today. 
34 I CHAPTER 4 

Automated Language Processing Constituent Technologies 

The panel identified three priority constituent technologies on which 

DOD should focus—technologies that will realize significant 

improvement over current automated language processing efforts. These 

are: (1) foreign-to-English translation technologies, (2) speech-to-text 

transcription technologies, and (3) information management and text 

processing technologies (also applicable for the contextual exploitation 

capability). Improvements in these technologies should allow automated 

processes and English-speaking users to examine and analyze all multilingual speech and text that is available in the information space; allow 

any user—be it a tactical, operational, or strategic planner; analyst; or 

decision-maker—to acquire basic language proficiency in days and expert 

language proficiency in months, for any language; and to continue 

improvements in word error rate, precision and recall, and usability 

measures, such as effectiveness, efficiency, and user satisfaction. 

One example of an R&D program in this area that integrates all three 

constituent technologies is the Defense Advanced Research Project 

Agency’s (DARPA) GALE (Global Autonomous Language 

Exploitation) program, illustrated in figure 3. The GALE program is 

developing and applying computer software technologies to absorb, 

analyze, and interpret huge volumes of speech and text in multiple 

languages, eliminating the need for linguists and analysts. It is also 

developing the ability to automatically provide relevant, distilled 

actionable information to military command and personnel in a timely 

fashion. Automatic processing “engines” convert and distill the data, 

delivering pertinent, consolidated information in easy-to-understand 

forms to military personnel and monolingual English-speaking analysts in 

response to direct or implicit requests. 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 35

Figure 3. GALE System for Transcription of Foreign Speech into English Text 

Foreign-to-English Translation 

Goals for foreign-to-English translation include: (1) providing high 

accuracy machine translation and structural metadata annotation from 

multilingual text document and speech transcription input at all stages of 

processing and across multiple genres, topics, and mediums (such as, 

Arabic, Chinese, the Web, news, blogs, signals intelligence, and 

databases); (2) understanding—or at least deriving semantic intent 

from—input strings regardless of source; (3) reconciling and resolving 

semantic differences, duplications, inconsistencies, and ambiguities across 

words, passages, and documents; (4) more efficient discovery of 

important documents, more relevant and accurate facts while decreasing 

the amount of time required to do it, and passages for distillation; (5) 

providing enriched translation output that is formatted, cleaned-up, clear, 

unambiguous, and meaningful to decision-makers; (6) eliminating the 

need for human intervention and minimized delay of information 

delivery; and (7) fast development of new language capability, swift 

response to breaking events, and increased portability across languages, 

sources, and information needs. 

Some examples of critical contributing technologies include: 

improved dynamic language modeling with adaptive learning; advanced 

machine translation technology that utilizes heterogeneous knowledge 

sources; better inference models; better tagging and annotation 

algorithms; language-independent approaches to create rapid, robust 
36 I CHAPTER 4 

technology that can be ported cheaply and easily to any language and 

domain; syntactic and semantic representation techniques to deal with 

ambiguous meaning and information overload; and cross- and monolingual, language-independent information retrieval to detect and 

discover the exact data in any language quickly and accurately, and to 

flag new data that may be of interest. 

Speech-to-Text Transcription 

Automatic speech-to-text transcription seeks to produce rich, readable 

transcripts of foreign news broadcasts and conversations (over noisy 

channels and/or in noisy environments) despite widely-varying 

pronunciations, speaking styles, and subject matter. In general, the two 

basic components of rich transcription are speech-to-text conversion 

(finding and transcribing relevant words) and metadata extraction (pulling 

out features to annotate the transcripts to provide more useful information 

to the user). There are also two basic approaches to speech-to-text 

transcription—those that use constrained vocabularies (such as, 

Phraselator), and those that do not. Recent achievements (2004) include 

word error rates of 26.3 percent and 19.1 percent at processing speeds of 7 

and 8 times slower than real-time on Arabic and Chinese news broadcasts. 

Goals for speech-to-text transcription include: (1) providing high 

accuracy multilingual word-level transcription from speech at all stages of 

processing and across multiple genres, topics, speakers, and channels 

(such as Arabic, Chinese, and other relevant speech dialects from news 

broadcasts, talk shows, the Web, signals intelligence, and databases); (2) 

representing and extracting “meaning” out of spoken language by 

reconciling and resolving jargon, slang, code-speak, and language 

ambiguities; (3) dynamically adapting to (noisy) acoustics, speakers, 

topics, new names, speaking-styles, and dialects; (4) improving relevance 

to deliver the information decision-makers need; (5) assimilating and 

integrating speech across multiple sources to support exploration and 

analysis to enable natural queries and drill-down; and (6) increased 

portability across languages, sources, and information needs. 

Some examples of critical contributing technologies include: improved 

acoustic modeling; robust feature extraction; better discriminative 

estimation models; improved language and pronunciation modeling; and 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 37

language independent approaches that are able to learn from examples by 

using algorithms that exploit advances in computational power plus the 

large quantities of electronic speech and text that are now available. The 

ultimate goal is to create rapid, robust technology that can be ported 

cheaply and easily to other languages and domains. 

Information Management and Text Processing 

There are many technologies that fall within this category—too 

many to address in detail here. The contextual exploitation capability 

area describes some of the more important technologies. This section 

supplements that discussion with a description of a few other key 

technologies of particular value to HTP. 

Information retrieval has been responsible for the development of 

many useful algorithms and techniques for document analysis. This is in 

part due to the statistical nature of information retrieval, which itself 

derives from the vast amount of data such programs typically face. The 

essential problems in information retrieval are concerned with both 

similarity and ranking. Binding similar documents together makes 

information retrieval conceptually coherent; ranking them in order of 

relevancy to a query makes it efficient. 

“Advanced search” uses a combination of an advanced keyword 

approach (to compensate for common typing/spelling confusions and 

idiosyncrasies) and probabilistic latent semantic analysis to ascertain if a 

particular topic is being discussed without using specific keywords. 

Latent semantic analysis is one of a large class of unsupervised machine 

learning techniques that transform the original representation of texts 

to a new representation reflecting patterns of word occurrences in a 

large corpus of texts. In some situations, using this new representation 

can provide a small improvement in the effectiveness of processes such 

as search or classification applied to the text versus using a 

representation based on the original words and phrases of the 

document. Latent semantic analysis is mostly likely to provide an 

advantage when the data has an underlying structure (modeled as 

dimensions in a real-valued space) that matches up nicely with the 

categories to which a system is trying to assign texts. 
38 I CHAPTER 4 

Entity extraction methods extract key facts from documents by 

accurately mining information from free text based on user requirements. 

These approaches were developed to be most effective when formal 

reports and articles are the materials for analysis. Entity extraction 

techniques are likely to be less effective in the chat medium, where 

content is less structured and language use is less formal. Abbreviations, 

misspellings, slang, and more speech-like constructions are the norm 

rather than the exception in chat. Although name translation remains 

problematic, automatic name extraction (or tagging) works reasonably 

well in English, Chinese, and Arabic. Researchers increasingly focus on 

sophisticated techniques for extracting information about entities, 

relationships, and events. 

Relationship extraction is much harder than entity extraction, and is 

important when seeking to extract entities and their relationships from 

textual narratives about activities, people, materials, and organizations, 

for example. Advanced techniques are able to efficiently and accurately 

discover, extract, and link sparse evidence contained in large amounts 

of unclassified and classified data sources such as public news 

broadcasts or classified intelligence reports. 

Detection uses advanced techniques to detect and discover the exact 

information a user seeks quickly and effectively and to flag new 

information that may be of interest. Cross-language information retrieval 

is the current focus of the research community with recent results 

showing the technique can work roughly as well as monolingual retrieval. 

Summarization reduces (substantially) the amount of text that 

people have to read. Researchers are now working on techniques for 

automatic headline generation (for single documents) and for multidocument summaries (of clusters of related documents). 

Graphical representations are critical to enable “connecting the dots” 

when representing data and patterns as graphs. Patterns specified as 

graphs with nodes representing entities such as people, places, things, and 

events; edges representing meaningful relationships between entities; and 

attribute labels amplifying the entities and their connecting links, are 

matched to data represented in the same graphical form. These highlyconnected evidence and pattern graphs also play a crucial role in 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 39

constraining the combinatorics of the iterative graph processing 

algorithms such as directed search, matching, and hypothesis evaluation. 

Link discovery starts from known entities and uses statistical, 

knowledge-based, and graph-theoretic techniques to identify explicit 

links, infer implicit links, and evaluate their significance. Search is 

constrained by expanding and evaluating partial matches from known 

starting points, rather than the alternative of considering all possible 

combinations. The high probability that linked entities will have similar 

class labels (often called autocorrelation or homophily) can be used to 

increase classification accuracy. 

Pattern learning techniques can induce a pattern description from a 

set of exemplars. Such pattern descriptions can assist an analyst in 

discovering unknown terrorist activities in data. These patterns can then 

be evaluated and refined before being considered for use in detecting 

potential terrorist activity. Pattern learning techniques are also useful in 

enabling adaptation to changes in terrorist behavior over time. 

Figure 4 depicts an experiment where a multi-lingual information 

retrieval front-end system comprised of various information management 

and text processing technologies was used to “automatically” ingest 

massive amounts of open-source text data, transform and translate it, and 

extract and auto-populate model-relevant data to a back-end analytical 

HSCB model. The analytical problem was to understand and forecast the 

preconditions and root causes that give rise to instability and conflict 

within nation-states (Indonesia and Thailand in this case). 

The data were drawn from a variety of open sources, and included 

over 1 million English documents and 2,300 foreign documents. The 

HSCB model—termed RAM—was a Bayesian network and hidden 

Markov model that measured the amount of rebel activity by a number of 

nefarious groups in the region—that is communist, socialist, separatist, and 

Islamic extremist groups such as GAM, GMIP, PULO, BRN, and JI.7

 

 

7. The extremist groups identified here are: Free Aceh Movement (GAM); Gerakan 

Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Barisan 

Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 
40 I CHAPTER 4 

Figure 4. A Multilingual Information Retrieval Front-End System 

The multi-lingual front-end system included a language-independent 

transformation and categorization tool based on a Hilbert engine that 

encodes ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) 

text into numerical vectors, and a linguistic pattern analyzer that 

automatically populates the RAM with model-relevant data. The results 

of the experiment show that given a corpus of 1,236,300 documents 

(2,300 being foreign Bahasa documents), it would take 117 man years for 

a human to read it all (assuming 12 minutes to read each document), or 

280 humans to read the documents in six months, whereas the 

automated system based on linguistic pattern analyzer, the Hilbert engine, 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 41

and RAM would take 0.05 man-years with a one time cost of 0.76 manyears to configure the linguistic pattern analyzer with the necessary 

English and foreign scripts. Assuming it would cost $100,000 per manyear, the automated front-end would provide a savings of $11,695,141 

over the human method. 

Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavior Modeling 

A motivation and justification for human, social, cultural, and 

behavior modeling in the context of military operations can be found in 

the following definition of war provided by Franklin C. Spinney: 

At its most fundamental level, the conduct of war is a clash of 

independent wills operating in the moral, mental, and physical 

domains. War is not a mechanical phenomenon of physics or 

technology. War is a living phenomenon, evolving continuously 

through the interaction of competing human minds with chance 

and necessity. Moreover, the conduct of war is a group activity 

embodying multiple interactions among complex formal 

hierarchies of individuals, each operating according to its own 

tempo and rhythm under conditions of stress and uncertainty. 

Organizational culture is, therefore, of paramount importance to 

the performance of military institutions. A common culture is the 

harmonizing glue, the shared set of beliefs, values, traditions, and 

experiences. It makes it possible for the complex hierarchies to 

take the initiative rapidly or react with a variety of responses to 

sudden external changes. They will not fly apart in a struggle to 

gain sustenance, avoid danger, and overcome obstacles and 

enemies. When addressing cultural change, it is also important to 

recognize that a military culture does not exist in isolation but 

interacts continuously with its supporting domestic environment.8

 

8. Franklin Spinney, John Sayen, and Donald E. Vandergriff, “Why It's Time to Adapt to 

Changing Conditions,” in Spirit Blood and Treasure, Donald Vandergriff (editor), Presidio 

Press, 2001.
42 I CHAPTER 4 

Considering this definition, it is not surprising that most senior 

military leaders have repeatedly proclaimed that that human resources—

soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines—are the military’s greatest 

competitive edge in battle and in peace. Courage, integrity, loyalty, and 

commitment—all human, social, cultural, and behavior dimensions—

have mattered throughout history. 

For purposes of this report, HSCB modeling refers to the disciplines 

and branches of science that investigate human social phenomena 

(cognition, conflict, decision-making, cooperation) at all levels of data 

aggregation (individual, group, societal, global). The social sciences play a 

key role in HSCB modeling—providing an understanding of a multitude 

of complex, often nuanced issues and how to make better tradeoffs. For 

example, a war may have begun because of poor economic conditions or 

ethnic hatred; targeting infrastructure may cause the country to come to 

the negotiation table but it may also aggravate the conditions that created 

the conflict in the first place. 

Figure 5 illustrates the main social science disciplines that are critical to 

exploit: cognitive science, psychology, sociology, political science, 

economics, and cultural anthropology. Other social science specialties that 

may be of situational importance to utilize include business administration, 

media and communication, criminology, education, environmental studies, 

ethics, geography, law, history, international relations, linguistics, literature, 

management and organization, philosophy, environmental studies, public 

policy, religious studies, social work, urban and regional studies, and 

women’s studies. 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 43

Figure 5. Critical Social Science Disciplines 

Another important aspect of HSCB modeling is the direct and 

intensive application of quantitative and computational modeling and 

simulation techniques from mathematics, physics, statistics, operations 

research, and computer science, coupled with one or more of the various 

social sciences just described. There are numerous computer-based tools 

and models in academia and industry today that have shown varying 

degrees of promise and utility for social applications and artificial societal 

environments at small and large scales. These include advanced 

quantitative statistical and econometric methods, event history analysis, 

artificial neural networks, wavelet analysis, content analysis, systems 

dynamics, geographic information systems, social network analysis, and 

multi-agent systems or agent-based modeling. Examples where there 

have been some “limited but promising” successes in coupling social 

science methods with quantitative/computational techniques is in 

marketing research to project sales of consumer goods, and in politics to 

forecast election results based on polling and other data. 

A goal for the DOD should be to extrapolate proven successes in 

HSCB modeling to a broader set of national security problems. Some 

illustrative examples include: 
44 I CHAPTER 4 

 a national system of government as a complex adaptive societal 

system for dealing with emerging issues through policy and 

other measures 

 an extremist belief system as a cognitive structure that uses 

radical notions arrayed as concepts and associations to interpret 

information and assign meaning 

 an election, on any scale, as a computation of political 

preferences among a group of voters 

 a counterterrorism system as a set of computational information 

processes, capabilities, and activities organized for the purpose 

of preventing terrorism or dampening its effects when not 

preventable 

These applications of HSCB modeling help users investigate patterns 

of human phenomena that range from cognitive systems to groups, 

organizations, societies, nations, civilizations, and world systems, and do 

so at time scales ranging from milliseconds (brain activity) to many 

hundreds of thousands of years (human origins). 

Constituent Technologies 

The panel identified three constituent technologies critical to enable 

the HSCB modeling capability: (1) macro HSCB models, (2) micro 

HSCB models, and (3) integrated micro-macro (unified) models. 

Although promising, there are significant challenges and issues associated 

with these three constituent HSCB modeling technologies. They include: 

(1) advancing the accuracy and reliability of HSCB models for 

assessment, prediction, and forecasting purposes (yet recognizing the 

limits to HSCB modeling for prediction and forecasting); (2) getting 

reliable data at the “right” level and unit of analysis (such as provincial, 

district, regional, transnational); (3) creating controlled experiments, and 

defining associated metrics, for which HSCB models can be validated 

with extensive human-subject trials; and (4) utilizing legitimate 

approaches to validate HSCB models that may in fact be different to the 

methods used in the physical sciences, and getting the DOD science and 

technology (S&T) community to recognize the reality that absent rigor 

there is still value in provoking thought. 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 45

Macro HSCB Models 

Macro HSCB models refers to the class of models that allow structure, 

interconnections, dependencies, and trends associated with macro 

organizational entities, such as nation-states, socio-cultural regions, and 

economies and political systems to be understood. Examples include: 

system dynamics models, organizational and network flow models, 

politico-econometric structural (regression) equation models, Bayesian 

belief/influence network models, and hidden Markov models. 

As an example, consider what a system dynamics macro HSCB 

model of nation-state instability might look like. Figure 6 illustrates a 

system dynamics model whose goal is to measure the level of instability 

within a nation-state. The model is based on the theory of loads versus 

capacities—state stability is a function of the relationship between the 

loads (or pressures) on the state, and the capacity (or power) of the state 

to manage and abate them. Dissidents and insurgents create loads on the 

state, for example, by drawing down disproportionate amounts of 

resources from the state that could be used for other purposes as they 

undertake anti-regime activities such as protests, riot, or acts of violence. 

The escalation of dissidents and insurgency is a precursor to 

propensities for large-scale instability and conflict. Dissidents and 

insurgents undermine the overall political support by the citizenry for the 

state or regime, shifting the balance of power. Counterbalancing this is 

the resilience of the state or regime, and its ability to withstand loads that 

lead to instability. In the figure, the top curve represents the nominal 

insurgent growth with no intervention by the regime. If the regime 

attempts aggressive removal of insurgents, the second curve projects that 

the insurgent population is reduced for a short period of time, but then 

increases again. However, by preventing recruitment through mediating 

anti-regime messages all together, a “tipping point” occurs where the 

regime can reduce the number of dissidents recruited and, ultimately, the 

number of insurgents as reflected in the bottom curve. 
46 I CHAPTER 4 

Figure 6. MIT System Dynamics Model for Nation-state Instability
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 47

A different approach to macro HSCB modeling developed by 

Claremont Graduate University for the same problem as described above 

is a politico-econometric nation-state fragility model termed the Politics 

of Fertility, Economics and Development (POFED) model. This model 

takes the form of a system of nonlinear dynamical regression equations 

comprised of five equations and dependent variables: fertility (or birth 

rate), income, human capital (measured as literacy in terms of high school 

graduates), instability (political deaths in this case), and relative political 

capacity. The POFED model was developed to understand dynamic 

interactions between per capita income, investment, instability, political 

capacity, human capital, and birth rates for the same two countries that 

the MIT system dynamics model focused on. 

The POFED model is based on the theory that a nation is fragile 

when the per capita income of its population declines over time, thereby 

generating a “poverty trap.” An important predictor of fragility is the 

extent to which a government extracts resources from its population. 

Weak governments fall below average extraction levels obtained by 

similarly endowed societies, while robust societies extract more than one 

would anticipate from their economic endowment and allocate such 

resources to advance the government’s priorities. Instability results from 

the interaction between economic and political performance. Weakening 

states decline in their ability to extract resources, but still perform above 

expectations, while fragile states under-perform relative to others at 

comparable levels of development, continuing to lose ground in relative 

terms. Finally, strengthening states are still relatively weak but begin to 

gain in relation to their relative cohort. In general, assistance provided to 

strong or strengthening states will have positive effects on stability, while 

similar contributions to weak or to a lesser degree, weakening states, will 

be squandered. 

The relative political capacity metric measures the ability of the 

government to extract resources (usually measured in dollars, for 

example) from the country through various means, such as taxes, labor, 

or military service. The instability—measured in deaths—reflects the 

level of political violence and anti-regime sentiment in the country. A 

relative political capacity of zero is the norm—that is, it indicates that the 

government is acting in a nominal capacity compared to other countries 

that have been assessed using these techniques. A negative measure 
48 I CHAPTER 4 

indicates that a government is underperforming and weak, while a 

positive level indicates that a government is efficiently extracting 

resources. Computing the relative political capacity for a country allows 

for a determination of the tendency of a particular country toward 

behavior that could lead to state failure. The accompanying instability 

metric, based on violent incidents, provides a metric for assessing the 

resilience of the country to insurgency and to natural disasters that 

undermine the state’s ability to govern. 

Micro HSCB Models 

Micro HSCB models refers to the class of models that allow 

relationships, interactions, intent, activities, and events associated with 

micro-organizational entities to be understood—entities such as religious 

and ethnic tribes, militias, or insurgent and terrorist networks. Examples 

include link and social network analysis models, socio-cultural ethnographic 

models, cultural identify affinity maps, cognitive and behavioral models, 

multi-agent systems, and cellular automata diffusion models. 

As an example, consider what a cognitive/behavioral micro HSCB 

model to capture human performance of an individual would look like. 

The components of even the most simplistic model would need to 

include the following: 

 perception—capturing information from the environment for 

memory storage, and sensing it directly or through 

communications from others 

 motor behavior/response execution—carrying out physical 

operations on the environment 

 planning—dynamically determining the tasks to be executed 

based upon the mission/goal at hand 

 memory—storing information for later use, retrieving relevant 

data when needed, and forgetting facts and skills with time 

 workload/attention—capturing the effort required to perform a 

mission and its effects thereon 

 situation awareness—measuring how well individuals 

understand information relevant to their goals 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 49

 learning—displaying improvements in performance with 

practice and new data 

 stress—mapping the influence of negative global factors on 

performance 

 individual differences—the impact of differences in attributes 

such as expertise, culture, and personality on individual behavior 

To work, this human performance model would need to generate 

sequences of realistic user actions that: (1) receive input about the 

environment, (2) actively maintain a representation of this input for use 

in current cognitive processing, (3) evaluate the contents of this actively 

maintained representation and determine how to respond to them, (4) 

generate actions in accordance with a response plan, and (5) learn 

knowledge from experience and store/retrieve it when required. 

The question of how best to develop a detailed human performance 

model is one that has been considered for many years in the cognitive 

sciences and psychology communities. Such considerations include 

whether to build upon a single existing modeling framework (for 

example, Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational); to adopt separate 

approaches for each model component (such as selecting one model for 

visual perception, a second for working memory); or to allow flexibility 

in selecting a unified model or model component, based upon the 

application need. Many of the major computational modeling systems 

can be downloaded from various academic and government 

laboratories and examined in detail to help make such decisions. 

Indeed, some of these human performance models have been validated 

across a wide range of ages (including children, young adults, and the 

elderly), and in a variety of domains. 

Integrated Micro-Macro Models 

Integrated micro-macro (unified) models refer to the class of 

models that essentially tie the modeling elements of the previous two 

together. One of the more difficult problems in modeling social and 

behavioral phenomena is to integrate and make coherent micro/macro 

models at multiple levels of data, granularity, and analysis, and across 

multi-disciplines of the social sciences. Similarly, understanding social 
50 I CHAPTER 4 

systems and social change—both sources and consequences—via 

integrated micro/macro models requires coupling multitudes of model 

ensembles, relating their input and output to each other. Just as with the 

physical sciences, a single model cannot capture all the phenomena in a 

complex social process. 

An example of integrated micro-macro HSCB modeling is found in 

the work done at the Center for Army Analysis to forecast country 

instability. The macro HSCB models are called Analyzing Complex 

Threats for Operations and Readiness—a country-level macro-structural 

model that identifies key factors (such as gross domestic product per 

capita, life expectancy, ethnic diversity, global trade patterns) that can 

contribute to different kinds and levels of conflict and country 

instabilities; and Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence—a pattern 

classification algorithm that analyzes the relationships between country 

macro-structural factors and historical instances of country instability. 

The micro HSCB model is called FORecasts of Crisis and Instability 

using Text-based Events—a set of models that in near-real-time 

monitors, assesses, and forecasts indicators of near-term instability by 

automatically parsing and converting electronic news stories into indices 

that reflect the character and intensity of behavioral interactions between 

people, the organizations they form, and the institutions where they 

work. The results of the integrated micro-macro HSCB model have been 

promising by demonstrating the potential to accurately forecast not just 

the occurrence, but also the level of intensity of country-specific 

instabilities five years in advance with about 80 percent overall accuracy. 

On the other hand, most attempts at producing unified micro-macro 

HSCB models of cognition (Adaptive Control of ThoughtRational; 

Goals, Operators, Methods, Selection; Executive-Process/Interactive 

Control; Soar) have not confronted the many complications involved in 

capturing the behaviors of higher level entities such as organized teams. 

When they have attempted to model teams, it was generally done for 

simple missions, with the primary extension of their models involving the 

addition of communication tasks that allow one individual to 

communicate with one or more other members of the team and 

remember the results. In addition to developing approaches for 

extending existing individual human models, the embodiment of team 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 51

behavior would ideally allow the operator of the system to observe and 

interact with its components at various levels of aggregation. This 

suggests that whatever specific enhancements are made should naturally 

combine to allow viewing simulations at a variety of different levels, from 

large teams to small teams to individual team members. 

Technology Strategies and Recommendations 

As described near the end of chapter 2, the panel assessed each 

constituent technology with respect to its development maturity and 

uniqueness to DOD. This assessment led to a simple categorization 

scheme shown in table 10, into which the particular technologies for 

HTP have been assigned. 

Table 10. Human Terrain Preparation Technologies Categorized According to 

Development Maturity 

Technology 

Areas

Promising, but 

Immature

Under 

Development 

Showing Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature 

in DOD

Human, social, 

cultural, 

behavior 

modeling

 Macro HSCB 

models 

 Micro HSCB 

models 

 Integrated 

micro-macro 

models 

Automated 

language 

processing

 Foreign-toEnglish 

translation 

 Speech-to-text 

transcription 

 Information 

management 

and text 

processing 

Rapid training/ 

learning 

methods/aids

 Human/team 

performance 

measurement 

 Language/cultur

e/leadership 

tutoring tools 

 High-fidelity 

immersive 

games, 

training and 

mission 

rehearsal tools 
52 I CHAPTER 4 

In this context, noting that DOD has nothing “at the ready,” the 

panel recommends that DOD: 

 Increase the priority and accelerate the creation of a 

continuous learning environment for training and 

professional military education. It is especially needed when 

the operational tempo is high and the traditional reliance on 

attendance at institutions for training and professional military 

education is most strained. Steps include: 

- more exploitation of commercially developed distance learning 

tools and more experiments on alternative approaches 

- creating a DOD program linking service efforts to design 

training tools and processes to develop cognitive decisionmaking skills in junior leaders 

- rewarding service members for pursuing less structured but 

equally compelling professional military programs of study 

that develop their skills in human terrain preparation 

- assigning higher priority and more resources to the 

development of immersive games, simulators, and training, 

and mission rehearsal tools to develop multi-cultural 

interpersonal skills supporting small unit operations 

 Plan to sustain a long-term commitment and robust effort 

to develop and adapt automated language processing 

technologies. This effort will involve tapping into and 

leveraging commercial research and development work and 

investments, but will also require focused investments for those 

particular languages and dialects to which the military may be 

uniquely exposed. 

 Develop an S&T roadmap for HSCB in response to the 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering’s 

(DDR&E) Strategic Planning Guidance (FY08–13) and 

create an S&T portfolio for such modeling that would 
HUMAN TERAIN PREPARATION I 53

- attract the best and brightest from the HSCB community to 

work on DOD problems; this could involve expanding the 

Defense Science Study Group program to include social 

scientists 

- establish benchmarks, metrics, experimentation, and 

validation techniques for HSCB modeling 

- be closely connected to the combatant commands and other 

potential users 
54 I CHAPTER 5 

Chapter 5. Ubiquitous Observation 

and Recording 

The QDR identified an emerging threat environment that 

fundamentally challenges the ability of traditional U.S. surveillance 

systems to detect, track, and identify adversaries. The tanks, submarines, 

and aircraft characteristic of enemy forces of previous eras are being 

augmented or replaced with small and dispersed teams and individuals. 

The United States now faces opponents who can employ what might be 

considered the ultimate form of stealth: individuals hiding in plain sight. 

Today’s adversaries exploit the urban environment by hiding among its 

populace or seeking the natural cover of foliage to block observation by 

traditional sensor systems. 

To counter this new threat, the panel believes that new technology 

exists or could be developed to provide new levels of spatial, temporal, 

and spectral resolution and diversity. Furthermore, the ability to record 

terabytes of data will provide an omnipresent knowledge of the present 

and the past that can be used to rewind battle space observations in 

TiVo-like fashion to identify and locate even low-level enemy forces. 

The panel’s concept extends the vision of persistent ISR to a more 

comprehensive capability in time and space called “ubiquitous 

observation and recording.” 

Capability Description and Technology Areas 

Today’s surveillance systems often provide either episodic observation 

with exquisite detail or coarse resolution with higher temporal sampling 

rates. These systems are usually operated independently with tasking often 

uncoordinated with the commanders in the field. Hence, their continuity 

of coverage is typically only marginally useful to the commander. 

The panel’s concept for ubiquitous observation and recording is a 

system of sensors that will be able to provide both surveillance of large 

areas and close access surveillance of individuals and small groups. The 

sensor system would be coupled to a data collection system able to 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 55

record and store everything captured by the sensors for long periods of 

time. The sensors in this network will need to be very diverse. They 

should include systems such as very-high-frequency imaging radars to 

penetrate foliage; high-frequency radars that can provide high-resolution 

day/night images and moving-target tracking in all weather; and optical 

systems that can detect, locate, and track systems with the high resolution 

in low night light conditions. Additionally, these sensors will need to be 

augmented with close-in sensors and tags, as well as humans on the 

ground in intimate contact with both the enemy and the noncombatant 

population. These close-in sensors will span the full spectrum of 

phenomenology from seismic and acoustic sensors to chemical, 

biological, and radiological sensors. 

To be most effective, this system of sensors will need to act as a 

hierarchically integrated network, where each layer in the network 

provides a region of focused attention with the next layer providing 

greater resolution in space and time but over a narrower area. Although 

full integration between every sensor is not required, it is critically 

important that certain subsets of sensors be vertically integrated to 

provide for rapid focus of attention spanning the space from broadarea to close-access.9

The system construct for ubiquitous observation and recording is 

shown in figure 7, and consists of three principal technology areas: 

1. Day/Night All-Weather Wide Area Persistent Surveillance.

A two-layer approach is envisioned: (1) large regions measuring 

approximately100 kilometers square under constant surveillance 

with day/night all-weather radars that can detect and track 

moving targets and image stationary targets at resolution 

measured in feet to meters, and with temporal sampling 

measured in tens of seconds; and (2) focus areas (cities) 

measuring approximately 20 kilometers square, observed 

continuously at a resolution of one meter and a sampling time of 

one second with the sensitivity to see like “an owl in the night.” 

 

9. This concept is a further refinement of the layered ISR architecture developed by the 

DSB Task Force on Future Strategic Strike, and documented in its February 2004 report. 
56 I CHAPTER 5 

2. Close-in Sensing and Tagging. This area entails the prolific 

use of hand-emplaced or autonomously delivered unattended 

networked sensors and tags to enable detailed quantitative 

tracking and measurement of individuals, vehicles, small groups, 

and other dispersed assets of value to the enemy. 

3. Soldiers as Collectors. An untapped real-time resource are the 

“boots on the ground” that could provide “cop on the beat” 

insights and intelligence. 

Regions of interest for focusing assets are determined by conventional 

intelligence means, assisted by the entire array of sensor systems 

themselves, providing near-real-time updates. 

Figure 7. Ubiquitous Observation and Recording Concept 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 57

Day/Night All-Weather Wide Area Persistent 

Surveillance 

The limited information in both space and time provided by broad 

area surveillance dictates the need for a two-layer architecture consisting 

of long-range collection systems coupled to a focused, limited, local area 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) suite with short-range sensors. The key 

architectural strategy is to use sufficient persistent sampling at limited 

resolution, combined with sufficient resolution and limited persistence. 

The integration of these two collection systems can provide a 

virtual capability in a region between both systems as shown in figure 8. 

The broad area surveillance network is likely to include both satellites 

and a number of high-altitude air vehicles with endurance measured in 

weeks. Continuous coverage is vital for tracking moving objects in an 

environment that is dense with both targets and confusers. Resolution 

on the order of one meter or less with update rates of one-per-second 

or less are needed for tracking moving objects operating in the midst of 

other moving objects. Both optical and radar sensor systems candidates 

will be used for these tasks. 

Radar Technologies 

Radar sensors are often preferred for broad area surveillance since they 

can provide all-weather day/night coverage. Substantial improvements in 

radar sensor technology will be needed to provide the level of capability 

envisioned for ubiquitous observation. Current radar technology can 

provide significant high resolution area coverage of fixed objects using 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, but at very low update rates 

over large areas. It is possible today to provide moving object radar 

detection but with poor angular resolution. A significant advance in radar 

technology will be needed to provide high update rates with high 

resolution over a wide area of coverage. 
58 I CHAPTER 5 

Figure 8. A Well-Balanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Architecture 

The ultimate vision for broad area radar surveillance is to provide 

efficient coverage by ultra-long endurance, high-altitude UAVs cued by 

a space-based radar system, illustrated in figure 9. The key attributes of 

a mixed space-based and airborne surveillance system are as follows: 

 deep, theater-wide, assured access, requiring an element that is 

space-based 

 persistent awareness and tracking of significant movements and 

near-continuous access to regions of interest 

 day/night, all-weather surveillance with radar surveillance systems 

using ground moving target indication (GMTI) for the broad area 

coverage and focused SAR imaging on selected targets 

 timely information in response to user needs through dynamic 

theater/combatant commander tasking 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 59

 terrain knowledge sufficient for visualization and for targeting 

precision-guided munitions, requiring radar-based high 

resolution terrain imaging (high resolution terrain imaging or 

precision digital terrain elevation data) 

 sufficient capacity to enable a new paradigm: “information 

needs driven tasking,” which calls for an integrated, electrooptical/infrared/SAR/GMTI dynamic tasking capability 

 ubiquitous observation through the use of an intelligent closed 

loop dynamic database 

Figure 9. Field of View Provided by Space and Airborne Radar Sensors 
60 I CHAPTER 5 

The space radar segment will provide both SAR and GMTI of 

ground forces in close contact and in real time with accuracy sufficient to 

target enemy forces. This evolution of space surveillance systems will 

provide not only strategic intelligence information, but real time tactical 

targeting information. The persistence and revisit rate of the space-based 

surveillance system will be a function of both the individual satellite 

design and the constellation size. Additionally it will be necessary to 

exploit all the radar scattering information that can be obtained by using 

full-polarization GMTI and high-range-resolution GMTI to dissect the 

target and enable target characterization along a broad dimensional basis. 

In this way sufficient information can be obtained in order to focus and 

task higher resolution optical sensors. There are a multitude of trade offs 

that can be made among these factors, as well as among the capabilities 

of the airborne sensors that augment this constellation to provide 

increased persistence and resolution. 

The improved capability of these surveillance systems will increase 

the incentive for an adversary to target these systems for defeat or 

countermeasures. The threats that these systems will face create the 

requirement for these systems to be designed for survival in such an 

environment. It is envisioned that a space-based surveillance system will 

be designed to withstand an attack by either a high-altitude nuclear 

detonation or electronic counter-sensor jamming systems intended to 

“blind” the radar sensors. These increased threats may stress the current 

state of radiation-tolerant electronic designs of radio-frequency transmit 

and receive modules, as well as computing power efficiency of today’s 

digital signal processing systems. 

It is important to remember that broad area sensors will operate as 

part of an integrated network. These systems are most useful when 

their tasking is coordinated with other sensors in the network. Similarly 

the collection and exploitation of all data in a timely and intelligent 

fashion is key to the overall system performance and utility. 

Optical Technologies 

Going beyond persistent surveillance to a continuous or video level 

of observation (<1 meter and >1 hertz imagery), offering a continuous 

“God’s eye view” of large areas, will enable a dramatic improvement in 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 61

situational understanding. This improvement will be achieved when 

high-resolution, high-update-rate data can fill in gaps and help tie 

together all sources of intelligence collection. For example, after a car 

bomb detonates, one would have the ability to play high-resolution data 

backward in time to follow the vehicle back to the source, to then use 

that knowledge to focus communication and signals intelligence sensors 

or search through achieved data. This view can provide the foundation 

upon which to map all other intelligence, much the same as imagery 

intelligence is tied to terrain databases today. 

Current video optical sensor technology offers area coverage 

through the use the use of a multitude of separate optical sensors 

(figure 10). This system does not scale well to very broad areas (such as 

a large city or country) due to the large number of sensors required. 

Multiple high-altitude, long-endurance air-vehicle-based optical sensors 

offer an attractive alternative when the goal is to cover such large areas. 

Figure 10. Hypothetical Synergy in Mixed Architectures 
62 I CHAPTER 5 

The elements that will enable such broad area video surveillance 

capability will include: arrays of small, low-cost UAVs for under-theclouds optical surveillance and tracking; ultra-long endurance, highaltitude UAVs whose endurance is measured in weeks for large focus 

areas; and space-based low-earth-orbit or mid-earth-orbit radar 

surveillance systems to provide a broad synoptic integrating view. 

Enabling technologies to achieve ubiquitous observation and recording 

as envisioned by the panel will likely include hydrogen powered UAVs 

for long endurance (H2 IC engines and longer-term hydrogen fuel 

cells); ultra-light weight sensor systems (radar, infrared, and optical); 

light-weight optics; large area (1 billion pixel) focal plane sensors; 

radiation-hard digital electronics for space transmit and receive 

modules; and 50 percent efficient space solar power. 

Future collection concepts like ultra-high 2-D spatial resolution and 

vector measurement of target velocity via multi-static range-range 

bilateration of GMTI radar data from two separate platforms offer 

potential enhancements to target location and identification. These new 

system collection opportunities will require the ability to task both 

airborne and space-based sensors in a very tightly integrated manner. 

Close-in Sensors and Tagging Systems 

The diffuse nature and low signature of current and future threats 

will make close-in ISR increasingly important. Such close-in sensing 

must include both traditional human intelligence, as well as a new set 

of sensors that must be placed very close to their targets because of 

the inherently low signature of these targets (which may be a single 

individual or small weapon). Outlined below is how technology can 

support both human intelligence and physically emplaced sensors and 

networks. Covertness will come from both the small size of the 

sensors as well as innovative camouflage and deception for the 

sensors and their means of communication. 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 63

Constituent Technologies 

The vision for close-in sensors is to develop a broad spectrum of 

sensors (chemical, biological, radiation, acoustic, seismic, optical, or 

infrared, for example) with integrated command and control (tasking) 

and data exfiltration links. The size of these sensors might range from 

that of a shirt button to that of a soda can (with < 1 cm3

 as a nominal 

goal). Also required is the means to precisely deliver these sensors 

across a broad area (1 meter circular error probability into a city or a 

nation) and the energy sources that will permit the sensors to operate 

from weeks to months.10

Current R&D programs for tagging, tracking, and locating should be 

enhanced to provide capability to deploy and use tags, taggants, and 

sensors for close observation in areas of denied access. Nanotechnology, 

in particular, offers potential for devices that can endure for very long 

periods of time in close proximity to targets of interest and that can be 

delivered by clandestine means. Biology and chemistry can be exploited 

to provide ability to track and identify people and materiel that move 

from locations of interest to other locations, and a combination of 

nanotechnology, biology, and chemistry promise to provide significant 

increases in capability to conduct pervasive surveillance on a global basis 

with minimized exposure of personnel and minimized probability of 

compromise of the deployed assets. Additional emphasis needs to be 

directed toward exfiltration of data from remote locations and 

autonomous control of sensors, including movement based on sensed 

information. Increases in science and technology investment currently 

planned in this area should be supported, with potentially added funding 

as the projects demonstrate progress. DOD and the intelligence 

community should also support efforts to maintain awareness of non–

U.S. R&D in these areas and potential threats to U.S. forces and critical 

national infrastructure. 

 

10. An in-depth review of DOD’s energy usage practices and energy requirements was 

conducted in a parallel study by the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy 

Strategy, report forthcoming. 
64 I CHAPTER 5 

Microsensor Technologies 

There are a variety of technologies that can support this vision for 

close-in sensing. Advances in high-density electronic packaging, largely 

driven by the handheld consumer electronics industry, have been 

dramatic in recent years. Similarly, there have been considerable advances 

in some relevant sensor technologies (such as microphones and video 

cameras). However, there are a variety of military-specific sensors that 

the department cannot rely on industry to produce. Chemical, biological, 

and radiation sensors are at the top of this list. There has been significant 

activity in existing DOD sensor programs, but progress has been slow. 

Other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, have 

started related programs in which DOD should be informed to avoid 

unnecessary duplication of effort. The panel encourages continued effort, 

but ones that are well synchronized across the interagency. 

In addition to the sensing technologies themselves, high performance, 

efficient signal processors are required to process sensor data and reduce 

bandwidth prior to data exfiltration. Such bandwidth compression is often 

required both to minimize sensor detection and to conserve power for 

communications. Although there has been notable progress in commercial 

low-power signal processors, the DOD needs are so extreme (1-10 mW) 

that continued development of DOD–specific custom processors for this 

application is warranted. 

Energy and Communications Technologies 

Whether close-access sensors can be easily observed is often 

dominated by the energy source and the communications system 

antenna. Although there have been extraordinary advances in battery 

technology in the past several years, the performance and lifetime of 

modern close-access sensing systems is still largely determined by battery 

life. A 100-fold increase in battery energy density should be a goal for 

these systems. The panel encourages continued research into advanced 

technologies such as energy scavenging, but recognizes that practical 

energy scavenging systems (except for solar cells) are not likely to appear 

within the next decade. Creative antenna designs continue to emerge and 

R&D in this area is also encouraged due to the critical need for small 

antennas. Specialty materials (such as, materials that morph, change color, 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 65

or have unusual visual or electronic properties) will continue to be key 

for antennas, energy sources, and structures for these sensors. 

Deployment Enablers 

The final technology challenge noted by the panel is the ability to 

deploy close-access sensors undetected. Work on low-observable, 

autonomous, air, land, and sea vehicles specifically designed for precision 

(<1 meter circular error probability) sensor emplacement across a broad 

region will continue to be a needed R&D investment area. 

Soldier as a Collector 

The need for close-access sensing and the likelihood of U.S. troop 

presence on the ground in conflict areas of stabilization zones offers 

the opportunity to create networks of sensors using the individuals as 

the platform to carry and/or distribute sensors, as well as to utilize 

their innate human sensing capabilities in a networked fashion. 

Fielding such networks would enable ground forces to fill a tactical 

intelligence gap that has become evident in current operations against 

adversaries able to adapt in near real time. Tactical intelligence 

gathered by these networks will complement national collection means 

in modern operations—especially in preventive and post-combat 

operations. A major lesson of recent operations is that human-tohuman interchange in the operational theater can significantly increase 

the likelihood of success. 

The timely collection of facts obtained at the tactical (and even the 

interpersonal level) may help to create better operational decisions at all 

levels. The goal is to create networks of soldiers who are capable of 

collecting information within their sphere of influence and who can share 

this information with other members of the net in a timely fashion. 

Constituent Technologies 

A variety of sensor technologies (many of them similar or identical to 

those discussed in the previous section) have size, weight, power, and 

other logistics attributes that make them suitable for employment on the 
66 I CHAPTER 5 

soldier without adding a significant burden. The organized collection, 

analysis, and reporting of such information provides for heretofore 

unobtainable improvements in the ability to 

 maintain blue force situational awareness while performing 

dedicated collection or other missions 

 monitor, record, and assess information in the relevant context 

for supported echelons 

 obtain imagery, audio, and other soldier-observed/collected 

data sharing with which to support command and control 

decisions 

 archive and retrieve close-in, detailed data to support future 

intelligence, operations, rehearsal, and training 

Micro/Miniature Sensors 

Several technologies must be developed and/or integrated to 

seamlessly integrate a network of sensors capable of collecting and 

archiving the data from within each soldier’s sphere of influence. Many 

front-end sensors (especially small digital/video cameras, audio recorders, 

and Global Positioning System [GPS] receivers) are commercially 

available and ready for integration. The consumer electronics industry has 

driven these technologies to an attractive regime of size, weight, power, 

performance, and cost. Other sensor technologies are at lower readiness 

levels and will require development to make them compatible as soldierborne equipment. Examples of these technologies include chemical and 

biological detectors, small multi-spectral sensors, mobile ad-hoc 

communication networks, and geolocation systems that will work in 

GPS-denied areas (such as in buildings). Also under development are 

some interesting technologies that can aid soldiers in their interaction 

with local civilians. These include automatic language translators 

(discussed in the automated language processing section in Chapter 4) 

and technologies to automatically detect intentional deception of people 

being interviewed by soldiers. 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 67

Automated Debriefing Tools 

To aid the soldier himself as the collector, the panel believes that 

automated and interactive debriefing tools will be needed. These tools 

will allow the soldier to quickly and efficiently collect personal 

observations and deliver them to the network with minimal effort. As 

soldiers in the field are already burdened with numerous stresses, this 

system should be seen as something to make their tasks easier rather 

than more burdensome. 

Recording 

The archiving, retrieval, fusion, and contextual understanding of the 

data collected will be a key element in determining the utility of a soldierbased sensor network. These technologies were discussed previously in 

this report. 

Energy 

Energy sources will be a key enabling technology. Batteries appear to 

be the only currently viable source of energy for soldier-borne 

equipment. As with close-in emplaced sensors, a 10- to 100-fold 

improvement in current energy storage per unit weight is both useful and 

necessary. Although industry is pushing these technologies hard, the 

extreme needs of DOD users warrant continued R&D investment in 

ultra-high-density energy storage technologies. 

Technology Strategies and Recommendations 

The maturity matrix for the priority constituent technologies for 

ubiquitous observation is shown in table 11. Outside of energy storage 

technologies, which are today being driven largely by commercial 

electronics, the priority technologies for ubiquitous observation are 

more specialized for DOD and intelligence community purposes, and 

will therefore require sustained investment to advance. Such has been 

the case for hyperspectral and foliage penetration sensors. The panel 

believes that these particular technologies are ready for operational 

fielding. In more speculative domains, such as microsensors, bio-
68 I CHAPTER 5 

inspired and bio-electronic tags and sensors, devices in the micro to 

nano domains, molecular scaled taggants, and micro delivery platforms, 

investment is deserved. 

Table 11. Ubiquitous Observations Technologies Categorized According to 

Development Maturity 

Technology 

Areas

Promising, but 

Immature

Under 

Development 

Showing 

Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature in 

DOD

Day/night allweather wide 

area 

surveillance

 High-altitude, 

long-endurance 

platforms 

 Giga-pixel 

optical imaging 

 Space-based 

GMTI/SAR 

 Active/ 

passive 

hyperspectral 

sensors 

 Foliagepenetration 

sensors 

Close-in sensor 

and tagging 

systems

 Stealthy, 

precision 

delivery 

platforms 

 Microsensor 

technologies 

 High 

performance, 

high efficiency 

signal 

processing 

 Ultra-highdensity 

packaging for 

millimeter scale 

sensors & tags 

 Native signature 

recognition at 

long ranges 

(human and 

object) 

 Efficient 

energy 

storage 

technology 

 Miniature 

sensor and 

tag 

technology 

 High 

density 

packaging 

for centimeter scale 

devices 

Soldiers-ascollectors

 Microsensor 

technology 

 Interactive 

automated 

debriefing 

 All-domain 

precision 

geolocation 

 Soldier-centric 

communications 

and networking 

technology 

 Body-borne 

flexible displays 

 Efficient 

energy 

storage 

technology 

 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION AND RECORDING I 69

To achieve significant progress toward the panel’s vision for 

ubiquitous observation, DOD must consider the management 

recommendations found in the main report. This capability is but the 

latest vision for ISR and, as with all previous visions, it must cut across all 

services and the intelligence community if it is to be realized. As such, 

cross-cutting programming, management, and oversight will be needed. 

In addition, three more technically focused recommendations should be 

pursued to support the ubiquitous observation vision: 

1. The Army, Marines, and DARPA should partner in an 

effort to accelerate the maturation of the soldier-ascollector concept. The program should also include 

monitoring and developing relevant miniature sensor 

technologies and automated debriefing tools. 

2. A sustained series of advanced technology demonstrations 

and advanced concept technology demonstrations should 

be supported through DARPA and DDR&E to develop 

and demonstrate the ability to task and integrate local 

collection with wide area assets. U.S. Strategic Command 

and U.S. Special Operations Command should be major 

participants in these activities because of their global 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance responsibilities. 

3. DARPA and related research and development agencies 

should sustain a focused program to develop energy 

efficient microsensors and the platforms to deliver them, 

along with development of the systems network concepts 

to enable close-in sensing. 
70 I CHAPTER 4 

Chapter 6. Contextual Exploitation 

A new set of information-rich exploitation and collaboration tools 

are needed to bridge the functional capabilities of ubiquitous observation 

to rapidly tailored delivery of scaled effects. The need is driven in part by 

the panel’s vision for ubiquitous observation and recording, but also by 

the environments in which the U.S. military must now operate. 

Contemporary and projected operational environments are characterized 

by extraordinarily complex and demanding terrains of: geography, social 

and cultural identity, state and non-state political association, 

interweaving of adversary activity with everyday commerce and civil life, 

communications, and much-increased expectation of mission 

effectiveness and avoidance of collateral damage. Within this milieu, 

target identification and location and decision-making still remain central 

elements of combat. The concept of “target” has expanded and now 

includes complex and often ambiguous entities, down to individuals in 

indigenous populations. In this increasingly demanding operating 

environment, the war fighter needs target discrimination tools that 

provide more rapid, accurate, and contextually relevant effects. 

Capability Description and Technology Areas 

The succinct description of contextual exploitation is the over-used 

phrase “connecting the dots.” The massive amounts of data already being 

generated by open, military, and intelligence sources demand much better 

automated tools for both analytical and real-time applications. The 

challenge is even more significant as the advances described for ubiquitous 

observation become a reality. The panel’s assessment identified three 

technology areas as priorities for the contextual exploitation capability: 

1. mega-scale data management 

2. situation-dependent information extraction 

3. human/system collaboration 

The combination of these technologies will open new opportunities 

to automate the discovery of relationships among apparently independent 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 71

events, actions, things, or people, masked by military and civilian clutter, 

and will provide tools to raise the level of human computer interaction 

from interface to broad domain collaboration. These tools will be used 

to extract salient and related features, and to enable time-critical 

targeting and intent recognition of evolving threats. Their development 

is being driven largely by the commercial sector and fueled by rapid 

innovations in underlying technologies such as computation, data 

storage, and software architecture. 

Mega-Scale Data Management 

Future operations can be expected to require the contextual 

exploitation capability to handle exabytes of data at transfer rates of 

terabytes per second, coupled to decision timelines in seconds to 

minutes. As the threat base evolves, there will be a greater dependence 

on integrated, multiple-domain sensors with much greater dynamic range, 

spatial reach, sample rate, and temporal history. Mega-scale data 

management will apply an integrated, federated, and scaleable data 

framework to link disparate information sources and provide robust 

knowledge management to permit conclusions based on contextual 

relationships. It will also incorporate a robust security and access 

environment to enable information to be routed and shared appropriately 

in a timely manner. Advanced automated decision tools will increase the 

war fighter’s ability to make timely decisions with an explicit evidential 

basis and reduce the level of information overload often experienced in 

answering prioritized information requests. User-defined knowledge 

sharing will minimize catastrophic errors due to cognitive biases and 

other limitations. 

In the private sector, the ability to model and improve marketing 

analysis, energy exploration, and financial forecasting have benefited 

from the application of these technologies. Within DOD, however, 

efforts to manage and exploit large data sets, conduct mission planning, 

and contingency management have had limited success. The panel 

(indeed the entire study team) believes that DOD must become a much 

more agile and responsive adapter of commercial advances in this and 

related fields in order to achieve the anticipated operational demands of 

data management. 
72 I CHAPTER 4 

Situation-Dependent Information Extraction 

Situation-dependent information extraction uses advanced algorithms 

to support situation associative processing and improve human systems 

collaboration. Tools are needed to go beyond static data filtering and 

template matching. Early work has shown that Bayesian networks, 

statistical analysis, and hidden Markov models can be used to extract 

meaning and context from complex and cluttered data streams. 

Application of these techniques for disparate sensors that are not 

temporally or specially matched would enable DOD to detect, discern, 

analyze, and understand the actions of stealthy adversaries embedded in 

complex domains. 

Effective implementation and utilization of these tools in 

conjunction with better understanding of the operational environment 

and adversary activities will improve performance of U.S. forces across 

the decision-making spectrum from tactical to strategic, and across the 

pre- to post-conflict timeline. Improvements in link analysis and intent 

inference will result in faster and more complete understanding of 

options leading to better decisions. Many of the tools described as 

applicable to human terrain preparation, especially for automated 

language processing, apply to this technology area as well. 

Human/System Collaboration 

Human/system collaboration is the least mature of the three 

priority technology areas identified by the panel. The current state of 

the art for humans interacting with computer systems is largely 

characterized by data filtering and graphical user interfaces. The longterm objective is to transform the interactions between humans and 

systems from an “interface” to a true “collaboration.” Through the 

development of the capability for computers to assist in tasks that today 

can be done only by humans, significant performance improvements 

should be expected, with goals of at least an order of magnitude 

reduction in workload for operators under stress, and two or more 

orders of magnitude reduction in time for complex analyses 

characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 73

To illustrate the areas where technology can be developed to 

enhance human-systems collaboration, the panel investigated three 

constituent technologies: 

1. natural man-machine interfaces 

2. knowledge representation 

3. human-guided algorithms 

Natural Man-Machine Interfaces 

The need for effective interfaces between the user/operator and the 

computer is obvious, whether it is for a soldier in combat or an analyst 

confronted with a “haystack” of data within which he/she is searching 

for the proverbial “needle.” It is imperative to understand how humans 

interpret and understand data to create useful information in both timepressured and life-threatening environments. The desire is that the 

interface be transparent and intuitive to the human and be supported by 

context-sensitive cues or some other reach-back knowledge management 

capability so that only the most relevant and timely data are presented. 

The modalities for interaction are likely to expand beyond just the visual 

and will include voice/speech, tactile, and other concepts (such as 

psychophysical context or physiological measurements of operator 

“state”). The mode of interaction could be keyed in part by the 

physiological state of the individual. 

This area is one where there is significant activity outside the 

department in the commercial sector in such industries as gaming, 

virtual reality, and large-scale data analysis application, including 

weather forecasting, financial analysis, and energy exploration. The 

department should establish an effort to actively monitor commercial 

developments and exploit them as appropriate for military missions. 

Knowledge Representation 

For the human and the computer to truly collaborate, it is necessary 

to improve the ability to represent human knowledge in a manner in 

which a computer can both store and operate. Knowledge representation 

has been recognized for decades as a key enabler for the tractability of 
74 I CHAPTER 4 

machine reasoning including decision-making, data mining, hypothesis 

generation/affirmation/negation, and search. There has been significant 

research in this area for a number of years, largely directed at trying to 

model and replicate human cognitive tasks in computer hardware. The 

field of artificial intelligence has been one of the prime drivers. There is 

still much to be done, but, as with the man-machine interface area, there 

is significant activity outside the department. Consequently, the panel 

recommends that the department establish a program to monitor and 

exploit these developments for the military mission. For military 

applications, knowledge representation challenges include representing 

commander’s intent and tactics and to represent political, military, 

economic, cultural, and religious characteristics of an operational 

environment and the relationships among them. 

Human-Guided Algorithms 

Automated (purely algorithmic) solutions to complex, large-scale 

problems such as image analysis and understanding for exploitation, 

“connecting the dots” for higher levels of fusion, and real-time plan 

generation for command and control applications (including tasking 

exploitation resources) often fall short due to: (1) the inability of the 

algorithm designers to build in the broad set of models required to 

capture the richness of these real-world problems, and (2) the heuristics 

required to trim the huge search spaces involved. 

A traditional approach to addressing these shortcomings has been 

to model the way that operators (humans) solve these problems 

(through, for example, cognitive task analysis) and to build software 

that embodies and/or supports those human-centric approaches. This 

often falls short due to the difficulty of building software that mimics 

complex human decision-making strategies. 

An alternative approach—referred to here as “human-guided 

algorithms”—is to augment algorithmic approaches with operator 

insight into models and heuristics that are highly context dependent. 

Said another way, in developing algorithmic approaches, it is nearly 

impossible for the algorithm designer to anticipate and build in models 

and heuristics for all possible contexts, although designers are often 

able to build many that are broadly applicable across contexts and to 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 75

build in a finite set of context-specific ones. Human-guided algorithms 

have “hooks” built in and associated human-system interface (also 

known as graphical user interface) mechanisms that allow operators to 

participate in the decision-making. The software architectures for such 

solutions must be designed early in the design cycle to accommodate 

these interactions. Furthermore the solution must be “instrumented” 

with additional data structures that are used to tag the solution to 

indicate which models and heuristics were employed in developing the 

solution. This approach provides insight to the human operator as to 

why and how a specific solution was developed. 

This area is judged by the panel to be in the very early stages of 

development and falls into the high-risk category. However, success 

with this technology is likely to pay significant dividends and help 

achieve the goal of at least two orders of magnitude improvement in 

the time for complex analyses characterized by uncertainty and 

ambiguity by creating the capability for computers to assist in tasks that 

today can be done only by humans. 

Technology Strategies and Recommendations 

The panel’s assessment of the maturity and uniqueness of the priority 

technologies for contextual exploitation is summarized in table 12. More 

so than any of the other capabilities, contextual exploitation will benefit 

from advances in the commercial sector. Current networking technology 

will continue to evolve rapidly based on market demands and worldwide 

competition. Development of business intelligence and networksearching algorithms will continue to respond to marketplace demands. 

The imminent appearance (in the 2010 timeframe) of key technologies 

opens many new paths. Exabyte storage will enable data collection 

approaching that of the human brain. Terabyte-per-second data transport 

rates will enable rapid collection of data to support new algorithms and 

advanced analysis. Petabyte processing will enable rapid computation and 

association of disparate data. 
76 I CHAPTER 4 

Table 12. Contextual Exploitation Technologies Categorized According to 

Development Maturity 

Central to the challenge is how to move ahead. The current 

programming and management of contextual exploitation within DOD 

are not well focused despite the many, but scattered efforts in the military 

services and defense agencies. There exists neither structured governance 

nor coherent planning across the department. Risks must be addressed as 

well. For example, great potential exists for adverse public and political 

reaction given contemporary concern for protecting privacy and other 

civil rights. Also, the potential for new threats based on technology 

surprise is significant, especially since adversaries can operate in an 

environment where they are less constrained by legal or moral scruples 

yet enjoy wide access to advanced information technologies. 

Rapid improvement requires establishing effective new connections 

between communities that do not easily communicate—the soldier and 

a new discipline of scientist. A related challenge is how to identify 

quality practitioners and deliver the potential their expertise can bring 

to the effort. 

Technology 

Areas

Promising, but 

Immature

Under Development 

Showing Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature 

Within 

DOD

Mega-scale 

data 

management

 Multi-level security 

and accreditation 

 Data 

management and

fusion from very 

diverse sensors 

Situation 

dependent 

information 

extraction

 Contextual 

analysis and intent 

recognition 

 Entity, relationship 

and pattern 

analysis 

 Data-to-informationto-target 

recognition 

 Information 

retrieval and 

knowledge 

discovery 

Human/ 

system 

collaboration

 Humanguided 

algorithms 

 Natural manmachine 

interface 

 Knowledge 

representation 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 77

Recommendations to DOD for progress include: 

 Conduct a major review of ongoing efforts to prioritize, 

integrate as necessary, and identify areas where additional 

funding can accelerate maturation of key technologies. 

 Establish goals and metrics to monitor progress, such as 

exabyte storage, terabyte-per-second data transfer, seconds-tominutes analysis and decision cycle time. 

 Relax restrictive rules for obtaining access to new sources 

of technology coming from outside DOD and often outside of 

the United States. 

 Recruit non–DOD partners—the Departments of Health and 

Human Services, Homeland Security, Transportation, Justice, 

State, and Commerce, as well as private entities—as sources, 

developers, and users. 
78 I CHAPTER 7 

Chapter 7. Rapidly Tailored Effects 

The complexities of the 21st century and the challenges inherent in 

countering a wide range of adversaries operating within an equally wide 

range of societal and political environments demands a “tool kit” of 

capabilities applicable to “assuring, influencing, dissuading, deterring, 

and/or defeating” these adversaries under any and all conditions. In the 

long war environment with highly adaptive adversaries, affordability 

and rapid maturation of such capabilities are of increased importance. 

Capability Description and Technology Areas 

The desired, enriched set of capabilities for rapidly tailored effects 

should be capable of dealing with a wide range of challenges and be: 

 instantaneously deliverable 

 scalable in scope and effect 

 applicable from tactical to strategic, and include WMD use 

prevention and mitigation 

 useable by a broad range of friendly forces (both skilled and 

unskilled, including allies and coalition partners) 

 feasible and affordable in the long war environment (from 

pre- through post-conflict) 

 tightly linked to human terrain capabilities 

 delivered with minimal vulnerabilities and counterproductive 

damage 

This capability is extremely broad, and has historically been a major 

focus of DOD’s planning and acquisition, most especially to achieve 

“defeat” and “defend” (such as against missile threats). The panel 

therefore chose key gap areas as the priority technology areas for 

expanding the tool kit of rapidly tailored effects: WMD protection and 

mitigation, influence operations, and time-critical fires from afar. 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 79

Influence Operations 

Influence operations, while related to information operations, 

primarily target a different audience. A recent document, approved by the 

Secretary of Defense, defines information operations as: “the integrated 

employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer 

network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and 

operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human 

and automated decision-making while protecting our own.”11

The definition above, and the definition found in the Joint 

Information Operations Publication 313, both focus operations on an 

adversary’s information and information systems. The importance of 

information operations is in no way diminished by this panel or by the 

DSB; in fact, defensive computer network operations is being addressed 

in a parallel DSB 2006 Summer Study on Information Management for 

Network-Centric Operations. 

However, the term adversary, while suitable for information 

operations, does not adequately address the primary target audience(s) of 

influence operations.12 In the case of ongoing operations in Iraq, one 

former Army brigade combat team commander categorized Iraqi citizens 

into three broad categories: “those who would never accept the 

Coalition’s presence in Iraq (religious fundamentalists, insurgents, 

terrorists); those who readily accepted the Coalition’s presence in Iraq 

(typically secular, Western-educated pragmatists); and the vast majority of 

Iraqis, who were undecided.”13 These last two categories are the primary 

focus of influence operations. 

While historical use of information operations has been focused on 

broad population centers at the strategic level, influence operations may 

take on a more tactical flavor and be tailored for population clusters 

 

11. Department of Defense Information Operations Roadmap, October 30, 2003. 

12. Defense Science Board Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional 

Environments, pg. 27, March 2006. 

13. Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team 

Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” Military Review, May–June 2006. 
80 I CHAPTER 7 

within a given commander’s area of responsibility. Tactical influence 

operations will need to be much more agile than the larger, more 

bureaucratic information operations, particularly the psychological 

operations portion which tends to be often overtaken by events by the 

time it is implemented. Greater agility will allow theatre commanders to 

stay ahead of a rapidly evolving information operations campaign that is 

executed by potential adversaries. In order to maintain the initiative over 

U.S. opponents, it will be important to keep the media rapidly informed 

of the facts surrounding newsworthy events. 

Training at the soldier/Marine level will be critically important to 

facilitate the rapid dissemination of information consistent with the 

desired messages and themes of a well-thought-out public and press 

engagement strategy. An ability to implement the notion of soldier as 

“transmitter” will have a profound effect on the ability to “win hearts 

and minds,” and to earn the respect, trust, and confidence of a 

potentially hostile population. In spite of current objectives in Iraq that 

involve achieving that respect, trust, and confidence within 12 months, 

the panel believes that the effective development of influence 

operations will take some time. In a cross-over example with the HTP 

capability, developments in language processing and cognitive sciences 

may identify specific, culturally sensitive messages and actions that can 

achieve predetermined reactions in individuals and small groups, to 

obtain desired objectives in a timely manner. 

In the current tactical environment, theatre commanders, of 

necessity, often take the initiative to develop their own approaches. A 

good example is presented in Col. Ralph Barker’s paper, in which he 

describes his experience as part of a brigade combat team in Baghdad in 

2004. The example is centered on an incident involving a vehicle-borne 

improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a Baghdad checkpoint known 

as Assassin’s Gate. The attack resulted in the death of about 50 Iraqi 

civilians waiting at the checkpoint. In this example, Col. Baker discusses 

how the tight controls that he was under from higher headquarters, not 

to release a statement to the local press, resulted in valuable time lost in 

the information operations campaign against the insurgents. While 

headquarters was gathering facts and preparing for a press conference 

later in the day, the insurgents were busy passing information “...to the 

press... that Coalition Soldiers were responsible for the casualties at the 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 81

checkpoint because of an overreaction to somebody shooting at them 

from the intersection; that is, the terrorists were spreading a rumor that 

the carnage on the street was not the result of a VBIED but rather, the 

result of an undisciplined and excessive use of force by [his] soldiers.” 

As this misinformation started to multiply in the Arab media, Col. 

Baker made the decision to have his field-grade officers talk to the local 

press at the scene to present the facts that were known at the time. The 

rapid presentation of the facts helped calm the situation, and resulted in a 

decision by the commander to engage the press, especially Arabic press, 

as quickly as possible with whatever releasable facts were known at the 

time. The brigade also kept the press updated with additional facts as 

they became known. Thus, the brigade was able to respond more rapidly, 

and to a greater effect, than the insurgent information operations effort. 

This active engagement approach to influence operations helped to 

mitigate adverse domestic reactions that nearly always followed in the 

wake of major incidents, and thus provides a real-world example of how 

influence operations can be carried out at the tactical level. 

Technical Tools for Influence Operations 

While the tools that are normally part of psychological operations 

(pamphlets, loud speakers, press releases, etc.) are likely to support future 

influence operations, the panel also identified the need to develop new 

tools to help theatre commanders make, and understand the possible 

impact of, choices involving military and civil/infrastructure operations. 

Particularly in the case of civil/infrastructure operations, the credibility of 

coalition forces will be directly tied to a demonstrated ability to improve 

the quality of life, physical security, and societal stability of the local 

population. New models are needed in the areas of non-kinetic causeeffect models; campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools; storytelling, 

gisting, and advanced visualization; and ultimately decision support tools 

that provide recommended courses of action. 

Because the analysis of conflict and nation-state instability is 

inherently complex and uncertain, no one social science theory or 

quantitative/computational model is sufficient. An ensemble of methods 

and models must be integrated within a single decision-support 

framework to generate a range of plausible futures. Robust adaptive 
82 I CHAPTER 7 

strategies that hedge across plausible futures will provide practical 

options for the decision-maker.14 Within a validated theoretical 

framework, these models and decision support tools will provide 

strategic early warning capability and actionable options for influencing 

and preserving the stability of the majority of population within a given 

area of operations, and minimize the likelihood of deadly conflict. The 

reader is no doubt struck with the link back to many of the same tools 

and issues important to the HTP capability. 

Time-Critical Conventional Strike 

Almost every recent study of how the United States should better 

prepare itself to deal with the challenges of anti-terrorism, counter 

insurgency, shaping the choices of emerging powers, and countering the 

acquisition or use of WMD has included statements about the need for 

a capability to quickly deliver a conventional strike against time-critical 

targets. In many of these cases this need may arise when U.S. forces are 

not deployed to any significant degree in the required area of 

operations, thus adding the requirement that such a strike has to be able 

to be delivered from afar while still maintaining the required timeline 

and precision. 

Despite the often repeated statement of need, no such capability 

exists today. Given a situation in which three of the four critical 

capabilities of the 21st century OODA-like loop do their job and 

indicate a rapidly emerging threat in an otherwise remote area where the 

United States does not have forward deployed assets, the rapidly 

tailored effects capability will have nothing to offer outside of a nuclear 

strike. Needed in the rapidly tailored effects tool kit is the ability to 

rapidly deliver a precise conventional strike against a person, vehicle, 

building, or facility when allied forces may not be in the region of 

interest or when entry has been denied. Useful metrics for such a 

capability would be: 

 

14. Popper, Steven, W., Robert J. Lempert, and Steven C. Bankes, “Shaping the Future,” 

Scientific American, pp. 66–71, April 2005. 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 83

 response time of less than a half hour (total time to impact, 

including decision time) 

 standoff range of greater than 1,000 kilometers 

 delivery accuracy of a few meters 

 logistics that involves no local support requirements 

Unlike most of the other eleven technology areas in the four critical 

capabilities, relatively mature technology is available to enable significant 

new capabilities for several options. In fact, with modest engineering, as 

opposed to ground-breaking S&T, these options could provide an initial 

capability within a decade. The acquisition of such a capability has not 

happened, however, because each of the available options has drawbacks, 

and it has proved difficult to reach a consensus on which solution is 

good enough and represents a reasonable compromise between all of the 

objective attributes. Options and issues include: 

 ballistic missile launched from the continental United States or 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

- mistaken interpretation of a nuclear launch 

- achievable accuracy 

 medium-range ballistic missile launched from submarine 

- availability of launch platform 

- sub-surface launch technologies 

 medium-range ballistic missile launched from allied country 

- political issues related to launch approval 

- political issues related to “cost” to the United States of 

basing 

- policy issues related to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty 
84 I CHAPTER 7 

 air- or surface-launched cruise missile 

- response time and availability of launch vehicle with 

improved reliability 

- flight time of cruise missile 

S&T investments could yield even more capable systems, but there 

are technical and policy issues associated with these as well. For 

example: 

 air breathers 

- hypersonic technology immaturity and expense 

 space-based directed energy 

- directed energy technology 

- policy issues related to space basing 

 terrestrial-based directed energy 

- directed energy technology 

- technology related to use of relay mirrors 

 long-range (intercontinental) gun 

- various gun and material technologies 

Two other issues stretch across all of the options and need to be 

addressed as well. First, timeliness of decision-making must match 

timeliness of the weapon in order for the mission to succeed. A weapon 

that can reach its target in tens of minutes or less is useless if the decision 

to use it takes hours or days. The use of technology to aid difficult 

decision-making in complex multi-dimensional situations must 

accompany any effort to develop the weapon component of a rapid 

conventional strike, as discussed previously. Equally important, however, 

will be pre-determined policies and practice to achieve timeliness. 

The second cross-cutting issue associated with a rapid conventional 

precision strike is the persistence of the ISR target tracking and 

identification that must accompany such a capability. The greater the 

probability that custody of the target position and identification remains 

unbroken the less is the need for the timeliness of the strike. There is 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 85

not a linear relationship between the two, but the relationship is strong 

and should be taken into account when addressing how to balance the 

requirements between the two. 

WMD Protection and Mitigation 

A recurring theme in DSB studies has been that the accelerating 

global proliferation of WMD and associated accountability, safeguards 

and security, reliability and maintenance, and utility and delivery 

technologies require a comprehensive approach to war fighter and 

system protection, consequence management, and continuity of 

operations. Proficiency in these areas has the added benefit of deterring 

adversaries and of being transferable for response to natural catastrophes 

in which DOD will have an important supporting role. 

The panel’s assessments of critical constituent technologies benefited 

from the comprehensive report of the Defense Science Board 2005 Summer 

Study on Reducing Vulnerability to Weapons of Mass Destruction. One of the 

report’s conclusions was that effective and rapid restoration and recovery 

are the cross-cutting capabilities needed with respect to all four modalities 

of attack addressed in the study (chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear). Attaining these capabilities will require the development of rapid 

diagnostics and environmental assessment tools, the discovery and 

application of broad-spectrum medical countermeasures (for pre- and 

post- exposure), and rapid decontamination agents and protocols. A more 

specialized area of concern to the panel is the significant drop-off in 

attention to nuclear survivability, both technically and operationally. S&T 

areas that would contribute most importantly to mitigating the effects of 

WMD are discussed below, together with desired performance and 

technical goals as well as challenges and issues. 

Rapid Diagnostic and Environmental Monitoring Tools 

Effective crisis management during a WMD attack demands the 

rapid integration of diverse information. Accurate situational awareness 

is critical to decision-making and to mounting a rapid and appropriate 

response; knowledge of the nature and extent of the attack are essential 

for both. Therefore methods and procedures for rapid, minimally 
86 I CHAPTER 7 

invasive screening of biological, chemical, or radiation exposure must 

be developed. Results from tests of individuals should be available 

within minutes and of the environment within hours. 

Furthermore, because a limited number of medical or environmental 

experts are likely to be available during a crisis, such screening should be 

simple enough to be performed by non-professionals. In addition, the 

ability to provide safe stand-off for operators will be important. 

Technologies for biological and radiation today do not support that 

requirement. For radiation detection, advanced active interrogation 

concepts have been proposed but are very immature and will require a 

sustained R&D investment for quite a few years. For bio-agent detection, 

concepts proposed to date have proved of limited utility. In both cases, 

system concepts for remotely delivered and operated in-situ sensors 

should be matured as the nearer term gap-filler. 

For large, perhaps isolated areas or long-term operations, portable 

and/or transportable detection and diagnostic equipment may be 

required. These systems must be fortified for a variety of field 

environments to include air flight and drops, a range of temperature, 

humidity and hazardous environments, and include supportable power 

systems appropriate for operational needs (such as 12-to-24 hour 

uninterrupted operation, with replacement components comprising less 

than ten percent of total weight and volume; nominal system reliability of 

at least 95 percent over the operational envelope). Communications and 

information integration requirements for assessment and decisionmaking also indicate that rapid data acquisition (15 minutes or less) with 

real-time analysis and display/send features are required. 

Broad Spectrum Medical Countermeasures 

Medical countermeasures, as well as the means to deploy them in 

time frames from hours to one or two days, should be in place for use 

in a WMD attack or similar crisis. The anthrax attacks of 2001 

illustrated that post-event treatment for a biological attack, even when 

available, currently requires active medical intervention for each victim 

for weeks to months. Long timeframes can also be envisioned for 

treatment of chemical or radiological exposures. Scientific and 

technological advances in the development of countermeasures could 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 87

reduce dramatically the time for surge response in an event and 

substantially reduce human suffering. 

Broad spectrum, active, and passive countermeasures (drugs and 

vaccines) for protection from exposure to chemical and biological 

agents must be discovered, developed, and deployed, but in many cases 

the fundamental knowledge required to accomplish these goals is still 

lacking. The department has recently made a commitment in the 

Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI) to pursue 

this path, but it is not without significant risk. Technological and 

process advances and improvements are needed in the areas of drug 

testing, approval, simulation, and modeling to speed and better inform 

scientific investigations. Because the DOD has limited expertise in 

these areas, future progress will depend on active collaboration with 

researchers in academia and the biomedical industry. 

While TMTI is initially focused on only two classes of biological 

threats, the department will be expected to address rapidly emerging 

threats as well. One example of relative neglect by DOD and the larger 

community (the Departments of Health and Human Services and 

Homeland Security) is the nuclear threat. However, as biomedical 

science and nuclear event survivability research advance, it should also 

be possible to develop countermeasures that reduce radiation exposure 

deaths substantially. Preliminary ongoing medical science investigations 

have shown some promise in this area, and such research should be 

working towards a goal of reducing exposure mortality by 90 percent. 

Rapid Decontamination 

Timely and safely restoring operations is crucial to minimizing the 

impact of a WMD event or similar crisis. Directed research, development, 

and technology transition should aim to improve decontamination 

processes to provide 99 percent assurance for reconstitution of operations 

within 15 minutes to 1 hour. Using a layered approach to reconstitution, 

methods and procedures should include isolation through early warning, 

as well as integrated design features to actively and passively protect 

and/or decontaminate areas, people, systems, surfaces, and infrastructures. 
88 I CHAPTER 7 

Decontamination processes for chemical or biological exposures 

have some similarities in the decontaminating agents that can be used, 

but radiological or nuclear contamination requires different procedures. 

In all cases, there remains a pressing need for additional work to define 

standards and processes for cleanup for each modality using currently 

available technologies. An overriding issue, long identified but yet to be 

resolved, is “how clean is safe?” Answering this question requires both 

interagency efforts and a well thought-out plan for public 

communication. Moreover, it can have different answers in civilian or 

military environments, and DOD must take responsibility for 

establishing its own standards in the wide array of operational 

environments it faces. As noted in the 2005 Defense Science Board 

summer study, the anthrax events in 2001 illustrated the importance of 

this issue in the biological realm, with enormous cost and time delays for 

reconstitution of postal facilities in the United States. Current radiological 

cleanup standards employed by the Environmental Protection Agency 

are equally restrictive and would result in enormous economic impacts 

even for radiological events in which there is little or no loss of life. 

Maintaining or Restoring Functionality after a Nuclear Attack 

A nuclear attack has the capacity to inflict immediate damage orders 

of magnitude above other modalities. The issue of mitigation and 

recovery in such a case was studied for many years during the Cold War, 

but much of that knowledge is forgotten. Prudent sheltering and 

showering by individuals, for example, can go far to mitigate the impacts 

of radiation exposure. With respect to both civilian and military 

infrastructure—and equally critical war fighting capabilities—attention to 

radiation hardening and/or operational workarounds has suffered from 

widespread neglect. Again much was learned during the Cold War. Over 

the past decade, investments by the Department of Energy have advanced 

the state-of-the-art in simulating both a nuclear event and the impact on 

critical electronics important to U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities. 

However, the expert community and the supporting test facilities in this 

area are proving unsustainable because of the lack of “user pull.” 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 89

Both the Congressionally-mandated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 

commission and a recent DSB study have taken DOD to task for its 

neglect of nuclear survivability.15 Recommendations for remedying the 

situation have been made and some actions regarding EMP have been 

recently agreed upon. But the spectrum of concerns extends beyond 

EMP—potential and declared nation-state adversaries are proclaiming 

their pursuit of theater and tactical nuclear weapons aimed at countering 

U.S. conventional military superiority, with a willingness to use such 

weapons on their own territory if need be; and evidence continues to 

build of terrorist interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

Technology Strategies and Recommendations 

 The panel’s assessment of the maturity and uniqueness of the 

priority technologies for rapidly tailored effects is summarized in table 13. 

The panel recommends the following for improving WMD protection 

and mitigation: 

 Building on the modalities panel report in Volume II of the 

Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, DOD, in partnership with other 

key federal agencies, should:

 16

- increase medical surge capabilities through coordinating 

existing assets, broadening the cadre of trained personnel, 

and developing rapid diagnostics and broad spectrum 

treatments 

- increase preparedness for crisis communications by 

preplanning content and improving regional communication 

systems 

 

15. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States of Electromagnetic 

Pulse (EMP) Attack, July 2004; and Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapon 

Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation, April 2005. 

16. See Volume II of the Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing 

Vulnerability to Weapons of Mass Destruction for a more complete description of each 

recommendation. 
90 I CHAPTER 7 

- institute multi-level planning to prepare regional response 

assets and enable rapid integration of federal support 

- reassess restoration processes and cleanup standards

for a range of WMD attack scenarios 

Table 13. Rapidly Tailored Effects Technologies Categorized According to 

Development Maturity 

Technology 

Areas

Promising, but 

Immature

Under 

Development 

Showing 

Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature in 

DOD

WMD 

protection 

and 

mitigation 

 Rapid 

diagnostics 

and 

environmental 

monitoring, 

incl. standoff 

bio and 

radiation 

detection 

 Broad 

spectrum 

medical 

countermeasures 

 Decontamination 

technologies 

 Nuclear weapons 

effects prediction, 

mitigation 

Influence 

operations 

 Kinetic and 

non-kinetic 

cause/effect 

models 

 Decision support 

tools 

incorporating 

complexity and 

ambiguity 

 Storytelling, 

gisting, 

advanced 

visualization 

 Gaming 

technology for 

campaign 

planning, 

targeting, 

shaping 

Time critical 

conventional 

strike 

 Directed 

energy 

weapons 

 Hypersonic 

delivery 

vehicles 

  Ballistic 

missile 

technology 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 91

 DOD leadership should re-instate nuclear survivability as 

a security requirement in critical war fighting and support 

functions. 

The task force’s recommendations for influence operations are: 

 DOD should undertake a major research and tool 

development effort to understand and enhance the training 

and execution (including assessing results) of influence and 

related non-kinetic operations. This effort should include 

developing credible “cause-effect” models. 

 DARPA and the service laboratories, working with U.S. 

Strategic Command and other combatant commanders, 

should expand emphasis for dealing with uncertainty and 

ambiguity in decision support tool development and for 

providing credible “cause-effect” models. Good use should be 

made of advances in the commercial sector as noted in table 13. 

For time-critical conventional strike, the panel recognizes the 

complexity of the issues associated with the options and recommends that 

 DOD develop a comprehensive plan to evolve time-critical 

conventional strike capabilities. The plan should encompass 

both nearer term options and radically new potential capabilities 

that could result from R&D in directed energy or other 

technologies. The plan should be supported by a careful 

systems analysis of the various options, using quantitative 

measures of effectiveness and spanning all of the critical issues 

including the requisite real-time decision-making.
92 I CHAPTER 8 

Chapter 8. Technology Push Perspective 

Thus far, this report has described a process and results traceable to 

mission and operational needs balanced against technologies available 

today, or those that could address those needs with the proper 

investment. However, the history of advances in military capabilities is 

filled with examples of technical “game changers” whose impact was 

not—and most often, could not be—anticipated. As such, a balanced 

S&T strategy must maintain a healthy “technology push” component, 

as well as the operational or capability pull. 

A focus on technology push has two primary objectives. The first is 

to discover game-changing capabilities enabled by technology 

advances—both to exploit new technology opportunities for use by the 

United States and, equally important, to assure that the nation not 

surprised by potential adversaries. The most likely sources of new 

capabilities of this magnitude are the technologies that are changing 

most rapidly and therefore are least fully exploited for military 

applications. Those which fit this criterion most obviously today are 

biotechnology (where DOD also lags well behind other government 

organizations and the private sector); nanotechnology; and information 

technology, which continues to expand in spite of the recent decades of 

advances. DOD must assure the development of potential capabilities 

based on detailed understanding of these technologies and the military 

opportunities they might present. Moreover, the synergies among these 

three areas is starting to manifest itself, such that DOD savvy in less 

than all three runs the risk of missing some important breakthroughs. 

The second objective is to seek further operational advantages in 

applications of available technologies. This is less likely to produce new 

game-changers, but it should be a deliberate objective in order to 

understand how adversaries could exploit the commercial advances and, 

of course, to better understand the military possibilities. 
TECHNOLOGY PUSH PERSPECTIVE I 93

Figure 11 is illustrative of the bio-nano-info opportunity space. The 

rectangles indicate the individual technology area with an example of a 

military capability that might be developed, enabled by that particular 

technology. The ovals represent capabilities that derive from the 

synergy of two or three of these high-rate-of-change technologies. 

Figure 11. Illustrative “Technology Push” Examples in the Bio-Nano-Info Nexus 
94 I CHAPTER 8 

Table 13 shows a number of examples for bio and nano that have 

been proposed as potential derivatives of these technologies and 

suggest potential for important military capabilities. 

Table 13. Potential Military Capabilities Based on Advances in Biology or 

Nanotechnology 

The message in table 13 is not what should be emphasized in S&T. 

Instead, there are many potential military capabilities that might emerge 

from a well-structured, but broad exploration of these technologies as 

applied to military problems. The panel is first to admit that the lists are 

incomplete and may contain some questionable items, but they do 

illustrate the range of applications that should motivate investments in 

these rapidly advancing areas 

. 
CONCLUSIONS I 95

Chapter 9. Conclusions 

Cross-Cutting Outcomes 

Upon completion of the panel’s examination of critical capabilities, 

it addressed the question of how the acquisition of these capabilities 

might impact the fabric of national security beyond enabling the 

missions they directly support. Three important cross-cutting outcomes 

emerged as a result of that inquiry. 

Improvements in Small Unit Forces 

During the long war in which the nation is now engaged, irregular 

forces and insurgents understand that battle casualties have a huge 

impact on the level of public support for conflict. It is not too strong 

to say that a key strategic advantage of today’s enemy is its ability to 

inflict casualties on U.S. forces, regardless of the level of casualties 

they sustain in doing so. Many of the technologies recommended for 

development serve to make U.S. forces better able to defeat the 

enemy in small unit actions, where most U.S. casualties are sustained. 

Decision-making and learning tools will sharpen the skills of the 

junior leaders whose competence is absolutely vital to victory in small 

unit conflict. Tools for language and cultural understanding will also play 

a major role in shaping the small unit battle. Human performance 

enhancement technology will provide the small unit leader with 

additional sensors and a deeper understanding of his battle space. 

The provision of these tools will result in much more capable small 

units and better small unit leaders, helping to strip away the enemy’s 

strategic advantage of causing casualties in tactical small unit actions. 

Avoiding Strategic Surprise 

The second cross-cutting outcome is a higher probability of avoiding 

strategic surprise. The human, social, cultural, and behavior modeling 

proposed in this report will help in understanding both the micro and 
96 I CHAPTER 9 

macro societies in which U.S. forces will operate. These tools, and those 

proposed in conjunction with influence operations, will give U.S. forces 

the ability to model alternative courses of action for kinetic and nonkinetic operations, resulting in better decision-making and a reduction in 

unintended consequences. 

Favorable Shifts in Asymmetries 

The third major cross-cutting outcome that will occur is a more 

favorable balance of current asymmetries. Ubiquitous observation will 

make it more difficult for the enemy to hide; and ability of U.S. forces 

to rapidly deliver tailored effects will enable these forces to take 

immediate advantage of greater enemy visibility. The tools developed 

for contextual exploitation will give U.S. forces a much better 

understanding of, and an ability to shape, the perceptual environment. 

Summary 

The panel’s work yielded four critical capabilities: 

 Human terrain preparation: the ability to much better 

understand how individuals, groups, societies, and nations behave. 

 Ubiquitous observation and recording: a shift from long 

dwell ISR over fixed areas observing “things” to ubiquitous 

ISR observing individuals. 

 Contextual exploitation: extracting meaning from floods of data. 

 Rapidly tailored effects: delivering the type and level of effect 

to shape the behavior of adversaries and influence the 

perceptions and actions of partners and neutrals. 

The four capabilities do not stand alone and, in fact, interact in 

myriad interdependent ways. In the view of the panel, these four, with 

their interconnectedness, define a 21st century transformation of the 

observed-orient-decide-act loop. No longer should the key capabilities 

be linked sequentially, and no longer are physical entities alone the 

drivers for observation and action. The “human terrain” takes center 

stage and encompasses the full breadth of understanding and shaping 

the actions of our adversaries, of ourselves, and of all others involved. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 97

Appendix A. Terms of Reference 



PANEL MEMBERSHIP I 101

Appendix B. 

Panel Membership 

CO-CHAIRS 

Name Affiliation

Dr. Mim John* Sandia National Laboratory 

Gen Mike Williams, USMC (ret)* LMI 

MEMBERS 

Dr. Matt Ganz HRL 

VADM Kevin Green, USN (ret) IBM 

MajGen Ken Israel, USAF (ret) Lockheed Martin 

LtGen Rick Kelly, USMC (ret) LMI 

Mr. Zach Lemnios Massachusetts Institute of Technology/ 

Lincoln Laboratory 

Mr. Larry Meador MGI Strategic Solutions 

Mr. Walt Morrow* Massachusetts Institute of Technology/ 

Lincoln Laboratory 

Dr. Bob Popp Aptima 

MG Bob Scales, USA (ret) Private Consultant 

Mr. Jim Shields Draper Laboratory 

Dr. Ann Skalka* Fox-Chase Cancer Research Center 

RADM Tom Steffans, USN (ret) ANTEON Company 

Mr. Bob Stein Private Consultant 

Dr. Rich Wagner Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Dr. Dave Whelan Boeing 

*Defense Science Board member 
102 I APPENDIX B 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Name Affiliation

CDR Alan Boyer NWC 

COL Kevin Brown, USA U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Col Ken Byrd, USAF Headquarters, U.S. Air Force/A5X 

Mr. Shane Deichman U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Anh Duong Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Mr. Dan Flynn Central Intelligence Agency 

Dr. Brendan Godfrey Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

Dr. Joanna Ingraham Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

LTC Todd Key, USA Joint Staff, J-8 

Ms. Carolyn Nash Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 

LtCol Dave Pere, USMC U.S. Marine Corps

Mr. Dennis Schmidt Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology

CAPT Dennis Sorensen, USN Office of Naval Research 

Dr. Dave Stoudt Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

MajGen Mike Worden, USAF Headquarters U.S. Air Force/A5X 

STAFF 

Tim Cullen Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Juile Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Kevin Gates Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 103

Appendix C. Capability Matrices 

This appendix contains supporting data for the mission-tocapability-to-technology systems analysis. The data contained in this 

appendix are the result of the analyses performed throughout the 10 

month summer study. 

Capability Prioritization 

List of Capabilities 

The capabilities in table C-1 resulted from the inputs of all of the 

members of the summer study. The members were asked to provide 

their view of the three most important capabilities needed to effectively 

deal with the five missions upon which the summer study results were 

based. After removing redundancies and broadening some of the inputs 

to accommodate similar functions provided by different members under 

one capability heading, the following 39 distinct capabilities resulted: 

Assessing Importance by Mission 

The capabilities in table C-1 were each examined with regard to 

their importance to each of the five missions. Tables C-2, C-3, C-4, C5, and C-6 contain the results of that examination. A code of 4 means 

that a capability is critical to that particular mission; 2 means that it is 

very important, but not absolutely crucial; 1 means that it contributes 

in a lesser but useful way; and zero means that it does not contribute 

to the capability. 
104 I APPENDIX C 

Table C-1. Thirty-Nine Capabilities Identified by Summer Study Panel 

Members 

Human intelligence 

Culture/language understanding 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 

Strategic surprise anticipation 

Strategic shaping 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 

Strategic communication 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 

Rapid decontamination 

Portal chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) detection/identification 

Covert penetration operations 

Identify & covertly tag, track people and objects globally 

Maritime domain awareness 

Joint networked command and control 

Consequence management 

Remote WMD detection 

Secure/ render safe WMD 

Undersea warfare 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 

Efficient power generation and storage 

Small unit/soldier protection 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 

Reduced footprint 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 

Small unit leadership training 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 

Rapid logistics 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 

Force/ strategic asset protection 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 105

Table C-2. Defeating Terrorist Networks 

Capability Importance 

Human intelligence 4 

Culture/ language understanding 4 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 4 

Strategic surprise anticipation 4 

Strategic shaping 1 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 2 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 4 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 1 

Strategic communication 2 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 1 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 2 

Rapid decontamination 1 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 0 

Covert penetration operations 4 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 4 

Maritime domain awareness 1 

Joint networked command and control 1 

Consequence management 1 

Remote WMD detection 0 

Secure/ render safe WMD 0 

Undersea warfare 0 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 4 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 0 

Efficient power generation and storage 1 

Small unit/soldier protection 1 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 2 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 2 

Reduced footprint 0 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 1 

Small unit leadership training 2 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 1 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 2 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 1 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 2 

Rapid logistics 0 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 1 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 2 

Force/ strategic asset protection 1 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 1 
106 I APPENDIX C 

Table C-3. Defending the Homeland 

Capability Importance 

Human intelligence 4 

Culture/ language understanding 2 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 2 

Strategic surprise anticipation 4 

Strategic shaping 2 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 2 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 4 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 2 

Strategic communication 2 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 4 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 2 

Rapid decontamination 2 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 4 

Covert penetration operations 2 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 4 

Maritime domain awareness 4 

Joint networked command and control 2 

Consequence management 4 

Remote WMD detection 4 

Secure/ render safe WMD 2 

Undersea warfare 0 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 4 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 1 

Efficient power generation and storage 0 

Small unit/soldier protection 0 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 1 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 0 

Reduced footprint 0 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 2 

Small unit leadership training 1 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 2 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 2 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 4 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 4 

Rapid logistics 0 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 1 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 4 

Force/ strategic asset protection 2 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 0 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 107

Table C-4. Preventing the Acquisition and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Capability Importance

Human intelligence 4 

Culture/ language understanding 2 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 1 

Strategic surprise anticipation 4 

Strategic shaping 4 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 2 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 4 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 1 

Strategic communication 2 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 0 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 4 

Rapid decontamination 1 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 1 

Covert penetration operations 4 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 4 

Maritime domain awareness 2 

Joint networked command and control 1 

Consequence management 1 

Remote WMD detection 2 

Secure/ render safe WMD 4 

Undersea warfare 0 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 1 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 0 

Efficient power generation and storage 0 

Small unit/soldier protection 0 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 1 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 0 

Reduced footprint 0 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 1 

Small unit leadership training 0 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 0 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 4 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 0 

Air/land/sea supremacy 2 

Rapid logistics 0 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 0 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 4 

Force/strategic asset protection 0 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 0 
108 I APPENDIX C 

Table C-5. Shaping the Choices of Nations at Strategic Crossroads 

Capability Importance 

Human intelligence 4 

Culture/ language understanding 4 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 4 

Strategic surprise anticipation 2 

Strategic shaping 4 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 2 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 4 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 1 

Strategic communication 4 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 1 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 4 

Rapid decontamination 0 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 0 

Covert penetration operations 2 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 0 

Maritime domain awareness 1 

Joint networked command and control 1 

Consequence management 0 

Remote WMD detection 1 

Secure/ render safe WMD 0 

Undersea warfare 2 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 4 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 2 

Efficient power generation and storage 0 

Small unit/soldier protection 0 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 2 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 0 

Reduced footprint 1 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 0 

Small unit leadership training 1 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 2 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 4 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 1 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 2 

Rapid logistics 2 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 2 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 2 

Force/ strategic asset protection 1 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 1 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 109

Table C-6. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

Capability Importance 

Human intelligence 4 

Culture/ language understanding 4 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 4 

Strategic surprise anticipation 2 

Strategic shaping 2 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 4 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 4 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 2 

Strategic communication 4 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 1 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 1 

Rapid decontamination 0 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 1 

Covert penetration operations 4 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 4 

Maritime domain awareness 0 

Joint networked command and control 2 

Consequence management 0 

Remote WMD detection 1 

Secure/ render safe WMD 1 

Undersea warfare 0 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 2 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 0 

Efficient power generation and storage 2 

Small unit/soldier protection 4 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 2 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 4 

Reduced footprint 2 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 2 

Small unit leadership training 4 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 4 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 1 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 1 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 4 

Rapid logistics 1 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 1 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 1 

Force/ strategic asset protection 2 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 1 
110 I APPENDIX C 

Overall Importance and Relative Priority 

Based upon the capability contributions to each mission, the overall 

relative priority was established by counting the number of missions to 

which each capability was critical, important, or contributed in some way. 

Table C-7 is presented in priority order based upon “critical” 

outweighing “important,” and “important” outweighing “contributes.” 

Prioritized Capabilities and the Four Critical Capabilities 

Table C-8 represents the principal association of the 39 prioritized 

capabilities above with the four critical capabilities—human terrain 

preparation, ubiquitous observation, contextual exploitation, and rapidly 

tailored effects—defined by the panel. The addition of the category 

“other” is required for a few capabilities that do not fit neatly into any of 

the four critical capabilities. In general these are lower priority capabilities 

or ones that are not principally associated with the DOD (such as 

“support/enforce international treaties and alliances”). 

Mapping into the Tier II JCAs 

Table C-9 shows the results of mapping the 102 tier 2 JCAs into the 

panel’s 39 capabilities. The capabilities are ordered by the number of tier 

2 JCAs that map into them. As seen from the matrix, the mapping is 

essentially complete, with only one capability failing to have any 

corresponding JCA. Two of the panel’s capabilities—air/land/sea 

supremacy and force/strategic asset protection—are noteworthy in that 

they are ranked relatively low because of their lack of high criticality to 

the five missions, yet a large number of the JCAs map into them. This is 

likely driven by the strong JCA focus on war fighting vice the summer 

study’s focus on the more non-traditional missions of the QDR. 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 111

Table C-7. Capability Ranking by Mission Contribution 

Capability Crit Imp’t Cont. 

Human intelligence 5 0 0 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 5 0 0 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 4 0 0 

Culture/ language understanding 3 2 0 

Strategic surprise anticipation 3 2 0 

Covert penetration operations 3 2 0 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 3 1 1 

Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 3 1 1 

Strategic communication 2 3 0 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 2 3 0 

Strategic shaping 2 2 1 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 2 2 1 

Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 2 2 1 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 2 2 1 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 1 4 0 

Civil affairs and reconstruction 1 2 1 

Maritime domain awareness 1 1 2 

Remote WMD detection 1 1 2 

Small unit leadership training 1 1 2 

Secure/render safe WMD 1 1 1 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 1 1 0 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 1 0 3 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 1 0 3 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 1 0 2 

Consequence management 1 0 2 

Small unit/soldier protection 1 0 1 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 0 3 2 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 0 2 3 

Joint networked command and control 0 2 3 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 0 2 2 

Force/ strategic asset protection 0 2 2 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 0 1 3 

Rapid decontamination 0 1 2 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 0 1 1 

Efficient power generation and storage 0 1 1 

Reduced footprint 0 1 1 

Rapid logistics 0 1 1 

Undersea warfare 0 1 0 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 0 0 3 
112 I APPENDIX C 

Table C-8. Ranked Capabilities and the Four Critical Capabilities 

Critical Capability Prioritized Individual Capabilities 

Ubiquitous observation Human intelligence 

Contextual exploitation Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 

Ubiquitous observation Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 

Human terrain preparation Culture/language understanding 

Contextual exploitation Strategic surprise anticipation 

Scaleable effects Covert penetration operations 

Human terrain preparation Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 

Scaleable effects Information security/information warfare/cyber supremacy 

Scaleable effects Strategic communication 

Distributed Air/ land/sea supremacy 

Scaleable effects Strategic shaping 

Scaleable effects Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 

Other Support/ enforce international treaties/alliances 

Scaleable effects Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and operations 

Ubiquitous observation Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 

Scaleable effects Civil affairs and reconstruction 

Ubiquitous observation Maritime domain awareness 

Ubiquitous observation Remote WMD detection 

Human terrain preparation Small unit leadership training 

Scaleable effects Secure/ render safe WMD 

Human terrain preparation Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 

Scaleable effects Medical surge for mass destruction events 

Scaleable effects Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 

Ubiquitous observation Portal CBRN detection/identification 

Scaleable effects Consequence management 

Distributed Small unit/soldier protection 

Human terrain preparation Rapid training for quick reaction missions 

Other Survivable global joint tactical communications 

Other Joint networked command and control 

Human terrain preparation Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 

Distributed Force/ strategic asset protection 

Other Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 

Scaleable effects Rapid decontamination 

Distributed Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 

Other Efficient power generation and storage 

Other Reduced footprint 

Other Rapid logistics 

Other Undersea warfare 

Other Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 113

Table C-9 Capability Ranking of Tier 2 JCAs 

Summer Study Capability # of JCAs 

Missions 

Critical 

Missions 

Important 

Air/ land/sea supremacy 16 1 0 

Information security/information operations/cyber supremacy 14 3 1 

Covert penetration operations 13 2 3 

Urban and stability operations 13 2 1 

Force/ strategic asset protection 12 0 3 

Knowledge discovery/data fusion/decision support 11 5 0 

Culture/language understanding 10 3 2 

Joint precision tailored global strike from sanctuary 10 2 1 

Support/enforce international treaties/alliances 9 2 2 

Consequence management 9 1 0 

Strategic surprise anticipation and shaping 8 3 2 

Detect and locate targets in cluttered environments 8 3 2 

Persistent ISR of fixed and mobile targets 8 2 3 

Strategic communication 8 2 2 

Modeling societal dynamics, stability and influencers 7 3 2 

Rapid strategic decision-making/translation to war plans and 

operations 

7 2 3 

Rapid task organization and force reconstitution 7 0 0 

Survivable global joint tactical communications 6 0 3 

Rapid logistics 6 0 0 

Rapid resource delivery to the battlefield 6 0 0 

Identify and covertly tag, track people and objects globally 5 4 0 

Strategic corporal/soldier-focused capability 5 2 0 

Small unit leadership training 5 1 1 

Rapid decontamination 4 1 0 

Joint networked command and control 4 0 2 

Space dominance (offensive/defensive) 4 0 1 

Human intelligence 3 5 0 

Rapid training for quick reaction missions 3 2 2 

Maritime domain awareness 3 1 2 

Portal CBRN detection/identification 3 1 1 

Broad spectrum medical treatments/preventatives 3 1 1 

Undersea warfare 3 0 1 

Remote WMD detection 2 2 0 

Secure/ render safe WMD 2 2 0 

Medical surge for mass destruction events 2 1 1 

Immersive live/virtual/constructive training 2 0 2 

Small unit/soldier protection 1 1 1 

Reduced footprint 1 0 1 

Efficient power generation and storage 0 0 1 
114 I APPENDIX C 

Technologies 

The Capabilities Panel was also tasked to examine and prioritize the 

technologies required to implement the capabilities discussed above. The 

data in the tables that follow are the results of the panel’s discussions and 

prioritization of capabilities. 

Critical Capabilities, Technology Areas, and Constituent 

Technologies 

Table C-10 lists the association of each of the four critical capabilities 

with the three most important technology areas for each. Each 

technology area depends upon a number of “constituent technologies,” 

and the 43 such technologies are shown as well. 

Technology Scoring 

The technologies listed in table C-10 were scored according to their 

contribution to the original 39 capabilities. As shown in table C-11, each 

technology was rated as critical (4), important (2), useful (1) or not 

applicable (0) against each capability. The individual technology/ 

capability ratings were then summed, with the technology ratings that 

applied to a given capability that was critical to two or more missions 

weighted twice as heavily as one that was critical to only one mission. In 

turn, the technology ratings that applied to a given capability that was 

critical to one mission were weighted twice as heavily as one that was not 

critical to any mission. The overall scoring is given in the last row and 

provides a useful assessment of the relative importance of each 

technology as it applies through the appropriate capabilities back to the 

original five missions. 

Table C-12 lists the constituent technologies in priority order based 

on the scores in the previous table. It also contains an entry code that 

indicates the development status for each constituent technology as 

defined below: 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 115

 PNWPromising but immature and still Needs Work 

 STCshows significant progress, investments being made, Stay 

The Course 

 TFCwork largely outside of DOD, Transfer From 

Commercial when ready 

 JDIdevelopment sufficiently mature that it should be in use 

today, Just Do It 

While table C-11 is useful in providing a vehicle to examine the 

relative importance of the individual technologies, it is not especially 

helpful in providing a foundation for developing a technology roadmap 

or development strategy, because those technologies within a given 

development status category as defined above have to be treated 

differently then those in the other categories. To make this easier to 

visualize, table C-12 groups the constituent technologies first by their 

development category and then, within that category, lists them in rank 

order. Included also is the critical capability principally serviced by each 

constituent technology. The technologies within the top overall 50 

percent are depicted by the shaded area of each development category. 
116 I APPENDIX C 

Table C-10. Association of Critical Capabilities, Technology Areas, and 

Constituent Technologies 

Critical 

Capability Technology Area Constituent Technology 

Space-based GMTI/SAR

Gigapixel optical imaging

Foliage penetration sensors

Active and passive hyper spectral sensing

Day/night all-weather wide-area 

surveillance

High-altitude long-endurance platforms

High density packaging

High-performance and high-efficiency signal processing

Stealthy/precision delivery platforms

Miniature sensor technology

Close-in sensor and 

tagging systems

Efficient energy storage technology

Body-borne flexible displays

Soldier-centric communication/networking technology 

Interactive automated debriefing

Ubiquitous 

Observation 

Soldier 

as a 

collector

All-domain precision geo-location

Directed energy

Hypersonics

Time critical strike from afar

Ballistic missile technology

Standoff active radiation detection

Rapid diagnostics and environmental monitoring

Broad spectrum medical countermeasures

Decontamination technologies

WMD protection and mitigation

Nuclear weapons effects and impact models

Kinetic/non-kinetic cause-effect models (environment; 

infrastructure; socio-cultural; DIME; PMESII)

Campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools (eg, 

gaming; stochastic estimation; weapon-target pairing; 

(non)lethal weapon effects)

Decision support tools (complexity, ambiguity)

Rapidly Scalable 

Effects

Influence operations

Storytelling, gisting, advanced visualization
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 117

Table C-10 (continued). Association of Critical Capabilities, Technology 

Areas, and Constituent Technologies 

Critical 

Capability Technology Area Constituent Technology 

Data management from very diverse sources

Entity, relationship and pattern analysis

Mega-data 

management

Multi-level security and accreditation

Advanced context/concept search, information retrieval 

and knowledge discovery 

Knowledge discovery (data to information to target 

recognition)

Situationdependent 

information 

extraction

Contextual analysis and intent recognition tools

Natural man machine interface

Human guided algorithms

Contextual 

Exploitation

Human/system collaboration

Knowledge representation

Macro HSCB models (structure/trends)

Micro HSCB (networks/events)

Human , social, cultural, behavior 

(HSCB) modeling

Integrated coherent micro-macro 

quantitative/computational models (taxonomies, 

application programming interfaces, semantics)

Foreign-to-English translation (e.g., voice, chat, instant 

message, e-mails; broadcast, conversational; gisting; 

summarization; [un]constrained) 

Automated language processing

Speech-to-text transcription (eg, Phraselator; voice 

response translator; speech-to-speech)

Socio-culturally relevant immersive games, training and 

mission rehearsal tools

Language/culture/leadership tutoring and coaching 

tools

Human Terrain 

Preparation

Rapid training/learning 

methods/aids

Human/team performance measurement models-tools
118 I APPENDIX C 

 Table C-11. Rank-Ordered List of Constituent Technologies 

Critical 

Capability Constituent Technology 

Raw 

Score Rank

CE Contextual analysis and intent recognition tools 31.0 1 

CE Entity, relationship, and pattern analysis 24.8 2 

UO Miniature sensor technology 23.8 3 

CE Knowledge discovery (data to information to target recognition) 23.3 4 

UO Efficient energy storage technology 22.3 5 

CE Data management from very diverse sources 22.0 6 

HTP Macro HSCB models (structure/trends) 21.5 7 

SE Decision support tools (complexity and ambiguity) 21.3 8 

UO All-domain precision geo-location 21.0 9 

SE Kinetic and non-kinetic cause-effect models (environment; 

infrastructure; socio-cultural; DIME; PMESII) 

20.8 10 

SE Storytelling, gisting and advanced visualization) 20.5 11 

HTP High fidelity, socio-culturally relevant immersive fames, training 

and mission rehearsal tools 

20.3 12 

HTP Micro HSCB (networks/events) 20.0 13 

SE Campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools (e.g, gaming; 

stochastic estimation; weapon-target pairing; effects) 

19.8 14 

HTP Integrated coherent micro-macro quantitative/computational 

models (taxonomies, application programming interfaces, 

semantics) 

19.5 15 

UO Interactive automated debriefing 18.8 16 

UO High performance and high efficiency signal processing 18.3 17 

CE Advanced context/concept search, information retrieval and 

knowledge discovery 

17.3 18 

HTP Foreign-to-English translation (e.g., voice, chat, instant 

messaging, emails; broadcast, conversation; gisting; 

summarization; [un]constrained) 

17.0 19 

UO Soldier-centric communications/networking technology 16.8 20 

STC Multi-level security and accreditation 16.0 21 

UO High density packaging 15.5 22 

HTP Language/culture/leadership tutoring and coaching tools 15.5 22 

SE Rapid diagnostics and environmental monitoring 15.0 24 

UO Space-based GMTI/SAR 14.3 25 

UO Active and passive hyper spectral sensing 13.8 26 

UO High-altitude long-endurance platforms 13.8 26 

HTP Human/team performance measurement models-tools 13.8 26 

SE Broad spectrum medical countermeasures 13.5 29 

CE Human-guided algorithms 13.5 29 

HTP Speech-to-text transcription (e.g., Phraselator; voice response 

translator; 2-way speech-to-speech) 

13.5 29 

UO Body-borne flexible displays 13.0 32 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 119

Table C-11 (continued). Rank-ordered List of Constituent Technologies 

Critical 

Capability Constituent Technology 

Raw 

Score Rank 

CE Natural man-machine Interface 13.0 32 

SE Directed energy 12.8 34 

UO Stealthy/precision delivery platforms 12.5 35 

SE Standoff active radiation detection 11.0 36 

UO Gigapixel optical imaging 10.3 37 

CE Knowledge representation 10.3 37 

SE Nuclear weapons effects and impact models 10.0 39 

SE Decontamination technologies 9.5 40 

SE Hypersonics 9.0 41 

UO Foliage penetration sensors 8.5 42 

SE Ballistic missile technology 8.5 42 

Note: HTP = human terrain preparation; UO = ubiquitous observation; CE = contextual 

exploitation; SE = scalable effects 

Table C-12. Constituent Technologies Grouped by Development Category

Develop. 

Status 

Critical 

Capab. Constituent Technology Rank 

UO Efficient energy storage technology/ TRL 5 5

CE Data management from very diverse sources/ TRL 5 6

SE Storytelling, gisting and advanced visualization)/TRL 2-5 11

HTP High fidelity, socio-culturally relevant immersive games, training 

and mission rehearsal tools/TRL 3-6

12

SE Campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools (e.g., gaming; 

stochastic estimation; weapon-target pairing; [non]lethal weapon 

effects)/TRL 3-6

14

TFC 

CE Advanced context/concept search, information retrieval and 

knowledge discovery (data mining)/TRL 2-6

18

SE Broad spectrum medical countermeasures/TRL 1-3 29

CE Natural man-machine interface/ TRL 2-3 32

CE Knowledge representation/TRL 3-5 37

CE Contextual analysis and intent recognition tools / TRL 3 1

CE Entity, relationship and pattern analysis/ TRL 3 2

CE Knowledge discovery (data to information to target recognition)/ 

TRL 2

4

SE Decision support tools (complexity and ambiguity)/ TRL 3 8

UO All-domain precision geo-location/TRL 4-5 9

STC

UO High performance and high efficiency signal processing/ TRL 5 17
120 I APPENDIX C 

Table C-12 (continued). Constituent Technologies Grouped by Development 

Category

Develop. 

Status 

Critical 

Capab. Constituent Technology Rank 

HTP Foreign-to-English translation (e.g., voice, chat, instant 

messaging, emails; broadcast, conversational; gisting; 

summarization; [un]constrained) /TRL 3-7

19

UO Soldier-centric communications/networking technology 

(waveforms, transmit/receive)/ TRL 5

20

Multi-level security and accreditation/TRL 3 21

UO High density packaging/ TRL 5 22

HTP Language/culture/leadership tutoring and coaching tools/TRL 4 22

UO Space-based GMTI/SAR/TRL 5 25

HTP Speech-to-text transcription (e.g., Phraselator; voice response 

translator; 2-way speech-to-speech)/TRL 2-6

29

UO Body-borne flexible displays/ TRL 4 32

SE Decontamination technologies/ TRL 2-6 40

UO Miniature sensor technology/ TRL 3-5 3

HTP Macro HSCB models (structure/trends)/ TRL 4-6 7

SE Kinetic and non-kinetic cause-effect models (environment; 

infrastructure; socio-cultural; DIME; PMESII)/TRL 2-6

10

HTP Micro HSCB (networks/events)/ TRL 2-4 13

HTP Integrated coherent micro-macro quantitative/computational 

models (taxonomies, application programming/interfaces, 

semantics)/TRL 1-2

15

PNW

UO Interactive automated debriefing/ TRL 3 16

SE Rapid diagnostics and environmental monitoring/ TRL 3-5 24

UO High-altitude long-endurance platforms/TRL 3 26

HTP Human/team performance measurement models-tools/TRL 3-6 26

CE Human-guided algorithms/TRL 2 29

SE Directed energy/TRL 3-7 34

UO Stealthy/precision delivery platforms/ TRL 6 35

SE Standoff active radiation detection/ TRL 1 - 3 36

UO Gigapixel optical imaging/TRL 3 37

SE Nuclear weapons effects and impact models/ TRL 2-5 39

SE Hypersonics/ TRL 4-5 41

UO Active and passive hyper spectral sensing/TRL 5 26

UO Foliage penetration sensors/TRL 3 42

JDI

SE Ballistic missile technology/TRL 7-9 42

Note: HTP = human terrain preparation; UO = ubiquitous observation; CE = contextual 

exploitation; SE = scalable effects 
CAPABILITY MATRICES I 121

Candidates That Did Not Make Our Short List 

Logistics 

The panel recognizes the vital importance of logistics across the 

spectrum of military operations. When examining the subject in light of 

the five missions, it was determined that better logistics capability is 

more a matter of using currently available technology than a subject for 

S&T investment. At the force levels contemplated in the QDR missions 

and SSTR, the logistics capability of DOD is more than adequate. 

Much can, and should, be done to adapt commercial technology and 

supply-chain management to military logistics, but recommendations on 

these matters are beyond the scope of this study. 

Air/Land/Sea Supremacy 

Air/land/sea supremacy is the appropriate military goal for major 

combat operations. The panel’s focus, however, was not major combat 

operations, but rather the insurgency and irregular operations characteristic 

of the five missions. There is no existing challenge to U.S. sea and air 

supremacy. The panel believes that the capabilities recommended will go 

far to ensure the land supremacy needed for the missions studied. 

Therefore, this subject was not included in the study or report. 

Network-Centric Operations 

The four capabilities highlighted in this report all rest on a 

foundation of robust connectivity. Vertical and horizontal integration of 

data and information is a prerequisite for success. The panel chose to 

view the network as an integral part of achieving the selected capabilities 

rather than as a stand-alone capability. Most of the connectivity issues 

studied were more a matter of policy implementation and resource 

allocation than research investment. The companion Defense Science 

Board 2006 Summer Study on Information Management for Net-Centric 

Operations examined these issues in more detail. 
122 I APPENDIX C 

General Force/Asset Protection 

The panel took an offensive-oriented view of asset and force 

protection. The four capabilities recommended for development— 

preparing human terrain, ubiquitous observation, contextual exploitation, 

and rapidly tailored effects—will serve force and asset protection needs 

in the environment of the missions studied. An exception was made in 

the case of WMD; some recommendations for defensive measures are 

included in the body of this report. 

Information Operations 

Information operations involve actions taken to affect adversary 

information and information systems. The panel came to the 

conclusion that these operations, though vitally important in major 

combat operations, had slightly less importance in the kind of 

operations necessary to prosecute the missions studied. The panel 

believes that influence operations, designed to get a positive message to 

an indigenous population of dubious loyalty, were more important than 

classical information operations, and included them as a substitute. As 

an aside, it is the belief of the panel that the definition of information 

operations should be expanded to include influence operations. 
GLOSSARY I 123

Appendix D. Glossary 

ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange 

BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

CLE combat leader’s environment 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DIME diplomatic, information, military, economic 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DOD Department of Defense 

DSB Defense Science Board 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

GALE Global Autonomous Language Exploitation 

GAM Free Aceh Movement 

GMIP Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani 

GMTI ground moving target indication 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HSCB human, social, cultural, and behavior 

HTP human terrain preparation 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JCA Joint Capability Area 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JI Jemaah Islamiyah 

LAST Learning with Adaptive Simulation and Training 

OODA observe-orient-decide-act 

PMESII political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information 

POFED Politics of Fertility, Economics, and Development 

PULO Pattani United Liberation Organization 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

R&D research and development 

SAR synthetic aperture radar 

SSTR stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

S&T science and technology 

TMTI Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative 

TRL technology readiness level 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicles 

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 

WMD weapons of mass destruction