NO. 07-08-0511-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 AT AMARILLO 

 PANEL C 

FEBRUARY 1, 2010 

 ______________________________ 

RANDY ERIC MORGAN, APPELLANT 

 V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 _________________________________ 

 FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF POTTER COUNTY; 

 NO. 121,814; HONORABLE W.F. ACORKY@ ROBERTS, JUDGE 

 _______________________________ 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

OPINION 

Appellant, Randy Eric Morgan, pled guilty to possession of marihuana in an amount 

of two ounces or less, a Class B misdemeanor,1

 and was sentenced to confinement in the 

Potter County Detention Center for 150 days and fined $400.. In a single issue, Appellant 

 1

See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. ' 481.121(b)(1) (Vernon 2003).
2 

 

asks whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of marihuana 

discovered in his vehicle. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 22, 2008, Appellant was charged with possession of a useable quantity of 

marihuana in the amount of two ounces or less. On September 12, 2008, Appellant filed a 

motion to suppress evidence of marihuana found in his Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) in plain 

view during a safety search by Officer James Clements. 

At the suppression hearing, the primary issue was whether Officer Clements had 

reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant for investigatory purposes prior to discovering the 

marihuana. The State=s first witness was Officer Douglas Glick. Since 1996, Officer Glick 

served as the Amarillo Police Department=s school liaison officer at Caprock High School. 

In this capacity, he spoke with students on a daily basis and, over the years, determined 

the credibility of certain students based upon the reliability of information they provided. 

During the latter part of March and early April 2008, the school was experiencing 

gang-related problems. Students had been involved in fights between alleged gang 

members and groups from outside the school campus. On March 31, Officer Glick 

responded to a call describing a large fight with a gathering of approximately 200 students 

in the parking lot of the school=s activity center. He dispersed the crowd.2

 Later, the next 

2

Officer Glick testified it was not uncommon for hundreds of students to gather to watch a fight.
3 

 

day on April 1, his student sources reported witnessing a fight between Appellant (a former 

student) and another person in the parking lot of the activity center on March 31. 

 On April 2, Officer Glick received reports from students that a second fight would 

take place off campus at Glenwood Park. His student sources, who witnessed the fight on 

March 31, told Officer Glick that Appellant would be fighting on April 2 and 3. His sources 

asked to remain anonymous because they feared gang retaliation. 

There were no reported fights on April 2. However, on April 3, Officer Glick 

investigated an assault on two students. One student was discovered unconscious, lying in 

the street. His injuries were serious and an ambulance was called. Although he suspected 

the students had been assaulted by Northside gang members, the victims were 

uncooperative. Shortly thereafter, he began hearing rumors that a big gang-related fight 

would be taking place after school the next day at Glenwood Park. His sources reported 

that Appellant would again be a participant. 

When Officer Glick arrived at school on April 4, students approached him with 

reports that Northside gang members were coming to the school to shoot people.3

 He was 

told that, if he attempted to intervene, he would also be shot. After hearing the rumors, he 

sought out sources he knew to be credible based on his past experience. He spoke with 

3

Officer Glick also learned from his sources that the rumored fight at Glenwood Park was a diversion 

intended to draw attention away from the school where the actual fight was to occur. 
4 

students, gang members, and administrators. His sources verified the reports and 

indicated that Appellant and another person would be involved in the fight. 

Based upon this information, Officer Glick met with school administrators and 

members of the Amarillo Police Department (APD). He had a sense of urgency because of 

the serious assault that occurred the day before and reports that weapons would be 

involved. He told school administrators and APD officers that he had received reports a 

fight would take place that day at school between Northside and Eastside gang members. 

He also informed them there was the threat of weapons and shootings taking place at the 

school. Based upon his investigation, he requested APD=s assistance. 

APD responded with marked and unmarked patrol cars, motorcycle units, and liaison 

officers from other schools. Along with high school administrators, they positioned 

themselves around the school perimeter along adjacent streets. From his vantage point, 

an assistant principal observed Appellant=s SUV driving on a street immediately adjacent to 

the school. He radioed Officer Glick. 

Because of the timing of Appellant=s appearance, his reported involvement in the 

March 31 fight on campus, the serious assault that occurred April 3, and the consistency 

and frequency with which Appellant=s name was mentioned by credible sources as being 

involved in recent violence at the high school, Officer Glick radioed officers keeping watch 

over the school perimeter and asked them to stop Appellant. He requested that they 

identify him and find out what he was doing in the area. 
5 

Officer Clements was parked on the school perimeter looking for any unusual activity 

that might indicate possible gang activity or fights. After receiving Officer Glick=s call, he 

spotted and proceeded to stop Appellant=s SUV. He believed the stop was gang-related 

and there might be weapons involved. Although Officer Clements pulled behind Appellant=s 

SUV and activated the emergency beacons on his motorcycle, Appellant continued 

traveling. Officer Clements considered this to be suspicious behavior. He also noticed 

Appellant making furtive movementsBmoving his right hand rapidly as though, in his 

experience, Appellant may have been attempting to gain access to a weapon or hide some 

object. 

Appellant came to a stop two blocks from the school. Officer Clements approached 

the SUV and removed Appellant from the vehicle. Because he was concerned Appellant=s 

furtive movements may have been intended to conceal a weapon, he handcuffed Appellant 

and patted him down. According to Officer Clements, Appellant was not placed under 

arrest but was merely being detained for further investigation. After Officer Clements 

turned Appellant over to Officer Ed Carroll, he returned to the SUV to search the interior 

driver=s side for weapons and observed a clear plastic baggie tucked between the front 

driver=s seat and the console. He also observed a marihuana cigarette in the SUV=s door 

handle. 

Officer Carroll walked Appellant to the patrol car and asked Appellant=s name. 

Appellant identified himself and then, without questioning, said, AI=ll be honest with you, I 
6 

 

have marihuana in the vehicle.@ After placing Appellant in the backseat of the patrol car, 

Officer Carroll approached Officer Clements who had already located the marihuana in the 

SUV. Officer Carroll returned to the patrol car and placed Appellant under arrest for 

possession of marihuana. He asked Appellant why he was at the high school and 

Appellant responded he was there to pick up a friend.4

 Subsequently, the trial court denied 

Appellant=s motion to suppress. 

On November 21, 2008, Appellant entered his guilty plea in open court while 

preserving his right to appeal the trial court=s ruling on his motion to suppress. Thereafter, 

he was sentenced and this appeal followed. 

Discussion 

Appellant asserts Officer Clements improperly detained him for investigatory 

purposes because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. He contends 

that, because his initial detention was improper, the trial court should have excluded the 

marihuana discovered in his SUV as the Afruit of the poisonous tree.@

4

There was no indication in the record whether this statement was made prior to receiving warnings 

regarding his right against self-incrimination. Neither was there any objection to Officer Carroll=s testimony and 

the voluntariness of Appellant=s statements were not challenged at the suppression hearing. 
7 

I. Standard of Review 

 A trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Hudson v. State, 247 

S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex.App.BAmarillo 2008, no pet.). In reviewing a trial court=s 

determination of the reasonableness of a temporary investigative detention, appellate 

courts use a bifurcated standard of review. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Almost total deference is given to a trial court=s determination of the 

historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court=s fact findings are 

based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 

725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). 

The same level of deference is also afforded to a trial court=s ruling on application of law to 

fact questions or mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions also 

turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 

108-09 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). However, if mixed questions of law and fact do not fall within 

these categories, appellate courts may conduct a de novo review of the trial court=s ruling. 

Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. 

When, as here, no findings of fact were requested nor filed, we view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling and assume the trial court made implicit 

findings of fact supported by the record. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2000). If the trial court=s decision is correct on any theory of the law 
8 

applicable to the case, it will be sustained. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855-56. Further, the legal question of whether 

the totality of the circumstances is sufficient to support an officer=s reasonable suspicion 

underlying an investigatory detention is reviewed de novo. See State v. Sheppard, 271 

S.W.3d 281, 286-87 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2004). 

Further, we interpret Appellant=s rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Texas 

Constitution consistently with the interpretation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the 

federal constitution by the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals. Sargent v. State, 56 S.W.3d 720, 724 n.2 (Tex.App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, 

pet. ref=d). Accordingly, the standard for investigative stops is the same under the Texas 

Constitution as under the United States Constitution. See Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 

115, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 894, 118 S.Ct. 236, 139 L.Ed.2d 167 

(1997). 

The threshold question we must determine is whether Officer Clements=s stop of 

Appellant was an investigatory detention or an arrest because the nature of the detention 

determines the constitutional parameters which apply to its legality. An investigatory 

detention is distinguishable from a custodial arrest, and the use of handcuffs does not 

automatically convert a temporary detention into a Fourth Amendment arrest. Sheppard, 

271 S.W.3d at 289. An investigatory detention, to be constitutionally valid, may be founded 

upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person detained is connected with 
9 

criminal activity, whereas an arrest, to pass constitutional muster, must be supported by the 

greater conclusiveness of probable cause to believe that the person detained has 

committed or is committing an offense. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 411 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1991). 

II. Investigative Detention 

A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the officer has reasonable suspicion supported by 

articulable facts that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal 

activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Ford, 158 

S.W.3d at 492. An investigative detention occurs when an individual is confronted by a 

police officer, yields to the officer=s display of authority, and is temporarily detained for 

purposes of an investigation. Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235-36 (Tex.Crim.App. 

1995). Whether reasonable suspicion exists is determined by considering the facts known 

to the officer at the moment of detention, and simple subjective good faith alone is not 

enough. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). 

Prior to initiating an investigative detention, an officer must have reasonable 

suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in criminal activity. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d 

at 768. The Areasonableness@ of a temporary detention must be examined in terms of the 

totality of the circumstances and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific, 

articulable facts, which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead 
10 

 

him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in 

criminal activity. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.5

 There is no definitive bright-line test in 

evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 

470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Common sense and ordinary 

human experience govern over rigid criteria. Id. 

5

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), the United States 

Supreme Court stated: 

[T]he requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: 

“sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth 

Amendment. . . .” 

469 U.S. at 346 (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804, 92 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971)).

Whether there is a reasonable suspicion is dependent on both the content of the 

information possessed by an officer and its degree of reliability. Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Both Aquantity and quality@ must 

be taken into account and considered in the Atotality of the circumstances B the whole 

picture@. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). The factual basis 

for an investigative detention need not arise solely from the officer=s personal observation 

but may derive from the collective knowledge of other officers when there has been some 

degree of communication between those officers; Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 341, 344 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (op. on reh=g), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 

L.Ed.2d 952 (1985), or information supplied by another person such as an informant. 

Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 259-60 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 

1150, 126 S.Ct. 1172, 163 L.Ed.2d 1129 (2006); Martinez v. State, 261 S.W.3d 773, 776 
11 

(Tex.App.BAmarillo 2008, pet. ref=d). Even circumstances Awhich when viewed 

independently of each other could be indicative of innocent action@ may give rise to 

reasonable suspicion; State v. 1998 Toyota Land Cruiser, Oklahoma Tag CMN-633 VIN 

JT3HT05J9W0007179, 277 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex.App.BAmarillo 2009, no pet.), and the 

possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to 

entertain reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346; Toyota 

Land Cruiser, 277 S.W.3d at 91. 

While a tip by an unnamed informant of undisclosed reliability may justify the 

initiation of an investigation, such a tip, standing alone, will rarely establish the requisite 

level of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative detention. Florida v. J.L., 

529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). However, a citizen 

informant=s information may provide an officer with reasonable suspicion if the information 

is corroborated by further indicia of reliability, i.e., some additional facts from which a police 

officer may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a temporary detention justified. 

Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258-59 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330-31). 

Corroborating information that can give rise to reasonable suspicion includes details 

that accurately predict the subject=s future behavior, link the subject to the alleged criminal 

activity, or give a particularized and objective reason to suspect the subject. Glenn v. 

State, 967 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.App.BAmarillo 1998, pet. dism=d). A citizen=s tip deserves 

great weight when there is a detailed description of the wrongdoing along with a statement 

that the event was witnessed firsthand; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
12 

 

76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), when a citizen puts their self in a position to be held accountable for 

their intervention; State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex.App.BFort Worth 1999, no 

pet.), the citizen is not connected with law enforcement or a paid informant; State v. Sailo, 

910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex.App.BFort Worth 1995, pet. ref=d), or there is sufficient evidence 

that an informant=s information is reliable based on a past relationship with law 

enforcement. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 

612 (1972); Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613, 616-17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).6

 Although 

there is no per se rule requiring independent police corroboration; Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 

618 (collected cases cited therein), when the reliability of the information is increased, less 

corroboration is necessary. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d at 341. 

6

The same factors applicable when establishing probable cause are also relevant in the reasonable 

suspicion context except that a lesser showing of suspicion is required. State v. Fudge, 42 S.W.3d 226, 239 

(Tex.App.BAustin 2000, no pet.) (citing White, 496 U.S. at 328-29). When reviewing an investigative detention 

under either state or federal law, it is accepted that Alaw enforcement officers may stop and briefly detain 

persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to 

arrest.@ Johnson, 912 S.W.2d at 235 (quoting Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). 

Here, Officer Glick received reports from students of future gang-related fights 

possibly involving weapons during the end of March and early April. Following an incident 

on March 31, Officer Glick met with students whom he believed were credible and reliable 

based on prior information he had received from them. His student sources identified 

Appellant as one of the persons that students had gathered to watch fight in the parking lot 

of the school=s activity center. His sources also reported there would be another fight on 

April 3 and Appellant would be involved. 
13 

As reported, on April 3, two students were assaulted after lunch and one student 

sustained serious injuries. Although Officer Glick suspected the assaults were gangrelated, neither victim would cooperate. Afterwards, he began receiving reports that a 

gang-related fight was going to occur the next day, April 4, and Appellant would again be 

involved. 

When Officer Glick arrived at school on April 4, students approached him saying that 

gang members were coming to the school with weapons to shoot people, including Officer 

Glick, if he got in the way. His credible student sources verified the reports and also 

reported Appellant would be involved. At this point, Officer Glick believed he had a credible 

threat of violence at the school accompanied by threats of weapons and shootingsBand 

Appellant would be involved. Based upon these reports, he coordinated a response among 

school administrators and the APD. 

When, as predicted, Appellant was subsequently identified driving down a street 

bordering the school, Officer Glick believed his appearance at the school coupled with 

recent events that week and coinciding with reports of a credible threat of violence involving 

Appellant, gave him reasonable suspicion to request that Appellant be stopped, identified, 

and questioned regarding his purpose for being in the area. He radioed his request to APD 

officers and Officer Clements initiated a stop of Appellant=s SUV. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot say that Officer Glick=s assessment of the situation in light of his 
14 

 

specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the school was unreasonable. See 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).7

In evaluating whether there is a reasonable particularized and objective basis for 

detaining a person suspected of wrongdoing for further investigation, government officials 

must consider the totality of circumstances.8

 Because Officer Glick=s information was 

based on face-to-face encounters with students,9 some of which were known to have 

provided credible and reliable information in the past,10 we find that Officer Glick had a 

7

Officer Glick served as school liaison officer at the school for twelve years. ASchool officials have a 

specialized understanding of the school environment, the habits of students, and the concerns of the 

community, which enables them to >formulat[e] certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior.=@

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting United States v. 

Cortez, 499 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

8

While making a determination regarding the more stringent Fourth Amendment standard of probable 

cause to search, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals described the totality-of-the-circumstances test as 

follows: 

[The] totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our treatment of 

probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific “tests” be satisfied by every informant=s 

tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable-cause standard is 

that it is a “practical, nontechnical conception.” In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the 

very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual 

and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 

technicians, act. . . . 

Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 618 n.20 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 

(1983).

9

A tip provided by an unidentified Aknown student@ may be relied on as added indicia of reliability 

permitting a school official to rely on the tip. In re K.C.B., 141 S.W.3d 303, 307 (Tex.App.—Austin 2004, no 

pet.). Moreover, Texas courts have distinguished between anonymous telephone informants and informants 

that personally approach officers. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 25 S.W.3d 908, 912-13 (Tex.App.BHouston [14th

Dist.] 2000, no pet.). AUnlike a person who makes an anonymous telephone call, an individual presenting 

himself to the officer in person . . . puts himself in a position to be held accountable for his intervention; thus, 

the reliability of the information he provides is increased.@ Id. at 913. 

10See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 (held that informant personally known to officer provided Aenough 

indicia of reliability@ to create probable cause); Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 616-17 (held that informant personally 
15 

 

reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was on the school=s perimeter for the purpose of 

engaging in criminal activity that might involve weapons and shootings.11 Further, there is 

no evidence of record indicating Officer Glick=s student sources were connected to law 

enforcement or paid informants. 

 That Appellant was detained on a public street bordering the school rather than on 

the school=s campus is of no moment. In light of the recent events at the school as well as 

the reported threats of gang-related violence, weapons, and shootings with Appellant being 

identified by credible sources as one being involved, Appellant=s presence on the school=s 

immediate perimeter on the day the violence was to occur required immediate action to 

assure the safety of students. The officers did not need to wait until Appellant Acrossed the 

line@ to detain him. 

known to officer as credible and reliable based upon past information provided Aenough indicia of reliability@ to 

create probable cause). 

11Officer Glick=s sources had verified approximately 200 students gathered to witness a fight involving 

Appellant on March 31, predicted the violent assault that occurred on April 3 and also predicted that Appellant, 

a non-student, would be present at the school on April 4 to participate in a gang-related fight involving 

weapons and shootings. That a tip contains Apredictive information@ capable of verification is also indicia of 

reliability. See Fudge, 42 S.W.3d at 239-40. 

Having determined Officer Clements=s investigative detention of Appellant was 

reasonable under the circumstances, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

finding the marihuana Officer Clements discovered in plain view in the SUV was admissible 

at trial and denying Appellant=s motion to suppress. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled. 

Conclusion 
16 

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Patrick A. Pirtle 

 Justice 

Publish.