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*********************************************** 
IN RE MADISON M. ET AL.*

(AC 41469)

DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed to this court from the judgments of the

trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his three minor

children pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 [j] [3] [B] [i]) on the basis of his

failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. The

petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, had filed neglect

petitions and an order of temporary custody for each of the three children. The father was on the run from the law at that time, but the

Department of Children and Families, nevertheless, unsuccessfully

attempted to contact him by calling several numbers on file, leaving a

message with a friend, and sending letters to addresses associated with

him. The children were adjudicated neglected and placed in the custody

of the petitioner, and specific steps were ordered for the father. When

the department later contacted the father by phone, he refused to provide

the department with his location and was uncooperative. After approximately one year of evading detection, the father was arrested, incarcerated, and appeared before the court at an evidentiary hearing, at which

time the previously ordered specific steps, which were not physically

delivered to the father, were admitted as an exhibit, and the court

approved the permanency plans of termination of parental rights and

adoption. In the months leading up to the trial on the petitions to

terminate the father’s parental rights, the department sent several letters

to him but received no reply. Thereafter, the trial court granted the

termination petitions with respect to all three children, finding that the

father had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation. The court

also found that the father had been provided the specific steps, as

required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and, alternatively, in light of his

absconding and refusal to cooperate with the department’s investigation,

the failure to provide him with the steps was harmless error. Held that

the trial court did not err in concluding that the respondent father had

been provided specific rehabilitative steps in a manner that satisfied

the requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i): under the circumstances

of the present case, where the father had evaded detection intentionally

and refused to respond to the department’s repeated inquiries, and where

the previously ordered steps were admitted as an exhibit during the

evidentiary hearing, at which time the steps would have been accessible

to the father and his attorney, physical delivery of the steps to the father

was not a necessary measure, and the petitioner’s efforts were more

than sufficient to ensure that he knew specific steps had been ordered

and that those steps were important to preserving his parental rights;

moreover, even if the respondent father had not been provided the

specific steps, such an omission would constitute harmless error, as

the father would have been unable to observe certain specific steps,

such as obtaining adequate housing and income, avoiding involvement

with the criminal justice system, maintaining a safe and nurturing home

environment, and developing a cohesive relationship with his children

because of his incarceration and the allegations that he had sexually

abused his children, and the physical delivery of specific steps would

have been a futile endeavor in light of the father’s attitude toward the

department and reluctance to change for the better, the court having

found that the father was not ready to assume a responsible position

in the lives of the children, that he was initially separated from his

children because of his untreated substance abuse issues and general

criminality, and that there was no indication that he had any intention

of addressing those problems or becoming a stable and dependable

figure in the lives of his children.

Argued September 6—officially released October 18, 2018**

Procedural History
Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New Britain, Juvenile

Matters, and tried to the court, Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial referee; judgments terminating the

parental rights of the respondent father, from which

the respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.

David J. Reich, for the appellant (respondent father).

Cynthia E. Mahon, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, Jane Rosenberg, solicitor general, and Benjamin

Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee

(petitioner).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The respondent, Donald S., appeals

from the judgments of the trial court terminating his

parental rights with respect to his minor children, Madison M., Deanna S., and Emma Grace S.1 On appeal, the

respondent claims that he was not provided the specific

steps mandated by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3)

(B) (i) and, consequently, was unable to achieve a level

of rehabilitation that would reasonably encourage a

belief that at some future date he could assume a

responsible position in the lives of his children.2 Additionally, the respondent contends that the failure to

provide him with the specific steps did not constitute

harmless error. We do not agree with either argument

and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following factual findings of the trial court, which

are not challenged, and procedural history are relevant

to our consideration of the issues raised on appeal. Prior

to the filing of the neglect petitions, the Department

of Children and Families (department) had received

numerous reports that the respondent and the children’s mother were not acting as responsible parents.

In 2011, the department substantiated separate

instances in which the parents had failed to follow up

on important medical appointments for Madison and

Deanna. The next year, the department also substantiated a report that the parents had cancelled appointments for Emma Grace, only three months old at the

time, against the advice of her doctor. Then, in 2013,

Emma Grace missed multiple appointments with medical specialists, as well as appointments with her pediatrician.

The parents were arrested in September, 2014, on

charges of risk of injury to a child; see General Statutes

§ 53-21; after Deanna, then six years old, was found

wandering alone outside in a dirty and disheveled condition. Several months later, in April, 2015, the department

received a report from Deanna’s school that there was

a six inch red mark on her backside. Deanna told school

staff that the respondent had struck her with a knife

and that he sometimes hits her with a belt. She also

told school staff that ‘‘it hurts’’ when he hits her, but

that she was ‘‘not afraid to go home.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Following an investigation, however,

‘‘the department decided not to substantiate either parent for neglect.’’

During this time, the respondent was cooperative

with the department’s investigation. In May, 2015, he

informed the assigned investigative social worker that

Madison had been exhibiting behavioral issues at school

and scheduled a meeting to address her individualized

needs. Then, on June 2, 2015, he contacted the department to notify officials that Emma Grace had been

injured when the stroller she was in fell down a flight
of stairs onto pavement. Two days later, on June 4,

2015, however, the department received reports that

the respondent had been arrested on June 3, 2015, for

breach of peace and interfering with a police officer,

stemming from an incident at the family’s home. The

department’s follow-up investigation revealed that the

respondent had been drinking and acting ‘‘nasty’’

toward the mother. She told him to leave, but he

refused. He later passed out in the backyard. When he

woke up, he began ringing neighbors’ doorbells and

screaming. At some point, the mother called the police,

and he was arrested. In connection with this incident,

a protective order was issued, and the respondent

moved out of the family’s home.

The next day, June 5, 2015, the respondent attended

an evaluation at Wheeler Clinic for mental health and

substance abuse issues. It was recommended that he

enroll in an intensive outpatient program at its facility.

He agreed and successfully completed the program in

July, 2015. The respondent was then referred to a

relapse prevention group. Shortly after enrolling in this

program, however, he was discharged ‘‘unsuccessfully’’

after he notified Wheeler Clinic staff that he was moving

to New Haven.

In August, 2015, the respondent again was arrested,

this time on motor vehicle charges. He failed to appear

in court on these charges, as well as the criminal charges

from the June 3, 2015 incident. Then, in October, 2015,

police began an investigation into allegations made by

the mother that the respondent had sexually assaulted

Madison. Although the police eventually concluded that

there was insufficient evidence to charge him, it was

at this time that the respondent’s whereabouts became

unknown to the department.

In December, 2015, department social worker Brenda

Matta was assigned to the children’s case. She

attempted to contact the respondent by using phone

numbers that the department had listed for him but

was unsuccessful. She also contacted a friend of the

respondent and left a message for him; her call was

not returned. After searching the state Judicial Branch

website, Matta found two addresses for the respondent

and sent letters to these locations. She received no

reply.

On December 18, 2015, following a report that the

mother and her new husband were consuming large

amounts of alcohol while caring for the children, the

department invoked a ninety-six hour hold on all three

children. Four days later, petitions were filed alleging

that the children were neglected. The same day, the

petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,

also sought and obtained an ex parte order of temporary

custody for each of the three children. In granting the

orders of temporary custody, the court also ordered

preliminary specific steps for the respondent and the
mother. Matta testified that, at the time, the whereabouts of the respondent remained unknown, and

notice of the orders of temporary custody was made

by publication.

A preliminary hearing on the ex parte orders of

temporary custody was held on December 29, 2015;

neither parent attended. At the preliminary hearing on

the orders of temporary custody, the court found that

abode service had been made on the mother and sustained the orders without prejudice to the respondent,

as publication was still pending. On January 27, 2016,

a preliminary hearing on the neglect petitions was held,

which neither parent attended. After finding proper service and compliance with Practice Book § 17-21, the

court entered defaults against both parents for failing

to appear, adjudicated the children to be neglected and

ordered the petitioner to file a motion to review the

permanency plan by September 13, 2016.3 The children

were committed to the care of the petitioner and specific steps were again ordered for each parent.

Finally, in February, 2016, the department was able

to speak with the respondent after an official from

Deanna’s school contacted Matta and informed her that

they had received a phone call from an individual claiming to be Deanna’s father. Matta called the number

the school provided and spoke with an individual who

identified himself as the respondent. During their conversation, the respondent said he wanted to see his

children but refused to provide his address. He became

loud, threatening, and verbally abusive, before hanging

up. Sometime between March and July, 2016, Matta

attempted to contact him again at the same number

but was unsuccessful.

In July, 2016, after nearly a year of evading detection,

the respondent was arrested and incarcerated. Two

months later, Madison informed her therapist that the

respondent had sexually abused her and her two sisters,

and the therapist reported the allegations of sexual

abuse to the department. On September 16, 2016, the

petitioner, pursuant to Practice Book § 34a-23, filed a

motion for emergency relief seeking an order suspending the respondent’s visits with the three children

until the department completed an investigation into

the allegations of sexual abuse.4 The court granted the

petitioner’s motion ex parte the same day it was filed.

Following an investigation into the allegations, the

respondent was arrested and charged with multiple felonies. The charges remained pending as of the date

of the court’s decision to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights.

Approximately one month after issuing the emergency ex parte order suspending the respondent’s visitation rights, the court held a hearing on the petitioner’s

motion to review the permanency plan.5 At this hearing,

the petitioner notified the court for the first time that
the respondent was incarcerated. The hearing was continued until November 9, 2016, at which time the respondent appeared and was appointed counsel. Initially, the

respondent, through counsel, objected to the petitioner’s motion; however, at the evidentiary hearing on

December 7, 2016, the respondent withdrew his objection. During the hearing, and in the presence of the

respondent and his attorney, the petitioner introduced

as an exhibit a social study in support of her motion

to review the permanency plan, which included the

specific steps ordered by the court on January 27, 2016.

At the end of the hearing, the court approved the permanency plans of termination of parental rights and

adoption.

Upon learning that the respondent was incarcerated,

Matta began sending letters to him once a month. The

letters identified her as the social worker assigned to

the family’s case, requested the respondent’s participation in the case, and provided him with her direct line.

He did not respond to these letters. In December, 2016,

Matta was able to speak with the respondent over the

phone, at which time he told her that he did not want

the department to contact him anymore. Despite this

statement, Matta continued to send him letters. She

spoke with the respondent once more in May, 2017,

this time seeking information for the termination of

parental rights social study. During their conversation,

the respondent became angry and stopped answering

questions.

On April 27, 2017, petitions were filed seeking to

terminate the parental rights of the respondent. The

petitions alleged grounds for termination pursuant to

§§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and (C). On October 24 and

30, 2017, a trial was held on the petitions to terminate.

Following the presentation of evidence and closing

arguments, the court ordered posttrial briefs addressing

the issue of whether the respondent had been provided

the specific steps, as required by statute, and heard oral

argument from the parties on December 6, 2017.

In a thorough and well reasoned memorandum of

decision, dated February 7, 2018, the trial court granted

the termination petitions with respect to all three children and rendered judgments accordingly.6

In its decision, the court found that there was clear and

convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent, and that he had

been unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification

efforts. Further, the court found that the respondent

had failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation

that would encourage a belief that, within a reasonable

time, he could assume a responsible position in the

lives of his children.7 See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)

(3) (B) (i). Concomitantly, the court found that the

respondent had been provided the specific steps as

required by statute and, alternatively, in light of his
absconding and refusal to cooperate with the department’s investigation, failure to provide him with the

steps was harmless error. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial

court erred in holding that the respondent had been

‘‘provided’’ specific rehabilitative steps in a manner that

satisfies the requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)

and, if so, whether failing to provide him with the steps

was harmless. ‘‘Our review of the court’s interpretation

of this statute is plenary.’’ In re Unique R., 170 Conn.

App. 833, 845, 156 A.3d 1 (2017).

‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists

of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial

court must determine whether one or more . . .

grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in

§ 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The [Commissioner of Children and Families]

. . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege

and prove one or more of the statutory grounds.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariana A., 181

Conn. App. 415, 427, 186 A.3d 83 (2018). ‘‘Because a

respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her

child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly

complied with before termination can be accomplished

and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Egypt E., 327 Conn. 506, 527,

175 A.3d 21 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Morsy E. v.

Commissioner of Children & Families (U.S. October

1, 2018) (No. 17-1549).

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is

not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative

policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles

governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Nevaeh W.,

317 Conn. 723, 729–30, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015).
Pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B), parental rights may

be terminated if ‘‘the child (i) has been found by the

Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been

neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding,

or (ii) is found to be neglected, abused or uncared for

and has been in the custody of the commissioner for

at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has

been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the

return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal

rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within

a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of

the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . .’’ Further, in In re

Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 500–506, 78 A.3d 797 (2013),

overruled in part on other grounds by In re Shane

M., 318 Conn. 569, 587–88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015), our

Supreme Court concluded that the specific steps

requirement found in subparagraph (B) applies to both

clauses (i) and (ii), and, in most cases, when seeking

to terminate parental rights under either ground, the

petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence

that steps had been ordered and provided to the respondent. Neither the statute nor our case law, however,

establishes a definition of the term ‘‘provided.’’

The respondent argues that ‘‘provided,’’ as it is used

in the context of this statute, requires physical delivery

of the specific steps to the parent. In this regard, the

respondent contends that at some point following his

appearance in this case at the November, 2016 hearing,

the petitioner or the court should have given him a copy

of the previously ordered specific steps or, at the very

least, communicated those steps, and their significance,

to him. He claims that failure to do so was tantamount

to noncompliance with the requirements of § 17a-112

(j) (3) (B) (i), for which we must reverse the judgments

of termination. We are not persuaded.

As our Supreme Court explained in In re Elvin G.,

supra, 310 Conn. 507–508, the ‘‘[s]pecific steps provide

notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be

done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination

of rights. Their completion or noncompletion, however,

does not guarantee any outcome. A parent may complete all of the specific steps and still be found to have

failed to rehabilitate. . . . Conversely, a parent could

fall somewhat short in completing the ordered steps,

but still be found to have achieved sufficient progress

so as to preclude a termination of his or her rights

based on a failure to rehabilitate.’’ (Citation omitted.)

In some respects, ‘‘[t]he specific steps are [simply] a

benchmark by which the court will measure the respondent’s conduct to determine whether termination is

appropriate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M., 148 Conn.

App. 308, 329, 84 A.3d 1265 (2014), aff’d, 318 Conn.
569, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). Indeed, when ‘‘determining

whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has

corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment,

regardless of whether those factors were included in

specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed

by the department.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Jazmine B., 121 Conn. App. 376, 390–91, 996 A.2d

286, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 924, 998 A.2d 168 (2010).

The petitioner contends that just as General Statutes

§ 45a-716,8 which § 17a-112 incorporates by reference,

allows for multiple means of legal service, we should

construe ‘‘provide’’ in a similar flexible and administratively efficient fashion. For her part, the petitioner

claims that this position is logically consistent with the

plain meaning of ‘‘provide,’’ which is defined as ‘‘to

supply or make something available . . . .’’ See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003);

see also Vazquez v. Buhl, 150 Conn. App. 117, 129, 90

A.3d 331 (2014) (‘‘[a]ccording to one dictionary, the

definition of ‘provide’ is to: ‘make (something) available’

or ‘supply (something that is wanted or needed)

. . . .’ ’’). From this common definition, it is argued,

one cannot necessarily infer that ‘‘provide’’ requires a

direct conveyance from one person to another.

Although we find merit in this position, we are reluctant to graft into the statute a one-size-fits-all definition

prescribing the efforts the petitioner must undertake

in order to ensure that a respondent is apprised of the

specific steps. Rather, it is more consistent with our

jurisprudence in this area that this issue be addressed

on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular facts

before the court. See, e.g., In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.

App. 224, 231, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (noting that for purposes of § 17a-112 ‘‘reasonable time’’ is factual determination to be made on case-by-case basis). In this regard,

there might be some circumstances where merely making the specific steps available in the court file would

be inadequate given the respondent’s involvement in the

case and cooperation with the department. Conversely,

where the respondent has evaded detection intentionally and/or refused to respond to the department’s

inquiries, we do not believe that physical delivery of

the steps is a necessary measure. The upshot of this

approach is that the court balances the respondent’s

willingness to participate in the proceedings against the

petitioner’s efforts to notify the parent of the actions

needed to facilitate reunification and avoid termination.

Applying this approach to the unchallenged facts of

this case, we conclude that the respondent was provided with the specific steps, as required by § 17a-112

(j) (3) (B) (i). In December, 2015, when the children

were first placed in the custody of the petitioner, the

respondent was on the run from the law. During the

initial stages of these proceedings, the department
attempted to contact him by calling several numbers

on file, leaving a message with a friend, and sending

letters to addresses associated with him. Further, once

contact was made with the respondent in February,

2016, he refused to provide the department with his

location, became argumentative, and eventually hung

up on the department social worker. After he was incarcerated and appeared in court, the previously ordered

steps were admitted as an exhibit during the December,

2016 evidentiary hearing. At this time, the steps would

have been accessible to the respondent and his attorney, if they had not been already. Finally, in the months

leading up to the October, 2017 trial, the department

sent several letters to the respondent asking for his

cooperation with the termination of parental rights

social study, but received no reply. Accordingly, given

the respondent’s recalcitrance throughout this process,

the petitioner’s efforts were more than sufficient to

ensure that he knew specific steps had been ordered

and that those steps were important to preserving his

parental rights. To require physical delivery of the steps

in this circumstance would only encourage respondents

to take a contentious or evasive posture during the

pendency of their case.

Even if we were to determine, however, that the

respondent had not been provided the specific steps,

such an omission simply would constitute harmless

error in this context. As in In re Elvin G., supra, 310

Conn. 509–17, where hindsight demonstrates that the

respondent would have been unable or unwilling to

observe specific steps, had they been provided, the

absence of such steps does not vitiate an otherwise

valid judgment. Here, the steps ordered in December,

2015, and January, 2016, required the respondent to

obtain adequate housing and income, avoid involvement with the criminal justice system, and maintain a

safe, stable and nurturing home environment, all of

which he could not accomplish given his incarceration.

Moreover, following new allegations of sexual abuse,

the respondent was no longer permitted to visit with the

children, which in turn prevented him from developing

a cohesive relationship with them, which was another

required step. Finally, many of the steps mandated that

the respondent cooperate and communicate regularly

with the department, which as evidenced in the record,

he failed to do repeatedly.

We find our conclusion of harmless error further

supported by the fact that the respondent does not

contest the trial court’s finding that he failed to rehabilitate. In deciding to terminate his parental rights, the

trial court found that the respondent was not ready to

assume a responsible position in the lives of the children, especially in view of the childrens’ ages and particular needs. Additionally, the court noted that it was

the respondent’s untreated substance abuse issues and

general criminality that initially led to his separation
from the children. There was no indication from his

conduct throughout the proceedings, even following his

incarceration, that he had any intention of addressing

these problems or becoming a stable and dependable

figure in the lives of his children. As such, any physical

delivery, if required, of specific steps would have been

a futile endeavor in light of the respondent’s attitude

toward the department and reluctance to change for

the better. See In re Jazmine B., supra, 121 Conn.

App. 390–91 (‘‘[i]n determining whether a parent has

achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may

consider whether the parent has corrected the factors

that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether

those factors were included in specific expectations

ordered by the court or imposed by the department’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]).

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** October 18, 2018, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The children’s mother consented to the termination of her parental rights

and did not participate in this appeal.

2 On September 5, 2018, the attorney for the minor children filed a statement pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, adopting the position of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families.

3

‘‘The statutes governing permanency plans were adopted to comply with

federal law regulating state access to federal funding for children who have

been removed from their parents . . . . In order to continue to receive

federal funds, Congress requires states to review permanency plans every

twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 622 (a) and (b) (8) (A) (ii) (2012).’’ (Citation

omitted.) In re Mindy F., 153 Conn. App. 809, 812–13 n.5, 104 A.3d 799

(2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 913, 106 A.3d 306 (2015); see also Practice

Book § 35a-14.

4 Prior to this order, the respondent had not visited with children at any

point while they were in the custody of the petitioner.

5 See footnote 3 of this opinion.

6 On May 23, 2018, the trial court issued a corrected memorandum of

decision, which fixed an error regarding the date on which it held a hearing

on the motion to review the permanency plan.

7 The court found that the petitioner had not met her burden of proof to

establish grounds for termination under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C). Specifically,

the court considered evidence that a previous investigation into claims

of sexual molestation by the respondent concluded that ‘‘the mother was

instigating [Madison] to make the allegation.’’ Additionally, the court noted

‘‘the vague nature of the current allegations, questions about [the respondent’s] opportunity to abuse the children after their statements of affection

for him, and the court’s lack of opportunity to hear from police or the

forensic interviewer about the children’s statements or to hear testimony

from the children themselves in order to assess the reliability and credibility

of those allegations . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) We do not address this

issue on appeal, as the petitioner did not present it as an alternative ground

to affirm.

8

‘‘Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, notice of the

hearing and a copy of the petition, certified by the petitioner, the petitioner’s

agent or attorney, or the clerk of the court, shall be served at least ten days

before the date of the hearing by personal service or service at the person’s

usual place of abode on the persons enumerated in subsection (b) of this

section who are within the state, and by first class mail on the Commissioner

of Children and Families and the Attorney General. If the address of any

person entitled to personal service or service at the person’s usual place
of abode is unknown, or if personal service or service at the person’s usual

place of abode cannot be reasonably effected within the state, or if any

person enumerated in subsection (b) of this section is out of the state, a

judge or the clerk of the court shall order notice to be given by registered

or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by publication at least ten

days before the date of the hearing. Any such publication shall be in a

newspaper of general circulation in the place of the last-known address of

the person to be notified, whether within or without this state, or, if no

such address is known, in the place where the petition has been filed.’’

General Statutes § 45a-716 (c).