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91–565 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 108–916

OVERSIGHT HEARING: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 23, 2003

Serial No. J–108–27

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

BRUCE ARTIM, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ............. 18

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ..................... 10

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah ............................ 1

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 178

Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 188

Leahy, Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont ............................. 9

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 192

WITNESSES 

Hutchinson, Asa, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, 

Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ..................................... 6

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C. ............................................................................... 3

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Asa Hutchinson to questions submitted by Senators Leahy, 

Grassley, and Durbin ........................................................................................... 29

Responses of Robert S. Mueller III to questions submitted by Senators Hatch, 

Grassley, Leahy, and Durbin .............................................................................. 74

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hutchinson, Asa, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, 

Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statement .................. 180

Migration Policy Institute, Muzaffar A. Chishti, Doris Meissner, Demetrios 

G. Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michael J. Wishnie, and Stephen W. 

Yale-Loehr, Washington, D.C., report (excerpts) ............................................... 195

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C., statement ............................................................ 216

(1)

OVERSIGHT HEARING: LAW ENFORCEMENT 

AND TERRORISM 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2003 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:45 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, DeWine, Sessions, Craig, 

Leahy, and Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH 

Chairman HATCH. I apologize to the two witnesses who are appearing before us that we have had to delay their testimony this 

long, and I understand, Mr. Director, you have to be through by 

1:30. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Chairman HATCH. So will do our best to try and move this along. 

We do have a couple of votes at 12 o’clock, so we will move along 

up through then, and we are going to try to keep going. Senator 

Grassley is going to run over and vote, and I will stay here as long 

as I can, and then he will come back to keep the Committee going 

so that we will not waste any time. 

We are trying to examine the recent efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security to 

combat the increasing threat of terrorism. As I have stated before, 

I am committed to conducting the meaningful oversight of the FBI 

and the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that as we 

fight the war against terrorism, we achieve maximum security 

without compromising the freedoms and liberties we cherish in this 

great country. 

As we focus on the FBI’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s recent efforts to prevent and deter future terrorist attacks 

against our country, it is important that we hear from these two 

distinguished witnesses who are here before us today. It is indeed 

an honor to have before the Committee Robert Mueller, the FBI Director, and Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security at the Department of Homeland Security. I look 

forward and we all look forward to hearing from both of you on 

your continuing efforts and commitment to winning the war 

against terrorism. 

2

Now, the challenges that we face in this war continue to be unprecedented. We fight a fanatical enemy, dedicated to the destruction—at all costs—of America. When Director Mueller took over the 

FBI days after the 9/11 attacks, he faced extraordinary challenges. 

He assumed responsibility for a law enforcement agency that had 

suffered from antiquated information technology and inadequate 

intelligence systems. Following, September 11, Director Mueller 

acted quickly to refocus the FBI, to reallocate its resources, to improve its internal information systems, and to transform its central 

mission from reactive crime-fighting to proactive terrorist protection and prevention. Congress recognized the enormity of this task 

and provided in the PATRIOT Act a set of new tools that has enabled the FBI to complete this transformation. 

It is apparent from news reports and recent independent reviews, 

such as those conducted by the General Accounting Office and the 

National Academy of Public Administration’s Academy Panel on 

FBI Reorganization, that the FBI has made great progress in its 

role as the lead terrorist prevention agency. By using many of the 

new tools provided in the PATRIOT Act, and by increasing information sharing, the FBI, with the assistance of other Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well 

as our international partners, has demonstrated a number of successes in capturing and prosecuting terrorists. Under Director 

Mueller’s able leadership, the FBI has significantly upgraded its information technology systems, has revised its FISA application and 

review procedures, and implemented a new infrastructure that will 

maximize the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of critical intelligence information among law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies. While must has been accomplished, even more remains to 

be done. 

Equally impressive has been the creation and operation of the 

new Department of Homeland Security, which required the consolidation of over 21 separate agencies and the merging of nearly 

180,000 employees into a single, unified agency. The Homeland Security Act placed with Secretary Hutchinson’s jurisdiction the primary responsibility for securing our Nation’s borders from terrorists who seek to enter and attack our country. In short order, Secretary Hutchinson dedicated himself to implementing new systems 

and policies designed to prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism, without disrupting the efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce at our borders. Now, I look forward to 

working with you, Secretary Hutchinson, as you implement programs to accomplish these goals, such as the new US–VISIT program. 

Now, I want to mention one other issue that I expect we will address today in follow-up to the Committee’s June 25th hearing on 

the Department of Justice’s Inspector General’s report on the treatment of the 9/11 detainees. The June 25th hearing was a fair and 

objective hearing. It is clear that the Government faced unprecedented challenges in responding to the 9/11 attacks. Dedicated public servants worked around the clock to investigate the attacks, 

identify and locate terrorist cells within our country, and secure 

our borders from further attacks. But having said that, it is also 

3

apparent from the IG’s report that there are valuable lessons to be 

learned from our response to the 9/11 attacks. 

I look forward to hearing from each of you today about the reforms you are implementing and your efforts to protect our country 

from future terrorist attacks. 

We will reserve the time for Senator Leahy, should he attend 

and come, so that he can interrupt at any time and make his statement. 

We will turn to you first, Director Mueller, and then to Secretary 

Hutchinson. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman 

and other members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here to 

update you on the issues we discussed during my most recent appearance on March 4th, and also to assure you that the FBI has 

been working hard to protect the American people from another 

terrorist attack. 

We have continued to make significant progress in our reorganization and in our ongoing efforts to improve our collection and 

use of intelligence, as well as to our commitment to demonstrating 

our respect for constitutional liberties in all our investigations and 

our programs. I want to thank you for your continued commitment 

and interest in ensuring the success of the FBI. The men and the 

women of the FBI appreciate that support and demonstrate daily 

their determination to fulfill the great responsibility that you and 

the public have entrusted to them. 

Even in the relatively short period of time since I last appeared 

before this Committee in March, we have continued to progress in 

improving and reorganizing the FBI so that we function more efficiently and are able to respond more rapidly to world events and 

changes in technology, both the technology available to us as well 

as the technology that is also available to criminals who threaten 

our economic interests and our infrastructure. 

Now, among the most significant challenges has been our commitment to use the authorities provided by the PATRIOT Act to 

protect the American people while at the same time continuing our 

commitment to honoring constitutional protections, including First 

Amendment freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly. 

Let me just start at the outset and make a few comments, if I 

could, about the PATRIOT Act. Our efforts to combat terrorism 

have been greatly aided by the provisions of that statute, and our 

success in preventing another catastrophic attack on the United 

States homeland would certainly have been much more difficult, if 

not impossible, without several of the provisions of that Act. It has 

already proved extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism, 

and our opportunity to use it will only increase. 

First and foremost, the PATRIOT Act has produced greater collection and sharing of information within the law enforcement and 

intelligence communities. 

As you know, prior to the Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—commonly known as FISA—was interpreted as requirVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:45 Jul 05, 2007 Jkt 091565 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\91565.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
4

ing that FISA surveillance was permitted only when the primary 

purpose of that surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. But in order to ensure that the primary purpose of that 

surveillance did not shift during the investigation, criminal investigators were essentially walled off from intelligence investigations. 

What is called a metaphorical wall was erected between intelligence and law enforcement out of concern that sharing of information between intelligence and criminal investigators would become involved in developing evidence for a criminal case. 

Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act displaced the primary purpose 

standard, permitting the use of FISA when a significant purpose of 

the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. In 

addition, Section 504(a) clarified that coordination between intelligence and criminal personnel was not grounds for denial of a 

FISA application. These changes, when combined with the 2002 

opinion from the FISA Court interpreting the new language, effectively dismantled the wall between law enforcement and intelligence. The resulting free flow of information and coordination between law enforcement and intelligence has expanded our ability to 

utilize all appropriate—and I say appropriate—resources to prevent 

terrorism. 

As a result, although the legal standard for obtaining a FISA 

warrant is still probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, we now have more opportunities to employ FISA as well as the opportunity for greater 

dissemination of the information that flows from that form of surveillance. 

I should add that information is flowing more freely in both directions. Section 203 of the PATRIOT Act modified the rules governing the handling of information obtained through the grand jury 

or from Title III surveillance, so that we may now disclose without 

delay any foreign intelligence information obtained from these 

criminal investigative tools to the Director of Central Intelligence 

and to our friends at Homeland Security. In fact, the statute mandates these disclosures. 

In addition, the PATRIOT Act gave Federal judges the authority 

to issue search warrants that are valid nationwide in terrorism investigations. In the past, a court could only issue a search warrant 

for premises within the same judicial district. But our investigations of terrorist networks often span a number of districts, and 

this change, which is limited to terrorism cases, has eliminated unnecessary delays and burdens associated with having to present 

warrants to different judges around the country. 

Title III of the Act, known as the International Money Laundering Anti–Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, has armed us with a 

number of new weapons in our efforts to identify and track the financial structures supporting terrorist groups. Past terrorist financing methods have included the use of informal systems for 

transferring funds in a manner that is difficult to detect and trace. 

The effectiveness of such methods was significantly undercut and 

eroded by the provisions of the PATRIOT Act. 

Finally, there are other provisions of the Act that have considerably aided our efforts to address the terrorist threat including: 

strengthening the existing ban on providing material support to 

5

terrorists and terrorist organizations; the authority to seize terrorist assets; and the power to seize money subject to forfeiture in 

a foreign bank account by authorizing the seizure of a foreign 

bank’s funds held in a United States correspondent account. 

Mr. Chairman, it is important for the Committee and the American people to know that the FBI is using the PATRIOT Act authorities in a responsible manner, and we are making every effort 

to effectively balance our obligation to protect Americans from terrorism with our obligation to protect their civil liberties. 

I want to spend just a moment on what we have done to address 

not only intelligence collection but analysis within the Bureau. 

The PATRIOT Act created new opportunities for us to strengthen 

and expand our longstanding intelligence capability and to allow 

the sharing of that intelligence broadly within the FBI, but also 

within our intelligence and law enforcement community partners. 

While intelligence has always been a core competency of the FBI 

and has been organic to the FBI’s investigative mission, the intelligence cycle of requirements, collection, analysis, dissemination, 

and feedback has not always been carried across the FBI. The PATRIOT Act has allowed us to ensure that the aggregate intelligence 

gleaned from our cases and our investigations is analyzed for 

trends and connections that might not be visible to us from a review of individual cases. And this threat-based look at FBI intelligence has allowed us to uncover terrorist networks and connections within the United States that otherwise might not have been 

found. 

Similarly, the PATRIOT Act has allowed the FBI and our intelligence and law enforcement community partners to exchange information that previously was not shared. The wide availability of 

threat information from all sources has been a key to our success 

in using intelligence to drive our investigations toward prevention 

as well as and in addition to prosecution. 

To properly manage this expanded intelligence capability, in January of this year we elevated intelligence to a program status at 

the FBI, and to that end, I have proposed to Congress the creation 

of an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence position and 

have selected that individual and have undertaken a program to 

develop and implement concepts of operations for key intelligence 

functions. 

Finally, let me spend a moment talking to you, Mr. Chairman, 

and the Committee on our progress in upgrading our information 

technology capabilities. 

Since the 9/11 tragedy, the FBI has had a number of information 

technology successes. The most significant of those has been the 

upgrade of our data communications infrastructure. As part of our 

Trilogy program, we put in worldwide high-speed data communications networks which became operational on March 28, 2003. This 

network is a significant increase in our capability to share all kinds 

of data, to include video and images, among all of our FBI offices 

throughout the world. This network will be the backbone for the 

implementation of most of our information technology systems for 

years to come. 

As part of our Trilogy upgrade, Bureau personnel throughout the 

world are having their desktop computers upgraded to state of the 

6

art. This upgrade is complete for all field locations and is currently 

ongoing at headquarters. Additional upgrades, primarily in software, are targeted for completion in November and December of 

this year, and all these upgrades are necessary to implement what 

we call the Virtual Case File, which is scheduled to come online in 

December 2003. This Virtual Case File is the result of a re-engineering of workflow processes and combines several existing databases into one. Previous automation efforts in the FBI basically 

automated paper process, retaining all of the steps in these processes. The Virtual Case File development team took a hard look at 

these processes and, with the involvement of agents and support 

personnel from the field, has re-engineered them to obtain significant efficiencies from our systems. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank this Committee 

for its continued leadership and support. The FBI’s capabilities are 

improving daily, in large part due to that support, and we will continue on this positive path with the benefit of your continued interest and leadership. 

I am happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Director Mueller appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Director. 

We will turn to Secretary Hutchinson now. 

STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Chairman Hatch, Senator 

Leahy, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. It is my privilege to be here 

and also to appear with my friend and colleague, Bob Mueller, who 

is doing an outstanding job in bringing innovation and leadership 

to the FBI. 

I wanted to respond to two particular areas today in my oral testimony and, of course, will submit my written testimony. 

First, I wanted to outline and summarize some of the various initiatives that we have implemented at the Department of Homeland 

Security to enhance security at our border ports of entry and 

through our transportation system. 

Secondly, I wanted to make some comments on the IG report 

that is part of the subject of this hearing today. 

If you look at what we have done since the Department was created, we have been able to expand the Container Security Initiative 

into phase two, which broadens the information that we get in advance of cargo coming to the United States through our sea carriers. We have deployed over 300 new Border Patrol agents to the 

Northern border. We have expanded the presence of Homeland Security officials in trouble spots on the Southwest border. We have 

worked to increase security through the implementation and development of the US–VISIT system that will allow us to fulfill the 

Congressional mandate for knowing visitors that come and go from 

the United States and who overstays their visas. We have implemented Operation Liberty Shield during the Iraq confrontation. We 

have implemented Operation Cornerstone that enhances our capaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:45 Jul 05, 2007 Jkt 091565 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\91565.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
7

bility in financial investigations and coordination with the FBI and 

their role. We have developed Operation Predator, which really 

combines the resources of legacy Customs agents and immigration 

agents to enhance their capability. 

We have increased our communications with the Department of 

State in partnership with them in developing the protocols at our 

consular offices, increasing the interviews with them, which enhances our security. Through Customs and Border Protection, we 

have developed rules in advanced cargo information in different 

modes of transportation that enhances our capability to assure 

cargo that comes into the United States is free of danger. Finally, 

we have increased the deployment of non-intrusive inspection technology at our ports of entry. 

I believe that all of these are consistent with Congressional mandates to the Department and particularly in my arena of border 

and transportation security. 

As we increase security, we must also keep clearly in mind that 

we must implement these security measures in ways that respect 

and enhance our civil rights and civil liberties. And through communication with the American people and those communities impacted by the September 11 detentions, we will strive to protect 

America by taking the steps that will be effective in diminishing 

the security threats that we face without sacrificing core American 

principles. 

That leads me to comment on the Inspector General’s report. I 

would note that the Department of Homeland Security took responsibility for 21 agencies in March of this year, and we did not exist 

in September of 2001. But, nevertheless, the Department of Justice 

IG report is important to our work, and we take the findings and 

the recommendations very seriously. 

As Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, I 

have responsibility for the operations of several agencies, including 

two most applicable to the IG’s report: one, the Bureau of Customs 

and Border Protection, the other the Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, or ICE. Within ICE, the focus is on our 

criminal investigations and enforcement at our Nation’s borders 

and immigration, customs laws. Customs and Border Protection secures our borders and facilitates the legitimate movement of cargo. 

These two organizations perform many of the functions of the 

former INS. 

It is our intention through this streamlining of communications 

between the agencies and the senior leadership to address one of 

the Inspector General’s main recommendations. I am pleased to report that the integration of the former customs and immigration 

personnel is progressing rapidly, and the increased capability 

makes our Nation safer. 

The IG report examines the immediate actions of the FBI and 

INS and the arrest and detention of 762 individuals. Let me comment specifically on some of the recommendations. 

The IG recommends that new steps be taken to ensure that, if 

another emergency such as September 11 happens again, a clear 

and effective process be in a place to guide Homeland Security and 

the Department of Justice through the crisis. We completely concur 

with this recommendation. We agree, for example, that there 

8

should be clear post-arrest communication between the FBI and 

Homeland Security regarding aliens that have a likely association 

with terrorism, regarding whether an alien detainee be labeled as 

a person of interest to an investigation, and regarding when an 

alien can be removed from the list of those that are of interest. We 

will establish with the Justice Department an effective crisis management process. 

I want to assure this Committee and the country that, should we 

ever find ourselves in another national emergency involving terrorism, we will have mechanisms in place to work cooperatively 

with the FBI and to ensure that individuals detained pursuant to 

our laws are treated fairly. Although we will work cooperatively, it 

is imperative that the Department of Homeland Security independently review the underlying facts and make assessments to both 

the necessity for detention and the appropriate detention facility in 

every case. This will also ensure that the Department of Homeland 

Security can make the proper recommendations to the court on 

bond, detention, and removal. This independent assessment is essential because it is DHS lawyers who are officers of the court and 

must have confidence in the representations made to the court. 

The IG asserts in its report that many detainees were held for 

a lengthy period of time without having charges filed against them. 

We agree that we need to put in place comprehensive instructions 

to clarify and streamline the process for serving charges—what are 

called ‘‘notices to appear’’ in the immigration context—on alien detainees. 

The IG concluded that the conditions some alien detainees faced 

were unsatisfactory. In response to that, we have implemented specific guidelines to our detention facilities. I am pleased to report 

that last week ICE issued a new detention standard that addresses 

the issue of ICE visitation of aliens in detention at Homeland Security-controlled facilities as well as facilities controlled by other entities. Finally, the standards include specific time frames during 

which officers must respond to certain enumerated detainees’ requests. We have included an operational order emphasizing the 

need for our employees to follow all applicable policies, procedures, 

and regulations governing detention. 

I also want to assure the Committee that ICE’s Detention and 

Removal Office has in place a set of standards that set a high 

standard with regard to immigration detention facilities. For the 

past 2 years, we have trained over 350 agents to serve as reviewers 

of immigration detention facilities. I am going to revisit that program to ensure that it is sufficiently strong to meet our objectives. 

The IG concluded that the Department needs to ensure that immigration officials in the field consistently conduct post-order custody reviews for all detainees who remain in custody after the typical 90-day removal period. We are making sure that we can complete those post-order custody reviews in a timely fashion. 

Although we have taken some steps to address the concerns identified by the Inspector General, we clearly need to accomplish much 

more. With Director Mueller, we will establish mechanisms to appropriately process aliens who may have a connection to terrorism 

in the event of another national emergency that involves alien detainees. I would be pleased to present further testimony on this 

9

issue to the Committee as the Committee directs, and I am looking 

forward to the questions that you might pose and answering any 

questions that the Committee deems would be helpful in your oversight work. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutchinson appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman HATCH. Well, thank you so much. 

We do have two votes going on right now, and I am going to try 

and utilize as much time as we can. Senator Grassley is going to 

come back, but I don’t know that he will come back between the 

two votes. 

Does anybody know how much time we have left on the first one? 

Okay. Well, let’s ask a few questions, and then we will probably 

have to recess until we can get back after the second vote. 

Oh, excuse me. The distinguished Ranking Member has an opening statement I would love him to give. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator LEAHY. We have been rapidly changing the rules around 

here. I didn’t know whether I would get a chance. But I do welcome 

you both here. All of the employees of the FBI and the Department 

of Homeland Security work very hard to keep us safe, and I want 

to say through you to them that you have certainly my deep gratitude and support, as both of you do. Sometimes we can be contentious, but I believe that is something that we can be unified on. 

I am sorry that the way the discussion has been, you are going 

to have very little time to answer questions because when we submit them for the record, it is not always easy to get answers. These 

are the some of the answers that have been received by the Department in the last week. On those rare occasions that you actually 

do get a chance to come up here and testify before us, people look 

back and find all the questions that have been asked before. These 

were from a year ago. Actually, some of these are from a year or 

so ago, and so we ask you questions, and a year later we get the 

answers. 

I don’t think that helps with oversight. At our last Committee 

hearing back on March 4th, the Chairman said he would ask you 

to testify regarding the FBI’s use of its authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. Five months later, we 

have yet to have that hearing. I would hope that we might have 

a chance to have a real hearing on FISA, a time when not just the 

Director of the FBI, but the Attorney General, should have to come 

and answer questions. Former Republican leader Dick Armey and 

I put in specific sunset provisions in the PATRIOT Act so that we 

would encourage the oversight process and the answering of questions. We have not had a very good opportunity to do oversight. I 

hope that those who want to see the sunset provisions go away 

would encourage answers to our questions. I would say, however, 

that, Director Mueller, you have always been available when I have 

called you on something, and certainly, Secretary Hutchinson, you 

have been here many times before committees, and I applaud that. 

10

I am going to put a statement and some material from Senator 

Kennedy in the record and also my full statement in the record. I 

am concerned, and you have touched on this, about the reports that 

Muslim and Arab immigrants being held in civil violations of our 

immigration laws have been subjected to abuse. Director, I look forward to coming down—and you and I have discussed this before—

I want to come down and see the new electronic abilities you have. 

As you know, I expressed this to you. Just a few days after you became Director, you had September 11th, and I think both you and 

I, and I know the President, were appalled at how very little ability 

there was for the Bureau to use electronic communications and 

computers. 

I recall saying during that time to one of the very top people in 

the Bureau about doing a Google search on some of the people 

under suspicion before September 11. The response was: ‘‘What is 

a Google search?’’ A question that their 8-year-old neighbor could 

have answered. And I know you have made information technology 

one of your priorities, so I will come down personally to see the new 

system. I wonder if perhaps the computer problems had been addressed prior to your arrival at the FBI, whether things might have 

been different on September 11th. 

We passed some FBI reform provisions in the Department of Justice authorization act. Some parts were blocked. This was the 

Leahy–Grassley FBI Reform Act of 2001. Senator Grassley and I 

have now reintroduced it, and I would hope that the administration 

would support it. 

I will put my full statement, Mr. Chairman, in the record, and 

I will come back to ask questions, and I will go and vote. Senator 

Grassley has never been shy about asking questions of the Department. I come along in the wake of the super tanker over here. But 

you can assume that some of his questions are similar to mine. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY [presiding]. Senator Hatch and I have arranged that I have already voted and he is going to stay over there 

and vote on this one and vote on the second vote, and then he will 

come back and I will go vote on the second vote. In the meantime, 

then, I can ask questions. 

I have a short statement. First of all, I am very glad to have an 

opportunity that the Chairman would make for us to have exchange in oversight with each of you. And I really feel good about 

the meeting that we had. It was kind of a private meeting last 

week, Director Mueller. I felt it was very productive, and I hope 

that the tone was right. I felt that the tone was right, at least on 

your part. And if you remember, at that meeting I brought up a 

number of examples of cultural problems within the FBI. These 

cultural problems are important because I think that they have 

some demoralizing impact upon agents, and the extent to which 

that is true, they diminish some trust that the public has always 

had in the FBI. 

11

Ultimately, these problems, I think, have some impact, negative, 

upon the FBI’s effort to carry out the new and horrendous responsibilities that you have on the war on terror and the prevention of 

things. It is quite a bit different from what the FBI has traditionally done. FBI agents are some of the country’s most honorable and 

hard-working Federal law enforcement people. These great men 

and women deserve every measure of protection when they try to 

improve the FBI by pointing out problems. 

I appreciate that you address retaliation head-on by referring allegations to the Inspector General. However, the FBI would be better served if retaliation were stopped in the first place. And I don’t 

mean to imply that you wouldn’t do that. You might not know of 

every instance. And I think that you have to prevent this activity, 

not just react to it, just like the FBI has to prevent terror attacks 

and not just investigate afterwards. 

You have taken some good steps to reform the FBI internally, 

and I have some questions that I will want to ask you that probably would not be unfamiliar to you. 

Let me make one comment before I do that. It is a follow-on of 

the statement I just made. And I know the FBI is a very, very big 

organization, and I know that you are one person in it. And I know, 

as I indicated, that you probably can’t be on top of everything, and 

you are going to have somebody that is not doing exactly what you 

would like to have done. But I hope that some way you can take 

steps to get people around you that really have your attitude filtered down to everybody so that you don’t have these instances 

where people are out of step. 

So I would like to give you three examples of cultural problems 

and ask you to address each one and do it after I finish. Overall, 

I also want to have you explain what you might be doing along the 

lines of what I just said about preventing instances like these happening. 

Several FBI agents testified to this Committee before your confirmation—now, this is before you came here, so this is 2 years ago. 

Agents Roberts, Perry, and Kiernan told us about problems with 

retaliation, FBI misconduct, coverups, and the double standard in 

discipline. Agent Roberts has had a retaliation complaint pending 

with the Inspector General since before your tenure, and Agents 

Perry and Kiernan recently were forced to join him in alleged retaliation with the Inspector General. 

I believe that these are patriotic agents who just want to do their 

job, and I am troubled that your high standards didn’t sink in with 

some officials in the FBI who wanted to target these individuals. 

Also, John Roberts’ wife, Brenda, has alleged that she suffered further harassment. Direct retaliation is one thing, but going after 

someone’s family is a very low act. 

The second point that I would make would be the FBI’s highestranking Arab agent, Arab-American agent, has filed a discrimination lawsuit. This is Agent Basam Yousef. He was our first legal 

attache in Saudi Arabia. He was instrumental in the Khobar Towers bombing case, and, unfortunately, this agent feels that he has 

been subject to discrimination and that the FBI has missed out on 

his valuable skills. You have been aware of this case personally for 

some time, so why could you not act to fix this situation earlier? 

12

Then the third and last point would be in regard to a letter that 

I just recently sent you about awarding contracts to former officials 

who were involved in serious misconduct during their careers. And 

I shouldn’t say it to imply that you awarded it. I mean to imply 

that they have an FBI contract. Because I think giving a contract 

to these people sends a terrible message to agents and the public 

that there are no consequences for wrongdoing. In fact, you might 

be rewarded for it. Charlie Matthews, who helped cover up Ruby 

Ridge, got a contract to travel to Indonesia for an FBI training session. The FBI also awarded a contract to a company called MPRI, 

where Joseph Wolfinger and Thomas Coyle worked. That contract 

is to do counterintelligence training. Wolfinger organized a fake 

conference in the Pottsgate scandal, and Coyle was investigated for 

Ruby Ridge and was on the Pottsgate disciplinary board despite a 

major conflict of interest. 

These people, in my judgment, are not models for FBI agents, so 

I am concerned about this, and I entered my letter into the Congressional Record yesterday along with a statement. I appreciate 

your hearing about these points of view, and now I would ask you 

to respond. 

Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, you asked what we have done 

to tell persons within the organization that I want to hear about 

that which we need to do better, and that persons who do provide 

those differing views should not be retaliated against. 

Shortly after I came, I sent an e-mail to everybody that explicitly 

indicated that I would not countenance retaliation. I have, whenever there has been an accusation of retaliation, referred that to 

what I consider to be an independent investigative body, the Inspector General’s office. I have awaited the determination of the 

facts because allegations can be made, but it is important that we 

determine whether there is substance to the allegation. I asked the 

Inspector General to do that on a number of occasions. And when 

I have received the report, I on occasion have asked for recommendations, and I have acted on those recommendations. 

With regard to getting the message out, I think if you went to 

any office that I have visited, you will hear that part of what I say 

to individuals in the FBI is that the good news reaches the top, 

often the bad news does not. And what I need to know is that 

which is wrong in the FBI because only by knowing it will I be able 

to fix it. That is a message I carry wherever I go. And what I want 

to hear, whether it be by e-mail or by message or otherwise, I want 

to learn what needs to be done to fix that which is wrong within 

the Bureau. Otherwise, it festers and it blows up down the road, 

and we cannot have that. So that is the message I carry out. 

With regard to the three particular instances that you mentioned, the individuals that testified before, I became aware of their 

allegations recently. I understand they went to the Inspector General’s office. I know I have had recent contact with Mr. Kiernan, 

who made a very valuable suggestion with regard to our statement 

of values, which I took and I adopted. And I look forward to seeing 

the results of the investigation by the Inspector General’s office of 

those concerns expressed to the Inspector General’s office and will 

take what action is necessary as a result of that investigation, if 

any. 

13

On the second point with Mr. Basam Yousef, yes, I did hear 

about that, and I directed our EEO investigator to sit down and address his concerns and, indeed, to invoke the ADR process, alternate dispute resolution process, to get to the bottom of his concerns. I just heard last Friday that he had filed suit, but we did 

make efforts to address those concerns in the process that we have 

set up to have an independent body look at the concerns expressed 

and try to deal with them prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 

Lastly, I did receive your letter yesterday involving three individuals, one who recently retired from the FBI, Charles Matthews. 

Until I received the letter, I had not understood your concerns. 

During the period that he had been the special agent in charge in 

Portland, Oregon, he had done a very good job. But I am taking 

the letter and the concerns you have expressed, and I am looking 

at that contracting process. 

As to the other individuals, Mr. Coyle I don’t believe I have met. 

Mr. Wolfinger I think I have met sometime in the past, but I have 

no knowledge of some of the concerns that you expressed in that 

letter, but I will follow up on it. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. I want to say to you that I think that 

those are all very, very good steps, and maybe you get tired of my 

asking to do more and do more. But I would just ask one additional 

thing, and this is not a question. It is a statement. If somehow you 

can send out another message—and maybe you can’t send out 

enough messages, and maybe there is somebody that is never going 

to get the message, because every organization has somebody that 

doesn’t want to listen. But that to all the management below you 

that there should not be any further retaliation. I am going to keep 

hammering on that, and I hope you can do that. 

Director MUELLER. And I will tell you, the immediate management below me, we have discussions about it and assure that we 

have to send the message, each of us—not just me, each of us—

out to the field that we want everybody to express their views. And 

we will accept those views even though we may at some point disagree, which can happen. 

The only other point, if I may, Senator is to say that one talks 

a great deal about the culture of the FBI, but I know you agree 

that part of the culture and the history of the FBI is the FBI 

agents’ commitment to excellence, the FBI agents’ commitment to 

hard work, the hours that agents and support staff have worked 

since September 11th are truly extraordinary. And, lastly, part of 

what makes the FBI agent what he or she is, as well as the support people, is the commitment to the protection of the public of the 

United States. And that all is part of what we can say is part of 

the FBI culture. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. 

Secretary Hutchinson—and it is difficult to have you before the 

Committee without saying, ‘‘Asa, would you answer a question?’’ 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. That would be fine. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Anyway, you obviously have a very tough job 

and a very new job in a very new Department to do it, and it takes 

an awful lot to get a new agency undergoing, I know. And that is, 

of course, securing and protecting our borders. I have done a lot of 

14

oversight on border security problems. I think I have expressed in 

a hearing I had before my own committee, the Senate Finance 

Committee, that I am worried about it. I think there is at least one 

area where we can help each other, and that is visa revocations 

and terrorism concerns. 

I requested a recent General Accounting Office report that found 

a legal loophole in the visa process. If you get to shore here in the 

United States before the State Department revokes your visa on 

terrorism grounds, you are in a sense home free. 

If that happens, your Department cannot deport a suspected terrorist, and obviously that doesn’t make the common-sense test, as 

far as I am concerned, because if these people are a threat to our 

security and just because they got a visa to get here, if we had 

known that before they got the visa, they wouldn’t be here in the 

first place. It shouldn’t be difficult for them to leave the country. 

The loophole that I am talking about is in the wording of the revocation certificate. There have been two hearings on this, but the 

State Department will not budge. Now, I think your Department 

has authority over visa policy, and the State Department is just 

supposed to carry it out. So I would like to have you assure me 

today, if you are aware of this, that you will get the State Department moving and get the loophole closed. And if I can help you in 

that way in any way, I would like to be able to do it. 

First of all, I hope you agree with me and, if you agree with me, 

that you would do that. 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. I agree with you, and you have my assurance that we are going to work to fix that problem. You have 

correctly stated the issue. The State Department can revoke a visa 

on information that they have at their discretion. The individual is 

already in the country. There is a more difficult process for Department of Homeland Security to go through the process to order their 

removal. But it would be helpful to us—and we have talked to the 

Department of State about this—that the revocation include that 

they no longer have authority to stay in this country. That would 

assist us in the removal process. 

We are in communication with the Department of State. You are 

correct that under the Homeland Security Act the visa policy is 

shifting to us. We have not fully implemented that transfer. We are 

getting close to the memorandum of understanding with the State 

Department. But we are ahead of the game on this and are looking 

at it to adopt appropriate regulations to remedy this discrepancy. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Can I further ask you in further clarification, 

then what you are telling me is you do agree, you are in the process of getting it done, there is no dispute over the policy, but it is 

just a case of working it through the bureaucracy? Is that right? 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. I was expressing my view with you, and 

Secretary Ridge, whom I have had the discussion with about this, 

and the instructions are get it fixed. The Department of State has, 

as you have indicated, appropriate concerns that they raise, and we 

are working through that. So I believe that we are going to be very 

shortly in a position to issue regulations on this matter. But that 

is what we are working on now, the regulations and addressing the 

concerns of the Department of State. 

15

But let me illustrate this further, if I might. If a visa is revoked 

in this country over someone, we take them into custody or we 

start processing them to remove them from this country. They can 

still assert asylum. They can still have access to the courts. But it 

will make it easier if we can cover our bases with the revocation 

that it removes their authority to stay in the United States, and 

that is what we are trying to accomplish. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I thank you very much. 

I am going to just recess. I don’t think you can go. I think you 

better wait until Senator Hatch says you can go. I will go over and 

vote on the second vote. I have no more questions. If I knew I had 

this much time, I would have had a lot more questions for you. 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you. 

[Recess 12:34 p.m. to 12:45 p.m.] 

Chairman HATCH. If I could ask some questions now, I will start 

with you. Director Mueller, I will start with you. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman HATCH. There have been reports in the press concerning the soon-to-be-released Joint Intelligence Committee’s inquiry into the events of 9/11. Some in the press continue to rehash 

old news events about alleged pre–9/11 miscues. Now, these criticisms are not new, and they have been leveled over and over again, 

and I understand that you have already implemented many of the 

recommendations made by the Joint Intelligence Committee. So I 

want to commend you, Director Mueller, for your commitment, cooperation, and willingness to embrace these and other reforms to 

protect the safety of our people here in this country and elsewhere. 

Can you outline the Joint Intelligence Committee’s recommendations and specifically address what steps you have taken or are in 

the process of taking to implement these changes? Now, if you have 

answered this question already, I would be happy to have you just 

summarize. 

Director MUELLER. Well, I have not had an opportunity to address the issue, but let me just spend a couple of moments, if I 

might, saying first off that the Joint Intelligence report had a number of suggestions, ten specifically that were certainly valid and we 

are in the process of implementing. 

If I can just go through them briefly, the first one was to 

strengthen counterterrorism as a national program and priority in 

the FBI. Since September 11th, we have simplified our priorities, 

and the number one priority is the prevention of an additional terrorist attack. We have backed that up by changing the way we organize addressing counterterrorism and assuring that accountability is in one place and not spread out through a variety of our 

offices and divisions around the country and headquarters. It is at 

headquarters, and the accountability for that program resides with 

the Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. 

Supporting that priority, we have shifted resources to address 

counterterrorism. Prior to September 11th, we had about 1,500, 

somewhat over, agents and analysts on counterterrorism. Hopefully 

by the time of the conclusion of the 2004 budget we will be up to 

almost 3,000 agents and analysts addressing counterterrorism. 

16

And, lastly, as I am sure, sir, you are aware, our program funding goes through particular fund programs, and we try to allocate 

our resources per those programs. But each special agent-in-charge 

understands that there should be no counterterrorism lead that 

goes unaddressed. And to the extent in the past that we have found 

that to be the case, I have asked the Inspection Division to take 

a look at a program and to make certain that it is addressing appropriately counterterrorism. 

The second recommendation was to establish and sustain career 

tracks for counterterrorism agents and analysts. With regard to 

agents, we are looking at that and hope to implement that as part 

of our re-engineering process. And with regard to analysts, we have 

established an Office of Intelligence. I brought over Maureen 

Baginski from the National Security Agency, one of the top career 

professionals there, to be the Executive Assistant Director, and she 

is in the process of changing the analytical structure and assuring 

career paths to the top for not only analysts but intelligence officers. 

The third recommendation was to significantly improve our analytical capabilities, particularly in qualifications and training. We 

established a College of Analytical Studies at Quantico. The curriculum was put together, and part of the teaching is done by our 

colleagues at the CIA. And we anticipate by the end of the year approximately 340 analysts will have been through that College of 

Analytical Studies. 

Also, in order to give the analysts access to information, we have 

put together separate databases with analytical tools and afforded 

it to analysts at the start at headquarters, but we hope to get that 

to the field in the future. 

Number four was to establish a strong reports officer cadre. We 

have established that at headquarters. We have 21 on board, headed by a CIA reports officer, with another 7 in background. And we 

expect to expand that capability. In the meantime, we put out intelligence information reports, intelligence articles, and every week 

we put out intelligence bulletins to State and local law enforcement. We have done a number of strategic analyses and a national 

threat assessment, and that is all within that cadre of reports officers and the extended use of those reports officers. 

We are currently training our new agents in effective use of the 

analyst and the intelligence analyst role in the Bureau. That is 

number five. The recommendation was to expand and sustain recruitment of agents and analysts with foreign language skills. We 

are doing that. And, in particular, when it comes to language specialists, we have undertaken a substantial program to augment our 

capabilities there. Whereas prior to September 11th we had 70 Arabic speakers, we now have 208; 24 Farsi, we now have 61; Pashtu, 

10, when we had one; and Urdu, we have 21, although we still 

need to augment our capability. And so I will use this opportunity: 

To those that have those skills, we still want to see you. 

Number seven is to increase efforts to penetrate terrorist organizations operating in the United States, and we have dramatically 

increased our source coverage throughout the United States. I cannot really go into detail here, but I can tell you that throughout 

the United States, special agents-in-charge and the street agents 

17

are increasing the source coverage, in part with the help of those 

communities with whom we have reached out to assure that we do 

have the lines of communication and information that will let us 

know if somebody is in the community and wants to do harm to 

the American people. 

The next issue was improving our National security law training. 

Phase one of our program—we have a three-phase program—provides for six 4-day national security conferences, actually eight of 

them around the country. We have held six. We have two to go, 

which are attended by agents and national security law unit attorneys as well as our US Attorneys. We have a distance learning program for counterterrorism and counterintelligence agents. And we 

are going to complete, hopefully by this fall, 2 days of face-to-face 

instruction in each field office on national security law. 

Number nine was the maximization of our exchange of 

counterterrorism information between the FBI and CIA, as well as 

Department of Homeland Security; and, lastly, exchange of information with State and local law enforcement. 

As I believe you know, we have now 66 joint terrorism task 

forces, actually, one in each of our 56 field offices, with 10 adjunct 

joint terrorism task forces around the country. Prior to 9/11, we 

had 912 participants. We now have in excess of 2,700 participants 

in our joint terrorism task forces. We have a national joint terrorism task force at headquarters with 30 agencies represented. I 

have established the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination with 

Louis Quijas heading it up, who is the former chief of High Point, 

North Carolina. We provide weekly bulletins and periodic briefings 

of State and local law enforcement, and I will say that our exchange of information with our other Federal agencies has been enhanced dramatically since September 11th, with the exchange of 

agents both at headquarters within Washington as well as in the 

field. 

And, lastly, solving our persistent IT problems, the recommendation was to solve those problems, and as you pointed out in your 

opening remarks, we are on our way to doing that. We have in the 

last few months put in in excess of 22,000 new desktop work stations, new printers, scanners, in excess of 2,600 switches and routers, 622 local area networks, and our wide area networks went online on March 28th. And as I stated in my opening remarks, we 

expect to have the user-friendly, Web-based applications for the 

agents and support employees, to go online in December. With that 

will be the migration of much of our data, investigative data, to an 

up-to-date database structure which enables us—not only us but 

others, but particularly us—to use the latest analytical tools to 

search that data. 

So I believe we are on the right track. We have a ways to go, 

but thank you for the opportunity to discuss what we have done 

since September 11th. 

Chairman HATCH. Well, thank you. 

We will turn to Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. You go ahead. 

Chairman HATCH. We will be happy to go to Senator Feingold 

and come back to you, Senator Leahy. 

18

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

thank the Ranking Member very much. 

Welcome, Director Mueller and Mr. Hutchinson. I first want to 

thank you, Mr. Director, for the very good meeting we had last 

week to discuss a lot of aspects of the work of the FBI, and I want 

you to know publicly as well that I have tremendous respect for the 

time and dedication and sacrifice by you and all the men and 

women at the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security in 

the fight against terrorism. 

I do appreciate that you and employees have been under incredible stress and demand since September 11th, and I hope you understand that I raise some concerns in the spirit of assuring the 

American people that their Government is doing all it can to protect them and to protect the Constitution. 

Mr. Hutchinson, I want to thank you, good to see you again, and 

also for your comments about the Inspector General’s report on the 

September 11th detainees. I think I was the first Senator to raise 

some questions about these detainees. I was glad to hear that you 

are committed to addressing the concerns, and I look forward to 

being informed about how your Department will implement the 

IG’s recommendations and take additional steps to prevent instances of abuse from occurring again in the future. 

Mr. Mueller, these questions are somewhat far afield, but I think 

that is in the nature of the fight again terrorism, so let me first 

ask you a question relating to Indonesia. Director Mueller, I would 

like to ask you about the status of the FBI investigation into the 

murder of American citizens in West Papua on August 31, 2002. I 

am concerned about the integrity of the investigation process, specifically whether the FBI has been able to conduct interviews without Indonesian military minders present and whether the FBI has 

been provided access to all the evidence previously requested as 

part of the investigation. I wonder if you could update us. And how 

would you characterize the cooperation that the FBI has received 

from the Indonesian Government and the Indonesian military since 

the investigation began almost a year ago? 

Director MUELLER. Let me answer the question with what I 

know. I have not been briefed on this in several weeks, but I know 

that early on, the investigation was going in fits and starts. More 

recently, we have had a team over in Indonesia working with the 

Indonesians. I know part of the process while they were there was 

obtaining all of the evidence necessary to the investigation, and my 

understanding is that that evidence is currently being flown back 

to our laboratory for analysis. 

I will have to get back to you on the status of the interviews. I 

know a number of interviews had been undertaken. Whether they 

had been undertaken without having persons present from the 

military, I would have to check before I give you an answer. But 

I would be happy to get back to you on that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that, and in light of what you 

said about the evidence, I will submit a question to you in writing 

because I would like to know whether there is any indication of 

tampering with any of the evidence that you have been able to obVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:45 Jul 05, 2007 Jkt 091565 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\91565.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
19

tain. And I assume your response anticipated that your analysis 

will determine that. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Now let me switch to Yemen. Director 

Mueller, as you know, in October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked 

during a stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, resulting in the deaths 

of 17 crew members, including one of my constituents, and the 

wounding of 39 others. Like most Americans, I was surprised to 

learn that on April 11, 2003, ten men, including men suspected of 

involvement in the Cole bombing, escaped from a prison in Yemen. 

One month later, the Justice Department unveiled a 51-count indictment against two of the escapees, Jamal al–Badawi and Fahd 

Al–Quso, who were indicted on various terrorism offenses. 

Now, Mr. Director, I am troubled that these people were able to 

escape, particularly when there was an active Federal investigation 

underway that resulted in the indictments of two of the escapees. 

What steps did the FBI take to get access to the suspects in 

order to question them? What steps did the FBI take to assist the 

Yemeni authorities or to encourage other U.S. Government agencies to assist the Yemeni authorities to prevent any possible escape 

by these suspects? 

Director MUELLER. Let me answer the first question. Actually, I 

would have to get back to you on whether or not we questioned 

these individuals, and I would have to find out specifically whether 

or not we were ourselves given access to the individuals or whether 

we obtained access through the Yemenis. So I can’t give you a specific answer on that question now. 

I will tell you that we were equally disturbed by the escape and 

that on two occasions I have been to Yemen. On the second occasion, it was post the escape, and I talked to President Saleh about 

that. He assured me that he is doing everything in his power to 

re-arrest those who got away. 

I do know that immediately following that escape, he made substantial changes in the hierarchy whom he held responsible for 

that escape, and generally the cooperation from the Yemeni authorities has been substantial since September 11th. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that, and I would appreciate any 

information you can get me, because I have tried every way I know 

to get an answer, and it just strikes me as mystifying that when 

we knew that Al–Qaeda operatives were in jail in Yemen, there is 

just a paucity of information about what we were doing to make 

sure they would stay there. And I can’t figure out how that happened, so I very much would like to be kept informed. 

Let me thank you for responding recently to my written questions of June 6, 2002. Several of my questions focused on FBI efforts to recruit agents and translators who speak Arabic, Farsi, 

Pashtu, Urdu, and other foreign languages, and you have said on 

a number of occasions that this was a priority for the FBI. 

So I was surprised to learn from your written responses, which 

I received just 2 days ago, that not a single special agent with proficiency in Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, or Urdu has been hired during 

the period from October 2001 to at least October 2002, and perhaps 

to date. It is unclear from your responses whether the figures on 

20

the number of translators and special agents hired are current as 

of some time this year or as of October 2002. 

So my first question is just a clarification. Do these actual hired 

numbers correspond to the period October 2001 to the present or 

to some other endpoint? 

Director MUELLER. I think they must be to some other endpoint, 

and I would have to get back to you on those figures. I have today 

the figures on the language specialists, which I gave in my response to the Chairman’s question. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I want to be clear. I am talking here not 

about translators but agents themselves having the capacity. 

Director MUELLER. Exactly. I do not have the answer on the 

number of agents. I do know we have had a number of Arab-American agents—and it may be small. I think it is a small number, but 

I know because I have recently been at graduations in which we 

have been graduating agents with that capability. But I would 

have to get back to you on the numbers. 

I will tell you that we are doing everything we can to recruit in 

all communities around the United States. And we have, I think, 

since September 11th something like 100,000 applications to be a 

special agent in the FBI, and a number of those, approximately 

half, have self-described skills in language or computer or otherwise. 

But we are finding that we need to more aggressively recruit 

Arab-American, Muslim American, Sikh American agents to assure 

that we have the numbers we need in the Bureau. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let me just hone this in more with regard specifically to the languages I mentioned rather than proficiency in foreign languages in general. In written responses, you 

also described the skill sets sought by the FBI for new special 

agents you planned to hire in fiscal year 2002: 193 of these agents 

were to have expertise in foreign language, but only 3 percent of 

those 193 were to have expertise in Arabic. In other words, the FBI 

sought to hire no more than six special agents who could speak Arabic. No plans to hire agents with proficiency in Urdu, Farsi, and 

Pashtu are even mentioned. These low hiring numbers and goals, 

coupled with the allegations in a lawsuit recently filed by the FBI’s 

highest-ranking Arab-American special agent that he has been systematically excluded from work on terrorism investigations because 

of his ethnicity I think raise very serious concerns about the FBI’s 

preparedness and ability to truly meet its number one priority: the 

prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks. 

The picture that emerges is the FBI is seeking to hire only minimal numbers of language-proficient agents who would be actually 

helpful in investigations of Al–Qaeda and other terrorist groups 

based in the Arab or Muslim world, failing to recruit even that 

minimal number of special agents it has identified and then, once 

hired, keeping them away from terrorism cases. 

Am in interpreting your statements and responses correctly? And 

if not, can you explain why the FBI has failed to aggressively hire 

special agents with language proficiency in Arabic or other specifically regional languages? 

21

Director MUELLER. I will tell you that I would have to look at 

those answers, so I can’t really opine on your interpretation of 

them. 

I will tell you that every special agent-in-charge who is responsible for recruiting in our communities understands the necessity 

to go out in the community and have the recruiting agents seek 

speakers of Arabic, Pashtu, Urdu, all of those languages. And that 

has been hammered home with the SACs in just about every meeting we have with them. 

I will have to look at the percentages and the like and what we 

had in our answers, but I can assure you that we all understand 

the necessity of having those language capabilities within the Bureau. And I will tell you that those agents who do have those language capabilities are used—I don’t want to say ‘‘used,’’ but have 

a special capability to represent us in a number of countries, to 

participate in investigative efforts with foreign counterparts, to assist in questioning of detainees down at Guantanamo, and everybody in the Bureau understands that if we could clone a number 

of them, we would be more than happy to do so. 

So I share your concern about those numbers, and we are moving 

to address that. 

Chairman HATCH. Senator, your time is— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Could I just make one remark and then conclude? 

Chairman HATCH. Sure. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I just want to be clear. You and I don’t agree 

on every single aspect of all these issues, but this is one where we 

do agree. 

Director MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINGOLD. My questions are in the spirit of wanting to 

get this done because I think it is critical to protect American lives, 

and I am sure you do as well. So I look forward to working cooperatively with you to help try to solve this problem. 

I thank the witness and I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman HATCH. Okay. We will go to the Democrat leader, and 

then I will go to the distinguished Senator from Ohio. 

Senator LEAHY. I thank both you and Senator DeWine. Mr. 

Chairman, listening to Senator Feingold’s questions reminds me 

that Senator Grassley and I wrote to the FBI last week. We asked 

that our staffs be permitted to interview Bassem Youssef, the FBI’s 

highest-ranking Arab-American agent. He has alleged the Bureau 

has discriminated against him despite his special skills, unique 

background, fluency in Arabic, and experience in counterterrorism. 

I believe Senator Hatch agrees with me on this. He wrote to you 

earlier this week to join Senator Grassley and my request to interview Agent Youssef. Is he going to be made available to us? 

Director MUELLER. I am not familiar with those two letters. I 

would have to look at that. I cannot see that there would be—well, 

let me just say I would have to look at the letters and discuss the 

circumstances with the Department under which he could be made 

available for you to be interviewed. 

I know before he was interviewed at some length by Congressman Wolf, so— 

22

Senator LEAHY. Because Senator Grassley, Senator Hatch, and 

myself are making the request, this is not a partisan issue. We 

want to make sure we are carrying out our oversight, and I would 

hope that the three most senior members of this Committee might 

carry some weight. 

The three of us have also requested an interview with Frank 

Perry, Patrick Kiernan, and John Roberts. Will you help us arrange their interviews as well? 

Director MUELLER. Again, I think we are in discussions with the 

Department. I have not seen those letters, but I believe there is 

some discussion with the Department of the circumstances under 

which they could be made available. 

Senator LEAHY. Again, I remind you it is the three most senior 

members of the Committee who have made the request. 

Now, Congress passed by overwhelmingly bipartisan votes the 

Clean Diamonds Trade Act to reduce the flow of rough diamonds 

that we understand have been used to finance terrorist groups, including Al–Qaeda, that fuel the bloody civil wars in Africa. These 

activities have serious implications for our National security. 

I understand that the administration has until the end of this 

month to issue regulations to implement the Clean Diamonds 

Trade Act and come into compliance with the so-called Kimberly 

process, the international regime established to stop the illicit traffic of blood diamonds. 

Now, that deadline is a week away. Do you think it is important 

for us to meet this deadline? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, I have to say that I am not familiar 

with that particular subject, and I would have to get back to you 

on that. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, I ask this because I would like to know 

what some of the consequences to law enforcement or our international efforts might be if we don’t stop the flow of conflict diamonds. You may have to submit your response in a classified 

version, but I would like very much to hear it. As much as I can 

say in an open hearing, I get concerned when I see the amount of 

money that flows from this illicit diamond trade into terrorism activity, to say nothing about some of the civil wars it fuels. 

Director MUELLER. I will say that we share that concern and 

have had investigations on that particular subject, and not just on 

one terrorist group but on several terrorist groups who may have 

benefited from the trade in conflict diamonds. 

Senator LEAHY. Newsweek reported last week that the FBI is 

conducting a wide-ranging investigation into the forged documents 

that purported to show Saddam Hussein’s regime was trying to buy 

uranium. The article states that the FBI is sending agents overseas 

to investigate the origins of the documents to determine who forged 

them, whether this was part of an orchestrated covert operation to 

build international support for the war. 

Is Newsweek right? Has such an investigation been initiated? 

Director MUELLER. The only thing I can say, Senator, is that we 

are looking at the source of those documents. 

Senator LEAHY. Will we be briefed on that when you are done? 

Director MUELLER. Well, I believe— 

Senator LEAHY. He asked innocently. 

23

Director MUELLER. If we are talking about ‘‘we,’’ this Committee, 

or Congress, I would imagine Congress and maybe in the context 

of the Senate Intelligence Committee. I would have to see when we 

are done where we go. I can’t prejudge. 

Senator LEAHY. Do you have any objections to the proposal Senator Grassley and I have made the FBI Reform Act to eliminate the 

so-called 14-day rule where members of the Senior Executive Service can be subject to disciplinary suspensions for no more than 14 

days? 

Director MUELLER. On that issue, no. 

Senator LEAHY. I also have questions regarding the Katrina 

Leung espionage case. The charges are she kept classified national 

security documents that she obtained from an FBI handler, who 

apparently was a long-time lover. You said that you firmly believe 

it is the duty of Congress to engage in its oversight function. Would 

you agree that the Leung case is one that would come under our 

oversight function? 

Director MUELLER. Congress’s, yes. 

Senator LEAHY. This Committee’s? 

Director MUELLER. That I would have to ponder upon. We did 

keep the Intelligence Committee apprised of what was happening. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, would you ponder upon it and let me know 

whether this is something that we could do in our oversight function without jeopardizing a criminal investigation? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEAHY. Secretary Hutchinson, I have a lot of questions 

which I will submit. As I said before, both of you have always been 

available to talk with me individually when I have asked. Please 

get back on some of these answers. And if you have questions 

about our questions, just pick up the phone and call me. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my good friend from 

Ohio for his courtesy, too. 

Chairman HATCH. Thank you, Senator. 

The Senator from Ohio? 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Director, thank you both 

very much for joining us. 

Director Mueller, I have two questions, and they are questions 

that I have asked you, I think, at least in two other hearings, and 

I will probably be asking you these same questions at the next 

hearing. But I think they are very important. I think they are important from a historical point of view, and I think history is going 

to judge us, frankly, by these two areas, at least these two areas. 

One is the whole area—and you have already touched upon this 

a little bit, but the issue of the computer, where you are with your 

computer system, the whole technology area. And so my first question is: Do you have enough money in this area? Do you have 

enough money in 2003? How are things looking in 2004? How are 

we coming along? That is number one, because I think it is important that you continue. And if you are not getting enough money 

from this Congress, we need to know that. That is number one. 

Number two is the whole change of the culture and the mission 

of the FBI that, of course, we have talked about, a change from reactive, looking at the crime after it has occurred, trying to solve the 

crime; to now a great deal of the focus of what you do on terrorism 

24

and the prevention of terrorism, the shifting of people from one 

mission to the other mission. And what I have asked you before is 

to detail for Congress and for the American people not just what 

you are doing, but the other question is what is not getting done. 

Because I think we have to lay that before the American people, 

lay that before Congress, and we have to constantly analyze, every 

3 months, every 6 months, what we aren’t doing. What is the FBI 

not doing that you have been doing in the past so we can make 

value judgments and so that we understand what assistance is not 

being given to local law enforcement, what crimes are not being 

prosecuted. 

You know, we have seen the statistics. We know the numbers. 

But I think it is helpful if the head of the FBI looks us in the eye 

and tells us what aren’t you doing. 

Director MUELLER. Let me address the first question with regard 

to the funding of our computer systems. We have pending a reallocation of funds to address a shortfall with regard to our computer systems, and assuming that reallocation is approved by the 

Appropriations Committees, then I believe we are where we need 

to be in 2003, and then we will see in the 2004 budget. But in our 

request in the 2004 budget, I do believe we have what is necessary 

to continue our progress in renovating our information technology 

systems. 

Senator DEWINE. But let me stop you there. If the reallocation 

in 2003, the year we are in now, is not approved, we will not be 

where we need to be. 

Director MUELLER. That is correct. 

Senator DEWINE. Let’s just be blunt about it. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator DEWINE. You have to have that reallocation— 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator DEWINE. —approved to stay on line of progress that we 

would hope to be making. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator DEWINE. And we all know how far behind we are. We 

all know what sorry state of affairs it was when you came into office. And we are not blaming you for that, but we all understand 

that. Everybody on this panel has complained about your system. 

So we want to make sure we understand that. You have to have 

that reallocation. 

Director MUELLER. We do. The reprogramming of funds that we 

have proposed, we do need that to continue the progress for this 

year. 

Senator DEWINE. All right. And you have your request in for 

2004. 

Director MUELLER. We do. 

Senator DEWINE. And you are telling me that the request you 

have made is adequate? 

Director MUELLER. It is adequate. 

Senator DEWINE. And we are not going to look back in 2 or 3 

years and say, well, that was just not enough? 

Director MUELLER. I do not believe that to be the case. I believe 

that we have looked at what we need to get the job done. We have 

added $137 million, which was unanticipated. It was substantial, 

25

but I am confident that that is what we need to continue our 

progress. 

Now, I have learned, I have come to learn that as you build information technology systems, you need to integrate them. You 

have to make certain you have an overall architecture. You have 

to put the pieces in place. And it is a continuous process. So I cannot tell you that I will not come up in 6 months or a year and say 

we are going to have to reprogram other funds or we need an additional infusion of funds to handle a particular capacity. But what 

we have tried to do is request the funds that we need and we can 

identify that need, explain that need and explain why it is going 

to advance our progress to bringing the FBI into the 21st century 

when it comes to providing the information technology capacity to 

the agents. 

Senator DEWINE. All right. Now, my second question? 

Director MUELLER. Your second question as to what we are not 

doing, I will say that, as I believe I testified last year, I redirected 

a number of agents—I think it was 480—from doing drug cases to 

doing counterterrorism. And I know we had discussions, Asa and 

I had discussions, about backfilling, and there has been some backfill from the DEA. I don’t think it is a total backfill. What we tried 

to do is make certain that with that reassignment, realignment of 

personnel, that no case fell through the cracks, and I believe that 

is the case. But we are not doing as many drug cases as we have 

done in the past. 

We are more selective in doing a number of other varieties of 

cases, for instance, bank robberies. We will rarely do a stand-alone 

bank robbery or a note-pass bank robbery, where we did that before. 

In white-collar crime cases, we are focusing on the larger whitecollar crime cases; where in the past we have done some of the 

smaller white-collar crime cases, we are not doing them. 

We have had to focus our resources on those priorities that we 

have established, whether it be in the national security arena or 

the criminal arena, and make certain that we put our assets towards those resources. 

As I have indicated before, every special agent-in-charge has the 

understanding that there should be no counterterrorism lead that 

goes unaddressed. That has meant that agents that are assigned 

to other programs in particular offices are pulled off to do issues 

relating to counterterrorism in a particular field office. But what 

I would like to be able to do in the future is be more flexible and 

more agile in terms of addressing the counterterrorist threat in 

particular communities when it arises, but not position agents 

there to stay there afterwards when the threat has been resolved. 

So what we are trying to do is be a much more flexible and agile 

workforce than we have been in the past. 

Senator DEWINE. My time is up. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HATCH. Thank you. We have just enough time for Senator Durbin to ask his questions. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

want to thank the two witnesses for coming before the Committee. 

Director Mueller, thank you for being here and thanks for the 

update on your technology upgrades. You were kind enough to brief 

26

me at the headquarters, and it was time well spent. I was glad to 

be there, and I am glad to hear that things are improving. 

And, Secretary Hutchinson, thank you for being here and for 

your service to our country. 

I would like to ask two questions, if I can. I hope I have the time 

to get responses to both. One is more complicated than the other. 

I have an amendment pending on the floor on the appropriation 

for the Department of Homeland Security which relates to this 

issue, asking the Department for an update on their technology improvements and the intraoperability of the computers at DHS with 

the Department of Justice and other agencies. 

What I have found, to my chagrin, is that even though progress 

is being made in a lot of agencies, there is no communication, technological communication, between these departments in a fashion 

that would facilitate fighting terrorism. And I would like you, if 

you could, to comment on progress that is being made between the 

FBI, Department of Justice, and DHS to share information. 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Senator. First of all, we are 

making that a high priority to fulfill the mandate to share information, and there is a continuous flow of information from the FBI to 

Homeland Security and vice-versa. 

It is important that we develop systems that are more compatible. Steve Cooper is our chief information office, and he is the architect and the one responsible for moving that forward. I believe 

the first priority is to make sure that the 22 agencies that came 

on board less than 4 months ago within Homeland Security can 

bring those systems together, and then obviously both with the 

FBI, Department of Justice, and the Department of State, to make 

those systems compatible. 

The information is flowing, but it can flow better when we have 

more compatible systems. 

Senator DURBIN. My question is whether there is intraoperability 

between the computer systems at the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. I would just ask that question. Can your computers communicate with their computers and the other direction? 

Secretary HUTCHINSON. Well, we do on watch lists. We have that 

capacity that we have that information. 

Now, there are limitations. Obviously, they have information 

that cannot be shared for counterintelligence reasons broadly. Obviously, we can receive that information, but, for example, there is 

some information they might have that our inspectors in the field 

at the points of entry might not need. 

Senator DURBIN. Oh, understood. Understood. There are certain 

areas where, for a variety of reasons, you wouldn’t want to. But 

you are telling me that capacity is being developed. 

I know I don’t have a lot of time, but I want to move to another 

issue that really concerns me greatly. There was substantial 

progress made yesterday in Iraq, obviously, with the killing of Saddam Hussein’s two sons. This morning’s paper reported that one of 

the reasons why there is an improvement there is the gathering of 

information from the Iraqis is starting to be a lot more effective. 

There is more cooperation. 

I have learned the difference between law enforcement and intelligence gathering. You deal with communities in a different reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:45 Jul 05, 2007 Jkt 091565 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\91565.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
27

spect. And I have had—Director Mueller, I think I have told you, 

I have had one of your agents from a faraway post call me and say 

we have got to learn this, we have to learn that intelligence gathering is a lot different than just flat-out law enforcement. 

You can go in and find technical violations and criminal problems to a fare-thee-well. That isn’t going to build up trust and understanding and communication and dialogue for sharing information for intelligence purposes. 

And so several months ago, the Department of Justice decided to 

initiate this interview project profiling the visitors to this country 

from Muslim Middle Eastern nations to come in and to be interviewed as to their status. 

Now, I have asked for numbers as to how many were called in, 

and I can’t get an exact number, but it appears to be somewhere 

in the 80,000 to 100,000 range of people who were called in from 

a variety of different countries. And it is my understanding that 

some 13,000, because of reporting for the interview, were subsequently deported. They were found to be in violation of their immigration status. 

I raise that question because, obviously, as a Senator from a very 

diverse State, I have heard from a lot of these populations saying 

this is just flat-out discriminatory. These people were cooperating, 

came in for the interview, were ready to help in any way they 

could, and were found to be in technical violation and deported. 

Can I ask both of you if you would comment on this reaction 

from them, in light of our need to gather more intelligence from 

these communities and to work more closely with them, whether or 

not we did something that might have been counterproductive? We 

basically said if you cooperate and come forward, be careful, because we are going to fly-speck and find out if you are in technical 

violation, and if you are, you are gone. 

If I could ask Director Mueller and Secretary Hutchinson to respond to that. 

Director MUELLER. We undertook a program in advance of hostilities in Iraq of reaching out to Iraqi Americans and interviewing 

them. And the numbers there, I think we interviewed close to 

10,000 across the country. And I would say—I have talked to a 

number of special agents-in-charge. I have talked to members of 

the Muslim community, the Iraqi community, and the fact of the 

matter is the interviews went exceptionally well. 

I am not aware of circumstances where, as a result of an interview and our reaching out, someone was deported. I will tell you 

that the vast, vast, vast majority of persons interviewed were 

happy to be interviewed and wanted to provide information. The 

fact of the matter is most of them were refugees from the Saddam 

Hussein regime, and they had information and intelligence, and 

that was helpful to our troops overseas. We had in excess of 200 

reports that were funneled to our troops overseas about the location of bunkers, weapons, communications facilities. And so those 

interviews I think went exceptionally well. 

There are going to be individuals who resent that, but the vast 

majority of the interviews, as I have heard from office to office to 

office, enabled us to develop intelligence and to develop a relationship that had not previously been there. 

28

Secretary HUTCHINSON. I would just second the importance of the 

outreach. Our ICE agents and, as well, our Customs and Border 

Protection have engaged in outreach to communicate to those communities that might be impacted by that. Information is critically 

important, explaining why we are doing this. 

You raise the issue of when they are out of compliance, what do 

you do? We want to make sure—obviously, we have an obligation 

if somebody is out of compliance to address it, but they are given 

a notice to appear. They are processed. It is not like they are immediately detained in most circumstances. 

And so we try to treat each one fairly and appropriately with 

good information. We have other investigative techniques from Operation Tarmac, in which we went into critical infrastructure facilities looking at benchmark checks. There were questions raised that 

adversely impacted the Hispanic community. So we don’t want that 

adverse impact, but we do have an obligation to take care of those 

that might be in violation and pursue those in accordance with the 

law. 

Senator DURBIN. Thanks. 

Mr. Chairman, I will submit my other questions for the record. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman HATCH. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate it. 

I promised I would let you go at 1:30. Let me just close with this: 

I want to state that I want to follow up in writing on an important 

issue that I am personally interested in, and I think it is important 

for the FBI to answer, and that issue is the death of Kenneth 

Trinidu. Now, the circumstances of Mr. Trinidu’s death continue to 

raise questions despite numerous attempts to find out what happened. I made several inquiries about this case myself to Attorney 

General Reno, and a grand jury was convened, but it did not 

produce an indictment. An Inspector General’s report was produced. A private lawsuit resulted in a finding of suicide. Nonetheless, Mr. Trinidu’s family continues to raise questions that to me 

are indeed troubling. 

So I look forward to your answers to the written questions on 

this important subject, and I hope that you can get back to me on 

that, if you will. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman HATCH. Well, you have been very patient. We apologize that it took so long to get you here. We will have others submit questions in writing, and if you can answer them as quickly 

as possible, we would be very appreciative. 

So, with that, we will recess until further notice. 

[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

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