.

Hon.Ben Ramsey, Chairman Opinion No. C-527 RailroadCommission of Texas TribuneBulldlng Re: Reconsideration of Attorney Austin,Texas General's Opinion WW-201, relating to the question of whether a Railroad Commlsslon employee may also serve as a joint boardmember for the State of Texas under appointment by the InterDearMr. Ramsey: state Commerce Commission.

you have requested a reconsideration of Attorney General's OpinionWW-201 (1957)which held:

"A substitutemember of a.joint board appointed.by the Interstate Commerce.Com- ;lsSsE under the provisions of Title 49,

Section 395 (Interstate Commerce Ait: ia?% II) hol.ds an offlce.of honor and trust under the .Unlted.StatesGovernment and while serving as a member of a joint board he cannot receive any salary or compensation for his services as an examiner for the Railroad Commission of Texas under the provisions of Article XVI, Section 33 of the Constitution of Texas. The office of a joint board member and the position of
an employee of the Railroad Commission of Texas are 'notincompatible."

An analysis of the provisions of Section 33 of Article XVIof the Constitution of Texas, the cases construing Sections 12,33 and.40 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas, and opinionsof this Office on the subject of dual offlceholding inTexas leads to the conclusion that Attorney General's Opinion W-201 should be overruled for the reasons hereinafter discussed.

Theproper characterization of the service performed by a jointboardmember is that of research,.advlce, and recommendationfor orders to be officially promulgated and enforced by the InterstateCommerce Commission. The decision making and

-2482-. .

Hon. Den Ramsey, Page 2 OpinionNo. C-527

enforcement of orders Is the exercise of federal sovereign powers by the Commission. 49 U.S.C.A., Ch. 8, Sects. 303, 305. Although the duties of hearing evidence and making recommendations from findingsmay be likened to that of an officer of the court, such as a Master in Chancery, It is held that such officers of a court are.not deemed to be holding an office or analogousposition under the United States In the
sense of dual office*holding. See Benjamin Watkins Leigh's Case, 15 Va. National Sav. Bank of D.of C. v. 100U.S. 195 Ward, Kimberlyv. Arms, 9 S.Ct. 355, 359, 129U.S. 512

It thus appears that the joint boardmember for theState of Texas has not been delegated any federal sovereignpowers to exercise, 'hisduties are sporadic, and he receives no salary
or compensation for such service. His servicemay not be characterized as rising to the dignity of an office or position of honor or trustunder theUnited States. Although his service might be said to be anaddltlonal duty Imposedupon hlm as an employee of the Railroad Commission,he Is neverthelessnot serving in such capacity as an office or position of honor or trust under the State of Texas.

The key to any decision to the question propounded lies In the construction of the Intent or meaning of the words "Office of profit or trust, under the United States,:' as used In the Texas Constitution In Sec. 12 of Art. 16, or "Civil Office of emolument,"as used in Sec.,43 of Art. 16, or "office
or position of honor, trust or profit under

. . . the United States," as used In Art. 16, Section 33. 1t.l.s evldent that the real intent of these sections of the Constitutionwas to trohlblt $a1 officeholding:, whether the public "office"or position be one of "profit or %rustw or Ithonor." "emolument' or merely one of These .wereadditional strictures Inserted therein for implementing the l%ndamental rule of law in this country forbidding one person from holding at one time two public offices or positions, the duties of which were Incompatible or against public policy and which Is applicable whether or not named in the excentlons in the Constitution. Biencourtv. Parker, 27 Tex. 558; State v. Brlnkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45; Thomas v. Abernathy County Line Independent School Dlst., 290 S.W. 152; Prultt'v.Glen Rose Indevendent School Dlst., 84 S.W.2d 1004; Knuckles v. Board of Education of Dell County (KY.), 114~S.W.2d.511,,514;22 R.C.L. 414,spar.56; Atty.Gen. OpinionsNos. v-63; 0-5145;.0-4957.

-2483-Hon.Ben Ramsey, Page 3 Oplnloti No. C-527

Section 33 of Article 16 of the Texas Constitutionprovides,

"TheAccounting Offloers of this State shall neither draw nor pay a warrant upon the Treasury In favor of any person, for salary or compensation
as agent, officer, or appointee, who holds at the same time any other office
or position of honor;trust or profit, under this State or the United States, except as prescribed In this Constitution.'.

. .n (emphasis added)

This Section was not Included In the Constitution of 1876
a.s a'safeguardagainst a recurrence of the evils and abuses of the "carpetbag"era, since It made Its first appearance In the Constitutionof 1869, a constitution drafted by Reconstruction Republicans,and Its policy reasons are at best conjectural. SeeVol. 43, Tex.Law Review,p. 951; Tex.Const. .Art.XII, Sec. 42 (1869).

The only~pollcybasis for the section has been stated to be that of Insuring fillvalue for state services rendered in thepayment of salary or compensation out of statemonies. Thus the safeguardwas aimed at preventing a person from holding at the same time two state offices or positions, or a state and federaloffice or position, the effect of whlch.would cause thatperson to divide his time and fidelity, to'the detriment.

. ofhle state servlce.~ See Attorney General Opinion No. o-2637 (193); Vol. 43, Texas Law Review, p. 952.

In construing themeaning df the Constitutions and statutes, a courtwill never adopt a construction that will make them absurd or ridiculous or one that ~111 lead to absurd conclusions
or consequencesIf the language of the enactment Is susceptible of any othermeaning. 53 Tex.Jur.2d 241, 243, Sec. 165, Statutes.
Furthermore,whereverpossible, that construction shallAbe adoptedwhich shallpromote the public Interest in accord with sound economic or governmental policy. Tex. 242, 11 S.W. 1029 (1888). State v. UeGress, 72

In view of the urgent policy arguments against a too narrow and 431restrictiveconsttictlon of Section 33, as set out in Vol. Texas Law Review,pages 952-955,~it seems clear that a liberalrather than a technical, narrow construction should'be indulgedso as to permit St&e employees to render valuable and beneflclentservice through intergovernmental,cooperation on

-2484-Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 4 OpinionNo. C-527

advisory or study committees. This 1s in the best interest of state government,and It would be unreasonable to Imputea meaning to the Constitutionwhich would lead to the opposite conclusion. In otherwords, a strict construction should be given to the words "officeor position of honor or trust" so. as not to hold anything to be within the prohibitionunless clearly exvressedand named and not to exnand It bv lmolIcatlon
or constru&.lon. Commonwealth,ex rel B&he v. B&s,'17 Sergeant & RowlesRep: 219 (1828).
Generally, in arriving at the meaning of the Constitution,
we find it should not be given a tlon" but It Is to be given a "narrowor technical construe-. "liberalmeaning in order to effectuate thepurpose of the provision of which it Is a part?' and "words will be considered to have been used In theirnatural
sense and ordinary signification,unless the context Indicates the contrary." 12 Tex.Jur.2d 362-363, Sec. 14; p. 364, Sec. 16, ConstitutionalLaw, and cases there cited. Furthermore, it is to be construed to meet changed conditions as they arise. m v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 221 S.W. ,880(1923).

The words In the phrase "Office or position of honor, trust, or~profltunder the.United States," are each wordshaving
a meaning ascertainableby reference to the other wordswith whi&h they are associatedunder the maxim, noscltur a soclis. 53 Tex.Jur.2d 221, Sec. 154, Statutes.
Since the appointment to the Joint Board Is without compensatIon,-It is unnecessary to discuss whether It Is en office

or position of "profit" or "emolument"under the United States. In this connection, the payment of "expenses" is to be dlstlngulshed from "compensation." "Compensation" Is synonymous with salary, pay, or emolument and 1s Intended to convey the Idea of reward or compensation for official services;It does not convey the idea of re-payment of out-of-pocket expenditures
or exoenses. such as travelinn and.subsistence while awav from home &d in-performanceof duly, which may be,allowedby law. Terre11 v. King?.118 Tex. 237, 241, 14 S.W.2d 786, 791 (1929), State v..Aronson

~,314 P.2d 849, 853 (Sup.Ct.,Montana 1957), andmany cases there cited.

The questlon~Is thus narrowed to a determinationwhether -itwould be such an ofSlce .orposition of honor or trustwithin the,constltutlonalmeaning. Even though.the.committee be created by Congressand be subject to some quasi-gov.ernmental supervision, throughaudit and by report to Congress, this would not constitutea member thereof, with principal dutiesof recommendation,research, study, and advice, the holder of an

-2485-Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 5 Opinion No. C-527

office or position of honor and trust under the United States withinthe purview of themeaning of such terms. as used in the aboveprovisions of the Constitution.
Thus, unless It Is an office or position of honor or trust under the United States within the sense intended or meant by the Constitution, a state employeemay serve In such a capacity and still draw his salary from the Comptroller.

The words "office or position of honor or trust" as used. in Section 33 of the Constitutionshould be held to have been used analogously, and as having the same characteristics and general though not Identicalmeaning, when given a practical, natural. ordinary, and reasonable construction. Webster's ThirdNew International Dictionary,p. 1769; Black's Law m0ti0w, 4thRd., "Position;" p. 1234, 33 Words & Phrases,p. 53,

and cases there annotated. The authorities hold that .a"position" is analogous to an "office" in that the duties thatpertain to It are permanent and certain. The same essentials,attributes, and characteristicsare present ~lnsofar
as the duties are governmental. Frazier v. Elmore,-180Tenn. 232, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565; Fredericksv. Board of Health of Town. ofWestRoboken, 82 ~.528, 529, 82 N.J.L. 200; Rlsley'v. Board ofCivil Service Comr's. of City of Los Angeles, 140 P.2d 167, 169,6CCal.App.2d 32; Murphyv. Board of Chosen Freeholders of BergenCounty, Sup., 163 A. 555, 556, 110 N.J.L. 9.

An "office"means "place'! or "position" and they.are deemed atklogousand ltiterch eable as understood In law. Phrases,p. 270, unde?Cffice 29 words 6c

-- Place or position;" and 1965 PocketPartpp. 97-98 and cases there annotated.

As stated in 22 R.C.L. 383, Sec. 16, Public Officers,

"Constitutionsand la.ws.sometlmes contain provisions applying to offices of trust or honor and offices or'places of trust or profit. The line between 'offices'and 'placesof trust or profit' within the meaning of such provisions has not been clearlymarked, and they~may be considered as approaching each other
so closely that they are In all essential features identical. A place of trust or profit is not, however, Identical with an office, yet it occupies the same general level in dignity and importance.

. . ..'

-2486-Hon. Ben Hamsey, Page 6

We'have, therefore, Opinion No. C-527

heretofore correctlyheld on this

. subject In OpinionNo. O-5341, dated July 19, 1943, that there Is no material legaldistinction inmeaning as to essential characteristicsbetween the term "officeand pos:tion of honor
or trust" and that as used In our Constitution, 'officeunder the United States'means that the holder thereofmust exercise
some governmental function, or be the depository of some sovereignty of theUnited States (FederalGovernment)before It rises to the dignity of an 'office'under the United States. Theremust be delegated to theperson holding such 'office'
some of the sovereign functions of the United States Government. There are severalpersuasive, though not conclusive, characteristics of what constltutes*apublic office; or to express it in anotherway, what constitutesholding an 'office under the United States.' We mention a few: Tenure and duration, oath of office, official bond, etc. But one indlspensable characteristic,as the cases hereafter noted affirm, is that the dutiesperformed shall Involve the exercise of sovereign power, whether great or-small. in a,comparatlvelyearly case, Our own SuptiemeCourt, Kimbrough v. Barnett, 93 Texas 301, 55 S.W. 120, quoted with approval Mechem on Public Officers
as follows:

"@Apublic office Is the right, authority,

and duty created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by.law or enduring at the pleasure of the creatingpower, an.lndlvidual 'isInvested with someportion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the~publ1c.l"

In the above OpinionNo. O-5341, and from the authorities
we found that "office"had a definite legalmeaning In the sensi employed in the Constitution:

.'('The term "office" Implies a delegation of
a portion of the sovereignpower to, and possession of, lt.by the person filling the office; a public office being an agency for the state, and the person whose duty It is to perform the agency being a public officer. The term embraces the idea of tenure, duration, .emolumentand duties, and has respect to a permanent public trust to be exercised in behalf of government, and not to a merely transient, occasional or incidental employment. A person In the.service of the government who derives his position from a duly and legally authorized election or appointment, whose

-2487-Hon. Ben RamseY, Page 7 0pir;i.m No. C-527

duties are continuous in their nature and defined by rules prescribed by government, and not by contract, consisting of the exercise of importantpublicpowers, trusts, or duties, ag a part of the regular administration of government, the place and the duties remaining, though the incumbent dies or is changed, every office in the constitutionalmeaning of the term implying an authority to‘exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either in making, executing or administering the laws. Mechem on Public Officers, 0 l-9.'"

The recent case of Willis v. Potts (19641, 377 S.W.2d 622, by the Supreme Court of Texas, construing Art. 3, Sec. 19, and Art.11, Sec. 5 of the Constitution,held that a City Councilman of the City of Ft. Worth held an "officeunder the State." Utilizing the reasoning of the earlier declslons, the Court's decisionis in harmony with our Opinion and not in conflict with it or the distinctionsought to be made.

Those authorities so construing the meaning of ?office" or "position"as comprehending continuousperformance of defined permanentpublicduties, compensation, tenure, exercise of sovereignty,and other essential requisites are in accord and
are thoroughlydiscussed and briefed in our Opinion O-5341. SeeWitkowski-v.Rurke, 65 A.2d 781; Sowers v; Wells, 150Nan. 630, 95 P.2d 281,.Abbott v. McNutt, 218 Cal. 225, 22 P.2d 510,89 A.L.R. 1109; Howard v. Saylor, 305 Ky. 504, 204'S.W.2d 815;United States v. David Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307, 81 L.Ed. 463;People ex rel Attorney Qeneral v. Leonard, 14 P. 853; In ReDoe's Estate. In Re. Wheeler. Mallory, as Public Adm'rTv. Wheeler,138 N.W. $97;Patten v. Miller, 8 S.E.2d 757, wherein theSupreme Court of Georgia approved of a state employee (memberof the Highway Do&d) holding at the same time.a positionas a member of the Advisory Commlttee.of the Atlanta Agencyof the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the'Court holdingthat his office "is not an office of profit or trust underthe Government of,the United States"; Hartigon v. Board ofRegents of West Virginia University 38 S.E. 698; HirschfeldCommonwealth ex relyAttorney GeneGal, 76 S.W.2d am(I(y.1; Stateex rel v. Hawkins, 257 P. 411, 53 A.L.R. 583; and KingstonAssoclates'v. La Guardia, 281 N.Y. Supp. 390, wherein itwasheld that members of the Advisory Committee .onAllotments,created by the President of the U. S., were not holding
an "officeof honor, trust, or emolument under the government oftheUnited States.:' The Court said:

-2488-Hon. Ban Ramsey, Page 8 OpinionNo. C- 527

"'Clearly,the members of the Advisory Committee on Allotmentspossess none of thepowers of the sovereign. They perform no Independentgovernmental function. Such function In general is either legislative, judicial, or executive. It is tooplain to require discussion that the Advisory Committee exercises no legislative or judicialprerogatives. It appears to be fairly evident that It llkewise possesses no powers of the executive

. . . .The committee. thuslacks the most Important characteristic or attribute associatedwith the idea of public office, ,namely,the right to exercise some part of thepower of the sovereign."'
Opiniono-5341, of July 19,l943, that a District Attorney could receive his salary and also serve as Chairman of the Local Chapter of The AmericanNational Red Cross, a Corporation chartered by Congress,because the latter was not an officeor position under theUnited States, Is consistentwidthour earlier CplnlonNo. O-5314, of July 2, 1943,holding that a state or county official could not be excluded from drawing his salary while serving as a member of an advisory board for registrants, the latter not being a position of honor, trust or'profitunder this State or the United States within the contemplation of our Texas Constitution.

-Ourstill earlier Opinion No. 0-4458, of. April 8, 1942, holding that a s,tate employee could serve without loss of salaT:
as a member of a County Tire Rationing Board for the same legal
reasons is likewise consistent with the above Opinions.

Char earlier and thoroughly considered OpinionNo. O-4313, of Jan. 24, 1942, written by Zollie C. Steakley, now a member of the Texas Supreme Court,-%s likewise consistent with the above opinions In holdi State Board of Education 7 that a state employee (memberof could,still draw his salary and serve on an Allen Enemy Hearing Board, created by the federalgovernment through the U. S. Attorney General,paying only nominal compensationbut requiring the member to -takean oath. The Board appointmentwas temporary, for an lndefinite,term,with only occasionalmeetings Andysporadic activities. .Itwas merely a fact finding and advisory administrative instrumentality, which could neither make nor enforce decisions.. We expressly held thatmembership upon such a Board, which would

-2489-Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 9 OpinionNo. C~- 527

be presumably identical to a National Study Committee, dld not constitute the holding or exercising of an office of trust, honor, orprofit under the United States. We there held that "It does not constitute a 'position'as that term
was intended by the Framers of the Constitution."

The precise question has still never been determlned,by
a Texas court but other $urlsdlct,ions are in general accord with our cited holdings. _( '- .
In McIntosh v. Hutchinson, 59 P.2d 1117, the Supreme Court of .Washlngtonheld th t a State Senator could still draw his salary and serve as aa"Distrlct Supervisor" of the Federal Works ProgressAdministration,which was not deemed to be the acceptance of a "civil office," cltlng Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 P. 411, 53 A.L.R. 583, as to the meaning of the term "office," to-wit:

"After an exhaustive examination of the authorities,we hold that five elements
are Indispensable In any position of public employment, In order to make'lt a public ~offlceof a civil nature: (1) It must be created by the Constitution or by the Legislature or created by a municipality or otherbody thro h authority conferred by the Legislature; (2 It must 7 possess a delegation of a portlon of the sovereignpower of government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public; (3) the powers conferred, and the duties to be discharged,must be defined, directly
or lmplledly, by the le lslature or through legislative authority; ?4) the duties must be performed Independently and without control of a superior power, other than the law, unless they be those of an Inferior
or subordinate office, created or authorized by the Legislature, and by Itplaced.under the.general control of a superior officer or body; (5),

It must have some permanency and contlnulty, and not be only temporary or occasional. In addition, In this state an officermust take and file an official oath, hold a commission or other written authority, and give an official bond, if the latter be required by proper authority."

-2490-.

Hon. Een Ramsey,Fage 10 OpinionNo. C-527

The Court concluded that the Senator was not appointed to an office since "the great weight qf authoritywell supports the necessity ofmeeting all of the conditions laiddown by the Montana Court and

. . . it Is notmade to appear that these conditions? or any of them, have been here met

. . .'I.

In accord and Involving similar questions and constitutiona prohibitionsare , 172 Atl. 415 (Del.);Cut-tin
v. State, 214 P. , 156 p.216
m State v. OY v. Board of g;er;lsors, 114 P.2d 569, citing Carpenterv. Sheppard, 135 13, 145 S.W.2d'

562, fbr'the necessity of takinga liberal view toward the encouragement of such enactments that their protectivepurposes "may be fulfilledwithout undue Imposition of constitutional limitations or hlderance through narrow judicial construction."

In Parkerv. Riley, 113 P.2d 873, 875. 876,.18 Cal.2d83, 114 A.L.R. 1405, the California Supreme Court upheld a statute pFovldlng for ihe creation of the ballfornla Coimisslonon Interstate Cooperationand prqvidlng formembers of the legislature to serve thereon. Although the Constitutionexpressly prohibited themembers from accepting "any office, trust, or employmentunder this state,' the Courtheld that the constitutionalmeaning of "office" or "trust"was not.applicable thereto as follows:

"'Itmay be note,d, however, that the positions created by the statutewhere attacked.lack certain elements usually associatedwith an "offlce!'.or"trust

. Thus, It Is generally said that an office
or trust requires the vesting in an Individual of a portion of the sovereign powers of the state. (Citation of authorities) The positions here created do not.measure up to so high a standard. They Involve merely the Interchange of Information, the assembling of data, and the formulation of proposal tom. be placed before the Legislature. Such tasks do not require the exercise of;a tart of the .soverelgnpower of the state.'

The Riley case doctrine was recently recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of California In State v. Aronson, 314 P.2d 849, 856-857 (1957). In accord, see also Gillespiev. Barrett, 15 N.E.2d 513 (Ill.); Johnson v. Chambers, 98 S.E. 263 (Ga.); and Readinp;.v. Maxwell, 52 P.2d 1155

-2491-.

Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 11 opi,nlOn NO. c-527

(Arlz.), for the proposition that certain essential elements
are required to constitutean "office" or "position"as used In such constitutionalsense and the meaning of these terms
as so used do not preclude the acceptance of such duties and service involvinghonor and trust and from which any citizen could not escape without evading his civic or patriotic duty to aid his government or country in times of temporary emergencies.

The term "officeor position of honor or trust" therefore necessarily implies, among other elements, compensation, stability,duration,permanency, continuity, taklng,oathand giving bond, and themaking and administering of governmental declslonslndependentlyand without control of a superiorpower, etc. The substantialabsence of these essentials appertaining tomembership on the Joint Board frees a state employee from the constitutional Inhibition to such service while continuing to draw his state salary. We do not believe that the constitutionalframers in 1869 Intended by their use of the wordsbeing construed to prohibit state officers and employees fromrendering freebeneficial service,to the public on such advisoryboards In furtherance of their state duty and in the interestand betterment of their federal government and its administration.

If there are other Attorney General's Oplnions'which necessarilyconflictwith this Opinion In Its result.and holding, they are overruled.'However, all of the Attorney General Gplnlonsappear to have tnvolved different facts or ClrCuSk stances,such as the holding of two public "offices" or "positions"of honor, trust, or profit, two offices deemed incompatibleat common law. They are thus distinguishable.

For example, in OpinionNo.~O-1898, of February 19, 1943, Itwas held that a State Health Officer or employee couldnot accepta commission from the Secretary of Agriculture under Sec.702(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and therebybecame an officer authorized to conduct examinations and Investigationsln.administerlng the act. Such would be a positionof honor or trustunder the United States within the constitutionalmeaning of the~terms, ~though,no-compensation
waspayable therefor. Likewise, in Opinion No. 0-58, of February14, 1939, we held that the position of~"SpeclalAgent" ofthe Bureau of Censuswas one of honor, trust, or profit underthe United States,prohibiting the State Registrar from .acceptingsame and drawing his state salary. Also, In Opinion NOS. O-5232 and o-5107, we held on the 'samegrounds that the Presidentof the College of Mines and Metallurgy as well as a DistrictJudge could not accept the position of Public Panel

-2492-Hon. Zen Ramsey, Page12 Opinion No. C-527

Member of.the Eighth Regional War Labor Board,which apparently. required the making and carrying out of governmentaldecisions and exercise of sovereignty,as distinguished frommere investigativeand advisory functions.

we held ln Opiniono-2226, May 23, 1940, that a memberof the County Board of School !Prusteescould not also serveas a member of the local community committee of the Agricultural Adjustment Admlnlstrat'lon, created by Congress, and by which. the committeemenwere elected by majority Vote of theproducersin the county to serve a definite term and/oruntil their
successorwas elected, and were pald at a Certain Per diem fork each day served. Here, they apparentlymade decisions and admlnlstered the program, and we pointed out that whlf;ethe taking of an oathwas not an "Indispensablecriterloff to constitute the appointment,an "office" or "position under the case holding of Commissioners Court of Limestone Countyv. Garrett (Com.App.),236,S.W. 970, 972, nevertheless. the committeeman "meets the prescribed essentials as an 'Officer' and holds an 'office'within the ContemPlation of our constl.tutlonal

lnhibltlons." Thus this opiniondoes not sonfllctwith the other Attorney General Opinions cited above hut I::In harmonywith them and clearly dlstingu~shable.
air *JFIn:5r,

!b. Y-7*, dated December 16, 1948; ur:tten by cJ<ir.+.m Whloh cites %fldPet-et-2 to ml?* ctkr or 0u.r aplnlw4 f+63he wfn* ~'a2 &:s VC-pg ei3tff5.eion h dUtleE 111':'lhsl'Jering

Whether a state employee can serve also as a Weatherman for the federal.government:

?h3 accounting officers of this State may not pay a state employee from the TreaSW who holds at the same time a Position of honor, trust, or profit wlth the U. S. Government. If the U. S- Weatherman in question holds such a posltlon he should not be paid for his state employment. unpaid observer, If he is simply an who holds no appointments Section 33 has no appllcatlon, and he maybe paid for his state employment. Art. XVI, Sec. 33.”

-2493-Hon. Ben Ramsey, Page 13 OpinionNo. C- 527

SUMMARY ------- The substitutemember of a joint board appointed by the InterstateCommerce Commission under the provisions of Title 49, U.S.C.A., Section 305 (InterstateCommerce Act,.Part II), does not hold an office of honor, trust, or profituriderthe United States .Governmentand while serving as a member of a joint board he can receive his. salary or compensation for his services
as an examiner for the Railroad Commission of Texas under the provisions of Article XVI, Section 33 of the Constitution of Texas. The office of a joint board member and the position of an employee of the Rallroad Commission are not incompatible. Opinion WW-201 is overruled.

Yours very truly,

WAGGONER CARR Attorney General of Texas

Kerns B. Taylc6r Assistant Attorney General KBT:dl

APPROVED: OPINIONCOMMITTEE:

W.V. Geppert, Chairman ArthurSandlin RogerTyler BobFlowers JerryBrock Ii. Grady Chandler.-

APPROVEDFOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY:" T. B. Wright

-2494-