PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

distinguished history. To avoid misunderstanding
and semantic confusion, however, the Commission
recommends the Department discontinue its use
of the term public diplomacy for public affairs pro-
grams designed to inform Americans about their
foreign policy.

Public diplomacy should be a strategic, long-term com-
munications process. In crowded and highly sophis-
ticated media environments, effective public diplo-
macy is not comparable to launching the fall line
of automobiles or next season’s network television
programs. It builds gradually on the long-term ex-
pectation that what the United States is saying and
doing is important, credible, and persuasive. It is
not single, dramatic efforts that make public di-
plomacy succeed. Rather, it is the steady, wise use
of all available means of communication over time.

U.S. interests are best served by keeping information and
cultural programs in a single agency. A little more than
a decade ago, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Dante B. Fascell (D-FL) conducted hear-
ings that led to a fundamental restructuring of how
public diplomacy activities are managed in Wash-
ington.’ Former members of this Commission tes-
tified in support of an organizational framework for
USIA that was eventually recommended by the House
International Operations Subcommittee and adopted
in a major executive branch reorganization in 1977.
With the perspective of more than ten years, we
are struck with how well the Subcommittee’s prin-
cipal conclusions, summarized below, have stood
the test of time:
= The key to effective public diplomacy is an
awareness of its utility and a willingness to use it
to further policy objectives;

w USIA should not be merged into the Department
of State, but should work closely with the Depart-
ment and have the necessary budgetary, personnel

and administrative autonomy to carry out the full
range of public diplomacy programs that are in the
national interest;
m= Educational and cultural exchange activities (then
headquartered in the Department of State) and the
Voice of America should be an integral part of USIA;
® Maintaining the integrity of the educational and
cultural programs and the Voice of America should
be of paramount concern, but no structural reor-
ganization, including the establishment of separate
agencies, will provide immunity from political pres-
sures; and
= The Director of USIA should participate in Na-
tional Security Council and Cabinet meetings.”

The unified organizational structure proposed by
Chairman Fascell, the Comptroller General, former
members of this Commission, and many other
knowledgeable groups and individuals has proven
to be a wise, farsighted, and cost-effective achieve-
ment. They recognized that information and cul-
tural programs, which have always been imple-
mented jointly by USIA’s officers overseas, should
be managed by a single agency in Washington.

The Commission is aware that some individuals
and policymakers have proposed further study of
the organizational separation of USIA’s policy ad-
vocacy, radio broadcasting, and educational and
cultural activities. Underlying these proposals are
several basic but not always shared assumptions:
that policy advocacy should be carried out by pol-
icymakers; that radio broadcasting should be lim-
ited to news and public affairs programs divorced
from official policy; and that the integrity of the
exchange programs, which seek to educate, are
jeopardized by close association with information
programs, which seek to persuade.

The Commission believes such proposals arti-
ficially separate policy advocacy, information pro-

““Public Diplomacy and the Future,” Hearings before the
House Subcommittee on International Operations, June,
197.

“ Memorandum from the House Committee on International
Relations to President Carter in Hearings on Reorganization
Plan No. 2 of 1977 before the Legislation and National Secu-
rity Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government

Operations, October, 1977, pp. 9-11.



MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

In the newsroom, VOA journalists check the source of a late-
breaking story. VOA maintains a “two source” rule: a story
won't be broadcast unless it is reported by a VOA corre-
spondent on the scene or confirmed by two independent
news sources.

VOA also recently began to reach 4.5 million
listeners in Brazil on a medium wave signal in
prime time through direct relay to the country’s
largest national radio network, Bandeirantes.

Medium wave placement and direct relays do
not guarantee the freedom and uncontrolled access
of shortwave broadcasting. Contract arrangements
can easily be terminated by indigenous broad-
casters. Nevertheless, programming on local sta-
tions conserves scarce resources, and every VOA
language service believes it could build larger au-
diences with increased medium wave delivery. VOA
should pursue transnational partnerships similar
to VOA Europe and VOA Bandeirantes in Asia,

Spanish-speaking Latin America, and other areas
where shortwave listenership has declined.

Regional broadcasters in many parts of the world
are using high-powered transmitters and attractive
programming to send powerful signals into nearby
countries, creating formidable competition for VOA
and other international broadcasters.

Finally, television presents a fundamental chal-
lenge to international radio broadcasting. So far,
its primary impact has been in providing alternative
sources of entertainment rather than news, which
remains tied to policy and protocol concerns in
many developing countries. While this ensures
continuing demand for reliable news, competition
from television and videocassettes makes it nec-
essary for VOA to offer more interesting programs
and to consider prime local TV viewing times in
scheduling its broadcasts.

MODERNIZATION

The need for VOA to modernize was clear to the
Commission and others in the late 1970s. Anti-
quated transmitters, some with vacuum tube equip-
ment dating from World War II, and deteriorating
facilities in VOA’s Washington headquarters led
President Reagan to announce support for VOA
modernization in 1982. A National Security Council
directive called for a long-term program that in-
cluded renovation of VOA’s Washington facilities
and a five-year plan to modernize existing relay
stations and construct new stations. The estimated
cost was $1.3 billion. The goal was to achieve global
coverage with a clear, reliable signal.

Six years later, the record on VOA modernization
is mixed.

On the one hand, significant progress has oc-
curred in planning, research and development, net-
work design and testing, recruitment of engineering
staff, and site negotiations with foreign govern-
ments. Many of VOA’s Washington program divi-
sions operate in new offices with their own studios
and a multilingual text processing system. A 250-
channel Master Control now routes broadcasts ef-
ficiently via a network control center to overseas


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Congressional visits warrant, USIA’s
posts require adequate lead time,

an understanding of the purpose of

the visit, and a sense of how much |
media and public contact would be |
welcome. Traditionally, the State
Department has been unwilling to
inform the Agency of planned
Congressional travel.

The Commission recommends the
Department provide USIA with timely
notice of overseas travel by
Congressional delegations to per-
mit their optimum participation in
public diplomacy programs. Like-
wise, State Department control of-
ficers at U.S. missions should keep
USIA’s Public Affairs Officers in-
formed of Congressional visits. USIA
recognizes that Members do not want the purposes
of their foreign travel to be misunderstood and that
some Congressional visits do not lend themselves
to public programs. When programs are appropri-
ate, however, the Agency needs to be able to plan
for them in advance. Given the option, most Mem-
bers welcome the opportunity to participate.

Occasionally, Members of Congress do contrib-
ute to public diplomacy programs here at home
through appearances on the Voice of America and
Worldnet, interviews for the Wireless File and the
Agency's magazines, meetings with foreign visitors
at the Capitol, and press conferences at USIA’s For-
eign Press Centers in Washington and New York.
But the opportunities far exceed the limited avail-
ability of most Members. The Commission appre-
ciates the constraints that limit Congressional par-
ticipation. Nevertheless, it is very much in the national
interest, and the Commission encourages Members
and their staffs to respond favorably when possible
to the Agency's program requests.

USIA’s small Congressional Liaison Office re-
sponds to Congressional inquiries and maintains
ongoing relations with USIA’s oversight commit-
tees. The Commission is concerned that in recent

Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) answers questions at a USIA-sponsored press confer-
ence at Manila International Airport.

years the Office has not been adequately staffed to
meet the Agency's Congressional liaison needs. As
a result, Members of Congress have not been kept
fully informed of public diplomacy activities of in-
terest to them and their constituerits: for example,
when a grant is made to a university in New York,
when a theater group in Louisville participates in
a multi-media exhibit, when a museum in Arizona
is featured in a USIA magazine, or when a Califor-
nia-based performing arts group draws rave reviews
abroad.

In addition, many of USIA’s posts ought to be
more aware of the value of Congressional pro-
grams. Greater attention to briefing Congressional
delegations on the role of public diplomacy in the
field, initiative in seeking to use Members and staff
in field programs, and sensitivity to Congressional
concerns in program reports to Agency headquar-
ters are needed.

The Commission urges USIA to give higher prior-
ity to its Congressional relations and to strengthen
the staff it devotes to the task.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

by audiences overseas. To us, their overall effec-
tiveness has been amply demonstrated. They con-
sistently produce prime time foreign television ex-
posure, extensive collateral print media coverage,
and informed discussion of topical issues by in-
vited audiences at U.S. missions around the world.
The Commission commends USIA for developing
this successful instrument of public diplomacy.

DAILY PROGRAM SERVICE

Until October 1988, Worldnet experimented with
several types of programs for daily broadcast.
“America Today” was an Agency-produced maga-
zine format program of news, public affairs, and
features on American life. “Hour USA” was a col-
lection of programs from the private sector on the
arts, science, English teaching, sports, and enter-
tainment. “Newsfile,” a televised newsclip service,
was translated into Spanish, Portuguese, French,
and Arabic for USIA’s posts to distribute to local
television stations.

On October 1, 1988, Worldnet suspended its pro-
gram service pursuant to legislation (PL 100-204)
that required the shutdown unless research showed
an average daily audience of two million for non-
interactive programs in Europe. USIA found an au-
dience of approximately 234,000. The Agency con-
tended the standard of two million was unrealistic
for three hours a day of non-prime time news and
public affairs programming in Europe. It favorably
compared its Worldnet audience with top-ranked
European English-language ‘satellite broadcasters
Sky Channel (1.3 million) and Super Channel
(660,000). USIA also pointed out that Worldnet’s
increasing value to broadcasters outside of Europe
was overlooked. The legislation did not affect
Worldnet'’s interactive dialogues.

The Commission regrets the shutdown. It jeo-
pardizes relations with national broadcasting op-
erations in more than 60 countries that use World-
net’s daily programs. It adversely affects hard-won
credibility developed by USIA’s field officers with
local television stations and government officials.
Most importantly, unless a legislative solution is
found, it will deprive the United States of an im-
portant communications tool and foreclose options

to future administrations in conducting public di-
plomacy by satellite. The Commission strongly urges
Congress to provide legislative relief quickly.

The Commission is aware there is bipartisan
skepticism in Congress about Worldnet. Concerns
have been expressed about the audience for World-
net’s daily service, its costs, and program content.
Past exaggerations and questionable audience es-
timates have contributed to this skepticism. Some
worry that Worldnet has been given disproportion-
ately high funding within USIA’s budget and is re-
placing programs of proven value. To increase sup-
port for Worldnet, USIA should take care that its
presentations to Congress are based on accurate
research, careful long-term planning, and a realistic
assessment of what is achievable in this dynamic
medium.

The Commission is convinced there is a sound
case to be made for Worldnet which, at under five
percent of USIA’s operating budget, is a modest
investment in a powerful communications tech-
nology. The United States is best served if Worldnet
is viewed on its merits as an essential and rapidly
maturing element of public diplomacy. Neither ex-
aggerated claims for Worldnet nor its dismissal as
an expensive luxury are in the national interest.

WORLDNET'S FUTURE

In assessing next steps, the Commission believes
it is important to be clear about the different ways
in which Worldnet’s programs are used. Excerpts
from an interactive may appear on local television
and be used in radio news programs and local
newspapers. In another country, the same inter-
active might be rebroadcast on local television in
its entirety. In Europe, cable and private operators
rekroadcast all or part of the daily service. Excerpts
from “Newsfile” and “America Today” have been
used regularly by national television systems in
many developing countries.

Worldnet differs significantly from the Voice of
America. Whereas, VOA is primarily a direct broad-
cast medium with growing program placement on
indigenous radio stations, Worldnet is primarily a


SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

devoted to program evaluation and media habits
research, and use all available research findings in
establishing program and resource priorities.

SUMMITS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

= Public diplomacy should be treated as a strategic
element in summit planning. Comprehensive and
coordinated public diplomacy strategies for su-
Perpower summits should be developed at the
highest levels of the White House, the Department
of State, and the U.S. Information Agency.

= Summit public diplomacy requires early guid-
ance on U.S. policy goals; early decisions on sum-
mit themes; analysis of the anticipated public opin-
ion impact of proposed U.S. policies; assessment
of potential public affairs strategies of other nations
and planned responses to them; reports on foreign
public opinion and media trends; close coopera-
tion between policymakers and the public diplo-
macy community; and a well-conceived plan of
public affairs activities.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

= The National Endowment for Democracy is con-
tributing effectively to the spread of democratic
values and institutions abroad. It should be given
adequate resources and broad bipartisan support.

CONGRESS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

= The Department of State should provide USIA
with timely notice of overseas travel by Congres-
sional delegations to permit optimum participation
by Members of Congress and Congressional staff
in public diplomacy programs.

ADVISORY COMMISSION

@ The President should appoint members of the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy on
a bipartisan basis for overlapping fixed terms. Con-
gress should amend the Commission's authority to
require that this be done consistent with the stat-
utory mandate of the past 40 years.

2

VOICE OF AMERICA

@ The Voice of America’s shortwave broadcasting
system will continue to be a vital national asset
and a primary means of reaching audiences in many
parts of the world well into the next century. VOA
modernization remains an urgent priority.

= The multi-year shortwave modernization pro-
gram announced by President Reagan in 1982 has
been impeded by lengthy site negotiations with
foreign governments, delays in hiring technical staff,
USIA’s inexperience with major acquisitions and
large-scale engineering projects, frequent turnover
in VOA Directors early in the program, increased
cost estimates, and unrealistic Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) and Congressional spend-
ing limitations.

= The National Security Council, USIA, and Con-
gress should reexamine VOA's modernization pro-
gram in terms of national needs, broadcast re-
quirements, resource priorities, and alternative signal
delivery systems. This should include early policy
review of OMB limitations on the shortwave mod-
ernization program.

= New communications technologies, declining
shortwave listenership in some parts of the world,
and competition from other broadcasters and me-
dia are challenging VOA to seek alternative trans-
mission systems and develop more competitive
programming. Increased resources are needed if
VOA is to do this well.

= VOA should expand its use of medium wave, FM,
cable, Worldnet transponders, leasing and facilities
barter arrangements, direct and package program
placement, and dial-in audio services; continue to
examine Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and other
technologies; give high priority to program exper-
imentation; and ensure the findings of program
reviews and audience research are applied to pro-
gramming and modernization decisions.

TM VOA's editorials “present the policies of the United
States clearly and effectively” as required by the



MANAGEMENT

liaison and public affairs positions. Commission
members have met many USIA officers with con-
siderable policy, regional, and communications ex-
pertise that qualifies them with little or no addi-
tional training to make significant contributions to
the work of the Department and the NSC.

The Commission is aware, too, there are many
State Department officers whose skills and incli-
nation qualify them to serve in USIA, both in Wash-
ington and overseas. The Agency would benefit
from having more State officers detailed to public
diplomacy positions. We encourage USIA and the
Department to work together to overcome barriers
(different assignment cycles, for example) to in-
creased interagency rotation.

We see only benefits in doing so. USIA’s officers
can bring public diplomacy considerations to the
policy process and provide State Department offi-
cers with a greater appreciation of their value. The
Department’s officers in turn offer useful insights
into policies and the policymaking process.

There are practical benefits for the officers as
well. USIA provides more opportunities to manage
programs, budgets and personnel, which can be
career-enhancing for State officers. In a Foreign
Service with more officer couples, interagency ro-
tation expands assignment opportunities and avoids
situations in which one spouse supervises another.
Interagency assignments can broaden the skills,
knowledge, and experience of officers in both
agencies.


EDUCA

ND ULTURAL PROGRAMS

Exchange of Persons

= The Commission finds that international educational and cultural
exchange programs administered by USIA in cooperation with private
organizations provide an understanding and appreciation of the United
States and are among the most effective tools of public diplomacy.
® Budget reductions threaten to undermine gains made during the
1980s and USIA’s ability to strengthen international exchange pro-
grams as intended by Congress.

| The Fulbright scholarship program develops trust and good will in
ways that further U.S. interests. Itremains a vital and innovative model
for other international educational exchanges.

@ USIA’s increasing reliance on short-term grants for American lec-
turers appears less likely to achieve long-term Fulbright program ob-
jectives. The Commission encourages the Agency to assess the use of
these grants.

TM Overseas academic counseling and domestic foreign student out-
reach programs are important to U.S. interests. They should be given
additional resources,

= Funding for the Central American undergraduate exchange program
should be restored to its FY 1986 level.

= Additional private sector participation in exchange programs with
the Soviet Union is in the national interest. The number of U.S. and
Soviet high school students participating in exchanges should be
increased,

@ U.S.-Soviet educational exchanges should emphasize the social sci-
ences and humanities. Reciprocity should be maintained in academic
fields and overall numbers of grantees.

= The Commission strongly supports negotiations with the
Soviet Union for an American cultural center in Moscow.

= USIA should expand its bilateral academic and cultural
exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe.

& USIA's posts should use their developing automation ca-
pabilities to maintain involvement of former International

Visitors and East-West Center participants in post programs.

he sharing of knowledge and values based
on firsthand experience is fundamental to
the mission of public diplomacy. During
the past year, USIA provided full or partial
sponsorship for approximately 6,000 participants
in academic exchange programs and 10,000 par-
ticipants in youth and private sector exchanges.
Across the globe, the U.S. has educational ex-
change relationships with more than 130 countries.
Exchanges are among the most widely recognized,
appreciated, and emulated of USIA’s programs.

Within the United States, exchange programs en-
joy broad bipartisan support. In an address to the
nation prior to the Geneva summit, President Rea-
gan stated that “enduring peace requires openness,
honest communications, and opportunities for our
[U.S. and Soviet] peoples to get to know one an-
other directly.” At the Commission’s 40th anniver-
sary conference in 1987, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-
RI) observed, “Dollar for dollar these [educational
and cultural exchange] programs are our most ef-
fective expenditures to enhance American influ-
ence abroad.”

Graphic evidence of the long-term impact of ex-
changes is contained in a recent report by the Latin
American Scholarship Program of American Ur‘-
versities (LASPAU). The study revealed that 95 per-
cent of all academic exchange grantees from Latin
America return to university employment in their


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

firmed a commitment to world’s fairs and reached
a number of broad conclusions: (1) world’s fairs
can enhance America’s international image and
further U.S. public diplomacy goals; (2) the U.S.
should remain in the Bureau of International Ex-
positions; (3) future U.S. pavilions should place
greater emphasis on trade and tourism; (4) federal
funding should be reduced through increased par-
ticipation by corporate sponsors and U.S. states;
and (5) interagency cooperation is needed in seek-
ing federal funds to alleviate the burden on USIA.
The Commission welcomes the task force report
and urges the new administration to look carefully
at its detailed recommendations. We are especially
concerned that full assessment of resource require-
ments and competing national priorities at the high-
est levels precede Presidential-level decisions to
participate in future world’s fairs. The National Se-
curity Council should issue clear guidance on the
USS. role in international expositions to all relevant
federal agencies and ensure continued White House
and multiagency involvement in their funding.

Soviets waiting to
view USIA’s “Infor-
mation USA” ex-
hibit, which wel-
comed more than
7,000 visitors a day.

The United States recently agreed to participate
in the 1992 world’s fair in Seville commemorating
the 500th anniversary of the first voyage of Chris-
topher Columbus. Congress, the NSC and OMB
should ensure that USIA does not bear the entire
burden of seeking the estimated $33 million needed
for U.S. participation. Nor should funds for Seville
come from other public diplomacy programs.

The Commission is pleased that President Rea-
gan recently directed that the costs of the Seville
World’s Fair should be “divided equitably” among
the budgets of USIA, State, and Commerce. We urge
the new administration to honor this directive so
that the federal portion of U.S. participation in the
Fair is funded on an equal basis by the three agencies.

The Commission also recommends that the Di-
rector of USIA be made a member of the Christopher
Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission. USIA
will play a major role in the Quincentennial, not
just in the Seville World’s Fair, but through a wide
variety of complementary programs.


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

Senators Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), John Warmer (R-VA), Ted Stevens (R-AK), Sam Nunn (D-GA), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), and
Albert Gore (D-TN) (left to right) take part in a conference in Brussels on technology, economic growth and security issues.

sustain an adequate level of funding for the pro-
gram. The Commission is concerned that the sec-
ond cycle of grantees shows a sharp decrease in
the number of scholarships for students from an
area important to U.S. interests.

U,S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES
Cultural and educational exchanges between the
United States and the Soviet Union have fluctuated
during the past 25 years. Formalized in a succes-
sion of General Exchanges Agreements, the level
of exchanges has waxed and waned with relations
between the two countries.
Government-to-government exchanges halted for
all practical purposes in the aftermath of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. A general improve-
ment in relations resulted in a Presidential decision
in 1984 to proceed with negotiations that culmi-
nated in the signing of the current General Ex-
changes Agreement in Geneva in 1985. Since then
the Agreement has defined the range of exchange
activities undertaken by the two countries. Cultural
relations have been discussed at each of the en-
suing U.S.-Soviet summit meetings and remain a
prominent item on the bilateral agenda.

The U.S.-Soviet Exchange Initiative announced
by President Reagan in 1985 became part of USIA’s
mandate and a staff was assigned to the Office of
the Director to carry it out. As distinguished from
conventional exchange programs administered by
USIA’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
the President’s Initiative is responsible for facili-
tating U.S. private sector exchanges in the arts, film,
television, media, books, and a variety of other
professional and people-to-people exchanges.

Representatives from USIA and the private sector
have engaged in talks with Soviet authorities in
Washington and in Moscow. Coordinated by the
Agency's Bureau of Programs, these talks included
participants from radio, television, film, newspa-
pers, magazines, and book publishing and led to
expanded cooperation with the Soviets in these
fields.

U.S.-Soviet “nongovernment-to-government” talks
are indicative of a fundamental asymmetry between
the two societies and the way they approach ex-
changes. The U.S. emphasizes the involvement of
the private sector, which historically has played an


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak observes a computer search of book
titles at USIA’s exhibit at the 1987 Cairo International Book Fair.

In September 1988, a so-called “U.S. Book Store”
opened in Moscow with an inventory of 4,000 titles
selected from American publishers. Purchases are
made in foreign currency. While the enterprise is
a significant advance, steps should be taken to
negotiate the convertibility of sale proceeds so that
Soviets lacking access to hard currency can pa-
tronize the store. Selected U.S. government publi-
cations and a broad range of titles should be
available.

FOREIGN TEXTBOOKS

USIA’s posts in Scandinavia, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and elsewhere pay considerable at-
tention to the authors of college and secondary
school textbooks in recognition that how their books
treat the United States will have widespread impact.

The Commission commends these efforts and urges
more posts to do likewise. Exchanges and personal
contact with textbook writers can help to ensure
that future generations of students and foreign lead-
ers will have access to information about the United
States that is fairly presented.

BOOK DONATIONS
Until 1988, USIA distributed books donated by U.S.
publishers to countries without viable markets for
American titles. The federal tax code permits Amer-
ican book publishers to write off twice the manu-
facturing cost of books donated to certain cate-
gories of recipients. Due to budget reductions, USIA
has discontinued its direct involvement with book
donations. The Commission has a high regard for
the value of this activity and regrets this decision.
USIA does continue to provide support for private
sector distribution of donated books abroad. In FY
1988, the Agency facilitated the shipment of more
than 2.5 million books worldwide. The Commis-
sion endorses continuing Agency participation in
this relatively inexpensive means of distributing rel-
evant titles to overseas audiences.

THE BOOK OF THE FUTURE

USIA also should explore the implications of new
technologies in book publishing. The time-con-
suming and labor intensive processes of manu-
script preparation and typesetting are expected to
undergo radical changes with the development of
desktop publishing and computerized books. Per-
sonal computers permit the printing and use of vast
amounts of information stored on compact disks.
The treasures of great library collections, which the
Agency cannot duplicate overseas, will become
available. USIA should give thought to these and
related advances in the development of its book
programs.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Exhibits

® Carefully focused multimedia exhibits, accompanied by language-
qualified American guides, are a highly effective means of commu-
nicating with millions of Soviets and East Europeans about life in the
United States. USIA should give high priority to a national exhibition
for China.

® The U.S. should not participate in world’s fairs unless it is prepared
to commit the resources needed for a top quality American presence.
Funding for world’s fairs should not be drawn from other public di-
plomacy programs.

@ The National Security Council should respond to the findings of the
World's Fair Task Force and provide a clear statement of the U.S. gov-
ernment's role in international expositions.

@ The Director of USIA should be a member of the Christopher Colum-
bus Quincentenary Jubilee Commission.

SIA operates multi-media exhibits in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and U.S.
pavilions at overseas world’s fairs ap-
proved by the Bureau of International Ex-
positions (BIE). USIA also produces centerpiece
exhibits for international trade fairs, primarily in
developing countries, and a variety of smaller ex-
hibits and graphics materials for its posts worldwide.
Exhibits are expensive and becoming more so.
Federal funding for exhibits at three world’s fairs
held outside the United States during the 1980s
totalled $23.3 million: Tsukuba (1985), $8.6 mil-
lion; Vancouver (1986), $6.9 million; and Brisbane
(1988) $7.8 million.” The 1992 world’s fairs in Se-
ville and Genoa will cost an estimated $33 million.
USIA’s recent highly successful solo exhibit in the
Soviet Union, “Information USA,” cost more than
$16 million.

* World’s fairs in the U.S. are handled by the Department of
Commerce, Congressional support for U.S. participation in
world’s fairs here at home has not been matched with ade-
quate funds for those held abroad.

America’s Western European allies, Japan, China,
and the Soviet Union spend much more on world’s
fairs than the United States, raising questions about
the U.S. commitment to high quality exhibits and
their overall value to public diplomacy. Second-
rate exhibits are not the answer. If the U.S. presence
in international expositions cannot be of the high-
est quality, the resources allocated for them should
be directed to other purposes.

The Commission places primary value on solo
exhibits in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
which over the years have repeatedly proven their
worth. The recent frequency of world’s fairs, how-
ever, has outstripped U.S. willingness to fund and
otherwise adequately support them. Changes are
needed in the way U.S. exhibits in world’s fairs are
funded and in the way decisions to participate in
them are made.

MULTIMEDIA EXHIBITS

The United States resumed thematic exhibits in the
Soviet Union under the U.S.-Soviet Exchanges
Agreement signed at the Geneva summit in 1985.
The program was suspended following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.

“Information USA,” the first exhibit under the
Agreement, focused on the communications rev-
olution, its impact on daily life and individual op-
portunity in a society that fosters the free flow of
information. A second exhibit, “Design USA,” is
scheduled to open in September, 1989.

“Information USA” completed an 18-month, nine-
city tour of the Soviet Union in December, 1988.
Total attendance exceeded two million. Visitor
comment was extremely positive. Hands-on use of
videos and computers added greatly to its impact.
Typically, Russian-speaking American guides were
a major attraction, providing opportunities for in-
formal give-and-take with Soviet citizens about life
in the United States. The value of language-quali-
fied guides in USIA’s exhibits cannot be
overemphasized.

The large number of visitors to “Information USA”
reflect the exhibit’s high quality and its appeal to
Soviet citizens. USIA should take care, however,


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Underinvestment in Public Diplomacy

@ The United States continues to underinvest in international infor-
mation and cultural programs, despite substantial increases in funding
during the 1980s. Investment in public diplomacy is smaller today in
real terms than two decades ago.

® Public diplomacy requires additional resources to modernize aging
facilities, to capitalize on new communications technologies, to meet
the challenges of glasnost and improved Soviet policy advocacy, and
to take advantage of program opportunities.

or the past 40 years, both Republican and

Democratic members of this Commission

have deplored continuing underinvest-

ment in America’s international informa-
tion and cultural programs. The Commission is
convinced additional funds are needed and would
be in the national interest.

As the decade draws to a close, there is cause
for satisfaction and concern in assessing the public
diplomacy budget.

Under the leadership of Director Charles Z. Wick,
and with bipartisan support in the Congress, USIA’s
budget has grown substantially, a net 79 percent
from the FY 1981 level. The Commission com-
mends Director Wick for bringing about this ex-
traordinary investment in USIA’s future. It will be
one of his most enduring and impressive
accomplishments.

The many resulting enhancements in America’s
public diplomacy capability include: a solid start
on VOA modernization; additional VOA language
services and broadcast hours; creation of the
Worldnet television service, RIAS-TV, Radio Marti,
and the International Youth Exchange program; and
growth in such core programs as books and inter-
national visitors. Through the combined efforts of
Director Wick and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI),

es

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
funds for educational exchanges have doubled.

Nevertheless, USIA’s operating budget is still
smaller in real terms than it was two decades ago.
Nor have human resources kept pace with recent
increases in program funds. Authorized American
and foreign national positions totalled 9,050 in 1988,
well below the Agency's 1964 peak of 12,500. The
United States continues to spend far less on public
diplomacy than its major allies or the Soviet Union.

In FY 1987, the Agency's budget began another
downward turn, leading to program reductions and
postponement of several important initiatives. VOA’s
modernization program has been delayed and dras-
tically scaled back. Urgent security measures for
overseas employees have not been funded. The
Agency has been forced to close posts and reduce
funding for Amparts, magazines, publications, ex-
hibits, student support, computer services, and other
basic programs.

Funding is inadequate for many promising op-
portunities: new cultural centers in Poland, Nica-
ragua, China, and the Soviet Union; Worldnet pro-
gram expansion; major multimedia exhibits in China;
additional language training for Foreign Service
personnel; increased VOA broadcasting to South
Africa; new initiatives in direct broadcasting and
information transfer by satellites, and selected en-
hancements in information and exchange pro-
grams to take advantage of glasnost and democ-
ratization in developing countries.

In response to a recent Commission survey, am-
bassadors at U.S. embassies around the world stated
time and again that high priority public diplomacy
opportunities exist for which funds are lacking, that
reductions have squeezed post operations to the
point where important programs will be curtailed,
and that further reductions in the infrastructure of!
public diplomacy are not in the interest of the United/
States.

The Commission is well aware that federal budget
realities create a bleak near-term outlook. The next



MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

relay stations by landline, microwave, and satellite.
The network control center ultimately will automate
all frequency scheduling and transmission and co-
ordination of broadcasts. VOA’s “Satellite Inter-
connect System” will soon transmit program feeds
from Washington to relay stations and provide two-
way voice and data communication using Intelsat’s
International Business Satellite circuits.

The Commission remains deeply concerned,
however, that VOA modernization has proceeded
much more slowly than national needs require. The
reasons are complex, and some are beyond VOA’s
control: lengthy site negotiations with foreign gov-
ernments, delays in hiring technical staff, USIA’s
inexperience with major acquisitions and large scale
engineering projects, frequent turnover in VOA Di-
rectors early in the program, increased cost esti-
mates, and unrealistic Office of Management and
Budget and Congressional spending limitations.

Continuing balances in VOA's capital account
also have proved tempting to policymakers seeking
funds for other projects. Approximately $24 million
has been taken from funds appropriated for VOA
modernization: $12 million for RIAS-TV, $3.9 mil-
lion for the “Information USA” exhibit in the Soviet
Union, $0.5 million for domestic Radio Marti claims,
and $7.5 million for TV Marti. The Commission
strongly opposes further use of VOA’s capital ac-
count for unrelated programs. If Congress and the
administration choose to fund such programs, they
should do so directly through regular processes.

For these and other reasons, the completion date
for the original five-year modernization program
has stretched from 1989 to at least 1994 and likely
beyond. Delays and refinement of budget estimates
have increased projected costs for the original pro-
gram from $1.3 billion to $1.8 billion.

In 1988, OMB limited VOA’s shortwave modern-
ization program to station construction in Morocco,
Thailand, and Israel and to leased transmitters in
West Germany. OMB required VOA to postpone
indefinitely constructing new stations in Botswana

and Sri Lanka, and to discontinue additional facil-
ities negotiations. Funding was not provided for
maintenance and replacement equipment needed
throughout much of VOA’s relay station network.

Simultaneous with these delays, new commu-
nications technologies, declining shortwave listen-
ership in some parts of the world, and competition
from other media are challenging VOA to develop
ways to supplement its shortwave delivery system.
Promising options include: medium wave leasing
arrangements with direct transmission to preclude
editing by local stations; use of Worldnet satellite
subcarrier feeds to deliver programs to local sta-
tions; dial-in audio services for indigenous medium
wave, FM, and cable stations; and satellite feeds
to commercial stations for direct retransmission.

Funding decisions by OMB and Congress pose
a fundamental question. Does the U.S. want to re-
main a global broadcaster with the capability to
deliver a clear, reliable shortwave signal to all parts
of the world? Or should VOA retreat to the role of
a regional broadcaster, aiming its message only at
priority areas? Policymakers need to confront these
questions directly and the consequences that flow
from them.

The Commission believes VOA’s shortwave
broadcasting system will continue to be a vital na-
tional asset well into the next century, particularly
for denied areas, rural populations, and developing
countries. But the Commission also has concluded
that construction delays and changes in the inter-
national communications environment require a
reexamination of the global VOA modernization
program contemplated by the President, the NSC,
and broadcast professionals in 1982. This reex-
amination should not be carried out primarily through
the budget process as it has been thus far. The
Commission recommends that USIA, Congress, and
the NSC give high priority to assessing VOA’s mod-
ernization program in terms of national needs,
broadcast requirements, resource priorities, and
alternative signal delivery systems.

The foregoing are only some of the issues VOA


MANAGEMENT

USIA Officer Assignments

@ The Commission finds continued under-representation of USIA of-
ficers in ambassadorial and other senior positions in embassies and
consulates. We recommend again that the President and the Secretary
of State correct this imbalance.

® USIA's officers should be assigned to a greater number and wider
range of positions in the Department of State and the National Security
Council. A major program of interagency officer rotation would ben-
efit both public diplomacy and the policymaking process.

AMBASSADORIAL ASSIGNMENTS

onsistent under-representation of USIA’s

Foreign Service Officers in career am-

bassadorial and other senior positions

in embassies and consulates has led the
Commission to recommend repeatedly that the
President and Secretary of State correct this im-
balance. Contrary to assurances, the situation per-
sists. Currently only two USIA officers are serving
as ambassadors. Only one is serving as a deputy
chief of mission (DCM). Only one is serving as a
consul-general.

The Foreign Service Act provides that the “Sec-
retary of State, in conjunction with the heads of the
other agencies utilizing the Foreign Service per-
sonnel system, shall implement policies and pro-
cedures to insure that Foreign Service Officers and
members of the Senior Foreign Service of all agen-
cies are able to compete for Chief of Mission po-
sitions.” Congressional report language on this leg-
islation is clear: “This would give USIA officers the
same opportunities possessed by other Foreign Ser-
vice members to compete for Chief of Mission and
other Foreign Service assignments outside the USIA.”

USIA’s Foreign Service Officers are tested for the
same general knowledge as their State Department
colleagues in entrance examinations. They are pro-
moted, retired, and selected-out under the same
rules. Overseas, they are subject to the same con-
ditions and the same hardships.

USIA’s officers monitor host country develop-
ments as closely as State Department officers, and
they are required to have similar indepth knowl-
edge of issues affecting the bilateral relationship
with their host country. USIA’s officers generally
have greater representational responsibilities than
their mission colleagues other than the ambassa-
dor and DCM. As a natural consequence of their
careers in public diplomacy, they develop broad
negotiating and cross-cultural communication skills.
USIA’s assignments typically give Agency officers
more extensive managerial experience earlier in
their careers than most State Department officers
receive.

In sum, the Commission believes USIA’s officers
possess the professional skills and experience
needed to qualify for the most senior overseas po-
sitions the Foreign Service has to offer. They are a
resource that is not fully and wisely used outside
of the Agency. USIA’s officers should receive the
same degree of consideration—no better, no worse—
than officers from the State Department and other
foreign affairs agencies in filling senior positions
at home and abroad.

INTERAGENCY ASSIGNMENTS

The Commission recommends the regular assign-
ment of USIA’s officers to the Department of State
and the National Security Council in greater num-
bers and to a wider range of positions than in the
past. Historically, USIA’s officers have been as-
signed to the Department's Office of Public Affairs
or to press positions in its geographic bureaus.
Similarly, assignments to the NSC are usually in


TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

In accordance with the requirements of Public Law 100-204 and Section 8, Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 2 of 1977, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
submits herewith a report on the U.S. Information Agency and the activities of the U.S.

government concerning public diplomacy.

Respectfully submitted,

B/ A}

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., Chairman
President

The Heritage Foundation
Virginia (R)

Tom C. Korologos

Vice Chairman

President

Timmons and Company, Inc.
Virginia (R)

Merrleg Jutl

Hershey Gold
Chairman of the Board
Super Yarn Mart
California (D)

Louis B. Susman
Senior Partner
Thompson and Mitchell
Missouri (D)

F xxi. 3, Bedlle,

Priscilla L. Buckley
Senior Editor
National Review
New York (R)

AIH Oh,

Richard M. Scaife

Publisher

The Tribune Review Publishing Co.
Pennsylvania (R)



MANAGEMENT

Automation and Telecommunications Planning

@ USIA has moved toa position of relative strength in its development
of automation and telecommunications capabilities. Continued prog-
ress will require adaptation of new technologi

automation plan and Agency leadership that devotes personal interest

into a coherent

and necessary resources to field and headquarters needs.

rom a modest base ten years ago, USIA

has moved toa position of relative strength

in its development of automation and tele-

communications technologies. Continued
progress will require coordination at the top, a co-
herent automation plan, and Agency leadership that
devotes personal interest and necessary resources
to field and headquarters needs.

In its 1986 report, the Commission recom-
mended that USIA create a central planning body
to coordinate policy, technical, and resource de-
cisions relating to automation and telecommuni-
cations planning. Shortly thereafter, an outside
automation consultant found the Agency’s “man-
agement of the central and distributed computer
operations lacks planning, standardization, disci-
pline, technical expertise, and coordination.” As
a result of these findings and recommendations,
the Agency established a Technology and Infor-
mation Systems Committee, chaired by the Deputy
Director. The committee was replaced by a Tech-
nology End Users group, chaired by the Associate
Director for Management.

This attention by USIA’s top management to the
Agency's automation and communication tech-
nology needs has made a difference. It led to nu-
merous studies by Agency working groups and pri-
vate sector consultants, organizational changes, and

* “Information Resource Management Automation Moderniza-
tion Study,” Electronic Data Systems Corporation, October,
1986.

resource adjustments. The Commission has seen
the studies, spoken with key principals, and viewed
many of the new facilities. USIA is putting existing
tools to more effective use, distributing its auto-
mation capabilities more widely, and acquiring cost-
effective new technology. We commend the Agency
for its progress in adapting state-of-the-art infor-
mation technologies to the needs of public
diplomacy.

AUTOMATION

A partial list of recent Agency initiatives includes:
® Automation of 192 posts enabling computer-to-
computer communication with each other and with
Washington.

@ Installation of more than 1,600 computer work
stations overseas.

= Placement of TVRO dishes at more than 150 posts
linking them via satellite with Washington.

= Installation of facsimile transmission terminals
at 105 posts.

= Acquisition of an IBM mainframe computer with
increased capacity adequate to Agency needs.

= Computer-to-computer transmission of the Wire-
less File to 185 principal and branch posts replac-
ing slower radioteletype delivery.

= Development of an automated multilingual sys-
tem to create, edit, and move text at the Voice
America.

= Renovation of USIA’s Operations Center and
placement of office automation systems and mod-
ular equipment throughout the Agency’s
headquarters.

USIA is taking commendable steps to improve
internal communications and distribute program
materials more rapidly.

Plans call for installation this year of an Auto-
mated Message Analysis and Distribution System
(AMADS) to distribute messages that are electron-
ically scanned for pre-assigned key words and
phrases. The Office of the Director is being auto-
mated, and new software will provide more rapid


MANAGEMENT

Foreign Service Time-in-Class

= The Commission finds that experienced and highly qualified Foreign
Service Officers have been involuntarily retired under the “'time-in-
class” provision of the Foreign Service Act when need for their service
continues. Congress and the foreign affairs agencies should consider
revision of “time-in-class” requirements for the good of the service
and to create expectations of a full career among highly qualified
Foreign Service Officers.

he Foreign Service Act requires USIA and

other foreign affairs agencies to establish

long-term personnel policies that ensure

a “regular, predictable flow of talent up-
ward through the ranks and into the Senior Foreign
Service.” The intent is to provide for the continuing
admission of able new officers, effective career de-
velopment through a series of assignments of es-
calating responsibility, and promotion of superior
officers from Class One into the Senior Foreign
Service.

The Commission strongly endorses the need for
a competitive career foreign service that is char-
acterized by excellence and professionalism and
administered in accordance with merit principles.
The Commission also supports the separation of
officers who do not meet requisite standards of
performance.

The Commission has found that under current
regulations many experienced and highly qualified
officers are subject to involuntary separation before
the age of mandatory retirement and before the
Agency has derived full benefit from their skills and
experience. Regulations under the Act, the so-called
“time-in-class” (TIC) provisions, provide for the
severance of officers who have not been promoted
within prescribed time limits.

“B

An anomalous situation exists in which highly
skilled officers, who are promoted rapidly before
reaching a plateau at Class One, fall victim to the
time-in-class axe in mid-career. Officers who are
promoted more slowly never reach the same hurdle
or do so close to the age of mandatory retirement.
The latter enjoy a full career in the Foreign Service
even though less competitive than their faster rising
colleagues.

To meet staffing needs, the Agency has offered
short-term “Limited Career Extensions” to some
officers, allowing them to continue their employ-
ment for up to three additional years without pros-
pects of further promotion. This temporary measure
does not adequately address the problem, however.

The Commission urges Congress and USIA to
examine time-in-class regulations with a view to-
ward ensuring the retention of experienced officers
whose skills are needed and creating expectations
ofa full career among highly qualified individuals.

Behind the scenes—the Worldnet control room in Manila
during an interactive program with Washington.


MANAGEMENT

selected posts. It would enhance the ability of the
President, Cabinet-level figures, and negotiators as-
signed to ongoing talks to participate more fully in
public diplomacy opportunities that are time sen-
sitive. The State Department has announced long-
range plans to establish two-way video teleconfer-
encing. USIA should consider working with the De-
partment to develop systems adaptable for Agency
programs.

Members of the Commission have observed how
USIA’s posts are using desktop publishing to tailor
Agency periodicals to local interests. At a time when
one-country publications are being evaluated for
their cost-effectiveness, desktop publishing allows
posts to place their signature on materials pro-
duced for worldwide distribution in a way that re-
duces costs and maintains high quality. The Com-
mission urges the Agency to showcase the best
examples of post creativity in developing computer-
assisted products and services as a means of en-
couraging widespread use of these information
technologies.

TRAINING AND PLANNING

Recent studies by outside consultants have found
that USIA’s officers lack adequate support and train-
ing in the use of new information technologies. As
a result, the Agency has expanded its training pro-
grams and introduced a new Executive Computer
Course tailored to the needs of Agency managers.
The Commission urges USIA to give high priority
to automation training if it is to maximize the return
on its investment in hardware and personnel.
Guidelines on the level of automation training re-
quired for Agency positions in Washington and
overseas should be established.

The problem of inadequate support for users of
automated communications systems has plagued
USIA for many years. To meet this need, an End-
user Computer Information Center was established

to assist officers in dealing with microcomputer
applications and central information resources. The
Center’s monthly newsletter deals with common
problems and updates Agency personnel on new
developments. The Center is contributing to in-
creased efficiency and cost-savings by acting as a
clearinghouse for uncopyrighted common use soft-
ware, such as financial spreadsheets, and by fa-
cilitating multiple uses throughout the Agency. The
Information Center plays an important role in bring-
ing together Agency elements that too often view
public diplomacy through separate prisms.

While the list of recent Agency automation ini-
tiatives is formidable, the Commission believes there
is still considerable room for progress in long-range
planning and coordination at the top. USIA has
identified the need for a plan setting forth auto-
mation goals, priorities, and funding commitments.
Planning papers from Agency elements have been
solicited in connection with its development.

The Commission strongly supports an Agency
automation plan, updated as necessary, that takes
into account the needs of all domestic and overseas
elements. It should include realistic Agency-wide
schedules for implementing new initiatives and more
timely replacement of obsolete equipment. Stan-
dards for hardware and software procurement should
be developed. And most importantly, the plan should
take fully into account the needs of the Agency’s
end-users.

USIA should continue to draw on expertise in
industry and the academic community and coor-
dinate where appropriate with automation pro-
grams in other foreign affairs agencies. The Agency
must also play a more active role in keeping posts
apprised of available software packages, applica-
tions, glossaries and other information. Involve-
ment of USIA’s posts in headquarters automation
planning is critical.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

National Endowment for Democracy

© The National Endowment for Democracy is contributing effectively
to the spread of democratic values and institutions abroad. It should
be given adequate resources and broad bipartisan support.

n his speech before the British Parliament in

June 1982, President Reagan expressed sup-

port for a study to determine how the United

States could contribute more effectively to the
spread of democratic values and institutions abroad.
The resulting report by representatives of labor,
business, Congress, the political parties, and the
private sector led to legislation in 1983 creating the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a pri-
vate, non-profit corporation committed to further-
ing democratic ideals throughout the world.

The Endowment'’s bipartisan Board of Directors
is comprised of twelve individuals from the private
sector, two members of Congress, and one member
from the Executive Branch. It receives an annual
grant from USIA in an amount determined by Con-
gress. By law, the Endowment does not carry out
programs directly but provides funds to private or-
ganizations on the basis of criteria established by
its Board.

In FY 1988, the Endowment’s budget was $16.8
million. Approximately 80 percent of its program
funds are devoted to projects carried out by four
core grantees: the AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union In-
stitute, the Center for International Private Enter-
prise affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce, the
National Democratic Institute for International Af-
fairs, and the National Republican Institute for In-
ternational Affairs. Endowment programs encour-
age democratic pluralism through development of
independent trade unions, business associations,
political parties, and other private sector organi-
zations committed to democratic processes. The
Endowment also supports publications, media
training, and programs of democratic education.
Grantees are forbidden to use Endowment funds
for partisan political activities, and USIA conducts
periodic audits to determine that grants are used
for authorized purposes.

“33

During consideration of the Endowment’s ena-
bling legislation, leaders of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee observed that the Commission could
“contribute usefully to the oversight of the Endow-
ment and its relationship with USIA.” Consistent
with this charge, the Commission has met with the
President and other representatives of the Endow-
ment on four occasions since publication of its last
annual report. We have discussed Endowment pro-
grams with U.S. embassy officials and reviewed
relevant General Accounting Office reports, USIA
Inspector General audits, and Congressional over-
sight hearings.

The Commission believes the Endowment is doing
important work. Its programs are diverse and ef-
fective. Endowment grants support the New York
and Brussels-based affiliates of Poland’s indepen-
dent trade union Solidarity. Other grants fund a data
bank on political prisoners in the Soviet Union;
help Freedom House, a U.S.-based human rights
organization; and provide assistance to newspa-
pers and magazines published by South African
blacks. The China Intellectual, a journal of inde-
pendent opinion circulating in China and among
Chinese students abroad, is supported by the En-
dowment as are free trade unions in the Philip-
pines, groups comprising the civic opposition in
Nicaragua, organizations committed to free market
principles in Peru, and women’s civic action move-
ments in Argentina and El Salvador.

“In good part by our example, democracy—a
child of the Age of Reason—is transforming our
modern world. From Spain and Portugal a dec-
ade ago to a trend that now encompasses Latin
America from Argentina to El Salvador, from the
Philippines to South Korea, the surge toward de-
mocracy is the most powerful political move-
ment of our time.”

Remarks by Secretary of State George Shultz at the Advisory
Commission’s 40th Anniversary Conference on “Public
Diplomacy in the Information Age," September 15, 1987


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

The American Center in New Dethi. USIA operates 141 information centers worldwide.

grams, and educational and cultural communica-
tion. The interdependence of these programs
overseas, so well-documented in the statements of
U.S. Chiefs of Mission, leads inevitably in our view
to the need for their co-location here at home.
Putative gains from their separation would be more
than offset by the serious damage that would be
done to coherent, integrated public diplomacy ef-
forts abroad that seek to portray the entire picture
of America.

The Commission is convinced that the funda-
mental integrity of USIA’s programs has been main-
tained since the reorganization of 1977. That oc-
casional contrary views persist, serves to remind
that perceptions are important. The integrity of all
of USIA’s programs must be protected, both in ap-
pearance and reality, and short-term, partisan ef-
forts to use them for purposes inconsistent with
their statutory authority should be guarded against.
Both Congress and future administrations must re-

main vigilant against political pressures that would
weaken USIA’s ability to carry out its mission.

The reorganization debate in large part is Wash-
ington-centered. It comes down primarily to head-
quarters concerns, turf battles, and “inside-the-belt-
way” preoccupations that shift attention from what
ought to be the primary focus of public diplomacy:
its effective implementation overseas.

The Commission believes the broader purposes
of public diplomacy can best be served by leaving
the management of this nation’s overseas infor-
mation programs, educational exchanges and ra-
dio broadcasting activities in USIA. It is also more
cost-effective and administratively efficient than
maintaining three separate agencies, and a second
major reorganization in a decade would be highly
disruptive. As U.S. Ambassador to Italy Maxwell
Rabb put it: “I don’t think it serves the U.S. gov-
ernment’s public diplomacy interests to keep dig-
ging up the USIA plant to look at its roots.”



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

COMMENTS BY U.S. AMBASSADORS ON AMERICA’S UNDERINVESTMENT IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Commission has received thoughtful com-
ments from more than 80 Chiefs of Mission on
their public diplomacy resource needs and
opportunities. Typical are the following:

“USIS is doing the best it can with what it has. It
needs more. Any cuts below current resource levels
would be crippling, since they would force USIS to
sacrifice important infrastructure.”

Ambassador James R. Lilley, Seoul

“The current atmosphere of change in the Sovtet
Union gives us the opportunity to do much more
than ever before in every category of public
diplomacy.”

Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr, Moscow

“Funding and staffing are inadequate for what
we need to do in this country and for the window
of opportunity open to us. USIS was forced to
close down its three branch operations. We very
much need to reopen them but the resources are
not there. On the other hand the Soviets are
busy opening up cultural centers throughout the
country.

Ambassador Thomas E. Gildred, Buenos Aires

“T personally bemoan the budgetary constraints
that have forced USIS over the years to spread its
personnel more thinly and intensely focus
programs at the expense of communicating with
youth and the wider public.”

Ambassador Roscoe S. Suddarth, Amman

“Lack of adequate funding prevents this post from
taking full advantage of the offerings of American
culture—the showcases of American society, which
are of enormous impact here. In this regard, we are
at a great disadvantage vis-a-vis Eastern bloc
countries which place great emphasis on this area
of activity.”

Ambassador James W. Rawlings, Harare

“USIA programs overseas provide more ‘bang for
the buck’ than any other comparable program that
1 know of. I encourage you to involve more directly
Members of Congress so that they may see with
their own eyes how well these overseas operations
work.”

Ambassador Rockwell A. Schnabel, Helsinki

“T hope you would agree that when there is a
chance to mount an exhibit, open a library, or
establish an English teaching program in China, it
should rank quite high in terms of claims on
available funding and staff.”

Ambassador Winston Lord, Beying

“USIS carries out its mission with no ‘fat’ in its
resource base. Any significant budget reduction
would quickly be reflected in reduced program
activity. My strong view is that such program
reduction is not in the interests of the United States
in this country or indeed in this region of Africa.”
Ambassador Robert M. Smalley, Maseru

“USIA’s severe financial crunch ts impacting on
what the post in Tunis can do. The kind of
flexibility we had in the past, the ability to seize on
opportunities as they arise, has been grievously
affected.”

Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., Tunis

“] did want to emphasize to you the opportunities
that are available if we have the resources to
capitalize on them.”

Ambassador Mark Palmer, Budapest

“We could effectively increase program activity by a
factor of 2-300 percent, provided of course that
American foreign service staff could be increased
as well.”

Deputy Chief of Mission Charles H. Brayshaw, Algiers

“While the Soviets and East Europeans offer over a
thousand scholarships to Syrian students every
year, we fund fewer than five. The Syrian
Government has traditionally drawn much of its
leadership from Syrian universities. Because the
benefits are so far-reaching, we would like to see
increased funding for academic exchanges. ...”
Chargé John B. Craig, Damascus

“At one time, we had fourteen American Centers [in
Japan]; now we have six. Even quite recently, we
had many more employees in USIS. As they have
gone, so have opportunities for improving
understanding and strengthening our partnership
.... IF USIS had more money, I believe it would use
it effectively and prudently.”

Ambassador Mike Mansfield, Tokyo


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Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) greets Soviet visitors at USIA’s
“Information USA” exhibit in Tbilisi.

These Soviet initiatives challenge the commu-
nications approach, program content, and resource
base of U.S. public diplomacy. The proliferation of
exchanges, exhibits, opportunities for live two-way
television broadcasting, and Soviet willingness to
engage in retail public diplomacy through debates
and panel discussions before foreign audiences
have made extraordinary changes in the public di-
plomacy relationship between the two countries.
To the Commission it seems clear the Soviets are
actively “doing more with more” in public diplo-
macy and can be expected to do so no matter what
the course of future policies. The U.S. traditionally
has underinvested in public diplomacy and been
content in its attempt to “do more with less.” One
experienced USIA Foreign Service Officer told the
Commission that while the Soviets tend to respect
American public diplomacy, they suspect our
steadfastness of purpose and U.S. resolve to tell its
story in all climates of our bilateral relations.

The Commission anticipates glasnost will be
challenged whenever long-term objectives com-
pete with short-term expediency. The U.S. should
be prepared for periodic contractions and expan-
sions of the new openness as the limits of this
policy continue to be tested.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

W

The Commission believes the United States should
pursue increased access in the Soviet Union, in-
cluding more opportunities for U.S. journalists to
travel freely and to interview Soviet officials, more
cities open to exchange visitors, greater access to
archival information by U.S. scholars, greater flow
of American materials to Soviet citizens, more op-
portunities for U.S. officials to provide timely public
affairs comment in the Soviet media, more direct
television dialogues between the two countries, and
increased U.S.-Soviet exchanges in all fields.

The content of our message remains an impor-
tant question. Americans addressing the Soviet
people through radio, television, exhibits and other
means are communicating ideas and information
about which, for the most part, their audiences have
little personal knowledge and still limited alter-
native sources of information. The challenge to
public diplomacy professionals is enormous.

Despite these changes in the communications
environment, Soviet disinformation continues. While
the propagation and covert dissemination of false
information damaging to the United States through
intermediaries seems inconsistent with the goals
of glasnost, the Soviet Union has yet to halt these
activities. They require constant vigilance and prompt
exposure. A recent agreement between U.S. and
Soviet officials to establish better mechanisms for
clarifying differences and correcting errors in in-
formation disseminated by both countries offers
some promise. The Commission will watch its im-
plementation with interest.

For its part, U.S. policymakers and spokesper-
sons must pay attention to the choice of words and
concepts used to frame the U.S.-Soviet public di-
plomacy dialogue. Care must be taken that terms
are descriptive, accurate, and non-euphemistic in
explaining U.S. policies and in defining the policies
of others. The Commission has in past reports con-
demned the distortion of language by the Soviet
Union to achieve psychological advantage and po-
litical ends. The United States has been less aware
of the importance of semantics in conveying ideas
and perceptions than its adversaries. Soviet efforts
to distort the lexicon of international affairs terms
should be countered with the truth.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Now in its fifth year, the Endowment has passed
successfully through inevitable growing pains. It
has overcome widespread skepticism regarding its
ability to remain non-partisan and concerns as to
how its efforts would be perceived abroad. This is
a credit to the Endowment's leadership and its ad-
herence to its authorizing legislation and statement
of mission.

As the Endowment's projects take root, it is in-
evitable that occasional opposition will occur in
countries where its programs are having an impact.
The Commission is confident the Endowment can
withstand such criticism and that fair-minded ob-
servers will hold it accountable solely to its

Congressional mandate and the evolving impera-
tives of U.S. foreign policy. It is important, however,
that the Endowment—-and Congress and USIA
through their oversight—take care that support is
not given to groups whose larger agenda conflicts
with the fundamental principles contained in the
Endowment’s charter.

The Endowment is one of the most effective in-
struments available to the United States for ad-
vancing democratic values abroad. Unfortunately,
its expanding impact and goodwill are occurring
just as its budget is beginning to erode. The En-
dowment should be given adequate resources and
broad bipartisan support.

Congress and Public Diplomacy

= The Department of State should provide USIA with timely notice of
overseas travel by Congressional delegations to permit optimum par-
ticipation by Members of Congress and Congressional staff in public
diplomacy programs.

embers of Congress and their staffs

are full partners in the conduct of

public diplomacy. Congress oversees

and appropriates funds for USIA’s
programs. It also plays a role in the formulation of
foreign policy and occasionally participates in the
communication of those policies and American val-
ues overseas.

The need for increased Congressional partici-
pation in public diplomacy programs deserves em-
phasis. Few among USIA’s overseas audiences un-
derstand the influence Congress has in shaping

U.S. policies and its essential part in the American
political process.

For USIA’s posts, Members of Congress offer good
program value. They are often articulate experts in
foreign and economic policies, trade, housing, drug
policies, health care, and other subjects relevant
to Agency program themes. Through well-planned
press conferences, panel discussions, and private
meetings with opinion leaders, Congressional del-
egations can do much to increase foreign under-
standing of Congress as an institution and to ad-
vance other U.S. mission objectives. Simultaneously,
they can observe how public diplomacy is carried
out in the field and thereby develop a better un-
derstanding of its value. In an increasingly inter-
dependent world, what they see and learn is often
directly relevant to the interests of their districts.

Early identification of such program opportuni-
ties is needed. To maximize the exposure that many


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN

Public Diplomacy’s Mission and Structure

@ Public diplomacy is a strategic component of United States foreign
policy. It should be treated and funded accordingly.

@ The international information and educational exchange programs
of the United States government have been carried out overseas as
integrated, coordinated programs since World War Il. The strength of
U.S. public diplomacy lies in the skillful, comprehensive use of all of
its major programs through a single organization.

@ USIA’s reorganization in 1977 followed the most extensive Congres-
sional hearings ever held on public diplomacy. It has proven to be a
wise, farsighted, and cost-effective achievement.

TM To avoid misunderstanding and semantic confusion, the Depart-
ment of State should discontinue use of the term public diplomacy to
characterize public affairs programs in the United States.

rofound changes are determining the fu-
ture of public diplomacy as Americans
enter the last decade of the twentieth
century. Instant global communications
are permeating national borders. The information
revolution is breaking down old rigidities and iso-
lation. Glasnost and improved Soviet media skills
are generating new challenges in the competition
for allegiances and political understanding. In de-
veloping countries, the spread of democratic values
and the free market system demonstrates the force
of ideas in the transfer of political power.
Governments are facing a new reality: if their
policies are to be understood and accepted, they
must learn to compete for the attention and support
of citizens in other countries. Public diplomacy is
not a substitute for traditional diplomatic relations
between governments. But its strategic use is im-
portant and adds immeasurably to the effectiveness
of traditional statecraft and military preparedness.

These changes have fundamentally altered USIA’s
role in America’s foreign relations. Communica-
tions innovations, new program opportunities, and
heightened relevance to the conduct of foreign pol-
icy are the dynamics in any current assessment of
public diplomacy. At the same time, USIA’s fun-
damental mission and basic organizational struc-
ture remain elements of historical continuity and
enduring value.

USIA’S MISSION
The United States has engaged in overseas infor-
mation programs, international radio broadcasting,
and educational and cultural exchanges since shortly
before World War II. Principal legislative authority
for these activities, now carried out by the U.S.
Information Agency, derives from two acts of Con-
gress: the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and the Ful-
bright-Hays Act of 1961.’ These measures give USIA
a unique mission:
TM To explain and advocate U.S. policies to foreign
audiences;
® To provide them with information about Amer-
ican society and culture;
@ To enable many to experience the diversity of
our culture personally; and
TM@ To advise American ambassadors and policy-
makers in the United States on foreign public opinion.
The Commission's visits to USIA’s overseas posts,
our discussions with public diplomacy profession-
als, and our recent worldwide survey of U.S. am-
bassadors lead us to several broad conclusions.

The Information and Educational Exchange (Smith-Mundt)
Act authorizes USIA to promote better understanding of the
United States through the dissemination of information about
its people and its policies. The Mutual Educational and Cul-
tural Exchange (Fulbright-Hays) Act authorizes USIA to in-
crease mutual understanding between the people of the
United States and the people of other countries by means of
educational and cultural exchanges. USIA’s “assessments of
the impact of actual and proposed United States foreign pol-
icy decisions on public opinion abroad” are authorized by
Executive Order 12048, March 27, 1978.



MANAGEMENT

access to information needed for management
decisions.

USIA is seeking to link various asynchronous
systems already on line such as the Wang VS net-
work, telecommunications channels used for cable
transmission, the ATEX system used for printing
publications and the Wireless File, and the multi-
lingual text system (SNAP) employed by VOA. The
Agency plans wider distribution of electronic mail
(E-mail) within headquarters and overseas. It is
also considering possible additional computers at
selected posts to facilitate regional or sub-regional
E-mail transmission of the Wireless File in lieu of
more expensive dial-up technology.

More than 40 posts now have access to NEXIS,
DIALOG, LEGI-SLATE—commercial data bases that
provide texts of news items, Congressional legis-

lation and policy statements. Public Diplomacy Query
(PDQ), a data base on USIA’s IBM mainframe com-
puter, provides domestic and overseas users with
easy access to a wealth of information culled from
the Wireless File and an expanding archive of Agency
program materials, most of which are not otherwise
indexed.

In recent months the Agency has installed fac-
simile equipment in many offices at headquarters
and posts around the world. The Commission be-
lieves the acquisition of telefaxing capability for
posts where dedicated lines are available is an
important step in improving the interoffice com-
munication that is vital to the work of a decen-
tralized, worldwide organization.

Two-way video teleconferencing is another tech-
nology that can make an important contribution at

Reports from VOA's 27 news bureaus and scores of stringers from ev
the globe are received in the VOA news operations center, or “bubble



EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.

International Visitors meet with professionals in
their fields and gain indepth exposure to the peo-
ple, culture, and institutions of the United States.
Programs are arranged through cooperation be-
tween USIA, contracting program agencies, and pri-
vate and voluntary groups throughout the country.
During the past year, 2,800 emerging leaders in
various fields visited the U.S. under the program.
An additional 2,200 persons, travelling to the U.S.
on their own, took part in programs arranged under
USIA’s Voluntary Visitor program.

The Commission is pleased that USIA and visitor
program groups have developed a data manage-
ment system. The system offers office automation
capabilities for community organizations and an
electronic mail network for the exchange of pro-
gram and biographic information. To date, equip-
ment has been installed in 68 community organi-
zations throughout the United States. The
Commission commends the Agency and the Na-
tional Council for International Visitors (NCIV) for
this achievement.

Because an IV grant is a large investment, it is
important that USIA’s overseas posts use their au-
tomation capabilities as a means to include former
International Visitors in a sustained relationship
long after the officer responsible for the initial con-
tact has departed from the post.

Forty current and 57 former heads of state and
government have participated in short-term visits
to the United States. This record of success attests
to the value of the IV program and USIA’s ability
to identify future leaders and use resources for max-
imum impact. Commission members are consis-
tently told by Chiefs of Mission throughout the world
that the program is one of the best public diplomacy
tools at their disposal.

PRIVATE SECTOR PROGRAMS
USIA provides selective assistance and grant sup-
port to nonprofit activities of tax-exempt organi-

zations whose programs complement the Agency's
mission to promote mutual understanding between
the peoples of the United States and other coun-
tries. Last year, the Agency’s Office of Private Sector
Programs, through grant review panels, awarded
107 grants involving 2,500 participants worldwide.
Overseas posts annually identify issues that can be
addressed through cooperative programs involving
private sector institutions in the U.S. and other
countries.

Private sector involvement in USIA’s programs
promotes the objectives of cultural exchange and
encourages domestic support for public diplo-
macy. The Commission believes these programs
have proven their value and significantly multiply
what can be accomplished through government
programs alone.

FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Commission has previously expressed concern
that insufficient attention is paid to assuring that
foreign students in the United States derive more
from their stay than exposure to classroom teach-
ing. Overseas counseling as well as domestic en-
richment programs and support services in the U.S.
are designed to deepen appreciation of American
institutions and culture.

USIA estimates that $3 million—less than ten
dollars for each of the more than 356,000 foreign
students currently studying in the U.S—would be
a reasonable annual expenditure for outreach pro-
grams to students who in many cases can be ex-
pected to assume positions of leadership and in-
fluence in their own countries. Current funding is
inadequate to reach the growing number of foreign
students seeking higher education in the United
States. The Commission strongly endorses this pro-
gram and believes its long-term value justifies ad-
ditional support for it.


THE COMMISSION

HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY’S
40TH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE ON “PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE,”

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 15-16, 1987.

President Reagan

“In this information age, this age of the mass media
and the micro-chip, of telecommunications satellites
above the planet and fiber optic cables underground,
in this new age traditional diplomacy alone is not
enough. The United States must speak not just to
foreign governments, but to their people, engaging in
public diplomacy with all the skill and resources we
can muster.”

“I believe that our public diplomacy represents a
powerful force, perhaps the most powerful force at our
disposal for shaping. the history of the world.”

“All these accomplishments [in public diplomacy
programs] have been made possible by individual
men and women, those unsung but utterly dedicated
Foreign and Civil Service professionals who run our
nation’s public diplomacy.... Let us take a moment
now to express this nation’s gratitude. To you, our
public diplomats, whether stationed here in
Washington or in posts from Rome to Shanghai: in a
difficult world, you tell America’s story, and America
gives you her thanks.”

Secretary of State George Shultz

“Foreign governments and their representatives gain
ready and direct access to our domestic media and
those of other countries, thus taking their views
essentially unfiltered to large audiences—over the
heads, or under the seats, of their own governments.
In short, the speed-of communication and easy travel
means ... we have to work hard ... to marshal
understanding and support for our policies both at
home and abroad. This is the new reality that must be
taken into account if any U.S. foreign policy initiative
is to be effective.”

“Now is certainly not the time to be short-sighted
about the importance of public diplomacy. In a world
where no one country can dictate economic, political
or military events, the need for international
cooperation, for coalition forging and confidence-
building becomes ever more apparent. It is just as
important for us to understand and to shape public
attitudes—abroad and at home—as it is to receive
and interpret the latest computer-generated statistics
or esoteric intelligence reports. People-to-people
programs are more important than ever.”

USIA Director Charles Z. Wick

“Almost immediately after World War Il, America
began to move boldly beyond traditional diplomacy,
and speak directly to the citizens of the world.
Noteworthy were our efforts to make allies of former
enemies. By 1950, 1,200 public diplomacy
professionals were running 25 information centers in
the Federal Republic of Germany alone. The results
were significant! Most Federal Republic cabinet
members over the past 30 years have participated in
our exchange programs of those early days.”

“America’s post-war public diplomacy effort was a
major success, but it was limited. Time soon ran out
on the political will to sustain a large financial
burden. And the effort to reach mass populations
overseas was severely limited by the technical means
available.”

“This conference is about something of fundamental impor-
tance to our foreign relations, America’s voice in the world of
the future. ,.." Secretary of State George Shultz.



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Summits and Public Diplomacy

= Public diplomacy should be treated as a strategic element in summit
planning. Comprehensive and coordinated public diplomacy strategies
for superpower summits should be developed at the highest levels of
the White House, the Department of State, and the United States In-
formation Agency.

= Summit public diplomacy requires early guidance on U.S. policy goals;
early decisions on summit themes; analysis of the anticipated public
opinion impact of proposed U.S. policies; assessment of potential pub-
lic affairs strategies of other nations and planned responses to them;
reports on foreign public opinion and media trends; close cooperation
between policymakers and the public diplomacy community; and a

well-conceived plan of public affairs activities.

orld opinion is the dominating char-

acteristic of summit diplomacy. In-

deed, it is the public attention given

to summit meetings, particularly those
involving the superpowers, that makes them unique
and distinguishes them from traditional forms of
diplomatic dialogue. How summits are perceived
fundamentally shapes their outcomes with impor-
tant consequences for the policies at stake.

Public diplomacy should be treated as a strategic
element throughout summit planning. Whether the
goal is allied support for a negotiated INF agree-
ment or reduced trade barriers among the Group
of Seven, foreign attitudes affect vital U.S. security
and economic interests. That public perceptions
of the four U.S.-Soviet summits since 1985 have
done much to change the bilateral relationship be-
tween the two superpowers is incontrovertible.
Public diplomats cannot achieve the success of

which they are capable if they are brought into the
planning process only after summit agendas are
finalized. Last-minute efforts to influence foreign
public opinion in the absence of an overall U.S.
government summit public diplomacy strategy are
rarely effective.

The Commission believes early interagency co-
ordination of summit public diplomacy themes at
the highest levels is essential and requires that
senior USIA officers be assigned to the White House
and all interagency groups and advance teams in-
volved in the summit planning process. Consid-
eration should be given to how foreign opinion can
be influenced to strengthen U.S. negotiating posi-
tions. A well-planned public diplomacy strategy may
incline foreign audiences to understand and accept
U.S. positions, to appreciate the constraints on them,
and to examine critically the positions of our
adversaries.

The Commission has looked closely at summit
public diplomacy in a special report on the Wash-
ington superpower summit.’ We noted that key in-
gredients in a successful strategy include early
guidance on U.S. policy goals; early decisions on
summit themes; analysis of the anticipated public
opinion impact of proposed U.S. policies; assess-
ment of potential public affairs strategies of other
nations and planned responses to them; reports on
foreign public opinion and media trends; close co-
operation between policymakers and the public
diplomacy community; and a well-conceived plan
of public affairs activities for informing foreign me-
dia and opinion elites.

The Commission recognizes that policymakers
may be reluctant to engage in public diplomacy
planning if a summit is contingent on negotiations
in progress. Overt signs of planning may commu-
nicate a commitment to summitry-at-all-costs that
encourages an adversary to refuse further conces-
sions at the bargaining table. While summit strategy
sessions are conducted in private, secrecy regard-
ing the fact that they are taking place is difficult to
maintain—particularly arrangements for the enor-
mous media contingent that accompanies them.
Much public diplomacy planning can be under-
taken quietly, however, and failure to do so risks

* “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Washington Summit,”
Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplo-
macy, March, 1988.


MANAGEMENT

the only solutions to a problem of considerable
magnitude and pressing urgency.

Without exposing personnel or foreign audi-
ences to needless risk, legislation and policies re-
lating to diplomatic security must take fully into
account USIA’s public diplomacy mission, the need
for public access to its facilities, and the desirability
that the Agency give visible evidence of the free
and open society it represents. In concrete terms,
this means that flexibility and continuing embassy
assessments of local conditions should be guiding
principles in determining standards for the protec-
tion of USIA’s officers and facilities.

The Commission recently invited comment by
U.S. Chiefs of Mission on how their embassies are
dealing with security needs in terms of their public
diplomacy mandate. We received many thoughtful
responses that suggest security remains an impor-
tant concern even at posts not normally thought to
be vulnerable to terrorist acts of local origin. There
appears to be a consensus that enhanced security
measures have not unduly impeded public access
to USIA’s facilities or the conduct of public diplo-
macy in general.

USIA’s regional area directors have commented
that attendance overall at Agency facilities has suf-
fered only marginally as a result of stricter screen-
ing measures. In some cases, however, audience
attendance has declined due to a wish to avoid
security gauntlets. Persons seeking a U.S. visa from
the consulate can be expected to show higher tol-
erance for security measures than a patron for whom
USIA’s library is one of several available. The Com-
mission urges USIA to monitor developing tech-
nology closely to find less intrusive security mea-
sures to help retain audiences.

The “hardening” of USIA’s facilities and creation
of “safe space” between them and public thorough-
fares must take local conditions into account and
not be based on an unbending Washington stan-
dard. Setback requirements from property lines
should be waived when alternative means of pro-
viding comparable protection are available and when
strict adherence necessitates USIA’s relocation to
remote areas where public diplomacy cannot be
conducted. Agency experts have assured the Com-

67

mission that development of security measures tai-
lored to post needs is less expensive than adher-
ence to an arbitrary worldwide standard.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY
1988-89 (PL 100-204) prohibits the employment of
foreign nationals in areas of diplomatic facilities
in communist countries where classified materials
are maintained. The measure goes into effect on
September 30, 1990. The intent of Congress is for
the Department of State to provide facilities that
will house sensitive core embassy operations from
which foreign nationals would be prohibited. The
Commission appreciates the need to maintain a
secure environment for the conduct of diplomatic
activities. However, as interpreted by the Depart-
ment of State, the adverse consequences of this
legislation for the conduct of public diplomacy are
considerable.

First, it is important that any definition of “core
embassy operations” provide guarantees that USIA
will retain the public access that is necessary to
accomplish its mission. USIA’s operations should
be maintained separately from secure areas in
chanceries.

Secondly, requiring USIA’s posts in Eastern Eu-
rope to adopt the strict “hire American” model that
now exists at the American embassy in Moscow
would do great damage to the Agency’s programs.
Foreign national employees are essential to public
diplomacy in all countries. They provide continuity,
institutional memory, language skills, and knowl-
edge of the country and its people that transient
American employees cannot possibly hope to
replace.

Finally, overly strict regulations promulgated with
conventional diplomatic goals in mind threaten to
inhibit USIA’s programs in Eastern Europe just as
new opportunities are occurring. Regulations that
limit the quantity and quality of contacts by USIA’s
employees jeopardize important cultural and in-
formational activities. Soviet bloc leaders have long
sought to limit contact by American diplomats with
the people in their countries. Regulations that in-
hibit such contacts help them achieve that goal.


MANAGEMENT

responsibilities that USIA’s Public Affairs Officers
have to serve as advisors to their ambassadors on
relations with the media. The Agency has made a
solid start, but in the Commission's opinion too
many of USIA’s officers still have not been given
sufficient media and advocacy skills training.

The State Department also has begun to provide
media training for some of its officers. Follow-up
training and practice at posts should become the
norm for both USIA and the Department.

The Commission encourages use of available
Worldnet satellite sub-channels by USIA’s Training
Office and the Foreign Service Institute for media
training at posts with TVROs. Conferences of am-
bassadors and Public Affairs Officers also offer op-

portunities to conduct media workshops with a
focus on regional issues.

At a time when budget restrictions mean that
fewer speakers and cultural specialists can partic-
ipate in USIA’s overseas programs, and when the
Soviet Union is giving more attention to the skilled
practice of public diplomacy, the Agency must cap-
italize to a greater extent on the skills of its own
diplomats. Nowhere is this more important than in
the Soviet Union. In recent correspondence with
the Commission, Ambassador Jack Matlock noted
new openness in the media will “require senior
substantive officers to do on-record and on-camera
interviews in Russian, and this requires special
training not offered up to now.”

Foreign Language Training

= Foreign language proficiency is vital to effective public diplomacy.
Current language training programs, personnel policies, and funding
levels do not provide an adequate supply of officers with the profes-
sional fluency required for today’s public diplomacy needs. The Com-
mission recommends that USIA undertake a thorough review of its

language policies.

he ability to speak and comprehend for-

eign languages is vital to public diplo-

macy. Public Affairs Officers have told the

Commission time and again that if com-
pelled to choose only one dimension of their over-
all program, they would retain language-qualified
officers in the field to represent U.S. interests and
maintain substantive ties with foreign opinion lead-
ers. Whether it is for a luncheon conversation with
a Hungarian journalist, a speech on the U.S. elec-
tions to Norwegian secondary school students, or
an on-camera television interview in Japan, USIA’s
officers must have the language skills necessary
for highly personalized forms of public diplomacy.
No matter how widely English is understood abroad,


MANAGEMENT

America’s message is received with greater appre-
ciation when delivered skillfully in the vernacular.

The Commission is concerned that language
training programs and related personnel policies
do not meet today’s public diplomacy needs. This
is just as true among America’s allies, where in-
formation about the U.S. often outpaces under-
standing of its policies and actions, as it is in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. U.S. Ambassador
to West Germany Richard Burt told us, “I want to
emphasize that officers here must be able to speak
good German if they are to engage in meaningful
public diplomacy with German audiences. The level
attained after the normal FSI [Foreign Service In-
stitute] course is not sufficient in most cases.” U.S.
Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock reported to
the Commission:

“USIA and the cultural and informational programs of
this embassy are served by an unusually talented
group of language-skilled Agency officers. As their
tours of duty come to a close, however, we need to be
certain that we retain—and even improve measurably
upon—their language abilities. If we are to take
advantage of the new opportunities with which we
are being presented daily as the Soviet system
becomes more open, we need better language skills
for both substantive officers and support staff... To
me this is a critical element in our ability to. respond
to the quickly changing circumstances affecting public
diplomacy programs here.”

USIA fills more than 90 percent of its language
positions with personnel who have at least mini-
mum professional proficiency’ or who meet a lower
standard that takes into account the difficulty of
the language and the shortage of fluent officers.
Many public diplomacy professionals believe, how-
ever, that minimum proficiency is not adequate for
effective communication with sophisticated audi-
ences in most countries. They contend that uni-

* Minimum proficiency is defined as the ability to speak effec-
tively in most formal and informal conversations on practical,
social, and professional topics and to read newspapers and
specialized reports.

7

versal proficiency standards in the foreign affairs
agencies do not take into account USIA’s distinctive
need, as a communications agency, for a higher
standard than the Department of State.

Pragmatic concerns complicate the issue. Be-
cause officers do not learn languages equally well
or with equal speed, and because assignments take
into account other factors, USIA often must com-
promise on assigning fully qualified language of-
ficers. The curtailment of language training to fill
a post vacancy presents a long-range problem of
performance by an officer with insufficient lan-
guage skills.

The Commission believes USIA should review its
language training programs and personnel policies
to determine whether they can be modified to in-
crease the supply of officers with professional
fluency. Although ideal solutions require major re-
structuring and larger resource allocations—par-
ticularly for the additional instruction and in-coun-
try training that is vital to progress beyond minimum
proficiency levels—there are other steps worth con-
sideration. For example, the Agency might consider
the temporary assignment of language-qualified
Foreign Service retirees to fill vacancies created by
officers in training. Such assignments would allow
USIA to honor post requests for additional training
for key officers in language-critical positions.

USIA also needs to consider whether the assign-
ment of officers on a worldwide basis throughout
their careers is conducive to the development of
language skills needed for effective public diplo-
macy, especially in difficult languages. Restructur-
ing of the assignment process to permit more lan-
guage specialization may be needed.

How well the United States equips a corps of
officers to speak fluently in foreign languages, with
the nuances and sophistication that professional
communication requires, is a critically important
question. In the long run, it is as important as any
question facing public diplomacy.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Research

= Commitment to public opinion research in foreign policy decision-
making remains largely ritualistic, despite enhancement of USIA’s re-
search capability and increased use of research findings by policymakers.
® USIA should tailor its research more closely to the needs of field
posts and resume country studies of media habits and telecommuni-
cations trends.

'@ USIA should give greater emphasis to attitudinal research outside
of Western Europe and Japan.

@ USIA should develop an Agency-wide program evaluation strategy,
increase the proportion of funds devoted to program evaluation and
media habits research, and use all available research findings in es-

tablishing program and resource priorities.

SIA conducts public opinion research in

support of its role as the principal ad-

visor to the President, the Department of

State, and the National Security Council
on foreign attitudes toward U.S. policies. The Agen-
cy’s Office of Research also produces media and
program evaluation studies.

The Commission supports expansion of USIA’s
research capability. In FY 1988, USIA’s still modest
research studies budget totalled $1.9 million. At-
titudinal research consumed 81 percent, compared
to only 19 percent for media and program evalu-
ation studies. Prospective budget reductions and
inattention to its value should not be allowed to
diminish this vital activity.

In 1986, USIA adopted the Commission’s rec-
ommendation that the Office of Research should
be an independent element reporting to the Direc-
tor and Deputy Director. The new arrangement is
working well. Research reports have added status
and influence within the Agency. Direct and effec-
tive relations have been established between the
Deputy Director and the Office of Research. Co-

operation with the policy guidance and planning
activities of the Bureau of Programs has been main-
tained, while appropriate organizational distance
has been put between program evaluators and pro-
gram managers.

ATTITUDINAL RESEARCH

Studies of mass and elite foreign public opinion
help policymakers weigh foreign reactions to cur-
rent policies and assess the likely impact of pro-
posed policies on foreign opinion. Supplemented
by reports of USIA’s field officers and foreign media
analyses, opinion studies provide context and con-
trasting perspectives to embassy and media re-
porting, help define agendas for economic and su-
perpower summits, and support communications
strategies and post programs.

Despite greater receptivity to opinion studies in
recent years, commitment to research by policy-
makers remains largely ritualistic. In times of crisis
or when public opinion is seen to have an obvious
impact on outcomes, as in the INF basing issue,
attention to research increases, but it does not rou-
tinely inform policy decisions. The problem lies
largely but not entirely with research consumers.
The Commission welcomes recent efforts by the
Office of Research to make its studies more useful
through shorter reports, quicker reporting of polling
results, and use of “flash” telephone surveys on
high priority issues.

Because in-country polling is generally possible
only in democracies, a high percentage of USIA’s
opinion research focuses on Western Europe and
Japan. Opportunities are increasing as developing
countries become more democratic, and glasnost
is generating new possibilities in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The Commission urges USIA
to examine its geographic distribution of research
resources with a view toward increasing opinion
studies in other parts of the world.

With a few notable exceptions, opinion research
is seldom tailored to the priority needs of overseas
posts. The responsibility lies not only with the Of-
fice of Research. USIA’s posts and area offices rarely


HE COMMISSI

his year marks the 40th an-

niversary of the U.S. Advisory

Commission on Public Diplo-

macy. For the past four dec-
ades, this Commission and its pred-
ecessors have provided oversight of
the international information, cultural,
and educational exchange programs
of the United States.

The Commission is independent and
bipartisan. It was established by Con-
gress to recommend policies and pro-
grams in support of USIA’s mission and
principal activities, and to develop
broad bipartisan support for them. The
Commission is required by law to as-
sess the work of the Agency and to
report its findings and recommenda-
tions to the President, the Congress,
the Secretary of State, the Director of
USIA, and the American people.
Through its public reports, Congres-
sional testimony, meetings with policy officials, and
various other activities, the Commission has sought
to improve USIA’s information and cultural pro-
grams, and to develop a better understanding of
their necessity and importance by the American
people.

The Commission is a successor to two commis-
sions created by Congress in 1948: the Advisory
Commission on Information and the Advisory Com-
mission on Educational Exchange. In 1977, these
commissions were merged into a single entity, now
called the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Di-
plomacy, and given additional responsibilities.

Commission members are appointed by the Pres-
ident with the advice and consent of the Senate.
All are private citizens who represent a cross sec-
tion of professional backgrounds and who volun-
teer their time in the conviction that public diplo-
macy is indispensable to the national interest and
to American foreign policy.

Since 1948, some 60 Americans from both po-
litical parties have served as Commissioners. They
have come from distinguished careers in journal-

The Advisory Commission at a monthly meeting in Washington. Left-to-right
(seated) Vice Chairman Tom C. Korologos, Chairman Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., and
Commissioner Richard M. Scaife: (standing) Commissioners Priscilla L. Buckley,
Louis B. Susman and Hershey Gold.

ism, education, law, business, labor, the arts, pub-
lic relations, and other professions. They have rep-
resented the public interest at the point where the
public diplomacy roles of Congress, the White
House, the State Department, and USIA intersect.
Throughout, they have sought to provide respon-
sible oversight and to develop public confidence
in the value of these programs.

THE NEED FOR A BIPARTISAN COMMISSION

When Congress created this Commission's pre-
decessors, it intended that appointments be made
so as to maintain the Commission's independence,
continuity, genuine bipartisan character and broad
professional composition. These criteria have gov-
erned Commission appointments for 40 years.

In 1988, Congress amended the Commission’s
statutory authority to eliminate the requirement that
Commissioners be appointed on a bipartisan basis
and to provide for service at the pleasure of the
President rather than for fixed three-year terms. The
changes become effective on January 20, 1989.

The Commission strongly opposes this legisla-


lhe 1980s have been good years for public

diplomacy. They have been years of pos-

itive change as the United States comes

to grips with the strategic implications of
the communications revolution in its foreign pol-
icy. They have also been years of revitalization for
the United States Information Agency.

In this report, my colleagues and I have taken a
longer term view of USIA’s policies and programs
than in the past. We have done so in the belief that
it is time to pause and reflect carefully on recent
gains—to identify those that hold promise of en-
during value and to point out continuing concerns.

Throughout, we have sought to address funda-
mental questions.

How should USIA consolidate and institution-
alize the public diplomacy initiatives of the Reagan
administration?

What considerations ought to guide the Bush
administration in dealing with more complex in-
formation environments and rapid technological
change?

Why should the American people support inter-
national information and cultural programs, and
how can we achieve a broader consensus for them?

Each of my colleagues brings unique perspec-
tives to our examination of public diplomacy, and
all have developed a deep appreciation of its long-
term value. Most of us have served several terms
on the Commission, and this report contains the
principal recommendations developed during many
rewarding years of association with USIA, its people
and its programs, and with each other. I thank my
fellow Commissioners for their many contributions
to this report and their tireless efforts on behalf of
the Commission during my tenure as Chairman.

Two other individuals played an important part
in the work of the Commission: former Vice Chair-
man e. robert (bob) wallach, who served from 1982
to 1988, and former Commissioner Herbert Schmertz,
who served from 1984 to 1988. We extend our ap-
preciation to both for their distinguished service
and their many contributions to the mission of pub-
lic diplomacy.

Where USIA stands today can be attributed in
considerable measure to the efforts of Director
Charles Z. Wick. His tenure generated an extraor-
dinary investment in the Agency’s future. He moved
USIA into the age of satellite television and made
things happen for the Agency in Washington and
overseas. As USIA’s oversight Commission, we spent
many hours with Director Wick. We shared his com-
mitment to public diplomacy even when we dif-
fered with him. We salute his achievements.

Public diplomacy depends on the efforts of
hundreds of men and women who serve their coun-
try often under conditions of great hardship and
personal risk. The Commission has met many of
these talented individuals at home and abroad. They
are performing vital and difficult work, and we hold
them in high esteem.

“Opinions,” Lord Palmerston said, “are stronger
than armies.” Americans have understood the im-
portance of ideas in shaping world events since
the Declaration of Independence. And for the past
eight years the United States has been led by a
President who fully understood that development
of public support for sound policies requires ef-
fective, skilled communication.

We wish the Bush administration well and ex-
press the hope that it will build on the solid foun-
dation provided by President Reagan and USIA so
that we as a nation may realize the full potential
of public diplomacy and make the commitment to

it that is needed.

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Chairman

December, 1988


ica-
and
dol-
tof

‘uc-
and

ign
ler-

of

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

USIA’s information and cultural programs should be part
of aunified, coherent effort to communicate with the people
and governments of other countries. More and more,
communication by governments across borders is
interdisciplinary. It involves a variety of comple-
mentary message carriers, including radio, televi-
sion, speakers, libraries, books, and personal con-
tact by language-qualified Foreign Service Officers.

Effective policy advocacy is not neutral. It seeks
to inform and to persuade. It should be reasoned,
civilized, and imaginative. If it is to be successful,
the policies themselves must be clearly stated and
supported by the American people. By using the
power of ideas to advocate foreign policy goals and
develop awareness of American institutions and
values, public diplomacy contributes to the ad-
vancement of U.S. interests.

Attitudes on most issues, however, are the prod-
uct of historical predispositions that develop slowly
and incrementally. How do foreign citizens feel
generally about the United States and ‘its role in
world affairs? How do they feel about the Soviet
Union? Other countries? What languages do they
speak and read? Where have they travelled? Have
they been on a Fulbright exchange program? Have
they visited the United States on an International
Visitor grant? Who did they meet and what were
their experiences while here? Educational and cul-
tural exchanges provide knowledge of our culture
and institutions that can generate mutual under-
standing and put our policies in perspective.

The Commission recently canvassed U.S. am-
bassadors on the relationship between USIA’s in-
formation and cultural programs and how they
advance embassy goals. The responses from more
than 80 Chiefs of Mission overwhelmingly support
the principle that these programs are interdepen-
dent and should be closely related overseas. Two
replies from among many are illustrative. From Bei-
jing, Ambassador Winston Lord wrote:

“It is difficult to envision a separation in the
information and cultural functions here in the field,

because they frequently are an integral part of the
same public diplomacy effort. For example, while it is

true that ‘Jiaoliu,’ our popular Chinese language
magazine, is a part of the print media and thus ina
technical sense ‘information,’ its articles and
audiences encompass all fields. Is the International
Visitor program strictly cultural because it is
administered by that side of USIA? Certainly not when
among those traveling are future policymakers ... .
Within the USIA, or Press and Culture team, each
officer is asked to take on a wide variety of tasks,
which frequently cut across several functional areas.
To act in any other way would be to create an
artificial division where one does not and should not
exist. At the same time, we recognize that this must
take place within the framework of respect for the
special mandate of independence for the VOA news
broadcasts and the Fulbright selection process.”

From Madrid, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew
stated:

“Lalso believe ... that public diplomacy can only be
fully effective when cultural, educational, exchange,
and information activities benefit from each other's
dynamics and share a common analysis of what the
United States can best bring to the bilateral
relationship. Strong links to our intellectual heritage
make policy advocacy credible, just as an
understanding of the U.S. democratic system is
essential to interpreting our finest cultural
achievements.”

What is clear from these statements, and many
others like them, is that the tools of public diplo-
macy and the interests of overseas audiences defy
easy categorization along informational or cultural
lines. Public diplomacy professionals have come
to recognize that U.S. policies are understood best,
and misunderstood least, by those who have an
appreciation of American society and its values.
USIA’s cultural and educational programs are in-
dispensable to achieving this goal.

The Commission also believes it is important to
emphasize that public diplomacy takes place over-
seas. In recent years, the Department of State has
used the term public diplomacy to characterize
some of its public affairs efforts within the United
States. The Department’s domestic public affairs
activities are quite legitimate and have a long and


THE COMMISSION

their staffs, senior foreign affairs officials, and pub-
lic diplomacy professionals in the private sector.
In addition to its annual reports, the Commission
has recently issued three special reports: Terrorism
and Security: The Challenge for Public Diplomacy,
Soviet Advocacy and the U.S. Media and Public
Diplomacy: Lessons from the Washington Summit.

Commission visits to USIA’s overseas posts pro-
vide invaluable firsthand impressions of the work
of public diplomacy. Commission members meet
with American ambassadors, USIA’s American and
foreign national staffs, and opinion leaders from
other countries. Through these visits, many of which
are financed privately, the Commission derives use-
ful comparative insights and a broad understanding
of USIA’s overseas programs.

The Commission’s meeting in 1988 with a group
of European Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in West
Berlin and subsequent travel to the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe immediately after the Moscow
summit were especially valuable in developing a
perspective on an international communications
environment influenced by Soviet glasnost and
changing East-West relations.

We wish to express our deep appreciation to the
many USIA employees at home and abroad who
have assisted the Commission in carrying out its
responsibilities. PAOs and their staffs throughout
the world and many Agency officers in Washington
have been helpful in providing views and infor-
mation that have contributed to the findings in this
report.

Support for the Commission is provided by a
small professional staff. We express our thanks also
to them for their diligence, their dedication to the
work of the Commission, and their commitment to
the mission of public diplomacy.

The Commission took the occasion of its 40th
anniversary to host a privately funded conference
on “Public Diplomacy in the Information Age.” For
two days in September 1987, some 200 leaders in
the foreign policy, legislative, media, business, la-
bor, and academic communities met at the De-
partment of State to exchange views on the impact
of the information revolution on foreign relations

and to consider the future course of American pub-
lic diplomacy.

Addresses by President Reagan, Secretary of State
George Shultz, and USIA Director Charles Z. Wick
set the tone for three panels:

International Communication in the 1990s. Rep. Dan
Mica (D-FL), Chairman, House Subcommittee on
International Operations; former USIA Director
Leonard Marks; and former Under Secretary of State
for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology
William Schneider.

Public Diplomacy and Changing East-West Relations. Syn-
dicated columnist and former State Department
Spokesman John Hughes; Rep. Jim Courter (R-NJ);
and Ray Benson, a career Foreign Service Officer
and former Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs
at the American Embassy in Moscow.

Public Diplomacy: The View from Congress. Senator
Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Chairman, Committee on For-
eign Relations; Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY),
Committee on Foreign Relations; Rep. Benjamin
Gilman (R-NY), Committee on Foreign Affairs; and
former Senator J. William Fulbright.

Commission Chairman Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. sum-
marized the premise of the conference by observing
that “state-of-the-art communications technologies
and recognition by world leaders of the importance
of public opinion are part of a worldwide trans-
formation in the conduct of diplomacy.” How these
changes relate to USIA’s use of communications
technology, to the continuing value of traditional
public diplomacy programs, to the impact of glas-
nost and changing Soviet media policies, and to
alternative organizational structures for public di-
plomacy were the main themes of the conference.
By bringing together knowledgeable persons from
diverse political and professional backgrounds, the
conference stimulated lively, informed debate, and
achieved its purpose of focusing attention on the
importance and dynamism of public diplomacy.”

* Proceedings of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Di-
plomacy Conference on “Public Diplomacy in the Information
Age," September 15-16, 1987.



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

administration should be guided by several fun-
damental considerations.

The primacy of field operations. USIA’s growth in the
1980s occurred primarily in needed facilities mod-
ernization and Washington-based operations. Field
staffing has not kept pace and is currently at the
lowest level in the Agency's history. In FY 1989,
authorized American positions at USIA’s overseas
posts totalled only 822, 10 percent below the 1980
level. During the same period, positions in the United
States increased by 26 percent, with VOA modern-
ization and Worldnet accounting for most of the
growth. Funds for new and expanded programs
such as Worldnet and exchanges—which are labor-
intensive overseas—have not been matched by
commensurate increases in staff. Further adjust-
ments in resource levels should not be made at the

expense of the Agency’s ability to carry out its basic
mission in the field.

Budget decisions must be guided by program evaluation
and strategic planning criteria. The Commission rec-
ognizes that many of its recommendations involve
commitment of additional resources at a time when
government agencies are being asked to make do
with less and when USIA faces an uncertain budget
future. If continued retrenchment becomes inevi-
table, reductions should be taken only after careful
assessment of bottom line priorities—not on the
basis of a desire to divide the misery equally. Ap-
portioning budget cuts evenly to all USIA elements
is comparable to passing out painful medicine to
the healthy and sick alike. It may be equitable, but
it is not a wise use of resources.

USIA needs to do a better job of ensuring that

USIA'S OPERATING EXPENSES*

1981
$439.4 Million
Administrative
Agency Direction Supoort ‘
75% 12% ie

Televison
2.0%

Programs
67%

Exchanges, Cultural
Affairs

21.0%

Voice of
Amenca
21.9%

Overseas Missions
32.9%

Exchanges, Cultural
Affaes
2%

1989
$604.6 Million (in 1981 dollars)**

Administrative
Research

Support
Agency rection 7.0%
TAY

Overseas Missions

Tee
oo 218%

Programs
53%

Radio Mart
Program
1%

Voice of Amenca
UTM

“Excludes VOA's constructon budget and grants forthe National Endowment for Democracy andthe East-West Center
**Stted in 1981 dolar for comparabve purposes, Graphs are sized accordingly Enacted 1989 appropriations totaled $781.6 milton.



UNITED STATES

i

= = ADVISORY COMMISSION

Hh

ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

|

itn

.
By)

x



MEDIA AND PROGRAMS.

program policies that expansion of regional daily
services will require. What criteria should govern
program selection? Is policy guidance adequate,
particularly for sensitive and fast-breaking events?
How should Worldnet communicate U.S. govern-
ment policies? What kinds of internal program eval-
uation mechanisms should be established?

NSC study. The Commission repeats its recom-
mendation that the National Security Council un-
dertake a study of the U.S. government’s use of
satellite television as an instrument of public di-
plomacy. The study should lead to an NSC directive
that will address Worldnet’s long-term needs and
appropriate institutional role. USIA concurred with
this recommendation in 1986 but suggested the
study be deferred until a second fully operational
regional Worldnet service provided additional ex-
perience. The NSC subsequently initiated a World-
net study; staff turnover and shifting priorities pre-
vented its completion. The time has come for a
Presidential-level statement on Worldnet similar to
those NSC directives that have guided the modern-
ization and strategic role of the Voice of America.

Research. Worldnet and USIA’s Office of Research
should work closely on a comprehensive research
program to include increased audience measure-
ment, assessment of audience and post program
preferences, and evaluation of the effectiveness of
Worldnet’s produced and acquired programs. Im-
proved audience measurement methodologies also
are needed. Some of Worldnet’s audience figures
in the past, based on estimates of potential rather
than actual viewers, have been confusing and un-
reliable. USIA’s posts should participate in devel-
oping research methods tailored to Worldnet’s highly
differentiated delivery systems and program
environments.

Satellite subcarrier technology, USIA should place a
high priority on use of Worldnet satellite subcarrier
technology to integrate simultaneous delivery of
other products and services: VOA programs, the
Wireless File, data transmission, and additional
Worldnet languages. The Agency’s experiments with

integrated transmission promise considerable sav-
ings and equivalent or enhanced signal quality
without dilution of the Worldnet signal.

VIDEO LIBRARIES
USIA has videocassette libraries in 120 posts. A
video catalog containing approximately 1,000 titles
on themes ranging from American history to Eng-
lish teaching permits posts to tailor their selections
to a variety of program objectives. Videocassettes
are viewed in USIA’s centers and libraries, loaned
for home use, and shown in classroom settings.
Mushrooming videocassette markets in the So-
viet Union, Eastern Europe, and the developing world
hold great promise. USIA is working to meet au-
dience demands for videocassettes in Eastern Eu-
rope and to increase language-version videocas-
settes in Francophone Africa and other developing
countries where usage is high. In some cases, USIA
is missing significant opportunities. Lack of staff,
for example, prevents the post in Moscow from
engaging in video programming. The Agency should
give greater emphasis to video programming and
to the acquisition of high quality cultural and public
affairs videocassettes.

RIAS-TV
On August 22, 1988, RIAS-TV, a television affiliate
to RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) in West
Berlin, began daily broadcasting. Like RIAS radio,
RIAS-TV is a joint U.S.-West German undertaking
established primarily to provide accurate news and
an American perspective to viewers in East Germany.
RIAS-TV seeks to provide an alternative not only
to East German media, but to West German tele-
vision, which is seen by most East Germans but
often does not report on events in the German Dem-
ocratic Republic. RIAS-TV’s UHF signal carries about
25 miles and reaches a potential audience of three
million in East Germany. RIAS-TV also transmits
via cable to a potential audience of two million in
West Berlin.


THE COMMISSION

Advisory Commission Vice Chairman Tom C. Korologos
addresses conference participants in the Benjamin Franklin
Diplomatic Reception Room at the Department of State.

Rep. Dan Mica (D-FL), Chairman, Subcommittee on
International Operations

“I see that for every dollar we spend in international
telecommunications, we can probably save ten or
twenty or fifty in military hardware.”

“We have got to think in new ways; the computer chip
and the technology in the satellite ... will help us
diplomatically, politically, and militarily, and I think
we can get our message to the rest of the world far
better and have it more well-received than any
competing government on the face of the earth.”

Rep. Jim Courter (R-NJ), Committee on Foreign Affairs
“We are in an improved position with glasnost to
press for an end of jamming of international radios

and for broader rights of foreign journalists
reporting from the Soviet bloc. Let us use these
opportunities to hold the Soviets to their slogans. Let
us also recognize that glasnost is in a way a product
of the Soviets’ recognition of the communications
revolution.”

Former Senator J. William Fulbright

“] believe the educational exchange concept, properly
administered, is the most powerful instrument to
promote the idea of freedom and democratic
institutions.”

“It is the most effective means available, over the long
term, to erode the mutual distrust and suspicion of
these two great superpowers for each other, and
eventually to enable them to cooperate not only to
avoid a nuclear war, but also hopefully to find
solutions for many other serious problems which
confront our complex, modern world.”

Former USIA Director Leonard Marks

“The information technology for the 1990s is
absolutely astounding. We are at the threshold of a
new era, where electronics will remain supreme for a
small part of the world. We must recognize that; we
must compete for that small audience. But for the
larger audience, let’s not overlook the fact that the
tried, the true, the traditional means of communication
must be the shortwave radio, the Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Marti, Radio
Afghanistan—whatever it is that we tell our neighbors
by radio and books.”

John Hughes, Former VOA Director and

State Department Spokesman

“We should use whatever new techniques are
available for spreading factual information. These
include the Direct Broadcast Satellites and
videocassettes and all the other marvels that we
have been hearing about today.”

“There is no magic formula, I think, in international
broadcasting to repressive societies. It is an ongoing,
long-term project, day after day, beaming the facts to
millions whose own governments attempt to tailor
and twist those facts. We don't need to hype the
story.”

Ray Benson, Career Foreign Service Officer and Former
Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs, American
Embassy, Moscow

“Gorbachev's policies ... offer enormous opportunities
for US. public diplomacy efforts. The Soviets are
aware of this. Not all welcome the prospects, yet not
all fear them. We should recognize that Soviet views
about our expanded public diplomacy efforts are
complex and not uniform. ... We must now be
cautious and intelligent in our purposeful efforts to
improve, enhance and expand our public diplomacy
programs. We have in this new situation new
opportunities to carry messages to the Soviet people—
messages which, in my view, they are without
question increasingly more willing to receive.”

“But under these influences [computers, VCRs, satellite
television], the Soviet state and Soviet society will
bear decreasing resemblance to the model of a state
which by its very nature cannot change at all. | think
we must reject that premise. We must recognize that
the changes in the USSR ... afford new and unusual
opportunities for public diplomacy—and for the men
and women on the ground who work in support of
our national objectives in our bilateral relations with
the Soviet Union. Give them the money and the tools
and they will do the job.”



THE COMMISSION

“My predecessors did the only sensible thing: with
fewer resources stretched over more countries, they
focused and targeted. Over 97 percent of our cultural
and information representatives came home from
Germany.”

“The Information Age is upon us. ... The inherent
need to communicate with mass publics—a desire we
had to suppress as we trimmed our sails and targeted
only elite influentials—was suddenly able to be
fulfilled. ... No longer did we have to rely solely on
indirect communication through elites. Now we could
reach mass audiences directly.”

Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-FL), Chairman,

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

“As a member of Congress for some 30 years now, I'm
not sure even the Congress begins to understand the
real struggle... The Director of USIA has struggled
valiantly and won some real battles in getting the
budget up, [but} we still don't have the money and
we don't have the national commitment yet. ...”

Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Chairman,

Committee on Foreign Relations

“Public diplomacy as debated on Capitol Hill and
elsewhere has come to describe two separate but
related phenomena. Narrowly, public diplomacy is
understood to describe the American government's
international information and exchange programs.
These are primarily the programs that are
administered by USIA. More broadly, though, public
diplomacy encompasses all of the problems and
actions of a government which influence public
opinion abroad.”

“Questions about both the exchange programs and
the VOA lead me to question the current bureaucratic
structure for the administration of these programs ... 1
believe consideration should be given to creation of a
center, hopefully named the J. William Fulbright
Center (analogous to the Wilson Center), in the
Smithsonian Institution to administer the academic
exchanges. Similarly, setting the VOA up as an
independent corporation could be one way to resolve
its identity problem. ... Consideration should be given
to bringing the information function back to the State
Department, perhaps as a fifth career cone.”

“While this alternative organizational structure for
public diplomacy has some obvious advantages, |

recognize the drawbacks. Reorganizing an agency that
was itself reorganized ten years ago is disruptive.
Further, regardless of Washington-based
organizational structures, the work of public
diplomacy overseas would still depend upon our
dedicated and capable Foreign Service Officers. 1 am
not at this time proposing any changes in USIA. I do
believe though, these ideas need to be explored
further...”

“Most important, public diplomacy must be at the
center of our foreign policy. Despite disagreements in
some specifics, | believe Director Wick has taken USIA
a long way in this direction. I continue to believe that
resources are inadequate, and that the mission of our
public diplomacy programs must be clearly elucidated.
1 commend the United States Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy for holding this conference, as 1
believe it contributes significantly to the process.”

Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY),

Committee on Foreign Relations

“The first question we must ask ourselves is whether
the US. press and public opinion agencies, and
individuals that are expected to promote U.S. policies
abroad, are included in a timely and effective way in
the development of the policies they are announcing. I
suggest there is clearly a gap. Whether it is due to
budget shortfall or attitudes ... [public diplomacy
officials] should become central players or we all lose
in the process.”

“Don't let me leave you thinking we should base our
foreign policy decisions on foreign opinion rather than
a frank assessment of our own national interests. But
1am arguing that we will be more successful in
achieving a consensus of international opinion, if we
have a comprehensive, sensible strategy in place. ...
We need to use USIA to its maximum advantage. .. .
We should continue to look for ways to strengthen the
role of USIA here in Washington and abroad, making
the Agency and its employees valued advisers,
strategists, and partners in the development and
achievement of our national goals.”

“My next concern bears on the issue of mixed and
multiple messages. ... The U.S. government must have
support at home before it can venture abroad. The
speed and advances in international communication
make it absolutely essential that our message be
understood and largely supported by our own
domestic audiences, or we will compromise our
opportunity abroad.”



EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

active role in all facets of U.S.-Soviet exchanges.

On the Soviet side, exchange programs are cen-
tralized in state-controlled organizations. While So-
viet leadership has focused attention at the highest
levels on increased bilateral exchanges, their ex-
ecution remains the responsibility of bureaucracies
that are severely challenged by the expanding scope
of exchange activities.

U.S.-Soviet exchanges are a sound investment by
the American people. Their sustained growth de-
pends on whether they remain free from the swings
of mood that have colored U.S.-Soviet relations in
the past. Private sector programs offer the best pros-
pects for long-term program continuity.

Very different considerations motivate U.S. and
Soviet participation in exchange programs. In the
U.S., they are looked upon primarily as a means of
increasing understanding of culture, society, and
languages—much like exchange programs con-
ducted with other countries. The Soviets prefer to
send a greater percentage of students in technical
fields, including engineering and the natural sci-
ences. The greatest benefit to U.S. interests results
when Soviet students and teachers learn firsthand
about American history, political theory, econom-
ics and literature. The Commission believes it is
essential that reciprocity be adhered to by both
parties in determining overall numbers of grantees
in academic fields.

In his speech at Moscow State University in June
1988, President Reagan proposed that the number
of high school exchange students be increased from
50 per country to between 1,000 and 1,500 each
year. He also expressed hope that 100 U.S. and 100
Soviet high schools would become involved in the
program. A Memorandum of Understanding estab-
lishes intermediate steps to reach these goals by
1991. One hundred students from each country will
take part in one-month exchanges this year. Youth
exchanges offer enormous opportunities, particu-
larly if students can learn from direct experience
about the society and family life in the other country.

a

While placement in American households pre-
sents few obstacles, concerns have been raised
regarding the adequacy of Soviet housing for U.S.
students who may participate in exchange visits of
up to nine months. USIA should explore with the
Soviets all avenues that will permit the most au-
thentic secondary school experience possible for
American exchange students and avoid their place-
ment in foreign student dormitories.

CULTURAL CENTERS

Recent developments in the Soviet Union have made
possible discussions on the opening of cultural
centers in each country. A bilateral commitment
has been made to begin negotiations in 1989 for
the opening of an American cultural and infor-
mation center in Moscow and a Soviet center in
the United States. An understaffed, underequipped
U.S. facility would merely add to the many exam-
ples of services in Soviet society that are inadequate
to existing demand. The American Center in Mos-
cow should be of the highest quality.

U.S. EXCHANGES WITH EASTERN EUROPE

USIA’s funds for exchange programs with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe approached $8 million in
FY 1988. Priority should be given to expanding bi-
lateral academic and cultural exchanges with these
countries. The Agency should encourage its posts
in Eastern Europe to identify ceilings imposed by
logistical considerations on enhanced exchange
programs and seek to reach them when funding is
available.

INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM

The International Visitor (IV) program brings lead-
ers in government, media, education, science, la-
bor, the arts, and other fields to the United States
for short-term visits that include professional en-
richment and home-stays with American families.
Nominations are made by USIA’s posts in accord-
ance with mission objectives.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Television

'® Television is a powerful force in shaping international events. Through
Worldnet, USIA's satellite television network, the United States has
taken the lead in using television to advocate its policies and develop
understanding of American society and values. Worldnet deserves ad-
equate funding and bipartisan support.

= Worldnet’s satellite system and placement of more than 150 Tele-
vision Receive Only (TVRO) dishes at USIA’s posts is a significant
achievement. USIA should give high priority to completing its world-
wide network of 185 TVROs.

= Worldnet’s “interactive” dialogues provide foreign journalists and
other specialized audiences direct access to U.S. policymakers and
American experts via satellite television. The Commission commends
USIA for developing this effective instrument of public diplomacy.

TM Worldnet has passed successfully through the inevitable growing
pains of its first five years. The United States is best served if it is
viewed on its merits as an essential and rapidly maturing element of
public diplomacy.

® Termination of Worldnet's daily program service deprives the United
States of an important communications tool, adversely affects USIA's
credibility with indigenous television stations and government offi-
cials, and forecloses options to future administrations in conducting
public diplomacy by satelli
to provide legislative relief quickly.

.. The Commission strongly urges Congress

@ USIA should prepare a statement of mission and a comprehensive
development plan for Worldnet.

@ The National Security Council should examine the U.S. government's
use of satellite television as an instrument of public diplomacy and
issue a directive clarifying Worldnet's long-term goals and appropriate
institutional role.

@ USIA should pursue use of satellite subcarrier technology
to integrate delivery of VOA programs, the Wireless File,
data and facsimile transmission and other services. Worldnet
and the Voice of America should seek all appropriate op-
portunities to coordinate programming and signal delivery.
= TV Marti, a proposal to broadcast U.S. government tele-
vision programs to Cuba from a tethered balloon in the Flor-
ida Keys, has far-reaching implications for public diplomacy
and the national interest. Funding for TV Marti should be
contingent on Congressional hearings, authorizing legisla-
tion, and thorough interagency review of technical, legal,
regulatory, policy, and programming issues. Funds for TV
Marti should be appropriated separately and not taken from
VOA's modernization budget or other public diplomacy

accounts.

elevision is a powerful force in shaping

international events. Proliferation of tele-

vision broadcasting operations is gener-

ating global demand for the export of news
and entire news shows via satellite. Expanding vid-
eocassette markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, and
the Middle East are eroding state control of infor-
mation and changing leisure time habits. Televised
“space bridges” are bringing citizens of different
countries together for substantive discussions. And
diplomacy is being redefined as heads of state and
foreign ministers communicate directly with citi-
zens in other countries.

Television poses profound questions for the con-
duct of public diplomacy. USIA’s priorities and tra-
ditional ways of doing business are changing sig-
nificantly as a result.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

review of each broadcast service. VOA’s manage-
ment is sensitive to the importance of program
evaluation, which it believes is underfunded.

The Bureau of Programs uses evaluation re-
search almost exclusively for exhibits and maga-
zines. The Bureau has no comprehensive long-range
evaluation research plan.

Worldnet undertook extensive audience re-
search for the first time in 1988. In addition to the
European viewership study, USIA commissioned
research on Worldnet’s audiences in the Middle
East, Africa, and Latin America. Although the stud-
ies were confined largely to audience measurement
and did little to assess viewer program preferences,
they were needed first steps in the long-range plan-
ning that Worldnet’s expansion will require. Es-
pecially welcome is Worldnet’s development of a
four-year research plan that will include market
research and program development studies.

Patrons leaving the Benjamin Franklin library, one of USIA's
oldest, in Mexico City.

Most program evaluation for the Bureau of Ed-
ucational and Cultural Affairs is conducted by the
Bureau itself, directly and through contractors. The
Commission recommended in 1986 that the Office
of Research undertake evaluations of exchange and
International Visitor programs and advise on stud-
ies contracted by the Bureau. Subsequent consul-
tations and studies of some of its programs by the
Office of Research are encouraging. Evaluation of
educational and cultural programs should be in-
formed by Fulbright program precepts and, like all
research, be tied closely to program management.
A larger role for the Office of Research is consistent
with these goals and can bring additional expertise
to the assessment of programs that comprise about
one-fourth of the Agency’s budget.

USIA’s posts and geographic area offices are not
primary consumers of evaluation research. USIA’s
area directors are receptive to more program eval-
uation, and the Office of Research plans to increase
its use in the field. This is long overdue and should
be given a high priority.

The information revolution has dramatically al-
tered the media environment for public diplomacy.
The private sector provides useful research on
changes in technology, media habits, and govern-
ment communications regulations, but it does not
always meet USIA’s needs, particularly in devel-
oping countries. USIA should resume regular media
environment studies to guide its program and re-
source decisions.

USIA needs to pay more attention to program
evaluation as a management tool. A comprehensive
Agency-wide program evaluation strategy should
be prepared, and the percentage of research funds
devoted to media and program studies should be
increased. Continuous research plans for the Bu-
reau of Programs and the Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs should be developed compa-
rable to existing plans for VOA and Worldnet.

Ultimately, successful program evaluation de-
pends entirely on the willingness of senior USIA
officials to implement relevant findings and
recommendations.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Siac

USIA’s Worldnet satellite television service links U.S. officials in Washington to audi-
ences around the world.

—

RIAS-TV’s program content and transmissions are
controlled by USIA, and an American Director su-
pervises its West German staff. Its annual operating
budget (currently about $27 million) is funded al-
most entirely by the West German government. The
U.S. provided $12 million in start-up expenses and
will pay annual transmission costs (now about $1.7
million). RIAS-TV will originate programs. It has a
Washington bureau and access to Worldnet pro-
grams and on-location footage produced by Amer-
ican networks in East Germany.

RIAS-TV has been controversial in West Germany
due to media fears of increased competition and
litigation over the propriety of Federal Republic
funding. Nevertheless, as RIAS-TV achieves the
professionalism and journalistic integrity charac-
teristic of RIAS radio, it promises to become a pow-
erful voice in Central Europe. Commissioners vis-
ited the studios of RIAS-TV this year and came away
impressed with the caliber of its personnel and
quality of its facilities. We commend USIA for this
initiative.

TV MARTI

Planning for a U.S. government
television service to Cuba was in-
itiated late in 1987, when Con-
gress earmarked $100,000 in USIA’s
FY 1988 appropriation for a fea-
sibility study to be conducted by
the Advisory Board for Radio
Broadcasting to Cuba. Six months
later in May 1988, the Advisory
Board informally recommended to
members of Congress that funds
be appropriated for TV Marti. The
Board concluded from its studies
that transmission from a balloon
tethered 14,000 feet above the
Florida Keys offered the best means
to reach Cuba with a television
signal.

In September 1988, Congress approved $7.5 mil-
lion for TV Marti in USIA’s FY 1989 appropriation.
The funds, taken from the Voice of America’s radio
construction account, were appropriated for “the
purchase, rent, construction, improvement and
equipping of facilities ... and startup operations
including a test of television broadcasting to Cuba.”
The measure was adopted without authorizing leg-
islation or hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee.

TV Marti raises significant questions for public
diplomacy and U.S. foreign relations. Is it consis-
tent with U.S. obligations under international law?
Is it technically feasible? What kind of programs
should be broadcast? What are the implications for
U.S. television stations, communications regula-
tions, and air traffic safety?

The Commission strongly believes any additional
appropriations for TV Marti should be contingent
on Congressional hearings, authorizing legislation,
and thorough interagency review of relevant tech-
nical, legal, regulatory, policy, and programming
issues. Such funds should be appropriated sepa-
rately and not taken from VOA modernization or
other public diplomacy accounts.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Indian journalists taking part in an international telepress conference with Assistant U.S. Trade

request research studies. While Washington policy
interests deserve priority, more attention should be
paid to field research needs and opportunities.

The Commission continues to believe the United
States should have as full a picture of Soviet in-
formation and cultural programs as it does of Soviet
military, economic, and diplomatic activities. Timely
and comprehensive understanding of Soviet public
diplomacy is essential to establishing program
priorities and long-term public diplomacy planning
by the United States.

PROGRAM EVALUATION
USIA conducts evaluation studies to determine the
reach and effectiveness of its programs, to assess
foreign communications policies and environ-
ments, and to estimate VOA and Worldnet audiences.
In FY 1988, $400,000 was allocated to the Office
of Research and distributed evenly for program
evaluation in VOA, Worldnet, the Bureau of Pro-
grams, and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs. USIA also conducted a special Congres-
sionally-mandated study of Worldnet viewership in
Europe costing $780,000. The Commission wel-

Representative Peter Allgeier. Telephone press conferences with U.S. officials in Washington can
be arranged quickly and are effective tools for explaining new directions in US. policies.

comes this modest increase in program evaluation
and the direct allocation of funds to the Office of
Research. Previously, funds were allocated by the
Agency elements whose programs were being
studied.

Emphasis on program evaluation and greater re-
ceptivity to it by Agency managers are key Com-
mission concerns. Effectiveness studies are im-
portant during periods of program innovation and
growth such as occurred in the 1980s. Equally, they
are needed to guide decisions on program priorities
in times of budget austerity.

USIA has expressed commitment to strength-
ening program evaluation, but its use by major
Agency elements is uneven. No Agency-wide strat-
egy exists for studying program effectiveness and
comparative program value, and funds for evalu-
ation research still fall short of Agency needs.

The Voice of America’s continuing research plan,
updated annually, is a model for other USIA bu-
reaus. Available research on audience size, char-
acteristics, listening habits, signal strength, and
program preferences forms part of VOA’s annual


MANAGEMEN

Security and Public Diplomacy

@ Maintaining a secure environment for U.S. diplomats abroad should
continue to be a high national priority.

® Legislation and policies relating to diplomatic security must take
fully into account USIA's public diplomacy mission, the need for public
access to USIA's facilities, and the desirability that USIA give visible
evidence of the free and open society it represents.

'® Direct appropriations to USIA or separately identified funds in the
Department of State's appropriations legislation are required to pro-
vide adequate resources for USIA’s diplomatic security needs,

@ Personal contact and reasonable access to facilities are essential to
public diplomacy. Replacement of foreign national employees with
Americans, unrealistic rules on fraternization and contact reporting,
overbroad “core chancery” policies, and restrictive chancery co-
location regulations threaten to cripple USIA’s programs just as

new opportunities are occurring in many communist countries.

n 1985, the Commission released a special
report that dealt with a fundamental question:
how does the U.S. shape its policies and po-
sition its overseas installations to create an
environment that is safe yet conducive to com-
munication with diverse elite and mass audiences?’
The report addressed a range of special concerns
confronting USIA in the face of increasing terrorism
and acts of violence against American diplomats.
Subsequently, diplomatic security issues were ad-
dressed by Congress in the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. Recent events
suggest there is no reason for America to lower its
guard against threats to diplomatic personnel and
sensitive information, but the need to consider the
special needs of public diplomacy remains.
In 1988, members of the Commission travelled
to U.S. missions in the Soviet Union, East Germany,

“Terrorism and Security: The Challenge for Public Diplo-
macy,” Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy, December, 1985.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and
Yugoslavia. Based on our firsthand observations,
the Commission concludes that USIA suffers from
woefully inadequate security resources and insuf-
ficient attention to its special security needs.

USIA has identified security priorities in FY 1989
requiring $22.4 million—a small sum compared to
what this nation invests overall in its public diplo-
macy programs. The Department of State has al-
located a mere $1.2 million for USIA from a current
supplemental security appropriation in excess of
$300 million, which it administers for the foreign
affairs agencies.

The gap between USIA’s needs and what the De-
partment plans to make available defies easy rec-
onciliation. Existing resources have permitted the
Agency to upgrade or relocate only 12 of its over-
seas facilities. Many critical security requirements
have not been funded. Barring unexpected progress
through interagency negotiations, USIA must con-
sider seeking its own supplemental appropriation
from the Congress.

A serious question exists as to whether the State
Department's control of the overseas security budget
serves the interests of USIA. The Agency has not
been invited to participate in the deliberations of
the Department’s Priorities Policy Group when
interagency security budget decisions have been
made. It has only recently been included in the
Department’s in-house meetings where security
budgets for overseas operations receive attention.

During consideration of the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security legislation, the Commission expressed
concern that USIA’s needs would suffer in com-
petition with the Department's priorities. In our spe-
cial report, we urged that the legislation “include
authorization for funds dedicated to providing se-
curity services for USIA’s installations” and that
“Jacking such clearly identified funds ... USIA’s
responsibilities will be diluted or ignored.” By any
measure, the Commission's warnings have turned
out to be well-founded.

The Commission concludes the State Depart-
ment cannot be relied upon to provide adequately
for USIA’s security budget requirements. Direct ap-
propriations to USIA or separately identified funds
in the Department's appropriations legislation are


THE COMMISSION

=

President Reagan delivers keynote address to the Advisory Commission's

40th anniversary conference on “Public Diplomacy in the Information Age.

tion and urges its repeal. It was adopted without
hearings or consideration of the views of the current
and many former Commissioners who question its
wisdom. It was opposed also by USIA, the lead-
ership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and
many other members of the House and Senate. The
legislation was adopted only as a conference sub-
stitute for a different and more deeply flawed Senate
provision.

The members of this Commission are convinced
the Commission’s credibility depends on its bi-
partisan character. If the Commission’s reports are
to represent the public interest and the views of a
broad cross section of the American public, the
Commission must remain bipartisan.

The Commission’s value also depends on the
expertise it develops over time. Without the con-

tinuity and institutional memory provided by stag-
gered terms, no safeguard is provided for informed
public diplomacy advice and support during changes
in administration, precisely when it is needed most.

The Commission recommends that the President
continue to appoint its members on a bipartisan
basis for overlapping fixed terms. We also urge
Congress to amend the Commission's statutory au-
thority to require that this be done, consistent with
the practice of the past 40 years.

COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

The Commission meets monthly with USIA’s Di-
rector and senior Agency officials. It testifies before
USIA’s Congressional oversight committees and
meets periodically with Members of Congress and


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy

@ The quantity, quality and extent of Soviet public diplomacy activ-
ities have increased dramatically under General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev.

® By adopting Western public relations techniques and skillfully ex-
ploiting the image of a more open society, the Soviets have improved
relations with the media in many countries and have greatly increased
receptivity to their public diplomacy.

® Glasnost and the current atmosphere of change in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe are generating extraordinary opportunities for the
United States with important implications for the funding, staffing,
and content of USIA’s programs.

@ The United States should pursue increased access and opportunities
in the Soviet Union: more open cities, fewer travel restrictions, more
opportunities for U.S. journalists to interview Soviet officials, greater
flow of U.S. materials to Soviet citizens, more opportunities for Amer-
ican officials to provide timely public affairs comment in the Soviet
media, and increased U.S.-Soviet exchanges in all fields.

® Soviet disinformation continues and requires constant vigilance and

prompt exposure.

he quantity, quality and extent of Soviet

public diplomacy activities have in-

creased dramatically under the leadership

of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.
Soviet diplomats have engaged in many more press
conferences, public appearances, and media in-
terviews providing visible evidence of glasnost, a
policy based in part on recognition that the infor-
mation revolution has made it impossible for the
Soviet leadership to monopolize public access to
information and ideas.

It is important to give credit to Western inter-
national radio broadcasting—including the Voice
of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and
Radio in the American Sector (RIAS)—for its part
in improving the information environment in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These and other

20

foreign news sources have demonstrated that bar-
riers to new ideas can be penetrated in the infor-
mation age, that censorship can be overcome, and
that jamming of radio signals can be rendered largely
ineffective. Chernobyl provides a clear example of
how reliance by the Soviet people on foreign news
sources placed Soviet domestic information efforts
on the defensive.

Soviet leaders, despite some internal opposition,
are adapting to these circumstances and have em-
braced greater openness. Domestically, they have
eliminated the jamming of all VOA services except
Dari and Pashto, while internal Soviet news broad-
casts have become more informative. Internation-
ally, they have borrowed Western media and public
relations techniques. Attractive spokesmen, skilled
in the art of persuasive communication and fluent
in foreign languages, have been made widely avail-
able to the world’s press. The timing and content
of Soviet proposals often appear designed more to
cultivate public opinion abroad than to further dip-
lomatic dialogue.

The Soviets have displayed a desire to improve
relations with the mainstream media in many coun-
tries to further their public diplomacy agenda. As
a result, the number of appearances by Soviets on
foreign television and the number of placements
of Soviet-authored articles in the foreign print me-
dia have increased out of all proportion to corre-
sponding U.S. access in the Soviet Union.”

Not surprisingly, glasnost appears to have a pro-
nounced effect on public thinking in Western Eu-
rope, the United States, and elsewhere. USIA's pub-
lic opinion surveys reveal that Soviet media efforts,
the changing nature of the East-West dialogue, and
reporting by Western media have combined to gen-
erate hopes for significant change in the Soviet
bloc. The polls have shown that Western Europeans
in varying degrees are becoming more optimistic
about peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and
the positive effects of glasnost. On certain issues
surveyed, many are now more supportive of the
Soviet leader than of the U.S. President.

* “Soviet Advocacy and the U.S. Media,” Report of the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, October, 1986.



EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.

American scholars to consider extended lecturing.

or research assignments abroad have led to greater
use of short-term grants. USIA’s American Partici-
pant and Academic Specialist programs exist for
the purpose of conveying information and skills
through grants of brief duration. In seeking ways
tomake the Fulbright program more attractive, USIA
should minimize its use of short-term grants and
encourage scholars with limited time to explore
other Agency programs.

THE HUBERT HUMPHREY NORTH-SOUTH

FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

The Hubert Humphrey Fellowship program marked
its tenth anniversary in 1988. Humphrey grants pro-
vide funding for highly qualified mid-career profes-
sionals involved in public service in developing
countries to participate in one year nondegree pro-
grams in the United States. Many involve practical
experience as well as academic training. The Hum-
phrey program has proven to be a valuable addition
to U.S. exchange activities.

INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGES

Among many of America’s allies, the under-thirty
generation is prone to challenge the security, po-
litical, and economic foundations of the Western
alliance. Experts studying these trends concluded
that increased knowledge and firsthand exposure
to other cultures through enhanced exchange pro-
grams across the Atlantic and with Japan would
provide the best possible antidote to symptoms of
ignorance and apathy.

In 1982, President Reagan announced creation
of the International Youth Exchange Initiative to
increase exchanges of youth in the 15-25 age bracket.
The Initiative channeled resources into exchange
programs involving private sector partners, notably
the AFS International, the Experiment in Interna-
tional Living, and Youth for Understanding. The
programs have been rich and diverse. Visits from

one to twelve months in the U.S. include school
attendance and home-stays. Approximately 15,000
American families have served as hosts for visiting
young people from abroad.

The Commission believes the program has been
successful in challenging stereotypes and in de-
veloping greater focus on world affairs and foreign
language training in U.S. secondary school curri-
cula. During the life of the program, more than
34,000 young people have participated in ex-
changes sponsored directly and indirectly by USIA.

CENTRAL AMERICAN STUDENT EXCHANGES

In 1985, Congress funded a pilot program of schol-
arships for Central American undergraduates to study
at accredited U.S. institutions of higher education.
Known as the Central American Undergraduate
Scholarship Program (CAMPUS), it was based on
recommendations contained in the 1984 “Kissinger
Commission” report on Central America. The pro-
gram provides educational alternatives for young
Central Americans of limited means.

CAMPUS was created to match educational op-
portunities with skill shortages in Central America
and to build lasting links between the U.S. and the
countries of the region. The students pursue un-
dergraduate studies in the social sciences, busi-
ness, communications, and education for 18, 24,
or 30 months. Grants fund language training and
other program enhancements as well.

The program began in 1986 with 154 participants
selected on the basis of academic potential and
financial need. Most earned bachelor’s degrees;
others earned credits towards master’s degrees. A
second group of 84 students arrived in the U.S. in
January, 1988. The program is evaluated by outside
contractors who interview students, faculty, and
advisors twice a year. Evaluations give CAMPUS
high marks.

The success of the program depends on contin-
ued Congressional support. It would be unfortunate
if early achievements were eroded by failure to


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

Cultural Diplomacy

ultural programs at their best commu-

nicate, often without words, the pur-

poseful, vibrant, and imaginative quali-

ties of American society—a society that
in many different ways gives voice to diverse mes-
sages and creative innovation. USIA’s programs in
the fine and performing arts are no less pragmatic
and result-oriented than its information programs.
Messages of freedom and creative excellence are
communicated through cultural diplomacy in
countries where English is not widely understood
and also where English is used masterfully to ex-
press disagreement with U.S. policies.

In the Soviet bloc and other areas, cultural pro-
grams often serve as the best and sometimes the
only avenues of communication open to USIA.
Political elites unwilling to attend an Agency-
sponsored lecture or press briefing often will attend
a symphony, a piano recital, or the opening of an
art exhibit. Public diplomacy professionals remark
frequently that cultural programs provide unique

entree to audiences that are otherwise untouched
by the broad reach of USIA’s programs. Many create
positive and enduring impressions of America as
a society with serious intellectual and cultural pur-
suits extending beyond material and political in-
terests. Often these impressions color perceptions
of the United States a generation later.

While impresarios in Western Europe, Israel, Ja-
pan and a few other countries assure that the best
of American culture is presented on a profit-making
basis, many countries do not provide attractive
commercial markets. The difficult task of allocating
scarce government resources for cultural programs
must continue to take private initiatives into ac-
count through seed money and other modest sup-
plementary support, while placing the lion’s share
of the Agency's resources in countries where pri-
vate interests do not portray the richness and di-
versity of U.S. artistic endeavors.

In its last report the Commission noted, and USIA
acknowledged in reply, that funding for cultural
programs has not kept pace with national needs
and is far less than what is spent by America’s allies
and the Soviet Union. The situation remains
unaltered.

The Commission welcomes the assistance of pri-
vate sector committees and the National Endow-
ment for the Arts in USIA’s cultural programs. They
extend the Agency's limited reach and help to en-
sure aesthetic excellence in America’s cultural
diplomacy.

A USIA-sponsored Artistic
Ambassador demon-
strates technique at a
master class for music
students in Kinshasa, Zaire.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS.

he Voice of America is a vital national

asset that will remain a primary means of

communicating with audiences in many

parts of the world well into the next cen-
tury. No other medium provides as direct, wide-
spread, instantaneous, and unfiltered access to for-
eign audiences as radio broadcasting. Radio's
immediacy, reach, portability, personality, relia-
bility, and informational value make it essential to
American public diplomacy.

As never before in its 47 years of broadcasting,
VOA faces a global information environment that
is raising fundamental questions about its pro-
grams and signal delivery systems. Glasnost is rad-
ically changing communications in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The Soviets have stopped jam-
ming VOA and other Western broadcasts. Indige-
nous AM and FM stations, television, videocas-
settes, and other leisure time electronic media are
competing for the attention of VOA’s listeners.
Shortwave listenership is declining in some parts
of the world, and audiences are becoming more
discriminating and sophisticated. VOA officials rec-
ognize these challenges and have begun to address
them.”

International radio broadcasting is not a dying
medium, but to remain competitive, its programs
must be interesting, and its signal delivery systems
must be the best available. The Commission be-
lieves VOA is facing threshold questions that will
require Congress and the new administration to
take a fresh look at traditional approaches to pro-
gramming, language priorities, and facilities
modernization.

* See the report of the VOA-2001 Committee, “VOA's Future in
Shortwave Broadcasting,” July, 1987. Uncertaken at the sug-
gestion of the Commission, it is a thoughtful inquiry by
VOA’s program and technical professionals into ways in
which the United States can maintain its leadership in inter-
national radio broadcasting.

PROGRAMS

VOA’s Charter calls for its broadcasts to include
accurate news reports, balanced presentations of
American life, and clear statements of U.S. policy.
In October 1988, VOA produced more than 1,209
hours of programming each week in 43 languages.
VOA broadcasts in shortwave to an estimated weekly
audience of 129 million listeners worldwide, about
half of whom are in the denied areas of the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Additional audiences
are reached through VOA’s Radio Marti Program,
VOA Europe, point-to-point feeds, and programs
recorded for placement on local radio stations.

Expansion and innovation characterized VOA's
programs during the 1980s.

News reports, essential to all VOA broadcasts,
were qualitatively enhanced by staff and news bu-
reau increases; additional coverage of special events;
installation of a multilanguage computer system to
create, edit, and move text; and greater use of live
segments, interviews, and on-the-scene coverage.
Regular access to the Soviet Union and Eastern

VOICE OF RMERICA
SATELLITE INTERCONNECT SYSTEM

Intelsat-SBS intelsat-AOR Intelsat4OR

Drawing shows communications from VOA headquarters
in Washington, D.C., to its relay stations worldwide using
domestic and international satellites.



MANAGEMENT

International Cultural and Trade Center

© The International Cultural and Trade Center complex that will com-
plete the Federal Triangle in central Washington, D.C. is an ideal per-
manent home for USIA, which is now located in eight headquarters
buildings. The Advisory Commission supports the finding of the United
States International Cultural and Trade Center Commission that USIA's
mission uniquely qualifies it to be the Center's primary tenant.

n 1987, Congress authorized construction of
an International Cultural and Trade Center
{(ICTC) complex to complete the Federal Tri-
angle on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washing-
ton, D.C. The Center, scheduled for completion in
1994, will be used primarily for international trade
and cultural purposes. It will house federal offices,
conference facilities, an exhibit area, foreign em-
bassy trade and cultural offices, and related activities.

AUSIA officer discusses Agency materials during an English
language teaching conference in Stuttgart.

The U.S. International Cultural and Trade Center
Commission, a Presidentially-appointed federal
commission created by Congress to manage the
project, has adopted the view that all ICTC tenants
should support the international cultural and trade
objectives of the Center.” The ICTC Commission
has also concluded that USIA’s public diplomacy
mission is consonant with the Center’s major pur-
poses and uniquely qualifies the Agency to be the
Center’s primary federal tenant. The Advisory Com-
mission supports this finding.

There are many advantages to public diplomacy
if USIA moves its dispersed Washington-based op-
erations—including the Voice of America, World-
net, its program and educational exchange bu-
reaus, and other headquarters activities—to a single,
centrally-located building. For the first time, radio
and television studios and international conference
facilities would be built entirely to meet the Agen-
cy’s special requirements. It would be cost-effective
and provide USIA with convenient access to the
White House, the Department of State, major media
outlets, and the private educational and cultural
organizations that work closely with its overseas
programs. The Foreign Press Center would remain
nearby in the National Press Building, a location
well suited to its purposes.

Locating USIA at the Center would satisfy
Congressional criteria for this major addition to the
development of Pennsylvania Avenue, and it would
bring USIA’s separate operations together for the
first time in the Agency's history.

“The ICTC Commission is comprised of six representatives
from the private sector and nine public representatives in-
cluding the Departments of State, Commerce, and Agricul-
ture, the U.S. Information Agency, the General Services
Administration, the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corpo-
ration, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the Mayor of
Washington, D.C, Former Senator Charles Percy is the Com-
mission’s Chairman.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Europe by VOA’s correspondents provides new re-
porting opportunities and adds greatly to the impact
and quality of VOA’s news coverage. Agreement to
open a VOA bureau in Moscow is a promising
development.

VOA initiated broadcasting to Oceania, created
a Creole service to Haiti, expanded programming
to Burma and Romania, introduced morning pro-
gramming to the Caribbean, and resumed Can-
tonese broadcasts to China and Hong Kong. Broad-
casts of VOA programs by indigenous FM and
medium wave stations increased; more than 3,000
radio stations in 103 countries now use VOA pro-
gramming. VOA is frequently cited as a source by
newspapers in Brazil, Indonesia, and South Asia.
_ Daily editorials, identified as opinion and distin-
guished from other VOA programs, “present the
policies of the United States clearly and effectively”
as required by the VOA Charter. The Commission
reviews VOA’s editorials on a regular basis and
continues to find them an appropriate tool of public
diplomacy. Efforts to tailor them to regional inter-
ests and vigilance to assure their congruence with
USS. policies should continue.

Many factors will contribute to maintaining VOA’s
role as a major international broadcaster. Program
quality is essential to attracting and retaining lis-
teners. Signal clarity is necessary. The absence of
timely and accurate news in many countries stim-
ulates continuing interest in VOA’s broadcasts. The
Commission is convinced also that America’s
achievements and leadership role in the world cre-
ate a demand for information about the United States
that gives VOA an advantage other major interna-
tional broadcasters do not have. Recently, this point
was made forcefully to the Commission by a senior
Soviet diplomat. Satisfying the desire to hear what
America has to say is a primary reason for contin-
ued investment in international radio broadcasting.
” The Commission is concerned, therefore, that
shrinking resources, rather than policy decisions
or broadcasting requirements, have forced VOA to
scale back on language services and program hours.
Since 1986, VOA has cancelled 160 hours of weekly

programming, cut staff by more than 250 positions,
eliminated direct vernacular broadcasts to Thai-
land and Portugal, reduced broadcast schedules in
13 other language services, and closed three news
bureaus. These reductions are occurring just as
dramatic changes are taking place in the interna-
tional communications environment, and as VOA
begins to address new broadcasting needs and
opportunities.

The end of Soviet jamming of VOA on May 25,
1987 and competition from the increasingly so-
phisticated Soviet and East European domestic me-
dia require that VOA rethink its program strategy.
Repetitive programming, needed when broadcasts
were jammed, can be reduced; longer and more
sophisticated programs are possible.

VOA Europe, inaugurated in 1985 with bipartisan
support from Congress and this Commission, has
reached the takeoff stage. Data compiled by USIA’s
Office of Research indicate a growing listenership
among successor generation audiences in the highly
competitive media markets of Western Europe. In
October 1988, VOA Europe broadcast in English 24
hours a day via satellite-delivered stereo signals to
42 local medium wave, FM, and cable radio affil-
iates in 12 countries. The BBC and Radio Swiss
International recently adopted the VOA Europe
model.

VOA Europe does not pay leasing costs: medium
wave and FM stations introduce their own adver-
tising, and cable companies profit from subscrip-
tions. The Commission supports the trial period of
advertising by local affiliates recently undertaken
by VOA Europe, consistent with the guidelines sug-
gested by the leadership of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee. VOA Europe’s success will de-
pend on audience research, close attention to an
appropriate entertainment/public affairs program
mix, enhanced program relevance to its audience,
and continued support from the foreign affairs
community.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

American Participants

SIA provides overseas lecture opportu-

nities for approximately 600 Americans

each year who speak on subjects rele-

vant to U.S. interests. Americans partic-
ipating in this program are commonly referred to
as “Amparts.” The Ampart program draws experts
from a broad range of responsible American opin-
ion, including U.S. government officials, scholars,
and professionals in media, business, labor, the
arts, and other fields. Amparts lecture and ex-
change views on issues of mutual concern with
professional counterparts at USIA’s posts and at
host country institutions.

Based on the principle that a free society is its
own best witness, the Ampart program makes an
important contribution to public diplomacy. In an
information age dominated by radio and television
broadcasting and other electronic media, Amparts
engage in the dialogue and personal contact that
are essential to the communications process.
Speakers who explain U.S. policies and present a
variety of views on subjects of interest to foreign
audiences can do a great deal to advance U.S.

composition using a computer in New Delhi.

interests abroad—both in formal lectures and
through informal interaction. Although costs per
program are relatively high, their value is inesti-
mable, particularly in countries where audiences
have limited personal contact with American spe-
cialists in their fields of interest.

Budgetary constraints limit USIA’s ability to re-
cruit speakers in greatest demand in the United
States. However, the Agency occasionally is able
to recruit “star-quality” Amparts in addition to the
many capable less well-known speakers who par-
ticipate successfully in the program.

Although USIA generally earns high marks for
getting a large volume of speakers before the right
audiences, the Commission believes a broader
consideration of post needs should apply for speak-
ers whose prominence and program relevance as-
sure them a welcome reception at virtually any post.
In planning programs for prominent Amparts, the
Agency should rely less on pre-designated post pro-
jections—made in the abstract often a year or more
in advance—and consider all nearby posts able to
make a strong case for programming such speak-
ers. Final decisions on itineraries
should continue to be a matter of
agreement between the Agency and
the Ampart.

The Commission also recom-
mends that USIA take steps to in-
form key officials in the new ad-
ministration of the importance of
the Ampart program. Policymakers
should be encouraged to take ad-
vantage of opportunities for direct
communication with foreign audi-
ences on topics that are relevant to
the Agency’s program themes.

American Participant, Pulitzer Prize-winning poet Henry Taylor, demonstrates


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

USIA’s Advisory Role

@ The President, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Ad-
visor should treat public diplomacy as a central elementin the planning
and implementation of foreign policy.

@ Intoo many instances, USIA is not called upon to advise the National
Security Council and the Department of State on the public affairs
consequences of proposed policies,

® The National Security Council’s Special Planning Group (SPG) and
International Information Committee (IIC) have not played the public
diplomacy coordinating role intended by NSDD 77. Routine and ef-
fective coordination between USIA, other foreign affairs and defense
agencies, and the White House Press Office is essential. The NSC should
devise a coordinating structure with which it is comfortable and use
it regularly.

SIA has played an occasional advisory

role in the policy formulation process

from its beginning. Since the Kennedy

administration, the Agency has been for-
mally required to advise policymakers on the public
consequences of proposed policies. Yet, as this
Commission and many others have often observed,
USIA still is not permitted to play an early, consis-
tent, systematic, or influential role in the policy
process.”

The case for considering the public opinion im-
pact of policies before they are made seems basic
and incontrovertible. Since foreign attitudes can
significantly affect the success or failure of policies,
it makes sense to include analysis of public opin-
ion—and significant social, cultural, and religious
trends—in the development of proposed policies
and in their subsequent implementation.

“For a thoughtful analysis of the importance of public opin-
ion in policy formulation, see Gifford Malone, Organizing the
Nation's Public Diplomacy, University Press of America, 1988,
pp. 85-89.

This should not be difficult for Americans to un-
derstand. No corporate executive launches a new
product without a market study. No university pres-
ident initiates a fund-raising drive without careful
analysis of potential donors. And no elected official
campaigns without polling the constituency on its
views. The Commission finds it puzzling that as a
society we have yet to appreciate fully the impor-
tance of public opinion in the conduct of our for-
eign policy.

The Commission does not mean that public opin-
ion should determine policy or override other im-
portant considerations. We do mean that public
diplomacy should be treated by the President, the
Secretary of State, and the National Security Council
as a central element in foreign policy planning. U.S
policies should take into account analysis of their
potential public impact, reports on foreign attitudes
and media trends, assessments of the public affairs
strategies of other nations, and close daily coop-
eration between policymakers and public diplo-
macy professionals.

The Commission strongly urges the new admin-
istration to consider the following.

Commitment must come from the top. The most care-
fully constructed interagency coordinating mech-
anisms will fail unless key foreign policy officials
fully understand the importance of public opinion
and are willing to make sure their subordinates
treat it with the same concern.

USIA’s Director must participate regularly in meetings of
the National Security Council. USIA’s legal authority
confers on the Agency's Director NSC advisory sta-
tus similar to that held by the Director of the CIA
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congressional intent
is clear as are the recommendations of the General
Accounting Office and many commissions and study
groups going back to the Eisenhower administra-
tion. Yet no administration has included USIA’s
Director in NSC meetings on a routine basis. A
Presidential directive should be issued that will
clarify USIA’s relationship to the NSC and mandate
regular participation in NSC meetings by the Agen-
cy’s Director. It is also essential that USIA have
access to all significant NSC policy papers and that



EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.

fundamental public attitudes towards the United
States, the administration in power, and America’s
role as a world leader. The Commission finds in-
structive his conclusion that successful basing of
INF weapons may owe much more to cultural and
educational programs (widely appreciated for rea-
sons unrelated to international politics) than to
intensely-focused short-term information activities
designed to persuade public opinion.”

While commentary on the value of exchange pro-
grams tends to focus on the development of pos-
itive images, exchanges are also a valuable means
to counter the powerful forces of disinformation
that can proliferate rapidly in an age of high speed
communication. For example, at a time when false
claims have circulated widely concerning nefarious
AIDS research and other U.S medical practices,
firsthand experience with American institutions
provides an awareness of how research is con-
ducted in the U.S. that makes these charges difficult
to credit. Academic exchanges fulfill scholarly and
cultural objectives; they also inform attitudes about
the United States over the long-term.

FUNDING EXCHANGES

The exchanges budget has increased from $44.8
million in FY 1978, the final year it was administered
by the Department of State, to $150 million in FY
1988. The FY 1989 appropriation totals $150 mil-
lion. Foreign governments, through binational Ful-
bright commissions, contributed an additional $10
million in FY 1988.

The exchanges budget has doubled since 1982
thanks to strong bipartisan support from the Con-
gress for the Percy-Pell Amendment (PL 97-241) and
the efforts of USIA Director Wick. However, current
budget stringencies and the weakened dollar are
undermining USIA’s ability to carry out the rebuild-

* Stanton H. Burnett, “U.S. Informational and Cultural Pro-
grams,” in Richard F. Staar, ed. Public Diplomacy: USA Versus
USSR, Hoover Institution Press, 1986, pp. 77-79.

ing contemplated by Congress. Further erosion will
undercut the gains of recent years, prevent the U.S.
from capitalizing on important opportunities, and
adversely affect the foreign and domestic constit-
uencies that are essential to the exchange programs.

FULBRIGHT ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

The Fulbright scholarship program was a signifi-
cant development at its inception in 1946 and re-
mains innovative in its approach today.

The program has expanded beyond exchanges
of scholars to include professional exchanges in
such fields as journalism, law, management, bank-
ing, and public administration. Participants engage
in degree programs, non-degree and self-study
courses, internships, and professional seminars.

The Fulbright teacher exchange program spon-
sors exchanges of American and foreign teachers
at the primary and secondary school levels for one
academic year. On leave from their institutions, the
teachers trade positions and residences with their
foreign counterparts.

The Commission encourages Fulbright planners
to give special attention to the emerging informa-
tion technologies that are changing teaching and
research throughout the world. For example, through
training many Fulbright scholars would be better
prepared to transmit knowledge about computers
and their application to the needs of foreign edu-
cational institutions.

Other approaches adopted by the Fulbright pro-
gram appear less likely to enhance valued long-
term objectives, particularly recent increases in grants
for periods as short as one month and serial grants
for brief repetitive visits over several years. The
Fulbright program is intended to foster enduring
relationships of friendship and mutual trust. It is
hard to imagine short-term visits achieving this ob-
jective as well.

The Commission is aware that financial consid-
erations and the increasing reluctance of many


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

East-West Center

he East-West Center is a U.S.
educational institution in
Honolulu that seeks to pro-
mote better relations among
the nations of Asia, the Pacific, and
the United States. Americans are
turning increasingly to Asia and the
Pacific for a variety of economic, po-
litical, military, and cultural reasons.
Emerging patterns of political co-
operation, trade and economic de-
velopment, and greater cultural
awareness are making it possible for
the U.S. to become a more dynamic
partner with the market-oriented
economies in the region. The East-
West Center has an important role to
play in helping to overcome barriers
to greater cooperation and in ad-
dressing important regional needs.

Established by Congress in 1960, the Center an-
nually brings some 2,200 scholars and profession-
als together for training and research in a broad
range of regional issues. The Center’s four institutes
focus on such topics as land and water resource
management, population expansion, satellite com-
munications, and Pacific Islands development. A
network of more than 25,000 alumni are now in
leadership positions throughout Asia and the United
States.

Major funding for the East-West Center, $20 mil-
lion in FY 1988, is provided by Congress in USIA’s
budget. Approximately $5 million in additional funds
are contributed annually by Asian governments and
private sector organizations. The amount of federal
support for the Center has remained constant in
recent years with relatively small increases in non-
appropriated funds. The Commission continues to
believe the Center's long-term financial interests
are best served if it increases the share of support
it receives from other public and private sources.

These Nepali students
Years of Nepal-iS, Relations” on display in USIA’s building in Kathmandu,

al

are among thousands who viewed an exhibit on “Forty

Commission members have visited and lectured
at the Center and have seen firsthand the mana-
gerial improvements and program changes brought
about under the leadership of President Victor Hao
Li and the Center's Board of Directors. With USIA’s
encouragement, the Center has increased its em-
phasis on economic development and interna-
tional political topics. Seminars on economic trends,
trade issues, narcotics problems, and the role of
the Soviet Union in the Asia/Pacific region are wel-
come additions to the curriculum.

The Commission believes USIA’s Public Affairs
Officers should make greater use of this valuable
resource. Increased use of the Center’s research
studies and sustained ties with its program partic-
ipants are desirable. We particularly urge USIA’s
Asian posts to use their developing automation ca-
pabilities to maintain contact with the East-West
Center alumni in their countries.


CONTENTS

Transmittal Letter
A Message from the Chairman
The Commission ..........
Summary of Recommendations and Findings

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Public Diplomacy’s Mission and Structure .
U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy .
Underinvestment in Public Diplomacy
USIA’s Advisory Role ..
Research
Summits and Public Diplomacy ....
National Endowment for Democracy
Congress and Public Diplomacy ....

MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Voice of America ..........
Television .
Wireless File .
US-INFONET .
Exhibits .
American Participants

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS
Exchange of Persons .
Book Programs ...
English Teaching
Cultural Diplomacy
East-West Center ...

MANAGEMENT

Security and Public Diplomacy ..
Media and Advocacy Skills Training .
Foreign Language Training
USIA Officer Assignments
Foreign Service Time-in-Class .
Automation and Telecommunications Planning
International Cultural and Trade Center

USIA Organization Chart

if
a



MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Intelsat V F-7
Intelsat V FB

Intelsat V-AF-11
Intelsat V-A F-11

Worldnet's regional services cover the globe via satellite.

placement service and engages in only limited di-
rect broadcasting. Audiences listen to VOA directly.
Most Worldnet viewers attend post screenings by
invitation or watch local television stations that
carry Worldnet in different forms. The implications
of these distinctions for programming and audi-
ence research are considerable.

Although Worldnet’s daily service was initiated
in Europe for technical and other reasons, the Com-
mission believes its impact and potential is greater
in less highly developed media markets. In a report
to the Congress in September 1988, USIA stated that
“material from Worldnet’s daily program service is

used in at least 36 non-European countries.” The :

report went on to cite extensive placement of daily
service programs in many developing countries,
including “as much as 40 percent of the U.S.-related
material seen on local news programs” in Latin
America.”

The Commission also sees considerable value
in experiments with brief self-contained programs
that facilitate placement on local television broad-
casts. ‘“Newsfile,” Worldnet's newsclip service,
convincingly demonstrated the usefulness of this
approach prior to suspension of the daily service.

“Worldnet Viewership Around the World,” Report from USIA
to Congress, September, 1988.

The Commission believes Worldnet has passed
successfully through the inevitable growing pains
of its first five years. Numerous telegrams from U.S.
ambassadors relaying concerns from foreign gov-
ernments and media about Worldnet’s shutdown
attest to its growing value. Illustrative are the views
of the U.S. mission in Liberia.

“We were unable to offer the News File and America
Today to the Liberian Broadcasting System [which]
with 150,000 viewers regularly uses about 8 minutes
of Worldnet clips on its nightly news program...
More significantly, [the] post had to leave television
and radio producers up in the air as to the
resumption of Worldnet programming. Clients who
count on these news feeds and actualities ... have
been left hanging in a way that injures our credibility
as reliable suppliers ... Without Worldnet, both the
information needs of this society and the mission's
effectiveness in communicating the American
perspective suffer a loss.”

The Commission strongly believes USIA should
be allowed to expand Worldnet’s interactives and
vernacular broadcasts to Asia, Africa, Latin America
and the Middle East. Tolerance for trial and error
is needed as the Agency experiments with program
formats and delivery technologies in anticipation
that the most significant payoffs in this dynamic
medium lie ahead.

As Worldnet’s role is defined by the next admin-
istration, the Commission urges broad agreement
on several goals.

Worldnet statement of mission. USIA should prepare
a statement of mission and a comprehensive de-
velopment plan for Worldnet. The Commission un-
derstands that budgetary uncertainties, fluctuations
in, satellite prices and availability, and lack of pro-
gram experience (both overseas and in Washing-
ton) have made it difficult to draft such planning
documents. Ina real sense, USIA is writing the book
on international television and public diplomacy.
Nevertheless, it is time for USIA to chart a com-
prehensive course for Worldnet, which can be mod-
ified as experience warrants.

In its long-range planning, the Agency should
give special emphasis to the audience surveys, re-
source estimates, and assessment of programs and



MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

WORLDNET

The United States has taken the lead in using tele-
vision for public diplomacy purposes through the
creation of Worldnet, USIA’s satellite television net-
work. Initiated with a single experimental satellite
press conference in 1983, Worldnet has grown in
five years to become a daily television service used
to transmit information about the United States to
all parts of the world. Worldnet is one of the most
far-reaching public diplomacy innovations of the
past decade and a significant accomplishment of
USIA Director Wick. It deserves adequate funding
and bipartisan support.

Worldnet is a network of TVRO dishes at USIA’s
overseas posts linked by satellite to the Agency's
television studios in Washington. More than 150 of
the 185 TVROs planned for the complete network
have been installed. Worldnet consists of five re-
gional services: Europe (EURONET), Africa (AF-
NET), Latin America (ARNET), the Middle East and
South Asia (NEANET), and East Asia (EANET). The

Foreign Service national employees in Somalia model World-
net T-shirts in front of USIA’s dish antenna.

Commission urges USIA to give high priority to
completing the technical arrangements for World-
net’s global system.

INTERACTIVE DIALOGUES
Worldnet consists of two kinds of programs: inter-
active dialogues and the daily program service.

Interactive programs provide foreign journalists
and other audiences access to U.S. policymakers
and American experts via satellite television. Pro-
grams are issue-oriented and tailored to the inter-
ests of participating posts. Secondary placement in
both video and print media significantly extends
their reach. Through November 1988, USIA had
sponsored 1,020 Worldnet dialogues.

Examples of Worldnet dialogues include:
TM Interviews with Secretary of State George Shultz
and Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci prior to
the Moscow summit;
® Programs on the role of market forces in devel-
oping countries with U.S. Chamber of Commerce
President Richard Lesher and other distinguished
economists from the U.S. and Latin America;
® A series of programs on the 1988 U.S. elections
with politicians, journalists, political consultants,
and public opinion experts;
TM Programs on ozone depletion with Dr. Robert
Watson, scientific coordinator for NASA’s Global
Habitability Project;
® An interview with Marta Istomin, Artistic Director
of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing
Arts;
® An interview with AFL-CIO President Lane Kirk-
land on the views of American labor organizations
and their support for the Solidarity movement in
Poland.

The Commission has discussed Worldnet’s pro-
grams with ambassadors, public diplomacy offi-
cials, and foreign opinion-makers. The Commis-
sion’s Chairman and Vice Chairman have appeared
several times as guests on Worldnet’s interactive
programs and have seen how they work from: the
inside. We have also seen how they are received


MANAGEMENT

Media and Advocacy Skills Training

@ The Commission strongly reaffirms its recommendation that USIA
and the Department of State provide media and advocacy skills train-
ing for all Ambassadors, Public Affairs Officers and other embassy
officials likely to serve as foreign policy spokespersons prior to and
during their service abroad.

he premise behind the Commission’s re-

peated endorsement of media and advo-

cacy skills training is quite simple: contact

with foreign journalists and other opinion
makers gives American diplomats opportunities to
advance foreign policy objectives and correct mis-
impressions about the United States. Training is
essential to doing this well.

Ambassadors, Public Affairs Officers, and other
designated embassy officials ought to welcome the
chance to present American viewpoints and seek
useful and appropriate public occasions to do so.
Television skills training is especially important if
U.S. diplomats are to communicate in a logical,
persuasive, and appealing manner via this chal-
lenging medium. With media contact becoming
more and more a part of daily embassy routine, it
is essential that hands-on training and frequent
practice become part of their professional
development.

The Commission welcomes USIA’s recent estab-
lishment of regular media training workshops for
its junior and mid-career officers. The workshops
combine technical training with role-playing on
substantive issues. Emphasis is given also to the

USIA provides on-camera media skills training for Foreign Service Officers.


SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

VOA Charter. Efforts to tailor them to regional con-
cerns and vigilance to assure their congruence with
U.S. policies should continue.

= VOA Europe and VOA Bandeirantes in Brazil are
successful experiments in placement program-
ming. VOA should pursue similar transnational
partnerships in Asia, Spanish-speaking Latin Amer-
ica, and other areas where shortwave listenership
has declined.

@ VOA’s International Training Center for journal-
ists and broadcasters in the developing world is
contributing to the free flow of information, creating
a large alumni network trained in all aspects of
broadcasting, and fostering national networks pat-
terned on VOA’s programming principles and jour-
nalistic practices. The Center should be given high
priority and adequate resources.

TELEVISION

@ Television is a powerful force in shaping inter-
national events. Through Worldnet, USIA’s satellite
television network, the United States has taken the
lead in using television to advocate its policies and
develop understanding of American society and
values. Worldnet deserves adequate funding and
bipartisan support.

TM Worldnet’s satellite system and placement of more
than 150 Television Receive Only (TVRO) dishes
at USIA’s posts is a significant achievement. USIA
should give high priority to completing its world-
wide network of 185 TVROs.

TM Worldnet’s “interactive” dialogues provide for-
eign journalists and other specialized audiences
direct access to U.S. policymakers and American
experts via satellite television. The Commission
commends USIA for developing this effective in-
strument of public diplomacy.

= Worldnet has passed successfully through the
inevitable growing pains of its first five years. The
United States is best served if it is viewed on its
merits as an essential and rapidly maturing element
of public diplomacy.

13

@ Termination of Worldnet’s daily program service
deprives the United States of an important com-
munications tool, adversely affects USIA’s credi-
bility with indigenous television stations and gov-
ernment officials, and forecloses options to future
administrations in conducting public diplomacy by
satellite. The Commission strongly urges Congress
to provide legislative relief quickly.

@ USIA should prepare a statement of mission and
a comprehensive development plan for Worldnet.
@ The National Security Council should examine
the U.S. government's use of satellite television as
an instrument of public diplomacy and issue a di-
rective clarifying Worldnet's long-term goals and
appropriate institutional role.

@ USIA should pursue use of satellite subcarrier
technology to integrate delivery of VOA programs,
the Wireless File, data and facsimile transmission
and other services. Worldnet and the Voice of
America should seek all appropriate opportunities
to coordinate programming and signal delivery.

= TV Marti, a proposal to broadcast U.S. govern-
ment television programs to Cuba from a tethered
balloon in the Florida Keys, has far-reaching im-
plications for public diplomacy and the national
interest. Funding for TV Marti should be contingent
on Congressional hearings, authorizing legislation,
and thorough interagency review of technical, le-
gal, regulatory, policy, and programming issues.
Funds for TV Marti should be appropriated sepa-
rately and not taken from VOA’s modernization
budget or other public diplomacy accounts.

WIRELESS FILE

@ Through computerized data transmission of the
Wireless File and experiments with direct delivery
of File copy to foreign media organizations, USIA
has greatly enhanced the quality and value of one
of its most useful media products.


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

native countries. Seventy percent maintain regular
contact with professors, advisors, and colleagues
from their American experience, and 25 percent
conduct collaborative research with their American
universities.”

U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Princeton Lyman put
it well in a recent letter to this Commission:

“The International Visitor program, and all exchange
programs, build over time a foundation of
communication and understanding between our

"M. Teresa Tatto, “Report on the Evaluation Study of the
Training for Development Program,” Latin American Scholar
ship Program of American Universities, December, 1987.
Cited in testimony by William M. Woessner, President, Youth
for Understanding, before the House Subcommittee on Inter-
national Operations, March 17, 1987.

societies that enhances the relationship in inestimable
ways. | know from my experience in Nigeria that our
job—whether in addressing political differences,
overcoming problems, or explaining U.S. policies—is
made infinitely easier because of the fundamentally
good feeling that has developed over the years
between thousands of Nigerians and Americans.
Almost every official with whom I meet has studied,
visited or participated in some program in the US.,
and that creates an atmosphere for addressing even
difficult differences in a more constructive manner.
Anti-American propaganda ... falls on far less fertile
ground because of this widespread body of people
who know our country firsthand.”

One senior public diplomacy professional has
cited surveys showing that, more than any other
factor, Western European views in the early 1980s
on the installation of INF weapons correlated with


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.

Book Programs

@ U.S. government support for book dissemination and translation
programs is inadequate in countries where information about the U.S.
is least available through alternative media and where Soviet distri-
bution of low-cost subsidized books remains widespread. The Com-
mission encourages renewed direct involvement by USIA in the do-
nated books program and development of data on overseas markets
for American titles.

he United States is the world’s leading ex-

porter of books with sales currently total-

ing an estimated one billion dollars per

year. Most of these exports, however, are
confined to popular titles sold in Canada, Japan,
Australia, India and Western Europe. U.S. book ex-
ports elsewhere lag considerably behind the Soviet
Union and some Western nations.

This “book gap” has grown more acute as gov-
ernment support for book dissemination and trans-
lation programs has declined. Systemic and policy-
related barriers (including high production costs,
distribution problems, and endemic copyright in-
fringement) have severely limited access by Amer-
ican publishers in most developing countries—
where information regarding the U.S. is least avail-
able through alternative media and where Soviet
distribution of low-cost subsidized books has been
most widespread.

The Commission supports book exports, not
merely as an end in itself, but as a means to convey
ideas that are important to the development of a
better understanding of the United States and its
policies. USIA spends just under $3 million an-
nually on programs intended to make U.S. books
available to elite and mass audiences.

TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS

USIA supports the publication and distribution
abroad of books in translation and as English re-
prints. It also assists in the transfer of reprinting

he

and translation rights to foreign publishers. The
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs rec-
ommends titles to posts, obtains rights, and oc-
casionally provides financial assistance to reduce
the risks. In 1987, some 650,000 books were pub-
lished and distributed.

USIA’s Regional Book Officers facilitate acqui-
sition of reprinting rights and translations primarily
in Spanish, French, and Arabic. Agency-supported
book translations have declined from a peak of 57
languages in the 1960s to 14 in 1985.

BOOK FAIRS AND EXHIBITS

USIA mounts thematic book exhibits at approxi-
mately 25 important national and international book
fairs each year. The Agency also sponsors thematic
exhibits of publishers’ display copies at some 85
posts.

Whether USIA’s involvement in this many book
fairs and exhibits is cost-effective is a matter of
conjecture, since no research has shown whether
a corresponding expansion of demand for U.S. titles
justifies the expense. It may be that strengthening
the Agency’s overseas library collections and sup-
port for indigenous libraries may be more effective
than book exhibits in countries where there is min-
imal demand due to economic scarcity, shortage
of foreign exchange, and unreliable distribution
networks. The Commission encourages USIA to de-
velop data on overseas markets for American titles
in evaluating and determining priorities for its book
programs.

U.S. BOOKS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The General Exchange Agreement signed at the
Geneva summit led to efforts to promote the dis-
tribution of U.S. books in the Soviet Union. Ne-
gotiations between American publishers and the
Soviets are creating commercial channels of dis-
tribution for U.S. books. Exchanges of book ex-
hibits began in 1988. And for the first time, the
Soviets have agreed to U.S. selection of titles for
translation and sale in the Soviet Union.


ats
ve

ise
tic

ant
aal

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

SECURITY AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

= Maintaining a secure environment for U.S. dip-
lomats abroad should continue to be a high na-
tional priority.

= Legislation and policies relating to diplomatic
security must take fully into account USIA’s public
diplomacy mission, the need for public access to
USIA’s facilities, and the desirability that USIA give
visible evidence of the free and open society it
represents.

= Direct appropriations to USIA or separately iden-
tified funds in the Department of State’s appropri-
ations legislation are required to provide adequate
resources for USIA’s diplomatic security needs.

= Personal contact and reasonable access to fa-
cilities are essential to public diplomacy. Replace-
ment of foreign national employees with Ameri-
cans, unrealistic rules on fraternization and contact
reporting, overbroad “core chancery” policies, and
restrictive chancery co-location regulations threaten
to cripple USIA’s programs just as new opportu-
nities are occurring in many communist countries.

MEDIA AND ADVOCACY SKILLS TRAINING

= The Commission strongly reaffirms its recom-
mendation that USIA and the Department of State
provide media and advocacy skills training for all
Ambassadors, Public Affairs Officers and other em-
bassy officials likely to serve as foreign policy
spokespersons prior to and during their service
abroad.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING

= Foreign language proficiency is vital to effective
public diplomacy. Current language training pro-
grams, personnel policies, and funding levels do
not provide an adequate supply of officers with the
professional fluency required for today’s public di-
plomacy needs. The Commission recommends that
USIA undertake a thorough review of its language
policies.

USIA OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS

= The Commission finds continued under-repre-
sentation of USIA officers in ambassadorial and
other senior positions in embassies and consu-
lates. We recommend again that the President and
the Secretary of State correct this imbalance.

= USIA’s officers should be assigned to a greater
number and wider range of positions in the De-
partment of State and the National Security Council.
A major program of interagency officer rotation would
benefit both public diplomacy and the policymak-
ing process.

FOREIGN SERVICE TIME-IN-CLASS

m The Commission finds that experienced and highly
qualified Foreign Service Officers have been in-
voluntarily retired under the “time-in-class” provi-
sion of the Foreign Service Act when need for their
service continues. Congress and the foreign affairs
agencies should consider revision of “time-in-class”
requirements for the good of the service and to
create expectations of a full career among highly
qualified Foreign Service Officers.

AUTOMATION AND

TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLANNING

m USIA has moved to a position of relative strength
in its development of automation and telecom-
munications capabilities. Continued progress will
require adaptation of new technologies into a co-
herent automation plan and Agency leadership that
devotes personal interest and necessary resources
to field and headquarters needs.

INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL AND TRADE CENTER

= The International Cultural and Trade Center com-
plex that will complete the Federal Triangle in cen-
tral Washington, D.C. is an ideal permanent home
for USIA, which is now located in eight headquar-
ters buildings. The Advisory Commission supports
the finding of the United States International Cul-
tural and Trade Center Commission that USIA’s mis-
sion uniquely qualifies it to be the Center’s primary
tenant.


UNITED STATES
ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

1989 REPORT


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Voice of America

TM The Voice of America’s shortwave broadcasting system
will continue to be a vital national asset and a primary means
of reaching audiences in many parts of the world well into
the next century. VOA modernization remains an urgent
priority.

= The multi-year shortwave modernization program an-
nounced by President Reagan in 1982 has been impeded by
lengthy site negotiations with foreign governments, delays
in hiring technical staff, USIA's inexperience with major ac-
quisitions and large-scale engineering projects, frequent
turnover in VOA Directors early in the program, increased
cost estimates, and unrealistic Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and Congressional spending limitations.

® The National Security Council, USIA, and Congress should
reexamine VOA’s modernization program in terms of na-
tional needs, broadcast requirements, resource priorities,
and alternative signal delivery systems. This should include
early policy review of OMB limitations on the shortwave
modernization program.

= New communications technologies, declining shortwave
listenership in some parts of the world, and competition
from other broadcasters and media are challenging VOA to
seek alternative transmission systems and develop more
competitive programming. Increased resources are needed
if VOA is to do this well.

@ VOA should expand its use of medium wave, FM, cable,
Worldnet transponders, leasing and facilities barter arrange-
ments, direct and package program placement, and dial-in
audio services; continue to examine Direct Broadcast Sat-
ellite (DBS) and other technologies; give high priority to
program experimentation; and ensure the findings of pro-
gram reviews and audience research are applied to pro-
gramming and modernization decisions.

® VOA’s editorials “present the policies of the United States
clearly and effectively” as required by the VOA Charter. Ef-
forts to tailor them to regional concerns and vigilance to
assure their congruence with U.S. policies should continue.
TM VOA Europe and VOA Bandeirantes in Brazil are successful
experiments in placement programming. VOA should pursue
similar transnational partnerships in Asia, Spanish-speaking
Latin America, and other areas where shortwave listenership
has declined.

® VOA’s International Training Center for journalists and
broadcasters in the developing world is contributing to the
free flow of information, creating a large alumni network
trained in all aspects of broadcasting, and fostering national
networks patterned on VOA's programming principles and
journalistic practices. The Center should be given high prior-

ity and adequate resources.


UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY The
ORGANIZATION CHART President

:
Counselor Director ;
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Voice of America Programs
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Office of External Affais 1 Foreign Press Centers ‘
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78



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

COMPARISON OF USIA’S OPERATING EXPENSES |

ON A CONSTANT DOLLAR BASIS*

FISCAL YEARS 1967-1989

Dols in Mons, eee
00

700

600:

500
Actual Dollars

0 T T T T T T T r T T
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 197 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989

“Excludes VOA's constructon budget, Rado Mart, and grants forthe
atonal Endoverent for Democracy and the East-West Center

HISTORY OF USIA’S POSITIONS
FISCAL YEARS 1967-1989*

Number of Positions
12500-92488

Total Positions

0 T, T. T T T T T T T.
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989

“Beginning n FY 1984, tating forthe Radio Mara program ws inuded
inthe postions shown fr both “Voce of Arena and “Total”

its resource decisions are based on rigorous pro-
gram evaluation, assessments of comparative pro-
gram value, and continuous review of country
priorities.

International broadcasting. In FY 1988, the United
States spent approximately $392 million on inter-
national radio and television broadcasting opera-
tions exclusive of facilities modernization: Voice
of America ($169.6 million), Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty ($172.5 million), Worldnet ($37 mil-
lion), and Radio Marti ($12.8 million). Now is an
appropriate time for a comprehensive review of US.
international radio and television broadcasting in
terms of national resource priorities, foreign policy
objectives, and changing technology and media
habits. The Commission is prepared to work with
Congress and the new administration in carrying
out such a review.

Representation. Adequate funds for overseas rep-
resentation activities are essential to effective pub-
lic diplomacy. The Commission welcomes recent
modest increases in the amount earmarked for rep-
resentation by Congress in USIA’s budget. In the
United States, we take it for granted that personal
contact in a social setting can boost sales, enhance
a corporate image, or garner political support.
Overseas, it means that USIA’s Public Affairs Offi-
cers can take full advantage of their access to opin-
ion elites and receive the hearing their message
deserves in crowded communications environ-
ments. Commission members are aware that many
Foreign Service Officers dip into their own pockets
rather than miss public diplomacy opportunities.
USIA’s representation funds serve the national in-
terest and should be increased to adequate levels.


WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

ublic diplomacy is a term that is used to

identify the international information,

cultural, and educational programs of the

United States government. The U.S. In-
formation Agency (USIA) has primary responsibility
for the conduct of American public diplomacy and
for advising the government on the policy impli-
cations of foreign attitudes and perceptions. The
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
oversees USIA’s programs and other government
public diplomacy activities.

USIA accomplishes its mission in different ways:
Personal Contact. Foreign Service Officers assigned
to American embassies around the world carry out
USIA’s programs and communicate with officials,
journalists, scholars, and other opinion leaders in
private meetings, sponsored seminars, and repre-
sentational events.

Voice of America. USIA’s international radio network
broadcasts news, policy editorials, and programs
on American life in 43 languages to a weekly world-
wide audience of 129 million listeners.

Educational Exchanges. In cooperation with American
private sector organizations, USIA supports edu-
cational and cultural programs intended to in-
crease mutual understanding between the people
of the United States and other countries through
the Fulbright academic exchange program and other
activities.

Television. USIA’s Worldnet satellite television net-
work transmits news and public affairs programs
from Washington to U.S. embassies, local tele-
vision stations, and cable systems overseas.
International Visitors. U.S. embassies annually invite
approximately 3,000 foreign leaders in government,
media, labor, science, education, the arts, and other
fields to come to the United States for short-term
visits.

Press and Publications. USIA’s Wireless File transmits
U.S. policy statements and interpretive materials to
all overseas posts. USIA publishes 14 magazines
and distributes features, by-line articles, and re-
prints from U.S. publications.

Libraries and Books. USIA maintains or supports 156
libraries and reading rooms in 95 countries used

by some four million visitors each year and assists
in the publication and distribution of approximately
600,000 books annually.

Cultural Programs. USIA administers the fine and per-
forming arts programs of the U.S. government
overseas.

USIA also supports exhibits, speaker programs,
English language instruction, Radio Marti, Foreign
Press Centers in the U.S., sports programs, media
training workshops, American studies programs,
and a variety of other activities. The National En-
dowment for Democracy and the East-West Center
in Hawaii are supported by Agency grants.

With certain narrow exceptions, USIA is prohib-
ited by law from disseminating its programs within
the United States. Consequently, despite its im-
portance, public diplomacy is not well understood
by the American people.

It is public diplomacy when President Reagan
speaks to students at Moscow State University, when
a USIA Public Affairs Officer explains U.S. policies
toa foreign news editor, when the Secretary of State
holds a press conference broadcast by VOA and
Worldnet television, when USIA arranges a NATO
site visit for European journalists, when an African
political leader visits an American family in St. Louis,
or when the U.S. Ambassador in Egypt gives a speech
on American aid programs.

Public diplomacy connotes communication,
public affairs, press relations, people-to-people ex-
changes, and cultural ties between nations. It en-
courages foreign audiences to examine U.S. poli-
cies and the American social experiment closely,
to ask tough questions, and to expect frank an-
swers. Exchange programs invite others to come
to the United States to see for themselves and to
hold up to the light the entire American experience.
Public diplomacy seeks to articulate what is cred-
ible and informative when measured against per-
spectives from other sources in an increasingly
crowded and sophisticated worldwide communi-
cations environment.

This report is about these purposes and these
programs.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

Wireless File

@ Through computerized data transmission of the Wireless File and
experiments with direct delivery of File copy to foreign media organ-
izations, USIA has greatly enhanced the quality and value of one of
its most useful media products.

SIA has made great strides in using the

technology of the information age to

modernize its oldest media tool—the

Wireless File. A compendium of official
policy statements, speeches, press briefings, news
reports, bylined articles, and other documentary
materials, the Wireless File seeks to explain the
policies and actions of the United States and do-
mestic developments that affect our relations with
other countries.

The Agency uses computerized data transmis-
sion and radioteletype to deliver five regional edi-
tions of the File to its overseas posts. File copy is
translated into Arabic, Spanish, and French. In re-
cent years, the File has become more useful to
journalists and foreign news editors through ex-
panded coverage and greater attention to Congres-
sional developments.

Some 125 posts receive the File via automated
systems. Electronic transmission greatly increases
delivery speed, reduces errors, enhances archival
capability, and permits posts to retrieve the File at
convenient local times and edit copy to preferred
length and format, including material of interest to
limited audiences. USIA is experimenting with
sending continuous updates of File material
throughout the day. The garbles, delays, and main-
tenance problems associated with radioteletype
technology are greatly reduced with automated de-
livery. Computer-to-computer delivery using inter-
national telephone services is expensive, however,
to the point that some posts cannot afford auto-
mated transmission.

In 1987, USIA initiated Express File, an experi-
mental service that transmits Wireless File copy
directly to 26 media organizations in London, Rome,
The Hague, Brussels, Copenhagen and Ankara. A
year later, USIA expanded its coverage to include
Tel Aviv. Clearly labeled as USIA material, Express
File is transmitted six days a week on facilities
leased from United Press International and the In-
ternational Foreign Correspondents Association.

The Commission welcomes USIA’s experiment
with direct transmission to media organizations.
The ability to deliver perishable information rap-
idly, directly, and reliably to foreign newsrooms is
a major step forward for public diplomacy.

The Commission is mindful of the concerns of
some that Express File technology can undercut
the role of USIA’s field officers in communicating
U.S. policies to foreign media. Properly used, we
believe the Express File is a good example of tech-
nology permitting Public Affairs Officers to do a
better job. With Express File, PAOs can pick up a
phone, call an influential editor about a significant
policy statement, and know the text has already
reached the newsroom. The ultimate responsibility
for ensuring that Wireless File materials receive
their maximum intended use lies as always with
overseas officers who are familiar with the issues
and sensitive to local concerns.

The Commission strongly encourages USIA to
pursue the use of Worldnet satellite subcarrier
channels to deliver the Wireless File. The potential
for cost-savings and error-free transmission is con-
siderable. Satellite delivery shows particular prom-
ise for those eight branch posts—most in Eastern
Europe—that still receive the File by diplomatic
pouch. The Commission hopes that success with
the Express File and with Worldnet subcarrier trans-
mission will, when available resources permit, lead
to seven-day Wireless File service.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

adversely affecting how summits and their out-
comes are perceived.

The last four superpower summits have been
media events on a grand scale. Public diplomacy
planning does not mean tailoring U.S. policies to
suit the needs of the media. It does involve timely
consideration of how issues are presented in rec-
ognition that immense public interest makes sum-
mits quite different from conventional diplomacy.

The visual image of the President at superpower
summits takes on an importance that is at least
equal to his message. For this reason, decisions
as to who the President meets, what groups he
addresses, and what media are used are critical.
Atthe Moscow summit, for example, President Rea-
gan’s meetings with non-official Soviets (students,
artists, religious leaders) had important ramifica-
tions for the message he sought to convey. Tele-
vision has become the dominant news medium in
the Soviet Union just as in the United States. It is
essential that future Presidents be allowed to speak
without censorship to Soviet television audiences
prior to future superpower summits.

In summit planning, the U.S. should ensure that

equal access to briefing facilities is provided for
foreign and domestic media. Joint media centers
worked well at the Washington and Moscow su-
perpower summits and contributed to the type of
positive foreign press coverage that well-briefed
journalists can provide.

Summits, by definition, are exercises in sym-
metry and equivalence. Joint final communiques
and joint appearances by spokesmen before the
world’s press at special media centers have be-
come the norm. It is important that a shared process
of communication at superpower summits not lead
to efforts to harmonize competing messages or to
imply a moral equivalence between U.S. and Soviet
objectives.

Finally, USIA should react quickly to provide post-
summit narrative and visual accounts to its posts.
The Agency's field officers legitimately wonder why
Soviet pamphlets—claiming credit for successes
and framing summit issues to suit Soviet priori-
ties—sometimes provide an unchallenged version
of summit events. USIA should improve its post-
summit communications and ensure that print and
visual materials are disseminated rapidly.

USIA Director
Charles Z. Wick and
senior staff meet
with Soviet Minister
of Culture Vasiliy
Zakharov and
Ambassador Yuri
Dubinin at talks
commemorating
thirty years of US~
Soviet cultural
exchange.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

and the next administration will face. The Com-
mission has no crystal ball, but we do offer several
general considerations for decision-makers in the
Executive Branch and Congress.

Supplements to shortwave. The search for affordable
supplements to shortwave delivery systems should
be pursued vigorously. Placement of VOA programs
on local stations can increase audiences at sub-
stantially lower costs than shortwave or medium
wave broadcasting. VOA is already doing a great
deal of this. It should be encouraged to do more.

VOAMorldnet cooperation. Worldnet’s satellite sub-
carrier technology offers a highly promising means
of delivering VOA’s signal to overseas dish anten-
nas for program placement, and in some instances
direct VOA broadcast relays. USIA should pursue
this as a high priority. Cooperation in the use of
news services, language talent, and program de-
velopment should also be emphasized consistent
with the special requirements of each medium.

Broadcasting priorities. The prospect of continued
funding uncertainty and unusual dynamism in VOA’s
communications environment will require ongoing
review of broadcast priorities. USIA, in cooperation
with the NSC and the Department of State, should
assess the cost-effectiveness of VOA's language and
English services. Language services with small or
rapidly declining audiences and English broad-
casts to areas of the world with few English speak-
ers or which duplicate VOA’s vernacular broadcasts
should be looked at especially closely. To this end,
the Commission welcomes the recent establish-
ment of VOA’s Broadcast Priorities Planning Group
and encourages its continuation.

New technologies. Direct Broadcast Satellite, single
side band, and other signal innovations seem un-
likely answers at the moment, but VOA should con-
tinue to monitor regulatory, technical, and political
developments relating to these technologies.

Research. VOA continues to set the standard for
Agency elements in effective use of audience re-
search and program evaluation. Additional invest-
ment in research, concrete application of the find-
ings by senior and mid-level VOA management,

“4

continued cooperation with the research depart-
ments of other international broadcasters, assess-
ment of what competitive broadcasters are doing,
and systematic long-range planning are essential.

INTERNATIONAL TRAINING

VOA’s International Training Center, established in
1983, provides training on reporting and writing,
radio engineering, station management, and jour-
nalistic standards for broadcasters and journalists
in developing countries. The Commission has sup-
ported VOA’s media training program from the out-
set, and we continue to find it a sound public di-
plomacy investment.

Modeled after successful programs operated by
the BBC and other international broadcasters, VOA
in five years has provided training opportunities for
more than 700 broadcasters and journalists from
90 countries. The Center works closely with USIA’s
overseas posts and the Agency’s program offices
in Washington. Thematic workshops on such is-
sues as drug abuse offer program development op-
portunities for VOA and other USIA elements in
addition to training in broadcasting skills.

The Center’s creative use of academic, journal-
istic, and language expertise in American univer-
sities gives depth and breadth to the program. For
example, innovative seminars at the University of
Maine for French-speaking broadcasters hold con-
siderable promise for academic programs in Span-
ish and other languages elsewhere.

The Commission finds that VOA’s International
Training Center is contributing to the free flow of
information, creating a large alumni network trained
in all aspects of broadcasting, and fostering na-
tional media networks that emulate VOA’s pro-
gramming principles and journalistic practices. It
has received many positive ratings from USIA’s field
posts. The Center should be given a high priority
and adequate resources.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

all NSC decision directives contain a public diplo-
macy component.

An interagency planning and coordinating mechanism is
needed, The elaborate public diplomacy coordinat-
ing mechanism established by National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) 77 in 1982 has not worked
well. The Senior Planning Group (SPG), chaired by
the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and its four subordinate committees have
met infrequently and have not played the overall
planning and coordinating role expected of them.

It is not the Commission’s intent to offer a blue-
print for a public diplomacy coordinating mecha-
nism at the White House level. If public diplomacy
is to be integrated effectively into the foreign policy
process, however, we believe it essential that one
be established, one that will be used and one with
which the new administration is comfortable.

Assignments and regular tours of duty. The assign-
ment of USIA’s officers to regular tours of duty in
the White House, the State Department, the Defense
Department, and other foreign affairs agencies can
increase cooperation and awareness of the value
of public diplomacy. USIA’s officers have served
effectively in such assignments, albeit infrequently
and not always at senior levels.

The Commission believes more USIA officers

Local journalists
attend a program
on the 1988
“Super Tuesday”
primaries at USIA's
Worldnet studio in
Caracas.

should be detailed to other agencies and more
policy officers should be detailed to USIA. A sys-
tematic program of interagency rotational assign-
ments, both in headquarters and the field, would
do much to bring USIA into the policy process and
policymakers into the public diplomacy process.
Senior USIA officers also should be assigned ad
hoc to the White House and interagency planning
groups for economic and U.S.-Soviet summits. Use
of the “USIA asset in place” is not adequate to
planning for summits and other events of similar
magnitude.

Increased field reporting. Reports from USIA’s field
officers can be useful in supplementing the atti-
tudinal research studies used to provide policy-
makers with assessments of foreign public opinion.
The Agency’s officers have a wide variety of con-
tacts and a wealth of knowledge about foreign me-
dia and cultures. Their reports can inform policy-
makers on such matters as travel by the President
and Cabinet-level officials, major foreign policy
speeches, and bilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions. USIA has not emphasized such reporting. The
Commission urges the Agency to increase the im-
portance it attaches to reporting on selected issues.


SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ND FINDINGS

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY’S MISSION AND STRUCTURE

® Public diplomacy is a strategic component of
United States foreign policy. It should be treated
and funded accordingly.

TM The international information and educational
exchange programs of the United States govern-
ment have been carried out overseas as integrated,
coordinated. programs since World War II. The
strength of U.S. public diplomacy lies in the skillful,
comprehensive use of all of its major programs
through a single organization.

TM@ USIA’s reorganization in 1977 followed the most
extensive Congressional hearings ever held on pub-
lic diplomacy. It has proven to be a wise, farsighted,
and cost-effective achievement.

® To avoid misunderstanding and semantic con-
fusion, the Commission recommends the Depart-
ment of State discontinue use of the term public
diplomacy to characterize public affairs programs
in the United States.

U.S.-SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

= The quantity, quality and extent of Soviet public
diplomacy activities have increased dramatically
under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

= By adopting Western public relations techniques
and skillfully exploiting the image of a more open
society, the Soviets have improved relations with
the media in many countries and have greatly in-
creased receptivity to their public diplomacy.

TM Glasnost and the current atmosphere of change
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are gen-
erating extraordinary opportunities for the United
States with important implications for the funding,
staffing, and content of USIA’s programs.

= The United States should pursue increased ac-
cess and opportunities in the Soviet Union: more
open cities, fewer travel restrictions, more oppor-
tunities for U.S. journalists to interview Soviet of-
ficials, greater flow of U.S. materials to Soviet cit-
izens, more opportunities for American officials to
provide timely public affairs comment in the Soviet
media, and increased U.S.-Soviet exchanges in all
fields.

® Soviet disinformation continues and requires
constant vigilance and prompt exposure.

UNDERINVESTMENT IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

= The United States continues to underinvest in
international information and cultural programs,
despite substantial increases in funding during the
1980s. Investment in public diplomacy is smaller
today in real terms than two decades ago.

TM Public diplomacy requires additional resources
to modernize aging facilities, to capitalize on new
communications technologies, to meet the chal-
lenges of glasnost and improved Soviet policy ad-
vocacy, and to take advantage of program
opportunities.

USIA’S ADVISORY ROLE

TM The President, the Secretary of State, and the
National Security Advisor should treat public di-
plomacy as a central element in the planning and
implementation of foreign policy.

® In too many instances, USIA is not called upon
to advise the National Security Council and the
Department of State on the public affairs conse-
quences of proposed policies.

® The National Security Council's Special Planning
Group (SPG) and International: Information Com-
mittee (IIC) have not played the public diplomacy
coordinating role intended by NSDD 77. Routine
and effective coordination between USIA, other for-
eign affairs and defense agencies, and the White
House Press Office is essential. The NSC should
devise a coordinating structure with which it is
comfortable and use it regularly.

RESEARCH

= Commitment to public opinion research in for-
eign policy decision-making remains largely ritu-
alistic, despite enhancement of USIA’s research ca-
pability and increased use of research findings by
policymakers.

® USIA should tailor its research more closely to
the needs of field posts and resume country studies
of media habits and telecommunications trends.
TM USIA should give greater emphasis to attitudinal
research outside of Western Europe and Japan.

®@ USIA should develop an Agency-wide program
evaluation strategy, increase the proportion of funds


EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

English Teaching

SIA’s English language teaching pro-

grams, long an essential part of Ameri-

can public diplomacy, are not given the

attention they deserve despite their im-
portance to U.S. interests. The government sup-
ports English teaching overseas for reasons that
include its intrinsic cultural and communications
value, exposure to American thought through class-
room materials, and student participation in other
USIA activities. Funding for these programs and the
number of USIA English teaching officers abroad
have not kept pace with rapidly expanding world-
wide demand for quality English language
instruction.

USIA employs a variety of direct and indirect
approaches in its English teaching programs: staff
consultations at U.S.-supported binational centers
and USIA’s information centers; training seminars;
exchange grants; language testing; distribution of
print, audio, and visual instructional materials and
equipment; publication of English Teaching Forum,
a professional quarterly journal; and consultations
with foreign government, university, and teacher
training officials. Budget reductions have caused
USIA to focus on programs for students who require
English for career development, on materials suit-
able for mass dissemination on a low cost basis,
and on the sale of Agency-produced materials to
generate revenues for other English teaching
activities.

In collaboration with Macmillan Publishers, USIA
is assisting in the development of a multimillion
dollar English Language Teaching by Broadcast
Project (ELTB) now expected to be completed late
in 1989. ELTB will include 26 TV/video and 52 radio/
audio programs as well as classroom and self-study
materials. A pilot series is being developed for
placement on foreign media and for use on World-

3|

net and the Voice of America. ELTB is expected to
provide-a financial return on the sale of supporting
text materials that will justify the private sector in-
vestment. Begun in 1985, ELTB has taken longer to
complete than anticipated. The project is a worth-
while example of public and private sector coop-
eration and a potentially valuable tool in foreign
English language instruction.

USIA continues to exercise the authority wisely
granted by Congress to apply proceeds from the
sale of English teaching materials to other English
teaching activities. “Recycled funds” have helped
posts increase their participation in worthwhile
programs and further their outreach with local in-
stitutions. More than $3 million has been reinvested
to date.

USIA recently reestablished the long dormant
English Teaching Advisory Panel to provide tech-
nical expertise on developments in Teaching Eng-
lish as a Foreign Language (TEFL). The Commis-
sion welcomes USIA’s use of private sector expertise
in this field.

“There is an ovvious international demand for
the English language. ... A quick survey
convincingly demonstrates the demand. Over 80
percent of the information stored in computers
around the world is stored in English. One-
quarter of China’s one billion people are
studying English. More than half of the Soviet
secondary school students wish to study

English. English instruction offers us a unique
opportunity to bridge cultural and political gaps.”

Remarks by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) at the Advisory
Commission's 40th Anniversary Conference on “Public
Diplomacy in the Information Age," Department of State,
September 15-16, 1987


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MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

US-INFONET

= The Commission finds US-INFONET, USIA’s automated information
and policy guidance system, to be a highly promising new service and
recommends that it be made available to all overseas posts as quickly
as local communications capabilities permit.

SIA has initiated a ten-year office auto-

mation plan to provide word processing,

electronic mail, telefax, program con-

trol, and budgetary and administrative
support functions to on-line users at the Agency's
headquarters and overseas posts. Known as US-
INFONET, the system will incorporate a variety of
office data bases planned or under development
by Agency elements.

USIA began routine electronic transmission of
policy guidance to overseas posts in 1987. Styled
“Keynotes,” it includes statements, press guidance,
speech excerpts, and other materials on the broad
range of major U.S. foreign policy issues.

Keynotes is compiled by the Agency’s Bureau of
Programs and sent via computerized data trans-
mission to posts in Europe, Asia, Latin America
and the Middle East. A master file, updated pe-
riodically, is maintained in computer memory. USIA’s
field officers can tap the entire collection or merely
the updates as they wish. The material is used for
talking points, in the preparation of speeches, and
for distribution to interested post contacts.

The Commission finds Keynotes to be a valuable
new service. Public Affairs Officers have informed

The Wireless File, edited on state-of-the-art equipment, pro-
vides authoritative statements and discussions of US. poli-
cies to American embassies.

us it enhances their ability to communicate more
quickly and knowledgeably on a greater number of
foreign policy issues than any one person could
hope to master through independent effort. The
Commission has found, however, that Keynotes is
not always updated on a regular basis, and it urges
the Agency to take care that information in the
system is current and relevant.

Keynotes, or “Guideline” as it will be called when
US-INFONET is completed, provides a useful and
comprehensive supplement to the Wireless File’s
daily compilation of items of regional interest. The
Agency plans to incorporate so-called “fast guid-
ance,” including texts of White House and State
Department briefings, in a separate data base called
“Policy Alert.”

USIA’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
is also developing a multiple data base called “Pub-
lic Diplomacy Query” (PDQ), an indexed compen-
dium of Agency products .and program events.
Wireless File articles are accessible within one hour
of release. Plans call for inclusion of lists of Inter-
national Visitors, VOA features and editorials, and
the full text of Agency magazines.

A separate data base within US-INFONET inte-
grates all program support requested by posts in
their annual country plans. Another data base un-
der development will provide a compilation of post
requirements for support on priority issues. US-
INFONET also affords access to leading commer-
cial data bases including NEXIS, DIALOG, LEGI-
SLATE and selected government data services.

Other features to be added when resources per-
mit include: “Expertise,” an index of individuals
who have participated in USIA’s programs; “Opin-
ion,” abstracted domestic and foreign media com-
mentary and public opinion analyses; and “Dis-
infonet,” a data source of Soviet active measures
and disinformation and U.S. government responses.

The Commission welcomes these developments
and urges USIA to give US-INFONET a high priority,
familiarize all overseas officers with its features,
update its contents regularly, and expand its dis-
tribution as quickly as local communications ca-
pabilities permit.


MEDIA AND PROGRAMS

that the numbers of visitors are kept at levels that
will ensure a positive viewing experience and not
impede the communication of exhibit themes.

The U.S. has much to gain from carefully focused
exhibits in the Soviet bloc and in China. They can
provide millions with unparalleled exposure to
American citizens and life in the United States out-
side the scope of official contacts and traditional
exchange programs. They offer a focal point for
collateral programming by USIA’s posts and open-
ings to political elites often unreachable in other
ways.

Multimedia exhibits in denied areas are a sound
investment. The Commission believes the time is
ripe for a national exhibition in China. We urge
USIA and the Congress to give it a high priority.

INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITIONS

Nations participate in world’s fairs to enhance their
image, to demonstrate accomplishments, and to
stimulate trade and tourism. In 1986, the Commis-

A guide demon-
strates communica-
tion equipment for
the handicapped at
USIA's “Information
USA" exhibit in Kiev.

sion recommended that USIA chair an interagency
task force to address continuing questions about
these traditional purposes, the quality of U.S. ex-
hibits, and their relationship to American interests.
What are the political, commercial, and public di-
plomacy benefits of world’s fairs? What is their
value compared to other public diplomacy pro-
grams? What is the appropriate level and mix of
federal, state, and private sector funding? Have
Presidential-level commitments to participate in
world’s fairs without full assessment of their re-
source implications adversely affected the quality
of the U.S. presence? What is needed to achieve
adequate funding and the national commitment
necessary for top quality U.S. exhibitions? In the
Commission's view, these and other questions raise
continuing concerns that need to be addressed by
Congress and the foreign affairs agencies.

USIA chaired a task force that included the State
and Commerce Departments. The task force reaf-


SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS.

US-INFONET

m The Commission finds US-INFONET, USIA’s au-
tomated information and policy guidance system,
to be a highly promising new service and recom-
mends that it be made available to all overseas
posts as quickly as local communications capa-
bilities permit.

EXHIBITS

= Carefully focused multimedia exhibits, accom-
panied by language-qualified American guides, are
a highly effective means of communicating with
millions of Soviets and East Europeans about life
in the United States. USIA should give high priority
to a national exhibition for China.

= The U.S. should not participate in world’s fairs
unless it is prepared to commit the resources needed
for a top quality American presence. Funding for
world’s fairs should not be drawn from other public
diplomacy programs.

m The National Security Council should respond
to the findings of the World's Fair Task Force and
provide a clear statement of the U.S. government's
role in international expositions.

= The Director of USIA should be a member of the
Christopher Columbus Quincentenary Jubilee
Commission.

EXCHANGE OF PERSONS

mw The Commission finds that international edu-
cational and cultural exchange programs admin-
istered by USIA in cooperation with private organ-
izations provide an understanding and appreciation
of the United States and are among the most ef-
fective tools of public diplomacy.

= Budget reductions threaten to undermine gains
made during the 1980s and USIA’s ability to
strengthen international exchange programs as in-
tended by Congress.

= The Fulbright scholarship program develops trust
and good will in ways that further U.S. interests. It
remains a vital and innovative model for other in-
ternational educational exchanges.

mw

= USIA’s increasing reliance on short-term grants
for American lecturers appears less likely to achieve
long-term Fulbright program objectives. The Com-
mission encourages the Agency to assess the use
of these grants.

= Overseas academic counseling and domestic
foreign student outreach programs are important
to U.S. interests. They should be given additional
resources.

= Funding for the Central American undergraduate
exchange program should be restored to its FY 1986
level.

® Additional private sector participation in ex-
change programs with the Soviet Union is in the
national interest. The number of U.S. and Soviet
high school students participating in exchanges
should be increased.

= US.-Soviet educational exchanges should em-
phasize the social sciences and humanities. Re-
ciprocity should be maintained in academic fields
and overall numbers of grantees.

= The Commission strongly supports negotiations
with the Soviet Union for an American cultural cen-
ter in Moscow.

= USIA should expand its bilateral academic and
cultural exchanges with the countries of Eastern
Europe.

® USIA’s posts should use their developing auto-
mation capabilities to maintain involvement of for-
mer International Visitors and East-West Center par-
ticipants in post programs.

BOOK PROGRAMS

@ U.S. government support for book dissemination
and translation programs is inadéquate in countries
where information about the U.S. is least available
through alternative media and where Soviet distri-
bution of low-cost subsidized books remains wide-
spread. The Commission encourages renewed di-
rect involvement by USIA in the donated books
program and development of data on overseas mar-
kets for American titles.