2021 IL App (1st) 192260-U 

FIRST DIVISION

March 15, 2021 

No. 1-19-2260 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

KATHERINE ROACH, as Special Administrator of the 

Estate of Jada Woodard, deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SANDER Y. CASTRO, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and

MAX BARNES and TEQUIA BELLANGER,

Defendants.

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 Appeal from the 

 Circuit Court of 

 Cook County 

 No. 19 L 2920 

 The Honorable 

Daniel T. Gillespie,

 Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hyman and Coghlan concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim with prejudice where 

plaintiff could not establish that defendant car owner’s negligence was a proximate 

cause of decedent’s death as a matter of law. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff, Katherine Roach, as special administrator of the estate of Jada Woodard, appeals 

from the circuit court’s dismissal of her claim against defendant, Sander Y. Castro. Plaintiff filed 
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suit against Castro alleging that his negligence in leaving his vehicle running with the keys in the 

ignition proximately caused Woodard’s death ten days later. The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s 

claim with prejudice after finding that Castro’s alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of 

Woodard’s death. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that on March 16, 2017, Castro was the owner of a 2013 

Dodge Durango. Castro drove to the Shell Gas Station at 1600 West North Avenue, Chicago. 

Castro went inside to pay for the gas, and left his vehicle running with the keys in the ignition. 

When Castro came out his vehicle had been stolen. 

¶ 5 On March 26, 2017, Woodard was a passenger in the stolen Durango, which was being 

driven by either Max Barnes or Tequia Bellanger near the intersection of West Fulton Street and 

North Washtenaw Avenue. The Durango was traveling at a high rate of speed and drove into a

flooded viaduct, lost control and collided with a building. Woodard died as a result of the injuries 

she sustained in the accident. At the time of the collision, either Barnes or Bellanger possessed the 

Durango knowing it was stolen, they transported an open container of alcohol in the passenger 

area and they failed to maintain control over the vehicle and prevent the injury to Woodard. 

¶ 6 On March 18, 2019, plaintiff filed suit against Castro, Barnes, and Bellanger, alleging that 

their negligent actions and omissions resulted in the wrongful death of Woodard under the Illinois 

Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2018)). As to Castro, plaintiff maintained that 

his violation of Chicago Municipal Code § 9-4-080 (amended March 11, 1998) proximately caused 

Woodard’s death. Section 9-4-080 provides 

“Required parking procedure. 
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No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended 

without first stopping the engine and removing the ignition key, and when standing 

upon any grade, effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels 

to the curb or side of the roadway.” Id.

¶ 7 Castro filed a motion to dismiss the claim against him pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 

2018). Castro argued that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to show that he proximately 

caused Woodard’s death. Plaintiff’s response argued that Castro’s violation of section 9-4-080 was 

prima facie evidence of negligence and, therefore, proximate cause was a question of fact for the 

jury to decide. Castro filed a reply. 

¶ 8 On October 3, 2019, the circuit court granted Castro’s motion and dismissed plaintiff’s 

claim with prejudice. In its written order, the circuit court stated that plaintiff could not plead 

sufficient facts to show that Castro’s negligence in violating the city ordinance proximately caused 

Woodard’s death ten days later. The court ruled that “[t]he proximate cause of the accident in this 

case was not Castro’s alleged violation of Section 9-40-080. The proximate cause of the accident 

was the loss of control of the vehicle by Defendant Max Barnes or Defendant Tequia Bellanger.” 

The circuit court ordered that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of its 

order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 

¶ 9 On November 1, 2019, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss 

with prejudice because a prima facie case of negligence has been pled, and proximate cause is a 

question of fact that must be decided by the jury. 
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¶ 12 We review de novo the circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss brought under section 

2-615. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). A section 2-615 motion to 

dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face. Id.

All well-pleaded facts are taken as true and reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff 

when reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under section 2-615. Id. “Thus, a cause of action 

should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts 

can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Id.

¶ 13 To state a claim under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff must plead that “(1) 

defendant owed a duty to the deceased; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach of duty 

was the proximate cause of the deceased’s death; and (4) monetary damages resulted to persons 

designated under the Act.” Bovan v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 386 Ill. App. 3d 933, 

938 (2008). “Aside from the additional element of the occurrence of death, the elements of a 

wrongful death claim are identical to those of a common law negligence claim.” Williams v. 

Manchester, 372 Ill. App. 3d 211, 223 (2007), vacated in part, 228 Ill. 2d 404 (2008).

¶ 14 The parties do not dispute that plaintiff has adequately pled that Castro’s violation of 

section 9-4-080 constituted a breach of a duty to Woodard. “The violation of a public safety statute 

is prima facie evidence of negligence and creates a cause of action if it is the proximate cause of 

the subsequent injury.” Kacena v. George W. Bowers Co., 63 Ill. App. 2d 27, 33 (1965). See also

Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74 (1954) (holding that violation of a similar parking ordinance 

established prima facie negligence on the part of the vehicle owner) and Ruyle v. Reynolds, 43 Ill. 

App. 3d 905 (1976) (same). “The injury must have a direct and proximate connection with the 

violation of the statute before liability will be held to exist.” Ney, 2 Ill. 2d at 79. Therefore, we turn 
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to the issue of whether plaintiff adequately pled that Castro’s violation of section 9-4-080 

proximately caused Woodard’s death. 

¶ 15 I. Proximate Cause 

¶ 16 Proximate cause consists of cause in fact and legal cause. Phillips v. Budget Rent-A-Car 

Systems, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 155, 165 (2007) (citing Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 

258 (2004). “Cause in fact concerns whether the defendant’s conduct is a material factor in 

bringing about the injury if the injury would not have occurred absent the defendant’s conduct. 

[Citation.] Legal cause consists largely of a question of foreseeability.” Id.

¶ 17 For proximate cause to exist, “[t]he injury must be the natural and probable result of the 

negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have 

foreseen as likely to occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not essential that the person 

charged with negligence should have foreseen the precise injury which resulted from his act.” Ney,

2 Ill. 2d at 79. There may be more than one proximate cause of injury, and “one is liable for its 

negligent conduct whether it contributed in whole or in part to the injury as long as proximate 

cause exists.” Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 

465 (1987). 

¶ 18 Generally, where a prima facie case of negligence has been established, proximate cause 

is a question for the jury. Ney, 2 Ill. 2d at 84. “Although the issue of proximate cause is ordinarily 

a question of fact determined by the trier of fact, it is well settled that it may be determined as a 

matter of law by the court where the facts as alleged show that the plaintiff would never be entitled 

to recover.” Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d at 257-258. 

¶ 19 A. Cause in Fact
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¶ 20 Castro argues that his violation of section 9-40-080 is merely a condition which made 

Woodard’s death possible and that the negligent driving was the cause in fact of her death. He 

argues that the theft of his vehicle by an unknown person and the subsequent negligent driving of 

Barnes or Bellanger were intervening causes of Woodard’s death such that Castro’s negligence

cannot be a cause in fact of Woodard’s death as a matter of law. 

¶ 21 “When, as here, the plaintiff’s injury ‘ results not from the defendant’s negligence directly 

but from the subsequent, independent act of a third person, ’ courts determine cause in fact by 

employing the ‘substantial factor’ test.” Kramer v. Szczepaniak, 2018 IL App (1st) 171411, ¶ 27 

(quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 259 (1999)). “A defendant’s 

conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about an injury if, absent that 

conduct, the injury would not have occurred.” Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258. Where “two wholly 

independent acts, by independent parties, neither bearing to the other any relation or control, cause 

an injury by one creating the occasion or condition upon which the other operates, the act or 

omission which places the dangerous agency in operation is the efficient intervening cause that 

breaks the causal connection and makes the other act or omission the remote and not the proximate 

cause of the injury.” Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 317 (1942). 

¶ 22 Here, we find that Castro’s negligence was a condition, not a cause in fact of Woodard’s 

injury where the facts show that the accident occurred ten days after and three miles from the theft 

of Castro’s vehicle, and where Barnes or Bellanger was driving the stolen vehicle at a high rate of 

speed with an open container of alcohol into a flooded viaduct. Plaintiff argues that she sufficiently 

alleged cause in fact because Woodard would not have been in the stolen vehicle but for Castro’s 

negligence. Thus, plaintiff claims that Castro’s negligence started the chain of events which led to 

Woodard’s injury. Kacena, 63 Ill. App. 2d at 39. But Castro’s failure to remove the keys from the 
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ignition is so attenuated from the collision because of the delay and numerous intervening causes

that plaintiff cannot show that Woodard’s death would not have occurred but for Castro’s 

negligence. We find that the facts pled by plaintiff and reasonable inferences drawn in plaintiff’s 

favor cannot establish that Castro’s statutory violation was a cause in fact of Woodard’s death. 

Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.

¶ 23 B. Legal Cause

¶ 24 Even if plaintiff adequately pled that Castro’s negligence was a cause in fact of Woodard’s 

death, we find that plaintiff cannot show proximate cause because it was not reasonably 

foreseeable that Castro’s negligence would cause a collision resulting in Woodard’s death ten days 

later and three miles away. 

¶ 25 In negligence cases involving injuries caused by the intervening acts of third parties, 

“where the plaintiff’s injury results not from the defendant’s negligence directly but from the 

subsequent, independent act of a third person,” the test for whether legal cause exists is “whether 

the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural 

and probable result of the first party’s own negligence.” Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d at 259. “If the act of 

a third party is the immediate cause of the injury and is such as in the exercise of reasonable 

diligence would not be anticipated and the third person is not under the control of the one guilty 

of the original wrong, the connection is broken and the first act or omission is not the proximate 

cause of the injury.” Merlo, 381 Ill. at 317. 

¶ 26 Our supreme court in Ney held that the intervening theft of an unattended vehicle does not 

necessarily relieve the vehicle owner of liability for an accident caused by the thief in flight where 

the theft was reasonably foreseeable. 2 Ill. 2d at 80. In Kacena, this court held that factors such as 

delay, the intervening criminal acts of the thief, or the negligent driving of the stolen vehicle also 
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do not automatically break the causal connection between a plaintiff’s injury and the vehicle 

owner’s statutory violation. 63 Ill. App. 2d at 35. However, we held that “leaving keys in any 

automobile cannot render the violator liable for all consequences that might follow that act.” Id.

Answers to “questions of foreseeability and proximate cause upon which liability depends can 

only be determined from a complete examination of the factual situation presented.” Id. These 

determinations are not solely the province of the jury. “[T]here are areas in which reasonable minds 

can and will disagree as to liability and these cannot be defined except on an ad hoc basis.” Id. at 

36. 

¶ 27 In Kacena, this court specifically declined to impose a bright line limitation on liability 

based on time or physical distance between a defendant’s statutory violation, a third-party’s theft, 

and a plaintiff’s injury. Instead, we held that “[e]ach case must rest on its own facts.” Id. at 35. 

¶ 28 This court has previously ruled that time and distance may break the causal connection 

between a defendant’s failure to remove keys from a subsequently stolen vehicle and an accident 

involving the stolen vehicle. Stanko v. Zilien, 33 Ill. App. 2d 364 (1961). Stanko involved a 

common-law negligence claim brought by plaintiffs injured in a collision with a car stolen from

defendant’s automobile dealership. Id. at 366. The collision occurred twelve days after and 411⁄2 

blocks away from the site of the theft. Id. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of 

the defendant, and this court affirmed, holding that “there was no causal connection between 

leaving the key in the car and the accident twelve days later and 41 1/2 blocks from the scene of 

the theft. To hold the original owner liable in this case would be beyond the bounds of proximate 

cause.” Id. at 369. We found that the driving by the thief “which was far away in time and place 

from the theft” was the proximate cause of the accident. Id.
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¶ 29 This court considered a similar situation in Phillips, 372 Ill. App. 3d 155. In that case, the 

driver of a stolen Budget rental car collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle, injuring plaintiff. Id. at 

159. The plaintiff asserted a common-law claim of negligence against Budget, alleging that it left 

the keys in the ignition of its unattended vehicle in its private parking lot and it owed a duty to 

prevent the accident in this case. Id. at 162. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor 

of Budget and this court affirmed, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that Budget owed 

plaintiff a duty to prevent the theft. Id. at 163. This court went on to state that even if a genuine 

issue of material fact existed as to Budget’s duty to the plaintiff, “summary judgment was 

appropriate in the case at bar due to lack of proximate cause.” Id. at 165. This court stated that 

proximate cause could not be established as a matter of law because plaintiff failed to show that 

the theft of the vehicle was reasonably foreseeable, and because the accident occurred eight days 

after and 26 miles from the theft. Id. at 166. Citing Stanko, this court found “that the remoteness 

of time and distance prevented the establishment of proximate cause.” Id.

¶ 30 Like Stanko and Phillips, we find that Castro’s alleged negligence was too remote in time 

and space from Woodard’s death to be a proximate cause of it. The facts as pled here, even when 

construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, cannot show that it was reasonably foreseeable 

that Castro’s alleged negligence would result in Woodard’s death ten days later, three miles away, 

after the theft of the vehicle by an unknown person and the negligent driving of Barnes or 

Bellanger. The delay and distance between Castro’s alleged statutory violation and Woodard’s 

death, and the multiple intervening acts of the theft and the negligent driving violations by Barnes 

or Bellanger, broke the causal connection between Castro’s acts or omissions and Woodard’s 

death.
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¶ 31 Because reasonable minds would agree that Castro’s alleged negligence was not a cause in 

fact or legal cause of Woodard’s death, to impose liability for Woodard’s death on Castro would 

be outside the bounds of proximate cause. See Holbrook v. Peric, 129 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1000 (1984) 

(proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law where “no reasonable person could infer that 

defendants’ alleged negligent acts proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.”). We find that the trial 

court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim because the time and distance between the statutory 

violation and the facts surrounding the fatal incident preclude plaintiff from establishing that 

Castro proximately caused Woodard’s death as a matter of law.

¶ 32 Plaintiff did not move to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies found by the 

circuit court. On appeal, plaintiff seeks remand to the circuit court to cure the proximate cause

pleading deficiencies. However, plaintiff does not provide any argument or suggest any factual 

basis that would cure this deficiency. Given the failure to request leave to file an amended 

complaint in the circuit court and failure to provide any basis on appeal justifying that relief, we 

will not speculate on plaintiff’s ability to do so. Because plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause 

as a matter of law, amendment would not cure the deficiencies in plaintiff’s claim. We thus find 

that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. 

Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 488 (2008) (holding that where no set of facts can be proved under 

the pleadings which would entitle plaintiffs to relief, dismissal with prejudice is proper). 

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.