J-S09011-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN WILSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1918 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0743951-1991

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 16, 2024

John Wilson appeals pro se from the order entered in the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas on July 3, 2023, dismissing his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546, as untimely. Because we agree with the PCRA court that Wilson’s 

petition was untimely and he failed to plead and prove an exception to the 

PCRA time-bar, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying the PCRA petition. 

Due to our disposition, the underlying facts of his conviction are not 

relevant to this appeal. Briefly, on April 8, 1992, Wilson pled guilty to firstdegree murder, aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy. On the same 

day, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Wilson did not 

file a direct appeal. 
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Over the next few decades, Wilson filed numerous unsuccessful postconviction petitions. As these filings span three decades, it is not entirely clear 

from the record exactly how many post-conviction petitions have been filed in 

this matter. However, we note at least seven filings are referenced throughout 

the record. 

On July 29, 2022, Wilson filed the instant pro se post-conviction petition, 

styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, Wilson claimed

his sentence is invalid because it was imposed pursuant to a subsequently 

repealed statute. See “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief,” 7/29/22, at 2-4. 

The PCRA court, concluding that Wilson’s claim asserted the illegality of 

his sentence, treated his petition as a PCRA petition subject to the PCRA’s 

timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 

1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining 

collateral review, and ... any petition filed after the judgment of sentence 

becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”) (citation omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA 

incorporates the remedy of habeas corpus if the Act offers the petitioner a 

remedy). On that basis, the PCRA court determined that Wilson’s petition was

untimely, and that he had not pled an exception to the time bar. As such, the 

court issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intent to dismiss his 

petition, and subsequently dismissed his petition as untimely. This timely 

appeal followed.
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Wilson argued in his petition that his sentence of life imprisonment 

lacked a valid statutory basis at the time it was imposed. He continues to 

make the same claim on appeal. 

The current version of the statute under which Wilson was sentenced 

reads in pertinent part as follows:

[A] person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree 

or of murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree shall 

be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment in

accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing

procedure for murder of the first degree).

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1). Accordingly, the statute dictates that the 

procedure for deciding between the penalties of death or life imprisonment is 

governed by section 9711. 

Prior to its amendment in 1995, section 1102(a) referenced 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 1311(d) rather than 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. However, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 was 

amended in order to replace 18 Pa.C.S. § 1311(d) as the applicable procedure 

for determining the appropriate sentence for first degree murder in 1980.

Wilson takes issue with the fact that section 1311(d) was repealed and 

replaced with section 9711 in 1980; however, the reference to section 1311(d)

in section 1102(a) was not changed to a reference to section 9711 until 1995, 

which is after he was sentenced. See “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief”, 

7/29/22, at 3.

Wilson was sentenced in 1992 pursuant to the then in-effect version of

section 1102. At that time, although section 9711's governance of sentencing 
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procedure for first-degree murder had been in effect for more than a decade,

section 1102(a)(1) still referenced section 1311(d). Thus, Wilson claims, his 

substantive due process rights were violated when he was sentenced under

section 1102, when the sentencing procedure set forth in that statute at the 

time of sentencing no longer existed.

This claim implicates the legality of Wilson’s sentence. See In re M.W.,

725 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. 1999) (holding that, when a sentencing issue “centers 

upon [a] court’s statutory authority” to impose a sentence, rather than the 

“court’s exercise of discretion in fashioning” the sentence, the issue raised 

implicates the legality of the sentence imposed) (citations omitted). The PCRA 

specifically includes challenges to an illegal sentence within its stated scope.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (“This subchapter provides for an action by which persons 

convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences

may obtain collateral relief.”).

Because Wilson’s claim implicates the legality of his sentence, it is 

cognizable under the PCRA. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly treated 

Wilson’s habeas petition as a PCRA petition. 

Prior to reaching the merits of Wilson’s claims on appeal, we must first 

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 
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judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA 

petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised 

therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three 

exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and footnote omitted).

Since Wilson did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal, his 

judgment of sentence became final on May 8, 1992, when his time for seeking 

direct review with this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) 

(judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review ... or 

at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). The instant petition – filed 

over thirty years later – is patently untimely. Thus, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review Wilson’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead 

and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 
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of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “[E]xceptions to the time-bar must be pled 

in the ... petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations 

omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before 

the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

Further,

although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special 

benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must 

comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if 

an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted).

Even liberally construed, Wilson has failed to plead and prove that any 

of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In fact, Wilson

failed to make any attempt to plead an exception at all. Even on appeal, he 

makes no attempt to argue that a time bar exception applies; he merely 

contends that his petition should not have been treated as a PCRA petition. 

See Appellant’s Brief, at 6. As noted above, the court properly classified 

Wilson’s petition as a PCRA petition. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

order denying Wilson’s petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.
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Date: 5/16/2024